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P-05(M)-443-12/2020

PERAYU Ja'afar Bin Halid RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Rayuan Jenayah - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman Mahkamah Tinggi - 3 pertuduhan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan 5 pertuduhan cubaan membunuh di bawah seksyen 307 Kanun yang sama - Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan: (1) Bagi setiap pertuduhan di bawah seksven 302 Kanun Keseksaan, perayu dijatuhkan hukuman gantung sampai mati; (2) Bagi setiap pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 307 Kanun Keseksaan, perayu dikenakan bukuman penjara 15 tahun dari tarikh tangkap dan hukuman berjalan serentak - Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: (1) Perayu telah berjaya membuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa beliau mengalami sakit otak (legal insanity) pada masa kejadian sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan di mana ia tidak terjumlah kepada satu kesalahan jenayah; (2) Menggunapakai peruntukan di bawah seksyen 347 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, Mahkamah Rayuan membebas dan melepaskan perayu kerana beliau melakukan kesalahan semasa hilang akal dan tidak mengetahui perbuatan beliau adalah salah atau menyalahi undang-undang (legal insanity); (3) Menggunapakai peruntukan di bawah seksyen 348 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, perayu dihantar ke Hospital Mental di Perak atau di Johor mengikut kesesuaian dan Mahkamah akan menyediakan laporan kepada Duli Yang Maha Mulia Yang DiPertuan Agong bagi perkenan Tuanku di bawah seksyen 348(2) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah; (4) Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman dibenarkan; (5) Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi atas sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan.

09/01/2024

YA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0602b8e2-a7d3-4045-812d-78f2cc6f0dc3&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO.P-05 (M)-443-12/2020, P-05(SH)-451-12/2020 DAN P-05 (SH)-452-12/2020 DI ANTARA JAAFAR BIN HALID - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang Perbicaraan Jenayah No.45B-12-09/2017, 45B-13-09/2017 dan 45B-14-09/2017 Pendakwa Raya Lawan Jaafar bin Halid] KORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, HMR HAJI AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, HMR S.M KOMATHY SUPPIAH, HMR 09/01/2024 09:13:54 P-05(M)-443-12/2020 Kand. 81 S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 PENGHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH Pengenalan [1] Perayu dalam ketiga-tiga rayuan ini adalah Jaafar bin Halid. Pada 1.12.2016, jam lebih kurang 7.15 petang hingga 7.30 malam, bertempat di jalan susur masuk ke Jambatan Pertama Pulau Pinang, Lebuh Raya Tun Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Georgetown, Pulau Pinang, dengan menggunakan sepucuk senjata api jenis Glock 19 Gen 4 No. Siri ABFR 017, perayu telah menembak 8 orang mangsa. Daripada 8 mangsa itu, tiga telah terbunuh dan 5 lagi mengalami kecederaan. [2] Lapan pertuduhan dikenakan terhadap perayu iaitu 3 pertuduhan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan 5 pertuduhan cubaan membunuh di bawah seksyen 307 Kanun yang sama. Rayuan No.443 [3] Selepas satu perbicaaran penuh, pada 16.12.2020, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang telah mensabitkan perayu bersalah bagi tiga kesalahan membunuh tiga mangsa berikut: (i) Ong Teik Kwong (OTK) dengan cara menembak di bahagian belakang kepala. Pada hari kejadian berlaku, perayu adalah pengawal peribadi (bodyguard) OTK. OTK berada ditempat duduk pemandu kereta BMW No. PMF 11 semasa beliau ditembak oleh perayu. Perayu pula berada di tempat duduk belakang kereta. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (ii) Choi Hon Ming (CHM) dengan cara menembak di bahagian dada dan peha kanan. CHM berada di dalam kereta melalui jalan yang sama bila beliau ditembak; dan (iii) Senthil Murugiah (SM) dengan cara menembak di bahagian dada kiri. SM menunggang motosikal melalui jalan yang sama bila beliau ditembak. [4] Bagi setiap pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan, perayu dijatuhkan hukuman gantung sampai mati. Rayuan No. 451 Dan 452 [5] Pada 16.12.2020, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang juga mensabitkan perayu bersalah atas lima kesalahan cuba membunuh lima mangsa berikut: (i) Arivarni a/p Krishnan dengan cara menembak di kepala. Pada masa kejadian, mangsa sedang memandu kereta melalui jalan yang sama. (ii) Nurul Huda binti Ab Aziz dengan cara menembak di bahu. Pada masa kejadian, mangsa sedang memandu kereta bersama 4 orang anaknya, melalui jalan yang sama. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (iii) Lee Hong Boon dengan cara menembak di dada kiri. Mangsa sedang menunggang motosikal semasa beliau ditembak. (iv) Mohamad Amirul Amin bin Mohamed Amer dengan cara menembak di dada sebelah kiri. Mangsa telah memberhentikan motosikal untuk melihat dan membantu mangsa yang cedera apabila beliau ditembak oleh perayu. (v) Puoh Bee Joo dengan cara menembak di bahu. Mangsa sedang memandu kereta semasa beliau ditembak. [6] Bagi setiap pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 307 Kanun Keseksaan, perayu telah dikenakan hukuman penjara 15 tahun dari tarikh tangkap dan hukuman berjalan serentak. [7] Perayu merayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman bagi kesemua lapan pertuduhan. [8] Di peringkat kes pendakwaan, perbuatan menembak 8 orang mangsa (actus reus) diakui oleh perayu. Perayu menafikan beliau ada niat (mens rea) untuk membunuh atau cuba membunuh. Pembelaan perayu ialah beliau mengalami sakit otak (legal insanity) dan tidak sedar apa yang berlaku pada masa kejadian. Kes Pendakwaan [9] Pada 1.12.2016 jam lebih kurang 7.26 petang, semasa Kpl Faizal bin Hamdan sedang bertugas di Bilik Kawalan IPK Pulau Pinang, beliau telah menerima panggilan telefon daripada satu lelaki Melayu bernama S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Azizan memaklumkan mengenai kejadian tembakan di susur jalan sebelum naik ke Jambatan Pertama Pulau Pinang, Lebuhraya Tun Dr. Lim Chong Eu dan telah memaklumkan kejadian itu kepada pihak DCC Timur Laut sepertimana dalam laporan polis Jelutong 7799/16. [10] Seorang anggota polis peronda, Kpl Azlan Shah (SP30) yang telah menerima maklumat tersebut terus menghala ke tempat kejadian. [11] Sampai di tempat kejadian, SP30 melihat berlaku kemalangan yang melibatkan beberapa buah kenderaan. SP30 nampak satu lelaki di sebelah kiri bahu jalan dalam keadaan berlumuran darah dan ketakutan sambil memerhatikan kereta BMW dengan nombor pendaftaran PMF 11 (kereta BMW). [12] Kemudian, SP30 melihat perayu datang dari pintu hadapan sebelah kiri kereta BMW. Pada ketika itu, perayu dilihat sedang menyelitkan pistol di bahagian belakang pinggangnya sebelah kanan. SP30 juga melihat seorang lelaki yang dalam keadaan berlumuran darah di kepala sedang berada di bahagian tempat duduk pemandu kereta BMW tersebut. [13] SP30 telah menghampiri perayu. Pada ketika itu, perayu sedang memegang bahagian pinggangnya seolah-olah ingin mengambil pistol. SP30 telah memberi amaran dan mengarahkan perayu meletakkan pistol dan merebahkan badan, namun perayu enggan memberikan kerjasama. Selepas itu, perayu dilihat telah mencekah pistol, mengeluarkan kelopak peluru dan meletakkan pistol itu di atas tanah. SP30 seterusnya mengarahkan perayu merebahkan badan, tetapi perayu enggan memberikan kerjasama. SP30 kemudiannya menerpa ke arah perayu dan dengan bantuan anggota lain, perayu berjaya ditangkap oleh SP30. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [14] Pegawai penyiasat kes, ASP Azmirul bin Abdul Aziz (SP38) mengesahkan bahawa perayu membawa bersamanya 2 magazine. Setiap satu magazine mengandungi 10 butir peluru. Ini bermakna perayu membawa 20 butir peluru. Hasil siasatan beliau, SP38 mendapati sejumlah 17 butir peluru telah dilepaskan oleh perayu. Tetapi, hanya 11 kelongsong peluru dijumpai di tempat kejadian. [15] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Hakim Bicara mendapati pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi kesemua 8 pertuduhan. Hakim Bicara berpuashati bahawa perayu mempunyai niat untuk membunuh dan percubaan untuk membunuh atas dua alasan. Alasan pertama ialah perayu menggunakan senjata api (Tham Kai Yau & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1976] 1 LNS 159; Sainal Abidin bin Mading v PP [1999] 4 CL J 215). Alasan kedua ialah perayu menembak ketiga-tiga simati di bahagian penting badan iaitu di kepala dan dada. Tembakan di kepala menembusi otak. Tembakan di dada menembusi jantung. Dalam kedua-dua situasi, keterangan pakar perubatan (SP3) ialah mustahil untuk mangsa boleh hidup. Mengambilkira semua perkara ini, Hakim Bicara memutuskan perayu mempunyai niat untuk mendatangkan kecederaan yang pada lazimnya boleh membawa kepada kematian simati. [16] Bagi kesalahan percubaan membunuh 5 mangsa, Hakim Bicara mendapati perayu telah menembak mangsa-mangsa di bahagian kepala, dada dan bahu. Kecederaan kesemua mangsa adalah parah yang memerlukan pembedahan dan rawatan segera. Jika tidak, mereka juga akan menerima nasib yang sama seperti 3 mangsa yang meninggal dunia. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [17] Dengan terbuktinya kes prima facie, perayu dipanggil membela diri bagi kesemua 8 pertuduhan. Kes Pembelaan [18] Perayu mengambil dadah ganja sejak berumur 18 tahun. Pada umur 24 - 25 tahun, beliau mengambil dadah heroin. Pada usia awal 30 an, beliau mengambil dadah jenis syabu (methamphetamine). Semasa memberi keterangan di mahkamah pada tahun 2019, perayu berumur 40 tahun. Ketagihan perayu kepada dadah jenis heroin adalah teruk sehingga beliau terpaksa menjalani rawatan pengambilan ubat methadone. [19] Perayu diambil bekerja oleh Syarikat GMP Gaisa sebagai pengawal peribadi. Pada 30.11.2016, perayu telah ditugaskan untuk menjadi pengawal peribadi kepada Ong Teik Kwong yang dikenali oleh perayu sebagai Dato’ M. Perayu turut dibekalkan oleh majikannya dengan sepucuk pistol jenis Glock dan 20 butir peluru. [20] Sebelum kejadian tembakan berlaku, pada 1.12.2016, jam lebih kurang 7.00 pagi, OTK bersama rakan perniagaannya, Lim Boon Leng (SP37) dan perayu bertolak dari rumah OTK menuju ke Pulau Pinang dalam kereta BMW. Kereta BMW dipandu oleh OTK. SP37 duduk di tempat duduk penumpang hadapan. Perayu duduk di tempat duduk belakang OTK. Pada masa berkenaan, OTK dan SP37 ada pengetahuan bahawa perayu membawa senjata api bersama beliau. [21] Di Pulau Pinang, semasa OTK, SP37 dan perayu berada di Kafe Arabica, perayu melihat perbincangan antara OTK dengan kawannya S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 agak tegang. Disebabkan itu, perayu telah mengeluarkan pistol dan meletakkan di atas pehanya. Perbuatan perayu ditegur oleh OTK yang menyuruh perayu menyimpan semula pistolnya. Perayu menurut arahan OTK. [22] Semasa kereta BMW berada di atas lebuhraya menuju ke Jambatan Pertama Pulau Pinang, perayu merasa suhu badannya panas, jantung berdebar-debar dan mendengar suara bisikan di kiri kanan telinga dan ada kelibat hitam di sebelahnya. [23] Perayu cuba menenangkan fikirannya dengan membaca ayat kursi, tetapi bacaannya tidak lancar. Kemudian, perayu tidak ingat apa yang berlaku selepas itu. Beliau hanya tersedar apabila mendengar arahan SP30 supaya meletakkan pistol. Perayu menurut arahan polis dan meletakkan senjata. [24] Perayu tidak ingat sama sekali yang beliau telah menembak 8 orang mangsa. [25] Pada 21.6.2015, perayu didapati pengsan di masjid dan dibawa ke unit kecemasan Hospital Kuala Lumpur (HKL) untuk rawatan dan pemeriksaan. Tetapi, perayu bertindak destruktif dan agresif selepas sedar. Ujian saringan urin menunjukkan perayu mengambil dadah methamphetamine/amphetamine dan benzodhiaziphine. Beliau dimasukkan ke wad psikiatri HKL dari 22.6.2015 hingga 26.6.2016 untuk distabilkan. [26] Pada tahun 2016, Dr. Mohammad Firdaus bin Abdul Aziz (SD2) adalah Pakar Psikiatri di HKL. SD2 adalah doktor yang merawat perayu S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 di wad psikiatri HKL dan menyediakan laporan perubatan D147. Mengikut D147, perayu menerima 5 rawatan susulan dan kali terakhir SD2 merawat perayu ialah pada 25.2.2016. [27] Semasa ditemubual oleh SD2, perayu mengaku beliau kerap mengambil dadah jenis methamphetamine dan enphitamine. Perayu juga mengaku beliau ada mengambil dadah jenis heroin dan telah pun mendapatkan rawatan methadone di klinik kesihatan terdekat. [28] SD2 memberi penjelasan, untuk mereka yang mengambil dadah jenis ETS emphathamine stimulant, antara symptom psikosis yang paling kerap adalah berhalusinasi iaitu mendengar suara atau melihat sesuatu yang tidak ada dan juga delusion. Delusion bermaksud percaya seseorang itu mahu mendatangkan kemudaratan, mahu mencederakan dia, berburuk sangka dengan orang. Sedangkan benda itu tidak betul. [29] Diagnosa SD2 dalam laporan D147 ialah perayu mengalami psikosis akibat penyalahgunaan dadah methamphetamine dan dadah heroin iaitu “Brief Psychotic Disorder secondary to Methamphetamine, Polysubstance (Methamphetamine/Amphetamine, Opiod) Use Disorder on Methadone Maintenance therapy”. [30] Menurut SD2, perayu berpotensi tinggi untuk mengalami psikosis semula kerana beliau kerap mengambil dadah methamphetamine dan jika perayu mengalami psikosis, ia boleh menjadi teruk dan berpanjangan. Seterusnya, SD2 juga menyatakan, oleh kerana perayu tidak lagi mendapatkan rawatan di HKL, maka jika berlaku psikosis mungkin tiada ubat untuk merawat beliau. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [31] Di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Bicara mendapati pembelaan perayu gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah kepada kes pendakwaan atas alasan-alasan berikut: (i) Perayu adalah seorang yang waras, tidak mengalami masaalah mental dan tidak mengalami sebarang gejala psikosis berasaskan laporan perubatan daripada Dr. Suaran Singh a/l Jasmit Singh iaitu Pakar Perunding Psikiatri, Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta yang memeriksa perayu pada 14.12.2016. (ii) Kali terakhir SD2 memeriksa perayu ialah pada 25.2.2016. Kejadian kes ini berlaku 10 bulan kemudian iaitu pada 1.12.2016. Oleh itu, keterangan SD2 dan pendapat beliau dalam laporan D147 bahawa perayu mengalami psikosis akibat pengambilan dadah jenis methamphetamine dan heroin adalah terhad setakat 25.2.2016 dan tidak boleh menjadi bukti konklusif yang boleh diterima oleh mahkamah sebagai asas kepada legal insanity. (iii) Berasaskan laporan perubatan D146 yang disediakan oleh Dr. Suaran Singh, perayu tidak mengalami gejala psikosis dan hanya mempunyai masalah kebergantungan kepada dadah. Oleh itu, perayu bukan seorang yang “medically insane” sewaktu diperiksa oleh Dr. Suaran Singh. (iv) Tembakan perayu kepada semua mangsa adalah “focus attack” dan bukannya secara rambang seperti perbuatan orang yang hilang akal atau tidak waras. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (v) Perayu gagal membuktikan semasa beliau menembak kesemua mangsa, beliau tidak waras atau hilang akal. Perayu juga gagal membuktikan bahawa beliau tidak tahu perbuatannya menembak mangsa adalah salah atau menyalahi undang-undang. Oleh itu, legal insanity juga gagal dibuktikan. (vi) Pembelaan kemabukan dadah tidak pernah dibangkitkan semasa kes pendakwaan. Pembelaan ini hanya dihujahkan di akhir kes pembelaan. Maka, kemabukan dadah adalah pembelaan yang difikirkan kemudian dan bukanlah suatu pembelaan yang baik. Alasan-Alasan Rayuan [32] Perayu membangkitkan 4 isu berikut: (i) Sama ada Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila memutuskan pembelaan kemabukan dadah tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa kes pendakwaan. (ii) Sama ada Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila memutuskan methadone mengurangkan pengambilan dadah methamphetamine oleh perayu dan memulihkan psikosis perayu. (iii) Sama ada Hakim Bicara betul dalam menilai keterangan mengenai pembelaan “medical insanity” dan “legal insanity”. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (iv) Sama ada Hakim Bicara betul dalam memutuskan tembakan adalah “focus attack” dan bukan secara rambang. Isu Kemabukan Dadah [33] Di para [98] alasan penghakiman beliau (Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1, ms 103), Hakim Bicara memutuskan kemabukan dadah tidak pernah dibangkitkan semasa kes pendakwaan. [34] Di hadapan kami, peguam perayu menghujahkan bahawa pembelaan kemabukan dadah ada dibangkitkansemasa kes pendakwaan. Peguam merujukkan kami kepada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan iaitu SP3, SP29 dan SP38 semasa di soal balas. [35] Kami mulakan dengan keterangan ahli kimia SP29. SP29 telah menjalankan ujian darah ke atas kesemua manga tembakan termasuk perayu. Saksi ini juga telah menyediakan satu laporan berasingan bagi setiap individu. Eksibit P12 adalah laporan ujian darah perayu. Ketika disoalbalas, SP29 setuju dalam P129, beliau menyatakan darah perayu mengandungi methadone. Menurut SP29, methadone adalah sejenis bahan yang digunakan dalam rawatan terapi untuk ketagihan heroin. Oleh itu, SP29 bersetuju ada kemungkinan perayu adalah penagih dadah. [36] Dato’ Dr. Zahari bin Noor (SP3) adalah seorang pakar perubatan. SP3 telah disoalbalas mengenai kesan kehadiran methadone dalam darah. Saksi ini setuju bahawa methadone adalah rawatan untuk heroin sahaja. Manakala bagi dadah methamphetamine, tiada rawatan seperti methadone. Saksi ini juga setuju ujian darah boleh mengesahkan sama ada seseorang itu di bawah rawatan methadone atau pun tidak. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [37] Pegawai penyiasat kes, ASP Azmirul bin Abdul Aziz (SP38) telah disoalbalas mengenai ketidaksempurnaan akal perayu dengan merujuk kepada laporan perubatan D146, D147, D149, D150 dan D151A. SP38 telah disoalbalas seperti berikut: S: Sebagai pegawai penyiasat, setuju dengan saya berasaskan dokumen D147, nampaknya OKT juga merupakan seorang pengguna dadah jenis methamphetamine atau Amphetamine? J: Setuju S: Rujuk ayat terakhir, doktor mengesahkan OKT ada peristiwa silam halusinasi suara dan penglihatan? J: Benar S: M/S 2 bahagian bawah, setuju rawatan adalah Stimulant Induced Psychotic Disorder; Amphetamine type stimulant? J: Ada S: Setuju daripada dokumentasi hospital, walaupun kamu ada pengetahuan bahawa OKT ada masalah mental khususnya halusinasi, tetapi kamu tidak membuat apa-apa siasatan berkenaan masalah mental ini secara teliti? J: Saya hanya berpandukan laporan s.342 CPC yang dihantar oleh Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta Perak. S: Setuju dengan saya, daripada dokumen, kamu boleh sahkan OKT pernah ada masaalah mental? J: Setuju [38] Daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan SP3, SP29 dan SP38, jelas kepada kami bahawa dari peringkat kes pendakwaan lagi, perayu telah membangkitkan pembelaan bahawa beliau adalah pengguna aktif dadah jenis methamphetamine/amphetamine dan dadah heroin. Akibat daripada pengambilan dadah-dadah ini, beliau mengalami S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 psikosis iaitu halusinasi suara dan Lembaga (auditory and visual hallucination) hingga hilang akal, agresif dan tidak ingat apa yang berlaku. [39] Apabila Hakim Bicara menyatakan kemabukan dadah tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa kes pendakwaan, ia membawa kesimpulan bahawa Hakim Bicara telah gagal mematuhi seksyen 182A(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dalam menilai keseluruhan kes pendakwaan. Dengan menafikan pembelaan kemabukan dadah, Hakim Bicara telah melakukan salah arah yang serius yang menyebabkan berlakunya salah laksana keadilan (miscarriage of justice) dalam mensabitkan perayu kerana keterangan kemabukan dadah telah tidak dipertimbangkan oleh Hakim Bicara. [40] Atas fakta dan keadaan kes ini, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam perayu bahawa dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa pembelaan kemabukan dadah adalah pembelaan yang difikirkan kemudian adalah satu dapatan yang salah, yang bertentangan dengan keterangan yang ada di hadapan mahkamah. Isu Methadone Memulihkan Psikosis Perayu [41] Di para [104] Alasan Penghakiman (Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1 ms 108, Hakim Bicara membuat dapatan fakta berikut: “... Sebaliknya OKT dalam kes ini tidak mengambil sebarang dadah pada masa kejadian dan hanya mengambil methadone yang disahkan oleh SD2 berkesan untuk mengurangkan pengambilan dadah ice (methamphetamine) kepada OKT sekaligus memulihkan psikosis yang dialami oleh OKT.” S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [42] Komplen perayu terhadap penemuan fakta Hakim Bicara itu ialah SD2 tidak pernah memberi keterangan bahawa methadone berkesan untuk mengurangkan pengambilan dadah ice (methamphetamine) dan sekali gus memulihkan psikosis yang dialami oleh perayu. [43] Sebaliknya, pakar perubatan, SP3 menyatakan methadone adalah ubat gantian untuk dadah heroin dan tiada ubat gantian untuk dadah jenis methamphetamine. [44] Keterangan SD2 ialah jika perayu mengalami psikosis lagi, tidak ada ubat untuk merawat perayu kerana beliau tidak lagi mendapatkan rawatan susulan di HKL. [45] Kesimpulan yang boleh dibuat dari keterangan SP3 dan SD2 ialah tidak ada ubat untuk merawat atau mengurangkan pengambilan dadah methamphetamine. Juga tidak ada ubat untuk memulihkan psikosis perayu. Methadone hanyalah ubat gantian untuk merawat ketagihan dadah heroin sahaja. Ini bermakna, dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa methadone berkesan mengurangkan pengambilan dadah methamphetamine dan memulihkan psikosis perayu tidak disokong oleh keterangan dan adalah satu dapatan yang salah. Realitinya ialah perayu belum pulih dari psikosis. Beliau mengalami psikosis pada 1.12.2016. [46] Kesan dari kekhilafan ini, Hakim Bicara telah menyimpulkan bahawa perbuatan perayu melepaskan tembakan terhadap kesemua mangsa adalah dibuat dengan niat. Pada pendapat kami Ini adalah salah arah yang serius yang telah menyebabkan berlakunya ketidakadilan kepada perayu. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Isu Medical Insanity Dan Legal Insanity [47] Perbezaan di antara legal insanity dan medical insanity telah dijelaskan oleh pengarang Buku Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes 26 th edn di m.s 307 seperti berikut: “Medical insanity” and “legal insanity” - There is a good deal of difference between “medical insanity” and “legal insanity” and courts are concerned only with the legal and not the medical of the matter. It is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a men’s action, that points him out to be a mad man, to be excepted from punishment, It is not mere eccentricity or singularity of manner that would suffice the plea of insanity. Abnormality of mind is not by itself sufficient to show that the accused must have acted while of unsound mind. Such exemption can be claimed only when the insane person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or he is doing either wrong or contrary to law.” [48] Dalam kes John Nyumbei v PP [2007] 2 CL J 509, Abdul Hamid Embong, HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) telah membuat dapatan fakta mengenai pembelaan Insanity seperti berikut: “10. The law on unsoundness of mind as a complete defence in our criminal jurisprudence is, as was correctly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, contained in s.84 of the Penal Code. It states: 84. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 12. Thus, under s.84 Penal Code, criminality has to be determined according to that legal test and not merely by the mental state of an accused person according to the medical test. 14. When the defence of insanity is raised, the court thus needs to consider two matters, namely: (i) whether the accused person has successfully established, as a preliminary issue, that at the time of committing the act he was of unsound mind, and (ii) if he was of unsound mind, whether he has proven that his unsoundness of mind was a degree to satisfy one of the tests earlier mentioned ie, that the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of his act as being wrong or against the law. (see Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, 5th edn, p 289 et seq). 16. The standard of proof upon the accused raising the defence of insanity is on the balance of probabilities, as in a civil case (Rajagopal v PP [1976] 1 LNS 122; [1977] 1 ML J 6; Goh Yoke v PP [1969] 1 LNS 48; [1970] 1 ML J 63). So, if the appellant here is able to show, either from the prosecution or other evidence that he committed the crime but was at that time insane, he cannot be culpable by virtue of s.84 Penal Code.” [49] Dalam kes ini, perayu mengatakan beliau tidak ingat apa yang berlaku. Beliau hanya tersedar apabila mendengar arahan supaya meletakkan senjata. [50] Tidak ada penjelasan kenapa beliau tidak ingat. Keterangan yang ada ialah beliau mengalami psikosis, mendengar bisikan suara dan S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 nampak lembaga hitam di sebelahnya. SP37 telah memberi keterangan bahawa beliau mendengar perayu “chanting” 2 - 3 minit sebelum mendengar bunyi tembakan. Tingkah laku perayu “chanting” menunjukkan perayu ada legal insanity. Perayu secara tiba-tiba tanpa sebab bertindak agresif menembak orang-orang yang tidak dikenali (kecuali OTK) yang melepasi kereta BMW. Masaalah psikosis ini pernah berlaku semasa perayu dirawat di HKL pada 22.6.2015. Laporan perubatan HKL berkaitan rawatan pada 22.6.2015 terkandung dalam eksibit D151A. [51] Dalam laporan HKL, eksibit D151A, perayu juga didapati mengambil dadah methamphetamine dan ubat methadone pada masa tersebut. Tetapi, perayu bertindak agresif dan destruktif. Semasa di wad psikiatri, kaki dan tangan perayu terpaksa diikat oleh kakitangan HKL. Dalam D151A, doktor yang membuat pemeriksaan fizikal terhadap perayu pada 22.6.2015 menulis: “…There was the presence of visual and auditory hallucinations and persecutory delusions at the time.” Seterusnya, doktor tersebut membuat diagnosa berikut: “stimulant induced psychotic disorder (amphetamine type stimulant) with stimulant use disorder.” [52] Maka, psikosis yang dialami perayu pada 1.12.2016 adalah psikosis yang berulang. SD2 telah memberi keterangan bahawa pengambilan dadah methamphetamine memberi kesan fizikal dan mental kepada pengambilnya. SD2 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa jika perayu mengalami psikosis berulang, psikosis beliau akan menjadi lebih teruk. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [53] Walaupun Hakim Bicara nampaknya menerima fakta bahawa perayu mengalami psikosis, tetapi Hakim Bicara memilih untuk menerima laporan perubatan D146 yang disediakan oleh Dr. Suaran Singh sebagai laporan yang tepat mengenai keadaan mental perayu. Hakim Bicara dipengaruhi oleh faktor bahawa Dr. Suaran Singh memeriksa perayu pada 14.12.2016, 2 minggu selepas kejadian tembakan sebagai laporan yang lebih tepat berbanding pemeriksaan terakhir SD2 ke atas perayu pada Februari 2016. [54] Pada pendapat kami, tujuan laporan D146 itu disediakan adalah untuk menentukan sama ada perayu layak (fit) untuk dibicarakan. Dr. Suaran Singh tidak dapat dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan kerana sapina tidak dapat diserahkan kepada beliau. Fakta menunjukkan Dr. Suaran Singh telah bersara dan beliau tidak dapat dihubungi. Tetapi, seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan menghendaki perayu membuktikan beliau hilang akal pada masa kesalahan dilakukan. Oleh itu, bagi maksud seksyen 84 KK, isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah ialah sama ada perayu hilang akal pada 1.12.2016. [55] Kami mendapati Hakim Bicara tidak mengambilkira keterangan perayu yang disokong oleh keterangan SP37 iaitu perayu membaca ayat kursi dan chanting untuk menenangkan hatinya semasa mengalami halusinasi suara dan lembaga hitam. Selepas itu, perayu bertindak agresif menembak mangsa. Kelakuan agresif perayu ini adalah konsisten dengan tingkah laku agresif beliau terhadap pesakit-pesakit lain semasa berada di wad psikiatri HKL dan juga semasa berada di wad Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta pada 14.12.2016. Tingkahlaku perayu pada masa kejadian 1.12.2016 itu jelas menunjukkan perayu hilang akal dan tidak tahu apa yang dilakukannya. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [56] Pada pendapat kami, pembelaan perayu bahawa beliau hilang akal akibat pengambilan dadah methamphetamine dan mengalami halusinasi suara dan lembaga yang menyebabkan beliau bertindak agresif tanpa sedar disokong oleh laporan perubatan D147 dan D151A. Pembelaan perayu ini menunjukkan beliau tiada niat untuk membunuh 3 mangsa dan cuba membunuh 5 mangsa. Isu Tembakan Rambang [57] Dalam penghakimannya, Hakim Bicara menyatakan tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan perayu telah melepaskan tembakan secara rambang. [58] Sebaliknya, kami mendapati keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan iaitu SP9, SP11 dan SP18 menunjukkan keadaan yang berlaku adalah sebaliknya. [59] SP9 telah memberi keterangan berikut semasa disoalbalas: S: Memandangkan kamu ada lihat dia, setuju dengan saya dia lepaskan tembakan tidak tentu hala? J: Setuju. [60] SP11 pula memberi keterangan berikut. Beliau sedang menunggang motosikal bila ditembak oleh perayu. Beliau berada dalam jarak antara 8 - 9 kaki dari perayu. Beliau lari bersembunyi di belakang pokok. Beliau nampak perayu berlegar-legar di atas jalanraya dan melepaskan tembakan. Kepada SP11, tingkahlaku perayu adalah seperti orang gila. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [61] SP18 yang menunggang motosikal telah ditembak di bahagian dada. Selepas terkena tembak, SP18 nampak perayu melepaskan beberapa das tembakan ke atas. [62] Keterangan SP9, SP11 dan SP18 menunjukkan perayu melepaskan tembakan secara rambang dan tidak tentu hala. [63] Mengambilkira keterangan SP9, SP11 dan SP18, kami mendapati dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa tembakan dibuat secara focus attack dan bukan secara rambang adalah tidak tepat dan tidak disokong oleh keterangan. Keputusan Kami [64] Setelah meneliti kes pembelaan, kami mendapati perayu telah berjaya membuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa beliau mengalami sakit otak (legal insanity) pada masa kejadian sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan di mana ia tidak terjumlah kepada satu kesalahan jenayah. [65] Menggunapakai peruntukan di bawah seksyen 347 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, Mahkamah ini membebas dan melepaskan perayu kerana beliau melakukan kesalahan semasa hilang akal dan tidak mengetahui perbuatan beliau adalah salah atau menyalahi undang-undang (legal insanity). [66] Selanjutnya, menggunapakai peruntukan di bawah seksyen 348 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, Mahkamah ini memerintahkan perayu dihantar ke Hospital Mental di Perak atau di Johor mengikut kesesuaian dan S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Mahkamah akan menyediakan laporan kepada Duli Yang Maha Mulia Yang DiPertuan Agong bagi perkenan Tuanku di bawah seksyen 348(2) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. [67] Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman dibenarkan. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi atas sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan. Bertarikh: 4 Januari 2024 - sgd - Hadhariah binti Syed Ismail Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Bagi Perayu : Encik Anbanathan a/l Yathiraju; Tetuan Anba & Associates. Bagi Responden : TPR Puan How May Ling; Jabatan Peguam Negara. S/N 4rgCBtOnRUCBLXjyzG8Nww **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-80-05/2023

PEMOHON EMBITION SDN BHD RESPONDEN KONSORTIUM EXPRESS SDN BHD

Enclosure 1. Originating Summons No. WA-24C-80-05/2023 (“OS 80”) is an Application for a Stay of the Adjudication Decision dated 15.3.2023 (“AD”) by Embition Sdn Bhd (“Embition”) pursuant to section 16 of the Arbitration Act 2005 and pending the disposal of the Arbitration proceedings between the parties.

09/01/2024

YA Tuan Nadzarin Bin Wok Nordin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=432e082a-8ffd-4480-a8f4-5346d5dfaa4d&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (MAHKAMAH PEMBINAAN) SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-80-05/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi No.: AIAC/D/ADJ-4596-2023 antara Konsortium Express Sdn Bhd (Penuntut) dan Embition Sdn Bhd (Responden); Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 15.05.2023 oleh Shamsul Bahrin Bin Abdul Manaf’ Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 15 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 (“CIPAA”); Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 16 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 (“CIPAA”); Dan 09/01/2024 16:41:12 WA-24C-80-05/2023 Kand. 19 S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dalam perkara Aturan 69A dan/atau Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah yang Mulia ini ANTARA EMBITION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1082956-X) …PEMOHON DAN KONSORTIUM EXPRESS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 756027-X) …RESPONDEN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (MAHKAMAH PEMBINAAN) SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-81-05/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi No.: AIAC/D/ADJ-4596-2023 antara Konsortium Express Sdn Bhd (Penuntut) dan Embition Sdn Bhd (Responden); S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 15.05.2023 oleh Shamsul Bahrin Bin Abdul Manaf; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 15 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 (“CIPAA”); Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 69A dan/atau Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini ANTARA EMBITION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1082956-X) …PEMOHON DAN KONSORTIUM EXPRESS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 756027-X) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (MAHKAMAH PEMBINAAN) SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-91-06/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Konsortium Express Sdn Bhd (Pihak Menuntut) dan Embition Sdn Bhd (Pihak Responden) Dan Dalam perkara Adjudikasi di hadapan Shamsul Bahrin Bin Abdul Manaf; Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 15-5-2023; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 28 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan, 2012 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7, Aturan 28, dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012 dan S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Aturan 69A Kaedah 5 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah (Pindaan) 2018 ANTARA KONSORTIUM EXPRESS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1082956-X) …PLAINTIFF DAN EMBITION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1082956-X) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) [1] Originating Summons No. WA-24C-80-05/2023 (“OS 80”) is an Application for a Stay of the Adjudication Decision dated 15.3.2023 (“AD”) by Embition Sdn Bhd (“Embition”) pursuant to section 16 of the Arbitration Act 2005 and pending the disposal of the Arbitration proceedings between the parties. [2] Originating Summons No. WA-24C-81-05/2023 (“OS 81”) is Embition’s application to set aside the AD under section 15 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”), whilst Originating Summons No. WA-24C-91-06/2023 (“OS 91”) is Konsortium Express Sdn Bhd’s (“KESB”) application to enforce the AD under section 28 CIPAA. S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Brief Background Facts [3] By a Letter of Award dated 13.06.20185, Embition appointed KESB to carry out infrastructure works for a project known as Construction and Completion of Infrastructure Works for Cadangan Pembangunan (Guarded Community) Perumahan Rumah Sesebuah diatas Lot 424, Mukim Ulu Kelang, Selangor Darul Ehsan untuk Tetuan Twin Ridge Sdn. Bhd. (“the Works”) for a contract sum of RM22,000,000.00. [4] This Letter of Award was issued by Messrs. KSKA Arkitek Sdn Bhd on behalf of Embition. The said Messrs. KSKA Arkitek Sdn Bhd is also designated as the Architect (“the Architect”) for the Works. [5] Apart from the terms in the Letter of Award, the parties agreed that the contract would be in the PAM Contract (Without Quantities) form 6 (collectively referred to as “the Contract”). [6] KESB claimed that KESB had carried out the Works under the Contract and thus states that it is entitled to issue Progress Claim No. 20 for the Works said to be done totalling RM1,347,044.94 to the Architect on 19.09.2022 and the Architect has issued the Interim Progress Certificate No. 20 (“IPC 20”) on 20.09.2022 for the said sum. [7] The issue that arose is in relation to the payment for IPC 20 which was allegedly not made by Embition on or before 20.10.2022. [8] KESB subsequently served a Payment Claim dated 27.12.2022 on Embition for a sum of RM1,347,044.94 and Embition served the S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Payment Response dated 06.01.2023 on KESB disputing the amount of RM1,279,425.69. Court’s Analysis & Findings [9] Under OS 81, Embition had in essence submitted that: (i) the Adjudicator had failed to call for an oral hearing. (ii) Embition had not been given the opportunity to submit on Progress Certificate no. 20 certified by the Architect. (iii) KESB used the CIPAA process to stave off the Arbitration that was initiated by Embition against KESB. Oral Hearing [10] On the issue of the oral hearing which learned counsel for Embition had submitted that the Adjudicator did not address; I have found that the Adjudicator did address the same at paragraph 28 of the AD where he found upon perusal of the cause papers and documents before him that there was no necessity to hold an oral hearing. [11] I hold that the decision of the Adjudicator on this issue should not and cannot be questioned once he has given his reasons for doing so after the Adjudicator had considered the relevant documents and evidence before him. It is completely within the Adjudicator’s discretion to determine the conduct of the Adjudication including whether he should hold an oral hearing. S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [12] The Court will not interfere once the Adjudicator has given his reasons for allowing or disallowing the oral hearing, see Mamoth Empire Construction Sdn Bhd v Stam Engineering Sdn Bhd & anor case [2019] 3 CLJ 718 and Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and Anor appeal [2018] 4 MLJ 496. [13] For the record, I have considered the cases relied on by learned counsel for Embition to support its contention that natural justice has been denied to them due to the lack of a fair hearing. [14] Although this Court totally agrees with and supports the legal principles therein, I find that the respective Adjudication Decisions in the said cases were set aside on facts which are quite different and which can thus be distinguished with the case before me. [15] Firstly, on Guangxi Dev & Cap Sdn Bhd v Sycal Bhd & Anor Appeal [2019] 6 MLRA case referred by counsel for Embition, the Adjudication Decision therein was amongst others allowed to be set aside not because no oral hearing was allowed but due to a preliminary report submitted by the Respondent therein which the Adjudicator failed to consider; whilst in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] MLRHU 1018, the Adjudication Decision therein was set aside due to inter alia a unilateral communication between the Adjudicator and one of the parties, for which the Court held that there was occasioned a breach of natural justice. S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [16] Accordingly, I will not, with respect, be able to rely on the said cases to support learned counsel for Embition’s contention that natural justice has been denied to them due to the lack of a fair hearing. Progress Certificate No 20 & Failure to Call Architect & The Opportunity to Submit on The Same [17] In relation to the issue of Progress Certificate No. 20 certified by the Architect, I find that the Adjudicator had addressed and considered this in the AD and after going through the documents before him, the Adjudicator had inter alia found that: 17.1 Progress Claim no. 20 was submitted to the Architect and he had thereafter issued Progress Certificate no. 20 certifying the same. 17.2 Embition did not dispute the correctness of Progress Certificate no. 20. 17.3 referred to clauses 15.1 and 15.4 of the Letter of Award 17.4 there was compliance with the abovementioned clauses by KESB. 17.5 the Architect had acted on behalf of Embition and it was not open to Embition to distance itself from the certification by the Architect. 17.6 Embition cannot use the excuse that Progress Certificate no. 20 was wrongly certified to avoid paying KESB. [18] In this respect, I have noted that learned counsel for Embition has contended amongst others that the Adjudicator should have called the Architect to explain and referred to several case laws which show S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 that the Architect when certifying is independent and cannot be imputed on parties. It was thus submitted that the Adjudicator had erroneously made a finding of fact/law on who the Architect is acting for, which is contrary to clause 11.1.c of the LA. [19] With respect, I agree with learned counsel for KESB that Embition ought to have raised all its defences with regards the said Progress Certificate No. 20 and/or the issues against the Architect for issuing the same and that Embition’s failure to do so was on its own peril and cannot be faulted on the Adjudicator. [20] Be that as it may, after considering Embition’s contentions and after going through the AD as mentioned above, I hold that the Adjudicator had identified, considered and analyzed the relevant documents and had asked himself the rights questions on this issue including in particular, but not limited to, Embition’s allegations that all variation works are subject to Embition’s approval and his decision thereafter that it was “..not open for the Respondent to distant itself from the certification by the Architect….”. [21] It was only after such analysis that the Adjudicator had come to his decision on the same. Whether his answer is one which is right or wrong is something which this Court will not interfere as that would be going into the merits of the matter which, according to settled law, this Court cannot do in an application to set aside the AD under section 15 CIPAA. Stay Application Under OS 80 S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [22] I have consequently considered OS 80, which is the Stay Application pursuant to section 16 of the Arbitration Act 2005 on the ground of that the AD should be stayed pending the disposal of the Arbitration proceedings. [23] It is trite that the fact there is an arbitration proceeding between the parties does not automatically mean that there is to be a stay of the AD, and that both the Adjudication proceedings and the Arbitration proceedings can exists independently. I quote and rely on the Federal Court’s decision in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 742 where the Court had stated: “[76] …We are fully in agreement with the learned High Court Judge that there is nothing to stop CIPAA 2012 from applying to the case at hand and there is no need to see adjudication and arbitration to be mutually exclusive to each other. …..” and quoting and adopting what the learned High Court Judge in the matter below had stated on the matter which was as follows: “… After the introduction of Adjudication, both Arbitration and Litigation will still continue except that now there is an additional dispute resolution mechanism of temporary finality that can be embarked upon before or concurrently with Arbitration or Litigation as the case may be. Thus, one need not have to choose in an “either or” approach between Adjudication and Arbitration but one can proceed in a “both and” approach in resolving a dispute on an architect’s claim against his client for his professional fees. Adjudication under CIPAA was never designed to be in conflict with Arbitration and Litigation and so its process may be activated at any time where there is a valid payment claim under a construction S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 contract. Premised on that proper perspective, the question of which would prevail over the other does not arise at all.” (emphasis added)” [24] I further find that the test of exceptional circumstances to justify a stay application has not been proven to the satisfaction of this Court. Justice Mary Lim (now FCJ) had in Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 that a stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances and wherein Her Ladyship stated as follows: - “[32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration.” [25] Thus, based on the above tests and the same grounds I have afore mentioned for this Court in dismissing the Setting Aside of the AD herein, I dismiss the said Stay Application under OS 80. S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Enforcement of AD [26] Since this Court has dismissed the application for Setting Aside of the AD, and there is to date no payment of the same from Embition to KESB’ I hold that there is nothing to prevent the AD from being enforced pursuant to section 28 of CIPAA. Decision [27] Wherefore I hereby dismiss with costs OS 81 and OS 80 with costs. I will in the circumstances allow and grant Order In Terms for prayers A, B (i) (ii) and (iii) and C in enclosure 1 of OS 91. Dated: 20th day of October 2023 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: K. Selva Kumaran [Messrs Rose Hussin] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: Dinesh Nandrajog [Messrs Nandrajog] S/N KgguQ/2PgESo9FNG1dqTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-82RS-24-10/2019

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) MOHD ZIN BIN PENGCHENG 2. ) MOHD HAIROL ANUAR BIN AZMAN 3. ) SHARI BIN DAHALAN 4. ) ASUAD RIDZUAN BIN RASLI 5. ) ROSYAIDI BIN ANUAR

section 379 Penal Code - section 380 Penal Code - section 34 Penal Code- section 114 illustration (a) Evidence Act 1950 - Theft - Admissibility of Information Leading to Discovery - Common intention - non-availability of offered witnesses

08/01/2024

Puan Nur Farahain Binti Roslan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ff5532c9-ef62-4496-a031-32046070e9a8&Inline=true

08/01/2024 11:55:20 WA-82RS-24-10/2019 Kand. 219 S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N yTJV/2LvlkSgMTIEYHDpqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the 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HE/01/2&2; 11 mum IIANKAIAN uuuswzv JEMAVAH 12 (MANKAMAN am: KAMAK-KANAK) xunu LUIIPUR mum NEGERI wuuvm PERSEKUVIIAN muvsnn wensucmnu JEMAYAN no WA-MRS-14—1flI2I)1!! psmmxwn mm V .. Mono zm am vzuecnms 2. new Hunm Arm»: am Azmm 3. sum am umuuu 4. nu»: muzum am Man 5. Rosvunl am mum naclslon AND snouuns or JLIDGMEM1 A. zucxsnouuu [11 ms case was Imlmfly mm belnva amlhex Msmstrme Yuan Muhamad Farsd bm Abdu\Ln|r1 On 1 7 2022. he was Lmnslevvad to me Mmnslry 01 Home Aflzlrs ms case was men mu m be hoard before Magnsuale Puan Amanlna mm. Mohamed A...m um unmnunalehy. she was away on malemhy leave mm m mm unsuited to this says m an lmnslerrad in ms court on 7 szuzz by me Supewmcrfovlhe Cr1mma\ Maguslmle om. Tun M aam hm Am Mind [21 On an 2 2(l23.Vhad1\xadlms case lordaulsmn an»: and ovlhe PIusecmmn‘s case Mme I named man me Pmsecunm had successmuy aslabllshnd apuna ram case am an av me five accused were umems to my delence The case wmmwd mm me accused‘: defiance and on an 2023, n has me (ms mse lor decwsmn Dwssausnod WW! my aecmn, Im Dapuly mug Praseculnr mm a Name cl Apnea: on vs «I zuzz N ynvaLv\k5gMnEvMDwA um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm a m: ounces AGAINST ms uccussn [:1 ma me nccuud ware charged ler Lwu ananaa. ma lint chnrgu mug under ncllon an aim: Punll caa am ma mam shame bcmfl unflm I-(Klan use 0! ma Punal con. mm. was amundwd on 13/7/2020 ma chums; nmwmad nummi me awused m Ihewrommal Vanguaoa rend asfulhwi pzmunuww PERTAMA Bahavm kamu aanganwanamaraamaaama pads I/09I2D1I3;amIebrII kurang 0430 Parana bmamnal dl Buemonl v saaua L/—Thanl Cmdomnnmm No a Lnwng Amps;-vg 2 raman L/-1'»-ma: durum am-n wangsa Maw dalnm Wrlaynh Porsvkvtuan Bandaruya Km»: Lurnnur. arm mnncun wnnv mm mmma mmk paagaau Cum Boon Lang, No K»: 630709471-5141 clan yang denukrarr Kama telah melakukavv saw Aesa/elven yang amen drhukum mbswah seksyan m Kuvun Keseksaan mhata beisamu sullsyan 34 Kamm Keseksaan man man dmukum dbawulv Kamm dan seksysn yang aama “ "pgnruuunm KEDL/A sanawa kamu dmgavv mm mm human:-some pads 7/I79I247VB)am)9hm many 04 30 pelnng bonsmnat 4; A—&6 Sssvu Ll-Thunt Cominmmnlm No a Loroflv Anmang 2 Tamar: L/-Than! m swam dasrah warvgaa Mam dslam mayan Persekuluun Bandamya Kuala Lumtam man nervcun aatam banqwvan lemma! ksdlanun aanaaaa mmun Chm soon Long, No K/P seams-|71»5ua, mm Wang ma. mu 5 mla din flengan lm kumu noun mo/akukan mu kesa/anan ylng pom. d/hukum maawan nksyln JED Knmm Kmk-aun d/Dam omama snksyurv J4 Kanun Ktseknun dsrv bohlv dmukum amawan Klnun dun wkkyirv yang sama ' c we counws nuvv M’ m: sun or me vxosecunou-s us: [41 A5 mpuanaa unaer secliwm 173mm 01 an Criminal Pmcedml cm meremnamtananm as ‘me cpc-), the prmeamon Dealslhl human as aauanusn a puma vacxe me against ma nccuuea alme am 1:! me pmseamms case Aaaammg am yY1vaLv\ksgMnEvMDpuA ma. am nmhnrwm a. med a my a. aflmnaflly am. dnuumnl VII muNG v-max -.. vawses ms umsbmx nu ma vvvseaman pmvan mat «ms varv mamas s1o\en by lhe amaad amoumma Io RM6 5 rmlhcm aswamea m the Ma dmrpfl [147] ms accused’: In: at aaasme m me mmem sass befnre me ws ma| lhe numprznam, spt, never received ms nus 5m\IHon vmm me Crmese mveslnr Thom win no avlflnnoa Drwfim Vnrwnvd m nmve Ih||SP1 reserved such sum Mmmmy‘ than m In vecoflpl and M wmen ngruImln| maven, Ina In Margumem .. um theoflenca cl nun nave! occumad as lhe suhpcl matlavmai was sum nevvuremalod [:41 Yr: delenmnlnq ms mallan ms teslvmomes ul ms pmsssmws wumsus wove mleflmly scmlmlzed in Hue wnh ms use a! pp v. Mend Rand Ann Bnhr (sup:-;. sp< nan xssunsa mm 015 mamas wave tecewed «mm a Climax mwslor known as Huang pm Aumuwl sm neveruwlhe memes mm M: very own ayus, km: wave um-v vruaocuuon wmsm. IhI| hum Mlrwn In ms banknote: mm -nenntad m was 5 mflhon [311 SP2wasme1"Derscnvmn -wswscme boxes awash a|PavuI\mnRasn1anuvs on 7/9/2015 Amardfls to sprs lesflmnny he raver opuwd up me buxes mm: he manned sam U—ThanA, lmwrvnr, spw had mvmmea Mm mm mm he was cavrywg wls Rm 5 mlwnn Vn cash [33] me cnnlems :11 ms horn Inntpmted «um pmum R-urdlnosl wen? only lean alter the boxes amvusd 31 Saw: u-mam on me same day There spz sp<, spa and spa counted ms momes logelher [341 spz Iesmrsd mat Ihey mumnd Im mamas m me 5 ban: and u mmmnsa In me 5 mmlcn Whan spa Msquexled vm pmzmuun to as mm m mm .1 mm Bangui mu Ium wu man out «mm ms ma 5 mnnon monks by spa Mm mm sum ms um um. spa ywuumsa lhe m-mm am In Imlnce mm Inlnnod up no was 9 mm. m. balanw was also awed by spa usmg um um nuke oounrm macmne where me naval ndded opt? Rm 9 mnwon [:5] Based an SP4: hwmony‘ us was sssugnad lo dehvurlma msmwuu la sp< m was Eangsa( Shopping Mall lugmhav wmn spzv Tneve Ihey waned Im nmund :- :1 sm yYNflLv\kSqMY\EYHDwA «mm. Snr1|\nunhnrwH\I>e U... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! e. : bows our spc In oumpms hs Iransamnn nm. aflxev. s Di)/mam slvv was mvnn (0 sun by SP1 [:5] Based on live nanihun um» Dmseeulmn wmvusuzs namsny sp2 spa and spa, an om nesmued mm um msmmua mm was Ibqnsstud by and deuvered to SP4 wn hum me arm-m1 or runway wnmm m Inn 5 boxes emleclad «mm Pa»/Hlnn Rumduncel Tm: meaama wu man canubulllsd to be m.../.n by sp« .n NI (eswmny um ouvmnwna me «am mu mm was Indeed 2 sum M mama: m A—&6 Saslra u.uum [an Latarln the day sm mquenln my a lunher RM2 mane" lrum sps wm. she max and lmm In balance mm at mamas 1 . RM53 mum Yms sum was man gm... to spz In be mm in spa m 2 [flue and mu: baxu Unrommaleiy, mus RM2 mm was neverpasuad m spa -ISF2 wuumarsked mm. ncmlad .z mnnmmn pnmnw Tm n a\s/.> cnnubcmad try spa in he msum mat ha mvev mcawed me pm mllmn my Acmmmg m spa, me am mum wai a mnaly loan war was 5 Imllon bwaan him and spu 24: In: «army ms lacang Manna! drflwcullbes spa Iom spa m mom upwflh . rawynrlo svgn . namummm uh upwz When spa ugvvad axhlbh pu, spw wn nm .1 me omoennd no dnn‘|bI-I ugnalnn ammc F12 . . bilpoka aueemenl am lhhwgh nul meulely wumnfl (ht umnuuuem M In: name!‘ awuvdmg |o5F'I's (e1|wImny,vm5 matSP1 would dehvarlilu RM2 mmon In spa and men may wuuna me sagned bespak: agnumenl be surrendered In SP1 n was also agreed max SP3 wand also pul up ms nnamnenl m London as ooumemn [an] n is the argument ol the datum: counsal mu (Ms bespuka loan agmems«|, |pI<:Ifir:I\ly new: number 3, mm mm sp: had alrasdy vecmvod am nI|Hon um Ina ncauud mesa me pmmsas, in-Mum allmlnlllrfl Inn mm um: um: mum was taken out «mm ma balance ulmorues vscmvud mm the Chmape mvnslaras Iasnfind by sps. Furlhervmre. Nth: own would In 3mep|SP3sorIHev1Imov|y|ha|he hafllfl renewed 015 RM? mmnn. m woukt b: agamsuecuunn aflhe Evidonu An. sm ynvaLv\ksgMnEvHDpuA “Nana smm mmhnrwm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! um Upon caralmly reading axmm P12‘ nu ma: lam: lam down and nursed In between names was an -1 she conflnnud man »m rucuwd RM2,0oa.oao4m Mam yau M a! ma am of ms ranw F0! avmdance n/dwbt nus w2,uoo.aoo-oo Ls moan! fur mm af me Loan‘ mm. «ma wan nnmsmsfll wu dalad 7:2/2am. ma um. any spa prumlus ms raudsd by me ammsd and ma mamas were smlsu Ammdwvg to em: lewvvlmy. he signed ma Klan aaneemem amuna noon at me Vawyeis mine Ind he womd Iacswe RM2 mmm Valrann ma evenmg Hmam, um RM2 mnuan was neverflelwened spa‘; msnmnny Vs cmmhamzd by me aasmmy of spz mace svz teslmed man he was an N: way to aehver mz nI|Hun m sr-3 as msxmaa Dy sm nl amum new on wzma bmoru ma nausea arvesmd mm [41] II cannm he flamed man Ihe wnrumg mm: loan agnaemeul was pouny malted TM phrase -as allhs dare arm mar uuuld shiver mean betnre or an m/zoua nun Nowevnv an oormans and aureemenl: um, u must be mad as a wmxa um um by maamaax [421 Ihem 2(2) was man agreemenl w: as «amm- mu / should pay Russmo-on as pmaaasmg be: In you /Dr A mrlaewllve monms /mm mo oayyou maomsa the Lao" (m perm/n mu; In me.“ 11:] MM. m um sav mm mm sqveunem. \| .s anaany mm mu m. aw mlllon a meant Iowan cl um Vonn Thnmiore‘ it is me mlenhan av plum nun um: um RM2 mm... 5 gm" by sw am unnerved by spa, spa mum my RM55 am on as pmesang me: In em them was no ewderuce gvan mat swa had 9.’-med paymg me pmcsssmg lees and weflher an 5?: tesmy man he named reawmg ma pmoessmg tees Thave1orv,n\s my mama mat spa navel renewed |he mz mum mm wls lakan mflby spacmm ma mamas nmleclcd «mm Pnvllhun nnsmams (M1 ta mm: lomfy om pom shmfld am. he mcmoa mu 5?: ma Put up a uropeny m London as mllnheral andlmssalsn 5:1 mmn ma balwkuloan aarwmmfl 13 am yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYHDwA «ma. am nmhnrwm a. U... w my a. nflmnnflly am. dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max -.. Ex Hswsm, no man We deed wn mt-chad In um luau uumwnenl and neflhar an sv1 tenmed mu he run Ieuewud me am Thus. we only znfelenus mat can bu made was man ma hesooke loan agreement, exmbll F12‘ ma ml Ian muum SP3‘; mum", m open cam an mu m any way allev lne Iemus mm hnn agreamorfl [451 As the pmsenumn nu mmssmny pm»/an Ina: mere were cash Iaken mu vm ms RM65 m\IHon renmvsd. x mm mm m. was Human existed and ms nu ms so ivwn m sw as he rm ms cnvicrly to deal oval n [as] Besndes lbe Rm 5 man m cash, there was s lunhar RM2 mfllnun m a save box m A—8—5 Saslm u-mam Th: sum no mz mmmn .5 ourmbomled by sm, spa» and spa Them am In Ian 2 sale boxes s. A-L8 Saslm U-mam. as an be seen wn exhllms wsmunu P3432), and ma ksys and passwmusla mm 2 us. Dara: an emruilwd to Iepansle pamnns mu ms bnx |hn| ounlamad ms am muion was smmnsa |u spa and spa svz maufiad mu m kn1w|hwa wave m2 mHIren 5: ha mm ms kuy m lhal mfn Inx spa cormcamled sum lawmnlvy and mum added mat sm knew me Password to lbs um save box Awa<n‘I1\e\me nl.aIgurmn|pm III: by me ueiancs .5 lfmmere was no ememe In vrme um ms RM2 -mmon sxmed n the sale box [an I have I:arIfuHy scmlnmzed ms lasnmunlu ul mo prvssmmun wnnmes manly sm. SP2 me 595 me an we penmnl knovdadul 0| um um mHlnn man was supposedly kam m nu ma box [431 sm had lodged s pokes lepnll mu/umusma, exmhn P9‘ mm msmuy amen mm amung me mssmg "ems m A-M Suva U—Tnam was RM2 mum. warm mxasn ms: was kem m 2: safe box mamas Imam m be opened bySF1's emvtuyee. my SP2 me me kay In one M ms nos boxu um he beamed max mac safe box mm»-a RM2 mum He demad mm In: win no mama smwlnu mu Ihe me but am not wmzln nmz mum on cmss summmn and an reaxzmnaflon, svz mmenesunas mm N me me my ID me sale box on SFI'smI1N5lI2ns n was sm vmu msmmea mac one pawn wmfd b5 msponsme vunne physocm key mnemum person would be responsme lm Ihe pasxwnn‘l\D1hs savs. 1.: sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. Snr1|\nunhnrwH\I>e med m my s. nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [50] The ulharplnuvv mm vespansvme oaraaamma nu? save ma|oun(|I\ed me RMZ mum was spa Awarding ho spes kzshmony she was spvs fimncd cum mwem, the may man was given In her was amy In ooun| memes m the mag. AM Saslva Umam and awsa lo pvocess documenls uumum SP1 pupavsd Vor namng pmpam spw had me Key «n A-$3 Saslrz U—lnaM as she wmked lhcvu 5 days a wank‘ Mnmly In may, lmm armmd1DDD-m mu 1 now spa vmlhevlzsurned mm she wn um m chimp cl dammsmmg SP1 scuhnow and harpb was my to mum me memes [5|] ma Iesmmmes M mes: 3 pmiewhnn wunessea ommbnralad mm aam mm and lhmr amaawe do an m any wny wnlradm with each nlher m cm malr lusumomes were so constant and amsaxenn, plus ma Ian ma| spa and spa were unshakon ny mare cmu—ax:m\ni(\un mains u flfllncml our me «a mi ngam mass man... as awadwn wlmeuu n. Iddmon. spin, at an mdapendent man. -kn temima um aceordmq lo ma mvanhalmn (In RNQ rmlhon am max .. one ama aara boxes I: <5 nharmara myvIIwma(5P1‘ spz am spa Ira IMNM Mnesses and ma: mun may have rela|ed m munwaswhal acmauy happened on ma: Inlufniday mm: Is no um:-1 mason furmela uoummremauoe is me madame smws ma4 nenher am: has any unedur mnlwe Yhus‘ n \s my rm-no m we Rm mllmn -. om ohm gain boxes m A-LS Sash: u4namausa exlslad u mu as ma RM6 5 mmm reoewed lmm ma Clmln mv-slnv [521 I am ruler mysefl nu ma mun Court case cl nu Boon Soon a Fublvc pmaacmm [arm uuu 1299 where the Han Own no|ed me fimflnus oi me Sesswum Conn Mlhuul dvsappmhaflnn xn man we {aduva 94 ms wmplalnam to furnish any mcelms came punch-use mma vamahles smleu am naut an wznkenllle pmssaman-s case 1713 Com m lm mild on :;4rcumsIanc|e\ evidence :9 mm Ina! ma nmnna mm wmmaa than [531 cmmax fur Nu aowssa had also raaaa the’ Inn mm the vxatl wm ol mam sum. was Ml pmven by me umwwuon However. it is my vlaw man mm \s na| an e\emen| H: be pnwsn Dy me nmsecuhon and what needs to be pmven was man the pmpeny Merl, vegmdlass m Ins aImun|ovva1ue,wzasIn\he wssesmn ul |he person Hanna, ma Issue mlsed Is a um-svmlar. 15 am yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «ma. am nmhnrwm a. med w my a. nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII .mm v-max [54] Iurmmd am bvpomlod um u (hrs 1urw:|umma| line can: amuum av meme: Iiul are m sasua u-mm n ml vellecled m e\(he<a1Ihs1wn chlrgui against me accused ai me Dmsecunon has deeded In not Induce a sum M RM! 4 mllmn M0191“ ma-we This .5 due m me lac! mat the RMI ; mum was Invsmgatsfi ursdev Ann—Maney Laundeflng. Anln-Yermmm Fmancmg and Proceeds n¢Un|Jw1ulA5nvl\es Au zoo: as mu 1-‘ acmaa had mgea . repufl agamsc Inn mmmamam iarme ma sum [55] In this cunem use befnm my in mums withered lmm Ihe nmmcunnn wllmssus m rsuavds la Ihe sxmenca cl menus m A£—5 Sasha M-Imam wnm consnslznl and nredrblu to prove mal such o-may was m ms passe-ssum sw sun was nae to deal wI|h me norms a|alH1mes as I have expunefl eamer [54] On lap of mm, 5P31’s lndependem Invealigxlmn also lends sunpun m me pmllcnman 5 use According m span, ms Vnveshaamn shawl mm In-vu wu mam a aim at my 9 vmlhan m sm ; nlsrmsul, um: sum was nvmcud hy sm m swat mmaawana me based on line moms: suuod wan drwovsw 5»: ma also lmmshad ms Dank |r-amsaaun shp he spa» as pmellha| he ma aw mmlon m ms sale bux Irma nllev ursnuly smmnaing lheIes|\lm1mu at Ina re\e~raM pmsscuhon mmga‘ Hm max me pmsacmmn has also socoeeda m Mm.-3 mu second ekamem . mm mm! mm. ummnl: run an neeuud nwvud Inch nvoplny vmlln In [M pom.-nan av an. complllnlnl um um an nuulld am In In mm In um um um mom. posuulon oflhc umlnl mm [571 For lheavnrdanoe av mvemmn these um zbmevvls wuuld be auscuweapmmw The properly ma bemmes ma sumac| manner 0! me change: me man mm 2 acpnvaw mam The monues x.. Ina lIv:| cnargv ware amen from Ike na9emen| parking at Sun uxnam Candormnmm mu. ma rmmas m no second marge were slain «mm um um sun. u-mm Cmvdnmuuum [sq Explanlliou am uclvun an mm mm om sums; as mum sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «ma saw nmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ‘A potion u ma :9 mun . mung to mow by removmv my obnlnb mm nvsvumuan mam n-av/rm arby sepemnngnlrrmv unyolmrllvwvg‘ I: we» any acmaw mnvvny yr ' m1 Illuntntlnn (pm moan an em. Punnl Coda Wuvmus mmum 1.7) A m good ram. nehawnq pmpem/bekwgmg roz ru as A’: mm pmpevw. lakes mm property wl‘ulB‘spossess:wv Hem as A does-no! Lake msamesny. he does not mmmn man ‘ my Fm ms nu! cum: 5»: was msnmma ms:-u In danvu am mmun tn sra‘ nu ma. spa vrunslvv me mamas ma avranqad n m 2 mm mu blue Iauxu Upon rsoewmg me am sun‘ spa rm win! dawn «o me bn:amen|pnrkl1g Ingelim mm SP5~Mmme2 boxes Time 592 was lnprvachufl by me 5"a<xusm and was asked m pm me hnxes m we auw xs boot and sulvendev the car Ksys to ma 5'» accused v-many, swz remsea Hawevev mmeu IM1“and 3'" accused came mnmeuls mum annmnched 5P2. he nnalry smenoered lhe key: In on sMw x5 as one ohm mam smwed M:poHoe ID SPZAHG SP5 wan um spll upanfl nsvucled m mlavmln um Isaame can [:11 Ailera Mule, 5P2 and spa wevelold tn exruha mlsand 9: win A-as Durmg an arms we may were up n AM, It»: mamas namamed m Ihe mm 01 me Bum x5 Amunilng In sps. he was Ihen nmugmm wk KL n 0:: same swv x5 and sum a\so tasmed mu he saw in: BMW X5 dnvsn on 9! me basemem navkuug ul Sula: u--mm aux Inn ma The RM2 mmsm. win m In: amw xs boot and was many maven and «am am at me pnuasunn av sm mnralnre. me was elnmeul and vmmn am-wnnm am woven ny |he nmemm «mm mm chains [52] m regains to me secum charge, me pmpeny m queshan .5 ma mamas m unll Au Sasha U—Tham wm 5:2 and sws wave mm In go up w AM» kzgelher vnlh maacuus-1, sps was M the sam umlsuangmg um balance oVmonuzs.CaInoK1enVaI\y armmd me same WM, sm mu am anuslod by me amusen and Will nwumd by (hi cwsed nu (nu ma mil wm sw evulvad ms mu, ha um mu m Iccul-d sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! umm: sps b slap an-Infimu an mamas mu m um: saw spa Ind spa enlennsl live mm. [as] spa mnher |esm\3d man when he was eswnnd In ms mam mom he passed me smy room were he saw spa almngmq Ihe monzs mi box ammsra ware also some mamas on me mm mm M: man he heard me 1-! accused mung spa In beau mu sun was damn Tmn u 4 0! mm wave Vnslmnfled In slay nu ma mam mm [341 wmxs the 4 ac meal wane |ald |a slay m lhu main room .. I-aioamwe uumers. spa minced Ihalmallhe 1“ accused entered me mam mam amliouk 3 luggage bags «mm ms InI\a| spa and spa reI:bgn\zIed mews luggage bags as the ones m exmm puny mm pas; [551 spa wen mm. causa by In w lccuxod was she wan nnstmclea In an (A1 in- slurs mam mam ms isle baxus ware plimd sm was wnstruded Io open ms sun box and dearmn um mamas In me sad sale box spa fullhav name that me was «an in pm me momes «mm on safe run on me now and table Allemands the us‘ amused asked spam arrange Ihe memes m a bmmm mx Min wmplsflng me task. in: was sum am In me mam mum [u] wmxn spa wu m Ina more room‘ spa m Ilsa mHIfl am as gn In ms some room In open ma mmr uh box. on ms my m ms mm mam, spa mama (ha! ha raw ms mree Image ms men am I7y1M1“accnsed same: we: «mm cl (ha amdy mm. mm were a\sn memes on the mus mane sludy mm Al me s|o:e mom, spa saw sp2 apemug me new box an the led! Mule spa was raid In «men ms sacs box on me ngm ms 531: box um spa wai mm to upsn am not onnlam any mamss spa mu wnnauad spa pulling monies [mm In sale box mac she opened on me Ham av Ihe Ilma room [an Mumsms Vatnr. sps was anahw caflefl In w In ms shady room were me was mmally avranqmg moms! when (ha accused mmea me uru| Eeinrema was she was m ms rmdsl av arrangmg mamas, m2 5 mnlmn was reamly armnasd m a wms and Mme Do: me am I rmllon ms sun on me name psnamg la as mngaa by sps. sm ynvaLv\kSgMnEvMDwA ‘H «mm. Snr1n\nunhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w my a. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ms 1- aucund then mslmded spa to put me RM! 4 rmllion m . brown box Ana.-mus, she wn: ism back am. In ma main room am. SP2 and son aoumbmitzed spa s testimony when they |eslihe-1 mm svs was awed us me ms worn by me accused rm Alluvlnat. the icculod murucled an Aollhe pmswmn wunsssesm 90 am... to ma hllelnenlpamrvg vu ms samce flevalnr 5.. vmlsmlm IEMIB elavalm. SP2 nesmsa ms: they passed Iho study room mm svz saw wax u war dent nl my memes SPIa\Io|s§msdlhs\IIe mused malnwevewuna m mums m ms smay mom and that we save hm-as were openm mus spa |ss¢tf>ed Ihal when they pawed lhe sludy mam mime waym lhe basement. Ihe sludy mom was emm-an msu boxes uvd momes mu wnm may look ms ulevulwr am. In (ha mums-u psmmg. Ihey wenl dmm lwelmv and mscen be men \n axMb1lP6{u) SP4 and svs mum flux my want dawn afiagmhsr with me hank mm cuunlmg machmes. . lmfluy mm 3 Imxes men and a luggage bags sm added that he sawunu box mnlalmng mes Du| 2 mm boxvs were amend and me man kmw Mm n comamsd my cw-may, ums snows mm sun In: memes remahvng m uml A—Sv£ Saslra U-mam wls mavad nut 01 svrs pasnumn and um om m SP1‘: pouemon SP2‘ spa and spa 3H Iastrfiod mama um wn: uuusaumunsums moms: mu wu pm/Voully m ma: uml Vhus lhu mm and mum ehmmn Irv am: woven in me wussumon wn regarusio ma second charge . Fm. okmenlz mu an accused um sn wnltwtn ms com": 01‘ ms sumplumm nu Expllnlllun 5 In ucflnn an mm Poul cm mums. .. iulhwl ‘ms consent menlmnsdln ms definmun maybe sxmsssa onmphad smmsy be gwsn svlhw by me person m possesmou, at by My person having for that purpose aulhnnly am: express nr msnsa .9 sm nvamksgMnEvMDwA «ML sum nmhnrwm be LAIQ4 w my .. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII nF\uNG W [721 The cnmplamlnl. 5:»: had ms-c a When mpurl an mm/zma mum‘ no PnduIl7H)057/1B marked u axmbw P7 flatmq man a sum av raw 9 mum" was mm «mm II: wamlses men the amused wmma the ma ms miss Ihal me oumwznamdui um mrwevlltame momes being moved out of ms pussessmn [13] Fnrltoennore, me memes were man out or as oossesslon men we mmphnam wu awly overseas He only gm Vnnlmcmnt In his worms on how to dnl Mlh hm rmmln Jud me eomptamam ms nu cunnnclmnl mm m 5 ucwud Io permh my km: 111 wniam [n] The accused a\sa entered he pmmsas inrcamfly umerlhe amse M 3 mm 1: the nomplawnanlwemm have grven mnsenl umnlue-1 arexpleslcd, m wumd not have guns woman the hassle n4u|11.a\nInqIMormmk>rIlrum(Vve secuvhy Imh n4 Suva u‘ ‘mnnrs mlnagemanl on Ina scanned‘: entry lnlu ms pmmnsas as evmned by mm m n mu m an mmuqh mo ccrv luwnflnql u nut-d by «man F7 [15] Assuming mr.awh\la|ha|SPI 5 workea namexy :92. 5». spa and spa had aumamy aver SFTS property, mere was ml em Bunsen] given «mm mam as sr-2 ms forced In ham! mm: RM2 rmllwon at me basement namng and an Iuumlmam wse demmd m a room before Ihe mam m uml A-5-6 Suva Urmanl were lake" by me acwsed [151 In ma nonlexl av Exnllnillnu 5 In mum :1: Mint Pmll cm. A a mm mm m: aewm and take em Mme pewassnn aim: we morws man was then m the Dflssessmn at sun and n was none msmnesny am M21001 mu camem av srn Such loss of me mnmes was umaoum a result 012 men Henm, x find mm me pnxewtnn has alsa mmuea the Mn elsmam . sum Mama TIIII nu an: -o mm mm In nun vnnnqlul Inn to ma: nation or mum: um to mmun nu ma Mnmon Ifl‘wrunulu\ and ’wmrIgfu| loss Iidafinsd uvvdev ncllon 2: mm mm cm Fur ease av relevance I veproduoe u belaw 1:: sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! to u:I1on1lD(4)M flu cvc. vn ordervo maka am a rmma «acne case‘ ma Wmoculmn mus! sdduov credrme evmeno: vmrvlnw each and every mgladllml 471 me sam nmence [51 Iveisr mysell In me use 471 P»: v mm: mm um Bukar mus] 1 cu 451. mere lbs Fadaml count has Van dawn me snaps lnaulmuld mam ny we own at me cm. olma pmsocu|\m‘s use .. lmlows 1.; me close 0/ me pmsecurms case, sumecv the emu» by by me pmsacuhan m lls lolahry lo a maxrnwm nvulnallm Cammfly suunmsa me uudm/My ol each al ma pmmmma wluresus mm mm aaoovml au masovmbh Vnlumrlas ma! may 2,. amwn /mm m. -wanna: H the swdsnco mamas or two or mom rrvtcrwvuvs‘ than am "I: rnhrlncv ma! :1 man mvauvsblo m we ammm (4 ask yonuuallmn mm" m now call upon 1:. lmuud 10 make his defence «nan. alocls in remnm sdnmam Vplsbared la mmmm on the meme new befove me’ It ms answet to that evidence ns “Yes”, men a Drfma luau us: has bssn mavte out and m. aersm should he cal/cd mm answex .5 We" then, a mm mm: law ms: nu; rlol bum mam am and ma accused snow as ammlted In/) nlltr the mm. 1! mm 1». accused:/ea: Ia mmlm s»1In!,mon zonvvcl. M mm an/amx /5 53/194 the awusido as logm sv/nerves. (hen gm Lmuuglv mo slum mm: m Mn! v PF[19dJ] MLJ zea- n nzuaurs as THE orrsucz I0 as wnovzu av ms PROSECUYION m Awmdlmm me mum. rm 0! llemenls mun mul| bl uulfred Dy um pmecmm. In mm in oflenoe undarsocuon cw allhe mm cm. an n Vulwm Yhat Ihe nmpefly m ques1|on\s movable pmpafly‘ mac such prupelly was m the passesskm 01 a nemm. max ma Icwsed mm such pmplfly wmlsl m the muenmn av ma parson sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! “’Wrvm1h4Iynln" I: gem by unmwmrmsm a/mpmyau much we perm gswngrs mu teqaw anmbd ‘Wmngml my rs ms ms by unlawmlmeans arpmpany up wmm ma person Iasmq yr .5 legally uvtrlhd.‘ A unison n ma to aim wmngm/(y whnn mm mm ruhlms wmngmlly a. mu as wvrsrv mclv paw aemms Wvonvfu//y A mm u sand to m- wmngiufly when mo. person 1: wrlwvgiufly Iwpt out olanypnwerry as well as when such psrswv ls mongiur/y an-wen arpmpeny ‘ nu] m me presenl case. n V! dam \ha| the accused had gamed Ihe memes «am we b-lament gamma and mm A»G«a M Sum: u-Tim-| wmnglnmy as may rm sons 30 undlrlho g um rand The wcused hid un\ydo1:\Ivud Rm lrmllmm nlhl mama: seuzed mm the ma vnun mam war acluaHy more [191 we nmnplamant, sm‘ nan else suflered wmngfm has as he has deany been wmngmlry deprived [mm dealmg mm his pvupeny Consequently‘ me proseculnn has my: Pmvan ma uxm ulemen| [no] As we pmeo.mo.. r... lucuulmlly pvcvan all m aiomamn ruqund In mm ms ommoe at men under sscmn :79 no on Puma! coca, x hmby mm mm! Ina rm charge .. woven agamn lhe accused In regards m We secoml change, Ywuuw now mscuss the addllnnal 2 siemenls lhal S needed la be pmven By me pmseunlun m mm: me mgredlafls under seam. am am: Penal Code. . s-mm. mm-m- Tum prupnny win I! an um 91 Inc mm In . hn||n14ng,Im\l or vunl [an mo-umg In the list cm-us, III: mm was um-n hum mv basemenl pm"; L11 Saslra U—Thanl wmle we second mm sKMasIm\IIIe Inonluwem slalom lmm um! A4}-B Saslra Ll-Thar! Coudomlmum sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEwDwA 1‘ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [:21 Rufnmnun n madam the us. oVLIkhImln- Kmmflln » smm An nu ma :4: where n was run: mat Ins expressmn mum‘ mus| be mfinldad as wvflK:a|mg same imxxme mended fur afionimg wma nun an vrotemnn «a me persons dvoellmg mm: n or Iurme pmpeny pinned were (or umady Any shwlure whim does run anon: sum any such pmladxun by nsew hm mereiy smes as a Vermng or mmr menu: 0! rnersry prwenlmu egress M mgrass unnul main Ina mm a bufldmq Suhl U-Than! u a wndomumum MID! hanvnygumdad ucumy Dlaany, (M basemonl onrkmq am alln uml N86 mus underma dafimmn av . buidmq . Emu. elomln .1».-n --mu buI|dImz. um or mm. was (Inn min; and u a human awelllmi erlor ma custody ntpropmy ms] spa had Izsnfim um unn A«B>5 Saslm U—YhanIwes an nllice Mwele gm wound WEN lmm Mundays m Fnaay: Vmm nmunfl mum unm 7pm She has an access ram ‘.7 mm A.” u we worksd (hem us sm . fmnnu-\ am SP2 Ilsa lumen Ihai um! A&fi was an nlhbu anu mm Ina! sm used (ha! um! as n. Mic: sm m N: nxamwnamrrlnduueflslaled (ha! nun use .5 a pnvace omce nu] The lesflmomes at me amen-man wnnesses wave also suwoned wnh umhn; F311Dy.P3(I1)‘FQ(12J‘P3L157ssweIlas P3{16)vm>ch nmwunauna unn was set up we same sort ol alfuxun lhere win amca desks and man: as Shawn M me vhuloariphs Exmhn: P3(31):nd Fuzzy Ilw mm In welanna at 2 av. be... much uvmua max um: Au wns mm usnd form: wrmdy ul svvs pmpemr [:51 Themime, n n my lmdlng am me new addflnonal e\emen1: yequllui to us vmven undev sedkm sen are an pmvw byme pmsecmm . lniomnnlonl ldhuu in dlncovury undnucllon 21 am». Evlduxu An mu [as| suction 21 mm mu-nu An use mm is lollcwn ‘Wham any fan rs deposed n as dvsmvsred m couseuusnue or mfvmvahun mewea /nun a persnn zuxused orany unsm m the msmyovs pm: alhwv 11 sm ynvaLv\ksgMnEvMDwA mm. smm nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my n. nrW\nnH|Y mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! an mum mm w-ram-anon, mmu tho mlavmamm umwntr In . wnlvuvon ov nah as man: dfslmlrny m M: Inc! "may dlsuovwsd maybe Wm “ [an In dealmg mm emanoe undev Search 21‘ me test In be apphad Is as pmpuundzd m cm»; Soon Kay v Pubilc Pwucnlnv (191112 mu n Smlnan u: use ronumme ma (Mn |esIs Much Velfl 2|: inflow! ‘ wrm was the am d!luwend7 The ma: flucuwrud nmbviou rm pllw mm wmchlmmfloundammunrl/onweveprbducvdandlhu knowlsdpv arm. avwstd as In mu What was my mmmrabon supplued by me amused relalmg msnncny to two runs mam discovered’ I: was Wonnenwv with mgard la a many. and game zurvmmrlran -m/an ha Ma rmaan m m. Bivupfl mu: m mu Msrujam /n ma wuu.1:olMr any AN mmwam. “un..g.u. ~ [u] Sedan 2: reams: pm afliva vuuuwng ms betme :1 may be uwuked u) we mmmmn must have been rvcemad mm a person smuged cl an onancs. my -um pawn mun haw been m munaym a palm: aflluav .1 lrveuma av qwmw (M mrmwun. um n ma mun bedevfiiidlv Is havmw been mwuversd m oonsemnnou M such mcunnauan Upon plot)! on me above, ma. my so mum lmormaflan. whellm n nmoum: In . mnlrukxn or nul, as mum duslmclw Io um run: many dlmavivud mny n. pruvnd [nu mu seal mm mm mswvuy one by one am as they were mumme dlsmvsiuas mdudmg mass from wmm an nu chmgad mgeom with the accused hem‘ I wm mamlydenlwllw Ina drscovefles max mmwe me accused here 2; sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [Io] Far Inn 7-’ seemed. the Vnlormnlnon wven mm ma ca ammy 010:3 mums: walglvuvou 22/9/zma The Iliomunun waiulven hylum znhe name he was m gonna mmay Thcrsfovs me 1“ and 2-1 element: haw been Mmlsd On me an element. there wem nmecnam mm Iry me delenoe mass as m me mmunme, at me dlwuvnry‘ espemzlw m regard: «a mu word: Imeved by me 2M accused mm nm In mg din:-wary Mme rmmss M 1119 mm ms: were wduosd mm mm wave u comm 'Sswa)<!u mmu bum, langkapan borkals kspada say: flan my pm; — man my: gun snmpan 1.1. Bug nlunguldungr mug lunar mm sayl, my Mom lm flan may sm .1. run»!!! abonu raw says /mn ma balm nmluk lemon: »Iu “ 1ms\Mavs mm In Mia 01 me 2“ amused Vs Inc one mm Imam: mu mans mum me rnumai am mdmn gm Racaaneu .5 made to me one ul mar Huuam v s A1370 5:: 12:4 where the com hen «M was was no msooveny nIany4nI:|depnIefl In by Ina accused and MAC: not nammnxu vman mu manned ma In pom me Mme ma Ina memmm ollhe pcvson whom m mm avlv xlolun umclu A can mw ckzsnr In home mm be the Nrgh Own caw MPIAMR: Proucmorv Kzmuilhy an/I Knpuumy|20|11]5 Mu no mere ilwas «same that n uvderm mns11|u1e‘wn1nmunon‘la\Img mderlhs gum». av seamen 27, me momum mus! name «mm the accused am nobody e\se (:31 Evan n ma prussuman 1: mymg an nzcuon 5 ov me E»/Hence AM ussu «or uubleuuanmoruducl, InaM:|Mme2'“Aocmsd‘|vM- m pomlmganhn bags oonlalnnu mu maul" rs maanuum as the mm or an 2-1 Iecuwd mu never -n -u.-um person mu mu mace The:eYore,l find mu ma Irmzrvnllml Ewen try me 2m ammo m be unadmissmla [say In raamm «a me u amused. mlnlmalmn mat lad no msmvery M5 Ewen on 22:9/zma m Imum 3 36pm Easad on pm: mpm msunzssssnu makes as uxhlbh P54. me nwusefl ma given wmauon as Vollnws zn sm yYlvflLv\kSqMY\EYHDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! ‘man. an bnluh Iurwkkun annana uya Nrmanyrkan rim! rm :1. rurnah am suyudl kwwasan Batu caves den aanamnya sayu scmbonyrhn dmlmah emak says an Kuala Kings-37 ' [vs] Subfiwunnflyn the mama amaa: Aswsy lbgelhar mu In: (sum lad ay ma 4"‘ nacuua an 23!BIZD1Ba|amund1 32am rm: anma allhe Am aocuseasvanmy muse m Kualn Knngsarand ma 4'" amused mm pmrmsd um aunma: av mamas an-aummu to RM44a,am on than wus moan \n we may M on: of line mans Tu remzve ma mamas‘ a may had ra be used and a Inmnuuz had lo be msmanuea In gel Inc menus auI(re1evBl(7I\bII P55<7—25u Clearly. we names dwauvumd were ludden lmm mam mm [vs] I refer la me an MP!’ y mam: Farm am mam Suki! L Amvr man a mu 401 vmem n was lam down as Delmar ‘A pvupor canmewn of m. maaaw omnlaydd m s 27 mu ra-any pwvod: the answer In ma amt»-m a! mm The sschan mm In a «as: ‘d::u1vuud' ma wont maaavern: defined In mam Law Dctronan/{61n Ed) as ra umxwsr mm wmclu was nman, aama:..1 at unknown [mm awry me Tagsliwsrsxghlorlrnowfcdge ofliopvthtmwiadgaofwmalnas suited Dumas naz mevemlave been known in ms dmxwemr She/Imar Pmduets cavmnuuauay Co cu A 111 err 24104108 Yee Ya Mann V PP [W72] 1 MLJ 124; mm was to a aaaaaga Imm ma ca/unrated case 0/Pulululn Kumsya 5 07: v Empsm NR 1947 PC .92 whom .: .a sand Nnvmuw IN seflron rs amugn: mm npammzvv Mun a pirsun m pom custody pmaaaas (rum some place av oancealmenl same nhjed m PP v Bun bm Se/»mn[1Dv4]2 Mu 476, Wm Smnndwnv 4 «Inner! mks Nev/Asiatic Ca AIR19d7 Hm u mm n was nan: Ihala drmlosum statement an/y nas any rmamng at an flmenlane Imm whum ma rnuvnlmanng amds was re:-coveted rs really n ma of «mesa/nlenl wmdv .1 wanna be mmnm av nnpassma rams palroe In mscuver vnlnamlonre asststance mun the accused sm ynvamkSqMnEvMDwA 2’ “Nana saw nmhnrwm a. med w my a. mmu-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum am Mus. m. Ianqungl or s 21 w!!! mam ms lpubcalrml a/ m. nation :1 inc mm rsmvered .3 M71 hum n plaw mzarvwalmvnl In /lymg flown mo mm: ms: av mun-lnnnt wlmm m. manning 0/ s 27, KT Tlwmus J Jmd m m. /ndran Suprlma Court can of sum ammmarmam vJseISIr|9'V/1979]? LRISJ atpp sen-no Thom m naming m 1 27 MIN Evidtnce Ml men mam 1». ummm or the mm madrrlaslblt llrscmery ul rm smc/at wan mm mm anygraoe mum :: ‘op-an waeassm m 010075‘ ms 3 ii/Vacraus nolnm mm wmn recovery Marlynncdnwnattng smdu was was hum a poaue winch 5 am a auwsams In others, :1 would mate the ewdenoe mm zmme Evn1:nL1Ac1 Any obprl am he mwam m planes mum m open or aooessabfie to other: Fm example, :1 ma uncle rs bunnd nn m. mam ruadudl 0! «n In mneulodbonoam «mum lymg on yubllcnlnnit u Imzllmidsn m 5 pubhcoffiaa. mu smc/9 wouhirumam out ulma wwbrmy alathon m nomlll crcumslamw: The person we hid n alum; knows mm 2 Is WIN he duaclnsas Mar Inn m any amer psrsun Hence, me aucaal msum rs not wmlllsl the mace was auxsslbll m mom or rmlbu! rmemer u was nrdwanly msiblu lo camels. n u r: mat, um. «I .s rmmallrusl mu ms mama mm /s zocessrbfia Io olhou - [:11 me u umuusd had sand that me menses we M ms parcms mm, ms SP15 had |es4\led mu upon amval .\ m. uni Muss, the door was opened by the w Iocuud - mm Hawavel, u an In 1' lcnnad who mm ‘as sms In «M mom and name on! when Ihl mamas wan run [an Relevance ‘: ma tn me use 01 u. RA|an v sm. mu CrL.l 322 mu) me n was needed mm mm we place a! mnwawenl was mm» me mum knawbdga no Ins aumsea me onnlessm Much rulales dmmuly m the dlsmvery :1! me sen mm W: Idrmwhls TheVac|mmIhe mm m anesuon was occuplnd by mm: also Va wmnmoquamul A: n was In 4* acumen Wm Md mm IM unlommnn mm was In In: dummy ul mumll aupne 1| balm n. M: narenlf mm, I um mm MI Ina sm yYlvflLv\kSqMY\EYHDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! «mu uhmvniw have bean mmuea me me mmuum. ghovn by mi N" accused on udrmssible [99] Upon mneval ul me memes rm me oeflmu. SP15 Vudged a poke: nspcll Kuala Kangsnv/DDBQZSIIB mamaa as axruml P57. spas had also ueslmm m mum on live Imurmalbon gm" by me 4- nccuwd In his u.am\nankuHnd1\ei mus Mfllhnfi Ina mqmmmanl mal nmmvnamn mm by (M lacuna mun bu pruvsd by an! mndencn The ma MPIAMII: Pmucubvv n m hm mun A: mama In men Awullme Pam J ran be men ms) sad as [allows ‘In/avmtnon yuan until! 5 27 It nal . mamsr ms: :5 mum by my to be AIV wnlvnv Am .5 to D1 ynwrnnd by 55 91 And 92 :3! Inc An Thlmluru m. mlomlahan must b. pmvvd by UV! uvrdbncv pursuant to .9 504»; of the m rm: Mmsn Naomi Mme mlovmshan gwun by me aowsod wvli notby rlwrl be suhsmrmva evudemx afls uwtsnls and n u ma: me waves: depuses m ecu/(as nawnq been sand by the accused Ina! war as lwdvmx (sec Blvagvallvj wnm m. mrormmtorv .5 conlamod In a palace new can onry Deusud /arms purpoae bmmnmg mnmnry {nu mm: Prasdzumv V Emh mu 1: mm mm 2; VVhaIeN/amnlnmsdm my am-rducunnnflcsn. HUM mgnoa, um any as avldcrvw olcovvuboml/an - mo} For Ilse sv um-mud. .mmnmm.. m-A an ua mueovsry MI man on 22/s/ma ul Imam 1.45pm Band on when reperl msuuzsuma markad u lxhubfl P94‘ ma nuzuud had qwen mxormanun as Inlows ‘Say: boar. Ilm/uklusn rumah Dupe! nladua says dnmana say: Ada aurahkan wbuah bog mam. bwwanw Dim/hurvlnq Darla‘! wing um Iublh kw-Ing Rmmooo nan mom D-sq bmm warm pm»/mam yang berm wanq tuna! mm many NM45,D(}fl kepads bans menus mya ' [mu m mam olflcav15P22) lhqalher valh m team an by m. 5"‘ mm an 2319/2ma nl amund 3 mm naa amm al mu 5* awuseas lnlherm wan mus. m Kola Samm semm mu m: 5- aumsefl had vmmnd um um samwo bags ooma|nl\u mu amuummg lo RM465,fl00 on mat ms mum flruswlg male in nrveul me mums. 17 sm yYNELv\kSqMY\EYHDwA «mm. Snr1|\nmhnrw\HI>e U... b may b. mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! nun Luamea nounsfl om ms dailnol smuua man «as 5' mxzuledl -Numulmn m mammus as he stated that he named war he «nuns! m N: cam. -raw A: n have msuussefl ssmsr, In dnwwry 01 me smuem mailer musl be gwan by Ihs nncusad lwlmpefl am such mu 0! nmormahon sud by mu awussd names that me mssuan at ms nlamss ws mom to me vamenmsw and 1101 ms 5' socuusa nmsen gm] Wwavar. um: non nn| mun um um noun may mlbulswaiy asceaua lhal place at avdema am a msmmsuon wrwanl lo Ie<1\un 27 s «ma madmm Mn. 01:! Euros ulmad . smle nfannamn don mnsummancaxvy eflocmue sammsamuny at us smsms :71 sutrsequem conduct under secxinn 3 is mu m ms Fudam Dmm case ac Amathenll :/P P Rzmanmy v Publl: Pmseculm [mm] 2 mu an my wndud nuns 5" amused Damhng In me says vmerslns memes were asmmea as veleclad m paHca report Mme. Kala Sm-avg semm/00481115 nurkud as nxrubu P92‘ mm was mmsqusm In In omnu, «ans sq-Aare7yw1IIun um mm M ma snmucm any pavsan an afinnca ianmslwmmn x. Ins wmrd many pmusedww‘ [my nsasuu anolmr Fedem Calm case Pllhml mun II M; lnmn vFnbl|c Pmslunot and mm Appeal [20:71 2 ML! m were n was held as iolhzws -11291“ hem by ma Court at Mosul, we mm ms! the conduct olponntmg In an puss» wnava me nams wan lmmd Lt rulcvnnl and Idwssrbm (mmn cnm v sum (Dam Admvmslrahovv) 1972 AIR ma; Clllrmlppa Randy J um at 9 «II n. awaamx of live amummms, 5/rrup/rcrm. mu an summed poman mt . mm omm Ind pulntpd mu! on nine: mm xlulvn Amara: or wnapuns wmch mm haw been und m m. colvwmsslon arms offence mm mm mam wnu/d be admisstble as mmiucl, undlr sewer! s or the Ewdenn: Au, msmm afwoelhel any statement by the accused mwtsmpolaneaus/V with u antwedwvrlo sud! mnducl [alts wunln me pmmw or mum 27 arms Ewderme Au - [Ins] ms mnducl arms 5" accused Vs mnsscsm wilh me «an max he mw what we bags Looked mm and mm mm mumascouki belmmd me my Wereme |ha|mu\d In sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. Snr1n\nunhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! bu mm win max me 5% roamed was m nosuexsmn «mm mum-I um um um um. mmiesmamy hum mm: Lumpmumaroa gem-w mum non) here are m?ve1a\ omevmsmvenes made Much Involved 5:726‘ SP27. spza, SP29. span and one perwn namad Parlmhan me lolal memes mm mm saw 01 the other mmses are RM24a,1Dona, RM1BD‘DflI200‘ RM965,0uo no‘ rwzsmoouoo and Rmtsomom :ssnu:1m\y A: man mm wlnauel :15 ml crmgm lAwo1heIw\lhIhl nwssd mm u do nnl wuh m mxcun :2. .amx...nm, 07 mscom-as at Iarvlh same In saymnl mm W. dlwuvnrlu man: and ma mumu imnd are named msnmrym me oilevvue here [1011 Upon corwlmnq me mnnlesmal wereiaum an mwwe-y. u ouesm am up in me man lassafmamus mm was «man by me mxnuuamam caum: larllve accused mmssoa um um; smum be um man we mm mmm am not m Van exnst. [mt] Navurllmulr. mm momes are easur ha ha dwswwad Ml mmlv um. bulky «an; sum as mnlmcyclas our Instance Thai duesn'| Mxessamy mean that where me prusewlwm cans w vemeve |>-we slnlen ‘Isms wu Mule, nwumd rundsvm - caieialzl. Imam me use nl momma: mu Sivullnh am Ihhadl V Pendfluwl Ray: [mo] MLJU um whens me man Conn mm as llve lulkvwlng 1w) Tms goes to show that fact Ihauhe Ruins am natpwduesdm nwvrdws not nenn that n rs Mar to me pmsecubun case I! may were no: rtucovered m we rm ptm, haw cam my be pmnuua m wum ma all suomv matters 0! mawy at mm can be mama .: the max Some am pnrunanla Sums, Mm manly, cm 2». span] by!/10 amped mm than/um my bug" Ivlmabi ' Fmmemmre. {mind an ms ummmmm sum, sum and also span‘ may run used we «moss muewed In any M7 mm! paisulul mus Yhamom, x mm the algumam mud in be malavanl nun] me am: ov Ins aamssnmy oi evudamza under mm 21 Mll cmsmme snmmenl evwdence fur the prusawlmv In estabnsh a pnma lame case zgal\s\ Ihe aucussrl Tms .5 as hsghhgmnd -. me Fodem cm m Lznkurloov I--mu: Pu-uIcuInv[IBI4]IMLJI1|J' sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA 1’ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! -1.. Chang Soon Kay . Pumtr: PmnculIwlVE77] 2 Mu re, IN ms.-r cam now mg: mg snmmm Manny lo we msnvwvy a/ m. fimnrm ma ammunmorv was ..gmry admmod m qwdcrvw umersvcimn Nofthe Ewdenm An! rm. Fudelal com ma manms evidence arm was suffimsmm msmy me wrmchon olme Appellant byms mauadae " Thus View .s Ievumsraled In me case cum 12... Bin Nullim v PP [1995] 3 nu sso mm me Federal Calm mm auumws ‘Fnm-mly. by mlson or 5 27, In much ufa statement .....1.: by an ucmscd .. polrm malady B: lands 1.. (ha drsnvvuryofa ma mztwrmslandma Ina! .: amounts to .. cwvfssston .5 admassrbfie .. =..um.. Wmm amm .1 mayao m paws such mm as are Iwhwmm Drma mm the charge These .nu....e. z....m nor confined in, knowledge an mepanofan accused 9/ ma... relevant maneva, the run: that m. accused had pousssaan ../ the ma. luunn or mm me much ... quuxhon wpx .....:..m ewIIm( .=.....x.... Kanayn ..x...g Empernr 74 mun A5 - . Sscllon :4 mm Penal cm. nml Sacborv an ac me Penal cm: pmmdas as lulhms ‘.14. Elrn .u uvuul porwnl um. let u. m 4.... by .u, 1.. llku ........u u 1; mm by M... no..- wn... . crvmma! act .5 am by swam! Wm.-s, m Iurllmarwt or me commun ......m.... can such ulsuch persons .3 mm. rm"... -1.1 ... um. um. murmurs: n m. m won dovvv Dy mm atom “ mu The Fedeval cam m Furou lln Ylmnn mommnn Khm V Puhllc Pmluunmlndollnrlih -muumuzrruama.»...:ma>ema..mo.annn :4 our-a Pena! God: is lnHews m n cmmnal act um panwupstnn .. dmng Mme 2:1. mm a mmmml wmurmon hetweanlhe names. and sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA 3" mm. 5.... .....m.rwm .. ..... .4 my .. ..nm...uny mm: dnuumnl .. mum Wm! A Yhal ha and to m order to um Ihs um! am 0! am poisansmn at nun nelson‘ mu he an sowumm me mnwu o1ma| person: and man he an :0 mm mm to cause wmnglm tau Io ma persun or wrongrm gem In mmsel m In pmvl m Mluncs Imam sflcflun Jan 07 Ina max Code. ma pmieculkm munl prev: Ihe slumums nan down under seclmn :77 am addmwnal elemenu such .. mums 1 ml pmpeny mu m in mm mm mm m a hundmg‘ mu mum ma 2 Thai mm mm"; (cm at mar, wns than Damn we as 2 human dwalhng at my lhe mslndy :11 vmnurw 2. rue musscunows use III The vmsecmmvu had cafled az wllrvau-3 amwws 5P1 . cm Boon um Icomphanam an — Jaganamnn A/L Rmannam av: — cm-a Bean Nam sm . am Slngh A/L Surjnn Smgh sps . Srv-I KumavA/L Suppfammy sps — Na Sch Kuan SP7 7 Sarueam mm Madanzumhah bm Tahanm spa . Corporal Nmhamad Mm n... Smb 5?» Lame Corpovzfl Md mm mm Mn Ahmad 10 av“: —Lam7e Cmpcml Murumad Mam Din Abdm n.....: 11 am 7 Surgeanl mm Ikvlm Mn Sulnlmnn :2 sm —CorpoIa\ Muhammld Am: bin Mus: 13 am _ Vnsvlrlor Fahml ma m Mnhd Sayuml :4 sm — Vrupeclur Dmeth AIL Ambalagan 15 SP15—A$F Freddy mu cmpm Ia SP‘6—AsF Jaswem Smgh A/L Sadusmgn 17 sP17— ASP Ssmmn A/L N Raman LDa~4o|o~suNA sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! e. my me an must be am mummamume aorlluun nlummn [1121 F01 mu 1-4 elemanl. a ran Du gleaned Nam Ina Mu chargss man an agamsl ms nuculed as pmv av Cnmmnl m. n-mew men may Fur We 2~— alsmam. panmpamau ma bw dues ml require Ynrnfl av lha nccuud m be ruesem u u amfscxanl V01 me accused m have am an ad wvm some nexus In mg uflsnca Lveizt Saharuain bin Non LOvsv Puhlh: Pm:-culor [ms] 4 nu an nu] SP2 Adanlmad ill lwa of Ihe accused m npun noun mm axam\naImn-1m:mel sum was In 5:24 Ind -V30 spa AI! um mam pm-cumn vnlnasses mum mm an [we Accused win al was wane mm mm wm on cnmu occurred me vrussnca olma V! aocu5ed ws¢ur\>ve¢com)bovaled byme mars Vac huokmm Saslra Ulhanl mansgemevn which was marked as exmbn P1 17 m lzcl n was me amaed 5 own home tepan r=..4u»otm2s/cs marked as exhrhn D122, wmm became mnluswe ev-damn ma| an we accused were mm scene mme mm on mmamm day. [us] In rlgams nu ma mm ainmmlh me pbamnn :1! law um-:1 u mqmns prod max |h- cnmmal ant wen mm m punulncu 0! a we-anarugad mm mm llllibub sum v Emnnmv AIR «us vc nu Hvwvvav. lha pmnangea Man may dsvalnu an we sum 01 m me mm at no-nmmm ov an ounce the cmcLa\ 15:! Dana live plan musl precede (M oumrmssson of the afienue (sea Nu Ah Klal v Public wmnunu mm 2 nu my Despllz ma, comrmn mmm may oflan he dwfinm to mm byway .11 misc! mama, mu :1 may he nmurwu mm. me cwumslnmas no me use and line mmm ov me accused n ‘s nus law ml to prove common Vnlarmen, all mm \- not-Iury lor ma pmseculson m umva .. mm were 1- m mm.» . mmmun ml-nmn belweeu an mu parvuns Involved m mmnil a cnrmna\ acl and lhal Inc an Much oonsflmed me ufianw Iznarqsd was oummmad m lumlevame ul man mmms: and n 5 unnecessary 10 WW: |haI lheve had |u he 2 common wnlumon ta wmrml me cnme sauavy wrmumnd (see smmu sanam bln Adam I Anor . nun: Pwuclmr [Inn] 2 sun: ms Public Prouculou rm... Lung tihlona .1 u:s[2n1n]5 um um sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [nu Ravumnq bad: In me specmcs m on pvnum can me queslnon >5 mam» men: was Damcivalmn rw {ha me accused mm culminated m a <;rImma\ 3:1 lhat unsuited m men mu rm me mama: gnmemd. n ma me on accused .5 me nusbewumd L71 ma wmxa cum He naxma me mm. m mm 551‘: vrnmxsas wear the guns ul . mm and um sw moms fluhnmsfly a. mi I| Ins mm :2! Ilse cums nnfl In ma pnmupllsd actively m me than M slum. In: as‘ aecum may/ed 3 mm min m mnnnllvg um Mule an ashe hnmsefl rm lambs an N: was me mam oharsdzerwm bmnghl an Ihe puppet: Tvgsmsv am snumny dmreograntled lhs mme commmsd wamsl me wm|>1a\«an| mu In I" nccumdx man was acluafly denved «mm . Ilnng oi Warmers ms guldan nunel av mlurmflnn mu ncquhnd «am no am mm um um mmpllmln . awn Impmyee‘ 5921 sum‘ m.ur»¢ cm M was omema mm SP1 wn! my-ng out Mega! mmm men sw wnslmcled mm m dapuln bun amwnk cl (ash we the Cash Depnsm Maam Accomtng to SP27, memes above RM5D,0nD no new to be declared am» bankouumer and omm mfnlmalnm musnoe mrnlshed In me mm m under «:1 the aemxm gnmmugh Vex SP1’: mmamu were (orlhe Irlumns an be dz:-uuad vna macmm mm caund spy in boooma umuus M 5:: 5927 me amzmlud sun; on um: mullet‘ ye| SP2 mmoly manna ml swan nuwnly and mm rum mm mm wns sun mnrucuom and (My mavew shnuid -manic 4: ms] Obv-uusry mssausm vnlh such explmabun, sn=27 wem ovna mvesngalz lha mallev Hawevev. II: headed new sum men mugm out spas and (oh! mm about sws aflaged mega! m:|<vIAas SP2? asked swze whelhev Ihe Isuzr knzw anyuna nu ma Malaysian Anltrcanunllen Cummlliluvv (hemmansr Mensa In as me mac )1: n. wlnlad In wage a «pm Onnslnusnu-l\y, sm -Iksd am m m mm realm! \h:|(I1II was a use max wmxm . cummumul um and mad name mm m nu. mac mo] SPZ5men Immdumd swzm sm whete me now. aflhem dunuued lunher an In: mgeu mega! aambes madman by sm swzs. upon receMng such Vnlnvmzlnon. passed a on In swan spa and span knew em‘): amu way on mm )2 sm ynvaLv\ksgMnEvMDpuA «mm. smm mmhnrwm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! smo m an Omoer Ix-Chums av smum mos) at Shdunu svso m lum Vnlmdunud someone nnmod sum or ‘zaw In sP2u vmara swan (old swza be male me tmormauon to Ilu: mm‘ or ‘hm mu spam Vnvnflvumam doesnl and were and then m Incl, he mm so see sum and wnmm hellha|Il1:m|I saml Imurmamn on drug smugghng swan suggallad to sP2v (Hal ms mm-Inn mnulfl Lu |rnmm\I!.efl Io lha Depuly mm at Cnmmnl mwwmuauoa Dmnmann row-mun / mmgma I Rnooms umsmnsy or mum known as M. 51:29 dlsanuaed mu span and she mggesm am: we wmmmn should in given 00 one msaeanr Mohd Zm slznd sm mm Mme! Innmmed sr-an |o mesa Ihe sand Inspaclw Mom En at Omlmm Coflee mum bade IFK KL Ths Dune ulmam, sr=29. spaom |nsn:dnrMuhd Zm me: were am lnsoeuor Mom Z\n ayeeu In ganunnuaecaus lmm 592: may span Imn 161 up a meenng between sum and Ininncmv Mom Zm ac a mamak salary swan mums-1 mm he am no| plmcwabe .. me curwnnillm balwun me Iwu and he um um kmw whnl sna mlayld|o\rIi9S'.1orlJ|oM Zm sm mnurm In rand Vmuactnv mm zm as the nu aocused [1221 A: can be 5597: fmm emu: D122‘ the 1M accused and his team mnssm av Imomem accused had mud:-am ma mu m SP1‘s pmmnses llwasme I"3r1:ns¢d vim Inumuad spa mmp whnlawav gm wax dung Ind mum, In pm m the mamas inw bmwl N. the mnnma SP5 In durum We mum m an Illa box Mxordng In 5P2 s» we aha svs‘ W91" accused me Ilsa mel each nfllnm mdtvnfluavy m me «am ems mam mom and mum: mm be not tel! anybody else me mm “mm M m uomptamznfs memes pm has role played by am no me any 4 accused was no V21: s|gnWu:In1 nus 24' aowsad um arrested SP5 EH11: bIuaman| pammg ana had mnuscam SP5‘: swan card In yawn emvylmu mm was sun u-mm spz also (calm-d man u was ml 2” acwsed who took me me me murmnn macrlne and ounhvcaled sw- husm documlmi me am amused’: ml: w-s mung me cumin wmls ma 4'» amused was m charge at‘ guarding me 4 Mann pmseommn wilneuz: ‘Mm were delamsd m me mam mm during me rad ma 5" accused‘: me was In we spz and man she la IPK KL m sm 5 sum xs aner me an n wns mm the 5*» mum 33 mm wmmclod SP2 In sulrendnr me mm m 01- smw x5 at me bclemenl nilklnfi more an mum summed wan! up In umuuus Saslrs u-‘mam [124] Appmxvnatae\y2 wosks zmenne mld.|I1e 2-2 4- and 5"'a:cusod had had tome mscovevy av memes Clearly Ins emence mm; mm In: 2w‘ 4" and 5m accuwd I-amalod IM mmmxssm cl In: mm as may moewed paymeul as an mdnnzemenl lo mmmu um um: [1251 A; lo! we final element, m am not mean when were mm be a mumn mm" m column Ina cnmma\ ac! musuy cnmmmad and our man ms accused Vs uM\ma|eIy dmrged As mated m Ihe case of msnir V sun: 0! .um..n.n AIR IBSJAII su, me mud: in numuanu ollrve mmmon mlenmn‘ was added to make paws, aclmqm mncen. Iushleim An act, wan: mnemuyma an munaea hymam‘ mm nu am. Home mmmernnoeallhe\rwmmcn\nInn!.-1n the man wuuld me! have bun riqmmd u .u n mcommanmmnmmpc-m an Imemnn he no me very cnrmna\ am done me] Relemw .9 Ina case above. the zw, an m and 5" aowsed had earned aul mm mles m «mm In: w assumed in the M mm; Ilse mam prusoctmm m......s‘ detaining the M. pmseculxm wnnussei m the main mom and mm ma mm Moms out at am. um...“ we clemy am: done .. mmm of M common mlunlmn m. avlnu ma. nmurvud .1... m. M ..m cm-lad u. mlerwuvenlnk mmnmmawum . Seclmn m. munnnon 1:) ohm Evident: Am 4950 [1211 Far use ac relereoce, wl\us1ra|\on(n)hu seclmn m av Ins Emenoe A41 195:: V: revue-sums Iutow ‘11A.CounnMypN¢ume exlsleuze ammin link The ma may pmsunw me sxmms M any rm mm. .7 mm: lfltc/y to have happened, regard bang ma In my common caulse alnamral events human can-ma, and public and pin/are busmzss, In men mam to the fans or the pamcular ms: n sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! no war! may»:-mm. 1.9) mm a man who .s m possess/on ovum. goods sown ..ap...m. mall .5 mu ma mm... m Nlxlwdlhl goods mwmg lhem to as mu»... ....:m n. W. ma...» re. ms posmwn um sum" 114 .u..smo.. :3) at m: Evnumx Au wso .. a one at a was ov pmIump(rmIoWIcLwNch as mm m Snhvon em-..=.. Vol 2 mm sum page 1515 - Bu rwlhmg mom mu. Iogmal mlsmnou arm. .....1m- 0! um um drlwn Imm amarnmvadmkrvown fads wunauuns help olany amfiaulmhss amw ....1 may are always mmmshle‘ \nu\he1wcrdi,n means that asme consequence at me mm! at an mma\ sane: M lads by one unity. the Cwn may wasuma Itve exmeme or happening .11 .. sopanm ad or evenl. mites were .5 a.. planznlou or evidence «a mu contrary The v-«.....pu.... undar um». «um Vs one mm the mm has dllcmlmn on mm-. In mvnke e. nm [129] In mg ml: am... Kok Clwovm v a man mu 44 n was me: 0... Cass: av man at rm/mug wnan ma mly .....m.:. ngalns! m. uwua /5 m. puxlvsuovl alpvopony mcsnfly mm. 7»... mu m mlflym . dun by ms...:.rm, maynnfiy in mm upon not so much .9: case: was... the law has us! a bwoen orpvoorupon er.» accused. but rumor as cases me... me Iaw has gvven speusl ngnmcanae m a aerlaun um al m..=....s......... ewderwe, namely, me possession alslolen goods. The /aw Ls me! such pnaeesmn .. m my/.wa.m or line then .a. moewvng umes: :xp(5mnd, mo] Assuming «a 12.. High Cowl Vn Pub: Pmuculovv w... rum R-Illm kiln Wan Ihhdlin man a nu aw. them arelhme nmma Ihal must be pmm ass... w¢1\onH4\lIus4ml\a»(3\I‘an be vwokvd and mvyare: 1|) man 0.: pmpefiy .s smlen. 1... dual .. parlnn .; ... pbssesswon Mme 9mneny.au.1 nu) nu. mg ml soon .1... um um sm ,mm..sgM..m.»... 3‘ “Nate 5.... .......w... .. ...... .. my .. .n....u.. mm: dnuumnl Vfl .n..m pm... mu Fur me am man, u m endnnlly mm mm ma pvnplrly - Kmlen at line mmplananl had ‘caged . whoa wan, axmbfl P7. may Fm me semnd crvllna‘ n reqwesa pssumo be m possmmon elm: pmpeviy In me mmnl case were ma, me Lmdsncs shows that me memes were lmmd to be m In possession olme 21:-...a sw -ccusad Al u had Mada an same: nmmg man m. 2“ accused: dusmvevy was Inadmslmh nmma nnl mclnaa In morun «om «mm In: z~= amused here For {ha w ma 5'" uucund mu mnmu were me... m mew ruapacllve raarems houses. Both M Ihu amwad had mu vlIv!|I:a\ capemiy to spend. spmlge‘ Iuvesl. av us! marshy mdelhe memes as may please To my mmd me 4“ am 5“ accused had we mm, cuwudy and mmumon oilhe monies They had Imemgenl and cmsuous possessmn Mine slmeu memes rm: pvvve: men may ma pomssm av me prwany as name we case 0! Puhllc vmucumnw... Mend nan... um wu. am an mm.) [131] FurIMfina\ mm Mvequlres Ihallna pmpanylaund Wu non anumum and ms ounnmes mm M: pnswsuun of the slmen nropeny m be (away Ieoenl There are no um and mu mles about Ihe mlmmum ar maximum length: ul Mme Much smma Lapse m on1erIm| ma plusumphun may or mm mu m be dmwn em use mum dnpund on nls own set 01 Isms (1341 Thu - lzxmud gm mmmuuun my: me moms: ware mddan m m. mnmavs house m Kuale Kam-par nu 22/9/zma, around 15days aner lhe ran wns carried nul al sasua urnzm. ms an be seen .. axmmn P54 Fuv ma 5'" accused‘ he gave miuvmnllun manna memes were hpdden wn us parents‘ Mus: m «ma sarang Ssmu| on 23/90013. amund 16dny3n1\ev(hB mu nus mu be seen m email was 11:51 A501: mums: were lad ny me 4" and am .m....a uulma 1:! man Lumpun nlmnwm Kuah xangm Perukand m Kain Swing s-mm, Km-n lup-cflvaly‘ mm lmnhailmu man ulamund 2 week: Manny relsvanl and m: In Vang ax In uucludu me apmmmnn L110‘: prerxumvlmn m this case. as sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ms] Cunldnmg all mm crnnnnn hnvl hem pmvsn n .. Mn la ma caunn on nvmamcv nnnns Dhesummnon should apply \ win to (In: case on un-nnopnu Dnnloamnm Sdn am y um: unasnanna wnn Mn n-mu [I955] 2 pm :15 where N was new man» -premmpuonuorlaw anngm In D: used only Wham my use rs mrcllynecessary lo! the ands av jaws: May an! umarnnl/y nmansmna m my sense man ‘sioppa/5 Ms odrou5' and mm mm... snauld my D: -ppm when! a nmssnyronnz Dw arnmmu u m Baxarmhla v EInmII1E7U} asu 525, 529‘ on mama nnoynmvenr the noun «am asuerhmtrvg ma mm mm sisouldbc pnme Dbpcl A7! a [udrnzal masnngannon, and mam rv they are a/Iuwed Ia nw/nplym exoess me mu mu bewmo drvwwd Vmmrealnfyand wnft /we among bnmws or 1!: cm! [1371 Gmdod by lhe cases mam/a,I am 0! nm wewmaludmn11A\l\usIral\nn(a)M (M Ewdsnca ~.n 1950 a avphcltfla anmnny on In mu on my nnllam ma Consequennafly the maennnany burden ya naw amnnaa an Ins amma In iuwunllor their possmann 0! ma mamas . sxnnann I1A.lIluslnIlon(u)nlII\e Evldcnal Au nsso nu} Anamer ma lhI| wu pmm-d out by Ike aacnnun aannmn was man nnna prnilclmun had iaued |a can run vnlnamas Hm. nnn. Cmmu mvewur we we Ina Rm 5 Imlhon m sn>n and seam the lawyer wnna drafted (ha bcipokl irvernnfly wan auteemenl behueen sun and 5P3. Hence‘ mus mun should nghfly am an ndvelse mlerews under secnnon um Iliuslmmn Ig) ullhu EvnenoeAc1195l7 mo] Sm n-annm man we memes amuunlmg to ma 5 munun man he reumvou on on 1/9/2013 wu mam - Cmnete lnveslur nnawavan, mana wn! no «em. :2! wnlian agreement of any sun lmwnu sm and ma Chi vesicr SP1 (mum mil ma sad nmasnmem am ml reqmm any son on dowmevvlatnm as men was a specmc mannur in any om and execnfle sane and pnnmnam uf oomvaruer asvscnalfl In mnnenmn mm ma mmpam9s' shares wmch nrnce canml be defimlely fixed sm nunrnanesmea men he um um ma any pamcmar aarealvnem as he omy dean wmn a 37 am ynvaLv\ksgMnEvMDpn1A “Nana snnm nmhnrwm a. med w my n... mmuny mm: dnuumnl VII mnmc wan mum at mnucwu and lhu cash memes nrnwnlww In ma 5 mfllmn wu m I-:1 lurme bakance Dune sum M a an. [no] spat mm um um ms mesugamn on me udenhly cl Itus Chwvese nveslnr as stated by 51:1 and SP31 hm am laflmad ma|SP1d\d not «my reveallhe udenmy no um: Cnmass Vnveswr Noweuev, SP1 mums!-1 ma! mnumuu.. as he an nolwanlla mm. mvulofl psrsonnl “my [1441 Fumlarmovu n m wvna to he mm 591 and ma Chwluxn rwltlnr warn cavrymg out mega! am/mes Much wwld mduda me memes stolen m «ms cuuenl use befuva mu, m \sno|lurme|a mnsuderlh.I|selcuflaclsasmeveLsamnherlnmmlnnhalmaller As Leslnfued by swzs, upon he! \rwesI\gaI\an, sms lnundma|SP1 had oomuclnd mznlpmanon av mm but again‘ as n have s1alm.|hns was rm Ihe change mm was bmugm bums me mmymnmemmn I’hnm!om,\m1I\na Lflargumem vs Vrmevanl [1421 Desplla nu my awe, 5931 had earned om uflequnla wwusltgilrnn In WWII that me memes ezusled and 01: msnmoms Mme mam vmseculnn mamas m mun ml cmmbcrme and do um oummdncl wnh ma alher may Annmur vnlness that was not named upon lay me pmsaumon was ma wwmr who mm In bespoks mmny Vuan agreement‘ axh|m|F12 Asl me men mm, In: ngnemem muld luv: I:-In btrlar wurdad huwevnn mu pan um Mines: Hand um be caflsd w he were mly In mqulglmn what he ma mum m 912 Plus‘ a mm mm: ware to we zvmnce nmsade allha main wardvnus nu ma agraarmnt u would M course hugger umon 92 01 the Evidtncn am am as prewouny ralud am obpcted to try me accused‘: mumex The accused‘: counsel can/\o| Now no! am can an ms pamcmav pm nu] Nu pumcum -mm M wflmsses .5 ruqmmd m mm! In: pmsawlmnl clu rm mm .5 -uqum n ma quaily v1~M|Mnsn{Merb mm... m .4 an Evldunu m ma; ms nmsrecumn‘: dams-on or um ulmg mess Mn vnlnesses no um cmzxa a scrlws nap nu ma pmseomms use an: Iefevunu xi made Io one case ur Tech Nae any. w PP[1ilT|1IlL.l zza. I e\so retu m me case mam Knum Lona vvp [me] 1 aux no where n wn: held mm ma mvocahun ac seem an usualum Kg) sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEwDwA " mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! cum mam Ad 1050 ncflscnlsannry ma mu mlndltnry wmnmma Yhn mun .. geuarnlry mucum vu draw om mvamnul swans! ms Dmincuhun as me p-mcmm. cannot he lettered by any nhfigaluon tn I:a\l a pemudar mm: Tha duly of me pruiawhonnto Dmvensnzse msmmmgeawoom.. alnswaym a\lowIhed2lenoe am op»-mmw In real Ms mama n .5 lm umlged M) an luv the delenoe [us] Fur\Mnmve,1M vmssunmn 5 may V: m mu ml neeennry mmam. Mm um niunmli to In unvouxng -2! ma "mm. at me an av ma Dmlumlmn m amav m nrlamlsh 3 Prime Ynie use at me had .1: me Dlnysumen use um huvllfi am:-gnu ma! duty. the uouncanwl draw an adverse mamme me rm Com! m Pu Pmncmm v c . Loony Fno[2001l]6 nu was stated as Inflows - u .3 wan sowed menu a 1>1mIma/ ms! prosucutvng murvsvl puma-4 mm .s no Mow malrve. Has a du-crenon as to whether arnal m call any pammlar wvmen mu m parncular Ivar a drscmmln not :9 can m supwrt um: cast: a wvmess mom he does not mm to be . mm anmm (see Kl-«om cnre Hm vPP[1as1]ML./ v05). Bu! mam Is an an:/ganm on me Dmssmbon m 121/ as wimsuss persons Mama .mm 7: auennu! In Wm AM ,..y.m upan whmh .1. use .5 but-1{.Ias Slfllvmlhll V arms): All 5: any Thus .1; Army Rarrud cxwarays; (as he mm was) mm m rm. Hoe we VPP new 1 MLJ 220 am m Nmmmm, 4». mm mm m as)! at nu! ma ml! a minus mummy a witness mm mm 5 flnlemenl has om mm /5 always m. nglll of rm nmsowbovv (Abduflah Zawam V P» [was] 2 Mu vs J rnmr as me Mal mm 5 mncumed, Rs duty rs nswvttnlly m deude whvmslan ms evidence bafove yr ma ptoseml/on has moved its case, and 1/ men an urvsllslicfovy Voamros m me pmmmon case to «mm mzm, mmnngmolsunn ;..:ms,1».p.m:m.o..n.s.:.n mm mpmomym ,...m.m mm (Abmur-n Zswlwrs c...) ms me auesmn m be sued m each use .5 whether the pmaecubon has prom (I: am awn mm: calling sumo olrm wnnassn mo an my/um. An ndvarsl mlarunct unnul o. dmwn for rum n cal! an wllmu Man Ma ,.a..a.n..=.. Ira: drsclrurgnfl rt: um... (sic N-mauymm 4 Or: wp mm 2 sm ynvamksgmnzvuupu 39 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! ML./ 336. Kadrr bm Awanq yps-(19991 2 ML! 33; ./nu/r bun Mans-m y pp 119901 2 MLI ma, Lom Ya/ng Sien y PP[1994] 2 gm 257; * . Muklug on mwkl. lonm ovuu motile: mum! and In Iohnonlu In pane. cunmdy me] One at me mun: tamed by Ihe nccuwdi cmmsel wnx mu Ihw wouculnn could not prove man ma rmmas Vmmd upon dscovery were me very um. mamas M were allegedly men by IM accused lmm S.I:1r= U—ThanL n was pm In his prusawlmn wnlncsws espechily me raldmg umnels mm liners was no nenvmcalnn done at wnagss lakzn m uuucnam ov In venly on me Ldenmly nflhne memes [111] with due vupam, Iha mnmu In a than can ulnnm m plxea an pm mm rvvumesln n unmnnpnq ovbdbevy ma Ina care ovum u: in mnum lo I): pmvan by me mosocmson max [ha pmvsny slolen I: we camp\avnanl‘s nmvany In taunt at one‘: awn rmney, many a pemm wumd rm make any sun ufrnarkmas mm wuuld m any wnydspmmale ns yam Furlnemme, mbo¢ymlhe\H1a|Il mm wumd M down each and may sena numhen no me banknote: may have .n thew pmewan as mnnuy .. meanna in dual! wllh on nn myyany basis nu] mm m VIM: case amanawnsq urbflbery vmevelhavu wumd be mnrkad money uvlrap money M1 any sense As I have drscussed eamer w my ‘udgmem. ma menus do baking m we mmmmnam [1401 we accusad : counse\ am sngglslad mauhe mumasfound ny me vesoecuve raldvw emmvs wan! no| Ihe mama slman «nun 591 ms was duo no me lanl ma: srs laumod ms nu ma nheckad Ina um...» nun «nun Ina mmlvnd ma 5 m|Hrun usury ma bank mle munnnu machme Thumfare al me mama ulfic - Vound some mouiers mu mu m mew ma-no packets lmm rupedrve Hummus! Irummlonsy 4: Vs pnaposueromnan those were me same morhes mal use we lhrouqh me my name naummg madame 4n sm nvaLy\kSgMnEvMDwA «w..,’. smnw nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my n. .mmn.u-y mm: dnuumnl y.. muNG Wm! «a spa / \nsna:1or5abndx bm Sibn 19 my — ASP loo: Ah mm 20 spn Vnsoeclnr Mnhd Immsnam pm Tamng @ Oiflmnn 2: sm — ASP Wayanmana bm Abdmlzm 22 922- ASP Wan Muhd Fams hm Wan Musuh 2: any ASP Knmml Azmum hm Mum zam 2» sun — uupaam Rmm... mun Munamad 25 sw:5— ASP SrI\Ha1arbm|IM\:hrnad 26 sv2s— Somavsundram A/L Saevwamam 27 spar . Kumarzn NL Narayznesamy 25 sp2a— Rahum Khan mu Narukanl 29 svn— ADP Lall Mama bum Mauser an sp:o— nsp mam Am am Awang mm. :1 spat -ASP sow A/L Sub:-Imumam 32 sp:2— ASP smmz.n hm Smelt m M lhe pmecmon stage‘ the Complainant SP1, had teamed mm be reserved a sum at we 5 mfllkzn on 7/9/2015». cash com me monies were sasd m hefmm a Cmna mvestm mum spa wlemyl In as Huang Fang. On ma| Mam! may around 9 50am. spu Vnslmaed SP2 In mum me monlm lmm . mm .« Pawlnun Rank!-vlc-I WI-an recavvmg SP1sms|m1:1nms,SP2 was acwmpanhea by sm, SP5 ma SP27 hr mum mwmn my SP2 um mllscud cm manic: 1». mar (mes pvosecuflan wmnosui warn ms|mcIed Io wan an Fnnuv Conn nusnnav neamy Vn amlher ac SP1s car, one Mnsubmu Tmon WXL sass 5:22 ms howsvev ammaamas by SPI‘s mend. one Malay man vmo led me my «mm pm: cw: NospIla\ Vov spz up main ona cmme man um SP2 mama mm no arms SP1‘: Toryola Fmlunav wvc ms m mnna lbs momu 1| Pa»/H-on Raumncm mqlllur wllh lhe Mllay man um lmvmu .\ m. pmvmsos‘ um Ma\ay man and SP2 m Ilnp by me Ionhy to man up the saxd cm»... man Theleafler. SP2 was «on: |o want an the basemnm parking wmle mm lhe Malay and Clmsse man took Ihe emaw upslalrs The 2 men appeared moments later nmgmg 5 mm; and clue boxes mugmy mu swze 01 a1 A4 pavev These bans was loaded No me naym pmumrs mm and suhsamuenfly‘ 5P2 dropped me omega 5 sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [150] on ma pm, Imam man the ms 2 mIHmn WI! Dnunlod usmw mu mm nous cuIn1|V|‘9 ruumm ai Iusflfiod by sps However‘ Ieamed cuunsel name Accused has ovedoaked ma um mm mm was anolvwv RM? mm. nu ma Mme sale Duxas m wu| we Saslra U—man| ms RM2 mum was nevev cmuaexamned Mme accused’: ummselan ns mm, mm m ptasbc humflesur m loose cash As spa wasme person Wm M; 4nsmma by 0-; w nccuud lo open and um an the sac box, 571: mm um me nnnnnnl kmmadga on um um nl ma am mllson n nun guns Ilmugh spa‘: | umony and such Ilualmm wsva nwlrwhd m rm [151] n V: min haw Mal vanure |o cmssexa me 5 mmess wmm ammm| lo an ameprmwce av ma umdawe Releranoe Is made «a the Com 0! Apnea! use 01 Unsunl hln Rnsad VPMBII: Pmsenutm pets] 4 mu «.3 1251 The ream .7! one my to cvnsx-axunlma m. muss. olllvs ad!/nus nnny. by mm lo mm 01 my me vsrsmn arms story Imsl be lahen m mean that mm of the ndvevse party an that Isue ma been acvepledxs me mm nes, wow Swse on/n V ;=;=1vm1u~s 13511941] v MLJ 212Iand A 5 5 Census! V II v Damemm [v95v]AIR cm 359] Oleamse, mu ms. «rain olfinrmn V Dunrvlvaflll s R 57 m ma Nllshury m m. Enghm Haws: L1! Loni; manna Ina rwowina ‘/I seams to me In be absolutely assaults! m 1». pwpcr 0006112! on cause, when 1: vs mhmind In suwwu mar . p-mm: mm.“ It ml speakmg Ih: mm. on a PM/only Wm. to am: In: am;-vlmn In the rust vy some auoswm pun m woswxaemnaoon ' pa; rm rma nu: smnl Dncnmo m. gold =4.m.m, »u...y»., Iuyudlng now . ans:-cxamrnalran ought to ». mnrmnvd by mu: counul Pumnv who‘: can to me rulevanl acrversa pam mtmm during men arm:-aiarmnalmvv .s not mwbly .1 matter ollsclvmwl pmasdme marinate /rrwovmntly. 1: rs also one of :ub§anna(1usace u masts m snwrs mm: 1:: mo wrmsss and to the mun My man! gives an oopommtly m the puny m putlm can In a wlnlss in me rm 0! my con»-mcnm, man he D/Ins m maka lo M: malrmony A. such, where . puny rm lo emunmm. . M nvnmm av on any Dar-Insular pan of /1, was All m. pvlwnlaypcal [on the ram at mu mum pm-ton m cmuaxnrrlns sm ynvaLv\kSgMnEwDwA “ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Pwv an the alloyed us. ola pumng by my aaeoasm mm was armaunl: to an rnwlrud acwptamv ormaewaenceanannsr penyr: nulaflmledia muangc iflatetlsee Ibvaxanwle me was an: v Wood Green Crown Com! ex P Tsyior [1§v5lC0m LR 5791 “ [152] Anoltver xssua man was posed by Ina accused's munsex was ma\ liver: was a mmepancy \n we amount m monies luund dunma the ram and me amount (2! meme: max ms re-counted m open court and upon Iaonmcamn mum; exmlzvts may mm cmlad av: oump\:\n\ng man»... rm bun Any mm cnm\Imnd\I:Hmm me nukes iulcl wn rm-ulmume vxmbwlsnnlhvscasa‘ ma nmpmmumw mxltha mm- .s not below: me x um mnva man xanified mm based on Ihe evidence arveu by me vandvng officers and sum as val! as sm that Im mamas sauna were ouuntm and documuned pmpeny as hum! In me Bovang Sevah Menyemh namely zxmbvls M3. P5», P52, P57, >71, ms nu, ma. m. m and m Tms Vs nm a new lar me nrmaumun Io prove [I54] In a -mumn, I am mclmld In Iwwve man (he rssuel rmsed by the aucma‘. cuumx an mam rad henmns m (hos |mi . ummnnnucim Mmovlivi uy maln Pfnseculion ...n..e....(ss2, SP4. so»: and spa) may coumex lo! the Iacunsd mm mm mu m... on u. I ml nl Im pm!-cul-on Ia can Ina mam pvuleclmw wmsm umeyswz, sw spa mud sue tn n1-vmfyu-a mnmes mm wen velnavod upon mswvery mm were smlen «mm me bnsamvnt pamm and mm A—B~6 Sasha U-Yhanl, Assam-nary. lame to do so mum mean mm were was a max m me mam or evnflence nu] Now Inc nmmu mm Mm ulrlwed upon mscavnry was not la the m\qma\ com or «mm: mm may have m wn... :| us noun hum Slilla ulhum Maneuver‘ ma mama: were sphl up ammsg m. mum am wma o|7wrilha1wweu\|sd mm A1 sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Drmiumnn mm.» more was ma an .m.m=. Mum um 11! the mdmanu ullhe stulen manna um an-chlngod a Dan M the slnlen mums: ha mumvsd m . manly cw-anger hence cnsngng Ihs angina! nalum wfulm ollhe money [151] In ms smmlmn, m wuulfl be mm meanngxess snd redundnm cm In: mu pmmmm wnnesses m be mugs ur rrcallsd 101 ms purposes M Vdmlwlng Ihe mm. Al I have expmlnnd mu... m my pudgment may have Been wnsxslenl vn latmyllvn mm the movuasda a. ma nu Inch humnn .. upon Ihnm to ma down an» Ind wavy sanal numbers or Iha mums: mmxvifl am mm um um use sam U—ThsnI Even spa Mu: ms mm»; as SP1‘: nnanuax am wal um srllnmld mm me may no pl am eweIylIansa<.1>on|nal 5?: made [1 5:] n Mm new mysefl m the Fedeml Court case at Sn Ah mm V Public Pvvncmol [mo] 1 mm 75 when n was named (ml u .5 unmessmy m cm! Ividenua lo nnwn um mm _ nu ma-K m Ina mm 0! Manna u um mm mm mckad up In: nbw-:1 a| um scene pm-iuoad n and mammun u as mat my uluecl man \s enough am nma - no need to an every n|!-wernflnzervmn mu-mm u unless Ihove ‘s duulrl as 10 me nenmy [155] In the mmenl case before (VIE, ml Ina mlmng Mflcms have aheady been! called m mm, an mom: lnal were «own «man ducavery For my 04 ucenlmg mysatt, x wamd 1.4.. mm up my am, findingl Ina! u .; mm” um um rnnmg uflluus mun pm!/en mm the man... wave a pan av the oomulamanfl mm mama: [mo] Acourdwnam n \s my Mdgnerfl mm mm mmg eonauaua a mawwm ewlusmn M an credlale evmm made avaflable before Ihus Cmm, n find mm me ehamsms ul Ihe Mleone cl men under mm mamas have al been named by me pmuuIIuJrI,su:h|ha|a puma facrecaseln rapsd um. nhargcv agimsl Ina accused urtdarl-cflonl :79 me: sea at Ina Pmnl Coda ma bun eulnbhlmd mm. m amuad m called In nmlrmewrdelenm sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvHDwA “ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 1; mi nzrsuczrs use [1511 The Wee nptnns under “mm 11301:) of an cm: were explalnefl in live aewsau mmugn lhewcnunsel and EH01 me accused won me we iwom amenee In me wllnus box The oevanoe had called a wvtneses nxmlaws sm . Mulvfl Znm hm Pnrlgcheng / w accused so: . Mum um: Armlrbm Ayn-n we wanted so: — Sham mm mm... / an mum sm— man Rmzuan om Rash mm amused sn5 — Rolyaldv hm Anuzv / an accused me —A5P sham Hezreen Shahnmin mm the m:I:Annfl‘s duly u I»: and M In: dahma case .5 In rune . mnsarmme doum amen lhe pvmeculwonk can: R.ver.nee .s mm home case 0! pp y cmwm Eon Soc mu] 2 cu ms were nwas hem ashHuw: - ms /wvdamenmflhal rllsnot /or me dzlancz to pmv: anyfmrlg andmalafl .5 rammed old Is m rundurnn mrp(uua!»on wmch rs reasonable and probable ma ma. cast: . daubl ellluvr N In the Imllv ol 1». pruuoulmn or as to ma gum ollm aawsw‘ nss) In a mmen, me acI:uIed'i mam dalenoe was than were ms only 5 tom! av Rm 4 man In um A454 Snsha u-mam and ma sum was nnmry seized by me amused dulmq um ram secom. me memes mum lmm urea“ am 5* nmuwd we-e ghten u, an: Junam lam Sam. ma znv accused‘: bmlhev m law. and nm the Imus av ma cnme N we count’: nurv A! we sun or we cuss nu] me duly 07:31 me mun hears at me mncbuswn av Ihe Inal is N eensmar all evdeme pmduued by bum me prusecmmn and me defence am In aeaae nmelher 4.: sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA «me smm ...m.mm be LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ms! the vrmaunnn has pmved nu ma bayenfl mm...» dnubl Thu .5 n ma dawn und2rs«:Iion1I2An1I9Io crc ms] The Fwelzfl Coull m m hlmmln Raujnn V PP[Zfl1J]4 cm 2: aamea as cuuows ‘Al the uDm:VIl&On om»: Mal. s 192» am»: cums: Pmeeduve Coda wnasvs a duty an me mar mm In mnsrdsr M1 ma swdamx adduced mm 2: and to decide wnemel me pmsecmmn r-as pmved as 12259 Dsywvd rsasaname doubt The mam nlmc accuxsd must be mnadsmd In the rum, 0/ Ina mum addumd by we pvvsucullon, as m)! as m I!!! Am: ol the wan-camp/rshod pnnapm .nu»aa:.u in MI! V PP[1V6.7] 1 ms 52, pm: 1 MLI zaa mm rvgavdm me approach In In rum m tvalualmqmo tvvdmae aims dc!-mos “ ma) I Mm mlal mm Vuldnuvk case at Mn V vs [ms] mu m where u mm ‘The count law of Magrsmslns to wppfiy n: as mum rr you nocvpl the uxplunatlm gvwn by at on behalf olms uccusmi you n-us1 ulaourw amml Eu! mrs does not ennlle you m conwaflyou do not behave that explanation. Is! he rs sew crvlmvd to an scams! .1 u mm m ynur mmd 5 rsmmable mum as to ms gum, as my arm: at pmmg ms gum /fies Ihmughoal on me pmaecuuon u upm on whom evidence yuu um an In a mr mu: nVdoubL mo pmsocumn has Imlod lo salmly mu anus amaummu. lrl: uyun u mm The flefmnnon I1HhatuIvn‘rsammbleduuM‘ ms emaaxea mm Hm. Cmm m rum Pmsecmotv Asxmy bin Achoi|2I11B'| muu 5:11 asmevouawm ‘[90] Resmnanb douhl m mmmal raw /5 ma! My aanolaaubl mans unnglrlary orsvvn ramnu An ul/quaint! dcm-when M reawnabis doublwaa given m the out MPP v Sarmm (sullillby Sllirrnl Jun/znts n Iouows It has again been ma lhal mmname flout)!’ rs IN dual)! wmdl mam yoalvestlate as tome corricmess aims mndusnn Much youruam rr umtev your news and upvvv yaw mmsmsnms, allot you have Iully mwstrgarsa ms eumme and conwamt n m all rt: pans, you say to sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA “ «mu. smm mmhnrwm .. u... m may he mmuly mm: dnuumnl vu muNG Wm! ymmm man: mg m gum than u u auatansbh mm hrs: am: who: sellles VI yuur ;udgImrv and mu .9 mstrng place mm 0! as somalrmes saw, .1 must be 5 mm 511 wlemn ma msaannar as to pmmme m we mmds onmum szme umnamry axle me vent/av m be gm A reasanntve ummm-usm a aoumansmgrmmms swdsnm or wan! al swdsnve and sauna! 5; In Amegmsry awn: u numocrml umulnlod la ov/dance - rue noun-s rmmues mu ANALVSLS AT ms sun or m: DEFENCESCASE . I'M monlns at Imll LI-A sum u-mun Condomlvlnm nu} Thu animus mwedlhs um mm aslnaydbd mm: nmsnculnn mg. mm 0.» mamas gem .n\ Suit: uxnann Cortdomxmnm unly Vulaled up to RM! 4 mnfliun and not a oenl more Then sum av RM‘! : mihun gem ws m\ec1adAn sxmmlD13. n was man posed lhzn :1 (ms mamas sewzea exueedsd RMI 4 mum. 1 wmld ml have 6: mm may 4 bmwn mes as mu be seen .. emlbm P5. Tu lurlhar Wave mew vmnn ma defence snugm tn dauumslrala now me am : mm mm be verfecuy anangm m we 4 hmvm boxes um Ioqnenlzn mm Lha I brown nomana me am 4 mlmun he (amend Vn noun may Au 5 A71 aw acwxed laslmed mallhere were no monies immd 3‘ We buanznt ovsam U—Thm|ssVn:amed m we w ma-as [In] sum naa mum mal mmng me mm Iher: mass mm cl ms 9 .mmo.. m um! A.-.43 Saslm U-Thlnl and a mm: RN12 nullon an the basement spa m her mmmuan m auaimd mI|\uI\ma7yluIIrHl¢mI|be1ore(ha mud, the ma mauled . sum mm: 5 mm. mud mun mum Iwem vul Inlol ullhe 5wh\Ie and Mn: Dons mar war bruflqmbackhy SP2.SP4,SP5am1 swzv Domammglhc fiM5.5nH|hon am" by [ha Chmsw mvefluv when me amused men We premxlns, liver: was a renaming sum M RM14mIH\on on the fame and me remammu RM2 mnllon was xn sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! spr. we box spa was man mllrunlad |1ySD1 m pm m. Em A m. on min bvvwn bvxe: Aflsv doing so. spa was mm to ca me mam vonm mu sm, ma 1“ ax>cused.I2s1tlad um am; Ins and us wns me only one we searched 01: um! suz, sua and 504 were m meme at svsnmng guard my spz, spa and sps m me mam mum WNID sus was mumps m ksep an 9,3 out Sm‘ Sm, 504 and sos an Iasmed mu lheywem Vnlormud by sol ma! sm had mm a vow av Rm 4 mum «mm mm A-E-G Nawuvlr. mm nllhum nw mu morwl wan my own eyes and none M (hem mm/ad mu m...... lulu mm Thaw leslwnorw an we mule! Imnuss m uml A4345 .s 2 my olheanay [1121 In comparison to me Iesnmames anne pmwumon wlnasses mmay spz. sm, sps and rpecmcalw spa‘ all 4 m Ihem saw Ihe memes memssxm and Ilny also munlm me man!!! mgslhnr me lesllmony at mass : mam pmmmm wanelscs mm mnsmanl-rm nmvlL1fltammn|rIdIL‘l|d wan alch -flhsr um unable to -easonabvy Deleve mu Ihare was my n mm :11 pm 4 nulhun m um! A-5»5 Sanra U-lhanl as swayed by the defiance me» me are A pmsacmunn wtlnessas mm are able to we a m»r>y~mm. acconm an how mp mums wave mm-um to null A456 M m we basement or Sasha U—Than| 111:] On lop ol Inal, sm Iaaurm Ihax M man In: sum 4 mum. an the ulwmpllon out n m. ..«.:..a m nnagul emu» pnmrzularly dings Nawuvar, mam WI! um um. «mm auha Winnie: AI npx Kuma Lumnun sm mslmnled 5P2, SP4, sps md spa 4.» mve a samwe almcrrlespedxve um um awarding «a $D1,|he unrve «ea msufls av an 4 oflhese pmsecuflon vnlnesses Iumad um puilwe as can be sew m cxmbtls mza, um, ms and we cenawy. wsm had genmnew men sprs prevmses an the pass that Iher: Wm drug muted acllvmss m me mm. sm mum have pmmmly chavgod spz SP4. sps ...1 spa Huwuvav. Vuv mama: wry knwm to sm, man: 4 pmlwulnon w.:...s..; W. mm chnrnud W In am. an [1141 we a wee naa pomled um um Iha prasenumn had «mum m rulneva m. o hmwn boxes 5: requeswd by cm datum Trvase 4 boxes were me hmnes mm contained me RM1 4 mm. sewed by the auwsed am the delevwe reqwrsd ma brawn bnxcs In avvnwms oourlme 4 bruwn boxesnuuld my hon RM14mnHmn home sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA 4’ «mm. Snr1|\nunhnrwH\I>e U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! bum AccDId\ng\y m Iccwad Man vuqusslnd mu m. RM! 4 rmlhnn (0 be bmughl -- la dannnslrila mwims rum Dulfld nu mm me sawfl hmu bum: ms; nsmuld be made kmwn Ihm flurmg live wmsu oflmstmh spc had filed In an apohmlnn nu ma own on 24134202: Var SP1's umes nmmmhlug tn RM3seo.ouo no that vms mm m D: vammed in mm taxman mm Yhe apwcaueu was «mu m be mm ou 29/a/zaza a| m Uflnn baton anamer maalslraln Yhe Veamsd mmlslrfllfi mm -mm ma Bpnhcalmn Ind Ina mnmu ware devalued min a Fm news-I Aoouum mm Mlybank smca (Human mas-2 may Despite Ims‘ I find mama aucusms Iequeslsrc bung M1 me RM1l mvlhnn and ma 4 mvwn boxzs an Vmmalznal sws during cross zxamlnahon (Lwfied |ha| durmg nu: ran‘ um ms Vnsmmed by 5?: In pm mg remaining menus an the fame amnummg In Run A mmnun {mo kzmwn boxes are \denM1ed mm 4 am... am: as -mm n amnbns PM!-Ann 2.. mn Inna: «um sun wls lnnmnlnd co wl u. me am 4 mlmon by sm tum 4 brmm baxu Iva aw) mu bamw mum down by me atnaed as mowu m axhm P5. Thus, u vs am 3 menu nfdvupmn om mm A bvvwu boxes my oonlam RM! a Imlhn‘ hm mere axlstnd ulnar memes In nue mm and me deveuu uas «am to admess INS Issue spa wu hercxarmnahun m cum slaled that she had omnlnd am 5 mmmn and stringed me mo 4.. 1 blue and Mule rm cum ms me She alsn dented out an In: mums: lrnm me we box. Navanhalessu mu dal-ncl uua asuwumy MI cm specnflr: um mgmg M uumn A may: dam-I wumm mun puma mwuamy duludaa Ihn pmsemllmrfs svudamx u m\ nmmm (sae Public Pmnculow uug Tu Nuall mu] 2 nu aw um YI1avufom,Ifim|hzHhe delenoe nl Ihe accused 1: ml belwevable. Yhu delsnue nlme accused u na| crsclma and \s we or hare zssennn I u=.«er myseflm 01: Conn K315519153! ln All nu bin Ahdulxh V pp (2111:) 4 cu 11: man u was new as none»: vuam, mm dams! or Dvvsanlmu u bin my uuuuzmuzm man /u M: am-uusraum ome pveseu: cans, mrmal muauunu msmorn mm m aoun‘saawplaIvL1ofcnvlanalronnflemdbyanamsltetlpersan muafbabassd mu reason and cummwv sunsu, and cannot be Mogscal Ix m:u:ua/ The zxtslanw or ruasoname dumb! I: dependent upon me lmzwlrty al evndoncs and sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA ‘5 «mm. sum mmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m may he nrW\ruH|Y mm: dnuumnl vu mum Wm‘ an is mmmnon olnlllhs mum in . hwurvdmulanubh mnnnarund M! m ranlalmvv' . wmm mu nucusld nu mcmuny nbmud the pnsummion Imdur iectlon114|I|nsItnIhn(:)nlltu Evi me. An mu ma] We no es! Cour! .n Ahdnllnh nln Ann V Public Pmueutov Ind oltwr .99.». main] I Mu 121 run we duvm a5(oHmn 1551 The llmdamenlal m. m mums! law 5 ma: me pmseml/an mm mm Ivory s/amen! olme mm charged nayund rwsormbll com, um Mal ma Iccunri bears no onus at Wm! Tm: gnnlrll mu rt nowtvw sumac! In uxclplmm as them 75 a mu 1.7 what ma nmucutron con 7 swlamy be fllpEdGL1)0D1lWU The engm oomman law aalhanlres mdfiad .2. am wnhun raw arrmvamery reeagmsa ma! ms mmum nwlam cases to smfl the onus to M: nccusvd to vxw/flals mmse/Vm mam smam These snuahans mcmde aersnm wmcn male In lads usaecmly Mm/rv me xnommge arms amused mcludmy no wot av mm: nulnanly, or Mama 5 slalmory pwslmlcworv mm. mu: - plflrcullr fault: pwlumod :9 ex»! unlux ma mmry rspluwd [see puma Pmuwlor v Gan Econ mm mm 71 3 ML./11A/mu Nude um. V mom Pmsemtor and Mvothur appeal (201914 MLJ 1 and mm. um um: v Pubm; Fvusewlol (2020: mm :17, 12mm cu 29) 4571 m mfii alpvuunuzhons m the wloerzamvxlollhe cl/mmartogallrstom may be mpweu Mus wivcvu a Jvanmzry msumpmn rs mvuksdm pmsums mu exmsnce or oena/n (am as berng the mgrsdrerll am»; ulfsmzs, 2m onus men shifts to me nccuwd Io msamw me Drssulned he! on the balance of pmbabmhes and m Irmuby uxcuwalo mmsen bum ms marge me does so, nu samsan sequins! Nne mm M n. rsgmlly alllln cling - mm The meme 0: so: and sns sgmnsl me drseuwfy 94 mamas a1Kua\a Kanusav and ma Saving Samnl msuacuvely Vs met me memes wae given by ane.1una\d: n... Sank mm no menu: ‘.2 be snz ; mom m law so: and sat‘. an not mm: Mme mum nhlamod the mam: hum nu! an may kmw haw much -mount ul mamas Junalm gm mu m (ham mdmdulfly Bum sun um SD5\5I1flsd|hn|.luna>d\mnl sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvMDwA “ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! wtm em a! lhlm upammry and meta Imoghl help lmm sm .ntt sns In keep mu momsiiov a Mend sm mu sus hmhu mtmsa ma! they kep| me names 91 meta Kangilr and Kata Saranu setnttt as K was safaris mp valuables a| men penanw house As on; Ime at defiance bmuqm lorward Dy tne accused VS naatea to live next wws. mm proceed In dtscnss lhe naxl utt- - Nnvuvlllablllly omtemt unmm [IIO] on at/tmozz al Ihe dose at We pinssuzlnxurfs us. ms pmwcumm rm Oflered Iwu wrlnnssssiu ms oelenw, namety one Pnrlhtbnn am the amntamma Junamt ntn San: The defence tnnntatw In tne mun tnat they wmm Ieuutre Ihe addvelsos Mmese wnnmes In Me event a pnnu tau case Ii made n-11 on In/z/202:: t nu-1 dscmsd um: um pnsmumn ma sutmassimly Dlwven Ks cue. On tn.» sums dale tn. mm. mraanlud that may wmlo be ulhnu Inc we wvlwinas mm by Ina Wosecuum and sums olhav wlrmwu man we yI| to be decnded me aetam agatn requested the sent witnesses nddvesses «nun ma pmsewmn an to/sauza via Iellec -uhuu| = nnmn was me mal msumsd on {W5/2023 tns dztenm um a Leltm lumlshnng me wllnesstes address lorme mm in product subpoenas, ma. the cam am an wanna. nm on 15/7/2023, taunaa counsel far we dofemsa mimmld Inn mm! mm tn. stmpoen. lndunmdvhm Sam mum mlbe mm as MS vmereabeuls welt tmknavm Laamad Deputy Pubic Pmseannr-udmltsd tntstam and salad lhalme Invesnaatmt: om»: naa seanched mate. a| ms Last knawn mates; btl ta no avatl. The defence called a mat M6 Mmesits and was «man In class is case as Junatat mum nn| be traoed. [10] n ts a well annmnatea pnnnpta lull . 1.1. Ind |uI1 mm mm be accorded to amt and very accma person ms pvinuma I! an uucvosan<:| mm 1 came! be samtn;-1 tmdevany uvcwnilances [tux me Cowl umapeat tn Publi: Pmuullovv Axnrwl bin vtmntzottt 4 nu 1| held as mm: sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDpuA “Nair s.n.t mmhnrwm .. tn... M my .. nnmn.u-y mm: mmn wa mum vtmxt man at me same Vnhby and spa dmve buck mu m. Malay man we Plume cm Hospilm mm, ma Mavay man parted mm spz The cum 3 Dmsaumun mm-ms, namely spa sps and spzv were sun wainrvglheru man spz rem/wed nu SN man anlured Ihe mv dmve hy spz Mme sps and spy was wznmg In ma am can we 4 pvunwlton wflnassas man Mama to Surla Sinner nms spz Vrulmclsd 5P4 nnfl sp-5 In lranshr ma 5 mm: .m blue bexas (rum ma mm. pommers mu mam: Mmmm Tnlmfs mm spz mum the -mm. he msxmmnd SP4 am15P5 |aImns1arIm mmmmmcana mumwu mlnauflbemu Vmkrwed SP2 aka lesufisd Iha| these hm-:5 wave me: opened no va mm mm m um-2‘ m1wevev,SP1 rm msdusad ezruerln spz mattmse boxes oumamed 3 large sum 94 rmmus [121 Alterlranflumng me sad huxa: an 4 0! me Dmseculmn wlnauns warm to spva omoe at uml AM Saslra umam commmmum Trvers, spz parted live Mnsubwsm mm. a| the basemenl nzmng and SP4 went In lake We service eievalm upvnahs Hemen Ielumed In the basemenlparkmg wllh a lmHay Acwvdmg Ia sp:, n was mound :1 man. Mum he man live lmfley lmm sp1 ; emu: Nsa, A. new ma« spa wla slvudy mm ma china («:1 ma swhlle and Mun boxes were loadea ammh-1\mI\ayan¢ SP4 Ingemervmh SP5 went up agam Mm me waded valley In SFl‘s me am. the salvne ulovawr Msanvmfle. SP2 mm SP27 wok he passengev He»/aim M Afifia me mam were pm m Inc may mom SP2lIvevn\nsIruI>1.ed me Imus to he npumd and u was allhal new mm sp2. spa, SP5, spa nnd spzv sawlhal Imsg buzz: eununnau mums SP2, spn spa nnd SP5 cmmlsd ma mums: Iogallser mm. ammmtnd m we 5 mxllnn me murwl were MI (Mn arm: tn sps nu Subsequeafly. spz raouwsd a phone can mm spv vaqwslmfi Rmemmnnoa m be given to spn. That sum was in D9 given to spa mm mm be waiting 2| ma Sank Eangsnr spz man asked Ior me mqx-cued sum «mm spa Much she Imk nu| Vvomme Rm 5 m|IHnn Altavll my run Inn pmaoomn spa va4:oun|edIhs mmalrunq rmxual mm a bank nu|u ummllng madame and n zauauaa up In pus v rmmun sm ,nvm»ksaMnzwum «mm. saw nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my a. nrW\nnH|:I mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-max -1231 lm‘ clvar law ma: wmn minutes vs oumaoyma woauumon 1.7 ms delsnva .1 ma mm m casu rm ma uoucuzm n rs Inn Dom-uisn duty of!" pvosecunm In em these wflnusxu for nu dollmx rm mo amass ohms dun/, me pvusucunon tans Io mm rms ob/Aganon the accused must be aequmed 1261 n was abhwutnry lwlm nroucubon to secure Instr ntlmdlmau am my were alhvvd as mass: :9 (M dc/um: Sum lam»: ma mwsmea a mrscamaw orwsnm “ Llknwwu m um. nvsum can he pmsocmnn has me houndtn duty to leave me anendnnce A11 mm Evin n mam. -mum rm Elva ravuumna nvklerwe Var me aowsed. u does no| detract «mm me pmleulmlfs duly ta pmduce mm m own may run» miavlo In: case ms Conn :11 Apvaal upm-d as vuuwr Ihudflln om. V pp (201511 ms nu vmurema 151111 /5 uysu! :1.» from Mt show nmum olma rm. and mu pmgmant ma! Kunllnn Kamiasamy, Avmwir Yaw! m1 Moawunnlh snmm Khawn were deeded new on ma pvivlmng rm: am: cwwmslanooi m ma» caws Thaw cases nearly showed that me Durvaple reqanlrng the duly pl [ha pmsecubm m sea»: ma attendance afar: alvsmd wmess rs olvlyapphmblu yr the wnnsss uflemd .5 a malenal or vucrul vntneu Ia me «stem, m mo nnsa ma! Ins/Mr awoena rs a/mu necessary In the unloldlng olme defence‘: case or Ian mm llva -ccuud In rarsmg a mmams doubt /n ma pt.-mmm cu. in ma.‘ . rum». lo ucuw nu/nuanmanm mu mwma the Acnuwd in that «r ha: dspnvnd m wound or an aaaonumry to amw mam» ms defsnm at In miss a masanshlu mm m ma prasmmows I::I.w /n sum a umlmstancs .2 can he said that me amused has been aepvwed afa Ienr and ms: me! much ummutalycausuda rmscamage uljumm to render has mnv/mun unsafe ‘ ma] Revevflng an m Ihe use new: me, 504 and sat; bum iashfiod man may renewed me mamas vmm Junalm aam Sm and spa mm mm man. mqueslea Ihem us new lhe mm: my a mend n \s avso parlmem lu no|e ma\Junak1\wzs\n1ac1 sm ynvaLv\kSqMnEvHDwA 5‘ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! cauuhl Dymva =11 nu wamg Omt>3vs,SP1fi mm am 35 mIHmu mm mm and mm \s found n pauce report THSL zsezms, mum P60 He 5 oxmuscy MI a (tenuous cMvadzraud1rw¢au1ha|he mmseWwaA uugmwmn an vxumnam armmm nr cash vawses may of aueslnns Only Junaxm mmsefl Vs ame In Iel vmy he gm (he mm «a sun and spa and when the mamas nngmalsd mm mu Ylverulorv u u my «mm man mm. x. nl Vmvnnlncs M15 me one who could nun . reaw-awe doubl on me pmsemlmn : uu The mama ol Junard s c\ear\y malavlzfl M2 nus amme and um lalure of In pmsswnan «a same ms anundznue nmmsxm has caused me awusefl m be deemed M 3 Carr and pm |naI J coucmsmu [1151 For Ins lnrepumu mnanl. 5H M In unused are Mraby aowunusd mud dulvalnud :11 com chimes mm a 1 2024 For me nvmeculnn Muhzmad Shamum hm Amldzm Fm me amused Hamdan bin Hamzah. mmama mm Mam Rasrldee. Azeazw mu Normn Prehared by. ;;‘x mm momma sum Rosuu M. Mlhlumah Pllajlslrm Juuyull 12 (unmumh but mun-u. lk) mm. Lumen! 51 sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! us: Upon reuervmwma pmsmwoo. spa wen! in ma am Elngsanngethurvnlh sm sn amund 12 wpm mere, my spo want was to pass Ihe mamas In sm wane SP27vr-med mme ca! Asm.mnuuosp4, nmkswonours fovSP1 to mmplele ms um mnsaamn and alter mnuuevsm, sp< gave Ihe paymenl shp tn sp4 spa am spzv men msm back Io Saslra u-Imm, howevsv. spa dropped an 5927 al Kamvunfl pm». ss ms mm wanted In on up ms Inolorcydn. spzv men want In RNE Bu|u|Em|nug|n man Icrwqucnnflsuhuqncmry wan! In ul SP27 man named back to seam uansm am-s [151 WM: SP4 am sP27 were running mm: for SP1 svnae 12 mum‘ sm conlamed sP2 .ngmna1amum‘H2 soon. In um zmoIh51anmd‘SPI msuuded SP2m gnu pm mum to spa SP1 had M50 conlacled spa pevmvuafly my me latter a: Drenfire ms Rm mmrun spz Ihen museum the said sum lmm spa Mm: spa had put Iha mmnl m 2 mus and Mun bnxa: Amum 4 mm. spa and sps warm to ms baismem parking \n um Inn pm mtlhon In spa On In: way now“, 597 wmscm SP4 in acoompawlhem in sand mo mane:/In spa m mum spo muse he wnl an-we amunfl m mmmss pom 2| Ihe basemam spz was aboul to ma the bums mlo SP1 5 amw xs ww 3512 men suuaamy. 2 men apnmsmeu mm and um: oflrvem asked Imnnlve buxas camamed sp2 remgruzad me 2 men zsme am and sm numbed. The sm aocusafl mslmclnd spz Ia load me boxes mla ms amw x5 and umsnd.e(me key: lo (M hum [111 SF2mmIIIyve1used moo ss Subuquunw. 2 more men anpmachad sn, Mm sm remamzzd zs(he1“and :v= aocuseo One wuss showed ms pause umspz spz man suneodemd me car keys to me am accused am reprinted man were wete nmmes ammmlmg m RM2 mH|nn m Ihe said boxes spz was memM1.mr:Ied In enter |hl smssa s Tayull Was Made sps was mmusa m am-r ms accused‘: mner car. s 9o\d<o\aumd mm: mm as mmules mm. spz ms mud In as: um 01 the car am spz nw spa rm lmved ll lhe Dnsemenl onkwvv Ind wn ullmg la\M1“And 2~ accused [In SP4 Ieslmed that he arrwed a| Seslra U-(ham basemevll pamna al zmmd 5 mm Them‘ spa was appmacma Iry 2 men and was wIs\ruc\sfl In sunemsr ms amass cam spa was runner nsnucled to um 1». av and was handcufled om av 7 sm yY1vflLv\kSgMY\EYMDwA «ms. sm.‘ nmhnrwm s. U... w my rs. mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! (M 2 mm also smwae II: pohca ID In spn sun was man alcurlud va ma ewes elevvnlnr by me accusad no an up In null Au M Aw, spa saw spa vn ma study room where she was vn It-s mldsl ov snsrvgvng me mamas, a pomon 01 me mamas wem an we lame and a ponvaaev vvweaavveaay atmnued mm boxes The 1“ acauaaa mswcted spa in ma whalsvu she was: flung spa Ihevv was nova In emer me mam mom vmava he saw spz zrvd sps wave avsa emenrvg ma same room av mal ume nu] 5P4 men law sps manna lhe mam mam aumrlud by mu 1“ accused. The vuuravvvve moseamon vvlllvaslesv sw, spa‘ spa em spa warn new mm In so: eme In each eemaravme mam room In ma main room, spn naueea me I“ accused gum |u Ihe muev and vzkvng on! :1 vuggage aegs. slver. am and green mhured The hugs wars nv-on bvuuml um um me mam mum [20] me 4- Iccuud um r.aHeu spa In ma mm room mm mmamea 2 save boxes The N lwuud mu-uevaa spa to open and av ma uva mm whvch ocnmnvvad RM2 milvon M cash spa had me passwuld In ma save bnxnnd u1mudarlIaHyv ma my m we save box was Ien by sn on me vzble ma 1“ aeeasea manned space uka am an me monies «mm me sale box and pm me savd mamas an Inn vaava am new 5ubsequavmyv|ne1"aDwsefl mm spa In am we movnes n a hmwn bnx [:1] ma. ma 1r‘ nccunfl ascxmud spa bark to me my mum Mm: spa was vvvllufly awn-um ma ramuvnmfl mm as received lmm me Chm: munluv berm ma smusad amvsd av A—SrS spa had av-eaey wumad memes kztslmu up In pm 5 mam mm she on! m we and Mme boxes The vunavmnq RM14 mllvuvv was on mevaave m me study mom wh:n|M1“ accused vns|mcled spa va shop vmatevsr she was thing we I" aameea mswevaa IN: Ieluamlng pm 4mHlnn vo he pm m n bmwvv box ay spa Allcvwams, spe was esnnnad backln lhc mam mom mane aaav Mme o pmssculvmv wvmu-aa wove ullsd unto me InHe|ane by one my mum v hour Valer an vaura: mu pmsecnmnn wilnessn wvvu told ve ma lo meaemca avavamr On mewayvama wvvaa amem: sp2. SP4 and spa nntad mil me save bnxzs were opamd and emanvea and me was no mums ven m we shady mom. NI ovmem wen! dawn I» we aaeaavevn parting Ingethevwvlh ma eaaasea and they were LwuugVv| ve vpv< xaava Lwnpur Thurs‘ ma veav ptoseumovv wvmesses wars 3 am yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDpuA “Nana sanav rnmhnrwm be mad a my a. nflmnnflly mm: dnuuvvnvvl VII arvurvc pnvuv mm |a awe n mum. 01 mw um:-3 sr-3 wa. uflld by we w aowssd when Inn mm askud ms «umemn mwm ovum-1 ma Dank me oourmng mamme sps showed to me N aclzuusd and named am me was one Drown Mix on the Mom Dnnlalmng memes The 1*‘ amused men asked spa to munuhe memes nu ma bvvwn box Much the ma so by mmmng mg zmmm and 1| lolafled up (D RMI 5 mm.. [23] Whsn ma ..»m¢ armed n| AM Slur: u-mam and rundod the premium‘ sP27 ma mu ml mum: to Saslm uarum am: vwck-nu up his mnlmcycka m Kampmg Pandan In that wmerval Mlume, sm ma wnew ma Jalan sum smug bu scan a wvvwelw cheque and warn cm «a sum. Yhereafler, SP21 headed hack to Sasha U4h:nt Whe« amvmg mere. he cafled spz spa and sp5 as sP27mdn‘\ have an access mu m go up In Au Howevev. mm 471 mam answered SP27s calb sm waned Yer at m: hasamnm parking vov appmzdmalely 1 ‘/1 mun Mun suddenly ».u.». SP2. 5»: and SP5uxA|mg me slnvaw wulc lhe nursed SF27 man nw mam handed In sum sEMW xs sm man HI hum um Sum: mm»: mm». wmuu wan [241 s»=27 then went In Jam Bukn Bnnlang to meet SPI's dm:r4:unv~!7adyguard‘ Raw and another mm Parlnizan m rehle max he jut? wnnassea Cansequenhdiy, Pavlmban mils! SP1‘: me «u uunvny me news [251 Al mu pnmcxtlr lune‘ sun was an m way In Lumun and upon heanng me new, 59: returned W-«am-wy lo M-Vaysm On mmzms. sm hoped . punsoe vawn Ilalma mat a sum mam 9 manor. was stolen mm ms alumnus. us sauva Urmanl r. we counrs rmnmas mu Amu.vs|: . rum mm-m; IMIIM nmnlnv In dunuan 1. movnhlu wopmy us; me asnmnn av ‘movalfla rarupatl‘/' s lmmd under uamn 2: 91 Inn was cm. ma. rs Ieprvduoed new sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 9 we wovds 'rvnvunIo pvupvlly‘ we rm-no-d In mduda corporeal propeny af every uesmpuon, except land and Imnqs attached 1.: ma narm. ormlrnansnl/V [asteoed in anyway wmm rs attached to ma salm - [:11 la\so rave: In me an mcm um bin cru Mud v Puhltc pmncummul Muu 354 where n \s stated out ‘A chuam [urn mm amount I! muvnblapvopovly A mmincyrvulv rs movable propafly Anomrimovab/a;nw¢I?.V' Cmifly‘ ma mm mum or mu m ms case are banlmmas vmnh ms 5 mm“ .5 mm -. the charges .3-mu the scanned and annlmalu are . cm a! ornpor-2V pmpsny rnemm, Ihxs wnmd mean‘ vnlmuu «mm mm In um wbmevd u vmvnn by the magma . Sncand «mm; mm Inch plvptny w compll Im.SF1 n on nalulllou at Its: [251 The second element man we pmsewlmn needs In prove us Ihzn ma pmpeny was m Ina possession cl lha wmplamanl The mmmn Dl'D°SSESSb01I‘Mms msauwa m me man Caun uu a1Pnb1|: Pmucmor v Wan Mom! rum... hm Win Mona lln [nan a mu am an below ‘Tm? wont 'yas1eswn' mm a pnyacsl txaplcdy In -my mm a mum as wa Me to me axcmsum aremym anaa dstermmalnon to zxemsv matplrysmal powel on ma‘: own behalf :1 rmpbes dwmmon and mnsaousness m we mmd nlmc person namg dwmrwn aver the ahpcl Possessrm must be sensuous and rnk/Irgcnlposaassmn and notmsmly Ins gnysrmlpwunoe aims accused m pmllmlfy 0! Jun m close pmxwmy to 1». abpct ' may The aux av (M aucusm delevlca us max me memes Iflaqed m bu mum annumnq to RM7 9 Imlhun, a; 51343.: m Ihe mmplavnanfs pouee report Vodgsd. axmm P7. was never m the wssessm. 0! ma wmulamanl lnslead. wh:| war m me wemses was my mums nmuunlmg to Run 4 mnlmn m Much me accused mm ngmmuywzeu Vn um um men can he seen n. ma accused 5 pmuce mpnmoxmbh 1:122 Whmh raw :0 sm yY1vflLv\kSqMY\EYMDwA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

JA-42S-4-05/2023

PERAYU MOHD KHAIRUL BIN ABDULLAH RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya

Criminal Appeal- Appeal against conviction - Section 6B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ("DDA") Whether the chemist report was incomplete as it failed to identify the isomer of Tetrahydrocannabinol- no evidence from the chemist or relevant expert to assist the court on the issue of isomer - the court does not deal in conjecture or speculation - the existence of Tetrahydrocannabinol in the Plant is sufficient to prove the offence under Section 6B(1)(a)Whether there is a break in the chain of evidence - Photos did not show the markings of 'S' or 'H' by SP2 and SP5 respectively - no testimony that the markings around the Pot and not merely on one side of the Pot - the Pot was produced in court - trial judge had the benefits of viewing the Pot himself and confirm the existence of the markingsTime gap between the seizure and surrender of the Pot to SP5 and it being locked into a locked steel cabinet - no explanation by SP5 why it took him 3 days after the Pot was surrendered to him was locked away into a steel cabinet - possibilities of the Pot being left in an open and unsecured area cannot be ruled out - possibilities of tampering cannot be ruled out - the markings were only made on the Pot and not on the Plant itself - marking on the Pot alone is insufficient - there is no evidence to ascertain the Plant in the Pot is the same plant from the time it was seized until it was surrendered to chemist (SP1) - no common measurement of the Plant between SP5 and SP1 to assist the court in the identification of the Plant - time gap becomes material since there is a doubt as to the identity of the PlantAppeal allowed- conviction and sentence set aside - Appellant acquitted and discharged

08/01/2024

YA Tuan Kan Weng Hin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2537a2a1-cb39-4a95-9847-2adbbe146c01&Inline=true

08/01/2024 11:13:30 JA-42S-4-05/2023 Kand. 30 S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oaI3JTnLlUqYRyrbvhRsAQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA—l2S-I-05/2023 Kand. 30 28/31/2024 11:13-33 IN me man COIIRT or IIIALAVA IN JOHOR BANRU IN ms sum or JONOR DARUL TAKZIM CRIMINAL APPEAL No; JA-5254415/:02: ssrwesu MOHD KHAIRUL am ABDULLAH ...AFFEI.LANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ...R5sPouuEm enmmus OF JUDGEMENT INTRODUCTION [1] ms is an appeal againsllhe daemon ome Veamed Sassxons Court Judge who had laund me Appaflam gunlly and conwcmea mm under s.6B(1Na) ar |h: nanqmus Drugs Au (952 (“Dam and m parlmulur la lhe amanded charge which .5 set mu belaw “aslvswa kamu paaa u szam ,.m mm kumm] 53:7 pelang at mmall oevamaa 14752. max 45, Jaw! comm va Tamar: Ccndana, Pustr Gudnng, mdnlam Danmndnlmr Bamv, a..1.«.m mmnmamam nfihukdmkamu Vslah msnanam lumbuhan ms Cannalm den mam Yulruhydmcnnnabmols bolcn mpalulelu secnm mrrgsung, dun dangurv vlu kuma mm mslakukan mm xsmananmnzwansexs/an 65{Wa)Ak1a Dadalv Esrmlvafl «:52 yangballh mnukummnawahaakaysn 6Bl3IAk1uy3IWszma“ IN .,=::unuuuv»:y-mmn ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vevly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ [21 rhe Iaamad cu-msex our the Appellanl and Respnndanl had filed man wrillen submuss-ans naspecuvely as bekwws 1) AppeHznA's sunmsmns dated 2 Novembar 2023 (End 19) 2) Raspnnaenrs subnusswns dalad 9 November 2023 (Elm! 22; 3; Addmcnal submissions nf me Appellanl dated 20 December 2023 (EM! 25) 4; Addmunal submissions on»: Respondent dated 27 Deoemher2023 gem 23) Brill um [31 On 1432019 at mm 630 pm, SP2 meme: 5 mm pallceman lmm me navooluts branch 0! Sen Nam Dislncl Ponce Headquaners oanducted a pone: apemhnn at an apartment um! having addruss as smeu In (ha charge spz apenad now me will me me door at me apsrlmenl unit which were closed bu| unlocked SP2 fmmd |he acwsed silting akzns on me Ilaor m the Wing mam. SP2 uonduded phys\ca\ a<amma|\on 01 me accused and mu nul find anylhmg wllegai or incnminalmg. [4] sm Khan ccmduclad examunanon 0! me prawns: and hunt! a plan! matwas planted In a mom pu-sue po| rm. Pal’) man he suspecled |a be a cannabu mam (“Che Maury The mam was waned on 3 wnadan chair muse me mm mom on me lefl side 01 me Muse The accused was msequemry avr:s|ed and all ma Items iound were sewzad by the palms. 5:2 made a marking '5' on the Pan mgemer mm date "14/sr2o19' and alleslad ms ngnamre to w (exhIb1tP3) On ma firs! wssua o1 ume gag um mg dgubls as |a exmh F3 and P9 [29] same pmceedmg on (ms. « Is In he naked man waamed munsex for ma Appellant Informed the noun (hat he will not be pmcsedmu mm the Issue aflhe vmssmg rubber band“ {so} On ma Issue M exmhils P3 and P9 man mlate m me Pm m which me Ham was planned we learned ommsel ma xubmmed mm mere a a discrepancy m the hmghl arms Pal baraeen me Pot mum was seized by spz an 14 3 2m and ma Pet wmch was produced m cowl The «eamea semen um submitted (here As a height mwapanay a12.5cm [31] \n his avidsnce, SP5 had slated me hem: of ma Pot al ma mm M lhe seizure was approxlmatew Zlcm Hawavan thus was no acmnv measuremenl cflhe Pm The height at 21am was omamed (hraugh me quelhons asked 0! SP5 (Appaal Racma, Julld 2(5), 17.217), 5 Inspeklov men mauumm k. muhkumuh bempa Mslmggtnn pakok mm mspsklorpamlelm SP5 Puhan Dnluk unluk says rumkpamyala Saks: Java pa vu, um ha/angsn Mnmmmah mmanmn SP5 Msrmuk psvmvggan 1171 um." mamml dun /anla: dl mam pasu owuamn hmygn ks muunq pom ukumn mpamaam 122cm gamma». gambarbnmw kssolnambwsdan s s Sslamsnya to 2 ms-poktorlmlun nuam my 4 Ukman Uaambtl dun alas Ianah mam pasu ssllmggl A1 bu/mug poknk, ulauln swam 101cm.s9bagaImaIm gumbur nomDor7dan a s swan says sarsmsnyn bumps nrw mu mmgg’) Nate sum rumba! Mu ... M In M, n.. .mW., mm mm. VI mung W.‘ J Tmwv pusu Dunga vzz Iafiak 1:71 5 Jam ksnnggmn paw bunga Dompn cm mspuklorl .I mm kumnq 21m [32] Dunng me «vial, ma Delenoe r/Junie‘ had paved the quesnans Io sP21Appeameoam_Ima 2A, [1 72). s »<-mu saya ukuumsu mm. lnspckrnn Dolph many mahknmm Dslzpa an‘! Hixatarrgsh cm ya xavau says baham me vs sstsngah cm, nu ma: 1:: Ian /aw: kmang km new I saw [33] The Defence caunsel had m ms quesuon to SP2 slated max me Pm was 18cm Humsvsv. before mu: quasllon was posed lo we SP2, me Davance counsel nan earner asked 2 similar queslmns to SP2 an ma helghl of me Fun, arm on lwlh quesuans, sm had znswarud that ha am not measure me flower PM See Appsal Rama, Jnlld 21/A) p 71. s Kamu ada ukw belapa pamlng, amps mm mm mg. ml‘) J Urvluk makmmun, says um msngukurpasu Burma mu say: ukur fluwada pun bums mama am» sampav Ac 5 ma mg; Ada ukw he max ma 4 . nm [34] It was in 01: next quesnan anev that he had usksd the qussfinn "kalau says um pasu bangs Mspekrur, boleh benlalm muhkaman maps cm’ 19 ssrurrguh cm ya Kalau says lzunagtdua waolsngan cm. was ambrl 15 /an lebfh kuninq 9cm mu/7 [351 From me wommgs and manner ma quemon was posed Io svz‘ 1: was net cleurwhelhar ma Pm wax acKuaHy measured and by wham 1: sw n:I:urnL\uqvRymw«wsAu -ma. sum maa Mu ... wed in M, m. .mw., mm mm. VI amine W.‘ [351 \n the ques|\nn,I11e Dafsnue cnunser seems in wages! In svz mat yr ms Pa\ was 18am anu n n was amuse by 2, n mum be zppvaxxmalery 9am counsel wanm oonfinnatian of n |a w n SP2 ounflrmsd -bemr [371 M ssarns man me quesuon pend used a nypnmemax measuvemanl o11Ecm mner man man quesllun, male was no olhev nemence M 13m: to SP2 or la any other witness espaaany sws. \n In ms: exammalmn ol SP5‘ me Defence counsel did not mallenge nov mse nny dwsnrepancy as to me hetghl of ms Pu|. In had‘ me mus 0! ma height 0! ma Pm was nu! mssu at an. smaly on such an Important am of ma hmfihl M ma Pol, mare isa dulyto pm me case to ma wnnass Sea sass ofwang swea Chm y. PP [1951] 1 ML! 212 pa) In any want n us no: mspnrsa Ihm ms Pa| which was pmfluced M own his the necessary marking as done by me wnnams namely‘ by 5;-2 and ‘H’ by sps The Pot was aecemea by me Devencs cnunsel and the leamsd Judge See Appeal Recsna. Jihd 2(5)‘ pagss 215 and 216. s Kalnu kiln hmguk pad: mm my bums moo-u P3, Vnspnklnrsaluju um pads P3 ml Ada lsmlaan H, can landaun s aleh pa1mkpalLs7 4 Vn,IeIu1u s mun dun unannng.n,..,,.,» I vs, xaluyu s lrvsvaklaryang somakan gambargsmbar W7 J va, new 5 . Seklranya say. rlquk glmburyangnalmg risks! Pam says oedangkan keuma nlman pmak pendakwaau dun salnlvarv Mahkarnan dun snlmun says mssu ada landnm J Ada landuan aural aumsa. rm s Kamu no/sh nampak pada gambafl J . Nampnk s . Kamu uanwaw J Nsmpak s Omrg W m rmmpsk rm lnspuklafl mm. GumrmrmsnasM<s!MI/k7 Pa GammwP9(4} SP5 Am mm wsma malah dskat paw w, Mvsan Hakim Emu Iurrgnk pun M says lengak Mahkumm nampak Ma (and: s mm a.m.: Iulam dun w mm mww "mu - [39] smoe the learned Inal judge uas seen the mavlungs on me Fun and nu| any other evmuca in show olherwlse, me issue at me height discrepancy with: Pet V: a uuu-snmev [40] The vssue at me photos as m axhihil P9 wave the learned wunsal had subrmltad that m me phmus. it ma non shawlha mavkmgs cf‘S' or 'H‘ which were mavked by svz and SP5 mspecfivaly rue Veamsd cuunse\ aubmrtled that me Po| had malkmg o1‘S‘and‘H':voundnand|he phmn which was Iaken by sps and not suaw such markmg avaund nua Pm. Huwevar nua puma taken omy suaw nne am or me Pat. H was not w ewdsnoe whelhev mrough the «esmmuy anus wanes: or exauuuanun the Pu| Iha| lhevs was rrlavkmg avaund me Pot and M1 merely on one sude av Il.|rHac1‘when svs was askud wuanuar us wuld see nus mavkmg an the Fan in nne aniono. ne vepealedly answered he could see in see Appeal Reuorv. Jnhd 2(5)‘ pages 215 and 216 -s Sakrmrnyauys ndukgambavyangpahngackmW[l;,sayacadsrng)1sn kepeda snlnnarl pnluk pelnflnkwmm dnri ulmarn Mahkamen darn salmall says max]: new Insrrdnuyn J Ma nanaaan ookal gamma: rm 5 Kama bo(sn rnampak pea. gnmbarl J Namyak - [411 Surely alnce me Pol was praduoed In conmn nne ueaenu wunsen com eaeiny wnfirm wnemei me Fun had me mlrknngs 51's‘ and nnn‘ amnmd in Dr only ana side on in in IS obvious Lha| nne man nudge had no doubts about in especianny since na had me benefds an Viewing nne PM nirnaenn and main eonnrrn nna exisnenee an nna markings on nne PM as n man nudge which ne and Time gag [421 On nne Esus at me nine gap between the seizure and snmundev an me Pal In 595 M14 21 2019 Ind in being locked away inna a locked anean cabinet in SP5‘: mom an 17 3 2019, me learned eounaen had subrnmed nnan mere was a break In me enain ulevndenos. [43] Na expnananon was given an SP5 why in look nini 3 days anner nne Pct which connairiee he Plan! was snmurndavad no ninn was nockeu away nnnn a eneen I:ahirne| in his Vudmd mom. Than would mean man lhvannghoul me 2 days betuie ilwas necked away on me 17 e 2019, me passinnnnnnes an me Pal being Iain in an open and unsecured aiea winmn ma pohce smnon cannm be mled oun. [44] smse (here was nu explanallun from svs about me 3 days delay befme he secured me Pot um: Week 01 key m n sleel cabme| m ms room which is am: lockad‘ n ma: me volrwmg quesnons a) Wherewas ms Pm kep| belcre mm s) Was n kep| under lack arm key? c) Could anyone nave had access «s ms Pm and Iampsved mm the PM wmsn (he Plant was planted wn arms Plant ussm [45] The (ac! max SP5 ma subsequendy pmceeded Io wssx m m me \od<ed steel canum on 11 3 mm maanuhzl sps xnswmme umponsnee onne we cusludy 0! me exhlbrl and mat n needed to he waned m a sacs and secured erwwnnmen| Tha| was o|wmus\y done «a prevent any paasmnny of |ampemIg cf |he exhibit xmce srs had my prnoeadad to ‘ask away ms Fan on 17 a 2019, me psssmilmy sv lampering cannm be Mad oul Smce me Defence has raised soma doubts I: to me psaaummy anampering, me benefit suns doubt shomd be given In me names [46] I raver to me Feflera\ omm case or Vusli Fualml v PP[ZD1I7]E cu 578 when n was held mar -mws aha)! now may wrllv Inc Vwslgmundaluypeal Mm Vmdlherbu merit r.. ms nlyumanls ndvnnmd by Ianmod colulsel In! ms appellant We aglu mm m. smmnsn arms aalw/lam mm mm rs . swans mum u m the weuhr av ms cammms, mu: arrsamg ms »daMr!y sv me cunnalm‘ Aocwdnllg it: me charms! (spa; the role! wepgm aims oannams mnlumd in ms lwa pudmge: av uvd G215 mm 2: nmmmu However, ms mvssogsung oMaaI1SP4)m Ins lvmnnna sated that he wsmsu ms oannaars m M: mpmsgss a1 and G2 and found me (am wnvgm In be ma nmmmos Tms would mssn by m luvm ms mnnam: touched the hands onna msrmsl llmu run bun an mcmuss in me weigh] a: my cannabis by m 21 gmmmzs wnn mqani lo Mrs discmoancy ls Nab: sum tummy Mu s. mud in M, me .mau.m, MW: nnumaul VI arwuns W.‘ M the wcrglil ouh. nunrulm mm: we nu axplanstrwi gvvsvl by 594 or any ulhar wilnusa: cnllsd by the pmsomlron 10111810)/IIIO mcvusu VII the wotgnl Them )5 no eviasuoo adduced by the pmscctmart In snow ms! the wmghmg scaly em to watgii the cnmiubis has not oeen oaltbrallfl um lllsrslnm inemme I! I5 A/su to he noted that sw n he menee an tml enpuiti Ins maimmdnl mhe cnminht: WI pemgee st and s2 tnmi the me he retain! and weighed them an 25 reanmy 2005 until Its ptem then. M a net mmksd “CL'[aitIi P3; an 27 Fphmnry zoos and salt! In the mstmsl on 23 mnmy 2005 H e tmntimnienz evamaling tne iuuseamone as! N! ma light nl me erwttvnu at/Maul: thee axial: e sauna! met as toms taentiiyoune cannabis as . any VIMDVI Wu! M the sums nsni that was suzsdlzy sP27' [41] Unlike the other cases where ttne dangerous drugs irtvolt/ad ate in wwdery tone or ciyetai tonn, this case iiwalves 2 giant. The markings were onty made on the Fat and not an the Ptent ttsett, This 4! mike! siiipnsing since the ettenee umter S.6B(I|(l| DDA involves the planting or ctmivatiml ol Cannabis ptehi. it so, the Plant seized sheutd have been tagged and marked eecemtngty I48] I am emte opinion iha| meiety marking the Fat atone is ineuir-cient since the mete presence al the pot er eanteiner is not an mgredlem necessary tot the oitence Thsve is no nos furtms court to teiy on to ascertain met the Plant in the Pol is the same plant item the Mme ll was seized ttntit il was sunendereti to the SP1 the is very matenet sinee mete is e time gap era iteys amt mete is he necam tn ascertain where and how the ptent was kept until l| is teckea away an me ti 5 zot it It is quite mieiet thet theie tuttsl be eanie nieens M iaentineatinn an the Pie": [49] Also, mere was no common meeeuiement at the Flam bulween SP5 amt SP1 which may esstst the court In the identification or the Plant SP5 measured the hsigm item the flour to the top of the ptant as tzzem and me height «mm the soil at the sttneee urine Polio the lap uflhe Pieiit es ‘luicml see SP5‘: wilness slalemem at Appeal Record, Jllld 2(A)\ page 131' - ulmn pads pokok «ml dulgnn manggmlnlmn 42; cam my . lo l A/kumn dlambll dart /anti! dlmana mu Mdlakiurl sallmgga he nuyung pnkak, ukmsn dlpemlehl 1122 cm} (sooogalmalls Gamnar mung Kn: Na 5 an Na 5/ 1472 llkumn msmml dun alas la:-all dalam pnu sallmgga x. Ilwlmg pokak ukumn mplmVu7Il(101 an; {sebagamlanu Gambarsarnngkos No man Na 2;- [5a1 Wllemas Sm had upraolaa lne Plan! and measured ll The measurement VS 120ml She had alsn weighed me planl Sea SP1‘: wflness slalemenl 3! Appeal Renard, Jllrd 2(A)‘ page 14. -um." oar: Tlmbavrqln llrllml mamlpalkurl llnwl pakuk Lsuabul uy. mm mmavkanpnknkdlnpnsu annnmammunl-mnmmnagun enemy: Sllbmmyfi saw rnlrlgullur am mm-V Dlhaylul mm mm. in Immng mm." Mar bilopunusayunrurlmlbanybovntpokaklooobul $nmo.sIp¢m¢nI<.man,saynl1upall mm mm "mm -dnl-h V200 nmlmn dun mu polvak Dzrnebln mm 2: 2: mm [511 Bath SP1 and SP5 measured the Plunl .n mlverenl way resulting ln Incanslsfencles in me heighl nfthe Flam When the Flam was ploduced in Conn, ll had already willed. The pvcllcullon had not releneu SP1 In the ex ms. Wfe1elVad,lS\8flI(ShS can canfirm whether II S me same Plantus ln me pllnlo mal she hsd recelved lrurrl SP5 [521 Slnoe mare ls a doubt as In one laenmy of me vlanl, Ihe Mme gap ol 3 days becomes malerlal wllhaul any explanalian lmm spa or any wnrlesses Any benefit at doubt snmllu he grven la me accused Sea lne case cl FF v Lee Hock Lal[2D04]1 cu 57 -ln my my me -mamnwn walllalmn' mm: In . pmpor mm mm mmmn Mnumeewdenm udducodla dalsnmrre wllamarapllmnfacncasu u sln n:I:uYnLlLlu‘/RymwlRsAD -ml. Sum mm wn ... M in navy l... nllglmuly wnl; mm. VI AFVLING pnflll has urnalbswl made 041! ms. Mills swdww aoduaodhas la as Semllmaud wonuny and Inns mama rm! :2. M a parmnclaly, cmmy emualm or an axarcue Mshmmlng am the 61117866 alum svmwleo ow The plosocullon rvllulm-A1 mu m. mg:-4)-Ilfs M m. Marga mm the evidence adduced lime zvxluban aims ewdsmre mm la «elm ln ms pmsecullonis case at 17»: slaps anus procasdmgs llselllhwl ll camlnl n. sud Inn! 5 ‘Wmln lawns: been made am The defence Mglllnol la as cal/ad mmly la denial Manly m- doubt: Tlls branch! on». man lrany, at um um! nfma prlnacllllarli case must go In m. acvussd - [53] I rum mat on Pmsacullun lm lallsd In prove Iheir case beyond leasonabla down. As men ma cnmldlun ls nut sale and should he sel aslda The appeal I5 allowed aom me cnrl\Ilc|icn and selllamm arv mi 85165 The Appellam ls aoqulned and dlschzlged nalea 4 January 2024 (K N wane HIN) ml al Commis any Hlgh CUMI :21 Malaya, Johor Enhru Counseli» Fol the Appellanl - Ellclk Sllalk Saleem B SM Dam! Temn Shank Adam 3. Co No 2|)D1..la|an cenaarasan 3‘ Taman Pemadanan Islam Lam, aossa Jahor Bshru, Jahor .9 sw n:l:uYnLlLlu‘/Rym»mfisAD -ml. sum mm M“ ... M In M, l... nllglulllly MW; mm. VI mm pnflll Fm me Res|7onden| — Tuan Umar Fauz Tlmbalan Pendakwa Rays Pawns! Penusmat Undangflndang Negeli Johan Am 2, Bangunan Dam‘ Ja‘alar Muhammad. Kaia lskandar‘ Nusafiaya Juhor [5] On nnd same day an about a an pm SP2 handed ever the Plan! together wnh me olher Items semad In me mvesuganng omen (SP5) spa carved om a prehmlnzly 1n1enogan1on o1 the accused and recovdsd the snansmenc «mm 51:2 AI and-A 11.10 pm. s1=5 marked ma i|ems seized He mavked me Pu| (sxh1b1( P3) mm a mnnnng 'H1“ mgelhev mm dale ~14/3/2019' and aflested ms mgnalura In 1: Al zboul11.35 pm, s1=5, with um assisxanos ol SP1 and Sin 190111 Raaftk took puma: dime ilems 1r=9(1—11)). 551134 11 Dhnlal were1n1<en(dx [S] on 15.5.2019, spa recorded ma slammsm «em a wwness name Mohd Nur Adm Em Ahdullah, and aha want In me scene Ingelhar mm sP2.1u phelas wave taken by SP5 at me scene (exhibit P11 (11 an [71 on 17 a 2019 at aboul 19 am, SP5 pm me mam mgemer mm me Fol mla a box marked as 111' and se:\efl1lwI|h POMS nnaja Maliysna 755 [exhibit P2) SP5 men kemlhe bex(exh1b1IP2)|ntn a 1ua<ed sisal cabmel In ms room that was a1sd1adked Adcdrding to hm. dn1y na nad access In ma cabinet and the mom [3] on 13 3.2019 a( about 2 29 pm, s1>5 delwaned me hex (exh la the walnut (SP1) (av ana1ys1s 1 P2) 19] upon mcewlng nne um, 51:1 marnmed Ihe cement: or the box and she vaund n mmnined a uL7| w1Ih me marking ofi“H1“ in wtncn a pianl was planted sP1 cnr1duc|ed ma anaws cl |he 1=1an1 According 1d ner analyss and her chemist napon texhlbw P7), the Mam contained mmnydnacannamno1s 1n her evidence 1n noun, sm |es|ified man Temanydmannamnms are um major Cannnbinmds found in cannams resIn.Accovd1ng In SP1‘ Cannabis 1; any pan lram wmcn msin may be oblamed Ivvespeclwe d1 (ha amdunn av whm me plan! is named. ms APPEAL [10] This Court In: Is In appellate com The appeal takes me «mm (113 cavmnullmn at a max and K Is open «a «ms cmm m decevmins w me vanuus findmus ollha man com me wnecx This Cum! may subgerxlhe awdence lo a mince! reemmmaxiun [111 ms cum Is guided by me pnnciwes as sal am in the Com ofApp-eal case elMahd Yusli Mangwz. Anorv PF [2014] 7 CLJ 597 where Kwas held as vanaws ‘I41 ws new use scmlmmafl m. mmms avadabls balms us We are Immful mm Mus m . ream based mm 1: rs Inls mu m mpeuue mun mu no new 10 mlorfsre um um fimtnys mm and/ummal uupv-clauon Mme rm by me mar mun n: ma. ma /aw snvusls ms pmvrary rm ol mmmm of mg av/aoncu Howlwr, 1»... mt axcaplmlu wnm 4.; mt/udgmsnt u based mu 5 wmngpmmrss olrad amum, m; mm was msumasnlmaiufl appvicmlrnn by Ina Innuudgu A7/the mam ormummnm ylnnad hefovs mm, (c; 1». m.r,m.;a nu comufietsly avsmaksd ma Wrsrwvl pmmmum N m. use Id! mat the cows: Lf-v-ms alfimmibylhe mslludwe mum rmmnvu auwnaa; {cl lira m.r,..a.;= had made an unwarvanlsd dsauallon am an Vanity/unumr masonmg «mm a4mweaormnr.sn.ar.m, or 1/; lm mauuag. Imdsu mnmmmaanymmmmmmnmnxnax one may mfoly my ms! nu raawnabls own wmen Ivadptupefiy mmam vlxalmvdaskodlha twvectquesltarls wnnldmve nmvadsl me ssmsoanclusvon, liver! In Dppellatn mun wm mtscvsna lo rodfly ma: mm! so Ina! rrwsmx u m ovcasmnad 4 sm .,=::u.w.wzy.mmu -W. sum rumhzv MU ... M In M, m. .mw., MW: nnumgnl VI mung W.‘ isee FEIEIYIMM W; Son and v Cunlay Canslmcfian Sdn and (29:21 i ms me, (24:12; 4 ML1 1491(1)‘ simiimni a/1P9rIasamy v Plllasumy ‘ my M99513 Mu «£5, ms»: 4 cu 545 mi; - [121 Diiiing ine rieeiing en 17.122023 Ihe Ieeiiied coiinsei for me Apizeliam had inrenned me coiin mei ne WIII ieiy an (we issues «oi the eppeei neineiy. ii neiims end gap in me exiiiisii P3 and P9 P3 belnglha Poi and F9 being iiie pnoios or die exnioiis seized by sr=2 Ansing iiom inese I1D|l|7ll|UgElherWl|hIHe lime gap 013 days belwean (he Sallflle iii ine Pei ie iiio PM being locked away by SP5‘ iiieie isa bleak in me enein o1 evidence ii) ins cnoniisi iepon dalad 24.11: 2015 iexiiibie P7) was ineeniigieie in as lei es ii ieiied m idenmy Iha iiiomei nflelmhydvocanrlabinol. [13] i pmpose |o deei wiiii the second issue rim The charms! i Ex lP7 [141 To iindemend me issue ieised by me ieenied Counsel, we need in reiereo (he amended eneige wnicii read: as eoiion 'BaIvnwa KBIIVH pad: 14 s zine in lawn kurang : so peluvg in mman D973/amll nsz Elnk 45 men Germans in, union CdIIDMIJl, Pasir Gudang, in mslnm Dsevah Jana! Bali/IA‘ D4 dilam Nagvn.Iuharbag(pmal1 din karml Mall merianim iiinioiinnnienis Cumlablsi den niena Tofnlhyomcnmmblnau ooien dlpemlehl menu /anyway, den mznwn Mu kumll Isiah ms/akukan mm mnmien ai Dawuh snisyen aaiiiiei Aide nednn Esmamlyl we: ynnoooien flfiflukllm oi bawali nksywi 5e1:uAm yang uni.“ [15] In |he amended Ghfllge, me eppeiieni was orieiged wiin pieniing die menu from wnien Teiienydiecannebinel oould be obtained diiociiy [161 Telruhydrccannamml Vs Yrsled In Fivsl Schadulu Pan III of lhe Dangerous Dmgs Ac|1952 Tslrunydmcannabrnulx, fllvydrnxy-J1wenIyI«6.n,7,H7, «oamanydraa, a. v mmuny.u+maanza 1n, mm." [17] Instead olcharglng me appeuam wnn p\an\Ing a plain {mm which Cannabvs could be omamau as as! am in sermon 6E(l)1a) or me om I952, Ih: pmsecuhm hadohalgad (he appauamwm plammg a manuram which Tetrahydmcznnzhinol could be ohlamad See seccian 6E(l|1a) which reads ‘Semen as Pnslndwn unplarmng urmllvvabcn oi mllsm plums (1)NopnIsL'mslm)l— 4.) aaman ms awn beharloran oanauavany amsvpatson, plan] orcullrvalw anypram «mm wmah rawopmm‘ ma Iuws, pnupy-straw orcsnnubls maybe oauma emmralrucuy ormdneci - [131 Cznnahvs as defined m sechon 2 ems DDA 1952 mad: as Iulluw 'cannam:'mesrI.I anypsrmluvryplanlamrs genus Calvnnbrs Imm wmcn mam rs Immd to no pmssnl rssm Mmspvclrvu 0! Us quarllrry, Md by whatever name lbs plan! nuybe dlsagnnlod, [19] By changing lhe Appeuam with planting a {dam «on. winch Tslrahydrocannablnm can be unnamed, ma leamad CL7unss\ aubmmeu max Te(rahydrucannabmn\ as hsled in Pan In or me man scheme raquues the chemisl rspcnlu sI1aw|heImmercln [201 was: is an Earner’ lsumer‘ as damned m ma Merriam-Webslev mcuonary ”onsuYlwnoHrlomoompou»ds,rnl14r:al:‘ lzrlmls mat mmsmms same mmlbar cl mum: M In: amna elements bu! Mar m slmcmral arnrlgamurlt and Pmasnlss“ [211 unlanunalely dunrlg lne lnal, an ma chsmlsl was nol um by lne Dalenoe aboul me lsumels or znymlrlg related la llwhen she leslmau ln noun rnele was no cnallanga llorrl lne Balance on «he chemlsl reparl in so Var as lfrelales to me have ollne “lsamavs‘ L7! lack am The Defence ma nm call any expan wines: to pnwide any explanaaon nor challenge me raven ln lacl. Inslead of asking SP1‘ me Delence counsel chosem ems axanune SP5, me lrlvesligatmrl (mean on ‘L see Mpeal Record, Jflld 2(5)‘ page 219 s lnspaklar. cube lcllyok a« ymrwwan ks-4 mtahymxzarlnablllnl aauan sarrarav Emam ,..:..al panama Akla mm Bomallnvl Snya clsdnngkun uapaaa lllrpsktov mama!-lmnlur, karlrlwlgamltamiurlg.-n Tslrahydmclnrlnhlrrul m mink dlnyhlzksll av mm lnpovwl nnn. lm7 J say. hank pm sebab buksrl kapekararl soyn rs Tldak pevmkarl Nspakaml Haklm Mamanya maruiuk kaplsfln mkllmen ml min alnyalmn emu plm MM7 spa naaa P5 saya Mnk Ida saalanlaln, Datuk [221 surely SP5, ma Polloe Olfioer is rlal qllallllea wlm lna relevanl expert knowleage In explzln ma cnannaal. slnluule ov arrangement ol lsumer ol Telrahydrucannabincl SP5 is nul W a posillon In lasmy as an expen wllness and lo explain (he lnlneames cl me Isamar ln such I aimalian, he ls lust a layman The nmmsel an um ask or oven anenlpl la vecall spc who had mndumad her sclanhflc tests and nnalysis and sna had concluded Iha\ ma Plan! 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Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-21NCvC-123-08/2021

PLAINTIF Suria Synergy Constructors (M) Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN 1. ) Kerajaan Malaysia 2. ) Jabatan Kerja Raya Malaysia

The Plaintiff is a private limited liability company whereas the 1st Defendant is the Government of Malaysia and the 2nd Defendant is the Jabatan Kerja Raya (“the Defendants”). The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants arises from a contract entered between the Plaintiff and the Defendants.The contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants via a letter dated 3/7/2012 was for a construction of a Police Headquarters in Pekan, Pahang (“the Project”). This letter was followed by a formal JKR contract.In the upshot the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim with a cost of RM30,000.

08/01/2024

YA Dato' Haji Akhtar Bin Tahir

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=834c4894-4d6e-4be3-858c-a164f77c82d7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL : WA-12BNCvC-127-09/2022 ANTARA FARIS AZMI BIN ABDUL RAHMAN (NO. K/P: 770924-14-5623) ... PERAYU DAN 1. DR AHMED ELTIGANI ABDELRAHIM AHMED ELMANSOURI (NO. PASPORT: P05292572) 2. ABDELRAHIM MUSA MAHGOUB HAMADELNIL (NO. PASPORT: P04974145) ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN JUDGMENT Introduction 1. In this case the Plaintiffs who are Sudanese citizens collaborated with the Defendant a Malaysian citizen to set up a company called 08/01/2024 15:28:35 WA-21NCvC-123-08/2021 Kand. 86 S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Valencia Health Sdn Bhd (“the Company”) to trade and supply in fruit juices. 2. The Company was to be run by the Defendant as an employee as well as a 5% shareholder. A Company bank account was opened up to facilitate the business with the Defendant being the sole signatory. The Plaintiffs had deposited a sum of money in the bank account. 3. On the failure of the Defendant to update the Plaintiffs on the income and expenditure of the Company the Plaintiffs sent 2 legal notices to compel the Defendant to update the Plaintiffs on the income and expenditure of the Company which the Defendant failed to comply. Hence the civil suit filed against the Defendant. 4. After a full trial the learned Sessions Judge allowed the Plaintiffs’ claim and directed the Defendant to pay 2 sums of money. The 1st sum of money of 78,926 ADH equivalent to RM88,827.21 for the money received by the Defendant from the Plaintiffs as well as his salary of 5 months. The 2nd sum of RM 28,374 was the proceeds of sales of the Company. The Court’s decision on learned Sessions Judge’s judgment Existence of valid agreement 5. The learned Session Judge made a finding that there existed a contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant although the terms of the contract were not in writing. S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 6. According to the learned Sessions Judge the contract between the parties could be deduced from the communications between the parties by way of e mail as well as the conduct of the Defendant providing the Plaintiffs with all the statutory forms to be filled up for the formation of the Company. 7. The Court agrees and accepts the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that there was a valid contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant based on the communication between the parties as well as the conduct of the Defendant. This proof of communication is exhibited in the common Bundle of Document filed by the parties in this case. 8. In the Court’s view the communication and conduct of the parties proves the existence of a valid agreement between the parties to collaborate to form the Company for the purposes of starting the business in Malaysia. 9. What amounts to an agreement between the parties is succinctly stated in section 2 of the Contracts Act 1950 as follows: In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context- (a) when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 obtaining the assent of that other to the act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal; (b) when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted: a proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise; (c) the person making the proposal is called the "promisor" and the person accepting the proposal is called the "promisee"; (d) when, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise; (e) every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement; 10. Also relevant is section 3 and section 4 of the Contracts Act 1950 which stipulates what amounts to communication between the parties and when the communication is deemed to be completed. The communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting, or revoking, by which he S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 intends to communicate the proposal, acceptance, or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it. (Section 3) 1) The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. 2) The communication of an acceptance is complete- (a) as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; and (b) as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. (Section 4) 11. Further under the Evidence Act 1950 conduct of a person is a relevant fact to be considered in a civil suit. Section 8(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 provides as follows: (2) The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to that suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if the conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Explanation 1 - The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act. Explanation 2 - When the conduct of any person is relevant any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing which affects his conduct is relevant. Breach of the agreement 12. According to the learned Session Judge the Defendant had breached the agreement between the parties when he failed to register the Plaintiffs as the directors of the Company. In the Court’s view the registration of the Plaintiffs as directors of the Company is a key requirement for the agreement to colloborate between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant to do business in Malaysia. 13. The learned Sessions Judge also dismissed the Defendant’s reasons that he could not register the Plaintiffs as directors of the Company as they had not supplied him with the relevant documents. 14. The Court agrees with this finding of the learned Session Judge that the reasons given by the Defendant has not been substantiated. The burden to prove that the Plaintiffs had failed to supply the relevant document lie upon the Defendant. This is clear S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 from section 103 of the Evidence Act which stipulates upon whom is the burden to prove a fact: The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. 15. In the Court’s reading of the notes of evidence the Defendant had not adduced any evidence indicating any attempts to get the relevant documents from the Plaintiffs and therefore has failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon him. On the converse the communication between the Defendant and the Plaintiffs show that whatever documents sent by the Defendant were duly signed and returned to the Defendant by the Plaintiffs. The e mail between the parties indicates this. 16. The learned Session Judge also found that the Defendant had failed to supply the income and expenditure account to the Plaintiffs when requested by them. 17. The Court accepts this finding of the learned Judge as the Plaintiffs have adduced the formal request for the income and expenditure accounts through their lawyers. This request was ignored by the Defendant. Although there are no express terms or any terms in writing in the Court’s view such a request for the income and expenditure account can be implied from the agreement between the parties. S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 18. In short the Court agrees with the learned Session Judge that the Defendant had breached the agreement between him and the Plaintiffs in this case. Remedy for breach 19. In this case the learned Session Judge found that the Defendant had admitted to receiving the monies to register and run the Company from the Plaintiffs. This admission is backed by the fund remittance slip by the Plaintiffs which was adduced in this case. 20. The Court accepts this finding of the learned Sessions Judge as under section 21 of the Evidence Act 1950 Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them or his representative in interest; 21. The learned Sessions Judge further found that as a result of the Defendant not performing his duties and responsibilities under the agreement, the Defendant has to return back all the monies received from the Plaintiffs. 22. In the Court’s view the learned Sessions Judge’s finding is backed by section 40 of the Contracts Act 1950 which states that: When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 23. Section 65 of the Contracts Act 1950 provides the remedy available to a party against the party breaching the agreement and not performing its promise as follows: When a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained in which he is promisor. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he has received any benefit thereunder from another party to such contract, restore the benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received. Conclusion 24. Having regards to the above factors the Court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal against the learned Sessions Judge’s decision with a cost of RM10,000. Dated: 27.12.2023 sgd DATO’ HAJI AKHTAR BIN TAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 PARTIES For the Appellant: Nama Peguamcara: Nizam Bashir Tetuan Nizam Bashir & Associates, C3-2-5, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan. For the Respondant: Nama Peguamcara: Abdelrahim Musa Mahgoub Hamadelnil Tetuan Jeeva Partnership D-22-03, Menara Suezcap 1, KL Gateway, No. 2, Jalan Kerinchi, Gerbang Kerinchi Lestari, 59200 Kuala Lumpur. S/N lEhMg25N40uFjKFk93yC1w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-12ANCvC-67-05/2023

PERAYU JAKS ISLAND CIRCLE SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN 1. ) EE SHIU LOONG 2. ) LOH AH HONG 3. ) CHEAH OLIVER PHEE-CHYE 4. ) ONG FOO CHONG 5. ) CHUNG SHEH LEE 6. ) TAM WEI EE 7. ) NEW WE-JIAN 8. ) FOO CHEK LEONG 9. ) CHAN YEE LAI 10. ) HWEE HON FAI (XU HANHUI)

This was an appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge in allowing the Respondent’s application pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) for issues pertaining to the late delivery for vacant possession (VP) and liquidated ascertained damages (LAD). This Court dismissed the appeal with cost. The reasoning behind this Court’s decision is as deliberated. Although there were other issues raised by both parties, the main issue is whether the Plaintiffs can set off the 20% balance of the purchase price against the LAD payable by the Defendant since the Defendant is under liquidation? CA 2016 provides for set off where there are mutual dealings. Section 526 of CA 2016 provides that set-off for mutual debts and mutual dealings prior to the winding up is allowed as an exception to the pari passu principle, as follows-“(1) This section applies where before the commencement of the winding up there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings between the company and any of the company’s creditor proving or claiming to prove for a winding up of debts.(2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the mutual dealings and the sums due from one party shall be set off against the sum sue from the other”. Set off under section 526 of CA 2016 is applicable for mutual dealings that was executed before the winding up.

08/01/2024

YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a92901cf-193f-40b6-b694-10286ccbbad7&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: WA-12ANCvC-67-05/2023 ANTARA JAKS ISLAND CIRCLE SDN. BHD. (DALAM PENGGULUNGAN) (NO. SYARIKAT: 200901031454 (874563-X)) …PERAYU DAN 1. EE SHIU LOONG (NO. K/P: 761122-14-5619) 2. LOH AH HONG (NO. K/P.: 801025-08-6016) 3. CHEAH OLIVER PHEE-CHYE (SWEDISH PASSPORT SWEDEN NO. 96422176) 4. ONG FOO CHONG (NO. K/P : 820801-14-5837) 5. CHUNG SHEH LEE (NO. K/P.: 830306-14-5134) 6. TAM WEI EE (NO. K/P.: 860718-23-5563) 7. NEW WE-JIAN (NO. K/P.: 871227-10-5071) 08/01/2024 15:35:50 WA-12ANCvC-67-05/2023 Kand. 49 S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 8. FOO CHEK LEONG (NO. K/P: 611210-04-5067) 9. CHAN YEE LAI (NO. K/P :660125-10-6188) 10. HWEE HON FAI (XU HANHUI) (SINGAPOREAN PASSPORT NO.: E7034352C) …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia No. Guaman Sivil : WA-B52NCvC-490-11/2022 Antara 1. Ee Shiu Loong (No. K/P: 761122-14-5619) 2. Loh Ah Hong (No. K/P.: 801025-08-6016) 3. Cheah Oliver Phee-Chye (Swedish Passport Sweden No. 96422176) 4. Ong Foo Chong (No. K/P: 820801-14-5837) 5. Chung Sheh Lee (No. K/P.: 830306-14-5134) 6. Tam Wei Ee (No. K/P.: 860718-23-5563) 7. New We-Jian (No. K/P.: 871227-10-5071) 8. Foo Chek Leong (No. K/P: 611210-04-5067) S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 9. Chan Yee Lai (No. K/P :660125-10-6188) 10. Hwee Hon Fai (Xu Hanhui ) (Singaporean Passport No.: E7034352c) …Plaintif -Plaint if Dan Jaks Island Circle Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat: 200901031454 (874563-X)) …Defendan GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This was an appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge in allowing the Respondent’s application pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) for issues pertaining to the late delivery for vacant possession (VP) and liquidated ascertained damages (LAD). This Court dismissed the appeal with cost. The reasoning behind this Court’s decision is as deliberated. [2] For ease of reference, the respective parties shall be referred as the Plaintiffs and Defendant as they were in the Sessions Court. S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BRIEF FACTS [3] The Plaintiffs are purchasers of parcels in a development project known as Pacific Star @ Section 13, Petaling Jaya (Project) that was developed by the Defendant before it was wound up by way of a voluntary winding up. [4] The Plaintiffs and the Defendant signed a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) according to Schedule H, Regulation 11(1), Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989. [5] However, the Defendant failed to deliver vacant possession within 36 months from the date of the SPA, which entitled the Plaintiffs for LAD as provided under clauses 25(2) and 27(2) of the SPA and pursuant to Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989. [6] It was undisputed that vacant possession was only delivered on 16.12.2021 (VP date). Therefore, pursuant to clause 26(3) of the SPA the Plaintiffs were deemed to have taken vacant possession 14 days from the VP date which was 30.12.2021. S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [7] In this regard, the Plaintiffs instructed their financiers to withhold the release of the balance purchase price to set-off with the LAD. For the record, the 2nd and 7th Defendant had paid the full purchase price after commencement of this Originating Summons (OS). [8] This OS was initially filed at the High Court on 21.01.2022 as Civil suit no. WA-22NCvC-48-01/2022 (Civil Suit). On 15.04.2022, the Plaintiffs filed an application under Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 (Application) against the Defendant. However, before the Defendant filed their Affidavit in Reply for the Application, the Defendant entered into a creditors voluntary winding up on 18.04.2022. The Civil Suit was later transferred to be heard at the Sessions Court by the learned High Court Judge on 28.10.2022. [9] On the other hand, the Defendant has also filed an Originating Summons on 04.09.2023 at the Kuala Lumpur High Court, Civil Action No. WA-24NCvC-3836-09/2023 (OS 3836) for similar actions and applied for this appeal to be heard together with OS 3836 which this Court dismissed. Reason being, that OS 3836 is not an appeal and is governs with separate procedural provisions under the ROC and thus cannot be heard simultaneously. S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 THE ISSUE [10] Although there were other issues raised by both parties, the main issue is whether the Plaintiffs can set off the 20% balance of the purchase price against the LAD payable by the Defendant since the Defendant is under liquidation? ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Order 14A of ROC: Determination of Questions of Law [11] This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied all the elements under Order 14A Rule 1 of ROC, as the questions posed by the Plaintiffs were questions that are suitable for determination without a full trial of the action and such determination will finally determine the entire cause or the matter (See: Savant-Asia Sdn Bhd v Sunway Pmi-Pile Construction Sdn Bhd [2009] 5 MLJ 754 (FC), Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan v Petroliam Nasional Bhd & Other Appeals [2014] 6 MLJ 31 (FC) and Seloga Jaya Sdn Bhd v UEM Genisys [2007] 7 MLJ 385 (CA). Vacant Possession and Liquidated Ascertained Damages S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [12] Based on Regulation 11(1) Housing Development Regulation of Schedule H, the provisions of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (HDA) and the case of Ang Ming Lee & Ors v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor And Other Appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60 , the time period for delivery of vacant possession and completion of the common facilities is 36 months from the SPA. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to claim LAD and in PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor And Other Appeals [2021] 2 CLJ 441, it was held that the starting date for the purposes of calculation of LAD is from the payment of the booking fee. Set off [13] The Defendant contended that since the Defendant has been wound up, the Plaintiffs cannot seek to set off the balance purchase price from the LAD as it would contravene section 526 of the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) and also an undue preference over other creditors. [14] CA 2016 provides for set off where there are mutual dealings. Section 526 of CA 2016 provides that set-off for mutual debts and mutual S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 dealings prior to the winding up is allowed as an exception to the pari passu principle, as follows- “(1) This section applies where before the commencement of the winding up there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings between the company and any of the company’s creditor proving or claiming to prove for a winding up of debts. (2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the mutual dealings and the sums due from one party shall be set off against the sum sue from the other”. [15] Set off under section 526 of CA 2016 is applicable for mutual dealings that was executed before the winding up. [16] Whether the Plaintiffs are allowed to set off within the meaning of section 526 of the Companies Act since the Appellant is under liquidation? Section 526 provides “…this section applies where before the commencement of the winding up there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings between the company and any of the company's creditor proving or claiming to prove for a winding up of debts.”. [17] Thus, the question of what does the word “mutual” mean? [18] In Sime Diamond Leasing (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v JB Precision Moulding Industries Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) [1998] 4 MLJ 569, the S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Federal Court deliberated on the issue of set off pertaining to an Equipment Lease Agreement and the issue arose was as to whether a set off could be allowed based on the Agreement under section 41 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 41 provides “where there have been mutual credits, mutual debts, or other mutual dealings between a debtor against whom a bankruptcy order is made…”. The Federal Court held that- “"[42] For the statutory set-off provisions to apply, the circumstances of a case must disclose mutual credits, mutual debits or other mutual dealings. The prerequisite of mutual dealings requires that the cross- demands must be between the same parties, and be held in the same capacity or right. (See, Ince Hall Rolling Mills Co Ltd v. The Douglas Forge Company [1882] 8 QBD 179, at p 183); Shand v. MJ Atkinson Ltd [1966] NZLR 551, at p.570; Peel v. Fitzgerald [1882] R 544, at p 547). ... [44] And, we would add, that it is settled law that where the circumstances of the creation of mutual liabilities are such as to show that they are related - where, for example, as in the present case, they arise out of a single contract between the parties - it is impossible for the parties to exclude even by private Agreement the statutory right of set-off conferred by s. 41 of the Bankruptcy Act. (See, Rolls Razor Ltd v. Cox [1967] 1 QB 552, per Denning MR at pp 569- 570)." [48] In the words of Sir Owen Dixon in Hiley v. People’s Prudential Assurance Co Ltd [1938] 60 CLR 468 at p 497: It is enough that at the commencement of the winding up mutual dealings exist which involve rights and obligations whether absolute or contingent of such a nature that afterwards, in the event that happen, they mature or develop into pecuniary S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 demands capable of set-off. If the end contemplated by the transaction is a claim sounding in money so that, in the phrase employed in the cases, it is commensurable with the cross-demand, no more is required than that at the commencement of the winding up liabilities shall have been contracted by the company and the other party respectively from which cross money claims accrue during the course of the winding up. [49] In our view, therefore, reciprocal obligations under a contract would, usually, be mutual. To illustrate, note the following dictum of Jessel MR in Peat v. Jones & Co. [1881] 8 QBD 147 at p 149 “a contract of sale and purchase is in its nature mutual imposing reciprocal obligations on the vendor and purchaser. Any claim arising out of mutual dealing could be set off. To the same effect is the case of Jack v. Kipping [1882] 9 QBD 113 where the vendor of goods had been adjudged a bankrupt, and it was held that the purchaser could set off against the trustee’s claim for the price a cross-claim for damages for fraud by the vendor, in having induced the purchaser to enter into the contract of sale and purchase. Conversely, we note the case of Tilley v. Bowman Ltd [1910] 1 KB 745, wherein a sale induced by the purchaser’s fraud, it was held that the vendor, on rescinding the contract could set off his claim to damages for the fraud against the trustee’s claim for repayment of the price.” (Emphasis added) [19] As such the word “mutual” in section 526 CA 2016 is to mean that where there existed contractual obligations and, in this case the SPA between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. Thus, section 526 of CA 2016 S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 allows set off as the word “mutual dealings/debts” in section 526 of CA 2016 to mean contractual obligations of the parties. [20] In the present case, the OS was filed before the voluntary winding up of the Defendant. The SPA is a mutual dealing which constitute mutual debts that took place before the winding up of the Defendant. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have met the requirement under Section 526 of CA 2016. [21] As the set off is allowed, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to claim for LAD based on the Federal Court case of SEA Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd v Lee Poh Choo [1982] 2 MLJ 31, that held at p 154 “… we are of the opinion that the plaintiff did not breach the agreement when she withheld payment of the money demanded by the defendant”. [22] On the doctrine of ‘stare decisis’, this Court is bound by the decisions of the Federal Court in the cases of Sime Diamond Leasing (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (supra) and SEA Housing Corp Sdn Bhd (supra). Variation of the Session’s Court Decision S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [23] The Defendant raised this issue in regards to the pronouncement of the decision of the Learned Sessions Court Judge which at first dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim on set off but later during clarification of the Order, decided otherwise. This Court agreed with the Defendant's Counsel that the learned Sessions Court Judge acted ‘functus officio’ when she varied her Order where the learned Sessions Court Judge ordered at first “not allowing the set off’” to later “allowing the set off”’. CONCLUSION [24] Accordingly, under O55 of the Rules of Court 2012, this appeal is by way of a rehearing and this court has assessed and weighed all the evidence and laws placed before this Court in its entirety. In this regard, for all the reasons aforesaid, this Court finds that there is no merit in the Defendants' appeal to warrant appellate intervention (See: Ong Leong Chiou v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd (FC) [2021] 4 MLRA 211; [2021] 3 MLJ 622; [2021] 4 CLJ 821, Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v. Petra Perdana Berhad & Another Case [2018] 1 MLRA 263; [2018] 2 MLJ 177; [2018] 2 CLJ 641 (FC), Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors, [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 and MMC S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLRA 144; [2016] 2 MLJ 428; [2016] 4 CLJ 665). (DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT NCVC 1 KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT Dated: 8 January 2024 COUNSELS The Appellant’s Solicitors Messrs. Wilson Lim Suite 19-9 Commerce One (Menara K1) Lorong 3/137C Jalan Klang Lama (Old Klang Road) 58200 Kuala Lumpur. The Respondents’ Solicitors Messrs. V L Decruz & Co. Unit 50-11-06, Tingkat 11 Wisma UOA Damansara No.50, Jalan Dungun S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur. S/N zwEpqT8ZtkC2lBAobMu61w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-16A-21-11/2022

PERAYU UNIVERSITI SELANGOR (UNISEL) RESPONDEN MOHD FUAD BIN MOHD SALLEH

Appeal against the decision of the Industrial Court Award - Whether should commence by way of judicial review under Order 53 of the ROC 2012 or Appeal under section 33C of the Industrial Relations Act 1976 - Notice of Application to strike out the Applicant's Appeal.

08/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=01258dcd-914a-4a2f-8dc7-7a415894a619&Inline=true

08/01/2024 13:36:05 WA-16A-21-11/2022 Kand. 43 S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zY0lAUqRL0qNx3pBWJSmGQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—15A—21—11/2022 Kand. 43 as/on/202: ]3:]b-D3 mum MAHKAMAH nuns: MALAVA nu KUALA LUMPLIR DALAM wuuvm nsassxurum KUALA LUMPUR. muvsu xanucuu ><uAsA.xuAsA mus» ruvum sum No w M g j_1_IzQ1g ANYARA umvmsun ssumeon (umsm ..r-znuvu om Mann rum am MOHD sausu mo. KIF: mn42s.o1-nus: ...nssvunn:u [Dalnm porlun mug. Ii K» Na an/uawzu an Mahkanuh Puuuhnn M:ravS K... Lumpur] mum Mom: rum am Mono SALLEH mu. KIP: 6JM26~D1-6365) PENUNTLIY om umvensm ssuwaon . svmmn Judgrntnt Introduction The Respondent filed a Nance ov Applmauon dated 23.6 2023 (Enclosure 20) under seamen 33c 01 me Industrial Re\auans Am 1967 (IRA) and/ur seem as of the mauunax Relahons (Amendment) Act 2020 and/nr me mherent junsdlclmn of “us up 1 Q4 :1 sm xm\AuuRLGqNx3nBw.AsmGG mm. smm ...m.mm .. 0... w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Honourable Conn underOrder92 Rule A urine Rules ol Courl 2012 (R06) «or an order in 1.1. The Appellants Npliee ol Appeal dated 3112022 and consequenlially lhe appeal nerein. be SINCK all: 12. Costs of lnis applicallun and me appeal herein to he pain by me Appellant lo tne Resvonderll; and 1 3 Any ano/or suen olner reliels and/or Orders deemed m and/or sullable by [his Honourable Court. 2 The grounds in support of the applicalion are as lollows - 21 no Appellanls appeal narein relates to a reference at eonstruclive dlsmlssal in lne lnauslna1 coun ano registered as lnduslnal court case No.: 20/4.2395/20 (me lnoustrlal Court proeooalngu.) Durlng tne lnouslnal coun proceedings. ma Respnndenl clalmed lhal lna Appallanl had conslruelively dlsmlssed lne Respondent lroni nis employment 22 Aller lne lnaustnal coun proceedings. Award No 2363 of 2022 (me said Award) was handed down by me lnouslrial ooun on 27 NJ 2022 unoer tne aaia Award, ma Appellanl IS reouned lo pay tne Respondent a sum ol RM 230.374 03 as oompensalion. due to the Dnnslrucllve dlsllllssal by «tie Appalianl 2.3. on 311 2022. me Appellanl men a Notice ol Appeal lo lne Hlgh coon agalnsl me declslofl altne lnoustnal Com m me said Award (tn: Nmlno of Appcll); and 2 A The lining ol a Nelioe olAppeal is lrvegulal as - a The ngnl lo appeal to this Honourable coun against a declslcn onne lnoustnal com is sel out in seaion sac or me IRA [2 section ass was incorporateo into me lRA pursuanl to section 24 or me lnoustnal Relations (Anienornenil Aoi 2020 (the Nnandmcnl Ant): Duezulll m xmlAuuRLGqNx3nsw.lsn1En «ma Smnl mmhnrwlll be met! a may i... nflnlnnllly -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .nuua mi caunnls For me Appenam Encrk Mohamed Vbrahxm om Mehamad Teman uzramm 5. Fuaadah Peguambexa dan Peguamcara 12 F, Jaian Eidara 8. su Man, Samaria mama 3, 47000 Sunqau Buloh, Selangor. [Ru] Tuan — IF/I/1168/3022} FD! the Rsspandenl Encik Mehd Jamfl hm Vaacob Teman Srihana Mohamad A Farlners Peguambela dan Peguamcara No" me, Jalan Bolmg Fadang H‘ 13/H, Seksyen ya. moo Shah Alam, Se\an9or ..-e 11 ar 11 m xm\Am:RLD|:Nx3nBw.AsmEG «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! c. sectton 35 or tne Amendment An expressly states that pmdeedrngs commenced tn the lrtdttstnal court nature the camlrlg tntu the pperetton ot the Amendment Act shall proceed and have etlect as rt tne IRA had not been amended by the Amendment Act d ‘lne cnanges brought shout by the Amendment Act only came ttttp lcrce on 1.1 2021 Hwever, me tndttstnal COIAI1 procaedlngs below commenced on 11120213 wntcn ls before the comma tnlc opetattpn at the AmendntentAc1: and e. Tneteloce, the tight to appeal to tnts Honourable court under sectton sac ol the IRA does not apply to lhe lnttttstnal court preceedtngs tneteln 3 Atlertrte neanngt I allowed the Respondents Notlce cuxppltcattpn (Enclosure 20) and my lull grounds now lollnw Background Facts 4 The background tans galhered from the cause papery and sttanttsstons tty ttte names are largely undlsnmed and can be summarlzed as tollows: - 4 1 The Respondent was appotnted as an Assactate Rrotessor er Pwfessor Medya' tn the Appellants Faculty pl Business wilh ettect «tom 21.9 2010. rne Respondent was oonfirrned ln nls past an 21 10.2011 Hts lastdrawn salary per month was RM 10,335.59 4.2. By a letter dated 14.11: 2019 tne Appsllaru transtaned tne Respondent lrcm the Famlw at attstness & Accountancy based tn snan Alant Io l=usat Ferlgallan Asast Dan umum (PADU) located at aestan teya, Selurlgor ‘ltte ttaneter look eflect drum 1 11.2019. Acootdtng to the Dtrectcr of Human Resources 11 Admtrllslrallnn o1 |rle Appellant, Pttan Runant ptntt Zakavla (cow-1), tne dectttton was due |n tns tnstntatons gtven to her by me Appellant’: tap management tnat cpnststed pl tne vc, Deputy vc nlAcademic. Deputy vc uiStudsn|Aflat1s,Treasurav and Raptstrat Fuse s M 11 /N xmlMluRL9|:Nx3nEWJSr11EG “Nair s.n.t narlherwlll be tn... a may t... nflnlnnllly mt. dnunvlmt VI eFlt.lNa vtmxl 43 Upon transler, the Respondent was to undertake to teach PADU s oourses as well as the wulses conducted by the conrntunrcatrdn, Visual Arts A computer studies Faculty, Engineering & Lite Sciences Faculty and Etiucalmrt 3. Soclal Studies Facully, 4.4. on ta ‘B20194 the Respondent wrote to the vc to seek clarification on what expertise he possesses to teach at PADU and the 3 raeulties namely, communication. vrsual Arts at computer Studies Faculty. Engineering a Life Sc-ences Faculty and Education 8. Social studies Faculty 4 5 on the same date. the Respondent wrote to cow—t seeking to know why he was chosen to be translerred lo Beslart Jaya given the distance at 70 km lronr the main campus and benents, it any, that would be provided by the Respondent upon trans1er. 4,6. By I113 letter dated 31 102019 addressed to the vc, the Respondent claimed wnslrucllve dlsmlssal tn hls letter, the Respondent oiled that his transler is aornpelled by rll motive and is an act at vlctlmtzahorl. and that his ettort to seek an explanation tdrthe transter was unanswered by the Appellant. Further, there have been a series at unlarrwarnrngs issued by the Appellant to the Respondent The cortllrtuuus pressure applied by the Appellant has caused the Respondent to alarm constructive drsrnrssat 0! his services with the Appellant and aemrdrngly. the Respondent tendered 3 months‘ rtouw ot reslgnatlorl etlectlve lrom 31.10 2019, in accordance with the terms at his contract of employment The Respondent thereol lodged a representation la the Director General at lndustnal Relatlons under Seclton 20 at the IRA 4.5. The Honourable M ler M Human Resouroes. Malaysia had reterred the Respondent‘: representation to the lnduelnal Coun under Sacllan 2013; of the IRA tor an Award on at t 2020 rrruer u rn xmIAm:RLDl:Nx3nBw.lsntEG “None s.n.r luvlhnrwm re tr... In my r... prwlnullly MIMI dnuavlnrtt vn arlurta vmul 4,9 Aner the rnduscrtal Ooun Dmceedtngs‘ me tndustrtat Own handed down the sad Award dated 27 to 2u22. under the ears: Award‘ me lrtduslnal Court held tnar the Respondent was oanstmc|tvety dtsnllssed by me Appettant 4 to As a result, the Appettartt was dtrecled to pay back wages and eornpensatrpn arnounttng to a late) of RM zso an 03 4 tt. Eetng dtssatrsrred wrtn |ne Award‘ the Appettant med a Noltoa oVAppeat (Enclasure t) on 3 tt .2022 to crrattenge lhe Award under sermon 33:: o1thetRA whrett was brought about by me tatest amendment under trre Amendment Act mat comes tnto eflect trorrt 1 1 2021. 4.12 The Respondent men med a Nohre otnvptrcatton tsndtosttre 20) to strrke our tne Appettant s appeal on 23 6 ztm nra daemon omre Conn Natlcn ol Appo V. Judtetat Revtow 5 me Respondent contended that the proper procedure tor the Appettant to crrattenge the sad Award was to me a tudretat revtew propeedtng tnstead at fittng a Nottce dmppeat. 6. It IS to be noted mat the pmper procedure to quash the tndustrtat Court Award has atmys by way at a judtctal revtew appltcaltcn. 7 However, amendments were subsequentty made to the IRA pursuant to the Amendment Act By vtrtue of |he Amendment Act, secltart 33c at ms nu was rnseoted to attow an appeat to me Htgn Court tn respem or the trrdustnet Court Award 8. Sectton 33c 11! the Amendment Act ts reproduced as tottows: - Apput agatnst an award Inthu Nwh Cum 33: my ll any person rs arsxmtsfiod wtln an award at me Court made under season so sum pevson may appeat tome High Court wttnrn twnrarr dayr trprrt rne data M raaum on tn. award v... 5 out r~ xmlAut:RL9|:Nx3nEw.tsmEG “Nair Smut luvthnrwttt r. t... a my r... nnmrtnttly MIMI dnuavtnnl vn nrturtfl v-mat (21 The pmeeeme M an apuaal to me men Conn snan be me pmceduva m we Rules av Court 2012 [F u 1Ay2o5au12] In! an nppux hum a sesmns Cwn mm inch modlficalwoni a: me cmmexances may rsumre 13» In dealing wun such appefls, me men Court snau have we Dow-rs as 1! me apbam us mm M: Seaman: com‘ 9 ll 15 to be noted ma| me on ‘ g mu: ewes: o1seoucn 33:: of the Amendmem Aci was an 1 1 2021 in semen 35 of me Amendmen| Act further s1a:es as fuuuws. - "Swing and cnnsmanan pmv inn: asm Camwawnit mac» underseclmn e dupmu mama undtr subsecl-on 91¢» dzumsmvrecagnmuvx made under: Seclmn 9, .ee.esennanens for raml ilamenl made unfluv Sl1:1Ion 21: ov me mumps! Au, am All nrocoedlngs commlnmd or mm mm bflove the Industrial Conn In nllllon In . nfnnnu undn mhncllnn um, Iulalcllon 2111:» Ind Suction zs hllnn Inc no me up-union vi IN: Ac! nun vloceed and nm mm as n we maneuver An hid nut bean summon mm. Acl. 12; A» was and veemamne, venue, an-enone and waiter or mmnzanune mane esuea arglamid undelme pnr1upa\A.c1 shaH In the enem ('Ya‘ me rules and vegmalmns, lorrm dlmchnns ana Mlavoiannhonzamns areounsII1eMw1m|he pnncipm Act as amenoea bytms A41 oonnnuem be m Vnrce unm such vulsi ana regmamns. [arms dvechnns and later o1 aulhonzmmnx -Irv vvvukud uramendsd (3; Any um. Iluuuon. man at e.-mmng. dam, men 117 wmmunuu undlr mu prlllclpll An Immedmtnly bnion 09! coming Inlo opmuan of mu Act. Ilull M sun mm as mm prlm:|pIIA1:l ms no: em Imlndud by we An." (emphasis added) 11 II 1s my view ma: based on me above semen 35 of me Amendmenu Am xne1 proceedings nu ma lndusmal Conn wmch commenced belore me operauon or me Amendmenl An an 1.1 2021 sneu be ueen with as -1 me pnnupal Act (IRA) nan not been amended 12 Vn the mslam case‘ I find lha\ lhe Vndusvlai COUI1 pmoeedmgs belween the Appeilanl and \he Respondent commenced on 6.11.2020 10. bflara |ha Amendment AC! was m lame, lherahre. p... am: am xmIAm:RLD1:Nx3nswJsmEn «mm. Snr1I\nav1hnrwH\I>e .1... a my 1... nflmnnflly mum: dnuamnl VI mum we me AnpsHan| musl deal wmh the \ndus|na\ Cowl proceedings as w me pnncupar Acl was never amended 73 on nms xssue, 1 have denuded m Osim (M) Sdn Bhd v. Mg Woon Wee [2023] AMEJ $531; [2023] 1 ms 524; [2023] MLIIJ 711 as vuwmvs . 1:21 In me mslanl use. I (Inc that the Indus" I Conn pm mus hnwun mu Aw-nun Ind um Rupon-1-m samm.~=.a on 5. zone. more -no Arnuudmem Anlwa lone Inerevfareme Appaflinl usl deal wun Um lnduslnal own pmaee mg as .r we Pnnc\va\Ac1 was never amended I3 nmsvme. I View max on Induxlml Courl nrncudinil w win cummtncnd More 1.1.2021, ma lpulll rlrocodun -man secllnn no In rlul -null:-bk In mu an {Sea Llm Phln Khlnn v. Kho Sn mu: mm 1 um I: (199512 MLRA 219: [men cm 529‘ mus) 1 AMR an. L0: cmw Marv; V. pp (191512 MLJ 36:[197a)|MU?A Wt M Frermssfl an me aioresaw reasons I am so me View Ina! In: sum mum at Aapc-I mu by [M Appellinl ls lnigullr ...a must bu struck W 3: cm. Apnallunl am: not haw . tummy rlyhl la m. cm Nnlicn on Appeal lo nus noun. ‘5 Sun I: :5 of the Am-nam m An expressly stale; mu mac Idln commnncnfl 1:: Inc Imiuslrl-I Cum! Balm: m. comm: mu: ovvuion om.» Amundmm|A:1smII nmcl-d and haw mm in mm IRA ma um um. Imlnflud hy me Amendment MI. us TM changes mwgm mm by me An: dmenl Act my came into Iona on 1 1 zazv. nomm, ms |m4..m.: Cmm pmclndlnul wow Izommlnctd on 5.1.2n2o mm mm. m. coming mlo opmuon 5:! ms Amendmtm Act (1 rnerevme. ma viuhl to appeal to this Honour mu Cnurl undur won 3:: nl . um am not may in ms Indusmnl Cmm uroceeflings hlrlm Cnncluunn Ia Based an m. ubovs. I am av the mew Ina! Omar 5: mm Rec Ielaung tu‘wv1malrevxewAs stm vam and apphcable m me Dresent casa v... 1 H 1: sm xm\AuuRLDqNx3nBw.AsmEG «mm. smm nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 w mm s. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 14 19 Thevevfnre Ins props] prooedme my Ihe Apu::am:o =na::enge me saxd Awud .5 In m:::a:s ]ud:c:.a] review pmceedmgs Vnslead .7: Wing Ihe um Nance ul Appea]' 1ampr:as:s added) Further, an me same Issue, Anand Ponnudura: J :n ma case cl Anokl Rtlail (M) Sin and v. uunkan:-r: Poru:-nun Mlllylla & on [2a2:] MLJU 26: [2023] 3 MLRH 230, [2023] 2 CLJ 455; [2025] 2 MELR176: [2o23]1 ILR :91 new as Iauaws » [ca] Fvstly apan fvom amendhm me 1957 Act In [nun an appeal Nov on nu ms nu: Suction 33:. I: x. to M nalld am s.¢::a.. 2:: 00171111161 mm nlnlmnlo mu rehrenceofllw nnvuummiorl nu ma bun Imunocd :n [ms regard pnolmlhe savd amendmem Wmeve WI! no hkelmood M the :apmama::on bevna semen Ihe nmw Genem] shal] nulfiy ms M:n]5le1 and :: .5 me Mlmslev vma men has me dnwremn vmsmav or not :9 mg: um um repluunliunn m m. Wnduuna] Cam] var an award ms dvscreuon exermsed by me Mmnsler hns mu m um am [he subpcl or ,::a:c:.: mvmw apphcaflons Hnweven mu pmman ..:.::»g to the mnvmn ammuon wan amendod by an lndusuial Relldons mmuuamonuy Acl zaza Ant mm u. can mu dlicrothm of on Min tzvr lul boon nmend Ind .. naw upland u «alums 7 ‘Se . n 2:: mm prmclpal an :5 amtndud 4:2] by subwlulmg [ur suBsen:1:on(.'S](7vi fufluwmg iubsachon :3) Whnn mu nu-nu fluuul :. nllnfild um um. :- no Hkelrhood of on npnulllallnns helnn «mm mm: ...:m=::m: [2], m nmm: Gunrll um: rcllr um npruumannns to un Conn fuvln .-aru : A: such an-u....nua.. amurldmcn . nawlhn Din:IarGurwrlI who is mammeu ha me: n npuw.m:on to me Industrial noun for .n -ward Wlnnn :. no :au.::msoa M mo nprvnnullon n-ma mum [19] [20] Assuch in my vIuw.onu waylo um: nun: appcalorludlclal mum :5 to be nllllud :. In consider who milrrid nu rcpnsnmllion In 2». lndunrul Cour] co: .n "ma. [2:] In my nplnlnn. um. upnnmnllnn ~ - unmu In [M :mmu:.: Eourl by nu nmcm: Geneu] an marvdatod Ivy the amended prnvlllon. Imn‘ In nppuu aughlln helllednununnnns-z1lnn3JC otm-1:67 AM u amtndid. p... n .: :1 sm xm]AuuRLflqNx3nBw.1smEG «mm. smm nmhnrwm .. U... :4 my :... nrW\ruH|:I mm]: dnuumnl Vfl .m:c Wm] [221 Hwwever, an [M umerhand‘ mu: represnnutmn ms nhmd lo mu unaunn-I Cnull by Ina mnum, mun. qunu clurly mu nlorancc was man wvsnankm union mm mm as: Act as unlmlndod mm In wmun cu mama: review wnuld be an pmpuappllclllurl m In mad: as} on mu mm mm. an n mgnngma um.» mm In unnm-r who nlened the npm-nuuon and rwllhe Dlre:wrGenIr:l. lnmy vltw, In: nu um um Mnnmeru mm wn dmu aw Jlnulry 24:21 rlulwi no dilknnnu u n was 0.. >4 ixlur who was . rclslnn ms dlsuefia rnhrrmg In: npvesenlaflon pursnunun an an 1951 MI 1: urumlndtd‘ [241 Fmlher my vlaw max wdncml revlaw was pwpefly unma in (ms case vs formed Dy me saving and mnsmunau prov-smn In seam as of Ihe Amenflmanl A»: much pnmaes as lenaws . 35 Saving and vansnnanav pnmsmns (1)Camplamls mane under ischun a mspmes Ieierred under subseclson sum exams rm recegnmnn ma. undalsauwen 9. rspreisrvlalwonslor /emstalemenl made understnuzn 20 0f the nnncrnm an and aH Dmoeedms commenced or awards made man in Maurine! cam m malxon la a relerence undev subsecnnn mm. subsechon 2013» am sachun 25 bulou um oummq mm opmmn M Ims acl mu pmmad Ind have effect as n the prmcIpa\z<.1 had not been amended by "us ad a; All mlu Md ngmauons, «onns ummns mm \elA2v no ammnuwni made Issued argnmled undermu nnrunpallm snau. In me exlenl Ihs\ ma Mes and nwulawns mnns dmuchons ma mm a! -umunzalmns us wniullsnl mm ma pnnclpal am as amended by an: 31:1. mmznuu in {)5 m fares unm such mln and ngmauons, nouns, anvectmns and Lemma! amhonuuons ave re:-vuked urzmendefl 13) Any mvasugatlun ml! av pmeeamgs done man or commenced under me rmnolpal an wmmedtalaly Delete the comma 4-no op-enamn nl mm «L mu a. dull war: .5 W In: prInc\Da\ac1 had no| been amendui by «ms an “ [Emflhnsu mma] 1251 As mgnugnm shave. lhn rnpvrumallons Ior veinslzlzmenl under Iccllan 2:: M an um um win nun: by um two 5: Ipondnnu In 202» pm: In In: Imtndnnmx ulullu ulkct Assum. in ugm Mlh llvlng Ind ‘lnnllllonll prnwlsln . In my V‘ , nu Appllcull w- clrlinly unllllnd Ia wound a ind In w proccodinui as ll um Prlnclrul Anna nolh n Ilmnded by the Amendmnnllct As suaa, n have no nmmn .n w:m\ss<ng me ameslvnn MLelmsd Serum we a M 1: sm xmlAm:RLDt:Nx3nBw.AsmEG «mm. smuw lunhnrwm .. U... n may he nrW\n|H|Y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Fu¢ara\ counsex and (nndudmg mm the Apnkcanl has mnecfly uhkllfl Juana! review pmoeemng n 1|: Man to chaflanoa me two awards iemphasvs added) 15 Based on Amlu Rntail (supra). as mgmigmed above. rl was me Honourame MInis|er :71 Human Resources who referred me vepresemauon (o the Indusmal Conn and not the Director Genera! m resnem a1 a dispute between |ha Appcnanx and me Respondenx under secnon 20 oi the \RA The renresemalmn was made by me Honouname Mumsleran 31.1 2020. 16. As Such m Ivghl Bf lha savmg and transmona\ prvvwslons In my view me Appellant must proceed to me ]ud\c\a\ review proceedings to chaHenge me said Award as 1' the pnncnpafl Act has no! been amended by me AmendmenIAc1 Conclusion 17 Premwsed on (he eflorcsand masons. 1 am uflha mew lhal the mower procedure lorlhe Appeuant to chaHenge the sand Award Is to mmale judicial rewew proteedmgs msxsad av my me sad Nance 01 Apnea! In As such‘ I aflow me Rssponaenrs apphcauon [Enclosure 25; mm oasis of RM 2.ooo.oa subject to the a|luca|ov lee Dated‘ 03 January 2024 /AAA/\ Ahmad Kamal bun Md Shahld Judge rugn caun Kuals Lumpuv hgurtatn m xmIAm:RLOt:Nx3nBw.AsmEG «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e med w may he mm-y mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

ND-83D-823-11/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMMAD SOLEHIN BIN SHAHRULNIZAM

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Offence of self-administration of dangerous drugs into body under section 15(1)(a) of Dangerous Drugs 1952 - Accused pleaded guilty to the charge - Accused is a young first-time offender - Sentencing - Factors to be considered in passing sentence according to law - Whether the sentence of fine is just and appropriate

08/01/2024

Tuan Uthman bin Abd Ghani

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64f9d8e9-9df4-4e41-8c1b-3fa313d3d1c1&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI PORT DICKSON DALAM NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS KES TANGKAP NO.: ND-83D-823-11/2023 PENDAKWA RAYA DAN MUHAMMAD SOLEHIN BIN SHAHRULNIZAM (NO. K/P: 040413050193) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The accused in this case was arraigned before this court to answer for a charge under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which reads as follows: “Bahawa kamu pada 30/11/2021 jam lebih kurang 6.20 pagi bertempat di Balai Polis Lukut, Port Dickson, di dalam Daerah Port Dickson, di dalam Negeri Sembilan telah didapati memberikan kepada diri kamu sendiri dadah berbahaya iaitu amphetamine dan methamphetamine oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 15 (1) dan dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 38B akta yang sama. 08/01/2024 23:51:33 ND-83D-823-11/2023 Kand. 11 S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Hukuman: Jika disabitkan hendaklah didenda tidak lebih daripada lima ribu ringgit atau hukuman penjara selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada dua tahun. Hukuman seksyen 38B ADB 1952: Pengawasan selama dua tahun atau tiga tahun” [2] The accused pleaded guilty to the charge. I accepted his plea and convicted him on the charge. Upon hearing mitigating and aggravating submissions from the accused and the prosecution respectively, I then passed a sentence of fine in the amount of RM1,900, in default of which four months’ imprisonment. I also ordered the accused to be placed under police supervision for the period of 2 years from the date of the conviction. [3] The prosecution has now filed an appeal against the said order of sentence. This is the grounds of my said judgment. BACKGROUND [4] The facts of this case are simply this. On 30 November 2021, the accused was brought to Lukut Police Station in Port Dickson wherein his urine sample was taken, and it was found to be positive methamphetamine upon test. His urine sample was also sent to the Pathology Department in the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital for an analysis wherein it was later found that his urine sample contained dangerous drugs of methamphetamine and amphetamine. [5] On 6 November 2023, he was charged before this court. He pleaded guilty when the charge was read to him. I was satisfied that he understood S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 the nature and consequence of his plea. The prosecution then tendered the facts of the case and all relevant documents to support such facts to be marked by the court as exhibits. The accused admitted to the facts of the case and all of the exhibits. In the circumstances, I accepted his plea of guilty and convict him on the charge. I then proceeded to hear submission for the purpose of sentencing. [6] The accused was unrepresented and was not a man of many words. He pleaded the court to impose a small amount of fine as a punishment for his conduct. He also told the court that he has to take care of his ailing grandmother. [7] The prosecution on the other hand moved this court for a deterrence sentence to prevent the accused from repeating the same offence. The prosecution also submitted that the court ought to take into consideration the rampancy of this kind of crime. [8] At this juncture I must highlight what had become apparent in the face of documents before the court. Firstly, the accused in this case was a 17-years-old child when the offence was committed and was around 19 when he was charged. Secondly, the accused was a first-time offender in the absence of any records tendered by the prosecution to show that he has prior convictions. With these facts in mind, I then proceeded to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed. SENTENCING [9] In deciding the appropriate sentence to be imposed, I am minded by the starting point that the court has to exercise discretion to pass a S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 sentence according to law as provided, inter alia, under section 173(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is trite that the courts are bound by statutory ambits and established judicial principles in passing a sentence according to law (see: PP v. Jafa Daud [1981] 1 LNS 28; Tan Lay Chen v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 4 CLJ 492, [2001] 1 MLJ 135). I considered the following judicial principles in deciding the sentence against the accused. [10] The foremost of established judicial principles that I considered in respect of the accused is the public interest. Generally, sentences imposed by courts must have deterrence and preventive effect to the offender and the public at large. However, the ultimate service to the public interest is to turn offenders from criminal ways to honest living. The seminal authority on this point is Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102 quoting an English case as follows: “One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball 35 Cr. App. R 164 as follows: In deciding the appropriate sentence a Court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves to the Court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the Court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” [11] The accused in this case was a child when the offence was committed and can be categorized as youthful offender when charged before this court at the age of 19. His age as well as the fact that he was a first-time offender must be factored into the context of public interest. It is another established judicial principle that public interest is best served for young first offenders to turn into honest living if they are kept away from custodial sentence. The precedent on this point is the decision of the High Court in Teo Siew Peng & 4 Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1984] 1 LNS 71 where the following was held regarding young first offenders: “As stated, at the time of the commission of the offence, all the appellants were young offenders, none of whom was above the age of 19 years. They are also first offenders. I take note of what was stated in the judgment in Tukiran bin Taib v Public Prosecutor [1955] MLJ 24 that "it is very desirable that a young first offender who is between the ages of 17 and 21 should be kept out of prison, if S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 possible." In that case, it is true that instead of imprisonment the appellant was sentenced to an advanced approved school, but the emphasis is that in respect of young offenders, imprisonment should be avoided as far as possible. In this connection, I would also quote for the purpose of consideration a passage in The English Sentencing System by Cross (3rd Edition) at page 141 which, after reference to the English Advisory Council on the Penal System, quoted from paragraph 10 of "The length of Prison Sentence" as follows: "Prolonged and repeated imprisonment is destructive of family relationships and, by encouraging the prisoner's identification with the attitudes of the prison community, increases his alienation from normal society. In addition, long-term institutionalisation is all too likely to destroy a prisoner's capacity for individual responsibility and to increase the problems he must face when he returns to society." In the Principles of Sentencing by Thomas (1st Edition), quoting from the judgment in the case of R v Smith [1964] Crim LR 70 that publication at page 19 thereof states: "In the case of a young offender there can hardly ever be any conflict between the public interest and that of the offender. The public have no greater interest than that he should become a good citizen. The difficult task of the Court is to determine what treatment gives the best chance of realizing that object. That realization is the first and by far the most important consideration."” S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [12] Apart from the above, I have also considered as a mitigating factor the fact that the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge. Although plea of guilty would not automatically guarantee a discount in sentencing, it is only fair that in the absence of any aggravating factors such as bad record of prior convictions, the accused ought to be credited for his plea which has saved public time and money that would otherwise be spent for a prolonged trial in court (see: Public Prosecutor v. Ravindran & Ors [1992] 1 LNS 47). [13] In addressing the prosecution’s submission that this court ought to take into consideration the rampancy of the offence under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1950, I would simply echo the same sentiment in another Magistrates’ Court decision in PP v. Muhammad Asyraf Ayut [2019] 9 CLJ 565 at para [16] to [19]. There, it was illustrated that harsh sentences per se do not warrant prevention of narcotic cases in this country. I must add that at the end, sentences passed by courts must be tailored into the nuances of facts and circumstances in each case. [14] Having taken into considerations factors as discussed above, I came into the decision that the accused can be kept away from prison as long as a sentence of fine with appropriate amount is passed as opposed to a sentence of imprisonment per se. In deriving into the appropriate amount of fine, I have to strike balance between imposing small, inconsequential amount of fine and a heavy, hefty one. Imposing a small, inconsequential amount of fine would send a wrong message to the public that crime entails only a small price. On the other hand, imposing a heavy and hefty fine would only put further burden to the accused who would turn into criminal ways to find the amount of money or else being sent away to prison. S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [15] Therefore, I am of the view that fine in the amount of RM1,900 in default of which four months’ imprisonment is the appropriate amount of fine to be imposed. It is neither too small nor too high an amount to be paid by the accused in this case taking cumulatively into consideration the mitigating and aggravating factors discussed above. I also had in my mind the following words of Pedlow J in Lee Yu Fah & 5 Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1937] 1 MLJ 179: “If a general principle can be laid down, I think it should be that a fine should seldom be so excessive as to ruin completely the people on whom it is imposed and to make them mere outcasts in the country and potential criminals through the urge of necessity.” CONCLUSION [16] Having regards to the facts and circumstances of this case together with all mitigating and aggravating factors present, I am of the considered view that the just and appropriate sentence to be passed against the accused is a sentence of fine in the amount of RM1,900, in default of which four months’ imprisonment. Dated 8 January 2024 sgd ……….....………….………….. UTHMAN BIN ABD GHANI Magistrate Magistrates’ Court, Port Dickson S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 For the prosecution – Puan Nadia Ezzati Binti Mohd Zainal, Deputy Public Prosecutor For the accused – unrepresented S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-24NCvC-524-06/2018

PEMOHON KALIAMMAH A/P MUTHU

Ini adalah permohonan Bakal Pencelah di Notis Permohonan (Lampiran 21) bertarikh 16.11.2022 untuk mendapatkan kebenaran mencelah dan selanjutnya untuk mengenepikan Perintah Mahkamah ini bertarikh 18.7.2018 yang diperolehi secara ex-parte oleh Pemohon. Bakal Pencelah juga memohon agar prosiding pelaksanaan atau sebarang permohonan berlanjutan daripada Perintah tersebut ditangguhkan sehingga penyelesaian permohonan ini.

08/01/2024

YA Dato' Rozana Binti Ali Yusoff

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bd1528fc-4749-4f81-ba74-68b7006a5d77&Inline=true

08/01/2024 12:39:31 PA-24NCvC-524-06/2018 Kand. 37 S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /CgVvUlHgU6dGi3AGpddw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PA—2ulCvC—52l—U6/2018 Kand. 37 02/01/2224 12:39-31 DALAM MAHKAIIIAH TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAIJ PINANG §AMAN PEMULA ND FA uucvcsuoa/201: Da\am pevkara mengenaw hananah yang dvksnaln sebagaw Lot Na 5365, Mu 12, Daerah Bare: Days. Pulau Pinang yang Ierkandung dalam Geran Hskmmk No cu. Jalan Panlaw Jerjaky Sungaw Nmang‘ 11900 Bayan Lepas, Fulau Fmang (‘Hananah cersenun Dan DéI\éIm Derkara mengenaw Penghakiman Mahkamah Tmggi Malaya dw Pulau Pmang, Gunman SIVII N0 22NCVC—15»D2/2015 henankh 9/9/2017 Dan Dalam perkara mengenav Penman Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia, Rayuan SMI Na. P- o2(Ncvc;w—1goa—1u/zms benarikh as/05/2917 Dan Dawn perkam mengenal Fenntah Mahkamah Psrsekuluan Malayswa. Permohonan sum Nu Ua(4)25a4a6/2u17u=) m Iowmlwmaaufipunw 1 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 417 5 A20 Kanun Tanah Nsgara, 1955 Dan Dalam perkara mengenal Aluran 1. Aluran A2 den Aluran 92 K4. Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 KALIAMMAH NP MUYHU (No. K/P: 610306417-5266 (E)(L) 3125191) PEMOHON VALEE NF KARUFPEN (N0. K/F: 411210-n1-5198) PEMOHON/BAKAI. PENCELAH ALA.sAN PENGHAKIMAN A. FENDAHULUAN [1] Wm adahah permohonan Saba‘ Penoelah di Nuns Permahonan lLampIran 21) benankh 16112022 umuk mendapafkan kebenaran menoehh dan se\arI]u|nya unluk mengenepikan Perinlah Mahkamah Inl henankh 1572015 yang diperoxem secara ex—par|e uleh Pemuhon. Bakal Pem>e\ah mg: rnemohon agar was bsflamulan g pewaksanaan alau sebarang pennohonan danpada Penman tersebut daanggunkan sehmgga penyelesaxan permnhanan um. sm Icgvvulugmascuspmw ; «mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom! a. FAKTA KE3 [2] Perkara suhjek yang memadl pemkaxan ada\ah mengenaw satu hsnanah yang dlkenali sehagaw Lot No. 5366, Mukim 12, Daelah Baral Days, Pmau Pmang yang |erkandImg da\am Geran N . 9569 bsrsama sebuah rumah beralamat No 10. Jalan 4, Ja\an Fania! Jenak, Sungax Nmung, 11900 Bayan Lapas Fulau Pinang ("Han2Inah «ersebur) Harlanah \ersebu| pads awalnya max lahun 1959) auaxah dndanarkan dw a|as narna 3 adlk beradik |PemHIk Eevdaflav).— la] Kallammah A/P Mulhu (Pemohun) 1/3 bahagvan [bl Bali Krishnan A/L Mulhu 1/3 bahagnan [c] Vasanlm A/P Mumu 1/3 bahagian [3] Pada tahun 2015, Baka\ Pencelah Ianu mu kepada Pemi Eevdaflar |e\ah menunlul an Mahkamsh Tlnggl Pulau Pinang melaxm Guaman swu No: ZZNCVC-I5-02/2015 supaya mernbataxkan nama ke ga 'ga Pemuluk aemanar (ersebul alas ahsan bahawa meleka Iidak mempunyaw seharang kepsmmgan ke alas Hananah xsrsenuc selain danpada menjadi pemegang amanah kepada dmnya. [4] Semasa prosiding sedang dljalankan, dua arang Pemmk Berdaflar yang bemama Ba1a Knshnan dan Vasan||'u tevah merekedkan penghakxman perselujusn pada 2332015 dengan Baka\ Fanoemh hahawa mereka memegang Harlanah (ersebut sebagm pemegang amanah kspada Eakal Penoelah. Tunlulsn swu masm ameruskan anlara Eala‘ Penoelah dengan Femohan sahaua Sslspas perblcaraan penuh uvadakan, Mahkamah Tmggw lelah pads 99.2015 mamuluskan Pemohon hanya memegang hananah lersahul sebagal pemegang m Icgvvulugmascusgmw 3 mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m mm .. mmmy mm: dnumml VI mum pom! amanah kepada aaxa1 Fencslah den name: Pemohon sebegai pemmk berdaflar hananah (ersebul dmalalkan dam dniaflarkan acas Eakal Pencemh. Psmohon uaak berpuas mm dan membua| rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan pada 5.10.2016 Iemadap kepmusan Mahkamah Tinggi lersebul Sehelum Mahkamah Rayuan membual kepulusan. Bakal Panoa1ah Ie\ah menukar hakvmlik Hadanah lersehul ke alas namanya pada «mu 2016. [5] Pads 03 as 2017, Mahkamah Rayuan Ielah membenarkarv rayuan Pemchun uan mengelepukan Fenghakvnan Mahkamah Tingg1 Fulau Plnang benarikh u9.o9.2o1a ssna menglsyuharkan Fernohon sebagal pemllik bersama yang nemana.-hag1 Hananah lerssbul Bake! Penoeum kemumannya membuat pemohonan unluk kebenaran merayu ke Mahkamah Persekuluan yang kemudvarvuya anmax dan mamennvankan Fennlah Mahkarnah Rayuan henankh on o5.2e17 mkekalkan [51 Selemsnya Femohun memlallkan ex pane Saman Pemula unluk memberi etek kepada Penman Milhkamih R/ayuan me\a|uI Swil Nu. P— 02(NCVC)W—190€-10/2015 benankh 03.05.2017 unluk melelak hak dan mendaharkan name Femohon sebagai pemmk bersama berdaflar unluk Hananah Iersehul. Fade 1a 7.2015. Mahkamah Tlnggi mernbenarkan ex Pfifle Samar: Pemula (ersebul. Eakal Psnoelah klru memohon unluk mencelah rrleiahu Lampvan 21 dan mga unluk mengenepnkan Penmah bsnankh 15 7.2013 m Icwvulugmuscuspmw . mm. s.n.1...m.m111... HIGH a M, .. nr1g\r1|HIy mm: dnuumnl VI mum M1 [7] Alasan permuhonan Baka\ Pemaelah m Lamplran 21 adalah bahawa ssmakan dx Pembat Tanah dan Daerah menaapan Penmnon nelan dmaflarkan sebagal pemmk selengah (1/2) bahagian aasam Hananan |ersehuI. Menum saxax Pencelan. Pemohon hanya bemak unluk 1/3 hahaguan dalam hananan (ersebul dan bukannya 1:2 bahagian sepenimana dndafiarkan. c. ANALISA DAN KEPUYUSAN {3} Ssle\ah membaca andavn-afiuavm yang dwfaflkan, hnqahan nsan dan hujahan berluhs pmak- hak saya menulak permuhonan Eakal Penoexan an Lampuran 21 a|as alasan benku| - [5] Adalah Iidak diperlikaukan bahawa Eakal Pencelah mempunyal kepenungan dalam Hananah lersebul sebagax permllk bersama dengan Pemohon xn. selaras dengan Kepulusan Mshkamah Rayuan benankh 03 05.2011 [17] Perintah Mahkamah Rayuan henankh 03.052017 memuluskan Femnhon adalah pemmk bersama lelapw udak menyebm «emang mmlah pembahaguan Hananah lersebut [c] Pemohen jugs dlflapati (idak memonon pemhahzgwan .unuan Hananah lersebul melahn ex parte Saman Pemmanya Pennlah Mahkamah Inggx benankh «s.7.2u1s, dibenarkan berasaskan kepada permohonan Pemohnn untuk permlah sepem benkul [i] Perinlah bahawa Fendaflar Hakmllnk Tanah dan/avau Pemadbw Tanah Daerah yang berkenaan da\am Negen Fulau Plnang hsndaklah mengambfl Vangkah yang sewqamya unmk memben efek kepada Psnmah Mahkamah Rayuan, Rayuan s I m Icwvulugmuscuspmw 5 mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. HIGH m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom! No: P- 021NCVC)W-1906-10/2016 berlankh 03 052017 dengan melelakhak dan/axau mendanarkan nama Pemohon sebagaw pemllnk bersama ["co-pr0pne1or“] berdallar di alas dokumen hakmlllk uanaran kepada Lot No 5366, Mukim 12‘ Daerah Baral Daya, Fulau Fmang yang (erkandung damn Geran No: 2856 . [xi] Eahawa Pendaftar Hakmuluk Tanah nan/avau Fentaamr Tanah Daerah Negeri Fulau Pinang hendaklah menandalangann segala dokumen yang berkenaan unluk member! efek kepada penmah mi; (".1 Eahawa Penolong Kanan Pendaflar Mahkamah Tmggl Man Fmang henaaxxan menandalangam segala dokumen yang herkenaan unluk memben elek kepada perinlah inv, [v] Relinew lam yang manggap sesuan man manlaat oren Mahkamah Vang Mulia W [d] Fenmah ex pane bsnankh 18.7 2018 (elah drbuat secara teralur se\aras dengan Penntah Mahkamah Rayuan berlankh 03.05 2017 Oleh Mu saya bsrpendapat naak ada sebab unluk saya mengenepwkan Permtah |srsebu\. [9] saxmya Bakal Fenuelah mempunym kelxdakkepasflan mengenaw Penman Mahkamah Rayuan berkaflan dengan Nmlah pembahagian Hsrlanah lerssbul‘ kekehman alau maka beliau hendaklah merujuk kamhafi ks Mahkamah Rayuan unluk mendapalkan peruexasan alau memchon un|uk dwbual pemhelman m Icgvvulugmascusgmw 5 mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m M, .. mm., mm: dnumml VI mum pom! m Saya mennhak Lampwan 21 selelah mengambfl we flan mematum Ferimah Mahkamah Rayuan Iambahan pma Mahkamah mu ndak mempunyal kuasa unluk memlnda alau mengubah Perimah Mahkamah Rayuan teusebun K05 dlbenarkan kus sebanyak RM3.0DD no dwbayar men Bakal Pencexan kepada Pemohan. (ROZA I ALI VUSOFF) Haklm Mahkamah Tmggi Pulau Pinang Tarikh 2 Januan 2024 PEGUAM BAGI PEMOHDN: TETIJAN vusoo u. ASSOCIATES Peguambexa dan Peguamcara Na. 17, Tlngkal saw Lehuh King 1I2on PULAU FINANG sm lcwmlwmuaufipunw 7 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! PEGUAM EAGI PEMOHON/EAKAL FENCELAH: vsrunu AMARESON s MEERA Peguambela darn Peguamcara Tmgkal 1, No.1-D. Lebuh Kmg moo PULAU PINANG srN1cvVvuIHnLIms4:AGpuaw s m. smm ...m.mm .. .4... w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-27NCC-11-02/2021

PLAINTIF 1. ) MULIAR OLEG 2. ) LI XUEYONG DEFENDAN PEMUNYA DAN/ATAU PIHAK-PIHAK YANG MEMPUNYAI MILIKAN ATAU KAWALAN TERHADAP KAPAL ORIENTAL DRAGON DI PELABUHAN PENAMA PENCELAH 1. ) BRIT UW LIMITED 2. ) LAVENHAM UNDERWRITING LIMITED 3. ) ASIA CAPITAL COMMODITIES TRADE SDN BHDPIHAK TERKILANPenang Port Sdn Bhd

Milango's principle - Whether a different consideration where there are a class of claimants against a fixed fund where some claims are in foreign currencies and there are different in ranking of priorities among the claimants - Proper conversion date for payment to claimant of foreign currencies

08/01/2024

YA Tuan Ong Chee Kwan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3cc28eaa-45c5-49bd-98f0-e65f8b9871e7&Inline=true

WA-27NCC-11-02-2021 Oriental Dragon (Final) (2).pdf 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ADMIRALTY ACTION IN REM NO.: WA-27NCC-11-02/2021 BETWEEN 1. MULIAR OLEG (Passport No. FE005524) (suing as Master of the Ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861)) 2. LI XUEYONG (Passport No.: EB9286099) and 193 other crew members as listed in Annex "A" to the Writ (suing as crew of the Ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861)) ... PLAINTIFFS AND The Owners and/or persons in possession or control of the Ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861) of the Port of Panama ... DEFENDANT AND 1. BRIT UW LIMITED (UK Company No.: 03217775) (suing as the sole corporate capital provider for Lloyd's Syndicate 2987 for the 2019 year of account) 2. LAVENHAM UNDERWRITING LIMITED (UK Company No.: 04512130) 08/01/2024 14:21:12 WA-27NCC-11-02/2021 Kand. 561 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (suing as corporate capital provider on its own behalf and on behalf of the other corporate capital providers for Lloyd's Syndicate 2468 for the 2019 year of account) 3. ASIA CAPITAL COMMODITIES TRADE SDN BHD (Company No.: 1343080-H) 4. PENANG PORT SDN BHD (Company No.: 199301028806 (283544-D)) ... INTERVENERS (Heard Together With) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ADMIRALTY ACTION IN REM NO.: WA-27NCC-21-04/2021 Admiralty in rem action against: the ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861) of the Port of Panama BETWEEN 1. CHAN YOKE PENG (NRIC No.: 680403-04-5302) (Malaysia Passport No. A41372901) 2. BAO HAONAN (PRC Passport No. EE6743531) 3. DING XINWU (PRC Passport No. EC3322116) 4. DONG XUEMENG (PRC Passport No. EH0454807) 5. GONG LIN (PRC Passport No. EH8997375) 6. HUANG GUOFU (PRC Passport No. E31768170) 7. JIA QINLIN (PRC Passport No. EC3555767) S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 8. LI MENGYAO (PRC Passport No. E95807530) 9. LIU DONGXUE (PRC Passport No. EC6091671) 10. LIU YUE (PRC Passport No. EH2719464) 11. MA NING (PRC Passport No. EG2018122) 12. NIU MINGJIAO (PRC Passport No. EH0456580) 13. SU XIAOLONG (PRC Passport No. ED4448421) 14. SUN LANJUAN (PRC Passport No. E42727975) 15. WANG YUNLING (PRC Passport No. EH6498651) 16. YAO MING (PRC Passport No. EH2721630) 17. YU GENG (PRC Passport No. EB7615241) 18. ZHANG ZENGRONG (PRC Passport No. G46716929) (suing as crew of the Ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861)) ... PLAINTIFFS AND The Owners and/or persons in possession or control of the Ship "ORIENTAL DRAGON" (IMO No. 7125861) of the Port of Panama ... DEFENDANT JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The equivalent value of our Ringgit Malaysia RM to the United D USD 1.00 as at 20.4.2021, was RM 4.123. However, by 21.8.2023, the value of RM had plunged to RM 4.79 to USD 1.00. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [2] The steep fluctuation in the value of RM has given rise in the present case to a dispute as to the proper date for the conversion of the equivalent in RM of claims made in foreign currencies, in particular, claims made in USD currency by the Plaintiffs in the Action in Rem Suit WA-27NCC-11-02/2021 and Action in Rem Suit WA-27NCC- 21-04/2021. [3] This judgment explores the principle in the English House of Lords case of Miliangos v George Frank (Textile) Limited [1976] AC 443. More specifically, the question whether a different consideration ought to be taken in the case where claims in both foreign currencies and local currency are made against a limited fund constituted in RM and where the claimants thereto are ranked differently in priorities. [4] As is shown in this judgment, the conversion date to be used for payment to claims in USD in this case can have significant consequences to the other claimants to the fund. Background Facts Action in Rem No: WA-27NCC-11- Suit 11 and Action in Rem WA-27NCC-21-04/2021 ( Suit 21 the Parties and their Claims against the Vessel [5] Suit 11 is an action filed by the Master and 193 crew members Plaintiffs in Suit 11 for unpaid wages and for disbursements in relation to repatriation costs incurred against the vessel, RIENTAL DRAGON the Vessel . Significantly, the Master S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 and the crew members had quantified their respective claims in the Statement of Claim as follows: For the Master: a) USD 30,660.00 (equivalent to RM 124,571.58 at the rate of exchange of USD 1 to RM 4.063 as at 9.2.2021) for the b) USD 335,179.85 (equivalent to RM 1,361,835.73 at the rate of exchange of USD 1 to RM 4.063 as at 9.2.2021) For the 193 crew members: a) USD1,615,512.28 (equivalent to RM 6,563,826.39 at the rate of USD 1 to RM 4.063 as at 9.2.2021) being the [emphasis added] [6] Suit 21 is also an action for outstanding wages earned and for repatriation costs by 18 crew members (other than those in Suit 11) against the Vessel Plaintiffs in Suit 21 . Similarly, the crew members had quantified their claims in the Statement of Claim as follows: a) USD 117,608.02 (equivalent to RM 484,897.87 at the rate of exchange of USD 1 to RM 4.123 as at 20.4.2021) being the Outstan S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 b) USD 47,260.42 (equivalent to RM 194,854.71 at the rate of exchange of USD 1 to RM 4.123 as at 20.4.2021) being [emphasis added] [7] The Defendant, Worldport Corporation Limited, having its registered address at Room 603, 6/F, Star House, No. 3 Salisbury Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong was the registered owner of the Vessel and or was in possession or control of the Vessel. [8] The Vessel was arrested by her Master and crew members in Suit 11. The registered owner of the Vessel did not put up security, and the Vessel was appraised and sold by judicial sale pendente lite, together with her bunkers for the total sum of RM 20,802,988.49. The sum (with interest earned thereon) was paid into Court and made available for enforcement of legitimate claims the Fund . [9] In Suit 11, 4 parties had successfully intervened in the action. They were: a) The 1st Intervener, Brit UW Limited (UK Company No.: 03217775), who is suing as the sole corporate capital account; b) The 2nd Intervener, Lavenham Underwriting Limited (UK Company No: 04512130) is suing as the corporate capital provider on its own behalf and on behalf of the other S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 2019 year of account; [The 1st and 2nd Interveners are the underwriters with respect outstanding remuneration in the event of abandonment and they have the obligation to meet the financial security requirements of Regulation 2.5.2, Standard A2.5.2 and Regulation 4.2, Standard A4.2 Paragraph 1(b) of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended)]. c) The 3rd Intervener, Asia Capital Commodities Trade Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 1343080-H) is a limited liability company incorporated in Malaysia who is in the business of operating ships. The 3rd Intervener had issued an Admiralty Writ in in Rem against the Vessel under Admiralty in Action in Rem No.: WA-27NCC-131-12/2020, the proceedings in which are still pending before this Court 3rd Intervener Suit 131 . d) The 4th Intervener, is Penang Port Sdn Bhd (Company No. 199301028806 (283544-D)). The 4th Intervener is the licensed port operator for the Port of Penang. [10] The following claims were received against the Fund: a) s; b) incurred by M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. and M/s Shaikh David & Co; S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Costs of producer of fund by M/s Shearn Delamore & Co; c) Maritime lien claims of Master and crew for unpaid wages and default judgments obtained by the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 and the Plaintiffs in Suit 21; d) Statutory lien claims for repatriation costs incurred by the Plaintiffs in Suit 21; e) Statutory lien claims for goods and materials supplied, and expenses incurred on account of the vessel by the 3rd Intervener in their own Writ in rem action (now pending full trial). Chronology of Material Events [11] The Writ In Rem Action in Suit 11 was filed by the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 on 9.2.2021. On the same day, the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 took out a Warrant of Arrest against the Vessel. [12] On 11.2.2021, the Bailiff of this Court, Tuan Mohd. Sofian bin Abdul Halim, served the Writ In Rem Action upon the Vessel and executed the Warrant of Arrest on the Vessel within the territorial waters of Malaysia in Penang, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service affirmed by Tuan Mohd. Sofian bin Abdul Halim on 15.2.2021. [13] On 20.4.2021, the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 filed the Writ in Rem Action against the Vessel. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [14] Subsequently, on 10.6.2021, the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 filed an application to have Suit 21 heard together with Suit 11 which was allowed by the Court on 13.8.2021. Thereafter, Suit 21 was heard together with Suit 11. [15] On 19.1.2022, the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 filed a Notice of Application seeking a Judgment in Default of Defence for crew wages and wages and disbursements. On 1.9.2022, after hearing submissions, the Court made the following orders: Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan dimasukkan terhadap Defendan berdasarkan terma-terma berikut: - (i) Memihak kepada Plaintif Pertama: (a) USD30,660.00 untuk Upah Belum Dijelaskan yang kena dibayar kepada Plaintif Pertama dan diperolehi oleh Plaintif Pertama di atas Kapal tersebut yang tidak dibayar dari bulan September 2020 hingga Januari 2021 seperti yang dibentangkan di Lampiran A kepada Perintah ini; (b) USD335,179.85 sebagai Pembelanjaan Belum Dijelaskan yang ditanggung oleh Plaintif Pertama untuk Kapal tersebut seperti yang dibentangkan di dalam Lampiran B kepada Perintah ini; (ii) Memihak kepada Plaintif-plaintif Kedua: (c) USD1,615,512.28 iaitu Upah Belum Dijelaskan yang kena dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaintif-plaintif Kedua menurut jumlah dan tempoh perkhidmatan mereka masing-masing seperti yang dibentangkan di dalam Lampiran A kepada Perintah ini; S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) Memihak kepada semua Plaintif: (d) Faedah pra-penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif pada kadar 5% setahun dari tarikh writ in rem ini hingga tarikh penghakiman selaras dengan seksyen 11 Akta Undang-undang Sivil 1956; (e) Faedah pasca-penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif- plaintif pada kadar 5% setahun selaras dengan Aturan 42 kaedah 12 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; (f) Kos sebanyak RM10,000.00 tertakluk kepada fee alokatur dibayar oleh Pencelah Ketiga kepada Plaintif Suit 11 Judgment in Default [16] Similarly, on 10.2.2022, the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 also filed a Notice of Application seeking for a Judgment in Default of Defence against the Defendant for crew wages and repatriation costs which was subsequently allowed by this Court on 5.4.2022 after hearing submissions on the following terms: Defendan berdasarkan terma-terma berikut: (a) Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif USD117,608.02 (bersamaan dengan RM484,897.87 pada kadar pertukaran USD1 kepada RM4.123 setakat S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 20.4.2021) untuk Upah Belum Dijelaskan yang kena dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaintif-plaintif menurut jumlah dan tempoh perkhidmatan mereka masing-masing yang dinyatakan bersebelahan dengan nama mereka dalan jadual butir-butir di dalam Lampiran A kepada Notis Permohonan; (b) Defendan hendaklah membayar USD58,442.03 (bersamaan dengan RM240,956.49 pada kadar pertukaran USD1 kepada RM4.123 setakat 20.4.2021) dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaintif-plaintif untuk jumlah masing-masing yang dinyatakan bersebelahan dengan nama mereka dalan jadual butir-butir di dalam Lampiran B kepada Notis Permohonan; (c) Faedah pra-penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif pada kadar 5% setahun dari tarikh writ in rem hingga tarikh penghakiman selaras dengan seksyen 11 Akta Undangundang Sivil 1956; (d) Faedah pasca-penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif pada kadar 5% setahun selaras dengan Aturan 42 kaedah 12 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; (e) Kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 tertakluk kepada fee alokatur dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif plaintif; dan 2. Kebebasan untuk memohon . [emphasis added] Suit 21 Judgment in Default S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [17] As can be seen above, although the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 and the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 had, in their respective Statement of Claim filed in Suit 11 and Suit 21, expressly converted their claims from USD amount into the RM equivalent as at the date of their respective Writs, the Suit 11 Judgment in Default did not mirror the stated reliefs thereto but only stipulated the sums claimed in the USD currency. However, it is not submitted before this Court that the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 had made an application to amend their reliefs in the Writ in Rem and Statement of Claims [18] By an order of Court dated 13.8.2021, it was ordered that the Vessel and its bunkers, fuel, lubricants and other consumables on board, if any the Bunkers Sheriff of the High Court, pendente lite the Order for Sale Pendente Lite [19] The Court also ordered that the proceeds of the judicial sale of the s, costs and expenses and all sums ordered therein to be costs and expenses, including such sums as may have been paid by the Plaintiffs and or their managers and costs and expenses [20] The terms of the Order for Sale Pendente Lite, inter alia, further ordered that within 2 weeks from the date of the payment into court, the proceeds of the judicial sale shall be invested in a bank in Malaysia as approved by the Accountant General to earn the best commercial interest rate pursuant to Order 90 rules 6 and 12(2) of the Rules of Court 2012. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [21] The Vessel and its bunkers were judicially sold to one Virma Maritime Corp (Corporation No.: 108465) with its registered address at Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands MH 96960 on 15.12.2021 for the sums stated below the Judicial Sale : (a) Proceeds of sale of the Vessel RM20,555,920.80 (b) Proceeds of sale of the bunkers RM247,067.69 Total RM20,802,988.49 [22] Subsequent to the above Judicial Sale, the total sum of RM20,802,988.49 was lodged with the Court pending an order of Court for the determination of the order of priority of the claims and payment out of the same to the parties so entitled. [23] Pursuant to the Judicial Sale of the Vessel, the Sheriff of the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur executed a Bill of Sale for the Vessel in favour of Virma Maritime Corp (Corporation No.: 108465). Subsequent to the Judicial Sale, the Sheriff of the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur gazetted and caused the publication of notices in respect of the proceeds of sale of the Vessel and the Bunkers with the following publishers: a) Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad (Government Gazette) on 20.12.2021; b) Star Media Group Berhad (The Star) on 20.12.2021; c) d) NHST Global Publications (TradeWinds) on 31.12.2021. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Determination of Priorities and Payment Out Order [24] On 21.10.2022, the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 filed a Notice of Application for Determination of Priorities and for Payment Out of the Fund. [25] The Application for Determination of Priorities and for Payment Out of the Fund Harun on 15.2.2023 and 7.3.2023. [26] On 20.3.2023, the Learned Judge delivered his decision in respect of the said Application for Determination of Priorities and for Payment Out of the Fund. In summary, the High Court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of the Vessel be paid out to the following Order of Priorities and Payment Out 1. Bahawa susunan keutamaan bagi semua tuntutan terhadap hasil berjumlah RM20,802,988.49 (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Puluh Juta Lapan Ratus Dua Ribu Sembilan Ratus Lapan Puluh Lapan dan Sen Empat Puluh Sembilan sahaja) termasuk bunker yang telah diserahsimpan dalam Mahkamah bersama-sama dengan faedah yang diperolehi seperti berikut: (i) Pertama, komisyen Syerif berkaitan dengan jualan Kapal tersebut; (ii) Kedua, perbelanjaan Syerif yang perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dan Pencelah Keempat; S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (iii) Ketiga, kos penahanan Plaintif-plaintif dan kos perintah untuk pentaksiran dan jualan Kapal tersebut dan semua prosiding di dalam ini, termasuk kehadiran di hadapan Syerif dan Yang Arif Hakim Admiralti setakat dan termasuk Notis Permohonan untuk Penentuan Keutamaan dan untuk Pembayaran Keluar ini; (iv) Keempat, lien maritim; a. jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tindakan Admiralti In Rem No.: WA-27NCC21- upah anak kapal, selaras dengan Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 yang diperolehi dalam Guaman 21; dan b. jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tindakan Admiralti In Rem No.: WA-27NCC11- upah anak kapal dan pembelanjaan Nakhoda selaras dengan Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 1.9.2022 yang diperolehi dalam Guaman 11; (v) Kelima, lien statutori iaitu jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tindakan Admiralti In Rem No.: WA27NCC-21- untuk Kos Penghantaran Balik, selaras dengan Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 yang diperolehi dalam Guaman 21 tertakluk kepada lien statutori ini disusun secara pari passu dengan lien S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 statutori lain yang mungkin diperintahkan (as may be ordered) dan melibatkan manamana pihak di sini dalam Guaman Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tindakan Admiralti In Rem WA-27NCC-131- 12/2020. 2. Bahawa sejajar dengan susunan keutamaan bagi tuntutan - tuntutan di dalam ini, pembayaran keluar daripada Kumpulan Wang hendaklah dibuat seperti berikut: (i) Pertama, kepada Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, sebanyak RM520,099.71 (Ringgit Malaysia Lima Ratus Dua Puluh Ribu Sembilan Puluh Sembilan dan Sen Tujuh Puluh Satu sahaja) iaitu komisyen Syerif berhubung dengan jualan kapal tersebut melalui lelong awam; (ii) Kedua, a. kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co., sebagai peguamcara Plaintinf-plaintif, jumlah sebanyak USD1,731,366.42, CNY529,468.14, GBP2,560.00 dan RM9,616.35 untuk pembayaran balik wang yang telah didahulukan oleh Plaintif-plaintif kepada akaun perbelanjaan Syerif; b. kepada Tetuan Shaikh David & Co., sebagai peguamcara Pencelah Keempat, jumlah sebanyak RM145,350.00 untuk caj pelabuhan; (iii) Ketiga, kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co., sebagai peguamcara Plaintif-plaintif, jumlah sebanyak RM340,444.97 (Ringgit Malaysia Tiga Ratus Empat Puluh Ribu Empat Ratus Empat Puluh Empat dan Sen Sembilan Puluh Tujuh sahaja) iaitu kos penahanan, S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 kos pentaksiran dan jualan Kapal tersebut dan semua prosiding di dalam ini, termasuk kehadiran di hadapan Syerif dan Yang Arif Hakim Admiralti setakat dan termasuk Notis Permohonan untuk Penentuan Keutamaan dan untuk Pembayaran Keluar ini; (iv) Keempat, kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co, jumlah berikut bagi lien maritim: - a. sebanyak USD117,608.02 (bersamaan dengan RM484,897.87 pada kadar pertukaran USD1 kepada RM4.123 setakat 20.4.2021) untuk Upah Belum Dijelaskan yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Guaman 21 menurut Lampiran A pada Kand. 56, bersama-sama dengan faedah pra- penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Guaman 21 pada kadar 5% setahun dan kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 selaras dengan Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 (Kand. 75) dalam Guaman 21; b. b. sebanyak USD365,839.85 (bersamaan dengan RM1,486,407.31 pada kadar pertukaran USD$1 kepada RM4.063 setakat 9.2.2021) yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif Pertama dalam Guaman 11, dan sebanyak USD1,615,512.28 (bersamaan dengan RM6,563,826.39 pada kadar pertukaran USD$1 kepada RM4.063 setakat 9.2.2021) yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif Kedua dalam Guaman 11, bersama-sama dengan faedah pra-penghakiman dan faedah pasca- penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Guaman 11 pada kadar 5% setahun dan kos sebanyak RM10,000.00 selaras dengan Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 1.9.2022 (Kand. 462) dalam Guaman 11; (v) Kelima, kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co, lien statutori bagi jumlah sebanyak USD58,442.03 (bersamaan dengan RM240,956.49 pada kadar pertukaran USD1 kepada RM4.123 setakat 20.4.2021) untuk Kos Penghantaran Balik yang dihakimi sebagai perlu dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaintif-plaintif dalam Guaman 21 seperti yang ditetapkan dalam perenggan 1(b) Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 dalam Guaman 21 bersama-sama dengan faedah prapenghakiman dan faedah pasca-penghakiman masing masing seperti yang ditetapkan dalam perengganperenggan 1(c) dan 1(d) Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 dalam Guaman 21 yang sama, tertakluk kepada lien statutori ini dibayar secara pari passu dengan lien statutori lain yang mungkin diperintahkan (as may be ordered) dan melibatkan mana-mana pihak di sini dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Tindakan Admiralti In Rem No. WA- 27NCC-131- [27] In essence, the High Court ordered that the proceeds of sale to be paid out to the following parties and in the following order of priorities: S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 a) the Senior Assistant Registrar of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur, the sum of RM520,099.71 (RM Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Ninety Nine and Cents Seventy One only) being the Commissions in respect of the sale of the Vessel by public auction; b) (i) to Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co., as solicitors for the Plaintiffs, the sum of USD1,731,366.42, CNY529,468.14, GBP2,560.00 and RM9,616.35 for reimbursement of monies advanced by the Plaintiffs to (iii) to Messrs. Shaikh David & Co., as solicitors of the 4th Intervener, the sum of RM145,350.00 for port charges; c) to Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co., as solicitors for the Plaintiffs, the sum of RM340,444.97 (RM Nine Hundred Ten Thousand Four Hundred Forty Four and Cents Ninety Seven only) being the costs of arrest, costs of the order for appraisement and sale of the Vessel and all proceedings herein, including attendances before the Sheriff and the Admiralty Judge up to and including the Notice of Application for Determination of Priorities and for Payment Out; d) to Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co, the following amounts for maritime lien: i) the sum of USD117,608.02 (equivalent to RM484,897.87 at the exchange rate of USD1 to RM4.123 as at 20.4.2021) S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 for Unpaid Wages adjudged as payable and owing to the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 in accordance to Annexure A to Enclosure 56, together with the pre-judgment interest and the post-judgment interest on all sums adjudged to be due to the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 at the rate of 5% per annum and costs amounting to RM20,000.00 pursuant to the Judgment in Default of Defence dated 5.4.2022 (Encl. 75) in Suit 21; ii) the sum of USD365,839.85 (equivalent to RM1,486,407.31 at the exchange rate of USD$1 to RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) adjudged as payable to the First Plaintiff in Suit 11, and the sum of USD1,615,512.28 (equivalent to RM6,563,826.39 at the exchange rate of USD$1 to RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) adjudged as payable to the Second Plaintiffs in Suit 11, together with the pre-judgment interest and the post judgment interest on all sums adjudged to be due to the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 at the rate of 5% per annum and costs amounting to RM10,000.00 pursuant to the Judgment in Default of Defence dated 1.9.2022 (Encl. 462) in Suit 11; iii) to Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co, the statutory lien with the sum of USD58,442.03 (equivalent to RM240,956.49 at the rate of USD1 to RM4.123 as at 20.4.2021) for Repatriation Costs adjudged as payable and owing to the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 as stated under paragraph 1(b) of Judgment in Default of Defence dated 5.4.2022 in Suit 21 together with pre judgment and post-judgment interest respectively stated in paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) of the Judgment in Default of Defence dated 5.4.2022 in Suit 21, S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 subject to other statutory lien in Suit 21 as set out in paragraph 1(b) of the Order dated 5.4.2022 in that Suit 21 together with the pre-judgment interests and post- judgment interests as set out in paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) respectively of the Order dated 5.4.2022 in that same Suit 21, subject to this statutory lien to be paid out in pari passu with other statutory lien as may be ordered involving any of the party herein in the 3rd Intervener Suit 131. [28] The abovesaid ranking of priorities and payment of claims out of the Fund can be better represented in the following table: Order Claim Amount (RM) Amount (foreign currency) Paragraph 2(i) 520,099.71 Paragraph 2(ii)(a) expenses to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. USD1,731,366.42 CNY529,468.14 GBP2,560.00 Paragraph 2(ii)(a) expenses to M/s Shaikh David & Co. 145,350.00 Paragraph 2(iii) Costs of producer of funds to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. 340,444.97 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Paragraph 2(iv)(a) Maritime lien claim to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. for unpaid wages USD117,608.02 (equivalent to RM484,897.87 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.123 as at 20.4.2021) Pre-judgment interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% in accordance with Judgment in default of Defence dated 5.4.2022 in Suit 21 Costs 20,000.00 Paragraph 2(iv)(b) Maritime lien claim to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. for unpaid wages disbursements USD365,839.85 (equivalent to RM1,486,407.31 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) Maritime lien claim to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. for unpaid wages USD1,615,512.28 (equivalent to RM6,563,826.39 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) Pre-judgment and post- judgment interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% in accordance with Judgment in default of S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Defence dated 1.9.2022 in Suit 11 Costs 10,000.00 Paragraph 2(v) Statutory lien claim to M/s Shearn Delamore & Co. for repatriation costs USD58,442.03 (equivalent to RM240,956.49 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.123 as at 20.4.2021) Pre-judgment and post-judgement interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% in accordance with Judgment in default of Defence dated 5.4.2022 in Suit 21 To rank equally and be paid pari passu with any other statutory lien that may be order or involve parties in Suit 131 the 3rd admiralty action which is pending S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [29] No objections were raised at the hearing of the Application for Priorities and Payment Out Order save for the following: a) The first objection was a common objection from the Defendant and the 3rd Intervener and it was as to the quantum to be awarded to the Plaintiffs as costs of the producer of the fund; b) The second objection was only from the 3rd Intervener and it -judgment interests in both Suit 11 and Suit 21. The Defendant claimed that the post-judgment interests of the Plaintiffs in both Suit 11 and Suit 21 must be capped only up until the date of filing of the Application i.e. 21.10.2022. [30] There was no issue raised with the payment of claims in Paragraphs 2(i), 2(ii)(b) and 2(iii). However, in respect of Paragraphs 2(ii)(a), 2(iv)(a) and (b) and 2(v), which are awards in foreign currency, the Order of Priorities and Payment Out does not specify: a) the conversion date of payment of the claims stated in foreign currencies into RM; b) the amount of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest to be paid in respect of the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and the Suit 21 Judgment in Default i.e. whether interest should be calculated on the USD amount that was ordered or the RM equivalent that was prayed. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [31] In any case, after the Court made the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, neither the Defendant nor the 3rd Intervener appealed against the decision. [32] It is also to be noted that in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, the conversion date for the USD to RM was expressly stated to be that applicable as at 9.2.2021 as was prayed in the Writ in Rem and Statement of Claim in Suit 11. Payment Out by the Court [33] Between April 2023 to August 2023, Messrs Shearn Delamore as solicitors for the Plaintiffs and 1st and 2nd SD corresponded with the Sheriff, the Finance Department of Kuala Lumpur (KL) High Court and to the Accounts Department, Federal POJ Fund. [34] More specifically, on 24.5.2023, SD set out to the Sheriff a summary of the amounts to be paid from the Fund to the Plaintiffs in Suit 11 and the Plaintiffs in Suit 21 pending the determination of the 3rd Intervener Suit 131 SD letter dated 24.5.2023 in the following manner: No. Perkara Amaun 1 Pemulangan Deposit Syerif bagi penahanan Kapal (Sila juga rujuk Penyata Sherif bertarikh 6.4.2023 di Kand. 503) RM15,000.00 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 2 Wang yang didahulukan oleh pihak Plaintif-plaintif kepada akaun perbelanjaan Syerif (Sila rujuk Perakuan Pendaftar bertarikh 23.4.2022 di Kand. 440 dan perenggan 2(i)(a) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) USD1,731,366.42 CNY529,468.14 GBP2,560.00 RM9,616.35 3 Kos Penahanan Plaintif (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iii) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) RM340,444.97 4 Jumlah Penghakiman bagi lien maritim sebanyak USD117,608.02 dalam Guaman 21 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv) (a) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) USD117,608.02 bersamaan dengan RM484,897.87 pada kadar pertukaran USD1 kepada RM4.123 setakat 20.4.2021). 5 Faedah pra-penghakiman dari 20.4.2021 sehingga 5.4.2022 dalam Guaman 21 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv) (a) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) Untuk ditentukan 6 Faedah pasca-penghakiman dari 5.4.2022 sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh ke atas jumlah penghakiman USD117,608.02 dalam Guaman 21 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv)(a) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) Untuk ditentukan 7 Kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 bagi Penghakiman RM20,000.00 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 5.4.2022 (Guaman 21) Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv)(a) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) 8 Jumlah Penghakiman bagi lien maritim sebanyak USD365,839.85 kepada Plaintif Pertama dalam Guaman 11 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv)(b) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) (bersamaan dengan RM1,486,407.31 pada kadar pertukaran USD$1 kepada RM4.063 setakat 9.2.2021) 9 Jumlah Penghakiman bagi lien maritim sebanyak USD1,615,512.28 kepada Plaintif-plaintif Kedua dalam Guaman 11 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2 (iv)(b) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) USD1,615,512.28 (bersamaan dengan RM6,563,826.39 pada kadar pertukaran USD$ 1 kepada RM4.063 setakat 9.2.2021) 10 Faedah pra-penghakiman dari 9.2.2021 sehingga 1.9.2022 dalam Guaman 21 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv) (b) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) Untuk ditentukan 11 Faedah pasca-penghakiman dari 1.9.2022 sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh ke atas Untuk ditentukan S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 jumlah penghakiman USD1,981,352.13 dalam Guaman 21 (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv)(b) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) 12 Kos sebanyak RM10,000.00 bagi Penghakiman Ingkar Pembelaan bertarikh 1.9.2022 (Guaman 11) (Sila rujuk perenggan 2(iv)(b) Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 13.3.2023 di Kand. 500) RM10,000.00 [35] In SD letter dated 24.5.2023, SD provided details of their RM account to receive the payments. No USD Account was provided. [36] On 28.6.2023, the Sheriff forwarded to SD for their confirmation Sheriff email dated 28.6.2023 an email that he received from POJ on POJ email dated 28.6.2023 informing that the Fund that was deposited earlier with the Court had been received amounting to RM 20,817,988.49 and the said email also set out a sum of RM 19,101,778.36 to be paid to Messrs Shearn Delamore, excluding the pre-judgment interests. The details for the sum of RM 19,101,778.36 were set out and the table is reproduced below: BIL PENERIMA BAYARAN USD CNY GBP *kadar RM 1 KOMISYEN SYERIF (Hasil Kerajaan) 520,099.71 2 SHEARN DELAMORE 1,731,366.42 4.5506 7,878,756.03 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Peguamcara Plaintif SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 529,468.14 0.6525 345,477.96 SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 2,560.00 5.6871 14,558.98 SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 9,616.35 SHAIKH DAVID & CO PENCELAH KEEMPAT 145,350.00 3 SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 340,444.97 4a SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 117,608.02 4.5506 535,187.06 SHEARN DELAMORE Faedah Pra Penghakiman ? SHEARN DELAMORE Kos (Penghakiman Ingkar) 20,000.00 4b SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif (1) 365,839.85 4.5506 1,664,790.82 SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif (2) 1,615,512.28 4.5506 7,351,550.18 SHEARN DELAMORE Faedah Pra Penghakiman ? SHEARN DELAMORE 10,000.00 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Kos (Penghakiman Ingkar) 5 SHEARN DELAMORE Peguamcara Plaintif 58,442.03 4.5506 265,946.30 3,888,768.60 529,468.14 2,560.00 19,101,778.36 [37] From the email of 28.6.2023, it is clear that POJ had converted the sums ordered to be paid in USD currency to their equivalent in RM currency based on the exchange rate issued by the a [38] With the payments to SD of RM 19,101,778.36, the 28.6.2023 further stated that there would be a balance sum of RM 1,701,210.13 left from the Fund. [39] On 20.7.2023, SD SD letter dated 20.7.2023 which effectively adopted the computations stated in the POJ email dated 28.6.2023 except that SD had removed the RM equivalent of all the sums ordered to be paid in USD currency. In the said letter, SD stated that the balance sum after the payments was estimated to be RM 806,000.00 which should be paid out to SD for the costs of USD 58,442.03 incurred for the Suit 11 and Suit 21 Judgments in Default and to meet the 3rd Intervene rd Intervener Suit 131 on a pari passu basis. SD also provided details of their RM account and USD account for the payments to be received. The SD letter dated 20.7.2023 is reproduced below: S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [40] The SD letter dated 20.7.2023 was copied to all the solicitors involved in Suit 11 and Suit 21. not enclosed. [41] The effect of SD letter dated 20.7.2023 was that SD wanted the sums ordered in USD in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out to be paid to them in USD currency. No one took any objections to the contents of the SD letter dated 20.7.2023 although the same disclosed a clear intention that SD was seeking payment out of the Fund in USD instead of in RM. This of course means that the costs for the conversion from RM to USD would not be borne by SD but POJ. [42] However, in the present application, the 3rd Intervener is taking objections to the following in SD letter dated 20.7.2023: a) In Paragraph 2(ii)(a), the claims in CNY and GBP were to be paid based on the conversion rate as at June 2023, when this is not stipulated in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out; b) In Paragraph 2(ii)(a), the claim in USD is to be paid based on whichever conversion rate applicable on the date the funds are disbursed, when this is not stipulated in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. c) In Paragraph 2(iv)(a) and (b), the claim is to be paid in USD currency, when the Order of Priorities and Payment Out specifically and expressly stipulated payment out in the RM S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 equivalent of the USD judgment sums as at the date of their respective Writs in Rem the terms of the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default; d) The pre-judgment and post-judgment interest under Paragraph 2(iv)(a) and (b) were calculated on the USD judgment sums when the Order of Priorities and Payment Out specifically and expressly stipulates payment out on the RM equivalent of the USD judgment sums. e) That post-judgment interest on the judgments sums under Paragraph 2(iv)(a) and (b) were calculated up to 31.7.2023, when this is not stipulated anywhere in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out or the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and the Suit 21 Judgment in Default; [43] Coming back to the events that have since unfolded, on 3.8.2023, the Sheriff issued a letter to POJ Sheriff letter dated 3.8.2023 to outline the payment arrangement according to the Order of Priorities and Payment Out to assist POJ. The Sheriff a S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [44] On 13.9.2023, POJ sent an email to the Sheriff and SD POJ email dated 13.9.2023 copied to all the other parties in Suit 11 and Suit 12 (except the Defendant) informing that POJ had on 21.8.2023 paid to SD the sum of USD 4,088,837.33 which at the exchange rate on that date at USD 1 to RM 4.79 amounted to the equivalent in RM to be RM 19,585,530.70 and in RM the sum of RM 740,098.24. This said sums when taken together with the Commissions of RM 520,099.71 and to Messrs Shaikh David of RM 145,350.00 means that a total of RM 20,988,404.90 had been paid out by POJ. This of course means that POJ had erroneously paid out a sum of RM 185,416.49 in excess of the total Fund of RM 20,802,888.78. [45] By reason of the overpayment, POJ sought from SD the return of the sum of RM 185,416.49 vide its email of 13.9.2023: From: Maimunah binti Endut <maimunahendut@kehakiman.gov.my> Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2023 11:18 AM To: Mohd Zamir Suhaimee <zamir@kehakiman.gov.my>; Nik Azila Shuhada <nik.azila@shearndelamore.com> Cc: Rohani binti Che Mie <rohanicmie@kehakiman.gov.my>; Aishah @ Noorliza Binti Hassan <noorlizahassan@kehakiman.gov.my>; Mohd Hairulzaki bin Hassan <hairulzaki@kehakiman.gov.my>; Noor Jannah binti Hj. Abdullah <jannah@kehakiman.gov.my>; Rajasingam Gothandapani <rajasingam@shearndelamore.com>; Justin Tong Wei Hang <justin.tong@shearndelamore.com>; Ally Ong Tze Xian <ally.ong@shearndelamore.com>; Matthew Jerome van Huizen <matthew@jnplaw.my>; Ellia Kamarul <ellia@sdco.com.my>; Norli binti Talip <NorliTalip@kehakiman.gov.my> Subject: RE: PENGESAHAN PEMBAYARAN BAGI NO. KES: WA-27NCC-11- S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 02/2021 - TINDAKAN ADMIRALTI IN REM TERHADAP KAPAL 'ORIENTAL DRAGON' DARI PELABUHAN PANAMA Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh & Salam Sejahtera, Tuan/Puan, Saya dengan hormatnya merujuk kepada pembayaran sebanyak USD4,088,837.33 kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co. 2. Dibawah adalah jumlah deposit yang diterima bagi kapal oriental dragon. Deposit tahanan telah dibayar secara berasingan. 3. Baki RM20,802,988.49 telah dibayar dengan kepada penerima bayaran dibawah dan bayaran untuk matawang USD adalah dianggarkan dengan kadar anggaran seperti berikut: S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 4. Berdasarkan anggaran semasa pada bulan Ogos 2023, jumlah deposit boleh menampung pembayaran sehingga aturan keempat dan masih mempunyai baki sebanyak RM387,429.62. 5. Walaubagaimanapun, setelah pihak JPM membuat bayaran kepada Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co pada 21.08.2023, kadar pertukaran sebenar adalah 4.7900. Ini telah menyebabkan deposit yang ada tidak dapat menampung sebahagian pembayaran pada aturan keempat. Ringkasan pembayaran sebenar adalah seperti dibawah: 6. Pembayaran ini telah menyebabkan kurangan pada akaun deposit sebanyak RM185,416.49. Sehubungan itu, Tetuan Shearn Delamore & Co diminta untuk membuat pulangan sebanyak RM185,416.49 kepada pihak kami dengan segera. 7. Segala kerjasama dan perhatian pihak tuan/puan berkaitan perkara ini amat dihargai. Sekian, Terima Kasih S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 Saya yang menjalankan amanah, Maimunah Binti Endut C.A.(M) Ketua Penolong Pengarah (Akaun) Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia PUTRAJAYA Tel: 03-8880 4228 [46] However, instead of refunding the overpaid amount, SD responded stating that they were taking instructions from their clients and stated further that they believed that POJ would need to apply to Court for the refund of the said RM 185,416.49. [47] The aforesaid, which obviously also means that there would be nothing left in the Fund to meet the claims in the 3rd Intervener Suit 131 against the Defendant prompted the 3rd Intervener to scrutinise the payments made under the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. [48] Quite understandably, the fact that SD appeared hesitant to even refunding the sum of RM 185,416.49 was disconcerting for the 3rd Intervener. Enclosure 520 [49] The 3rd Intervener, jointly with the Defendant proceeded to ask this Court for a case management date to bring this matter to the attention of the Court. Parties attended before me on 4.10.2023, and the 3rd Intervener thereafter together with the Defendant immediately S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 filed the present application in Enclosure 520 seeking, inter alia, for the following orders: a) That the RM equivalent conversion rate for the payment of USD 1,731,366.42, CNY 529,468.14 and GBP 2,560.00 out of the proceeds of sale of the Vessel be the date of the Certificate Sheriff on 23.4.203 or alternative the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out on 20.3.2023; b) That the RM equivalent conversion rate for the payment of USD 117,608.02 and USD 58,442.03 in Suit 21 and USD 365,839.85 and USD 1,615,512.28 in Suit 11 be 20.4.2021 and 9.2.2021 respectively; c) That the pre-judgment and post-judgment interest adjudged in Suit 21 and Suit 11 be computed based on the RM equivalent stated in the respective Writs and Statements of Claim thereto. [50] In the interim, SD quite rightly undertook not to release the sum of USD4,088,837.33 in their custody until the final determination of the application or further order of the Court. [51] It is the 3rd Intervene SD request vide the SD letter dated 20.7.2023 for the payment out and the calculation on the conversion to RM currency was not in accordance with the law or the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 [52] By adopting a wrong approach on the payments, both the Plaintiffs and or SD and the Sheriff have caused an incongruous position where the Plaintiffs and SD have effectively been paid more than the amount available in the Fund for the enforcement of claims against the same. [53] In view of the above, it was contended that the Sheriff letter dated 3.8.2023 authorising POJ to make payment is defective. As a consequent, it is further contended that the payment out to SD as per the terms thereof that were made on 21.8.2023 is also defective, and must be forthwith corrected by this Court. The Sheriff letter dated 3.8.2023 cannot be relied on to authorise POJ to make payment. The Sheriff must issue a fresh authorization letter for payment that is in accordance with the terms of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. [54] It was also contended that the payment out of the Fund ought not issued. [55] Accordingly, this Court was urged to intervene and give effect to the Order of Priorities and Payment Out by: a) an order to rectify the defective and irregular payments made to SD; b) an order that POJ provides the correct conversion date for the foreign currency claims, and calculation of payment of the S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 claims in order of priority out of the Fund as allowed under the Order of Priorities and Payment Out; c) although the 5th ranking claims (ranked equally and to be paid pari passu) are deferred pending conclusion of the 3rd in rem action, an order directing POJ to provide 2(v) and its RM equivalent. For clarity, the 3rd claim is in RM currency, thus requiring no conversion date to be determined. d) an Order that any surplus wrongly retained by SD be forthwith refunded and paid into the Fund, to satisfy the 5th ranking claims. [56] The Plaintiffs opposed the 3rd Intervener and application in Encl. 520, contending that: a) this Court is Functus Officio; b) there is no overpayment by the Court. The Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid in the foreign currency i.e USD as adjudged and ordered in the Judgments in Default and in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, particularly paragraph 2(ii)(a), 2(iv)(a) and (b) and paragraph 2(v) thereof; c) the effective date of USD to RM conversion in respect of USD currency amounts ordered to be paid under paragraph 2(ii)(a), S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 2(iv)(a) and (b) and paragraph 2(v) of Order of Priorities and Payment Out is the date of payment; d) the Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid pre-judgment and post- judgment interest upon the principal sums expressed in the foreign currency as adjudged and ordered in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. e) t Statement. [57] Essentially the core issue for determination is the proper date to affix the conversion rate that ought to be used for the payment of the foreign currency sums as ordered under the Order of Priorities and Payment Out as certified by the Admiralty Sheriff, the sums adjudged under the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default and the payments of both the pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the adjudged sums in these 2 Suits. A. Court whether functus officio [58] The Plaintiffs contended that the 3rd Enclosure 520 is defective and or is an attempt to sidestep the doctrine of functus officio. That this application seeks to invite this Court to reopen, alter, amend and or re-litigate the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 [59] In support, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mr Tong Wei Hang cited the Federal Court case of Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Tab 5 Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1, where Abdull Hamid Embong FCJ speaking for the Federal Court held: We conclude by saying that once a regularly obtained order or judgment has been perfected, the court is functus officio. The matter as decided vide encl 6 is thus res judicata and cannot be re-litigated. It needs to be emphasised that the order made under encl 6 was appealed and affirmed right up to the Federal Court. It cannot now be revisited or reasserted under any guise in a subsequent proceeding. The issues raised by the respondent in encl 29 could have been brought up during the appeal process. The law does not allow the respondent to have a second bite of the cherry and in the manner as it did. This passage from Tenaga Berhad explains the rationale: There was no merit in the appellant's argument that the second application to set aside the default judgment was justified because it was based upon a different ground from that relied upon in the first application. The doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense was applicable in the present case. It was certainly open to the appellant to ground its first application on the basis that the default judgment was irregular. It was therefore an issue which properly belonged to the first application. But it chose not to rely upon that ground. Once the first application was dismissed, it was not open to the appellant to make a second application to set aside the judgment on a different ground. It would amount to presenting one's case in installment which the law does not permit. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 [45] In our judgment too, the re-litigation of a regularly and properly concluded matter as determined by the court is prohibited by the wide doctrine of res judicata. The judicial process rests on the twin pillars of certainty and finality. A final order or a judgment must therefore be vigorously protected by this doctrine, a position taken by the common law courts ever since Henderson (emphasis added) [60] Thus, it was submitted that the 3rd -litigate, and re-open and re-write a regularly obtained Judgment on the e [61] Further, in the Federal Court case of Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ at p. 417 - 418, Peh Swee Chin FCJ referred to a point relied by Court of Appeal that a perfected order, is not capable of being amended or altered except for certain exceptions as stated in Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143: same action to alter, vary or set aside a judgment regularly obtained after it has been entered or an order after it is drawn up except under the slip rule in O28 r 11 of Rules of Supreme Court 1957 (O20 r 11 of Rules of High Court 1980) so far as necessary to correct errors in expression the intention of the court, unless it is a judgment by default or made in the absence of a party at the trial or hearing. But if a judgment or order has been obtained by fraud or where further evidence which could not possibly have ben adduced at the original hearing is forthcoming, a fresh action S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 will lie to impeach the original judgment. The hearing of the action Peh Swee Chin J stated that: perfected in the manner described in the above passage, a party to the judgment generally and subject to the same passage, or any other written law, and apart from any appeal, cannot reopen the matter finalized in the judgment by seeking to alter it or amend it for the court would be functus officio by virtue of the ratio of Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid. Once perfected, a judgment of the High Court is also entitled to the obedience and respect from the parties to it on the basis of a command from a superior court of unlimited civil jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation classic for its incontestable precedent wise correctness, clarity (emphasis added) [62] I respectfully disagree with Mr Tong Wei Hang. The Federal Court has clarified that where it is necessary to work out or give effect to an order, the functus officio rule is not transgressed; the Court is empowered under its inherent jurisdiction to grant consequential orders. [63] In fact, the Federal Court in Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 237 expressly addressed the issue of functus official: S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 In discussing the doctrine of functus officio, the High Court found that the application for reinstatement made pursuant to the grant of the earlier final declaratory orders, was not an application to re-open the original case so as to vary, alter or amend that final judgment and order. It was held that the deliberate refusal and disobedience to comply with the original declaratory orders. As such the plaintiff had no option but to seek consequential orders so as to give effect to the original judgment and declaratory orders handed down by the High Court. [33] The court went on to examine the principle of finality and concluded that the ap judicata and corollary to it the rule of issue estoppel and . Importantly the court pointed out that the application for consequential orders was neither a rehearing nor a re-opening of the case. The judge cited Fritz v Hobson [1880] 14 Ch D 542 at p 561, which sets out the fundamental principle expounded by Fry J at p 561 on liberty to apply in relation to orders of court. It bears repeating here: In the next place, it is said that I have no jurisdiction to amend the judgment or to grant this application, because the Court has no jurisdiction to rehear an action. In my opinion I have jurisdiction to grant this application. In the first place, it is to be borne in mind that an order was made, although it was not drawn up, directing the motion in question to stand until the trial. According to my understanding of the practice (and this is confirmed by what the Master of the Rolls has said) all orders of the Court carry with them in gremio (in gremio legis is a Latin to the court. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 [34] The rationale above was relied upon by this court in Sungai Biak Tin Mining per Suffian LJ. Additionally the above ratio has been consistently followed by our courts (see Societe Des Etains De Bayas Tudjuh v Woh Heng Mining Kongsi [1978] 2 MLJ 267 at p 270; Sungei Biak Tin Mines Ltd v Saw Choo Theng & Anor (No 2) [1970] 2 MLJ 226 at p 227, Leong Ah Weng v Neoh Thean Soo & Anor [1983] 2 MLJ 119 at p 120). [35] From our case-law it is evident that liberty to apply for consequential orders in order to work out or give effect to the final judgment or order of the court is well within the inherent jurisdiction of the court. To this extent the rule of functus officio is not transgressed. And in the instant appeal both the High Court and the Court of Appeal concluded on well- articulated grounds that the consequential order was required to give effect to the original judgment against Stone World for liability in detinue. There would be no reason to disagree with the courts below, with great respect. [36] Support for our exposition of the law is also to be found in Singaporean case-law. In Tan Yeow Khoon & Anor v Tan Yeow ordered the examination of accounts of several parties owned by the parties. An expert was appointed but the parties could not agree on the incorporation of certain terms. The plaintiffs applied court) to resolve the issue. [37] The High Court in Singapore held, inter alia, that where the incorporation of terms were for the purposes of sustaining or working out the earlier order made and is nothing more than a complementary or enabling direction to work out the judgment of the court such an incorporation would be allowed under the rule. More significantly the court S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 went on to hold that even if the further direction was to be regarded as a variation, it would be allowed if it was intended to to the original order. In that case the court had occasion to comment on the unreasonableness and obduracy of the plaintiffs there. [emphasis added] [64] Just like in the Stone World case, Enclosure 520 is not designed to re-open the case to vary, alter or amend the final judgments made in favour of the Plaintiffs, or the terms of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. Enclosure 520 is necessitated by the Plaintiffs and or Order of Priorities and Payment Out any conversion date and maintaining that the correct conversion date is the date of payment. The Plaintiffs also refused to return the sum overpaid, which they argued is only refundable by way of a Court Order. [65] To my mind, there is no doubt that this Court is fully empowered to grant the consequential orders to complement and enable the working out of the terms of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. B. [66] At the outset, it must be stated that it has long been accepted that the Malaysian Courts have the jurisdiction and power to pronounce judgment in a foreign currency. [67] The Supreme Court in the case of New Kok Ann Realty Sdn Bhd v Development & Commercial Bank Ltd, New Hebrides (In S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 Liquidation) [1987] 1 MLJ 57 2 approved the ratio decidendi in the English House of Lords case of Miliangos v George Frank (Textile) Limited [1976] AC 443 Miliangos decision to award the judgment for the loan sum in USD. [68] The issue of what should be the conversion date for enforcement of foreign currency debts was also deliberated and determined by the House of Lords in the Miliangos. [69] Briefly, Miliangos was a Swiss textile producer who sold and delivered textiles to George Frank Ltd, a textile trader located in England. George Frank refused to pay for the textiles. Miliangos sued George Frank in England for the amount of the debt in the currency of the contract which was Swiss francs. Over the time of the litigation, the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the pound dropped dramatically. The traditional rule required that the debt in Swiss francs be converted to pounds on the date of the breach. Miliangos would lose a significant amount of the value of the money owed if paid in pounds due to the exchange rate. The issue before the House of Lords was whether the English courts could order a judgment in any currency besides pounds sterling. The Lords ruled that the debt could be paid in Swiss francs, breaking a line of authority over 200 years old. As for the conversion rate, the Lords ruled that it should be at the date the court authorised enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling: As regards the conversion date to be inserted in the claim or in the judgment of the court, the choice, as pointed out in the Havana Railways case [1961] A.C. 1007, is between (i) the date S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 of action brought, (ii) the date of judgment, (iii) the date of payment. Each has its advantages, and it is to be noticed that the Court of Appeal in Schorsch Meier and in the present case chose the date of payment meaning, as I understand it, the date when the court authorises enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling. The date of payment is taken in the convention annexed to the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 (article 27 (2)). This date gets nearest to securing to the creditor exactly what he bargained for. The date of action brought, though favoured by Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe in the Havana Railways case, seems to me to place the creditor too severely at the mercy of the debtor's obstructive defences (cf. this case) or the law's delay. It may have been based on an understanding of the judgment of Holmes J. in the Deutsche Bank case (272 U.S. 517) now seen to be probably mistaken (see Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, 3rd ed. (1971), p. 355 and cases cited). The date of judgment is shown to be a workable date in practice by its inclusion in the Carriage by Air Act 1961 which gave effect to the Hague Convention of 1965 varying, on this very point, the Warsaw Convention of 1929, but, in some cases particularly where there is an appeal, may again impose on the creditor a considerable currency risk. So I would favour the payment date, in the sense I have mentioned. In the case of a company in liquidation, the corresponding date for conversion would be the date when the creditor's claim in terms of sterling is admitted by the liquidator. In the case of arbitration, there may be a minor discrepancy, if the practice which is apparently adopted (see the Jugoslavenska case [1974] Q.B. 292, 305) remains as it is, but I can see no reason why, if desired, that practice should not be adjusted so as to enable conversion to be made as at the date when leave to enforce in sterling is given. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 [65] However, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs and the 3rd Intervener differed in their interpretation of the above passage. [66] According to learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, the House of Lords in Miliangos decided that the conversion date is the date of payment which in this case it was contended was on 21.8.2023 when POJ made the payments from the Fund to SD. [67] Reference was made to the case of In Re P Suppiah (Tara Rajaratnam, Judgment Creditor) [1989] 2 MLJ 479 where the learned Judge, LC Vohrah J, had this to say on the relevant date of conversion in relation to the enforcement of a costs order: s concern international contracts, the to give the law new direction in a particular case where on principle and in reason it appears right In the present case having regard to the continuing monetary trend I would favour the date of payment as the choice of the judgment debtor to pay either the exact amount in sterling as taxed or the equivalent in Malaysian currency at the time of the payment. The delay in payment by the judgment debtor should not have the effect of causing the judgment creditor any financial loss or imposing upon her any [emphasis added] [68] However, learned counsel for the 3rd Intervener, Mr Jeremy Joseph, contended that where the judgment is expressed in foreign currency, the appropriate conversion date should be the date of payment , but as understood and clarified by the House of Lords to be the date S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 when the court authorises enforcement of the judgment in terms of the local currency , citing the 2 examples given by Lord Wilberforce in the last sentence of the aforesaid passage. [69] Mr Jeremy Joseph pointed out that In Re P Suppiah, the learned judge had to determine between the conversion date prevailing when the costs were actually ordered and the conversion date at the time when the bankruptcy notice was issued. The learned judge rightly chose the latter as that was the date when the Court authorised the enforcement of the taxed costs following the decision of the House of Lords in Miliangos. Significantly, the Court did not apply the conversion date as at the time of payment as contended by learned counsel for the Plaintiffs. [70] To my mind, the confusion between the date of payment and the date when the Court authorises the enforcement of the judgment is easily resolved when one reads the judgments of Lord Edmund- Davies and Lord Fraser of Tullyberton in Milliangos. This was what they said: Per Lord Edmund-Davies: see it, the core of this litigation is not really whether judgments given by the courts of this country must always be expressed in sterling, though that point was expansively canvassed. I say this because the probability, nay, the certainty is that if a money judgment is given in our courts is to be enforced here there will inevitably come a stage when if the judgment is one expressed in a foreign currency, it must be converted into sterling so that those responsible for enforcing the judgment S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 (whether by levying execution or otherwise) may know what steps are open to them and how far they can go. As Roskill L.J said in Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v Castle Investment award: can issue for a sum other than a sterling amount. I therefore think that the necessary conversion should be effected and deposed to in an affidavit before the application for leave to enforce is made. Leave can then issue under section 26 [of the Arbitration Act 1950] to enforce the award in the same manner as a Per Lord Fraser of Tullyberton: currency into sterling so that it can be enforced in this country. The question is what the conversion date should be. Theoretically, it should, in my opinion, be the date of actual payment of the debt. That would give exactly the cost in sterling of buying the foreign currency. But theory must yield to practical necessity to this extent that, if the judgment has to be enforced in this country, it must be converted before the date when the [70] Thus, one must u judgment in Miliangos payment or, failing such payment, the date on which the court authorises enforcement of the judgment. The date of actual S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 payment applies in the case where judgment is given in foreign currency and the judgment creditor satisfies the judgment voluntarily without the need for the judgment creditor to take execution proceedings to enforce the same. However, where the judgment debtor fails to pay and the judgment creditor has to apply to the Court to enforce the judgment through execution proceedings, then the conversion date is the date when the Court authorises the enforcement. This date is used more out of procedural efficacy so those responsible for enforcing the judgment (whether by levying execution or otherwise) may know what steps are open to them and how far they can go The principle that the court may give judgment in foreign currency is, after all, essentially one of a procedural character. [71] However, what must be appreciated is that Miliangos was not a case involving claims made by several claimants over a limited fund, where there is a possibility that the available funds may not be sufficient to meet all the claims and where there is a ranking of priorities among the various claimants in terms of receiving payments. This significant distinction was highlighted by Miss Vinodhini, learned co-counsel for the 3rd Intervener. [72] The present case is analogous to that of a winding up of an insolvent company. The case of Re Dynamics Corporation of America [1976] 1 W.L.R. 757 is a case in which it was held by Oliver J. that on the compulsory winding-up of an insolvent registered company a creditor's claim for a debt in foreign currency, and any set-off in foreign currency against such a debt, must be converted into sterling at the date of the winding-up order. The learned judge did not follow S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 the opinion of Lord Wilberforce in Miliangos that in the case of a company in liquidation, the corresponding date for conversion would be the date when the creditor's claim in terms of sterling is admitted by the liquidator. [73] Oliver J opined that the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1948 (and their predecessors) was to ascertain the liabilities of the company as at the date of liquidation and to secure the division of the debtor's property among the claimants pro rata according to the values of their claims at that time. His Lordship therefore held that foreign debts must be valued in terms of sterling as at the date of the liquidation. In other words, in a compulsory winding up of an insolvent company, the conversion date for foreign debts is the date of the winding up because the relevant statutory provisions provided for the liabilities of the company to be ascertained as at that date. [74] Another analogous situation to the present case is where a shipowner who faces or anticipates several claims arising out of the same casualty obtains a decree from the court limiting his liability. [75] In Owners of the mv Eleftherotria v Owners of the mv Despina R; The Despina R, [1977] 3 All ER 874, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant claiming damages for a collision caused by determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to be awarded the damages in the currencies in which the expenditure or losses were directly and immediately incurred i.e RMB, yen, sterling and US dollars or damages in US dollars, the currency in which the plaintiff S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 operated. Brandon J held that the plaintiff was entitled to be awarded as damages the amount of reasonable expenditure and loss expressed in US dollars or the sterling equivalent of such amounts as that was the currency in which the loss had effectively been borne. [76] In reference to 3 situations arising in Admiralty law which will give rise to special problems if damages for tort are in appropriate cases awarded in foreign currencies, Brandon J made a reference to the limitation action under section 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. The relevant passages are reproduced below: The third situation is where a tortfeasor, who has or anticipates a number of claims against him arising out of the same casualty, having either admitted liability or had it established against him, brings an action to limit the total amount of his liability in respect of all claims under s 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. In such a case, assuming that it is agreed or decided that he is entitled to limit his liability, and assuming further that the total amount of all the claims exceeds his limit, the fund out of which a dividend on such claims will have to be paid will be a sterling fund. If the damages claimed by one or more of the claimants are put forward and proved in a foreign currency, a question will arise as to the date at which conversion into sterling should take place. With regard to this, my provisional view is that it should be one of three dates: either that of the decree of limitation, or that of the constitution of the limitation fund, or that of proof of the claim against the fund. The situation which arises when a tortfeasor limits his total liability under s 504 of the 1894 Act is a form of statutory insolvency: see Burrell v Simpson & Co ((1877) 4 R (Ct of Sess) S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 177 at 182) by the Lord President (Lord Inglis) and The Liverpool (No 2) ([1960] 3 All ER 307 at 312, [1963] P 64at 83) by Harman LJ. The date of conversion should, therefore, be the same as it would be in a bankruptcy or company liquidation. In the Miliangos case ([1975] 3 All ER 801 at 814, 838, [1976] AC 443 at 469, 498) Lord Wilberforce and Lord Cross of Chelsea both expressed the view that, in a company liquidation, the date for conversion equivalent to the date of payment in an ordinary case should be the date when proof of the creditor's claim was admitted by the liquidation. The corresponding date in Admiralty limitation proceedings would, I think, be the date on which the Admiralty registrar on the reference found a claim proved against the fund. In a company liquidation case subsequent to the Miliangos case, however, Re Dynamics Corpn of America, Oliver J regarded the observations of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Cross of Chelsea referred to above as obiter dicta only, and decided not to follow them. His conclusion, based on other earlier authorities, was that the right date for conversion, equivalent to the date of payment in ordinary cases, was the date of the winding-up order. If this view be correct, as to which it is not necessary that I should express any opinion, the corresponding date in Admiralty limitation proceedings would, I think, be the date of the decree of limitation. [77] , albeit provisional, was that in a limitation action where the fund is insufficient to meet all the claims, where there is a claim in foreign currency, the conversion date ought to be the date of the decree of limitation equating the said date to the date of a situation which arises S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 when a tortfeasor limits his total liability under s.504 of the 1894 Act [78] In both cases, namely, compulsory winding up of an insolvent company and in a limitation action under the Admiralty law, the Court did not choose the date of actual payment or distribution of dividends as the conversion date. Instead, the date of the winding up order and the decree of limitation was thought to be most appropriate. So, in the case like the present where claims with different priorities are made against the proceeds of sale of the vessel, what should be the appropriate conversion date? Should it be the date of constitution of the Fund i.e the date the proceeds of sale are paid into Court, the date of judgment of the claims against the Fund, the date where the Sheriff certifies the expenditure and claims, the date of determination of priorities or the date of payment out? [79] To begin, I would not equate the claims made against the Fund in the present case as akin to a liquidation process or limitation action where the premise is that the available pool of fund will be because in the present case, the Vessel is sold because the Defendant had chosen not to defend the claims in Suit 11 and to permit the Plaintiffs to seek the recovery of their claims from the proceeds of sale of the Vessel. I do not think that the sale of a vessel under arrest to meet the claims in an in rem action is a form of statutory liquidation as opined by Brandon J in The Despina R to be the case in a limitation action. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 [80] I agree that in cases where there are one or more claimants in foreign currencies to a limited fund (which is denominated in the local currency) together with other claimants, there must be just one unit of account, which invariably would be in the currency of the fund and a conversion date that is common to all the claimants (unless otherwise agreed or ordered). The reason for the same is simply that the Court is concern not only to deal with the currency problem but also to ensure fairness and equality of treatment among the different competing claimants of different ranking in priorities. [81] It seems to me that in the case of claims against a limited or common fund, a common conversion date is necessary to avoid the uncertainty resulting from the fluctuation in the currency of payment vis-à-vis the foreign currency debts which will impact the available amount in the fund to the other claimants. [82] To illustrate - where the fund constituted is RM 10,000.00 and the claimants to the fund consist of A, B and C for the sums of USD 1,000, USD 750 and RM 2,500 respectively. If at the date the fund was constituted, the USD to RM conversion rate is USD 1 to RM 4.20, the sums to be paid out to meet the claims would be RM 4,200, RM 3,150 and RM 2,500 to A, B and C respectively. The fund in fact has a balance of RM 150. This is scenario 1. [83] However, if payments were made, let say, 1 year after the fund was constituted and if the US dollars were to appreciate by then to become 1 USD to RM 4.80, and assuming all the claims were made on the same date, the sums to be paid out of the fund to A, B and C would be RM 4,800, RM 3,600 and RM 2,500 respectively. The total S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 sum would exceed the fund by RM 900 in which case, assuming all the claimants rank pari passu, the amounts that they would receive would be proportionately reduced. In this case, C would receive about RM 2,293.60 (2,500/10,900 x 10,000). This is scenario 2. [84] constituted but B and C were paid a year later A would have received RM 4,200 leaving an available balance of RM 5,800 in the fund. By the time B and C made their claims for RM 3,600 and RM 2,500 respectively, the fund would have been short of RM 300 and both have to accept a proportionate reduction as full satisfaction of their claims. Here A received his full claim but not B and C. This is scenario 3. [85] were made one year after the fund was constituted, after paying the sums of RM 4,800 and RM 3,600 to them, C will only receive RM 1,600. This is scenario 4. [86] What is clear from the abov position are as follows: a) the delay in payments from the fund can subject C to currency fluctuation risks which may impact his ability to recover his full claims; b) the difference in the time of payment to the foreign currency S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 c) w the risk of currency fluctuation may impact his ability to recover his full claims. [87] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs contended that the loss to C in the above scenarios is merely the function of the ranking of priority and the principle in Miliangos that the payment to the foreign creditor will, as nearly as possible, compensate him for his loss. Thus, if the conversion date at the time of payment results in C receiving less, this is an incident of the different ranking in priority of payment and the principle in Miliangos that must be accepted. This is because the fluctuation in the currency may also work in favour. [88] With respect, I do not agree. Given the different ranking in priority of claims, it is not uncommon that the time of payments will invariable be different for the different claimants. If the conversion date is based on the time of payment, whilst the foreign currency debtors with higher ranking will receive their claims in the form of the equivalent in RM of their foreign currency at the time of payment and thereby compensated for their actual loss, the remaining claimants with lower ranking will have to bear the risks of the fund diminishing. The result is that the risk of the deteriorating RM is borne only by the lower ranking claimants. [89] To my mind, although the principle in Miliangos that a foreign currency debtor ought to be paid as nearly as possible for his actual loss which means that the applicable conversion date is the time of payment or the date when the Court authorises the enforcement of the payment, a different consideration must apply in cases where S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 the claims made against a limited fund consist of different ranking of priorities and in foreign currencies. In this regard, I adopt the following comments of Michael Howard, John Knott and John Foreign Currency Claims, Judgments and Damages order of priority. These include claims by successive arrested for a maritime claim. Although these situations are very diverse, we think the principle to be applied is common to all of them. The question of the order in which liabilities are to be satisfied can be decided at any time as a matter of principle. It is not necessary to know even which claims are valid to determine in what order they should be paid. But the same is not true of the identification of the date of conversion. On that depends the amount that is left for each creditor after those with priority have established their claim. That does demand for a single date of conversion. Otherwise, those whose interests are deferred suffer the double disadvantage not only of being behind in the queue but also of having to endure the risk of exchange value of their claim diminishing while they stand there. [emphasis added] [90] The obvious question is of course which conversion date ought to be applied. Mr Jeremy Joseph proposed the date the Admiralty the Order of Priority and Payment Out was made. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 [91] Mr Jeremy Joseph argued reimbursement of costs incurred by the arresting party in its original currency, and only determined and payable after they are taxed by the Sheriff under Order 70 r. 22, the correct conversion date should be the . [92] In an admiralty in rem action where the res is sold and proceeds made available for enforcement by legitimate claimants, each claimant becomes entitled to its claim on the date the Court recognizes and authorises enforcement of its claim against the sale proceeds. In the case of reimbursement of Sh expenses, it is standard admiralty practice to seek the approval of the Sheriff before incurring the expense, as the party incurring the expense (usually the arresting party) is only entitled to be reimbursed such expenses that are taxed and approved by the Sheriff. [93] Following the aforesaid, it was contended that SD became entitled all invoices, statements of accounts, bills, payment vouchers, receipts and all other d were inspected and taxed by the Sheriff and the Sheriff issued his Certificate on 23.4.2022. [94] amounts recoverable by the arresting party. In support, the following passage in Dilingham Corporation Canada Ltd v. The Ship Shinyu Maru [1980] 1 FC 303 was quoted to this Court: S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 72 although they are determinable, and the amount can only be determined by taxation of same, converting the amounts expressed in Japanese yen to Canadian dollars as of that date, it is more equitable to choose the date of certification of the bill of costs as the appropriate conversion date. The fact that this will prove more costly to plaintiff is not a fact to be taken into consideration, as the Japanese yen might have fallen in value in relation to the Canadian dollar in the interval instead of increasing in value, and the decision would have to be the same. An appropriate date for conversion appears to me to be the date on which the amount to be paid can be ascertained and payment made. [emphasis added] [95] s expenses. It has no relevance to the other claims in foreign currencies made against the Fund in the present case e.g. the judgment sums in Suit 11 and 21. More importantly, whilst the document authorising the enforcement of the said sum. [96] As regards the conversion date being the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, could this be said to be the date of enforcement of the maritime claims made against the proceeds of sale of a res, ie. when court authorises enforcement of the [97] It is trite admiralty law and procedure that an in rem judgment or S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73 case) must be first recognized and ranked in the order of priorities and ordered to be paid out of the proceeds of sale. [98] Mr Jeremy Joseph contended that having a judgment in rem or a claim for compensation alone does not recognise or authorise a claimant for enforcement against the proceeds. He cited O 70. r. 20(9) where the Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, set aside or vary any judgment entered in pursuance of this rule. This can in rem action, or any other intervener in the action where the res is arrested and sold and proceeds paid into Court, under O.70 r 16. [99] However, to my mind, the fact that the judgment in rem may be set aside does not mean that the judgment is not recognised or not enforceable. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it must be noted that what is being considered here is the enforcement of claims against the proceeds of sale of the Vessel. At the time of the judgment in rem, it may be the case that there is no common fund existing e.g the defendant may have provided an alternative security to the plaintiff or that the proceeds of sale have not been constituted. In fact, even if the fund from the proceeds of sale were constituted, the judgment in rem could not be enforced against the fund until the determination of the claims and the order of priority has been made. [100] O. 70 r 22(5) recognises that when proceeds of sale of the res had been accounted for, any person who has an interest in the proceeds of the sale shall be entitled to be heard. Once the proceeds of sale are paid into Court, any party who has an in rem judgment can apply to Court under Order 70 r. 21 for an order to determine the order of S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 74 priority of claims against the proceeds of sale and for the payment out of the claims. [101] At this point, the Court will consider all claims against the proceeds of sale (both local and foreign currencies) and rank them in their order of priority (based on established law) and order payments in accordance with that priority. In this regard, I agree with Mr Jeremy Joseph that this is the moment when the Court enforcement of the judgment in terms of the local currency or , following the Milliangos. As Lord Edmund-Davies said in the Miliangos, the judgments or claims expressed in foreign currency, must be converted into [Ringgit Malaysia] so that those responsible for enforcing the judgment (whether by levying execution or otherwise) may know what steps are open to them and [102] Therefore, it is my judgment that the operative date when the Court authorises enforcement of the judgment in rem and the claims against proceeds of sale of a res, would be the date when the Court makes an order to determine the priorities of the claims and order the payment out in accordance with that priority, ie. the date of the Order for Priorities and Payment Out in the present case. [103] Thus, I agree with Mr Jeremy Joseph and hold that in the present case, the conversion date is the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out which was on 20.3.2023. By this date the proceeds of sale of the Vessel have been paid into Court and the Fund certified and given their priority, an order for the payment out of the S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 75 Fund to account of the same can be made and was in fact made. The Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default had also been entered by the time the Order of Priorities and Payment Out was made. The only other claim against the Fund yet to be determined and ascertained is the 3rd Intervene claims in the 3rd Intervenor Suit 131. This claim is made in RM currency and entails no conversion date. [104] It is my judgment that applying the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out as the conversion date strikes a right balance between meeting the principle in Miliangos i.e for the payment to be such that it would put as nearly as possible the actual loss in foreign currency on the one hand and the need not to place the other the double disadvantage not only of being behind in the queue but also of having to endure the risk of exchange value of their claim diminishing while they stand there on the other hand. [105] The conversion date fixed on the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out will be less prejudicial to the foreign currency claimants compare to say, the date of the constitution of the Fund, i.e the date the proceeds of payment is paid into Court since the Order of Priorities and Payment Out is the nearer date to the time of payment than the date the Fund is constituted. C. Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default [106] The Suit 11 Judgment in Default and the Suit 21 Judgment in Default were entered against the Vessel on 1.9.2022 and 5.4.2022 respectively. By this time, the Fund had already been constituted, S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 76 the judicial sale of the Vessel had taken place on 15.12.2021 when a Bill of Sale was signed with one Virma Maritime Corp from the Republic of the Marshall Islands for the total sum of RM 20,802,988.49. [107] At the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and the Suit 21 Judgment in Default were duly recognised and expressly provided for by the High Court in Paragraph 2(iv)(a) and (b) which stipulate that: For Suit 11 Judgment in Default: a) the sum of USD365,839.85 (equivalent to RM1,486,407.31 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) be paid to the Master for his wages and disbursements; b) the sum of USD1,615,512.28 (equivalent to RM6,563,826.39 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.063 as at 9.2.2021) to be paid to the crew as unpaid wages; c) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% in accordance with Judgment in Default of Defence dated 1.9.2022; d) costs fixed at RM 10,000.00. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 77 For Suit 21 Judgment in Default a) the sum of USD117,608.02 (equivalent to RM484,897.87 at the exchange rate of USD1=RM4.123 as at 20.4.2021); b) pre-judgment interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% in accordance with Judgment in default of Defence dated 5.4.2022; c) costs fixed at RM 20,000.00. [108] Clearly, from the express terms of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, the Court had authorised enforcement of the judgment sums obtained in Suit 11 and Suit 2 in terms of the currency stipulated therein, which is the RM equivalent as prayed in the in rem, namely, the sums of RM 1,486,407.31 and RM 6,563,826.39 for the Master and the crew members in Suit 11 and the sum of RM 484,897.87 for the crew members in Suit 21. [109] Notwithstanding the aforesaid, Mr Tong Wei Hang, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs contended that the conversion date stated in the s in rem in both the Suit 11 and Suit 21 were nothing more than to comply with the common practice when filing a claim in foreign currency to state the equivalent value in RM at the time of the Writ. It was submitted that the Plaintiffs are by no means barred from insisting on payment of judgment in foreign currency. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 78 [110] Reference was made to the English Civil Procedure Volume 1 (White Book 2023) where at para 16.3.3, it states thus: Money claim expressed in a foreign currency Where a claim is for a sum of money expressed in a foreign currency the claim form must expressly state a variety of matters including the Sterling equivalent of the sum at the date of the claim and the source of the exchange rate relied on to calculate the Sterling equivalent (PD 16 para 9.1 (See para 16PD9 below)). [111] Mr Tong Wei Hang also referred to the case of The Owners of Cargo Gang Cheng ion to amend an order (which had not been perfected) for damages to be awarded in USD because of the fall of the value of the RM as support that the Courts in Malaysia has the power and jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in a foreign currency. [112] The brief facts in Gang Cheng are as follows: a) the suit was brought by cargo owners against a shipowner for cargo damage. It was not disputed that the cargo purchased in USD and freight paid in USD. However, the cargo was delivered in Malaysia and salvaged in Malaysia; b) when the suit was filed, the plaintiff pleaded only general damages and did not specifically plead for the judgment to be given in USD; S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 79 c) during trial, the plaintiff led evidence in RM to calculated its losses and sought RM1,800,000.00 in damages, based on the exchange rate of RM2.55 to the USD; d) for the sum consternation, this would have meant that the judgment was worth only some USD450,000.00 rather than USD700,000.00 and the Plaintiff had, due to the effluxion of time and the sharp downward value of the RM to the USD lost about USD250,000.00. The plaintiff immediately filed a notice of motion seeking the variation of the judgment to receive the judgment in USD. [113] In rejecting the objection from counsel for the defendant, the learned Kamalanathan Ratnam J held: Mr Arun for the defence vociferously argued that since in their submission the plaintiffs had asked for damages in Ringgit, they were awarded what they had asked for. But such a submission fails to consider the very purpose and nature of this notice of motion. It is because of that error that the plaintiffs now seek to rectify the order that has not been perfected. In fact, in Ling Nam Rubber Works the appellants' counsel had 'forgotten to ask then and there for interest as well, so that the order was tacit with regard thereto'. In the result an application was made, like in this case, before the order was passed and entered, for an amendment to include the interests. The same has happened in this case. Counsel had omitted to ask for the award of damages in the currency that best expressed the party's loss. Perhaps at that stage he might have thought it was unnecessary. In any S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 80 case, I cannot even in this case consider this omission as an error. It is the intervening act of the fall of the value of the Ringgit between the pronouncement of the judgment and the perfection of the order that had necessitated this amendment to the order. Therefore, it is not correct for the defence to contend that by submitting for the award of damages to be in Malaysian Ringgit or its equivalent in United States currency, the plaintiffs were bound by what they received by way of judgment in Malaysian Ringgit. Counsel for the defence also argued that if I allowed this application I would be opening the flood gates to many such applications in that every plaintiff who has a judgment which can be expressed in more than one currency could come forward to seek a variation whenever the fluctuation benefits the plaintiff. This submission is flawed from inception. If the facts denote as in this case that there was a clear trading in United States currency and unchallenged evidence was adduced as to the rate of the Malaysian Ringgit to the US$1, then whether it is one case or a hundred, the road to justice must be open to each and every one of them. The flood gate principle must not be used to shut out the legitimate claim of a litigant. [emphasis added] [114] Further, in Inter Diam Pte Ltd v PJ Diamond Centre Sdn Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 189, Mohd Hishamudin J held that where it had been agreed between the parties that in respect of some of the transactions, payment should be in USD, it would be wrong in principle to deny the plaintiff's rights to be paid in USD. In any case, there was no legal impediment with regard to giving judgment in USD or to giving judgment in the manner as prayed for in the statement of claim, namely, 'the sum of USD86,488.10 or its equivalent in Ringgit S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 81 Malaysia on the date of judgment' of conversion can either be the date of judgment or the date of payment. [115] Armed with the aforesaid cases, Mr Tong Wei Hang contended that this Court should always uphold the principle that a plaintiff should be compensated in the currency that best expressed his loss. Since in this case, the wages and disbursements of the Master and crew members were paid in USD, the payment out from the Fund representing the proceeds of sale of the Vessel should be in USD converted at the date of payment. [116] With respect I disagree. [117] As a start, in Malaysia there is no equivalence to the English White Book 2023 requirement for a claim expressed in a foreign currency to convert the RM equivalent sum in the Writ or Statement of Claim as at the date of the claim although it may be a good practice to do so. However, the plaintiff claiming a sum in foreign currency is always at liberty to pray in his reliefs from the Court at the time of judgment for the payment of the foreign sum without specifying a conversion date or specifying the conversion date as at the time of judgment or time or payment. [118] Instead, in both the Suit 11 and Suit 21, the Plaintiffs had expressly prayed in the reliefs the sums in USD converted to RM as at the date of the Writ filed, namely, on 9.2.2021 and 20.4.2021 respectively. In other words, the Plaintiffs have unequivocally opted to recover their claims in RM instead of USD at the time of filing their Writs in Rem. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 82 The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to amend the reliefs when they proceeded to obtain the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and the Suit 21 Judgment in Default but chose not to do so. [119] This was precisely what happened in Den Norske Bank ASA v The [1998] MLJU 55, where an amendment was made before judgment for the conversion rate to be the date as at payment instead of the date when the claim was filed as was originally pleaded by the 1st intervener. In rejecting the objection by the plaintiffs, Abdul Malik Ishal J (as he then was) held as follows: The learned counsel for the plaintiffs mortgagee, argued that having provided the Malaysian Ringgit equivalent of their claim as at the date of the filing of the statement of claim the 1st intervenors were said to be bound by the amount in the Malaysian Ringgit equivalent as stated in their pleadings. Mr. Raj Sativale further contended that the 1st intervenors have chosen to crystallise the debt owing to them by the defendants. Mr. Clarence Edwin for the 1st intervenors argued that the writ and the statement of claim both pleaded the debt in Greek Drachmas and the statement of claim prayed for judgment in the Greek Drachmas and merely provided for the Malaysian Ringgit equivalent at the date of filing. Mr. Raj Sativale in advancing his argument relied heavily on the decision of K.L. Rekhraj JC (now J) in Ascot International Pte Ltd v. Elevic Trading Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 CLJ 645 where his Lordship held the view that a plaintiff filing a writ in Malaysia for a claim in foreign currency must express his claim in Malaysian Ringgit before filing the writ in court. The learned Judicial Commissioner relied on a 1936 decision of S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 83 Terrell J in the case of Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd v. Firm of Yaik Joo Ann [1936] MLJ Rep 88. : Mr. Raj Sativale contended that the first intervenors were bound by their pleadings. This is indeed true. But there was a failure to mention that the law too provide for an amendment of pleadings. Order 20, rule 3 (1) of the RHC states as follows: "A party may, without the leave of the court, amend any pleadings of his once at any time before the pleadings are deemed to be closed and, where he does so he must serve the amended pleading on the opposite party." and it allows an amendment to the pleadings to be made once without leave and before the close of pleadings subject, of course, to certain obligations as to the service of the amended pleadings and in certain circumstances as to the necessity of amendments by the other party [emphasis added] [120] In our instant case, the Plaintiffs never applied for any amendments to their Writs in Rem in Suit 11 and Suit 21 and were happy to have their judgments to be expressed in RM as at the date of the Writs in Rem. Further, even at the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, the Plaintiffs were contended to have their claims expressed in similar terms as in their Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 84 [121] Indeed, the Plaintiffs, when making the Priorities and Payment Out Application, specifically fixed the RM equivalent of their Judgment sums as at the date of their Writ in Rem actions, that is, 20.4.2021 for Suit 21 and 9.2.2021 for Suit 11. [122] Accordingly, it is my judgment that the Plaintiffs are no longer entitled to expect payments of their claims in Suit 11 and Suit 21 in USD and or its equivalent as at the date of payment. The claims have already been converted into RM as at the date of the Writ in Rem when the judgments were granted and the sums to be paid out as ordered in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out had been expressly stated in RM. D. Pre-judgment and Post-judgment interests [123] -judgment interest in both the Suit 11 and Suit 21 also run from the date of the action. [124] Paragraph (2)(iv)(a) and (b) of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out authorised the payment of pre-judgment interest and post- judgment interest on all sums adjudged to be due to the Plaintiffs under the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default. [125] I agree with Mr Jeremy Joseph that since the Court authorised enforcement of the Judgment sums in their RM equivalent, it should follow that the interest rate of 5% p.a should be applied on the RM equivalent. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 85 [126] This was the intention of the Plaintiffs as expressed in the following manner: a) by fixing the conversion date for their claims in the RM equivalent as the date the action was brought, that is, 20.4.2021 for Suit 21 and 9.2.2021 for Suit 11 in Prayers 2 (iv) (a) and (b) and Prayer 2 (v) of the Priorities Application. b) by the use of the words, -sama dengan faedah pra-penghakiman dan faedah pasca-penghakiman ke atas semua jumlah yang dihakimi sebagai kena dibayar kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dalam Penghakiman Ingka in Suit 11 and Suit 21, the Plaintiffs intended interest to be charged on the judgment sums, which are stated in the RM equivalent. [127] the correct interest payable to the Plaintiffs to be as follows. Interest (RM) Suit 21 Default Judgment Paragraph 2(iv)(a) Unpaid Wages of USD117,608.02 converted to RM484,897.87 as at 20.4.2021 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 86 Pre-judgment interest on RM484,897.87 at the rate of 5% p.a on from 20.4.2021 (date of action) until 5.4.2022 (date of Judgment) 23,314.95 Post-judgment interest on RM484,897.87 at the rate of 5% p.a from 6.4.2022 until date of full satisfaction (date of payment out of the Fund) 66.42 per day Suit 11 Default Judgment Paragraph 2(iv)(b) Unpaid Wages of USD30,660.00 converted to RM124,571.58 as at 9.2.2021 Pre-judgment interest on RM 124,571.58 at the rate of 5% p.a from 9.2.2021 (date of action) until 1.9.2022 9,726.82 Post-judgment interest on RM 124,571.58 at the rate of 5% p.a from 2.9.2022 until date of full satisfaction (date of payment out of the Fund) 17.06 per day Suit 11 Default Judgment Paragraph 2(iv)(b) of USD335,179.85 converted to RM1,361,835.73 as at 9.2.2021 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 87 Pre-judgment interest on RM 1,361,835.73 at the rate of 5% p.a from 9.2.2021 (date of action) until 1.9.2022 106,335.12 Post-judgment interest on RM1,361,835.73 at the rate of 5% p.a from 2.9.2022 until date of full satisfaction (date of payment out of the Fund) 186.55 per day Suit 11 Default Judgment Paragraph 2(iv)(b) Unpaid Wages of USD1,615,512.28 converted to RM6,563,826.39 as at 9.2.2021 Pre-judgment interest on RM6,563,826.39 for at the rate of 5% p.a from 9.2.2021 (date of action) until 1.9.2022 512,517.95 Post-judgment interest on RM6,563,826.39 at the rate of 5% p.a from 2.9.2022 until date of full satisfaction (date of payment out of the Fund) 899.15 per day Suit 21 Default Judgment Paragraph (2)(v) Repatriation Costs of USD58,442.03 converted to RM240,956.49 as at 20.4.2021 Pre-judgment interest on RM240,956.49 at the rate of 5% p.a from 20.4.2021 (date of action) until 5.4.2022 11,585.72 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 88 Post-judgment interest on RM240,956.49 at the rate of 5% p.a from 6.4.2022 until date of full satisfaction (date of payment out of the Fund) 33.01 per day Erroneous Payments [128] From the POJ email dated 13.9.2023, it would appear that POJ had used the conversion rate of USD1=RM4.7900 as at 21.8.2023 for all the USD claims including the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default notwithstanding the express stipulations in the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. [129] It is also confirmed that POJ had also used the conversion date as at 21.8.2023 for the claims in CNY and GBP. [130] Also, in respect of the pre-judgment and post-judgment interests on the Suit 11 Judgment in Default and Suit 21 Judgment in Default, interests at 5% p.a. were imposed over the sum in USD and not in RM. [131] Not only were the wrong conversion date used for the foreign currency, POJ had also over paid a sum of RM 185,416.49 in excess of the Fund. It is trite that the payments to the claimants to the Fund are limited by the quantum representing the Fund. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 89 [132] All the aforesaid errors necessarily mean that the payments made to SD by POJ pursuant to the Order of Priorities and Payment Out were not properly made in accordance with the law. As such, this Court will make the appropriate orders to regularise the payments. To my mind, there can be no doubt that this Court has the jurisdiction to do so. [133] Before concluding and for completeness, during oral submissions, it was highlighted that there was prepared by the Sheriff as to the details of payment out on the sums due to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Order of Priorities and Payment Out. [134] Although not specifically provided for under O 70 of our Rules of Statement and it is unfortunate that this was not done in this case. the present case. [135] As regards the sum of RM 185,416.49, SD clarified at a further hearing subsequent to the main oral hearing of Enclosure 520 that the total sums that SD had received from POJ did not in fact exceed the Fund (RM20,802,988.49) if the sum of RM520,099.71 that had previously been paid out to the Sheriff and the sum of 145,460.00 paid to Messrs Shaikh David are not considered. However, SD conceded that the sum of RM 185,416.49 demanded by POJ to be refunded is in fact a sum that is over and above the balance of the Fund available at the material times for payment to them. On this ground, SD intimated that it was prepared to make the refund of the sum. S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 90 [136] Before concluding and making my orders in respect of Enclosure 520, I need to further state that the payment out of the Fund in the present case should have been made to the claimants in the local currency and such payments ought not to have been converted into the foreign currencies as requested by SD which had resulted in POJ having to bear the costs for the conversion. Conclusion [137] Based on my above analysis and findings, I hereby make the following orders: a) that the RM equivalent conversion rate for the payment of USD 1,731,366.42, CNY 529,468.14 and GBP 2,560.00 out of the proceeds of sale of the Vessel be the date of the Order of Priorities and Payment Out, namely on 20.3.2023; b) that the RM equivalent conversion rate for the payment of USD 117,608.02 and USD 58,442.03 in Suit 21 and USD 365,839.85 and USD 1,615,512.28 in Suit 11 be 20.4.2021 and 9.2.2021 respectively; c) that the pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at 5% p.a. that are adjudged in Suit 21 and Suit 11 be computed based on the RM equivalent amounts as stated in the respective Writs and Statements of Claim thereto. The computation is as set out in paragraph 127 above; S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 91 d) that Messrs Shearn Delamore to refund to the Court all excess payments made on 21.8.2023 forthwith after computing the correct sums payable based on the conversion rates as ordered herein. The sum refunded after deducting the RM 185,416.49 (which shall be paid back to PJO) shall be kept by the Court for payments to all the pari passu claimants under the Order of Priorities and Payment Out; e) costs of this application to be borne by the Plaintiffs fixed at RM 25,000.00 subject to allocator. f) there be liberty to apply. Dated the 8th day of December 2023 ONG CHEE KWAN Judge of the High Court of Malaya High Court of Kuala Lumpur, NCC2 Counsel: 1. Nik Azila Shuhada together with Mr. Tong Wei Hang and Ms. Ong Tze Xian for Plaintiffs / 1st and 2nd Interveners Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) 2. Mr. Lionel Noel for Defendant Messrs. T S Oon (Kuala Lumpur) S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 92 3. Mr. Jeremy Mark A/L Joseph Jayaraj S. together with Ms. Vinodhini Benjamin Samuel and Mr. Matthew Jerome van Huizen for 3rd Intervener Messrs. Joseph & Partners (Kuala Lumpur) Case Reference: 1. Miliangos v George Frank (Textile) Limited [1976] AC 443 2. Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Tab 5 Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1 3. Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 4. Hock Hua Bank v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 5. Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 237 6. New Kok Ann Realty Sdn Bhd v Development & Commercial Bank Ltd, New Hebrides (In Liquidation) [1987] 1 MLJ 57 7. Miliangos v George Frank (Textile) Limited [1976] AC 443 8. In Re P Suppiah (Tara Rajaratnam, Judgment Creditor) [1989] 2 MLJ 479 9. Re Dynamics Corporation of America [1976] 1 W.L.R. 757 10. Owners of the mv Eleftherotria v Owners of the mv Despina R; The Despina R, [1977] 3 All ER 874 11. Dilingham Corporation Canada Ltd v. The Ship Shinyu Maru [1980] 1 FC 303 12. [1998] 6 MLJ 492 13. Inter Diam Pte Ltd v PJ Diamond Centre Sdn Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 189 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 93 14. [1998] MLJU 55 Legislation Reference: 1. Companies Act 1948 2. Section 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 3. Order 90 rules 6 and 12(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 4. O 70 of our Rules of Court 2012 S/N qo7CPMVFvUmY8OZfi5hx5w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

JA-A52NCvC-73-04/2023

PLAINTIF MELIN SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN NORIZAM BIN TUKIMAN

Permohonan di bawah Aturan 42, Kaedah 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012- Aturan 1A dan Aturan 3 - Aturan 12 Kaedah 5 (1) - pemfailan di luar masa- tiada penjelasan kelewatan- tiada kebenaran mahkamah memasukkan kehadiran selepas penghakiman ingkar kehadiran diperolehi

08/01/2024

Tuan Mohd Zaki bin Mohd Salleh

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d90bda08-623b-4287-abe2-6418eb777306&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: JA-A52NCvC-73-04/2023 ANTARA MELIN SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 201801046539 (1308571-M)) … PLAINTIF DAN NORIZAM BIN TUKIMAN (No. K/P: 810417-01-5123) … DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Permohonan Defendan di Kandungan 9 iaitu Permohonan Pengenepian Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran di Kandungan 7 di bawah Aturan 42, Kaedah 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012) A. PENGENALAN 1. Plaintif memfailkan Writ Saman (Kandungan 1) dan Pernyataan Tuntutan (Kandungan 2) pada 20 April 2023. Kertas-kertas kausa adalah seperti berikut - a) Afidavit Penyampaian Plaintif yang diikrarkan oleh Fazli Bin Bahari pada 19 Mei 2023 (Kandungan 4); b) Perakuan ketidakhadiran bertarikh 26 Mei 2023 (Kandungan 5); c) Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran 29 Mei 2023 (Kandungan 7); d) Memorandum Kehadiran Defendan bertarikh 7 Julai 2023 (Kandungan 8); e) Notis Permohonan Defendan di Kandungan 9 iaitu Permohonan Pengenepian Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran bertarikh 12 Julai 2023 (Kandungan 9); 08/01/2024 12:39:09 JA-A52NCvC-73-04/2023 Kand. 30 S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 f) Afidavit Sokongan Defendan yang diikrarkan pada 12 Julai 2023 (Kandungan 10); g) Afidavit Balasan Plaintif yang diikrarkan Chang Geok Huat pada 27 Julai 2023 (Kandungan 12); h) Afidavit Balasan Defendan yang diikrarkan pada 9 Ogos 2023 (Kandungan 13); i) Afidavit Tambahan Plaintif yang diikrarkan Chang Geok Huat pada 11 Ogos 2023 (Kandungan 14); 2. Pada 11 September 2023, Mahkamah ini telah menolak Kandungan 9 dengan kos sebanyak RM2000.00. Defendan tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan tersebut telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru yang bertarikh 19 September 2023 dan sekarang ini Mahkamah ini menyatakan alasan menolak permohonan defendan seperti di Kandungan 9. B. LATAR BELAKANG RINGKAS KES 3. Plaintif mendakwa Defendan telah gagal membayar sejumlah wang melibatkan satu penghakiman persetujuan. Lanjutan itu, Plaintif telah memfailkan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan di Mahkamah pada 20 April 2023. 4. Melalui Afidavit Penyampaian Plaintif oleh Fazli Bin Bahari yang diikrarkan pada 19 Mei 2023 (Kandungan 4) telah menjelaskan bahawa satu surat iringan Pegumacara Plaintif bertarikh 05.05.2023 telah dihantar bersama writ saman dan S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif tersebut ke alamat-alamat terakhir Defendan di Senai, Johor dan juga di Kulai Jaya, Johor melalui Pengeposan A.R. Berdaftar dan secara Sijil Akuan Mengepos. 5. Memandangkan Defendan telah gagal untuk memasuki kehadirannya dalam tempoh masa empat belas (14) hari, Plaintif telah memperolehi satu (1) Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran terhadap Defendan pada 29.05.2023 (Kandungan 7). 6. Tindakan Defendan ialah memfailkan Memorandum Kehadiran Defendan yang bertarikh 7 Julai 2023 (Kandungan 8) dan seterusnya Notis Permohonan Defendan di Kandungan 9 iaitu Permohonan Pengenepian Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran bertarikh 12 Julai 2023. C. ANALISA MAHKAMAH 7. Plaintif telah membangkitkan Bantahan Awalan bahawa Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran yang direkodkan terhadap Defendan hanya boleh diketepikan oleh Defendan dalam tempoh masa tiga puluh (30) hari selepas Defendan menerima Penghakiman tersebut. Aturan 42 Kaedah 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memperuntukkan – “Kecuali sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan selainnya dalam Kaedah-kaedah ini, jika peruntukan dibuat dalam Kaedah-kaedah ini untuk mengetepikan atau mengubah apa-apa perintah atau penghakiman, suatu pihak yang berniat untuk mengetepikan S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 atau mengubah perintah atau penghakiman itu hendaklah membuat suatu permohonan kepada Mahkamah dan menyampaikannya kepada pihak yang telah mendapat perintah atau penghakiman itu dalam tiga puluh hari selepas perintah atau penghakiman itu diterima olehnya.” 8. Dapatan Mahkamah ini secara amat jelas ialah Plaintif telah menyerahkan Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran kepada Defendan pada 11.06.2023 (eskhibit CGH-5 Afidavit Tambahan Plaintif di Kandungan 14) dan Defendan hanya memfailkan Notis Permohonan tersebut pada 12.07.2023, dimana ia telah melebihi tempoh tiga puluh (30) hari. 9. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujah oleh Plaintif iaitu bahawa prinsip dalam otoriti Mahkamah Rayuan Ng Han Seng & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn. Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 647 kini tidak boleh digunapakai berdasarkan kepada prinsip dalam otoriti Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu di dalam kes Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj v Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor [2009] 4 CLJ 329 yang secara jelasnya memutuskan bahawa peruntukkan mandatori tidak boleh dilanjutkan masa di bawah Aturan 1A dan Aturan 3 Kaedah 5, KKM 2012. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah ini menerima bantahan awalan pihak Plaintif. 10. Seterusnya, dapatan mahkamah ini juga bahawa tiada mana-mana alasan dikemukakan oleh defendan bagi menerangkan kelewatan memfailkan Kandungan 9. Adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa dalam prosiding interlokutori sebegini mahkamah hanya bergantung kepada “affidavit evidence” dan apabila ianya S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 tiada atau tidak diterangkan secara jelas, maka mahkamah ini tiada apa-apa perlu dipertimbangkan. Bukannya tidak berlaku adil kepada defendan, tetapi defendan sendiri tidak mahu ianya diadili dengan tidak menerangkan mahupun mengadakan keterangan-keterangan yang sejati dan kukuh. Rujukan mahkamah ini ialah kepada kes – Sarkawi bin Sadijo (t/a Jojo’s Musical and Promotion House) v. BMG Music (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 515 at p.532 (para. E-F – “The weight to be attached to a statement of belief in an affidavit that depends upon sources and grounds other than the knowledge of the deponent will, of course, depend upon the nature of those sources and grounds. An original source will normally carry much more weight than an intermediate source, and where original sources are known, they must be identified. But it does not follow that intermediate sources cannot be referred to or relied upon. Ultimately, it must be for the court to weigh all the material in order to decide whether the applicant has made out his case for the interlocutory relief sought.” [Emphasis added]. 11. Selain dari dua alasan penolakan kandungan 9 yang disebut di atas iaitu pemfailan di luar masa dan tiada mana-mana alasan dikemukakan oleh defendan bagi menerangkan kelewatan , Mahkamah ini juga secara selamat mendapati Defendan gagal mematuhi Aturan 12 Kaedah 5 (1) Kaedah - Kaedah Mahamah 2012 yang memperuntukkan seseorang Defendan tidak boleh memasukkan kehadiran dalam suatu tindakan selepas penghakiman telah dimasukkan kecuali dengan kebenaran Mahkamah sepertimana diputuskan di dalam kes – kes – S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (a) Wan Mohd Sofian Bin Wan Md Saad v MBF Finance Bhd [2000] 1 CLJ 492; dan (b) Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad v Lim Beng Kooi [2016] AMEJ 2086. 12. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada Aturan 1A dan Aturan 2 Kaedah 3 Kaedah - Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bagi memulihkan keadaan pelanggaran yang telah berlaku terhadap Aturan 12 Kaedah 5 Kaedah - Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Pada hemat Mahkamah apa yang telah berlaku di dalam kes semasa gagal dipatuhi dengan jelas dan bukannya secara teknikal dan tidak boleh menjadikan Aturan 1A dan Aturan 2 Kaedah 3 Kaedah - Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 sebagai alasan sepertimana diputuskan di dalam kes Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al- Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor v Datuk Captain Hamzah bin Mohd Noor and another appeal [supra]. 13. Seterusnya Mahkamah ini merujuk di dalam kes Mohamed Suboh v Devadas [1980] 1 MLRA 395 diputuskan – “… I am of course not unmindful of the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Collins M.R. in Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1 which is aptly reproduced at the beginning of Mallal's Supreme Court Practice as follows: Although a court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, the relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress; and the court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case. S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 The observations of Lord Collins are certainly not meant to excuse recalcitrant litigants who have scant respect for the rules of procedure. The rules are there to be followed and they may be relaxed in the interest of justice only if sufficient cause is shown. To what extent will non-compliance with any rule of procedure affect the proceedings must depend on the kind of rule involved. I can think of four categories of the rules. First the rules which are minor or technical. Non-compliance with such rules will not vitiate the proceedings. In the second category are those rules which prescribe periods of time within which to file and deliver pleadings or other documents in civil proceedings. Extension of time is generally granted in such a case on terms if the granting of the extension does not put the other party to the proceedings at any disadvantage. The third category of rules are those which must be strictly complied with before a person can obtain any relief in court. Order 14 is a good example of this category of rules...” D. KESIMPULAN 14. Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan alasan-alasan seperti dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah ini menolak permohonan defendan di Kandungan 9 dengan kos sebanyak RM2000.00. Bertarikh pada 8 haribulan Januari 2024 ..tt.. (MOHD ZAKI BIN MOHD SALLEH) Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Sivil 5 Mahkamah Negeri Johor S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Kaunsel: a) Bagi pihak Plaintif – Z.N. Chong, T/n Tia & Noordin (MASAI, JOHOR) Peguambela & Peguamcara b) Bagi pihak Defendan – Mohd Nizam, T/n Sheffie & Partners (KUALA LUMPUR), Peguambela & Peguamcara S/N CNoL2Ttih0Kr4mQY63dzBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-156-04/2021

PLAINTIF CENTRAL SUGARS REFINERY SDN BHD DEFENDAN HOLSTEN MARKETING (M) SDN BHD

Sale of goods – sugar local supply contract – credit limit and credit term – written approval of credit limit by Chief Financial Officer – whether any oral agreement of Head of Sales Department to increase credit limit by more than 3 times – analysis and assessment of evidence – whether allegation of oral agreement consistent with contemporaneous documents – whether allegation of oral agreement consistent with conduct of parties – parallel stipulation of credit limit and credit term – effect – continued supply of sugar for short time after credit limit exceeded – whether evidence of oral agreement to increase credit limit – export contract – payment before delivery – whether waiver of payment term – whether any obligation to deliver when there is no payment made.

08/01/2024

YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2f107fd2-19fc-4af7-8ecc-d867ede7863d&Inline=true

1 THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: BA-22NCvC-156-04/2021 _________________________________________________________ BETWEEN CENTRAL SUGAR REFINERY SDN BHD (COMPANY NO. : 99042-W) … PLAINTIFF AND HOLSTEN MARKETING (M) SDN BHD (COMPANY NO. : 680066-W) … DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT (After Full Trial) Introduction 1. This is trial of the Defendant/Holsten’s counterclaims after this Court previously granted summary judgment on 4.1.2022 to the Plaintiff for the unpaid value of sugar sold in the amount of RM1,255,125.00. The execution of the entire judgment sum was stayed pending the trial of the Defendant’s counterclaims. There is no appeal against the summary judgment dated 4.1.2022. [see the Summary Judgement dated 4.1.2022 in Enclosure 37] 2. When granting the summary judgment with stay, this Court pursuant to O.34 of ROC 2012 also directed that the counterclaims be tried on the following main issues: 08/01/2024 15:02:07 BA-22NCvC-156-04/2021 Kand. 118 S/N 0n8QL/wZ90qOzNhn7eeGPQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (1) export sugar. (2) The Plaintiff/CSR was not in breach of any supply obligation in the circumstances of the present case. (3) In the circumstances, Holsten has not specifically proved its counterclaim for special damages in respect of the export sugar. 3. In conclusion, this Court dismisses the Defendant/Holsten’s counterclaims with costs. 4. After hearing the further submissions of the parties’ respective counsel on quantum of cots, costs of the counterclaim action are assessed at RM80,000, subject to allocator, and shall be payable by the Defendant/Holsten to the Plaintiff/CSR. Dated this : 3rd January 2024 Signed ….…................................................................ TEE GEOK HOCK JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM (NCVC 10) S/N 0n8QL/wZ90qOzNhn7eeGPQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 To the parties’ solicitors: 1. For the Plaintiff : Suaran Singh & Chow Xing Hui Messrs Law Partnership (Kuala Lumpur) 2. For the Defendant : Sivashankar Messrs R Kengadharan & Co. (Petaling Jaya) S/N 0n8QL/wZ90qOzNhn7eeGPQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aA—22m:vc—15s—oa/2021 Kand. 115 L3,'I_IC'IA~' 17 :2-III ms HIGH COUHY or MALAVA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE sun: or SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN. MALAVSIA CIVIL sun No: BA-22NDtC-I55-D4/2021 BETWEEN CENTRAL susnn HEFINERV sou BHD (COMFANV NO. : 99042-w) PLAINTIFF AND HoLs1EM MARKEYING (M) sun EHD (COMFANV NO. : saaassw) DEFENDAN GROUNDS or JUDGEMENT (Alter Full man Introduction 1. ms Is mal uHhe I)eIenaarII/HuIsIerI's cmm|erc\aIms alter IrIIs Cmm pre\IIaI.IsIy gvanled summavy Iuagmem an 4.1 2u22 In me FIaIrIIIII (or me unpald vame aI sugar sum In me amount at FIMI 255.125 no The execuuan aI me enure Iuagmem sum was stayed pendmg me mal cf me I)eIem1arIrs cmmterc\aIms, TIIeIe Is na appeeI agamsl me summavy Iuugmem daIed 4 1.2022. [see me Summavy .JudgemenI dated 4.1 2u22 In Enclosuve 37] 2. when granung IIIe summeIyIImgmenI mm sIayI IIIIs Cnun pursuam (0 0.34 an ROG 2oI2 also dIYEC|ed IIIaI IIIe emmIeIcIeIms be med an IIIe Iufluwmg mam Issues. 1 SIN nnanuwznnaozunnv-zero ‘Nat: s.II.I Mamba! WIH be H544 M mvv be DVWIHMVIY m VHS nnmmanl M AFILINC WVLII m expcm sugar. {2} The Plamhll/CSR was no| m breach al any supp\y obhgatmn m me cm:ums|am:es 0! me presem case rap In me curcumslances. Hmsten has nal specmcauy preveu us eeunrercxarm var spemal damages H1 respecr al me expnn sugar 3. In concmsmm W5 Caurl ersmrsses me DelendanIIHnlsten's eeunnercxarms wuh costs. 4. Afler neanng me lurther sunmrssrens oi |he pames respecluve counsel en quantum oi cats, casts al \he eounrercxamr acuan are assessed ar RM80,DDD. sub]ec| |a aHacatnr, and shall be payable by \he Delendant/Hols\en re \he Flamm/CSR Dated nhrs . 3" January 2u2A Signed TEE GEOK HOCK JUDGE HVGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM (NCVC 10) To me pames suncnors 1. 2. For me P\a\nu!l For me Delendanl : Suaran Sing?! :2. Chew Xmg Hm Messrs Law Farlnevshnp (Kua\a Lumpur) Swashankar Messrs R Kengadharan 3. Co. (Peiahng Jaya)

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

W-03(IM)-63-10/2020

PERAYU peninsular home sdn bhd RESPONDEN Ko Lim Tristar Sdn Bhd

Assessment of damages-Appellate intervention-Loss of profits-Gross rental for loss of use-Deductions to be applied-Reliance on valuation report

08/01/2024

YA Datuk See Mee ChunKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Sri Mariana binti Haji YahyaYA Datuk See Mee Chun

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: W-03(IM)-63-10/2020 ANTARA PENINSULAR HOME SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 776827-K) … PERAYU DAN KO LIM TRISTAR SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 653022-A) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur Saman Pemula No: S (22) 24-2644-2007 Dalam perkara proforma-proforma jual beli bertarikh 4.10.2007 dan pelaksanaan perjanjian jual beli Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi, 1980 Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 11, 18 dan 41 Akta Relif Spesifik, 1950 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 37 Kaedah 1, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA KO LIM TRISTAR SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 653022-A) … PLAINTIF DAN PENINSULAR HOME SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 776827-K) … DEFENDAN] 08/01/2024 15:30:38 W-03(IM)-63-10/2020 Kand. 63 S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM LEE SWEE SENG, JCA MARIANA BINTI HAJI YAHYA, JCA SEE MEE CHUN, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court Judge (HCJ) who on 23-9-2020 affirmed the assessment and award of damages by the Deputy Registrar (DR) given on 22-1-2019. [2] After having heard and considered the submissions of both parties, we allowed the appeal in part and set aside the assessment of damages of the HCJ and DR. We now give our reasons for doing so. [3] The parties will be referred to as in the High Court. Parties and background facts [4] The Plaintiff who is the Respondent here, is the purchaser of 22 units (the units) of a development in Tower A of Menara UOA, Bangsar (the premises). The units are located on the 19th, 20th and 22nd floors of the premises. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] The Defendant who is the Appellant here, is the developer for the premises, which comprises 2 office blocks and a podium for retail spaces. [6] After the execution of the booking form on 4-10-2007, a dispute arose between parties. This resulted in the Plaintiff commencing action against the Defendant for specific performance and damages. In the Liability Proceedings, the High Court on 25-5-2012 ordered the specific performance of the sale of the units to the Plaintiff by the execution of Sales and Purchase Agreements (S&Ps) and that damages be assessed. The Defendant’s appeal on liability to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 25-6-2013 and its application for leave to the Federal Court was dismissed on 19-11-2013. [7] The Defendant executed the S&Ps for the units in favour of the Plaintiff on 18-3-2014. [8] The Plaintiff then filed the application of assessment of damages (Assessment Proceedings) which proceeded by way of affidavits. [9] The damages awarded was RM7,234,457.46. Submissions of the Defendant (Appellant) [10] It was submitted by the Defendant that in a breach of contract, the Plaintiff can claim for damages for either loss of profit or loss of expenditure. Here, the Plaintiff was claiming for loss of profit from January 2010 (the date the Defendant ought to have delivered vacant possession) until 17-3-2014 (the date the Plaintiff actually received vacant S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 possession). This was in essence a claim for loss of gross revenue and not loss of profit. [11] It was submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the fact and the amount of loss and that the loss of revenue cannot be equated to loss of profit. The costs and expenditure such as service and maintenance charges, and other costs related to the premises, bank interest for the financing of the purchase of the premises and income tax payable on the profit, should have been deducted. [12] Further the reliance on the Raine Horne Zaki Report (RHZ Report) as the basis for the amount of rental income between 2010 to 2014 was flawed. This was because there was no data, documents and/or comparison of the area in the vicinity with the premises. There was no valuation for 2010 where the Plaintiff assumed that the rent for 2010 would be the same as 2011. There was also no basis to calculate the rental income based on 100% occupancy. [13] There was a further flaw on the calculation of the time period. The deposit had been paid on 4-10-2007 such that if the S&Ps had been signed in 2007, vacant possession (VP) would be 36 months on 3-10- 2010. The period for loss of rental income should start from 3-10-2010 and not January 2010. The computation too should not end at 17-3-2014. Submissions of the Plaintiff (Respondent) [14] It was submitted that it was an undisputed fact that the units are commercial units to be used solely for business purposes. The Plaintiff is a property investment company as evident from its Memorandum of S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Association. The purpose for the purchase of the units was to generate rental returns and income. It was foreseeable and within the contemplation of parties on the purpose of the purchase. [15] The Defendant had acknowledged and adopted the same period for assessment and what was at variance was only the rental rates. [16] No appellate interference was warranted on quantum. Further an appellate court should not reverse the concurrent findings of the DR and HCJ, save for in the most exceptional circumstances. Reference was made to Goo Sing Kar v Dato Lim Ah Chap & Ors [2013] 3 MLJ 374 [CA] and Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 [FC]. [17] Damages in cases involving the deprivation of property are not subject to deductions as the principle is that the Plaintiff should be entitled to receive a reasonable rental value of the units. [18] The Defendant had not adduced any evidence through an independent and professional valuation such that the DR and HCJ were correct to accept the Plaintiff’s RHZ Report. The RHZ Report had been prepared with the necessary investigation and took into account the prevailing market condition of similar properties in the locality and vicinity of the premises. The RHZ Report had given a range of rental whereby the Plaintiff had taken the lesser rate in the range. The Defendant’s own exhibited documents support the lesser rental rates. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Our decision [19] The appeal concerns the issue of quantum of damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff for the deprivation of the use of the units. [20] At the outset, we note that there are no grounds prepared by the DR or the HCJ on the order of assessment of damages. [21] We start with addressing the Plaintiff’s submission that as the subject matter of the appeal concerns the quantum of damages and given the concurrent findings of the DR and HCJ, an appellate court ought not to reverse such findings, except in the most exceptional circumstances. Two authorities were cited to support this proposition. [22] The first case was Goo Sing Kar at pages 385-387: “[29] Two preliminary matters require to be stated at the outset. First, the subject matter of the appeal concerned damages and its quantum, and therefore the principle that the court will be disinclined to reverse the finding of the trial judge as to the amount of damages should apply. The findings of the trial judge should not be reversed merely because the appellate court might be of the opinion that if they had tried the case at first instance they would have given a lesser sum. … ... [32] Thus, for the appellant to succeed he must show either (a) the trial judge has acted on some wrong principle of law, or (b) the trial judge has made an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages in the sense that it is so extremely high or so very small. [33] The second preliminary matter concerned concurrent findings. On the facts of this appeal, there were concurrent findings of the deputy registrar and S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 the High Court judge, and again I took note of the general principle, established by the Court of Appeal, that save in the most exceptional circumstances, the Court of Appeal will not upset concurrent findings. In Milik Perusahaan Sdn Bhd & Anor v Kembang Masyur Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 6, for instance, this court has held as follows: … it is a general principle upon which this court acts that save in most exceptional circumstances, concurrent findings of fact will not be gone into by us. But that is not to say that an appeal of this nature will never succeed. If the appellant can sufficiently demonstrate to a conviction that a serious error of principle has occurred in both the lower tiers of the High Court, this court will have no hesitation; and indeed we are duty- bound to correct the resultant error (at p 12 of the report) [34] On the facts of this present appeal, we found that the appellant had failed to demonstrate to that degree of conviction required by this general principle that there had been any serious error of principle on the part of the High Court judge when he heard the appeal from the assessment of damages by the deputy registrar.” [23] The second case was Topaiwah at page 285: “Or another way of putting it – that it is a matter of assessment but not of calculation. So far as this court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer L.J. in Flint Levell [1935] 1 KB 354 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [24] We certainly agree with the legal proposition advanced that where the appeal concerns quantum of damages, we should be slow to reverse the concurrent findings of the DR and HCJ, except where there are exceptional circumstances. [25] It is trite that an appeal to this Court is by re-hearing as per section 69 Courts of Judicature Act 1964. This Court may draw inferences of fact, and give any judgment, and make any order which ought to be have been given or made, and make such further or other orders as the case requires. We are therefore entitled to look at the entire evidence and make the necessary assessment. [26] In this regard, the Assessment Proceedings proceeded by way of affidavits. [27] In a breach of contract, the Plaintiff can claim for loss of profit or loss of expenditure as damages. This is made clear in Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Ng Bak Guan [2003] 1 LNS 522. Loss of profit premised on loss of rental [28] It is not disputed that the Plaintiff here is claiming for loss of profit by relying on loss of rental. [29] In the Affidavit in Support (encl. 50/26-33), the Plaintiff has relied on the Raine Horne Zaki (RHZ) Report as in exhibit “OPN-5” to form the basis of its loss of rental income and the calculation thereof (paragraph 9). The RHZ Report is for the period 2011 to 2014 and for 2010 the Plaintiff is S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 proceeding on the basis that the rent for 2010 is the same for 2011 (paragraphs 10 and 12). [30] In paragraph 12 too is set out the rental computation loss as follows: Jumlah kaki persegi Hartanah tersebut Kadar Sewa Pasaran 2010 (RM5.50 kaki persegi) x 12 bulan Kadar Sewa Pasaran 2011 (RM5.50 kaki persegi) x 12 bulan Kadar Sewa Pasaran 2012 (RM5.50 kaki persegi) x 12 bulan Kadar Sewa Pasaran 2013 (RM6.00 kaki persegi) x 12 bulan Kadar Sewa Pasaran 2014 (RM6.50 kaki persegi) x 76 hari (1.1.2014 – 17.3.2014) 25,274 1,668,084-00 1,668,084-00 1,668,084-00 1,819,728-00 410,477-46 The total loss of rental income is RM7,234,457.46 (paragraph 13). [31] The above shows that the Plaintiff has adduced evidence for loss of rental revenue which does not amount to loss of profit. This means that the Plaintiff has to prove the profit which it would have made from the rental of the premises and not merely the total rental income that it would have received. This means that in order to generate the revenue in the form of rental, there has to be costs and expenditure expended. It cannot be the gross rental as was awarded. [32] Support for this proposition can be found in Ismail v Haji Taib [1972] 1 LNS 47 where the Federal Court stated: “As regards damages, as has already been stated the plaintiff claimed both special damages and general damages. Under special damages he claimed a sum of $1,224, the proceeds at $85 per kuncha of the padi which he estimated he would have harvested less the amount of padi he would have had to give the landlord by way of rent. The trial president allowed this claim though there was no evidence to show that the estimate was reasonable. Even if the estimate was reasonable, the plaintiff should not have been awarded the full sum S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 claimed ($1,224), because there should be deducted from it what he would have had to spend on producing the estimated amount of padi. …” (emphasis added) [33] There is further a decision of this Court in Sime UEP Properties Bhd v Woon Nyoke Lin [2002] 3 CLJ 719 at page 740: “It is clear from the authorities that in order to succeed in claims for damages for loss of profit one must establish the actual losses one would have suffered as a result of the breach. A projection as in this case is not sufficient to establish the would be losses of profit. A venture into a business would not necessarily mean that one can make a profit out of it because there are instances where people suffer losses. Not all businesses end up with a profit. It is clear to us that the respondent failed to establish the expected losses as a result of the breach. (emphasis added) [34] The Plaintiff had relied on a decision of this Court in Othman bin Ali & 290 Ors v Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 708 that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages measured by reference to rental and it need not have suffered actual loss and irrespective of whether it could have rented out the units. It was said at pages 718-719: “[31] It was undeniable that in a normal case where once a trespass to land or a deprivation of use of land had been established, the normal measure of damages to be applied would be the actual proof of ‘loss of rental’ or a reasonable estimation of such a ‘rental return’ that was directly attributable and flowing from a lawful use of the land but denied by that wrongful action. This was consistent with the two underlying basic principles in law which required S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 that any damages awarded would, so far as money can, put the affected or deprived party in the same position as he would have been if the tort had not occurred subject to the further overriding consideration that such damages to be awarded was in any event not too remote or speculative in nature. [32] In Inverugie Investments v Hackett [1995] 3 All ER 841,the Privy Council opined (in an appeal from the Bahamas Court of Appeal) that although the plaintiff might not have suffered any actual loss by being deprived of the use of property, he was still entitled to recover a reasonable rent for the wrongful use of his property by the trespasser, and similarly, even if the trespasser might not have derived any actual benefit from the use of the property, he was still obliged to pay a reasonable ‘rent’ for the benefit or use he enjoyed based on what has been termed as the ‘user principle’. Lord Lloyd of Berwick delivering the advice said as follows: … of the landlord of residential property, can recover damages from a trespasser who has wrongfully used his property whether or not he can show that he would have let the property to anybody else, and whether or not he would have used the property himself. The point is well expressed by Megaw LJ in Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 All ER 240 at p 242; [1979] 1 WLR 285at p 288 as follows: It appears to me to be clear, both as a matter of principle and of authority, that in a case of this sort of the plaintiff, when he has established that the defendant has remained on as a trespasser on residential property, is entitled, without bringing evidence that he could or would have let the property to someone else in the absence of the trespassing defendant, to have as damages for the trespass the value of the property as it would fairly be calculated; and, in the absence of anything special in the particular case it would be the ordinary letting value of the property that would determine the amount of damages. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 It is sometimes said that these cases are an exception to the rule that damages in tort are compensatory. But this is not necessarily so. It depends how widely one defines the ‘loss’ which the plaintiff has suffered. As the Earl of Halsbury LC pointed out in Mediana (owner) v Comet (owners), The Mediana [1900] AC 113 at p 117; [1900–3] All ER Rep 126 at p 129, it is no answer for a wrongdoer who has deprived the plaintiff of his chair to point out that he does not usually sit in it or that he has plenty of other chairs in the room. ...” [35] The aforesaid paragraph 31 of Othman bin Ali states that where deprivation of use of land is established, the normal measure of damages is “actual proof of loss or rental” or “a reasonable estimation of such a rental return” (emphasis is ours). It is not stated anywhere that there is no need for actual loss or renting out. [36] It is only in paragraph 32 that it is stated that “although the plaintiff might not have suffered any actual loss by being deprived of the use of property, he was still entitled to recover a reasonable rent for wrongful use of his property by the trespasser” (emphasis is ours). This is with reference to a landlord-trespass situation which is not our case here. [37] The Plaintiff can indeed claim for loss of profit but not loss of revenue, which is the essence of its claim. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim the entire gross rental without having to bear the corresponding expenditures in relation to the premises. [38] While the measure of damages in deprivation of property may be reasonable rental value, this has to be subject to deductions that the Plaintiff would have to spend in order to produce the revenue as per Ismail v Haji Taib. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [39] Reference was also made to McGregor on Damages (15th edition) at paragraphs 911 and 914 at pages 581-582 as follows: “911 … More often he will have the property transferred to him late, either because the delay does not discharge the contract or he elects not to treat the delay does not discharge the contract or he elects not to treat the delay as a discharge, or because he forces the seller’s hand by successfully suing for a decree of specific performance. In such a situation the measure of damage is properly regarded as damages for delay. … 914 The normal measure of damages is the value of the of user of the land, which will generally be taken as its rental value, for the period from the contractual time for completion to the date of actual completion. This is so whether the delay is brought to an end by the voluntary action of an indolent seller or by a decree of specific performance against a recalcitrant seller. …” While the above passages may support the proposition that rental value is claimable, they do not go to the extent of saying that there need not be no actual loss. Raine Horne Zaki Report [40] The Raine Horne Zaki (RHZ) Report which is Exhibit “OPN-5” to the Affidavit in Support is to be found in encl. 23/138-151. Although we have referred to it as the RHZ Report, it is termed as a Certificate of Rental Valuation. Since the RHZ Report was relied upon by the Plaintiff and appears to be the basis for the DR and HCJ to award damages of RM7,234,457.46, we find it necessary to set it out in extenso at pages 140 and 141: S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [41] What follows next are photographs of the premises, namely the subject tower, the ground floor, the subject units and internal views (pages 142-151). [42] At paragraph 1, it was stated that “we confirm herewith that we have made our necessary investigations and taken into account the prevailing market condition of similar properties in this locality and in the vicinity of the subject property”. However, nothing else was said as to what these investigations were, what the prevailing market condition of similar properties were, where exactly were these similar properties, where the words “in this locality and in the vicinity” are too general. We find that no explanation, details and analysis were given to support the rental range given. [43] At paragraphs 2 and 3, the basis of valuation is given. Paragraph 2 defines “market rental value” in general terms. Paragraph 3 then states: “Our valuation is on the basis that the tenant is responsible for internal repair and maintenance of the subject property whilst the landlord is responsible for quit rent assessment, insurance, major structural repairs, external repair and maintenance.” (emphasis added) [44] This means the RHZ Report itself stated that the Plaintiff as the landlord would be responsible for quit rent etc but these expenses were not deducted from the rental income claim made by the Plaintiff. [45] Other than that, there really was nothing for this Court to evaluate how the rental rate was arrived at. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [46] In addition, the RHZ Report did not state the rental income for 2010. There was no basis for the Plaintiff to assume that the rental for 2010 would be the same as for 2011. This was an assumption without a basis. [47] In Yap Boon Hwa v Kee Wah Soong [2019] 1 LNS 1157, this Court had occasion to say the following: “[75] The learned High Court Judge further relied on the Quantity Surveyor's Report to state that the Rawang Land Project is in actual fact a loss making project. However the learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the Quantity Surveyor had already confirmed that the Report was prepared based on the "SelangorKu" guidelines which has yet to come into force and only applicable for development of land less than 2 acres. Clearly, it is not applicable to the Rawang Land Project in ascertaining whether there is a loss. Whatever findings in the report would be inaccurate and inapplicable to the Rawang Land Project. The learned High Court Judge held that in the absence of any other comparables adduced by the 2nd plaintiff, the court has no other choice but to accept the Quantity Surveyor's Report. This, we found to be erroneous as it is always the burden on the claimant to prove his claim for damages with supporting evidence and credible valuation. It cannot be a situation where the defendant simply throws to the court any form of report or valuation which is not applicable to the case in question, especially in the present case, where the "SelangorKu" guidelines is not applicable and not enforced yet. The court cannot be forced to accept any kind of reports to satisfy the claims by the defendant despite such reports being unreliable as the basis is wrong and not applicable for development which is more than 2 acres. It is trite law that the burden is on the claimant to provide credible basis for his claim. (emphasis added) S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [48] Much earlier, the Supreme Court in United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Hing Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 31 at page 36 entirely agreed with a passage in the text book “The Identification of Handwriting and the Cross-examination of Experts” by MK Mehta as follows: “It is common failing in a number of experts that they do not clearly state their reasons on which they base their opinions while submitting the reports to the courts. The result is that the courts as well as the lawyers suffer from a distinct disadvantage. It is extremely difficult for them in such cases to test and verify the correctness of the opinions given. The mere opinion of the expert that a particular writing or signature is written or not written by the writer whose standard admitted writings or signatures were supplied to him for comparison, without any cogent reason, is not enough. The function of the expert is to give his honest opinion and place before the court all the data on which he bases his opinion, because it is the court who has to decide the case and accept or reject his opinion. In the absence of a clear and precise statement of his reasons, it is difficult for the court to appreciate the opinion of the expert. It is also not fair to the opposite side who is to cross-examine the expert on the correctness of his opinion. Any opinion given without stating the reasons is valueless and is of no use as evidence.” (emphasis added) [49] We are therefore of the considered opinion that the RHZ Report cannot be used as the basis of calculation of the rental income as it was lacking in analysis and details of how the calculation was arrived at. [50] The contention by the Plaintiff that the Defendant did not produce any independent and professional valuation meant the HCJ and DR were right to accept RHZ Report, is without merit. This is because this Court is not compelled to accept any kind of report where such report is unreliable S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 and without any basis. Further, the burden is always on the Plaintiff to provide credible basis for its claim. [51] The fact that the Plaintiff had used the lower end of the rental range in the RHZ Report does not negate the unreliability of the Report. The same goes for the contention that the Defendant’s exhibited documents supported the rental rates. [52] The RHZ Report proceeded on a rental income based on 100% occupancy. We find and agree with the Defendant that it is not probable for Menara UOA with 2 office towers and a combined space of 40 over floors to be 100% occupied within the first few years of VP. [53] Shorn of the RHZ Report, the Plaintiff has not produced any credible basis to support the rental rate which was its claim for damages. Damages to be awarded [54] Arising from the above, it behoves upon us to determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff rather than the RM7,234,457.46 awarded which was gross rental. [55] We find and agree with the Defendant that it is not probable for the rental income to be calculated on 100% occupancy and that deductions can be made for costs and expenditure expended. [56] The Defendant had correctly submitted that the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove its losses. The Defendant had taken upon itself to adduce documents to show the probable occupancy rate and the S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 deductions for maintenance charges and sinking fund, insurance, quit rent and assessment, water and fixed sewerage charges and financier interests at 5.75%. The documents for probable occupancy rate are in RR Vol 8/12, pages 77-101, Vol 9/12 page 103 and 106-156 and derived from the record of renovation deposits. We find there is indeed a co- relation between renovation work as reflected in the renovation deposits and occupancy. [57] According to the Defendant, based on the occupancy rate, the computation of the rental income for the premises would be RM4,046,285.49. [58] The documents for the tabulation of maintenance charges and sinking fund, insurance, quit rent and assessment, water and fixed sewerage charges for the premises are in RR Vol 8/12, pages 4-200 and Vol 9/12, pages 1-76. As may be recalled, the RHZ Report had stated that the Plaintiff as the landlord would have to be responsible for quit rent, assessment, insurance and maintenance. Further, these are outgoings in respect to a landlord’s obligation when renting out. [59] The documents for the financing costs are shown in RR Vol 10/12, pages 45-71 and Vol 9/12 pages 155 and 156. These are in respect of what the Plaintiff would have to pay as interest had it executed the S&Ps in 2007. [60] Contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertion, all the above are not self-serving documents but are supported by documents such as receipts for charges imposed, receipts for renovation approval, actual tenancy agreements and prevailing interest rate charged by commercial banks. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [61] As for the calculation of the time period, we find that the Defendant has used the same period for assessment as the Plaintiff’s, namely 1-1- 2010 to 17-3-2014. [62] In its written submissions dated 1-6-2023, the Defendant had submitted the following as loss of rental income after the necessary deductions: “Total estimate rental income (from 01.01.2010 – 17.03.2014) RM4,046,285.49 Less (i) Maintenance and sinking fund (RM 614,759.77) (ii) Insurance (RM 14,011.90) (iii) Quit Rent and Assessment (RM 194,409.61) (iv) Water and fixed sewerage charges (RM 12,965.72) Financier interests of 5.75% (RM4,071,007.55) Net rental profit/(loss) (RM 860,869.06) [63] We however find that in paragraph 19 of the Defendant’s Affidavit in Reply (2) affirmed on 19-3-2018 (encl. 17/71) that the Defendant had made a concession on the loss of profit that the Plaintiff could have made to be RM228,926.18. The relevant part reads as follows: “… menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif hanya akan menerima keuntungan sebanyak RM228,926.18 selama tempoh tersebut. Kini dikemukakan dan ditunjukkan kepada saya ditandakan sebagai Ekshibit “A-14” adalah sesalinan pengiraan tersebut.” S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [64] Exhibit “A-14” as found in encl. 27/73 shows the calculation as follows: [65] This amount also factors in the deduction in respect of the tax payable on the rental income, which is again an expenditure. [66] We must always bear in mind that that the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff. Here the Defendant had made a concession on the loss of the profit which the Plaintiff could have made. The DR and HCJ had also given no reasons for accepting the figures and assumptions and for accepting the RHZ Report. Under the circumstances, where the appeal is a re-hearing, we have looked at the entire evidence and made the necessary assessment based on the affidavits. S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Conclusion [67] For the above reasons, we allow the appeal in part and set aside the assessment of damages of the HCJ and DR and allow judgment to be entered for RM228,926.18 at 5% interest per annum from 22-1-2019 which is the date of assessment of the DR. We award costs of RM20,000.00 to the Defendant, subject to allocatur. (SEE MEE CHUN) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated: 8-1-2024 Counsel for the Appellant: Joseph Ting (Alan Tan Fu Seng with him) Messrs Joseph Ting & Co Puchong, Selangor Counsel for the Respondent: Ong Kheng Leong (Jeyasingam Balasingam, Moses Mathew George & Hee Hooi Chun with him) Messrs Ghazi & Lim Kuala Lumpur S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Cases referred to: Goo Sing Kar v Dato Lim Ah Chap & Ors [2013] 3 MLJ 374 Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 [FC]. Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Ng Bak Guan [2003] 1 LNS 522 Ismail v Haji Taib [1972] 1 LNS 47 Sime UEP Properties Bhd v Woon Nyoke Lin [2002] 3 CLJ 719 Othman bin Ali & 290 Ors v Bukit Lenang Development Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 708 Yap Boon Hwa v Kee Wah Soong [2019] 1 LNS 1157 United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Hing Construction Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 31 Other sources referred to: McGregor on Damages (15th edition) Sweet & Maxwell Limited S/N sX7qEDDOk6W0clUuRR8xA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-22NCvC-150-11/2022

PLAINTIF TANG YOKE LIN DEFENDAN 1. ) LIM SENG CHIEW 2. ) Ch'ng Ewe Ghee 3. ) Lim Phaik Lean 4. ) Ch'ng Wei Ying

Full Trial – the Plaintiff claims that there is in effect a loan agreement with interest and that the sale and purchase agreement with the 1st Defendant is a sham in furtherance of an illegal moneylending transaction with the Plaintiff’s property being used as collateral for such transaction.Issues• Whether the sale and purchase agreement between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant dated 7th January 2019 was a sham to disguise an illegal moneylending transaction; and• If so, whether the 2nd to 4th Defendants are subsequent bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration.The Court finds that the sale and purchase agreement between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant dated 7th January 2019 was a sham to disguise an illegal moneylending transaction.The Court also finds that the 2nd to 4th Defendants are subsequent bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration of the said property and sheltered under the proviso under Section 340(3) of the National Land Code 1965.The Court allows the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ counterclaim and declares that the 2nd to 4th Defendants are the registered owners entitled to the full beneficial interest of the said property; andThe purchase price of RM1.4 million is to be paid to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors as per the sale and purchase agreement between the 1st Defendant and the 2nd to 4th Defendants whereby the 1st Defendant would be entitled to retain a sum of RM850,000.00 being the redemption sum he paid and the balance of RM550,000.00 to be paid to the Plaintiff through her solicitors.

08/01/2024

YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d5574247-8e4c-4451-abc3-2fbdecba1170&Inline=true

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originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N R0JX1UyOUUSrwy97LoRcA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N R0JX1UyOUUSrwy97LoRcA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N R0JX1UyOUUSrwy97LoRcA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N R0JX1UyOUUSrwy97LoRcA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1>A—22m:vc—15u—11/2u22 Kand. 124 22/01/20:: ,2'Eb 04 DALANI MAHKAMAN TINGGI DI PIILAU PINANG NEGERI PULAU PINANG GUAMAN SIVIL NO Ncvc-150-11/2022 ANTARA TANG VOKE LIN (N0. KIF: 690507-DB»5G2|l) ...PLA£NTlF DAN 1. LIM ssms CHIEW (NO. K/P: 730112-o7-5305) 2. cwuc EWE GMEE (N0. KIP: sewn-n1-sus) 3. LIM FNAJK LEAN (Nu. KIF: 300111-01-sun) 4. arms WEI VIMG (Mo. K/P2010101-01-sand) DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN sw wmx1uy0uusmy<z7mRcA me 1 Ms: W; Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm GROUNDS or JUDGIIENY lntro¢.1uc1|anlYhe claims [11 Trie Pisiriiiw was me previous regisiered mar oi a properly in PN 9266, Lai Na 3246, Seksyen i, Eandar Tarijarig Takong, Daerah Timur Laul‘ Negan Puiau Piriarig iriereiiianei reierraa ia as lhe“said pmper|y”] The Plaintiff irieri eriieied iriio a saie and pureriase agreerrieni an 7*" January 2019 arid me said properly was suesequemiy lIans1erred iri iris riama oiirie 1“ Dereridsrii Trie said propeny is currently registered in me riamas ol xria 2"’ lo 4"‘ Deiendariia pursuanlla me salaand purchase agraememdalad 16"‘ August 2022 between mam and the 1" Defendant This IS yet another case where (he Plaintiff is seeking to recover the sand pmperty on me Dasls mamie saie and purchase agreemeiiiwiiri me 1" Dalendanl is null and void as I! was in furlheranoe of an Hlegav merieylending lmnsamicin [21 niieiigri rier amended Statement of claim. irie Plairiim contends ma: mere was ari iuegai morieylandirig xrarisacnori wriereey a sum of RM47o,ooc.uu wiin irixaresx di RM23,5D0 00 per morim was agreed upon wmi sums bemg disbursed U.) me Hairiuirs husband's mmpany known as Lam Loong Prioia House Sdfl arid (rieieirianer ieierred in as -Lem Loong'). [:1 rrie Plairiiiii Further pieeds ireud and/ov misrepreeeriiaiioii arid mus seem a flecllralion men are is me Iegar owner er me said pmpeny and for me said pmpany |u be ragisiered iri her name on me basis IN R®(1UyOUUSrwyfi7mR:A vans z ai 51 we s.ii.i n-vihnrwm be used m mm i.. aiiaimiiu Mimi dnunvilnl wa nF\uNG WM! VI that the 1‘ Dafcndanfs maI:|i0n m IGSDSCI V1 (ha nun- delivery aflhsvacanl possessmn cilhe said pmperly by me Pnaumm vii that me 1* Defendanfs suhcmms did not ratam the 3% rexention sum and did not dawm lav the Stale mnsenl lees paid an benariolme Plairmfl m advance, and d that the 2"“ to A” Defendants are non subsequen| Dona nde Dulchasers lcrvamable wnswderanon Thu I“ Dofondanru Contention:/Suhmlillonl [12] TM 1" Duendam amends/sunmuvs as 6o\|ows' a man were u no wnuen man agmmam mu anry a sala and purchase agrsumant batwsen lha Pw-mm and me «- Delandant b. lhnl DNA Puma: Consultancy sdn Bhd was not named as a pany to me case. c the! the Plainmv pleaded rraud, mwsrwresonvallon, and oovluskm agamsi me 1- Delervdanl and DNA Pmmlar Consulmncy sdn Bhd but fuilsd In parlicmarlze Ihe alleged fraud, milrsnrasenlallan and collusion‘ ‘ sw wm\<1uyOuusmy‘a7mR:A me xx ms: «ms smm ...m.mn be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm a, lhat the Plamlm alleged conspiracy, fraud, nnsrepreeennauun and Ialsmcanon ov dowmems by me 1‘ Dehndanl and ms Lawyer. Mr. Mark Lwew but and not make Mr Mark new a party‘ a mal me sand pmperly us now charged lo Mahayan Banking Berhad there’ «er referred to as “MBB') by the 2'“ to 4'" Defendan1s(subsequenl vwners) um MBB was nol named as e pany f lhal the Plaumm had renewed mnsmerauan as her Voan m Hung Leung \s\amic Bank Eemad was rsdeemed eumplexem g. that to allow me Pminllfrs dam! wuu\d be unlalr and umusl enrichrnem, and n. that :2 was me Plamllfland hev husband who pamapaueu 171 a (ransacuon wmn Foo Kok Chang (M50 veierred In as“KC Foo“) wna was a broker var the 1" Decendam *" hmlnlonl [13] The 2"“ m 4* Dalendlnls oenuendslsubnms as vullows. a mat they are the subsequent hona Me purmaseus lor valuable consmeralwan and they have mdeleasnble mine to me sand properly pursuant nu the promo to section 340(3) anon Nlflovul Llnd Cod: 1935. IN Rwuuyfluusmymmfizn ms 11 M51 ‘Nata smm n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. nrighvnflly mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Annlylillboclllovi First Issue: whether the ule and gumllzse agreement between the Pialriufi and me I" Dchndant aeted 7°- Januag 2019 was a attain to disguise zi eg monlylending transaction The circumstances ieaoing |o iiie execulmn of the ailged sale and pun:hese agreement dated 7'” Jenuag zone and whether the same was susgiaious [14] in delemi 7" January 2019 is a sham in disguise or an iiiegai nierieyiending iransaciion, itie coiin wiii have ta examine the circurnstarioes surrounding itie enlaring n o such saie and purchase agreemenl and me eonduci or the Phnies to con suspicious circumstances which would negate me exisienee oi ii gen saia and purchase agreement in this regaru. irie Caurl oi Appeai decision In ueiirnooo bin oayuti v Ll ciiee Leone and enoniereppeai pizza] a IIILI 155 is inainictive as it heio ea ioiiws: wriemaritia said sale and purchase agieenienidaied er whether itiere are '(2)Whsnsi/er it was aiiageu xhai an agreerneni before Me com! was a sham ai-iu a Iabrlczlbori mm the iuijaar olcircumvsrllmg the law. it behaved the court to examine the external Bl/ld9l'IL‘e to see me pieces orine puma formed a conereni whoia The eoim had re In re ae I! warn unusual rearures in the a man: and examine the clmums I Ividnnco eueii as the eonduet altbn grriee tun ingqnr arouse susglclari (see para 211). IN nmiuyuuusmyaviam use is ofsl ‘Nuns Semi n-nherwm be used M mm ii. uflnineflly MIME dnunvilnl VI] eFiuNG WM! (Jun scrmlrvls/ng me mas-man um court was dumbound la shim: ma sum):-llghl cl consistency and cahnrenco and la in H mm were convndlcllona mu cfild out my in lxglanation No one /aclor was conclusive‘ but 17 when taken logelher mm were more queshons rarsed than [here were satisfying answers. then In all plababflrry me agreement was a sham and fabmtalron lo camouflage me real tvansacfion which, :1 allowed to prevafl, wauld contravene the law (see paras 214-215;. mm; unusual reamms, suspmaus urcumsrams, anomslres and aborral/an: m [ho Instant was appeals, when kuken together, strung/y nogatsd ma existence olany genuine SPA m each case and wowed the: me agreemams and related documents in each case were all a sham lo drsrracl aw denerva (ha anfovcemslvtaulholfly andlhs apps:/am In sacn case, on balance olprobab:/Mas. the rms Ivansactron was an Illegal money/ending Ivansacnon (see pass 50-54 L 215) " [15] smarxy, m Pnnnir Solvlm an Sinnliyah a. Anur v ran cm; Foo a. On [mu 7 MLJ 3:4. Evm\ Manene Peters JC (as Her Ladyshlp than was) held as follows “[34] In older to determine whuher mu aim is a sham It is gninem 3; note that the cam! agght to have rgyd to all the circumstance; both helm: and g1 pg gig of we nxtcutlon of Int lgruomonl IN fiwuuyfluusmyfivmfizn van: :4 m :2 Wu Sum ...m.. M“ be used m mm nu nvVmruH|:I mm; dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm (921 rne above /act: are suong mdicaxlans that vne parties nad nol rnrended (0 9/119! rnlo a sale and purchase Wreemenl but lnsresa, executed lna relevant documents 10 facJ'Il‘rare ma proporry lo as used as a socurtry for a man The sxsculron 119' the sgrsemam‘, Form 14A, letter seeklrlg Iedempllon sralarnenl /ronl HSBC and me CKHT forms (exnrbited at pp 104429 of Pan E ol the can), pornl 10 an Irresistible eorlc/usion lnal the agreernenz dated 4 May 2015 and omar docurnanls All ralalron to the same were a fagade lo a money Iendlng Iransactlon and, lnarerora, a snarn agreernem to dusk me rrue infenhbn or me pamas " [16] From the ablwemermuned cases, ll is clear lnal n ls incumbem an Ihis coun lo consider and examlrle lne urcumstances ham helm and an we lime ol me exewliall at me Sald sale and puronasa agveemult rncluding me oonduel al me pamx al lne rnalenal lune and venous conversallons mrdugn wnals/App messages and ma nepasll Iransaclml records la lumlerdelermlne whether there were unusual laalurae. susploldus clrmmslarlms, anomalles and abervslmns In lerms a! me sald agreenlenl [I7] In znls regard, ll ls lo be nalad mal ma l=larnnll pleads al paragraphs 5 la a cl ma amended slalemenl ul Clalm mal Lam Loang nas bommad a sum ol RM47o,ouu.oo lronn me 1" Delendnnl and/or DNA Premlercansullancy sdn Ehd wim an lma1asIolRM23,5D0.00 per monln. [la] II IS also me Plalnlllrs pleaded case (Hal Foo Kak Chang W“ a planner of DNA Pm consulranay Sdn End and lhal as ‘ slN fim\<1L1yOL1usrwy‘fl7la:R:A "-2 15 M 51 we s.n.l ...n.rwn as used m mm me mn.u-y urn. m.n.n VII nrlum v-mxl msmarauon for the moneylendmg agreemenl, DNA Prermsr oansuuanay Sdn End had prawded a Wash to me mainmra husband's company It \s also not duspuled that me address 01 DNA Premier Cnnsmlancy Sdll Blvd \s the same as the 1“ Defendant as refieded m Ihe sake and purchase agree-nem da|ed 7“ January 2019. [19] As to be background auaumswanoas Veadmg In Ihe lnan, the Plainmrs husband, Mr Wong Moon Hee (PW1| leslmed uunng examina|ion wn dtiel as mews ":2: Could yau clulfy to ma Nonoulablc Court mm happened In January 2919? In January 21119, / was approached by an agent who oilsrsd to land me a sum av RM 4 70,000 00 via wnacsapp. However, / was mu (0 charge a Place ol pmpeny known as belongmglo my we to [he Iendsr. Hun brhlly so: am mo mma on». loan agrumcnr IN wwuuyfluusmymmfizn man 15 am -uaa a.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. annmuu mm: dun-mm Va .nuNG pm The agreed loan sum between us was RM uaooaoa mm nmnllllx Inlmat of 5% amourmng la RM23,5OO 00. Having deducted me sum afRM7lJ,500 so as the savanna payment for the inlecesl‘ for ma mnnlh of January 201:7, February 2019 and March 21719 and the legal less 0/ Rrmooaoo [Sea Ousshon and Answer Nos. 5 and 7 o! the Vwness slalsmsnl WSPW—1[ [20] II ls not dlsputed that the sam Lam Locng had renewed on 9"- January 2019 a mlal sum olRM3a5,5au Do. In myvlsw, mus amount of RM:ss5,5oa nn reaelved by Lam Loang ls cleany oonslslem wnrl PW1 ‘s evldence (as well as a vvnalsApp D0nllelSallan)wfII19I was the balance from me RM41o,aon on anemaauclmg the above was mums’ lrlIeres1 and legal lees whlllng RME4,5D0.UU wmlsl me 1" Delendanl has pleaded that he had Dald a lunher sum cl RM115.000 no ln cash, no ervlderloe whatsoever was led to prove his and I would conclude man one only manles plld by me M Delendanl lo the Plalmill/Lam Loang was RM3a5,5nn an. [21] The Plainmrs husband (PW!) had lurlhev lasmlea mama had made paymenl lo: me mlerssl mcuneu lor me loan burmwad lmm me 1' Delendanl vla Fan Knk cheng and/or DNA Premler Consultancy Sdn Ehd PW1 lssflflad during examinallon ln chm as (allows IN fiwtlllycllusmymlnkzn Pig: n M52 Nuns Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used m van; .. nflglnnllly aw. dun-mm VIZ muus ma “D: What mppcnnd an-r yuu ncoivod tn: sum 0! Rma5.s0o.a07 Foo Kok (many had mqussred me to make men repayment an behalf ofLam Loong to DNA Premiel Consunancy Sdn Bhd rum: Pram/sf). Subsequently, I made 7 ruuxmtnts to mug Pmm-ea: uaa Account No. 2053003374 whereby ms pamcmars are as follows‘ - No. me Amount (RM) 7 154.2010 23.50000 2 16 52019 23,500.00 3 11 0.2019 23,500.00 4 23, 500.00 T ’5 l13.e.2019 23,5o0,00 0 27.9.2019 23,500 00 7 4 i1 2010 23, 500. 00 [See Question andAns'wer N0 9 olfhe vwmess Statement, WSPW- 1: [22] It Is |o be noted that the testimony 01 PW1 av paymg the mletesl or RM23,5(lD.K)K) .5 «me: cnlrobotalsd by vanaus bank stauemenvs [23] lhave also no|ed mallhe sum 01 RM3B5,5DD.Dfl was a‘! paid 0: Lam Loony’: awoum 01 which RM300,000,00 was by msh aapam and sw wwuuyfluusmymmkzn run n ma mg smm ...m.mm be 0;... 0 van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm 0.. mum pans! a sum ol RMe5,5oo an 6-om the 1" Defendants personal bank account. [26] In my Vlmvi N there was indeed a genuine sale ano puronasa agreement‘ the burning question IS 17167! Why ls trie Plainllfi paying me 1‘ Defendant and/or DNA Piemuer consultancy Sdn End a oonsistent amount of RM 23,500.00 mm April lo November 2019 is. lhraa months aiter the execution ol me sale and purchase agreemenldalad 1” January 2019 llwas clearly interest for true said loan lllhlch riaye been discussed previously. In triis regard, l rind that the WhaIsApp mnvelsahon belwseri PWI and trre said Foo Kak cneng very telling and clearly indicative mat the transaction was In last VI lunneranoe ol a loan wiui interest and that the Said sale and purchase agreement dated 7'" January 2o19was In eflacl eullateral for me said loan. It is perhaps apt trial i set out in vemaum me wl-atsApo conversation altne malenal lime of slgnlng tne sale and purchase agreement wrncn in my view lnoicateo mat n was In laet In lunneranee ola loan transaction: in fiwtluyfluusrwymlnkzn has n at 51 -rue s.n.i 1-nhnrwlll be used m yam .. nflglrrnflly mm. mm. VIZ arlurm Wm .7:/u/ins, ma . msms u m. -»n— s’) ~.~-., A14 '12‘: we-141:; mun .~=-we.-.3 ruszybuen no (at m. ..-.25. ~ L. ,-. w 4. 7 mxc, “ 4.1;’ ; 1- — L—<'> ». “ ‘J”g M, .,u .; .7 ii; », ,»,m.«: », ». , v. vv S7,eL*:r.\/4:-:-J .\.~. :. am» Ee:_:.r (mm m, m .» aw, ‘H ‘aw ‘ :3/n.'7n;a. :0-53 — 5 An‘-w mm J . .1. m are: » 14 2: x ‘:0 u 1 Hears — Lean u r-. bun:/zum, 10.5: — 4:5”? Ea|a'v’\ an sa‘,2na M/u./zme, 1: se — sum... men: wean K)WA{[[’:> us/u:r2m9, 'a,5- — Stepren mm 2 mm: L um 3:ea — . 2 :1H_ rmlcn , 1,55: 5., 5: ma). gm, ,. n — .»~y_-. ,, L>>-1 u>:u:( Lat!’ wcmus, u 3: — swarm am: >42: . :u:1ez 41;: x; J xn(e:r*e:A.a\'.e HJJ mm mm, 1. 1n , 1rN—K:. an: .L um :z'n:'zo.9, 1“: — L»<—x:. rm; grnperty mac: km my M.“ : /an/2|/19, r. — L—|1—Kcv 5::vpe:(y c)va:qen to mm may 03/axrzmi, x — phln Ywrvv : hv 2 v.=..»=m. xn (Pu We :w.4 mm‘ exacxly (re game my gum” use: an so x nqm, sarrr Unz puxrhiie but mm H) W mm . cmmm, uqz — mum Yuansy as — Hang Aeong sank u — W... mm oz/01/zms, um 7 Stephen mm; oz — on: nimez 1) — 1 mm ( cue at Ire mnuz a.:..m; n- n) M19, 1 as 7 pm». .5 m co.-n. mg 1:117 as/anzaxs. u-35 — Stephen Yuan: 3» — aereasen mm u. my gut! 5.; gm ‘Lt .: .5: ».o:,.z. - n2/mrzou, u 42 ~ , u1—I<:. the ,3 m execuuanar’ a: swan. u u — m...,m man: .49: “mm. alno mm ul the 2 mm emu 2019, 1. u mm: ;1,Lk m 01 m n3/uwzma, 11-41 v_— —.<:- lea But)‘ ions In: an e;/n.,2m, .145 7 5:-umm hang on as mam. u.<5 — y.— —x:» V7.0 .. Inc M. ma a. mum. n 45 — fizuyhen ‘tam; mu: m. M Nrvl » other cm; um C ,1 :.... takstraw u 322:’ s/N RA.|xIuy0uusrvm1LnR:.« run an: "M-mvsumn-nwunuInuuimwiymwmxnuwnyumw-mum-mm-rwurmuum lnal me 2"“ lo 4“ Detandanls are not auosequenl berm lida nurcnasers for valuable enrlslderallon [4] me 1-" Delendanl on me other nand pleads and In essenoe ocntelldslhanhere was a proper sale and Purchase Eareemellt and that he nad used one Foo Kok Chang, a olnaclor of DNA Premier consullancy son and as a broker lor me sale and purchase oi ms sald pmperly In lnls regard, the 1* Delendam pleads lnal me purchase prloe was RM1,35D,0O0 00 olwlllcn he pald lne Plamlllra sum ol RM 500,500.00 and subseduemly paid a funny sum oi RM850,00D,D0 lo l-long Leong lslamlo Bank as me redempllon sum (M lne sand property. The 1- Delendanl danles any knowledge or me loan and pleads lnal n at all ll was a loan, ll was wnn Lam mono and nao nolnlng lo do mm ma 1“ Delendanl. ‘ma 1-‘ Delendanl pleads lnal any money glvan by me 1- nelendanllo me Plalnllll vla Lam Lnal\g‘s adoounl was [or the paymenl ol me said pmpeny and ndlnlng lo do wlln mar loan. » such,l.|1e 1-‘ Delendallt denles any llaud and/or mlsrepmenlallon and puls lne Plainllfl‘ lo slricl prool lhal there was a loan [5] The 1" Delandanl nnally pleads lnal lna subsequent sale ollno sald pmparly lo me 2'-1 and 4' Delendams ls vahd. The 1-! oetendanl also mounls a counlemlalm ln me allemalwe In lnal ll me coon IS minded lo allow me l=lalnnll‘a clelm, lne Plalnllll ougnl lo return the aulnaolRM5oo,5o0 noand Rull35a,0m on lolne I" Delendanl |ha| have been allegedly pald by me 1“ Delendanl as pan oaymenl and reoomollon sum, IN amluyuuusmyovlanm rue x 0151 -we s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used a mm ne nflmnnllly sun. dun-mm wa muno ma — L—n—V”* .r~m:(.V—_- vV|:’LVV4Y,V‘ ..-, ~1- 4 K . Zxdwiliw ~ «u n _— . ,, W m s=,.=.nq, .. mu: ....m htmv ‘ma’ :tn‘~ms't L5 0) .c;.. L:-as — 1—.—'<“ nfat .7 n— 1.,‘ ¢r:.*( V{ :21»: 11 ..—c.:> L)'L1.‘u.\!, ‘s — G:-_*a?(1 mm: mm :HV1K .5 D 3~ J: :“UvL:al . :3 H: mm; gun, u .r V v. H: nu. am. 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A um. rcxu an an ta’-5' 7:/2: zms, A: As I «,:.,.m ‘(mung aux a4'»r.Aw:A xx -u 951,-4: um 20 ;. mas — »,« MW 'Il~a: ml, 9. :».= nun (car. ca’ rmruruxu {Te mutt’ In/u;/gum, was — H4; ;. 5rr—2a’L—4s1v cuumnn. as — s=.,»..- Yww um .. m. .,z. m mrl um me’ aunuzoxa, 11 09 — L—x»»<c 463k an-23,153 ammu-_s. 12-so - Swan ha‘; ,-p. ,.g.: mm cuamm, 12 u — —»«—.<: awn. auctarnan M. at mama. :2 so 7 :.'.¢yr-u ‘{;a*uq‘ runs): In rrzwxluze um -/ur2un, 11 51 V L-It KC m ‘ u ..», lzuu -.1.» W.“ um: um Icn. n:s2 V s:...m..» mm. ».,...»....=. m x ndrratrm mg. inn): 3 docmewu iI::eeme:v( nqr~:»qz~: 2:: W lam nun/xnxw, A2 :3 — 141 x»- w. mu. inn a:u1 mm, M \n— craze!) sun Jo-tar? ta!/ea: mm. W51.‘ 5 q’ 1': mm. um mm 11.5. — _ ..rx.~ Lou» .w».m~m of 1mm, )1: m I 35:14 m 3;». aw: mm.» zavcat c4/oxrzus, ; :4 V L—u—.<c Bu 1 wawfiz cucnxius. 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Orrltteji mu: 4.,” ¢1r.zte:> IAQ)Q W... u:v.:Le:> <».,m mm.) :4... WW. .; v, .,lu fawn: «, am. (Mn mu.» mm mg... UM M... mm <...3..A, DVrIL((‘:— um mm) 1.on7 ‘Man clv.rL~:n:> tum)‘ Aw, =.m:,a..m. in m (59 m. aunts z-1: ,...‘.. . IW Eli/KW} U :.,. m»»...m u .5 xccflrx qlve n um: Wm: hank m:.. w A 5,03: U25 y...., Any mm an-xx 1%‘ {hi .5 I?’ my aw .: Ai\ CISVV mm tum; Is“: :3 . : nw who x.. Y, -.9 V0 LL‘! Wu nmx at .3»; .. m deal <. Em my Y13Hl’h4nLA'FH u rugums: mmvun-1 nmwmuhnu.-umwin-a¢m\nu\nyn4m\-nun-umu1uF\uNspwu :a—.:: V-1-: .» M _. , , Pan. w urn’/Ln, ;c~. .» VI- :u‘\r :.~.» . /10 em” :5 ., :\(AS‘ 2: .; — —a<*» L “,1 ;..-;. K’; 2.4.» ,1.,.».u, I lurtv W , .m ., ~,..r. “,4- asssu 'V‘\r/I V.-4, , 2.». rawsl ;~. 0-! V7 .«. :4 1, -. H r. Alli] u. I .—»,—.-:. ar 41 V. .r<- mam \‘Ib")(/‘A21 V woe» may : -251‘ K: “mm ow». 0.. .4. W r|e!'e<1 — —. <3 CVVYHC'1‘ -2 — _—zuprr,> ma; wm: V,“ .4‘ mm 1'! . v<r- « Inn. ‘.4 um a, ‘a r r7..e. nu me, am; .- .9. . 52,: .1: cw,/12.2. gm. 1:.» E9/§.rJL.J‘ — Quc (WC :1): M are/0./10:2, — mu. :.~ 3 uzue :2): 2R’I.(‘I . ca/swam, .;-5; - v, n—t<; ».« ymuq. \i:AcJ 7'] \/£’/ urn: 21;;-, x rhasc 2 am d«am_~n Ea: . cs/0. ms. ms; — ; K arr : my awn zcxa, — L—>(—-1:: av‘. L‘9':./1:I2, , <:m.;.« am». or :9;Ll/zaflt, :1»: — 5tup'a'v m._, >4; xn, teen r-)i‘>e'nA1KA' as/u: zm, 11-4~ 7 am Jun, .4; V -:rAu4:\\ :9/av 73.9, :2 ae — _+.«:- <.~«m.; u1.\(Ke.;> :9/axrzms. us: . flcpkcw nc 4' ran m K Mao um .. aa/m'7n:3,2t>1:— ‘. xr ‘mp ;-s/mam, .. :4 — 5(eu‘en Yum; mm KC. mm ms. 1: 2; — H x.~- . SM! NF . .».; 61 mm R.» mu 1 an 4‘ at)‘ E9/0111119, 1. 42 — L M: an’ nawuwan, xx 52 - saw." mu. cxwm: .»,m;4e 9, ummon. Luz V m.coa X 5\ - 1s,n:m/wnnn mom. . mm . Lsauzm n Wm. x n p:c:ALmJ um mL:(esL (0: mm. 2....» C’ A am med :Vu:s gm. A1u 1 mama ,.» mm :4“; (a1aT mm )3 196,5 IV mm \5 Lass Edm nwamm, r 2.: — L— —K:» o awcmm conneurv aw nu/201; :9/u: zen, ; :1‘ — 1 ><—x:v <"Ed) mum u;/:1 '1nn, . xv — -. >1-H‘ <I(edla emu-:> own)/gun, 1» 2 — ..— —x:- «gm. urv M. aa/amen. r 4; — S:epre1 new «men, .¢ HEW Hm n W n nan: ny/on/2:115, :- u — -, N K: 1.3. 2:: 07))‘ may srce «.4. .5 Us .—:-»a;,zou, 1‘-u , smm mm. ay'£ r§'n:'zm3, .\'.u L»!-KE .u.5Lm .. .»- A -.9 an AI :1‘! ll 1,... 4. my 5 .»...mm aux u nus mm. 55,..;.;.".3m..'.2?f“...u.........,...m.m,....m..4.....m....;m... am ntn, .- :4 3mm m—a~ er-oi: a‘,a'r'xar n um: /21‘ :, ‘. 5, — kw: wk u...“ Hue .u.=».=‘ um./25:9, 2!: n 7 kwxc Ln: Sew; Lrz ,2; mm-ssv .. 01 um, gr, — L—tl—x(‘. 7 1(C .4: ,4... 5,; ,m M, ~ c :e<s.mL .5:-« nae‘: 43». yr. zcu _» =2 j{fiYl’L‘H Haw am 1/n.,7:.a, n — V» 5': am af(e:'wc* 7,» ymwa ‘W , vzxrwfw m .//0./zms, ,2 J: — smm ‘man; my fiauzuy 1. n£["e, .; rant) Mam:-y {V m«.;.: szmuz , km: .71 z w 2 . — Vcmvfzw mm. «mm mum» ,1/:w>c.s, — 4LEb":v um; <I»1ed1e a...zm> :3/n:/inn. 7 swam mm awn»: ugh: rnllectvn z rdria 3/c./2013, 15.2’ wpm ‘iucng. A. KC. mu: .... .. -4'11‘ 11/91/203. 1; 25 — ;—H¢» m, .. inc mum .1/n./nu. ,a 1: surnn mm. y.. u/amm, urns — mm: ma vWz1.vvq I‘! pang W .. mum :. um mm, was — s»...=».n mm; am :1/awzon, .1 :5 — alapnen men; 04.4.. nwutzear H/M/22:9, o n — ;— 4: m am; (ever: Jyon revels’. zunwenra, m :2 sum. mm kc. nun [B may Llvr nan cauczrmn Dlupezly N/ox/20:2, m 52 — mum mw «um: om:uu:> :4/or/mu, 11 2: V L WK" A.(Aqht mm ,:\/:!L meuzm, ,2 2; — L—N—l<C M A hv u. in :1d lites: lain u/n1/Inn, 14.1: — Stephen um. <>‘2d.a :mn((a:> .1/uuzan, u n — 5:-wen ‘(many wt: m am my. D-AISIRIVUA ., m1 x,m,m u/bx/zen, n n — L—N—KC m w/xtandlfia x.ns3,z3: Man: mm» mum s\ Sxqn up u 1.39=,naIz mm 5 mm. m:e!a3( 0~:¢ .. mm. mm... .5 call art um .uu.:mn 2 urun. rm. .2 3“? Loan 43n.onn m. u 5\ mmv 2 mantis; mm“: lxzqal ms: Lcz :n.m( 5, m 11 pipe: van a/mums, u an — Stephen Yuanq Hazruna KC. any ..¢.n.a HQEIIV zzuu/mu, 1; Sn — mm: Surly "K ymnq at.» LN: -...y. 22/ax/1329, 12 51 — Stephan ‘many Kc. Pliny: am. no N... =». my ans: tax the Mn mum.“ will c: M mm c ..mm :3’! run:n:1ed um um - Can my u, [my ~ 22/nuzlns, .2»u V L—M—KL‘ :5: mm ...u ha 5411 5.1 2»: v [at but s..m.. x u an. ; ELgure s/M nmxIuy0uuswm1LnR:A he 1: an mmvun-1 nmwmuhnu.-umwin-a¢m\nu\nyn4m\-nun-umu1uF\uNspwu [25] The abme WhaIsApp conversauon has been placed m part B al me common Burma 01 Documents and F00 Kok cheng (Dw2) does not dtsuule lha ourwersauon. DW2 Iasufied dunng cross- exarmnanon as cauawsz "KDAY So. this is me Wharsapp convsmauorr between you and (he P/arnrmhusband FKC coma." {See page so aflhe Notes ofEvmence dated 1-‘ August 2023] [26] Furlher, In my vvew. me wnmsnup conversation fvom 3“ to 7'" January 201935 mghllgmed above are indwd relevam to shed ngm on the arcurnscarrm leading m are execuuon of me sale and purchase agteemenl dated 7'" January 2019 [See me High Court case 0! Pannlr sclvam (supr|)]. [21] Having pamsed me WhavsApp mrwasalmn from 3'“ |o 5* January 2019 and mereaner tram e* lo 11" January 2019, me irresishbie wncluslon man I rasar are as lolkwvs: a The P\ainMTs husband did mdeed have a discussmn wm Foo Kak Chang penaumng lo Iakmg a loan and Ina! me said propeny owned by Ina Plaimxfl was |a be um as a oo\la(eraL The 1'- Delenuaru has admmed usmg Foo Kok Chang as a bmker; IN fiwuuyfluusmyavmkzn flue )1 Ms: -rm! smm n-uhnrwm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm h A loan surn has been agreed upon at a sum RM47o,oco.au with Interest 0! RM23.50fl 00 per rnenm, c. A sale and purchase agreement dated 7" January 2019 had to be executed and stamped wltn the Form 14A belng kept in esomw wlln the urmeralanalng that upon lull rapeyrnent, the Sald sale and pktrcnase agreement dated 7'" January 2m9wtll be resclrtded. t1 ln the event the Imrmwar calls to pay 3 rnontns interest, the lender (1-I uelermant) wlll proceed to transier the Sald nroperiy to his name. e The 1" Defendarlfs DEISDVIEI bank amount detalls ln HOB was provided tn lacllnate payments. and i, ulscuaarons warn um and enqumes made ea In new lrta l=lalntl«a nuenena would repay tne pnncrpal loan amount in whtdl it was indlcaled mat II will be rapatd mm the sale at ulnar propamas [23] Qullaaparl lrnrn tne wltatsnpp conversation alme belng lnalcalwe 013! II was a loan lransactlan, I agroa wrtn the Platntllrs submission and I am also an tne vlew lnal [hare are lndaed SUSDICAOLIS uraurnstanoss surmurmingtna terms and otmdlnons on»: sale arm nurcnase agreement which would land to negate znat ll was a gsnulne sale and nurcnase agreement. ‘ aw Rw(1LlyOUuSmyfi7lnR:A has )1 am we s.n.l n-vlharwlll be used m yaw me nnnmun sun. dun-mm w. mane ma [291 rnscry, as oonecuy panned out by me Plamhfl, me purchase price slipulated m the said sale and pumhass egreemem dated 7m January 2019 was RM1.350,0o0 no with me aepasu being 10% of the purchase pnoe LG, RM135.00000 me purpaneu deposit of RMson,sou.uo allegedly paid lay me P‘ Defendant wnsmutes ahncsl 40% n1 me purchase pnoe ov me sad pmpeny which m my vvew Is suspmus and inmcanye that wt was no: a genume 52:19 and purchase agreement [30] However, wh|ls| there was eumenoe M the paymen| or RM3a5.5au no, mere was no evudence of payment of the sum of RMl15.000.D0 which m my view have not been proven. In tact, al best, the ewdenoe M17151“ Defendant (nwa) Is lhal wt was paxd In Foo Kok Chang. DW3 testmed as lullmvs "JUDGE Yes, Bur can I ask why was this, when we saw RM300,00£7 was pard cash deposn to me bank account Why wasn't ms RM115 done mmuariw Lsc rm bmku noldme mar lhlk hood III: a sh for RM115 000. xsr So, you a/so paymg me casn c!RM115,500Ia Illa P/slnlrfl. 1.3:: To Mr Foo. IN wwuuyfluusmymmfizn Page :5 M51 -use sum n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. unyn.u.y mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! JUDGE No! RM500. RM115 KET RM115 lo MIFDO. Kn Do you receive any proof of recerpl or me, of ms cash amounting to RM1150OD , Lsc M KET By Plainlifl from Mr Fm LSC & KET Can I put u (0 you that you never pawl rm: RM115.000 m P/amm oi P/atntrflhuslzsnd? LSC ‘flux mnuon mm at to Mr Fan." [See pages 145443 of me Nulss ol Evidence dated 1“ August 2023} sw wwuuyfluusmyavmfizn nu in nlil um sum ...m.mm be used m mm u. unmmuly mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm [5] The 2"-‘ I0 4"‘ Delenderrls dd ndl deny purchasing me said oropehy for a purchase price at RM1A milllon but plead lhal they are subsequent bone llde purchasers for valuable cnnslderallan and that may are slill aolei willing and ready lo pmoeed wilh such sale. As such. the 2"“ lo 4"‘ Dolendanls oounleldalmi seeking a deolaralidn rhal lhey are the nghllul registered owner M me sad Drunefw [7] Havlng sel out the dalms/oounlardalms, I will now eel out the chronology and hackgroundlac1s,|he lssues lhal arlse lollowed lay my analysis and oundusian as lo whether the Plalnlifl has succeeded in proving her elainrs on a balance o1 prubahllltles and similarly lo determlne n lhe Deiendanls are suooesslul In lheir respecliye deurrlerclairns Background Fnmlchronolggy [la] The background lscls have been summarized oy lhs Plalrlllflln lhsir written submission and part: 09‘ ms sama lfi reproduced to set out ma chronology nllhelacls and the progrossllirn sol ms vlrlous lransacIlons' lmu Emil 7 1.2019 A sale and purchase agreemencenlerod oezweeEiTr?J Plalllflfl as rugislared owner and [he I" Delendanl for me purponad sale nl lho said pmpeny lor the sum 0! RMI.350,000.00 ‘ SIN nmiuyuuusmyormnm me a rats: «mo Smnl nnvlhnrwm .. or... M mm r.. oflmnoflly sun. mm. VII .nunc WM! [31] Anamar susplcmus aspec| oflhe sale and puvchase agreemsnlwas mal althmlgh clause 15.1 sllpulated max ma 1= Delendanl was In pay ma Plainllfl‘ me aopamanmonl of uulgmngs. ma evidence revealed man VI was not oalculaleo no! oald. ln (hls regard, DWI teslified during cmss-uamlnaoon as foflwls: "KET Mr Mark, do you agree mm me lhar to calculate lhe anporriunmenl of the oulgolngslspanolmeprocessrocomplela ma whole oonuayanomg procedure’ LSH Nol necessary A lot afKL lawyer may lion’! calculale one KET If n is no: necessary, why did you out me clause m your SGP7 LSN w docalcularo. KEY so for lms, you do oaloulala7 S0 [or ems caaa, whathsr you calculala at you drd not calculate? LSN Did not enlculnra becausa ma -/andnv dldnl dellvsr vacant possesslon. " [See page 45 a/ma Nola: nlEvl'd9nce dated 1"AugusI 2023] IN wwuuyfltlusmyfivmfizn me M M51 -ma am ...m.mm be used m yaw u. mm-y mm: dun-mm wa mulls wnxl [32] Anolher crifical and impnrlanl Inch! 10 cormdur is that me «- Defendanl had never me! ur talked to me Ptainmv nor viewed the said pmpeny priur lo the exeumon al the sac and purchase agreernenl dated 7'" January 2019 In this respect. the 1-4 Defendant (DW3) cesufied during cmss-exammation as Valium. "KET So, Mr Lrm, me you ever met Plnmliflbelon? Lsc ug, KET You never met P/allmfl Dela:-97 HEV9 YGII balked to PIIMIIWDMWE7 1.5:: ND KEY Nave you met P/airllvff husband Defers? Lsc MW KET I Irefelyw to Bundle A, page 25. ex, Mr Urn? Lsc Yes. KET Ok so, page 26 is part or your Defence Ok. So new page 26, paragraph ea, in yaw Defenv9.Y0uhavs menuonsmat. /rssdrtla you, -suamrp/am, En Yuong Isiah bebslaps IN wmxtuyfluusmyfivmkm rule :2 M51 -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Lsc Lsc JUDGE Lsc Lsc kn/I mervghubungi Defendant 1'. ls that wrvecl? « am not undarslsnd your Malay ck. lam sorry. 0k. never mind Tms uooumem Is your pteaurngs for your case In Ihe Court Your szazemem oloefence. This para an, n says. that the Ptammrs husband Mr vuong had on various occasions comaaed you to rawar menawar, I0 discuss on E kansaamn of buymg me pwpeny before me sap was signed. mars whalilsays & So, you mean that Mr Yuony. the Pnammr husband navel contact you and olfar you for ma sales and purchase ullnls pmpeny wmclv lmean, Na 2 cube pmnarm WW7 E 0k Imlsr you to Me paragraph as which also m Malay. In paragraph 65, n I: stated that. you mums: have slated In your Defence mar the Ptamu/I husband ha: contacted you several times «or the usnsrer 0/ me money kw ms payment ol the purchase pncs, for me pmpsvfy. LSC & KET ok, Mr L/m so. you never talked to F/ainlrfinr Plarntiffhusband, owecf’ Lsc Nam. KEI ox, Mr Lun ls it we max, rerer to page 26. what you have stated in your Defence rs mcorrecl, right’ Is n unm4e7 Lsc vu KET ok, Irephmse. Mr Foo asked you whether you are mrsresxed to purchase the pruperfy from the P/ainm, censor’? 1.5:: Yes. KET ox Lsc syu wnutuyfluusrv-ry‘fl7mR:A rage uovsz um sum n-nhnrwm be used m mm u. nflmruflly mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm [See pages 130,731 and 137 0/ the Notes of Evidemre dated 1” Aug:/512023] [33] In my vnaw‘ qune apan fmm me lacl nnan nhe 1= Deiendanrs evndence eonnradieced ms pleaded case, Hind man we (act man no never men or spoke no nhe Plannm or her nusband nor wsrwed nne sand property Is another lacmr wmon casts doubts on nne genunneness of me sane and pumnase agreemenl. [34] Deslanle me 1“ Detendanrs pleaded defence man me Pnannmrs husband nod on several aonxsions ountacled me 1-‘ Defendant lo vfierlhe said pmoenyvorsane, iron. nne nanimony omws, it is clear man no such one for sane was nnade nur was more vnewing of me sand nrooeny. As no wny nne said properly was nevev viewed s beyond me but nn my view, «ms evnoenoe oorrnbumles nne Flarnlrfis contention that the naroumslanom heading to the execuuan of INS sane and purchase agreemenn were suspnenous and consequenfly man was In naon to be used as oonnatevan Ioren nuegan nnoneylending Iransacflon [35] I also Iunner none men more was a denay 0! more nhan 12 rnonnns nronn me ongnnan oonnpnenon dane. one may argue men nne delay was caused oynne need no obvain nne svave oonsenn nn Iespeclnllha said propeny. Fnsny, me 1-‘ nenendenn and not testify on (ms delay In omnpnenng me sane and purdlasa agraemsm secondly, gnven man Lann Loong was m nnnenonel dmeuny an me rnanenal mne, nwound be Iuasanabiu for me no oononude nnan In dnro need M mnneyn H 45 iuognun for me Pnsinon no agree/lnlow eucn a nengnny oomplsnnon nn wwnnuyfluusmymmkm hue so 0451 -use s.n.n In-vnhnrwm be used m mm s. unnmnn-y sun. dun-mm wa .neua Wm pertpa of more than 12 months. [see the case M Patttttr SOIVIIII teupra) where the Htgh ceun retetree to the case at Porlvllppan ate attmuatattt Plllay v Pertaeattty are sithattthatatttn Plllai 1. Attor [2tm1] I MLJU 1421. [36] I have also zxmstdered the tact that no starrtpm sate and pumhase agreement was ever pruvided to the Ptatrttitt All the Plainflf reoervett was a sale antt purchase agreement with the t‘ Detendartts name being redacted wttheut any explanation tor such anuntaly. [37] Further, whttst DW1 testtfied that he had advanced the state pehsent tees an ttehart 01 the Ptatntttv. he hvwever did not clarm the same (mm the Plathtm In date as entttted to wrth no explanatton gtveh tor such tattute. [35] In atmtttott, another pecullaflly ts that the 1-‘ Delendanl appears |o have ncllaken any tegat action agatnsl the Ptattttttr tn respect anhe rlnndeflvery al vafanl passeaaten. l| ts the Pratntttrs case that tn acwldance wtth the sate and pttrdtasra agreement, tt was the P!atnMi‘s obligation to aerrver vacant possession of the sattt pmperly tn the t- oetenaant ea ptttehaaet wtthth 5 walking days upon rtttt paythetttovtne ttatance purchase pttee ol the said property by vtntte 0! Clause tt aha section 2 oi the Fmh Schedule at the sate and purchase agteemettt. Heweter, the Ptathttn lesllfied that she never passed the keys Io ahyott Iudmg the 1" netenaaht and the 1" netettaanrs snltctlor. This ts also otmsislsnl with the testimony at the 1- Detehaanra eattertet when he aattttttea that the Ptatntm did not deliver vzcanl pnsstasston ht aeattten, lha1"De1IndInldurI'IIg tn amtuyeuusmyartam trauxatsz ‘Nate a.tt.t In-rthnrwm be ts... m van; was nflgtrrnflly mt. dun-rtnrrt VIZ nF\t.ING Wm! uusuxannnauon has am admmea lo unllatemfly changmg the lacks because he conswdered the sand pmparly (0 Debug en mm. [:9] In any event, m is m be nmed mac DWI aammed Ina! he did not take any action var any alleged breach onne agreement despue the man ueuvary M vscanlpossessxon and unflerunssexaminatwon lesflfied that he merely Ian :1 In the hands of the purchaser DW1 Iesufied as loflaws. "JUDGE The vendor refused to give mane passsssm, rzgm. So your my 55 a /av/ye! is not finished unit‘! the sap rs comp/stsd, n‘gm7 LSH Yes. JUDGE So what transpired? Sn (he vendor didrn grve vacant possessran, your cm: n ma pumhaser, you are auing for the purchaser, nghl? You mum ac! /0! (he vendor M/Piaf did you 1107 What happensd next? Do you know? LSN lluvelnathe yrcnnser." [see page 45 olme Notas oIEvn1em:e dated 1“ August 2023} [401 Imeresungny. me I" oeceoaanrs leslnmony on Ims rssua av vacant possession during cross-exammluon IS as lollows: IN wwuuycuusmymmfizn an :1 015) -um smm ...m.mn be used m yam .. mmny mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! “KET Did your lawyer M Mark ask you [0 comes: P/ammr herseII7 Lsc No. This is not my dug: wmnhls Is their dug xsr Vou mean [ms is your rewyers duly. Lsc or course But since I cannot get me key, I srrefglvlaway go to change me look because me pmpsvfy rs hslang to me " [See page 15.9 ol Ins Nolss affvrdsncs dazed 1= August 2023] [41] Having oansmerea aH me manars mgnngmea above, m 5 my mew that com pamee were not adldsm nor had any xnlanmn to enter into a sac and purchase agreernenx bu| man we F\amUfl‘s husband and me 1" Deremam together mm or v\a Ms moxer, Fm Kok Chang had agreed Ihal me said properly be used as mllaleral car a loan ov RM470,000.00 wilh an Inleresl 0! RM23,50l7.00 per monlh mm are understanding Ihal me eem properly would be transterren to me 1" Devenuanu N are Planmifl aevaunea mree months‘ rmeresu. Smoe me P\a\nIM‘s husband para mleres| (or seven munms mu defamled msreaner. me 1"De1endanllhen unused Form mm lransler me said properly In hlmsafl. [421 VA my wew, «an. an me oueerveuene arm findings made nerein ahcve, me we and purchase agreement was ueany e sham ana was in luflharznca ev e maneylendmg uansaeuen. IN fiw<1uyOuusmy97mR:A use 3: ms: -we en.‘ ...m.mm be used m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm [43] W10! W5 nnmrrg, Ihsra Is no nacessmy (0 cnnsider me Issue of fraud and misreprusanlafinn as pleaded. As such ma 4-‘ Defendanfs con|entIon that Mr Mark Liew bemg me 1“ Delendanfs sohcxlnrs and F00 Kok cneng nal being madea pariylu (ms Sulla non-slaner In my new, beanng in mind mac me 1* nerenuam was "wowed m the loan lransacbon, was me -purchaser‘ in me sale and purchase agreemem and subsequermy the me being nramarm Ia ms name, n was suficxent lovlhe 1“ Defendant to be made a party in ms Sum. [44] smaa I have concluded that the sale and Durchase agreemem was a snam, me P¥aIrIM‘s claim agarrrsn the 1' Darenaam wumd arurnaruy be auawaa and Ins saxd pmpefly raven to the Plaimm as Ihe mle nl {he 1“ Dedermam Is deleated pursuant 10 Section 34D(2)(c) M the Harman Land Code 1965. However, as seen earner me 1* uecenaam has subsequently sold me sad properly to (he 2”“ lo 4' Delendanls and I WM (1931 with that later VII the judgmenl However, In the meanume, having onncluded tha| It was a sham agreement. x wrn deal wrlh me 11 nevanaanra cnuntemlalm [See me High Court case M Kunn cm. Jon 4. Or: v sss Comlmcflon sun and[2n1s] uuu 111:]. E1 1- Mgngyrg ; Cgumn I:|5 m [45] Yhe «-4 De1endanl In thew amanaad srararrram of Deienoe and 0oun(en‘Ja\m is uekmg me remedy M resmuuon by saekrrrg ma return Mme sum of RM1,35D,00D 00 where RM5|lU,500.00 being IN wwuuyfluusmymmfizn me N5 5051 ‘Nuns saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm he nrW\nnH|:I mm: dun-mm Va .nuNG Wm ms sum luanod to me P\amm'f and/or haw husband as wen as me reaempuan sum of RMa5o,cu0 no [46] \n this mspea, references made |n ma recent Federal coun case o1 Triple Zosl Truding a. Suppliurs L ors v. Applied Bullness Tcchnolugin Sdn Ehd mm: 10 cu 137 wheve n was held that m cases where n .s dear mat [here rs an inegal moneylending uansacuun. the ‘tender rs no! emmed en the pnruspal sum and ma mleres1 The reaem case cf Triple zest Tra g a. Suppliers (supra) considered me Hrgn Courl case of Vww Guang cneng V. ‘rang Lu Hiok L ors [2020] MLRNIJ 1539 [affirmed by me ooun amppeau m ‘rang no Hlnk A On v. how Gulng Chang (202216 MLRA sow; mm] 5 ML! 5M)where u was enurrcraced that m deter un/rcsnsed monayrsrraers from conlmumg with their nelanaus business, It rs rrr ms pubuc mlsrssr ror un/mensed rrrorreyvenaers ro be rtspm/ed of msrr II/sgsl 'prrrrcrpe/ loan sums’, mteIes1 and whats‘/sr Illgollan properly or bsnefil eryoysd from (her uruawm moneylendmg busmess". [471 More reaerruy, me Fedeml ooun case av mm. Zest naumg a suppnm A on v. Appllod auslnm Tnchnnlogiu Sdn End [2023] In cu 137 was oansraerea n the court 0! Appeaw case ol LII Kuang 50!! V‘ "Ian Srl Dam’ Slrl Dr M Mnhadnvnn uavunngam a. Anomomwuu [2023] 1 ms we where Ihe ccun ohippeal he\d max me agraemem bslween names was vord ab rrrrua and me Med 0! such mega: (mnsacuon rs |ha| me "less Ifas wneve It Va//5'. IN wwuuyfluusrwyavmfizn me an m 52 wane sum In-uhnv WW .. used m mm a. nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm wa anurm Wm § inflwau? moaipl L71 ma mu pumhaaa pm alRM1,350,000.DI) ame said pmpeny ‘ The 1‘ Dmfianla€£ m me sum of RMas.5cu no and RM3IXl,O00.00 vide cash deposm to Lam Loom] §tate aonsaag lrinsler vfthe 55' properly 151l)2D19.C0In7ple7I )'r me puvporled saufisma Bmnerly. 15.M.2Lfi9 Extended complenon aafe 1 the said property 2.6.2020 The 1“ Deienaanrs solidmr went on m request a (rash radempbon stakemsnflmm Hung Leong Islamic Bank. me Plaintiffs flnancwer bank Wlzazo ‘The M nere?d§nf pan: ma r RME50,000 on In Hong Leong Islam‘: Bank 020 The said pmpeny was transferred in the 1- Defendant and reg\s1e¢e¢ in the 1- Defiendanrs name. 14.3.2020 The Pramxiff Vodged a police report In respect at the transfer uflhe saw: pmoeny In me 1* Defendam 14 9.2020 The Plaimm lodged a private caveat on me said property was puesamauon No. o799a2o2aoo1oss ‘(rveramafler remraa to as me “pm/ale avast‘) Fenang High Court vine Originating Summons No, Mzmcwpsazov/2021 (herelnaflev relened m as 12. . sm Rm\<1uyOuusmy‘a7mR:A rm s .2 :2 nine saw n-nhnrwm a. .4... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm [A8] As such‘ l am at me nrm view that the I" Dslendarll ought not tp be entitled to be repaid the sum of RM5DO.500 on or RM3a5,5on oo which have been laanea to the Plamltll and/or the husband‘; company in lespecl ot the 1“ Defendant‘: munlemlairn tor the sum of RM550tD00.DD perng the redernptiun sum, I will deal with this in the next tasua peflalnlng tn the 2'” to 4' Defendants sucond Issu whether an 2"“ to 4'" Defendants are born ntte gurehum (pr ulnuhln Donsidorntion [49] Having considered that the said salt: and purchase agreement dated 7"‘ January 2019 was a sham ID disguise an Illegal moneylendlng transaction I now move on Io consldu inha 2* to Al" nalenaants are suhsequenl bnna has purchasers tar valuable apnsluaratlpn [50] As the title :21 the 1*‘ Detendant is deleated pursuant to section 3MJ(2)(c) ofnto National Lnnd Cod: I965, ttwuula also lollw that the title lmnslerred to the 2"" to 4" Defendants is also liable to be set aside unless the 2‘ and 4"‘ Defendants are able to establish that they are suhsequenl bona hue pumhaseis lor valuable ponsldemtton pursuant to the proviso under section 340(3) ol the National Lam: Code was. In this case. there is no dispute that the 2"" to 4"‘ Delendants became the registered propnetms on 18"’ octpber 2022 upon executing the sale and purchase agreement wtth the I“ Delerldant on 16” August 2022. IN Rw(tUyOUuSrwy97tnR:A oar « at u -use Sunni In-vlhnrwlll be used M mm a. uflnlhallly MIN: glam. vta .nuue mat [511 The 2"’ lo 4' Ddandants wnland that may are suhssquenl bona fde purchasers lcr vamable consuderanan and lhslefnre snevtema under the pnzwso in section 340(3) Mme Nntionll Land Coda was. [52] On the other hand, the Plainlrfi contends that the 2" m A"‘ Delendanls are not bone fide purcnasers forvaluable umsmeraaan on ma loHowmg grounds’ a True 2"‘ to 4” Defendants weve aware of the Plammfs adverse clawm on me sad uroperiy. b. The 2~ |u 4*" Devenaanxs had acted in a careless manner and were nagugenv. c. The 2” to 4" Deienaanus «awed co exetuse their right to lermmale ma sale and purchase agreement, and :1. The 1- uaramam has yet in rsoewe the balance 9% deposll sum and ba\ance purchase price from ma 2"‘ m 4'" Delendanls‘ financrers. [53] Again, the counwul nave ca scmlmise lhe chwmslances Ieaamg to ma awe and purchase agreement m cmmdei whether or no! may are subsequanl bona nae purcnasars lur vamable consiaarauon arm in nus regam me ewdenne av me 2"‘ Daleudanl -s cmual rn wmxtuyfluusmyavmkm we n (2152 Nuns saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm me nrW\nnH|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [54] The 2"” Delendanl during crossexaminallan leslmea max lavior lo slgnirlg the Leller cl Conflrrnalion to Sell a. Purcnasa to Dulchasra me sald properly, he was bmugm by a pmpeny agerll to viral ms uld pruperly and me pmpeny was lwrud to be vacanl. Further, me evldarloe will also reveal Ina! me 2"“ In 4“ Delencancs have mmugrr lhelr sallmms, mnaucled a mle search at me sara prupervy un 21“ June 2022 and he same had revealed lhal mere wasted a prlvale caveal lodged bylhe P|aIntlflcn14"' seplember 2020 and me Same belng ss|asit1e was calm order on 31-‘ January 2022 [551 Huweven the 2” lo 4'" Defendants through (hell wlioiwrs men urldefluok varl'ous 519135 In ascertaln me status aflhe prlvala mveal and dld not e=)<ecute me sale and purchase agreemenl lmlll the removal of me prilmle caveal, The saliclmv men conducted a Court file search an ongmallng Summons No PA—24NCvC442-D7/Z021 (hereirlalver rerened to as “us 442') and aisoauerea that the salt} prwale caveat was remuved pursuant to me Court Order dated 31'' January 2022 ln os 442 [56] The 2"“ In 4"‘ Dalendanls than reoelved a lens! dated 8'‘ August 2022 oonfirrnlng Ihauhe priva|e uaveat was rammed and mm there was nu appeal filed by In: Plaintlfl. The 2" lo 4' Deienflarlls |harl executed the sale and purulase Igrsemenl Ind proceeded I0 oh|aIn a loan (rum MEB I! was only subsequently dld the Pllmllfl commence INS clalm EIQIIHS1 [he 1" Delendarll ln Nuvambav 2022 and meraaflal Iha 2"‘ I0 4'” Defendants belrlg Edda as oo- dalerldams in March 2023 when Iha Plainnfl dlsooverad (hll I710 said property have been sold by me I" Delendam to the 2" In 4"‘ Delendarlls, On Ines: 75015, the 2"‘ In 4" Delendarlls submil that IN fimxluyuuusmyavmkm me a nu: -ma s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m van; .. nflglnnllly MIN: dun-mm VIZ nFluNG ma (hey are subsaquenl bona fide purchasers lor valuable cpnsldaranon as they nad nallad lrra slgning of ma sale and purcnasa agreamenl upon dlseeverlrlg me said prwala caveal andmul only execuled me said sale and purpnase agreement sdpsaquenlly afler naving enquired and was sallsfied that me sad privale caveal nas been removed by Cowl ordardalad 31‘ January 2022 with no appeal med and no plner dalm med by Ihe Plainull [57] Funner, he 2"“ lo 4'" Deiendanls contend man may ware aware lnal no appeal was filed by me Plainllli against the sald Court Order rerrravlnglne private caveatdaled 31“JarIuary 2022 and in has been adrnnled by me Plalrlllfl and me F'lalrlIflF‘s husband during uoss— exarnlnaupn lnal lne Plainulrs privale caveal nad no legal lnipacl Since 31' January 2022 pursuanl la lne l-lrgn coun order This would have rneanl mac lne vl nelendanl was free lo sell me said pmperly lo lne 2"’ and 4* nelendanls. As such, ills eonlerlded lhal may are non: ride purpnaaers to: valuable eansideral-on. [53] on me other nand, It I! ma Plaln|M‘s ppnlennon lnal havlng knowledge Iha| mere was privaie pavaal previously, ma 2"" In 4* Delendanls were Indeed aware oi the Plainws adverse alaini on me said prvpeny [59] to lhis end, we Plalnmlrelles on lrle case M Lu Sluk Chlng v Edm Rnlly sun and is on 12021} ulL.lu inzo wnara me rllgrr Conn med ma Fadaral Court case pl 1 slvam all nmamallngam (an repruenlullvuledrnlnlnulor lav me name of Nagarnumu n/I Puluarny, annual v Public Bank BM min] 5 NIL! 111 wrncn held as [allows lN Rwlluyfluusrwymlnfizn has an pl ax -uua a.r.l In-vlhnrwlll be used a mm ms nrwlrullly sun. dun-mm wa aFluNG Wml ‘[43] rhererore a purchaser who ta not guilty 0/ any fraud but who has krlawlldga that his predecessors we or fnltlvst is (aimed with fraud is not ontitlnd to the lmtarlt of the promo until! I 140(3) In the crrcurnstartca of that case, I! was held that there knowledge or the fraud would strmce to negate goott term." [60] Further, the Plalnttll eerttahds that the 2'“ to the 4” Datertoants had also Failed to lake enttrtary precatmon and trtvestlgaliort of a reasonable pnrttent purchaser when they lallea to seek cahhrrttatiort ttont the Platntttt or the Ptelnttlrs soltettor as to whether they lnteho to file a evtl sutt trt respect of the salt: property. [see eases omlolttl Najih vusol V ulalt onshore sert she a. ore [2ll23) 4 MLRH 22a and Llptrtatt Slmfoni sen Bhd v Fembangunall Orltld Dean sah Bhd pots] A Mu 141] [511 In my oottstuereo vtew, whtlst knowledge at a nreoeoessota tltle er tttterest tttay disenlllle a purchaser to the benefit o1 a provtso to sectlon 340(3) ettlte Mettortal Latte cone ms. In my considered vtew, the 2" to 4'" netertoattta have taken the necessary ptecauttens prtor to entering that the sale and purchase agreement As seen eartlar, they halted the purchase upon atswvehng the prtvate caveat entered by the l=latrtttlt. lt was only upon reeetvlng eohnttttatton tn wrllmg that the sald prtvata caveat had bsen tetnovec and that there was no turthar appeal are the 2" to 4' oelettttartta pvooaed wllh the sate wntlat the aolrcttor lor the 2"’ to 4* oelettuartts testlnee that she are not delve lurther. the teeue re to tn amtuyeuusmyertaaot I11! 3 0751 we s.t.t ...n.r M“ be used m mm ee alrtr.t-v Mthts dnunvlnrll vta mane Wm! wnalexlenl snaulu lnvesliganans be made on lne lists Ml IS case‘ lam lmahls lu Dunclude lnal bearlng In nnnu lnal me prlvaee caveat had been removed a|mos1 9 manlns eanler mm no appeal and wllh no suil commenced‘ mere was no need |a lnuesllgale lunller and rarlnot uanslale lo a lack o1 bone ides. ln 13:1, VI my vlew, ll IS lne Plainllw wno Is al laull In lnal ones ma pnvale caveat was removed wlthout any appeal by her, sne should have immediately commenced proceedings againsllIle1" Devenaanl. ll she had done So‘ one 2"‘ 104"‘ Delendanls would cermlnly nel nave purchased me send nropeny Unlenunelely, me sull was filed ln Nuvember 2022 aner Ihe sale and purchase befwaenIhe1“DelendarlIarld1he 2"‘ la 4'" Delenuanls was perleclea and me lllle lranslsned and reglslerea Ifl me names ol me 2'-1 lo 4* Deleuuanls an 18" ocmber 2022. [62] As such, I would conclude that lne 2"“ lo 4"’ nelenaenls have suwesslully prwen Olal they have laken all ruasonahle steps/precaullons and are subsequenl Dona me purchaser: lur valualaleeonsluerauon. Assucn, I will allow me 2"‘Io 4- Defierldanls‘ eeumen-.1eirn lor me aselerauon mat lney are me ngmlul regis|ered propnelols at me sam pmpany and barlsfiolal awnars. [53] ‘nus IS sl-ll nel Ihe end ol me rnaller. As hlghlighled eamer in lhls luagnlenl. allnougn me uansler nee been perfaded anu me me eunemly raglsleled ln me 2'“ lo 4* Delenuanls, lne lnlllal deposit is sllll being nelu Dy me 1- nelenaunrs Sollcllol as seeker-olaev and me 2*’ la 4*" Defendants‘ financial bank have ya! lo release lne balance loan sum penalng me de|sm\l'nallon al unis Sui|. vlnm my mncluslun above me: me 2"’ le 4* Dellenaanls are subssquem IN fiwtlklyflklusrvrymlnksn me u M51 -use s.n.l In-vlhnrwm as used m mm the nflmnellly sun. dun-mm VI] .nune we bnna nae purchasers lar valuable opnsruerauan, lne sale and purchase between lne 1- Defendant and me 2" lo 4* Detendanls (wllh me oonrplenan dale exrenaea) nan nan be completed, The ques1Iun men ls la wnp ls the purchase prlcelmunles as be paid lo? on the one hand,1he 12525 alluded to earlier such as Triple Zasl Tradlng A Supp" rs (supra) will suggest lnal me efiec1 of any lllegal lransanipn will result M’! ore 'losslles where /1 faIIs"arld Ihala parly cannot cialm enullemenl (mm an lllegal aci In my Vlew, applying «me, me 1‘ Delermanl oenalnly annot be erllltlefl to resmuuon In me amuunl pl me alleged loan sum ol RM500,5Il0 00, Does (ms however apply up lne redemplmn sum that was pald lo the bank lmne Bald pmpeny In my mew, lt smula nm and a drsuncuen eugnl to be made heiween a loan surn para la a barmwer as opposed |o a vadempllorl sum pald lo a third party bank. In me case of new ouang clung v. Tang Lee Hiuk rs. our [2020] 1 ms IB9B(alfrmed by me caun 0! Appeal ln Tang Lee Him: 5 on y. Veou Guang Chung [mu] 1 ms 1510), I| was slaled mal me rallanale cl not allcwlng an unlloensed mcneylenderm recover me money was “In aeler unlicensed rrlaneylenders lrprn corlllnumg wrrn merr nelariaus business, ll ls In me publlc rnreresr rpr unlicensed moneylenders to be depm/ed of [hell illegal 'prrncrpal loan sums‘, lnzeresl and wilalaval ill-gotten propefly or barre/7: sruoysd from znelr unlawvul molleytemiing busmsss‘. ln my eonsiuerep mew, the 1" Delenuanl wlll oenalnly be deprlvad pl lls rllegal pnrrclpal loan sum and inleresr and wlll nor be eruoylng the benelll at me sand pmpeny by me orders made so (at. In my eanaicereu ulew, bnarlng In mind anal lne sum ol RMa5o.non up was pald to Hang Leong Islamic bank to radeem me sild progeny, me 1-‘ Delemanlougnue rn Rw(1LlyOL1uSrvIy‘fl7mR:A Fun 47 er :2 -use s.r.l n-vlhnrwlll be used m van; was mlr.u.y mums dun-mm vu .nuua ma be aflnwed Io relam that sum as n cannot be eonsraered to bee pan at a principal Vaan sum ur mlevest [541 As such, ounsidenng an are above, u would order that upon paymenl of me lull purchase pnoa olRM1.4 million lo the 1-‘ Delendant,wh1<>‘I vs to he pad to the 1“ Deflendanfs sollmmr as stakehwder, Ihe 1“ Derenpenr rs enmled to retain RMa5o,ooo on being me redenrpupn sum paid Iolhe bank prevuusny and that me balance RM55u,uao.ao Is to be unrneeracely rransvenea lo we Plnmlm [as] A: mgnngmea eamer, all panes are In agreement that me 2"’ to 4"- Deaenuams are subsequent purchasers and woum have good me In me even! I were In find and mnc1udelhaH.hare are pone nae purdmasers cm varuame eunsrueraupn. an the [ads 01 we ease. smpe we purchase pnoe :71 me sad pmpeny was vuuy paid and proper seams and enquina done and proper mnvsyancmg uocumenxauons adhered to, I am sausned and nnd lha| me 2'“ to 4* Defendants are suhsequem bona flde purchasers lov vamable mnsudaralmn Funner, cpnnwrng me daemon or me coun auppeav m a recenr case rn anara Angknsa Sdn and e Chunk um Clluln a. on 12023] Muu 2545, which lads are sunuano me curlent. wl appears max me 2"" lo 4'" Defendants are subsequent bone flde purchasers for valuame eonsiuereupn and ough| Io retam men me. n wwttuyfluusmyfimakzn mun ar 51 we s.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm ms pnmnmly mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG wrm Cnnclus [56] In the upshot, me Courl makes me following conduslons and orders: i, The Pwamrm has suocessvuny pmven that lb: said sale and purchase Igraemenl mm Ihe I‘ Delendam was a sham to cloak an Illegal moneyxenamg tmnsadlan, u. The 2" to 4'" Ddeodums are hona fide purchasers for valuable canmemnon and 35 such he 2"‘ w 4” Dclendams are ennneu to me mu beneficial mlemsl ov me an prcpeny: and The sale and purduasa pm M RM1.4 mxllmn Is m be pm m cm 1* Delendanfs salimlnrs as per (ha sale and puruhnse ngruemenl balwaen the 1-‘ Dulanduru and ma 2nd to 4'” Defendlnls wneraby ma 1- Delendanl would be emmaa m mam I mm of RM850,DDO.DU bemg me redemption sum ha paid and me balance at RM550,0D0.0D to be paid to the Piamlfli through her soliuburs. [an In ugm oflhe pawhar (ads of me can. I wm not order any costs between the Plamlm‘ and the 15‘ Defendanl Haweven I nrder the ‘ sw wmxtuyfluusmyfivmkm am 49 al 5: «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Plainlimo pay the 2-1 |o 4*" Delendanls costs 07 RMSUUU oo subiecl Io allucalor name 5*" January 2924 1 VA A-una Fonnudurli Judg- Guorn-mm High Cuufl Punann Coun us): Ms Koay Ee Ten; nogemer with Mr. Koay cmm Hian fmm Messrs Koay Partnership (Bukil Meflajam) lonhe Plamlrfl. Mr John Khan Boo Lav mgemer with Ms Nurbandah Bl Ahmad from Messrs. Ismafl Khoo &AssociaIes(Penang)Iovme1" Defendanl Mv Teen Ban Choon Waller from Messrs. Winston Ng & Teoh |Pensng) nu ma 2"’ to 4" Detendams. sw wm\<1uyOuusmy‘a7mR:A me an :15! um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm “O5 442") In seek, amongsl olners. an Ordsrfovlhé pnvale caveallu be mai lalnealexlenaecl ‘ 51.1 2u2’2 Data‘ sn Tun Aha Malid km Dale‘ Hall run Harman who Ihen an 31* January 2u22 ardafed me said private caves: in be remuved Thee was no appeal ‘againsl such calm Older lo remove me said privale caveat. 18.6.2022 The 74-4“ Delendams signed me bouklnglorm and paid me eamasl depcsll of RM14,000.0D lor me punenase of H1: sald pmpeny. 21.5.2022 The 2'-1 -4" Delendanls uonauclea a land Search on the Said prnpeny wlnlelx reveals lne sxlslenoe 01 me Plalnlnrs private caveat. 15.1.2022 The 1“ and F Defendants execuifa lener of extension «or slgnlrrg me sale and purdlase agreemenl. 2l.7.2n22 The 2'“ and 4* Defendams execulea and accepted fol banking laahty [mm Malayan Eankmg Berhad for a loan l0 Purchase we saw: property. 3.5.2022 The 1' D?lem1anrs sollcllars, Messrs. cnee Sun A Assealales lnlormsd ma 2"‘ — 4“ Detenaanrs sollcllms, Messrs. Kham cnaow Pan 3. Asaauale: that me prwale caveal had lnaeea been remlwsd. SIN nmluvuuusmyarlanm me a alsz nine s.n.l I-vlhnrwm a. l... M may he nflfllnnflly ml. dun-mm v.. .nunc vtmxl c nfumd mo: Bftars Anqkasa Sdn and v Check Lam Cmlan L 01: [2023[MLJU 2545 Johals BiAbdu/Kad1‘rMarv‘can v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou &Ar1or[1980] 1 MLRA 355 Kuan Chee Jan .4 Ors v SSF Construction Sdn End [2016] MLJU 1173 Lee Kuang Gen 1/ Tan sn Da1o'Ssn Dr M Mshadsva/1 Mahalingam & Another Aupear [2023] 1 LNS 2410 Les Sook Cl-ung v Eden Rea/ty Sdn Bhd L Dr: [2021] MLJU 1020 uputan smulom Sdn Bhd v Psmbangunsn Drkid Desa Sdn and [2019] 4 ML] 141 Manmood bin Doyub V L} Ghee Leang and another sppesl [2020] 6 MLJ 755 Mend Na/‘I'D Yusafv Mak oflshore sdn EM 5 Ors (202314 MLRH 228 Pannrv Seivim afl Sfrmaryah & Ana v Tan Chia Foo 5 0m /2021] 7 MLJ 384 Ponsvrappan s/o Arunasa/am P1//ay v Periasamy s/n Sunamhsranm Pills: & Ar1or[20fl1]1 ML./U 742 Tan Kmv Knuan v Tan Kee K1ar(M[ Sdn Ehd (199511 CLJ SUPP 147 Tang Les Hlok 2; Or: v. Vsow Gusng cneng 12122216 MLRA 601 (202215 ML] 534 Tnp/e Z55! Tradmg & supptieu & 015 v App/lad Busmsss Tscnnolagm Sdn Bhd[2023] 10 cu 157 T511/am afl Tnsrsmalmgam {as repmonrams/admmrsuavor fol the estate cl Nsgarnulhu all Penasam}/, deceased) v Puma Bank BIn1(201B] 5 Mu 111 new Guang cnsng v Tang Lee Mok a. 015 12u2o]MLRHu 15.19 sw wm\<1uyOuusmy‘a7mR:A mg. 5; .15; um 5.11.1 ...m.mm be used m van; .. nrighvnflly mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Lg muons llfvnd National Land Code 1955, senior: 340 Evidence A<:f1950, Seclrons 101,102,103 IN Rwttuyfluusmyfimzfizn mm M 51 -um 5.11.1 ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG Wm as 2022 "me 2"“ — 4"*T3. ndanis signed and returned «he executed sale and Purchase ugreemam and Dlher j relavantdocumenis logelhlrwilh ma balanuedennsil nfRM34,DOD.DD(0lhB1“ Defendant. 1a.a.2o22 Tna aala and‘p‘un:nau agreemanl between the 1-' Defendanl and the 2"“ — 4» naiandania 1:: 10.2022 The nanaiar and charge of me said properly were registered IVI ma name at we 2"" » am naiandama pending me reiaase or me loan fun! the banana Purchase W109. 1a.1o2n22 The 2'“ — 4“ De1enda7i1s‘ so111:i1ors issued a Ienar requesiingiheirnnandei bank in release ma balance cuicnase price 2.11.2022 The Piainmi filed ma praaani aun agains1 me 1-‘ Defendant. 3.11 2022 A1 (he rsquesl d1 me 2”‘ — 4'” Deiendanrs flnanciev bank, the 2"‘ — 4" Defendants‘ solllflmrs Issued 5 lelw In me 1" Defendanfs solicitors to request for me relevant documenia penamlng |u Ihe withdrawal oi the private caveat. 11112022 ‘A1 me requw uv me 2"“ — 4'" Deienaanrs flnandsv ibank, me 2" — 4" Dziendams‘ soiiciiois issued a ‘bnar to me 1" Deiandanrs sdiiciiois 1o seek 1 am Rm\<1uyOuusmy‘i71a:R:A “Nana Smn1nuv1hnrwH1I>e .1... w my 1... nrW\nnU|:I am. dnuumnl 1.. .mm Wm! nauam tinfimattnn an wnettter then? was any pending IegaT ‘ proceeding agamsHl1e1“Deiendan|. 22 1 1 .2022 ' 2322023 The? * Devenuams so ots ssued a Vellertzu The 2-’ — 4'” Deiendsnts sollcilors renewed at lane? oteonnmtatton hunt the 1- Dafendanfs satienurs than there IS currently a legal pmeeeamg and/or dawn against the w- Defendant in respea af the sat: propeny by the Plstmm. the 1' De1endant‘ssoIiemors confirming the extension 0! the nomplelton at me sale and purchase agreement pendmg lha tasomtton of the wash! suit 3 3.2023 73 2023 23.3.2112: 12.6.2023 me Platmwrs solieitots, Messrs. Koey Parlnetship t\ssu% e leller to me 2“ — 4“ nevenaants‘ solicitors. Khaw Checw Puh 3. AssocIa|es tequesning tor the smlus M the sme Iransacunn between the 1‘ Defendant and the 2"“ — 4* netenasms. The PIainWs Khaw Cheow Poh ts Assuciales stalmg that the sale and Durchase agreement was pending I:omp\eI\an W 1 =t@oEt In add the 2'” |o 4' oetements as cndeiendanls tn ‘ ttus Sun 5E ma 1- ueiennanrs sohcitors oannmting lhal Ihey are agreeable to extend the uomp\enun oi ttte sale and pumtuse egteemeat untu 30.5.2024 ‘ sm fiwttuyfluusmyfimzkzn «mt. s.n.t...us.mm... mu cl 52 t... w my t... mm-y em. dun-mm VII nF\uNG Wm! In to be Trl d [9] A lnal was conduclad we! savaral days mm a total cl ewghl wuneem. Havmg read me parties‘ wnnan submissions, mare are Iwo pertinent msuee on he med/ueqaea a wnamar the sale and purchase agreement belwean ma Plavnlvfl and ms 1-‘ Deienaaru dated 7"- January mm was a snam to disguise an mega: muneylendmg lransanwon, and I: W so, vmelher the 2'-1 In 4* Devendams are suhsequam hana fide pumhasaus var valuame aensuderaziun no] These two mam vssues wfll be mnsmaraa hereinaflev Hauever. beflare \ do sa, I have not lcrgmten that the burden of proof lies on me Ptamlnfl lo prove her dam: agamsl me Delandanls on a balance of pmbamlmss as pmwded under Sm:tlom1D1.I02 and 103oHho Ev/ldanmAct 1950. [See uses auohara ax Abdul Kadlr Marlcln v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou 5 Anal [mo] 1 MLRA as nu Tan Kim Khuan v. Tan KI: Kiat mu Sdn an¢[1m11 cu supp 1m. [:1] ma P|a.nmrs con|an|\onsIsubmnasm\s .n essence can be summanzad as rauums a. as mere wt: 3 Voan vansacnon w-m mleresl charged, me I" Dafiendnm failed «a rabm me presumpum mu mars was a IN fiwuuyfluusmyfivmkm me 5 0451 we sn.‘ ...n.mm as used m mm ms nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa aF\uNG Wm moneylendirig lrerlsacliori bameen Lam Lnong and «he 1“ Deteridam. b. IhaHhe1"DS'BVldaMi7ld Foo Kok crierig ire owners mum Premier Consultancy Sdn Bhd who were irivuived in a riioneyleriaing aransacmn, c. man (here were urnisuai and suspieious cir::ums1ances in me purported saia afld purchase uansacnm 0! me said pmperty (or me loilomrig reasons- i. me Piainnw did rim receive any monies in respect 0! ma purcriase price imrri me 1“ Defendant including the apportionment oi outgoings, ii. a leller was dated urie same day as me dale of signing the sale aria punfiiase agleemefllcurlfifwllny mamie mu pumiase pnae ai RM1 35 rniuron have been «my paid. . (he purponad deposil paid by ciia 1- Defendant to ma Plairmir is conirary to me lemts in the sale and purchase agraainern umaa r" January 2019 iv lhe wmplelion period 01 vi: sale and pulmase ugreernenx look more than a year, y the Flainurl am no: receive a stamped oapy onria saia and puran-as agreemenl dalad 7'- January zone. ‘ SIN wwtiuyfluusrwymmkzn Vase mm 52 Nuns s.ii.i n-vihnrwm as used M mm i.. nflmrinflly siiri. dnnnvinril y.. nFiuNG WM!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-12A-94-12/2022

PERAYU Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan RESPONDEN Kiruba Raja A/l S.m. Kanagamany (Mej (R) Dr.)

TATACARA SIVIL: Rayuan dari Mahkamah Rendah ke Mahkamah Tinggi – Perbicaraan melalui keterangan afidavit – Saman Pemula − Tindakan undang-undang untuk menuntut milikan kosong Tanah yang dipajak oleh Responden/Plaintif dengan Tuan Tanah (Kerajaan Negeri Selangor) terhadap Perayu/Defendan – Lima isu untuk dibicarakan iaitu locus standi, initial entry into the land, new residential home built by the Defendant (Appellant), interference by the High Court, dan wrong mode of action – Perayu gagal untuk membukikan keterangan untuk menyangkal kes Responden − Pada peringkat rayuan, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak perlu mengusik dapatan fakta dan pemakaian undang-undang yang betul oleh Tn HMS – A. 89 k. 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

08/01/2024

YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e2a72df8-b821-4fcb-a653-89955f1bbbaa&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12A-94-12/2022 ANTARA DANEESWARAN A/L NAGAPPAN (No. K/P: 760728-01-5631) − PERAYU DAN KIRUBA RAJA A/L S.M. KANAGAMANY (MEJ(R) Dr.) (No. K/P: 540719-08-5031) − RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Shah Alam Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Guaman Sivil No: BA-B54-23-08/2022 Antara KIRUBA RAJA A/L S.M. KANAGAMANY (MEJ(R) Dr.) (No. K/P: 540719-08-5031) − Plaintif DAN DANEESWARAN A/L NAGAPPAN (No. K/P: 760728-01-5631) − Defendan) [Yang diputuskan oleh Tuan Azman bin Ahmad, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam pada 25-11- 2022] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan 08/01/2024 15:31:04 BA-12A-94-12/2022 Kand. 29 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [1] Kiruba Raja a/l S.M. Kanagamany [Mej (R) Dr.]/Plaintif memfailkan Saman Pemula di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam pada 5-8-2022 (Lampiran 1) berkenaan dengan perkara yang berikut terhadap Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan/Defendan: • tanah rizab yang dipegang di bawah P.A. 19083, No. Lot 2425 Mukim Batang Kali, Daerah Hulu Selangor, Selangor Darul Ehsan yang dalam Kawalan Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan diselenggarakan oleh Pengarah Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor yang memajak Plot ST 1 serta Plot ST 2 dan ST 4 Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Sg Tamu kepada Plaintif. • seksyen 62 dan 63 Kanun Tanah Negara (Akta 56/1965). • seksyen 7 & 8 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950. • prosiding terus untuk mendapatkan pemilikan tanah. • Aturan 7 dan Aturan 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [2] Perintah yang dipohon ialah – (a) Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain hendaklah masing-masing keluar dari Tanah tersebut dan menyerahkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan, keluarganya dan tiap-tiap orang lain kepada Plaintif termasuk memindah keluar barang Defendan daripada Tanah tersebut dalam S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 tempoh 8 hari dari tarikh penyerahan Perintah ini kepada Defendan. (b) Perintah ini adalah dianggap disampaikan kepada Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain yang menduduki Tanah tersebut dengan meninggalkan satu salinan Perintah di bahagian ketara Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan. (c) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk mengisukan writ pemilikan kepada pihak bailif atau pegawai Mahkamah yang relevan diperintahkan untuk menyebabkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif termasuk dengan menggunakan khidmat polis dan di mana perlu menggunakan kekerasan dalam melaksanakan writ pemilikan iaitu termasuk memecah apa-apa kunci pagar, pintu dan sebagainya bagi tujuan untuk mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut untuk Plaintif. (d) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk serta-merta memohon kepada pihak-pihak yang relevan untuk memotong dan menghentikan bekalan elektrik dan/atau air yang disambungkan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan dan orang lain. (e) kos tindakan ini ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah dan dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. (f) relief lain dan selanjutnya yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah ini. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [3] Saman Pemula ini disokong oleh afidavit sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Plaintif. Keputusan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (“Tn HMS”) yang bijaksana: [4] Pada 25-11-2022, melalui platform eReview, Tn HMS yang bijaksana telah membenarkan Saman Pemula ini dan kos dalam kausa. [5] Terkilan dan tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana, Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan/Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Keputusan rayuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi: [6] Pada peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah ini, Defendan merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana. [7] Pada 27-11-2023, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu/Defendan seperti yang berikut: Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah kepada keseluruhan tindakan, rekod rayuan, dan hujahan bertulis, Mahkamah ini mendapati keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dibuat menurut lunas undang- undang dan tiada kekhilafan fakta. Mahkamah ini mendapati 5 triable issues yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu/Defendan adalah – i. locus standi, ii. initial entry into the land, S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 iii. new residential home built by the Defendant (Appellant) with express authority of the Plaintiff (Respondent), iv. interference by the High Court, dan v. wrong mode of action, telah dibicarakan melalui keterangan afidavit dan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya. Mahkamah ini tidak perlu mengganggu dapatan fakta oleh Tn HMS. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu/Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM6,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dikekalkan. [8] Alasan penghakiman ini mengandungi sebab mengapa Mahkamah ini pada peringkat rayuan menolak rayuan oleh Perayu/Defendan dan sekaligus mengekalkan keputusan Tuan HMS yang bijaksana. Latar belakang fakta Afidavit sokongan: [9] Dalam afidavit sokongan, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa beliau ialah anggota Angkatan Tentera Malaysia berpangkat Mejar dan telah bersara. Selepas persaraan, Plaintif menjalankan aktiviti penternakan. [10] Plaintif memajak sebidang tanah dengan Kerajaan Negeri Selangor melalui Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor di Mukim Batang Kali iaitu 3 plot yang dikenali sebagai ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4. Plaintif S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 merujuk kepada 3 Perjanjian Pemajakan bertarikh 23-10-2002, 1-10-2008 dan 1-5-2009 (Ekshibit KR-3). Tempoh pemajakan dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian-Perjanjian tersebut. [11] Sejak Plaintif memajak Tanah tersebut, Plaintif telah mengusahakan dan menyelenggara Tanah tersebut untuk penternakan lembu dan aktiviti penanaman rumput, utiliti, laluan jalan, kandang lembu, rumah rehat untuk pekerja dan stor ladang. [12] Pada tahun 2016, Plaintif melantik Defendan sebagai pekerja lading untuk memandu lori dan menguruskan ternakan serta membantu kerja- kerja di ladang di Tanah tersebut. [13] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa rumah rehat tersebut digunakannya sebagai tempat untuk berehat sama seperti pekerja-pekerja ladang lain. Namun begitu, Plaintif mendapati Defendan telah menggunakan rumah rehat tersebut sebagai rumah kediaman dan bermastautin di rumah rehat tersebut serta stor ladang. [14] Alasan yang diberikan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif mengenai penggunaan rumah rehat tersebut sebagai rumah kediaman ialah kerana rumah Defendan jauh. [15] Plaintif telah menyuruh Defendan keluar dari rumah rehat tersebut namun Defendan enggan. Pada tahun 2017, tanpa kebenaran Plaintif, Defendan telah berpindah bersama seluruh keluarganya ke rumah rehat dan stor ladang. Defendan dan keluarganya menghuni dan mendiami rumah rehat dan stor ladang tersebut berlanjutan sehingga tahun 2020 dan 2021 di mana apabila Covid-19 melanda negara ini, Perintah S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Kawalan Pergerakan dikuatkuasakan dan ini membuatkan Defendan tidak berpindah dari rumah rehat dan stor ladang tersebut. [16] Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah menjual lembu ternakan, menyeleweng pendapatan ladang dan kerja di ladang semasa ketidakhadiran Plaintif ke Tanah tersebut semasa Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan dikuatkuasakan. Antara lain, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa bilangan lembu ternakan semakin susut, lembu ternakan kekurangan zat makanan dan sangat kurus, Defendan gagal menguruskan operasi ladang dan kenderaan ladang serta Defendan menyeleweng pendapatan yang diperoleh dari ladang tersebut. [17] Pada bualn Mei 2022, Plaintif mengambil keputusan untuk memberhentikan Defendan dan meminta Defendan dan keluarga keluar dari ladang. Plaintif ingin memulakan kerja pemulihan ladang ternakannya. [18] Pada tahun yang sama juga, Plaintif menerima tawaran untuk memasuki program pembangunan industri tenusu negara untuk penternak kecil. Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar telah memberikan 10 ekor lembu kepada Plaintif. [19] Tindakan Defendan yang menghalang Plaintif memasuki Tanah tersebut menyebabkan Plaintif menempatkan sementara 10 ekor lembu tersebut di ladang ternakan lain. Tingkah laku Defendan ini mengakibatkan Plaintif tidak dapat meneruskan usaha dalam penternakan lembu dan Plaintif mengalami kerugian yang besar. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [20] Oleh itu, Saman Pemula ini bertujuan untuk mendapatkan Perintah Mahkamah untuk Defendan mengosongkan dan memberi milikan kosong Tanah tersebut kepada Plaintif. Afidavit jawapan Defendan: [21] Defendan membantah dan memohon agar Saman Pemula ini dibatalkan dengan kos. [22] Perkara yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan ialah – (a) Defendan ialah bekas perajurit di Angkatan Tentera Malayisa yang telah bersara daripada perkhidmatan; (b) atas nasihat peguamnya, Defendan menyatakan bahawa terdapat 3 kriteria yang perlu dipenuhi oleh Plaintif bagi permohonan di bawah Aturan 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 iaitu – i. locus standi untuk memulakan prosiding ini. Plaintif tiada locus standi kerana tidak mempunyai pajakjan sah bagi plot ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4; ii. ketiadaan lesen atau persetujuan diberikan kepada Defendan yang masuk dan menduduki tanpa izin/persetujuan mana-mana pendulu dalam hakmilik daripadanya. Plaintif telah memberi izin, mempunyai pengetahuan dan kerelaan untuk membenarkan S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Defendan menetap di Tanah tersebut. Defendan bukannya penyewa; dan iii. Plaintif tidak mengenal pasti setiap orang yang menghuni Tanah tersebut dan tiada dalam afidavit Plaintif untuk mengenal pasti orang yang menghuni Tanah tersebut. Plaintif dalam afidavit sokongannya mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Defendan menduduki Tanah tersebut bersama isteri dan anak- anak, tetapi Plaintif gagal menamakan mereka dalam tindakan ini dan gagal menyatakan mengenai langkah- langkah munasabah untuk memperihalkan mereka; (c) atas nasihat peguamnya juga, Defendan dapat menyangkal Saman Pemula Plaintif ini jika Defendan dapat menunjukkan bahawa (i) kemasukan awal ke atas Tanah tersebut mestilah sah (“the initial entry upon the land must be lawful”); dan (ii) kewujudan sebarang kebenaran atau lesen yang nyata atau tersirat oleh pemilik yang mana pendudukan diteruskan (“the existence of any express or implied consent of license on the part of the owner pursuant to which the occupation continued”), jika Defendan dapat menunjukkan 2 kriteria bahawa terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan, maka prosiding terus dapat disangkal. Dalam kes ini, Defendan percaya bahawa terdapat isu dan fakta yang memerlukan perbicaraan penuh. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Dapatan fakta dan analisis undang-undang oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana Persoalan: Adakah keputusan Tuan HMS khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang? [23] Pada hahikatnya, tiada alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana. [24] Dalam prosiding di peringkat rayuan, peguam Perayu (Defendan) memberitahu Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa terdapat 11 surat permohonan untuk mendapatkan alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen telah banyak kali dibuat namun masih tiada alasan penghakiman tersebut. Manakala, peguam Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa mereka akan bergantung kepada hujahan dan otoriti yang difailkan sahaja. Analisis, Dapatan dan Keputusan [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan bertulis Perayu (Defendan) dan Responden (Plaintif). [26] Isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) ialah – (a) locus standi Responden (Plaintif); (b) Perayu (Defendan) bukan setinggan dan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut secara sah; dan (c) wujud isu untuk dibicarakan. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Hujahan Perayu (Defendan): [27] Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa Tanah tersebut adalah dimiliki oleh Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan diamanahkan kepada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Perayu (Defendan) menafikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) ialah pemajak tanah yang sah pada waktu Saman Pemula ini difailkan. [28] Perayu (Defendan) mendapat nasihat peguamnya dan menyatakan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) gagal membuktikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan Saman Pemula ini. Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut telah tamat pada bulan April 2022 dan tiada lanjutan pajakan dan dengan itu Responden (Plaintif) tiada locus standi untuk membawa tindakan Saman Pemula ini. [29] Bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) sendiri menunjukkan bahawa bayaran sewa untuk 3 plot Tanah iaitu ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4 ialah sehingga bulan April 2022. Perayu (Defendan) berjaya menunjukkan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) itu tiada apa-apa kepentingan ke atas Tanah tersebut dan Responden (Plaintif) bukan pemajak sah atas namanya pada Tanah tersebut. [30] Berkenaan dengan isu Perayu (Defendan) bukan setinggan dan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut secara sah; dan wujud isu untuk dibicarakan, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa Plaintif sendiri yang mencadangkan Perayu (Defendan) bekerja dengannya sebagai Pengurus Ladang dalam perniagaan Milikan Tunggal bernama Twin Cow Livestock (001536676-W) yang dimiliki oleh Responden (Plaintif). Twin Cow Livestock menjalankan perniagaan ladang tenusu. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [31] Responden (Plaintif) telah mengelirukan Mahkamah ini dengan fakta mengenai perkara yang berikut: (a) Perayu (Defendan). Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan fakta bahawa beliau ialah Pengurus Ladang Twin Cow Livestock dan disebabkan Responden (Plaintif) gagal untu membayar gaji bulanan Perayu (Defendan) iaitu dari tempoh Disember 2016 hingga Jun 2019, maka Responden (Plaintif) telah memaklumkan Perayu (Defendan) mengenai cadangan untuk membuat pampasan dengan menukar gaji yang belum dibayar ini kepada pelburan dalam Twin Cow Livestock yang mana Perayu (Defendan) diberikan milikan 20% saham Twin Cow Livestock dan juga keistimewaan tambahan. Atas dasar janji dan representasi Responden (Plaintif) itu, Perayu (Defendan) memasuki suatu perkongsian di mana pada 15-6- 2019, Responden (Plaintif) dan Perayu (Defendan) menandatangani Perjanjian Perkongsian. (b) rumah rehat yang ditunjukkan oleh Responden (Plaintif) dalam Ekshibit KR-4 itu tidak lagi wujud. Ini kerana dengan pengetahuan dan persetujuan penuh Responden (Plaintif), Perayu (Defendan) mempunyai hak di bawah Perjanjian Perkongsian untuk merobohkan rumah rehat itu dan seterusnya Perayu (Defendan) membina seuah rumah kediaman iaitu pada sekitar bulan Oktober 2016 bagi tujuan penginapan dan penggunaan Perayu (Defendan) dan keluarganya. Resit bagi kos pembelian pembinaan rumah kediaman diekshibitkan sebagai Ekshibit DN-4. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [32] Seterusnya, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa atas nasihat peguamnya, permohonan Responden (Plaintif) menurut peruntukan seksyen 7 dan 8 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 tidak mendedahkan sepenuhnya dan terus terang (“full and frank disclosure”) dan tidak datang ke Mahkamah dengan tangan yang bersih (“do not come to court with clean hands”). [33] Untuk menyokong penegasannya itu, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa terdapat komunikasi antara peguam Responden (Plaintif) dan peguam Perayu (Defendan) di mana Responden (Plaintif) telah menuntut tunggakan sewa sebanyak RM33,412.40 yang mana dinafikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Berdasarkan itu, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa adalah jelas yang Responden (Plaintif) mengakui bahawa status kewujudan Perayu (Defendan) di atas Tanah tersebut adalah sah dan bukan sebagai seorang setinggan. [34] Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa beliau telah membuat laporan polis bertarikh 28-4-20022 mengadu mengenai perkara yang berikut: • pihak sebenar yang meminta Perayu (Defendan) keluar/berpindah dari Tanah tersebut ialah seorang individu bernama Dr. Manikam dari Syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd yang telah membeli perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock. • terdapat 4 orang berbangsa India yang tidak dikenali meminta Perayu (Defendan) agar meninggalkan rumah kediamannya di tanah tersebut. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [35] Perayu (Defendan) percaya bahawa tindakan Responden (Plaintif) menyaman Perayu (Defendan) melalui Saman Pemula di bawah Aturan 89 ini ialah sebagai suatu jalan pintas (yang tidak sah) untuk mengusir Perayu (Defendan) dari rumah kediamannya di atas Tanah tersebut supaya penjualan perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock (yang dilakukan secara tidak sah) serta aset dan tanah yang dipegangnya dapat disempurnakan oleh Dr. Manikam dan syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd. Tindakan Responden (Plaintif) ini adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Sama ada Responden (Plaintif) berjaya menyangkal bukti Perayu (Defendan) mengenai isu/persoalan yang dibangkitkan? [36] Responden (Plaintif) menjawab persoalan mengenai perkara yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) seperti yang berikut: (a) Responden (Plaintif) ialah pemajak yang sah dari tahun 2002. Rekod bayaran pajakan dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-11. Sebagai pemajak, Responden (Plaintif) memunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas Tanah tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap Perayu (Defendan). (b) pada 2-3-2022, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor telah mengeluarkan surat kepada semua penyewa Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Hulu Selangor termasuk Responden (Plaintif) mengenai arahan pajakan. Antara lain, surat tersebut menetapkan syarat iaitu tempoh pajakan maksima selama 21 tahun akan diberi; semua kos permohonan ditanggung oleh penyewa/pemajak dan tidak S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 boleh mendirikan bangunan tanpa kebenaran Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Surat Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-12. (c) tiada bukti dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Responden (Plaintif) membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) tinggal di Tanah Tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) hanya membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut untuk menjalankan kerja penternakan dan bukan untuk menetap di Tanah tersebut. (d) pendudukan Perayu (Defendan) dan setiap orang dalam keluarga Perayu (Defendan) adalah tanpa kebenaran Responden (Plaintif). Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang mengunci pintu pagar untuk masuk ke Tanah tersebut telah menafikan akses Responden (Plaintif) ke Tanah tersebut. Saman Pemula ini memohon Perintah Mahkamah untuk Defendan dan semua pihak yang tidak mempunyai hak untuk menduduki Tanah tersebut supaya keluar dari Tanah tersebut dan memberikan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut kepada Responden (Plaintif). (e) Responden (Plaintif) menafikan yang Perayu (Defendan) ialah Pengurus (Manager). Perayu (Defendan) sama seperti pekerja-pekerja lain di ladang tersebut dan rumah rehat tersebut bukan untuk diduduki sebagai rumah kediaman. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (f) sebagai pekerja ladang berstatus warganegara Malaysia berbanding dengan pekerja-pekerja lain di ladang yang berstatus warganegara India, maka hanya Perayu (Defendan) sahaja diberikan kerja untuk memandu lori dan menguruskan penghantaran dan pengambilan barang ternakan. (g) berkenaan dengan perjanjian perkongsian yang dikatakan oleh Perayu (Defendan), Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa perkongsian itu hanya dalam bentuk draf perjanjian yang belum dimuktamadkan dan tidak diteruskan. Pendaftaran Twin Cow Livestock di SSM pada 19-5-2022 ialah Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemilik tunggal (“sole proprietorship”) dan nama Perayu (Defendan) tidak disenaraikan sebagai rakan konsi dalam perniagaan tersebut. Carian SSM syarikat Twin Cow Livestock dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-13. (h) pajakan Tanah tersebut ialah atas nama Responden (Plaintif) dan bukan atas nama syarikat perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock. (i) pembinaan rumah kediaman di atas Tanah tersebut adalah tanpa kebenaran atau permit daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Perayu (Defendan) tiada bukti untuk menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah ini bahawa suatu rumah kediaman yang sah dibina. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (j) perbualan antara Responden (Plaintif) dan Perayu (Defendan) melalui aplikasi WhatsApp tidak boleh dijadikan sebagai memberikan kebenaran dan memberikan hak kepada Perayu (Defendan) untuk menduduki dan menetap di Tanah tersebut sehingga enggan keluar apabila diminta oleh pemajak iaitu Responden (Plaintif). (k) permohonan Saman Pemula oleh Responden (Plaintif) ialah untuk mendapatkan balik milikan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang dipajak oleh Responden (Plaintif). Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang mengunci pintu ke Tanah tersebut telah menghalang Responden (Plaintif) dan/atau ejennya untuk memasuki Tanah tersebut bagi melakukan kerja pemulihan Tanah tersebut dan membaiki kenderaan. Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) ialah cuba mengambil Tanah tersebut secara menyalahi undang-undang. (l) tawaran daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor kepada Responden (Plaintif) untuk menyertai “Program Pembangunan Industri Tenusu Negara – Skop Program Transformasi Penternak Kecil” melalui surat bertarikh 17-2-2022 dan pada 23-2-2022 Responden (Plaintif) menerima tawaran tersebut. Seterusnya, 10 ekor lembu telah dihantar kepada Responden (Plaintif). Penempatan 10 ekor lembu tersebut di ladang ternakan lain secara sementara adalah akibat daripada tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang tidak membenarkan Responden (Plaintif) memasuki Tanah tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) tidak dapat meneruskan usaha dalam penternakan lembu dan Responden (Plaintif) S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 mengalami kerugian yang besar. Responden (Plaintif) melampirkan Ekshibit KR-14 yang mengandungi gambar lembu dan surat tawaran daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. (m) keengganan Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari Tanah tersebut menyebabkan Responden (Plaintif) menuntut sewa daripada Perayu (Defendan) dan menggesa Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari Tanah tersebut. [37] Berdasarkan kepada pernyataan Plaintif, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa segala kandungan dalam afidavit balasan Defendan adalah isu yang tidak relevan dengan tuntutan Plaintif. Defendan tiada hak untuk menduduki tanah tersebut dan isu yang dibangkitkan adalah untuk mengelirukan Mahkamah. [38] Dalam kes rayuan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan rayuan oleh Perayu (Defendan) berdasarkan apa yang dipaparkan pada kertas kausa, afidavit dan hujahan pihak-pihak. Ketiadaan alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana tidak sama sekali menyebabkan keputusan rayuan ini tersasar dari landasan keadilan. Status Tanah tersebut: [39] Peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menghujahkan bahawa pihak Responden (Plaintif) secara jelas mengemukakan latar belakang fakta secara salah dan mengelirukan khususnya mengenai pajakan yang dinyatakan oleh Responden (Plaintif). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [40] Peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menegaskan bahawa tidak wujud pajakan bermula dari tempoh pertama pajakan iaitu pada tahun 2002 hingga 2007 dan seterusnya 2008 hingga 2013. Rujukan dibuat ke atas Perjanjian Pajakan bagi Plot ST 2 dan ST 4. [41] Selain itu, peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut adalah ditukar daripada pemajak (“lessee”) kepada penyewa (“tenant”) dan juga daripada bayaran pajakan kepada bayaran sewa. [42] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa penegasan dan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menyerang pihak Responden (Plaintif) mengenai status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut. Pihak berkuasa dan pihak yang terlibat secara langsung dalam isu status Responden (Plaintif) ialah Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Tiada apa-apa tindakan undang-undang diambil oleh Tuan Tanah terhadap Responden (Plaintif) sama ada atas kausa kemungkiran bayaran pajakan mahupun penamatan pajakan. [43] Mahkamah menerima keterangan afidavit dan hujahan pihak Responden (Plaintif) yang berjaya membuktikan mengenai isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Isu − Status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut: [44] Keterangan afidavit Responden (Plaintif) gagal disangkal oleh Perayu (Defendan) iaitu – S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 • Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 has a lease up to 30/09/2023 whereas Plot ST 1 has a lease up to 30/04/2024 and both the leases are continuing and rental payments are being paid by the Respondent/Plaintiff as follows: (i) For Plot ST 1 the Lease Agreement is at pages 44-57 Records of Appeal dated 01/05/2009 and the lease is for 5 years up to 30/04/2014 under clause 1.1 Lease Agreement and extended for a further 15 years from 30/04/2014 to 30/04/2024. The relevant Exhibit is KR-3 at page 44 to 57 Record of Appeal, clause 1.1 at page 46 which grant the first 5 year and subsequent 15 years. (ii) for Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 the Lease Agreement is at pages 58–71 Record of Appeal and the lease is from 23/10/2002 to 23/10/2007 and subsequently extended from 01/10/2008 to 30/09/2013 and further extended from 01/10/2013 to 30/09/2023 this is at page 30 to 43 of the Record of Appeal particularly clause 1.1 at page 32 and further confirmed by an additional agreement dated 9 January 2023 which states that the lease is further extended to 30 September 2023. (Plots ST 1, ST 2 & ST 4 are stated as “said land”). • pursuant to the Lease Agreement the term of the lease for the said land is from 2002 until 2022 which is up to the date of the proceeding at the Sessions Court and still currently ongoing and rental payment for the said lease is shown on pages 119 for Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 and at page 120 for Plot ST 1 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Records of Appeal. • further, the Department of Veterinary Service [Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar] has send a letter dated 19/01/2023 to the Respondent/Plaintiff, Mejar (B) Dr. Kiruba Raja A/L S.M. Kanagamany which confirms that the Respondent/Plaintiff is the lease of the said land. Dapatan Mahkamah Tinggi: [45] Keterangan afidavit beserta dengan dokumen sokongan, Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada apa-apa fakta salah dan tiada fakta yang mengelirukan dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) dalam Saman Pemula ini. Isu − locus standi: [46] Isu locus standi bahawa Responden (Plaintif) tidak boleh membawa Saman Pemula ini kerana bukan berstatus pemajak adalah ditolak. Berdasarkan perjanjian pajakan dan perjanjian lanjutan pajakan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa status Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemajak adalah jelas maka isu locus standi gagal dipertahankan oleh Perayu (Defendan). [47] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “There is clear and unequivocal evidence to show that the Respondent is the lessee of the land namely Plot ST 1, ST 2 & S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 ST 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “said land”) from 2002 until now as stated above. The Appellant/Defendant had failed to even adduce a single shred of evidence to show that he and his family has the right, consent or licence to remain on the said land from the owners of the said land. The Appellant/Defendant’s only argument is that the Respondent/Plaintiff have no locus standi and have no right to evict the Appellant/Defendant. The Appellant/Defendant seems to only pick on the Respondent/Plaintiff but have on his own failed to adduce any evidence to show that he has the right, licence, or consent from the owners of the said land namely the Selangor State Government or Department of Veterinary Service who maintains the said land.”. [48] Walaupun dalam Saman Pemula tidak memplidkan mengenai status Perayu (Defendan) sabagai penceroboh Tanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini mendapati keengganan Perayu (Defendan) untuk keluar dari Tanah tersebut yang bukan miliknya dan terus menghuni, mendiami dan menduduki Tanah tersebut, maka hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah seorang “trespasser on the said land and remains there as a squatter without consent or licence from the Department of Veterinary Service or Selangor State Govt who are the owners of the said land” adalah tepat. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [49] Nas undang-undang dalam kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “Halimah bt Rahman v. Hassim bin Salahuddin & Ors [2010] MLJU 2016 case clearly states that a lessee of land can obtain an order for the recovery of his land which is wrongly occupied by a trespasser or squatter. In Sidek Bin Haji Muhamad & 461 Ors v. The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 313 case the Federal Court held that – “It is well established that a Court of equity will never assist squatters to resist an order of possession illegally acquired; it will never intervene in aid of wrong-doers”. The Federal Court further propounded using the principle in Grafton v. Griffin 39 ER 130, ‘The owner is not obliged to go to court to obtain an order of possession. He is entitled, if he so wishes to take the remedy into his own hands. ….. He can even use force, so long as he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary’ ”. [50] Perbezaan yang dibuat oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) antara kes ini dengan kes Shaheen Bte Abu Bakar v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [1998] 4 MLJ 233 adalah betul. Ini kerana dalam kes Shaheen, “PKNS who filed the O.89 Rules of Court 2012 application against Shaheen, had already sold the land to Puncak Alam and therefore PKNS did not have the locus to maintain the S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 application as they were not the owners at time of filing of the case; the land occupies by Shaheen and the other settlers was approved by the Selangor State Government who allowed the settlers to remain there, build a surau with approval and provided with water supply, roads and a community hall.”. Manakala dalam kes rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Perayu (Defendan) hanya sebagai pekerja kepada Responden (Plaintif) yang tiada apa-apa hak, kebenaran atau lesen daripada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor mahupun daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar untuk kekal di atas Tanah tersebut. [51] Tanah tersebut adalah milik Kerajaan Negeri Selangor yang diselenggara oleh Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar. Pemajak Tanah ialah Responden (Plaintif) di bawah perjanjian-perjanjian dan tiada apa-apa isu mengenai bayaran pajakan dan status sah Responden (Plaintif) sebagai Pemajak sah di sisi undang-undang. [52] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa jika pun status Responden (Plaintif) bukan sebagai Pemajah sah di sisi undang-undang, maka pihak yang boleh membawa tindakan ialah Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan/atau Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar. [53] Keterangan afidavit dan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) bahawa surat daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor (Department of Veterinary Service, Selangor) bertarikh 19/01/2023 kepada Responden (Plaintif) merujuk Plaintif sebagai lessee (….tuan selaku pemajak …..) Tanah tersebut. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [54] Selanjutnya, dalam surat tersebut, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar telah mengarahkan Respondent (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan apa-apa struktur kekal atau rumah bagi kediaman di atas Tanah tersebut dalam masa 30 hari. [55] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada nas undang-undang kes yang dikemukakan oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu Lebbey Sdn Bhd v. Chong Wooi Leong & Anor And Other Applications [1998] 5 MLJ 368 1 yang memutuskan – “1. (1) The registered owner of any land is prima facie entitled to possession of it, and any person claiming a right of occupation against such registered owner, such as in the case of the defendants, bears the burden of proving such right on a balance of probabilities (see p 373E-F). The state government, let alone any Minister, Exco member or politician has nothing to do with the proceedings under the Code, which recognizes only the state authority. The district officer is unknown to the Code. Therefore, the defendants not only entered the land without consent but had also remained thereon without the consent of the state authority. The knowledge or acquiescence of other state authorities or personalities is wholly irrelevant to the Code. The application of equitable principles and the doctrine of estoppel was therefore misconceived (see pp 374E-I and 375C); Government of the State of Negeri Sembilan & Anor v Yap Chong Lan & Ors [1984] 2 MLJ 123 followed. ... S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 3. (3) A person seeking remedy in equity must come with clean hands. It was clear that the defendants had been in breach of the Code punishable under s 425 thereof. The defendants could not be said to have come with clean hands. That the state authority had not acted against the defendants could not mean that the state authority had given consent. Such argument could not stand in the face of the clear provision that no title to state land shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under any licence for any period whatsoever. Therefore unless the Appellant/Defendant can show legally that he occupies the land under licence, he has no recourse under Shaheen Bt Abu Bakar’s case. [55] Mahkamah berpendapat isu lain yang dibangkitkan oleh perayu (Defendan) iaitu mengenai syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd yang telah membeli perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock, dan perkara yang berkaitan dengan perkongsian adalah isu sampingan yang gagal dibuktikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Keterangan afidavit yang dinyatakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) adalah keterangan fakta yang tidak bercanggah dengan keterangan dokumen yang menyokong, iaitu − • kedudukan Perayu (Defendan) sebagai pekerja Responden (Plaintif) selari dengan fakta bahawa dapat memasuki Tanah tersebut bagi urusan kerja di ladang ternakan. • kewujudan rumah rehat atau rumah untuk berehat di ladang tersebut adalah munasabah untuk mana-mana pekerja menggunakan fasiliti itu. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 • sebagai pekerja kepada Responden (Plaintif), penamatan pekerjaan oleh majikan iaitu Responden (Plaintif) bukanlah suatu tindakan yang tidak wajar. Apa yang tidak wajar ialah keengganan Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari ladang tersebut apabila tidak lagi berkhidmat dengan Responden (Plaintif). • penegasan Perayu (Defendan) bahawa beliau ialah salah seorang pemegang saham dalam Twin Cow Livestock adalah suatu yang tidak dapat dipertahankan. Ini kerana Responden (Plaintif) membuktikan bahawa perniagaan Twin Cow Lifestock ialah perniagaan milik tunggal Responden (Plaintif) dan ini jelas dalam maklumat carian SSM yang diekshibitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) dalam Ekshibit DN-1. • Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa perjanjian perkongsian tiada apa-apa kaitan dengan pemilikan Perayu (Defendan) ke atas Tanah tersebut. Tanah tersebut bukan dimiliki oleh Responden (Plaintif) maka hak yang terbit berkenaan dengan Tanah tersebut ialah antara Responden (Plaintif) dengan pihak Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. • Saman Pemula oleh Responden (Plaintif) ini berpunca daripada tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang enggan keluar dari Tanah tersebut. Sedangkan, apa yang berlaku ialah tawaran untuk menyertai Program Pembanginan Industri Taman Negara, menghendaki Responden (Plaintif) menggunakan Tanah tersebut bagi merelaisasikan Program S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 tersebut. [56] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dari peringkat mahkamah Sesyen lagi, Perayu (Defendan) menegaskan mengenai haknya untuk kekal menghuni dan menduduki Tanah tersebut. Namun begitu, tiada apa-apa bukti kukuh dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) mengenai haknya. [57] Dalam kes yang dirujuk oleh Perayu (Defendan) kes Bohari Taib & Ors v. Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor [1991] 1 MLJ 343, prinsip undang-undang yang hendak diguna pakai oleh Perayu (Defendan) adalah berbeza daripada kes yang dituntut oleh Responden (Plaintif). Dalam kes Bohari itu “the settlers have been given approval to remain on the land by the Selangor State Government as evidence was provided by documentary exhibits in their Affidavit”, walau bagaimanapun, dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Perayu (Defendan) gagal menunjukkan apa- apa keterangan dokumentar dalam afidavitnya bahawa Kerajaan Negeri Selangor mahupun Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) kekal dan mendiami Tanah tersebut. Isu – Rumah rehat dan/atau rumah kediaman: [58] Fakta mengenai Tanah tersebut adalah jelas daripada pernyataan Responden (Plaintif) yang memajak Tanah tersebut bagi tujuan penternakan. [59] Pernyataan Perayu (Defendan) yang menjual rumahnya dan kemudian membina rumah di atas Tanah tersebut di ladang tersebut, maka bukti mengenai kebenaran tuan punya tanah iaitu Kerajaan Negeri Selangor hendaklah dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Penggunaan S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 tanah pertanian dan dijadikan tanah untu membina kediaman hendaklah dibuktikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Kegagalan untuk membuktikan isu ini maka hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah seorang “trespasser and has illegally build a house on the said land without consent of the land owner” adalah tepat. [60] Kewujudan surat daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Vetinary Negeri Selangor bertarikh 19-1-2023 kepada Responden (Plaintiff) berkenaan dengan perjanjian pajakan dan perjanjian tambahan masing-masingnya bertarikh 11-10-2008, 1-5-2009 dan 9-1-2023, mengenai larangan membina apa-apa bangunan/rumah kediaman di Tanah tersebut dan menurut klausa 19 Responden (Plaintiff) diperintahkan untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman tersebut. [61] Mahkamah ini mendapati kegagalan Perayu (Defendan) untuk menghubungi dan/atau mengadu kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan/atau Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor untuk mencabar arahan yang diajukan oleh Responden (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman yang dibina Perayu (Defendan) dan seterusnya untuk mengekalkan rumah kediaman tersebut adalah suatu kegagalan Perayu (Defendan) yang amat ketara. [62] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan jawapan/balasan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) yang berjaya membezakan prinsip undang-undang dalam kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) dalam kes Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v. Tang Eng Ironworks Co.Ltd [1992] 2 MLJ 217. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [63] Mahkamah ini memetik semula hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “However having read the said case, it can be easily distinguish on the facts in Ting Ling Kiew’s case vastly differs from our case before this Honourable Court in that under TING’s case there are issues relating to fraud or intention to defraud as a central issue which is not the case here before this Honourable Court. The Appellant/Defendant only chooses to use the principle of the Ting Ling Kiew’s case to rely on their submission and does not state the actual reasons the said case were decided on such a manner. In reply to para 37 of the Appellant/Defendant the Respondent/Plaintiff avers that there are no conflicting facts in the matter and the non-availability of the grounds of judgement is not a factor for this Appeal to be allowed and neither has it caused injustice to the Appellant/Defendant as this Honourable Court is entitled to look into the entire facts of this case before arriving at a decision.”. [64] Walaupun ketiadaan alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana selepas dipohon oleh pihak Perayu (Defendan) dan pihak- pihak hanya bergantung kepada keseluruhan kertas kausa, afidavit, dokumen dan hujahan bertulis masing-masing, pada peringkat rayuan, fakta yang jelas mengenai status Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemajak yang sah di sisi undang-undang adalah kukuh. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [65] Pada peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi ini, Mahkamah ini tidak boleh mengusik fakta bahawa keberadaan Perayu (Defendan) di Tanah yang dipajak oleh Responden (Plaintif) daripada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor adalah suatu yang salah. Permohonan Responden (Plaintif) untuk “mengusir” Perayu (Defendan) adalah dibuat mengikut lunas undang-undang dan pematuhan Responden (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman di Tanah tersebut adalah juga mengikut lunas undang- undang. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa − “It would be an absurdity to the rule of law if the Appellant/Defendant who is a trespasser and a squatter on the Selangor State Government Land is allowed to remain on the said land without the consent or licence from the Selangor State Government or the DVS who maintains it as it will set a bad president. The Selangor State Government nor the DVS are not party to this matter as they have leased the said land Respondent/Plaintiff to carry out his cattle farming business. All the Respondent/Plaintiff is seeking through this suit is to remove a trespasser who is a squatter on the said land and therefore this Honourable Court should not disturb the decision of the sessions court.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [66] Hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah “plainly wrong” tanpa mendedahkan apakah keterangan untuk menunjukkan yang Tn HMS yang bijaksana itu khilaf di sisi fakta dan undang-undang. [67] Bagi perkara ini, keputusan kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) iaitu kes UEM Group Bhd v. Genisys Intergrated Engineering Pte Ltd [2010] MLJU 2225 dan kes Renal Link Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Harman Singh [1997] 2 MLJ 373 adalah tidak dinafikann di mana “the Appellate Court will not intervene with the decision of the trail court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving in its decision”; the Federal court on UEM’s case have set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision who interfered with trial court’s decision. Similarly in Renal Link’s case the Court of Appeal held that it would not be open to us to intervene and upset the finding of the trial judge.”. [68] Maka pada peringkat rayuan kes ini di Mahkamah Tinggi maka, keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen tidak boleh diusik/diganggu/dicampurtangan kerana tiada apa-apa substantial evidence dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) untuk menunjukkan bahawa terdapat “a grave mistake committed by the Sessions Court, the decision is plainly wrong, or the Sessions Court’s decision is a miscarriage of justice causing prejudice to the Appellant.”. Isu – mode yang salah digunakan oleh Plaintif: [69] Saman Pemula yang dibawa oleh Responden (Plaintif) dari awal hingga akhir iaitu keputusan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah mengikut mode yang betul. Responden (Plaintif). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 memfailkan Saman Pemula di bawah O.89 r.1 Rules of Court 2012 provides – “Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this Order.”. [70] Permohonan bagi prosiding di bawah O. 89 ialah suaimanfaat bagi mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut atas sebab yang berikut: (i) The Respondent/Plaintiff is the person in possession of the land by virtue of the lease agreement dated 11.10.2008 and 1.5.2009 and 9.1.2023 from DVS and Selangor State Government. (ii) The Appellant/Defendant is occupying the said land is not the tenant or tenant holding over. (iii) The Appellant/Defendant remained in accepting of the said land without licence or consent from the Selangor State Government or DVS or any pervious owner. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa “the Originating Summons under O.89 is the correct procedure to be used for the recovery of the said land from the Appellant/Defendant who is a squatter on the land.”. [71] Berkenaan dengan pengataan Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah penyewa kerana Responden (Plaintif) telah menuntut bayaran sewaan tertunggak sebanyak RM33,412.40, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dalam kes ini sememangnya tiada apa-apa perjanjian sewaan dimeterai dan dimasuki antara Plaintif dan Defendan. [72] Sebagai balasan kepada pengataan Perayu (Defendan), Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa “The demand made by the Respondent for RM33,412.40 is to claim for damages against the Appellant/Defendant for illegally occupying the land and denying the Respondent/Plaintiff right to the land. The Respondant has been paying rental for the lease to the Department of Vetinary Services and not being able to utilise the said land. The Respondent had suffered damages due to the illegal occupation of the said land by the Appellant/Defendant who had deprived the Respondent/Plaintiff from carrying out his cattle farm with the assistance of DVS. However the said claim for damages were not raised under this action as the claim under O.89 ROC 2012 is purely for summary possession of land and not for damages.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [73] Penelitian Mahkamah ini kepada keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah jelas bahawa tiada apa-apa ganti rugi diawardkan kepada Responden (Plaintif) terhadap Perayu (Defendan). Mahkamah merujuk kepada Perintah Mahkamah Sesyen bertarikh 25-11-2022 iaitu – (a) Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain hendaklah masing-masing keluar dari Tanah Plot ST 1 serta Plot ST 2 dan Plot ST 4 Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Sg Tamu di bawah Lot 2425, Mukim Batang Kali, Hulu Selangor, Selangor D.E. (Tanah tersebut) dan menyerahkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan, keluarganya dan tiap- tiap orang lain kepada Plaintif termasuk memindah keluar barang Defendan daripada Tanah tersebut dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh penyerahan Perintah ini kepada Defendan. (b) Perintah di sini adalah dianggap disampaikan kepada Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain yang menduduki Tanah tersebut dengan meninggalkan satu salinan Perintah di bahagian Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan. (c) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk mengisukan writ pemilikan kepada pihak bailif atau pegawai Mahkamah yang relevan diperintahkan untuk menyebabkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif termasuk dengan menggunakan khidmat polis dan di mana perlu menggunakan kekerasan dalam melaksanakan writ pemilikan iaitu termasuk memecah apa-apa kunci pagar, pintu S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 dan sebagainya bagi tujuan untuk mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut untuk Plaintif. (d) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk serta-merta memohon kepada pihak-pihak yang relevan untuk memotong dan menghentikan bekalan elektrik dan/atau air yang disambungkan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan dan orang lain. (e) kos dalam kausa. Campur tangan dan gangguan Mahkamah pada peringkat rayuan [74] Prinsip undang-undang mengenai appellate intervention only justified that on the available evidence, that the SCj is erred (Kes Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 146). [75] Dua ujian yang dikenal pasti perlu dipenuhi bagi tujuan appellate intervention adalah “plainly wrong test” and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence test” (the case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 98-99). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [76] Dalam kes Ong Leong Ciou & Anor v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at 329, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa – “[125] We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to the findings of facts made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demean our and credibility of the witness before him or her. Generally, such finding ought not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.”. [77] Dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa – “... an appellate Court should not interfere with factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial Judge was plainly wrong or one that no reasonable Judge could have reached. If it is not, the fact that the appellate Court may have reached a different conclusion on the facts, is irrelevant.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [78] Mahkamah ini mendapati penemuan fakta oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana adalah tepat mengenai prosiding di bawah O. 89 ini. Dapatan fakta dan pemakaian undang-undang oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah betul dan tidak khilaf kerana − (a) Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi sebagai pemajak untuk memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Perayu (Defendan). Perjanjian Pajakan dengan jelas dapat membuktikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) telah memasuki Lease Agreement di antara Kerajaan Negeri Selangor bersama-sama dengan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor (Landlord/Owner) dengan Responden sebagai Lessee. (b) Perayu (Defendan) gagal untuk mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan bahawa Perayu (Defendan) mempunyai lesen atau kebenaran untuk menduduki dan mendiami Tanah tersebut daripada Tuan tanah/Pemilik berdaftar Tanah tersebut. Kegagalan membuktikan pengataannya dan gagal menyangkal keterangan dokumentar Responden (Plaintif) maka Perayu (Defendan) itu ialah a trespasser and a squatter on the said land. (c) Tindakan melalui Saman Pemula ini di bawah O. 89 ROC 2012, bagi summary possession untuk Tanah tersebut yang dimulakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) adalah suatu mode yang betul berdasarkan fakta kes ini secara keseluruhannya. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (d) Perayu (Defendan) gagal untuk mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam adalah khilaf dalam keputusannya dan memutuskan secara tidak adil untuk Mahkamah Tinggi mengetepikan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dan untuk membolehkan Mahkamah Tinggi pada peingkat rayuan membenarkan rayuan Perayu (Defendan). Kesimpulan [79] Berdasarkan alasan yang saya nyatakan di atas, penghakiman saya memutuskan bahawa pada peringkat rayuan, saya telah menjalankan peranan rayuannya. Apabila dapatan fakta adalah teratur maka tafsiran dan pemakaian undang-undang statut dan kes oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana adalah tepat. Maka, Mahkamah ini tidak perlu mengganggu keputusan Tuan HMS yang bijaksana. Keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam dikekalkan. [80] Oleh yang demikian, rayuan Perayu (Defendan) ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM6000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur). Bertarikh: 8 Januari 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 Peguam cara: Bagi Perayu (Defendan): Nur Fatin Farzana binti Mohd Redzuan Tetuan Nazrin Nasir T Anand & Co., Kuala Kubu Bharu Bagi Responden (Plaintif): Ravindran A/L Ramanujam Tetuan Ravi Ram & Vjay Aziana, Kuala Lumpur S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

ND-83D-823-11/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMMAD SOLEHIN BIN SHAHRULNIZAM

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Offence of self-administration of dangerous drugs into body under section 15(1)(a) of Dangerous Drugs 1952 - Accused pleaded guilty to the charge - Accused is a young first-time offender - Sentencing - Factors to be considered in passing sentence according to law - Whether the sentence of fine is just and appropriate

08/01/2024

Tuan Uthman bin Abd Ghani

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64f9d8e9-9df4-4e41-8c1b-3fa313d3d1c1&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI PORT DICKSON DALAM NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS KES TANGKAP NO.: ND-83D-823-11/2023 PENDAKWA RAYA DAN MUHAMMAD SOLEHIN BIN SHAHRULNIZAM (NO. K/P: 040413050193) GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The accused in this case was arraigned before this court to answer for a charge under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which reads as follows: “Bahawa kamu pada 30/11/2021 jam lebih kurang 6.20 pagi bertempat di Balai Polis Lukut, Port Dickson, di dalam Daerah Port Dickson, di dalam Negeri Sembilan telah didapati memberikan kepada diri kamu sendiri dadah berbahaya iaitu amphetamine dan methamphetamine oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 15 (1) dan dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 38B akta yang sama. 08/01/2024 23:51:33 ND-83D-823-11/2023 Kand. 11 S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Hukuman: Jika disabitkan hendaklah didenda tidak lebih daripada lima ribu ringgit atau hukuman penjara selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada dua tahun. Hukuman seksyen 38B ADB 1952: Pengawasan selama dua tahun atau tiga tahun” [2] The accused pleaded guilty to the charge. I accepted his plea and convicted him on the charge. Upon hearing mitigating and aggravating submissions from the accused and the prosecution respectively, I then passed a sentence of fine in the amount of RM1,900, in default of which four months’ imprisonment. I also ordered the accused to be placed under police supervision for the period of 2 years from the date of the conviction. [3] The prosecution has now filed an appeal against the said order of sentence. This is the grounds of my said judgment. BACKGROUND [4] The facts of this case are simply this. On 30 November 2021, the accused was brought to Lukut Police Station in Port Dickson wherein his urine sample was taken, and it was found to be positive methamphetamine upon test. His urine sample was also sent to the Pathology Department in the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital for an analysis wherein it was later found that his urine sample contained dangerous drugs of methamphetamine and amphetamine. [5] On 6 November 2023, he was charged before this court. He pleaded guilty when the charge was read to him. I was satisfied that he understood S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 the nature and consequence of his plea. The prosecution then tendered the facts of the case and all relevant documents to support such facts to be marked by the court as exhibits. The accused admitted to the facts of the case and all of the exhibits. In the circumstances, I accepted his plea of guilty and convict him on the charge. I then proceeded to hear submission for the purpose of sentencing. [6] The accused was unrepresented and was not a man of many words. He pleaded the court to impose a small amount of fine as a punishment for his conduct. He also told the court that he has to take care of his ailing grandmother. [7] The prosecution on the other hand moved this court for a deterrence sentence to prevent the accused from repeating the same offence. The prosecution also submitted that the court ought to take into consideration the rampancy of this kind of crime. [8] At this juncture I must highlight what had become apparent in the face of documents before the court. Firstly, the accused in this case was a 17-years-old child when the offence was committed and was around 19 when he was charged. Secondly, the accused was a first-time offender in the absence of any records tendered by the prosecution to show that he has prior convictions. With these facts in mind, I then proceeded to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed. SENTENCING [9] In deciding the appropriate sentence to be imposed, I am minded by the starting point that the court has to exercise discretion to pass a S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 sentence according to law as provided, inter alia, under section 173(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is trite that the courts are bound by statutory ambits and established judicial principles in passing a sentence according to law (see: PP v. Jafa Daud [1981] 1 LNS 28; Tan Lay Chen v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 4 CLJ 492, [2001] 1 MLJ 135). I considered the following judicial principles in deciding the sentence against the accused. [10] The foremost of established judicial principles that I considered in respect of the accused is the public interest. Generally, sentences imposed by courts must have deterrence and preventive effect to the offender and the public at large. However, the ultimate service to the public interest is to turn offenders from criminal ways to honest living. The seminal authority on this point is Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102 quoting an English case as follows: “One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball 35 Cr. App. R 164 as follows: In deciding the appropriate sentence a Court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves to the Court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the Court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” [11] The accused in this case was a child when the offence was committed and can be categorized as youthful offender when charged before this court at the age of 19. His age as well as the fact that he was a first-time offender must be factored into the context of public interest. It is another established judicial principle that public interest is best served for young first offenders to turn into honest living if they are kept away from custodial sentence. The precedent on this point is the decision of the High Court in Teo Siew Peng & 4 Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1984] 1 LNS 71 where the following was held regarding young first offenders: “As stated, at the time of the commission of the offence, all the appellants were young offenders, none of whom was above the age of 19 years. They are also first offenders. I take note of what was stated in the judgment in Tukiran bin Taib v Public Prosecutor [1955] MLJ 24 that "it is very desirable that a young first offender who is between the ages of 17 and 21 should be kept out of prison, if S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 possible." In that case, it is true that instead of imprisonment the appellant was sentenced to an advanced approved school, but the emphasis is that in respect of young offenders, imprisonment should be avoided as far as possible. In this connection, I would also quote for the purpose of consideration a passage in The English Sentencing System by Cross (3rd Edition) at page 141 which, after reference to the English Advisory Council on the Penal System, quoted from paragraph 10 of "The length of Prison Sentence" as follows: "Prolonged and repeated imprisonment is destructive of family relationships and, by encouraging the prisoner's identification with the attitudes of the prison community, increases his alienation from normal society. In addition, long-term institutionalisation is all too likely to destroy a prisoner's capacity for individual responsibility and to increase the problems he must face when he returns to society." In the Principles of Sentencing by Thomas (1st Edition), quoting from the judgment in the case of R v Smith [1964] Crim LR 70 that publication at page 19 thereof states: "In the case of a young offender there can hardly ever be any conflict between the public interest and that of the offender. The public have no greater interest than that he should become a good citizen. The difficult task of the Court is to determine what treatment gives the best chance of realizing that object. That realization is the first and by far the most important consideration."” S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [12] Apart from the above, I have also considered as a mitigating factor the fact that the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge. Although plea of guilty would not automatically guarantee a discount in sentencing, it is only fair that in the absence of any aggravating factors such as bad record of prior convictions, the accused ought to be credited for his plea which has saved public time and money that would otherwise be spent for a prolonged trial in court (see: Public Prosecutor v. Ravindran & Ors [1992] 1 LNS 47). [13] In addressing the prosecution’s submission that this court ought to take into consideration the rampancy of the offence under section 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1950, I would simply echo the same sentiment in another Magistrates’ Court decision in PP v. Muhammad Asyraf Ayut [2019] 9 CLJ 565 at para [16] to [19]. There, it was illustrated that harsh sentences per se do not warrant prevention of narcotic cases in this country. I must add that at the end, sentences passed by courts must be tailored into the nuances of facts and circumstances in each case. [14] Having taken into considerations factors as discussed above, I came into the decision that the accused can be kept away from prison as long as a sentence of fine with appropriate amount is passed as opposed to a sentence of imprisonment per se. In deriving into the appropriate amount of fine, I have to strike balance between imposing small, inconsequential amount of fine and a heavy, hefty one. Imposing a small, inconsequential amount of fine would send a wrong message to the public that crime entails only a small price. On the other hand, imposing a heavy and hefty fine would only put further burden to the accused who would turn into criminal ways to find the amount of money or else being sent away to prison. S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [15] Therefore, I am of the view that fine in the amount of RM1,900 in default of which four months’ imprisonment is the appropriate amount of fine to be imposed. It is neither too small nor too high an amount to be paid by the accused in this case taking cumulatively into consideration the mitigating and aggravating factors discussed above. I also had in my mind the following words of Pedlow J in Lee Yu Fah & 5 Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1937] 1 MLJ 179: “If a general principle can be laid down, I think it should be that a fine should seldom be so excessive as to ruin completely the people on whom it is imposed and to make them mere outcasts in the country and potential criminals through the urge of necessity.” CONCLUSION [16] Having regards to the facts and circumstances of this case together with all mitigating and aggravating factors present, I am of the considered view that the just and appropriate sentence to be passed against the accused is a sentence of fine in the amount of RM1,900, in default of which four months’ imprisonment. Dated 8 January 2024 sgd ……….....………….………….. UTHMAN BIN ABD GHANI Magistrate Magistrates’ Court, Port Dickson S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 For the prosecution – Puan Nadia Ezzati Binti Mohd Zainal, Deputy Public Prosecutor For the accused – unrepresented S/N 6dj5ZPSdQU6MGzjE9PRwQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-12A-94-12/2022

PERAYU Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan RESPONDEN Kiruba Raja A/l S.m. Kanagamany (Mej (R) Dr.)

TATACARA SIVIL: Rayuan dari Mahkamah Rendah ke Mahkamah Tinggi – Perbicaraan melalui keterangan afidavit – Saman Pemula − Tindakan undang-undang untuk menuntut milikan kosong Tanah yang dipajak oleh Responden/Plaintif dengan Tuan Tanah (Kerajaan Negeri Selangor) terhadap Perayu/Defendan – Lima isu untuk dibicarakan iaitu locus standi, initial entry into the land, new residential home built by the Defendant (Appellant), interference by the High Court, dan wrong mode of action – Perayu gagal untuk membukikan keterangan untuk menyangkal kes Responden − Pada peringkat rayuan, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak perlu mengusik dapatan fakta dan pemakaian undang-undang yang betul oleh Tn HMS – A. 89 k. 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

08/01/2024

YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e2a72df8-b821-4fcb-a653-89955f1bbbaa&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12A-94-12/2022 ANTARA DANEESWARAN A/L NAGAPPAN (No. K/P: 760728-01-5631) − PERAYU DAN KIRUBA RAJA A/L S.M. KANAGAMANY (MEJ(R) Dr.) (No. K/P: 540719-08-5031) − RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Shah Alam Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Guaman Sivil No: BA-B54-23-08/2022 Antara KIRUBA RAJA A/L S.M. KANAGAMANY (MEJ(R) Dr.) (No. K/P: 540719-08-5031) − Plaintif DAN DANEESWARAN A/L NAGAPPAN (No. K/P: 760728-01-5631) − Defendan) [Yang diputuskan oleh Tuan Azman bin Ahmad, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam pada 25-11- 2022] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan 08/01/2024 15:31:04 BA-12A-94-12/2022 Kand. 29 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [1] Kiruba Raja a/l S.M. Kanagamany [Mej (R) Dr.]/Plaintif memfailkan Saman Pemula di Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam pada 5-8-2022 (Lampiran 1) berkenaan dengan perkara yang berikut terhadap Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan/Defendan: • tanah rizab yang dipegang di bawah P.A. 19083, No. Lot 2425 Mukim Batang Kali, Daerah Hulu Selangor, Selangor Darul Ehsan yang dalam Kawalan Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan diselenggarakan oleh Pengarah Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor yang memajak Plot ST 1 serta Plot ST 2 dan ST 4 Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Sg Tamu kepada Plaintif. • seksyen 62 dan 63 Kanun Tanah Negara (Akta 56/1965). • seksyen 7 & 8 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950. • prosiding terus untuk mendapatkan pemilikan tanah. • Aturan 7 dan Aturan 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [2] Perintah yang dipohon ialah – (a) Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain hendaklah masing-masing keluar dari Tanah tersebut dan menyerahkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan, keluarganya dan tiap-tiap orang lain kepada Plaintif termasuk memindah keluar barang Defendan daripada Tanah tersebut dalam S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 tempoh 8 hari dari tarikh penyerahan Perintah ini kepada Defendan. (b) Perintah ini adalah dianggap disampaikan kepada Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain yang menduduki Tanah tersebut dengan meninggalkan satu salinan Perintah di bahagian ketara Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan. (c) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk mengisukan writ pemilikan kepada pihak bailif atau pegawai Mahkamah yang relevan diperintahkan untuk menyebabkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif termasuk dengan menggunakan khidmat polis dan di mana perlu menggunakan kekerasan dalam melaksanakan writ pemilikan iaitu termasuk memecah apa-apa kunci pagar, pintu dan sebagainya bagi tujuan untuk mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut untuk Plaintif. (d) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk serta-merta memohon kepada pihak-pihak yang relevan untuk memotong dan menghentikan bekalan elektrik dan/atau air yang disambungkan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan dan orang lain. (e) kos tindakan ini ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah dan dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. (f) relief lain dan selanjutnya yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah ini. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [3] Saman Pemula ini disokong oleh afidavit sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Plaintif. Keputusan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (“Tn HMS”) yang bijaksana: [4] Pada 25-11-2022, melalui platform eReview, Tn HMS yang bijaksana telah membenarkan Saman Pemula ini dan kos dalam kausa. [5] Terkilan dan tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana, Daneeswaran a/l Nagappan/Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Keputusan rayuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi: [6] Pada peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah ini, Defendan merayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana. [7] Pada 27-11-2023, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu/Defendan seperti yang berikut: Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah kepada keseluruhan tindakan, rekod rayuan, dan hujahan bertulis, Mahkamah ini mendapati keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dibuat menurut lunas undang- undang dan tiada kekhilafan fakta. Mahkamah ini mendapati 5 triable issues yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu/Defendan adalah – i. locus standi, ii. initial entry into the land, S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 iii. new residential home built by the Defendant (Appellant) with express authority of the Plaintiff (Respondent), iv. interference by the High Court, dan v. wrong mode of action, telah dibicarakan melalui keterangan afidavit dan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya. Mahkamah ini tidak perlu mengganggu dapatan fakta oleh Tn HMS. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu/Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM6,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dikekalkan. [8] Alasan penghakiman ini mengandungi sebab mengapa Mahkamah ini pada peringkat rayuan menolak rayuan oleh Perayu/Defendan dan sekaligus mengekalkan keputusan Tuan HMS yang bijaksana. Latar belakang fakta Afidavit sokongan: [9] Dalam afidavit sokongan, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa beliau ialah anggota Angkatan Tentera Malaysia berpangkat Mejar dan telah bersara. Selepas persaraan, Plaintif menjalankan aktiviti penternakan. [10] Plaintif memajak sebidang tanah dengan Kerajaan Negeri Selangor melalui Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor di Mukim Batang Kali iaitu 3 plot yang dikenali sebagai ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4. Plaintif S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 merujuk kepada 3 Perjanjian Pemajakan bertarikh 23-10-2002, 1-10-2008 dan 1-5-2009 (Ekshibit KR-3). Tempoh pemajakan dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian-Perjanjian tersebut. [11] Sejak Plaintif memajak Tanah tersebut, Plaintif telah mengusahakan dan menyelenggara Tanah tersebut untuk penternakan lembu dan aktiviti penanaman rumput, utiliti, laluan jalan, kandang lembu, rumah rehat untuk pekerja dan stor ladang. [12] Pada tahun 2016, Plaintif melantik Defendan sebagai pekerja lading untuk memandu lori dan menguruskan ternakan serta membantu kerja- kerja di ladang di Tanah tersebut. [13] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa rumah rehat tersebut digunakannya sebagai tempat untuk berehat sama seperti pekerja-pekerja ladang lain. Namun begitu, Plaintif mendapati Defendan telah menggunakan rumah rehat tersebut sebagai rumah kediaman dan bermastautin di rumah rehat tersebut serta stor ladang. [14] Alasan yang diberikan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif mengenai penggunaan rumah rehat tersebut sebagai rumah kediaman ialah kerana rumah Defendan jauh. [15] Plaintif telah menyuruh Defendan keluar dari rumah rehat tersebut namun Defendan enggan. Pada tahun 2017, tanpa kebenaran Plaintif, Defendan telah berpindah bersama seluruh keluarganya ke rumah rehat dan stor ladang. Defendan dan keluarganya menghuni dan mendiami rumah rehat dan stor ladang tersebut berlanjutan sehingga tahun 2020 dan 2021 di mana apabila Covid-19 melanda negara ini, Perintah S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Kawalan Pergerakan dikuatkuasakan dan ini membuatkan Defendan tidak berpindah dari rumah rehat dan stor ladang tersebut. [16] Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah menjual lembu ternakan, menyeleweng pendapatan ladang dan kerja di ladang semasa ketidakhadiran Plaintif ke Tanah tersebut semasa Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan dikuatkuasakan. Antara lain, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa bilangan lembu ternakan semakin susut, lembu ternakan kekurangan zat makanan dan sangat kurus, Defendan gagal menguruskan operasi ladang dan kenderaan ladang serta Defendan menyeleweng pendapatan yang diperoleh dari ladang tersebut. [17] Pada bualn Mei 2022, Plaintif mengambil keputusan untuk memberhentikan Defendan dan meminta Defendan dan keluarga keluar dari ladang. Plaintif ingin memulakan kerja pemulihan ladang ternakannya. [18] Pada tahun yang sama juga, Plaintif menerima tawaran untuk memasuki program pembangunan industri tenusu negara untuk penternak kecil. Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar telah memberikan 10 ekor lembu kepada Plaintif. [19] Tindakan Defendan yang menghalang Plaintif memasuki Tanah tersebut menyebabkan Plaintif menempatkan sementara 10 ekor lembu tersebut di ladang ternakan lain. Tingkah laku Defendan ini mengakibatkan Plaintif tidak dapat meneruskan usaha dalam penternakan lembu dan Plaintif mengalami kerugian yang besar. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [20] Oleh itu, Saman Pemula ini bertujuan untuk mendapatkan Perintah Mahkamah untuk Defendan mengosongkan dan memberi milikan kosong Tanah tersebut kepada Plaintif. Afidavit jawapan Defendan: [21] Defendan membantah dan memohon agar Saman Pemula ini dibatalkan dengan kos. [22] Perkara yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan ialah – (a) Defendan ialah bekas perajurit di Angkatan Tentera Malayisa yang telah bersara daripada perkhidmatan; (b) atas nasihat peguamnya, Defendan menyatakan bahawa terdapat 3 kriteria yang perlu dipenuhi oleh Plaintif bagi permohonan di bawah Aturan 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 iaitu – i. locus standi untuk memulakan prosiding ini. Plaintif tiada locus standi kerana tidak mempunyai pajakjan sah bagi plot ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4; ii. ketiadaan lesen atau persetujuan diberikan kepada Defendan yang masuk dan menduduki tanpa izin/persetujuan mana-mana pendulu dalam hakmilik daripadanya. Plaintif telah memberi izin, mempunyai pengetahuan dan kerelaan untuk membenarkan S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Defendan menetap di Tanah tersebut. Defendan bukannya penyewa; dan iii. Plaintif tidak mengenal pasti setiap orang yang menghuni Tanah tersebut dan tiada dalam afidavit Plaintif untuk mengenal pasti orang yang menghuni Tanah tersebut. Plaintif dalam afidavit sokongannya mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Defendan menduduki Tanah tersebut bersama isteri dan anak- anak, tetapi Plaintif gagal menamakan mereka dalam tindakan ini dan gagal menyatakan mengenai langkah- langkah munasabah untuk memperihalkan mereka; (c) atas nasihat peguamnya juga, Defendan dapat menyangkal Saman Pemula Plaintif ini jika Defendan dapat menunjukkan bahawa (i) kemasukan awal ke atas Tanah tersebut mestilah sah (“the initial entry upon the land must be lawful”); dan (ii) kewujudan sebarang kebenaran atau lesen yang nyata atau tersirat oleh pemilik yang mana pendudukan diteruskan (“the existence of any express or implied consent of license on the part of the owner pursuant to which the occupation continued”), jika Defendan dapat menunjukkan 2 kriteria bahawa terdapat isu yang boleh dibicarakan, maka prosiding terus dapat disangkal. Dalam kes ini, Defendan percaya bahawa terdapat isu dan fakta yang memerlukan perbicaraan penuh. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Dapatan fakta dan analisis undang-undang oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana Persoalan: Adakah keputusan Tuan HMS khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang? [23] Pada hahikatnya, tiada alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana. [24] Dalam prosiding di peringkat rayuan, peguam Perayu (Defendan) memberitahu Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa terdapat 11 surat permohonan untuk mendapatkan alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen telah banyak kali dibuat namun masih tiada alasan penghakiman tersebut. Manakala, peguam Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa mereka akan bergantung kepada hujahan dan otoriti yang difailkan sahaja. Analisis, Dapatan dan Keputusan [25] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan bertulis Perayu (Defendan) dan Responden (Plaintif). [26] Isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) ialah – (a) locus standi Responden (Plaintif); (b) Perayu (Defendan) bukan setinggan dan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut secara sah; dan (c) wujud isu untuk dibicarakan. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Hujahan Perayu (Defendan): [27] Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa Tanah tersebut adalah dimiliki oleh Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan diamanahkan kepada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Perayu (Defendan) menafikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) ialah pemajak tanah yang sah pada waktu Saman Pemula ini difailkan. [28] Perayu (Defendan) mendapat nasihat peguamnya dan menyatakan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) gagal membuktikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan Saman Pemula ini. Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut telah tamat pada bulan April 2022 dan tiada lanjutan pajakan dan dengan itu Responden (Plaintif) tiada locus standi untuk membawa tindakan Saman Pemula ini. [29] Bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) sendiri menunjukkan bahawa bayaran sewa untuk 3 plot Tanah iaitu ST 1, ST 2 dan ST 4 ialah sehingga bulan April 2022. Perayu (Defendan) berjaya menunjukkan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) itu tiada apa-apa kepentingan ke atas Tanah tersebut dan Responden (Plaintif) bukan pemajak sah atas namanya pada Tanah tersebut. [30] Berkenaan dengan isu Perayu (Defendan) bukan setinggan dan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut secara sah; dan wujud isu untuk dibicarakan, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa Plaintif sendiri yang mencadangkan Perayu (Defendan) bekerja dengannya sebagai Pengurus Ladang dalam perniagaan Milikan Tunggal bernama Twin Cow Livestock (001536676-W) yang dimiliki oleh Responden (Plaintif). Twin Cow Livestock menjalankan perniagaan ladang tenusu. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [31] Responden (Plaintif) telah mengelirukan Mahkamah ini dengan fakta mengenai perkara yang berikut: (a) Perayu (Defendan). Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan fakta bahawa beliau ialah Pengurus Ladang Twin Cow Livestock dan disebabkan Responden (Plaintif) gagal untu membayar gaji bulanan Perayu (Defendan) iaitu dari tempoh Disember 2016 hingga Jun 2019, maka Responden (Plaintif) telah memaklumkan Perayu (Defendan) mengenai cadangan untuk membuat pampasan dengan menukar gaji yang belum dibayar ini kepada pelburan dalam Twin Cow Livestock yang mana Perayu (Defendan) diberikan milikan 20% saham Twin Cow Livestock dan juga keistimewaan tambahan. Atas dasar janji dan representasi Responden (Plaintif) itu, Perayu (Defendan) memasuki suatu perkongsian di mana pada 15-6- 2019, Responden (Plaintif) dan Perayu (Defendan) menandatangani Perjanjian Perkongsian. (b) rumah rehat yang ditunjukkan oleh Responden (Plaintif) dalam Ekshibit KR-4 itu tidak lagi wujud. Ini kerana dengan pengetahuan dan persetujuan penuh Responden (Plaintif), Perayu (Defendan) mempunyai hak di bawah Perjanjian Perkongsian untuk merobohkan rumah rehat itu dan seterusnya Perayu (Defendan) membina seuah rumah kediaman iaitu pada sekitar bulan Oktober 2016 bagi tujuan penginapan dan penggunaan Perayu (Defendan) dan keluarganya. Resit bagi kos pembelian pembinaan rumah kediaman diekshibitkan sebagai Ekshibit DN-4. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [32] Seterusnya, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa atas nasihat peguamnya, permohonan Responden (Plaintif) menurut peruntukan seksyen 7 dan 8 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 tidak mendedahkan sepenuhnya dan terus terang (“full and frank disclosure”) dan tidak datang ke Mahkamah dengan tangan yang bersih (“do not come to court with clean hands”). [33] Untuk menyokong penegasannya itu, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa terdapat komunikasi antara peguam Responden (Plaintif) dan peguam Perayu (Defendan) di mana Responden (Plaintif) telah menuntut tunggakan sewa sebanyak RM33,412.40 yang mana dinafikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Berdasarkan itu, Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa adalah jelas yang Responden (Plaintif) mengakui bahawa status kewujudan Perayu (Defendan) di atas Tanah tersebut adalah sah dan bukan sebagai seorang setinggan. [34] Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa beliau telah membuat laporan polis bertarikh 28-4-20022 mengadu mengenai perkara yang berikut: • pihak sebenar yang meminta Perayu (Defendan) keluar/berpindah dari Tanah tersebut ialah seorang individu bernama Dr. Manikam dari Syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd yang telah membeli perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock. • terdapat 4 orang berbangsa India yang tidak dikenali meminta Perayu (Defendan) agar meninggalkan rumah kediamannya di tanah tersebut. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [35] Perayu (Defendan) percaya bahawa tindakan Responden (Plaintif) menyaman Perayu (Defendan) melalui Saman Pemula di bawah Aturan 89 ini ialah sebagai suatu jalan pintas (yang tidak sah) untuk mengusir Perayu (Defendan) dari rumah kediamannya di atas Tanah tersebut supaya penjualan perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock (yang dilakukan secara tidak sah) serta aset dan tanah yang dipegangnya dapat disempurnakan oleh Dr. Manikam dan syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd. Tindakan Responden (Plaintif) ini adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Sama ada Responden (Plaintif) berjaya menyangkal bukti Perayu (Defendan) mengenai isu/persoalan yang dibangkitkan? [36] Responden (Plaintif) menjawab persoalan mengenai perkara yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) seperti yang berikut: (a) Responden (Plaintif) ialah pemajak yang sah dari tahun 2002. Rekod bayaran pajakan dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-11. Sebagai pemajak, Responden (Plaintif) memunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas Tanah tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi untuk membawa tindakan ini terhadap Perayu (Defendan). (b) pada 2-3-2022, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor telah mengeluarkan surat kepada semua penyewa Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Hulu Selangor termasuk Responden (Plaintif) mengenai arahan pajakan. Antara lain, surat tersebut menetapkan syarat iaitu tempoh pajakan maksima selama 21 tahun akan diberi; semua kos permohonan ditanggung oleh penyewa/pemajak dan tidak S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 boleh mendirikan bangunan tanpa kebenaran Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Surat Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-12. (c) tiada bukti dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Responden (Plaintif) membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) tinggal di Tanah Tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) hanya membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) memasuki Tanah tersebut untuk menjalankan kerja penternakan dan bukan untuk menetap di Tanah tersebut. (d) pendudukan Perayu (Defendan) dan setiap orang dalam keluarga Perayu (Defendan) adalah tanpa kebenaran Responden (Plaintif). Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang mengunci pintu pagar untuk masuk ke Tanah tersebut telah menafikan akses Responden (Plaintif) ke Tanah tersebut. Saman Pemula ini memohon Perintah Mahkamah untuk Defendan dan semua pihak yang tidak mempunyai hak untuk menduduki Tanah tersebut supaya keluar dari Tanah tersebut dan memberikan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut kepada Responden (Plaintif). (e) Responden (Plaintif) menafikan yang Perayu (Defendan) ialah Pengurus (Manager). Perayu (Defendan) sama seperti pekerja-pekerja lain di ladang tersebut dan rumah rehat tersebut bukan untuk diduduki sebagai rumah kediaman. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (f) sebagai pekerja ladang berstatus warganegara Malaysia berbanding dengan pekerja-pekerja lain di ladang yang berstatus warganegara India, maka hanya Perayu (Defendan) sahaja diberikan kerja untuk memandu lori dan menguruskan penghantaran dan pengambilan barang ternakan. (g) berkenaan dengan perjanjian perkongsian yang dikatakan oleh Perayu (Defendan), Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa perkongsian itu hanya dalam bentuk draf perjanjian yang belum dimuktamadkan dan tidak diteruskan. Pendaftaran Twin Cow Livestock di SSM pada 19-5-2022 ialah Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemilik tunggal (“sole proprietorship”) dan nama Perayu (Defendan) tidak disenaraikan sebagai rakan konsi dalam perniagaan tersebut. Carian SSM syarikat Twin Cow Livestock dilampirkan sebagai Ekshibit KR-13. (h) pajakan Tanah tersebut ialah atas nama Responden (Plaintif) dan bukan atas nama syarikat perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock. (i) pembinaan rumah kediaman di atas Tanah tersebut adalah tanpa kebenaran atau permit daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Perayu (Defendan) tiada bukti untuk menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah ini bahawa suatu rumah kediaman yang sah dibina. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (j) perbualan antara Responden (Plaintif) dan Perayu (Defendan) melalui aplikasi WhatsApp tidak boleh dijadikan sebagai memberikan kebenaran dan memberikan hak kepada Perayu (Defendan) untuk menduduki dan menetap di Tanah tersebut sehingga enggan keluar apabila diminta oleh pemajak iaitu Responden (Plaintif). (k) permohonan Saman Pemula oleh Responden (Plaintif) ialah untuk mendapatkan balik milikan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang dipajak oleh Responden (Plaintif). Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang mengunci pintu ke Tanah tersebut telah menghalang Responden (Plaintif) dan/atau ejennya untuk memasuki Tanah tersebut bagi melakukan kerja pemulihan Tanah tersebut dan membaiki kenderaan. Tindakan Perayu (Defendan) ialah cuba mengambil Tanah tersebut secara menyalahi undang-undang. (l) tawaran daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor kepada Responden (Plaintif) untuk menyertai “Program Pembangunan Industri Tenusu Negara – Skop Program Transformasi Penternak Kecil” melalui surat bertarikh 17-2-2022 dan pada 23-2-2022 Responden (Plaintif) menerima tawaran tersebut. Seterusnya, 10 ekor lembu telah dihantar kepada Responden (Plaintif). Penempatan 10 ekor lembu tersebut di ladang ternakan lain secara sementara adalah akibat daripada tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang tidak membenarkan Responden (Plaintif) memasuki Tanah tersebut. Responden (Plaintif) tidak dapat meneruskan usaha dalam penternakan lembu dan Responden (Plaintif) S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 mengalami kerugian yang besar. Responden (Plaintif) melampirkan Ekshibit KR-14 yang mengandungi gambar lembu dan surat tawaran daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. (m) keengganan Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari Tanah tersebut menyebabkan Responden (Plaintif) menuntut sewa daripada Perayu (Defendan) dan menggesa Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari Tanah tersebut. [37] Berdasarkan kepada pernyataan Plaintif, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa segala kandungan dalam afidavit balasan Defendan adalah isu yang tidak relevan dengan tuntutan Plaintif. Defendan tiada hak untuk menduduki tanah tersebut dan isu yang dibangkitkan adalah untuk mengelirukan Mahkamah. [38] Dalam kes rayuan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan rayuan oleh Perayu (Defendan) berdasarkan apa yang dipaparkan pada kertas kausa, afidavit dan hujahan pihak-pihak. Ketiadaan alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana tidak sama sekali menyebabkan keputusan rayuan ini tersasar dari landasan keadilan. Status Tanah tersebut: [39] Peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menghujahkan bahawa pihak Responden (Plaintif) secara jelas mengemukakan latar belakang fakta secara salah dan mengelirukan khususnya mengenai pajakan yang dinyatakan oleh Responden (Plaintif). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [40] Peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menegaskan bahawa tidak wujud pajakan bermula dari tempoh pertama pajakan iaitu pada tahun 2002 hingga 2007 dan seterusnya 2008 hingga 2013. Rujukan dibuat ke atas Perjanjian Pajakan bagi Plot ST 2 dan ST 4. [41] Selain itu, peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan bahawa status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut adalah ditukar daripada pemajak (“lessee”) kepada penyewa (“tenant”) dan juga daripada bayaran pajakan kepada bayaran sewa. [42] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa penegasan dan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menyerang pihak Responden (Plaintif) mengenai status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut. Pihak berkuasa dan pihak yang terlibat secara langsung dalam isu status Responden (Plaintif) ialah Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. Tiada apa-apa tindakan undang-undang diambil oleh Tuan Tanah terhadap Responden (Plaintif) sama ada atas kausa kemungkiran bayaran pajakan mahupun penamatan pajakan. [43] Mahkamah menerima keterangan afidavit dan hujahan pihak Responden (Plaintif) yang berjaya membuktikan mengenai isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Isu − Status Responden (Plaintif) ke atas Tanah tersebut: [44] Keterangan afidavit Responden (Plaintif) gagal disangkal oleh Perayu (Defendan) iaitu – S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 • Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 has a lease up to 30/09/2023 whereas Plot ST 1 has a lease up to 30/04/2024 and both the leases are continuing and rental payments are being paid by the Respondent/Plaintiff as follows: (i) For Plot ST 1 the Lease Agreement is at pages 44-57 Records of Appeal dated 01/05/2009 and the lease is for 5 years up to 30/04/2014 under clause 1.1 Lease Agreement and extended for a further 15 years from 30/04/2014 to 30/04/2024. The relevant Exhibit is KR-3 at page 44 to 57 Record of Appeal, clause 1.1 at page 46 which grant the first 5 year and subsequent 15 years. (ii) for Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 the Lease Agreement is at pages 58–71 Record of Appeal and the lease is from 23/10/2002 to 23/10/2007 and subsequently extended from 01/10/2008 to 30/09/2013 and further extended from 01/10/2013 to 30/09/2023 this is at page 30 to 43 of the Record of Appeal particularly clause 1.1 at page 32 and further confirmed by an additional agreement dated 9 January 2023 which states that the lease is further extended to 30 September 2023. (Plots ST 1, ST 2 & ST 4 are stated as “said land”). • pursuant to the Lease Agreement the term of the lease for the said land is from 2002 until 2022 which is up to the date of the proceeding at the Sessions Court and still currently ongoing and rental payment for the said lease is shown on pages 119 for Plot ST 2 and Plot ST 4 and at page 120 for Plot ST 1 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Records of Appeal. • further, the Department of Veterinary Service [Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar] has send a letter dated 19/01/2023 to the Respondent/Plaintiff, Mejar (B) Dr. Kiruba Raja A/L S.M. Kanagamany which confirms that the Respondent/Plaintiff is the lease of the said land. Dapatan Mahkamah Tinggi: [45] Keterangan afidavit beserta dengan dokumen sokongan, Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada apa-apa fakta salah dan tiada fakta yang mengelirukan dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) dalam Saman Pemula ini. Isu − locus standi: [46] Isu locus standi bahawa Responden (Plaintif) tidak boleh membawa Saman Pemula ini kerana bukan berstatus pemajak adalah ditolak. Berdasarkan perjanjian pajakan dan perjanjian lanjutan pajakan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa status Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemajak adalah jelas maka isu locus standi gagal dipertahankan oleh Perayu (Defendan). [47] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “There is clear and unequivocal evidence to show that the Respondent is the lessee of the land namely Plot ST 1, ST 2 & S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 ST 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “said land”) from 2002 until now as stated above. The Appellant/Defendant had failed to even adduce a single shred of evidence to show that he and his family has the right, consent or licence to remain on the said land from the owners of the said land. The Appellant/Defendant’s only argument is that the Respondent/Plaintiff have no locus standi and have no right to evict the Appellant/Defendant. The Appellant/Defendant seems to only pick on the Respondent/Plaintiff but have on his own failed to adduce any evidence to show that he has the right, licence, or consent from the owners of the said land namely the Selangor State Government or Department of Veterinary Service who maintains the said land.”. [48] Walaupun dalam Saman Pemula tidak memplidkan mengenai status Perayu (Defendan) sabagai penceroboh Tanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini mendapati keengganan Perayu (Defendan) untuk keluar dari Tanah tersebut yang bukan miliknya dan terus menghuni, mendiami dan menduduki Tanah tersebut, maka hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah seorang “trespasser on the said land and remains there as a squatter without consent or licence from the Department of Veterinary Service or Selangor State Govt who are the owners of the said land” adalah tepat. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [49] Nas undang-undang dalam kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “Halimah bt Rahman v. Hassim bin Salahuddin & Ors [2010] MLJU 2016 case clearly states that a lessee of land can obtain an order for the recovery of his land which is wrongly occupied by a trespasser or squatter. In Sidek Bin Haji Muhamad & 461 Ors v. The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 313 case the Federal Court held that – “It is well established that a Court of equity will never assist squatters to resist an order of possession illegally acquired; it will never intervene in aid of wrong-doers”. The Federal Court further propounded using the principle in Grafton v. Griffin 39 ER 130, ‘The owner is not obliged to go to court to obtain an order of possession. He is entitled, if he so wishes to take the remedy into his own hands. ….. He can even use force, so long as he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary’ ”. [50] Perbezaan yang dibuat oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) antara kes ini dengan kes Shaheen Bte Abu Bakar v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [1998] 4 MLJ 233 adalah betul. Ini kerana dalam kes Shaheen, “PKNS who filed the O.89 Rules of Court 2012 application against Shaheen, had already sold the land to Puncak Alam and therefore PKNS did not have the locus to maintain the S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 application as they were not the owners at time of filing of the case; the land occupies by Shaheen and the other settlers was approved by the Selangor State Government who allowed the settlers to remain there, build a surau with approval and provided with water supply, roads and a community hall.”. Manakala dalam kes rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Perayu (Defendan) hanya sebagai pekerja kepada Responden (Plaintif) yang tiada apa-apa hak, kebenaran atau lesen daripada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor mahupun daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar untuk kekal di atas Tanah tersebut. [51] Tanah tersebut adalah milik Kerajaan Negeri Selangor yang diselenggara oleh Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar. Pemajak Tanah ialah Responden (Plaintif) di bawah perjanjian-perjanjian dan tiada apa-apa isu mengenai bayaran pajakan dan status sah Responden (Plaintif) sebagai Pemajak sah di sisi undang-undang. [52] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa jika pun status Responden (Plaintif) bukan sebagai Pemajah sah di sisi undang-undang, maka pihak yang boleh membawa tindakan ialah Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan/atau Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar. [53] Keterangan afidavit dan dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) bahawa surat daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor (Department of Veterinary Service, Selangor) bertarikh 19/01/2023 kepada Responden (Plaintif) merujuk Plaintif sebagai lessee (….tuan selaku pemajak …..) Tanah tersebut. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [54] Selanjutnya, dalam surat tersebut, Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar telah mengarahkan Respondent (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan apa-apa struktur kekal atau rumah bagi kediaman di atas Tanah tersebut dalam masa 30 hari. [55] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada nas undang-undang kes yang dikemukakan oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu Lebbey Sdn Bhd v. Chong Wooi Leong & Anor And Other Applications [1998] 5 MLJ 368 1 yang memutuskan – “1. (1) The registered owner of any land is prima facie entitled to possession of it, and any person claiming a right of occupation against such registered owner, such as in the case of the defendants, bears the burden of proving such right on a balance of probabilities (see p 373E-F). The state government, let alone any Minister, Exco member or politician has nothing to do with the proceedings under the Code, which recognizes only the state authority. The district officer is unknown to the Code. Therefore, the defendants not only entered the land without consent but had also remained thereon without the consent of the state authority. The knowledge or acquiescence of other state authorities or personalities is wholly irrelevant to the Code. The application of equitable principles and the doctrine of estoppel was therefore misconceived (see pp 374E-I and 375C); Government of the State of Negeri Sembilan & Anor v Yap Chong Lan & Ors [1984] 2 MLJ 123 followed. ... S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 3. (3) A person seeking remedy in equity must come with clean hands. It was clear that the defendants had been in breach of the Code punishable under s 425 thereof. The defendants could not be said to have come with clean hands. That the state authority had not acted against the defendants could not mean that the state authority had given consent. Such argument could not stand in the face of the clear provision that no title to state land shall be acquired by possession, unlawful occupation or occupation under any licence for any period whatsoever. Therefore unless the Appellant/Defendant can show legally that he occupies the land under licence, he has no recourse under Shaheen Bt Abu Bakar’s case. [55] Mahkamah berpendapat isu lain yang dibangkitkan oleh perayu (Defendan) iaitu mengenai syarikat KM Vet Sdn Bhd yang telah membeli perniagaan Twin Cow Livestock, dan perkara yang berkaitan dengan perkongsian adalah isu sampingan yang gagal dibuktikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Keterangan afidavit yang dinyatakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) adalah keterangan fakta yang tidak bercanggah dengan keterangan dokumen yang menyokong, iaitu − • kedudukan Perayu (Defendan) sebagai pekerja Responden (Plaintif) selari dengan fakta bahawa dapat memasuki Tanah tersebut bagi urusan kerja di ladang ternakan. • kewujudan rumah rehat atau rumah untuk berehat di ladang tersebut adalah munasabah untuk mana-mana pekerja menggunakan fasiliti itu. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 • sebagai pekerja kepada Responden (Plaintif), penamatan pekerjaan oleh majikan iaitu Responden (Plaintif) bukanlah suatu tindakan yang tidak wajar. Apa yang tidak wajar ialah keengganan Perayu (Defendan) keluar dari ladang tersebut apabila tidak lagi berkhidmat dengan Responden (Plaintif). • penegasan Perayu (Defendan) bahawa beliau ialah salah seorang pemegang saham dalam Twin Cow Livestock adalah suatu yang tidak dapat dipertahankan. Ini kerana Responden (Plaintif) membuktikan bahawa perniagaan Twin Cow Lifestock ialah perniagaan milik tunggal Responden (Plaintif) dan ini jelas dalam maklumat carian SSM yang diekshibitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) dalam Ekshibit DN-1. • Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa perjanjian perkongsian tiada apa-apa kaitan dengan pemilikan Perayu (Defendan) ke atas Tanah tersebut. Tanah tersebut bukan dimiliki oleh Responden (Plaintif) maka hak yang terbit berkenaan dengan Tanah tersebut ialah antara Responden (Plaintif) dengan pihak Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor. • Saman Pemula oleh Responden (Plaintif) ini berpunca daripada tindakan Perayu (Defendan) yang enggan keluar dari Tanah tersebut. Sedangkan, apa yang berlaku ialah tawaran untuk menyertai Program Pembanginan Industri Taman Negara, menghendaki Responden (Plaintif) menggunakan Tanah tersebut bagi merelaisasikan Program S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 tersebut. [56] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dari peringkat mahkamah Sesyen lagi, Perayu (Defendan) menegaskan mengenai haknya untuk kekal menghuni dan menduduki Tanah tersebut. Namun begitu, tiada apa-apa bukti kukuh dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) mengenai haknya. [57] Dalam kes yang dirujuk oleh Perayu (Defendan) kes Bohari Taib & Ors v. Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor [1991] 1 MLJ 343, prinsip undang-undang yang hendak diguna pakai oleh Perayu (Defendan) adalah berbeza daripada kes yang dituntut oleh Responden (Plaintif). Dalam kes Bohari itu “the settlers have been given approval to remain on the land by the Selangor State Government as evidence was provided by documentary exhibits in their Affidavit”, walau bagaimanapun, dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Perayu (Defendan) gagal menunjukkan apa- apa keterangan dokumentar dalam afidavitnya bahawa Kerajaan Negeri Selangor mahupun Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar membenarkan Perayu (Defendan) kekal dan mendiami Tanah tersebut. Isu – Rumah rehat dan/atau rumah kediaman: [58] Fakta mengenai Tanah tersebut adalah jelas daripada pernyataan Responden (Plaintif) yang memajak Tanah tersebut bagi tujuan penternakan. [59] Pernyataan Perayu (Defendan) yang menjual rumahnya dan kemudian membina rumah di atas Tanah tersebut di ladang tersebut, maka bukti mengenai kebenaran tuan punya tanah iaitu Kerajaan Negeri Selangor hendaklah dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Penggunaan S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 tanah pertanian dan dijadikan tanah untu membina kediaman hendaklah dibuktikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). Kegagalan untuk membuktikan isu ini maka hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah seorang “trespasser and has illegally build a house on the said land without consent of the land owner” adalah tepat. [60] Kewujudan surat daripada Jabatan Perkhidmatan Vetinary Negeri Selangor bertarikh 19-1-2023 kepada Responden (Plaintiff) berkenaan dengan perjanjian pajakan dan perjanjian tambahan masing-masingnya bertarikh 11-10-2008, 1-5-2009 dan 9-1-2023, mengenai larangan membina apa-apa bangunan/rumah kediaman di Tanah tersebut dan menurut klausa 19 Responden (Plaintiff) diperintahkan untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman tersebut. [61] Mahkamah ini mendapati kegagalan Perayu (Defendan) untuk menghubungi dan/atau mengadu kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dan/atau Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor untuk mencabar arahan yang diajukan oleh Responden (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman yang dibina Perayu (Defendan) dan seterusnya untuk mengekalkan rumah kediaman tersebut adalah suatu kegagalan Perayu (Defendan) yang amat ketara. [62] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan jawapan/balasan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) yang berjaya membezakan prinsip undang-undang dalam kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) dalam kes Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v. Tang Eng Ironworks Co.Ltd [1992] 2 MLJ 217. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [63] Mahkamah ini memetik semula hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – “However having read the said case, it can be easily distinguish on the facts in Ting Ling Kiew’s case vastly differs from our case before this Honourable Court in that under TING’s case there are issues relating to fraud or intention to defraud as a central issue which is not the case here before this Honourable Court. The Appellant/Defendant only chooses to use the principle of the Ting Ling Kiew’s case to rely on their submission and does not state the actual reasons the said case were decided on such a manner. In reply to para 37 of the Appellant/Defendant the Respondent/Plaintiff avers that there are no conflicting facts in the matter and the non-availability of the grounds of judgement is not a factor for this Appeal to be allowed and neither has it caused injustice to the Appellant/Defendant as this Honourable Court is entitled to look into the entire facts of this case before arriving at a decision.”. [64] Walaupun ketiadaan alasan penghakiman disediakan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana selepas dipohon oleh pihak Perayu (Defendan) dan pihak- pihak hanya bergantung kepada keseluruhan kertas kausa, afidavit, dokumen dan hujahan bertulis masing-masing, pada peringkat rayuan, fakta yang jelas mengenai status Responden (Plaintif) sebagai pemajak yang sah di sisi undang-undang adalah kukuh. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [65] Pada peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi ini, Mahkamah ini tidak boleh mengusik fakta bahawa keberadaan Perayu (Defendan) di Tanah yang dipajak oleh Responden (Plaintif) daripada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor adalah suatu yang salah. Permohonan Responden (Plaintif) untuk “mengusir” Perayu (Defendan) adalah dibuat mengikut lunas undang-undang dan pematuhan Responden (Plaintif) untuk merobohkan rumah kediaman di Tanah tersebut adalah juga mengikut lunas undang- undang. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa − “It would be an absurdity to the rule of law if the Appellant/Defendant who is a trespasser and a squatter on the Selangor State Government Land is allowed to remain on the said land without the consent or licence from the Selangor State Government or the DVS who maintains it as it will set a bad president. The Selangor State Government nor the DVS are not party to this matter as they have leased the said land Respondent/Plaintiff to carry out his cattle farming business. All the Respondent/Plaintiff is seeking through this suit is to remove a trespasser who is a squatter on the said land and therefore this Honourable Court should not disturb the decision of the sessions court.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [66] Hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah “plainly wrong” tanpa mendedahkan apakah keterangan untuk menunjukkan yang Tn HMS yang bijaksana itu khilaf di sisi fakta dan undang-undang. [67] Bagi perkara ini, keputusan kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) iaitu kes UEM Group Bhd v. Genisys Intergrated Engineering Pte Ltd [2010] MLJU 2225 dan kes Renal Link Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Harman Singh [1997] 2 MLJ 373 adalah tidak dinafikann di mana “the Appellate Court will not intervene with the decision of the trail court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving in its decision”; the Federal court on UEM’s case have set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision who interfered with trial court’s decision. Similarly in Renal Link’s case the Court of Appeal held that it would not be open to us to intervene and upset the finding of the trial judge.”. [68] Maka pada peringkat rayuan kes ini di Mahkamah Tinggi maka, keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen tidak boleh diusik/diganggu/dicampurtangan kerana tiada apa-apa substantial evidence dikemukakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) untuk menunjukkan bahawa terdapat “a grave mistake committed by the Sessions Court, the decision is plainly wrong, or the Sessions Court’s decision is a miscarriage of justice causing prejudice to the Appellant.”. Isu – mode yang salah digunakan oleh Plaintif: [69] Saman Pemula yang dibawa oleh Responden (Plaintif) dari awal hingga akhir iaitu keputusan oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah mengikut mode yang betul. Responden (Plaintif). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 memfailkan Saman Pemula di bawah O.89 r.1 Rules of Court 2012 provides – “Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this Order.”. [70] Permohonan bagi prosiding di bawah O. 89 ialah suaimanfaat bagi mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut atas sebab yang berikut: (i) The Respondent/Plaintiff is the person in possession of the land by virtue of the lease agreement dated 11.10.2008 and 1.5.2009 and 9.1.2023 from DVS and Selangor State Government. (ii) The Appellant/Defendant is occupying the said land is not the tenant or tenant holding over. (iii) The Appellant/Defendant remained in accepting of the said land without licence or consent from the Selangor State Government or DVS or any pervious owner. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) bahawa “the Originating Summons under O.89 is the correct procedure to be used for the recovery of the said land from the Appellant/Defendant who is a squatter on the land.”. [71] Berkenaan dengan pengataan Perayu (Defendan) bahawa Perayu (Defendan) ialah penyewa kerana Responden (Plaintif) telah menuntut bayaran sewaan tertunggak sebanyak RM33,412.40, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dalam kes ini sememangnya tiada apa-apa perjanjian sewaan dimeterai dan dimasuki antara Plaintif dan Defendan. [72] Sebagai balasan kepada pengataan Perayu (Defendan), Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa “The demand made by the Respondent for RM33,412.40 is to claim for damages against the Appellant/Defendant for illegally occupying the land and denying the Respondent/Plaintiff right to the land. The Respondant has been paying rental for the lease to the Department of Vetinary Services and not being able to utilise the said land. The Respondent had suffered damages due to the illegal occupation of the said land by the Appellant/Defendant who had deprived the Respondent/Plaintiff from carrying out his cattle farm with the assistance of DVS. However the said claim for damages were not raised under this action as the claim under O.89 ROC 2012 is purely for summary possession of land and not for damages.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [73] Penelitian Mahkamah ini kepada keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah jelas bahawa tiada apa-apa ganti rugi diawardkan kepada Responden (Plaintif) terhadap Perayu (Defendan). Mahkamah merujuk kepada Perintah Mahkamah Sesyen bertarikh 25-11-2022 iaitu – (a) Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain hendaklah masing-masing keluar dari Tanah Plot ST 1 serta Plot ST 2 dan Plot ST 4 Taman Kekal Pengeluaran Makanan Sg Tamu di bawah Lot 2425, Mukim Batang Kali, Hulu Selangor, Selangor D.E. (Tanah tersebut) dan menyerahkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan, keluarganya dan tiap- tiap orang lain kepada Plaintif termasuk memindah keluar barang Defendan daripada Tanah tersebut dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh penyerahan Perintah ini kepada Defendan. (b) Perintah di sini adalah dianggap disampaikan kepada Defendan dan tiap-tiap orang lain yang menduduki Tanah tersebut dengan meninggalkan satu salinan Perintah di bahagian Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan. (c) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk mengisukan writ pemilikan kepada pihak bailif atau pegawai Mahkamah yang relevan diperintahkan untuk menyebabkan milikan kosong Tanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif termasuk dengan menggunakan khidmat polis dan di mana perlu menggunakan kekerasan dalam melaksanakan writ pemilikan iaitu termasuk memecah apa-apa kunci pagar, pintu S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 dan sebagainya bagi tujuan untuk mendapatkan semula milikan Tanah tersebut untuk Plaintif. (d) Mahkamah memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk serta-merta memohon kepada pihak-pihak yang relevan untuk memotong dan menghentikan bekalan elektrik dan/atau air yang disambungkan ke atas Tanah tersebut yang diduduki oleh Defendan dan orang lain. (e) kos dalam kausa. Campur tangan dan gangguan Mahkamah pada peringkat rayuan [74] Prinsip undang-undang mengenai appellate intervention only justified that on the available evidence, that the SCj is erred (Kes Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 146). [75] Dua ujian yang dikenal pasti perlu dipenuhi bagi tujuan appellate intervention adalah “plainly wrong test” and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence test” (the case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 98-99). S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [76] Dalam kes Ong Leong Ciou & Anor v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at 329, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa – “[125] We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to the findings of facts made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demean our and credibility of the witness before him or her. Generally, such finding ought not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.”. [77] Dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa – “... an appellate Court should not interfere with factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial Judge was plainly wrong or one that no reasonable Judge could have reached. If it is not, the fact that the appellate Court may have reached a different conclusion on the facts, is irrelevant.”. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [78] Mahkamah ini mendapati penemuan fakta oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana adalah tepat mengenai prosiding di bawah O. 89 ini. Dapatan fakta dan pemakaian undang-undang oleh Tn HMS yang bijaksana adalah betul dan tidak khilaf kerana − (a) Responden (Plaintif) mempunyai locus standi sebagai pemajak untuk memfailkan tindakan ini terhadap Perayu (Defendan). Perjanjian Pajakan dengan jelas dapat membuktikan bahawa Responden (Plaintif) telah memasuki Lease Agreement di antara Kerajaan Negeri Selangor bersama-sama dengan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Veterinar Negeri Selangor (Landlord/Owner) dengan Responden sebagai Lessee. (b) Perayu (Defendan) gagal untuk mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan bahawa Perayu (Defendan) mempunyai lesen atau kebenaran untuk menduduki dan mendiami Tanah tersebut daripada Tuan tanah/Pemilik berdaftar Tanah tersebut. Kegagalan membuktikan pengataannya dan gagal menyangkal keterangan dokumentar Responden (Plaintif) maka Perayu (Defendan) itu ialah a trespasser and a squatter on the said land. (c) Tindakan melalui Saman Pemula ini di bawah O. 89 ROC 2012, bagi summary possession untuk Tanah tersebut yang dimulakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) adalah suatu mode yang betul berdasarkan fakta kes ini secara keseluruhannya. S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (d) Perayu (Defendan) gagal untuk mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam adalah khilaf dalam keputusannya dan memutuskan secara tidak adil untuk Mahkamah Tinggi mengetepikan keputusan Tn HMS yang bijaksana dan untuk membolehkan Mahkamah Tinggi pada peingkat rayuan membenarkan rayuan Perayu (Defendan). Kesimpulan [79] Berdasarkan alasan yang saya nyatakan di atas, penghakiman saya memutuskan bahawa pada peringkat rayuan, saya telah menjalankan peranan rayuannya. Apabila dapatan fakta adalah teratur maka tafsiran dan pemakaian undang-undang statut dan kes oleh Tuan HMS yang bijaksana adalah tepat. Maka, Mahkamah ini tidak perlu mengganggu keputusan Tuan HMS yang bijaksana. Keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam dikekalkan. [80] Oleh yang demikian, rayuan Perayu (Defendan) ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM6000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur). Bertarikh: 8 Januari 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 Peguam cara: Bagi Perayu (Defendan): Nur Fatin Farzana binti Mohd Redzuan Tetuan Nazrin Nasir T Anand & Co., Kuala Kubu Bharu Bagi Responden (Plaintif): Ravindran A/L Ramanujam Tetuan Ravi Ram & Vjay Aziana, Kuala Lumpur S/N C2n4iG4y0mU4mVXxu7qg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-02(IM)-66-01/2022

PERAYU TUMPUAN MEGAH DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) ING BANK N.V. 2. ) O.W. BUNKER FAR EAST (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD

Whether a foreign arbitral award with its seat supposedly in UK may be registered as a judgment of the Malaysian High Court under REJA after it has been enforced as a judgement by the UK High Court. Whether the Judgment Debtor is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal as it has not applied to set aside the Arbitral Award nor opposed its enforcement in UK. Whether the passive remedy is available to the JD in the opposing the enforcement application under the Arbitration Act 2005. Whether the High Court should have allowed the directions for trial of the issue of fraud that goes to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal by way of a de novo hearing. Whether the issue of a lack of jurisdiction may also be raised in the Setting Aside REJA Application.

07/01/2024

YA Dato' Lee Swee SengKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Datuk See Mee ChunYA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin Mazlan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=38a10b4d-ce7d-46f4-9a0d-844f9c240480&Inline=true

1 of 57 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: W-02(IM)-66-01/2022 ANTARA TUMPUAN MEGAH DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD … PERAYU DAN (1) ING BANK N. V. (2) O.W. BUNKER FAR EAST (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur (Bahagian Kuasa-Kuasa Khas) Saman Pemula No.: WA-24-4-01/2021 Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 3, 4 dan 11 Akta Penguatkuasaan Penghakiman Bersaling 1954 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 28, Aturan 42 kaedah 12, dan Aturan 67 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; 07/01/2024 13:05:36 W-02(IM)-66-01/2022 Kand. 85 S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 of 57 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Keadilan, Mahkamah Perniagaan & Harta England & Wales, yang diperoleh dalam No. Tuntutan CL- 2020-000740 dan bertarikh 13.11.2020. Antara (1) Ing Bank N. V. (2) O.W. Bunker Far East (Singapore) Pte Ltd … Pemiutang-Pemiutang Penghakiman Dan Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd ... Penghutang Penghakiman S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 of 57 CORAM: LEE SWEE SENG, JCA SEE MEE CHUN, JCA MOHAMED ZAINI MAZLAN, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] The plaintiffs in the High Court below had applied for registration of a judgment of a UK High Court under our Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1958 (“REJA”). It is generally understood that in such an application, the defendant against whom the UK judgment had been obtained, cannot raise defence on the substantive merits of the plaintiffs’ claim. [2] However, the defendant argued that this particular case is different as the UK judgment had emanated from an Arbitral Award, supposedly with its seat in London and that under our Arbitration Act 2005 (“AA 2005”), any recognition and enforcement of the Arbitral Award in Malaysia may be objected to under s 38 AA 2005 on the grounds allowed under s 39, often referred to as the passive remedy. [3] The objection in this case is that there was no arbitration agreement at all as the alleged arbitration agreement was contained in two Invoices which the defendant argued before the Arbitral Tribunal to have been issued by the 2nd plaintiff fraudulently. Moreover, the relevant arbitration agreement is to be found in a set-off agreement between the parties wherein the seat of arbitration is not in London under the London International Maritime Arbitration Association (“LIMAA”) Rules but in Kuala Lumpur under the KLRCA Arbitration Rules. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 of 57 [4] The defendant contended that as the challenge goes towards the very jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, that challenge may be raised even at the Enforcement Court at Kuala Lumpur without an application being made to set aside the Arbitral Award at the Court where the seat of the Arbitration is said to be, in London. [5] The defendant further contended that its failure to oppose the recognition and enforcement of the Arbitral Award in the UK Court does not bar them from objecting to the recognition and enforcement of the Award at Kuala Lumpur. The defendant’s stand is that the plaintiffs cannot deprive it of the passive remedy available under s 38 AA 2005 even though the plaintiffs had chosen not to have the Award recognised and enforced under the AA 2005 but instead under what the plaintiffs perceived to be a more advantageous mode of enforcement under the REJA where the Enforcement Court would ordinarily not be allowed to go behind the foreign judgment in the defendant’s attempt to set aside the registration of the foreign judgment. At the High Court [6] The plaintiffs obtained an ex-parte order on 22.3.2021 for the foreign judgment to be registered in the High Court of Malaya. The defendant duly applied to the High Court on 27.4.2021 in Enclosure 17 for the registration to be set aside under sections 5(1)(a)(i), 5(1)(a)(ii), 5(1)(a)(iii), 5(1)(a)(iv), 5(1)(a)(v) and 5(3)(b) of the REJA (“the Setting Aside REJA Application”). [7] The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs are ING Bank N. V. and O.W. Bunker Far East (Singapore) Pte Ltd respectively and shall be referred to S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 of 57 collectively as the Judgment Creditors (“JCs”) or sometime as the 1st JC or the 2nd JC where the context requires and the defendant, Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd as the Judgment Debtor (“JD”). [8] Pending the hearing of the application to set aside the ex-parte order, the defendant applied in Enclosure 24 on 3.6.2021 under Order 67 rule 9(2) and/or Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”) for the following orders: (a) that the issues between the JCs and the JD be tried in any manner in which an action may be ordered to be tried under Order 67 Rule 9(2) of the ROC where oral and documentary evidence may be adduced as follows: (i) whether there was a contract between the parties which incorporates the O.W Bunker Group Terms and Conditions (OWB Terms) and the arbitration agreement contained therein; (ii) whether the 2nd JC was engaging in a money lending transaction with a third party, Straits Energy Ltd, that was being disguised as a purchase of marine bunker fuels by the 2nd JC from Straits Energy Ltd for delivery to the JD; (iii) whether there was an actual sale and delivery of marine gas oil from the 2nd JC to the JD; and S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 of 57 (iv) whether the English High Court Judgment was obtained by fraud in the circumstances of this case. (collectively referred to as “Potential Issues”); [9] Order 67 rule 9(2) of the ROC provides as follows: “(2) The Court hearing such application may order any issue between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor to be tried in any manner in which an issue in an action may be ordered to be tried.” [10] In the affidavit in support of the application, the defendant alluded to the issue of whether there was a contract that incorporates an arbitration agreement where the seat of arbitration is in London ought to be tried with oral and/or documentary evidence by this Court as the said contract in the two invoices were fraudulently issued. The 1st JC was a party to the arbitration by virtue of an assignment of the Invoices by the 2nd JC to the 1st JC as part of the security for the financing given by the 1st JC to the 2nd JC. [11] It was further alleged that the issue of whether the 2nd JC was engaged in a money lending transaction with a third party, Straits Energy Ltd, that was being disguised as a purchase of marine bunker fuels by the 2nd JC from Straits Energy Ltd for delivery to the JD when there was no actual sale and delivery of marine gas oil from the 2nd JC to the JD ought to be tried with oral and/or documentary evidence by the High Court below. [12] The JD argued that there are high authorities to support its contention that when the defence of passive remedy is raised with respect to the absence of a binding arbitration agreement with the result that the S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of 57 arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction, the High Court hearing the objection to the recognition and enforcement of an Arbitral Award must hear the matter afresh (de novo). It was also highlighted that though under the doctrine of kompetenze-kompetenze the Arbitral Tribunal may decide on its own jurisdiction, its decision cannot be final and is always open to challenge even at the recognition and enforcement of the Arbitral Award stage. [13] It was further highlighted that the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on its own jurisdiction, even if this involves finding of fact, has no legal or evidential value and that the High Court before which the issue of jurisdiction is raised, is duty-bound to hear the matter afresh and be independently satisfied that the arbitrator indeed has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. [14] As there is a conflict in the affidavit evidence on the validity and applicability of the arbitration agreement, it was argued that the special facts and circumstances of the case require oral and documentary evidence to be led. [15] The defendant in its affidavit further sought to persuade the High Court that expert witness and/or expert evidence on the standard documents for the purchase and supply of the marine bunker is required to determine the issues between parties including expert witness and/or expert evidence on English law. [16] The core of the challenge thus goes to the very jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. If there is no contract at all to begin with then there cannot be found an arbitration agreement in that which does not exist. It would be different from a case where there was a contract which was later S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 of 57 discovered to be illegal and void, in which case, it may be argued that the arbitration agreement may be severed or separated from the underlying contract and still survives as in having a life of its own. [17] On the other hand, the JCs argued that the issue of whether there is a valid arbitration in the two Invoices and whether these invoices were issued fraudulently or a sham had been ventilated before the Arbitral Tribunal and evidence had been adduced by both sides in support of their respective positions and the arbitrator had decided in the JCs’ favour. There was no application to set aside the Arbitral Award filed by the defendant in the English High Court and so the matter had become res. [18] The JCs also argued that the JD is estopped from resuscitating the issue of a lack of an arbitration agreement as the JD had not applied to set aside the Arbitral Award nor challenged the recognition and enforcement of the Arbitral Award granted by the High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts of England & Wales that had exercised jurisdiction to grant the Order dated 13.11.2020 in favour of the JCs. [19] The JCs’ argument found favour with the High Court and it dismissed the JD’s application for directions to be given for oral and documentary evidence to be adduced based on its failed argument that there was no arbitration agreement and hence the arbitrator has no substantive jurisdiction to hear the dispute. [20] The JD is the appellant before us and the JCs the respondents. Where appropriate the JCs are sometime referred to as the Award Creditors and the JD as the Award Debtor. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 of 57 In the Court of Appeal [21] On appeal, learned counsel for the JD reiterated that the sole question is whether the Setting Aside REJA Application ought to be heard with oral evidence. [22] Learned counsel for the appellant JD submitted that the learned High Court had erred in holding that the JD cannot challenge the validity of the arbitration proceedings or the UK Award in its Setting Aside REJA Application as these are irrelevant for the purposes of the registration of the UK Judgment. The appellant JD “should have taken steps to challenge it according to the avenues available under the UK Arbitration Act 1996 within the stipulated time period”. The High Court “as a registering court is not the forum to deal with these issues” (paragraphs 25 to 28 and 31 to 41 of the Grounds of Judgment). [23] It was further submitted that the High Court erred in holding that there was a lack of particulars relating to fraud on or before the UK Court and/or that the UK Court was deceived into granting the order (paragraphs 22, 29 to 30 and 40 of the Grounds of Judgment). [24] It is not disputed that the JD had participated in the London Arbitration subject to a reservation as to the jurisdiction of the London’s Arbitral Tribunal. After a 3 day oral hearing the Arbitral Tribunal delivered its Award in favour of the Award Creditors on both jurisdiction and merits. The Arbitral Award required the Award Debtor to pay the Award Creditors the sum of USD937,373.24 and costs of Arbitration of GBP105,535.00 together with interest. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 of 57 Whether the lack of jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal in an international arbitration may be raised by a JD in its application to set aside an ex-parte registration of a foreign judgment under the REJA when it has not applied to set aside the International Arbitral Award nor opposed its enforcement as a judgment of the UK Court in its seat in London [25] The learned Judge appeared to have proceeded from the premise that as the JD cannot be allowed to challenge at the High Court below the validity of the arbitration proceedings or the UK Arbitral Award, then the main and ultimate relief of setting aside the ex-parte judgment entered under the REJA cannot succeed in any event and would have to be dismissed. That being the case, then the application before it, which though interlocutory in nature as to a matter of procedure only, would have to be dismissed too as it would be pointless and an exercise in futility. [26] Convinced of the soundness of its approach, the High Court observed and concluded as follows: “34. It is trite that a court order is valid until it is set aside and that a positive step must be taken to set it aside. 35. The JD did not take any steps to challenge the Arbitral Award within the stipulated time period despite having had the opportunity to do so under section 67 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 nor did the JD take any steps to oppose the enforcement proceedings commenced by the JCs in the English High Court despite being well aware of the same. 36. It is clear that the UK Arbitration Act 1996 provides avenues for the JD to seek recourse where it is dissatisfied with the Arbitral Award. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of 57 37. Upon perusal of the cause papers filed, I find that the JD's explanations show that it was well aware of the avenues available to them under the UK Arbitration Act 1996 to challenge the Arbitral Award but have instead chosen to ignore the same at their own risk. … 41. To me, not only does this go against the very concept of comity and substantial reciprocity between the nations which is enshrined in the REJA, but it also goes against the doctrine of res judicata and estoppel.” (emphasis added) [27] With the greatest of respect to the High Court, the premise that it proceeded from is contrary to the approach that our Courts and others have taken when confronted with the same issue. One must not lose sight of the fact that with respect to arbitration and in this case the matter of recognition and enforcement of a foreign Arbitral Award, there is a specific statute governing it. It is the AA 2005 which specifically provides under s 8 thereof that: “No court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except where so provided in this Act.” [28] Matters of “Recognition and enforcement” of Arbitral Awards are governed by s 38 and “Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement” are expressly provided in s 39 of the AA 2005. It would appear that to proceed under the REJA would fly in the face of the clear language of s 8 AA 2005. For ease of reference, ss 38 and 39 of the AA 2005 are set out below: S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 of 57 “38. Recognition and enforcement (1) On an application in writing to the High Court, an award made in respect of an arbitration where the seat of arbitration is in Malaysia or an award from a foreign State shall, subject to this section and section 39 be recognised as binding and be enforced by entry as a judgment in terms of the award or by action. (2) In an application under subsection (1) the applicant shall produce- (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy of the award; and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of the agreement. (3) Where the award or arbitration agreement is in a language other than the national language or the English language, the applicant shall supply a duly certified translation of the award or agreement in the English language. (4) For the purposes of this Act, "foreign State" means a State which is a party to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958. 39. Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement (1) Recognition or enforcement of an award, irrespective of the State in which it was made, may be refused only at the request of the party against whom it is invoked- (a) where that party provides to the High Court proof that- (i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under any incapacity; S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of 57 (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of the State where the award was made; (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party's case; (iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration; (v) subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; (vi) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Act; or (vii) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made; or (b) if the High Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia; or S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 of 57 (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. (2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to the High Court on the grounds referred to in subparagraph (1)(a)(vii), the High Court may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security. (3) Where the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.” (emphasis added) [29] It is a reasonable proposition that registration of a UK Arbitral Award as a UK Judgment only allows enforcement of the Award as a judgment within the jurisdiction (i.e., in the UK only). It can thus be argued that such a registration does not extend to enforcement of an arbitral award as a judgment overseas. Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (“Lord Thomas”) in his expert opinion exhibited by the JD in support of its application opined as follows: “43. Section 66 of the 1996 Act must be construed in accordance with the purpose of the 1996 Act and the overall legislative scheme. The New York Convention has established a special regime for the enforcement of international arbitration awards distinct from the regime applicable to the enforcement of judgments of courts. Effect is given to that regime by sections 100-104. Section 66(4) makes clear that nothing in section 66 is to affect the recognition or enforcement of an award under any other S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 of 57 enactment or rule of law or under the New York Convention. Put in this context and in the context of the other matters I have set out, it is in my view clear that in section 66(1) the term "enforce as a judgment" means enforcement of the judgment within the jurisdiction. It does not encompass enforcement of an arbitral award as a judgment overseas, as the regime of the New York Convention is the regime for use for that purpose; the express provision in section 66(4) reinforces this construction. An Order made under section 66(1) and any judgment entered under section 66(2) in the circumstances of this case therefore cannot be relied on as enforcement for the purposes of the New York Convention. It is of course possible, that an overseas arbitration debtor will submit to the jurisdiction of England and Wales to contest an application under section 66(1) to enforce the judgment. If the arbitration debtor does so submit and the arbitration debtor fails and the court makes an Order for enforcement, then the arbitration debtor may be precluded from contesting enforcement elsewhere on the principles mentioned in Dallah. But that is the result of a decision after submission to the jurisdiction for the purposes of contesting enforcement. … 45. Thus, in my view it is clear that it is not within the scope of section 66 to use the process in that section to enforce the award in Malaysia. The provisions of the New York Convention were the provisions to be used for that purpose. The Order of Cockerill J therefore does not as a matter of English law determine the issue of the jurisdiction of the LMAA Arbitral Tribunal for the purposes of enforcement overseas and cannot be relied on as precluding TMD from asking the High Court of Malaya to determine that issue for itself.” (emphasis added) S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 of 57 [30] It is a given that an Arbitral Tribunal may decide on whether it has jurisdiction to hear the matter before it under the doctrine of kompetenz- kompetenz. However, its decision on its own jurisdiction is never final and it is always open to challenge in the Court of the Seat of the Arbitration (“the Seat Court”) or in the Court before which the Arbitral Award is sought to be enforced (“the Enforcement Court”) which would normally be where the assets of the losing party is found. [31] The challenge at the Seat Court by an Award Debtor in setting aside an Arbitral Award is referred to as active remedy as opposed to a challenge to resist the recognition and enforcement of an Arbitral Award by an Award Debtor, which is called passive remedy. Both the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (“the New York Convention”) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) regimes recognise the availability of the active and passive remedies. [32] The fact that our Parliament had allowed the same grounds under a setting aside of an Award under s 37(1) of the AA 2005 to be repeated in an application to oppose recognition and enforcement under s 39(1) would mean that Parliament does not consider the same grounds to be redundant. For ease of reference, s 37(1) of the AA 2005 is reproduced below: “37. Application for setting aside (1) An award may be set aside by the High Court only if- (a) the party making the application provides proof that- S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 of 57 (i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under any incapacity; (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of Malaysia; (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party's case; (iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration; (v) subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or (vi) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Act; or (b) the High Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia; or S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 of 57 (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia.” (emphasis added) [33] In Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Serdang Baru Properties Sdn Bhd and another case [2018] 12 MLJ 706 it was observed by the High Court at paragraph [23] that in a domestic arbitration, both an application for setting aside under s 37 and also a corresponding application under s 38 of the AA 2005 to recognise and enforce the Award, the Court would generally hear both applications together as one would be a flip side of the other in that if the Award is set aside then correspondingly it will not be enforced and conversely if not set aside it would generally be enforced. [34] However, in the case of an international arbitration, the setting aside is at the Court where the seat of arbitration is which may well be different from the jurisdiction where a party may want to enforce an Award in its favour. An Award for instance may be against the public policy of the State where the Award is sought to be enforced though the same Award is not successfully set aside by the Court where the seat of arbitration is or even when the Award has been enforced in the Seat Court. See paragraph [24] of Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko (supra). [35] As both sections 37 and 39 of the AA 2005 are applicable to international arbitration as well, it would appear that generally there is no bar to an award debtor who did not apply to set aside an Arbitral Award, to later oppose an Enforcement Application under s 39 AA 2005 and to raise the issue of a lack of jurisdiction because of the absence of a valid arbitration agreement. A challenge to an Arbitral Award may be by way S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 of 57 of setting aside the Arbitral Award in the Seat Court or to oppose or resist enforcement in the Enforcement Court. See paragraph [26] of Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko (supra). [36] Our Supreme Court, as far back as the case of the State Government of Sarawak v Chin Hwa Engineering Development Company [1995] 3 MLJ 237, had recognised passive remedy even under the old Arbitration Act 1952. His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ observed at page 245 as follows: “We agree, that in certain circumstances, a party may avail himself of a passive remedy by which is meant he does not take the initiative to attack an award, but simply waits until his opponent seeks to enforce the award by action or summary process, when he resists enforcement. Mustill and Boyd on Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed) at p 546 have instanced two situations when the passive remedy would be available; namely: (1) where the award is so defective in form or substance that it is incapable of enforcement; (2) where the whole or part of the award is ineffective, on the ground that the relief granted lies outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.” [37] The Singapore Court of Appeal wrestled with this issue of “passive remedy” in PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV and Ors [2013] SGCA 57; [2014] 1 SLR 372 and delved deep into their legislative history of its International Arbitration Act and recognised its applicability under the Singapore arbitration regime in resisting an application to enforce an international Arbitral Award. This is because s 3(1) of their Act provides that the Model Law, with the exception of Chapter VIII of the Model Law, has the force of law in Singapore. Article 36 of the Model Law on enforcement of an arbitral award is in Chapter VIII. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 of 57 [38] The Chief Justice of Singapore Sundaresh Menon CJ in writing for their Court of Appeal in PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV and Ors (supra) concluded as follows: “84. As we have held, the content of the power to refuse enforcement under s 19 must be construed in accordance with the purpose of the IAA which, as we have stated, is to embrace the Model Law. Given that de- emphasising the seat of arbitration by maintaining the award debtor’s ‘choice of remedies’ and alignment with the grounds under the New York Convention are the pervading themes under the enforcement regime of the Model Law, the most efficacious method of giving full effect to the Model Law philosophy would, in our view, be to recognise that the same grounds for resisting enforcement under art 36(1) are equally available to a party resisting enforcement under s 19 of the IAA.” [39] For us, Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is reproduced in our s 39 AA 2005 and as was observed in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko’s case (supra): “[33] …The reproduction in section 39 following the same grounds in a setting aside of an award under section 37 cannot be for decorative purposes but for the deliberate design of permitting the same grounds not raised because there was no previous application to set aside under section 37 to be raised in resisting or opposing an application under section 39 of the AA 2005. The repetition of the same grounds has nothing to do with it being redundant but everything to do with reiteration as in making those same grounds available in resisting an enforcement application under section 39 of the AA 2005.” [40] Thus, there is no place for the Award Creditors to argue that res judicata applies in that the JD could have applied to set aside the Arbitral Award at the seat of the arbitration in London but chose not to and thus is S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 of 57 barred or estopped from objecting to the enforcement of the Arbitral Award now in the High Court of Malaya. [41] Neither is it a valid ground for the Award Creditors to say that since the Award Debtor did not resist the enforcement of the Arbitral Award in London, then it is estopped from objecting it now in the Malaysian High Court. Availability of the passive remedy debunks the argument of res judicata or issue estoppel having set in. [42] This was precisely the argument raised by the appellant in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, [2012] EWHC 3518 (Comm) where the UK Supreme Court speaking through Lord Mance had no compunction in dismissing it as follows: “[22] …Second, Dallah’s case quotes extensively from Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (1999) para 658, pointing out that arbitral tribunals are free to rule on their own jurisdiction, but ignores the ensuring para 659, which says, pertinently, that: ‘Even today, the competence-competence principle is all too often interpreted as empowering the arbitrators to be the sole judges of their jurisdiction. That would be neither logical nor acceptable. In fact, the real purpose of the rule is in no way to leave the question of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction in the hands of the arbitrators alone. Their jurisdiction must instead be reviewed by the courts if an action is brought to set aside or to enforce the award.’ [23] In its written case Dallah also argued that the first partial award gave rise, under English law, to an issue estoppel on the issue of jurisdiction, having regard to the government’s deliberate decision not to S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 of 57 institute proceedings in France to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction to make any of its awards. This was abandoned as a separate point by Miss Heilbron in her oral submission before the Supreme Court, under reference to the government’s recent application to set aside the tribunal’s awards in France. But, in my judgment, the argument based on issue estoppel was always doomed to fail. A person who denies being party to any relevant arbitration agreement has no obligation to participate in the arbitration or to take any steps in the country of the seat of what he maintains to be an invalid arbitration leading to an invalid award against him. The party initiating the arbitration must try to enforce the award where it can. Only then and there is it incumbent on the defendant denying the existence of any valid award to resist enforcement.” (emphasis added) [43] Even Part Two of the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006 has this helpful information on its Article 16 on which our s 18 of the AA 2005 is copied from or modelled after: “4. Jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal (a) Competence to rule on own jurisdiction 25. Article 16 (1) adopts the two important (not yet generally recognized) principles of “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” and of separability or autonomy of the arbitration clause.“ Kompetenz-Kompetenz” means that the arbitral tribunal may independently rule on the question of whether it has jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, without having to resort to a court. Separability means that an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. As a consequence, a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 of 57 and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. Detailed provisions in paragraph (2) require that any objections relating to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction be made at the earliest possible time. 26. The competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction (i.e. on the foundation, content and extent of its mandate and power) is, of course, subject to court control. Where the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, article 16 (3) allows for immediate court control in order to avoid waste of time and money. However, three procedural safeguards are added to reduce the risk and effect of dilatory tactics: short time-period for resort to court (30 days), court decision not appealable, and discretion of the arbitral tribunal to continue the proceedings and make an award while the matter is pending before the court. In those cases where the arbitral tribunal decides to combine its decision on jurisdiction with an award on the merits, judicial review on the question of jurisdiction is available in setting aside proceedings under article 34 or in enforcement proceedings under article 36.” (emphasis added) [44] Section 18(1) and (2) of our AA 2005 reads: “Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction 18. (1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)— S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 of 57 (a) an arbitration clause which forms part of an agreement shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the agreement; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the agreement is null and void shall not ipso jure entail the invalidity of the arbitration clause.” (emphasis added) [45] As can be discerned above, a distinction is drawn between the effect of the existence or otherwise of an arbitration clause as opposed to one which existence is not in dispute but which agreement, of which the arbitration clause is a part of, is found to be null and void in which case, the arbitration clause still survives and is not invalid under the doctrine of separability. See the English case of DHL Project & Chartering Ltd v Gemini Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [2023] 3 All ER 580 at [44] – [47] and the Singapore Court of Appeal COT v COU & Ors [2023] SGCA 31 para [30]. [46] The first instance under s 18(1) AA 2005 with respect to the existence of the arbitration clause would go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal such that if there is no arbitration clause because of a lack of an agreement whether it be a case of importation by reference or that of the exchange of documents referring to an arbitration clause has not resulted in a consensus ad idem between the parties or that the arbitration clause is contained in a document issued fraudulently or that the document is a sham. The focus is on the formation of the arbitration clause or agreement. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 of 57 [47] That is what the Court is called to hear independently and afresh irrespective of how the Arbitral Tribunal itself had arrived at the decision that it has jurisdiction to hear the matter referred to it. [48] The second instance with respect to the validity of the arbitration clause has nothing to do with the formation of the agreement containing the arbitration clause but the performance of it which may result in the agreement being held by the Arbitral Tribunal to be null and void and thus affecting the validity of the concluded contract. Precisely because of the doctrine of separability of the arbitration agreement from the main or principal or underlying agreement, the arbitration agreement will survive the underlying agreement that the Arbitral Tribunal may find to be null and void. [49] The Court is not concerned with the challenge on finding of facts en-route to the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision on the underlying agreement being null and void. That is within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. [50] The JCs cannot deprive the JD of the latter’s passive remedy by strategically electing to enforce the Arbitral Award that had been enforced in the UK High Court as a judgment of the Court by way of registering the foreign judgment in the High Court of Malaya under the REJA. [51] We are conscious of the fact that the REJA has referred to Arbitral Awards in its definition of “judgment” but like all definitions in an Act of Parliament, it is always qualified by the opening words on the Interpretation section in this case s 2 as follows: S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 of 57 “2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires —” See the Federal Court’s decision in Metramac Corp Sdn Bhd v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd [2006] 4 MLJ 113. [52] The REJA of 1958 cannot supersede the AA 2005 which came later and is a more specific legislation governing all matters relating to or arising out of arbitration. In the event of an apparent conflict or confusion, a latter legislation would prevail and be the more appropriate legislation when it is a more specific legislation pertaining to enforcement of an Arbitral Award compared to the REJA which is of a general application to all judgments. See the Court of Appeal case of Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya v Visamaya Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 5 MLJ 554. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant would apply with the result of a specific statute overriding and prevailing upon a general one. [53] The scheme of enforcement of a foreign Arbitral Award in our jurisdiction is by way of a s 38 AA 2005 application consistent with our treaty commitment under the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law where the jurisprudence is different from a registration of a foreign judgment per se. [54] In this regard it is pertinent to refer to the observation of the Federal Court in Masenang Sdn Bhd v Sabanilam Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2021] 6 MLJ 255 as follows: “[140] To apply the well-known Latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, a special law prevails over a general law. In any event, arbitration is a completely distinct and disparate dispute resolution process in comparison to the adjudication of civil disputes. The S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 of 57 concepts and philosophy of these two modes of dispute resolution are completely different. These two modes are accordingly governed by distinct and separate legislation. As such, in the present context, the AA is the relevant legislation, not the CJA. The two ought not to be conflated. In an arbitration dispute, the cause of action which may be, for example, breach of contract, is determined finally. The civil courts are approached not for the purposes of trying the same cause of action, but purely for the purposes of recognition and to a very narrow extent, the setting aside of the arbitral award. In that sense, the jurisdiction of the civil courts as stipulated in the AA is not engaged as it would be in a normal civil matter. Therefore, this takes the cause of action which has merged in the arbitration award out of the scope of the CJA and brings it into the purview of the AA. [141] In this context it is important to reiterate again that the provisions of the CJA and the RC are general codes that provide the substantive and procedural basis for deciding disputes arising from general civil disputes. These laws do not limit nor affect any special law such as the AA. The AA is a special law codified to govern arbitration proceedings, both domestic and international. It gives effect to the principle of party autonomy by giving the parties the freedom to choose courts under the seat of arbitration that will have supervisory jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) [55] We are conscious of the fact that s 4 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 that provides as follows: “Provision to prevent conflict of laws 4. In the event of inconsistency or conflict between this Act and any other written law other than the Constitution in force at the commencement of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.” S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 of 57 [56] However, there is no similar clause in the REJA which is clearly a statute of general application. [57] Learned counsel for the JD had referred to the written opinion of Lord Thomas who opined that it would be illegitimate to enforce an Arbitral Award obtained in the UK in the form of a UK Judgment and to then proceed to register it under the REJA as that would be to deliberately bypass ss 38 and 39 of the AA 2005 and thus taking a foreign Arbitral Award outside the regime provided under the New York Convention regime to which Malaysia is a signatory party to the Treaty as well as outside the UNCITRAL Model Law regime. [58] In fact, Lord Thomas castigated it as judgment laundering and opined at paragraphs 50, 51 and 58 of his Expert Report as follows: “50. In this connection it is useful to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Strategic Technologies v Procurement Bureau of the Republic of China Ministry of Defence… (to which I will refer as Strategic). The claimant in that case had obtained a default judgment in 1999 in the High Court of Singapore against the defendant which was held to have submitted to the jurisdiction of Singapore; damages were assessed in 2002. In 2009 the claimant obtained a default judgment on the basis of the Singapore judgment in the Grand Court of Cayman Islands against the defendant which was also held to have submitted to that jurisdiction. The claimant then registered the Cayman Islands judgment in the High Court of England and Wales under section 9 of the AJA 1920. When the registration came before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales the issue was whether a judgment on a judgment could be registered under section 9. 51. The Court of Appeal held that on a literal reading of section 12 of the AJA 1920 a judgment (the judgment of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands) on a judgment (the judgment of the High Court of Singapore) could S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 of 57 be within the literal wording of the section. However, it was wrong to construe the section literally. It should be construed in the light of the purpose and scheme of the legislation. Considering the approach to the AJA 1920 in that way, the Court of Appeal held that a judgment on a judgment was not a judgment within the Act for two essential reasons: (1) the principle of reciprocity on which the provisions in the AJA 1920 and the subsequent Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 should not be unbalanced by permitting a judgment on a judgment to be recognised. As Males LJ stated at paragraph 55: It would mean that a judgment given in a state with which no such [reciprocal] arrangements existed and which was not even in the Commonwealth (for example, the United States) could in effect be registered for enforcement here by the expedient of an action to enforce that judgment in an intermediate state to which the 1920 Act does apply, an expedient sometimes described somewhat pejoratively as "judgment laundering". … 58. For these reasons I have set out in the three preceding sections of this opinion, the answers to the specific questions I have been asked: … I. I do not consider as a matter of English law TMD's refusal to avail itself of its active remedy in England and Wales would prevent TMD advancing the contention that this is a "judgment laundering exercise" similar to that which was attempted in Strategic…” S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 of 57 [59] We do not need at this stage of the hearing of the appeal on Enclosure 24 which is essentially praying for an order pursuant to O. 67 r. 9(2) ROC that the matter should proceed to trial, to determine if the opinion on a question of foreign law, ought to be accepted by our Courts. We agree that the effect of the UK Judgment arising as it does from a UK Award is governed by English law. The application of English law in Malaysian proceedings is a question of fact and as such Lord Thomas’ Opinion would be relevant. [60] Suffice to say that the opinion presents an arguable case on behalf of the JD for the High Court to make a finding on it when it is fully argued at the hearing of Enclosure 17, the Setting Aside REJA Application as under s 5(1)(a)(i) the registration of the foreign judgment shall be set aside if the judgment is registered in contravention of the Act. [61] As the application before us in Enclosure 24 is only for the very limited relief of a trial being had where oral and written evidence as well as expert evidence be adduced for the purpose of setting aside the ex- parte order for registering the foreign judgment that had emanated from an Arbitral Award and as there is no application by the JD to strike out the JCs’ Originating Summons, we need say nothing more at this stage. [62] We are of the further view that assuming the route of registering a foreign Arbitral Award as a foreign judgment under the REJA in the Malaysian High Court is allowed, the same objection on jurisdiction may be raised. As it is, as the JCs here had chosen the REJA route instead of the UNCITRAL Model Law route under our AA 2005, the JD should not be disadvantaged or suffer any prejudice in any way as opposed to a s 38 AA 2005 Enforcement Application. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 of 57 Whether in applying to set aside an ex-parte order for registration of a foreign judgment emanating from an International Arbitral Award under the REJA, the High Court below should hear the objection of a lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal de novo [63] It has been well established, at least since Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763 [2012] EWHC 3518 (Comm) where it was observed as follows: “[30] The nature of the present exercise is, in my opinion, also unaffected where an arbitral tribunal has either assumed or, after full deliberation, concluded that it had jurisdiction. There is in law no distinction between these situations. The tribunal’s own view of its jurisdiction has no legal or evidential value, when the issue is whether the tribunal had any legitimate authority in relation to the government at all. This is so however full was the evidence before it and however carefully deliberated was its conclusion. It is also so whatever the composition of the tribunal—a comment made in view of Dallah’s repeated (but no more attractive for that) submission that weight should be given to the tribunal’s ‘eminence’, ‘high standing and great experience’…” (emphasis added) [64] That approach was followed by the High Court of England in Central Trading & Exports Ltd v Fioralba Shipping Company the Kalisti [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 580 as follows: “[9] A series of first instance cases has made clear that a s 67 challenge involves a rehearing (and not merely a review) of the issue of jurisdiction, so that the court must decide that issue for itself. It is S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 of 57 not confined to a review of the arbitrators’ reasoning, but effectively starts again. That approach has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 All ER 485, [2011] 1 AC 763, which also makes clear that the decision and reasoning of the arbitrators is not entitled to any particular status or weight, although (depending on its cogency) that reasoning will inform and be of interest to the court.” (emphasis added) [65] Section 67 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides as follows: “Challenging the award: substantive jurisdiction. (1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the court — (a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction; or (b) for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction. A party may lose the right to object (see section 73) and the right to apply is subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).” [66] Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763 [2012] EWHC 3518 (Comm) have been applied by our Courts in Food Ingredients LLC v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd and Another Application [2012] 8 MLJ 585 (HC); Agrovenus LLP v Pacific Inter- S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 of 57 Link Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2014] 4 CLJ 525 (CA) and SPNB- LTAT Sdn Bhd v ABI Construction Sdn Bhd [2016]7 CLJ 275 (HC); Thai-Lao Lignite Co Ltd & Anor v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2017] 9 CLJ 273 and The Government of India v Vedanta Limited & Anor [2018] MLJU 630. [67] The JCs’ argument is that even assuming for a moment that the above may be so for a s 38 application under the AA 2005, the instant application before the High Court below is one under s 5 of the REJA. We are fully conscious and cognisant of that. We do not think that the JCs here can harness any perceived strategic advantage by the REJA route of registering the foreign judgment here in Malaysia. Where jurisdiction and fraud issues are raised bona fide before the Court, it cannot be simply brushed aside on ground that it should have been raised in the foreign original Court where the judgment had been taken where the JD had not participated in the Enforcement Application before the foreign Court. [68] Neither can it be raised that as the Award Debtor had not applied to set aside the Arbitral Award, then it is barred from objecting to its enforcement both in UK and in other jurisdictions under either the provision of s 39 of the AA 2005 in the case of enforcing a foreign Arbitral Award Malaysia or under the REJA. [69] Even s 5 of the REJA itself recognises that a jurisdictional objection may be raised that the original court that registered the Arbitral Award as a judgment of that court has no jurisdiction to do so in the circumstances of the case. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 of 57 [70] The relevant parts of s 5 of the REJA read as follows: “5. Cases in which registered judgments must, or may, be set aside (1) On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment- (a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied- (i) that the judgment is not a judgment to which this Part applies or was registered in contravention of this Act; (ii) that the courts of the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case; (iii) that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear; (iv) that the judgment was obtained by fraud; (v) that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in Malaysia; or (vi) that the rights under the judgment are not vested in the person by whom the application for registration was made; and (b) may be set aside if the registering court is satisfied that the matter in dispute in the proceedings in the original court had previously to the date of the judgment in the original court S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 of 57 been the subject of a final and conclusive judgment by a court having jurisdiction in the matter. (emphasis added) [71] Learned counsel for the JD submitted that fraud in the issuance of the 2 Invoices which contained the arbitration agreement were issued fraudulently and if it were given an opportunity to successfully prove that, then the arbitration agreement would fall with it as being part of the poison tree. From the discussion of the relevant cases above, the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal had heard the JD’s witnesses and evidence and dismissed it, does not prevent the JD from raising them in what is essentially an opposition to an Enforcement Application under s 38 of the AA 2005. When so raised the Court would need to hear the issue de novo as the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction is never final. [72] The fraud here is with respect to the formation of the contract where if it is proved to be a fraud or a sham, then there is no contract to begin with and in which instance there would be no arbitration agreement with the result that the Arbitral Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to hear the matter. [73] Whether that is true or not, is a matter that the High Court below must independently arrive at by hearing evidence that may be adduced by both sides without being influenced at all by the finding of facts of the Arbitral Tribunal where fraud if proved, would unravel everything including the arbitration agreement. [74] This is not the place to go into the merits of the fraudulent allegations as that is best left to the High Court to decide under the S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 of 57 directions that the JD had prayed for with respect to the tendering of documentary evidence, the calling of witnesses and the evidence of the expert as to what English law is with respect to Enforcement Application in UK under the UK Arbitration Act 1996. [75] The Enforcement Court in the UK would have no jurisdiction if fraud could be proved which would go to the very root of the existence of the contract. Here the Arbitration Agreement is not separable as it is not a case of fraud affecting the validity of the contract in its performance or implementation but fraud affecting the very existence of the contract at the very inception in its formation. [76] As highlighted by learned counsel for the JD, it is pertinent that the lack of jurisdiction of the original court is spoken of in the context of “the circumstances of the case” which is flexible enough an expression to address the issue of jurisdiction being raised in the registering Court where the foreign judgment emanating from an arbitral award is to be registered. [77] The very presence of this ground for setting aside the foreign judgment that is sought to be registered in the registering High Court is indicative enough that such a ground of a lack of jurisdiction of the foreign original Court may be properly raised where there are bona fide grounds substantiating it for the registering Court to inquire into and to analyse and assess whether there was an arbitration agreement to begin with since the JD had furnished some prima facie evidence to that effect which is to be tested in the crucible of cross-examination. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 of 57 [78] After all the High Court below has a broad power under O. 67 r. 9(3) ROC, should it decide to allow the application to set aside the registration of the foreign judgment, and may do so for the reason that it is not just or convenient that the judgment should be enforced in Malaysia or that there is some other sufficient reason for setting aside the registration. Whether the issue of fraud in the formation of the contract that contain the arbitration agreement and thus affecting jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, had been set out with sufficient particularity such that a trial of the issue where witnesses are called would be a proper exercise of discretion [79] Whether in an O. 67 r. 9 ROC application, the High Court should order a trial where witnesses may be called on the issue of jurisdiction is a matter of discretion of the High Court. Like all exercise of discretion, it must be done by correctly applying the relevant legal principles, taking relevant factors into consideration and disregarding irrelevant factors such the discretion may be said to have been exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the overall justice of the case. [80] As narrated by the JCs themselves in their submissions, the 1st JC is a company incorporated in the Netherlands and it is in the business of providing banking services. The 2nd JC is a company incorporated in Singapore and it was involved in the business of the sale, supply and trading of bunkers to supply fuel to ships at hubs and ports. It had around 13.11.2014 filed for bankruptcy. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 of 57 [81] The 1st JC was appointed on behalf of a syndicate of banks to act as a security agent under a revolving borrowing base facilities agreement dated 19.12.2013 (“Facilities Agreement”) between inter alia O.W. Bunker & Trading A/S (“OWBAS”) and the 1st JC. [82] As part of the Facilities Agreement, the 1st JC entered into an omnibus security agreement dated 19.12.2013 (“Security Agreement”) with OWBAS and a number of OWBAS’s subsidiaries, under which OWBAS and the relevant OWBAS subsidiaries assigned to the 1st JC all of their rights, title and interest in any amount owed or to be owed to them under any Supply Contract (as defined in the Security Agreement) including the supply contracts entered into between the JD and the 2nd JC which formed the subject matter of the Arbitral Award. [83] We are not for a moment suggesting that the moment fraud is raised, and in this case, in the context of jurisdiction or a lack of it, then the Court in a de novo hearing must conduct a full trial with witnesses called just to determine the question of jurisdiction. The Court must always have regard to the peculiar and particular facts of each case set out with sufficient particularities. [84] There would well be cases where even in an independent rehearing of a jurisdictional issue as in that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction, all that the Court needs to do may be to interpret the relevant documents where for instance, the arbitration agreement is said to have been imported by reference. These would be cases where the Court needs only to interpret contractual documents containing a reference to an arbitration agreement. After all interpretation of contract is a question of law. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 of 57 [85] The more difficult cases where witnesses may need to be called would be whether there was a concluded agreement to begin with which agreement contains the arbitration clause and in such cases the conduct of the parties during the negotiations of the contract and subsequent conduct in the performance of the so-called concluded contract may be relevant and may need witnesses to be called. [86] In Dallah’s case (supra) it was whether there was a concluded contract involving the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Pakistan when it was not a signatory to the agreement but instead a statutory trust body was the signatory and where the Ministry has an interest in the proper implementation of the contract. Witnesses were called to prove that the Ministry was not a party to the contract and though the foreign Arbitral Award was made by the Paris ICC Arbitral Tribunal in favour of Dallah, the English Courts refused to enforce it with the decision to dismiss enforcement by the UK High Court being affirmed in the Court of Appeal and then by the apex UK Supreme Court. [87] Where there are allegations of fraud that go towards the formation of the contract and there are conflicts of affidavit evidence, then it behoves the Court to direct that a trial be had with witnesses called and evidence adduced, including expert evidence if necessary, so as to be able to separate truth from falsehood and half-truths. It is difficult if not impossible to resolve what is true by a mere reading of affidavit evidence in conflict. Lawyers have honed the art of cross-examination to be deployed to distill the truth from witnesses, to display contradictions and to destroy credibility of some in the process. It is not every case of conflict of testimonies that can be resolved with the Solomonic sanction of S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 of 57 severing “the baby into two”. It is in the crucible of cross-examination that the dross of deception is burnt and the gold of guarded truth refined. [88] Learned counsel for the JD had used the analogy of why a summary judgment application heard via affidavit evidence is not allowed where the plaintiff is alleging fraud for there would invariably be conflict of affidavit evidence. While that may be so, the converse is not true in that the defendant may allege fraud and the Court in hearing the summary judgment application would examine if there is prima facie evidence of fraud as alleged by the defendant and whether there is sufficient particularity as to justify a trial to resolve conflict in affidavit evidence. In other words, it must be raised bona fide and not for the purpose of delaying the just and expeditious disposal of the dispute. [89] It was submitted by learned counsel for the JCs that the Arbitral Tribunal had sieved through and scrutinised all the evidence of fraud and found none. The matter was said to be res, and that it would be an abuse of the Court’s process to have the witnesses testify again, this time before a High Court Judge. The High Court in its Grounds of Judgment had categorically stated as follows: “40. All in all, I find that besides the fact that the JD failed to provide particulars of the alleged fraud upon the English High Court, the JD appears to be suggesting that not only oral evidence of factual witnesses (each party put forward three witnesses who provided witness statements in the London Arbitration) ought to be presented to this Court, further documentary evidence and oral evidence from an expert witness and/or expert evidence is required. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 of 57 41. To me, not only does this go against the very concept of comity and substantial reciprocity between the nations which is enshrined in the REJA, but it also goes against the doctrine of res judicata and estoppel.” (emphasis added) [90] Unfortunately for the JCs, res judicata is not engaged here as the Arbitral Tribunal, no matter how eminent it may be constituted of, cannot be the final judge of its own jurisdiction. It may decide but its decision is not determinative and final and when raised either in the context of a Setting Aside Application in the Seat Court or in an Enforcement Application in whichever jurisdictions the Award Debtor may have assets, the Court would hear the evidence afresh on jurisdiction or the lack of it. In fact, no deference is paid to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the finding of fact with respect to jurisdiction; such a finding of fact has no legal or evidential value. See para [30] Dallah’s case (supra). [91] We are of the considered opinion that the JD had raised sufficient particulars of fraud in the formation of the contract in dispute in paragraphs 41 to 43 and 49 to 51 of the affidavit of the JD in Enclosure 18 at the High Court as follows, wherein paragraphs 41, 42 and 50 are reproduced herewith: “41. … there never was a supply of MGO/ bunker by OWBFE to the Vessels on the alleged dates, there can be no Alleged Contract. With no Alleged Contract, there can be no incorporation of the OWB Terms between the parties. With no incorporation of the OWB Terms, there are no grounds for the Judgment Creditors to argue that the London Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties. By that reason, the English High Court thus had no jurisdiction to hear the Judgment Creditors' ex-parte Order to enforce the London S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 of 57 Arbitration Award. 42. I hereby state that the proper agreement between the parties is the 2014 Agreement. I understand that the purpose of the 2014 Agreement was for all TMD's transactions with OWBFE for sale and purchase of bunkers would be negotiated on a case by case basis with detailed terms to be agreed on similarly and any conflict in terms would be superseded by the 2014 Agreement. This is expressly provided in Clause 11.2, that the 2014 Agreement prevails over any other agreements in conflict. 50. As the London Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties in the first place, it follows that the English High Court would have no jurisdiction to hear the Judgment Creditors' ex-parte application and to make the English High Court Judgment on that basis.” [92] The issue of fraud, though it does not affect the judgment obtained pursuant to an Enforcement Application before the UK High Court as there was no fraud practised on the UK Enforcement Court as such, does nevertheless arise in an acute sense with respect to the issue of whether there was a concluded arbitration agreement in the two impugned Invoices dated 17.10.2014 and 1.11.2014 such that if the impugned Invoices were fraudulently issued then the arbitration clause in the impugned Invoices would fall with it being the fruit of the poison tree. To that extent the allegations of fraud that goes towards jurisdiction is relevant to be decided at a trial of the issue which is best done where witnesses are allowed to be called. [93] Thus, learned counsel for the JD had premised the submission as fraud on the part of the JCs as stemming from fraudulent transactions and claims based on the two impugned Invoices containing the arbitration S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 of 57 agreement as can be seen in Enclosure 29 at the High Court at paragraphs 16 to 18 as follows: “The English High Court Judgment is obtained by Fraud 16. I am advised and verily believe that fraud on the part of the Judgment Creditors stems from their insistence on proceeding with the London Arbitration and the accompanying enforcement of the London Arbitration Award well knowing that they did not have the basis to do so. The London Arbitration Award is premised on Fraudulent Transactions and Fraudulent Claims by the Judgment Creditors against the Judgment Debtor 17.1 I aver in paragraph 22 … that the Judgment Creditors were unable to produce any evidence to support the existence of the alleged oral contracts between the Judgment Debtor and the Judgment Creditors for the supply of marine bunker fuels to Straits 1 and Dolphin 1. However, in spite of being aware that they have no evidence of the said oral agreements, the Judgment Creditors commenced arbitration proceedings against the Judgment Debtor. This is a clear indication of fraud. 17.2 …Mr Han-Chen Cheah, the trader who allegedly entered into the oral contract with the Judgment Debtor had confirmed in his statement that he had no "specific recollection" of the alleged oral contracts. The Judgment Creditors cannot claim that the London Tribunal is a tribunal of competent jurisdiction where no evidence of the existence of such an agreement had been provided by the Judgment Creditors during the course of the London Arbitration proceedings. 17.4 …that the deliveries of the marine bunker could not have occurred because the tank capacity of Straits 1 and Dolphin 1 were much smaller than the alleged amount of marine bunker fuels delivered. Even though it was impossible for the alleged amount marine bunker fuels to be delivered, the Judgment Creditors continued to maintain their claim in spite of S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 of 57 knowledge of its impossibility. This is yet another example of the Judgment Creditors' fraudulent conduct. 17.5 … that the daily reports for Straits l show that at the material date, the vessel was in the Kuantan region and not at the port of Pasir Gudang. This is clear evidence that the ships could not possibly have received the said marine bunker fuels. However, in spite of the above evidence, the Judgment Creditors persisted in their claim that marine bunker fuels were delivered to Straits l even though this clearly contradicted the evidence they were relying on (i.e. the BRRs). Their continued persistence in maintaining their claim in spite of the evidence is clearly fraudulent conduct. 17.6 … that the daily reports for Dolphin 1 show that at the material date, the vessel was in the South China Sea en route to Miri in Sarawak and not at the port of Kuantan as alleged by the Judgment Creditors. Yet again, this is clear evidence that the ships could not possibly have received the said marine bunker fuels… This is yet another example of the Judgment Creditors' fraudulent conduct.” [94] At this stage we suspend any determination as to whether the particularised allegations are true or otherwise as that are to be determined at the trial on the issue of jurisdiction which is inextricably linked to whether the impugned Invoices were fraudulent transactions. Suffice to say that there is sufficient prima facie evidence raised on a bona fide basis for the JCs to answer which answers have to be tried and tested in the crucible of cross-examination. [95] The allegation of fraud assumes greater importance as there is another earlier written arbitration agreement contained in a Set Off Agreement dated 7.4.2014 between the JD and the 2nd JC which contained an “entire agreement” clause. This earlier arbitration agreement S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 of 57 provided for arbitration in Malaysia under Malaysian law with arbitration under the then KLRCA Rules. Whether the London Arbitral Tribunal had wrongly ignored the Malaysian Arbitration Agreement and thus assuming jurisdiction when there was none is a matter to be heard de novo by the Malaysian High Court below. [96] The relevant arbitration clause and related clauses in the Set Off Agreement reads as follows: “10. Settlement of dispute 10.1 Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement and the Transaction Agreements, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) which Rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause. 10.2 The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall be in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 10.3 The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English. 10.4 Any arbitral award shall be enforceable in accordance with the Rules of the 1958 Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). The award rendered may be entered in any court or other authority having jurisdiction or application may be made to said court or other authority for a judicial S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 of 57 acceptance of the award and an order of enforcement, as the case may be.” 11. Miscellaneous 11.1 This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding of the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. No amendment, modification or alteration of any term in this Agreement shall be binding on either Party unless the same shall be made in writing, and executed by or on behalf of the Parties hereto. 11.2 This Agreement shall be dominant and shall prevail over any other agreement(s) in conflict with this Agreement, including but not limited to the Transaction Agreements, unless such priority is expressly negated.” (emphasis added) [97] As there is the “entire agreement” clause in Clause 11.1 coupled with the “prevailing clause in the event of conflict” in Clause 11.2, it is certainly an arguable case on the lack of jurisdiction of the London Arbitral Tribunal to assume jurisdiction even assuming for a moment that there was no fraud in the formation of the contracts in the two impugned Invoices. [98] All that the JD is asking for at this stage is for the issue of jurisdiction to be determined at trial where oral evidence may be adduced through and not determined via conflicting affidavit evidence. We see no good reason why this should not be allowed in the light of the prima facie S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 of 57 allegation of fraud in the issuance of the two impugned invoices and the prevailing arbitration agreement in the event of conflict. Whether non-recognition of the English High Court’s Judgment would be in violation of the principle of international comity and substantial reciprocity as statutorily provided under the REJA [99] It would not be unfair to say that in deciding to dismiss the application in Enclosure 24 filed by the JD for a trial to be had on the issue of jurisdiction, the High Court had laboured under the misconception that it is not to inquire into the merits of the challenge on jurisdiction when it observed as follows: “32. Further, it is my considered opinion that the non-recognition of the English High Court Judgment would be in violation of the principle of international comity and substantial reciprocity as statutorily provided under the REJA. The mechanisms of registration of a foreign judgment are part of the administration of justice in Malaysia. 33. It is to be noted that the English High Court Judgment is final and conclusive. It was also not the function of the registering country, which Malaysia was in this case, to examine the merits of the English High Court Judgment or even to criticize the English High Court Judgment.” [100] What has perhaps been overlooked is the fact that Malaysia is a party to the New York Convention, reputed to be one of the most widely recognised and ratified Treaties in the world with 169 member States. Our ss. 38 and 39 AA 2005 are substantially a reproduction of Article V of the New York Convention. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 of 57 [101] The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 is another international instrument that Malaysia has adopted and our AA 2005 is clearly modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law. The UNCITRAL Model Law does not supplant the New York Convention but rather it synchronises with and supplements and strengthens it. Our ss. 38 and 39 of AA 2005 are clearly a reproduction of Article 35 and 36 respectively of the UNCITRAL Model Law. [102] There is no good reason why the principle of international comity and substantial reciprocity should not be invoked with respect to recognition and enforcement of a foreign Arbitral Award, both under the New York Convention and under the UNCITRAL Model Law which are international instruments compared to REJA which is more bilateral rather than multilateral. [103] Here the JCs have the upper hand on deciding under which provisions of the Malaysian statute to proceed under with respect to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. Whilst we have expressed the view that the more appropriate statute to do this is under our AA 2005, we do not think that by electing to proceed under the REJA, the JD should be deprived of any of its defences that may be available to it had the enforcement been under ss 38 and 39 of the AA 2005. As we have shown, even under the permitted defences or objections, the JD is always allowed to raise the issue of a lack of jurisdiction in the foreign Court enforcing the Arbitral Award under s 5(1)(a)(ii) of the REJA on the ground that “the courts of the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case.” S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 of 57 [104] Learned counsel for the JCs cited the Court of Appeal’s case of Mann Holdings Pte Ltd & Anor v Ung Yoke Hong [2019] 6 CLJ 475 (CA) (“Mann Holdings”), where it was held that any challenge towards the merits or propriety of the foreign judgment must necessarily be undertaken in the original jurisdiction where the judgment was pronounced, and not the Malaysian courts: “[55] In the case of judgments from a superior court of another jurisdiction, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 is a specific statute enacted to provide the mechanism for how such judgments from recognised jurisdictions such as the High Court of Singapore may be enforced in Malaysia. That specific mechanism involves a mandatory registration process with adequate timelines enacted for setting aside the registration, before such judgment may be enforced or executed. After such judgments are registered, it is the registration that is challenged and not the merits or propriety of the judgment. That exercise must necessarily be undertaken in the original jurisdiction where the judgment was pronounced.” (emphasis added) [105] We have no issue with the sound principle propounded in the above case. It must be remembered that Mann Holdings (supra) is not a case involving an arbitral award where the participation of the JD, in the instant case, in the London Arbitration was with reservation on the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the matter in dispute. In the above case the judgment debtor had fully participated in the trial which decision in favour of the judgment creditor had been affirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal, not to mention a previous challenge on the jurisdiction of the Singapore Court to hear the dispute which also had been affirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 of 57 [106] We were also referred to our Supreme Court case of See Hua Daily News Bhd v. Tan Thien Chin & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 107 (SC) (“See Hua Daily News”) where learned counsel for the JCs summarised the principles as follows: (1) Burden is on the party requesting for a trial of the issues to prove the existence of the triable issue; (2) The party requesting for a trial must condescend to particulars of the allegations in their affidavits; (3) The allegations must not be frivolous or vexatious; and (4) The allegations must be made bona fide. [107] We are in full agreement with the propositions above. We also wish to add that See Hua Daily News (supra) was not a case proceeding from an arbitral award in Brunei. The fraud raised there was not a fraud going towards jurisdiction of the original Court in Brunei nor the registering Court in Malaysia. It was a summary judgment where fraud was raised by the judgment debtor and it was in that context that the Supreme Court pointed out that no steps had been taken to set aside the judgment in Brunei and observed as follows: “But they have alleged fraud and not mistake. Thus, even on its very face the alleged fraud is clearly frivolous and vexatious. The nature of the alleged fraud is such that it cannot have been made bona fide. Since the burden of providing the existence of the triable issue is on the appellants, it is the more reason that they must condescend to particulars of the alleged fraud in their affidavits. In the absence of S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 of 57 particularization we must, on the authority of Wallingford case agree with the learned trial judge that the affidavits of Mr. Lin are insufficient to raise a triable issue on fraud.… The question is, can they now have a second bite at the cherry and be allowed to retract their voluntary admissions, and can they now adduce fresh evidence to show that it was not their own carelessness but it was in fact the respondents themselves who had ordered the publication? On this particular issue, in our view the appellants are estopped from denying the admissions. Further, before fresh evidence can be adduced after judgment, the appellants must show that such evidence is not only material and credible, but also that they could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original trial.” (emphasis added) [108] The above case has no nexus whatsoever to the issue of jurisdiction that arises from fraud with respect to the formation of the contract containing the arbitration agreement. The differences are poles apart. [109] There is no place for the unfounded fear that the Malaysian High Court would be sitting in judgment over the final decision of a competent court of another jurisdiction as here we are dealing with an arbitral tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is now being challenged in our High Court. We are not dealing with a judgment arising from a cause of action brought and heard in the High Court in the UK. Decision [110] Having considered the submissions of the parties, we are more than satisfied that the High Court had erred in law and applied the wrong S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 of 57 legal principles when the passive remedy was always open and available to the JD as the appellant, to raise the lack of jurisdiction arising from no arbitration agreement in the two impugned Invoices said to have been issued fraudulently. [111] The Arbitral Tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction is never final and a Court in hearing what is essentially an enforcement of the Arbitral Award must inquire into whether there was an arbitration agreement in the light of the allegations of fraud at the stage of formation of the contract, which allegations have been raised bona fide and with sufficient particularities qualifying as prima facie evidence of fraud. See the tests enunciated in Vijayalakshmi Devi d/o Nadchatiram v Dr Mahadevan s/o Nadchatiram & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 709, Tan Kok Cheng & Sons Realty Co Sdn Bhd v Lim Ah Pat (t/a Juta Bena) [1995] 3 MLJ 273 and Sathiaseelan a/l Nagappan v Ketua Pengarah, Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial [2023] MLJU 671. [112] We have kept in the forefront of our mind that the JCs’ application was made not under s 38 AA 2005 but under s 5 of the REJA. Be that as it may, being essentially an enforcement of an Arbitral Award, we see the test in the circumstances of this case, to be no less different than one made under the AA 2005. It is a challenge to the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction which our High Court must be independently satisfied. The High Court had failed to take into account relevant factors and had taken into account irrelevant factors in refusing the Application for Trial of the issue of jurisdiction. We were thus constrained to allow the appeal and to set aside the order of the High Court. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 of 57 [113] We had therefore allowed the Application for Trial of the issue of jurisdiction in Enclosure 24 under Order 67 rule 9(2) ROC. We awarded costs of RM15,000.00 to the appellant subject to allocator. [114] As the High Court had already inadvertently proceeded to decide on the merits of the main Originating Summons, we direct that the Originating Summons be heard before a different Judge. [115] It goes without saying that the High Court in hearing the Originating Summons after a trial may affirm its decision to register the foreign judgment as a judgment of the High Court or alternatively set aside the ex-parte order for the registration of the foreign judgment for the reasons set out in O.67 r.9(3) ROC as follows: “(3) Where the Court hearing an application to set aside the registration of a judgment registered under the Act is satisfied that the judgment falls within any of the cases in which a judgment may not be ordered to be registered under subsection 3(2) of the Act or that it is not just or convenient that the judgment should be enforced in Malaysia or that there is some other sufficient reason for setting aside the registration, it may order the registration of the judgment to be set aside on such terms as it thinks fit.” Dated: 3 January 2024. Sgd Lee Swee Seng Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 of 57 For the Appellant: Nahendran Navaratnam Wong Wye Wah Brandon Toh Derrick Chan Messrs CK Chan Law Practice For the Respondent: Sharon Chong Tze Ying Muhammad Suhaib Bin Mohamed Ibrahim Messrs Skrine Date of Decision: 17 November 2023. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 of 57 Legislation referred to: Arbitration Act 2005 [Act 646] (Sections 8, 18, 37, 38 and 39) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91] (Section 4) English Arbitration Act 1996 Chapter 23 (Section 67) Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act 1958 [Act 99] (Sections 5(1)(a)(i), 5(1)(a)(ii), 5(1)(a)(iii), 5(1)(a)(iv), 5(1)(a)(v) and 5(3)(b)). Rules of Court 2012 (Order 67 rule 9(2) and/or Order 92 rule 4) Cases referred to: Agrovenus LLP v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2014] 4 CLJ 525 (CA) Central Trading & Exports Ltd v Fioralba Shipping Company the Kalisti [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 580 COT v COU & Ors [2023] SGCA 31 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, [2012] EWHC 3518 (Comm) DHL Project & Chartering Ltd v Gemini Ocean Shipping Co Ltd [2023] 3 All ER 580 Food Ingredients LLC v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd and Another Application [2012] 8 MLJ 585 (HC); Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Serdang Baru Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors. [2018] 12 MLJ 706 Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya v Visamaya Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 5 MLJ 554. S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 of 57 Mann Holdings Pte Ltd & Anor v Ung Yoke Hong [2019] 6 CLJ 475 Masenang Sdn Bhd v Sabanilam Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2021] 6 MLJ 255 Metramac Corp Sdn Bhd v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd [2006] 4 MLJ 113. PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV and Ors [2013] SGCA 57; [2014] 1 SLR 372 Sathiaseelan a/l Nagappan v Ketua Pengarah, Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial [2023] MLJU 671. See Hua Daily News Bhd v. Tan Thien Chin & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 107 (SC) SPNB-LTAT Sdn Bhd v ABI Construction Sdn Bhd [2016]7 CLJ 275 (HC) State Government of Sarawak v Chin Hwa Engineering Development Company [1995] 3 MLJ 237, Tan Kok Cheng & Sons Realty Co Sdn Bhd v Lim Ah Pat (t/a Juta Bena) [1995] 3 MLJ 273 Thai-Lao Lignite Co Ltd & Anor v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2017] 9 CLJ 273 The Government of India v Vedanta Limited & Anor [2018] MLJU 630. Vijayalakshmi Devi d/o Nadchatiram v Dr Mahadevan s/o Nadchatiram & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 709 S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 of 57 International Rules and Conventions referred to: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (“the New York Convention”) KLRCA Arbitration Rules London International Maritime Arbitration Association Rules (“LIMAA”) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) S/N TQuhOH3O9EaaDYRPnCQEgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

JI-83-395-10/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMAD ZAIM SYAFIQ BIN MD THANY

Seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan - menggalang penjawat awam melakukan fungsi jawatannya - pembuktian mens rea - dengan sengaja

07/01/2024

Puan Nur Azzuin Binti Abdul Moati

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f70401a0-59ab-4181-8b9c-9ae3b61ebdee&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET PONTIAN DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM KES JENAYAH NO. JI-83-395-10/2021 PENDAKWARAYA V MUHAMAD ZAIM SYAFIQ BIN MD THANY ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Keputusan di akhir kes Pendakwaan) PERTUDUHAN OKT telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan - Bahawa kamu pada 07/06/2021, jam lebih kurang 1630hrs, bertempat di tepi jalan Taman Jaya 2, Pontian, didalam Negeri Johor telah didapati dengan sengaja menggalang seorang penjawat awam iaitu KPL RF 146586 Khairu Zaman bin Bakar daripada menjalankan kewajipannya sebagai anggota polis dengan cara menggalang penama daripada menjalankan fungsi jawatannya iaitu dengan buat rondaan dan pemeriksaan. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan. Hukuman penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai 2 tahun, atau dengan denda yang boleh sampai RM10,000.00, atau kedua-duanya. 07/01/2024 15:10:47 JI-83-395-10/2021 Kand. 40 S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 SAKSI-SAKSI PENDAKWAAN 1. SP1 - RF 146586 Koperal Khairu Zaman bin Bakar - Pengadu - Pegawai Operasi - Pasukan Gerakan Am (PGA) Simpang Renggam 2. SP2 - RF 157941 Koperal Azlan bin Sungkanah - Platun Infantri, Platun 6, Kompeni D, Cheras 3. SP3 - G16159 ASP Al Amin bin Mohamed Zawawi - Ketua Kompeni A - Batalion A Pasukan Gerakan Am (PGA) Simpang Renggam 4. SP4 - G21939 Inspektor Mohd Syahir bin Mohamad Nasir - Pegawai Operasi - Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah IPD Pontian 5. SP5 - G21589 Inspektor Sugendharan Nair a/l Karunagaran - Pegawai Penyiasat - Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah IPD Pontian S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 FAKTA RINGKAS KES PENDAKWAAN 1. Pada 07.06.2021, jam lebih kurang 4.30 petang ketika SP1 dan SP2 sedang melakukan rondaan OPS Benteng Covid dengan menaiki motorsikal, mereka ternampak sebuah kereta Perodua Axia berwarna kuning dengan nombor pendaftaran TBR420 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai ‘kereta tersebut’) sedang berhenti di bahu jalan Taman Jaya 2, Pontian, Johor. 2. SP1 dan SP2 kemudiannya berhenti di hadapan kereta tersebut untuk melakukan pemeriksaan terhadap kereta tersebut. SP1 dan SP2 berjalan menghampiri kereta tersebut sambil SP1 memperkenalkan diri dan menunjukkan kad kuasa yang digantung pada leher SP1. 3. Sebaik sahaja SP1 dan SP2 menghampiri kereta tersebut, secara tiba-tiba kereta tersebut berundur dalam jarak 5-6 meter dan bergerak ke hadapan ke arah SP1. SP1 melepaskan tembakan ke tayar hadapan sebelah kiri namun tersasar ke tayar belakang kereta tersebut. Kereta tersebut kemudiannya terbabas ke arah bahu jalan dan memecut laju. 4. SP1 kemudiannya memaklumkan perkara tersebut kepada Pegawai medan di Batu Pahat dan membuat laporan polis Pontian 3358/21. OKT kemudiannya telah hadir sendiri di Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Pontian pada keesokannya harinya, 08.06.2021 dan ditahan oleh pihak polis. S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN 1) Seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan – Barang siapa dengan sengaja menggalang mana-mana penjawat awam dalam menjalankan fungsi jawatannya, hendaklah dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh yang boleh sampai dua tahun, atau dengan denda yang boleh sampai sepuluh ribu ringgit, atau dengan kedua-duanya. 2) Elemen pertuduhan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan adalah – a. OKT dengan sengaja menggalang penjawat awam; dan b. Penjawat awam tersebut sedang menjalankan fungsi jawatannya. Elemen pertama – OKT dengan sengaja menghalang penjawat awam. 1. Bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan, pihak Pendakwaan perlu membuktikan kewujudan mens rea pada OKT iaitu halangan tersebut dilakukan dengan sengaja. Merujuk Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes 28th edn, vol 1 di perenggan 15 mukasurat 998 yang menyatakan - “15. Mens rea - In order to constitute an offence under this section, the obstruction must be 'wilful'. It is, therefore, not enough to prove obstruction by the accused to a public servant but it must also be proved that the intention was encompassed with some sort of hostility towards such public servant.” 2. Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kes Teck Yam v. PP [1967] 1 LNS 186 – “For an offence under section 186 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to prove the following: (1) that there was obstructing of a public servant, (2) that S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 the public servant was at that time discharging this public function, and (3) that the person obstructing did so voluntarily. It is in my view clear that to obstruct under section 186 of the Penal Code is to do an act which makes it more difficult for a public servant to carry out his duties. I take that definition of "obstruction" from the case of Hinchliffe v. Sheldon. It is therefore quite clear that the appellant was making it more difficult for the chief assistant district officer to discharge his public function and that the said officer was at that time involved in discharging his public functions. The only remaining element of the alleged offence is whether the obstruction was voluntary that brings me to section 39 of the Penal Code which defines "voluntarily" as, A person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily" when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it. The definition of the term "voluntarily" bears resemblance to the definition of "willfully" current in the English law. (See Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 21st edn. P. 82). In Rice v. Connolly, Lord Parker, CJ said: 'Wilful' in this context in my judgment means not only 'intention' but also connotes something which is done without lawful excuse.” 3. Seksyen 39 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinisikan “dengan sengaja” sebagai – Seseorang adalah dikata menyebabkan suatu kejadian “dengan sengaja” apabila ia menyebabkan kejadian itu dengan jalan yang ia telah bermaksud hendak menyebabkannya, atau dengan jalan yang pada masa menggunakan jalan itu, ia ketahui atau ada sebab mempercayai mungkin menyebabkan kejadian itu. 4. Di dalam kes ini sememangnya jelas terdapat halangan bagi SP1 dan SP2 semasa hendak menjalankan pemeriksaan terhadap OKT yang ketika itu berada di dalam kereta tersebut yang telah melarikan diri sebaik sahaja dihampiri oleh SP1 dan SP2. Namun persoalan yang perlu dijawab adalah adakah perbuatan OKT pada S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 ketika itu adalah bermaksud untuk menggalang penjawat awam dari menjalankan tugasnya atau OKT ada sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa perbuatannya boleh menyebabkan suatu halangan terhadap penjawat awam yang menjalankan tugas. 5. Keterangan SP1 dan SP2 mengatakan bahawa semasa kejadian mereka berpakaian preman dan menunggang motorsikal persendirian semasa menjalankan rondaan dan tujuan mereka berpakaian preman adalah bagi mengelakkan orang awam tahu akan kehadiran polis yang sedang menjalankan rondaan. Saksi-saksi Pendakwaan juga bersetuju bahawa sekiranya SP1 dan SP2 tidak memperkenalkan diri, OKT tidak akan dapat mengetahui bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah anggota polis. 6. Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengemukakan sesalinan rakaman CCTV dari kedai yang berhampiran dengan tempat kejadian sebagai keterangan di Mahkamah. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti rakaman CCTV tersebut dan berdasarkan rakaman tersebut dapat dilihat SP1 dan SP2 menaiki motorsikal dan berhenti di hadapan kereta tersebut. SP1 dan SP2 kemudiannya terus mendekati kereta tersebut dan kereta tersebut berundur dan kemudiannya bergerak laju ke sebelah kanan. Berdasarkan rakaman CCTV tersebut Mahkamah mendapati kereta tersebut bukan cuba untuk melanggar ke arah SP1 sebaliknya bergerak ke kanan untuk mengelak motorsikal dan SP1 dan seterusnya melarikan diri. 7. SP1 di dalam keterangannya mengatakan bahawa jarak masa antara SP1 dan SP2 turun dari motorsikal dan mendekati kereta hanyalah 3 saat sahaja dan kereta tersebut dalam keadaan cermin kereta tertutup sepenuhnya. Berdasarkan S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 rakaman CCTV juga tidak dapat dilihat sama ada SP1 ada menunjukkan kad kuasa dan juga memperkenalkan diri kepada OKT. Mahkamah ini berpendapat berdasarkan dari rakaman CCTV dan keterangan SP1 terdapat juga kemungkinan bahawa OKT tidak mengetahu bahawa yang mendekati kereta tersebut adalah anggota polis yang sedang menjalankan rondaan berdasarkan kepada pakaian dan kenderaan yang dinaiki oleh SP1 dan SP2. Tambahan pula pada ketika itu SP1 hanya berpakaian singlet tanpa lengan. Sekali imbas sesiapa sahaja pasti tidak akan menyangka SP1 dan SP2 adalah anggota polis yang sedang menjalankan rondaan. 8. Di dalam situasi di mana pelbagai kemungkinan boleh dipadankan dan pelbagai kesimpulan boleh dibuat berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan, undang-undang telah menetapkan bahawa Mahkamah ini perlu memilih kesimpulan yang memihak kepada OKT. Sekiranya OKT tidak mengetahui bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah anggota polis yang sedang menjalankan rondaan, perbuatan OKT melarikan diri tidak boleh dikatakan beserta dengan niat untuk menggalang SP1 dari melakukan fungsi jawatannya. Elemen 2 - Penjawat awam tersebut sedang menjalankan fungsi jawatannya. 1. Elemen kedua bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan adalah ketika kejadian penjawat awam tersebut sedang menjalankan fungsi jawatannya sebagai seorang penjawat awam. Pertuduhan yang dikemukakan terhadap OKT adalah menggalang Khairu Zaman bin Bakar daripada menjalankan fungsi jawatannya iaitu membuat rondaan dan pemeriksaan. S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 2. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes Sulaiman Takrib v. Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu; Kerajaan Malaysia (intervener) & Other Cases [2009] 2 CLJ 54 - “Section 186 makes it an offence for anybody to voluntarily obstruct a public servant in the discharge of his public functions. What is a "public function" is not defined. First, it is up to the officer to decide whether, in his view, what he was doing was a public function or not. In the final analysis, it is for the court to decide.” 3. Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, keterangan saksi-saksi Pendakwaan iaitu SP1, SP2 dan SP3 mengesahkan bahawa ketika kejadian SP1 sedang menjalankan tugasan rondaan dan pemeriksaan OP Benteng Covid bersama SP2. Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa ketika kejadian SP1 dan SP2 sedang menjalankan fungsi jawatannya seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 19 dan seksyen 20 Akta Polis 1967. Seksyen 19. Pegawai polis hendaklah disifatkan sebagai bertugas Tiap-tiap pegawai polis, pegawai polis tambahan dan konstabel penjaga, bagi maksud Akta ini, hendaklah disifatkan sebagai sentiasa bertugas apabila dikehendaki bertindak sebagai demikian dan hendaklah melaksanakan tugas dan menjalankan kuasa yang diberi kepadanya di bawah mana-mana undang- undang lain di mana-mana tempat dalam Malaysia di mana dia mungkin menjalankan tugas. Seksyen 20. Tugas am pegawai polis (1) Tiap-tiap pegawai polis hendaklah melaksanakan tugas dan menjalankan kuasa yang dipertanggungkan atau diberikan oleh undang-undang ke atas atau kepada seorang pegawai polis, dan hendaklah mematuhi semua arahan yang sah berkenaan dengan pelaksanaan jawatannya yang mungkin diterimanya dari semasa ke semasa daripada pegawai atasannya dalam Pasukan. S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 SAMA ADA KES PRIMA FACIE BERJAYA DIBUKTIKAN 1. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan PP v. Mohd. Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 - “After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a Subordinate Court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See, Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS 122; [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105; Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] 1 LNS 116; [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it must call for the defence. If the accused then elects to remain silent, the court must proceed to convict him. It is not open to the court to then re-assess the evidence and to determine whether the prosecution had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence from the accused that casts a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case renders the prima facie case one that is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Put shortly, what the trial court is obliged to do under ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC is to ask itself the question: If the accused elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See, Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ 101 (Rep); [1983] 2 MLJ 232. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be called. And if the accused S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 remains silent, he must be convicted. If the answer is in the negative, then the accused must be acquitted.” 2. Di dalam kes ini pihak Pendakwaan bergantung kepada keterangan SP1 dan SP2 serta rakaman CCTV yang dikemukakan. Walaubagaimanapun Mahkamah ini mendapati rakaman CCTV tersebut tidak menjurus kepada satu kesimpulan sahaja iaitu OKT telah dengan sengaja atau bermaksud untuk menggalang tugas seorang penjawat awam. 3. Berdasarkan kepada alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah ini mendapati pihak Pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan kes prima facie apabila tidak dapat membuktikan elemen pertama pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 186 Kanun Keseksaan. Dengan itu, bersandarkan prinsip undang-undang di dalam kes PP v. Mohd. Radzi bin Abu Bakar (supra), OKT dilepas dan dibebaskan dari pertuduhan tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Bertarikh pada 7 Januari 2024 NUR AZZUIN BINTI ABDUL MOATI Majistret Mahkamah Pontian, Johor Pendakwaraya : TPR Nurezzati binti Zaini Pejabat Pendakwaan Negeri Johor Peguambela : Puan Nurul Hidayah binti Basiran Tetuan Hazza Khalid Suraya & Partners S/N oAEE96tZgUGLnJrjth697g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-B52NCvC-285-11/2020

PLAINTIF ZAHID BIN ABD AZIZ DEFENDAN 1. ) NURUL IZZATI BINTI ZAHID 2. ) MOHAMAD KHAIRI BIN ZAHID 3. ) MOHAMAD AZRI BIN ZAHID 4. ) MOHAMAD ZAFRI BIN ZAHID 5. ) RASHIDAH BINTI ABD RAHMAN 6. ) AMANAH SAHAM NASIONAL BERHAD

sama ada tuntutan Plaintif adalah suatu amanah (trust) atau pun pemberian hadiah (hibah)- sama ada Mahkamah ini mempunyai bidang kuasa mendengar kes sekiranya ia adalah tuntutan melibatkan hibah dan bukan amanah - sama ada suatu wang yang dimasukkan dalam akaun ASB anak-anak merupakan amanah atau pun hibah.

05/01/2024

Puan Rafiqha Hanim binti Mohd Rosli

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8f26841a-fc2d-401b-9142-2d3e5d426376&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO.: BA-B52NCVC-285-11/2020 ANTARA ZAHID BIN ABD AZIZ (No. K/P: 611216-10-6393) …PLAINTIF DAN 1. NURUL IZZATI BINTI ZAHID (No. K/P: 900813-14-5586) 2. MOHAMAD KHAIRI BIN ZAHID (No. K/P: 911002-14-5869) 3. MOHAMAD AZRI BIN ZAHID (No. K/P: 950119-10-5141) 4. MOHAMAD ZAFRI BIN ZAHID (No. K/P: 020517-10-1399) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (SELEPAS PERBICARAAN PENUH) A. PENDAHULUAN 1. Kes ini melibatkan tuntutan Plaintif yang merupakan bapa kepada Defendan Pertama hingga Defendan Keempat (selepas ini dikenali sebagai Defendan-Defendan) dalam kes ini yang menuntut kesemua wang beliau yang didakwa telah dimasukkan ke dalam akaun Amanah Saham Bumiputera (ASB) di bawah nama anak-anak beliau. 2. Berdasarkan pada pemberiaan di atas, pihak Plaintif menyatakan yang kesemua wang tersebut hanyalah disimpan di bawah nama mereka sebagai pemegang amanah kepada beliau dan sekiranya beliau masih hidup adalah dianggap sebagai suatu pelaburan untuk tabungan (investment) beliau dan 05/01/2024 16:36:16 BA-B52NCvC-285-11/2020 Kand. 65 S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 hanya akan menjadi milik kesemua Defendan sekiranya beliau telah meninggal dunia. 3. Bagi Defendan Kelima iaitu Amanah Saham Malaysia Berhad (ASB) hanyalah bertindak sebagai Defendan nominal dengan mengendalikan akaun-akaun ASB tersebut sahaja dan tidak mempunyai apa-apa tanggungan liabilti. Dalam pada masa yang sama, Defendan Kelima tidak pernah hadir ke Mahkamah ini walau pun telah ada pemakluman telah diberikan kepada pihak mereka. 4. Berdasarkan pada kesemua keterangan, dokumen serta hujahan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM8,000.00 dan bersandarkan pada keputusan ini, kesemua Defendan kecuali Defendan Kelima tidak berpuas hati dan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi. B. KERTAS-KERTAS KAUSA 5. Sepanjang perbicaraan ini berjalan, kesemua pihak telah memasukkan dan mengguna pakai kesemua dokumen seperti di bawah: (i) Ikatan Pliding Ikatan A; (ii) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (A) Ikatan B; (iii) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (A Tambahan) Ikatan B1; (iv) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B1) Ikatan C; (v) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B2) Ikatan C1; (vi) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B3) Ikatan C2; (vii) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B4) Ikatan C3; (viii) Ikatan Dokumen bersama (B5) Ikatan C4; (ix) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B6) Ikatan C5; (x) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B7) Ikatan C6; (xi) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (B8) Ikatan C7; (xii) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (C1) Ikatan D; (xiii) Ikatan Dokumen Bersama (C2) Ikatan D1; (xiv) Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Defendan Ikatan E; (xv) Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan 2 Defendan Ikatan E1; (xvi) Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif Ikatan F; dan (xvii) Nota Keterangan (NK). S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 C. SAKSI-SAKSI & PENYATA SAKSI 6. Saksi-saksi yang telah memberikan keterangan secara viva voce adalah seperti di bawah: Saksi Nama Saksi Tandaan Dokumen PW1 Zahid Bin Abd Aziz PSP-1 DW1 Rashidah Binti Abd Rahaman PSD-1 DW2 Nurul Izzati Binti Zahid PSD-2 DW3 Muhammad Khairi bin Zahid PSD-3 DW4 Muhammad Azri bin Zahid PSD-4 DW5 Muhammad Zafri bin Zahid PSD-5 D. FAKTA RINGKAS KES 7. Kes ini adalah berkenaan pertikaian ke atas akaun-akaun ASB di bawah nama Defendan-Defendan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai akaun ASB tersebut). 8. Plaintif telah memasukkan sejumlah RM200,000.00 ke dalam akaun-akaun ASB Defendan 1, 2 dan 3 (setiap satu akaun) manakala sejumlah RM50,000.00 dimasukkan ke dalam akaun ASB Defendan 4 dengan alas an yang kesemua wang ini adalah dijadikan sebagai pelaburan Plaintif selama Plaintif masih hidup dan sebagai balasan atas amanah ini, kesemua duit tersebut akan menjadi hak Defendan-Defendan selepas kematian Plaintif. 9. Berdasarkan fakta ini, Plaintif mengatakan bahawa anak-anak beliau hanyalah bertindak sebagai pemegang amanah bagi pihak Plaintif. Pada semua masa material, Defendan-Defendan telah mematuhi arahan Plaintif sehinggalah kesemua Defendan bertindak meninggalkan rumah Plaintif setelah ibu mereka bercerai dengan Plaintif. 10. Atas perkara ini, Tuntutan utama Plaintif adalah untuk mendapatkan semula wang yang telah dilabur untuk tabungan (investment) ke dalam akaun-akaun di atas nama Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 beserta beberapa tuntutan lain sebagaimana dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif. S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 E. FAKTA-FAKTA YANG DIPERSETUJUI 11. Plaintif adalah bapa kepada Defendan 1,2,3 dan 4 dan DW1 adalah ibu kepada kesemua Defendan. 12. Plaintif telah membuka akaun pelaburan Amanah Saham Bumiputra di atas nama Defendan 1,2,3 dan 4. F. ISU-ISU UNTUK DIBICARAKAN 13. Kesemua pihak dalam kes ini telah membuat pengakuan dan bersetuju bahawa Mahkamah ini mempunyai bidang kuasa bagi mendengar dan melupuskan kes ini sungguhpun kes ini melibatkan isu amanah antara bapa dan anak-anak yang beragama Islam. Kesemua pihak telah bersetuju yang mereka tidak akan membuat rayuan bagi isu yang melibatkan bidang kuasa Mahkamah. 14. Oleh demikian, berdasarkan persetujuan kesemua pihak di atas, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa terdapat 4 isu yang perlu dibicarakan seperti di bawah: (i) isu pertama ialah sama ada Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 adalah pemegang Amanah bagi pihak Plaintif atau pemilik kepada duit dalam akaun-akaun pelaburan Amanah Saham Bumiputra di bawah nama Defendan-Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4; (ii) isu kedua ialah sama ada wang di dalam akaun-akaun tersebut merupakan wang hadiah atau pemberian oleh Plaintif kepada anak-anaknya sebagai wang simpanan atau tabungan untuk masa hadapan mereka; (iii) isu ketiga ialah sama ada Defendan-Defendan pernah membuat pengeluaran daripada akaun-akaun Plaintif. semasa buku-buku akaun pelaburan Amanah Saham Bumiputra asal Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 adalah dalam simpanan Plaintif; dan (iv) isu keempat sama ada Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 pernah memaklumkan penukaran kepada akaun-akaun baru oleh pihak Defendan 5 kepada Plaintif. S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 G. ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH (a) ISU PERTAMA: sama ada Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 adalah pemegang Amanah bagi pihak Plaintif atau pemilik kepada duit dalam akaun-akaun pelaburan Amanah Saham Bumiputra di bawah nama Defendan-Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4: (b) ISU KEDUA: sama ada wang di dalam akaun-akaun tersebut merupakan wang hadiah atau pemberian oleh Plaintif kepada anak-anaknya sebagai wang simpanan atau tabungan untuk masa hadapan mereka; dan (c) ISU KETIGA: sama ada Defendan-Defendan pernah membuat pengeluaran daripada akaun-akaun Plaintif. semasa buku-buku akaun pelaburan Amanah Saham Bumiputra asal Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 adalah dalam simpanan Plaintif. 15. Berkenaan dengan ketiga-tiga isu di atas, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kesemua isu di atas adalah saling berkaitan dan akan membuat suatu analisa dan dapatan secara bersesama dan bersekali bagi kesemua isu ini. 16. Bagi kesemua isu di atas, Mahkamah ini telah melihat pada kesemua keterangan serta dokumen yang berkaitan dalam kes ini dan berpandangan bahawa pemberian wang yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintif ke dalam akaun ASB tersebut merupakan suatu kontrak amanah dan bukannya hibah atau wang hadiah sebagaimana yang didakwa oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam tindakan ini. 17. Mahkamah mengambil perhatian berkenaan makluman yang diterima semasa perbicaraan bahawa kesemua Defendan ini telah keluar dari rumah Plaintif dan kini tinggal bersama ibu mereka sementelah Plaintif dan ibu mereka bercerai. 18. Mahkamah ini juga dimaklumkan bahawa ibu mereka telah membuat suatu permohonan penceraian dan perkongsian harta sepencarian (mutaah) terhadap Plaintif di Mahkamah Syariah dan permohonan ibu mereka telah pun dibenarkan. Namun, Mahkamah ini dimaklumkan bahawa pihak Plaintif tidak S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 bersetuju dengan keputusan tersebut dan telah membuat rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah. 19. Atas perkara ini, Mahkamah ini membuat peringatan bahawa kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini bukanlah suatu permohonan berkenaan dengan pemberian hadiah dalam Islam (hibah) yang sememangnya berada dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam Perkara 74 dan 77, Perlembagaan Persekutuan. 20. Lanjutan dari perkara di atas, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif ini adalah suatu tuntutan berdasarkan suatu amanah (trust) antara beliau dan kesemua Defendan yang sememangnya berada dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah ini berdasarkan pada Perkara 74 dan 77, Jadual Kesembilan, Senarai Pertama, item 4(e) (i), Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang turut dinyatakan dalam kes TM FEROZE KHAN & LAIN-LAIN v. MEERA HUSSAIN TM MOHAMED MYDIN [2006] 3 CLJ seperti yang dijelaskan di bawah: “pemakaian undang-undang Islam bagaimanapun adalah tertakluk kepada undang-undang sivil yang terpakai kepada semua tanpa mengira sama ada pihak beragama Islam ataupun sebaliknya. Kewujudan statut-statut tempatan berkenaan amanah telah dipengaruhi oleh undang-undang Inggeris yang dirujuk dan diguna pakai sehingga ke hari ini mengikut peruntukan seksyen 3 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956. … Pekara ini secara langsung memberi kuasa kepada Mahkamah Sivil untuk membicarakan sebarang isu berkenaan amanah. Antara statut tempatan yang memperuntukkan undang-undang amanah seperti Akta Pemegang Amanah 1949, Akta Syarikat Amanah 1949, Akta Pemegang Amanah (Pemerbadanan) 1952 dan statut lain.” S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 21. Pandangan Mahkamah ini juga dikuatkan dengan suatu penulisan artikel bertajuk ANALISIS PERUNDANGAN DAN KES HIBAH AMANAH DI MALAYSIA, (MOHD. ZAMRO ET. AL), INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT VOL. 2: (JUNE) 2023 DI PERENGGAN 4, DI M.S. 80, yang jelas memperincikan perbezaan hibah dan amanah seperti di bawah: “Hibah ialah suatu akad yang mengandungi pemberian milik seseorang secara sukarela terhadap hartanya kepada seseorang yang lain pada masanya hidup tanpa balasan (i’wad) (Muhammad Rawwas 1985; Al-Sharqawi 1997)… … Manakala amanah pula amanah atau harta amanah secara ringkasnya bermaksud seorang pemegang amanah yang memegang hartanah bagi faedah tertentu (Ahmad Hidayat Buang 2006). Daripada kenyataan ini dapat difahami bahawa amanah bukanlah sifat peribadi seseorang semata-mata bahkan ia boleh wujud dalam bentuk kontrak yang mengikat kedua-dua pihak untuk saling menjaga kepentingan masing-masing berdasarkan apa yang telah dipersetujui. Kontrak amanah lebih kepada kontrak bersifat pertolongan pada asalnya di mana seseorang meminta individu lain mentadbir urusannya tertentu tanpa balasan. Pegangan harta amanah boleh wujud dalam pelbagai bentuk sama ada harta alih mahupun harta tak alih, berupah atau tidak (Noor Liza et.al 2019).” 22. Dalam pada masa yang sama, Mahkamah ini melihat keterangan kesemua pihak Defendan yang tidak menafikan sama sekali bahawa segala wang yang dimasukkan dalam akaun mereka adalah wang yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintif berdasarkan keterangan viva voce seperti yang berikut: (i) Keterangan Plaintif (PW1) 23. Keterangan PW1 yang memperihalkan kesemua transaksi dalam akaun ASB adalah duit beliau duit sebagaimana dalam PSP1 dari soalan 37 hingga soalan 43 seperti di bawah: S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 37 S Sila rujuk “DB1/17-21” Boleh Encik Zahid maklumkan Mahkamah apakah dokumen tersebut ? J Akaun Semasa Perbankan peribadi saya. 38 S Dalam “DB1/17”, pada tarikh 28.3.2013 terdapat pengeluaran sebanyak RM250,000.00 dan pada tarikh sama satu kemasukkan duit sebanyak RM199,990.00 ke dalam akaun Izzati sebagaimana di “DA1/2” dan kemasukkan RM50,000.00 ke akaun Khairi di”DA1/5”. Adakah kemasukkan duit ke akaun anak-anak Encik Zahid adalah dari duit tersebut? J Ya. 39 S Dalam “DB1/19” pada tarikh 26.6.2013, pengeluaran RM50,000.00 dan pada tarikh yang sama jumlah RM50,000.00 dimasukkan ke dalam akaun ASB Khairi sebagaimana “DA1/5”, betul ? J Ya. 40 S Dalam “DB1/21” pada tarikh 5.9.2013, pengeluaran RM105,000.00 dan pada tarikh yang sama jumlah RM104,990.00 dimasukkan ke dalam akaun ASB Khairi sebagaimana “DA1/5” adalah duit yang sama, betul ? J Ya. 41 S Dalam “DB1/38” pada tarikh 9.11.2015, pengeluaran RM210,000.00 dan pada tarikh yang sama jumlah RM199,990.00 dimasukkan ke dalam akaun ASB Azri sebagaimana “DA1/9” adalah duit yang sama, betul? J Ya. 42 S Dalam “DB1/41” pada tarikh 21.1.2016, satu kemasukkan duit sebanyak RM14,750.00 dan pada tarikh yang sama jumlah RM14,750.00 dikeluarkan dari akaun ASB Khairi sebagaimana “DA1/7” adalah duit yang sama, betul? J Ya. 43 S Duit yang dimasukkan ke akaun Encik Zahid dari akaun Khairi tersebut sebenarnya duit apa? J Duit keuntungan ASB. 24. Selain dari itu, Plaintif (PW1) turut memberikan keterangan semasa sesi pemeriksaan semula di m.s. 15 hingga 16 Nota Keterangan (NK) yang beliau ada meminta pertolongan anak beliau iaitu Defendan 4 untuk mendapatkan kembali duit dari akaun-akaun ASB Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 yang mana keterangan ini sehingga ke akhir perbicaraan tidak pernah disangkal oleh mana-mana Defendan yang jelas dapat dilihat seperti di bawah: S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 PP : Ok…ada tak en Zahid bertanyakan kepada Azri Tentang perkara berikut perkara tadi PW1 : Ahh..somewhere September atau November 2018, Mohd Azri ada berjumpa dengan saya McDonald SS2 saya ada minta pulangkan balik duit saya dia kata tak boleh saya kata apasal pulak sebab dah buat buku baru di mana ibu nama ibu dimasukkan dan kalau nak kena keluarkan duit kena ada signatory persetujuan 2 orang. PP : Adakah kenyataan itu semua benar En Zahid PW1 : Ketika itu saya percaya anak saya ketika itu saya percaya anak saya dan kemudiannya bila saya nak ke mahkamah ini untuk saman mintak balik wang saya saya dapat tahu benda itu tidak benar. PP : sila, saya tanya balik soalan tadi En. Zahid..adakah En Zahid pernah minta supaya anak-anak En pulangkan balik duit en? PW1 : ini dokumen A aaa… PP : eerr.takde itu hanya untuk rujukan mahkamah sahaja PW1 : Mohon maaf..err saya ada mintak balik duit saya melalui anak bongsu saya Mohd Zafri…ketika itu dia di Sekolah Sultan Alam Shah ..aa…tolong bagitahu kakak dengan abang ayah nak duit ayah balik kerana ayah dah tak kerja kena gantung and then bila saya jumpa dia lagi saya katakan apa cerita duit ayah jawapannya aaa..diaorang kata nantilah bagi balik pada ayah saya cakap ok diaorang tu siapa? Aaa…ibu kata dia akan pulangkan baliklah nantilah ok saya bagitahu Zafri, Zafri duit ASB ayah tu takde kena mengena dengan ibu pun itu jer… 25. Melalui keterangan di atas, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa sebenarnya kesemua anak Plaintif menyedari bahawa duit tersebut adalah milik duit Plaintif dan mereka hanya memegang sebagai pemegang amanah dan mereka akur bahawa sekiranya digunakan perlu dipulangkan semula kepada Plaintif. S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 26. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah ini juga melihat pada keterangan Defendan-Defendan yang menyatakan kesemua perbelanjaan mereka adalah mencukupi bagi menampung perbelanjaan dan pendidikan mereka memandangkan Plaintif sebagai seorang bapa telah menyediakan perbelanjaan secukupnya buat mereka. 27. Melalui keterangan bersumpah Defendan-Defendan juga, Mahkamah ini telah melihat bahawa kesemua Defendan telah bersetuju bahawa buku simpanan yang asal ASB tersebut berada dalam kawalan Plaintif serta kesemua Defendan tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya mengeluarkan wang tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran bapa mereka. Keterangan bersumpah Defendan-Defendan boleh dilihat seperti di bawah: (ii) Keterangan DW2 di m.s. 87 NK: PP: tiada…Cik Nurul betul atau tidak ya ketika itu Cik Nurul tak boleh mengeluarkan wang tanpa kebenaran Bapa Cik Nurul..sebab buku kan berada dengan bapa cik nurul jadi tak boleh keluarkan wang tersebut tanpa kebenaran bapa atau Plaintif, betul? DW2: err..betul 28. Defendan-defendan turut mengakui telah membuat pengeluaran dengan kebenaran Plaintif yang jelas dapat dilihat seperti di bawah: (iii) Keterangan DW2 di m.s. 86-87 NK: PP : Tak ingat …adakah Plaintif pernah meminta Cik Nurul untuk mengeluarkan duit daripada akaun tersebut. Pernahkah Plaintif meminta Cik Nurul untuk mengeluarkan wang daripada akaun tersebut? DW2 : Ada PP : Adakah Cik Nurul telah mengeluarkan wang tersebut sebagaimana diminta oleh Plaintif DW2 : Ada PP : Dalam anggaran berapakah umur Cik Izzati ketika pengeluaran tersebut DW2 : 23 atau 24 S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iv) Keterangan DW3 m.s. 102 dan m.s. 104 NK: PP: Cuba En Khairy ingat ada tak Plaintif mintak En Khairy untuk keluarkan duit tersebut? DW3: Kalau apa yang saya ingat sewaktu ayah saya suruh saya keluarkan duit tu dan dia suruh masukkan ke dalam akaun adik bongsu saya sebagai penambahan pelaburan. PP: Maknanya kamu ingat bahawa ayah kamu pernah suruh kamu keluarkan? DW3 : Pernah tapi nak kata tarikh bila saya tak ingat.. PP: Adakah En Khairy pernah mengeluarkan wang ketika buku akaun tersebut akaun ASB tersebut berada di tangan Plaintif? Pernah tak keluarkan ketika buku tu ada di tangan Plaintif? DW3 : Kejap saya kalau saya keluarkan seingat saya saya kurang ingat seingat saya kalau saya keluarkan atas arahan ayah saya supaya duit itu di masukkan ke akaun adik bongsu saya PP: Maknanya tak pernah keluarkan sendirilah? DW3 : Sendiri atau bersama ayah… PP : Secara sendiri sendiri… DW3 : kurang ingat… PP: Adakah En Khairy ketika buku akaun ASB itu berada di tangan bapa En Khairy, En Khairy ketika itu tidak boleh mengeluarkan wang sebab buku ada dengan bapa jadi En Khairy tak boleh keluarkan wang kan, buku takde ? DW3 : Buku takde betul.. PP : Tak boleh kan DW3 : Tak boleh (v) Keterangan DW3 di m.s. 107-108 dan 111 NK: PP : Setuju atau tidak walaupun bapa kamu tidak pernah menggunakan perkataan pemegang Amanah tetapi kamu telah mengeluarkan wang tersebut apabila diminta oleh bapa kamu? Betul tak? Walaupun bapa kamu tak pernah sebut duit itu kamu sebagai pemegang Amanah? DW3 : Ok… S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 PP : Ok tadi kamu ada kata kamu ada keluarkan duitkan DW3 : A ya betul PP : Ok…kamu keluarkan sebab ayah kamu yang suruh kan? DW3 : Ya sewaktu bersama dengan dia PP : Tapi kamu keluarkan jugak duit apabila ayah kamu suruh keluarkan? DW3 : Ok..betul PP: Ok tapi takpe…semasa dia nak keluar dia bawa kamu bawak keluar duit tu kan? DW3 : Ok betul PP: Ok Betul..lepas tu buku tu dengan kamu kan, masa keluar tu mestilah kamu bawak buku tu ke bank kan? DW3 : Ya tuan lepas tu… PP: Lepas tu kenapa kamu tak serah kepada ibu kamu kamu serah kepada bapa kamu? DW3 : Sebab dia ada sebelah saya waktu bank saya bagilah kat dia balik 29. Dalam pada masa yang sama, melalui keterangan secara bersumpah DW3 juga telah bersetuju bahawa kesemua wang dalam akaun ASB tersebut adalah hak milik bapa mereka yang merupakan tabungan (life time savings) seperti yang dinyatakan di m.s. 100-101 NK seperti di bawah: PP: I got no saving for retirement I was robbed of my lifetime savings so I must find a way to generate income I only have I me and myself so no choice got to do it alone. betul kan? DW3 : Betul PP: So dia ada cakap my lifetime saving DW3 : Betul PP: Ok…Puan pada mukasurat 1016…ok…assalamualaikum Khairy ada (inaudible) jumpa tu.. DW3 : Ya saya PP: I have to endure all these and then clean up all the mess in my life bestowed to me by my children before I go away.. DW3 : Ok PP : Ok…Khairy ada jawab kemudian apa yang your father bapa kamu cakap what I meant is my lifetime saving ASB betul? DW3 : Betul S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 30. DW4 juga ada membuat keterangan dalam Mahkamah ini dan mengaku bahawa kesemua wang tersebut adalah simpanan Plaintif untuk tabungan dan pelaburan yang mana DW4 juga ada membuat pengakuan yang kesemua Defendan perlu memulangkan semula seperti di m.s. 119 dan m.s. 128 NK: PP : Tiada..ok…ketika pembukaan akaun ASB tersebut adakah bapa En Azri ada beritahu apa-apa berkenaan dengan duit tersebut? DW4 : aa..tiada apa-apa tuan PP : tiada apa-apa…pernahkah bapa en azri memanggil En Azri ke dalam bilik beliau untuk memberitahu berkenaan tujuan akaun ASB tersebut di buka? DW4 : Yang dipesan tentang ASB bila dalam bilik tu saya kurang pasti tuan PP : Tapi ada? DW4 : Ada PP : Pernah tak err..bapa En Azri beritahu En Azri bahawa akaun-akaun ASB tersebut di buka dengan tujuan sebagai pelaburan? DW4 : Sebagai pelaburan..ya diterangkan… PP : Tanpa pengetahuan..Adakah bapa kamu pernah bertanya kepada kamu untuk pulangkan duit bapa kamu daripada akaun ASB? DW4 : aa..ada tuan PP : ada..apa jawapan kamu? DW4 : Saya akan usaha dengan dia untuk pulangkan duit dia 31. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah melihat pada keterangan PW1 yang secara konsisten mengatakan bahawa wang tersebut adalah untuk simpanan dan pelaburan beliau yang dilaburkan dan bukannya sebagai hibah atau hadiah. 32. Mahkamah juga melihat pada keterangan Plaintif yang tidak dicabar yang mengatakan bahawa wang tersebut dikhaskan untuk tabungan dan pelaburan Plaintif selama beliau masih hidup dan hanya akan menjadi hak Defendan-Defendan apabila Plaintif meninggal dunia. Keterangan Plaintif juga disokong oleh keterangan DW1 hingga DW4 seperti di bawah: (vi) Keterangan DW1 di m.s. 70 NK: S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 PP : Ada sebut wang hadiah tak? DW1 : Takde pun PP : Ada sebut pemberian tak? DW1 : Sekejap ya…untuk perbelanjaan bersekolah dan pengajian mereka PP : Ya lah tapi takde perkataan wang hadiah dan pemberian dariapada Plaintif kan? Takde kan DW1 : Ikut sini tak de lah (vii) Keterangan DW2 m.s. 82 NK: PP : Ok adakah ada disebut dalam mana-mana dokumen bahawa tersebut adalah wang hadiah dan pemberian daripada Plaintif DW2 : Tiada disebut dalam mana-mana dokumen (viii) Keterangan DW3 di m.s. 98 NK: PP : Ok..tujuan wang yang dimasukkan ke dalam akaun ASB en khairy, en Khairy jawab antaranya adalah sebagai wang hadiah dan pemberian daripada plaintif dan sebagai simpanan dan tabungan untuk masa hadapan kami, betul? DW3 : Betul PP : Ok..adakah..soalan saya, adakah ada disebut dalam mana-mana dokumen bahawa wang tersebut adalah wang hadiah dan pemberian daripada plaintif? DW3 : Tidak ada dokumen cuma.. (ix) Keterangan DW4 di m.s. 119 NK: PP : Adakah ada disebut dalam mana-mana dokumen bahawa wang tersebut adalah wang hadiah dan pemberian daripada plaintif? DW4 : Tiada black and white tuan 33. Maka adalah jelas di sini, bahawa duit simpanan dalam akaun ASB tersebut bukanlah suatu pemberian hadiah akan tetap sebagai suatu amanah bagi tabungan dan pelaburan Plaintif sahaja. Tambahan juga, Plaintif telah memberikan keterangan bahawa kesemua buku simpanan tersebut berada S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 dalam kawalan beliau yang boleh dilihat dalam keterangan beliau di m.s.24, m.s. 32-33 dan m.s. 45-46 NK seperti di bawah: PD : Maka saya katakan bahawa tidak ada sebarang kawalan ke atas - akaun-akaun Defendan-Defendan tersebut, setuju atau tak? PW1 : Itu tak setuju PD : Baik seterusnya ya..En Zahid mengatakan bahawa memegang keempat-empat buku-buku ASB Defendan-Defendan, setuju ya.. PW1 : Saya pegang? Yes PD : Dan memegangnya sejak akaun-akaun tersebut dibuka? PW1 : Ya PD : Mengikut soalan no 5 penyata saksi en zahid, buku-buku tersebut ada dengan Zahid kerana duit-duit itu milik En Zahid itu yang En Zahid cakap ya PW1 : No 5 ya PD : Ya PW1 : Kenapa buku-buku akaun tersebut berada dengan En Zahid, is that the one? PD : Ya PW1 : Ok so you nak I baca jawapan? PD : Buku-buku tersebut berada dengan en zahid kerana duit-duit tu milik En Zahid, setuju ya itu jawapan En Zahid PW1 : Soalan ya kenapa buku-buku akaun tersebut berada dengan En Zahid Jawapan dia sebagaimana saya telah jelas kan kepada anak-anak saya duit yang berada di dalam akaun-akaun tersebut adalah milik saya saya cuma menumpang nama anak-anak untuk pelaburan saya dan saya tak nak dan tak benarkan mereka menggunakan duit-duit tersebut sewenang-wenangnya. PD : Dan mengikut soalan 6 penyata saksi en Zahid kepada soalan adakah di laburkan duit duit tersebut untuk kepentingan dan pembelajaran anak- anak jawapan en Zahid adalah tidak kerana saya telah memberikan duit belanja kepada mereka dan kad kredit dengan limit 3000 untuk keperluan mereka, itu jawapan kepada soalan 6,betul ya.. PW1 : Ya S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 PD : Sebab dah bagi duit belanjakan? PW1 : Ya PW1 : Kenapa buku-buku akaun tersebut berada dengan saya, dengan en Zahid.. PD : Ya..Jawapannya sebagaimana saya telah jelaskan kepada anak-anak saya duit yang berada di dalam akaun-akaun tersebut adalah milik saya saya cuma menumpang nama anak-anak untuk pelaburan saya ya itu jawapan En Zahid Ya PW1 : Ya PD : Jadi saya katakan ini adalah bertentangan dengan keterangan bertulis en Zahid di dalam mahkamah Tinggi Syariah apabila en Zahid menyatakan di soalan 13 bahawa En Zahid peruntukkan jumlah RM200 ribu kepada 3 anak dan RM50 ribu kepada bongsu demi kebajikan dan masa depan anak- anak, setuju tak ini bertentangan? PW1 : Dia tak sama lah 2018, 2018 mutaah anak sekolah belajar so at that..eerrr.at that point in time that is what the ASB is for just in case kalau saya mati but we are talking now dalam mahkamah PD : Itu En Zahid tidak nyatakan di mana-mana di dalam jawapan Zahid di sini atau pun di dalam keterangan bertulis En Zahid Di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Ya, jadi saya katakan bahawa apa yang apa keterangan yang En Zahid berikan berkenaan dengan peruntukan RM200 ribu tersebut bukanlah untuk menumpang nama anak-anak untuk pelaburan En Zahid dan merupakan milik En Zahid, En Zahid setuju atau tidak? Do you agree? PW1 : Do I agree di mahkamah syariah that I must say bende ni menumpang? PD : Bahawa..baik saya ulangkan balik lah… PW1 : I’m lost what you want..i’m lost PD : bila En Zahid mengatakan soalan no 5 ya, bahawa duit yang berada di dalam akaun-akaun tersebut adalah milik saya PW1 : Milik saya betul.. PD : Saya cuma menumpang nama anak-anak untuk pelaburan saya.. PW1 : Betul S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 34. Berdasarkan segala keterangan di atas, adalah jelas bahawa hujahan Defendan-Defendan yang mengatakan bahawa duit dalam akaun ASB tersebut adalah wang hadiah pemberian Plaintif kepada mereka adalah TIDAK BENAR memandangkan atas keterangan mereka sendiri adalah jelas bahawa segala kemasukan wang dalam akaun-akaun ASB Defendan 1 hingga 3 sebanyak RM200,000.00 setiap satu akaun dan dalam akaun ASB Defendan 4 pula dimasukkan sebanyak RM50,000.00 adalah merupakan suatu amanah kepada bapa mereka sahaja dan tidak berpindah milik kepada mereka. Ini jelas dapat dilihat bahawa kesemua perbelanjaan serta wang bagi pembelajaran mereka telah disediakan secukupnya oleh Plaintif. Oleh demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan tiada keperluan untuk Plaintif menggunakan wang dalam akaun ASB tersebut bagi menampung perbelanjaan mereka. 35. Pandangan Mahkamah ini adalah berdasarkan kes YONG NYEE FAN & SONS SDN. BHD. v. KIM GUAN & CO. SDN. BHD. [1979] 1 MLJ 182 yang memperuntukkan 5 elemen yang perlu ada bagi membentuk amanah secara sah seperti di bawah: (i) pihak yang membuat amanah; (ii) pemegang atau penerima amanah; (iii) pihak yang mendapat manfaat harta amanah; (iv) harta amanah; dan (v) arahan yang dinyatakan dalam amanah. 36. Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa sungguhpun tiada dokumen bertulis yang menyatakan bahawa duit simpanan dalam akaun ASB tersebut adalah bersifat amanah, namun segala perlakuan dan tindakan kesemua Defendan adalah terang lagi bersuluh melalui keterangan mereka sendiri seperti di atas boleh dijumlahkan sebagai pengakuan mereka sendiri yang wang tersebut adalah amanah yang diberikan oleh Plaintif. 37. Pandangan Mahkamah ini adalah jelas dinyatakan dalam menggunapakai kes IKUMI TERADA v. JEMIX CO LTD & ORS AND ANOTHER APPEAL[2020] S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 2 MLRA 150 yang memperincikan prinsip pemegang amanah seperti di bawah: “Principles Of Express Trust [36] In the case of Geh Cheng Hooi & Ors v. Equipment Dynamics Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLRA 519 (SC), it was held that trusts are either express trust or trust arising by operation of law. The learned judge did not commit an error of law when dealing with the issue of trust before him. In fact, other than that, the case of Yeong Ah Chee v. Lee Chong Hai & Anor And Other Appeals [1994] 1 MLRA 226, referred to in the judgment that there are three “essentials” of an express trust (three certainties), we may add that the three certainties were also discussed in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2006] 1 MLRA 131. At pp 146-147, the Court of Appeal said: “[60] The law governing the certainty of a trust is that laid down by Lord Langdale MR in the seminal case of Knight v. Knight [1840] 49 ER 68. There it was held that for a trust to be certain three requirements must be fulfilled. First, there must be certainty of intention. Second there must be certainty of subject matter: both in terms of the corpus and the beneficial interest. Third, there must be certainty of the objects of the trust. A trust is void if there is uncertainty in any of these three elements.” [37] In the Court of Appeal case of Qimonda Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Sediabena Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 MLRA 574, it was held that the court must consider the circumstances concerning the relationship between the parties. As trust can be implied even where the agreements themselves do not contain an express clause as it is clearly manifested in the agreements and the correspondence concerned that it was the intention of the parties to create one. [38] According to Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [310.043], the law allows a declaration of trust of any S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 property to be made informally and by parole. There is no necessity for a declaration of trust to be made in writing, to be valid (Teoh Heng Seng & Ors v. Teoh Kiew Seng & Anor [1999] 4 MLRH 46). In respect of the certainty of intention, there had to be clear evidence of an intention to create a trust and this could be inferred not only from the alleged settlor’s words and conduct but also of the surrounding circumstances and the interpretation of any agreements that might have been entered into (Guy Neale v. Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2014] SGCA 64). It is not necessary for a trust to be in writing (Wan Naimah v. Wan Mohamad Nawawai [1972] 1 MLRA 47). Intention is a matter of evidence and it can be established by way of inference (Emas Offshore (M) Sdn Bhd v. Suhaimi Maryani [2012] MLRHU 1585). A person’s intention for a trust is to be gathered from the totality of the particular circumstances of the case, including the words written or spoken and the conduct of the parties (ESPL (M) Sdn Bhd v. Radio & General Engineering Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 MLRA 248). Express Trust-Certainty of Subject Matter [39] Pursuant to Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia [310.052]: “In order to create a valid trust, the property to be affected by the trust must be either expressly designated or so defined that it is capable of being ascertained otherwise the trust is void for uncertainty.” Express Trust-Certainty Of Object [40] The case of Re Chionh Ke Hu Deceased [1964] 1 MLRH 182 provides that the objects or persons to be benefited by a trust must be expressly designated or so defined that they are capable of being ascertained. 38. Pandangan Mahkamah ini juga disokong oleh kes ESPL (M) SDN BHD v. RADIO & GENERAL ENGINEERING SDN BHD [2004] 2 MLRA 248, YA. Gopal Sri Ram (HMR) dalam menyampaikan penghakimannya berkata: [19] In our judgment, Re Kayford Ltd is merely another authority in a long line that illustrate the proposition that a person’s intention is to be gathered from the totality of the particular S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 circumstances of the case, including the words written or spoken and the conduct of the parties. 39. Berdasarkan kes ESPL (M) SDN BHD v. RADIO & GENERAL ENGINEERING SDN BHD seperti di atas, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif, bahawa pihak Plaintif telah membuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa perlakuan Defendan-Defendan dalam kes ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa mereka memahami dengan jelas berkenaan niat Plaintif yang hanya memasukkan wang beliau ke dalam akaun ASB mereka sebagai tabungan dan pelaburan beliau dan bukannya sebagai hadiah atau hibah. (d) ISU KEEMPAT: sama ada Defendan 1, 2, 3 dan 4 pernah memaklumkan penukaran kepada akaun-akaun baru oleh pihak Defendan 5 kepada Plaintif. 40. Berkenaan dengan isu di atas, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa kesemua Defendan tidak pernah memaklumkan penukaran akaun kepada Plaintif sebagaimana yang diterangkan seperti di bawah: (i) Keterangan DW3 di m.s. 111 NK: PP : Kamu kata kamu tidak ada masalah dengan bapa kamu tapi kenapa kamu tak beritahu tentang pertukaran akaun ASB kamu DW3 : Saya yang seingat saya buku tu takde dengan saya saya pergi buat repot polis dan saya pergi ke kaunter ASB bukak buku baru kebetulan waktu tu ada macam… PP : Ok buat repot polis tu kenapa? DW3 : Sebab nak buat buku baru kena buat repot polis dulu PP : Kenapa kamu tak mintak izin dengan bapak kamu saja DW3 : Saya tak perlu sebab itu atas nama saya S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 PP : Ialah tapi kamu tahu buku tu ada dengan bapa kamu kan? DW3 : aa..tahu PP : kemudian kamu buat repot hilangkan? DW3 : Ya betul (ii) Keterangan DW2 di m.s. 88 NK: PP : Adakah cik nurul ada memberitahu kepada plaintif bahawa buku akaun ASB cik nurul telah di tukarkan DW2 : Bagitahu? Tak ada PP : Tak ada DW2 : Tak ada (iii) Keterangan DW3 di m.s. 105-106 NK: PP : Ok bila pertukaran akaun berlaku ya? Adakah en Khairy sedar berlaku pertukaran akaun daripada akaun lama kepada akaun baru? Sedar tak? DW3 : Sedar PP : Ok bila? DW3 : Saya tak ingatlah tuan PP : Tak pasti ya..tak ingat tak ingat DW3 : Tak ingat tak pasti PP : Ok ..tapi sedar benda tu berlaku ya DW3 : Sedar S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 PP : Jadi adakah en Khairy memaklumkan kepada bapa en Khairy? DW3 : Oh tidak (iv) Keterangan DW4 di m.s. 122-123 NK: PP : Bila berlaku pertukaran akaun Asb en azri? DW4 : Pertukaran? PP : Haa DW4 : Buku.. PP : Haa..buku DW4 : 2016 atau 2017 saya PP : Bagaimana err…boleh berlaku pertukaran tersebut? DW4 : Bagaimana boleh pertukaran…kerana buku tu tiada dalam jagaan saya PP : So, macamana buat tu? DW4 : kena buat repot polis dan pergi ke ASB untuk buat buku yang baru tuan PP : bukankah buku tersebut ada dengan bapa en azri? DW4 : Sebelum kejadian itu ya PP : Selepas kejadian? DW4 : Saya tidak pasti tuan PP : Ok…adakah en azri ada mengeluarkan duit dari akaun ASB tersebut selepas penukaran? DW-4 : Ada tuan S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 PP : Berapa kali? DW4 : Kurang pasti tuan PP : Kurang pasti…adakah enazri meminta keizinan dari bapa En Azri untuk membawa keluar wang tersebut? DW4 : tidak tuan PP : Pertukaran tersebut ada maklum tak kat bapa en azri DW4 : Tidak tuan 41. Sehubungan itu, berdasarkan keterangan kesemua Defendan seperti di atas, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tindakan Defendan-Defendan menukar akaun-akaun ASB dengan membuat laporan polis dengan mengatakan kehilangan buku-buku akaun tersebut adalah TIDAK BENAR dan sebenarnya mereka mengetahui bahawa kesemua wang tersebut adalah bersifat amanah sebagaimana yang diplidkan serta dinyatakan oleh Plaintif secara konsisten dalam Mahkamah ini. 42. Mahkamah berpandangan yang kesemua Defendan sedar bahawa sekiranya mereka memaklumkan berkenaan penukaran buku simpanan ASB tersebut akan menyebabkan Plaintif mengetahui bahawa duit yang telah diamanahkan kepada mereka telah digunakan bukan seperti yang diamanahkan oleh Plaintif. 43. Ini dikuatkan juga dengan keterangan PW1 di m.s. 61 NK yang turut menerangkan yang Plaintif sendiri tidak dimaklumkan berkenaan dengan pertukaran buku simpanan ASB tersebut: PP : Tadi ditanya tentang ok..sori sori silap emmm…ok errmmm…soalan dia tadi ditanya tentang err..di sebabkan mereka err..mereka telah pecah amanah soalan pasal pecah amanah tadi en Zahid ingat pasal pecah Amanah PW1 : Aa pasal dia pecah amanah lah S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 PP : Jadi en Zahid kata setuju mereka pecah Amanah PW1 : Ya setuju PP : En Zahid cakap demikian PW1 : Kerana mereka first I found out mereka tukar ke buku baru buku lain buku baru tanpa pengetahuan saya itu satu it was done behind my back PP : Ok samada mereka tukar tadi siapa yang buat pertukaran dia orang ke PW1 : Dia orang bukan saya saya tak tahu apa PP : Diaorang yang sendiri buat ke atau bank yang buat pertukaran PW1 : aa..I believe dia pergi bank la tukar 44. Oleh demikian, berlandaskan pada kesemua keterangan di atas, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kesemua Defendan yang merupakan pemegang amanah bagi wang simpanan ASB tersebut dan melalui keterangan mereka sendiri telah mengaku bahawa penukaran buku simpanan ASB tersebut adalah dibuat tanpa memaklumkan kepada Plaintif. H. KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH 45. Berdasarkan pada semua analisa dan dapatan di atas, Mahkamah ini membuat keputusan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes di atas imbangan kebarangkalian (balance of probabilities) melalui keterangan secara viva voce serta melalui keterangan dalam dokumen-dokumen dalam kes ini bahawa sebenarnya kesemua wang yang dimasukkan dalam akaun ASB tersebut adalah amanah (trust) yang perlu dijaga oleh kesemua Defendan sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam dalam kes WAN NAIMAH v. WAN MOHAMAD NAWAWI [1972] 1 LNS 164 yang dijelaskan seperti di bawah: S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 “a trust must may be made quite informally, provided that the words used are clear and unequivocal.” 46. Sehubungan dengan pandangan di atas, adalah jelas bahawa pihak Defendan 1 hingga 4 telah memungkiri amanah yang telah secara jelas memperincikan peranan mereka sebagai pemegang amanah dalam mengurus tadbir wang dalam akaun ASB tersebut sebagaimana yang dijelaskan dalam kes RE SCOTT [1903] 1 CH 1 seperti di bawah: … the word trusts refer to the duty or aggregate of obligations that rest upon a person described as trustee. The responsibilities are in relation to the property held by him or under his control. That property he will be compelled by a Court in its equitable jurisdiction to administer in the manner lawfully prescribed by the trust instrument or in the absence of such instrument in accordance with equitable principles.” 47. Oleh demikian, berdasarkan pada kesemua analisa dan dapatan di atas, Mahkamah dengan ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM8,000.00. Disediakan oleh: RAFIQHA HANIM MOHD ROSLI HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (6) SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN 14 DISEMBER 2023 S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 BARISAN PEGUAM: PEGUAM PLAINTIF ENCIK MOHD ZUBIR BIN EMBONG TETUAN MOHD ZUBIR EMBONG & ASSOCIATES PEGUAM DEFENDAN ENCIK HAZMAN BIN HARUN TETUAN HAZMAN TAN S/N GoQmjy38G0CRQi0XUJjdg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-22NCvC-64-04/2022

PLAINTIF 1. ) Abd Manan Bin Husin [Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Bagi Haji Mat Zain Bin Haji Salleh, Si Mati] (Selepas Ini Dirujuk Sebagai 'Haji Mat Zain Tersebut' Menurut Perintah Bertarikh 7.5.2021) 2. ) ISMAIL BIN AB SAMAT DEFENDAN 1. ) Zalina Binti Idris (Sebagai Wakil Diri Kepada Siti Zauyah Binti Abdullah, Simati) Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Bagi Abdullah Bin Abdul Majid) 2. ) ROSLIN BINTI MUHAMMAD (Pentadbir Harta Pusaka bagi Abdullah Bin Abdul Majid) 3. ) AZIZAH BINTI ABDULLAH 4. ) HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH 5. ) Mohd Khusairi Bin Mohd Isa 6. ) MOHD SHAMSURI BIN MOHD ISA 7. ) ROZAINI BINTI ABDULLAH 8. ) ZALINA BINTI IDRIS

Full Trial – claim by the Plaintiffs in Suit 64 as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain for a declaration that the estate of the late Abdullah is holding ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain. Issues• Whether the late Abdullah held ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the letter dated 30th January 1983 by Mohamad Bin Abdullah, the son of the late Abdullah permitting the 1st Plaintiff to build a house on the said land tantamounts to the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain having an interest in the said land;• Whether there is fraud/ misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct committed by the late Abdullah and/or the estate of the late Abdullah against the Plaintiffs as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• If fraud/misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct by the late Abdullah is found, whether the Limitation Act 1953 and/or the principle of laches applied to defeat the claim of the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession of the said land; and• Whether there is unjust enrichment on the part of the late Abdullah.The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a constructive trust in favour of the late Haji Mat Zain nor found any unconscionable conduct.The Court also finds that the estate of the late Abdullah and/or the Defendants have an overriding interest as the registered proprietor of the said land.The Court finds that the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession subject to them compensating the two Plaintiffs in Suit 64 for the present value of the said houses to be assessed by an independent valuer appointed by the Court. The costs of this valuation is to be borne by the estate of the late Abdullah.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=32b21f6e-3a91-4baa-b860-fb5c52b4c520&Inline=true

05/01/2024 14:07:20 PA-22NCvC-64-04/2022 Kand. 83 S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bhyMpE6qku4YPtcUrTFIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the 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E3 C:/01,204; ,4 w :n DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAU PINANG DI DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG. MALAYSIA GUAMAM SIVIL NO P zzucvoeo NI2|l22 ANTARA 1. AED MANAN am HUSIN (No. KW: 550222-07-5471 r(um-- 4935755) [Punladb Han: Punk: luql H:)| rm bln Bin Haj? Sallo ,si um: (aolepil lnl dlruluk sabagni ‘Hun Mat Zaln msebur menurul Pcrinlnh bfrurilm U1.05.1D2I) 2. ISMAIL am AB SAMAY (No. KIP: 541111-oz-5529 I (Lama: 4711139) PLAINTIF-FLAINTIF DAN 4. sin ZAUVAM amnnanumm [NO. KIP: :muM1—52a4] Pomadhlr mm Punk: Blgl Abdulllh am Abdul Majld 2. ROSLIN amn MUHAMMAD mo. Kl samza-nu-5744} P-nmdmr Mum Punk. Abdullnh am Abdul Mxjld sw x:nyMvE6qxuwPIcuvtF\A Ms: I M -4 mm Sum M... M“ be used m van; M nugvuuly mm; “Mm. VII mum puns! fl 3. AZIZAH awn AEDULLAN mo. KIP.: 5no7u.n7.5Iss] 4. HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH (No. K1P.: 430330-07-5102] 5. MOHD KHUSAIRI am Mono ISA [N0. KIP.: 610908-07-5255] E. MOHD sHAMsuRI BIN MOHD ISA [N0. K/F.: 71092142-5:75] 1. ROZAINI Imm ABDULLAH [NO. K/P.: s1Ims-a1-5594] I. ZALINA amn IDRIS mo. KIP.: saw 1-01-51 54] DEFENDAN-DEFENDAM DIDEIIGAR EERSAMA BALAM MAHKAMAN TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAIJ FINANG DALAM NEGERI FULAU FINANG GIJAMAN SIVIL no ucvc 21-on/2022 ANYARA I. AZIZAH amn AEDULLAH [No. mp: 5oo11¢o1‘s1n] sw I:nyMvEuqxuwPIcuvIFIA mm Sum M... M“ be used M mm I. nflmrufllv mm; “Mm. VII muwa VWLII nauzawu 11.2. ms subsequent purchase by me Ia|e Abauiisn at me nublic auc1iDn vide a saunnd inaeniure oi sale dated 3" May 1941 was sinister and irauauianny done 11.3. the esvace oi the iaie Abdullah had krmwledge at all material limes that me Iaie Haii Mai Zain was run a squatter simp/rune: but the owner of the V. undivided share ollhe sax: iand, and 11 4 that the years oi wuupaiion and paymem oflhe assassmanl is an acknowledgement by the late Abauniaii that V, undivided sriareei me said iana is heid on mnstruclivetruslforme iamiiy Mme lala Haji MalZaIn. mu Dofomi-ms‘ coimmlmu/submissions [12] The mnlsnlians/submissions of me esla1e or the late Abduliah are summarized as ioiiews 12.1. me pmcivf paymem Mme quil rem urassessmenl is not proof olan equivasie ngm over me said land. 12 2. me oucupaiiun or me said and does not prevent the esiaia ol the Is|a Abduilah as ma registened pmprieioiimm taking acaon to ream/er the said |and1 IN wmnsaamwiamm p... :1 nl :4 ma 5.11.1 ...m.m111 be flied m mm 1.. nflmruflly sum. dun-mm Va arium WM! 12 3. ma allegad olal agreement mwean me lala Hall Mal zaln and the IICE Abdullah is not Iarlable nor admlsslble In law as it ls based on hearsay, and 12.4 male was an lnordmale delay In lxlmmenclng lhls presern acllon and ma eslata onne lale Hall Mal zaln have sat on lh - nghls aasplla having knawledge mal lne name 01 me late Hall Mal zaln was not leglslam: on me me Deed slnce 1941 llsall. sumnn ot Prod [13] ll la lllle law lllal he who aaaena musl prwa me P8I'lil:uIaHa<.1s.As such‘ lne burden of glow llas on me aslala cl lne lala Hall Mal am as me Plalnlllls lhmughaut [ha lnal la prove lnau clllm aglmsl ma esbzaie nllha |a|aAbdu||zh and In be veslad wlm V. undrvlded an-re ollhe sale land on a nalanaa nl pmbablllllas as enshrined under socllom ma. 1n: and lo: ol on Evldunuu Act flsa. [saa cam of John: al Abdul Kndlr Mnrlcln v lnvrtnnco Lam Kwck Fun A Anuv[19l|l] l IALRA anal and Tan Kiln Knunn v. ‘rm Kn Kim (M) sun and mu] 1 cu SUPP 141}. [141 To ml: and, II 1! also am lnal I quola the use of Lucllununan clmu Alng-ypln Q LAI|lgnppIn I Anor v. Socurn lvunmlnn Sdn and mm 3 MLRA 501 were me Federal calm held as fnllows. -(521 saclnzn 1lJ1(1Jpmvl'l1e.sIII.!t'VVhl)ev9Id9:wes any couma give judgment as to any legal righl a llanlllry dependent on lno IN MyMnEaqkuwPIl:LmFlA Page :2 04 u ‘Nab! a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be flied M mm ms anlln.l-y MIN: dun-mm Va .mm mm SKISISHDU oiiecis wliicii he asserts, niusi prove iiiei those tests exisi' "Ssclion tot states that Ihe initiei burden afpieiiing a piinie iecie case in liis favour is ass: on the nieiniitt . " twaodmlte and AIFWAH Law 0/ Evidence, tstli ed"\ Vol 3 al p 3194) illusiiation in to 5 mt guts It bemrid doubt mat the "human armor " iests tllmugholn an the p_I.!lntIII. Section 102 mums that "Thu iiumn of E! in a suit of ggceeding lies on mi gersarl who would fall illto Ividcncc at an weie given on siiliev si "rlis inillll anus eimvigg tho case is afwazs an tliia flaimlff " tseikei Law aIEvldence tstli odn at 1599. lltusti-ation ta to s 102 ggls It beige doubt ilut - gllinttlfllas the iniiiai units or E! {M nius e glillmlllius both tllu buntoii ol flies mil as the initixi onue oigiooi. iii Biiiesrone Pte Ltd v. sninii & Associates Far Eesi Lii1[2i7o7]4 SLR 855, me singepoie Cotirr omppeai per vx Reieii ./CA dsln/Sling iiie iuitgnieiii ol the coun, explained (ha! ei me sieit of iiie pieiniiit s case the burden oi pmol and me arms aipioercoinsi.ie- ' . atilie sienolilie piainmis case, my igaiaurden almving riie eximnse oi nix nluvnnr Incl mat Ml gnlnilir must mile and lhe evldentill burden :1! soma (no! Inlteronlly inciudlbio evidence 471' iii: nxistanca olsuch I-ctcoineiite. l/pan eitauciion oiiiiei evidence, the evidential minzten shins io iiie cteiendent, as me case may lie, in adduca some evidence in ieouilai. ii no evidence in remillal is adduced. lhs court may eonciuue iioni (ha evidence oi Ibo dale/idanl IL on me avhnr nena, svldarmv in rahuttal IS eaitueeit, me ewaentiai Duldcn IN bhyMDE6QMi4VPlcLivYFiA v... u eiu -we s.ii.i IHIWDIY MU be HSQG m my me nvwiruflly MW; m.i.i. VII AFVLING WM! shifls back [0 the p/HVIMV, U, u/limsls/y, Ihs evidenlial burden comes I0 iasi an ina defendant, Ins l9gs/ burden of pniar or me reievanl fan would have been discharged by the plainhf The Iegalbumeri 0! pidai. a paiinaneni and enduring miidan ~ does naisnin. A parry who nas me legal lumen drpidoiaii any issue IN/SI discharge it Ihmughoul. sonieiiines, the legal aiiidan is spoken or, /naccurals/y, as "S‘himng”, Bur wnai is miiy ineanz is inai anoinei issue nas been engaged, on wnian (he opposiia party neais me /eqa/burden Diplval ' §51The ml: is mat ‘the onus oimoiafanzgaiticuiar hztlles on the am who mm It not on him win: denies it- at inciimnir pmbaliarl qiii decii, non qui neqax, acrvli incibir piooaiion . The glnlnfllf is bound in ma iiisi Instance ta show a gma laclecasa and inn vos it imgifm inc mm will not assist nim. Hum (ho maxim Ever est condition delendantls. A flalnlm‘ cannot obviously advantagg Ilimsdf by the weakness of mo doilnu. A fllnfllrs case must stand or hll um me ovldonct adducod by him. When. however. (he dslandant, or either liligarll pan}/, insiaad ol denying wnai is a//eged againm nim, iaiias an some naw maiiai wiiian, i/inie, is an answai I017, me miiden orpinoi changes sides, and iia, in ms (um, ls bound lo sndw a pfima iacid 9559 at ieasi and, ii ne leaves I! iinpaiiaci, ina mun WI" rlal assist niin. Raiis sxcipendo Ill aclal” (woodio/is and AIHWA/1, sum, vol 3 ai p aisomgu " in wiinsaamwiaunm 7:5: in am warn Sum llnnflhlv nu as used M mm me nvmnnfily mm; dnunmnl VIA .mnc WM! [151 As such. the burden of meat tea on the estate at the late Hatt Mat Zam |o wave the extstehee a1 a txxtstructtve trust iar the hate Hatt Mat zeth and the consequential right |o be vested wtth the ‘/1 uh ed share of the Sam rand tn the name at the late Hah Mat zattt. [16] There ate several issues which teeutte judtaal eohsuetettoh/asterhttnettoh as f0HUws' t5.1.whether the late Abdullah hetd ‘A undivtded share of the Said Iahtt an emslruclwe ttustrortha estate ctthe late Hap Mat Lam. 16.2.Whetner the tettet dated 30" Janualy 1933 by Mohamad Bun Abdullaht the sun 0! the tate Atntuueh psmtitung the I“ Platnfifl (0 Dutld a house on the sand land lamamaunls In the slate M the late Haji Mat zath having an thterest tn the sen tend, 16.3 whether there Is ftaudl mtsrepresehtauonx uhoohstatnhabte conduct oommttted bythe late Abdullah and/av the estate at the |a|e Atmuttah agalllsl the Platntttts as the estate at the late Hatt Mat L-tm, ta.4.tr llaudlmtsrepresanlalinnl unoohsetanahto wnduct by the hate Atzeutteh ts found. whethu lh: untttauen Act 125: aharor the pnnotpla at taches eppttea In aeteat the atetht 0! the estate at‘ the late Hail Mat Zain. IN t>ltyMnE£t:kuWPIcUvYFtA um ts em ‘Nata s.t.t In-vthnrwm be ts... m mm .. nflmheflly MW: dun-mm VI] nrtuNG Wm! l65,Whethev ma es1aIe of ma late Abaunan ws enulled Io vacanl possesswun oflhe saw and and 165Wha(her mere ws unyusc enrichmenl an the part al the Vale Ahdullah. [17] From me abwe, n will be clear lhat me crmcal issue m nus case .5 whether ar nut Ihere was Iraud/musrepresemamon or unconscuoname mnducl by me Vale Ahdnmah or the same ov me late Abduflah and whether may mm '/2 undrvxded share 01 me sand land on conslrucuve trust 70! the 9.51315 0! (he |a|e Hap Mat Zam being [he benefmianes of me Vale Han Mat Zain The detenrwlalmn nlthns mam asue wwll w my View rash/e me omav Issues F‘ :1 mun: Whnhor mu lama Abdull-h hold V. undlvld r m gm lgnd gn conslmctlve mnua: ma nlah ohm Inn Hg'i Mac Iain mg M53151 mg“ i; lgudl mlscemnnmlonl unoonscionahlu conduct committed fix mg gjg Aggllan and the -am: of an n Abdullah a lmlmo nun oflhn In H ’i Man i [15] The emu: ov me Late Han Mal h: n Iheirsuhmlssion mnnarms man a remedial oonstrucirve Izual sxlsls tor the V. undivided share or the saw: land m their favour The estate Mme Ia|s Han Mal Zam refers to ma case 0! RH: Bunk Ehd v Trivl M (M) Sdn Bhd a. on and aw wmpzaamvpucunm Page ns am -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! unoum -punt [2016] 1 ML! 175 where one Faaerat Courl held as tottems: "1271 A D'0PvI‘sfa'y rams-1y may also us awarded where tt Is apprnvrtale tn Lonrho Ptc u Fayed and omsrs ttvu M19921 1 WLR 1a! p 9, Mttten .t ctled me ruttawtng passage from Meagnar, Gummow and Lenane, Equt‘ Ramsdlss, (2nd Ed) at p 321, wntcn sstd met when appropriate the noun wuutd grant a propnetary remedy. Doclmtss and When appropnate, tns mun wttt grant a pwpvietary remedy to restore to ma ptatnmr property of whtch he has been wrongty deprived, or to pvsvenl lhs derandant imm retatntng e benefit wnten ne has olzlatnad by hrs awn wrong It /5 nolpossible and it weutd net be destrabla, to attempt and exhaustive nlassificaltbn ortne sttuatrans tn whtclv /[wt/I410 so Eauiry mus! retain what has been called us tnnerent ttaxtutttty and cspactly to adjust to new situations by reterenee ta me marnepnnge of equitable turtsdicrton " [19] In adanten, reltanoe ts placed on me ease at Atlas cauinutsa Fumltme Ltd at al v Nallonal Trust co Lid [1932] as DLR(4m) 161 where the Brilish Columbia Courl at Aupeat new as tulle-us: "A remedtat cormructrve trust ts a trust trnuesed Dy mun order as a mmody tor a wrong Tne enttttemenr to max remedy may be a malls: ol euuemntnre law, but me (ms! tteett I: not created by me acls uttne pames, or even uy me oottgauun In make teetttuttorr, but IN t>l1yMnE&:kuWPIcLtvYF\A 7:5: :1 mu -nus s.r.t n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nVW‘nlWY MW: dun-mm VII uF\uNG v-mat by ma order of the noun As wltn other calm orders, the trust wlll some mm being wtran Ins arder is plorlotmced, unless, in an appmpllala case the alder ls made rslroacllvs or /15 comlllg lnla force ls deferred It may be war m many cases where a rsmedlal L‘orlsfmc1l've trust ls lmposetl the court will oruar tllax it be lmpossd wltll ellecl lrom Ills true when the srluatlon arose which gave use to the uruusl snnchmenl. sea Rswltlk v. Raw/uk. mere must, ol wurse. be a causal corlnecllorl between the progeny tn qllsslton and the unjust enrlcttrrrent. See somrtrarl v Solocharl, [1955] 2 5 CR, 38 and Rosellleld u Olson (1985), 1 E.c.L R. (2d) 708 The rel-rtedlal construcllve lnlsl must be tllstmgulshed lrum the autzsmntrua mrrsuuctlua trust which the court declares to have anssrl, as 3 result ollne conduct aims panles, and by the lame ol mat conduct alone, at me sarllsr tlms wllen the relevant conduct acoumaa." [2D]Fur1.her, reltanoe ls also placed an me mass at Nlulchlmkl u Dodds(1iB5) a2 ALR 429 where me Hlgn Court ol Auslralla per Dean: J emlncla|ed as lollams "rn kn l fl n ‘ IV l:orI§!mcllI/8 !vI.l§1does nol involve g derllglg/MS conlllwad fixlfll )( muggy (cl Wnh v Wirlh (95 cu?) at u 235 The inslililflonal character ol ms trust nas never completely oollteratea us rsmedlal ongirls sven m the case otttra mam lradltlonsl forms olaxprsss and lmplrea trust. ms IS a Iorriorl in the case arconstrucllva trust where, as has been mentlonau, II-la mmedlhl crlaraaer remains pmdomlnan! tn that the [rust use/I Elmer rsplsssnts, or mllsds the auallamllty ol, equitable relief m the pamcular ctrcumslancss. IN tallyMrlE&:kuwPIcLlvYFlA P11: 1: MM Nata Smut In-vlhnrwm as used M mm the ntwlmflly MIN: dun-mm VII nFluNG WM! Indeed, in Mrs country at leasl, the constructive trust has not outgrown its formative s1ages as an aqunable remedy and should sn'Il be seen as eonsrmng an n psrsansrnramsdy attaching lo property which may be moulded and adjusled to gun; slicer lo the app/rcarion and mlsr-p/ay of equrlable principles rn fne crvcumslances nllhs pamcu/at case /n psmcular, where wmpsling common law or equilali/e c/arms are or may be involved, 5 .1ee1e1sr1on olconstructive trust by way ofremeoy can properly be so framed [hat me consequences urns impasmon are npsrarfvs only from me dale onuagmsnz nr formal court order or lrum some alner specified date. The fact that (he consrructrve trust remains preduminarmy remedial does nut, hawsvsr, mean thfil 1! represents a medium run (he indulgence ol nmsynmuo notmns oliarrness and justice As an equneme remedy, 11 Is evsnams an/y when warranted by established equitable pnnaplss or Dy me /sgmmale processes of legal reasoning, by analogy, Indmrtson and deduclron, from the sramng pain! or a prayer understanding ol the oonoeprual Ioumiaxron or such pnnuptes (cl, generally, Sir Frank Kms foreword to me 1s: ed 11975) 0! Msaghar, Gummow and Lenane: Eqmly, Docmne: and Remedies, at pp v~vii or the 2nd ad (1954), and see also, 99 Re Drp/ock [1943] on 455 at 451-2 ,'Fem'?( v Pemn[197o; AC ms: 19:, am, 509, 325,- Cowcnev v EowcnsI[1922] 1 wm 425auJn,-119721 1 All ER EM at 948;_Iacobs’ Law Ill Trusts /7! AMAVE/la, llh ed {V977‘ Moagrvsr and Gummow), paras 13471-2, 1325-9,-Allen v Snyder (197712 NSWLR 655 at 539, 7021!, Oakley, on an, pp 1-112, Pam, on on, pp 4-5). Vrswed as a remedy, the Iunclmn ml the mrvstrucuvs Irus! .s not to mndsr superfluous, but 10 reflect and enforce. me pnnclples ol the law 0! aqmty 1n mympzaqkuwfilcuvrrm '13: ., s. .. ‘Nata s.n.1 n-nhnrwm be used M van; .. nflglnnflly mm; mmn 1.. mum pans! musnis inanrieia is rropimirr me /aw all/71: counzryinnne notion oi '5 constructive rrusi ofn new model“ which, "by wrnazever name 1: rs desmbed . is imposed by law whenever iusfice and good conscience” (in ms sense at 1armass- ur wnar "was raw) 'reqmra it" (per Lard banning MR, Eves v Eves [1975] 1 Wu? meat 1341 1342, [1a751:sAriER 765 at 771, 772 and Hussey V Palmer [1972] 1 wu? 1235 at 1259-90.'[1972I 3 All ER 744 5! 747)." my on ma Nstolical Incl: ohms prasarn case, in IS cleav that mare were Mo Indemuras rn respsmafme saw warm The late Haji Malzain and me Abdullah wave rag\sIArad as nananis in common ai ina said land was me. man Indanlum dam 15* Ann! I930 under Iha Engnsn Daad System :1 ma R9g\sIar M Deeds. Penang on 27* May 1930. [221 anm |enanls in wmmon were regmelld is shimmy inangagors OHM said land wide a sianuwry mnngtge dated 19“ Apru «van on 27“ May 1930 at me Ragmrar cl Dem, s-ennng. [231 was a mom: inaeniura dated M May 4941, (ha said land wus iransvened to me Im Abdulllh only wno had paid $130.00 as the SUCOBSSM ladder of the said land at a public aucfinn Ce half! lhe morlgagors had hreachad me said smumry murlgaue The second Indenlure was regisnereu on 30'" Jun: 1941 under me Deed nyslem at me Registrar 0! Deeds‘ Penang rn tal1yMnE&:kuWPIcL1rYF\A raaem-rm ‘Nuns Sum! n-nhnrwm be .1‘... M mm me mn.u.y sun. dun-mm r.. mum pans! 2. HASNAH BINTI AEDULLAH (Nu. m: Awssnm-51021 3. MOHD KHIISAIRI am MOND ISA [No. KIP: smwa-tn-51551 4, Mom! SHAMSURI BIN MOND ISA (No. KIP: 11 n921—o2sa1s] 5. ROZAINI sum Aauumxu [No. KIF: 5109:3411-5594] 6. SITI ZAUYAH EINTI ABDULLAH [Na mp: mm-o7-52541 memnaax meVa\m ZALINA snm mums [No. K/P. 530617-07-5154} sen.-agai pemegang Surat Kuasa Waknl yang sah bag! P\aInM-F'\amM) PLAIDITIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. ABD MANAN am HUSIN [No. KlF:5MI222-d7»547T] 2. Isuun. am smn nzrsunmnzrsunm sw Wmusaqmmcmm me a m « mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm [24] Fmm ma above, it is clear that oniy me name of me late Abauuah has been registered on me said land being me mghesl bwdder for me same at ma malena\ nme. [25] The esuna 0! ma Vale Haj Mat Zaln wnlends max mere exis|s s4nis(ershIp and mequwable conduct on me pan of me late Ahdmlah. The estate onne late Ha]: Mal Zain submits mac me lace Che Long (wwa cl lhe Vale Haji Ma1Zam)had pend me mommy mongage sum in me late Abdullah who had man aauaa lo pay on ma arvears which lad to the sad land being aucunnsd and \a¢ar pumnasea by ma Vane Abdunah solely. [29] In my view, there ' no emdenoe Io substarmate me above and such hare avermenls/asserlluns is \n my vsew insulficienl to conclude that the Vale Abdullah is gumy 0| slmsletship and inwumhle oonducl [See ma mse al axnary Force Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Pelabuhan John! [zoos] 1 ms 313] ms conlermcn now that me late Che Long naa made me payments under me slalulory mongage \s also not oerlam as me estate of ma Isle Hafl Mal zam has oonsaxanuy taken me poaiuan man ma Vale Ha]: Mal Zam and me ma One Long were uneducatad and bara\y had enough mone|ary funds var surv|va\ at that me. [27] Funnen vn my Maw, ma eslale auna ¥a|e Haj: Mal zam have a\so failed to pmve on a balance M probablllues man (her: exlsls any constructive trust var me estate oflhe ma HaiiMa(L!1n.Nowhere doe: ma ueond lndamure dated 3"‘ May um mdimls or mlar that mere was ImsI(holh axpraaaxy oHmp|1ed\y)clealedlcrlhe asoaua at [he late Hap Mal zam There Is alsa no evidence lo subslanllala ma can|anuonsllac1: lhal Ihe IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A Page 11 M u Nuns sum n-nhnrwm be used m yaw ma anmmmy mm: dun-mm wa mum pm late che Lung has made the payment for the V. undwidzd share at the sald land and the late Abdullah pmnused lo regtsler the said W undlvlded share VI the name of the late Hail Mal zatn or the late che Lung [25] ln edditlon, havlrlg aonsrdered the lacts at [his sate, I find that the estate at the late Ha]! Mat zain have tatled lo pmve on a balance of probabllmes that there was any unmnscionable conduct and/or any grounds tor rue to find or impose: temedtal aonstrumlve trust tn tavour ulthe late Halt Mat utn and the estate altne late Hajl Mat zaln due la the loflowlrtg laclars a The estate oltne late Hali Mat zaln have nm addueed any ongenl evrdenue nut rely neaytly on hearsay le aentend that the late Ahdullan had nhlalned the sad land tnde the second lndenture lor the benefit or the late Halt Mat Zam Thls slnularty appltes wtth respect to the wn|en!lorl v1 unoonsctonaole oonduot on the pan at the late Abdullah when the sald land was putchased, b. The estate or the late Halt Mat Zaln admllted tn fllelr lallmony especlally the 1' Platntttl that the alleged oral agreement bemaen the |a|eAbdu\|ah and Ihe lale Haji Ma( Zalrl was knclwn only to nlrn lrorn the statements heard lrorn the late che Long wmch Is nut adrrllsslhle under me rule agalrlsl hearsay and that ll muld be [me av Hal The I" Piamlifl I¢5|ifIed dtmng L7uss— examination as follows: "FD :T9k sellqu? Jndl In! kalounggn nombol 4 In! berdtlsarkan kelerangan one Long A uw ad: IN t>l1yMnE6QkuWPIcL1vYFlA Pig! :2 one -we s.n.t nnvlhnrwm ue used M yaw ms uflmnaflly mt. dun-mm vta .nuye Wm! SP1 PD SP1 ‘IA SP1 SP1 FD SP1 miklumatmiklumal I-lln barkonun Inllgtl Elfinflan Irsan torsebul. : Ini adalan dang: cm LL»,-1. > Oh: Lyg somata-mana7 :Katsrsngsn pasarmpamnggan 4:15!-I spasarapa yang bevlaku pada tahun 1930 bsrdasarkan apa wnq drbemahu kepada Encik Marian oran cha Lang7 ‘Ya. V lad: kelslangan one Long Ievsebln mungkin boleh oem/, mungkm bnlsh Irdak betul, selu/u arau vidak7 may sslu/u Im berpsndu kspsda dokumen may kamr dapal: .- 1.-gin." gjurnn Ilsln mm id: dokumln. Jadl saga ma "5 Eng dlmaklum am. one Long mungkin betul mugkln mm mm? va ” [See page 45 orme Noles or Evidence daled 9* May 2025] c The leuer [mm Mohamad hm AhduHah datad aw» January 1933 had emy gwen the 1" Plalnlm permission to bmld a house and could not tantamount |o Ihe esme at the lale Haj: Mal Zam aaqumng ngms and beneficial mlarasl an me said land. a The 2"’ Plnmufl aammau during ms Iesllmuny lha| ma estate 09 ma Vala Haj! Mal Zam had volunlanly gn/an/sunendarea ma paddy «am to ma as(a|e o1lheIaIeAbdu\I:h wnnom nusrng any ob)ec1>cn lo Ihe same when ma aslale :11 ma lace Abdunah aw MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A Viuezsmu -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm a. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm rsqueslsd for lh: same m 2019. The 2"“ P\ainlif1(SP2| lnsnfied as louaws’ “FF Tak, tak Er/a dla Duat rampssan ifu, EM‘/k Ismail bag/Tahu rampasan dmuaz w sawan pad: lsnah Abduliah alaupun sawah pacn Ha/I Mal Zam mp SP-2 :Dus-due belalv says bust. YA Rampasan mbual ax sawan pad: mans, kawzlsan maria? sp-2 .»<awa:an sebe/ah kampnmg Haj} Mal Zam, yang ssoeran pan! pro/sk aw sebelah Ha//’AbduIIah PP :so kodua-dun nan-gt-n mu monk. momma: rnmgurfl sp-2 :Mnnh mblla-omul um-nun. PF mun sp-1 FF Yang Abdu/Ian cu you bayav sswaksn? s;=~2 'Ya PP Dan mu kswasan bapa menus you lah, mam. /-mpu jugs? SP»? . va PP . Macum mans Iampasan im bsnaku, omen [alukarfl SP-2 . say: Ink bohh [5/as curna dupe bagiruhu kalza kami akan ambil bahk Ian (Brush nu sebub hak d-pa (See page 87oIlI>e Notes ofevidomv dated 9'" May 2023] IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A Pauuolu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ‘PD SP—2 PD SP-2 FD SP—2 PD sP—2 PD SP-2 PD SF-2 PD 5:12 ‘.1111! up knakan sin‘ Znguh dmng unluk munumur kombalf mlnggmbilalfh kumbali slwuh (orsobut knuru sawan ttrstbul adalan mill); mereka. Sen.l[u Ivnutldlk7 -saga seIu[u. Jawalz kepada Mallkamah dengan ;eIas senqu 1/ad: awak I/dak ads aps-ans benlshan (ah verhadap psngambtla/than semu/a sawah yang sslangah bahagran kamu usahakan pads lahun 2019 Isrssbut Trdak Dan kamu ‘mg ulah muumn kamba/I seem bark Iah kflda Sfri Zagzah. :Dan sebagaipenyewa sawah, awak/uga ads ulusan penukaran name mm rsu subsrdr dan ha/a /‘uga Kan? vya. ‘Dan um M. sour: balk dan aman man mcmbull flllklllll nun: dlll nlml IV/All aebagnl gngwl kegdn SM Zauxlfl, aalu Al ltlu @& .Ya mm balk. :TIu1n non-mg bnnnh-n7 Tldak mu. [See page 32 ol the Note: 9/ Ev/dance dated 9" May 21:23] ‘PD ‘Tad! Enclk lsmall ksln Ellclk Ismal/ eenen kamba/l sscsra 9/ok Kan, secera eman s/2.2 ‘Va PD ./ad! Iak timbul Vail dskwaan mersmpas sawah padi Iersebtll Memarlg ssrah ksmbs/I sacalx elak tan. SP-2 :Ya ' [see page as alrhe Notes o/swdence dated 9* May 2023) e The estate cfllhe late Hap Mal zain have tzottt admltted dunng tne cuurse or the tnal that they do not even have knowledge about the 5112 of me said land wnen claiming the ‘/1 urldlvlded snare dune said land, and r Tne estate at the late ttall Matzaln had sleot on men rlgnts and did not take any reasonable amen to enforce their alleged banefiolal lrtleresls/ngms over the V. undivtded snare 01 tne satd land despite havlng krmwiedge at tne alleged uncurlsciovtable canduct etme IateAbdullah since 1941 ttsen. [29] In additlon, tne estate ulttte late Haj: Mat zatn seeksa declarallnn met me send V. undwtded share at the sad land I5 based on the oral agvsement wlnareln Ins ‘/e share 07 the two muss: and ‘/4 share 07 the paddy neld belungs ta the estate 01 flle late Haji Mal z n. ln my vlaw, the mat agreement rematne a hate assamen wttn no evldenee adduced In sutzslaniiale sucn a claim. In any event, this oral agreement ts supztsedad by tne sewnd lrtdenlure, we can be seen from me testtmany dune 1-‘ Plutntttf dunng cmesexnnunullon as lulluus. lN t>ltyMnEfl~:kuwPtcuvtFlA y... mi and -we s.n.t In-vthnrwlll be used M mm ms mnmu-y enn. m.n.n n. mane em ‘PD SP1 : rskpzy n-arm akan mm o/sh peyuamcara Enmk Jadl saga kalnkan seluu alau Ildak Indulture Sale [lug kedul Irll Kelli! mamnasr araugun Inl [any Ilrbaru 1941 Iran dun ll Illengafisl afl-33 kandugggn gang ada di A1aL!m lndenkuw Salt mo Mrsobut. Sotlfu mu lidak? Mansn 59$! [see page 48 anhe Noxes afEw'der1oe dated 9" May 2023] PD SP1 . PD SP1 PD s1N MyMnE6qxuwPIcuvrF1A -ms s..1.1...m..w111.. .15.. m mm 1.. nVVfl\ru“|¥ mm; dun-mm VII mum Wm nay, lakva ran Slya kstl says cadangkan Enctk Manan be/sh sslu/u slau lsk selu/u sabab lsd1 Encxk Msnan kara I-Bk d-lk psngslahuan spa Darfaku 19317 hmgga 1341 msksud dia 11 Iahun ads gap agak/umlah yang psmang darn dokumsn dengan pales manyalakan alas kemurlgktran Abduuan bin And Mafia dan juga Ha/'1 Mat zarn rmska hananah tersebul dtlelang semula dan Abdu//ah Ma/1:1 mum pembe/i kedua berdasarkan dokumsn di mukasural 25 Kan? Ya Jad1, saya kala yang !ad1'EI1c:'k Manan secuju ape yang dlkalskan olsh Che Long .11 dalsm pwapsn 4 ads/an salu peqaniian lrsan berdasariran dokumen 19317 okay dnllm 11 n n n n n m §7 mu dlsnkog oleh dakumen gang suELsedl menngnasl dnkuman pm gamma maka geflgnflan llsln gang dlbuatmulut Ilu adalah lldak zflakal her: n berl-ku gzmbahan dalam mug 11 rahurl terso.-but setulg arau lidak soalan sag? SP1 . Sctuiu.” [See page A9 allhs Noles ofEvn1sm:e dated 9'" May 2023] [an] \n mnclusmn, havmg consmarea |ha above, I am 11! the Iha| lha aslala 1.71 mm mm Hap Mal Zain have lalled lo prove an a hamnce of DVobabHrhes(haHJ1e IslaAbduIlah nova; V; unawea share of me sad land on eensxrucwe (rust m ilvourahhe Vale Hap Max Zam or me aslam of ma lace Hay Mal Zain sooand Inuo: vnmhur mu I-nu dzlud 19'“ Januag Igu gg Mohzmad mn Abdullah gs gm sun mum [ah Ahdullgh Emu g Inc: I“ Flalmlfl to build g ngug E Q; gig lug V!§j§ gnu, um gl gm I ' ' II immu in mo and land. [311 The same onhe Iale Hap Ma| Zam a\sn mugs on me leltar wssuad by Mohamad Em Amman, son ov me me Abeuuan dated 30" Junuary was and amend than such wetter Is mmcauve mu me estate of me Isle Hap Mal Zam have a x unmvuaea share OHM! beneficial mlerasl mm sawd land In mvs respeau, m \s apt lha| (he contents of me send lelter be rewoduwd belaw sw MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A P21: 11 m u -m Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm mu. AlHA¥fl\Aku|i i. lilivlhilm ..u. )nIJm\wIv [321 A perusai onna said lener win reveai inai ii only vrinls pennission id me 1* Pliirmfl |o oonsu'uc1 a noiise/buiiding on iris said iand and nothing more. in rein, in niy view, me iamnai ins eslala dune iaia Hap Mat Zain sndidi me 1- Pisinmv have lo nhlain mnsenl [mm ins iainiiy ol Mohamad EH1 Abdiiiiaii lo nuiid a house very tailing as ii wdiiid appear that the iaiiiiiy of me iaie H.-iii Mal zaiii annealed iriai «vie iaie Nafi Mai zain is no: me co-owner of me said land. If me lale Han Mal zain is indeed me co-owner Wllh ins i/2 undivided share dune said iarid, one weuid nave moiigm mai such peniiissim was ndi required and may would have just proceeded to puiid a house on me said iand [:3] Fuflhafi piwwneis pi me said land but iriis was not dune. in bl1yMDE5I:kuOVPlcUvYF\A we s.n.i In-vihnrvim as used M mm i.. mimiiiy MIME dnunvinnl n. AFVLING Wm! Ia it indeed an am’!!! a! iris ‘A undivided snaid of me said land‘ 0191" Pllinllfl ougrii In have pmcureid a siiriiiur Ianerlmiii Mohllllmld sin Andiiiieih in cdiirinn than me arsIa|a or me ieie Hlii Maiza are me vasszsem [341 In (am, most crii-navy. ma 1" Plainlifl (SP1) conllrmed dunng orUss— exammallarl that he seems «ha ha is not the mm at me sild land SP1 leanfled during cross-examination as roiiows: "PD Encik Marian says karakan Encik Manan perm pevguumpa Encik Muhamad sebab Encik Manan menyedan bahawa Ericik Ma/um bukan pemilik hsnanah Iersebul pads ksrrka /In SP1 Ya, beiui " [see new 5:! arm: Nara: o/Ev/dtncv dated 9'" May 2023] [351 As such, i am ov me View mm me wrmen ieneri amhonzalran by Mnhamad am Abdullah mereiy gives ms esiaie oi me late nap Mal zm andlur Ch: I" Piainmr me ngm in mind a house and occupy the Said land which is consisienzwim Ihe nghis Mme estate oime iaie Amuiiun as me mgismrea owner: oi me said land, The same at me lala Haji Mal zam have .1 yes: praved on a haixnce at probahilmas mew ngms in occupation onne saia ism hul nmhing lurlhav in pmve (ha alamenl onzanenciai righls over me said land nor ma oxlslonna ova conslmclivo |rus| [36] In determining mis issue, II is tip! that reference is made to me vmv-sions under me National Lnnd com 1965 IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1vYFiA sun. so mu -m s.n.i n-vihnrwm be used M mm .. mimiiuy MIN: dun-mm VII .mm mm GROUNDS or JUDGMENT mmonucnou [11 The mspule herein pertains «.2 ms ownership ofa piece av land m Penang M wmch the mslary ra\ales back m almost a hundred years since 1930. [21 Theve us no mspme mat me said land ws currenfly regIs1ered in ma nams oi the descendants/admmlsuamrs of me late Abdullah Em Abdul Majid (heramafler raranaa to as ‘Ab\1u|Iah'). n .5 also not mspmea that since 1941 me sam land was registered only m the name 0! the late Abdlmah and naw m me names of the descendants/admmuslraiors aflhe late Abdullah [31 The descendants/adnu slramrs av the late Hap Ma| Zain hm Saueh (herennaflar Ielened to as ‘Haj: Mal Zam"| have oommenced Sun PA— 22Ncv¢>a-Mu/2022 (hereinaller revenea In as -sum 64') claunmg |n|eralIa V. share M me savd land on one basvs that the Lava Abdullah was a co-uznmwa uuszee «or V. share 0! me said Land .n lavauv of me ma Hap Mal zam [A] The descendants/admmlslnlors ollhe Vale And-man nave filed sun PA- ZZNCVC-121-08/2022 (herelnaflar ravamaa to as “sun 12v) seeking vacant possession 0! the saw land Imm ma two Delendanls who are lhe Flalnhls Vn sun 34 above. {5} By oonsem olme parllas, these two Suns ware mnsulidaled and man: Iogalhev. IN wyMnEaqkuwPIcuvtF\A run and -ma s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [371 A perusal oflhe lalasl land Search daled 11-“ November zuln would reflect the name Mme lala Abdullah I: ma sols reglslareu proprietor nflhe full share ohhe said land Rehrenne is also made lo lhe (RC1 that the second lrldenlure was leglsleled cln 3G"'JLme1941 under the Deed syslervl at the Reqislrar ol Deeds, Penarlg. [321] The lndeleasmllia, of We IS lhe hallmark of the Torrens syslarn oi land lrlles wrllcn was laler adopted under sectlon :40 of mu nallonal Land Cod: I965 mrr oerlalll excepllorlsl for the lndefeaslblllly ol regrslered Wes or lrllelesls ln land and reglslered leases. chavges and easemerlls. [39] ll IS clearlllal me lnleflm register and the land Search are norrcluswe evldenoe man We lllle lo me sald land ls leglslered ln me name ol me eslale ol me lale Abdullah aooardlng In smlon as of nu Nnialul Lnnd Code was. Tnelelme, me lala Abdullah am me eslale 0! me lala Azmullah (as sucoassars) as reglslared pmprlelcrs are prlma lacle anlltled to enpy indaleaslhle lllle/an/nership to me sald land [See the Faaaral Conn case cl ran Bu v K Manmlamulllu [1911] 2 ull_l 71. [40] However‘ oansldenng that male ls an allegallan al lraudlmlsrapvesarllallanl uncurlscxlnable mmlucl, salmon 14o(2)(:) olllu Nlllollll Land com 1995 ls relevant. The clue or lrlleresl ullhe lale Abdullah and suhsequenuy tha erslals cl me lale Anaullarl would be dehaasible m uses 01 lraud nr misreplesenlallurl me burden of prool us on me eslale ollne Isle Ha]! Mat Zaln lo prove ma elements or lraun on a balance 01 plnbablllues. [sea ma Federal calm case M [411 [42] Silmn all A son: 5dn mm It uamai Solis Sin and [20:51 MLJU M92] The dam cl lhe esma ol Ihe late Han Mal Zaln an naua re-«fives around me raa Ina! ma second lndenture was om.-nnaa via naua/mmapraaanzanon The ascace oi ma late Han Mal zain oonlend a| paragraphs 14 and 15 M lhelr Statement 01 Claim that the late Che Long was rnsrapresemed by me lale Abdullah sonuecnne m 1941 . e mac uponlull sememem onne rnangage sum, the name oflhe Iale Han Mat hm mu be registered is me proprietor ov me sand land and ma late Amman has also misrepresented that he wiH new ‘/2 undmded share of he Sam ‘and for the beneffl of the lamwry 0! the late Haj Mal Zaln but this was not done Mlawmg the death 0! Ihe late Abduflah. However. I note ma: apan {mm ma [act unau Ihe Issua eilraud was not subnnnaa upon .n ma wnnan suhmssmns, mere xs no ewdence ca prove fraud or rmsrepresenvanon vn my men, n Is aaany loo Vale (or me estate um-e lale Hail Ma|hm wnow assen manna late cha Long Is no| aware av nor undersmou me oonnencs of me seoand lndenlure gwen that she Is uneducated. Daspne mesa iacns bemg mfurmed by the late One Long to me P\amM1s somawna In 1953, nomung nas been done by me asvana av me Yale Ha]i Mal Zam to assert man ngms nor wen anempx In register one ‘/2 undmded snare 01 In: sawd land m ma names nl ma Vale Hap Mal Zam. More mun 40years have passed sinue the aeam cl me late on: Lung m 193: mu nothing has been done by me astute M the Vat: Han Mal Zaln m asset‘ man Iruzrasl in ma ‘/1 undivided share at me said land. [43] As such, I am aflhe mew that the eslale Mme late Haii Mat Zam have failed to wave on a ha\arIce nf pmbabllvlies that there is n-aud/ rmsrwresemalinn cnmmilled bylhe |ateAbdu|1ah and me estate or me late Abduuan nun: Inn Doc EEIX7 [441 The esVa|e at the late Abdullah submits Ina! m any case, we dalm by me eslme o1|he\aI.e Han Mat Lam ougm Io be msmissea baud on Inches m this respect. reference Vs made k: In: case of nn song Vang @ Tan Kong nong 5. Ann! v Tun Mwn Llng @ nu Slaw Lang 5 On [2922] 2 nu cos wnem me Court 0! Appeal held as lnHmMs' "[941 From me pmnr/n:' own Issltmony 111: clear that P1 and P2 knaw about lha alleged ms: m 4970 and P3 knew Intel. in 1975. They had been asking for me account: over one year: and we not receive any response Irom en. dalandanfs They ma nal lake any nclron ol whether to me an aczmn a ul/an m lodge a caves: to «cum Ihsv own over [he disputed properties Inslead, m_-1 nun wnltod for thou! nu! - c-mug [9 ggmamg :5 union ng-Inn tin dnfcndanm purportedly on ma mason that they were reluctant to not as they wsw siblings. H5] The law on the doctrine of/aches is wen semed Th/5 com in TI/ng Kean Hm 5. Anal v Yuen Hana Pnarva 1201.913 MLRA 550; (201912 MLJ 334 had succinctly summarised the docm'ne as rouaws. IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A huuvtu Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm (371 For lsches lo be ralsed. men must In dclajg Imounllng la acquiescence (sea‘ Cheeh Kym Tong & Ana! v ram Kalli [1999] 1 MLRH 281 1193913 MLJ 252, [1959] 1 Cu 373 Foo l-loldmgs sun El-n1 & Anal v Foo clmon Ymg (20141 2 MLRH 41 7, Amnluala V Scu//y [1861] /XHLC 360) nu doclrim al Iachos is based an the maxim that ‘guy ltd: (ht vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights’ Lam Sslbome succlncrly explained In me landmark case oILmdsay Petroleum Co HLm1{1374) LR 5 PC 221 am 1n every case 11 an argument agamsk rellsl wlvch olhsrwlss would be [I451 ls launder! all men: delay, lhal delay of course not amounrrng lo a bar by any Statute al Llmllallolvs, the valfdlly 0/ that delence must be mad upon prlnclples substantially equlraole. Two circumstances nlwlya Ilnglnt In such CJSCS an mi length of the new and the nnun 0! me acts done during me Interval which might afiuct OIIIIOI £11 and cause a balance of ustlce at Inlustlce In tlklnfl MI on: cnulso cl mo may so far :5 relates in me remedy. /35] Edgar Jusepll JIJ m ma case n/A/[red remplelon & Ors v Low Yul Ha/dlngs sun Blvd & Anar[19E9] 1 MLRH 144, [19av]2 ML] 202, [1959] 1 cu (Rep) 219 explalned me docmne u/lam: Lac»: LI An tgglhhln dereneelmglxlgg lug. ulllmn -na «my In mncullng a dnlm. A com ol gulg IN mmusaqmvmnm mg: n m u ‘Nata 5.11.1 IHIWDIY WW be used m van; M m\g\ruHIy MVM5 dun-mm vn .mNe M1 minus 11: Aid to - mic dun-m1 what: the p_IaInwr hu 3! 1 his :4 ts and no uhsc-d la! a tea! Ionglh of time. H0 is Mm said to be barrvd 1:: teen... In 11e1enn1n1ng whslnsr mere has been such a delay as In ammm! to Iaches the court considers whether there has been awllrescence on we Plaimrifs pan and any change olposilinn mar nu occurred on the pan of me aerenaenc The ducmna o/reones rests on the conszdemion that ms ml/us! to we a menme remedy where he has by me conduct done the! which mrght fairly be regarded as 9<7uiva)enr la a warver 011! Dr wireve by ms conduct and newest ne Has, mougn not waiving the remedy pm me olherpartyin a position In which 11 would nolbe reasonable 1o place him we remedy were errerwams In be asserted 14 Helsnurys Laws o!Eng/and (am 511) paras 1151,1152 Lacnes has been suooncny uescmaed as inamon with one‘: eyes open “ [45] As such, bearmg in mind me! more has how such a long de\ay m lime since me smile of me Iala Han Mal Zam was swam of ma non- regmvaoon Mnwnershnp ar lhev bene4fl::|a\ nghu. over me </. unannaea share 0! me sad lend. m my considered view, one pnnaple at Iacnas would avw |a dates! the dawn of ma eslale oi me Im Haii Mal Zain Fourth Inn: wrmnu and scan. at me. Ian Abdunah an onmlcd Io vacant Esssssnan anns sal land [45] V71 delamunmg whslhav ms ssaaca M ma Vale Abdullah are enlmad In vacanl pussassidn dc ma said land, ans snauld oonsldav me regisuauon of ownersmp -n ma names M Ihe lale Abdullah and subsequenuy ma vesnng m me names at me «me of the Isle Abdullah [471 In such cases, me he aslala anne Lacs Abdmlnh have proved fls nus and an mcsnuon to mgam posssssbn‘ m Is for me same anne Lacs Hay Mat Zam to prove max may can set am a We or a ngm lo possessmn mnswslenl wI|h me ownership ov me eslals d1 me hate Abduflah In |hvs rusnecld reference vs made In ma dasa ovcansy. ldul (M) Sdn Bhd V Oranq-Dung vg Munglnz n sag ' Ponga' (Puongavnnzm AIL vad am) a. Ors[1WB] uL.:u 125 where Abdm Mallk lshak J (as HIS Lardsmp man was) nsxd as fnlluws " According to me auihomres, once ms yarnmr has mud rrs rim and an rnmnion to r-gun Qssossfon it was for we dvhndanls to ma um ms delendnnls can setaul . ml. or I Ilflht to Esesslan consisfeg with the yllnfiffs owngfiflig The burden wourd be on me defendants in show that they had the right rd occupy that plot of /and marked as 'c31' m we /ayout plan on the be/ance afprobabrmvss andms datendanrs miselab/y failed (0 do so Pure and smw/e (hrs was a case nf ejecrmem or what rs popu/arly known as an amen for trespass " syn MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A rage as at u -was saw ...n.mm be used m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm [48] Fmrrl the historical background ot the case. it is clear that there is consent by the iaredeoesscrto allow the estate olthe late Hat: Mat zain to reside and occupy the said land Testimony “uni the witnesses of the male or the late Abdullah also indicated that the right to remain in ocmlpaltcn ol the said land was glven graturtpusly treated on the good relationship between the parties’ predecessors. As such‘ the estate or the late t-laii Mat zain cannot he classified as squatters snnpliciter: Further, whilst there is evidence that peririissicri was granted to build a house an pan ot the said land, there Is no evidence that the estate M the late llaii Mat zain were authorized or glven pemllsslarl to continue remaining on the said land indefinitely [49] As such, I am otthe View that it is not reasonable to expect the sad consent to exist fol an indefinite period/indefinitely once the notice to ouit dated 21*‘ Oc|uber202| and 25° Ocwber 2021 was given to the estate ol the late t-taji Mal zairi (and in pa ciilar the 1- and 2" Plainlrflsli such consent to continue occupying the said land ceased and the estate olthe late t-tail Mat zain would he required to vacate the said land within a reasoiiahle time. [50] Further‘ I am ol the view that the idea at a gratuitous pernitssionlconsent/authorizatiun hetrlg aple to occupy an alienated llnd owned by the |ateAbdttI|ah and subsequently the same allihe late Ahdullah perrnanenity av perpetually, arter being given due rlollce |o gu repugnant to the concept ol indetcasioility cl utle ola registered pmpllelol as provided under section 14:: oflhl Illttloml Land coal was and the concept against adverse possetsslon cl land hy occupahan. as excllcllly provides in Sacllon :41 ottha Natlerial Laird code 1995 in this respect, relerenca is niade to the case ol Ahmad in ahmipsdatuoyaiauirria nae n am Nuts s.n.i nnvlhnrwlll be used M mm the antii.ii-y MIME dun-vlnhl vta aFlt.lNG wnxl Shnllly llmnll Baku v NII Salmi 2.-man N] Wln Mona Bid [2014] 5 cm on man was relerrld in a isoem case oi say-nan. s-nndu Sdn Bhd v Jabaun Fongalrnn nan Sallran Nngnri seminar 5 On min] I MLJ :22 where |he Conn dmppeai held as lanows: "mo; nis calm al Appeal in Ahmnd Shumy lenull saw v ml Slims luldan H] Wan Mohd 2aId[2a1l] 5 cL.l an applied both me concepl ol mde/easlblllty of ville and me carlrept ol nonapulicaoilily oiadvsrse pdssassion to pieeem me ngnl ofa Vsglslalsd pmpllslol Ia assan ma ngm over nla land as lolinws. 1391 we further note lnar me defendant in ne: pleading and testimony nad claimed that slie had been staying in me house since it was cansliueied in 1985 and has me ngnr to remain on me said house and the sald land. In our view, the idea oh gmulmus liunee. boiI_Ig able to occugx an alienated Innd awnod by someone else rmanen or ru-I um bsln due notice to gulf LI Iegugmnt In the comma of lndefeaslbillg 0! Elle ofa registered Erafllelor as grovided undo! s 340 and ma conccgt agginsl adv/us: ussasslon at land :11 occuullon as exglclgg sated III 5 341 of the NLC (Emphasis added)" [51] In respect at me Issue of me payment ol quil rem, in is me wnIen|iun 01 me eslale oi me late Hap Mal Zaln that me same has been paid by IN bhyMnE£qkuWPIcLlvYF\A tile an m u Ihem urml 2015 Hn1wevev.m 2016, me qml rsnl was wssued In the name of Zalnuran Em Manamed who Is a membev ol lhe lute Abdullah family. [521 The es1aIe of the lane Abdullah on the exner nana mncends a| paragraph as onnenwnuen eupnnseien maldespule havmg knawledge that me name m me qml rem was changed so Zamuven an Mohamed someflme In 2015, no action nas been miualed try the es1aIe oune Late Hap Maezam to preserve lhewalleged rights No ewaenee nor reasons were Ionnconnng «or one Vaflura of me estate of the late Hap Mal Zaln to assert mew ngms. AH nney contend m men submwssion m reply is that mey have been paying qmurencawme while rpran mese years wnereas the esule M the late Abdullah and Ihelf predewssovs had never bothered In make the payments an reeenuy. That, In my view, Is msummen: to justify me norracixon by me same vflhe me Haji Mat Zam when me name .n we qui| rem was changed 201610 me name Mzalnuren Em Mohamed [531 Further and In any evem, me pm: of peymem at qun rent or assessment is nu| 97001 07 an equitame right over the san! land and the pemnued pceupauon does not prevent the ragustered pmpnelorlrom takingaclnon Ia recover the Said land In (Ins respecl. V1 is apt man I r318! to me case av cm: sun Llun A Vnng Lulu Lwn. Wang on-e Foonq dlnllllu Plnghunl-Ponghunl Llln [2013] I LNS 2233 where rt was held us (wows: “ The N00’ alpayment ofquil rent by the defendants In Ihis case did no! PIDVE mat the dalamtanls had fights DI mares! towards the uni /and which was resided by the Mid p/flmllfl. Even though Mo defendant was said to have resided for a long lime on one sard land, IN p«yMnEaqkuw»=IcuvmA has as am -una s.nn ...n.mn be used m mm ms nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa anum pm it did not bar ins reglslsred piopiialows ngnl lo lake ncfiorl and the issue o/lunilarion did nol aiise as slam in s 34 allhs National Land coda (see paras as L 3339) r [54] As such, having considered all the alacvei lhe estate :21 the Isle Abdullah as regislened owners or the said land are in my view entitled |o vacant possession ofllie said land lmm me eslale of the lace Haji Malzalrl what New? [551 Having lound lhnl ineio is no conslrucllve line: in lavoui oline law i-laii Mai zain and/oi ins aelala or iris lals HRH Mil znn and me: (ha eslaie nl ins leis Ahdullah II anmled lo vacant possession oi me said land, inal is nol ine end of me inanei Ffom lne lame oi ine ease, in is undapuleo inal me me Flalnlifis in sun in havs aasupied pan or ins said lend, nailing buin lneii nouses and iilling of ins paddy nslds tank piece. in fan‘ as seen aaiiiei. Monnniao sin Abdullah had previously given omission is me I“ Piainlillo build nis nouse on oanonne said land and ma Plsinlilis have indeed been occupying me said land slnos 1953. wriilsl lnera is no evidence that me 2"“ Plai ' was similarly given permlsslon lo build a house on ma said land I1 is clear inn (ha seiale ollne laleAl>dullan was awam dime exlslanoe aflha house and did mining aadm it. [56] on ma Facts asvaalisried. l find lnal allnouqn lne eslale oi lne laie Abdullah are indeed me iegislaied piooiielois in me said land‘ lnaia IN MyMpE6qkuOVPlcUvYFlA ran: an um um. s.ii.i nnvlhnrwlll be u... m min i... nflmnallly MIMI dnunvllnl VII aFluNG WM! [51 I wm now set out me background facts, «no issues‘ as wen as the names‘ reapeeuva mnlenlmnslsulzrmssians m a mew or deciding wnamar the names have dvscharged thew raspecuve burdens .n proving «new claims Back Facts [1] The oaokgronno vaovs have largely been agreed upon by parlies and can be summarized as loiloms: 7.: sonnenm Vn man, «no late Han Mal Zam and ma [ale Aooouan Jomkly umcnasen Iano known as Lot 2529, Genan Muldm Na sen. MK II‘ Daenh Seberang Fem Ulara, Fulau Pmang (vonnony Lat 123(1). Mum XI, Dnnnm o1 Pmvirme Waflaslay Nonn, Penang) (neunnanar refermd m an ‘ma saio xanerp for szeooo lrom s N A A.LAnma5n\am Chellmr sou clAHagupah cnsmar. 7.2.The Isle Naji Mal Zaln and the Iain Abdulllh hack 3 pm! loan Vmm s NA A.LAmnm:sn. Cnemar on pan finance me purchnsa o1 me no Vina 7 3 The rats Haji Mal Zaln and me me Abduflah were registered as tenants Vn oonnnon onne said land vids me ms: Indanlura at Sale dated 15'' Am 1930 under me Englnn Deed Syslam at the Reamer of Duds. Penang on 27'” May 193:: «n MyMnE&:kuwPIcuvrF\A age 5 A7414 ma sanaw n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm wa muNG v-mm was bertarniy license and consent la the Piaintitts to oocupy me said land andiorte construct thelr houses. There is certainly no ssue or any adveise possession [571 In tne case 01 sontul uiitni Sdn and v Atirnaa Amlrudln Bin Kninntiidin A ois [zoom 4 MLJ soa, trie Plairitias triete coniinenoed e elairn ior uaeant possession and inesne prom on trie basis triat the Defendant occupiers were lrespasseis Ttie Delendante oerttericled ttiat iney were not tiespasseis, but telnet, lawtul ocwpanls as ltoerisees coupled with equity wnieti long existed due Lo mnllmmus occupation and possession otttie said land rite l-tigri Ooutl were after a lull trial wnilst finding that trie Detenderits nave equity, siieti equity was subiect ID lrte Plaintitts‘ Ovemdlrlg ngnts to legal erivrrerstiip pursuant Ia national Land code was. The High court tneie ordered vacant vessessiorr subieot to the Plalnm apinpensating trte netenuants tar all posts ineuned In trie construction ot the respedive ttaiises and elteinetively, the value ot the present riouses to be assessed by an independent valiier to be appotnled by the court. [5411 Applying lne ahave and reverting to ttie laots ot itiis ease. there is ceruirtly no issue at adverse possession in inis ease. wtiilstttre estate aitrtelata Heii Maizaln have an eeuliyie be tsdmnsd wiin, sueriequny must be subjec| to me Detenoanls (asIa|s at ine late Ahdullelii ouernding rtgtit to legal ovrneistiip pursuant to trie National Land code was As siieti, (ha estate oi itie late Abeullari will tneietore have its vacant possisslon subiect ta tnein bornpensaung iiie Iwo l=iainti«s in sult 54 lot the present value ot the said riauses to be assessed by an independent valuei appointee by trie court. The costs at [his valuation VI to be borne by the 951315 ottne laIBAbduHah. Funnel, trte parties are in t>l1yMnE£qkuOVPIcL1tYFlA Page ii niu -vita s.n.i n-vlhnrwm be used ta mm na ntwltrnfily MIN: dun-vlnrtl n. nFluNG wnxl gtven llberly In apply In true Courl fur the purposes at me assess-nenl alme value of lne Sald Mn pmpemes occupied by me Plalnlms WI suit 54. [see the Hlgh cuun case nf s-nml ulu sun Bhd (supri)] [59] I will also further order tnal lne Plelntllls in Sml 64 are to vacate Ihe sald land wnhin three nmnlns M the male paymenl IS made In the Plalnltfis allne value assessed olme sald houses bysuch independent valuer appointed by the Court or any omec date ordered by coun subsequently In the event there IS an lssue in respect ol the veluamn A AND PONNUDURAI Judge Hlgn Caurl Ganrgalmvrl Pul-u Plrlang. counult 1: Mr. Musmapna from Messrs Muslnapha AAssocmes lngetnev wlm Mr John Khoo from Messrs. Isrnall, Khoo I-Associates lurlm Plaimifls in suit 64 and Defendants VI Suit 121. Ml Azmr B.Ahmadlo9al.|1er wilh Ms. Nurjannan El Che All from Messrs Aswan Slmon &Azhar for the Defendants in Suit 64 and Plaintllls In Swl tzl. c M-ma Ahmad Shazrfly Ismail Ham v M! Salma Zardan H] Wan Mohd Zan1[ZO1A] 5 CL] 817 A!/as Cabinets A Fumrtum Ltd er al v Nalronal Trust Co L:d[199a]5a DLR (4th) 151 Bayangan Sspadu sun Ehd v Jabatan Pangairan den Sahran Nsged Sslangut 5 0rs[2l721]1 MLJ 322 Binary Force Sdn Elldv Lembaga Pelabuhan John! (2009) 1 LNS :13 Cahaya Ideal (M) Sdn Bhd v 075719-Orang Vg Menyena/r om‘ Sbg ’Ponga' (Poongavanam A/L Vadlva/u) A Dr: [1999] ML./U 125 Chia Swee Lran 4 Vang Lam Lwn. Wong Chss Foong dan/slsu Penghum- Penghum Lain [2015] 1 ms 2233 Jahara Br Abdul Kadir Msncan v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anal [1930] 1 MLRA 335 Lerchumanan Chelllar A/agsppan @ L A/lsgappan 5 Anal v. Secure Ptanlarmn Sdn Bhd [2017[3 MLRA 501 ML/somnsk: r/Dodds (1955) G2 ALR 129 RHB Bank Bhd V Travslsogm (M) sun BM 5 Or: and anorhel appeal [2a16I1 MLJ 175 serum! Mum Sdn Bhd V Ahmad Amimdm am Kamsrumn & Ors 1200014 ML] 503 Smnuiyzih 5. Sons sun Bhd voamm‘ Sefia Sdn BM [2915] MLJU 1:292 Tan xang Yong @ Tan Ksng Hang A Anov v Kan Hwa Llng @ rsn Slaw Lang & Ors (202212 ML] 5175 Tan Kun Klvuan v Tan Ku KralfM)Sn1n Bhd[199fl]1 cu supp 147 Toll Bee I/K Mamthamulhu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 sw MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A me .2 MM um s.n.1...m.m111.. used m mm 1.. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm glslallans referred In NanonarL.:m1 Code, sscnons 99, 340, 341 Evin1sncaArt 19511, Sacfians 101, 1112, V03 meumu 74.l3oth tenants nh oommorn were regnstened es statutory rnndrtgagers or the sand larnd vnde a statutory mortgage dated 15'“ April 1930 an 27"‘ May 1930 at the Re rar oi Deeds. Penarlg. 7.5.\nde a second lnderntune oi sale dated 3*’ May 1941, the Sald land was trahslened to the late Abdullah only as the late Abdullah had paid stat) 00 as the successful bldder oi the sand land at a yublic auctnonn as both the rnnortgagena had breached the sand statutory mortgage. The seoond Irndernture oi sale was registered on 30'“ June t94t under the Deed system an the Rsglsltar oi Deedsi Penang. 7.6.The 1* Plalnlrfl in Sull 64 above is currently an adrnninnstrator and one at the henelnciaries oi the late Hall Mat Zeln who currently resndes in a house which he has bulll on part oi the sand land. For the auondanoe of doubt, the Planrntnlis In sunt 64 above wnll be relened to as the estate oi the late l-tall Mat zaun whereas the Plaintms in Sun 121 above wnll be retened to as the estate at the late Ahdullah. The late Hall Ma|Zaln's wits and larnrly have worked and Illlsd the paddy held on part otnhe said land. The 2'“ Planntnil IS the son-in4aw olthe late Hall Matzairn and resides in another house which he has also built on part oi the sand land adtacanl to the I" Planrnuil's house. 7 7 It ns the ease oi the estate oi the late Hall Mat Zltn that the V" Planntnll in Sun 64 above was lnlnrlned by the late che Long (the me at the lane Haji Mat zain) that the late Hajl Mat Zaln had depended on the late Aodullah to handle all matters oennainnne the serd land nneludnhg the aeynnerntol mortgage nhatalrnents to the s IN NtyMpEaqkuOVPlcUvYFlA Page s om -one Serial In-vlhhrwlll be ts... m vanw he mnmnnny sum. dun-vlhhl VII aFlt.lNG v-mat chatty where lhe lale Haii Mal zaln would pay his ponmn e1 lha lnslalmenls InIIle|aleAhduHah1o pay the Chelly. 7.8 Aowrdirlg lo the 1' Plilrllrllin sull 64 above. lhe lake Che Long had inlorrned hlnr lhal the lane Ahdullah was a regular vrsrmr la the lale Haji Mal ZaIn‘s house each mnlh to oolled lhe lnstalmenls and also lo vlsll them Aflerlhe late Haji Mal zain passed away, lhe like Che Lung would oonllnue lo hand over her late husbands rnslalrnenls lo the tale Abdullah. 7.9. The basls el lhe dalm of me eslare el me lale Hali Mal zarn was Ihal the late Ahdullah had Informed the late Che Long ln or about 1941 that me loan had been fully serlled and lhe late Abdullah lald me lare one Long fllallhe said land was regrslered solely n ma lake Ahdullah's name because me late Hall Mel Zaln had passed away and mac Ihe lale Haji Abdullah held ‘/2 share ollhe sald land larlhe lale Hall Mal zarn's larnlly no It is lunher oenlended Dy lhe eslale enha lala Han Marzaln lhal me laleAbdullah alaa undendoll and agreed wlm lhe lele che Lung and gave all me ovlglnal decdnrenls pen/arnlng I0 lhe purchase ol are land In lhe lace Che Long before lhe lale che Long wenllor Hall m 1901 but lhal lhe lale Abdulllh had passed away belona me lare che Long rellrrned lrern prlgrlrnage 7 ll Nalnrng much seems lb have occurred lmrn 1941 unlll 2019 save lor lhe 1- Plalnlill seeking pernnssldn frnrrl Meharnad Abdllllarl (lhe Ian 54 me |a|e Mxtullah) permllllng me I" Plalnlrll lo aulld a house an lha said land we lener dated 30" January 1953. IN bllyMDEfll:kuOVPlcUvYFlA me 7 M u ‘Nata Sahel In-vlhnrwlll re used m mm has nflnlhallly sun. dun-vlnhl wa .nana we 7.12 Then on 7"‘ June 2019. the 1“ Defendant lrl Sull 641 as an Idmlnlslralor at ltre late Atxtullatvs estate went wrtn her daughtev (the all uetenaant) and her husband, Erlak Nazn and lwn utners (0 see me l=laintl«s and (0 seek vacant possession at ttle Sald land The Plaintms nae votunlarlly glvsnlsurrernterea tne paddy field to the Delenesnts wttneut ralslng any nblacllon when the Delemtarns requested are same. The Detenuents subsequently bum fuur houses on part of me said larld wrttr tne lull knowledge at the Plainlifis 7.13.Due to ttle above rnerttante, tne 1“ Plalntltr as me attmrnlstrator of me estate 01 tne lata Han Mat zatn then subsequently entered a prlvale caveat on part 01 the sald land at me Lam Reglstry on 22'-1 January 2020. Slmllovl 7 t4. on 7“ May 2021, tne 1" Plaintlfi‘ obtained Letters u7Ad wlrereln me I" Plalnull was appuimsd as admlrllslrawrufihe estate at the late Haji Mat zam 7 l5.The estate at me late Abdullah vlde lhelr snliertars tnen lssuea Notreee m ourt In the estate at me late Hall Mat Zaln trn pameular me two Plalntlfls in surt 54) dated 2t- Onober 2o2t and 25'" October 2o2t respectlvely The estate of the late Hali Mat Zain! wllslllors vlde men letters daled 15"‘ Nuvember 2021 and 5'- December 2a2t lrl response replbed am earlteneeu tnat the late Abdullah was rloldlng vs undlvlded share 01 the Said land [or tne estate at tne late Hail Mat zain. tlenee, me two eurrenl Sulls belrlg filed. lN bllyMnE&:kuWPIcL1vYFlA In: I at u we Smnl In-vlhnrwlll re tn... a mm r.. ntwlrrnllly sum. dun-vlnnl wa nFluNG v-mxl nu Flllnmfl‘ Claim [31 The Phslnufls m sun 54 being me same of me late Hap Mal zem and as wcumer: M pan al me smd land mler-aha suck me vauawmg when 5.1. e uscxaranan manna regwslrllicn ullha ln|e Abdullah as sols awnur under the saoend Indenlure u null -nu void and ms esme 01 me me HI]: Mil zum ere owners of vs undiwdad there came mid wens pursuant to e cm\s|ruc1wa|rus|. e 2 rasmutiun order lor the mum of me ‘/9 undwea mm M the sen land, 8 3 e deuareunn Ihal me Plamnns have me right In remem on me sam \and‘ 8.4 an Dnier in demolish [I12 fuur houses behanglng in he Deierldams which were eneaea without me wnsem of me Maflis Bandaraya Seherann Pam, and 3.5 an Order men one Desemems pay for me general losses and damages as weH as for economic loss The DI1'nnd.Inh' g g g gggngm 3 m [9] The DefendanIs'(es1ala ollhu late Abdullah) aeience and oounlerdaim is summarixod as follows’ IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1vYF\A ms 9 .c u ‘Nata sew n-nhnrwm es used m mm ms unmmuly mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm 9.1 me Piarrrmfs have varied |n discharge Ins burden of pmvmg ms existence Ms eonsmrmrve trust In lavuur aflhe iaie Han Matzain, 9.2.Ihe marine oi lashes apphes as me Pisrrrmis have slept on (hair rrgms rora very iorrg urns, and 9 3 me Delendarrts are armed in vacant possession Mme said land as may are me regislerai owners onhe said land [1 0] The irial look pluoe over several days mm me ssnaia of me iaie Haii Mal Zaln and me exist: :71 me me Abdullah Calling 2 wrinsaaes each and ma p-rues nave meruner med in vespscliva wrinan submissions 1' comarm rr m| Pin [1 1) The oamanuoris/submissions at Ihe esme at me lane Hap Mal zain are summarized as volume 11 .lhat ma inmal svaiumry mangage rrismrruiiy pmves ma ownership of me said iarrd in question by the «we predecessor iarriiiies IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1rYFiA P112 mam ’NnI2 s.n.i In-vihnrwm r. used m mm r. nflninnflly mm: dun-mm VII nFiuNG WM!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

PA-22NCvC-64-04/2022

PLAINTIF 1. ) Abd Manan Bin Husin [Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Bagi Haji Mat Zain Bin Haji Salleh, Si Mati] (Selepas Ini Dirujuk Sebagai 'Haji Mat Zain Tersebut' Menurut Perintah Bertarikh 7.5.2021) 2. ) ISMAIL BIN AB SAMAT DEFENDAN 1. ) Zalina Binti Idris (Sebagai Wakil Diri Kepada Siti Zauyah Binti Abdullah, Simati) Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Bagi Abdullah Bin Abdul Majid) 2. ) ROSLIN BINTI MUHAMMAD (Pentadbir Harta Pusaka bagi Abdullah Bin Abdul Majid) 3. ) AZIZAH BINTI ABDULLAH 4. ) HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH 5. ) Mohd Khusairi Bin Mohd Isa 6. ) MOHD SHAMSURI BIN MOHD ISA 7. ) ROZAINI BINTI ABDULLAH 8. ) ZALINA BINTI IDRIS

Full Trial – claim by the Plaintiffs in Suit 64 as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain for a declaration that the estate of the late Abdullah is holding ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain. Issues• Whether the late Abdullah held ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the letter dated 30th January 1983 by Mohamad Bin Abdullah, the son of the late Abdullah permitting the 1st Plaintiff to build a house on the said land tantamounts to the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain having an interest in the said land;• Whether there is fraud/ misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct committed by the late Abdullah and/or the estate of the late Abdullah against the Plaintiffs as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• If fraud/misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct by the late Abdullah is found, whether the Limitation Act 1953 and/or the principle of laches applied to defeat the claim of the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession of the said land; and• Whether there is unjust enrichment on the part of the late Abdullah.The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a constructive trust in favour of the late Haji Mat Zain nor found any unconscionable conduct.The Court also finds that the estate of the late Abdullah and/or the Defendants have an overriding interest as the registered proprietor of the said land.The Court finds that the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession subject to them compensating the two Plaintiffs in Suit 64 for the present value of the said houses to be assessed by an independent valuer appointed by the Court. The costs of this valuation is to be borne by the estate of the late Abdullah.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=32b21f6e-3a91-4baa-b860-fb5c52b4c520&Inline=true

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E3 C:/01,204; ,4 w :n DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAU PINANG DI DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG. MALAYSIA GUAMAM SIVIL NO P zzucvoeo NI2|l22 ANTARA 1. AED MANAN am HUSIN (No. KW: 550222-07-5471 r(um-- 4935755) [Punladb Han: Punk: luql H:)| rm bln Bin Haj? Sallo ,si um: (aolepil lnl dlruluk sabagni ‘Hun Mat Zaln msebur menurul Pcrinlnh bfrurilm U1.05.1D2I) 2. ISMAIL am AB SAMAY (No. KIP: 541111-oz-5529 I (Lama: 4711139) PLAINTIF-FLAINTIF DAN 4. sin ZAUVAM amnnanumm [NO. KIP: :muM1—52a4] Pomadhlr mm Punk: Blgl Abdulllh am Abdul Majld 2. ROSLIN amn MUHAMMAD mo. Kl samza-nu-5744} P-nmdmr Mum Punk. Abdullnh am Abdul Mxjld sw x:nyMvE6qxuwPIcuvtF\A Ms: I M -4 mm Sum M... M“ be used m van; M nugvuuly mm; “Mm. VII mum puns! fl 3. AZIZAH awn AEDULLAN mo. KIP.: 5no7u.n7.5Iss] 4. HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH (No. K1P.: 430330-07-5102] 5. MOHD KHUSAIRI am Mono ISA [N0. KIP.: 610908-07-5255] E. MOHD sHAMsuRI BIN MOHD ISA [N0. K/F.: 71092142-5:75] 1. ROZAINI Imm ABDULLAH [NO. K/P.: s1Ims-a1-5594] I. ZALINA amn IDRIS mo. KIP.: saw 1-01-51 54] DEFENDAN-DEFENDAM DIDEIIGAR EERSAMA BALAM MAHKAMAN TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAIJ FINANG DALAM NEGERI FULAU FINANG GIJAMAN SIVIL no ucvc 21-on/2022 ANYARA I. AZIZAH amn AEDULLAH [No. mp: 5oo11¢o1‘s1n] sw I:nyMvEuqxuwPIcuvIFIA mm Sum M... M“ be used M mm I. nflmrufllv mm; “Mm. VII muwa VWLII nauzawu 11.2. ms subsequent purchase by me Ia|e Abauiisn at me nublic auc1iDn vide a saunnd inaeniure oi sale dated 3" May 1941 was sinister and irauauianny done 11.3. the esvace oi the iaie Abdullah had krmwledge at all material limes that me Iaie Haii Mai Zain was run a squatter simp/rune: but the owner of the V. undivided share ollhe sax: iand, and 11 4 that the years oi wuupaiion and paymem oflhe assassmanl is an acknowledgement by the late Abauniaii that V, undivided sriareei me said iana is heid on mnstruclivetruslforme iamiiy Mme lala Haji MalZaIn. mu Dofomi-ms‘ coimmlmu/submissions [12] The mnlsnlians/submissions of me esla1e or the late Abduliah are summarized as ioiiews 12.1. me pmcivf paymem Mme quil rem urassessmenl is not proof olan equivasie ngm over me said land. 12 2. me oucupaiiun or me said and does not prevent the esiaia ol the Is|a Abduilah as ma registened pmprieioiimm taking acaon to ream/er the said |and1 IN wmnsaamwiamm p... :1 nl :4 ma 5.11.1 ...m.m111 be flied m mm 1.. nflmruflly sum. dun-mm Va arium WM! 12 3. ma allegad olal agreement mwean me lala Hall Mal zaln and the IICE Abdullah is not Iarlable nor admlsslble In law as it ls based on hearsay, and 12.4 male was an lnordmale delay In lxlmmenclng lhls presern acllon and ma eslata onne lale Hall Mal zaln have sat on lh - nghls aasplla having knawledge mal lne name 01 me late Hall Mal zaln was not leglslam: on me me Deed slnce 1941 llsall. sumnn ot Prod [13] ll la lllle law lllal he who aaaena musl prwa me P8I'lil:uIaHa<.1s.As such‘ lne burden of glow llas on me aslala cl lne lala Hall Mal am as me Plalnlllls lhmughaut [ha lnal la prove lnau clllm aglmsl ma esbzaie nllha |a|aAbdu||zh and In be veslad wlm V. undrvlded an-re ollhe sale land on a nalanaa nl pmbablllllas as enshrined under socllom ma. 1n: and lo: ol on Evldunuu Act flsa. [saa cam of John: al Abdul Kndlr Mnrlcln v lnvrtnnco Lam Kwck Fun A Anuv[19l|l] l IALRA anal and Tan Kiln Knunn v. ‘rm Kn Kim (M) sun and mu] 1 cu SUPP 141}. [141 To ml: and, II 1! also am lnal I quola the use of Lucllununan clmu Alng-ypln Q LAI|lgnppIn I Anor v. Socurn lvunmlnn Sdn and mm 3 MLRA 501 were me Federal calm held as fnllows. -(521 saclnzn 1lJ1(1Jpmvl'l1e.sIII.!t'VVhl)ev9Id9:wes any couma give judgment as to any legal righl a llanlllry dependent on lno IN MyMnEaqkuwPIl:LmFlA Page :2 04 u ‘Nab! a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be flied M mm ms anlln.l-y MIN: dun-mm Va .mm mm SKISISHDU oiiecis wliicii he asserts, niusi prove iiiei those tests exisi' "Ssclion tot states that Ihe initiei burden afpieiiing a piinie iecie case in liis favour is ass: on the nieiniitt . " twaodmlte and AIFWAH Law 0/ Evidence, tstli ed"\ Vol 3 al p 3194) illusiiation in to 5 mt guts It bemrid doubt mat the "human armor " iests tllmugholn an the p_I.!lntIII. Section 102 mums that "Thu iiumn of E! in a suit of ggceeding lies on mi gersarl who would fall illto Ividcncc at an weie given on siiliev si "rlis inillll anus eimvigg tho case is afwazs an tliia flaimlff " tseikei Law aIEvldence tstli odn at 1599. lltusti-ation ta to s 102 ggls It beige doubt ilut - gllinttlfllas the iniiiai units or E! {M nius e glillmlllius both tllu buntoii ol flies mil as the initixi onue oigiooi. iii Biiiesrone Pte Ltd v. sninii & Associates Far Eesi Lii1[2i7o7]4 SLR 855, me singepoie Cotirr omppeai per vx Reieii ./CA dsln/Sling iiie iuitgnieiii ol the coun, explained (ha! ei me sieit of iiie pieiniiit s case the burden oi pmol and me arms aipioercoinsi.ie- ' . atilie sienolilie piainmis case, my igaiaurden almving riie eximnse oi nix nluvnnr Incl mat Ml gnlnilir must mile and lhe evldentill burden :1! soma (no! Inlteronlly inciudlbio evidence 471' iii: nxistanca olsuch I-ctcoineiite. l/pan eitauciion oiiiiei evidence, the evidential minzten shins io iiie cteiendent, as me case may lie, in adduca some evidence in ieouilai. ii no evidence in remillal is adduced. lhs court may eonciuue iioni (ha evidence oi Ibo dale/idanl IL on me avhnr nena, svldarmv in rahuttal IS eaitueeit, me ewaentiai Duldcn IN bhyMDE6QMi4VPlcLivYFiA v... u eiu -we s.ii.i IHIWDIY MU be HSQG m my me nvwiruflly MW; m.i.i. VII AFVLING WM! shifls back [0 the p/HVIMV, U, u/limsls/y, Ihs evidenlial burden comes I0 iasi an ina defendant, Ins l9gs/ burden of pniar or me reievanl fan would have been discharged by the plainhf The Iegalbumeri 0! pidai. a paiinaneni and enduring miidan ~ does naisnin. A parry who nas me legal lumen drpidoiaii any issue IN/SI discharge it Ihmughoul. sonieiiines, the legal aiiidan is spoken or, /naccurals/y, as "S‘himng”, Bur wnai is miiy ineanz is inai anoinei issue nas been engaged, on wnian (he opposiia party neais me /eqa/burden Diplval ' §51The ml: is mat ‘the onus oimoiafanzgaiticuiar hztlles on the am who mm It not on him win: denies it- at inciimnir pmbaliarl qiii decii, non qui neqax, acrvli incibir piooaiion . The glnlnfllf is bound in ma iiisi Instance ta show a gma laclecasa and inn vos it imgifm inc mm will not assist nim. Hum (ho maxim Ever est condition delendantls. A flalnlm‘ cannot obviously advantagg Ilimsdf by the weakness of mo doilnu. A fllnfllrs case must stand or hll um me ovldonct adducod by him. When. however. (he dslandant, or either liligarll pan}/, insiaad ol denying wnai is a//eged againm nim, iaiias an some naw maiiai wiiian, i/inie, is an answai I017, me miiden orpinoi changes sides, and iia, in ms (um, ls bound lo sndw a pfima iacid 9559 at ieasi and, ii ne leaves I! iinpaiiaci, ina mun WI" rlal assist niin. Raiis sxcipendo Ill aclal” (woodio/is and AIHWA/1, sum, vol 3 ai p aisomgu " in wiinsaamwiaunm 7:5: in am warn Sum llnnflhlv nu as used M mm me nvmnnfily mm; dnunmnl VIA .mnc WM! [151 As such. the burden of meat tea on the estate at the late Hatt Mat Zam |o wave the extstehee a1 a txxtstructtve trust iar the hate Hatt Mat zeth and the consequential right |o be vested wtth the ‘/1 uh ed share of the Sam rand tn the name at the late Hah Mat zattt. [16] There ate several issues which teeutte judtaal eohsuetettoh/asterhttnettoh as f0HUws' t5.1.whether the late Abdullah hetd ‘A undivtded share of the Said Iahtt an emslruclwe ttustrortha estate ctthe late Hap Mat Lam. 16.2.Whetner the tettet dated 30" Janualy 1933 by Mohamad Bun Abdullaht the sun 0! the tate Atntuueh psmtitung the I“ Platnfifl (0 Dutld a house on the sand land lamamaunls In the slate M the late Haji Mat zath having an thterest tn the sen tend, 16.3 whether there Is ftaudl mtsrepresehtauonx uhoohstatnhabte conduct oommttted bythe late Abdullah and/av the estate at the |a|e Atmuttah agalllsl the Platntttts as the estate at the late Hatt Mat L-tm, ta.4.tr llaudlmtsrepresanlalinnl unoohsetanahto wnduct by the hate Atzeutteh ts found. whethu lh: untttauen Act 125: aharor the pnnotpla at taches eppttea In aeteat the atetht 0! the estate at‘ the late Hail Mat Zain. IN t>ltyMnE£t:kuWPIcUvYFtA um ts em ‘Nata s.t.t In-vthnrwm be ts... m mm .. nflmheflly MW: dun-mm VI] nrtuNG Wm! l65,Whethev ma es1aIe of ma late Abaunan ws enulled Io vacanl possesswun oflhe saw and and 165Wha(her mere ws unyusc enrichmenl an the part al the Vale Ahdullah. [17] From me abwe, n will be clear lhat me crmcal issue m nus case .5 whether ar nut Ihere was Iraud/musrepresemamon or unconscuoname mnducl by me Vale Ahdnmah or the same ov me late Abduflah and whether may mm '/2 undrvxded share 01 me sand land on conslrucuve trust 70! the 9.51315 0! (he |a|e Hap Mat Zam being [he benefmianes of me Vale Han Mat Zain The detenrwlalmn nlthns mam asue wwll w my View rash/e me omav Issues F‘ :1 mun: Whnhor mu lama Abdull-h hold V. undlvld r m gm lgnd gn conslmctlve mnua: ma nlah ohm Inn Hg'i Mac Iain mg M53151 mg“ i; lgudl mlscemnnmlonl unoonscionahlu conduct committed fix mg gjg Aggllan and the -am: of an n Abdullah a lmlmo nun oflhn In H ’i Man i [15] The emu: ov me Late Han Mal h: n Iheirsuhmlssion mnnarms man a remedial oonstrucirve Izual sxlsls tor the V. undivided share or the saw: land m their favour The estate Mme Ia|s Han Mal Zam refers to ma case 0! RH: Bunk Ehd v Trivl M (M) Sdn Bhd a. on and aw wmpzaamvpucunm Page ns am -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! unoum -punt [2016] 1 ML! 175 where one Faaerat Courl held as tottems: "1271 A D'0PvI‘sfa'y rams-1y may also us awarded where tt Is apprnvrtale tn Lonrho Ptc u Fayed and omsrs ttvu M19921 1 WLR 1a! p 9, Mttten .t ctled me ruttawtng passage from Meagnar, Gummow and Lenane, Equt‘ Ramsdlss, (2nd Ed) at p 321, wntcn sstd met when appropriate the noun wuutd grant a propnetary remedy. Doclmtss and When appropnate, tns mun wttt grant a pwpvietary remedy to restore to ma ptatnmr property of whtch he has been wrongty deprived, or to pvsvenl lhs derandant imm retatntng e benefit wnten ne has olzlatnad by hrs awn wrong It /5 nolpossible and it weutd net be destrabla, to attempt and exhaustive nlassificaltbn ortne sttuatrans tn whtclv /[wt/I410 so Eauiry mus! retain what has been called us tnnerent ttaxtutttty and cspactly to adjust to new situations by reterenee ta me marnepnnge of equitable turtsdicrton " [19] In adanten, reltanoe ts placed on me ease at Atlas cauinutsa Fumltme Ltd at al v Nallonal Trust co Lid [1932] as DLR(4m) 161 where the Brilish Columbia Courl at Aupeat new as tulle-us: "A remedtat cormructrve trust ts a trust trnuesed Dy mun order as a mmody tor a wrong Tne enttttemenr to max remedy may be a malls: ol euuemntnre law, but me (ms! tteett I: not created by me acls uttne pames, or even uy me oottgauun In make teetttuttorr, but IN t>l1yMnE&:kuWPIcLtvYF\A 7:5: :1 mu -nus s.r.t n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nVW‘nlWY MW: dun-mm VII uF\uNG v-mat by ma order of the noun As wltn other calm orders, the trust wlll some mm being wtran Ins arder is plorlotmced, unless, in an appmpllala case the alder ls made rslroacllvs or /15 comlllg lnla force ls deferred It may be war m many cases where a rsmedlal L‘orlsfmc1l've trust ls lmposetl the court will oruar tllax it be lmpossd wltll ellecl lrom Ills true when the srluatlon arose which gave use to the uruusl snnchmenl. sea Rswltlk v. Raw/uk. mere must, ol wurse. be a causal corlnecllorl between the progeny tn qllsslton and the unjust enrlcttrrrent. See somrtrarl v Solocharl, [1955] 2 5 CR, 38 and Rosellleld u Olson (1985), 1 E.c.L R. (2d) 708 The rel-rtedlal construcllve lnlsl must be tllstmgulshed lrum the autzsmntrua mrrsuuctlua trust which the court declares to have anssrl, as 3 result ollne conduct aims panles, and by the lame ol mat conduct alone, at me sarllsr tlms wllen the relevant conduct acoumaa." [2D]Fur1.her, reltanoe ls also placed an me mass at Nlulchlmkl u Dodds(1iB5) a2 ALR 429 where me Hlgn Court ol Auslralla per Dean: J emlncla|ed as lollams "rn kn l fl n ‘ IV l:orI§!mcllI/8 !vI.l§1does nol involve g derllglg/MS conlllwad fixlfll )( muggy (cl Wnh v Wirlh (95 cu?) at u 235 The inslililflonal character ol ms trust nas never completely oollteratea us rsmedlal ongirls sven m the case otttra mam lradltlonsl forms olaxprsss and lmplrea trust. ms IS a Iorriorl in the case arconstrucllva trust where, as has been mentlonau, II-la mmedlhl crlaraaer remains pmdomlnan! tn that the [rust use/I Elmer rsplsssnts, or mllsds the auallamllty ol, equitable relief m the pamcular ctrcumslancss. IN tallyMrlE&:kuwPIcLlvYFlA P11: 1: MM Nata Smut In-vlhnrwm as used M mm the ntwlmflly MIN: dun-mm VII nFluNG WM! Indeed, in Mrs country at leasl, the constructive trust has not outgrown its formative s1ages as an aqunable remedy and should sn'Il be seen as eonsrmng an n psrsansrnramsdy attaching lo property which may be moulded and adjusled to gun; slicer lo the app/rcarion and mlsr-p/ay of equrlable principles rn fne crvcumslances nllhs pamcu/at case /n psmcular, where wmpsling common law or equilali/e c/arms are or may be involved, 5 .1ee1e1sr1on olconstructive trust by way ofremeoy can properly be so framed [hat me consequences urns impasmon are npsrarfvs only from me dale onuagmsnz nr formal court order or lrum some alner specified date. The fact that (he consrructrve trust remains preduminarmy remedial does nut, hawsvsr, mean thfil 1! represents a medium run (he indulgence ol nmsynmuo notmns oliarrness and justice As an equneme remedy, 11 Is evsnams an/y when warranted by established equitable pnnaplss or Dy me /sgmmale processes of legal reasoning, by analogy, Indmrtson and deduclron, from the sramng pain! or a prayer understanding ol the oonoeprual Ioumiaxron or such pnnuptes (cl, generally, Sir Frank Kms foreword to me 1s: ed 11975) 0! Msaghar, Gummow and Lenane: Eqmly, Docmne: and Remedies, at pp v~vii or the 2nd ad (1954), and see also, 99 Re Drp/ock [1943] on 455 at 451-2 ,'Fem'?( v Pemn[197o; AC ms: 19:, am, 509, 325,- Cowcnev v EowcnsI[1922] 1 wm 425auJn,-119721 1 All ER EM at 948;_Iacobs’ Law Ill Trusts /7! AMAVE/la, llh ed {V977‘ Moagrvsr and Gummow), paras 13471-2, 1325-9,-Allen v Snyder (197712 NSWLR 655 at 539, 7021!, Oakley, on an, pp 1-112, Pam, on on, pp 4-5). Vrswed as a remedy, the Iunclmn ml the mrvstrucuvs Irus! .s not to mndsr superfluous, but 10 reflect and enforce. me pnnclples ol the law 0! aqmty 1n mympzaqkuwfilcuvrrm '13: ., s. .. ‘Nata s.n.1 n-nhnrwm be used M van; .. nflglnnflly mm; mmn 1.. mum pans! musnis inanrieia is rropimirr me /aw all/71: counzryinnne notion oi '5 constructive rrusi ofn new model“ which, "by wrnazever name 1: rs desmbed . is imposed by law whenever iusfice and good conscience” (in ms sense at 1armass- ur wnar "was raw) 'reqmra it" (per Lard banning MR, Eves v Eves [1975] 1 Wu? meat 1341 1342, [1a751:sAriER 765 at 771, 772 and Hussey V Palmer [1972] 1 wu? 1235 at 1259-90.'[1972I 3 All ER 744 5! 747)." my on ma Nstolical Incl: ohms prasarn case, in IS cleav that mare were Mo Indemuras rn respsmafme saw warm The late Haji Malzain and me Abdullah wave rag\sIArad as nananis in common ai ina said land was me. man Indanlum dam 15* Ann! I930 under Iha Engnsn Daad System :1 ma R9g\sIar M Deeds. Penang on 27* May 1930. [221 anm |enanls in wmmon were regmelld is shimmy inangagors OHM said land wide a sianuwry mnngtge dated 19“ Apru «van on 27“ May 1930 at me Ragmrar cl Dem, s-ennng. [231 was a mom: inaeniura dated M May 4941, (ha said land wus iransvened to me Im Abdulllh only wno had paid $130.00 as the SUCOBSSM ladder of the said land at a public aucfinn Ce half! lhe morlgagors had hreachad me said smumry murlgaue The second Indenlure was regisnereu on 30'" Jun: 1941 under me Deed nyslem at me Registrar 0! Deeds‘ Penang rn tal1yMnE&:kuWPIcL1rYF\A raaem-rm ‘Nuns Sum! n-nhnrwm be .1‘... M mm me mn.u.y sun. dun-mm r.. mum pans! 2. HASNAH BINTI AEDULLAH (Nu. m: Awssnm-51021 3. MOHD KHIISAIRI am MOND ISA [No. KIP: smwa-tn-51551 4, Mom! SHAMSURI BIN MOND ISA (No. KIP: 11 n921—o2sa1s] 5. ROZAINI sum Aauumxu [No. KIF: 5109:3411-5594] 6. SITI ZAUYAH EINTI ABDULLAH [Na mp: mm-o7-52541 memnaax meVa\m ZALINA snm mums [No. K/P. 530617-07-5154} sen.-agai pemegang Surat Kuasa Waknl yang sah bag! P\aInM-F'\amM) PLAIDITIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. ABD MANAN am HUSIN [No. KlF:5MI222-d7»547T] 2. Isuun. am smn nzrsunmnzrsunm sw Wmusaqmmcmm me a m « mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm [24] Fmm ma above, it is clear that oniy me name of me late Abauuah has been registered on me said land being me mghesl bwdder for me same at ma malena\ nme. [25] The esuna 0! ma Vale Haj Mat Zaln wnlends max mere exis|s s4nis(ershIp and mequwable conduct on me pan of me late Ahdmlah. The estate onne late Ha]: Mal Zain submits mac me lace Che Long (wwa cl lhe Vale Haji Ma1Zam)had pend me mommy mongage sum in me late Abdullah who had man aauaa lo pay on ma arvears which lad to the sad land being aucunnsd and \a¢ar pumnasea by ma Vane Abdunah solely. [29] In my view, there ' no emdenoe Io substarmate me above and such hare avermenls/asserlluns is \n my vsew insulficienl to conclude that the Vale Abdullah is gumy 0| slmsletship and inwumhle oonducl [See ma mse al axnary Force Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Pelabuhan John! [zoos] 1 ms 313] ms conlermcn now that me late Che Long naa made me payments under me slalulory mongage \s also not oerlam as me estate of ma Isle Hafl Mal zam has oonsaxanuy taken me poaiuan man ma Vale Ha]: Mal Zam and me ma One Long were uneducatad and bara\y had enough mone|ary funds var surv|va\ at that me. [27] Funnen vn my Maw, ma eslale auna ¥a|e Haj: Mal zam have a\so failed to pmve on a balance M probablllues man (her: exlsls any constructive trust var me estate oflhe ma HaiiMa(L!1n.Nowhere doe: ma ueond lndamure dated 3"‘ May um mdimls or mlar that mere was ImsI(holh axpraaaxy oHmp|1ed\y)clealedlcrlhe asoaua at [he late Hap Mal zam There Is alsa no evidence lo subslanllala ma can|anuonsllac1: lhal Ihe IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A Page 11 M u Nuns sum n-nhnrwm be used m yaw ma anmmmy mm: dun-mm wa mum pm late che Lung has made the payment for the V. undwidzd share at the sald land and the late Abdullah pmnused lo regtsler the said W undlvlded share VI the name of the late Hail Mal zatn or the late che Lung [25] ln edditlon, havlrlg aonsrdered the lacts at [his sate, I find that the estate at the late Ha]! Mat zain have tatled lo pmve on a balance of probabllmes that there was any unmnscionable conduct and/or any grounds tor rue to find or impose: temedtal aonstrumlve trust tn tavour ulthe late Halt Mat utn and the estate altne late Hajl Mat zaln due la the loflowlrtg laclars a The estate oltne late Hali Mat zaln have nm addueed any ongenl evrdenue nut rely neaytly on hearsay le aentend that the late Ahdullan had nhlalned the sad land tnde the second lndenture lor the benefit or the late Halt Mat Zam Thls slnularty appltes wtth respect to the wn|en!lorl v1 unoonsctonaole oonduot on the pan at the late Abdullah when the sald land was putchased, b. The estate or the late Halt Mat Zaln admllted tn fllelr lallmony especlally the 1' Platntttl that the alleged oral agreement bemaen the |a|eAbdu\|ah and Ihe lale Haji Ma( Zalrl was knclwn only to nlrn lrorn the statements heard lrorn the late che Long wmch Is nut adrrllsslhle under me rule agalrlsl hearsay and that ll muld be [me av Hal The I" Piamlifl I¢5|ifIed dtmng L7uss— examination as follows: "FD :T9k sellqu? Jndl In! kalounggn nombol 4 In! berdtlsarkan kelerangan one Long A uw ad: IN t>l1yMnE6QkuWPIcL1vYFlA Pig! :2 one -we s.n.t nnvlhnrwm ue used M yaw ms uflmnaflly mt. dun-mm vta .nuye Wm! SP1 PD SP1 ‘IA SP1 SP1 FD SP1 miklumatmiklumal I-lln barkonun Inllgtl Elfinflan Irsan torsebul. : Ini adalan dang: cm LL»,-1. > Oh: Lyg somata-mana7 :Katsrsngsn pasarmpamnggan 4:15!-I spasarapa yang bevlaku pada tahun 1930 bsrdasarkan apa wnq drbemahu kepada Encik Marian oran cha Lang7 ‘Ya. V lad: kelslangan one Long Ievsebln mungkin boleh oem/, mungkm bnlsh Irdak betul, selu/u arau vidak7 may sslu/u Im berpsndu kspsda dokumen may kamr dapal: .- 1.-gin." gjurnn Ilsln mm id: dokumln. Jadl saga ma "5 Eng dlmaklum am. one Long mungkin betul mugkln mm mm? va ” [See page 45 orme Noles or Evidence daled 9* May 2025] c The leuer [mm Mohamad hm AhduHah datad aw» January 1933 had emy gwen the 1" Plalnlm permission to bmld a house and could not tantamount |o Ihe esme at the lale Haj: Mal Zam aaqumng ngms and beneficial mlarasl an me said land. a The 2"’ Plnmufl aammau during ms Iesllmuny lha| ma estate 09 ma Vala Haj! Mal Zam had volunlanly gn/an/sunendarea ma paddy «am to ma as(a|e o1lheIaIeAbdu\I:h wnnom nusrng any ob)ec1>cn lo Ihe same when ma aslale :11 ma lace Abdunah aw MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A Viuezsmu -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm a. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm rsqueslsd for lh: same m 2019. The 2"“ P\ainlif1(SP2| lnsnfied as louaws’ “FF Tak, tak Er/a dla Duat rampssan ifu, EM‘/k Ismail bag/Tahu rampasan dmuaz w sawan pad: lsnah Abduliah alaupun sawah pacn Ha/I Mal Zam mp SP-2 :Dus-due belalv says bust. YA Rampasan mbual ax sawan pad: mans, kawzlsan maria? sp-2 .»<awa:an sebe/ah kampnmg Haj} Mal Zam, yang ssoeran pan! pro/sk aw sebelah Ha//’AbduIIah PP :so kodua-dun nan-gt-n mu monk. momma: rnmgurfl sp-2 :Mnnh mblla-omul um-nun. PF mun sp-1 FF Yang Abdu/Ian cu you bayav sswaksn? s;=~2 'Ya PP Dan mu kswasan bapa menus you lah, mam. /-mpu jugs? SP»? . va PP . Macum mans Iampasan im bsnaku, omen [alukarfl SP-2 . say: Ink bohh [5/as curna dupe bagiruhu kalza kami akan ambil bahk Ian (Brush nu sebub hak d-pa (See page 87oIlI>e Notes ofevidomv dated 9'" May 2023] IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A Pauuolu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ‘PD SP—2 PD SP-2 FD SP—2 PD sP—2 PD SP-2 PD SF-2 PD 5:12 ‘.1111! up knakan sin‘ Znguh dmng unluk munumur kombalf mlnggmbilalfh kumbali slwuh (orsobut knuru sawan ttrstbul adalan mill); mereka. Sen.l[u Ivnutldlk7 -saga seIu[u. Jawalz kepada Mallkamah dengan ;eIas senqu 1/ad: awak I/dak ads aps-ans benlshan (ah verhadap psngambtla/than semu/a sawah yang sslangah bahagran kamu usahakan pads lahun 2019 Isrssbut Trdak Dan kamu ‘mg ulah muumn kamba/I seem bark Iah kflda Sfri Zagzah. :Dan sebagaipenyewa sawah, awak/uga ads ulusan penukaran name mm rsu subsrdr dan ha/a /‘uga Kan? vya. ‘Dan um M. sour: balk dan aman man mcmbull flllklllll nun: dlll nlml IV/All aebagnl gngwl kegdn SM Zauxlfl, aalu Al ltlu @& .Ya mm balk. :TIu1n non-mg bnnnh-n7 Tldak mu. [See page 32 ol the Note: 9/ Ev/dance dated 9" May 21:23] ‘PD ‘Tad! Enclk lsmall ksln Ellclk Ismal/ eenen kamba/l sscsra 9/ok Kan, secera eman s/2.2 ‘Va PD ./ad! Iak timbul Vail dskwaan mersmpas sawah padi Iersebtll Memarlg ssrah ksmbs/I sacalx elak tan. SP-2 :Ya ' [see page as alrhe Notes o/swdence dated 9* May 2023) e The estate cfllhe late Hap Mal zain have tzottt admltted dunng tne cuurse or the tnal that they do not even have knowledge about the 5112 of me said land wnen claiming the ‘/1 urldlvlded snare dune said land, and r Tne estate at the late ttall Matzaln had sleot on men rlgnts and did not take any reasonable amen to enforce their alleged banefiolal lrtleresls/ngms over the V. undivtded snare 01 tne satd land despite havlng krmwiedge at tne alleged uncurlsciovtable canduct etme IateAbdullah since 1941 ttsen. [29] In additlon, tne estate ulttte late Haj: Mat zatn seeksa declarallnn met me send V. undwtded share at the sad land I5 based on the oral agvsement wlnareln Ins ‘/e share 07 the two muss: and ‘/4 share 07 the paddy neld belungs ta the estate 01 flle late Haji Mal z n. ln my vlaw, the mat agreement rematne a hate assamen wttn no evldenee adduced In sutzslaniiale sucn a claim. In any event, this oral agreement ts supztsedad by tne sewnd lrtdenlure, we can be seen from me testtmany dune 1-‘ Plutntttf dunng cmesexnnunullon as lulluus. lN t>ltyMnEfl~:kuwPtcuvtFlA y... mi and -we s.n.t In-vthnrwlll be used M mm ms mnmu-y enn. m.n.n n. mane em ‘PD SP1 : rskpzy n-arm akan mm o/sh peyuamcara Enmk Jadl saga kalnkan seluu alau Ildak Indulture Sale [lug kedul Irll Kelli! mamnasr araugun Inl [any Ilrbaru 1941 Iran dun ll Illengafisl afl-33 kandugggn gang ada di A1aL!m lndenkuw Salt mo Mrsobut. Sotlfu mu lidak? Mansn 59$! [see page 48 anhe Noxes afEw'der1oe dated 9" May 2023] PD SP1 . PD SP1 PD s1N MyMnE6qxuwPIcuvrF1A -ms s..1.1...m..w111.. .15.. m mm 1.. nVVfl\ru“|¥ mm; dun-mm VII mum Wm nay, lakva ran Slya kstl says cadangkan Enctk Manan be/sh sslu/u slau lsk selu/u sabab lsd1 Encxk Msnan kara I-Bk d-lk psngslahuan spa Darfaku 19317 hmgga 1341 msksud dia 11 Iahun ads gap agak/umlah yang psmang darn dokumsn dengan pales manyalakan alas kemurlgktran Abduuan bin And Mafia dan juga Ha/'1 Mat zarn rmska hananah tersebul dtlelang semula dan Abdu//ah Ma/1:1 mum pembe/i kedua berdasarkan dokumsn di mukasural 25 Kan? Ya Jad1, saya kala yang !ad1'EI1c:'k Manan secuju ape yang dlkalskan olsh Che Long .11 dalsm pwapsn 4 ads/an salu peqaniian lrsan berdasariran dokumen 19317 okay dnllm 11 n n n n n m §7 mu dlsnkog oleh dakumen gang suELsedl menngnasl dnkuman pm gamma maka geflgnflan llsln gang dlbuatmulut Ilu adalah lldak zflakal her: n berl-ku gzmbahan dalam mug 11 rahurl terso.-but setulg arau lidak soalan sag? SP1 . Sctuiu.” [See page A9 allhs Noles ofEvn1sm:e dated 9'" May 2023] [an] \n mnclusmn, havmg consmarea |ha above, I am 11! the Iha| lha aslala 1.71 mm mm Hap Mal Zain have lalled lo prove an a hamnce of DVobabHrhes(haHJ1e IslaAbduIlah nova; V; unawea share of me sad land on eensxrucwe (rust m ilvourahhe Vale Hap Max Zam or me aslam of ma lace Hay Mal Zain sooand Inuo: vnmhur mu I-nu dzlud 19'“ Januag Igu gg Mohzmad mn Abdullah gs gm sun mum [ah Ahdullgh Emu g Inc: I“ Flalmlfl to build g ngug E Q; gig lug V!§j§ gnu, um gl gm I ' ' II immu in mo and land. [311 The same onhe Iale Hap Ma| Zam a\sn mugs on me leltar wssuad by Mohamad Em Amman, son ov me me Abeuuan dated 30" Junuary was and amend than such wetter Is mmcauve mu me estate of me Isle Hap Mal Zam have a x unmvuaea share OHM! beneficial mlerasl mm sawd land In mvs respeau, m \s apt lha| (he contents of me send lelter be rewoduwd belaw sw MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A P21: 11 m u -m Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm mu. AlHA¥fl\Aku|i i. lilivlhilm ..u. )nIJm\wIv [321 A perusai onna said lener win reveai inai ii only vrinls pennission id me 1* Pliirmfl |o oonsu'uc1 a noiise/buiiding on iris said iand and nothing more. in rein, in niy view, me iamnai ins eslala dune iaia Hap Mat Zain sndidi me 1- Pisinmv have lo nhlain mnsenl [mm ins iainiiy ol Mohamad EH1 Abdiiiiaii lo nuiid a house very tailing as ii wdiiid appear that the iaiiiiiy of me iaie H.-iii Mal zaiii annealed iriai «vie iaie Nafi Mai zain is no: me co-owner of me said land. If me lale Han Mal zain is indeed me co-owner Wllh ins i/2 undivided share dune said iarid, one weuid nave moiigm mai such peniiissim was ndi required and may would have just proceeded to puiid a house on me said iand [:3] Fuflhafi piwwneis pi me said land but iriis was not dune. in bl1yMDE5I:kuOVPlcUvYF\A we s.n.i In-vihnrvim as used M mm i.. mimiiiy MIME dnunvinnl n. AFVLING Wm! Ia it indeed an am’!!! a! iris ‘A undivided snaid of me said land‘ 0191" Pllinllfl ougrii In have pmcureid a siiriiiur Ianerlmiii Mohllllmld sin Andiiiieih in cdiirinn than me arsIa|a or me ieie Hlii Maiza are me vasszsem [341 In (am, most crii-navy. ma 1" Plainlifl (SP1) conllrmed dunng orUss— exammallarl that he seems «ha ha is not the mm at me sild land SP1 leanfled during cross-examination as roiiows: "PD Encik Marian says karakan Encik Manan perm pevguumpa Encik Muhamad sebab Encik Manan menyedan bahawa Ericik Ma/um bukan pemilik hsnanah Iersebul pads ksrrka /In SP1 Ya, beiui " [see new 5:! arm: Nara: o/Ev/dtncv dated 9'" May 2023] [351 As such, i am ov me View mm me wrmen ieneri amhonzalran by Mnhamad am Abdullah mereiy gives ms esiaie oi me late nap Mal zm andlur Ch: I" Piainmr me ngm in mind a house and occupy the Said land which is consisienzwim Ihe nghis Mme estate oime iaie Amuiiun as me mgismrea owner: oi me said land, The same at me lala Haji Mal zam have .1 yes: praved on a haixnce at probahilmas mew ngms in occupation onne saia ism hul nmhing lurlhav in pmve (ha alamenl onzanenciai righls over me said land nor ma oxlslonna ova conslmclivo |rus| [36] In determining mis issue, II is tip! that reference is made to me vmv-sions under me National Lnnd com 1965 IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1vYFiA sun. so mu -m s.n.i n-vihnrwm be used M mm .. mimiiuy MIN: dun-mm VII .mm mm GROUNDS or JUDGMENT mmonucnou [11 The mspule herein pertains «.2 ms ownership ofa piece av land m Penang M wmch the mslary ra\ales back m almost a hundred years since 1930. [21 Theve us no mspme mat me said land ws currenfly regIs1ered in ma nams oi the descendants/admmlsuamrs of me late Abdullah Em Abdul Majid (heramafler raranaa to as ‘Ab\1u|Iah'). n .5 also not mspmea that since 1941 me sam land was registered only m the name 0! the late Abdlmah and naw m me names of the descendants/admmuslraiors aflhe late Abdullah [31 The descendants/adnu slramrs av the late Hap Ma| Zain hm Saueh (herennaflar Ielened to as ‘Haj: Mal Zam"| have oommenced Sun PA— 22Ncv¢>a-Mu/2022 (hereinaller revenea In as -sum 64') claunmg |n|eralIa V. share M me savd land on one basvs that the Lava Abdullah was a co-uznmwa uuszee «or V. share 0! me said Land .n lavauv of me ma Hap Mal zam [A] The descendants/admmlslnlors ollhe Vale And-man nave filed sun PA- ZZNCVC-121-08/2022 (herelnaflar ravamaa to as “sun 12v) seeking vacant possession 0! the saw land Imm ma two Delendanls who are lhe Flalnhls Vn sun 34 above. {5} By oonsem olme parllas, these two Suns ware mnsulidaled and man: Iogalhev. IN wyMnEaqkuwPIcuvtF\A run and -ma s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [371 A perusal oflhe lalasl land Search daled 11-“ November zuln would reflect the name Mme lala Abdullah I: ma sols reglslareu proprietor nflhe full share ohhe said land Rehrenne is also made lo lhe (RC1 that the second lrldenlure was leglsleled cln 3G"'JLme1941 under the Deed syslervl at the Reqislrar ol Deeds, Penarlg. [321] The lndeleasmllia, of We IS lhe hallmark of the Torrens syslarn oi land lrlles wrllcn was laler adopted under sectlon :40 of mu nallonal Land Cod: I965 mrr oerlalll excepllorlsl for the lndefeaslblllly ol regrslered Wes or lrllelesls ln land and reglslered leases. chavges and easemerlls. [39] ll IS clearlllal me lnleflm register and the land Search are norrcluswe evldenoe man We lllle lo me sald land ls leglslered ln me name ol me eslale ol me lale Abdullah aooardlng In smlon as of nu Nnialul Lnnd Code was. Tnelelme, me lala Abdullah am me eslale 0! me lala Azmullah (as sucoassars) as reglslared pmprlelcrs are prlma lacle anlltled to enpy indaleaslhle lllle/an/nership to me sald land [See the Faaaral Conn case cl ran Bu v K Manmlamulllu [1911] 2 ull_l 71. [40] However‘ oansldenng that male ls an allegallan al lraudlmlsrapvesarllallanl uncurlscxlnable mmlucl, salmon 14o(2)(:) olllu Nlllollll Land com 1995 ls relevant. The clue or lrlleresl ullhe lale Abdullah and suhsequenuy tha erslals cl me lale Anaullarl would be dehaasible m uses 01 lraud nr misreplesenlallurl me burden of prool us on me eslale ollne Isle Ha]! Mat Zaln lo prove ma elements or lraun on a balance 01 plnbablllues. [sea ma Federal calm case M [411 [42] Silmn all A son: 5dn mm It uamai Solis Sin and [20:51 MLJU M92] The dam cl lhe esma ol Ihe late Han Mal Zaln an naua re-«fives around me raa Ina! ma second lndenture was om.-nnaa via naua/mmapraaanzanon The ascace oi ma late Han Mal zain oonlend a| paragraphs 14 and 15 M lhelr Statement 01 Claim that the late Che Long was rnsrapresemed by me lale Abdullah sonuecnne m 1941 . e mac uponlull sememem onne rnangage sum, the name oflhe Iale Han Mat hm mu be registered is me proprietor ov me sand land and ma late Amman has also misrepresented that he wiH new ‘/2 undmded share of he Sam ‘and for the beneffl of the lamwry 0! the late Haj Mal Zaln but this was not done Mlawmg the death 0! Ihe late Abduflah. However. I note ma: apan {mm ma [act unau Ihe Issua eilraud was not subnnnaa upon .n ma wnnan suhmssmns, mere xs no ewdence ca prove fraud or rmsrepresenvanon vn my men, n Is aaany loo Vale (or me estate um-e lale Hail Ma|hm wnow assen manna late cha Long Is no| aware av nor undersmou me oonnencs of me seoand lndenlure gwen that she Is uneducated. Daspne mesa iacns bemg mfurmed by the late One Long to me P\amM1s somawna In 1953, nomung nas been done by me asvana av me Yale Ha]i Mal Zam to assert man ngms nor wen anempx In register one ‘/2 undmded snare 01 In: sawd land m ma names nl ma Vale Hap Mal Zam. More mun 40years have passed sinue the aeam cl me late on: Lung m 193: mu nothing has been done by me astute M the Vat: Han Mal Zaln m asset‘ man Iruzrasl in ma ‘/1 undivided share at me said land. [43] As such, I am aflhe mew that the eslale Mme late Haii Mat Zam have failed to wave on a ha\arIce nf pmbabllvlies that there is n-aud/ rmsrwresemalinn cnmmilled bylhe |ateAbdu|1ah and me estate or me late Abduuan nun: Inn Doc EEIX7 [441 The esVa|e at the late Abdullah submits Ina! m any case, we dalm by me eslme o1|he\aI.e Han Mat Lam ougm Io be msmissea baud on Inches m this respect. reference Vs made k: In: case of nn song Vang @ Tan Kong nong 5. Ann! v Tun Mwn Llng @ nu Slaw Lang 5 On [2922] 2 nu cos wnem me Court 0! Appeal held as lnHmMs' "[941 From me pmnr/n:' own Issltmony 111: clear that P1 and P2 knaw about lha alleged ms: m 4970 and P3 knew Intel. in 1975. They had been asking for me account: over one year: and we not receive any response Irom en. dalandanfs They ma nal lake any nclron ol whether to me an aczmn a ul/an m lodge a caves: to «cum Ihsv own over [he disputed properties Inslead, m_-1 nun wnltod for thou! nu! - c-mug [9 ggmamg :5 union ng-Inn tin dnfcndanm purportedly on ma mason that they were reluctant to not as they wsw siblings. H5] The law on the doctrine of/aches is wen semed Th/5 com in TI/ng Kean Hm 5. Anal v Yuen Hana Pnarva 1201.913 MLRA 550; (201912 MLJ 334 had succinctly summarised the docm'ne as rouaws. IN MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A huuvtu Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm (371 For lsches lo be ralsed. men must In dclajg Imounllng la acquiescence (sea‘ Cheeh Kym Tong & Ana! v ram Kalli [1999] 1 MLRH 281 1193913 MLJ 252, [1959] 1 Cu 373 Foo l-loldmgs sun El-n1 & Anal v Foo clmon Ymg (20141 2 MLRH 41 7, Amnluala V Scu//y [1861] /XHLC 360) nu doclrim al Iachos is based an the maxim that ‘guy ltd: (ht vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights’ Lam Sslbome succlncrly explained In me landmark case oILmdsay Petroleum Co HLm1{1374) LR 5 PC 221 am 1n every case 11 an argument agamsk rellsl wlvch olhsrwlss would be [I451 ls launder! all men: delay, lhal delay of course not amounrrng lo a bar by any Statute al Llmllallolvs, the valfdlly 0/ that delence must be mad upon prlnclples substantially equlraole. Two circumstances nlwlya Ilnglnt In such CJSCS an mi length of the new and the nnun 0! me acts done during me Interval which might afiuct OIIIIOI £11 and cause a balance of ustlce at Inlustlce In tlklnfl MI on: cnulso cl mo may so far :5 relates in me remedy. /35] Edgar Jusepll JIJ m ma case n/A/[red remplelon & Ors v Low Yul Ha/dlngs sun Blvd & Anar[19E9] 1 MLRH 144, [19av]2 ML] 202, [1959] 1 cu (Rep) 219 explalned me docmne u/lam: Lac»: LI An tgglhhln dereneelmglxlgg lug. ulllmn -na «my In mncullng a dnlm. A com ol gulg IN mmusaqmvmnm mg: n m u ‘Nata 5.11.1 IHIWDIY WW be used m van; M m\g\ruHIy MVM5 dun-mm vn .mNe M1 minus 11: Aid to - mic dun-m1 what: the p_IaInwr hu 3! 1 his :4 ts and no uhsc-d la! a tea! Ionglh of time. H0 is Mm said to be barrvd 1:: teen... In 11e1enn1n1ng whslnsr mere has been such a delay as In ammm! to Iaches the court considers whether there has been awllrescence on we Plaimrifs pan and any change olposilinn mar nu occurred on the pan of me aerenaenc The ducmna o/reones rests on the conszdemion that ms ml/us! to we a menme remedy where he has by me conduct done the! which mrght fairly be regarded as 9<7uiva)enr la a warver 011! Dr wireve by ms conduct and newest ne Has, mougn not waiving the remedy pm me olherpartyin a position In which 11 would nolbe reasonable 1o place him we remedy were errerwams In be asserted 14 Helsnurys Laws o!Eng/and (am 511) paras 1151,1152 Lacnes has been suooncny uescmaed as inamon with one‘: eyes open “ [45] As such, bearmg in mind me! more has how such a long de\ay m lime since me smile of me Iala Han Mal Zam was swam of ma non- regmvaoon Mnwnershnp ar lhev bene4fl::|a\ nghu. over me </. unannaea share 0! me sad lend. m my considered view, one pnnaple at Iacnas would avw |a dates! the dawn of ma eslale oi me Im Haii Mal Zain Fourth Inn: wrmnu and scan. at me. Ian Abdunah an onmlcd Io vacant Esssssnan anns sal land [45] V71 delamunmg whslhav ms ssaaca M ma Vale Abdullah are enlmad In vacanl pussassidn dc ma said land, ans snauld oonsldav me regisuauon of ownersmp -n ma names M Ihe lale Abdullah and subsequenuy ma vesnng m me names at me «me of the Isle Abdullah [471 In such cases, me he aslala anne Lacs Abdmlnh have proved fls nus and an mcsnuon to mgam posssssbn‘ m Is for me same anne Lacs Hay Mat Zam to prove max may can set am a We or a ngm lo possessmn mnswslenl wI|h me ownership ov me eslals d1 me hate Abduflah In |hvs rusnecld reference vs made In ma dasa ovcansy. ldul (M) Sdn Bhd V Oranq-Dung vg Munglnz n sag ' Ponga' (Puongavnnzm AIL vad am) a. Ors[1WB] uL.:u 125 where Abdm Mallk lshak J (as HIS Lardsmp man was) nsxd as fnlluws " According to me auihomres, once ms yarnmr has mud rrs rim and an rnmnion to r-gun Qssossfon it was for we dvhndanls to ma um ms delendnnls can setaul . ml. or I Ilflht to Esesslan consisfeg with the yllnfiffs owngfiflig The burden wourd be on me defendants in show that they had the right rd occupy that plot of /and marked as 'c31' m we /ayout plan on the be/ance afprobabrmvss andms datendanrs miselab/y failed (0 do so Pure and smw/e (hrs was a case nf ejecrmem or what rs popu/arly known as an amen for trespass " syn MyMnE6qkuwPIcuvtF\A rage as at u -was saw ...n.mm be used m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm [48] Fmrrl the historical background ot the case. it is clear that there is consent by the iaredeoesscrto allow the estate olthe late Hat: Mat zain to reside and occupy the said land Testimony “uni the witnesses of the male or the late Abdullah also indicated that the right to remain in ocmlpaltcn ol the said land was glven graturtpusly treated on the good relationship between the parties’ predecessors. As such‘ the estate or the late t-laii Mat zain cannot he classified as squatters snnpliciter: Further, whilst there is evidence that peririissicri was granted to build a house an pan ot the said land, there Is no evidence that the estate M the late llaii Mat zain were authorized or glven pemllsslarl to continue remaining on the said land indefinitely [49] As such, I am otthe View that it is not reasonable to expect the sad consent to exist fol an indefinite period/indefinitely once the notice to ouit dated 21*‘ Oc|uber202| and 25° Ocwber 2021 was given to the estate ol the late t-taji Mal zairi (and in pa ciilar the 1- and 2" Plainlrflsli such consent to continue occupying the said land ceased and the estate olthe late t-tail Mat zain would he required to vacate the said land within a reasoiiahle time. [50] Further‘ I am ol the view that the idea at a gratuitous pernitssionlconsent/authorizatiun hetrlg aple to occupy an alienated llnd owned by the |ateAbdttI|ah and subsequently the same allihe late Ahdullah perrnanenity av perpetually, arter being given due rlollce |o gu repugnant to the concept ol indetcasioility cl utle ola registered pmpllelol as provided under section 14:: oflhl Illttloml Land coal was and the concept against adverse possetsslon cl land hy occupahan. as excllcllly provides in Sacllon :41 ottha Natlerial Laird code 1995 in this respect, relerenca is niade to the case ol Ahmad in ahmipsdatuoyaiauirria nae n am Nuts s.n.i nnvlhnrwlll be used M mm the antii.ii-y MIME dun-vlnhl vta aFlt.lNG wnxl Shnllly llmnll Baku v NII Salmi 2.-man N] Wln Mona Bid [2014] 5 cm on man was relerrld in a isoem case oi say-nan. s-nndu Sdn Bhd v Jabaun Fongalrnn nan Sallran Nngnri seminar 5 On min] I MLJ :22 where |he Conn dmppeai held as lanows: "mo; nis calm al Appeal in Ahmnd Shumy lenull saw v ml Slims luldan H] Wan Mohd 2aId[2a1l] 5 cL.l an applied both me concepl ol mde/easlblllty of ville and me carlrept ol nonapulicaoilily oiadvsrse pdssassion to pieeem me ngnl ofa Vsglslalsd pmpllslol Ia assan ma ngm over nla land as lolinws. 1391 we further note lnar me defendant in ne: pleading and testimony nad claimed that slie had been staying in me house since it was cansliueied in 1985 and has me ngnr to remain on me said house and the sald land. In our view, the idea oh gmulmus liunee. boiI_Ig able to occugx an alienated Innd awnod by someone else rmanen or ru-I um bsln due notice to gulf LI Iegugmnt In the comma of lndefeaslbillg 0! Elle ofa registered Erafllelor as grovided undo! s 340 and ma conccgt agginsl adv/us: ussasslon at land :11 occuullon as exglclgg sated III 5 341 of the NLC (Emphasis added)" [51] In respect at me Issue of me payment ol quil rem, in is me wnIen|iun 01 me eslale oi me late Hap Mal Zaln that me same has been paid by IN bhyMnE£qkuWPIcLlvYF\A tile an m u Ihem urml 2015 Hn1wevev.m 2016, me qml rsnl was wssued In the name of Zalnuran Em Manamed who Is a membev ol lhe lute Abdullah family. [521 The es1aIe of the lane Abdullah on the exner nana mncends a| paragraph as onnenwnuen eupnnseien maldespule havmg knawledge that me name m me qml rem was changed so Zamuven an Mohamed someflme In 2015, no action nas been miualed try the es1aIe oune Late Hap Maezam to preserve lhewalleged rights No ewaenee nor reasons were Ionnconnng «or one Vaflura of me estate of the late Hap Mal Zaln to assert mew ngms. AH nney contend m men submwssion m reply is that mey have been paying qmurencawme while rpran mese years wnereas the esule M the late Abdullah and Ihelf predewssovs had never bothered In make the payments an reeenuy. That, In my view, Is msummen: to justify me norracixon by me same vflhe me Haji Mat Zam when me name .n we qui| rem was changed 201610 me name Mzalnuren Em Mohamed [531 Further and In any evem, me pm: of peymem at qun rent or assessment is nu| 97001 07 an equitame right over the san! land and the pemnued pceupauon does not prevent the ragustered pmpnelorlrom takingaclnon Ia recover the Said land In (Ins respecl. V1 is apt man I r318! to me case av cm: sun Llun A Vnng Lulu Lwn. Wang on-e Foonq dlnllllu Plnghunl-Ponghunl Llln [2013] I LNS 2233 where rt was held us (wows: “ The N00’ alpayment ofquil rent by the defendants In Ihis case did no! PIDVE mat the dalamtanls had fights DI mares! towards the uni /and which was resided by the Mid p/flmllfl. Even though Mo defendant was said to have resided for a long lime on one sard land, IN p«yMnEaqkuw»=IcuvmA has as am -una s.nn ...n.mn be used m mm ms nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa anum pm it did not bar ins reglslsred piopiialows ngnl lo lake ncfiorl and the issue o/lunilarion did nol aiise as slam in s 34 allhs National Land coda (see paras as L 3339) r [54] As such, having considered all the alacvei lhe estate :21 the Isle Abdullah as regislened owners or the said land are in my view entitled |o vacant possession ofllie said land lmm me eslale of the lace Haji Malzalrl what New? [551 Having lound lhnl ineio is no conslrucllve line: in lavoui oline law i-laii Mai zain and/oi ins aelala or iris lals HRH Mil znn and me: (ha eslaie nl ins leis Ahdullah II anmled lo vacant possession oi me said land, inal is nol ine end of me inanei Ffom lne lame oi ine ease, in is undapuleo inal me me Flalnlifis in sun in havs aasupied pan or ins said lend, nailing buin lneii nouses and iilling of ins paddy nslds tank piece. in fan‘ as seen aaiiiei. Monnniao sin Abdullah had previously given omission is me I“ Piainlillo build nis nouse on oanonne said land and ma Plsinlilis have indeed been occupying me said land slnos 1953. wriilsl lnera is no evidence that me 2"“ Plai ' was similarly given permlsslon lo build a house on ma said land I1 is clear inn (ha seiale ollne laleAl>dullan was awam dime exlslanoe aflha house and did mining aadm it. [56] on ma Facts asvaalisried. l find lnal allnouqn lne eslale oi lne laie Abdullah are indeed me iegislaied piooiielois in me said land‘ lnaia IN MyMpE6qkuOVPlcUvYFlA ran: an um um. s.ii.i nnvlhnrwlll be u... m min i... nflmnallly MIMI dnunvllnl VII aFluNG WM! [51 I wm now set out me background facts, «no issues‘ as wen as the names‘ reapeeuva mnlenlmnslsulzrmssians m a mew or deciding wnamar the names have dvscharged thew raspecuve burdens .n proving «new claims Back Facts [1] The oaokgronno vaovs have largely been agreed upon by parlies and can be summarized as loiloms: 7.: sonnenm Vn man, «no late Han Mal Zam and ma [ale Aooouan Jomkly umcnasen Iano known as Lot 2529, Genan Muldm Na sen. MK II‘ Daenh Seberang Fem Ulara, Fulau Pmang (vonnony Lat 123(1). Mum XI, Dnnnm o1 Pmvirme Waflaslay Nonn, Penang) (neunnanar refermd m an ‘ma saio xanerp for szeooo lrom s N A A.LAnma5n\am Chellmr sou clAHagupah cnsmar. 7.2.The Isle Naji Mal Zaln and the Iain Abdulllh hack 3 pm! loan Vmm s NA A.LAmnm:sn. Cnemar on pan finance me purchnsa o1 me no Vina 7 3 The rats Haji Mal Zaln and me me Abduflah were registered as tenants Vn oonnnon onne said land vids me ms: Indanlura at Sale dated 15'' Am 1930 under me Englnn Deed Syslam at the Reamer of Duds. Penang on 27'” May 193:: «n MyMnE&:kuwPIcuvrF\A age 5 A7414 ma sanaw n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm wa muNG v-mm was bertarniy license and consent la the Piaintitts to oocupy me said land andiorte construct thelr houses. There is certainly no ssue or any adveise possession [571 In tne case 01 sontul uiitni Sdn and v Atirnaa Amlrudln Bin Kninntiidin A ois [zoom 4 MLJ soa, trie Plairitias triete coniinenoed e elairn ior uaeant possession and inesne prom on trie basis triat the Defendant occupiers were lrespasseis Ttie Delendante oerttericled ttiat iney were not tiespasseis, but telnet, lawtul ocwpanls as ltoerisees coupled with equity wnieti long existed due Lo mnllmmus occupation and possession otttie said land rite l-tigri Ooutl were after a lull trial wnilst finding that trie Detenderits nave equity, siieti equity was subiect ID lrte Plaintitts‘ Ovemdlrlg ngnts to legal erivrrerstiip pursuant Ia national Land code was. The High court tneie ordered vacant vessessiorr subieot to the Plalnm apinpensating trte netenuants tar all posts ineuned In trie construction ot the respedive ttaiises and elteinetively, the value ot the present riouses to be assessed by an independent valiier to be appotnled by the court. [5411 Applying lne ahave and reverting to ttie laots ot itiis ease. there is ceruirtly no issue at adverse possession in inis ease. wtiilstttre estate aitrtelata Heii Maizaln have an eeuliyie be tsdmnsd wiin, sueriequny must be subjec| to me Detenoanls (asIa|s at ine late Ahdullelii ouernding rtgtit to legal ovrneistiip pursuant to trie National Land code was As siieti, (ha estate oi itie late Abeullari will tneietore have its vacant possisslon subiect ta tnein bornpensaung iiie Iwo l=iainti«s in sult 54 lot the present value ot the said riauses to be assessed by an independent valuei appointee by trie court. The costs at [his valuation VI to be borne by the 951315 ottne laIBAbduHah. Funnel, trte parties are in t>l1yMnE£qkuOVPIcL1tYFlA Page ii niu -vita s.n.i n-vlhnrwm be used ta mm na ntwltrnfily MIN: dun-vlnrtl n. nFluNG wnxl gtven llberly In apply In true Courl fur the purposes at me assess-nenl alme value of lne Sald Mn pmpemes occupied by me Plalnlms WI suit 54. [see the Hlgh cuun case nf s-nml ulu sun Bhd (supri)] [59] I will also further order tnal lne Plelntllls in Sml 64 are to vacate Ihe sald land wnhin three nmnlns M the male paymenl IS made In the Plalnltfis allne value assessed olme sald houses bysuch independent valuer appointed by the Court or any omec date ordered by coun subsequently In the event there IS an lssue in respect ol the veluamn A AND PONNUDURAI Judge Hlgn Caurl Ganrgalmvrl Pul-u Plrlang. counult 1: Mr. Musmapna from Messrs Muslnapha AAssocmes lngetnev wlm Mr John Khoo from Messrs. Isrnall, Khoo I-Associates lurlm Plaimifls in suit 64 and Defendants VI Suit 121. Ml Azmr B.Ahmadlo9al.|1er wilh Ms. Nurjannan El Che All from Messrs Aswan Slmon &Azhar for the Defendants in Suit 64 and Plaintllls In Swl tzl. c M-ma Ahmad Shazrfly Ismail Ham v M! Salma Zardan H] Wan Mohd Zan1[ZO1A] 5 CL] 817 A!/as Cabinets A Fumrtum Ltd er al v Nalronal Trust Co L:d[199a]5a DLR (4th) 151 Bayangan Sspadu sun Ehd v Jabatan Pangairan den Sahran Nsged Sslangut 5 0rs[2l721]1 MLJ 322 Binary Force Sdn Elldv Lembaga Pelabuhan John! (2009) 1 LNS :13 Cahaya Ideal (M) Sdn Bhd v 075719-Orang Vg Menyena/r om‘ Sbg ’Ponga' (Poongavanam A/L Vadlva/u) A Dr: [1999] ML./U 125 Chia Swee Lran 4 Vang Lam Lwn. Wong Chss Foong dan/slsu Penghum- Penghum Lain [2015] 1 ms 2233 Jahara Br Abdul Kadir Msncan v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anal [1930] 1 MLRA 335 Lerchumanan Chelllar A/agsppan @ L A/lsgappan 5 Anal v. Secure Ptanlarmn Sdn Bhd [2017[3 MLRA 501 ML/somnsk: r/Dodds (1955) G2 ALR 129 RHB Bank Bhd V Travslsogm (M) sun BM 5 Or: and anorhel appeal [2a16I1 MLJ 175 serum! Mum Sdn Bhd V Ahmad Amimdm am Kamsrumn & Ors 1200014 ML] 503 Smnuiyzih 5. Sons sun Bhd voamm‘ Sefia Sdn BM [2915] MLJU 1:292 Tan xang Yong @ Tan Ksng Hang A Anov v Kan Hwa Llng @ rsn Slaw Lang & Ors (202212 ML] 5175 Tan Kun Klvuan v Tan Ku KralfM)Sn1n Bhd[199fl]1 cu supp 147 Toll Bee I/K Mamthamulhu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 sw MyMnE6wkuwPIcuvtF\A me .2 MM um s.n.1...m.m111.. used m mm 1.. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm glslallans referred In NanonarL.:m1 Code, sscnons 99, 340, 341 Evin1sncaArt 19511, Sacfians 101, 1112, V03 meumu 74.l3oth tenants nh oommorn were regnstened es statutory rnndrtgagers or the sand larnd vnde a statutory mortgage dated 15'“ April 1930 an 27"‘ May 1930 at the Re rar oi Deeds. Penarlg. 7.5.\nde a second lnderntune oi sale dated 3*’ May 1941, the Sald land was trahslened to the late Abdullah only as the late Abdullah had paid stat) 00 as the successful bldder oi the sand land at a yublic auctnonn as both the rnnortgagena had breached the sand statutory mortgage. The seoond Irndernture oi sale was registered on 30'“ June t94t under the Deed system an the Rsglsltar oi Deedsi Penang. 7.6.The 1* Plalnlrfl in Sull 64 above is currently an adrnninnstrator and one at the henelnciaries oi the late Hall Mat Zeln who currently resndes in a house which he has bulll on part oi the sand land. For the auondanoe of doubt, the Planrntnlis In sunt 64 above wnll be relened to as the estate oi the late l-tall Mat zaun whereas the Plaintms in Sun 121 above wnll be retened to as the estate at the late Ahdullah. The late Hall Ma|Zaln's wits and larnrly have worked and Illlsd the paddy held on part otnhe said land. The 2'“ Planntnil IS the son-in4aw olthe late Hall Matzairn and resides in another house which he has also built on part oi the sand land adtacanl to the I" Planrnuil's house. 7 7 It ns the ease oi the estate oi the late Hall Mat Zltn that the V" Planntnll in Sun 64 above was lnlnrlned by the late che Long (the me at the lane Haji Mat zain) that the late Hajl Mat Zaln had depended on the late Aodullah to handle all matters oennainnne the serd land nneludnhg the aeynnerntol mortgage nhatalrnents to the s IN NtyMpEaqkuOVPlcUvYFlA Page s om -one Serial In-vlhhrwlll be ts... m vanw he mnmnnny sum. dun-vlhhl VII aFlt.lNG v-mat chatty where lhe lale Haii Mal zaln would pay his ponmn e1 lha lnslalmenls InIIle|aleAhduHah1o pay the Chelly. 7.8 Aowrdirlg lo the 1' Plilrllrllin sull 64 above. lhe lake Che Long had inlorrned hlnr lhal the lane Ahdullah was a regular vrsrmr la the lale Haji Mal ZaIn‘s house each mnlh to oolled lhe lnstalmenls and also lo vlsll them Aflerlhe late Haji Mal zain passed away, lhe like Che Lung would oonllnue lo hand over her late husbands rnslalrnenls lo the tale Abdullah. 7.9. The basls el lhe dalm of me eslare el me lale Hali Mal zarn was Ihal the late Ahdullah had Informed the late Che Long ln or about 1941 that me loan had been fully serlled and lhe late Abdullah lald me lare one Long fllallhe said land was regrslered solely n ma lake Ahdullah's name because me late Hall Mel Zaln had passed away and mac Ihe lale Haji Abdullah held ‘/2 share ollhe sald land larlhe lale Hall Mal zarn's larnlly no It is lunher oenlended Dy lhe eslale enha lala Han Marzaln lhal me laleAbdullah alaa undendoll and agreed wlm lhe lele che Lung and gave all me ovlglnal decdnrenls pen/arnlng I0 lhe purchase ol are land In lhe lace Che Long before lhe lale che Long wenllor Hall m 1901 but lhal lhe lale Abdulllh had passed away belona me lare che Long rellrrned lrern prlgrlrnage 7 ll Nalnrng much seems lb have occurred lmrn 1941 unlll 2019 save lor lhe 1- Plalnlill seeking pernnssldn frnrrl Meharnad Abdllllarl (lhe Ian 54 me |a|e Mxtullah) permllllng me I" Plalnlrll lo aulld a house an lha said land we lener dated 30" January 1953. IN bllyMDEfll:kuOVPlcUvYFlA me 7 M u ‘Nata Sahel In-vlhnrwlll re used m mm has nflnlhallly sun. dun-vlnhl wa .nana we 7.12 Then on 7"‘ June 2019. the 1“ Defendant lrl Sull 641 as an Idmlnlslralor at ltre late Atxtullatvs estate went wrtn her daughtev (the all uetenaant) and her husband, Erlak Nazn and lwn utners (0 see me l=laintl«s and (0 seek vacant possession at ttle Sald land The Plaintms nae votunlarlly glvsnlsurrernterea tne paddy field to the Delenesnts wttneut ralslng any nblacllon when the Delemtarns requested are same. The Detenuents subsequently bum fuur houses on part of me said larld wrttr tne lull knowledge at the Plainlifis 7.13.Due to ttle above rnerttante, tne 1“ Plalntltr as me attmrnlstrator of me estate 01 tne lata Han Mat zatn then subsequently entered a prlvale caveat on part 01 the sald land at me Lam Reglstry on 22'-1 January 2020. Slmllovl 7 t4. on 7“ May 2021, tne 1" Plaintlfi‘ obtained Letters u7Ad wlrereln me I" Plalnull was appuimsd as admlrllslrawrufihe estate at the late Haji Mat zam 7 l5.The estate at me late Abdullah vlde lhelr snliertars tnen lssuea Notreee m ourt In the estate at me late Hall Mat Zaln trn pameular me two Plalntlfls in surt 54) dated 2t- Onober 2o2t and 25'" October 2o2t respectlvely The estate of the late Hali Mat Zain! wllslllors vlde men letters daled 15"‘ Nuvember 2021 and 5'- December 2a2t lrl response replbed am earlteneeu tnat the late Abdullah was rloldlng vs undlvlded share 01 the Said land [or tne estate at tne late Hail Mat zain. tlenee, me two eurrenl Sulls belrlg filed. lN bllyMnE&:kuWPIcL1vYFlA In: I at u we Smnl In-vlhnrwlll re tn... a mm r.. ntwlrrnllly sum. dun-vlnnl wa nFluNG v-mxl nu Flllnmfl‘ Claim [31 The Phslnufls m sun 54 being me same of me late Hap Mal zem and as wcumer: M pan al me smd land mler-aha suck me vauawmg when 5.1. e uscxaranan manna regwslrllicn ullha ln|e Abdullah as sols awnur under the saoend Indenlure u null -nu void and ms esme 01 me me HI]: Mil zum ere owners of vs undiwdad there came mid wens pursuant to e cm\s|ruc1wa|rus|. e 2 rasmutiun order lor the mum of me ‘/9 undwea mm M the sen land, 8 3 e deuareunn Ihal me Plamnns have me right In remem on me sam \and‘ 8.4 an Dnier in demolish [I12 fuur houses behanglng in he Deierldams which were eneaea without me wnsem of me Maflis Bandaraya Seherann Pam, and 3.5 an Order men one Desemems pay for me general losses and damages as weH as for economic loss The DI1'nnd.Inh' g g g gggngm 3 m [9] The DefendanIs'(es1ala ollhu late Abdullah) aeience and oounlerdaim is summarixod as follows’ IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1vYF\A ms 9 .c u ‘Nata sew n-nhnrwm es used m mm ms unmmuly mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm 9.1 me Piarrrmfs have varied |n discharge Ins burden of pmvmg ms existence Ms eonsmrmrve trust In lavuur aflhe iaie Han Matzain, 9.2.Ihe marine oi lashes apphes as me Pisrrrmis have slept on (hair rrgms rora very iorrg urns, and 9 3 me Delendarrts are armed in vacant possession Mme said land as may are me regislerai owners onhe said land [1 0] The irial look pluoe over several days mm me ssnaia of me iaie Haii Mal Zaln and me exist: :71 me me Abdullah Calling 2 wrinsaaes each and ma p-rues nave meruner med in vespscliva wrinan submissions 1' comarm rr m| Pin [1 1) The oamanuoris/submissions at Ihe esme at me lane Hap Mal zain are summarized as volume 11 .lhat ma inmal svaiumry mangage rrismrruiiy pmves ma ownership of me said iarrd in question by the «we predecessor iarriiiies IN MyMnE&:kuwPIcL1rYFiA P112 mam ’NnI2 s.n.i In-vihnrwm r. used m mm r. nflninnflly mm: dun-mm VII nFiuNG WM!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

MA-B51C-1-02/2021

PLAINTIF Zulkarnain Bin Abdul Majid DEFENDAN 1. ) Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia 2. ) Perunding Aidid Sdn Bhd 3. ) Bayan Pelangi Sdn Bhd 4. ) Jabatan Peguam Negara

I) Undang-undang kontrak - Plaintif menuntut bayaran tambahan akibat perobohan dan pembinaan semula bangunan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif gagal mematuhi gred konkrit yang ditetapkan oleh Kontrak menyebabkan bangunan tersebut diarahkan dirobohkan dan dibina semula. Oleh itu tuntutan Plaintif seharusnya gagal.II) Kegagalan Plaintif mematuhi gred konkrit dalam kontrak tersebut adalah suatu kecuaian dan pelanggaran terma kontrak yang telah diakui oleh Plaintif dan Plaintif tidak pernah menafikan mengenai Plaintifif bertanggungan terhadap kos perobohan dan pembinaan semula bangunan tersebut di mana ianya adalah dalam pengetahuan Plaintif.

05/01/2024

Tuan Mohd Sabri Bin Ismail

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05/01/2024 12:14:55 MA-B51C-1-02/2021 Kand. 153 S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wectRKl0y0CydhPGNQnUMQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal MA—E51C—1—fl2/2021 Kand. 153 05/01/2224 12:1L-55 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI MELAKA DALAM NEGERI MEIAKA, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. MA—a5I<;14J2/2021 ANTARA ZULKANAIN BIN ABDUL MAJID . PLAINTIF DAN I. KEVUA PENGARAH PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN A FEMEANGUNAN KRAFTANGAM MALAYSIA 2. FERUNDING AIDID snu arm 3. EAVAN PELANGI so» am: 4. KERAJAAN MALAVSIA DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PEMGENALAN [11 Plalrmi pad: mas: mamas: adalah pamvlvk cunggax psrmagasn yang hermzge dengan nama lulkanam um Abdul maps can wan dllanlrk men Deteman Panama sebagax Komranor unluk melaksanakan ken:-Xena sm wscmxmymiymwsuunumn m. smm ...m.mm .. .4... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm nembmaan sebuah bangunan yang dmamakan Knrnpleks Budaya Kral Me\aka berdasarkan suam konlmk benankh 19.21110 [21 Plairrfii av dulam Femyllzan Tumummyu lalah memmm Iegumlah RM540359 0|) dflflhflfla Defendan Panama flan Delendnn kaduu Imluk hens-ken: Isrnhsnan M94 msmmna semula hangunan tzersebut akan (elem u. ¢a\am Hujihavl wamm wan menunmi RM33859679 sebagal kos nembu-nan semula LAVAR BELAKANG KES [11 neinnuan Pen/ama Isiah mnlanuk Plumnl unmk memaunkln yamun pvqek karwkerp memhma sebuah Komplaks amaya xrav Mehki di ms Lmszaz Mulum BukIlKa|I1, Duamh Mama Tongan, Mulukl dmam xomnak Na PKKMID2/MLK/ZDGS (seisass ml mam: aebagal -proyek nerseburr. [I] oerendan Kedua adalah Perundlng Kewrmzsrian Awam um Slruklur nan nun dllmuk on-n Dehndan Pamma nehagm Konsullan Jumten (Engineer) bagr pmak rmenaan Panama daVam rlroxek bavsabut [51 Defsndin Kefiqa adalah sehuah syarikal psmbekai Plamlll Ielan memasukkan san. penghaktman Ingkar Pemhelaan lemadap Delendan m wmmmyflcymvsmznnuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! PF’ Sekilanya srrukluv Dangurvan my mdinksn adalah under designed :1: mane beam sectlon dan reinforcement adalah Inadequate’ PSSD4‘ Ya PF Adakan bangunan rm nla/nut unfuk drdudukfi PSSD4 Kalau mangiku! am ssgr kemmtslaan mu solemn! untuk dmur.1uk/ rm] Illahklmlh memjuk pula kepada Pemenkmn Ealas saksi ueiendan Panama. Yuln nu]: bx-nu Em suboh ulell pegunmcara PI-Inm pads 20.5 2023 yang membarlkun kanarangan nanxm. PF says many sekafi /am yn says mink ksuada ujian cube pads awn! Jsdi selqzzas upan kamesn pecamm dvhual Ks alas cm cor-ems pm. Imn‘ ke-7 den was dun serum. mampevulam kapulusan danpada makma! mum. Dcfsndnn xma mesh’ mangesman was My concrula menu: selamat urgmm mungtkutgrsd yang nflalapkmi sns Ya PF‘ Svtujll ya Dan upan cube rm jugs re/an dinamur kepada Delemtan Panama unluk kslu/usan msrelm SeMI.I7 SD5 Die Dukan kelumxan Apaoua kepmusan ujian cube drperufehl av mama disaksxkarl alert 3 pmakjadt mans ks/au lulu: uuromsnc m wuelnxnnyocymvsminuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: flnuamnl VI mum pom! conclala batch m: wen digunakanlah, krra Mus/an Km menggunakan ma punya sneez dan Iah m narm [211 men nu jelu menuruukan buhawa Puma: semsmangnya Ielah mengaku kegagalan uflan konkrn nersebm sena kegogalan Puamm mernmum gm kmknlyang dmampksn oxen Kommk letsebul D. dalam kes wnmboa F55 Sun and v Vlflng Fah Enlsrpnse sun and mm MLJU 429, VA cm Kah smg xelah memutuslxam szpefll benkur 127; The mama heron mus (‘om elem .-«inn In the D¢f:mhn| having mum m comply mm m: speclfiuucns required by Iht Cnnslmclimu (‘on\I\c|uIvcnconsmw'\|IgI11c eonuvlc fluormg Ih: p|IInIIfi‘s fadory The 5-ngumznls raised l1_\ the defendant dn nnx pmme any valid dcfcnoc :9 me pmnmr. fallulc Io ovnlply mu. me spocxfiwlluns rzquntd by m: Cnnsnucnon comm Hana, me finding om: Conn .5 mu m. defcndml Iuu mm up mm mp >p.-u:iwms .. n:q|nml by m cumuumnn cmum m (h: cnnsmlmon arm: commie floor“ Per-gakuan Iiabimi oleh Plaimif aan IM-ndan Kudu: bug! kos pemhohan a. pombinaan ssmuli bangunln [221 KVausa I0 1 aasam Komrak hevsebm menyalakan sspem benkul. M 1 osucmous 0: ms cowrmcran me cmmaam mu m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! up mmmm. comma, mr and wmmn-srm me won; in amxvalme m we coma, nupenam me mm m a proper mm: and m acnardalvce wan good manaqsmsnl puma am: In on besl -anrvrngo arm Govemmeu 4:; ma nlllnmwmn mm: txpodidall umtnaorpvnwvme wmlv want: ta um um the ma; gummy mm the rwuaemenb m the comm my mom mo mm and as-zwalge nu anmms is tonfimedm Ems ca»rm.1 by sxvclsmg pwlassoonll magma»! am prams, Isqmm sms, cm and mum /n poflumlmy rm Wants, the Conmcmrxnll pruwda mu mm.“ pvoosdunxmnrefonnaqraedbyfnsfiovemmuntrurnpumnymd uwrdfrvamofl nun:-zm [2319 owgaunya bum manmankun ken:-Kane bag: Prqek Ianebul mangwux of Ialah gngal. anguan danlavan ingklr unluk melaksanakan mrma yang umyavakan dalam Kamrak lerubm akvhal kegagalan Plavml mammm grad konkm yang amecapksn semnggi menyebahlmn bangunan tenebul mak mama: unluk dduduki dan membanayakan keselamaun on-n nu Dafundan Panama herpaku mengaauman mm bcgi karjvkeria perabohln dan pembmaan semma [241 Deiendan Panama halah mamaklumkan kepada Plainlif me|a\uI sum Deraman Penamu benunxh 15122011 menqanll unluk mn-n unmk metubuhkan bangunun xamnut aklbal kagaglbn P\amM mengamukakan oaaangan pembakan slruktuv per-vadavran bag: Kompwks Budaya Km m wmnmyocymvsruanuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI mum pom! Melaka selepas Lima! tempoh lawman pada 2112011 yang mana wanyz ‘uga aaalan suslu pelanggaran Krausa 51(d)koImak Izersebul. [25] Ms\a|m surat Iersehut, Defendan Penama telan mengelnarkan emban- arahan benkul secara jelas kepada Plamnf‘ 1 Kranangan Mnmysa man mmwm bamwa semua ho: yang mm: bemamn mum. muronoh an mvmbma aemula Dangunan recsenut adalsn m bawan tanggungan sepanurmy. alslv pm man mm: Karmakml seas Pemnavny MM Sun and subuwu parlmflmg sml 5 mm: yang ananux s-nag-»muu plhlk mn us-I malwm 3191/: mm narkniun mnnganllnya --mm datum penomnm max mm M mmm Mnysu ml m-mm wpaya pm-sktuan bemubunasacanlsm: dongunpvlv-K P-mmymumusqn am: dam mennwnuman caaangan navyensam bemunung ms ywnv vwrmar Dan paual pemncangan Ker/a meroban um membmc serum! Dwgwlln lemebu! dalam Iempun amnnr mm 114; mu um mm mm! »u 5 mam diegaskan bahawa denaa lmlswalarv sebanyak mmzes selvan telalv pun burkuatkuasa UM pm mom: om. pmk man bemmla darl v Oqm 2:711 semnma ram nang-man teuvbatumapkuv mongtklnsvuoflusryarrg rem mtapxan sepem sum mm yang pomah dukemavkan sebelum rm [25] Selsvusnya‘ Defendan Penama mengesankan bahzwa Deisndan Penama ;uga \erah mernberikan arahan ksaaaa Devenaan Kedua me4aIuv swat Defienoan Panama bervankn 15.12.2011 sepem berikul 2 Bemubanp surll nun unamm 1n Narvurvbev 2am, Kralfanwan Malays»: dengan mr mengoranksn mm pmlk man seb-agar pemndmg sun! can slruktulylr-9 drlarmk mran berranggunaan sepenulmya Iamadap semul has (A sm Mamyoomvsmmm «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ommn m-moon u-n mcmbmn mum bangwvln (mm: dr mm 3092/: human mengenamya mun dz/pm pengerahuan pnhak man manangan Many“ new man om-rwwnvun um. uklft kl ms urnu No: my recon; dan Dthak man ma bevlanggunmawab untuk menanggmvg kerugnan pmlk mrmgnn Mnaysm m seuanpng man 4 Krlnlngnn Mnlaysra ma mgm memsgasoan nahawa pmax man Ineodamh Dsmmsan secara tems uengan plhax komlaknzl bemubunq penyelesaan km cum menmnnan nqu.-na mmnan din memblna semula bangunan mubul Schubunulrv 1u,p4"“r K/lhnwn Mdnysu dvngllmlmumulmun max man mswtmuhakan nemnnm puma»-un swml/I yam: felon drsankan. peogesanan penyehaan kenaauena dr Iapak men kaana tapak dan cadangan penyelesanan berxanan M25 metoboh aan nmmna sanma nangunnn Ieqsenm dalam telnpdh emp-at Dela: ml nan den rank» sum! m. 121) Selarusnyu, Mahkamah juga menaaoaa bahawa Plamm semamangnya belah membual pengakuan secava ;e!as kepada Defervdan Panama yang mana Plamm sendin benanggungan sepenuhnya Izerhadap kagagalan Plaxrmfmemamhi grea konkrityang lelah dmetapkan o\eh Komrak tenebul melsmw dokumsndukumen berikm a) SuratPLa1nlfl kepads Dsfsndsn Panama benankh 19 01.2012 2 Dung.-an [ass bark man, says mym memohon lanllnan mesa kedua (2) sslams lspan (5) aulan :2: am: xsbab ksgagalsn rekabsnluk xtrukmrbsngunan komplsks flan Ksgagalan pmduk konm yang I/dak menepalr grad konknl yang dfhmendah sm wmnmyflcymvsrumuuma «mm. Snr1|\nanhnrwH\I>e U... m may n. mmun -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! D) sum|P1airmvkepada Defandan Panama banankn19 01 2012 2 Donqamasa bunk man, says imzin mmzsmuknkan uwmwnkos ker;a4<aqa msmooh dan membma semula strukrur aansunan komplsks ssnsrfi blltirzin dr bawnlt im W Kslarangnn Korja 7:./3745!: Kn: (Rm ‘ n Koskeqa rnembun ‘4o,9sam 1 ‘ \2 Km mlmbml semuh m'uklur;445.5499D l bsnvunafl Irsknbanluk mm) Perundmy Am Sdn EM V \ Jhmran’ Kas lifinnmg mm 45649990 u. Kas slmklur mm 51,175.29 ./umrsn Kns d/Inngqung men 11,175.29 Zulkarum BM Abdul Mdifid Iufian'I?e‘seIwur-Er? Kos Keqa so7To7'519 ‘.MsmboII aan Mambma Semma ‘ smmr Bangunan Komprsks (231 salurqumya, Mahkamah jug: msndapali bahawu Duanaan Ksdua mm memnemn pangnkuan kepldu neaa-man Pammn memui tutu! mevak: bsnankh 2912,2011 berhuhung pemlncangan dl anlara Plamm dan Is sm mmmyuoymvsuamm m. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e .4... w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! neaeman Kodui was 26 I2 2011 di mam Defendin Kedua Isiah membenkan pangakuan unmk P\aInM uan bemoan Kedua mengambu (Inggunmawab seem bersama nugx menanggung kos berkanan kaqa-kena memboh am membma uemulu bangunan Inrsebul betdaszmtan kanaungan sum Delendan Kedua Ielsebulsepem benkul 2 Adalah mmlklumkan banaws pmak karm Gan pmak Zulkamam Em Abdul MHiI'd(kovIIrak?0I) lslsn mengsdakan pemrncangan bemubung pamara rsrssbur m abs pads 25m: Drssmber 24:21 den pads dasamyi mhak mm akan rnsngambfl langgung/awab urmlk menanggung kos hsrkarvsn Ksrya4<e/1.! mernaoh flan membma semula bangunarv wrsebutbersama pfhak lmnrraktm [291 Kegagalaa Plalnhf memaluhl gm «om: dalam kcnhk omen-u Va» mum kemllan um pelanggmn mm komrak yang nn man... den Plainnl din Plalnm mu peman menaflkan mengenal Plambfif benanggungan lemadm kos pembohan nan panbmaan ssmula bangunan huebul dl mm tiny: mum dallm pengelahuan Pram DI dalim Wong Hon Lsong David V Norazman Bin Adnsn H995] CVMLJ253 d1 rnana Mahkamuh Rayunn wan memuluslrarl sepem mm "Afiar nu, Ihc appellant hm mum m {spend to |hc lcucr M17 Deszmber 1991 Irma: had mm bean an :|y!rrn=nl as amgm, 1! .; msonme to m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! expea . pmmpk nnd wgm-om demal Em, .. wc lmvc pointed um, um wav no response whalsoewr fmm me appellmu" Tindalan plainlil munmmlkakan umumn kos moroboh a. mnmhlna wnula bangunin ummp dmndln mum. an-m kndnn plaimil mun nmugmnul llnhlllll pmmu nu kogngalamvyn mu-mum grad konkdl adalah berslm mala mu. rm] Adalah Mas bahawa never-dau Panama cam. mangamukskan xaumnman bayaran hag: Pram mu-aux kepada Plamm sepem yang dmyalakandlal M Pemenksaan Bah): Saks! Ddendan Panama‘ Tuln Hap Sanusl ole» pegulmcara Pllmhlplda 19 5 2023 PF Adakah plainlildibayer unruk knnb-«sun dllnkukan nu ys sslunggs 15 v2 2011 spam/a drarahkan unluk keqa-haria meruwv dart msmmna semula7 502 Die telah cabayar Inenqvkuv progress sampar mnkn yang mans banqunan m nsrpma dnmbohksn PF Tap! soa/an says mam Pmrnm dmsyar unluk Rena-ixeqa memboh den memnma semu/a snz Unluk membon dan membma kos nu aua/an -manggung om P/amnlaan Delendan Kedua tsk 5-Hap says Penmdmg Andra m wmmmyflcymvsmznnuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! PF .1561 scalar: says adakah pm-ran ;m347,a1o a7 yang dlpolalvg mm fumlah fm yang Ia/ah rfbelan/akan men pramnr unmk membon dan msmbma semum oangumw soz. fidak. Im ada/ah kekurangan danpada skop ass! konbak ya pelarasan unluk xkop ass! konrrak PF‘ Say: tamskun ks pomnggan A ya polongan unfuk kacacalan RMWEJ60‘ rooonymasuan jumlun In! 502 Itecacsfan PF lm bahagun A 3 ow, ba/ah/elnskan nu kscacalan spa 502 Fomngm Ianhkan pllvak ksoga Mg/ kegs memmm kacacan-n oaram pmjek in: ma Ink terminals me who» mmacz tap] ads koI]u~kar_ya yang mane ma defects lap! Kenn-aklornuk datangjsdi ma plnggr! mud puny pmak kahgn unmk ma/aksamakan kscacaixn Mm parkarn ml rsrpnksa back charge kspadn kanlrsklorssal [31] Plallllfl Ialan memullkan nmmlan tamadap Debndan Panama walaupun Plalmif sendm Ietah mempunyal pengemahuan banawa kns meloboh den memhma semul: bangunin oersehul psrlu dvlanwung oleh Plamfl undwn dun Defender! Kadnu mulakli sum! Delendan Panama henankh 15 12.2w. pa mmaksn Pvamm unluk memmm kos meroboh dan munbma semula hangunan semula dan Defendan Panama dalam keadaan Maine! lehah m wmnmyocymvsruanuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: dnuamnl VI mum pom! mangoiahuu dan mengakui nan Plainrii din Defandan Kedua bag! hos «mm: mm mm-1 jahax, menyullhxln um menyulahgunulun pmszs Mamamah. D: aauam kes lndah Desa Sau/ana Caip sm am & 015 v. James Foovrg Clveflsl «Iuen. Judge. Hm" com Malaya R009] 2 MLJ 11 av mans pihlk Mahkumnh Rmm lalah munollk ruyuln dengln K05 mu menynvakm aepam hankul “[82] Me caugam afabvue 0/ pmclsx of IF»: wurt are vrver C/wed and mIr«mm1ypmIumu pnrruunl 1.; the Inynad nfulkwnsuznwl nvurlulllt /run. 1». /actual rmlnvfonmi m euchpamcwlar L-me, /33; In oaoml Pun & Parmcn (wing 42: afirml v Wu Chang 1... [I was] mm 3 71 3x4 nu S/ngupurc mm nfflzpml txplmrml «mu xzxqm 0] my mom oflhe pmm. 9/ the cow! - under my mum» uhwh .3 m pan nmlzrm wuh uurx Th: Inn has am given a we wtrprttalmrt vy me mum mx mcludcs mrmdcmlumx arm public palm)’ ard ow mtrrul uf /mum It rum;/is: Ihav the pmcrx: aflhe mun mm! be Iuudbomfide and prwprrly ovndnusl ml H Ivhmrd Drv Imfzrlx »,w. .4 mg dxfiwl/mu have mtublulzdan mm a/vhe praccn qflhe mull‘ m wmwxnyfioymvsuouumu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e HIQG w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! Keuga paaa 15102016 minikala Plamxii man menank balik umunan remaoap Defendan Keempat rs] Merujuk kepma term:-lemma kanuak an flllam prwak Imsehux. Idilan ms hahnwe kaodnn perulehln 1-Procursmsm komrak mxaru «man n:d|s1{“tI3dn‘;una/method? dimana F\aInI|1 seoega» Kormaktor mama te1an dvlarmk unluk keqa-keqa pembinaan msnakala wenuan Kedua yang ounnm obh Dshndan Panama auaxan Km5u\Ian kqurucman yang bensnggungiawab unmk vekabemuk (“Dos:gn’) dalam pmpx Inrsebul rn Bangnnun herusbul yang smng dibvna om. Plnlnlfl mar. diarihkan duvobohkan oveh Dchndan Panama dln peflu fliblnl “mull ah: nullul Devanuan Kedua uruna bangunan Iernebul nnak selamnl unluk dniuaukl dan agunmn pm man lsrsabul. m Benkul rnempakan dokumemdckumen yang man sapamang Demxcaraan mi kes mi 1' No. Doi(umon—DokInrwn Tandaan 1 1 «km. Pnavna A J uni, _ _ T 1 2 {man Dukuman Bars-nu (Bunagmn A) 5 1 (N01) 1 m w¢\RKmy11GymPsm3nwIa mm. s.n.1...m.m111... U... m may .. mn.11-y -mm: dnuamnl VI nF1uNa M1 hujumllhtuntman kos arahan mu-anon A mmmna wmula bangunln Dhh pllinlif ldlllh I|flIk Ionlhhn dlll ulah glgll flbukflkln olnh Malrmf [33] Mahkarnah mendanan bahima Plamlit gngal menyavakan dengan jelas dan secara kvnsisten bay Jumlah mnlutan dalam hndalcan ini Jnmhh (unfutan yang dxkernukakan aleh Piaxrmf mengena: has ken:-keqa aramm meroboh nan msmbml samma bangunln «mew: sepsm benkut JUMLAH Kos MERDBCH DAN BINA N0 DDKUMEN SEMULA BANGUNAN DlTUNTUT(RM) 1 sum Pmnm kapafla Defanaln Panaml S67.575.Ii pzemnkn :9 0120121644!) x um Flamm Kepada asns Conslmcuon 510,153 63 lconsuuam benankh is 3 201316261) ‘ i 3 ;sum Pumm xepaaa osns Cnnslrucnun 525,193 6: ‘ consumam benarikh 22 7 2014 (am) 3 sum Puma! kepudn Defendan Fenalru 915,166 as Vbenamn 20.10.2014 4E-22) ‘ sm Mamyoomvsmmm m. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e .4... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! :1 }§n§ F’\aIrm‘l Ripm Defsndan Panama|4|1‘45939 %bemankh 51:: 2015 (S-278) ‘4 ‘ Non‘: T|ml|flIlI PCIIHIN kapadl Dafandln 540859 KID "PemImI hqmnkh cs axons (9239) I 5 H-huahan aenuns Plsmlfl benankh 33559679 ‘15s.2o23 \ \ [:41 Bemasarkan dd<uman-dekuman yung flinyalakln an aim, Mankamah mam-an nun-wu Plnmhf an -epanmq mm ylnu mllenul ealnn gagnl unmk mengamukakan dokumen bagi membuktlkin mnumm Puanmr (erhadap Delenaan ?enama dalam undakan ml walwpun wnys Isiah ammra oleh Defiendan Panama melalm sural peguamcara oevenaan Panama nenamm «snow Di dllam kes Hssraf Idaman sun and v Msrsmg Connrucnan Sdn and 12421511 IMLJ464 dl mm Muhlumah I-rw lehh menolak Iuntulan Puamm dun memumsm sepem benknt: ‘my Ihe crmrl aprev mm the nkfimiznv nu ma plum/I17 «Wear; 1.; be ad/umng rlxfigwex m the dmrn pmceedr In fact, mg caunflmhev to my um /heplamnfi": chum u wnplynnl mpporml n :1 mm one I:/jurluddmg "Tn Ahe rvurrsber: m a 51a.-my work done. mm Ihe pmwwm -my a mu I‘/mm a/‘ova M19». 1.» .. mm .1 ».m1m..,m:mundnM7.,., mm m mmt mam uumumimg I11: Flamnfl mul pmvc, arrdpmvc urn-II} me detailed 12 m wmnmyfloymvsruzmuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! man up aflbe clam: In this mam the mmfinq, [he evrdence wmlr ma. (1.! m nndemme the plamnm clam: sama ad: phinlif hulnh mnggunapanui kuausau konlrak louahm [:5] Di dalaru kss ml adalah pelas herbukn bahiwa Plammenn menguamn mengmll mnan Derendln Psruml mg. pumbohnn am pembmaln semuia banguuan Iersebul mslalm sum oeaenuan Panama henamm 5.10 mm adalah dvsebabkan oleh kegaganan Plaum sendm nnluk memmum grad konkm yang amaupkan dam Kontrnk mmsom yam aural Delendan Panama nenam. cs 12 um yang mkemukakan kepada Flamul Ila: lwgagalan Plamm sendiri umuk mengsmukakan cadsngan pembalkan mukmr bangunan pemadbnran bag: Kompleks Budiyz Krav Mauaka selepas tzmanempoh Ianiuvan masa pads 211 2011 [as] Mahkamah ml meruiuk kepaaa Pemyaizan Saks: Defsrwlan Panama Tuan Hap Sinus: (PSSD2) yang menyalakan sepsm berikut S29 Boieh Elvcrk sankan kspada Mahkamah Dag: rlmlurun-tunruan FlaMr:/Dagrperbe/an/aalv-peme/aryaan /am sepem my as/am muka sum 1 sanmgga 355 Vkalan Dakumen Pramm Deg: belsma gm he/M15 am dmv pe(!2.3ga1 rm bolen sncvk sahkan Impede m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Mahkamah adakah Deferrdan Panama hams benanggungan bagi Kn:-kos teuebuw J19 saya meneyaskan bahawa Defends Psrlsma lfdak benanqgungzin same sekala temadap kos4~0$ yang drlurmn oleh P/ainziv m cakumen make aura! v sel.-mgga 385 Ixaran Tambahan Plslnbf lelsebul Sayaiuga pema ya ballawa Plainmjuga mempunym Binqelahuun mengenamys dare pevkelx an ;uga Ielah drperselu/u: an aaram Kontmk ninaan Iersebuf sapem an Klausa A3 a dam Krausa 44 0 Kamm msemn saya mengesankan bahawa K/ausa 43 0 dan Krausa 44 a Isiah denyan [alas menyalakan sepsm osnm clause 43 0- may and Extsnsoon a! Time Upon 1: becammg reasnnably sunarem ma: me prowess al the Wbrkxs dsmyed, ms COVIWBCIDV snail folwvlh mvsn Wnllen nozme Iv the offinsr named m Appendor as to the causes oIn1e)ay and relevant: mrmnarmn wnh suppamng documents enablmy me sad 077106! to /Ill"! an opmron B: to me cause and calculation DI one rengm nme/ay mu me opinion om-e saidofiaermsmsd m the Appendix ms oompletron om. Wants /5 likely to be delayed mhas been delayed beyond me can mam Compbtron slarsdm Apuedvx omeyona anyexxenoea Dale for compmmn prsvtousry fixed under ms Clause am an any a! more 1:! me Iolmwing events‘ m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! (a) Force majsurs ns pnmasa nnam/am 51 m Exceplfonallyrlmemenl wsamer, (9; Suspension a/Work anus: clause 50. rd; Dtrscfiofl Qiven bylha s o, mnssvuennal upon dfsnum mm nerghboulmg wmel pmwded the same rs not due to any act negligence or warm or ms connaaor or snnoanzmcmn nommamd or olnelwrse; (2) S 0‘: mstrucuon Issued under clause 5 nmov, PROV/DED ALWA vs YNAT sncn mstmctmn are no! issue due to any act, n99/Igenm‘ deluu/I or much a! nus Contract by the Canlramor at my sub-conmzclal, nommmed orornorwua: (7) Klause 44.0-Claims lar Loss and Expenses u 1 if at any Irma owing the regular pmqrisx or me Works at any parfthsroofhas neen n-arnna/ry sfioclsd by reasonoldelays as slated W697 CVHUW 43 1 (CH5) (2). (T) and (I7, and (he Contractor has mcuned mrect loss and/or expense neyund mar reasoname contynplatsd and /0! which [he Contractor would not be rambursed bye naymentmade underanyothgylplvvfsron in this Contract. xnen me canmzo: shall wnn Imny ran) days oune occurrence ofsucn even! at clmumslanoes oi /Instructions give name in wvmng to me 5 0 of his mlenlmn to claim /0! such dwecl loss or expand together wllh an m wuelwkmyflcymvsmanwla mm. s.nn lunhnrwm .. U... m may he mmun -mm: dnuamnl VI muNa Wm! estimate om: smourtl ofsuch toss and/ovexpsrtse subject to Clause 44 2 nereot 44 2 As soon as ts pmcttcante out not tater than nmery (wt days ansr practical eamptsrmn ol ms Works, ma Contractor stutt st/Dm/I Iutt pamcmal of an claims In! attect loss or expense under clause 44 1 Iogséher mm all sutzporrmg dvcumanlst vouclwrs, exptanattons and nalcuhsttorts wmcn may be necessary to enable me dtrscl lass or sxnsrlse to be ascwtatned by me s 0 my amount atsuch dtrscl loss or expenses ascenatnad by me 5 0 snatt tze added tu me cumract Sum 44 3 time Conlraclorlhtls lo comp/y mm mm 4-: tam: 44.2, ha shall not be amntsd to such claim and me suwmmom snatt be dtscrtatge mm .3" Vtabillly tn comectmn wtttt me ctatm Dish mt, bentasarkan klausa-Hausa int says mangesahkan oanawa tdausa 44 o udak terpakat kepsaa Ptatnttt memandangkan atattan merooah flan membtna semuta yang dnxeluavkan dsh Dsfsrtdan Panama Iwsobul slabs! daripndo kacuntan Plmrml mam atau pemhoka! konknt pmek P/5/nltlsendlrl tan semmungan dengan mu. Mahkamah VII herpendapal bahiwa ksgagalan Ptatnut lersebut adalah sualu Delanggaran Velma Konlmk tersetm sepemmana yang dinyalakan dalarn Klaus’-1 43 (e) yang tetan 2s m wu:\RKmyGGymPGm)mtMa mm. amt ...m.mm .. U... m may t... mm-y -mm: mm. VI mum Wm! menyebsbkan Plavml man herhalang dan mengguna pakai muse 44 mfsebul. [38] DI sampung nu. Mahkamah mendapafi bahlrwa Pnnanm jug: telan dmaklumkan sarzara )9 I IIIBIEIIII Iural Defender: Fammn hanankh 15.12 2013 bahawa semua kas yang lembal bemanvan kerga4<er;a meroboh dan memhma samula nangunan tersebul adalan dvlanggung segenuhnya oleh Plamlfl sebagaw Kunttaktor den Perunmng Am Sdn Ehd sebagal perundmg swll dun slmkluv yang uinanuk sens ma: kalewalan yang psriu fllbnyav alah F‘! M aanlah seblnylk RM442 E5 sehnn lahlh pun berkualkuasa dan penu dibayarweh Plainm hermula den 1 5 zen lsu bovhubung pongtmaan donda max (um) [39] mnlen memadi «am yang man diperfikalkan bahlwa ke\ewaVan Flamnlmanylapknn hlngunan xemzm mun manyablbkm Dendl Glnnrugr Tenemu (LAD) dnkenakan Namun Denda Ganumg: Tenemu sebanyak RMa2,w as tersehul dlkenskan akmm aamaaua kegagman P\aInM menyupkan ken: pans akhir lzemnoh Varunmn mm yang Isllh dlbenilkan am 0905 mm sapemmana yang dmynrakan pads Parakuan Kama max sap banankh arm Ogos 2012 Minkamah marqux kavada Pamyutaan 27 m Mnmyoomvsnanwa mm. smm lunhnrwm .. U... m may he nrW\ruU|y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Saks: necenuan Panama Tuan Ha)? Sanusr (pssnzp yang membenkan keleraugan sepem berikul. szsv sarsh Enctk lararlgkan kepada Mankamah adakah Plamhf man dmsnskan Dsnda Ganmug: Tenemu sebsnyak {LAD} RM 52,441 as aktbal danpada amhan membnn clan membma semula slruklurbangunm msamm 425' Trdak segi amhan merobon dun rnombina semma smmur blnyunan ulnma yang naak manmkul spewkm sepemmlna dr dalam konmak, Pvarnnv Isiah mbamn ‘extension 0! mm’ wpsm yang Isiah drmaklumkan m da/um Pmmn Kellmbaran mm Larqman Mesa No 01 nenamm mm: Mmzavzmmm sum! 139- m and J Dakumen Tamoehm Dolandsn Panama, mm or para 2, /an/ulnn mase scram; zva new team dyborikan bag! fu/um Pslubahan dun Pambmaalv sem-ua Bangunan ssluma 213 hum‘ flan Praumuuga dmenkan mum mm nagv sanamsmn lam supsm yang mm dmyaulkan m‘ datum Perakuun [menu], :11‘ mane]:/mlah kuammnan adalan sebenyak :59 Ivan Denda Ganrimgv Temmlu sebsnyak (LAD) RMs2,«1 55 mkenakar amber darlnada kegsgalan Piaiiml menytapkan ksria pads akhvr tempoh Ianman mesa yang zeran amenarkan am; 0905 21:12 sepemmane yang dlnyalakan pads Palskuan Ksqs Tank Slap bsdankh am: 0905 2012 23 m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Vumuvau Plainuimmadap Doiumian Kudua. [401 Msllklmah rnondanafi bahwa nadn NM kanxnak di mars Phairmdan Denman Kedul ax mans Defendan Kadua rem duanhk aleh Defendln Penama sebaga: konsultan -mtux pmjek Iersebm men kerana nada ape— Ina komrik dIbuaId> inliva Plaimrvdan Dwfendan Keane, mikl Plaunmmtak mm membawa I-ndakan um larhadap Dslondan Kodua [41] Plamm tidnk merrlplidkan sebmng mmman di bawin undang-undung Tan c-mmp nevenaan Kedua. Plalnhf an an-m pemenksnan balasnya menynlakan hahawa Dsiendun Kadua yang man melskukan kenuanan semasa Deveman Kedua reka bermlk swktur hangunan harssbnl Namun memandmgkm mm pm: at: kumrax an anura Flaurmf darl Devana n Kedua Plalnrn naak bolen belglnlung kepada pvlnslp esloppel unhuk mangalakan bahawa Defendan Kedua pnw kspada konlmk untuk memblna bangunan Izersebul D: dalam Kes Eausfaad Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v Dynalurcv covpovuuon smn BM [2014] 5 cu 533 VA Abdul Mahk max JCA menyuvakan “pen. benkm "[611 we Iiw n clcnr A person win» a; not a pan» to . mam: pm. In rim V,-sur an aronlmcl [see Kepor-g Pmsyecung mm on V Crhvmdr [men 1 l/NSo7,[l°(>8] 1 ML] 1m,r('.n9c7]z1>cc ass, PC, and 5 2w) qr me kun|rsA:L5 Act wsn, (lvems Chmmc Hankmg Lbvpurlllon Ltd » W00 19 m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Hxng Bmtlms (M) Sdn and [I992] 2 cu Iaso, [M2] 2 ML! Im, HC, nmd Badtnddsn Muhd Muludm 5: Amy v mu Mnlnrysvan Fmancc and [1993] 2 cu 75; [I993] I ML] 393, PC) [M] Section zmv of me cmnmu Acx Inso pnvvinlu ma ounldemllvn fvrapmmw: may Imw: (mm lhcpronusrctwany olhrr pmy II cmnol be denied mu -he scope arm: soclmn Is wvdcr than ma Enghm mlc mt mum consuiznllnn In move Iimn um p1DVl\V\CC(W€ me «pm». «rum Wflberfiumc III Kcpong Pntsprcnng Llcl .2 On v Schmidt Iwpm ll p m nffln MU Ivpamnm II I! n cornea pmpnslrmn mm W sly mu in Malaysia. |lI-: Imam nf pwwlw IS confimd Ia ||\e mle um «My a puny In a uuntnd may sue on EA [551 The cm n|"l\ucddl: v Atkinson [Ixsu I B a s M. II 107, In ER 751 at 753 to 764. mega lhr mm: a|'pnvIIy In Ils pvesrnr form The M: m um casmay be :4.-rd mum wmm Twaddle wnc zngagni In Guy’: daughlzr Tn pmwde can win: young couple my (Imfimnnfige, (‘my and Twedd|e‘sfxl’Iscr by :IImmnn..Im_ agreed bawezn them ma mu would pay W|IlIlflI 1\-mddle nun II In: (mu lg-med Ihm Wtllnm Iweddlc couldsnc rm mcsasulns When In dud Guy um mu um pmd me pmnm: sum mm wIII..m Imam Kllcll In.» cxucumr, Alkxnmn. for Ibc money Iss1 Mohlmrd Dzmddm J Llnm me Chltfhlilioc) rigluly 5...: in Fxma Palmbvulk semm Sdn Bhd v Sumhmjnyu Pclabuhm Pulau Plnangdc /\IIrvr[|V!3] I cum‘ [Ian] lCLJ(Rzp)514,[l9X8] I m w¢IRKI1yI1GymPGm:InwIa mm. Sum ...m.mm .. HIQG In may he mm-I mum: flnuamnl VI nF\|.ING v-max 7130‘ ‘bouumrfuonwmoif ' Tandlan 3 ilkalnn Dokumen Bersama (Eahagmn A) c Dokuman Bersama (Bahaqwan A)‘ D ookumén ae-sama (?Iat?afin’B): E \ Dukumln Bsvuml (Banyan 3;‘ 7 7 lkllan Ookuman aeussma (Banagan 5;‘ G (Bahagan Ikuun Dokuman Earsarna 1Bahugran E) [9] Pad: mas: oerbcanan‘ no-an Ptamauelan memanggil dun (2) many sakn Filmhf bag: membenkan kenarangan den kahrangan nku Plalmif blah divekodkan sepem benkm sm mmmyuoymvsuamm m. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e .4... w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! ML! 259 mp 537 (cu) [1 2n (ML!) mm, “It |.\ um mm H): English aoarme ofpnvlly ofmnlnd Ipvpllrs m our law ufczxnlncl" um The duc1nIu:u|'vm1Iy u|‘cnull:u1Is here 1054:!) In Murphy And Others v Buwzr [ms] 2 mm. 506, :11: mm calcgurically sum um. mu firangcr to ux uunsldcrahon ran an advantage cf 3 oonlncl, alwmgs. nude forlus bmcfll" Blunlly pm. um, Ihz panic: |a ma uwmacl um znfmwablt ngllls and ohltgmons under mg mm-:21 rm A: an eshhlxshcd pnnctulc ofennlnct Im an uvmrmn lnw doctrine nfpnvuy nfocnlrsm slums cm vlu: nmple pm|h(I(I0n Ilul, “nu unc Inn um pnmws 113 . mvmncl an be bound by n umnulca um: .1" lfircwlwlmd Shnnurlg Mun Luruilcd v Ilnbcn Wn|.kn:r Benn: and Roy V1m:¢mPeIIIpu[|9l0]Z sckzza, llp 229) -- [42] Vsu pnw aemsaap kontrak1uga|e\ah tflbangkilkan m dalarn Kss Tan Poly Yes v Tun Boon man 5 0merAppsa/:[2D17] 3 cu see YA Imus Hamn JCA (as he was then) Igluh menyalaklrr “IIHI 'l"n.e fimdlrnznlnl principle of lnw on m pmm hm becn \x\n:m|Ily fullawed ma ltpvzlcd by our calms am only a pally to a canine: cm sue M n ma only me pm.“ In . conlrnu have enfmwlhlc nun: ma uhltylvnns under «um uaulrul We‘ may calcgtvrically sum, .. an cxtcvlulm a. blur. prim:I'pV: man no manger m we cnnslflsrnllnn can an advmuge of: banana. nlrhough mm for has bcnzfil We mu nu mu mgani mm m lb: cm: nflinusxnd m wmnmyfloymvsruzmuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! um: Shipyard say. Bhd v |)ynnl'<vme cmmmm. Mn mm [2014] 5 cu 5 120151 I ML! 2x4 whrmn Abdul Ma||.k lshak JCA handing down mg pmgmn ofmis court said at pp swam ‘cup, pp 307 nu ma (MLJV [an Selamulnya av dalam kes Dalo’ Mohamed Shawl Hamued mm: No saa12s—ow;m) v Dalm Mull: Osman [mu] 1 ms 1437 VA Gunalan Mumsndy JCA eeaan menyalakan xepem benkut -{en mm: W: conclude. we must mass mm we luv: Ilnllusl guy“ of mm mm prlnciple on me xppnunm nflhc dncmnc nfpnvng. of wnlrsck unfler which um um; cslzlshshcd ml: .. mat wily pamrs In a mum mcuv nghls pm ahlugalwns under 1: Rckmme need muly be mm: m the case M Roman Narvxl smpyam Sdn arm v Dynaflmae Cnrpurmion sap and [mu] 5 an in when use Court pr/«ppm mm dun ma mu ‘As an csubluhed pnncxplc alumna law, me nommnn law dnclnn: of prhily of mnlnm sand: for ma slrnpk: yr0ptm|Lon um. "nu um um Ibo pulls up a comma up be hound by n or mum um 1" (Kirecnwood Slxrppmg Plan Lumen v mm Walkfl amp» nu! Roy Vmoml Pelllpn [mu] 2 sck 221, u p 229 " [u] Keskes yang amuk dx mas rnenuruukkan bahawl Phlnllhtdak bolah mamum tuntulln a. man knnlrlk mmmp Defendln Kodua walauwn Plamm mun menenml mean?! an keunlungun (‘benefit’) dlllpl - kamrlk lersebul m ms pea-ermn yang man mereka sempummn m wmnmyfloymvsruzmuma mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w my p. mm-y mum: flnuamnl VI murwa Wm! [sq Seterusrvya Plainrinelan gagal unluk membuknkan hanawa Derendan Kedua mempunyal Ianggungjamab di bawah komlak an amara Plalnhf dan Deisman Panama PEMUTUP [46] Bemasarkan kepada alasanalasan yang dlnyaukan ax am sens belvanduknn hwahln yang dkernukakln nlen Deiendarmafundnn‘ Mahklmlh menaapam dun memumskan hahawa alas imbangan mmangkauan Flamnl Ielah gagfl umuk mammumn ken flan kausa Imdakan ammo Deflandan-dslendan sepem yang oelah dmyatakan m dalam kas G)ove Kendall Limited &AnorV Maple Challenge Sdn EM a 0:5 Andofl-:9! omer sums [2013] ML.|lI1452,d\mana M-nkam-n mam mannlak mnunan Pnamm knraua Plamm max bsqaya membukfikan has Phmlii mampunyal pembuklmn an am bebsn Iumarangman upnbnla nuku ketermgan Plamnl mu msokong sepem benkut "[445] Bascd on um mans mm mm, the (‘min mncluded as follows‘ an The plaintiffs hnvc faxled m pm: mm mm, on :5 mum» of pmhilh m, «yum all m: defemlmm m mmy of mm axvcgnuums, cnnlzmlons and/or accuszhons are In: pmdnms ofsclfvwrung ,mm-ems 33 m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! nddl=du||h|»cnmsv=nc1z<znd crvnmadlcnmls. mm. mmalnnmxulnlznnakd md uncawoboralvd." [47] Dengzn yang demlkian‘ Mahkamnh memuluskan bnhuwx tunfulan pwamm mmuanp Defundan-defsndan dhnlak dengan kos lelap menglkul skaLa aenamm peas 4 H5 JANUARI 2024 IMOHD S ISMAII.) Hakim Sesyen Mahkamah Sesyen 2 Negen Melaka vuhakpmak aagx pmak Plamm En Sandrasegaran all Kannlappen Veman way, Bernard & Cheung 80250 Jonur Eahm. John: m wmmmyflcymvsmznnuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Bag! pmax Deiendan Fenxma c-k Nov Auah mm» Ch: Hurun nan Cik Marja betsimany: Temarl Am 5 Assncnalss. moo Sen Kambangan. Sehngor Daml Ehsan, Eagr pmax nevenaan kedna En Kunasegaran Nadasen Tehuan Bahanxim, Wan E Kuna GD-$00 JDIKIY Eahru 5687 words m wsexmmyficymvsmanuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! No. Kama Saksl Yandaan V1 smn Yhomn (STA cTmsuInng wssm ‘ Engineers) \ 4} +7? _ 2 yzulkan 3 Ab mm wssI=2 no) Manakile‘ plhak Delendan Panama man mengemukakan arms: (4; mung nu: Dohndlu Parumn xugi membenkan kenmngan dun helerangan mu-nxs. Delennln Peruml mahuuexouxan seven: benkul f I VI-damdan BIII Ahmad i PSSD I 2 Sanusl Bin Mom! Vunus PSSD 2 3 Nomlan Em Sslamst l PSSD 3 ‘ T r” ’ I>ssD'4* l [111 DI sampmg nu. pmak nemaan mua mar. msmanggil dua (2) ovang I|ksIDe1andIu Kedu: bug: memberikm kannng-n den kehrlngan uku- evanam Kadul man dlrekodkan sepem benkm m mmmyooymvsuamm mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! No. ‘Mama Saksl Tandaan 1. Zakana Bln Suboh PSSD 5 Shamsudm Em Abdul Rashni PSSD S [121 Salalah Muhkamah mendsngiv keterangan saksl-saksi dan mengambll xnra kzsemua axsmnn yang mean dwkemukakun sen; menelm huyanan aan kssemu: pmak‘ make an ms wmbangan keharangkahan Mauk-mah memuxuskan banwa mnfulan plan-m 1e-hadap nefendar-— flelendan dflnlak dengan kn: [Map menglkul xkaLa ALASAN MAMKAMAN Anhan vurbbohill I pumbinaan ssmula bannunan own deiondan p-nan-a Idnlih mum kogngal-n plllnlll momnunl gm: konm ymg am-pkan oleh knnlrlk. [131 Plalnlil adallh msmplkan knmrakwv yang duannk ulsh Dafandan Panama bagl pmyax lzersebux :1! mm: Plainlif man berseluju unmk mamhunlkan Pmjak Iamuum-n msmnumsy-raman lama Denkaulannya aengan menundalangam Kcnlrak tevseoun sapemmana yang amwwkkan m wmnmyocymvsrumwuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m vuny .. mm, mm: dnuamnl VI mum pom! oleh Surat Selupu Tenma mm hagi Konuak Iersebul yang dnandakan sehagai -94- Termnvlenna yang amyaman ual-m Kunuak museum Idalnh sehauaimana benkul: u 2 smwency of Connrncts Documatts 1.; 7». Contra: document: am to be mm as mmuaky snptannnry aim: anc-(hm rm Conlriaov vs-II mm tworyriung ntetsswy aw me pmpv encubunume Imzvnsunalvtscompisbonnzcorflmylnlhemumtecvl-rid malmng at we come: Documsrvs um tugvlller mm.’ the Irv: mtsnt In-1 murvlrw my urmly not p-mwmv mm m aumuumma Inn Man .>. ranonably mm mmhum a 1 mm:-mnon m wmnna rm Conlrlctov henby Illvnunlx Ind «mum to tho smmmem m-:— (9: ms Canmaclcansnute .3 wear and and bmdmu oahgarm aim Contractor and is enlameable m Aceoldanne win its mm andcondmans w x has mess-vy i»»am~.-a/ Ind zmnna/c-pan-Irry to undonnke m. wens: Ana m. coma.» acmmeagas Ma Ma Smrsmmem has anrasd mm nus Contact m raharrn an n: raurzsenllnons and wmlrvlm as alolesard [M1 Mehlui suramevenuan Penama berwikh 5 10 20:1 yang dilanflakan sehigal we (selepas mvdlrujuk sebagax 'suraI telsebul“), Deflendan Penama wan mangenhkan hahaw: Dofandan Panama lalah manalvma makluman den Pnamm mengenm kewnlsan uuan konkm keen: flan pmak Uruversm wmmog. Mmaysna gum; yang ananm oleh Flamm‘ sendm memlul sum| 1 sm mmmyuoymvsuamm «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w my me mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! Pnamm benarikh 4102011 bwdisalkan puma kskualan konknl adalan mununz oemanmng gm sapamnya yang anaaapun nlsh Konllak tarsebul mm 25N/mmz me6alm an lakes! yang mgamm tseiepas mi dlmjuk sanagai ‘kegagalarv unan konkrix |redua') Defendan Penama Juga menyxlakan buhawa kepulusan unan knnkrik panama parts was mu yang mgemdi din rasuk mama yuga man gagar as mama puma keknalan Imnkvil nulam 14.7N/mrnz nemanaang gm senalumya 2§NIrnm2 1151 Sahubungan nu. Dsfendin Feflxml mun msmaklumkan kepadl Plalnhl Duhuwa scmkour bangunan Ielsebul yang perm dirobohkan adalah karmqkl uang, ruuk a-n I-I094 olmcuk minindlngkan kmmun as samva adalah gagal danpada bekulan grad yang urns (selepas Im uuyuk xab.agaA‘i1ahIn barIabul“) nu) Mama: aural herslhul, Defendan Panama yuga man membankan peluang kepada Pmnm umuk melunlnlquru-ukurpemndnng pravamnaI_ ylng mana kusnya nenuaman dnanggung o\eh Flamhl, umuk manbevikan pengasahan kesewamatan bangunan tevsebul kelana Dangunan lersebut axan dinum blah kamangan Dalsnuan Panama sana palawan flan omng rImaA yang berumsun dengin Dslandan Panama Dufandun Perlamu juga Ielah menegaskln banawa keglgahan Pmnlrl aenaga. xumzaxxa: mamamm m wnelwmnyficymvsmznnuma ‘Nana Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e met! a may a. nrW\n|U|y -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa v-ma! Irahan Delendan Panama sebagai pemwlik bangwlan‘ menyebabkan P annul adalah benanggungsn xe am segala kas tamhanan [on Flam telzh gagal unmk mengemukakan cadangan nembavkan xlrukwv bangunan luvsabul ssbpus unmet nempan raruuxan masu pad: 2 1<.2u1\ an man: Dcfendan Panama balah rnenganhkan Plamnl ma\aluI suramere-man Penama benankh 15 12 2011unmk memoohkan bangunan sersabuukmtksnuwsan ksgagnlan Iman konkmbangnman Ievsehuladalah sanualu Iungkah keurammn sogera yang munalabah den penu dvamlm beruasaman nasmal plhak pemnmngperundnng yang mlanhk nu] Di samping nu. nnaakan D66-indan Perhmu mengelulrkan arahan meroboh dun mernbm: umula bangunan Inrsebur ma . Pw-mm adalan mm flan new bug! moruiga kmsamanan samu: pmak sapemmana yang mnyeinkan mam kalerangan MKS: Defsndun Panama, Dr Ir Ramfl Bin Nam s:5- Balelv Dokuw maklumkslv kspadu Muhkurnalv xebuqai xoorsng ,-murera bemengalaman Dangunan Iersebut yang n-empunyai kspulusan Esnmals /»—sus Cube Strsngrmsvcs) pads kadsrd: anlala 7 1N/mm: -2a wmmz dengan ksdelpulara ada/armada 11 1N/mm? adakah ranya wan-at muuauk: acau hams drmouhkan? m Mnmyoomvsmmm mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ./15 Pada par-dangan says iiku ouvgunan rsrsebu! mempunym Esnmare !n—Srte Cube S(rengm(e;cs] pads kadar an amara HM/mmz »2o 9N/mmz dengan kadar puma adnlah pads 11.m/mm2 Islsh gags! memslum gm konkm yang dttelapkan olen kunlrak Apab-ta ndak memamm grad kalvlml mm bangunan (arsenal ada/ah max sslamal drduduk: alas ram: keselamalan [19] Seherusnya. semasa Pemenmanaalas Saksi Deaendan Panama, Dr Ir Ramh Em Nam oleh peguamcara Plamm pada 19 62023 membenkan irelerangan sspem benkul. PF Soalan Kaye‘ yang max dlulal type M Iracmre say: cadangkan mmarvn Iiada vracturs PSSD4: Du: Insmpunyal rracrum yang mam banyak den sukar untuk ma nyazakan yang mana oomman da/am sampw tsrxsbut FF Pads mm sum! 5 [ikalan Dokumen Bslsamu Bahsgvan E No 2 (F)] auahalv maksud me, 26 71 type oHvaclme7 PSSD4' Yang Am, 25 71 I11 bsrmaksud psmang compressive fractured yang be-taku Dada samp‘e yang diambrl dam -.>u ads/an Iraclma yang verydomlnanl aarsm sesualu samplu PF Dan unxuk «urn-«am yang malt dam/nannlu says tradangkan memang Vvdalv Deena domrnannrdak berimi serious 1: PSSD4' Bukan makbempa sermus mm rrvegulaldan agak sukar unluk my msngukur yang man 531:: rnel-uad1 sebagar mamr fracture naram sample lerselzuv m m wmmmyflcymvsmznnuma mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

CB-42S-1-02/2022

PERAYU Sugumaran A/l Govindasamy RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Rayuan jenayah - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan - Rayuan dibenarkan - Sabitan dan hukuman diketepikan.

05/01/2024

YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=75acc66d-6ec6-4a5d-a33b-7680217d4607&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - CB-42S-1-02-2022 Sugumaran Govindasamy v PP - final 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: CB-42S-1-02/2022 ANTARA SUGUMARAN A/L GOVINDASAMY (NO. K/P: 900905-14-6535) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Di Raub Dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur Kes Jenayah No. CC-62RS-01-02/2019 Antara Pendakwa Raya Lawan Sugumaran a/l Govindasamy (No. K/P: 900905-14-6535)] 05/01/2024 11:12:34 CB-42S-1-02/2022 Kand. 58 S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan sabitan dan hukuman bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan. Pada asalnya terdapat tiga orang Orang Kena Tuduh (OKT) yang dituduh di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan dan salah seorang daripada OKT telahpun meninggal dunia dan OKT2 telah mengaku salah di akhir kes pendakwaan. Kini tinggal rayuan oleh OKT3 sahaja iaitu Perayu dalam kes ini. [2] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa hakim yang mendengar rayuan tidak wajar campur tangan dalam dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara. Ini adalah disebabkan hakim yang mendengar perbicaraan tersebut mempunyai peluang untuk mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi semasa mereka memberikan keterangan. Ini bermakna hakim bicara berpeluang melihat tingkah laku saksi-saksi semasa memberikan keterangan. Sebaliknya, Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan ini tidak mempunyai keistimewaan sedemikian. Oleh itu dalam kes ini Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan ini hanya meneliti kepada nota keterangan, alasan penghakiman dan eksibit-eksibit yang telah difailkan di dalam Rekod Rayuan sebagai sandaran kepada keputusan terhadap rayuan ini. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] Mahkamah juga mendapati dalam kes ini terdapat beberapa dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang berkaitan dengan kredibiliti saksi-saksi. Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa isu berkenaan dengan kredibiliti saksi-saksi itu adalah terpulang kepada hakim yang membicarakan kes tersebut. Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak sepatutnya campur tangan terhadap apa-apa dapatan yang berkaitan dengan kredibiliti saksi-saksi. Ini yang dapat dilihat adalah di perenggan [23] alasan penghakiman apabila mahkamah bicara berpendapat bahawa kesemua intipati telah diterima melalui keterangan SP1, SP8 dan SP9. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam alasan penghakiman juga telah menyatakan menerima keterangan SP1, SP8 dan juga keterangan saksi-saksi yang lain. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak wajar untuk Mahkamah campur tangan dalam isu berkenaan kredibiliti saksi-saksi tersebut. Hakikat Kesalahan Di Bawah Seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan [4] Selain daripada itu adalah wajar sekiranya Mahkamah meneliti kedudukan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan yang telah dinyatakan sebagai asas kepada pertuduhan. Bagi memahami kedudukan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan adalah perlu untuk Mahkamah ini meneliti pandangan yang dinyatakan dalam Speeches and Poems with The Report and Note of India Penal Code oleh Lord Macaulay Volume II 1867 yang menjadi asas kepada Kanun Keseksaan di India yang menjadi sebahagian daripada undang-undang negara ini di halaman 441 seperti berikut: S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “There can be no case of robbery which does not fall within the definition either of theft or of extortion; but in practice it will perpetually be matter of doubt whether a particular act of robbery was a theft or an extortion. A large proportion of robberies will be half theft, half extortion. A. seizes Z., threatens to murder him, unless he delivers all his property, and begins to pull off Z.’s ornaments. Z. in terror begs that A. will take all he has, and spare his life, assists in taking off his ornaments, and delivers them to A. Here, such ornaments as A. took without Z.’s consent are taken by theft. Those which Z. delivered up from fear of death are acquired by extortion. It is by no means improbable that Z.’s right-arm bracelet may have been obtained by theft, and left-arm bracelet by extortion; that the rupees in Z.’s girdle may have been obtained by theft, and those in his turban by extortion. Probably in nine tenths of the robberies which are committed, something like this actually takes place, and it is probably that a few minutes later neither the robber nor the person robbed would be able to recollect in that proportions theft and extortion were mixed in the crime; nor is it at all necessary for the end of justice that this should be ascertained. For though, in general the consent of a sufferer is a circumstance which very materially modifies the character of the offence, and which ought therefore, to be made known to the Courts, yet the consent which a person gives to the raking of his property by a ruffian who holds a pistol to his breast is a circumstance altogether immaterial.” S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [5] Oleh yang demikian, apabila meneliti kesalahan rompakan (seksyen 390), rompakan berkumpulan (seksyen 391, seksyen 392, seksyen 395) tidak boleh terlepas pandang untuk meneliti seksyen 378 (tafsiran curi) dan seksyen 383 (pemerasan). Ini adalah disebabkan seksyen 390 (2) dan (3) Kanun Keseksaan telah memperuntukkan bahawa di dalam keadaan tertentu curi boleh menjadi rompakan. Begitu juga pemerasan boleh tergolong kepada rompakan seperti di bawah seksyen 390 (3) Kanun Keseksaan. Oleh yang demikian adalah satu langkah yang baik untuk Mahkamah, pihak pendakwaan dan peguam memastikan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa pertuduhan berkenaan kesalahan rompakan tidak terlepas pandang tafsiran pemerasan dan curi bagi memastikan keadilan yang sewajarnya dapat dilaksanakan kepada Tertuduh dan mangsa jenayah. Dalam kata lain kesalahan rompakan atau rompakan berkumpulan tidak boleh berdiri sendiri tanpa dihubungkaitkan dengan pemerasan atau curi. [6] Pemakaian seksyen 390 Kanun Keseksaan dalam kesalahan rompakan dan hubungkaitnya dengan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Senjata Api (Penalti Lebih Berat), 1971 dapat dilihat dalam keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Fairoz Azman Amironzuki v. Pendakwa Raya (2021) 1 LNS 108, (2021) 2 MLJ 771. [7] Oleh itu dalam meneliti peruntukan seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan, ia haruslah dilihat bersama-sama dengan takrifan seksyen 380 dan 378. Satu keistimewaan dalam naskah Kanun Keseksaan yang wajar diberikan perhatian ialah terdapatnya takrifan-takrifan untuk S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 memahami apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dalam Kanun Keseksaan. Ia perlu diberikan perhatian dalam memahami peruntukan-peruntukan berkenaan dengan kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Kanun Keseksaan. Kegagalan berbuat demikian akan mendorong kepada kefahaman yang keputusan yang tersasar daripada peruntukan yang dinyatakan di bawah Kanun Keseksaan. [8] Misalnya seksyen 390 (3) Kanun Keseksaan dinyatakan: “Extortion is "robbery", if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.” [9] Peras ugut, pemerasan (extortion) telah ditakrifkan di bawah seksyen 383 Kanun Keseksaan seperti berikut: “Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion". S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [10] Curi (theft) pula ditakrifkan seperti berikut di bawah seksyen 378 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu: “Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft.” [11] Oleh itu curi boleh menjadi rompakan sekiranya semasa melakukan curi tersebut terdapat keterangan yang menunjukkan wujudnya keadaan seperti di bawah seksyen 390 (2) Kanun Keseksaan. Sementara itu pemerasan akan menjadi rompakan sekiranya terdapat keadaan di bawah seksyen 390 (3) Kanun Keseksaan. Sekiranya rompakan itu dilakukan dalam keadaan di bawah seksyen 391 Kanun Keseksaan ia menjadi rompakan berkumpulan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 395 Kanun Keseksaan. [12] Penelitian kepada seksyen 391 Kanun Keseksaan menunjukkan perkataan yang digunakan ialah apabila dua orang atau lebih secara bergabung (conjointly commit) atau cuba melakukan rompakan (attempt to commit). Ini bermakna seksyen 34 iaitu niat bersama tidak lagi perlu digunakan bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 391 Kanun Keseksaan. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Rex v Yeo Kim Watt & Anor [1946] 12 MLJ 155 dan Wong Kim Wan v PP [1948-1949] MLJ supp 134. “It follows from this that the guilty act of a gang robber who commits murder in the case of a gang robbery is imputed to all S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 the others who conjointly commit that gang robbery and there is, therefore, no need in such a case to have recourse to section 34 or to consider the question of common intention.” [13] Ini bermakna pertuduhan rompakan berkumpulan tidak lagi timbul isu niat bersama di bawah seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Adalah didapati terdapat juga peruntukan undang-undang yang sama dengan peruntukan di atas misalnya seksyen 16 Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009. Penelitian Keterangan Dalam Rayuan Ini [14] Keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan ialah menunjukkan bahawa ketiga-tiga OKT melalui keterangan SP1 dikatakan telah berada bersama-sama di tempat kejadian. Seterusnya SP8 pula dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa beliau telah nampak OKT1 dan OKT2 dan seorang yang sedang memandu kereta. Dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan tersebut bahawa yang memandu kenderaan tersebut adalah OKT3 kerana tiada keterangan yang lain dikemukakan bagi menunjukkan OKT3 berada dalam kenderaan tersebut. [15] Keterangan SP1 yang menyatakan bahawa beliau telah nampak OKT3 memegang rantai emas selepas kejadian tersebut. Namun demikian seperti yang disahkan oleh Peguam Perayu dan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bahawa rantai emas itu tidak langsung dikemukakan S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 di Mahkamah sebagai barang kes atau dicamkan oleh SP8. Malahan keterangan SP1 juga tidak menerangkan secara terperinci rupa bentuk rantai emas tersebut untuk mahkamah bicara dapat mengesahkan bahawa rantai emas itu adalah sama dengan rantai emas yang diperolehi daripada SP8. [16] Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah wajar untuk SP1 memberikan perincian berkenaan dengan rantai emas tersebut. Ia akan dapat mengesahkan bahawa rantai emas tersebut adalah rantai yang dirompak daripada SP8. Ini tidak dilakukan dalam kes ini. [17] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan seperti yang dihujahkan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bahawa ketiadaan rantai emas tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak akan menyebabkan satu kes prima facie tidak dibuktikan. Namun demikian kewujudkan rantai emas tersebut yang dicamkan secara sah adalah mustahak untuk memastikan sama ada keterangan SP1 dan SP8 tersebut boleh dijadikan asas oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen untuk memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie. [18] Pada masa yang sama kewujudan rantai emas itu sebagai keterangan membolehkan Mahkamah menggunakan seksyen 114 (a) Akta Keterangan 1950. Seksyen 114 (a) Akta Keterangan menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 114 Court may presume existance of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume:- (a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession; [19] Jika keterangan sedemikian ada di hadapan Mahkamah iaitu rantai emas tersebut yang dirompak daripada SP8 berada di tangan OKT3 seperti yang dilihat oleh SP1, maka sudah terang lagi bersuluh bahawa OKT3 tidak dapat mengelakkan diri daripada dikatakan terlibat dalam perbuatan rompakan tersebut. [20] Hal ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Amathevelli P Ramasamy v PP [2009] 3 CLJ 109 apabila terdapat satu keterangan tersebut apabila barang-barang yang telah dirampas daripada simati berada di tangan OKT. Dalam kes tersebut Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa tiada penjelasan yang diberikan oleh OKT bagaimana barang-barang kemas simati boleh berada dengannya. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat ia adalah keterangan yang boleh diterima masuk di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [21] Prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam kes Amathevelli P Ramasamy v PP (supra) itu telah diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dan diulang lagi oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Pathmanabhan Nalliannen v PP & Other Appeals [2017] 4 CLJ 137 seperti berikut: “[127] At any rate it is apposite to clarify here that even if information pursuant to s. 27 of the EA is found inadmissible, that piece of inadmissible evidence does not automatically affect the admissibility of the evidence of subsequent conduct under s. 8 of the EA (Amathevelli P Ramasamy v. PP [2009] 3 CLJ 109; Prakash Chand v. State (infra) ). [128] That conduct of pointing to the places where the items were discovered by the second and fourth accused persons, which was subsequent to an offence, falls squarely within the ambit of "the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding".” [22] Oleh itu Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kewujudan rantai emas tersebut dalam kes ini adalah mustahak untuk menunjukkan bahawa OKT3 terlibat dalam kes ini. Ini adalah apa yang telah dinyatakan dalam kes Amathevelli P Ramasamy v PP (supra) seperti berikut: “[34] In this case the deceased was wearing the gold chain at the time of her death. This is a material element to connect the appellant to the murder of the deceased. This is further supported S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 by other evidence such as, the acid injury on the appellant's lips and arm when the deceased also had acid injuries and the presence of the Yamaha motorcycle at the deceased's shop at about 7.05 am on the material date. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to convict the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The inferences drawn from the evidence of conduct of the appellant will remain as she has not explained them pursuant to s. 9 of the Evidence Act. As Augustine Paul FCJ said in the judgment of this court in Parlan bin Dadeh v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 CLJ 717 at p. 747: If the explanation is accepted by the Court then the inference arising from the conduct is rebutted. If it is not accepted or if the accused does not explain his conduct the inference remains unrebutted.” [23] Namun dalam kes ini keterangan berkenaan dengan perkara tersebut tidak ada dikemukakan. Mahkamah ini juga meneliti kepada perenggan [33] kes Amathevelli P Ramasamy v PP (supra) yang memperihalkan berkenaan nilai keterangan penemuan barang kes selepas kejadian tersebut ditangan Tertuduh seperti berikut: “[33] SP10 said in his evidence that he had never seen the gold chain before. SP7 said that the gold chain that the deceased was wearing on the fateful morning was missing. He identified P40 and P44A-F as that of the deceased. Thus the appellant was clearly in possession of recently stolen goods. Under s. 114(a) of the S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Evidence Act it may be presumed that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. This presumption can also be indicative of any other more aggravated crime which has been connected with the theft. As Matthew CJ said in Abdullah bin Saad v. Public Prosecutor [1955] 1 LNS 3.” [24] Sekiranya terdapat keterangan bahawa rantai emas yang didakwa ditemui bersama-sama OKT3 berada di tangan OKT3 maka anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (a) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai. Ini menyebabkan OKT3 boleh dikaitkan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan bersama-sama dengan orang lain dalam kes ini sekiranya OKT3 tidak dapat memberikan penjelasan berkenaan kewujudan rantai emas tersebut dalam milikannya. [25] Dalam kes ini keterangan yang dikemukakan ialah SP1 melihat bahawa OKT3 memegang rantai emas tersebut dan penilaian Mahkamah bicara mendapati bahawa SP1 menyatakan OKT3 memberitahu SP1 bahawa rantai emas tersebut adalah milik isteri OKT3. Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan bagi menyanggah dakwaan OKT3 tersebut. Namun demikian Mahkamah juga mengambil kira keterangan saksi-saksi bahawa rantai emas itu tidak kelihatan bersama-sama dengan OKT3 sebelum kejadian tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun ia tidak dapat menyokong keterangan bahawa rantai emas tersebut adalah merupakan rantai emas yang dirompak daripada SP8. Mahkamah ini berpendapat S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 terdapat pemutusan rantaian keterangan berkenaan dengan rantai emas tersebut adakah ianya rantai emas yang dirompak ataupun rantai emas yang sememangnya berada dalam milikan OKT 3 sebelum kejadian tersebut. [26] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati SP8 semasa membuat laporan polis tidak memperihalkan berkenaan dengan rantai emas yang telah dikatakan dirompak daripadanya. Sekiranya maklumat tersebut dinyatakan dalam laporan polis ia boleh membantu Mahkamah bicara membuat dapatan bahawa rantai emas yang ditemui di OKT3 itu adalah sama dengan rantai emas yang diperihalkan dalam laporan polis tersebut. Namun ia tidak dilakukan sedemikian yang menyebabkan masih tiada kaitan dapat ditunjukkan di antara rantai emas yang dikatakan dilihat oleh SP1 berada dengan OKT3 adalah merupakan rantai emas yang dirompak daripada SP8. Pengecaman [27] Berkenaan dengan pengecaman OKT3 adalah didapati bahawa keterangan dalam perbicaraan ini mendapati bahawa CCTV dapat menggambarkan imej OKT1 dan OKT2 telah dapat ditunjukkan dan pengecaman juga telah dibuat dalam kawad cam terhadap OKT1 dan OKT2. Begitu juga keterangan SP8 bahawa beliau boleh mengecam dua orang lelaki yang masuk ke dalam premis tersebut dan itu telah menyebabkan ia adalah konsiten dengan keterangan yang terdapat di dalam CCTV. Namun wajah OKT3 tidak terpapar dalam CCTV yang dikemukakan. Di samping itu tiada juga keterangan kawad cam yang S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 dilakukan dapat mengecam OKT3 sebagai lelaki yang berada dalam kenderaan pada masa kejadian tersebut. [28] Apa yang lebih menarik dalam kes ini apabila Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen membuat kesimpulan mana ada orang lain lagi selain daripada OKT3 yang ada dalam kenderaan tersebut. Asas kepada keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut ialah kerana keterangan SP1 sebelum ini yang menyatakan bahawa ada tiga orang yang telah dibantunya dan duduk di hotel sebelum itu yang menunjukkan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpuas hati bahawa tiga orang itu, dua orang sudah dikenal dalam CCTV dan dicamkan oleh SP8 maka OKT3 mestilah orang yang ketiga berada dalam kenderaan tersebut. [29] Ini ditambah pula dengan alasan yang dikemukakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa nombor kenderaan yang ditulis dalam laporan polis SP8 itu adalah sama nombor dengan kenderaan yang disahkan oleh SP8 tersebut. Persoalannya adalah adakah dalam kes ini identiti Perayu iaitu OKT3 telah dicamkan. [30] Oleh yang demikian adakah wajar bahawa disebabkan kenderaan yang digunakan adalah kenderaan yang sama maka Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen betul apabila menyatakan bahawa OKT3 adalah merupakan pemandu kenderaan tersebut bagi menjadikan jumlah individu yang terlibat dalam rompakan tersebut adalah tiga orang iaitu OKT1 dan OKT2 serta seorang lelaki yang dikatakan OKT3 semata-mata berdasarkan kepada sangkaan SP8 yang menjadi asas kepada S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa lelaki dalam kenderaan tersebut adalah OKT3. Tugas Hakim Bicara Semasa Meneliti Keterangan-keterangan [31] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa semasa hakim bicara mengendalikan perbicaraan penelitian yang teliti kepada keterangan saksi-saksi perlu dilakukan. Ia juga memerlukan hakim bicara membuat dapatan-dapatan, penerimaan keterangan saksi-saksi, penolakan keterangan saksi-saksi, pengecaman saksi dan Tertuduh, pengecaman eksibit-eksibit. Kesemua tindakan tersebut hendaklah digambarkan dengan jelas dalam alasan penghakiman. Ia hendaklah dilakukan sejajar dengan peruntukan undang-undang keterangan dan tatacara Kanun Prosedur Jenayah. Ini adalah penting bagi membolehkan hakim yang mendengar rayuan dapat memahami dan menghargai dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara yang tidak memerlukan campur tangan hakim yang mendengar rayuan. Oleh itu seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan [2] di atas, sekiranya dapatan-dapatan tersebut jelas dilakukan mengikut undang-undang maka tidak ada keperluan untuk dapatan hakim bicara tersebut diganggu oleh hakim yang mendengar rayuan. Kegagalan untuk membuat dapatan yang sewajarnya mengikut undang-undang serta digambarkan dengan terang dan jelas dalam alasan penghakiman boleh membuka ruang dan memberi alasan untuk hakim yang mendengar rayuan mengganggu dapatan-dapatan tersebut. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [32] Oleh itu adalah menjadi amalan yang baik untuk hakim bicara sentiasa meneliti keterangan-keterangan, membuat dapatan-dapatan dan menyatakannya dengan jelas dalam alasan penghakiman. Pada masa yang sama semasa membuat dapatan-dapatan tersebut hakim bicara dapat membuat dapatan berdasarkan kepada: (a) keterangan terus daripada saksi-saksi; (b) anggapan; atau (c) inferens. [33] Hakim bicara setelah meneliti keterangan-keterangan daripada saksi-saksi yang jelas dapat mengecam OKT atau eksibit-eksibit di dalam Mahkamah melalui keterangan langsung boleh membuat dapatan berkenaan dengan sesuatu isu yang relevan dalam perbicaraan tersebut. Misalnya, saksi mata kejadian menyatakan bahawa dia nampak OKT telah menikam mangsa sehingga menyebabkan kecederaan di bahagian perut. Saksi tersebut dapat mengecam OKT di Mahkamah atau sebelum ini melalui kawad cam, dapat mengecam mangsa dan dapat mengecam senjata yang digunakan, maka ketika itu hakim bicara boleh membuat dapatan fakta bahawa OKT telah menggunakan senjata yang dikemukakan sebagai eksibit mencederakan mangsa. Dalam contoh di atas hakim bicara boleh membuat dapatan tanpa memerlukan kepada anggapan atau inferens. Ini adalah disebabkan keterangan tersebut dikemukakan secara langsung oleh saksi mata kejadian tersebut. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [34] Namun demikian terdapat keadaan apabila Mahkamah perlu membuat dapatan fakta dengan menggunakan anggapan-anggapan yang dinyatakan di bawah Akta Keterangan 1950 atau anggapan- anggapan yang terdapat dalam undang-undang bertulis yang lain. Namun demikian hakim bicara perlu memastikan bahawa sebelum anggapan itu digunakan fakta asas berkenaan sesuatu perlu dibuktikan di Mahkamah terlebih dahulu. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah dalam kes PP v Chia Leong Foo [2000 6] MLJ 705 seperti berikut: “The applicability of the presumption provisions must be considered against this background. Their language shows that they have been enacted to provide evidence of the facts to be presumed upon proof of the basic facts. It is these basic facts that raise the presumed facts. Thus they contemplate a situation where there is no evidence of the facts to be presumed. Where there is such evidence and the presumption provisions are still invoked it would mean that what has been proved to exist has, at the same time, also been presumed to exist. This is illogical as it would amount to facts which have been proved as also having been presumed. This would go beyond the explicit words and object of the presumption provisions as they are designed to meet a situation when there is no evidence of the facts to be presumed. As I said earlier presumptions are only a special mode of proving facts which must otherwise be proved by evidence. It follows that where there is such other evidence presumptions cease to apply as such evidence, being not inadmissible, is capable of proving the very facts to be presumed. Presumptions are therefore S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 restricted in their operation to instances where there is evidence only of the basic facts. The limitation on the use of the presumption provisions in the face of available evidence can be discerned if the ramifications of their use in such circumstances are considered. It must first be observed that reliance on the presumption provisions where there is available evidence of the facts to be presumed will be unfavourable to the accused. This is because where the court relies on a statutory provision relating to a presumption of law like the presumption provisions it is bound to take the fact as proved until evidence to the contrary is given, on a balance of probabilities, to disprove it (see PP v Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89; Nagappan a/l Kuppusamy v PP [1988] 2 MLJ 53). This results in a legal burden being imposed on an accused person though it is not illegal. Failure to discharge the burden, even where a reasonable doubt as to guilt exists, will be followed by conviction (see State v Mello & Anor [1999] 1 LRC 215). However, if the court had acted on the available evidence in proof of the relevant ingredients without resorting to presumptions there is only an evidential burden on an accused person to raise a reasonable doubt. Thus indiscriminate use of presumptions when there is evidence of the facts to be presumed will be unfavourable to the accused as it will place a heavier burden on him which could have been avoided. Fairness to the accused therefore demands that the presumption provisions are used only when there is no evidence of the facts to be presumed. Arbitrary use of the presumption provisions, without any fixed guidelines, when there S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 is direct evidence of the facts to be presumed may also prejudice the accused in another way.” [35] Kesan pemakaian anggapan telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lt Kol Yusof bin Abdul Rahman v Kol Anuar bin Md Amin & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 562 seperti berikut: “The key word here is 'presuming', the meaning of which is provided by s 4 of the Evidence Act 1950. Presuming a fact means 'regarding the fact as proved unless and until it is disproved'.” [36] Adalah penting untuk hakim bicara semasa menggunakan anggapan di bawah undang-undang tidak menjadikan pemakaiannya sebagai suatu automatik. Ia telah dinyatakan dalam kes PP v Haji Ismail & Another [1940] 1 MLJ 76 seperti berikut: “There is no question of the mechanical application of any general rule of presumption.” [37] Penelitian kepada duluan-duluan kehakiman dan nas undang- undang di atas dapatlah dirumuskan bahawa hakim bicara semasa menggunakan anggapan seharusnya terlebih dahulu berpuas hati bahawa terdapatnya fakta-fakta asas di hadapan Mahkamah sebelum menggunakan anggapan tersebut melainkan anggapan tidak bersalah (presumption of innocence) dan anggapan kewarasan (presumption of sanity). Pada masa yang sama hakim bicara haruslah meneliti kepada S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 seksyen 4 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang telah memberikan asas kepada penggunaan anggapan. Seksyen 4 Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan seperti berikut: “4 Presumption (1) Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard the fact as proved unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it. (2) Whenever it is directed by this Act that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard the fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. (3) When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.” [38] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang termaklum bahawa terdapat dua jenis anggapan yang boleh digunakan oleh hakim bicara iaitu anggapan undang-undang dan anggapan fakta. Dalam konteks anggapan fakta Mahkamah boleh setelah berpuas hati terdapatnya fakta-fakta asas menggunakan anggapan fakta iaitu seksyen 86 hingga seksyen 88, seksyen 90, seksyen 107 hingga 111, seksyen 114 dan seksyen 114A Akta Keterangan 1950. Sementara bagi anggapan S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 undang-undang pula ialah seksyen 41, seksyen 112 dan seksyen 113 Akta Keterangan 1950. [39] Apa yang penting ialah anggapan fakta tidak seharusnya digunakan sebagai jalan mudah untuk membuat dapatan kepada sesuatu fakta sedangkan fakta-fakta asas belum dikemukakan di Mahkamah. Anggapan juga tidak wajar digunakan sekiranya pembuktian sesuatu fakta boleh dibuat melalui keterangan-keterangan langsung di Mahkamah bagi membuktikan sesuatu fakta tersebut. Misalnya satu fakta terdapat keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa terdapat saksi mata yang melihat Tertuduh telah mengambil barang keluar daripada milikan atau jagaan pengadu dan ditangkap bersama- sama dengan barang tersebut. Dalam contoh di atas adalah wajar sekiranya Mahkamah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa barang tersebut telah dikeluarkan daripada milikan pengadu oleh Tertuduh berdasarkan keterangan saksi mata tersebut dan tidaklah perlu menggunakan anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (a) Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini adalah disebabkan fakta tersebut dapat dibuktikan berdasarkan keterangan saksi mata yang tidak memerlukan penggunaan mana-mana anggapan. Begitu juga seorang yang telah didapati di dalam tangannya dadah berbahaya dan telah dituduh memiliki dadah tersebut. Dalam contoh di atas keterangan yang jelas menunjukkan bahawa fakta bahawa dadah itu berada di dalam milikan Tertuduh telah dapat ditunjukkan melalui keterangan saksi-saksi mata yang tidak memerlukan penggunaan anggapan pemilikan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [40] Oleh itu pemahaman yang jelas berkenaan bila dan bagaimana anggapan boleh digunakan bagi membuktikan satu fakta adalah penting bagi mengelakkan daripada hakim bicara membuat dapatan dengan menggunakan anggapan yang tidak betul. Ini boleh menjejaskan dapatan dan sabitan yang dilakukan oleh hakim bicara. [41] Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga boleh membuat inferens. Inferens adalah berbeza dengan anggapan. Ini telah disinggung oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PP v Tan Tatt Eek & Other Appeals [2005] 2 MLJ 685 seperti berikut: “Of course, inferences drawn from direct and/or circumstantial evidence can be made in appropriate cases. But inferences are quite distinct from statutory presumptions.” [42] Ia diperincikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP v Lin Yu Choy [2011] 6 MLJ 61 seperti berikut: “[17] Inferences are quite distinct from statutory presumptions. This distinction is recognised in Public Prosecutor v Tan Tatt Eek & other appeals [2005] 2 MLJ 685 at p 711; [2005] 1 CLJ 713 at p 748 where Steve Shim FCJ (later CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) discussed the issue of double presumptions under s 37(d) and s 37(da) respectively. [18] The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (5th Ed), Vol 1 defines the word 'inference' to mean: S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 1. the action or process of inferring; the drawing of a conclusion from data or premises; 2. a conclusion drawn from data or premises; an implication, the conclusion that is intended to be drawn. Seterusnya menyatakan di perenggan [24] dan [25] seperti berikut: “[24] In our view, a presumption is one provided by law. It involves a situation where the law provides proof of a fact in issue when basic evidence is available. When a presumption is invoked, the burden on the accused is discharged by rebutting it on a balance of probabilities, whereas an inference of fact is rebutted by creating a reasonable doubt. [25] The inference relates to the element of knowledge based on the conduct of the accused in running away and throwing the plastic bag. The invoking of the statutory presumption of possession was derived from custody or control to enable the deemed possession to be triggered under s 37(d).” [43] Jika ditinjau maksud inferens dalam konteks hubung kait dengan Bahasa Melayu seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Kamus Dewan Edisi Keempat, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP) 2021 membawa maksud kesimpulan yang dibuat berdasarkan kepada fakta (asas) tertentu. S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [44] Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa sesuatu inferens boleh dibuat berdasarkan suatu fakta. Ia bukannya boleh dibuat berdasarkan kepada satu agakan atau telahan yang tidak berdasarkan kepada fakta. Oleh yang demikian hakim bicara semasa membuat inferens tidak boleh bersandarkan kepada sesuatu yang bukan fakta. Kesimpulan tersebut hendaklah sesuatu yang logik atau diterima akal dan munasabah. [45] Dalam konteks ini Mahkamah perlu merujuk kepada takrifan fakta di bawah Akta Keterangan 1950, iaitu: “"fact" means and includes- (a) any thing, state of things or relation of things capable of being perceived by the senses; (b) any mental condition of which any person is conscious; ILLUSTRATIONS (a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place is a fact. (b) That a man heard or saw something is a fact. (c) That a man said certain words is a fact. (d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact. (e) That a man has a certain reputation is a fact.” S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Oleh yang demikian hakim bicara semasa menjalankan perbicaraan hendaklah memastikan bahawa dapatan yang dibuat adalah berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan secara langsung atau penggunaan anggapan atau inferens yang sewajarnya. [46] Jika ini dapat dilakukan ia akan menjadikan dapatan dan sabitan dalam suatu perbicaraan jenayah dilakukan berdasarkan semata-mata kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah. Ia bukannya berdasarkan kepada sudut pandang peribadi hakim bicara atau perkara-perkara yang tidak dibuktikan melalui keterangan di Mahkamah atau fakta-fakta yang tidak dibuktikan di Mahkamah. Pematuhan kepada tatacara pengendalian keterangan saksi-saksi dan eksibit- eksibit seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta Keterangan 1950 dan Kanun Tatacara Jenayah akan menjadikan dapatan hakim bicara sukar untuk digugat atau diganggu oleh hakim yang mendengar rayuan. Ia juga dapat dijadikan panduan kepada pendakwaan untuk memastikan bahawa beban pembuktian yang diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang dapat dilakukan secara teratur dan bukannya berdasarkan kepada sangkaan-sangkaan yang tidak disokong oleh keterangan. [47] Begitu juga dengan pihak pembelaan yang akan mengemukakan pembelaan atau mengemukakan soalan-soalan kepada saksi pendakwaan berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang yang terdapat dalam Akta Keterangan 1950 dan undang-undang bertulis dan tidak berdasarkan kepada sangkaan atau persepsi semata-mata. Pada hemat Mahkamah inilah yang dimaksudkan dengan perbicaraan yang adil berteraskan kepada undang-undang dan bukannya berdasarkan S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 kepada sangkaan atau spekulasi yang tidak dapat dibuktikan di Mahkamah sehingga ia menjadikan perbicaraan tersebut tidak lagi mencapai maksud mencari keadilan yang sepatutnya menjadi matlamat utama dalam suatu perbicaraan. [48] Oleh itu dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa OKT3 adalah orang yang berada dalam kenderaan tersebut adalah satu yang tidak dapat disokong oleh keterangan, anggapan atau inferens yang boleh dibuat oleh hakim bicara dalam kes ini. Dalam erti kata lain jika seseorang itu menggunakan kenderaan yang sama ia tidak semestinya menunjukkan pemandu kenderaan tersebut adalah OKT3. Pada hemat Mahkamah, hakim bicara yang mendengar kes tersebut tidak boleh membuat satu kesimpulan yang mudah berkenaan dengan OKT3 adalah merupakan orang yang berada di dalam kenderaan tersebut pada hari kejadian. Ia adalah satu kekhilafan yang memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini. Pembelaan Perayu [49] Seterusnya Mahkamah meneliti kepada pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Perayu. Dalam alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan penilaian kepada keterangan SP1 dan OKT3 dan menyatakan bahawa keterangan OKT3 tidak boleh diterima kerana terdapatnya percanggahan dengan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh SP1. Ia adalah merupakan budi bicara hakim untuk menerima atau menolak mana-mana keterangan dalam satu perbicaraan kerana hakim dapat meneliti keterangan SP1 dan melihat S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 keterangan OKT3 itu tidak konsisten dan Mahkamah bicara telah membuat keputusan tidak menerima keterangan SP1. Di antaranya adalah berkenaan dengan keterangan OKT3 bahawa dia telah balik selepas kejadian dengan menggunakan teksi sedangkan SP1 menyatakan bahawa dia telah membawa OKT3 dan kawan-kawannya balik dari tempat kejadian. Itu tidak menjadi persoalan kerana ia adalah merupakan budi bicara hakim bicara untuk memutuskan keterangan yang diterima atau ditolak. Apa yang lebih penting ialah sama ada diterima atau ditolak adakah keterangan-keterangan tersebut telah menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah kepada kes pendakwaan atau sebaliknya. [50] Pada masa yang sama Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan juga telah dihujahkan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bahawa pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh Perayu adalah merupakan penafian semata-mata dan ia tidak disokong dengan keterangan-keterangan dan ada sebahagian daripada itu adalah pemikiran semula kerana ia tidak ditimbulkan pada peringkat kes pendakwaan. Sama ada penafian semata-mata atau sebaliknya apa yang penting ialah adakah keterangan-keterangan tersebut telah berjaya menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah. Dalam erti kata lain Mahkamah perlu melihat kepada tugas pembelaan untuk menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Hakim yang mendengar perbicaraan harus melihat keterangan-keterangan sama ada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan adalah satu keadaan yang telah menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 seperti yang diputuskan dalam kes Rosli bin Yusof v PP [2021] 7 CLJ 681 dan Abdullan Atan v PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151. [51] Persoalan yang timbul dalam kes ini OKT1 dan OKT2 telah mengaku salah dan telah dijatuhkan hukuman. Namun dalam kes ini tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan OKT2 sebagai saksi bagi kes pembelaan. Peguam Perayu berhujah bahawa Timbalan Pendakwa Raya sepatutnya memanggil OKT2 untuk memberikan keterangan. Mahkamah berpendapat hujahan tersebut adalah tersasar daripada tugas pendakwaan dan pembelaan dalam suatu kes jenayah. Mahkamah berpendapat dalam kes ini bukanlah menjadi tanggungjawab pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan OKT2 sebagai saksi setelah pihak pendakwaan menutup kes pihak pendakwaan. Sebaliknya sekiranya OKT2 ingin dikemukakan sebagai saksi ia sewajarnya dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan sebagai saksi pembelaan. [52] Namun begitu Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa bukanlah tugas pihak pembelaan untuk membuktikan ketidakbersalahan Perayu. Apa yang perlu dilakukan oleh pihak pembelaan hanyalah menimbulkan keraguan munasabah bagi kes pendakwaan. Dapatan Akhir [53] Akhirnya Mahkamah memutuskan setelah meneliti nota keterangan, alasan penghakiman dan juga hujahan-hujahan adalah S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 tidak selamat untuk mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu dapatan sabitan dan hukuman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen diketepikan, rayuan Perayu dibenarkan dan Perayu dilepas dan dibebaskan. Bertarikh: 05hb. Januari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu Swinder Singh a/l Ram Singh Tetuan Kiranjit Randhawa & Co Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Responden Lee Wai Yi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N bcasdcZuXUqjO3aAIX1GBw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-45A-19-07/2020

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH LEE YU HUAT

The Prosecution confirmed the facts as per the findings of this Court. The Deputy Public Prosecutor submitted that the time spent already in prison ought to serve as a lesson for the Accused.This Court sentences the Accused to ten months imprisonment for each charge. Both ten months imprisonment sentences are to run concurrently. Effective from the date of his arrest. The Accused was hereby free to go.

05/01/2024

YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2cee9e93-1d36-4875-a32d-eb464c9e2915&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY MALAYSIA CRIMINAL CASE NO: WA-45-9-07/2020 BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR …. APPLICANT AND LEE YU HUAT (NRIC No: 820208-10-5359) …. ACCUSED GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Charges [1] The Accused faces three charges. One charge is for drug trafficking 3,797.2 grams of methamphetamine. The second charge is for drug possession of 0.78 grams of 3.4-Methylenedioxymenthamphetamine (MDMA). The other charge is for drug possession of 0.78 grams of ketamine. The charge for drug trafficking under s39B Dangerous Drugs Act 1939 (DDA) carries a penalty of death or life imprisonment with minimum whipping of 12 strokes. The charges for drug possession under 05/01/2024 16:05:47 WA-45A-19-07/2020 Kand. 144 S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal s12(2) DDA provides the penalty of a fine not more than RM100,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or to both. [2] The drug trafficking offence was said to have been committed on 24.12.2019 at approximately 4.25pm at the side of the road in front of Shamelin Star Residence Rigel, Lorong 1/19, Taman Shamelin Perkasa, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. The drug possession was allegedly committed on the same date at 5.20pm at F1-18-8 Kondominium Sg Besi 2, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. The Prosecution Case [3] At 1pm on 24.12.2019 the Complainant (SP4) received information from the public that there was someone of Chinese ethnicity who was trafficking drugs using a black Honda Accord with the registration plate WA 2266 K. With a team of seven other police officers, SP4 monitored the road in from of Shamelin Star Residence Regal, Lorong 1/91, Taman Shamelin Perkasa, 56100 Kuala Lumpur at around 4.25pm. [4] After 15 minutes of recognisance, SP4 sighted a black Honda Accord with the said registration plate stopped at the side of the road. He saw a man of Chinese ethnicity which appeared suspicious to him, stepped out from the driver’s seat. [5] SP4 and the police team introduced themselves and apprehended him. A physical body search was conducted. A Honda remote control was seized from his right hand. The man witnessed SP4 searched the car where a black plastic bag was retrieved from behind the seat of the back passenger seat. S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [6] A further examination of the black plastic bag resulted in the discovery of five green plastic bags with the label ‘Qing Shan’ where in each of the five green plastic bags contained one clear plastic with contents suspected methamphetamine. They were seized together with two keys and two white access cards. [7] The man is the Accused. He was arrested. SP4 and the police team then set off to F1-18-8 Kondominium Sg Besi 2, No 1 Jalan Besi Kawi, Off Lebuhraya Sungai Besi, 57100 Kuala Lumpur, directed by the Accused. The apartment door was opened using the keys seized from the Accused. The apartment was empty and a search was conducted witnessed by the Accused. [8] Three black packets written on them ‘James Bond’ with contents suspected to be MDMA powder was found on a small table in the living room and one bottle labelled ‘Ribena’ was found with liquid inside it suspected to be MDMA. Also seized was the Accused’s Malaysian passport. [9] SP4 explained the reasons for the Accused’s arrest to him and the seizure forms were duly signed (P18 and P19). The Accused was taken to the Cheras police station for further action. SP4 had weighed the contrabands seized. All items were marked by SP4 before he lodged the first information reports (P20A-B, C). SP4 thereafter surrendered all items including the car to the investigating officer SP12. They were documents (P21, P22). [10] SP12 recorded all items which were kept under his custody. SP12 had conducted finger dusting that did not yield any results. The items were S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal photographed. The suspected drugs were sent to be analysed by the chemist (SP1). Vide the chemist report (P10), SP1 confirmed the drugs to weigh 3,797.2 grams of methamphetamine which is listed in Schedule 2 DDA. The drugs found at the house in the black packets labelled ‘James Bond’ were 0.60 grams of MDMA and 0.33 grams of ketamine. The liquid in the ‘Ribena’ bottle was 0.18 grams of MDMA and 0.45 grams of ketamine. [11] The Prosecution called 12 witnesses. The black Honda Accord was brought to the court compound of the Kuala Lumpur Court Complex on 24.11.2022 and marked as Exhibit P35. Dangerous drugs [12] Through SP1 there was no reasonable doubt that the drugs retrieved were those described in the charges. The chemist report (P44) prepared under s399 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) is admissible. There was also no reasonable doubt raised as to the weight. There was no break in the chain of evidence. All the drugs were positively identified by SP4, SP12 and SP1. The Defence did not throw any challenges as to this element. See Balachandran a/l Selvaratnam v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 CLJ 85. Possession of the dangerous drugs [13] For the charge of drug trafficking, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused had direct possession of the drugs in the black Honda Accord. This is based on the evidence that the Accused had in his right hand the S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal remote control of the car. There was no one else in the car and he had alighted from the driver’s seat. [14] The location of where the drugs were discovered according to the Prosecution which was in a special hidden compartment of the car showed that he knew of the drugs he was in possession of. The Prosecution further relied on the evidence that he was shocked and taken aback at the time of apprehension which the Prosecution submitted showed conduct on his part that displayed his guilt. [15] As to the drugs found in the apartment, the Prosecution relied on the evidence that the keys and card access to it was found on the Accused’s person. It was him that directed the police to the apartment and no one else was there. The drugs found in the apartment together with his passport showed that he was in possession of them. The prosecution cited few cases which were Public Prosecutor v. Limneswaran A/L Jegathesan [2019] 1 LNS 494, Public Prosecutor v Kenny Chai Sok Peng [2019] 1 LNS 1568 and PP v Vinod Raj Uthayakumar [2019] 1 LNS 845. Drug trafficking [16] The Prosecution implored this Court to invoke the presumption under s37(da)(xvi) DDA that provided that any person in possession of more than 50 grams in weight of methamphetamine shall be presumed, unless contrary is proved, to be trafficking drugs. S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The Defence [17] In the submissions for the defence, it was stressed that SP12 had the day after the Accused was arrested applied on 25.12.2019 for remand that cited one of the reasons as to locate the accomplice and trafficker. SP12 had also recorded the statement of two member of the public, one Tan Ken Hong [NRIC No: 960910-33-5247] and Chin Yoon Choy [NRIC No; 661108-10-6041]. The evidence adduced at trial was that they had confirmed that they saw one Ng Tze Hao [NRIC No: 911123-08-6199] and one Chan Wai Kit [NRIC No: 870215-10-5731] had used the black Honda Accord two days prior to the Accused’s arrest. It was also witnessed that Ng and Chan had carried a black bag into the car. [18] The Defence submitted that the Prosecution had failed to show any exclusive possession of the dangerous drugs by the Accused. The Defence challenged the presumption of s37(h) DDA as it was contended that the Prosecution had failed to prove that the compartment at the back of the Honda Accord was classified as special compartment. The Defence pointed out that the witnesses the Prosecution called to testify the normal body for Honda Accord cars (SP9 and SP11) were not experts. [19] The Alcontara Notice was given to the police at a very early stage according to the Defence that raised reasonable doubts to the Accused’s possession but raised suspicions that the drugs in the car were Ng Tze Hao and Chan Wai Kit’s. The Defendant submitted that the Radhi Direction applied in this case and that the Prosecution had failed to prove that there was wilful blindness on the part of the Accused over the drugs found in the car as well as the apartment. S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [20] The Defence additionally invited this Court to invoke adverse inference under s114(g) Evidence Act 1950 when the Prosecution had failed and/or refused to call Tan Ken Hong and Chin Yoon Choy to testify at trial. Assessment by this Court [21] This Court was most concerned about the fact that the investigation had knowledge of other people’s purported involvement pertaining the car and the drugs. Evidence shows that it was SP12 who had supplied the names of Ng Tze Hao and Chan Wai Kit when he answered the question as to whom did the public (Tan Ken Hong and Chin Yoon Choy) inform him carried a black plastic bag into the car. [22] This most certainly created reasonable doubt in this Court’s mind as to the element of possession of the dangerous drugs by the Accused. There were no efforts taken by investigation to even locate Tan Ken Hong and Chin Yoon Choy. With such material information that they have, this Court is left with no choice but to conclude that the Prosecution was hiding something not favourable to them. It is most appropriate to invoke adverse inference against them for the non-calling of Tan Ken Hong and Chin Yoon Choy with regards to the charge of drug trafficking. See Chin Kek Shen v Public Prosecutor [2013] 5 MLJ 827; Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492; [1987] 1 CLJ 250, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2004] 1 MLJ 177; [2003] 4 CLJ 409. [23] Moreover, this Court found that the contention that the location of the drugs was a special hidden compartment were not proven by the S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Prosecution. This case started with the drugs found in the special hidden compartment. But towards the end, in the midst of challenged hurled at the testimonies of SP9 and SP11 on the make of the Honda Accord, the Prosecution had not addressed or replied on s37(h) DDA. [24] In this case, the Prosecution had failed to show that the location was a compartment specially constructed and designed for the purpose of concealment. No experts were called. This Court found that SP9 did not have the necessary qualification, experience, or expertise. In fact, SP9 admitted that he did not have proof that he had ever worked with Honda. SP11 testified he could not confirm that the additional compartment was a result of modification. Their knowledge on the matter was insufficient for this Court to hold them as experts in Honda Accord cars. [25] In concluding this case, it is imperative to address a significant concern that has emerged from the proceedings – the inadequacy of the police investigation that preceded this trial. The role of law enforcement in our justice system is foundational, serving not only to enforce the law but to ensure that justice is pursued with diligence, integrity, and respect for the legal rights of all individuals. [26] Regrettably, in this instance, the investigation conducted was not just inadequate, but egregiously so, falling far below the standards expected of competent law enforcement. This substandard investigation has had severe consequences, not least the unwarranted consumption of precious judicial time and resources, which could have been allocated to other cases where the need for justice is urgent and clear. See Rahmani Ali Mohamad v PP [2014] 6 MLJ 525; Bunya AK Jalong v Public S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Prosecutor [2015] 5 MLJ 72; 1 [2015] 5 CLJ 893, Pang Chee Meng v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 MLJ 137. [27] More critically, this investigation's deficiencies led to the remanding of the accused in custody, an action that, given the insufficiency of evidence, was both unjust and unnecessary. The principle that an individual is innocent until proven guilty is a cornerstone of our legal system. In this case, the evidence presented did not meet the threshold of establishing guilt prima facie, let alone beyond reasonable doubt. This Court’s decision [28] There is reasonable doubt raised on the charge of drug trafficking for the reasons aforementioned. The Prosecution had failed to established a prima facie case for this charge. The Accused is hereby acquitted and discharged of the charge under s39B(1) DDA. [29] However as to the two charges of possession under s12 DDA, this Court finds that the elements have been fulfilled and a prima facie case is made out against the Accused. The Accused is ordered to enter his defence to the said two charges. [30] This Court explained the decision to the Accused in Bahasa Malaysia. The Accused confirmed he understood them. His counsel then explained the three options that are available to him under the CPC. [31] The second and third charges were read to the Accused in Bahasa Malaysia. The Accused confirmed he understood the charges, their nature S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal and consequences of his plea. To each of the two charges of possession under s12 DDA, the Accused pleaded guilty. [32] The Prosecution confirmed the facts as per the findings of this Court. The Deputy Public Prosecutor submitted that the time spent already in prison ought to serve as a lesson for the Accused. [33] This Court sentences the Accused to ten months imprisonment for each charge. Both ten months imprisonment sentences are to run concurrently. Effective from the date of his arrest. The Accused was hereby free to go. DATED 21 DECEMBER 2023 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the Prosecution: DPP Fatin Hanum Abdul Hadi DPP Nik Mohd Fadli bin Nik Azlan DPP Mohamad Shahrizzat bin Amadan Deputy Public Prosecutors For the Accused: Maanveer Singh Dhillon and Intern Lim Sheng Zhen S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal T/n Maanveer Singh Dhillon & Co. S/N k57uLDYddUijLetGTJ4pFQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY MALAYSIA PUBLIC PROSECUTOR …. APPLICANT

Tika 2.6.0

PA-22NCvC-121-08/2022

PLAINTIF 1. ) AZIZAH BINTI ABDULLAH 2. ) HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH 3. ) MOHD KHUSAIRI BIN MOHD ISA 4. ) MOHD SHAMSURI BIN MOHD ISA 5. ) ROZAINI BINTI ABDULLAH 6. ) SITI ZAUYAH BINTI ABDULLAH DEFENDAN 1. ) ABD MANAN BIN HUSIN 2. ) ISMAIL BIN SAMAT

Full Trial – claim by the Plaintiffs in Suit 64 as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain for a declaration that the estate of the late Abdullah is holding ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain. Issues• Whether the late Abdullah held ½ undivided share of the said land on constructive trust for the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the letter dated 30th January 1983 by Mohamad Bin Abdullah, the son of the late Abdullah permitting the 1st Plaintiff to build a house on the said land tantamounts to the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain having an interest in the said land;• Whether there is fraud/ misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct committed by the late Abdullah and/or the estate of the late Abdullah against the Plaintiffs as the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• If fraud/misrepresentation/ unconscionable conduct by the late Abdullah is found, whether the Limitation Act 1953 and/or the principle of laches applied to defeat the claim of the estate of the late Haji Mat Zain;• Whether the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession of the said land; and• Whether there is unjust enrichment on the part of the late Abdullah.The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a constructive trust in favour of the late Haji Mat Zain nor found any unconscionable conduct.The Court also finds that the estate of the late Abdullah and/or the Defendants have an overriding interest as the registered proprietor of the said land.The Court finds that the estate of the late Abdullah is entitled to vacant possession subject to them compensating the two Plaintiffs in Suit 64 for the present value of the said houses to be assessed by an independent valuer appointed by the Court. The costs of this valuation is to be borne by the estate of the late Abdullah.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8003141e-a54a-426b-b2c3-09ad91c0f9b1&Inline=true

05/01/2024 14:10:57 PA-22NCvC-121-08/2022 Kand. 14 S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HhQDgEqla0KywwmtkcD5sQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify 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MALAYSIA GUAMAM SIVIL NO P zzucvoeo NI2|l22 ANTARA 1. AED MANAN am HUSIN (No. KW: 550222-07-5471 r(um-- 4935755) [Punladb Han: Punk: luql H:)| rm bln Bin Haj? Sallo ,si um: (aolepil lnl dlruluk sabagni ‘Hun Mat Zaln msebur menurul Pcrinlnh bfrurilm U1.05.1D2I) 2. ISMAIL am AB SAMAY (No. KIP: 541111-oz-5529 I (Lama: 4711139) PLAINTIF-FLAINTIF DAN 4. sin ZAUVAM amnnanumm [NO. KIP: :muM1—52a4] Pomadhlr mm Punk: Blgl Abdulllh am Abdul Majld 2. ROSLIN amn MUHAMMAD mo. Kl samza-nu-5744} P-nmdmr Mum Punk. Abdullnh am Abdul Mxjld sw HhDDgEq\anKvwwmIkcD5sD Ms: I M -4 mm Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum pm 3. AZIZAH awn AEDULLAN mo. KIP.: 5no7u.n7.5Iss] 4. HASNAH BINTI ABDULLAH (No. K1P.: 430330-07-5102] 5. MOHD KHUSAIRI am Mono ISA [N0. KIP.: 610908-07-5255] E. MOHD sHAMsuRI BIN MOHD ISA [N0. K/F.: 71092142-5:75] 1. ROZAINI Imm ABDULLAH [NO. K/P.: s1Ims-a1-5594] a. ZALINA amn IDRIS [NCL KIP.: 560617-07-5154] DEFENDAN-DEFENDAM DIDEIIGAR EERSAMA BALAM MAHKAMAN TINGGI MALAVA DI PULAIJ FINANG DALAM NEGERI FULAU FINANG GUAMAN SIVIL no new 21-on/2022 Armuu I. AZIZAH amn AEDULLAH [No. mp: 5oo11¢o1‘s1n] sw HhDDgEq\anKywwmIkcD5sD Pu: 2 am mm Sum M... M“ be used M mm I. nflmrufllv mm; “Mm. VII muwa VWLII 11.2. ms subsequent purchase by me Ia|e Abauiisn at me nublic auc1iDn vide a saunnd inaeniure oi sale dated 3" May 1941 was sinister and irauauianny done 11.3. the esvace oi the iaie Abdullah had krmwledge at all material limes that me Iaie Haii Mai Zain was run a squatter simp/rune: but the owner of the V. undivided share ollhe sax: iand, and 11 4 that the years oi wuupaiion and paymem oflhe assassmanl is an acknowledgement by the late Abauniaii that V, undivided sriareei me said iana is heid on mnstruclivetruslforme iamiiy Mme lala Haji MalZaIn. mu Dofomi-ms‘ coimmlmu/submissions [12] The mnlsnlians/submissions of me esla1e or the late Abduliah are summarized as ioiiews 12.1. me pmcivf paymem Mme quil rem urassessmenl is not proof olan equivasie ngm over me said land. 12 2. me oucupaiiun or me said and does not prevent the esiaia ol the Is|a Abduilah as ma registened pmprieioiimm taking acaon to ream/er the said |and1 IN H>1DDuE¢=HKyvrwmlkcD5iD p... :1 nl :4 ma 5.11.1 ...m.m111 be flied m mm 1.. nflmruflly sum. dun-mm Va arium WM! 12 3. ma allegad olal agreement mwean me lala Hall Mal zaln and the IICE Abdullah is not Iarlable nor admlsslble In law as it ls based on hearsay, and 12.4 male was an lnordmale delay In lxlmmenclng lhls presern acllon and ma eslata onne lale Hall Mal zaln have sat on lh - nghls aasplla having knawledge mal lne name 01 me late Hall Mal zaln was not leglslam: on me me Deed slnce 1941 llsall. sumnn ot Prod [13] ll la lllle law lllal he who aaaena musl prwa me P8I'lil:uIaHa<.1s.As such‘ lne burden of glow llas on me aslala cl lne lala Hall Mal am as me Plalnlllls lhmughaut [ha lnal la prove lnau clllm aglmsl ma esbzaie nllha |a|aAbdu||zh and In be veslad wlm V. undrvlded an-re ollhe sale land on a nalanaa nl pmbablllllas as enshrined under socllom ma. 1n: and lo: ol on Evldunuu Act flsa. [saa cam of John: al Abdul Kndlr Mnrlcln v lnvrtnnco Lam Kwck Fun A Anuv[19l|l] l IALRA anal and Tan Kiln Knunn v. ‘rm Kn Kim (M) sun and mu] 1 cu SUPP 141}. [141 To ml: and, II 1! also am lnal I quola the use of Lucllununan clmu Alng-ypln Q LAI|lgnppIn I Anor v. Socurn lvunmlnn Sdn and mm 3 MLRA 501 were me Federal calm held as fnllows. -(521 saclnzn 1lJ1(1Jpmvl'l1e.sIII.!t'VVhl)ev9Id9:wes any couma give judgment as to any legal righl a llanlllry dependent on lno IN HhDDuE¢=HKyvIwmlkcD5iD Page :2 04 u ‘Nab! a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be flied M mm ms anlln.l-y MIN: dun-mm Va .mm mm sxislencc ollecis which he essens, must prove iiiei (hose laels exisr "ssciion 101 siaies lnei Ihe iniiiel burden cfpvoving a puma facis case in his favaur is cast on the nlerniiil . " (waodmlle and AmlrNl Law 0/ Evidence, min edn. vol 3 al p 3194) Illllsllalloll in to s lav guts It begnd doubt mi in» "burdtlv armor " iesxs throughout an the p_l.:lnmr. Section 1:72 mums me: "The hurdnn of El in a suit of ggceeding lies on mi gersarl who would fall ilno evidence at all weie given on aim: si "The initial anus elmvlng the case is afwazs on me flaimlff " (saikai Law aIEvldence lsili edn at 1593. Illustration (u to s 102 ggls It beige dollbl than u gllintilfllas the initial onus ol El {sq Time a glillmllllus both tllu buiden ol flies ml! as the Inltlll onus olgiool. /rl Bniesrone Pie Lid v. smnii & Associates Far Eesi Lii1[2l7o7]4 SLR 855, me singapoie Court omppeal pei vx Rajah ./CA dsllvsllrlg ilie ludgmenl ol the coun, explained inei el me sien of iiie plslntlll : case me burden ol pmol and me arms alpmurcoinci.le- ' . ailne srsnollhe plainmls case, M! lgalaurden onflvlng rlie exlmim of nix ieleveni not met me gulnillr mus! mve Ind lhe evldentlll burden ol soma (not inherently lncmdlblo evidence at‘ me exlsience olsuch lucnmlnelde. l/pan adducllon ollhal evidence, me evidential burden shins to me delendenl, as me case may lie, to adduce some evidence in ieouiiul. ll no evidence /II ieouiial is adduced. lhs court may eoncluue iioin (ha evidence ol me 1.19/9/vdanl IL on me alhar nena, swdancv in rebuttal I5 adduced, me eviaeniial Duldcn in HhDDgEqIanK‘/wwmlkcnfisn nu. u eiu -we Sum IHIWDIY Mu be used m mm me uun.iu MW; dnunmnl via nF\uNG we shifls back [0 the p/HVIMV, U, u/limsls/y, Ihs evidenlial burden comes I0 iasi an ina defendant, Ins l9gs/ burden of pniar or me reievanl fan would have been discharged by the plainhf The Iegalbumeri 0! pidai. a paiinaneni and enduring miidan ~ does naisnin. A parry who nas me legal lumen drpidoiaii any issue IN/SI discharge it Ihmughoul. sonieiiines, the legal aiiidan is spoken or, /naccurals/y, as "S‘himng”, Bur wnai is miiy ineanz is inai anoinei issue nas been engaged, on wnian (he opposiia party neais me /eqa/burden Diplval ' §51The ml: is mat ‘the onus oimoiafanzgaiticuiar hztlles on the am who mm It not on him win: denies it- at inciimnir pmbaliarl qiii decii, non qui neqax, acrvli incibir piooaiion . The glnlnfllf is bound in ma iiisi Instance ta show a gma laclecasa and inn vos it imgifm inc mm will not assist nim. Hum (ho maxim Ever est condition delendantls. A flalnlm‘ cannot obviously advantagg Ilimsdf by the weakness of mo doilnu. A fllnfllrs case must stand or hll um me ovldonct adducod by him. When. however. (he dslandant, or either liligarll pan}/, insiaad ol denying wnai is a//eged againm nim, iaiias an some naw maiiai wiiian, i/inie, is an answai I017, me miiden orpinoi changes sides, and iia, in ms (um, ls bound lo sndw a pfima iacid 9559 at ieasi and, ii ne leaves I! iinpaiiaci, ina mun WI" rlal assist niin. Raiis sxcipendo Ill aclal” (woodio/is and AIHWA/1, sum, vol 3 ai p aisomgu " in HhDDfiEUiflKyvIwmlkcD5iD 7:5: in am warn Sum llnnflhlv nu as used M mm me nvmnnfily mm; dnunmnl VIA .mnc WM! [151 As such. the burden of meat tea on the estate at the late Hatt Mat Zam |o wave the extstehee a1 a txxtstructtve trust iar the hate Hatt Mat zeth and the consequential right |o be vested wtth the ‘/1 uh ed share of the Sam rand tn the name at the late Hah Mat zattt. [16] There ate several issues which teeutte judtaal eohsuetettoh/asterhttnettoh as f0HUws' t5.1.whether the late Abdullah hetd ‘A undivtded share of the Said Iahtt an emslruclwe ttustrortha estate ctthe late Hap Mat Lam. 16.2.Whetner the tettet dated 30" Janualy 1933 by Mohamad Bun Abdullaht the sun 0! the tate Atntuueh psmtitung the I“ Platnfifl (0 Dutld a house on the sand land lamamaunls In the slate M the late Haji Mat zath having an thterest tn the sen tend, 16.3 whether there Is ftaudl mtsrepresehtauonx uhoohstatnhabte conduct oommttted bythe late Abdullah and/av the estate at the |a|e Atmuttah agalllsl the Platntttts as the estate at the late Hatt Mat L-tm, ta.4.tr llaudlmtsrepresanlalinnl unoohsetanahto wnduct by the hate Atzeutteh ts found. whethu lh: untttauen Act 125: aharor the pnnotpla at taches eppttea In aeteat the atetht 0! the estate at‘ the late Hail Mat Zain. IN HhDDt]E¢=DKyvIwmlkcD5iD um ts em ‘Nata s.t.t In-vthnrwm be ts... m mm .. nflmheflly MW: dun-mm VI] nrtuNG Wm! l65,Whethev ma es1aIe of ma late Abaunan ws enulled Io vacanl possesswun oflhe saw and and 165Wha(her mere ws unyusc enrichmenl an the part al the Vale Ahdullah. [17] From me abwe, n will be clear lhat me crmcal issue m nus case .5 whether ar nut Ihere was Iraud/musrepresemamon or unconscuoname mnducl by me Vale Ahdnmah or the same ov me late Abduflah and whether may mm '/2 undrvxded share 01 me sand land on conslrucuve trust 70! the 9.51315 0! (he |a|e Hap Mat Zam being [he benefmianes of me Vale Han Mat Zain The detenrwlalmn nlthns mam asue wwll w my View rash/e me omav Issues F‘ :1 mun: Whnhor mu lama Abdull-h hold V. undlvld r m gm lgnd gn conslmctlve mnua: ma nlah ohm Inn Hg'i Mac Iain mg M53151 mg“ i; lgudl mlscemnnmlonl unoonscionahlu conduct committed fix mg gjg Aggllan and the -am: of an n Abdullah a lmlmo nun oflhn In H ’i Man i [15] The emu: ov me Late Han Mal h: n Iheirsuhmlssion mnnarms man a remedial oonstrucirve Izual sxlsls tor the V. undivided share or the saw: land m their favour The estate Mme Ia|s Han Mal Zam refers to ma case 0! RH: Bunk Ehd v Trivl M (M) Sdn Bhd a. on and aw »nnu.za=uKWm:v=us.n Page ns am -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! unoum -punt [2016] 1 ML! 175 where one Faaerat Courl held as tottems: "1271 A D'0PvI‘sfa'y rams-1y may also us awarded where tt Is apprnvrtale tn Lonrho Ptc u Fayed and omsrs ttvu M19921 1 WLR 1a! p 9, Mttten .t ctled me ruttawtng passage from Meagnar, Gummow and Lenane, Equt‘ Ramsdlss, (2nd Ed) at p 321, wntcn sstd met when appropriate the noun wuutd grant a propnetary remedy. Doclmtss and When appropnate, tns mun wttt grant a pwpvietary remedy to restore to ma ptatnmr property of whtch he has been wrongty deprived, or to pvsvenl lhs derandant imm retatntng e benefit wnten ne has olzlatnad by hrs awn wrong It /5 nolpossible and it weutd net be destrabla, to attempt and exhaustive nlassificaltbn ortne sttuatrans tn whtclv /[wt/I410 so Eauiry mus! retain what has been called us tnnerent ttaxtutttty and cspactly to adjust to new situations by reterenee ta me marnepnnge of equitable turtsdicrton " [19] In adanten, reltanoe ts placed on me ease at Atlas cauinutsa Fumltme Ltd at al v Nallonal Trust co Lid [1932] as DLR(4m) 161 where the Brilish Columbia Courl at Aupeat new as tulle-us: "A remedtat cormructrve trust ts a trust trnuesed Dy mun order as a mmody tor a wrong Tne enttttemenr to max remedy may be a malls: ol euuemntnre law, but me (ms! tteett I: not created by me acls uttne pames, or even uy me oottgauun In make teetttuttorr, but IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD 7:5: :1 mu -nus s.r.t n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nVW‘nlWY MW: dun-mm VII uF\uNG v-mat by ma order of the noun As wltn other calm orders, the trust wlll some mm being wtran Ins arder is plorlotmced, unless, in an appmpllala case the alder ls made rslroacllvs or /15 comlllg lnla force ls deferred It may be war m many cases where a rsmedlal L‘orlsfmc1l've trust ls lmposetl the court will oruar tllax it be lmpossd wltll ellecl lrom Ills true when the srluatlon arose which gave use to the uruusl snnchmenl. sea Rswltlk v. Raw/uk. mere must, ol wurse. be a causal corlnecllorl between the progeny tn qllsslton and the unjust enrlcttrrrent. See somrtrarl v Solocharl, [1955] 2 5 CR, 38 and Rosellleld u Olson (1985), 1 E.c.L R. (2d) 708 The rel-rtedlal construcllve lnlsl must be tllstmgulshed lrum the autzsmntrua mrrsuuctlua trust which the court declares to have anssrl, as 3 result ollne conduct aims panles, and by the lame ol mat conduct alone, at me sarllsr tlms wllen the relevant conduct acoumaa." [2D]Fur1.her, reltanoe ls also placed an me mass at Nlulchlmkl u Dodds(1iB5) a2 ALR 429 where me Hlgn Court ol Auslralla per Dean: J emlncla|ed as lollams "rn kn l fl n ‘ IV l:orI§!mcllI/8 !vI.l§1does nol involve g derllglg/MS conlllwad fixlfll )( muggy (cl Wnh v Wirlh (95 cu?) at u 235 The inslililflonal character ol ms trust nas never completely oollteratea us rsmedlal ongirls sven m the case otttra mam lradltlonsl forms olaxprsss and lmplrea trust. ms IS a Iorriorl in the case arconstrucllva trust where, as has been mentlonau, II-la mmedlhl crlaraaer remains pmdomlnan! tn that the [rust use/I Elmer rsplsssnts, or mllsds the auallamllty ol, equitable relief m the pamcular ctrcumslancss. IN HnDDqE¢=nt<y»rwmIkcD5sn P11: 1: MM Nata Smut In-vlhnrwm as used M mm the ntwlmflly MIN: dun-mm VII nFluNG WM! Indeed, in Mrs country at leasl, the constructive trust has not outgrown its formative s1ages as an aqunable remedy and should sn'Il be seen as eonsrmng an n psrsansrnramsdy attaching lo property which may be moulded and adjusled to gun; slicer lo the app/rcarion and mlsr-p/ay of equrlable principles rn fne crvcumslances nllhs pamcu/at case /n psmcular, where wmpsling common law or equilali/e c/arms are or may be involved, 5 .1ee1e1sr1on olconstructive trust by way ofremeoy can properly be so framed [hat me consequences urns impasmon are npsrarfvs only from me dale onuagmsnz nr formal court order or lrum some alner specified date. The fact that (he consrructrve trust remains preduminarmy remedial does nut, hawsvsr, mean thfil 1! represents a medium run (he indulgence ol nmsynmuo notmns oliarrness and justice As an equneme remedy, 11 Is evsnams an/y when warranted by established equitable pnnaplss or Dy me /sgmmale processes of legal reasoning, by analogy, Indmrtson and deduclron, from the sramng pain! or a prayer understanding ol the oonoeprual Ioumiaxron or such pnnuptes (cl, generally, Sir Frank Kms foreword to me 1s: ed 11975) 0! Msaghar, Gummow and Lenane: Eqmly, Docmne: and Remedies, at pp v~vii or the 2nd ad (1954), and see also, 99 Re Drp/ock [1943] on 455 at 451-2 ,'Fem'?( v Pemn[197o; AC ms: 19:, am, 509, 325,- Cowcnev v EowcnsI[1922] 1 wm 425auJn,-119721 1 All ER EM at 948;_Iacobs’ Law Ill Trusts /7! AMAVE/la, llh ed {V977‘ Moagrvsr and Gummow), paras 13471-2, 1325-9,-Allen v Snyder (197712 NSWLR 655 at 539, 7021!, Oakley, on an, pp 1-112, Pam, on on, pp 4-5). Vrswed as a remedy, the Iunclmn ml the mrvstrucuvs Irus! .s not to mndsr superfluous, but 10 reflect and enforce. me pnnclples ol the law 0! aqmty 1n HhDDqEu:nKywwmIkcD5iD '13: ., s. .. “Nata s.n.1 n-nhnrwm be used M van; .. nflglnnflly mm; mmn 1.. mum pans! musnis inanrieia is rropimirr me /aw all/71: counzryinnne notion oi '5 constructive rrusi ofn new model“ which, "by wrnazever name 1: rs desmbed . is imposed by law whenever iusfice and good conscience” (in ms sense at 1armass- ur wnar "was raw) 'reqmra it" (per Lard banning MR, Eves v Eves [1975] 1 Wu? meat 1341 1342, [1a751:sAriER 765 at 771, 772 and Hussey V Palmer [1972] 1 wu? 1235 at 1259-90.'[1972I 3 All ER 744 5! 747)." my on ma Nstolical Incl: ohms prasarn case, in IS cleav that mare were Mo Indemuras rn respsmafme saw warm The late Haji Malzain and me Abdullah wave rag\sIArad as nananis in common ai ina said land was me. man Indanlum dam 15* Ann! I930 under Iha Engnsn Daad System :1 ma R9g\sIar M Deeds. Penang on 27* May 1930. [221 anm |enanls in wmmon were regmelld is shimmy inangagors OHM said land wide a sianuwry mnngtge dated 19“ Apru «van on 27“ May 1930 at me Ragmrar cl Dem, s-ennng. [231 was a mom: inaeniura dated M May 4941, (ha said land wus iransvened to me Im Abdulllh only wno had paid $130.00 as the SUCOBSSM ladder of the said land at a public aucfinn Ce half! lhe morlgagors had hreachad me said smumry murlgaue The second Indenlure was regisnereu on 30'" Jun: 1941 under me Deed nyslem at me Registrar 0! Deeds‘ Penang rn HhDDuE¢=nKyvrwmIkcD5iD raaem-rm “Nuns Sum! n-nhnrwm be used M van; .. mn.u.y sun. dun-mm r.. mum pans! 2. HASNAH BINTI AEDULLAH (Nu. m: Awssnm-51021 3. MOHD KHIISAIRI am MOND ISA [No. KIP: smwa-tn-51551 4, Mom! SHAMSURI BIN MOND ISA (No. KIP: 11 n921—o2sa1s] 5. ROZAINI sum Aauumxu [No. KIF: 5109:3411-5594] 6. SITI ZAUYAH EINTI ABDULLAH [Na mp: mm-o7-52541 memnaax meVa\m ZALINA snm mums [No. K/P. 530617-07-5154} sen.-agai pemegang Surat Kuasa Waknl yang sah bag! P\aInM-F'\amM) PLAIDITIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. ABD MANAN am HUSIN [No. KlF:5MI222-d7»547T] 2. Isuun. am smn nzrsunmnzrsunm sw HhDDgEqIanKwrwmIkcD5sD me a m « mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm [24] Fmm ma above, it is clear that oniy me name of me late Abauuah has been registered on me said land being me mghesl bwdder for me same at ma malena\ nme. [25] The esuna 0! ma Vale Haj Mat Zaln wnlends max mere exis|s s4nis(ershIp and mequwable conduct on me pan of me late Ahdmlah. The estate onne late Ha]: Mal Zain submits mac me lace Che Long (wwa cl lhe Vale Haji Ma1Zam)had pend me mommy mongage sum in me late Abdullah who had man aauaa lo pay on ma arvears which lad to the sad land being aucunnsd and \a¢ar pumnasea by ma Vane Abdunah solely. [29] In my view, there ' no emdenoe Io substarmate me above and such hare avermenls/asserlluns is \n my vsew insulficienl to conclude that the Vale Abdullah is gumy 0| slmsletship and inwumhle oonducl [See ma mse al axnary Force Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Pelabuhan John! [zoos] 1 ms 313] ms conlermcn now that me late Che Long naa made me payments under me slalulory mongage \s also not oerlam as me estate of ma Isle Hafl Mal zam has oonsaxanuy taken me poaiuan man ma Vale Ha]: Mal Zam and me ma One Long were uneducatad and bara\y had enough mone|ary funds var surv|va\ at that me. [27] Funnen vn my Maw, ma eslale auna ¥a|e Haj: Mal zam have a\so failed to pmve on a balance M probablllues man (her: exlsls any constructive trust var me estate oflhe ma HaiiMa(L!1n.Nowhere doe: ma ueond lndamure dated 3"‘ May um mdimls or mlar that mere was ImsI(holh axpraaaxy oHmp|1ed\y)clealedlcrlhe asoaua at [he late Hap Mal zam There Is alsa no evidence lo subslanllala ma can|anuonsllac1: lhal Ihe IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5aD Page 11 M u Nuns sum n-nhnrwm be used m yaw ma anmmmy mm: dun-mm wa mum pm late che Lung has made the payment for the V. undwidzd share at the sald land and the late Abdullah pmnused lo regtsler the said W undlvlded share VI the name of the late Hail Mal zatn or the late che Lung [25] ln edditlon, havlrlg aonsrdered the lacts at [his sate, I find that the estate at the late Ha]! Mat zain have tatled lo pmve on a balance of probabllmes that there was any unmnscionable conduct and/or any grounds tor rue to find or impose: temedtal aonstrumlve trust tn tavour ulthe late Halt Mat utn and the estate altne late Hajl Mat zaln due la the loflowlrtg laclars a The estate oltne late Hali Mat zaln have nm addueed any ongenl evrdenue nut rely neaytly on hearsay le aentend that the late Ahdullan had nhlalned the sad land tnde the second lndenture lor the benefit or the late Halt Mat Zam Thls slnularty appltes wtth respect to the wn|en!lorl v1 unoonsctonaole oonduot on the pan at the late Abdullah when the sald land was putchased, b. The estate or the late Halt Mat Zaln admllted tn fllelr lallmony especlally the 1' Platntttl that the alleged oral agreement bemaen the |a|eAbdu\|ah and Ihe lale Haji Ma( Zalrl was knclwn only to nlrn lrorn the statements heard lrorn the late che Long wmch Is nut adrrllsslhle under me rule agalrlsl hearsay and that ll muld be [me av Hal The I" Piamlifl I¢5|ifIed dtmng L7uss— examination as follows: "FD :T9k sellqu? Jndl In! kalounggn nombol 4 In! berdtlsarkan kelerangan one Long A uw ad: IN H>tDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD Pig! :2 one -we s.n.t nnvlhnrwm ue used M yaw ms uflmnaflly mt. dun-mm vta .nuye Wm! SP1 PD SP1 ‘IA SP1 SP1 FD SP1 miklumatmiklumal I-lln barkonun Inllgtl Elfinflan Irsan torsebul. : Ini adalan dang: cm LL»,-1. > Oh: Lyg somata-mana7 :Katsrsngsn pasarmpamnggan 4:15!-I spasarapa yang bevlaku pada tahun 1930 bsrdasarkan apa wnq drbemahu kepada Encik Marian oran cha Lang7 ‘Ya. V lad: kelslangan one Long Ievsebln mungkin boleh oem/, mungkm bnlsh Irdak betul, selu/u arau vidak7 may sslu/u Im berpsndu kspsda dokumen may kamr dapal: .- 1.-gin." gjurnn Ilsln mm id: dokumln. Jadl saga ma "5 Eng dlmaklum am. one Long mungkin betul mugkln mm mm? va ” [See page 45 orme Noles or Evidence daled 9* May 2025] c The leuer [mm Mohamad hm AhduHah datad aw» January 1933 had emy gwen the 1" Plalnlm permission to bmld a house and could not tantamount |o Ihe esme at the lale Haj: Mal Zam aaqumng ngms and beneficial mlarasl an me said land. a The 2"’ Plnmufl aammau during ms Iesllmuny lha| ma estate 09 ma Vala Haj! Mal Zam had volunlanly gn/an/sunendarea ma paddy «am to ma as(a|e o1lheIaIeAbdu\I:h wnnom nusrng any ob)ec1>cn lo Ihe same when ma aslale :11 ma lace Abdunah aw HhDDuE¢in><ywwmlkcD5iD Viuezsmu -ma Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm a. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm rsqueslsd for lh: same m 2019. The 2"“ P\ainlif1(SP2| lnsnfied as louaws’ “FF Tak, tak Er/a dla Duat rampssan ifu, EM‘/k Ismail bag/Tahu rampasan dmuaz w sawan pad: lsnah Abduliah alaupun sawah pacn Ha/I Mal Zam mp SP-2 :Dus-due belalv says bust. YA Rampasan mbual ax sawan pad: mans, kawzlsan maria? sp-2 .»<awa:an sebe/ah kampnmg Haj} Mal Zam, yang ssoeran pan! pro/sk aw sebelah Ha//’AbduIIah PP :so kodua-dun nan-gt-n mu monk. momma: rnmgurfl sp-2 :Mnnh mblla-omul um-nun. PF mun sp-1 FF Yang Abdu/Ian cu you bayav sswaksn? s;=~2 'Ya PP Dan mu kswasan bapa menus you lah, mam. /-mpu jugs? SP»? . va PP . Macum mans Iampasan im bsnaku, omen [alukarfl SP-2 . say: Ink bohh [5/as curna dupe bagiruhu kalza kami akan ambil bahk Ian (Brush nu sebub hak d-pa (See page 87oIlI>e Notes ofevidomv dated 9'" May 2023] IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD Pauuolu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ‘PD SP—2 PD SP-2 FD SP—2 PD sP—2 PD SP-2 PD SF-2 PD 5:12 ‘.1111! up knakan sin‘ Znguh dmng unluk munumur kombalf mlnggmbilalfh kumbali slwuh (orsobut knuru sawan ttrstbul adalan mill); mereka. Sen.l[u Ivnutldlk7 -saga seIu[u. Jawalz kepada Mallkamah dengan ;eIas senqu 1/ad: awak I/dak ads aps-ans benlshan (ah verhadap psngambtla/than semu/a sawah yang sslangah bahagran kamu usahakan pads lahun 2019 Isrssbut Trdak Dan kamu ‘mg ulah muumn kamba/I seem bark Iah kflda Sfri Zagzah. :Dan sebagaipenyewa sawah, awak/uga ads ulusan penukaran name mm rsu subsrdr dan ha/a /‘uga Kan? vya. ‘Dan um M. sour: balk dan aman man mcmbull flllklllll nun: dlll nlml IV/All aebagnl gngwl kegdn SM Zauxlfl, aalu Al ltlu @& .Ya mm balk. :TIu1n non-mg bnnnh-n7 Tldak mu. [See page 32 ol the Note: 9/ Ev/dance dated 9" May 21223] IN HhDDgE|zIanK‘/wwmlkcnfisn -ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm mumu ‘PD ‘Tad! Enclk lsmall ksln Ellclk Ismal/ eenen kamba/l sscsra 9/ok Kan, secera eman s/2.2 ‘Va PD ./ad! Iak timbul Vail dskwaan mersmpas sawah padi Iersebtll Memarlg ssrah ksmbs/I sacalx elak tan. SP-2 :Ya ' [see page as alrhe Notes o/swdence dated 9* May 2023) e The estate cfllhe late Hap Mal zain have tzottt admltted dunng tne cuurse or the tnal that they do not even have knowledge about the 5112 of me said land wnen claiming the ‘/1 urldlvlded snare dune said land, and r Tne estate at the late ttall Matzaln had sleot on men rlgnts and did not take any reasonable amen to enforce their alleged banefiolal lrtleresls/ngms over the V. undivtded snare 01 tne satd land despite havlng krmwiedge at tne alleged uncurlsciovtable canduct etme IateAbdullah since 1941 ttsen. [29] In additlon, tne estate ulttte late Haj: Mat zatn seeksa declarallnn met me send V. undwtded share at the sad land I5 based on the oral agvsement wlnareln Ins ‘/e share 07 the two muss: and ‘/4 share 07 the paddy neld belungs ta the estate 01 flle late Haji Mal z n. ln my vlaw, the mat agreement rematne a hate assamen wttn no evldenee adduced In sutzslaniiale sucn a claim. In any event, this oral agreement ts supztsedad by tne sewnd lrtdenlure, we can be seen from me testtmany dune 1-‘ Plutntttf dunng cmesexnnunullon as lulluus. lN HhDDuE¢=nl<ywwmIkcD5iD y... hi and -we s.n.t In-vthnrwlll be used M mm ms mnmu-y enn. m.n.n n. mane em ‘PD SP1 : rskpzy n-arm akan mm o/sh peyuamcara Enmk Jadl saga kalnkan seluu alau Ildak Indulture Sale [lug kedul Irll Kelli! mamnasr araugun Inl [any Ilrbaru 1941 Iran dun ll Illengafisl afl-33 kandugggn gang ada di A1aL!m lndenkuw Salt mo Mrsobut. Sotlfu mu lidak? Mansn 59$! [see page 48 anhe Noxes afEw'der1oe dated 9" May 2023] PD SP1 . PD SP1 PD s1N H>wDDqE¢an><ywwmIkcD5sD -ms s..1.1...m..w111.. .15.. m mm 1.. nVVfl\ru“|¥ mm; dun-mm VII mum Wm nay, lakva ran Slya kstl says cadangkan Enctk Manan be/sh sslu/u slau lsk selu/u sabab lsd1 Encxk Msnan kara I-Bk d-lk psngslahuan spa Darfaku 19317 hmgga 1341 msksud dia 11 Iahun ads gap agak/umlah yang psmang darn dokumsn dengan pales manyalakan alas kemurlgktran Abduuan bin And Mafia dan juga Ha/'1 Mat zarn rmska hananah tersebul dtlelang semula dan Abdu//ah Ma/1:1 mum pembe/i kedua berdasarkan dokumsn di mukasural 25 Kan? Ya Jad1, saya kala yang !ad1'EI1c:'k Manan secuju ape yang dlkalskan olsh Che Long .11 dalsm pwapsn 4 ads/an salu peqaniian lrsan berdasariran dokumen 19317 okay dnllm 11 n n n n n m §7 mu dlsnkog oleh dakumen gang suELsedl menngnasl dnkuman pm gamma maka geflgnflan llsln gang dlbuatmulut Ilu adalah lldak zflakal her: n berl-ku gzmbahan dalam mug 11 rahurl terso.-but setulg arau lidak soalan sag? SP1 . Sctuiu.” [See page A9 allhs Noles ofEvn1sm:e dated 9'" May 2023] [an] \n mnclusmn, havmg consmarea |ha above, I am 11! the Iha| lha aslala 1.71 mm mm Hap Mal Zain have lalled lo prove an a hamnce of DVobabHrhes(haHJ1e IslaAbduIlah nova; V; unawea share of me sad land on eensxrucwe (rust m ilvourahhe Vale Hap Max Zam or me aslam of ma lace Hay Mal Zain sooand Inuo: vnmhur mu I-nu dzlud 19'“ Januag Igu gg Mohzmad mn Abdullah gs gm sun mum [ah Ahdullgh Emu g Inc: I“ Flalmlfl to build g ngug E Q; gig lug V!§j§ gnu, um gl gm I ' ' II immu in mo and land. [311 The same onhe Iale Hap Ma| Zam a\sn mugs on me leltar wssuad by Mohamad Em Amman, son ov me me Abeuuan dated 30" Junuary was and amend than such wetter Is mmcauve mu me estate of me Isle Hap Mal Zam have a x unmvuaea share OHM! beneficial mlerasl mm sawd land In mvs respeau, m \s apt lha| (he contents of me send lelter be rewoduwd belaw sw H>wDDqE¢an><ywwmIkcD5sn P21: 11 m u -m Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm mu. AlHA¥fl\Aku|i i. lilivlhilm ..u. )nIJm\wIv [321 A perusai onna said lener win reveai inai ii only vrinls pennission id me 1* Pliirmfl |o oonsu'uc1 a noiise/buiiding on iris said iand and nothing more. in rein, in niy view, me iamnai ins eslala dune iaia Hap Mat Zain sndidi me 1- Pisinmv have lo nhlain mnsenl [mm ins iainiiy ol Mohamad EH1 Abdiiiiaii lo nuiid a house very tailing as ii wdiiid appear that the iaiiiiiy of me iaie H.-iii Mal zaiii annealed iriai «vie iaie Nafi Mai zain is no: me co-owner of me said land. If me lale Han Mal zain is indeed me co-owner Wllh ins i/2 undivided share dune said iarid, one weuid nave moiigm mai such peniiissim was ndi required and may would have just proceeded to puiid a house on me said iand [:3] Fuflhafi piwwneis pi me said land but iriis was not dune. in HhDDuE¢=DKywwmlkcD5iD «me s.n.i In-vihnrvim as used M mm i.. mimiiiy MIME dnunvinnl n. AFVLING Wm! Ia it indeed an am’!!! a! iris ‘A undivided snaid of me said land‘ 0191" Pllinllfl ougrii In have pmcureid a siiriiiur Ianerlmiii Mohllllmld sin Andiiiieih in cdiirinn than me arsIa|a or me ieie Hlii Maiza are me vasszsem [341 In (am, most crii-navy. ma 1" Plainlifl (SP1) conllrmed dunng orUss— exammallarl that he seems «ha ha is not the mm at me sild land SP1 leanfled during cross-examination as roiiows: "PD Encik Marian says karakan Encik Manan perm pevguumpa Encik Muhamad sebab Encik Manan menyedan bahawa Ericik Ma/um bukan pemilik hsnanah Iersebul pads ksrrka /In SP1 Ya, beiui " [see new 5:! arm: Nara: o/Ev/dtncv dated 9'" May 2023] [351 As such, i am ov me View mm me wrmen ieneri amhonzalran by Mnhamad am Abdullah mereiy gives ms esiaie oi me late nap Mal zm andlur Ch: I" Piainmr me ngm in mind a house and occupy the Said land which is consisienzwim Ihe nghis Mme estate oime iaie Amuiiun as me mgismrea owner: oi me said land, The same at me lala Haji Mal zam have .1 yes: praved on a haixnce at probahilmas mew ngms in occupation onne saia ism hul nmhing lurlhav in pmve (ha alamenl onzanenciai righls over me said land nor ma oxlslonna ova conslmclivo |rus| [36] In determining mis issue, II is tip! that reference is made to me vmv-sions under me National Lnnd com 1965 IN Hnnfluzaanwywwmlkcnfisn nae so mu -m s.n.i n-vihnrwm be used M mm .. mimiiuy MIN: dun-mm VII .mm mm GROUNDS or JUDGMENT mmonucnou [11 The mspule herein pertains «.2 ms ownership ofa piece av land m Penang M wmch the mslary ra\ales back m almost a hundred years since 1930. [21 Theve us no mspme mat me said land ws currenfly regIs1ered in ma nams oi the descendants/admmlsuamrs of me late Abdullah Em Abdul Majid (heramafler raranaa to as ‘Ab\1u|Iah'). n .5 also not mspmea that since 1941 me sam land was registered only m the name 0! the late Abdlmah and naw m me names of the descendants/admmuslraiors aflhe late Abdullah [31 The descendants/adnu slramrs av the late Hap Ma| Zain hm Saueh (herennaflar Ielened to as ‘Haj: Mal Zam"| have oommenced Sun PA— 22Ncv¢>a-Mu/2022 (hereinaller revenea In as -sum 64') claunmg |n|eralIa V. share M me savd land on one basvs that the Lava Abdullah was a co-uznmwa uuszee «or V. share 0! me said Land .n lavauv of me ma Hap Mal zam [A] The descendants/admmlslnlors ollhe Vale And-man nave filed sun PA- ZZNCVC-121-08/2022 (herelnaflar ravamaa to as “sun 12v) seeking vacant possession 0! the saw land Imm ma two Delendanls who are lhe Flalnhls Vn sun 34 above. {5} By oonsem olme parllas, these two Suns ware mnsulidaled and man: Iogalhev. IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD run and -ma s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [371 A perusal oflhe lalasl land Search daled 11-“ November zuln would reflect the name Mme lala Abdullah I: ma sols reglslareu proprietor nflhe full share ohhe said land Rehrenne is also made lo lhe (RC1 that the second lrldenlure was leglsleled cln 3G"'JLme1941 under the Deed syslervl at the Reqislrar ol Deeds, Penarlg. [321] The lndeleasmllia, of We IS lhe hallmark of the Torrens syslarn oi land lrlles wrllcn was laler adopted under sectlon :40 of mu nallonal Land Cod: I965 mrr oerlalll excepllorlsl for the lndefeaslblllly ol regrslered Wes or lrllelesls ln land and reglslered leases. chavges and easemerlls. [39] ll IS clearlllal me lnleflm register and the land Search are norrcluswe evldenoe man We lllle lo me sald land ls leglslered ln me name ol me eslale ol me lale Abdullah aooardlng In smlon as of nu Nnialul Lnnd Code was. Tnelelme, me lala Abdullah am me eslale 0! me lala Azmullah (as sucoassars) as reglslared pmprlelcrs are prlma lacle anlltled to enpy indaleaslhle lllle/an/nership to me sald land [See the Faaaral Conn case cl ran Bu v K Manmlamulllu [1911] 2 ull_l 71. [40] However‘ oansldenng that male ls an allegallan al lraudlmlsrapvesarllallanl uncurlscxlnable mmlucl, salmon 14o(2)(:) olllu Nlllollll Land com 1995 ls relevant. The clue or lrlleresl ullhe lale Abdullah and suhsequenuy tha erslals cl me lale Anaullarl would be dehaasible m uses 01 lraud nr misreplesenlallurl me burden of prool us on me eslale ollne Isle Ha]! Mat Zaln lo prove ma elements or lraun on a balance 01 plnbablllues. [sea ma Federal calm case M N HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD Page in or u -rlma Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be flied M mm r.. nflnlrullly arm. mm. VI] nFluNG mm sinne all A son: 5dn and v uarnai Stlia sun and [20:51 MLJU M92] [411 The dam cl lhe estate 0! me rare Hari Mal Zaln an naud re-4o\ves around me far: mat are second lndenture was warned via «rand/rnrsrapreaenrarron The asrare oi ma late Han Mal zain oonlend a| paragraphs 14 and 15 M lhelr Statement 01 Claim that the late Che Long was rnrsrapresenred by me lale Abdullah sonrernne In 1941 r e mar uponlull semernenr dune rnangage sum, me name oflhe rare Han Mat hm will be registered is me proprietor of me send land and me rare AhduHah has arsd misrepresented mar he wiH how ‘/2 undmded share of he Sam ‘and for the beneffl of the lamwry 0! the late Haj Mal Zaln but this was not done Mlawmg the death 0! Ihe late Abduflah. [42] However. I note mar apan from me [act unar Ihe rssua emaud was not submmsd upon In me wnden srrhrnrssrans, mere rs no ewdence we prove fraud or rnrsrepresenvanon vn my wen, rr Is araany loo Vale (or me esrave emre lale Hair Ma|hm wnow asserr maune rare Cha Long Is nol aware 0! nor undersrood me ounrencs of me semnd Indenrure gwen mar srre Is uneducated. Despne rnese iacrs bemg mfurmed by are late One Long ro me P\a|nMf5 somarrnra In 1953, nornrng nes been done by me esrare av me Yale Haji Mar Zam re aesan maxr ngms nor even anenrpx In register me ‘/2 undmded snare 01 In: sard land m ore nanrae nl rne Vale Hap Mar Zam. More men 40years have passed sinue we deem cl me late one Long m me: am nomrng has been done by me esme M are Vat: Han Mal Zaln rd assen man Iruzrasl in ma ‘/1 undmdad snare at me said land. rn HnDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sn nruzmu -nae s.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm a. nrwhrnflly mm: dun-mm vra .nuNG Wm [43] As such, I am aflhe mew that the eslale Mme late Haii Mat Zam have failed to wave on a ha\arIce nf pmbabllvlies that there is n-aud/ rmsrwresemalinn cnmmilled bylhe |ateAbdu|1ah and me estate or me late Abduuan nun: Inn Doc EEIX7 [441 The esVa|e at the late Abdullah submits Ina! m any case, we dalm by me eslme o1|he\aI.e Han Mat Lam ougm Io be msmissea baud on Inches m this respect. reference Vs made k: In: case of nn song Vang @ Tan Kong nong 5. Ann! v Tun Mwn Llng @ nu Slaw Lang 5 On [2922] 2 nu cos wnem me Court 0! Appeal held as lnHmMs' "[941 From me pmnr/n:' own Issltmony 111: clear that P1 and P2 knaw about lha alleged ms: m 4970 and P3 knew Intel. in 1975. They had been asking for me account: over one year: and we not receive any response Irom en. dalandanfs They ma nal lake any nclron ol whether to me an aczmn a ul/an m lodge a caves: to «cum Ihsv own over [he disputed properties Inslead, m_-1 nun wnltod for thou! nu! - c-mug [9 ggmamg :5 union ng-Inn tin dnfcndanm purportedly on ma mason that they were reluctant to not as they wsw siblings. H5] The law on the doctrine of/aches is wen semed Th/5 com in TI/ng Kean Hm 5. Anal v Yuen Hana Pnarva 1201.913 MLRA 550; (201912 MLJ 334 had succinctly summarised the docm'ne as rouaws. IN HnDDuE¢=m<ywwmIkcD5sn uuumu Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm (371 For lsches lo be ralsed. men must In dclajg Imounllng la acquiescence (sea‘ Cheeh Kym Tong & Ana! v ram Kalli [1999] 1 MLRH 281 1193913 MLJ 252, [1959] 1 Cu 373 Foo l-loldmgs sun El-n1 & Anal v Foo clmon Ymg (20141 2 MLRH 41 7, Amnluala V Scu//y [1861] /XHLC 360) nu doclrim al Iachos is based an the maxim that ‘guy ltd: (ht vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights’ Lam Sslbome succlncrly explained In me landmark case oILmdsay Petroleum Co HLm1{1374) LR 5 PC 221 am 1n every case 11 an argument agamsk rellsl wlvch olhsrwlss would be [I451 ls launder! all men: delay, lhal delay of course not amounrrng lo a bar by any Statute al Llmllallolvs, the valfdlly 0/ that delence must be mad upon prlnclples substantially equlraole. Two circumstances nlwlya Ilnglnt In such CJSCS an mi length of the new and the nnun 0! me acts done during me Interval which might afiuct OIIIIOI £11 and cause a balance of ustlce at Inlustlce In tlklnfl MI on: cnulso cl mo may so far :5 relates in me remedy. /35] Edgar Jusepll JIJ m ma case n/A/[red remplelon & Ors v Low Yul Ha/dlngs sun Blvd & Anar[19E9] 1 MLRH 144, [19av]2 ML] 202, [1959] 1 cu (Rep) 219 explalned me docmne u/lam: Lac»: LI An tgglhhln dereneelmglxlgg lug. ulllmn -na «my In mncullng a dnlm. A com ol gulg IN HhDDgE|zIan><‘/wwmlkcnfisn mg: n m u ‘Nata 5.11.1 IHIWDIY WW be used m van; M m\g\ruHIy MVM5 dun-mm vn .mNe M1 minus 11: Aid to - mic dun-m1 what: the p_IaInwr hu 3! 1 his :4 ts and no uhsc-d la! a tea! Ionglh of time. H0 is Mm said to be barrvd 1:: teen... In 11e1enn1n1ng whslnsr mere has been such a delay as In ammm! to Iaches the court considers whether there has been awllrescence on we Plaimrifs pan and any change olposilinn mar nu occurred on the pan of me aerenaenc The ducmna o/reones rests on the conszdemion that ms ml/us! to we a menme remedy where he has by me conduct done the! which mrght fairly be regarded as 9<7uiva)enr la a warver 011! Dr wireve by ms conduct and newest ne Has, mougn not waiving the remedy pm me olherpartyin a position In which 11 would nolbe reasonable 1o place him we remedy were errerwams In be asserted 14 Helsnurys Laws o!Eng/and (am 511) paras 1151,1152 Lacnes has been suooncny uescmaed as inamon with one‘: eyes open “ [45] As such, bearmg in mind me! more has how such a long de\ay m lime since me smile of me Iala Han Mal Zam was swam of ma non- regmvaoon Mnwnershnp ar lhev bene4fl::|a\ nghu. over me </. unannaea share 0! me sad lend. m my considered view, one pnnaple at Iacnas would avw |a dates! the dawn of ma eslale oi me Im Haii Mal Zain IN HnDDqE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sn 73:: 35 em -nee 5.11.1 n-nhnrwm be used m mm 1.. nrwhuflly mm: dnunmnl VI] .nuNG wrm Fourth Inn: wrmnu and scan. at me. Ian Abdunah an onmlcd Io vacant Esssssnan anns sal land [45] V71 delamunmg whslhav ms ssaaca M ma Vale Abdullah are enlmad In vacanl pussassidn dc ma said land, ans snauld oonsldav me regisuauon of ownersmp -n ma names M Ihe lale Abdullah and subsequenuy ma vesnng m me names at me «me of the Isle Abdullah [471 In such cases, me he aslala anne Lacs Abdmlnh have proved fls nus and an mcsnuon to mgam posssssbn‘ m Is for me same anne Lacs Hay Mat Zam to prove max may can set am a We or a ngm lo possessmn mnswslenl wI|h me ownership ov me eslals d1 me hate Abduflah In |hvs rusnecld reference vs made In ma dasa ovcansy. ldul (M) Sdn Bhd V Oranq-Dung vg Munglnz n sag ' Ponga' (Puongavnnzm AIL vad am) a. Ors[1WB] uL.:u 125 where Abdm Mallk lshak J (as HIS Lardsmp man was) nsxd as fnlluws " According to me auihomres, once ms yarnmr has mud rrs rim and an rnmnion to r-gun Qssossfon it was for we dvhndanls to ma um ms delendnnls can setaul . ml. or I Ilflht to Esesslan consisfeg with the yllnfiffs owngfiflig The burden wourd be on me defendants in show that they had the right rd occupy that plot of /and marked as 'c31' m we /ayout plan on the be/ance afprobabrmvss andms datendanrs miselab/y failed (0 do so Pure and smw/e (hrs was a case nf ejecrmem or what rs popu/arly known as an amen for trespass " syn HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD rage as at u -was saw ...n.mm be used m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm [48] Fmrrl the historical background ot the case. it is clear that there is consent by the iaredeoesscrto allow the estate olthe late Hat: Mat zain to reside and occupy the said land Testimony “uni the witnesses of the male or the late Abdullah also indicated that the right to remain in ocmlpaltcn ol the said land was glven graturtpusly treated on the good relationship between the parties’ predecessors. As such‘ the estate or the late t-laii Mat zain cannot he classified as squatters snnpliciter: Further, whilst there is evidence that peririissicri was granted to build a house an pan ot the said land, there Is no evidence that the estate M the late llaii Mat zain were authorized or glven pemllsslarl to continue remaining on the said land indefinitely [49] As such, I am otthe View that it is not reasonable to expect the sad consent to exist fol an indefinite period/indefinitely once the notice to ouit dated 21*‘ Oc|uber202| and 25° Ocwber 2021 was given to the estate ol the late t-taji Mal zairi (and in pa ciilar the 1- and 2" Plainlrflsli such consent to continue occupying the said land ceased and the estate olthe late t-tail Mat zain would he required to vacate the said land within a reasoiiahle time. [50] Further‘ I am ol the view that the idea at a gratuitous pernitssionlconsent/authorizatiun hetrlg aple to occupy an alienated llnd owned by the |ateAbdttI|ah and subsequently the same allihe late Ahdullah perrnanenity av perpetually, arter being given due rlollce |o gu repugnant to the concept ol indetcasioility cl utle ola registered pmpllelol as provided under section 14:: oflhl Illttloml Land coal was and the concept against adverse possetsslon cl land hy occupahan. as excllcllly provides in Sacllon :41 ottha Natlerial Laird code 1995 in this respect, relerenca is niade to the case ol Ahmad in H>tDDuE¢=DKywwmlkcD5iD nae n am Nuts s.n.i nnvlhnrwlll be used M mm the antii.ii-y MIME dun-vlnhl vta aFlt.lNG wnxl Shnllly llmnll Baku v NII Salmi 2.-man N] Wln Mona Bid [2014] 5 cm on man was relerrld in a isoem case oi say-nan. s-nndu Sdn Bhd v Jabaun Fongalrnn nan Sallran Nngnri seminar 5 On min] I MLJ :22 where |he Conn dmppeai held as lanows: "mo; nis calm al Appeal in Ahmnd Shumy lenull saw v ml Slims luldan H] Wan Mohd 2aId[2a1l] 5 cL.l an applied both me concepl ol mde/easlblllty of ville and me carlrept ol nonapulicaoilily oiadvsrse pdssassion to pieeem me ngnl ofa Vsglslalsd pmpllslol Ia assan ma ngm over nla land as lolinws. 1391 we further note lnar me defendant in ne: pleading and testimony nad claimed that slie had been staying in me house since it was cansliueied in 1985 and has me ngnr to remain on me said house and the sald land. In our view, the idea oh gmulmus liunee. boiI_Ig able to occugx an alienated Innd awnod by someone else rmanen or ru-I um bsln due notice to gulf LI Iegugmnt In the comma of lndefeaslbillg 0! Elle ofa registered Erafllelor as grovided undo! s 340 and ma conccgt agginsl adv/us: ussasslon at land :11 occuullon as exglclgg sated III 5 341 of the NLC (Emphasis added)" [51] In respect at me Issue of me payment ol quil rem, in is me wnIen|iun 01 me eslale oi me late Hap Mal Zaln that me same has been paid by IN HhDDgEqIaflKyvrwmIkcD5sD tile an m u ‘Nata Sum IHIWDIY WW be used M mm d. aiimi-y MW; dnunmnl vn nF\uNG WM! Ihem urml 2015 Hn1wevev.m 2016, me qml rsnl was wssued In the name of Zalnuran Em Manamed who Is a membev ol lhe lute Abdullah family. [521 The es1aIe of the lane Abdullah on the exner nana mncends a| paragraph as onnenwnuen eupnnseien maldespule havmg knawledge that me name m me qml rem was changed so Zamuven an Mohamed someflme In 2015, no action nas been miualed try the es1aIe oune Late Hap Maezam to preserve lhewalleged rights No ewaenee nor reasons were Ionnconnng «or one Vaflura of me estate of the late Hap Mal Zaln to assert mew ngms. AH nney contend m men submwssion m reply is that mey have been paying qmurencawme while rpran mese years wnereas the esule M the late Abdullah and Ihelf predewssovs had never bothered In make the payments an reeenuy. That, In my view, Is msummen: to justify me norracixon by me same vflhe me Haji Mat Zam when me name .n we qui| rem was changed 201610 me name Mzalnuren Em Mohamed [531 Further and In any evem, me pm: of peymem at qun rent or assessment is nu| 97001 07 an equitame right over the san! land and the pemnued pceupauon does not prevent the ragustered pmpnelorlrom takingaclnon Ia recover the Said land In (Ins respecl. V1 is apt man I r318! to me case av cm: sun Llun A Vnng Lulu Lwn. Wang on-e Foonq dlnllllu Plnghunl-Ponghunl Llln [2013] I LNS 2233 where rt was held us (wows: “ The N00’ alpayment ofquil rent by the defendants In Ihis case did no! PIDVE mat the dalamtanls had fights DI mares! towards the uni /and which was resided by the Mid p/flmllfl. Even though Mo defendant was said to have resided for a long lime on one sard land, IN HhDDqE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD has as am -una s.nn ...n.mn be used m mm ms nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa anum pm it did not bar ins reglslsred piopiialows ngnl lo lake ncfiorl and the issue o/lunilarion did nol aiise as slam in s 34 allhs National Land coda (see paras as L 3339) r [54] As such, having considered all the alacvei lhe estate :21 the Isle Abdullah as regislened owners or the said land are in my view entitled |o vacant possession ofllie said land lmm me eslale of the lace Haji Malzalrl what New? [551 Having lound lhnl ineio is no conslrucllve line: in lavoui oline law i-laii Mai zain and/oi ins aelala or iris lals HRH Mil znn and me: (ha eslaie nl ins leis Ahdullah II anmled lo vacant possession oi me said land, inal is nol ine end of me inanei Ffom lne lame oi ine ease, in is undapuleo inal me me Flalnlifis in sun in havs aasupied pan or ins said lend, nailing buin lneii nouses and iilling of ins paddy nslds tank piece. in fan‘ as seen aaiiiei. Monnniao sin Abdullah had previously given omission is me I“ Piainlillo build nis nouse on oanonne said land and ma Plsinlilis have indeed been occupying me said land slnos 1953. wriilsl lnera is no evidence that me 2"“ Plai ' was similarly given permlsslon lo build a house on ma said land I1 is clear inn (ha seiale ollne laleAl>dullan was awam dime exlslanoe aflha house and did mining aadm it. [56] on ma Facts asvaalisried. l find lnal allnouqn lne eslale oi lne laie Abdullah are indeed me iegislaied piooiielois in me said land‘ lnaia IN HhDDuE¢=HKYwwmlkcD5iD ran: an om «ma s.ii.i nnvlhnrwlll be u... m min i... nflmnallly MIMI dnunvllnl VII aFluNG WM! [51 I wm now set out me background facts, «no issues‘ as wen as the names‘ reapeeuva mnlenlmnslsulzrmssians m a mew or deciding wnamar the names have dvscharged thew raspecuve burdens .n proving «new claims Back Facts [1] The oaokgronno vaovs have largely been agreed upon by parlies and can be summarized as loiloms: 7.: sonnenm Vn man, «no late Han Mal Zam and ma [ale Aooouan Jomkly umcnasen Iano known as Lot 2529, Genan Muldm Na sen. MK II‘ Daenh Seberang Fem Ulara, Fulau Pmang (vonnony Lat 123(1). Mum XI, Dnnnm o1 Pmvirme Waflaslay Nonn, Penang) (neunnanar refermd m an ‘ma saio xanerp for szeooo lrom s N A A.LAnma5n\am Chellmr sou clAHagupah cnsmar. 7.2.The Isle Naji Mal Zaln and the Iain Abdulllh hack 3 pm! loan Vmm s NA A.LAmnm:sn. Cnemar on pan finance me purchnsa o1 me no Vina 7 3 The rats Haji Mal Zaln and me me Abduflah were registered as tenants Vn oonnnon onne said land vids me ms: Indanlura at Sale dated 15'' Am 1930 under me Englnn Deed Syslam at the Reamer of Duds. Penang on 27'” May 193:: yn HnflDqEu=nKywwmIkcD5sn age 5 A7414 «ma sanaw n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm wa muNG v-mm was bertarniy license and consent la the Piaintitts to oocupy me said land andiorte construct thelr houses. There is certainly no ssue or any adveise possession [571 In tne case 01 sontul uiitni Sdn and v Atirnaa Amlrudln Bin Kninntiidin A ois [zoom 4 MLJ soa, trie Plairitias triete coniinenoed e elairn ior uaeant possession and inesne prom on trie basis triat the Defendant occupiers were lrespasseis Ttie Delendante oerttericled ttiat iney were not tiespasseis, but telnet, lawtul ocwpanls as ltoerisees coupled with equity wnieti long existed due Lo mnllmmus occupation and possession otttie said land rite l-tigri Ooutl were after a lull trial wnilst finding that trie Detenderits nave equity, siieti equity was subiect ID lrte Plaintitts‘ Ovemdlrlg ngnts to legal erivrrerstiip pursuant Ia national Land code was. The High court tneie ordered vacant vessessiorr subieot to the Plalnm apinpensating trte netenuants tar all posts ineuned In trie construction ot the respedive ttaiises and elteinetively, the value ot the present riouses to be assessed by an independent valiier to be appotnled by the court. [5411 Applying lne ahave and reverting to ttie laots ot itiis ease. there is ceruirtly no issue at adverse possession in inis ease. wtiilstttre estate aitrtelata Heii Maizaln have an eeuliyie be tsdmnsd wiin, sueriequny must be subjec| to me Detenoanls (asIa|s at ine late Ahdullelii ouernding rtgtit to legal ovrneistiip pursuant to trie National Land code was As siieti, (ha estate oi itie late Abeullari will tneietore have its vacant possisslon subiect ta tnein bornpensaung iiie Iwo l=iainti«s in sult 54 lot the present value ot the said riauses to be assessed by an independent valuei appointee by trie court. The costs at [his valuation VI to be borne by the 951315 ottne laIBAbduHah. Funnel, trte parties are in HhDDfiE¢=HKyvirwmlkcD5iD Page ii niu -vita s.n.i n-vlhnrwm be used ta mm na ntwltrnfily MIN: dun-vlnrtl n. nFluNG wnxl gtven llberly In apply In true Courl fur the purposes at me assess-nenl alme value of lne Sald Mn pmpemes occupied by me Plalnlms WI suit 54. [see the Hlgh cuun case nf s-nml ulu sun Bhd (supri)] [59] I will also further order tnal lne Plelntllls in Sml 64 are to vacate Ihe sald land wnhin three nmnlns M the male paymenl IS made In the Plalnltfis allne value assessed olme sald houses bysuch independent valuer appointed by the Court or any omec date ordered by coun subsequently In the event there IS an lssue in respect ol the veluamn A AND PONNUDURAI Judge Hlgn Caurl Ganrgalmvrl Pul-u Plrlang. counult 1: Mr. Musmapna from Messrs Muslnapha AAssocmes lngetnev wlm Mr John Khoo from Messrs. Isrnall, Khoo I-Associates lurlm Plaimifls in suit 64 and Defendants VI Suit 121. Ml Azmr B.Ahmadlo9al.|1er wilh Ms. Nurjannan El Che All from Messrs Aswan Slmon &Azhar for the Defendants in Suit 64 and Plaintllls In Swl tzl. IN Hnl)l3qEuanKywwmIkcD5sl) me 4: at u ‘Nata s.n.l ...n.mn be used m van; .. nflglrullly MIN: dun-mm VI] .rluNG Wml c M-ma Ahmad Shazrfly Ismail Ham v M! Salma Zardan H] Wan Mohd Zan1[ZO1A] 5 CL] 817 A!/as Cabinets A Fumrtum Ltd er al v Nalronal Trust Co L:d[199a]5a DLR (4th) 151 Bayangan Sspadu sun Ehd v Jabatan Pangairan den Sahran Nsged Sslangut 5 0rs[2l721]1 MLJ 322 Binary Force Sdn Elldv Lembaga Pelabuhan John! (2009) 1 LNS :13 Cahaya Ideal (M) Sdn Bhd v 075719-Orang Vg Menyena/r om‘ Sbg ’Ponga' (Poongavanam A/L Vadlva/u) A Dr: [1999] ML./U 125 Chia Swee Lran 4 Vang Lam Lwn. Wong Chss Foong dan/slsu Penghum- Penghum Lain [2015] 1 ms 2233 Jahara Br Abdul Kadir Msncan v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anal [1930] 1 MLRA 335 Lerchumanan Chelllar A/agsppan @ L A/lsgappan 5 Anal v. Secure Ptanlarmn Sdn Bhd [2017[3 MLRA 501 ML/somnsk: r/Dodds (1955) G2 ALR 129 RHB Bank Bhd V Travslsogm (M) sun BM 5 Or: and anorhel appeal [2a16I1 MLJ 175 serum! Mum Sdn Bhd V Ahmad Amimdm am Kamsrumn & Ors 1200014 ML] 503 Smnuiyzih 5. Sons sun Bhd voamm‘ Sefia Sdn BM [2915] MLJU 1:292 Tan xang Yong @ Tan Ksng Hang A Anov v Kan Hwa Llng @ rsn Slaw Lang & Ors (202212 ML] 5175 Tan Kun Klvuan v Tan Ku KralfM)Sn1n Bhd[199fl]1 cu supp 147 Toll Bee I/K Mamthamulhu [1977] 2 MLJ 7 sw H>1DDqE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sn me .2 MM um s.n.1...m.m111.. used m mm 1.. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm glslallans referred In NanonarL.:m1 Code, sscnons 99, 340, 341 Evin1sncaArt 19511, Sacfians 101, 1112, V03 IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD meumu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 74.l3oth tenants nh oommorn were regnstened es statutory rnndrtgagers or the sand larnd vnde a statutory mortgage dated 15'“ April 1930 an 27"‘ May 1930 at the Re rar oi Deeds. Penarlg. 7.5.\nde a second lnderntune oi sale dated 3*’ May 1941, the Sald land was trahslened to the late Abdullah only as the late Abdullah had paid stat) 00 as the successful bldder oi the sand land at a yublic auctnonn as both the rnnortgagena had breached the sand statutory mortgage. The seoond Irndernture oi sale was registered on 30'“ June t94t under the Deed system an the Rsglsltar oi Deedsi Penang. 7.6.The 1* Plalnlrfl in Sull 64 above is currently an adrnninnstrator and one at the henelnciaries oi the late Hall Mat Zeln who currently resndes in a house which he has bulll on part oi the sand land. For the auondanoe of doubt, the Planrntnlis In sunt 64 above wnll be relened to as the estate oi the late l-tall Mat zaun whereas the Plaintms in Sun 121 above wnll be retened to as the estate at the late Ahdullah. The late Hall Ma|Zaln's wits and larnrly have worked and Illlsd the paddy held on part otnhe said land. The 2'“ Planntnil IS the son-in4aw olthe late Hall Matzairn and resides in another house which he has also built on part oi the sand land adtacanl to the I" Planrnuil's house. 7 7 It ns the ease oi the estate oi the late Hall Mat Zltn that the V" Planntnll in Sun 64 above was lnlnrlned by the late che Long (the me at the lane Haji Mat zain) that the late Hajl Mat Zaln had depended on the late Aodullah to handle all matters oennainnne the serd land nneludnhg the aeynnerntol mortgage nhatalrnents to the s IN HhDDt]E¢=nl<ywwmIkcD5iD Page s om -one Serial In-vlhhrwlll be ts... m vanw he mnmnnny sum. dun-vlhhl VII aFlt.lNG v-mat chatty where lhe lale Haii Mal zaln would pay his ponmn e1 lha lnslalmenls InIIle|aleAhduHah1o pay the Chelly. 7.8 Aowrdirlg lo the 1' Plilrllrllin sull 64 above. lhe lake Che Long had inlorrned hlnr lhal the lane Ahdullah was a regular vrsrmr la the lale Haji Mal ZaIn‘s house each mnlh to oolled lhe lnstalmenls and also lo vlsll them Aflerlhe late Haji Mal zain passed away, lhe like Che Lung would oonllnue lo hand over her late husbands rnslalrnenls lo the tale Abdullah. 7.9. The basls el lhe dalm of me eslare el me lale Hali Mal zarn was Ihal the late Ahdullah had Informed the late Che Long ln or about 1941 that me loan had been fully serlled and lhe late Abdullah lald me lare one Long fllallhe said land was regrslered solely n ma lake Ahdullah's name because me late Hall Mel Zaln had passed away and mac Ihe lale Haji Abdullah held ‘/2 share ollhe sald land larlhe lale Hall Mal zarn's larnlly no It is lunher oenlended Dy lhe eslale enha lala Han Marzaln lhal me laleAbdullah alaa undendoll and agreed wlm lhe lele che Lung and gave all me ovlglnal decdnrenls pen/arnlng I0 lhe purchase ol are land In lhe lace Che Long before lhe lale che Long wenllor Hall m 1901 but lhal lhe lale Abdulllh had passed away belona me lare che Long rellrrned lrern prlgrlrnage 7 ll Nalnrng much seems lb have occurred lmrn 1941 unlll 2019 save lor lhe 1- Plalnlill seeking pernnssldn frnrrl Meharnad Abdllllarl (lhe Ian 54 me |a|e Mxtullah) permllllng me I" Plalnlrll lo aulld a house an lha said land we lener dated 30" January 1953. IN H>lDDuE¢=HKyvMmlkcD5iD me 7 M u ‘Nata Sahel In-vlhnrwlll re used m mm has nflnlhallly sun. dun-vlnhl wa .nana we 7.12 Then on 7"‘ June 2019. the 1“ Defendant lrl Sull 641 as an Idmlnlslralor at ltre late Atxtullatvs estate went wrtn her daughtev (the all uetenaant) and her husband, Erlak Nazn and lwn utners (0 see me l=laintl«s and (0 seek vacant possession at ttle Sald land The Plaintms nae votunlarlly glvsnlsurrernterea tne paddy field to the Delenesnts wttneut ralslng any nblacllon when the Delemtarns requested are same. The Detenuents subsequently bum fuur houses on part of me said larld wrttr tne lull knowledge at the Plainlifis 7.13.Due to ttle above rnerttante, tne 1“ Plalntltr as me attmrnlstrator of me estate 01 tne lata Han Mat zatn then subsequently entered a prlvale caveat on part 01 the sald land at me Lam Reglstry on 22'-1 January 2020. Slmllovl 7 t4. on 7“ May 2021, tne 1" Plaintlfi‘ obtained Letters u7Ad wlrereln me I" Plalnull was appuimsd as admlrllslrawrufihe estate at the late Haji Mat zam 7 l5.The estate at me late Abdullah vlde lhelr snliertars tnen lssuea Notreee m ourt In the estate at me late Hall Mat Zaln trn pameular me two Plalntlfls in surt 54) dated 2t- Onober 2o2t and 25'" October 2o2t respectlvely The estate of the late Hali Mat Zain! wllslllors vlde men letters daled 15"‘ Nuvember 2021 and 5'- December 2a2t lrl response replbed am earlteneeu tnat the late Abdullah was rloldlng vs undlvlded share 01 the Said land [or tne estate at tne late Hail Mat zain. tlenee, me two eurrenl Sulls belrlg filed. lN H>lDDl:E¢=nl<ywwmIkt:D5sn In: I at u we Smnl In-vlhnrwlll re tn... a mm r.. ntwlrrnllly sum. dun-vlnnl wa nFluNG v-mxl nu Flllnmfl‘ Claim [31 The Phslnufls m sun 54 being me same of me late Hap Mal zem and as wcumer: M pan al me smd land mler-aha suck me vauawmg when 5.1. e uscxaranan manna regwslrllicn ullha ln|e Abdullah as sols awnur under the saoend Indenlure u null -nu void and ms esme 01 me me HI]: Mil zum ere owners of vs undiwdad there came mid wens pursuant to e cm\s|ruc1wa|rus|. e 2 rasmutiun order lor the mum of me ‘/9 undwea mm M the sen land, 8 3 e deuareunn Ihal me Plamnns have me right In remem on me sam \and‘ 8.4 an Dnier in demolish [I12 fuur houses behanglng in he Deierldams which were eneaea without me wnsem of me Maflis Bandaraya Seherann Pam, and 3.5 an Order men one Desemems pay for me general losses and damages as weH as for economic loss The DI1'nnd.Inh' g g g gggngm 3 m [9] The DefendanIs'(es1ala ollhu late Abdullah) aeience and oounlerdaim is summarixod as follows’ IN HhDDuE¢=nKywwmIkcD5sD ms 9 .c u «we sew n-nhnrwm es used m mm ms unmmuly mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm 9.1 me Piarrrmfs have varied |n discharge Ins burden of pmvmg ms existence Ms eonsmrmrve trust In lavuur aflhe iaie Han Matzain, 9.2.Ihe marine oi lashes apphes as me Pisrrrmis have slept on (hair rrgms rora very iorrg urns, and 9 3 me Delendarrts are armed in vacant possession Mme said land as may are me regislerai owners onhe said land [1 0] The irial look pluoe over several days mm me ssnaia of me iaie Haii Mal Zaln and me exist: :71 me me Abdullah Calling 2 wrinsaaes each and ma p-rues nave meruner med in vespscliva wrinan submissions 1' comarm rr m| Pin [1 1) The oamanuoris/submissions at Ihe esme at me lane Hap Mal zain are summarized as volume 11 .lhat ma inmal svaiumry mangage rrismrruiiy pmves ma ownership of me said iarrd in question by the «we predecessor iarriiiies IN H>iDDqE¢=nKywwmIki:D5su P112 mam «mu s.n.i In-vihnrwm r. used m mm r. nflninnflly mm: dun-mm VII nFiuNG WM!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

PA-22NCvC-185-12/2022

PLAINTIF HST ENGINEERS SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN ZURICH GENERAL INSURANCE MALAYSIA BERHAD

Claim by plaintiff (insured) against defendant (insurer) for wrongful repudiation of insurance claim – Whether material non-disclosure and breach of duty of utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei) committed by plaintiff – Whether claim time barred – Whether loss event is outside coverage of architects & engineers professional indemnity policy.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b50e0710-1eae-4d10-9cb4-582556d4e99a&Inline=true

05/01/2024 16:39:33 PA-22NCvC-185-12/2022 Kand. 55 S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EAcOta4eEE2ctFglVtTpmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal u—22ncvc—1e5-12/2022 Kand. 55 D5/a1/202:: 1:349:33 ln owe r-lwgn cum ul Malaya IVI Penang ln me slale u1Penang, Malaysia civll sun No PA—22Ncv<:—ws5—12/2022 Belween HST Engineers Sdn and Plswnlwfl And Zurlch General Insurance Mslsyswa Bhd Delendanl gngunas or Judgmenl lnlroducllorl w. Tne F-lalnlwlrs cw) clalm agalnsl me Delenaanl (“D“) Is lor Indemnlly under an lnsuranoe pelwcy. D had rapudlaled F"s lnsuranoe clawrn and terminated me lnsurance pnllcy 2 F seeks cunwpensalwon in lne sum cl RM1 ,o2s,os7 55 as me arnounl whlch D (as lhe wnsurerl ws requlred Io wndenwnwly and pay In P (as lne lnsuredl. P lurlner seeks var i declsralwon met me lerrnlnsuon cl lne lrlsuranoe Dohcy by D ls Irlvalld 3. Aller a Ml lnal, I msrnwssea P’: clswrn Here are lne grounds 01 my judgmenl Background fads 4 P la a eonsullsnl engmeer. P was appolnled by slsrseries Deyeloprnenl sun ana ('l1ovllopIr’j lo pmvlde own and slnlclural cunsullancy servlces lor a prolect known as ‘Cadangarl sxlnw Perumaharl [Guarded Oommlmllyj aw alas Lu| ass dan s51, Jalan Nangka‘ Muklm 11, Seberarlg Perai Tengah, man Flnang' (’proj:l:I“| 5 D IS an lnsurancs eornpeny. P |ook up an Ar::hl|ec1s 3. Engineers Prolessmnal lnuemnwly Fallcy(“lnsuran:n pulley‘) lrorn D. The Insurance pclllcy ls an lndemnfly policy whereby D agrees |o lndemnlly F agalnsl lose lncurred as a vesull ol any clawrn lar clvll hablhiy flrsl made agalnsl P and nol d to D dunrlg lne periud cf insuvanoe‘ based sulely on P's provlslon cl pralesswonal servwces rn adauc-Ezzelflylvltpvlq “Nana s.n.w ...n.rwwww s. U... s may he mwnww-y mwnln dnuuvlml y. .nuna vtmxl 5. P was msured by n mruugn a Prmasarorrar rnaamnrry Tnsurance (Arcmtecls Er Engmeers Frofesswnal Vndemmty Policy] |Pohcy N0. 011400055358-DD) (or coverage duralmn from 24 10 2014 until 2310 2015. And Fmlsssmnal Indemmfiy Vnsuranoe (Amhllscts & Engineers Prulsssmnm Indemnity Policy) (Pohcy Nu 011406053365-0|) for cuvevage peneu «rem 24.10.2015 unm 231112015 The Insurance pohcy has a letmaclwe dais of 24 10.2012 The Flam ifs case 7 F‘s case 1:; «ms 1n January 2012, P suhmnlsd a «rat drawing subrnrsaren la lhe4ocalaulhor1ty1Ma1hs Perbandaran Ssberang Peraij. Tnrs was a plan ragamrng me de 0! the prqecL a one year vaxar In January 2013, P submmed a semnd urawrng subrrnssren In me man aumonly The plan «or the second drawmg subm1ss1on vonoweu vanous amenurnanra by the consu\larvtarchnec1 of me projecl1.e.HD Au;h1I2c\ A Assocracaa. 9 In May 2013, me devebpev awarded the prqect Io PC construcnon sun Ehd as the mam comracrar (‘main cumractov“). Hence‘ F produced the s1ruc1ura1 design plans daled May 2013 («mm drawing suI7m1ss1an) to me mam auncracmr. Th In 10. There was a defect in Ihe prqecl known as ‘defle n ulcar porch slabs 0! 27 umls' The delec1 has srnee been reamed by me mam conuaclor The mam ocnlraulnr wmmenoed ma rsctmcauon works on 23.1 2015 and completed mern rn August 2015. 11 What happened was rnrs 1n May 2013‘ me mam contractor arened |he cunslruclmn cl ms burmrng known as Type 5 mraa smray bungalows Subsequanfly m March 2014 me man oonlvacmr rapanea In me developer eonearning ma sx1s|enoe arue11ec1iun Type B car porch From March 2014 re November 2014. me mam contractor was Instructed to rnon1rar1ne selllemem and 1a1ara1 movement 0! |he porch suunura, flany. 12 On 15. 2DI5, |he prujecl oblamed the Cemflcale G7 comwetion and eamphanae ram me oonsu\lzmarchrIer.1.SuDsasquenl\y.oarT\D|a1nI5 were raaawaa «mm me house buyers The mrnprarnra panarn lo aavscrs 111 me m a:J.m4.EEze1rg1v1Tpn.g «war. 5.11.1 nunhnrwm a. u... m mm r... mrmrrry mm: dnuumnl VII mum pmm dlscloee the rnalenal lacl ol the dellecllcn cl lhe ear porch slabs belore enlsrlng unto me lnsurance conlracl on 21 10.2014. P has eammllled a rnalenal non-dlsclnsure As sucn, lhe msurance conlract was lawfully repudlaled by D due lu me malerral nendlsclesure and hreacn a! ulmoel good lallh oonrrnmed by P (D) The deslgn man by the Pl ml" was lssued oulslde ol lne coverage geno 47 P had submmed mree deslgn plans dated ll) January 2ol2 mral deslgn plan). Ill) January 2013 (second deslgn plan) and (n) May zlm (third deslgn plan) respecllvely lo me local aulnonry 4a Aeoordlng lo lne adlueler. all me car porcn rool slabs el me 27 unns nad experleneed me same dawnward t1eflecllorl.They were ollne opinion lnal there eduld he a llaw n we design or lne car perch, lnal led la rue slnrclural daf2v:| 49, The adlusler rnel wllrr P sunseduenlly. P provlded lne adjusler wllh lnelrnndlngs on me posslalecause onne delleclion olthe car pmll slabs P had earned our (W0 lesl ealeulallens. Based on me lwo lesl calculalions, P nad relaled lne meal poeslale cause ol lne lsulure, r 3 me cracks on me porch slab. leakage ollne porch and ssgglng alme perm lo alewlaelere ol whlcll, P did not ln lne drawlng, advlsre la precamper me lernporary lormwovk and supporl so. The adjusler explalned lnal lne lerrn ‘precarnber means I| requlres |he conlraclor lo pusn up /lack up one lernporary lonnworx and suppon. so lhal lne daileelldn ealculaled can be ollssl hy the push up / rack up value. wrlnoul preeamnenng lne lernperary larmwork and supporl of me porch slruclure, me lenlporary lurmwork and suppon lmght nave selllernenl due lo me wel curlcvele welgnl and me un—si|e gvmmd condlllon These Mo posslpllllies mlgnl cause me pnyslcal denecllpn ol lhe car porcn slabs 51. The adlualer lnen re-auendsd me sue wrln me lndependsm punsull r engrneer lle Dw—2l an 23.3 mm Whereln a de|al|ed inspecll 01 me alleclea car purcn roar slabs was named aul ln urldenaking lnls lnspecllon, lne slruclural and arcnileclural plans 0! me enecled bulldlngs were relerred 10‘ «or analysls back-lo-hack wllrr me pnyslcal evidence secured al sue 1 1 ru adlzm-Ezzelfwlvltv-Q “Nana a.r.l navlhnrwm u. UIQG a may r... nflmruflly -mm: dnuavlml VI aFluNa Wm! 52. The iniiependeni oonsullani engineer ( e CH Psrurldlrlgl was appoinied by D laid carry out a delalled Irwesllga ri on me precise cause al irie delleciion of ine car poron rock slabs From me lamp and iindings oi lhe independani oonsulianl engineer. na concluded inai. -al The oonsuiiaiii would mmlder ina delleriion on ma aaniiimr asani / slab in ineir onion 0) The corlsullanl also rnoiilii gm we-<:amberlrls|mc1>ofl |a wnlradardunng and aalora ouM1ru<:1lun\u aoimol iris derlecllon wiinin irniii oizsnini 5; rnsralpra. ma laiiuro is due lo iinpropsr assign L11 iris caiiiilaysr beam! slxh - 53 Based on ins findings cf ina indapandeni oonsuluini engineer, ii showed that P should have considered the dsllechon on the cantilever beam I slab in Ihelf design calculations And Ihal P should have given prer camber inslru ion to the project ocnlraclor durlng and belore construction 10 control the defléflrorl. Em F had killed I0 do Sn. Thesis were said |0 be irie prirnary causes at me lailurs ar deneoiion ul ins car porcn slaps The loragoing lailure is aooordingly regarded as improper design oi iris oaniilaysr peani / slab 54 The insurance policy iakan am by P willi D is lroni 24 in 2014 uniil 23 102015 Arm ma l'e\roac|Ive daia is on 24 io.2oi2. According la ins adlus|er‘s findings, lrie design prepared uy P was lssued as iar back as January 2012 and is paiora lrie reiroaoiivs dais ur124.iu 2oi2 Tnerelura. F isoui otoovsragei as me errorsnd omission oocurrad on lrie lirsi des on plan daiad January 2012. 55 Based on ins adjusiars nndings. liie error was evldenl in ins January 2oi2 liisi design plan as ii dld not corllaln any pre-camber inslallalion. The error, as cannrrrisd by ina indapendenl consullanl sngirraars nnuings, rs iliai F snould nave oonsidarad ine delleciipn on me canlllevel beam I slap in lneir design calwl ' ns Arid P anould nave glven pre— camber insiruairons lo canlrol ine dsrlsnion Thus, (here was no failure in worlnnansnrp pin design since |he lalluve was evldenl In ins nrsi design plan daied January 2m 2. ins loss is oui or me rsiroaciive dale. 55. F wnlends iliai llle January 2012 deslgn plan was only ins nrsi submlsslon plan lo the local auiliorily lar ineir reoord And inal iollpwing ilia lirsl subrnlsslorl plan, more were ainendnienls io ins design plan laiori a sscorld siiprnission plan daiad January 2013 was suprniiled lo ins local aulnoniy srn fldaud-EEZelFylv|Ypnig '2 «nil. Smnl nuvlhnrwlll be mad m mm he nflnlnnllly MVMI dnuuvlnnl n. aFluNG vwul 57 However, accuvdmg |o ine adlusten in all ||'le iliree design plans. «here was no lnslrufllon on me precairioering inslruc1lon slated on any ol we design plans, Trierelore, irrspeczive ul ine lac: me: the Mo suoeeouenl plans daled January 2013 and May 2013 were wiinin ine relrdaciive dale 04 24 10.2012, lne design error exieled from lne very beginning. .e ine firsl design plan daled January 2012 59 Hence, lrie error ensred in me first design plan, wnicn is oul of coverage since ii is belore the relroaolive dale Accordingly, Ihe adiusier lound lnal llie loss is ouleide lne policy cover I accept Ihe firldlrlgs ol lne adiuslar, which I consider lo be credrble and suppaned by lne documenlary evidence. 59 in I've premises. I and inai P's lirsi design plan cclnlalnlng lne improper design is daied January 2012 Tu wil,be1uve|Ile reiroaciive dale 01 24.10.2012 as set oul in lhe insurance policy Alinougli inere were lwu suoseduenl plane dared January 2013 and May 2013. riowever, me enor exlsled in lne lirsl design plan dated January 2012. Namely. no pre- panioenng I slruclions were given lo lne oroiecl eonlraclorlnen and ii was no: recrilied in ine oiner suoseouenl design plans 50 Hence. the error e\<lsIed lmm prlor to the VEIVDEEHVE date It Is lrierelore my conclusion inal P's insurance claim is outslde of «lie coverage ol lne Insurance policy, as irie design plan was dared oelore «lie retroactive dale ol the lrlsurarloe policy. 51 Even il ii aannol oe conclusively eslahlished lnal me delleclion cl llie car percli slaos is a design issue allnbulable to P. I do na| liiinx lhal rnauers Tnis is because the scope ol me exclusion clause in me insurance policy includes any claim arising lroni any error or umlssiurl wnicri "ls s//aged lo nave taken place prior lo the relmacfive dale" Here. ine claim is indeed in connection wilri an error or omission lnal ‘ls alleged‘ to exls| in me nrsi design plan daled January 2012. well oelore lne 24 10 2012 reiruaciive dale c The Plalnlilrs anion isl rriebarred s2. Pursuam lo seclion slllla) ol lrie Limilalion Act 1953. an aclion rounded on oonlraci or lon snail not be orougnl after six years lrom the dare mien me cause ataclion accrued F‘: cause of aciion againsl D is rounded in curltracl i e lorine oreacn unlie insurance oonlraci IN a.~J.:u4aEEz¢lfi:lvflvvI§ ‘S «no. Smnl mmhnrwlll re u... w any i... oflnlrullly MVMI dnuuvlml vn aFluNa vlmxl 53. I and that P's cause ofacmon agarrrar D we unra barred as six years nar. elapsed smce the tune when are uause 01 aarorr accrued‘ wnrar s In March 2015 That was the date when D was supposed to mdemnify PS loss under the Insurance pnhcy. 64 F was nutified Mme deflechon ol the car porch slabs in Match 20t5. However, mere re a mscraparrey In F‘: pleaded case and me testimony or PW-1 (director 07 P). In QAA 28 0! hrs witness statement, FW4 testified (hat F was notified cflthe deflecnon Vh November 2015 65 F mad the Instant smt on so 12 2022, seven years aner me cause or acuan had accrued. Regarmess 0| whelher u is ca\cu\a(ed Irorn March 2015 or November 2015. In any event, 1 gr: on F‘: pleadings, wnere P stated that the data 0! me was was in March 2015 as Paragraph 1s at me srarernenc or cnazrn reads ‘we or. pure». ms rm marrmrr Incnmd Io» regararrrg aenecrm at car porch arm or 21 mm: or Type 5 than xtmay bur-gaxawa 4 aar park mans’) as such me F'\am\\l1 mmugh ru mauvince agem known as Aon Vnsnvance Emkers (M) Sdn snu naa Med an msumnce crarrn on man cflthe marnnu win the Dafendlm‘ 67 It is sigmhcant Io note mar P memsehtes have pleaded that than cause cflavlron accrued in March 2015. Paragraph 13 of the Statement cf Claim reads we ma Plnlnlilfl car... of nation covnnnncl vmr ma month nl Much znls saw‘)! me P\mnlM nasmea an miurancn cram mm mm oarenaam ' 65. On the xssue ol asoertammg the time when the Iwmllatlon pencd ought tn start mnmng agabnstan Insured, I rerer to the ronuwrng aulhonlnes wmch have examined the posmon M the Vaw. 69 In ALW car womsnap sun and v AXA Amn General Insurance Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 561 at 575. the Federal corm held: "1371 n rs we raw that m. mll arrr am for nscerulnmerrl or an amount»! Ion orerarrrr in . fir: insunncl erarrn Is ma flat: om. me In Ansurmce law, a ma pointy M an mdemnrlypolrcyr mans, a porrcy mm. amrgaraa the meme! onry to make good the actual loss surreraa by an. Insured The rnsurevl cannot remver mam man mo sum msmad under ma pohcy me rnarrraa canrml mcovsr more man wnarn. tsiablvshas to be me aclua/amounlolhrs You’ an a:Jau4.EEz¢1rg\v|tpn.g “ “Nana a.n.r mmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 a mm .. nrtmnnfllli mm: dnuumrrl VII mum mar 70 in su Hock Guan I/AXA Amn Generallnsurance Maieysia Bnd[2c2u] MLJU179B,the duesiion was whelherlhe cause nlamiun tor an indeniniiy insurance commences at ine time at me occurrence of one insured event or at me iirrie irie insurer repudiated Iiao ’ under the pciicy The Higii ocun neid. V241 Nflving car-isidemd ms amiesaid uuirioniies mid aner readnig me arrreie M/hen does an insureds cause araciian agauiai an insurer sun. A! III: nni. al me Even! /Loss or Altar ins insum nas oisciainim Liaoinry’ ny s «wens xuriiar puriiisried in (am) 3 ML./ CKXKI, the W Supmma coun Ellclsvnn in ccrinecr snipnzr-g Inc and error v Svangcx Arigfarlygs Auursris Foremrlg mie Swerdisll Club) and ms‘ mi Reno: /2:219] Uxsc 29 and ma supreme com or New South wares cm oIAWea/ decision ui ls‘/one criurm inmrporared v A/Iisriz Ausrraria Insurance Ltd /zine) Nswu 27, isnare me same view as in. /earned ./udiaa! ccrririiiusicner lhal me cause 1:! acuari In an ind-irrnrry Insunnce poucin uniess me oonhcl oirierwise Dwwfllii riamsanir -mu.- from ma ms cmia rm miizand not rnini ms duh ompudiarrari o/risen», cy ma msmur 7i Acpiyrng iiie almve auiiioriiies, I agree wiiii D iiiai me dare oH|1e 'loss' is irie dale wnen lhe ‘ioss event‘ uccurred Nanieiy wnen me design pisn was Wenaledi sinoe i\ was a design issue or arguably in ine anerriaiive. me dare when the detieciion oi zne car porch slabs uccurred or wrien P was noiined in me deiieciion. In an iriese siiuaiioiis, me dale oi recudiaiion is irrelevant as me loss did not occur ai ine repudieuon date 12 I am saiisiied met more men SIX years nae iapsed since P's cause oi aciicn accrued wiieiner iirne slarled In run lrnm wneri me design was produced or wrien irie deuenion cniie car pcrcii slabs nappened Hence, we anion is me barred by vinue ofseclion smxai urine L alion Act 195:. d) No ioss suffered by the Piainuii under me insurance ooiicy 73 P's cause 0| anion against D is Iur breach (:7 insurance contract and wrongiui repudiation The insurance coniraci neie is an indemnfly cciiay Le. a pohcy wnicn obhgaies ine insurer Io make good the anus! ioss suffered by the insured As sucn, P niusi esiaoiisri me aciuai amounl of iis ‘ass 74. The insurance pulicy dennes loss as lulluws “Loss um mans irieiciiewiiia rcrwiiian uie inluved is legaiiy name I SIN a.~J.:u4-Ezzeifyivflvvvq 5 “Nair Smlinunhnrwmbeuledlx:vuflyhenflnirufllyirfiiriindnuunnnxvinnfiuriflWm! (3) mmpersauon am Ior uernrant - wits puvwam In an award or Iudgment alairtstthe Insured. tut seitismems nsgolialad by us and mrwemed in try Ine Insuma. (5) sellllmems negohfled by me rnsuree Dal eniy wrtn our plior wnuan mnsem. Ia) eiarnr expenses. Ie) Inuurryoesis aut Ion dun ner Inclufle In wages, saiery commission, Iees. cnerees am ottrertann In ramunemlmn er pram In be Ieeara. lost ortoregens hymn Iniuvad. an a nasuirer e I:IaInr. IIII any oompunsm In an award or selllamam which represents rne cost at peflorvnanea aim: Irnumd! engrnai eenneeruei eniiearron non—IuImnIenI er negligem aenennanee at wm:h nes given use Io me claim - 75 P hears me bumen 01 proat F wIII nave Io discharge Ineir burden at proclan a tzaianee of probabilities, In showing trial a Ioss has erscuned. Fm instanee, Inat P has paid tor the eeet oi Ine remedial works I trnd lhal P nas Ieried to discharge their human at pnaot. 75 In GM 20 at tus witness staIement, Pw—I (mreetor M P) adrnmed tnat Ina main eomractor trad carried out and cumpieted tne Vscflficaltnri on tne dellsclion onne car porcn slabs. Furlher, PW—1 Iestmea In &]&A 21 at nis witness etaternenr that tne cost 0! me remedrai walks incurred by the main mnhacicrwas RM1.o2a.os7 55. 77 AI pavagraph 11 01 the statement at csernr. P sla|ed Inat -me ini/moss and the Said amourll incurred by the Plamlill will be produced In bundle of document” In similar vein, paragraph 19 or the Reaiy staIed tnet "me P/afnlm‘ pleads ma! documentary evidence will be produced as taunaie ol document /egsldmg the P/aIrIlI'FI"s claim amnulillg Ia RM1, 029,087. 55 . ". 7a. In the Isunaie at Documen|s. P has pmduoed the mam sontraaors claim addressed to the deveioper arnournrng Io RM1,o2Ia,I1Ia7 55 However, F varied to adduoe any payment document to snaw that P had paid Ine main mnlractar tor the Ioss Incuned. In other words, n was not pmven |ha| P has paid the said sum at RMI.c2e,os1.55 Even during Ine Irrei, F II |n produce sucn evidence In court 79. II Is noiewonny Inat P Itrernseives nave pieaaea tnei an amount at RMI .o2e.os7 55 ‘is expected‘ to be ciarrnerx against them. Which implies that no such claim has been made against P as yet. Lsl aiane tnat P has acmally paid me Said sum. so Paragraph 20 at the steienreni at cIeInI reads: IN fldaud-EEZe1fyMYpnIg “ «er... s.n.I nmiharwm be u... m mm .. nrwinnflly en. dnuumnl _ .nuna Wm! >20 n ls expense that an amaunl a4 RM1,n2s,oa7 55 as ex 25 3 me would M ualmu aga-rm me Flam!!!‘ 81 From the evidence adduced, I am sallsfied that P did not sufler any loss as mey am not paylorlhe reclifiualmn wurks Thus was admllled by (hell own wxlnesses. a2 Dunng crass exammaum PW4 (mreelor ol F')IesMIed lhal P am not pay fur me cost of me remedial works carried ml! by |he mam eonlraclur P'W~1 also Iestlfied lha| nu CW1‘ cl ' has been filed against Pin respect cl me said sum. aa. Tms was confirrnsd by ww-2 lprojeu dllecwr ollhe main contractor] whn teslllled that the devempsr had Bald the sub-ecnlvamor for the remedlal works. And no clvll MM has been mnialed agalnsl P 70! the amount incurred PW—3 (ChIe1 Operatlons Offioer 01 the developevl also Donfirrned that lhe sald amount was not clalmed agalnsl or Dad by F. 34. ln |hIs regard. me relevsnl pruvislons ullhe msurama pellcy rsads: ‘lnsunng clause we agree lo Indemnity me lrrsmeu agaurm You murred as a resulloianly clalm «or cwll uaurmy ml made agalns| me lnsuved ml nollfled la us aurlng me perlud cl lnwvanu, based sonelyan are .r....rea's Dmvlslon at me nrofesslnnal semces Clalm alarm Shall mean any nral av wnllan demand reaewea bymu lumen dunng Ihe penod ohnsurznoe lnchldlng om ml umlea m . u .l praceaum nnmmenmd W me servloe m a slzlemam ul clalm, wnl. mmvlmm or smular uleedmfir or an amllrallon oromer auamam. durum: resalmmn pmoeedlnu camvensauan wmpensalmn snall mean rmrrelary companulmn ma mulled .s legally oblbgaled to pay, wflemav by a mgmsm ur Iward‘ or 3 selllemem newualea WM ow prlovwmlan oonism, om does Hal Include clam. expenses ~ as Under lrre insurance policy, D is nbhged la rnclemmly P agaIns| 'loss‘ lncurred by P less‘ Is defined lo mclude ‘cumpensa|mn' Compensallon‘ m turn us delmea lo mean ‘moneialy carnpensalrorr (he Insured ls legally abllgaled 19 pay, wrrelhar by a judgment or award. or a sslvlemanl rregoualea wllh wr prlor wrulsrr consent‘. 56. Here, were is no monelary cumpensaflon whlch P rs legally obhgated |o pay As there ls no judgmenl or award, ur a selllemem negohated by P wrm D's pner wrlllen eonserrl. am a:Jau¢-Ezzelrglvfipng ‘7 «mm. Sum! luvlhnrwm a. U... a may r... mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa wax 57. Furthermore. the Insurance pcllcy defines W055‘ as "ssmemenls negotiated by me rnsured but only mm our prior wrmen mnssnl". were P dld no! OM31?! D's consent beficre admilllng clvll llablllfiy and underlaklng lo pay the cost of the recmlcallon. as Recall lnal P nas venernanlly denled man lne cause onne deflecllon at me cal porch slabs was due to lnerr deslgn delault. P nas asserted lnal lnere are many posslble causes In me prernlaes, F snould have dlspuled il wrln lne developer or me rnain mnlractm, and not admll lo lrablllty or undenake to pay lne cost ov me reclmcanen 59. It Is plarn lnal no clann nae been med oy lne develuper orlne mam conlracler agarnsl F’ Ior ms :05! ol lne renredral works Nor drd P pay far lne remedlal warks. Furmer, P nas larled lo provrde documentary plucfllo Show Ihal any loss was sullered by ll 90 I oonolude lnal P dld nm srmer any less as dellned under the rnsurance policy Even a a :2 clalm were to be made by me rnaln conlraclar or me developer agalnsl P now. lnere rs lne queslmn Mwhelher lne Irrnrlallon period has sel In and such a claim would he llrnemarred. 91. In a civil case‘ ene panys eyrdence ls lne ulners as well Tnlrs, a plalnnlv may rely on lne delendanrs evrdenoe lo prove me case The eanyersa is (me as well. (See the court el Appeal case o1 ran Kah Khram y Lrsw Chm crrlran 5 Ant» [2007] 2 MLJ 445 al 450-451) 92 In this regard, Ps awn wlmessas adrnnled lnal P dud nol sufler any loss. Nor was lnere any payrnenl which nad aeen lnclmad by P lnal needed lo oe indernnmed by D P nas nol pald lur lne ml of me remedial works ln shorl, F has lalled lo prove Lhal a loss nas uncurved such lnal D's oolrgalron lo lnaernnlvy P Is lngerred In llgnl ounls, ac1uaHy lne burden does nal snm lo 0 la show lnal lnerr repudralron ol P's lnsuranoe clalm was lusllflefl cancldslen 9:4 For lhe reasons abclve, I nnd that F has nel preven rls case on a balance olpmbabllilies llnerelure dlsmissed P's daim l ordered me pay costs 0! RM5c,ooo to D Deled 7 December 2023 rn fldaud-EEZ¢lFylvlYpmg “ “Nair Smal mmhnrwlll .. LAIQ4 m mm .. nflnlnallly sun. dnumlnnl y.. .nnna ml X Quay Chew Soon Judge High Courl or Mamya, Penang CMI Division NCVC 1 Quasi! Sunny Khan (Mix!!! Sunny Khno 4 Cal cm the mum Thnyakugnn Rqendran ma Ha vn Jenn /Maul: omm... Hsshrm 5 Ca] Yer um Devfendam «9 sm a:J.:u4-EEz¢1fw\vfiv-Q «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! sw a:J.m4aEEz21rwv|tw-q mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm car porch eteae. Netnety water portdtng en, Ieaktng or, saggtng at and Crackmg at the car perch slabs. 13 on to 12 2015, P tttmishett tts ttnutng wtth regent lo the ‘porch L lrame structurat dfitgn calculalton‘ lo the z;onsu||anI etettttect P‘: eontentton ts trtts. ta) me tttsx sel at the aestan Dlart eonststett ot we met -uetntnen W the wrtsunam attuned tn than only Sulvsequertflylheva were amended derstgn ptan at menu wonnssten tn January 2013 ana eanatntanen plan tn May zeta, (h) teeamtng the uetteetten al eet nnrch stens em ttntts enype E (Nee statey ettngetews tt ts not due ta ercettsee by P5 design (0) aortvarsetyiha sate aeatun by P15 tn mac! and tn aecentanee to the bulldtng Dondfllofl at at tnatenat ttnta A: wet. the deslgn etan ta tn meet tn the ntanth et May zatz, Much ts tn the tanee at the leflhspetltve dale at the tnllllanofi pettey ta; htnhet. me ‘d2Y|et.1mrt ul cal pomtt slab: at 27 ttntts at Type B Imus sluvey btmgakrws tan be due |u ntany tasters Among enters. the quattty et the bulldtllg matwul, nogttgenss nwent managsmam ttttnng cnnslmciiart ants rtegltgunoe tn sttpennsten Ml e went. at st|e‘ and te) loltewtng mm. the cenltlever beam / stab hes been torn down and vedeslgrted wtttt steet etentent In tonn wetmomett oenstete The msurance claim meet by me Platnmr wtm mg Qggme t 14. Peragteptt 16 at the statement at ctetnt pleaded that tn March 2015. P tnetmett tese rsgardtnglhe‘de1tet:1tan of set porch stabs at 27 uni|s 0! Type E ttnee storey bungatwws‘ As such, P made an trtsurance etettn wttrt D 15 P’: tnsurenoe c ts tor D to tndemmfy P tn respect at the recllficatlort east ot the detect arnounttng to RMI,028,087 55 as at 26 3.2016 F ettegee that D has urttaMuHy retectett P's Insurance claim T In ts D's ease ts this on zt 122015, F claimed that around March 2015 it etmetea tess tn retatton lo the delleclton at car porch steas 0! 27 urtlls of Type 5 three storey hungatows P made an trtsurance ctatnt wtth D SIN arJt:u4aEEz¢1ft:tvttvvI§ 3 «we. Smut navthnrwmbeuledlx:vulwltaenrwtrtnfllytmtttl dnu1vtlnlvnlF\LINQ vtmxt 17. Aflev 1ne ad]us|er's(1.e.Sedgw1ck Malaysxa Sun and) 1nves|>gaI1ons, 11 was reponed 0131 me deflecivon o1 car porch slabs was firs: drseoverea 1n Maren 2014 And was caused by among mners nrnprpper deswgn e1 me canmever pearn / 5151: The deflermon of me car pomh slabs, wrucn rrrs1 arose 1n Maren 2014, we knoum 1p P more P mnk up one msurance pohcy wmn D. 13 D also mssovered 1na11=‘s nrs1 deswgn p1an ounlaimng 1ne Improper des1gn,w1nch caused me ee1ec1. was prepared and Issued as 1ar back as January 2012 That is to say, belare me re1reac11ve dale e124 10.2012, as se1 out m are insuranoe palmy And amp ae1ore1ne insurance poney was me" up mm D. 1n 1na1, P's Insurance claxm 15 oumde o1 1ne coverage pencd and coverage e1 1ne msulance poney 19. Therelnre n, pursuant 1.: the |evms and eonunans M the msuranoe policy. repudIs|ed P's msuranoe dawn and me Insurance pahcy via 11s neuers da|ed 14.2.2013 and 20.32019 20 D assens 1na1 P's aenon,wmenis1ounded m pon1rac1, s urne parrea. srnee 6 years nas e1apeea 1mm me dale when me cause e1 acinon accrued. Nanre1y 171 March 2015, as Needed by P 1nernse1ves a1 paragrapn 18 or me S\a|emenl o1 Clamu. 21 D pleaded we express or wmplwed |erms cf me rnaur-anee pohcy as loHaws (a; 13 um no: pay any chum rnaea agalrm P or 1n anyway mumalsd up P prmv k: we wmmsnoemunt 1:! ma Ballad :11 Insurance, at ansmg hum ur altnbnlamu In miller: e1 winch 1: was aware o1, or which a reucnable pvwn 111 me cnrcumsmnces woum have been aware, pmr 10 me aarnnreneernem o1 lhe person a! -nsuranes, my D wnu no1 pay any damn umng nun. er .n mnneeuen wun any oanoun. I11, evmv av armssmn wrncn has taken puaee mar 10 me ratmacllva me am 15 an 2» m 2n12 Ac) P has a duly to ad"! u|mus|gwd1a1|Mub|mmae!1de1L and m) P was a may 1a dwsclaxe any nrauer man 5- knuws, ane any rnauer raaspnaary krmwn In he re1eyan1 11: as daemon m accaphlvg me Ask and delevmumng rne Insurance lemus 10 Be apphad Issues var ue1errn1nauon 22 The rssues 1er dexenmnaxion may be surnmariseu as follows an a,aa4.ssm,mr.....e ‘ «nu. a.n.1...n.ran.. u... a my .. anmnauly mm: dnuumnl vu .r1uNG v-711:1 la) wmner P has cammmzd . mmenax nomsmsme and breached ns duly at utmost quad Vawh av duly Ia duscmse mailers mm P s awake ac And Much cause he relevanl no US declswun on wnamu to mam the ask and to dslarrmne ma Insumnoe (errni. my wmmsr F‘: Insunmva cum mes «mm nr m mnrvecmn mm any mam. a-:1. ermrnromlssuzn mm. hu man once nnar m the relmaclwe da|e av the Insurance Dnimy mar. .; on 2A In 2:212‘ La) Whemsv P‘: claim «or ma mdemmly sum :71 fiM1,u2s,oa7.55 undav Ills msurarwe may ws bavvad by umnamn, and my Whflhar P has mwma 2 was mvflarlha msurinee Dnlmy 23. Here are my nnaings my Fim1ly.Ilmd mm P has aammmed . mmenm mmmnsure and launched ms duly :11 mmm good mm or duly m dxscmse manzrsmm P15 aware cl ms ‘s an: In P‘sVaHure In miorm Donne deflledwon ulme car porch s\abs and me umumslanoes M dalm (Hal may am «mm m. wfvan P buck mu m mwvinoe may on zma zou Wnnsldersuuztl . mlllarm ha mmm m D's decwsmn m amenmvg In; Ask and delerm my me mmme Izmu m be nppuea As such, I am sausfved mm D .5 eJ.c\uflefl «mm memnny-nu P on lhe miumnce claw on this fimumi mane‘ I wnmd dismiss P's ac1Ion (I77 Summary, I am mm P‘: msuranu cum ames vmm an em or emnssian Much has taken phct pmr In me nxlmncnve um cl me msurance pnhny. mm an 24 m zmz This .5 because P‘: dawn vlen nnmamma me mmmnemeugn Vs dated January 2012 It \s below me Mwachve dale se1 om m me msuranw balmy‘ we 24 10.2012. Awummgny. P‘: mwvaws mam lafli oumda ov me wvsvaus ov me Iniurancs pansy, since the mug" wan war dated mm lhu Ialmacflve da|e 0! In msuunce Whey on msiunhernm nllzmnlwe ground. x mnsidenhal D's repudnalnon allhe Insurance pom ‘a lawful am that D vs rml name m mdemmiy P on me msur-ance manm (C) Tmvdry, x mm mm P‘: awon n ma barred Swnce mx yells ha: alarmed Drum msumavmvn me cam .24 achan scum, whmh W5: W1 March zms As pfleaded by P Ihemsahtes a| pamgmnh «a el Ihe Suxemenl M Clam nnd (db F\nal\y‘ I rm (Hal mere Vs no loss snmevud ny F undsrms msunme pew Since P ham annulled Ina! may never pm my ms was. Awurdmgvy. mm .5 nuflvIm1VovDlu mdemmfy SIN a:J.:m-Ezzzlfmvflvnq 5 “Nana S.” ...u..,wm.,.u......:n..»,...m.my.m.m.m._.n..mW 24 Here 15 my explananon a Mgjengl nglH.11sc\usure and mash a! duly 25 In Maren 2o14.1rre main eontraaur had deteclsd 1ne ae11ec11on onne car porch slabs rn respea or 27 mm: of me Type 3 1nree-s1orey bungalows on 2.4.2014, P was notmed anne deflsciron of the ear porch s\ahs aunng ane o1 1ne rennugnuy sue rneeungs 25 Jurukur Mas was appomxea to rnon11or1ne aenecuun of |l1e car pomh swans 1n (our 111 me umls wn11e1ne rest a1 me unils were to be mammred by one main mn1rac1or1nernse1yss. Tne nronnonng o1 me deflec11un of me car porch slabs took place «mm my 2o1411nsep1ernber 2014. muniluved nmee a week vonwu 1nun1ns 27 The eonsunanxarcn11ec1ins1mc1ea P 1e su1mr11ne1r1orrna1 concmsnon repon aa1e¢ 1.10.2014. Tnerea11erun 14 10 21114.1: requeslefl lorme 1111 survey reparl «urn 1na main oonnamor on 5 11 2014, P recewsd 1ne1rna1 survey reparl lmm the mam aannracmr and reques1ea for dunner n1oni1onng1o be done. 25 1n vamng lu mfurm u u11neaa11ec11on 01 me car porch shah: and the c1rcurns1ances cf dalm which may ansre «nan: 11 when P look up me msuranae pohcy on 21 10 2014, I find that P has cnmmmed a rna1enaI nan-mscxesure. And bveached 1s duly 111 u(mns( good «sun or duty 1o mscloae any rnaner which F Is aware of, and u1a1 1s reasonabw relevxm 1o D's dsmslon 1n acceplmg the risk and delervmmng the Insurance 1ern.s in be applied Since P was weH aware or me deflaclicn at me mar porcn slabs be1ore1ne1nsuranae pahcy was 1aken up 29 cwauses 14 and 19 ol the excmsmn clause in we insurance pnhcy reads: 'Exc1nx1uns we WWI‘ ml nay any1n.ng1n respect or 14 Pnuvanfl Panmng any clmm made against or m any way 1nl1malea(o\beImuvad pmr lo the cnmmeneemem av me penod cl msurancs av dvecfly nr mnenry ansmg lmm or annbuvama 1o (ar any1au; or e1m.nm.nm ofwnlnh an lnulud Ia: war. or cl Much 3 reamnable person 1:: ma curcurnnanoss wou\d have been 5 srn a:J.m4-EEz¢1rg1v1tpn.g «me s.n.1...n.rw111... .1... 1. mm 1... m1r.11.y mm: dnuumnl y.. mum M1 aware, Drior In an com mailers out o4wnIaI a c elm cmnnpuinmu sunnu .5 lg: .un.aI..I.I..I - I9 Rflmamw: am any r.\mm aIIeeIIy oI InaIIecuy allsmg Hum III In uonnecmn Mm any conduct, an. emu D! oInImnII wnIaI has taken place DI VS .u.n.a In nan liktll plan prior IL: IN uwoacllvn an.- an PW-1 Idrrector or P] teslmed that he had knuwiedge of me aenecmn onne caI pomh s\abs In March 2014, i 2 before Flock up the Insurance pehcy on 21 10.2014 LIkewIseI PW-3 (Chief Opevaliuns omcer of ma developer) (esufied that me ¥55u8 ol me dellecllon at lhe car povch swans was known let P in March 2014 31. 1 rely on me volluwing aII¢numIes In ms /nsurance Bhd v Ralhmasamyafl Kasinalhan [2015] 2 MLJ 399 at 332, the come! Appeal made reference to me Federa\ com case 01 Emma Insurance Co Ltd y Ngau An Kau [1972] 1 ML! 52 and said [19] /n #19 case arcmna Insurance Co LII: y ~gaII an Kau, me Fedaul Conn hsfid IIIaI In every case me Issue whsmer mm Im . VIDIFJVSDIOSWI Of rnmflecl I1IsemIIIs oI mrswplssenlillofl In an unswar In In. proposal loan is B QAISJIVDII at Van Io as u.I.InIIneu by me am»! and wnm In. palicy coIII.IIIs . basis zlaun Irwu not In. mun’: funcfian to mwulrl Inkfi the mnlernllly n! the antvmr 1n: IILIWII to the aIIesIIan III we proposal form wm be dumod mnttrhl-.1 In. own oil!" mswernadbeen nude I coIII1moII om-policy ' 32. In Amencan InIeInIsrIorIa/ Assurance Co Ltd v Nadarajan s/I sIIbIaInanIaIII [2013] 5 MLJ 195 al 202, me coun ofAppea\ new 'In/ DWSIIEHI ta 5 usw III the /I-Isuramre Im I996 (‘me my Ills msurud IS oaltpu Io disclose In me vlvnosar lorm an In ram nnII:rI nu knlw DI oIIgIII to have known runy llld ImnrIIny. ulhuwlsn In. policy Imm muy be Inyawazea Unoar s 1547 :11 My Art In. insurnd nIIIu Imcum In the anpounnx mm en. convict al IVIIUIIIIEI Im nnnnd Inkn any mane: wmen Mu irlsurud um wIIIIII: an nI.y.III ta Illl docislnn onne apnwnnz on Wfilmlrla lccipl the risk ornuland the rates and terms to be appllul DI my Inum . rnaannhle persnrv III the c;IcIIInsIaIIm coumn cxpnclud to mow to M Iereyam. II; In the Instant 0555, ms Insunu was not ufufmaxkgoad I-nn 1ube«IIIIae rm; wllvrv Ila InIIwII.I1In. flnpl/Lani Ihal he was Barmng an e:IIIIIaIaII annuar mculm oIi'M154z0an when III Iecl scoordmg lo FW1. he was onry eaInIng an EHIVIIEHHDGIIIQ D/E3041] RMSU mm The mg drflsrenm In the sxfrmalsd mcuma a(aDauARM100 Ixm ya VS a malsNa/ fact as II may have a bearmg on In. IIII. DCCUDEIVDH or me Inmsa and this In mm In y mm Mu decision of III. apneuaIII on WIIEIIIIV or not to must mu Inn mu conxlU'4"'”Y In 7 sm fldaud-EEZ¢1fy\v|Ywng «mm. Snr1n\mmhnrwH\I>e .I... M mm I... InIII.II.y MVMI mmn vu nF\uNG puns! ttomtttttte the mos I Primrllms and «mu to bc applied it. at. pottctes mot: by me atapcttsttt, at m. Vnsulid WI! bound By the tysttsttst W sam M the was tuvaosst forms I/1.5! me answlfl atven We mm and (Hal tnt IIISWIII wottta form my basis or ttt. sotttttot between the msumd mt ttt. IPPGIIIHI ttt Pan ty of the msuraflfl poyoos, II was otmy mad that m pmtu-s.t totttt. .tt.tt M at. but: aim: Ansunncn pal‘ tn 33. The CDUI1 ot Appeat m we /nsulance Bhd y Ralhmasamy (supra) held [at page 334; -1251 Nfivmg oottsttteteo the stotessta stymamtes tetettoa In by me tmettoattt s COIlnSE/ we aW9W me pmnostttott av/aw Iatd down llmrsm oottcttmmg a hast: clause tottttatn wnlrads ottnstttttm 126! tn ms GOMIIHIDII, WI wottta I730 rule! to the ttaott an!!!/ad Ptmntptes or lrlsullflbu Law rm Ed}. Dubltshedby Lexl:Ne)IlL ttt which the learned attmot Poll cntt cttst had also Glfilamod aw 237 wvtat ts .9 basis watts»; and how tt opmttts ttt an tttstttam mtttmst. A pmpour wna lpP"V: Itn III insur-ttcc policy I! tumor a duty to dllclau ttt .tt inlllrif nll t-tttottttsttott Gdrlsfdcvld in be tttmttat by a pflldlflk tottttot ttt addlhon In an m£ul9d'S my In tttsctose maronttt VHVDVMBIIOH. an tosttm may also sbctl tttatattot tnrottttattott ttottt an Allsuffid mm ms qttasttotts In .- pwposat «otttt /H s pmpasnl totttt, EH tttstttott I5 r-quytoa to mm sttttttmttts uflsd sttosomottoes stoo slalemenll otouttttott pifllmtnglamlflsklflbelrllllrad At. insWDdI5lnViNlMyIIlidOfDWiNInl ms ottttt otttto Jfllelnenff gtyett ttt the proposat tontt mo »o dono ay tttsarnotstma what 15 potztttany known an IM Burt cltllltfl A ryprcst asst: must lead! as tottows (Sal L V BIIIIIIV Law IIISIIIHIIDI Co Ltd [1972] 2 Maya’: now at) t WBIIBIII lhtal ms shame slalemenls /Vlad! tsy me at on my belvall st. ml: and camnlele and tame mamttspruamt slmllba mt DDS!-I‘ om. oottttttc.» between me and me oanuaony ms us: of a basis Clause I! by far the most cammorl way Wzlralmes an CIIEIII1 ttt an tn!!!/EH69 Dmvtfacf. wnstt an msumd Warvanls ms tttttn or aostttacy arms slalemvrtlr tmtt W! a prupout tam, I01 tttsum is -ttttwott In Wold mo cottvm ab Irlllln tt 2». shtlmlrlts .t. tttsocttnto evsn moi-'9" my hlvo nu am: an m. Vfllllffid my The VVSIIVEV L1 not awett to snow tttty II4IlSB/ ttttt oemett ma ttttsststatnettt and the /ass whmfl lakos place Eaue/Iy, vllhsrs s s ttttsststsmsttt M a pmposal rotm sotttottttttg tt bust: aattss, Ina Insurer ts a/so no! obbgsd to snow that that mtsstatotmtt mnsltlulsl :3 fun! mltenal Ia ma Ilsk Wltnllad, ttstosty Ihnl me ttttottttsttott wottta haw W|”ll9V|L‘lUlJ7mdlHI)nSIlr9! ttt ttts dentsvbn mmet to lake on the Ilsk of ms stttottttt tttotototttm to be mtgaa rot tmnefiak/Hy ms ttstt - a sm a:J.:u4-Ezzetfmvfiw-q “Nair SM Illnhnrwm be t... M my t... nflmnnflly om. dnuuvunl VII AFVLING vmm an Plemlsed on lne abo\4e—men(loned aiillioniiee, wriere lrie policy is governed by a basis clause. Ihs answers lo «lie oiieslions in iris proposal lorni will be deemed niaierial Glven marine lniiri orllie answers had been made a oondilion ol iiie pcllw The insure ' eniiiled to avoid me conlrael if lriere was any inaccuraie inlorrrialiori in lne proposal lorrn |haI was rnaienal lo the pulley 35 The insuranoe policy liere is governed hya oasis clause wnicri reads: ins Aopiicaniii am-owisdgeiriai lm psiiiculars and suienienis wmalned in (Ills Pvupuul and III are abmmnirlylng doourneriis snail oe ire oasis or um cunhlcl siiould a Pnllcy be issued. and runner, irie Apollcariis aairiowiedoe irial ilie Proposal and ine aedoinpanying dosiiriienls will oo Irlwlporalsd in ms Polu:y' 35 In irie preserll case, P was nolllled ol lhe delleoiion in Marcn 2014. i.e even oeloreine insurance policy was taken up wilri D on 21 10.2014. Tiiis was undoiioledly a noiiliable mailer ll was a eircunislance ilial oughl to lie disclosed no Dr as me prmeci was ongoing al lrie Ilme when P look up irie insurance policy. 37. P snould expec1 lhe possioilily dial more could he coniplainls lrom the house buyers oonoeming lire dellenion at |he car porch slabs since inere was no lormal conclusion reporl nor linal solullori to me delleclion pmblem unlil 5.11 2014 Trierelore, lriis was clearly a nolilieble rnanerand a circurrislance ilial ougrii lo oe disclosed lo D. 35 The proposal lorrri was signed by P on 21.10 2l114.Allhauirne. lnere was no linal conclusion repon given lo ine developer regarding the dellectiori ol the car porch slabs As sucn, irie mailer was rlul conclusively decided ei lne rnalerial lime 39 lvw—4 line oonsiillanl areriiiecl ol ihe proiecl) leslrlied ilial a formal conclii ri repon was reqiiesied lo oonsliisively decide on me delleclion manner He iesiilied iriai lriey riad reoiiesied lor a lonnal ooneliision reporl lo be prepared by P and put lo resi the niamer M lrie deneciion el me car porcn elaos. 40 The laci lliai lne nnal reporl was no: out oelore F lock up ine insurance pullcy goes lo snow me: me mailer ol irie delleeiion ol irie car porch slabs was nor cclncluslvely decided in ins circiinisiancee. P ouglrii to know iris: ii was niaierial lo nave disclosed ine deneciion ol me car porcri slaps oelore taking up are insurance policy 2 srn fldauc-EEZ¢lfylv\Ypirrg “None s.n.i luvlhnrwlll be ii... a wally i... nflglnlllly MIMI dnuavlml vn nFluNQ pom! 41. under secIIorI 150 ulthe Insurance A4:1I§96,F nss a I1u1y1edIscIuse |o me Insurer a rrIaI1er Inar ne knows or ought reasonably Io know In be reIeuanIIo1rIe I1ecIsIon uI Ine Insurer cn whe1IIer Io accep11ne rIsII or nm and me ra1es and IerrrIs1o be appIIed. Tne saru provIeIcn reads: “150 Dmy or mckrsula III were a mnnrea n1InsIIraneeIs enlered Inc». a pmpow slIaI| cIseIese la Ins lmensed Insurer e nraner Ina» (er ne knnwvs In be nrreuem In Ine daclsmn er Ine IIceIIseI1 Insure! on wbeIh5r\I: sseemrne rIskarno1arIdIhemIzsaI\d|envIsIra be appIIsdI or 11:) u Ieasenanre person In 1necIIcurrIsIanc.s mum be exvened Io know Io be nIIevan1 42. AI1nougrI me Insurance M1 1996 was repsaIed by and repIaoeI: wnn Ine FInarIc1aI sennces Act 2013 on 30.6.2013. semen 150 or me Insurance Am 1996 renIaIneI1 In Iaree un 31 12.2314 II was Inen IepIaeeI1 wIIII secucn 129 and scneuure 9 of me I=InancIaI semees Ad 2013, wmcn came InIo operslion on 1 1 2015 Tnus, eecucn 15a of me Insurance Am 1995 IS me aDD|ICabIe pm on a11ne1Irne Ihe Insurance con1rae1 was entered Into an 21 10.2014. 43. Regardless. me rsquIrsmenl ol pre-cerIIraeIuaI I1IscIosure in reIatIon In an Insurance eumram vemams me same, wrremer under me lnsuvarme Am 1996 or me I=inancIaI Serwoss Am 2013 As secuon 129 and paragraph 4 M scrIeduIe 9 at me FIrIancIaI servrces Am 2013 essen1iaIIy repIIca1es r.ec1Ion 150 o1 me Insurance Ad 19915. 44 An IneureroanncI be made liable Ior an unknown rrsk, panIcuIarIy one ma1 was wIIIIIn IneInsure«.1's kncwIeI1ge 1ha1 comd develop II’I|0 a claim. Here. P had IaIIer1 In aIecIoee Ihe delleclmn oI1he car purch sIabs TrIa1 was a IrIa1enaI Iac1 wrIIcn erIouId have been made knuwn In D As II IS relevant to me c1ecIsIon cI D on wrIe1rIer 1e iDoep\ me risk and (he Ineuranee1errns1u he appli . 45. In IaIIIng 1o dIscIose Ine nIa1erIaIIae1cuncerrIIng1rIe deIIec1Ion 0! one car pomh sIabs, me Insurance cunnram beiween F and D1: voIdabIe Dis en1I1IeI1Ic rsscmd Ine Insurance conlvac\ D had I1uIy repuaIaIed based on IIIeIr IeI1ers o1 repudia1Ion I1e1ed 14 2 2013 and 2c 3 21:15 46 I agree wrm D that me duty .91 |he Insured Io dIscIose rrIaIenaI Iaus lo 1ne msuver Is aIunr1anIenIaI prIncIpIe o1 Insumrroe law By nrrIII1IrIg |o sru fldaud-EEZ¢IFyIv|Ypnrg “’ «nu. Snr1nImrrIhnrwIIII>e u... M mm he nrWIrraII|y mm: flnulfllnl wa nFIuNG WMI

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

B-05(M)-51-03/2021

PERAYU MAT SALLEH BIN NOH RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Criminal Appeal – Section 3 and section 3A of the Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act 1971 [Act 37] (“FIPA”) – Whether the firearm was discharged whilst committing robbery – Section 3 of the FIPA also makes it clear that the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that no hurt is caused to the victim – Issue on the credibility of the only eye witness – It is trite that the evidence is weighed and not counted pursuant to section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 – All appeals on conviction are dismissed – Appeals against the sentence are allowed.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

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05/01/2024 09:34:21 B-05(M)-51-03/2021 Kand. 37 S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N rDUuGp0jokhc1YClq2Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a—n5(M)~51»o3/2021 Kand. 37 3:/on/mu ; IN THE COURT or APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) FPEA BETWEEN wAN MUNAMMAD AZRAMI EIN WAN ZULLKIFLI APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PRosEcuToR . RESPONDENT HEARD TOGETHER wrm mn BETWEEN MOHD ASRIZAL BIN MOHD. IERAHIM voNG APPELLANT AND Puauc PROSECINOR HEARD TOGETHER WITH sw N)uuGVa‘uknc1vr:Iqzsw Nat! Sum INNDEY WI“ be M M mm u. DIIEIMIIIY mm; nnnmvgnl VII EFILING VWLII BETWEEN MAT SALLEN BIN NOH APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDENT [In Ihs Maner a! (he Hwgh com o! Makaya at Shah Alam. 1n|he Slate olSe\an9ar Darul Ehsan Cnmlnal Trial Nu: BA-45D-1-D3/2018 and BA.45D-2—n3/2015 Between Pubhc Pmsecumr And 1. Mohd Asnz/cl! bin Mchd Ibramm wan Muhammad Azmml mn Wan zmkm: 3, Ahmad Favsal mu Muda (DNAA PADA 5/10/2017) 4 Ma! SaHeh bin Nah] CDRAM: HADHARIAH ElN'flS‘1EDtSMAlL,JCA AZMAN am ABDULLAH, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN. JCA 1 sw n)uuGw‘akru<1vc\q1sw mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; mm. VII mum pm ". Name 'pushsr‘ fidak drketahur. (c) Dakar waklu magnb, mereka me/ma! mnang /e/ski India (smo; dalang he srlu. OKT1 ms/ms.‘ Faisal Ierus pergr ks arah lelaki India Isrsebul den ksmudianya me/ihar Fmsal flan /8/Bk! /M115 tersebul bargelul. DKT1 mendengar Faisal menjsm kspsda Islskr India fsrsebul dan ms/wnls dadah dan wang dar/pads /elaki India rersebux. Lslskl Indra tsrsebul ssorang "pusheI' dadah OKT1 mm menganalf Vs/akf Ind/a larssbul (.1) Ssmasa Parse! dun /e/ukr Indra rm beige/uf, oxn dalsng mengmsmpm mslska den srah bslakalvg dim pergr ks ssbe/ah krri mansks/u oxrz bevada ur sebe/ah Kansn msreka. Semsss nu, OKT7 Ierdengal bdrm SHIN /srupan dan ms/I715! OKT2]a1uh .1. Sim oxn Iiada penqstahuan punca lelupan flan ape yang Ie/ah be!/aku mm Nada perrgeiahuan dan mak nampak Faisal msmbswa prsml di fsmpal ks/sdlan oxn trdak nampak sesrapa msmsgang pistol dr lamps.‘ ke/adian. (9) mm msnsfikan memegang pistol m lamps! kajadian dun tldak psmah [engok alsu memegang pistol [P21/i] Ierssbur sebelum kefidfan. c»<r1 lidak msmbawa pistol Iersebut ks lempatkejadran. (r; oxn mengaku hsnrisk me/akukan sa/mm [slept msnsfikan msngguneksn pistol tslsebul dan mensflkan ada melepaskan lsmbakan msnggunaksn pistol Ierssbur. (g) OKT1 me/vyalakan plslol tsrsebut dtpunyal oleh Faisal. Se/spas dilangkap polls den ssmasa berada 4/’ dalam Vaksp, F5755! memberilshu OKT1 bahawa pistol Iarssbut mtlikmya 11 IN muuevllakrmvmuzsw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm F221 FSlSa/ tslah msnmggsl dunfa kalans sakll as/an. gem (n) False! Haggai dl wok c 11! Msntan com dan pairs ls/ah msnangkap Faisal .1.‘ Sim. Faisal datarlg denytwn polis ks ruman OKTV dart W/is Ielsh menangkap OKT1 (r) orm trdak pernan Pergr ks Hotel Sun Beans din rmds pengelzlhuzm srapa yang menyewa d1 blllk hots! lslsebut. 0) Pmak pohs mak memmpas mmr tsrsabul daripsda DKT1. Pihak pairs man mslampas prlslol tsrssbul danpada lelak: Indra lelsebuf OKT2 gave an unswcm slalemenl and his decenoa was as vouaws: (s) Pads 23.09.2015, oxrzr bersama OKT1 flan oxm barsda m Rsszoran Subaldsh dl Sunga/ Way uniuk maker! malam Sslspas makan ma/am, pads jam Vsbih kmang 7.30 malam, meleka 1e/ah Pelyr ke B/ck E a; Mermsli Court, Sunway dengan msmsikr‘ kerela P9/odua wva yang drpandu o/sh OKT3 unluk bslshal dirumah mm. (a) Ssrnass an dalam ksrsts, OKT1 man msnenma panggusn msron daripada sanmng kswarmya yang bsmama Faisal (ferruduh yang Ielah msninggal dunxa) unluk uarang ke tempal /erak kevela Bluk E m Menlan Cour! unluk be!/umpa dsngsn Fa/sa/. OKT1 den Farsal ads/ah kawan dan OKT2 jugs mengsna/I Faisal mels/ul ox n (c) Apabila masuk ks da/am kawasan Iszak ksrsta Blok 5 dr‘ Mentari court, tanudun kedua nampak Faisal ke/ual den langge temper /em kers-Ia dun belja/an msnuju ks srah ssorang )9/akr Indra yang jugs bsrada m slru. (:1) Sampar di‘ mu, OKT1 dan DK12 keluar dan kerela Psrodua Viva (arssbut. mzanian oI<72 nampek pergaiuzan di anlala Faisal dan Ie/ski‘ India mi. was weak ks/Liar dan bsrads di da/am kersla Pemdua V/VB tslsabul paaa sellsp mass dan duduk iii bshagien pemsndu karaia Parodua Viva Isrssbuf (9) OKT2 Isms psrgr menomng meleraiksn paigaiuian (17 anlara Faisal dan Is/aki‘ India ifu Semasa berbual dennkian, OKT2 Ierdengar sum bunyiseurnparna Iembakan dan rem [arm in am: (Ishtar. Se/spas jafuh di am: /anlar, oxrz nampsk pana kanannw Imsna tembaksn OKT2 Isms msrsngkak kc belskang ssbuah karsls di Iarnpai Isaak kalsla telsebuf dan pads masa iin nampak satu bends seumpama pistol di alas Ianiai Laiaki India fersebul mengambil bends (midi; rersebur dan menyacukan Kenada keflala OKT? dan inimenysbabksn Iemidun ksdua be/ass lakut. (I; Pads mass Ilu, om: nsmpsk OKT1 mslariksn an den sini dangan menaIk/ Ksrsls Pemdua Vh/a dan bslgelak keluardari kswssan Iaiak kelsls iarsamn OKT2 ridak nampek Faisal pelgi ks maria seiepas keltldiisn Iersebul. Ig) om: risda pengeianuan sebab psrgs/man di amsla Faisal dan Ieim India iersebul Lslaki /ndis nu mansnyakan ramia-In kadua dslsng dart mama dan msmysk paha kanan (srtuduh ksdua yang cadaia dan msnyshabkan OKT2 msnjent kasakiean. In) oI<r2 yang xrdak dupe! nenaian Is/an bsljaya melangkak sehingga ke Iimgga dan zaaiguiing ks D8/kom dl tlngkal 3 tamper /etak karsta Ierssbuf dan ksmudrsn iannn ks bswah dan msndalal di afas ssbuah keralzi kancfl. 1; IN rDuuG¢JIakrs:1YC\aZSw Nuns Sum! n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\ruU|:I mm: dan-mm VI] mum pm m OKT2 maslh cubs mersngkak ke srah sam (fang lampu dan Islakl mm: msbm msmukul Ierfuduh Kedua. fldak lama ksmudian, pans libs dr kawassn tersebul dam msmbawanys ke Puss: Perubaran Umversilr Ma/aya -mm lawman. 0') own» new pengelahusn mengsnar‘ kswu/udan prsm: dan pe/um yang dfgunskan da/sm kss w sabslum, semasa dan selspss ksjsdisn Ismbskan bsrlaku. [23] OKTJ gave ms ewdence on cam and his devence version was as lu|luws' (5) OKTS bsmsra 49 tahun dsn msmpunyal/chm kumng on bus): kadal m kawassn RBIHSII Panjang, Kc/anfen yang cnsewakan kepsda psnyewa—penyswa (:2) Pada 2a/9/2015, on: bevsama dengan oxrz bsnolak am Ke/aman ke Kuala Lumpur. oxn msncadangkan marska menyswa kemla unluk ks Kuala Lumpul Kevsla lsrsebur dissws alas nams oxra kslans any msmpunyar Vesen mamsndu (5) Sampal dr'KuaIa Lumpur, padajam Isom kulang 5.30 petang. OKT2 telah menerims panggr/an le)eIon dal/pads seovsng kawtmnya be/name Faisal. Faisal ls/ah msmmls axrz darn OKT3 perg! ks lsmpak Islak kslsta dlslok D Martian cam. (11) Ssmpsl .1: temps: Ielsk karate m‘ Mervfari cam, OKT3 ms/iha! OKT1 dan Faisal zeta): berada disifll (e) om Ie/ah lurun deli kevera V/‘Va Iersebut dsn Faisal puls msngamhkan OKT3 psrgi ms/arakkan ksrsla Vrva yang dipsndunya :1: (amps! Ielak ksrela d: silu. OK73 diberifahu olsh Falsal bamawa ada '.I0b' L/nluk dllakukall tewpl tldak msmberltahll xenuduh kellgs apskah './almersebuv. (l7 Alas arahall Qxfll OKT3 lslan melellskkarl ksrstanya pads /arak Iebifl kurang 50 mats: dari tsrrlpal belieu be!/umpa dsngan Faisal dan marlunggu dl da/am kereta Vlvs lsrselwr Semass msrmnggu Ieblll kulallg 30 mini! dl da/am ksnzfa Vlva Ialssblll, OKT3 Kirdsngsr blmyl lslupan meuam I6}/iif mslslup oxra berasa takul manderlgar blmyr /eiuparl tersebut dan menunggu /eblh kurarlg 15 mlnn an S/Iu ssbs/um merrlandu ksrsla Viva M/un darl barlgurlsn Islak ksrsla flan Deredar dari silu. (g) one Ildak msmbawa prsval [F'21A] larssbuf darl ma psngslalluan siapa yang membawa plslollezseburke arm (n) oxrrs [uga tlada pengslanusn mengsrlai plsvol yang digunakarl oleh OKT1 semasa kejadiarl tersebut. (V) OKT3 Ildak lerlmsl dalam samun bsrkumpularl dengan bersanlalakan plshl lsrsehul. [24] The aelence also called arlclhsrwilnsss. Munammad Rldhuan bln Abdul Razak (‘*Dw4")l Evlderlce by DW4 was as lullo (al Pads 23/9/2015, lam Ieblh kwang 5.30 Iwlgga 7.30 malam, 504 bsrsda dl Sunway Merltarl relapi Ifdak mgsnumlah yang bsllau bevads sm bevehal (/spak) Esrsama kawlsnnya bsmama Hasii den tslah bsrlamu derlgan OKT1 sm merlgems/l‘ OKT1 se/sk swal lanun 2:215 darn dapal merlgscam OKT1 dl Mahkamah (bl OKT1 lelah marlsrima panggflan rsls/‘on dallpada seomng 15 IN rDuuGV-7lakru:1YCluZSw -um Smnl ...m.mm be flied M mm .. mm-y MIN: dun-mm VI] .mm mm kawzmnys bsmsma Faisal. sm ms/ihatmuka DKT1 neumah den oxn keluar darl rumsh urlluk Izerjumpa Faisal. mm I/dsk msmbsrilshu SDI msngapa FEVSEII mahu Der/umpa mm. sm /uga mengenan Faisal dan psmsh bsrjumpa dsngan Faisal sebelum W (C) Sslapas lebih kurang so nrngga 40 miml kamudralv, sm rnelmar OKT1 bank he rumsh den kelfhatan ke/am-kabu! dan gs/Leah Apsblls drtanya nlsh sm rmmgapa OKT1 :15/am Keadssn bsgffu, OKT1 manjawab rrsda spa-ape flan rem mssuk ks as/am bflfknya (.1; Se/spas rm, scu pun be/rk ks rumahnya. Pavia kessokan harmya di sebe/ah Iengsharl, sm manerima panggilan rs/eron darfpeds Hssrl yang msmbsrilahu oxn le/sh d/Iangkap pobs ksrsna Iarmzal dalam kes samurv. (9) sm msnyazakan yang semssa sm be/-ads m rumah mm bamama Hasif, SD41 lidak rvampak OKT1 msmsgang alau msmbawa EPBJDE senjala dun nampsk OKT1 keluar den" Iumah be!/‘umpa Farsal da/am kasdsan sehslai sspinggang (I) We/at/pun sm dsn oxrv bsrkawalv, SDA trdak pemah dlrmnla oéeh lsrtuduh panama membevrkan kelsrangan sedemxkian dw mahkamah Finding ulthn loamod mu! judgl ax ml and of ma dIfInca's cas- [25] At me conc\us\on of me mm, A was me flndmg 01 me learned Ina! page mal me defence had lafled to cast a reasonams doubt on the prosaculmds case consequemly, me Appeusnzs were convicted (or me offence as per me charges. 15 IN muuevllakrmvmuzsw -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm [25] The learned High court Judge, in coming la his declslufly held as lollows (a) The OKT’l's datenoe basically was on the allegallon llral Faisal (lne deceased accused) was me nraslennlnd cl lha gang-robbery againsl Pwlo. ln llrla regard, ma learned High Caurl Judge was cl me view lnal Falsal nad before me lnal and ll was easy lor the Appallanls Io pul all lira blame on Falsal as he cauld rim appear in wan to give his leslirncny. Durlng lira irlcidenl, Faisal is nol me one wno have ngnl wllh I‘-‘W10 aasadas, while delendlng lunrsell, om had adrnluao that he intended ln cummll gang-robbery agalnsl FW1O and nad done so lcgallrar wllh OKTZ, OKTS and Faisal (lno deceased accused) om only denled carrylng lire gun and havlng shat OKT2. lb) wlln regard lo lne delence made by OKT2, lna learned High coun Judge found lnal lnere were many inalellal discrepancies in oKT2's slalsmenl as edmpared lo lna slalarnanl led by mm and o><r3. Those inalerial conliadrcllons have aflecled llle de1ensecfOKT2 and as such lne ooun lound lnal OKTZ is nm a credible wilnsss. OKT2‘s defense nas also failed lo rebuune oreaunrpllon ol knalmedge aboul lne gun used by OKT1 dunng Ihe rncrdaril and on me balance of probahlllnes lailao lo casl reasonable doub me pvoseculicn's case. (c) The delenoe ol OKT3 was lrlal he was 50 melars from where ins fighl look place and Inns na had no knowledge mal OKT1 :7 IN rDuuG¢Jlakhc1YClaZSw -use Snllal ...nu.r M“ be used a yaw oa nllnlnallly MIN; dnnnvlnrll via arlum wnxl carrying ar had in ms pnssessinn or under N5 cus1udy 0! control of ma firearm Tne Veamed High Conn Judge upon cunswdermg ma mailer hold the same wew as for on: that there were many malenm macrapanaea Vn the statement or mm. Sum malenal oonlrsdlchons have afleded nia ae1anaa.rhana1ora,ma oaun was anna viewlhat on: \s not a crsdmla wflness and ms defense failed to new the presumption of knuwkadgs aboul the gun used by om during lhe mcidenl, on ma balance of pmaaanmes, om lauad to cast reasonable doubt m ma pmsecufiorvs case (a) Based an the arorasam reasons. the Veamed High Couruudgs convicted ma Appauans (or me ufiences as per charges and ma Aupeflants were senlenoed |u death by nanging. This app-an [27] aevora ua are three appaaxa wllh three dmeren(Pa|1inn av AppeaL However, grounds mac \5 subm ed before us may be summarised as follows: (0 me delenee o1|he Appeflams had raised reasonable mm to me amaacm.an'a case om am not ma or cause death or Injury to Pwm and was merewan allempllo ND PW10 were .5 no amaenca 10 claany shmv |ha(OKTl ahouna gun n coma also be Pww or Faisal lhalshal (hsgun lhalcaused the xmury I0 OKT2. OKT2 and OKT3 did no! that Know lhal OKT1 was carrying or had m ms pussessiun or under his custody or 1: IN muuewlakraztvcwuzsw "Nuns sum In-nhnv M“ be used m mm a. nflmnnflly mm; flan-mm Va muna Wm comm! me nneamn; and (fr) the evidenoealP\N1U ls nm credible. There arsmserepanmss Vn his statements. Our an on [28] II is firs: apposwa that secuon 3 and secfian 3A of FIFA be staxsd as Iellaws: -3. Family iv! dilcllamlnn a muann In um commiulnn M . scnmunm winne- Any person WM ellha Ilma oinis mnmmng ur iltlmplmg m eomnm av axmwa ms wmmlssmn ova schedmefl nflevme magma. n firearm wnh Imam m muse damn av hurl In any parsom shah. nommsnammg (MI no nun u caused Iheqeby, he numshed wnn Ampnlonmam lav a term of not um man may yams am not exaesdmu my years Md wilh whirapmg mn um um man mm mm u. Penllly mmompllcu In us: of dlnch-rpl wnrunn Wheve, wnn ‘mum be cause deem xx hull to any person, . flmarm Vs uncnangea by any pawn an we nuns av ms uummmlnu nr altemplmg la omnnm or abelunq me mnmnumn ula sdwdulud mm, each av ms aocamnhnes Vn vespeci av Ihe meme pvwanu :1 I115 wens no me wmmlulun or anammsa umnnnmn er abelmsnl mam who may reamnably an pcasumad to have Imawvv me: such persan was urvymg mm In ms pnsseuslnn orumerhu custody ortxmvulmsfivearm shafl, nmwnns4.anmng um um mm Vs caused by me dwchalys omeov, be punllhed wnn Imprlsonmem For a |emv cl ml less (Mn «niny yuan but mu exoaodilvg fully yuan and mm wmpp-nu wnn non ms mm mm slmkes unless he pmvea mu in nu Vzknn an mawnahls naps in pvsvenl the flvscharga ~ syn rvuuewlakrucwmuzsw "Nuns smnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. .mmn.u-y mm: mmn wa mum pm Issln (I): The dorurrcu ofrlru Appellants mu nlsoa ruasanablo doubt to the prosocur/on’: can [29] ll was submlued by me counsels :71 all lne Appellanls lnal lnelr delenoa had raised doubl lo the pwsecutlan's case. [:0] ln lnls regard, lar ol<Tl, the counsel suhmlIIedlhatOKT1 ls not me one who snal ms gun. ll could also he PW‘lfl or Faisal llns daoeased accused) who s|'lo| the gun. Tnus, lnis lulluwsd by me submisslan alarm and OKT3 lllal lmlll did not “Val know Anal OKT1 was carrying or had In ms possession or under nlscuslady or control llrefireann The learned ouunsel had referved to me case ol Pub/lo Pmecular v. Dng Fah clrsng (1996) 1 cu 501 on wnellrer dlscharge ol lne firearm was an acl separate and dlsllrlal lrern lne rubbery as lollows: -ma accused a-scnargsd N5 firearm ml al ms vlollm: and i| wns ml proved mar rm amused dlxcharued a «warm an we llma or commmlng me lvbbelv. [31] We have wnsidsred lhe Appellanls' delsnoe and (hell submlsslurl. Hawever. we are ::ons|l-aim la depart lmrn me nnalng ol lne learned High Court Judge. We reler lo lhe case at Lu my chin @ Lon rock song A on v Gall Yook cnln A Anar[2l7D3) 2 ML: 97 w n held as lollows: “Ganerallyl an zppellals mun wlll nal lnlelverle unless ln. lnsl mun was smwn la be plainly wrong In arrwlrlg at Its declslon or wrlete there had been no nr lnsmuml judlclal appmlallan ul me avlderlce. Judlnial appreolatknn or evldence mearll man . Judge who was rsqulrea lu aaruunale upon 3 dlsnme musl amve al hls dadsmvl on an lull. man by nssasslflgl welgnlng snu, for gum: reasons ellher anosvltrlg or :9 la rDUuGWlakhclYCluZSw -ans Sallal ...n.r wlll as HSQG M mm s. nllnlrrallly Mlhls m.l.n VI] aFluNG Wflxl JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introductian [1] There are «me (3) separate appeals before (ms caun emanating lvom ma aamsmn 111 the High com dated 17.02 2021 In mnvimmg and sentencing me Appeuama. [2] [3] At me High com, me |naJ mvolveu A accused as iollows. (1) Mohd Asrizal am Mohd Ibrahim (Appellam in Appaa1 No. a 05041414-oz/2021 and hereinafter win he referred m as -om-) (II) Wan Muhammad Azraml bin Wan Zlllklm (Appellant in Appeal No. E-05|M)A3—D2J2D21 and hereinafter wiH be referred to as 'DKT2') 11.1; Ahmad Fmsal am Muda (mscnargea not amaunfing w acquillal on 05 10.2017 due to ma reason that the accused had been died) (M Ma: Saneh hm Nah (appwane m Appeal No, B-D5(M)-5I- 03/2021 and herzinafler will be reranaa In as “om:-1 DKT1 was charged as leflcwsz "Bahama kamupada 23/9/21215, jam mm kuung 11130»: bensmpal m lenuaal /slak kemla Blok D, Apanmenr Maman Court J3/an as as, Para/my Jaya m damn dlsran Para/mg. aa/am Nsgslt Sslanaof Dam Ehmn, man drdaputt mnleplskan Iumbslqm ssryala in! mass mraman mmpakarv mumuan dangan ma: hondak msnyubahkan Immannrv zltau kezsderaan ks am Pralap M Ramasamy No. K/F‘: s31ao:1—aa—5297 Oleh yang dlrmharv kamu Isiah 3 IN muuG¢J1akrsc1vc\aZSw -ma 5.11.1 n-nhnrwm be 1;... m mm 1.. WW1-y mm: dun-mm Va aF\uNG Wm rarewng rna wfvme or any pen A7! are evidence pram belam him H. mm. when ducktmg wnamar to awapr M m rerem ms enema er a wnnese. near it agmrm Ie\evin| cm rnua. ne mustuk: rnru awuum ma presenee erasseme arany rmlwe um. wnnass may hive rn gmng ma ervldsnce wnara aontampulary documems exlmedr he nrusx teal ma mu mdenea M a wflnul pgamxlthue. He must also test me avraenee era nenssmarwuness agninsl rna nmbamlmss mm eaa-. Thu vrvlclph oeIma\ In anpe\IatemlerVemnoe\slha1e dedsmn antved n||1y n ma! mun wvlhouljudwcm apprvaahun afmu -vraanes may be set asrae an swam’ [32] In oonsraenng mesa apnea‘: we fulluw «ms uourr earlier declsinn In the case of Fling: Axman bin Amfmnzukilwn Pundakwa Rnya [2021] 2 MLJ 7714202111 LNS10B\nwh\ch Hrs Lordship Abdm Kanm Abdm Jam JCA stated max m deuermrnrng whether the firearm was arsmarge-1 whusr cnmmiuing robbery, me whom rncruent snoum be vreweu as a smgle transacmn [331 wnan we evahlaled me «me and eviaenee m this case, we laund Lha| me ewdenoe ms corroborated. It is not only me evrdsnoe by PW1u who is the Vilmm H’! tms case but also evsdenee tram the report 0| SP12 slated Mat (here was 3 presence at the DNA at OKT2 and OKT3 m the hole! roam (ram wmcn tsw Hams were seized includmg rne buHet whwch re identxcal tome one tmmd the scene It is dflfrcmt to amva at me decision he! one happen an 07 a sudden [341 The uerence also failed to rebut that there rs a discharged offirearm VII which happened at the tame of the wmmisswon at the robbery. Secliun 3 ol the FVPA alsn makes it dear Ilia! the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that nu mm Is caused in the warm. u Is anougn enaunara Is e discharged olfirearm annennre er mmmlltlng or enampong to commit N rtvuuevflrakrecrvmuzsw nse e.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm s. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm VI] anum wrm nv apelling lne ocrnnusslon oi a scheduled olvence enunreraled in lhe scnodule \o lne Act which in lnis case a robbery It is too bad mal H1 lnie case, me snol had caused inlury lo OKTZ. The use oi gun H’! a robbery IS a claar Indication that there IS an intention lo cause death or senous injury In the Vlcllm and such lndlcalinn 07 intention becomes unclaimed when mere is a dlsoharged of nreann nalwllhslandlng lnal na nurl is caused in me Victim. PW“) 1351 Tne counsel ior one also supniilled me: an adverse presunrplldn under sac|lon1141g|nHhe Evidence Aol should be lnvaked in «ma case an the reason mal lna prosecution lalled to prove that me gun belongs in any Appellanls. All |he Appellants suggesleol mat il Faisal line deceased accused) who might bring me gun 1o me scene In wnlon lney had no knowledge aboul IL The prcsecullon was said lulled m produoe 112 slalemant D7 Faisal. [as] In we regard, we raler lo lne case at any Mdoi seng A on v. FF[1|l15]1 LNS nzl wnlcn Abdul Rahman Sehli, ucn [as no lnen was) aralad as follows’ ‘I59! Flmnur, even wnnaul SD7‘s evidence lne preaaoullon slrasdy nau sufflusm uvldawa in aslzbllsh a WINE case case aaeinir all in. apgellnnls 1n... the (allure In cull him as e wlweculion wllrlusa is oi nu nnmequenne as com um reaulr lira gun in me pmsewlmri use I1 is are law lnal an adverse rnleenoe canrlm he dram. «or lailureiaoalla wllness man in» prosaaulion ner dlschanled na buruun As my Purlfl New (‘J said In Chas xcs-n Long v FP[1996]I sm sin :1 pigs: 523-524 “The eooellenra mnlentlcn lsmalll-1e lallrna ml the nmsecullun re adduoe evidence oi lnosa ome< eaniolae rneanl rnar rne mun could preaunia lnal me evidence would have we aialrm lna proeacurlon, nIali$\>1en were no such use Such nlgumsnlx are wmmorfly made. Commonly mu‘ such arguments are Mlham mam The mun mun neume In anw any such presumvmn umess me wuness nol pvoduaad Vs eusnlml m we pmsmmuws can Any crvmna\ |ransamK:n may be nhsorved bya numberemnnmex ms um naculary «mus prosewuun In pmflues every snngxe one av Imae wnmse. M on prvuecnfiun need lndu xslo amuse mnesseswnose evtdsnoe can bebelxeved w as In esxauun me as» bwyom rsaiunnma dnum out at a number no wumsss, n mymen urfly nu nsuuarytn bung m Me or awn, as mg as lmse wmesses auuafly poodueed are Ibla to gwe evmencs mus nmnsaaxon, man: We no masnn way an me yes would he cam mt my any vrnumphon mama be amm met me evxaenee at those wimeues ml pmduced mum havu bsen against me vmsecumn ' [37] \n our present appeals‘ Pww was ab\e In give evidence of me tmnsacnon as he was the victim and the sole eye-wuness. Pwm able m mlorm the com! me snuaman at me me o1 ms moment. He can remember OKT who salt In me car which far imm mm in wmch mus [am Is not mspmea by OKT. Tms Issue Is also relaled la the next issue on the area: my oi PW1D. Issue (fr): Tm avldonco ol PW10 Is not crodlbla [33] AM the eeunear of we Appeflanls raised lhis wssue on me pomt that the learned Hwgh Court Judge was in encr in rewmg on me ewaenee ol Pwm m wmch we are aware ma: PW10 ws me only eye wnness For me prosecunon The Appeuams contended lhsl mere are alscrepancies m me evwdence \ed by PWlU‘ |u name a few, FW1D m his testimony during the exarmnahnn In chief stated that when the gun was pointed at him. OKT2 had asked our me bag to be handed:/er In ms coueague on me Ien and N muuewnakrsctvcwazsw we Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm the mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm during the crass-sxammatinn, wwm sand met when he wed in push away the gun‘ a shot was fired However, 0: eenlramcnon, dnnng me re exarmnaficn when PW10 was asked by me pmsacumr to explam why he did nox agree that me shaoung happened by acckienl, PW1D then changed his evidence by saying that the accused had already tried to sham when the pistol was pmmed [39] The waamed oounse! var OKTI drawn this Cnun anenunn k: the ass ov Rudin Irwan Iakunduu bln II ganl lwn Ponaakws Ray: [2017] 5 MLJ 736 which hem as loHows: [40] 1221 aamasanun ponuhuan luml keyed: naked myuun dan panuhakiman hahnn mama. kaml harsemgu bnhswa ham btcari wan bevgalmmg sspammnya kenada kalsrsnuan nsan sm dalnm mznsabflkan peliyu dengan pelluduhan Hakim lucava vanah msnanmz kenenandan SP1 seas.-s bu|a(-hula! den Mas nna. mukl Made vahdl lanpa mambuat pemmbangan Iemadap vahxa hahawa sm searmg sakm yang aemepenunsan uanpadn maranean ma \elah mheflkan aneh sew sewdm sann beldauflun kepad: keulunman kaieranqan dawn $125 an hadnean kann max syak ug. bnhawn sm adahh Ieoranq Saks! yang rnsmpunm kenanmlan damn. kes lm. Kzhemngin sm svwllimya dhehu dan dhsmna denaan sacara hsmalnwafl men haxhn bicam dnn mevangan anus: sedemhaan new mnmwukan ketaranqan yang Isnn sebzual sakangan. Fads pandangan kann mmngsn sew bukzmah ketevanwan yang kukuh umuk memhu.a|sab\lankeams nslnyu eneh hakum meare munladw ialu flzpalan dan Keuumsan yang saxannax umuk d.penennnhan- vwm regard to this Issue, we are ofllle View Ihal the learned High court Judge is the one who had the audwo and wsual advantage In observe the demeanour of lhe wunesses Hence, he was cleany antmsd to make findings wiin regard In me credioiiny oi ins wrineeees. As an appeiiaie ocurly we eneoid be slow to inrenere wnn siren findings unieee in can be sndwn before us that ine rindrngs were perverse end egarnei eii eyerieoie evidence. in me present case‘ we see no reason to disium ine iinding oi ins learned Hign coun Judge. [41] we are guided by me decision oi Raja Azlari snan FJ (as His Highness men was) in me case oi Public Prosecutor vaemir Hejmerun bln HI]: idris (Na 2) [1 im] 1 ML] 15 wnicn siaied inar: -. in my opinion. ine disclenlinnies inere wiii away: My neeeuse in ma cimurnnanoe: VI wvncn avsms havflensdr lvevy wilnaii does noi remnmer rne eerne mine and no doe: noi rumomb-er eoaneieiy eveI'Y erngie rning iner neoeened rne quesunn is vmelhar exrsienea oi oenein fliscrevariales is srmereni id deeiruy inarrcredrmiiiy were is no ruie anew man in. tuslimony -71 s mneu niesi em-er no beliavod in nu eninery or non ei an A mum is luHy oernoeieni_ lor good and oogeni reasons. in mere: ene nan enne resnrndrry die wriness and reism ins diner. in ine ensenoe ev any nunlvadiclion. huwsvav‘ and VII rne absnnw or any rnnereni rrnpnmnininy, ine zvideno: er enywnneer, wneiner . pence mines: or um. ma gives evndenca on amnvinlnn. sneuid nonneiry be edeepiee: [42] As io wneiner the com accept Just a srngie wimess In prove me eeee of iris prosecuirom It is inie mar me evidence is weigned and not counted prnedani to eecnon 134 onne Evidence Act 1950. The iaw is eiear that “Na penrcuier number I)! wrrrreseee snail in any case be nzquimd tar the praoiorerry veer: In Ravanlal errd Dm‘Ia[Ial’s Law or crimes (27lh Ed) er pp 1965-1969, it scared Ihal, -ii is new a wen senied prineipie at law Ihnl oonvichon can he susiarned on me sole |esIimany onne pmsecutnx. ii ii inspires confidence.” [431 coining bad< lo nurcaser the learned High ccuruuage line riol only eensioereo lne evioenoe o1 PW10 mil also olrier corraborallva evieenee. Therefore. we are nol convinced liisl me learned High courl Judge was wrong. conclusion [44] in lne upshot, naving perused lrie aooesl reeoros. iris gmunds or judgement and the wnllen submissions by parlies and aaseo on lire eloreseio reasons, we unanimously find lliel lliere is no rrienl in lire Aooellarils' epoesls on conviction. All appeals on conviction are hereby dlsmlssed. [45] wim regard to the appeals agairisl senlenee, il is lrile law mail when me punisrirneril lo any orierioe is amended in e heavier punisrlmenl, it is me inlenlion oi lrie Parlisrrieril lo perceive such orlerioe as serious. Triereiore, in arfwlng In our oee ion ler eppeel egeirisl senlerioe iri mese appeals, we are gillaeo by lrie decision Abdul Mahk lshak JCA in lrie case cl Yong /or Mun vPubIiI: Prosecutor 120121 ls MLJ 209 as follows 152] we mil now reier lo me Heriaero in eioer In onoerserrro are lro. pulvose ano irileriliori olirie an M lrie lriiro Fafllzmefllaly slllino allhe ‘Dewari Riayal‘ mouse :71 Raprueniiflvesj an 27 luiy 1971i lire rlonollieoie ailoriiey eenerel mi sri aeooi xaoir oln Vuwl me-l uld al p 3550 in me Nsrisard wrrol we ere bringing neie ll an 2msril1msn| iai an erihamsd. a higher, psnally loreornrnilling mbbsry and lirorieooirig and omer oiierioes as slalea iriere, lolli syoes, I1 may use liresirns, at May used penukul. paku. er oererio M any elliier wenpnn ii iosl hka oroirury anrris Eu|wna|we are going In kill s lha use Milreamisr zs bomb ma wands‘ when cummlmng climax huzuia was -s an ma mama»: new [35] From me aaaax-s m Pumamenl as seen lmm ma H-nurd, an an wi: hem w| m neoewly, so to sneak. in ma on us: M fivaarmx to mmm1|'urmu‘l payvofl ho\d—ups‘ mama enharw dealt: ann,a.y [us] On ma Max, M a 2 gm“ rvuscamaqe cl juslme ml to mrwu the aaaeuanum aammunng ma uwmm as par ma amended charge m ex?! war.‘ [45] Tharebm, we areafthe consmayaa viswmatssncus ouenca should be pumsnaa wym severe pumsmuem. Huwever, afler takmg me can eralmn me mmgafion put larwam by me delencs counsms av ma Appauams, we agree to sax asme ma senlanee Imposed by me High Cam and sentence ma AppaHan(s war. a primnment for a term 0130 years. We a\so make an war [or I2 slrokas 0! M1 ng m OKT3 and mm. Na senlenceoiwhvppmg to on: because he had anamea me aga 0150 years old. «gm (AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH) Judge Cuurl o1 AvPea\ Msmysla Fu(m[aya Due M Decision : I7 Augun 2023 Ground: mum : In nacemxm 2n23 Loaul Ronmonmlon For OKT1 (Appeuam in Appeal No. E»u5(M)4A—D2/2021) For oK1'2 (Appenam wn Appsa\ No. E—05|My43—02/2021) For mcr: (Appellant in AppaaY N0 E415(M}51—D3/2021) For an Rupnndnnt sw muuewnakrmvmazsw sanm Basmr (together mm Najuhah zmkmi; [Msssrs. Salxm Easlw, Ruswwza 5 Ca] Srsekam Piflex [Messrs. Sreekanl Plllai] Afifuddm hm Ahmad Hafifi (together wm: Muhammad Ammm bin Jamamddin) [Msssm Sa\ehuddm seinm A Assoc] Mohd Falruz bvn Johan [Anon-ey Gene.-ars Chambers] 23 um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm melakukun mm kawlahln yang boleh ammm dr blwuh ssksyerl :9 AMA: San/ala Am wanam Lnmn Euurll 1971.- 14] on 2 we: charged as Inflows. "Bahawa kamu bersnnmuma derwan (1) many yang man mm/nggal mm/a den Matsa/Ian Mn Nan {Na K/P'71G7290.’l—5H1)psda 22/9/2915. mm mm kunng 19347 hrs beflarnpal an Iowa! lcluk lmmfi am D, Aammen! Mann-n com, man P15 819. Psfalmg Jays, ar dc/um durirv Putahng, dalam Negm Sa/angel Daml Ehnn, mm: melakukan rovmakan bcrkulvloulm oongan ssomng rakan Kama nama Muhd Aural Dm Mona rmnlm Yong (No K/P E5C|6UD—l7J—5179)IvIah melfipaskan tembakun un/ara any danger: na: hmdflk menysb-bklrv kurvlaban atxu lmnadsrasn K2 ntas Pump «/1 Ramasamy No K/P5310175-06-5297 ytnq mlml Iwmu mompunyal penaemnuan ratmn rmmu membave aervlala apt asmasa me/akukarv rwnpakan Olen yang amnmn umu Inlalv rm/akukan mm hesaransn yang owon dmukum aroawan saksyen :4 ma San/are A». (Forum Lsbm Bars!) 1971." [51 Wmle OKT3 was charged as fcflcwst ‘Sahara um bwsama—sama Hangar: 4:; mung /ayryang Isran d/tuduh, pads 25/9/2015, [am mun kuung 1930 his beflsmpakdr renwa!/stair mm smk 2, Apartment Mentsli Com, ./alnn ms an, Pslalmg Jaya a. flnlum nusrah Pa:-any‘ dalam Nsgen S9/anger Dam! Ehsm, rsmasa Inslekukan mmpaknn borkt/Nlflularv dmgan swung rakzn kamu norm! Mona mm: urn Mona Vhmlmn Yong (No K/P'550609—0a6179HsIsh melapnsksn tambakarv aenyau apt dangan rvlal hendak manyobabhn komattan slaw ksnerletnan ks alas Fran!!! M Ramasamy Nu xx»: 531003455297 yang nnana kamu mempwlysl nanwanuan rakarv kamu msmoswa .an,aa-a am‘ samass melakukun mmpaksrv own yang aannnnan kamu la/an melakukun sunlu mananan mg Dom: drhukum .12 bawah suluyun 34 Am Senlala Apl (Penam Liam Bern!) W71 ' am rvuuewlakrncwmuzsw ma. Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e a... w my a. nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm y.. mum v-mm [6] AI me curlcluslon dune trial, lne learned Hlgh Court Judge lmmd lrral all the Appellarrls gullry rne charges The appellants ware sentenced to dream by hanging. 171 Aggrleved wrm lne convlciiun and sanlende, me Appellarrla ndw appealed la «ms Court. we neard me appeals on me l7 us 2023. Al me conclusion cf lne sularnrssldrrs, we dlsrnlased lhe Appellants’ appeal nn CON/lc1l07I um we allowed me appeals on aerrlanoe. we now provlde our reasons lorlna decision. ‘rho ProIacudon'I can [5] The presecmlorr-a case was establlshad by me evidence cl ils wltnssses and accepted by the learned trial judge. Pm m a nutshell, Apaellanls were crrarged mm an ollance under lhs Flreamls (Increased Penalty) A51 1971 [A6137] ('FlPl\“) [9] ln me oammlsslon of an elvance (a gang»rubbery) with me lrrlenllan to cause deam er lrllury tn one Pralap a/l Ramasamy(‘PW1D”). OKT2 and OKT3 being me adcdrn ' in me case of dlscnarge of me nrearrn oomrvlined by DKT1 were cnarged under secllan 3A of me sarne Act. ArloUleraccused,Ahmat1 Falsal am Muda, hasdled and he was drscnarged wllJ1oulacqul|lal(“DNAA')by andlner l-lign ccun Judge on us lu.2m7 OKTI was charged undersectlan 3 of l=lFA ufdischarglrlg a firearm [10] me dwenoe was commllled on may ms at appmxlmalely 7 30 pm al lhe Darkmg Inl cl Elak D, Apanrrrenl Menlari cdun, Jalan PJ5 em, Pelallng Jays, salangor uaml Ehsan. 5 am rDUuGVJlakh<1YElq1Sw -we s.n.l Men M“ be used a mm re anrmun mm; dun-mm vn AFVLING wnxl mi when PW10 was about he enter his car and pu| his iaptdp in the back. he saw mree men get out Mme viva ear who then came tewerds hini. one oi the nien came hum the train (whn was identihed as om by PW1D)whiie the other Mn men train the back PWIO stiii raeegnire and remember the faces 01 the Mu men who came from behind and approached him when nne of ms men was identified as OKT2 while the other man was the accused who had died. [12] white OKTI was hoiding the gun arid painted it at PWIfl‘s chest, there was a stmggie between them which resutted in OKTt firing e shot using the gun Hawever. it was a had break. The shot hit OKTZ's h and caused Injury. [1 3] After the shot. PWIO managed to grab the gun from 0KT1‘s hands and distanced hinrseiiimrri the a0cused.0KT1 arid another accused (who had died) managed to escape in the Viva car where there was a driver wetting (or them in the car PW1D identmed the man who was driving the viva car during the inudenl as on: Awarding to Pwto, the identmcatiuri oi OKT3 could be made because the niirrar at the vtua car was eirnoet completely open during the incident and FW10 uuuid see the face eiot<T3. [14] OKT2 whe suitered an iriiurytd his thigh as e reauit of being shot by QKT1 was unable to escape OKT2 did tried to escape (mm the Sfflfle by jumping down to the ground floor oi the parking buiidlng and hiding in the area near the parking but ing but PW10 managed in find him. [15] The investigation oiiioer ('SP6") and his team arrived at the scene at approxtrriaiaty 11.45 pm and wtiect the iotidrwing items such as a pair :71 samba biack/brown siippers size to, a blue I-shin with a mtmd wllar (size a in rDUuGWtakhc1YCiuZSw -use s.ii.i Ilnvihli M“ be used M mm Die niinihaiily MVM5 dnunvinnl via nFit.ING Wflxi XL) and diced swabbing taken irorn the (races at blood drdps round on me wall at the corridor outside ihe parking iot ai the 2nd Hour‘ on the mi of the sliver-colored Psmdua Kancil with regIstra|iorI rio: WHP 2986 which parked at the side of the parking building and on the red sons iaceted near me ience [16] Aiter me investigation st the scene, SP5 and his team were instrucied to oanlinuethe investigation and wanna room no. 207, 2nd iioor, Sun Beans Hotsi (the haiei room) which is located at Jsian PJS 8/ti, Deiai-an Mentari, Petaiing Jaye, seiangor (iocaisd appmxiniaieiy ma mslals irdni the scans) Police investigation showed that me hotei mom had been rented by the accused heiare the incident. SP6 and his iesni arrived at the hinei mum at spproxirristeiy 12.40 am on 29 D9 2015. upon investigation, SP6 and his team iound the ioiiawiiig Items‘ iii a ysllnw Izullel wntien s A E 9x1913 on the quihh mattress; I a brawn trousers oflhe brand "BcriItori“ size aim on a brawn uarpet «our. (Hi) s shon-sissvea ooiiared shirt with "Uriivelsili Maiaya" written on il s(iAd( an the handle of the cupboard 4001'. (iv) 2 white digaiene minis an me brawn carpet iidei: (V) 2 Izmwn cigarelle humus an the blown csrpei noon (Vi) 3 hngerphnts (F1 to F3) an a move Iransparenl piaslic home; and (W) t fingerpnnl impression (F4) on the green catered pissuc wmtari "niemati" in the room [17] Ali the items seized was sent in me chemist namely SP12 Based 7 in rDUuGWiakhctYGiuZSw Nuns Sum Illvihli wiii be used M mm we niininniily MVM5 m.i.n VI] nFiuNG WM! on me report MSP12, «here was a presence or me DNA MOKTZ and on: which snow Ihai ham 0! them were in me iroiei room before me incident Ingeiher with me deceased accused. [rs] For me complete rams on me veslngaiion by the police, we respectfully railed an me grounds at judgment by me learned High coun Judge who had Dulhned the material (365 0! prosecution case. Finding ov me Iourrrud trlnl Judgn at the clan of tho prosecution‘: cnu [19] inai wage are best surnrried up as lollows: Al the and of me pmseculicn case, the key findings or me iearned (a) mu regard to OKTI, Ihe ieernea High caun Judge satisfied manna prosecution had pmvsd aH me elemenis dune oflenca which are as roiiow - (ij OKT1 had discharged a iirearm, (in OKT1 nad discharged a firearm ar me iirne oi his eomrnming or allsmpllng in Dammit or abetting the Gammissiun at a ecneduied mverrce, and (iii) OKTI nad discharged a nreann with intent ID cause deem or nun to any Person‘ shaii, rrmwnnsiandrng that no run is caused. in) The eiemenre were maven by an overwheiming evidence 01 PW“) and PWB (lnsp Nor Harman bin Ab Hamid). The sin muuewiekrucwciqisw -we s.n.i In-nhnv win he used m mm a. niinirraiily MIN; dun-mm VII arium pm learned Hwgh Coun Judge was of ms w (hat om has me mlanflan co cause death at injury to PWIO based on the inference N PW10 had not amperaled or resisted or relused In hand over nzs bebngwngs lo om, ne woma have been shot by om. om used me gun [PZIA] which ms ewdence shuwed «no: it \s runcnener The shalwas fired oy cm and caused wruury to OKT2. (c) on me charge agamsl one and mm, me Ieerneo won Court Judge held «nenne proeecuxion had sueeessmuy proved (heir case m which 2111 me e\emen(s nl ma pwenoe were sansaea The elements ere: (1) a nreenn is dvscharged by any person at me |ime oi ms oornrnimng or allemplmg lo cummxt or abemng me oornnussion 0! a schsdmed cflencer on a nreernn is discharged with mtem to causedeath or hurl lo any person‘ (m) each of me eeemnpuoee Vn respsm at me owenue presem at me spene or me nomrmssxon ur attempted commission or abeimelll: uy) eaon onne awornphpes may reasonably be presumed to have known that such person was carrying 111 neo in ms posssssxan or under his custody or wnlrol me nreernn and (y) unvess were is prove that me aeoemphoss had Iaken all reasonable seeps |o prevent the discharge. (4; Evraenee by Pww showed that an me accused were at the s rn rvuuevllakrmvmuzsw -one s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m yaw n. nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n wa .nuns wrm scene and cam ' ed a gang-robbery an FW1D. PW1D also confirmed that OKT2, OKT3 and Falsal [the masses accused] fallen lo lake all raasanabla steps to prevem om lmm firing ma gun. (e) The laamaa High Cflurl Judge also made a llnalng mal PW1D VS a credlble wimess and his Iesllmnrly was sampled by me Hlgh Court afler a maximum asaassmanl at his cred lmscwonnlness. In «an, ammlng lo the learned High om Judge, SF1D Is a vlchm 01 [N5 Incidem and has teamed honestly abou| what happened lo mm durlng ms irlolderll and [20] Therefore, the learned Hlgh Conn Judge louna a prime lama case had been established by the prosecullon agalnsl all the Appellants and ordered me Appellants |o erller melr delenoe. Dohllm [21] OKT1 gave his evidence on oath. oKT1's defence was as follows‘ (ls) OKT 1 ls/ah rnerls//ms parlggl/an lelsforl daripada kawamlya bemama Faisal (lammlm yang zelah me/llrlggal dlmla). Ba/lau msmlnla OKT1 dalang bequmparlya dl Iampsk lalak karate Blok 5 m Msnlarv com Falsal (vsnuaull yang lalan menlnggal durlla} llnggal dl‘ Mentan Court :1. Blok c. (D) Alas pelmfnlsan Falaal, OKT1 valan pergl ks rempal lalak ksrsra Blok E msslml aan mallhal Faisal Slldflh bevads :1! sin: bersama OKT2 darl oK13. Falsal membsmbhu ada slam in IN rDUuGWlakhc1YCluZSw -ma Sum! nnvlhnrwlll be flied M mm .. mm-y mm: dnunvlnnl VI] .mm mm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24NCvC-1329-08/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) GREENCHAIN HARVEST SDN BHD 2. ) LIAU THENG HOOI RESPONDEN NCT UNITED DEVELOPMENT SENDIRIAN BERHAD

Land Law - Mixed development project - Abandoned project - Scheme of Arrangement - Subsequent purchasers at public auction - Whether purchasers the legal and beneficial owners - Principle of Beneficial Ownership and Doctrine of Bare Trustee

05/01/2024

YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=823bc0a9-6d95-49fc-8d16-c0652062d91e&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) SAMAN PEMULA NO.: BA-24NCvC-1329-08/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai satu (1) unit pejabat kedai 3 tingkat yang dipegang di bawah GRN340049, Lot No. 126533, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor (dahulu dikenali sebagai HS(D) 51621 PT 65051, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor) yang mempunyai alamat pos di No. 26, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai satu (1) unit pejabat kedai 3 tingkat yang dipegang di bawah GRN340048, Lot No. 126532, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor (dahulu dikenali sebagai HS(D) 51620 PT 65050, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor) yang mempunyai alamat pos di No. 28, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan 05/01/2024 09:07:09 BA-24NCvC-1329-08/2022 Kand. 32 S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai satu (1) unit 3 tingkat Pejabat kedai yang dipegang di bawah GRN340082, Lot No. 126566, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor (dahulu dikenali sebagai HS(D) 51654 PT 65084, Mukim Dengkil, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor) yang mempunyai alamat pos di No. 22, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 214, 215 dan/atau 217 dalam Kanun Tanah Negara 2020; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Specific Relief Act 1950; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 7 dan Aturan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 ANTARA 1. GREENCHAIN HARVEST SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 200601022513 / 742267-M) 2. LIAU THENG HOOI (No. K/P: 610226-07-5047) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN NCT UNITED DEVELOPMENT SENDIRIAN BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 200501024080 / 706212-T) … DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This case is about the sad tale of (yet) another failed land development project. As in all other cases of abandoned housing projects, the innocent victims here are the purchasers of properties developed and sold by the developer. The twist here is that the dispute before this Court is not between the original purchasers of the properties of this land development project and the original developer. The present case involves an action commenced by the Plaintiffs, who are subsequent purchasers of 3 units of shoplots in that project, against the Defendant, a white knight that had stepped in to revive and complete the project. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The Main Issues [2] The issues involved are straightforward. The first is whether the Plaintiffs are the legal and beneficial owners of the units that form the subject-matter in this dispute and are thus entitled to the Individual Strata Titles of these properties. [3] Arising from this first main issue are these additional subsidiary issues, namely, (a) whether the units involved in this case fall under the scope of a Scheme of Arrangement that had been sanctioned by the Court; and (b) whether the units involved in this case are the “unsold and unredeemed’ units. [4] The second main issue arises from the Defendant’s counterclaim, that is, whether the Plaintiffs are liable to pay damages to the Defendant being the rehabilitation costs of the Plaintiffs’ units. [5] Following this second main issue is the imperative question of whether rehabilitation work had indeed been carried out to the three units that are the subject matter in this dispute. The Parties, the Subject-Matter and the Background Facts [6] In order to resolve the above issues, it is vital that the backgrounds facts and how the present parties become involved be clarified. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [7] As noted, central in this dispute are 3 three-storey units of shoplots. For convenience, the units involved are referred to as Unit 26, Unit 28 and Unit 22. All 3 units were originally held under a master title. [8] The original developer of these 3 shoplot units is Kumpulan Sepang Utama Sdn Bhd (“KSU”). Together with Lengkap Legenda Sdn Bhd (“LLSB”), the proprietor of the project lands, KSU and LLSB had entered into an agreement to develop the project lands as a mixed development project. The units involved in this case are part of larger mixed land development project. Both KSU and LLBS are now in liquidation. [9] An important fact is that the entire project was divided or undertaken in numerous or different phases. On this point, it is crucial to note that the units that form the subject matter in the present case are all in Phase 1 of the project. [10] Unit 26 and Unit 28 had initially been purchased by one Chia Tack Kee (“CTK”) and the original purchaser of Unit 22 was one Chia Onn Kay (“COK”). The purchase of Units 26 and 28 and of Unite 22 were financed with a loan obtained from Public Finance Berhad (taken over by Public Bank Berhad vide a vesting order dated 20 August, 2004) and Public Bank Berhad respectively. [11] When CTK and COK defaulted in the repayment of their loans, the said Units were auctioned. The First Plaintiff, Greenchain Harvest Sdn Bhd, was the successful bidder for Units 26 and 28 and the Second Plaintiff, Liau Theng Hooi, was the successful bidder for Unit 22. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] It is noteworthy that the First and Second Plaintiffs had paid the full purchase price in cash for the units involved to Public Bank Berhad and three separate Deeds of Assignment had been executed by Public Bank Berhad in favour of the Plaintiffs to transfer the ownership of these units to the Plaintiffs absolutely. [13] As for the Defendant, NCT United Development Sdn Bhd, it is engaged in the property development business. As noted in paragraph [1] above, the Defendant is the white knight that had stepped in to revive and complete the abandoned project. [14] The genesis of the Defendant’s involvement can be traced to a Scheme of Arrangement, sanctioned following an Order dated 6 March, 2012 vide Kuala Lumpur High Court No Petition 26NCC-26-02/2012, whereby the Defendant was entrusted to rehabilitate and/or revive and/or complete the said project. [15] A number of additional vital facts that must be borne in mind are that, first, this Scheme of Arrangement only involved the purchasers of Phases 2A, 3A, 3B, 4A, 5A, 5B and 5C of the project. [16] Second, Paragraph 5 of the Sanction Order provides that: “ … NCT United Development Sdn Bhd berhak kepada unit-unit yang tidak dijual dan tidak ditebus di dalam Projek tersebut, Tanah- tanah Projek dan semua hasil dan penerimaan di bawahnya dan daripadanya.” S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [17] Following the granting of the Sanction Order is this added pertinent detail. The Defendant was registered as owner of the Project Lands on 11 September, 2012. This has resulted in the Defendant being the current registered proprietor, as reflected in the individual titles for the said units/properties. [18] Accordingly, the entire affair leading to this present action can be broken into two distinct periods, namely pre and post the Scheme of Arrangement. In relation to the former period, the Plaintiffs have already stepped in the picture. Entry by the Defendant is only after the Sanction Order was given, that is, during the latter period. The Claims [19] The Plaintiffs sought a great number of reliefs. The orders sought are: (a) A declaration that the 1st Plaintiff, GREENCHAIN HARVEST SDN BHD, is the legal and beneficial owner of the Property known as a 3- storey unit shop-office currently held by the Defendant under the title of GRN340049, Lot No. 126533, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor (previously held under HS(D) 51621 PT 65051, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor) which has a postal address at No. 26, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan (hereinafter known as "Unit 26"); (b) A declaration that the 1st Plaintiff, GREENCHAIN HARVEST SDN BHD, is the legal and beneficial owner of the Property known as a 3- storey unit shop-office currently held by the Defendant under the title S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 of GRN340048, Lot No. 126532, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor (previously held under HS(D) 51620 PT 65050, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor) which has a postal address at No. 28, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan (hereinafter known as "Unit 28"); (c) A declaration that Public Finance Berhad (taken over by Public Bank Berhad vide a vesting order dated 20.8.2004) is an Absolute Assignee on Unit 26 and Unit 28 ("The Properties") where the Deeds of Assignment dated 11.11.2009 and 11.12.2009 which have been completed between Public Bank Berhad and the 1st Plaintiff is valid and in force; (d) A declaration that the 2nd Plaintiff, LIAU THENG HOOI, is the legal and beneficial owner of the Property known as a 3-storey unit of the shop-office currently held by the Defendant under the title of GRN340082, Lot No. 126566, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor (previously held under HS(D) 51654 PT 65084, Mukim Dengkil, District of Sepang, State of Selangor) which has a postal address at No. 22, Jalan Kenanga 1/7, Taman Kenanga, Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi, 43900 Sepang, Selangor Darul Ehsan (hereinafter known as "Unit 22"); (e) A declaration that Public Finance Berhad (taken over by Public Bank Berhad vide a vesting order dated 20.8.2004) is the Assignee of Unit 22 ("The Properties") where the Deed of Assignment dated 10.6.2008 which has been completed between Public Bank Berhad and the 2nd Plaintiff is valid and in force; (f) An Order that the Defendant release and assign the Individual Strata Title of The Properties free from any encumbrance to the Plaintiffs S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 and/or to the Plaintiffs’ solicitor and also submit the completed Memorandum of Transfer of The Properties, which is valid and may be registered together with the applicable payment to the Plaintiffs and/or the Plaintiffs’ solicitors within fourteen (14) days commencing from the date of order; (g) Alternatively, if the Plaintiffs are unable to take back The Properties from the Defendant and/or the Memorandum of Transfer of The Properties cannot be registered, then the Defendant shall pay for all damages and losses suffered by the Plaintiffs where such damages and losses shall be assessed by the Court Registrar; (h) An interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendant from transferring The Properties referred to in paragraph (a), (b) and (d) above to any third party until the full decision is decided by this Honourable Court; (i) An order that the Defendant shall submit all necessary documents (including a certificate of completion of construction / certificate of fitness and permission to transfer from the lawful authority) to transfer the original property title of The Properties to the Plaintiffs within 14 days from the date of this order; (j) An order that the Defendant shall settle and pay all outstanding outgoings in respect of The Properties as of prior to the completion of the transaction of the transfer of ownership of The Properties; (k) General damages and/or exemplary damages and/or severe damages paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs assessed by this Honourable Court; S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (l) The cost of this Originating Summons is to be borne by the Defendant; (m) Plaintiffs are allowed and be given liberty to apply for other incidental orders to have effect and enforce in order to fairly protect their rights in action; and (n) Other and further reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper. [20] In support of their claims for the above reliefs, the Plaintiffs relied primarily on the Principle of Beneficial Ownership/Doctrine of Bare Trustee. They cited the Federal Court decisions in Tan Ong Ban v Teoh Kim Heng [2016] 2 AMR 813; [2016] 3 CLJ 193; [2016] 3 MLJ 23; [2016] 2 MLRA 433 and Yeo Ping Tieng & Ors v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 CLJ 776; [2020] 3 MLJ 269; [2019] 6 MLRA 616 which explained the principle of beneficial ownership and cases such as Noraini Binti Mohamed Hadi v Pembangunan Tanah Dan Perumahan [2020] AMEJ 0604; [2021] 3 CLJ 518; [2021] 4 MLJ 152; [2020] 4 MLRA 158, Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Bhd [2018] 3 AMR 259; [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 6 MLJ 1; [2015] 5 MLRA 665 and Seck Mun Foo v Datuk Harris Bin Mohd Salleh [1997] 1 CLJ 321; [1996] MLJU 611; [1996] 3 MLRH 150 in support of their contention that the Defendant, though the registered proprietor of the properties concerned, is a mere bare trustee. [21] It was argued by the Plaintiffs that as the individual titles were not issued for the Plaintiffs’ units in the said Project until recently, subsequent purchasers of units such as the Plaintiffs will have to have these rights and benefits under the original purchasers’ sale and purchase S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 agreements with KSU and the Land Proprietor assigned to them. The Plaintiffs reasoned that it is only by such assignments would “the chain of title to the contractual rights and benefits pass and the subsequent purchasers become successors in title or the lawful [sic] assigns of the original purchasers”. [22] The Plaintiffs underscored the fact that the units/properties were sold to the Plaintiffs by way of a public auction on 25 May, 2007 and 24 August, 2007 and these made them bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. References were made to cases such as Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd v Time Engineering Bhd [1996] 2 AMR 1537; [1996] 2 CLJ 561; [1996] 2 MLJ 12; [1996] 1 MLRA 154], J Raju v Kwong Yik Bank Bhd & Anor [1994] 2 AMR 1220; [1994] 2 CLJ 695; [1994] 2 MLJ 408; [1994] 1 MLRA 156 and EON Bank Bhd & Anor v Tay Guan Hui & Ors [2001] AMEJ 0036; [2001] CLJU 182; [2001] 5 MLJ 374; [2000] 5 MLRH 827. [23] The Plaintiffs also submitted that the Scheme of Arrangement did not adversely affect the Plaintiffs’ ownership as the Sanction Order dated 6 March, 2012 excluded the purchasers of properties in Phase 1 and/or Phase 1A. In other words, Unit 26, Unite 28 and Unit 22 do not fall under the Scheme of Arrangement. [24] The Plaintiff also averred to the fact that the Defendant had previously filed an Originating Summons for summary possession of the subject land in 2016 but the Defendant had subsequently withdrawn the 2016 OS against the Plaintiffs. As for the suits against the other purchasers, these purchasers and the Defendant had reached an out-of- court settlement. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [25] In response to the above arguments, the Defendant submitted that it had rightly obtained the rights to the Project Lands following the Sanction Order. These rights, according to the Defendant, include “to deal with all the unsold and unredeemed units on the said Land after the Defendant has paid all the settlement sum” and “access to the Project Lands to conduct the rehabilitation works pursuant to the Sanction Order”. [26] In reply to the beneficial ownership and bare trustee principles raised by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant also cited Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd v Time Engineering Bhd. However, the Defendant went on to rely on the following additional authorities, namely, Karuppiah Chettiar v Subramaniam [1971] 1 LNS 43; [1971] 2 MLJ 116; [1971] 1 MLRA 663 and Hiew Min Chung v Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd & Ors; [2000] 4 AMR 4178; [2000] 8 CLJ 165; [2001] 1 MLJ 21; [2000] 3 MLRH 148 for the proposition that whether purchasers are beneficial owners depends upon whether a Memorandum of Transfer has been executed. [27] The Defendant read Tan Ong Ban v Teoh Kim Heng as conferring a purchaser only a right in personam and not in rem. Hence, the Defendant adopted the argument that the present action should have been instituted against the original developer KSU and not the Defendant. [28] On the reference by the Plaintiffs to the Originating Summons for summary possession of the subject land by the Defendant in 2016, the Defendant argued that that 2016 OS is irrelevant to the current proceedings. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 The Counterclaim [29] In its counterclaim, the Defendant prayed for the following reliefs: (a) That the 1st Plaintiff be ordered to pay a sum of RM320,000.00 to the Defendant being the rehabilitation cost for each of the 1st Plaintiff’s unit in 7 days; (b) That the 2nd Plaintiff be ordered to pay a sum of RM320,000.00 to the Defendant being the rehabilitation costs for the 2nd Plaintiff’s unit in 7 days; (c) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on each of the decreed sums above allowed by this Honourable Court from the date of this counterclaim until full realisation; (d) In consequence to the respective Plaintiffs paying the full sum decreed in prayers (a) to (c) above [subject always to prayer (e)], the Defendant shall affect the following:- (i) The Defendant shall register the respective Plaintiff’s Lots in the name of the respective Plaintiffs; (ii) Upon successful registration in (i) above, the Defendant shall deliver the original title of those lots to the respective Plaintiffs or their solicitors. (e) That the Plaintiffs shall pay the costs for the Defendant to effect the transfer of the respective lots stated in prayer (d) above S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (including but not limited to the legal fees, stamp duty and real property gains tax); (f) Costs of this action; and (g) Any further and/or other relief deemed fit and proper by this Honourable Court. [30] The Defendant’s counterclaim is premised on section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950. The Defendant argued that section 71 will come to its aid even if the Plaintiffs’ units have been redeemed. The relevant section 71 reads as follows: Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act 71. Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B’s house by mistake. B treats the goods as his own. He is bound to pay A for them. (b) A saves B’s property from fire. A is not entitled to compensation from B, if the circumstances show that he intended to act gratuitously. [31] The Defendant cited cases such as Usima Sdn Bhd v Lee Hor Fong (trading under the name and style of Pembinaan LH Fong [2017] 6 AMR S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 652; [2017] 9 CLJ 646; [2017] 7 MLJ 273; [2017] 5 MLRA 552 and Kraas Solutions Sdn Bhd v Konsesi Kota Permatamas Sdn Bhd [2018] 3 AMR 790; [2018] 9 CLJ 26; [2018] 6 MLJ 202; [2018] 4 MLRA 70 to support its contention that section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies in the instant case. [32] In reply to this counterclaim, the Plaintiffs submitted that no rehabilitation works had been carried out by the Defendant to the said units. The Plaintiffs further claimed that neither had there been any issuance of CFO and/or CCC and that the Plaintiffs had obtained vacant possession of the said units even before the Defendant had taken over the said Project. The Decision of this Court [33] After a thorough examination and consideration of the affidavits, submissions (both written and oral), and the authorities filed by the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the Sanction Order issued by the Court (vide Kuala Lumpur High Court No. Petition 26NCC-26- 02/2012) approving a Scheme of Arrangement which transferred the master title to the Defendant is crucial in this application. [34] There is no denying that the Defendant had rightly obtained the rights to the Project Lands following the Sanction Order. [35] As noted in paragraph [3] above, two subsidiary questions arise at this juncture. First, does the Sanction Order that approved the Scheme of Arrangement include the units/properties purchased by the Plaintiffs? S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [36] The second question is: what is the extent of such rights? [37] On the first subsidiary question, by the Defendant’s own admission, the Scheme of Arrangement did not include Phase 1 of the Project – of which the 3 units in dispute are part of. [38] This brings us to the second subsidiary question, as raised in paragraph [3] above. As further noted in paragraph [25] above, these rights, as admitted by the Defendant, include rights “to deal with all the unsold and unredeemed Units on the said Land after the Defendant has paid all the settlement sum” and “access to the Project Lands to conduct the rehabilitation works pursuant to the Sanction Order”. [39] Are the 3 units which are the subject matter of the present dispute “unsold and unredeemed units”? This is the pivotal question. The units have indeed been sold, not once but twice. Hence, what remains is the question of whether these are unredeemed units. [40] After the successful bids by the Plaintiffs for the units at the public auctions, two separate Deeds of Assignment were executed by Public Bank Berhad in favour of the First Plaintiff to transfer the ownership of Unit 26 & Unit 28 to it absolutely. [41] Likewise, a Deed of Assignment was then executed by Public Bank Berhad in favour of the Second Plaintiff to transfer the ownership of Unit 22 to him absolutely. [42] These events render all these 3 units as units that have been sold and redeemed. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [43] On the assertion by the Defendant that the element of full payment of the purchase price was only one element of the concept of bare trustee and that the requirement of Memorandum of Transfer is another mandatory element for the concept of bare trustee to be invoked (Fung Sui Jin v Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd & Ors [2001] 1 AMR 1104; [2001] 5 CLJ 501; [2000] MLJU 532; [2000] 4 MLRH 435), this Court is in agreement with the submission made by the Plaintiffs that Fung Sui Jin is distinguishable. Fung Sui Jin concerned a purchase of property directly from the developer. In the present case the Plaintiffs had purchased the said properties through public auctions in which the Plaintiffs were never required to sign a Memorandum of Transfer. The requirement here is that a Deed of Assignment (by way of transfer) from the defaulter’s financier, which in this case is Public Finance Berhad, is executed to absolutely assign all the rights and interests to the Plaintiffs. This resulted in the Plaintiffs becoming the legal and beneficial owners of the said properties. [44] On the submission by the Defendant that read Tan Ong Ban v Teoh Kim Heng as conferring a purchaser only a right in personam and not in rem, it must be remembered that that case involved a purchaser who has, unlike the Plaintiffs in the present case, yet to pay the purchase price of the property in full. (See also IB Capital Sdn Bhd v Ivory Indah Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] AMEJ 1159; [2021] 1 LNS 2348; [2022] 1 MLJ 860; [2021] MLRAU 148.) [45] Based on these findings, this Court answers the first of the two main issues outlined in paragraph [2] above in the affirmative. S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [46] Order in terms is granted as per prayers (1) to (6), (10) and (13) in Enclosure 1. [47] As for the counterclaim, the reliefs sought by the Defendant is outlined in paragraph [29] above. In support of its counterclaim, the Defendant relied on Exhibit NCT4. [48] After a careful examination of the relevant Exhibit NCT4, this Court finds that that Exhibit does not disclose rehabilitation work having been carried out to the 3 units under consideration in this case. [49] In view of the above conclusion, the answer to the second main question as adumbrated in paragraph [4] above is in the negative. [50] The counterclaim is dismissed. [51] The Defendant to pay costs of RM10,000 to the First Plaintiff and RM10,000 to the Second Defendant. Dated: 5 January, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Counsel: YL Phan with Nicole Leaw for the Plaintiffs (Messrs. Leaw & Phan) Gary Ng with Jordan Teng for the Defendants (Messrs. Dennis Nik & Wong) S/N qcA7gpVt/EmNFsBlIGLZHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

DJ-62-41-09/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) MR. YAKAREYA ARWAESUEMAE 2. ) MR. ANUWA HAYIPIYOH

Sama ada Seksyen 12 FIPA adalah tidak sah kerana bertentangan dengan Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang meletakkan kuasa kehakiman (judicial power) ke atas Mahkamah - Sama ada Seksyen 12 FIPA adalah “ultra vires” Perlembagaan Persekutuan kerana menyingkirkan kuasa kehakiman Mahkamah di bawah Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan - Sama ada Mahkamah akan hilang kuasa budi bicara mempertimbangkan hal jaminan bagi seseorang yang dituduh bawah kesalahan FIPA bagi seseorang tertuduh yang belum dibuktikan bersalah.

05/01/2024

Tuan Badrul Munir bin Mohd Hamdy

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=782c4aba-2dc0-49ff-b371-292d5087e246&Inline=true

1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI PASIR MAS DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN NO. KES: DJ-62-41-09/2023 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN 1. MR. YAKAREYA ARWAESUEMAE 2. MR. ANUAR HAYIPIYOH 3. ALASAN PERINTAH [1] OKT-OKT telah dihadapkan ke Mahkamah ini dengan pertuduhan berikut: PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 01.09.2023 jam lebih kurang 1.30 pagi, bertempat di LOT 15005 Taman Sri Anggun, Jalan Rantau Panjang Gual Nering Pasir Mas di dalam Daerah Pasir Mas, di dalam Negeri Kelantan didapati memiliki sepucuk Revolver Buatan Smith & Wesson, No Siri: 48758B22, MADE IN USA .38 S&W SPL, dengan menyalahi undang-undang dan dengan 05/01/2024 18:02:17 DJ-62-41-09/2023 Kand. 28 S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Senjata Api (Penalti Lebih Berat)1971 [Akta 37] dibaca bersama Seksyen 34 KanunKeseksaan.” PERTUDUHAN KEDUA: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 01.09.2023 jam lebih kurang 1.30 pagi, bertempat di LOT 15005 Taman Sri Anggun, Jalan Rantau Panjang Gual Nering Pasir Mas di dalam Daerah Pasir Mas, di dalam Negeri Kelantan didapati memiliki: i) 5 butir amunisi .38 casing berwarna emas , dan bullet berwarna emas bertulisan PMC 38 SPL, ii) 1 butir amunisi .38 casing berwarna perak, dan bullet berwarna kelabu bertulisan A USA 38 SPL tanpa lesen, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah Seksyen 8 (a) Akta Senjata 1960 [Akta 206] dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 8 Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” [2] Pada 7 November 2023, OKT Pertama telah mengaku salah terhadap kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut. Sehubungan itu OKT Pertama didapati salah dan sabit dengan kedua-dua pertuduhan. OKT Pertama dijatuhkan dengan hukuman sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah kedua-dua pertuduhan. S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] Pada 28 November 2023, peguambela telah membuat permohonan lisan bagi OKT Kedua dibenarkan jaminan sementara pelupusan kes. Mahkamah ini telah mendengar hujahan-hujahan pihak OKT Kedua dan pihak Pendakwaan serta menetapkan keputusan bagi permohonan ini pada 5 Disember 2023. Pada 5 Disember 2023, Mahkamah ini telah menolak permohonan tersebut atas alasan-alasan yang diperincikan di perenggan- perenggan selanjutnya. [4] Pihak Pendakwaan berhujah bahawa Seksyen 8 Akta Senjata Api (Penalti Lebih Berat)1971 [selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Seksyen 8 FIPA] ialah kesalahan yang tidak boleh diberi jaminan langsung (unbailable). Seksyen 12 FIPA memperuntukkan bahawa tiada jaminan boleh dibenarkan bagi kesalahan di bawah FIPA. Atas prinsip “Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant” FIPA ialah undang-undang spesifik yang mempunyai peruntukan spesifik yang melarang jaminan bagi kesalahan di bawah FIPA. Oleh itu, Seksyen 388 (1) KTJ adalah tidak terpakai dalam permohonan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. [5] Pihak Pendakwaan telah merujuk kepada kes Suresh Kumar Velayuthan v. PP [2020] 4 CLJ 270 yang mana Hakim memutuskan bahawa: S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “(4) Sekiranya hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak adalah betul dan s 13 Akta adalah ultra vires perkara 121(1) Perlembagaan dan oleh itu melanggar Perlembagaan, ini akan bermaksud bahawa apa-apa permohonan untuk memberikan ikat jamin akan kembali kepada s 388 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (‘KTJ’). Kesan dari ini adalah, akan tidak menghiraukan prinsip ‘generalia specialibus non derogant’, yang bermaksud bawah satu Akta am yang dibuat tertakluk kepada Akta spesifik. Oleh itu, adalah jelas niat Parliamen bahawa peruntukan ikat jamin dalam s 13 Akta berniat untuk mengatasi peruntukan am berkaitan ikat jamin dibawah s 388 KTJ. Oleh itu, s 13 Akta adalah terpakai untuk kesalahan dibawah Akta tersebut dan bukannya peruntukan KTJ apabila berkaitan dengan ikat jamin. Dalam keadaan ini, peruntukan s 13 Akta yang secara mutlak tidak membenarkan ikat jamin untuk individu yang dipertuduhkan dengan kesalahan di bawah Bab VIA Kanun Keseksaan yang berkaitan dengan keganasan dan dibawah mana tertuduh dipertuduhkan adalah sah di sisi undang-undang dan tidak ultra vires perkara 121(1) atau perkara 8 Perlembagaan.” S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [6] Pihak OKT Kedua pula berhujah bahawa Seksyen 12 FIPA adalah tidak sah kerana bertentangan dengan Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang meletakkan kuasa kehakiman (judicial power) ke atas Mahkamah. Seksyen 12 FIPA adalah “ultra vires” Perlembagaan Persekutuan kerana menyingkirkan kuasa kehakiman Mahkamah di bawah Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Mahkamah akan hilang kuasa budi bicara mempertimbangkan hal jaminan, isu faktor umur, kesihatan dan jantina bagi seseorang yang dituduh bawah kesalahan FIPA bagi seseorang tertuduh yang belum dibuktikan bersalah. [6] Pihak OKT Kedua telah merujuk kepada kes PP v. Mohamad Bukhari Abdul Aziz [2021] 1 LNS 2294 yang mana Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman dalam mengekalkan perintah jaminan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen memutuskan bahawa: “[36] Namun begitu, Mahkamah ini juga mengambil pendekatan secara harmoni (harmonious construction) seperti dinyatakan di dalam kes Abdullah Atan v. PP & Others Appeals (supra) dalam mentafsirkan larangan jaminan di bawah seksyen 12 FIPA berbanding dengan kuasa kehakiman yang sedia ada (inherent powert) yang terletak ke atas badan kehakiman atau S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 mahkamah di bawah Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dalam mempertimbangkan untuk membenarkan jaminan.” [7] Dalam kes PP v. Mohamad Bukhari Abdul Aziz (supra) tersebut, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman telah merujuk kepada kes Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat and Another Case [2017] 3 MLJ 561 sebagaimana berikut: “[24] Di dalam kes Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat and another case [2017] 3 MLJ 561, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menjelaskan “kuasa kehakiman” dan “Perkara 121” seperti berikut: [71] An astute observation on ‘judicial power’ was made by Eusoffe Abdoolcader SCJ in the majority judgment of Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311, where His Lordship said that: … Judicial power may be broadly defined as the power to examine questions submitted for determination with a view to the pronouncement of an authoritative decision as to the right and liabilities of one or more parties… S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [86] Thus to put it in perspective, the judicial power of the court resides in the Judiciary and no other as is explicit in art 121(1) of the Constitution.” [8] Setelah meneliti hujahan dan rujukan pihak OKT Kedua dan pihak Pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini tidak dapat bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak OKT Kedua. Seksyen 12 FIPA adalah seterang matahari di siang hari dan tanpa sebarang waham pengertian yang lain memperuntukkan bahawa tiada jaminan boleh dibenarkan bagi kesalahan di bawah FIPA. Atas prinsip “Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant”, FIPA ialah undang-undang spesifik yang mempunyai peruntukan spesifik yang melarang jaminan bagi kesalahan di bawah FIPA. [9] Berkenaan kes Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Another Case (Supra), dengan rendah diri Mahkamah ini berbeza pendapat dengan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman dalam kes PP v Mohamad Bukhari Abdul Aziz (Supra). Mahkamah ini berpendapat Pesuruhjya Kehakiman telah terkhilaf menafsirkan prinsip dalam kes Semenyih Jaya di luar konteks. S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [10] Dalam kes Tanasilan Nakethiran v. PP & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 872, Hakim telah menjelaskan konteks sebenar kes Semenyih Jaya dengan mengatakan: "[30] ...Usurpation of powers of judicial power happens only when there is a discharge of clear judicial power by non- qualified person/s and not by judges or official officers or non- judicial personages which will rendered the said exercise to be ultra vires art 121 of the FC. A clear example of usurpation of judicial powers is demonstrated and elucidated by Zainun AN FCJ (as she then was) in Semenyih Jaya (supra). In that case, section 40D of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 was found to effectively usurps the power of the court in allowing a person other that the judge to decide on the reference before it. To borrow the words of Zainun AN FCJ (as she then was), the judicial power to award compensation has been whittled away from the High Court judge to the assessors in breach of art 121 of the FC because the power to award compensation in land reference proceedings is a judicial power that should rightly be exercised by a judge and no other." S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [11] Dengan kata lain, penyingkirkan kuasa kehakiman Mahkamah yang dimaksudkan dalam kes Semenyih Jaya adalah merujuk kepada Parlimen yang memperuntukkan undang-undang yang membenarkan individu selain hakim dalam membuat keputusan dalam sesuatu prosiding mahkamah. Selanjutnya dalam kes Datuk Zainal Abidin Alias & Satu Lagi lwn. PP [2023] 2 CLJ 70, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman mengatakan: Held: "(3) Seksyen 41B ADB adalah berperlembagaan dan tidak bercanggah dengan per. 121 PP. Ini kerana, walaupun kuasa untuk memberikan jaminan adalah satu kuasa kehakiman, namun, tidak diperuntukkan bawah undang- undang bertulis. Ini bermakna, semasa mahkamah menggunakan kuasa kehakiman untuk memberi jaminan untuk satu-satu kes, ini diperuntukkan bawah undang-undang bertulis seperti bawah s. 388 KTJ dan s. 13 Akta Kesalahan Keselamatan (Langkah-Langkah Khas) 2012 atau lain-lain undang-undang bertulis yang memperuntukkan secara jelas kuasa mahkamah untuk memberi jaminan. Dalam erti kata lain, kuasa kehakiman untuk memberi jaminan bukan termasuk dalam bidang kuasa sedia ada mahkamah atau bidang kuasa semakan kehakiman S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 mahkamah. Bidang kuasa kehakiman untuk memberi jaminan adalah sesuatu yang dizahirkan dalam undang-undang bertulis secara tersurat. Oleh itu, jika undang-undang bertulis tersebut telah memperuntukkan tiada jaminan boleh diberi oleh mahkamah, seperti dalam s. 41B ADB, ini tidak boleh ditafsir sebagai menghakis bidang kuasa kehakiman dan bercanggah dengan per. 121 PP. (4) Terdapat perbezaan antara s. 41B ADB dengan s. 388 KTJ. Seksyen 39B dibaca bersama-sama dengan s. 41B ADB adalah satu kesalahan tidak boleh jamin (unbailable). Sebaliknya, kesalahan yang boleh diberi jaminan bawah s. 388 KTJ adalah kesalahan-kesalahan yang tidak boleh dijamin (non-bailable). Bagi maksud s. 388(1) KTJ, sekiranya terdapat keterangan bahawa seseorang itu adalah bawah 16 tahun atau seorang wanita atau seorang yang sakit atau uzur, mahkamah boleh mempertimbangkan untuk membenarkan jaminan. Namun begitu, bawah s. 41B ADB tiada peruntukan proviso seperti dalam s. 388(1) KTJ. Ini memberi kefahaman bahawa kesalahan- kesalahan yang diperincikan bawah s. 41B ADB langsung tidak boleh diberi jaminan oleh mahkamah." S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [12] Kes di atas menggariskan bahawa walaupun memberi jaminan ialah kuasa kehakiman tetapi kuasa ini hanya timbul daripada undang-undang bertulis yang membenarkan atau tidak membenarkan. Ini juga diputuskan dalam kes Suresh Kumar Velayuthan v. PP [Supra] yang mengatakan: “Held: (1) The powers of the court derive from the Constitution and not merely from federal law. Accordingly, there can be no dispute that, the courts are vested with jurisdiction or judicial power to declare a provision of legislation passed as unconstitutional. Ganesan’s case proceeded from the premise that the power to consider the grant or refusal of bail was an exercise of judicial power. However, the exercise of judicial power does not begin until and unless the court was called upon to exercise such power. In s 13 of the SOSMA, which concerns persons charged with offences relating to terrorism, the court was simply not called upon to take any action. This was because the foundation or substratum for the exercise of that power was not there in the first place. It was axiomatic therefore, that a substratum of laws must first exist before the edifice ofjudicial authority may be erected thereupon for otherwise, the question of removing judicial power does not arise. Therefore, although the principle to be enunciated from Ganesan’s S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 case is that any legislation that seeks to remove from the courts any judicial power cannot be countenanced as this would be wholly inimical to the doctrine of the separation of powers, this could not hold true where there was no substratum or foundation laid for the exercise of such power. Under all the circumstances, there was no basis or foundation for the exercise of judicial discretion in respect of bail in the case of those persons charged with offences relating to terrorism under s 13 of the SOSMA.” [13] Akhir sekali sebagai menoktahkan alasan Perintah ini, dalam kes Samat Yamin v. PP [2023] 6 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan mengatakan: “[23] As for the fact that this court had on 22 December 2020 granted bail to the applicant Koh Chin Wah in Criminal Application No:W-07-94-08-2019, even though he was also charged under s. 26A of the Act, the learned SFC submitted that without the grounds of decision for allowing the said application, the reasons for doing so were merely speculative as held by this court in Malaysian Motor Insurance Pool v. Tirumeniyar Singara Veloo [2019] 10 CLJ 731. Furthermore, he said applying the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation based on the maxim S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 generalia specialibus non derogant, which this court did in Abdullah Atan v. PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151, s. 388(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply given that SOSMA has laid down the specific procedures pertaining to bail. This court in Abdullah Atan 's case (supra) distinguished the application of Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Another Case [2017] 5 CLJ 526, which should be done in this case as well, said the learned SFC, as there is no displacement of judicial power here, unlike in Semenyih Jaya 's case (supra) where the determination of the amount of compensation for compulsory land acquisition under s. 400 of the Limited Acquisition Act 1960 rest not which the judge only but also with the two assessors who sat with him. It is to be noted that this court had done the same distinguishment fairly recently in Letitia Bosman v. PP & Other Appeals [2020] 8 CLJ 147. We would pause here to say and without any need for further elaboration that we are definitely on all fours with the learned SFC on the points he had rightly and succinctly canvassed as stated in this paragraph of our judgment." [13] Dengan kata lain, kes Semenyih Jaya dan Seksyen 388 (1) KTJ adalah tidak terpakai dalam permohonan di hadapan di S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Mahkamah ini. Oleh yang demikian, permohonan OKT Kedua untuk jaminan adalah ditolak. BADRUL MUNIR BIN MOHD HAMDY HAKIM SESYEN MAHKAMAH SESYEN PASIR MAS KELANTAN Bertarikh: 1 JANUARI 2024 Pihak Pendakwaan: TPR Siti Edabayu binti Subhan (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan) Pihak Tertuduh Kedua: Mohd Ridzuan Bin Muhamad (Tetuan Mohd Fadzli & Co.) . S/N ukoseMAt/0mzcSktUIfiRg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

06(RJ)-1-03/2023(B)

PERAYU 1. ) KETHEESWARAN A/L M KANAGARATNAM 2. ) VIVIENNE KETHEESWARAN RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya

[1] In the present case, having examined section 61A by itself and in context earlier, we find that judicial power has in no way been abrogated, curtailed or subjugated to the Legislature by any means whatsoever. The use of the phrase ‘prima facie evidence’ by no means has the conclusive effect as erroneously proposed by the appellants. In all cases, the defence retains the ability to call rebuttal evidence and the Judiciary retains the obligation to evaluate all the evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case sufficient to warrant a conviction before calling for defence. [2] We are inclined to accept the respondent’s submission that when depositions under section 61A are tendered as evidence, even as prima facie evidence of any facts stated in the deposition, the prosecution is not absolved of its obligation to prove a prima facie case including but not limited to adducing further evidence that is available or in certain cases, corroborating the depositions. [3] Insofar as the right to a fair trial is concerned, it is our view that section 61A has fairly triangulated the rights of the accused, the victims and public interest.[4] Reading section 61A in context, we find that there is in the first place, no discrimination against the appellants as regards sections 52 and 61A. The two provisions are entirely different provisions catering for different procedures for different circumstances which have been explained above. In any case, the basis for the application of section 61A over section 52 is clear in that the former applies when a witness can no longer be found by virtue of them having been deported pursuant to the applicable provisions of Act 155.CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCE: Constitutionality of Section 61A of Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (“ATIPSOM”) – Section 30 and Section 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 - separation of power – whether Section 61A of ATIPSOM is unconstitutional? – prima facie evidence - judicial power – Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution – Fundamental Liberties – Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution – Fair Trial – procedural and substantive fairness – cross-examination of the deponents – Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution – principle of proportionality – Section 52 of ATIPSOM -

05/01/2024

YAA Tun Tengku Maimun binti Tuan MatKorumYAA Tun Tengku Maimun binti Tuan MatYAA Tan Sri Dato' Mohamad Zabidin bin Mohd DiahYA Datuk Harmindar Singh DhaliwalYA Dato' Abu Bakar Bin JaisYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul Jalil

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05/01/2024 11:10:57 06(RJ)-1-03/2023(B) Kand. 69 S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SZ0oVsHWNkOV/0SRQ7xZoQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

B-05(M)-44-02/2021

PERAYU MOHD ASRIZAL BIN MOHD.IBRAHIM YONG RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Criminal Appeal – Section 3 and section 3A of the Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act 1971 [Act 37] (“FIPA”) – Whether the firearm was discharged whilst committing robbery – Section 3 of the FIPA also makes it clear that the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that no hurt is caused to the victim – Issue on the credibility of the only eye witness – It is trite that the evidence is weighed and not counted pursuant to section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 – All appeals on conviction are dismissed – Appeals against the sentence are allowed.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

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05/01/2024 09:25:43 B-05(M)-44-02/2021 Kand. 41 S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N piRgV/eKc0eQU1zy5zJjsg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a—n5(M)~u»o2/2021 Kand. 41 bu 3:/on/mu ; IN THE COURT or APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) FPEA BETWEEN wAN MUNAMMAD AZRAMI EIN WAN ZULLKIFLI APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PRosEcuToR . RESPONDENT HEARD TOGETHER wrm mn BETWEEN MOHD ASRIZAL BIN MOHD. IERAHIM voNG APPELLANT AND Puauc PROSECINOR HEARD TOGETHER WITH sw PIfiI7VIeK:nuuuIxy5:JI9§ Nat! Sum INNDEY WI“ be M M mm u. DIIEIMIIIY mm; nnnmvgnl VII EFILING VWLII BETWEEN MAT SALLEN BIN NOH APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDENT [In Ihs Maner a! (he Hwgh com o! Makaya at Shah Alam. 1n|he Slate olSe\an9ar Darul Ehsan Cnmlnal Trial Nu: BA-45D-1-D3/2018 and BA.45D-2—n3/2015 Between Pubhc Pmsecumr And 1. Mohd Asnz/cl! bin Mchd Ibramm wan Muhammad Azmml mn Wan zmkm: 3, Ahmad Favsal mu Muda (DNAA PADA 5/10/2017) 4 Ma! SaHeh bin Nah] CDRAM: HADHARIAH ElN'flS‘1EDtSMAlL,JCA AZMAN am ABDULLAH, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN. JCA 1 sw mfiyvrgxm-uulzysurvs mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; mm. VII mum pm (E) {'1} (9) (U (9) ". Name 'pushsr‘ fidak drketahur. Dakar waklu magnb, mereka ms/ma! seorang /e/ski /ndfa (SP10) dalarlg he Srlu. OKT1 msimsi Faisal isms pergf ks arah lelaki India Isrsebul den ksmudianya me/ihar Faisal darn /5/ski /mire tersebul bargelul. mm mervdengar Faisal menjsm kspsda Islski India rsrsebul dan msmmls dadah dan wang dar/pads ieiaki India tersebux. Lslskl India fslsebul ssorang "pushef dadah OKT1 Iidak manganalf ieiaki India Ierssbul Ssmasis Faisal dsn /e/uki India nu beige/uf, OKT1 dalsng melvghamp/N mslska den srah bslakalig dim peigi ks ssbe/ah kiri mansks/u oxrz bevada di' sebe/an Kanan msleka. Semsss nu, OKT1 Ierdengal bdrm satu isrupan flan msiinai OKT2]a1uh in situ OKT1 Iiada penqstahuan punca lelupan flan ape yang Ie/ah be!/aku OKT1 Nada perrgeiahuan dan iuiak nampak Faisal msmbawa pistol di fsmpal ks/sdlan OKT1 trdak nampak sesiapa msmsgang pistol in iampai ke/adian. OKT1 msnsfikan memegang pistol d! lamps! kaiaaian dun tldak psmah iengok alsu memegang pistol [P21/1] Ierssbul sebelum kejadfan. OKT1 lidak msmbawa pisioi Iersebut ks lempatkejadian. oxn mengaku hsndsk me/akukan samun [slept msnsfikan msnggurieksn pisioi tslsebul dan mensflksn ads melepaskzvm Ismbakan msnggunakan pistol Ierssbur. OKT1 me/vysvakan piszoi tsrsslzut dlplmyal oleh Faisal. Se/spas dilangkap polls darn semasa belada ai daiam Vaksp, Faisal membelilshu OKT1 bahawa pistol iarssoui milikinya 11 F221 Faisal tslah msnmggsl dunfa kalans sakll aa/an. am: an) Fa.sa/ Haggai dl wok c 11! Maman com dan pairs ls/ah msnangkap Farsal .11 situ. Faisal datarlg dengan polis ks ruman OKTV dart W/is Ielsh menangkap OKT1 (r) orm ndak pernan Pergr ks Hotel Sun Beans dan rmds pengezanuan srapa yang menyewa d1 blllk hots! lslsebut. 0) Pmak pohs mak memmpas prim! tsrsabul daripsda DKT1. Pihak pairs man mslampas pistol tsrssbul danpada lelak: Indra lelsebut OKT2 gave an unswcm slalemenl and his decenoa was as vouaws: (a) Pads 23.09.2015, OKT2 bersama OKT1 flan oxm barada m Rssloran Subaldsh dl Sunga/ Way uniuk maker! malam Sslspas makan ma/am, pads jam rabin kurang 7.30 malam, meleka 1e/ah Pelyr ke B/ck 5 di Mermsli Court, Sunway dengan msmsikr‘ kerela P9/odua wva yang drpandu o/sh OKT3 unluk bslshal dirumah mm. (D) Ssrnass dr dalam ksrsts, OKT1 ta/sh msnenma panggdsn maron daripada sanmng kswarmya yang bsmama Faiaa/ rrenuauh yang Ielah maninggal dunla) unluk uarang ke tempal /erak kevela Bluk E m Menlan Cour! unluk be!/umpa dsngan Fa/sa/. OKT1 dan Farsal ads/ah kswan dan OKT2 jugs mengsna/I Farsal mels/ul ox n (c) Apabila rnasuk ks da/am kawasan Iazak ksrsta Blok 5 dr‘ Mentari court, tanudun kedua namprsk Faisal ke/ual den langge rsmpar rem kers-Ia den belja/an msnuju ks srah ssorang )9/an Indra yang juga beams .11 slru. :2 (I1) (9) (0 (9) (rt) Sampar dr mu, OKT1 dan OK12 keluar dan kerela Psrodua Viva (arssbut. Tmawan OK72 nampek pevgeluznn d: annals Faisal den »e/am‘ /ndia nu, oxn ndak ks/usr den bsrads dl dn/am kersla Pemdua V/vs Islsabul pads sellsp mass darn duduk di bshagmn pemsndu karsls Parodua Viva Islssbuf oxn Isms psrgr menohmg meleraiksn pelga/utan dr anlara Farsal dan Is/akr‘ India ifu Semasa berbual dennkran, OKT2 Ierdengar snru bunyiseurnparna Iembakan dan rem /atuh dr ms (Ishtar. Se/spas jafuh dr am: /anlar, oxrz nampak psha kanannw lurks/vs tnmbakan OKT2 Isms msrsngkak kc bslakang ssbuah karsls di Iempaf Isaak kalsla telsebuf dan pads mass nu nampak sam bends seumpama pistol df nzas ranrai Lslakf India fersebul mengambil bends (nmou rersebur dan menyacukan Kenada keflala OKT2 dan irvimenysbabksn rerzudun ksdua be/ass ram. Pads mass /Iu, om: nsmpsk OKT1 mslsriksn dm dsn srlu dengan menark/ Ksrsls Pemdua vm den bslgerak keluardari kswssan /atak kersls fsrsabut OKT2 ndak nampak Fsrsal pelgi ks mana serepas keladusn Iersebul. OK12 rinda pengeznnuan sebab psrgs/man dr anisla Fmssl dan /e/akr India iersebul Lslakl /ndls nu mansnyakan lsrtuduh kadua dslsng dart mama dan msmysk paha kanan (srtuduh ksdua yang cedars dan msnysnabkan OKT2 msnjent kesakrean. oI<r2 yang ndak dupe! Dena/an Is/an bsljaya melangkak sehingga ke limgga den berg-mng ks be/kom dl tlngkal 3 Ismpat /max karsta lerssbuf dsn kamudrsn mun ks bswah dan msndalal dr afas ssbuah kerala kancfl. as m OKT2 maslh cubs mersngkak ke srah sam (fang lampu dan Islakl mm: msbm msmukul Ierfuduh Kedua. fldak lama ksmudian, pans libs dr kawassn tersebul dam msmbawanys ke Puss: Perubaran Umversilr Ma/aya -mm lawman. 0') own» new pengelahusn mengsnar‘ kswu/udan prsm: dan pe/um yang dfgunskan da/sm kss w sabslum, semasa dan selspss ksjsdisn Ismbskan bsrlaku. [23] OKTJ gave ms ewdence on cam and his devence version was as lu|luws' (5) OKTS bsmsra 49 tahun dsn msmpunyal/chm kumng on bus): kadal m kawassn RBIHSII Panjang, Kc/anfen yang cnsewakan kepsda psnyewa—penyswa (:2) Pada 2a/9/2015, on: bevsama dengan oxrz bsnolak am Ke/aman ke Kuala Lumpur. oxn msncadangkan marska menyswa kemla unluk ks Kuala Lumpul Kevsla lsrsebur dissws alas nams oxra kslans any msmpunyar Vesen mamsndu (5) Sampal dr'KuaIa Lumpur, padajam Isom kulang 5.30 petang. OKT2 telah menerims panggr/an le)eIon dal/pads seovsng kawtmnya be/name Faisal. Faisal ls/ah msmmls axrz darn OKT3 perg! ks lsmpak Islak kslsta dlslok D Martian cam. (11) Ssmpsl .1: temps: Ielsk karate m‘ Mervfari cam, OKT3 ms/iha! OKT1 dan Faisal zeta): berada disifll (e) om Ie/ah lurun deli kevera V/‘Va Iersebut dsn Faisal puls msngamhkan OKT3 psrgi ms/arakkan ksrsla Vrva yang dipsndunya :1: (amps! Ielak ksrela d: silu. OK73 diberifahu :4 olsh Falsal bamawa ada '.I0b' L/nluk dllakukall tewpl tldak msmbarltallll terluduil Kellga apskah './abflersebul. (I7 Alas arahall onm, om: lslan melellskkarl ksrstanya pads /alak Iebifl kurang so mats: dari lsmpal belieu be!/umpa dsngarl Faisal dan marlunggu dl da/am kereta Vlvs lsrselwr Semass msrmnggu Ieblll kulallg 30 mini! dl da/am ksnzfa Vlva Ialssblll, OKT3 Kirdsngsr blmyl lslupan meuam I6}/iif mslslup oxra berasa takul menderlgar blmyl /eluparl tersebut dan menunggu /eblh kurarlg 15 mlnn en S/Iu sebs/um merrlandu ksrsla Viva M/un darl barlgurlsn Islak ksrsla flan Deredar dari silu. (g) one Ildak msmbawa prsval [F'21A] Iarssbuf darl ma psngslalluan siapa yang membawa plslollezseburke arm (n) oxrrs [uga tlada pengslanusn mengsrlai plsvol yang digunakarl oleh OKT1 semasa kejadiarl tersebut. (V) OKT3 Ildak lerllmsl dalam samun bsrkumpularl dengan bersanlalakan plshl lsrsehul. [24] The aelence also called arlclhsrwilnsss. Munammad Rldhuan bln Abdul Razak (‘*Dw4")l Evlderlce by DW4 was as lullo (al Pads 23/9/2015, lam Ieblh kwang 5.30 Iwlgga 7.30 malam, 504 bsrsda .1, Sunway Merltarl relapl Ifdak lngstmmah yang bsllau bevads sm bevehal (/spak) Esrsama kawlsnnya bsmama Hasii den tslah bsrlamu derlgan OKT1 sm merlgems/l‘ OKT1 se/sk swal lanun 2:215 darn dapal merlgscam OKT1 dl Mahkamah (bl OKT1 lelah marlsrima panggflan rsls/‘on dallpada seomng 15 kawzmnys bsmsma Faisal. sm ms/ihatmuka DKT1 neumah den oxn keluar darl rumsh urlluk Izerjumpa Faisal. mm I/dsk msmbsrilshu SDI msngapa FEVSEII mahu Der/umpa mm. sm /uga mengenan Faisal dan psmsh bsrjumpa dsngan Faisal sebelum W (C) Sslapas lebih kurang so nrngga 40 miml kamudralv, sm rnelmar OKT1 bank he rumsh den kelfhatan ke/am-kabu! dan gs/Leah Apsblls drtanya nlsh sm rmmgapa OKT1 :15/am Keadssn bsgffu, OKT1 manjawab rrsda spa-ape flan rem mssuk ks as/am bflfknya (.1; Se/spas rm, scu pun be/rk ks rumahnya. Pavia kessokan harmya di sebe/ah Iengsharl, sm manerima panggilan rs/eron darfpeds Hssrl yang msmbsrilahu oxn le/sh d/Iangkap pobs ksrsna Iarmzal dalam kes samurv. (9) sm msnyazakan yang semssa sm be/-ads m rumah mm bamama Hasif, SD41 lidak rvampak OKT1 msmsgang alau msmbawa EPBJDE senjala dun nampsk OKT1 keluar den" Iumah be!/‘umpa Farsal da/am kasdsan sehslai sspinggang (I) We/at/pun sm dsn oxrv bsrkawalv, SDA trdak pemah dlrmnla oéeh lsrtuduh panama membevrkan kelsrangan sedemxkian dw mahkamah Finding ulthn loamod mu! judgl ax ml and of ma dIfInca's cas- At me oonc\us\on of the mm, A was me findmg 01 ms learned man page mal me defence had lafled to cast a reasonams doubt on the prosacuIAun's case consequently, me Appensnzs were convicted (or me offence as per me charges. 15 sw mfiyvrgxrouuuizysuvw -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm The ieamea High court Juage, in coming in his decision‘ new as louows (a) The om-s aetenae basically was on the euegeuen iaai Faisa¥ (lhe deceased accused) was me masienniaa ei me gang-rubbery agains|FW1D. in una regem, me ieameu High Caurl Judge was M the view !ha( Faisal had before the M57 and II was easy hr the AppeHanls Io pm all the blame on Faieai as he eauia rim appear in wan to give his iesiimeny. During me incident, Faisal is noi the one who have ngm wan I‘-‘W10 aesades, while de4endmg runiseié, om had admmad that he intended In cummil gang-robbery againsl FW1O and had done so iegeiner wiia OKTZ, OKTS and Faisai (me aeeeaeea accused) om aniy demad carrying me gun and having shat OKT2. in) with regard to me detence made by OKT2, |ha learned High Court Judge found mai there were many inaienai discrepancies in oKT2's slalsmenl as compared la me sieiarneni iea by mm and o><r3. Those material contradiciians have affecledlI1ede1ensecfOKT2 and as such me mun (mind that OKTZ is an: E ciedible wiinese. OKT2‘s defense has also failed lo rebumie areaunipnon of knevneage aboui me gun used by mm uunng Ihe ineiaeni and on me balance of probamlmes iaiiea |n casl ieasoneaie duub me p1osecuIicn's case. (c) The delenee ov OKT3 was via! he was 50 rneiers from where iris figni took place and Inns he had no knawieage Iha| OKT1 :7 SW hifiwvrgxrflluuilysflvifi -we Sum ...n.. M“ be used m mm ea nvVmruH|y MIN; dun-mm via muaa WM! (<1) carrying ar had in Ms pnssessinn or under N5 cus1udY or control of ma firearm Tne teamed High Cour! Judge upon cunstdenng ms mailer hold tna same vtew as for on: that there were many rnatenat dtacrapanotes tn me statement or mm. Sum malenal oonlrsdlcltons have auaaaa nis ae1anss.rhara1ora,ma court was anna viewlhat oxn ts not a craatata wflness and ms defense failed to rebut the praaunrpnan of knuwtadga aboul tna gun used by om during tna moment, on tna balance of praaammres, om latled to cast reasonable doubt tn me prosecutions case Based an the arorasata reasons. ms taarnau High couruudga mnvtmed tna Appauans (or me ufiances as per charges and ma Aupeflants were senlenoed |u uaatn by nanging. nris app-an [27] Belore us are three appaats wtm tnrea dmeren(Pa|1inn ul AppeaL However. grmmds that ts stmm ed before us may be summarised as follows: (t) the delenoe o1|he Appauancs had rarsaa reasonable doubt In me amsacunows case OKT1 am not are ar cause death or Injury to FW1D and was meratyan allempl to ND PW10 There ts no avtderrcato clearty show|ha(OKT1 ahottna gun It coma also be FW1D or Faisal matsnat msgun lhalcaussd the tmury to OKT2. ot<'r2 and on: am not mat Knowlhaiob-(T1 was carrying or had V1 ms pussessiun or under his custody or I! am htfiwvraxrmuuizysuvin Nuns Sum ...ns.. M“ as used m mm as nflmnnflly MW; dun-mm wa .rtuua wnxt comm! me firearm: and (fr) me evidenoealP\N1U ls nm credible. There arsmscnapancass Vn his statements. Our an on [28] II is firs: apposwa that secuon 3 and secfian 3A of FIFA be staxsd as Iellaws: -3. Family iv! dilcllamlnn a muann In um commiulnn M . scnmunm winne- Any person WM ellha Ilma oinis mnmmng ur iltlmplmg m eomnm av axmwa ms wmmlssmn ova schedmed nflevme magma. n firearm wnh Imam m muse damn av hurl In any parsom shah. nommsnammg (MI no nun u caused Iheqeby, he numshed wnn Ampnlonmam lav a term of not um «nan may yams am not exaesdmu my years Md wilh wnzppmg mn um um man mm mm u. Penllly mmompllcu In us: of dlnch-rpl wnrunn Wheve, wnn ‘mum be cause deem xx hull to any person, . flmarm Vs uncnangea by any pawn an we nuns av ms uummmlnu nr altemplmg la oommn or abelunq me mnmnumn ula sdwdulud mm, each av ms aocamnhnes Vn vespeci av Ihe meme pvwanu :1 I115 wens no me wmmlulun or anammsa umnnnmn er abelmsnl mam who may reamnably an pcasumad to have Imawvv me: such persan was urvymg mm In ms pnsseuslnn orumerhu custody ortxmvulmsfivearm shafl, nmwnnsaanmng um um mm Vs caused by me dwchalys omeov, be pxmllhed wnn Imprlsonmem For a |emv cl ml less (Mn «niny yuan but mu exoaodilvg fully yuan and mm wmpp-nu wnn non ms mm mm slmkes‘ unless he pmvea mu in nu Vzknn an mawnahls naps in pvsvenl the flvscharga ~ SIN vnkvvrexan-uuizyswin "Nuns smnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. mn.u-y mm: mmn wa .nuNG pm Issln (I): The dorurrcu ofrlru Appellants mu nlsoa ruasanablo doubt to the prosocur/on’: can [29] ll was submlued by me counsels :71 all lne Appellanls lnal lnelr delenoa had raised doubl lo the pwsecutlan's case. [:0] ln lnls regard, lar ol<Tl, the counsel suhmlIIedlhatOKT1 ls not me one who snal ms gun. ll could also he PW‘lfl or Faisal llns daoeased accused) who s|'lo| the gun. Tnus, lnis lulluwsd by me submisslan alarm and OKT3 lllal lmlll did not “Val know Anal OKT1 was carrying or had In ms possession or under nlscuslady or control llrefireann The learned ouunsel had referved to me case ol Pub/lo Pmecular v. Dng Fah clrsng (1996) 1 cu 501 on wnellrer dlscharge ol lne firearm was an acl separate and dlsllrlal lrern lne rubbery as lollows: -ma accused a-scnargsd N5 firearm ml al ms vlollm: and i| wns ml proved mar rm amused dlxcharued a «warm an we llma or commmlng me lvbbelv. [31] We have wnsidsred lhe Appellanls' delsnoe and (hell submlsslurl. Hawever. we are ::ons|l-aim la depart lmrn me nnalng ol lne learned High Court Judge. We reler lo lhe case at Lu my chin @ Lon rock song A on v Gall Yook cnln A Anar[2l7D3) 2 ML: 97 w n held as lollows: “Ganerallyl an zppellals mun wlll nal lnlelverle unless ln. lnsl mun was smwn la be plainly wrong In arrwlrlg at Its declslon or wrlete there had been no nr lnsmuml judlclal appmlallan ul me avlderlce. Judlnial appreolatknn or evldence mearll man . Judge who was rsqulrea lu aaruunale upon 3 dlsnme musl amve al hls dadsmvl on an lull. man by nssasslflgl welgnlng snu, for gum: reasons ellher anosvltrlg or :9 slN hlfiuvlsxsouuuizysulw -ans Sallal ...n.r wlll as HSQG M mm s. nllnlrrallly Mlhls m.l.n VI] aFluNG Wflxl JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introductian [1] There are «me (3) separate appeals before (ms caun emanating lvom ma aamsmn 111 the High com dated 17.02 2021 In mnvimmg and sentencing me Appeuama. [2] [3] At me High com, me |naJ mvolveu A accused as iollows. (1) Mohd Asrizal am Mohd Ibrahim (Appellam in Appaa1 No. a 05041414-oz/2021 and hereinafter win he referred m as -om-) (II) Wan Muhammad Azraml bin Wan Zlllklm (Appellant in Appeal No. E-05|M)A3—D2J2D21 and hereinafter wiH be referred to as 'DKT2') 11.1; Ahmad Fmsal am Muda (mscnargea not amaunfing w acquillal on 05 10.2017 due to ma reason that the accused had been died) (M Ma: Saneh hm Nah (appwane m Appeal No, B-D5(M)-5I- 03/2021 and herzinafler will be reranaa In as “om:-1 DKT1 was charged as leflcwsz "Bahama kamupada 23/9/21215, jam mm kuung 11130»: bensmpal m lenuaal /slak kemla Blok D, Apanmenr Maman Court J3/an as as, Para/my Jaya m damn dlsran Para/mg. aa/am Nsgslt Sslanaof Dam Ehmn, man drdaputt mnleplskan Iumbslqm ssryala in! mass mraman mmpakarv mumuan dangan ma: hondak msnyubahkan Immannrv zltau kezsderaan ks am Pralap M Ramasamy No. K/F‘: s31ao:1—aa—5297 Oleh yang dlrmharv kamu Isiah 3 IN p1RyvraK:muuIzy5:Jvin -ma 5.11.1 n-nhnrwm be 1;... m mm 1.. WW1-y mm: dun-mm Va aF\uNG Wm rarewng rna wfvme or any pen A7! are evidence pram belam him H. mm. when ducktmg wnamar to awapr M m rerem ms enema er a wnnese. near it agmrm Ie\evin| cm rnua. ne mustuk: rnru awuum ma presenee erasseme arany rmlwe um. wnnass may hive rn gmng ma ervldsnce wnara aontampulary documems exlmedr he nrusx teal ma mu mdenea M a wflnul pgamxlthue. He must also test me avraenee era nenssmarwuness agninsl rna nmbamlmss mm eaa-. Thu vrvlclph oeIma\ In anpe\IatemlerVemnoe\slha1e dedsmn antved n||1y n ma! mun wvlhouljudwcm apprvaahun afmu -vraanes may be set asrae an swam’ [32] In oonsraenng mesa apnea‘: we fulluw «ms uourr earlier declsinn In the case of Fling: Axman bin Amfmnzukilwn Pundakwa Rnya [2021] 2 MLJ 7714202111 LNS10B\nwh\ch Hrs Lordship Abdm Kanm Abdm Jam JCA stated max m deuermrnrng whether the firearm was arsmarge-1 whusr cnmmiuing robbery, me whom rncruent snoum be vreweu as a smgle transacmn [331 wnan we evahlaled me «me and eviaenee m this case, we laund Lha| me ewdenoe ms corroborated. It is not only me evrdsnoe by PW1u who is the Vilmm H’! tms case but also evsdenee tram the report 0| SP12 slated Mat (here was 3 presence at the DNA at OKT2 and OKT3 m the hole! roam (ram wmcn tsw Hams were seized includmg rne buHet whwch re identxcal tome one tmmd the scene It is dflfrcmt to amva at me decision he! one happen an 07 a sudden [341 The uerence also failed to rebut that there rs a discharged offirearm VII which happened at the tame of the wmmisswon at the robbery. Secliun 3 ol the FVPA alsn makes it dear Ilia! the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that nu mm Is caused in the warm. u Is anougn enaunara Is e discharged olfirearm annennre er mmmlltlng or enampong to commit N prfiyvrexsouuulzysuvw nse e.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm s. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm VI] anum wrm nv apelling lne ocrnnusslon oi a scheduled olvence enunreraled in lhe scnodule \o lne Act which in lnis case a robbery It is too bad mal H1 lnie case, me snol had caused inlury lo OKTZ. The use oi gun H’! a robbery IS a claar Indication that there IS an intention lo cause death or senous injury In the Vlcllm and such lndlcalinn 07 intention becomes unclaimed when mere is a dlsoharged of nreann nalwllhslandlng lnal na nurl is caused in me Victim. PW“) 1351 Tne counsel ior one also supniilled me: an adverse presunrplldn under sac|lon1141g|nHhe Evidence Aol should be lnvaked in «ma case an the reason mal lna prosecution lalled to prove that me gun belongs in any Appellanls. All |he Appellants suggesleol mat il Faisal line deceased accused) who might bring me gun 1o me scene In wnlon lney had no knowledge aboul IL The prcsecullon was said lulled m produoe 112 slalemant D7 Faisal. [as] In we regard, we raler lo lne case at any Mdoi seng A on v. FF[1|l15]1 LNS nzl wnlcn Abdul Rahman Sehli, ucn [as no lnen was) aralad as follows’ ‘I59! Flmnur, even wnnaul SD7‘s evidence lne preaaoullon slrasdy nau sufflusm uvldawa in aslzbllsh a WINE case case aaeinir all in. apgellnnls 1n... the (allure In cull him as e wlweculion wllrlusa is oi nu nnmequenne as com um reaulr lira gun in me pmsewlmri use I1 is are law lnal an adverse rnleenoe canrlm he dram. «or lailureiaoalla wllness man in» prosaaulion ner dlschanled na buruun As my Purlfl New (‘J said In Chas xcs-n Long v FP[1996]I sm sin :1 pigs: 523-524 “The eooellenra mnlentlcn lsmalll-1e lallrna ml the nmsecullun re adduoe evidence oi lnosa ome< eaniolae rneanl rnar rne mun could preaunia lnal me evidence would have we aialrm lna proeacurlon, nIali$\>1en were no such use Such nlgumsnlx are wmmorfly made. Commonly mu‘ such arguments are Mlham mam The mun mun neume In anw any such presumvmn umess me wuness nol pvoduaad Vs eusnlml m we pmsmmuws can Any crvmna\ |ransamK:n may be nhsorved bya numberemnnmex ms um naculary «mus prosewuun In pmflues every snngxe one av Imae wnmse. M on prvuecnfiun need lndu xslo amuse mnesseswnose evtdsnoe can bebelxeved w as In esxauun me as» bwyom rsaiunnma dnum out at a number no wumsss, n mymen urfly nu nsuuarytn bung m Me or awn, as mg as lmse wmesses auuafly poodueed are Ibla to gwe evmencs mus nmnsaaxon, man: We no masnn way an me yes would he cam mt my any vrnumphon mama be amm met me evxaenee at those wimeues ml pmduced mum havu bsen against me vmsecumn ' [37] \n our present appeals‘ Pww was ab\e In give evidence of me tmnsacnon as he was the victim and the sole eye-wuness. Pwm able m mlorm the com! me snuaman at me me o1 ms moment. He can remember OKT who salt In me car which far imm mm in wmch mus [am Is not mspmea by OKT. Tms Issue Is also relaled la the next issue on the area: my oi PW1D. Issue (fr): Tm avldonco ol PW10 Is not crodlbla [33] AM the eeunear of we Appeflanls raised lhis wssue on me pomt that the learned Hwgh Court Judge was in encr in rewmg on me ewaenee ol Pwm m wmch we are aware ma: PW10 ws me only eye wnness For me prosecunon The Appeuams contended lhsl mere are alscrepancies m me evwdence \ed by PWlU‘ |u name a few, FW1D m his testimony during the exarmnahnn In chief stated that when the gun was pointed at him. OKT2 had asked our me bag to be handed:/er In ms coueague on me Ien and N pufiyvraxrouuulzyswin we Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm the mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm during the crass-sxammatinn, wwm sand met when he lned to push away the gun‘ a shot was fired However, 0: eenlramcnon, dnnng me re exammaficn when PW10 was asked by Ihe pmsscumr to explam why he did nox agree that me shaoung happened by acckienl, PW1D then changed his evidence by saying that the accused had already tried to sham when the pistol was painted [39] The weamed counsel vcruKTI drawn this cnunanenunn |o|he mse ov Rad?" Irwan Iakunduu bln II ganl lwn Ponaakws Ray: [2017] 5 MLJ 736 which hem as loHows: 1221 aemasanun ponuhuan luml keyed: naked myuun dan panuhakiman hahnn mama. kaml harsemgu bnhswa ham mar: wan bemalmmg sspammnya kenada kalsrsnuan nsan am dalnm mznsabflkan peliyu delvgan pelluduhan Hakim lucava vanah mananmz kelenanuan SP1 seas.-a bu|a(-hula! din Mas nna. mukl Mada vahdl lanpa mambuat pemmbangan Iemadap vahxa hahawa sm searing esxn yang aamepenunssn uanpadn maranean ma \elah mheflkan aneh sew sewdm sann beldauflun kepeuu: keulunman kaieranqan dawn $125 an hadapan kann max syak ug. bnhawn sm adahh Ieoranq Saks! yang rnsmpunm kenanmlan damn. kes lm. Kzhernngin sm svwllimya dhehu dan dhsmna denaan sacara hsmalnwafl men haxhn bican dnn mevangan anus: sedemhaan new mnmwukan ketaranqan yang Iann sehzgal sakangan. Fads pandangsn kann mmngsn sew bukzmah ketevanwan yang kukuh umuk memauansamuanuaaxas nemyu anah hakum means munladw ialu flzpalan dan Keuumsan yang selamal umuk dmenaImnk2n' [40] vwm regard to this Issue, we are of the View lha| the learned High court Judge is the one who had the audwo and wsual advantage In observe the demeanour of lhe wunesses Hence, he was cleany antmsd to make 2. n pnyvrexmsuulzysuvw Nuns a.nn n-nhnrwm be used a mm a. nflmnsflly mm: dun-mm ha snum Wm findings wiin regard In me credioiiny oi ins wrineeees. As an appeiiaie ocurly we eneoid be slow to inrenere wnn siren findings unieee in can be sndwn before us that ine rindrngs were perverse end egarnei eii eyerieoie evidence. in me present case‘ we see no reason to disium ine iinding oi ins learned Hign coun Judge. [41] we are guided by me decision oi Raja Azlari snan FJ (as His Highness men was) in me case oi Public Prosecutor vaemir Hejmerun bln HI]: idris (Na 2) [1 im] 1 ML] 15 wnicn siaied inar: -. in my opinion. ine disclenlinnies inere wiii away: My neeeuse in ma cimurnnanoe: VI wvncn avsms havflensdr lvevy wilnaii does noi remnmer rne eerne mine and no doe: noi rumomb-er eoaneieiy eveI'Y erngie rning iner neoeened rne quesunn is vmelhar exrsienea oi oenein fliscrevariales is srmereni id deeiruy inarrcredrmiiiy were is no ruie anew man in. tuslimony -71 s mneu niesi em-er no beliavod in nu eninery or non ei an A mum is luHy oernoeieni_ lor good and oogeni reasons. in mere: ene nan enne resnrndrry die wriness and reism ins diner. in ine ensenoe ev any nunlvadiclion. huwsvav‘ and VII rne absnnw or any rnnereni rrnpnmnininy, ine zvideno: er enywnneer, wneiner . pence mines: or um. ma gives evndenca on amnvinlnn. sneuid nonneiry be edeepiee: [42] As io wneiner the com accept Just a srngie wimess In prove me eeee of iris prosecuirom It is inie mar me evidence is weigned and not counted prnedani to eecnon 134 onne Evidence Act 1950. The iaw is eiear that “Na penrcuier number I)! wrrrreseee snail in any case be nzquimd tar the praoiorerry veer: In Ravanlal errd Dm‘Ia[Ial’s Law or crimes (27lh Ed) er pp 1965-1969, it scared Ihal, -ii is new a wen senied prineipie at law Ihnl oonvichon can he susiarned on me sole |esIimany onne pmsecutnx. ii ii inspires confidence.” [431 coining bad< lo nurcaser the learned High ccuruuage line riol only eensioereo lne evioenoe o1 PW10 mil also olrier corraborallva evieenee. Therefore. we are nol convinced liisl me learned High courl Judge was wrong. conclusion [44] in lne upshot, naving perused lrie aooesl reeoros. iris gmunds or judgement and the wnllen submissions by parlies and aaseo on lire eloreseio reasons, we unanimously find lliel lliere is no rrienl in lire Aooellarils' epoesls on conviction. All appeals on conviction are hereby dlsmlssed. [45] wim regard to the appeals agairisl senlenee, il is lrile law mail when me punisrirneril lo any orierioe is amended in e heavier punisrlmenl, it is me inlenlion oi lrie Parlisrrieril lo perceive such orlerioe as serious. Triereiore, in arfwlng In our oee ion ler eppeel egeirisl senlerioe iri mese appeals, we are gillaeo by lrie decision Abdul Mahk lshak JCA in lrie case cl Yong /or Mun vPubIiI: Prosecutor 120121 ls MLJ 209 as follows 152] we mil now reier lo me Heriaero in eioer In onoerserrro are lro. pulvose ano irileriliori olirie an M lrie lriiro Fafllzmefllaly slllino allhe ‘Dewari Riayal‘ mouse :71 Raprueniiflvesj an 27 luiy 1971i lire rlonollieoie ailoriiey eenerel mi sri aeooi xaoir oln Vuwl me-l uld al p 3550 in me Nsrisard wrrol we ere bringing neie ll an 2msril1msn| iai an erihamsd. a higher, psnally loreornrnilling mbbsry and lirorieooirig and omer oiierioes as slalea iriere, lolli syoes, I1 may use liresirns, at May used penukul. paku. er oererio M any elliier wenpnn ii iosl hka oroirury anrris Eu|wna|we are going In kill s lha use Milreamisr zs bomb ma wands‘ when cummlmng climax huzuia was -s an ma mama»: new [35] From me aaaax-s m Pumamenl as seen lmm ma H-nurd, an an wi: hem w| m neoewly, so to sneak. in ma on us: M fivaarmx to mmm1|'urmu‘l payvofl ho\d—ups‘ mama enharw dealt: ann,a.y [us] On ma Max, M a 2 gm“ rvuscamaqe cl juslme ml to mrwu the aaaeuanum aammunng ma uwmm as par ma amended charge m ex?! war.‘ [45] Tharebm, we areafthe consmayaa viswmatssncus ouenca should be pumsnaa wym severe pumsmuem. Huwever, afler takmg me can eralmn me mmgafion put larwam by me delencs counsms av ma Appauams, we agree to sax asme ma senlanee Imposed by me High Cam and sentence ma AppaHan(s war. a primnment for a term 0130 years. We a\so make an war [or I2 slrokas 0! M1 ng m OKT3 and mm. Na senlenceoiwhvppmg to on: because he had anamea me aga 0150 years old. «gm (AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH) Judge Cuurl o1 AvPea\ Msmysla Fu(m[aya Due M Decision : I7 Augun 2023 Ground: mum : In nacemxm 2m: :7 Loaul Ronmonmlon For OKT1 (Appeuam in Appeal No. E»u5(M)4A—D2/2021) For oK1'2 (Appenam wn Appsa\ No. E—05|My43—02/2021) For mcr: (Appellant in AppaaY N0 E415(M}51—D3/2021) For an Rupnndnnt sw mfiyvrgxrouuuizysuvw sanm Basmr (together mm Najuhah zmkmi; [Msssrs. Salxm Easlw, Ruswwza 5 Ca] Srsekam Piflex [Messrs. Sreekanl Plllai] Afifuddm hm Ahmad Hafifi (together wm: Muhammad Ammm bin Jamamddin) [Msssm Sa\ehuddm seinm A Assoc] Mohd Falruz bvn Johan [Anon-ey Gene.-ars Chambers] 23 um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm I4] [51 am MW melakukun mm kawlahln yang boleh ammm dr blwuh ssksyerl :9 AMA: San/ala Am wanam Lnmn Euurll 1971.- OKT 2 wa: charged as Inflows. "Bahawa kamu bersnnmuma derwan (1) many yang man mm/nggal mm/a den Matsa/Ian Mn Nan {Na K/P'71G7290.’l—5H1)psda 22/9/2915. mm mm kunng 19347 hrs beflarnpal an Iowa! lcluk lmmfi am D, Aammen! Mmlsfl com, man P15 819. Psfalmg Jays, :1! dc/um durirv Putahng, dalam Negm Sa/angel Daml Ehnn, umasa melakukan ronuaam bcrkulvloulm oongan ssomng rakan Kama nama Muhd Aural Dm Mona rmnlm Yong (No K/P E506UD47J—5179)IaIah molspsskarv lembakun un/ara any danger: rife.‘ hmdnk monysb-bklrv kurvlaban atxu lmnadsmsn K2 mm: mm; n/r Ramnsamy No K/F: 531003-ad-5297 yang mum] hamu mempunyal pengamnuan ralmn rmmu membave asnlala ap. ssmasa me/akukarv rwvlliakan men yang amnmn um Inlalv rm/akukan suatu hesarallan yang owon dmukum aroawan saksyen :4 ma San/are A». (Forum Lsbm Bars!) 1971." Wmle OKT3 was charged as renews: ‘Sahara um bwsama—sama Hangar: 4:; mung /ann yang Isran d/tuduh, pads 25/9/2015, [am mun kuung 1930 his beflsmpakdr renwa!/stair mm smk 2, Apartment Menrsli Com, ./alnn ms an, Pslalmg Jays‘ u. flnlum nusrah Pa:-any‘ dalam Nsgen S9/anger Dam! Ehsm, rsmasa Irlslekukan mmpaknn borkt/Nlflularv dmgan swung rakzn kamu noma Mona mm: bin Mona rmnnn Yong (No K/P'550609—036179}IsIsh melapnsksn tambakarv semen apt dangan rvlal hendak manyobabhn komahan slaw ksnerletnan ks alas Fran!!! M Ramasamy Nu xx»: 531003455297 yang nnana kamu mempwlysl nanwanuan rakarv kamu msmoswa .an,aa-a um‘ samass melakukun mmpaksrv own yang dcmwan kamu la/an melakukun sunlu mananan mg Dom: drhukum .12 bawah suluyun 34 Am Senlala Apl (Penam Liam Bern!) W71 ' wuuulzysuvw “Nana sanaw n-nhnrwm a. a... w my a. nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm y.. mum v-mm [6] AI me curlcluslon dune trial, lne learned Hlgh Court Judge lmmd lrral all the Appellarrls gullry rne charges The appellants ware sentenced to dream by hanging. 171 Aggrleved wrm lne convlciiun and sanlende, me Appellarrla ndw appealed la «ms Court. we neard me appeals on me l7 us 2023. Al me conclusion cf lne sularnrssldrrs, we dlsrnlased lhe Appellants’ appeal nn CON/lc1l07I um we allowed me appeals on aerrlanoe. we now provlde our reasons lorlna decision. ‘rho ProIacudon'I can [5] The presecmlorr-a case was establlshad by me evidence cl ils wltnssses and accepted by the learned trial judge. Pm m a nutshell, Apaellanls were crrarged mm an ollance under lhs Flreamls (Increased Penalty) A51 1971 [A6137] ('FlPl\“) [9] ln me oammlsslon of an elvance (a gang»rubbery) with me lrrlenllan to cause deam er lrllury tn one Pralap a/l Ramasamy(‘PW1D”). OKT2 and OKT3 being me adcdrn ' in me case of dlscnarge of me nrearrn oomrvlined by DKT1 were cnarged under secllan 3A of me sarne Act. ArloUleraccused,Ahmat1 Falsal am Muda, hasdled and he was drscnarged wllJ1oulacqul|lal(“DNAA')by andlner l-lign ccun Judge on us lu.2m7 OKTI was charged undersectlan 3 of l=lFA ufdischarglrlg a firearm [10] me dwenoe was commllled on may ms at appmxlmalely 7 30 pm al lhe Darkmg Inl cl Elak D, Apanrrrenl Menlari cdun, Jalan PJ5 em, Pelallng Jays, salangor uaml Ehsan. 5 SW hlfiyvlgxsfluuulzysulw -we s.n.l Men M“ be used a mm re anrmun mm; dun-mm vn AFVLING wnxl mi when PW10 was about he enter his car and pu| his iaptdp in the back. he saw mree men get out Mme viva ear who then came tewerds hini. one oi the nien came hum the train (whn was identihed as om by PW1D)whiie the other Mn men train the back PWIO stiii raeegnire and remember the faces 01 the Mu men who came from behind and approached him when nne of ms men was identified as OKT2 while the other man was the accused who had died. [12] white OKTI was hoiding the gun arid painted it at PWIfl‘s chest, there was a stmggie between them which resutted in OKTt firing e shot using the gun Hawever. it was a had break. The shot hit OKTZ's h and caused Injury. [1 3] After the shot. PWIO managed to grab the gun from 0KT1‘s hands and distanced hinrseiiimrri the a0cused.0KT1 arid another accused (who had died) managed to escape in the Viva car where there was a driver wetting (or them in the car PW1D identmed the man who was driving the viva car during the inudenl as on: Awarding to Pwto, the identmcatiuri oi OKT3 could be made because the niirrar at the vtua car was eirnoet completely open during the incident and FW10 uuuid see the face eiot<T3. [14] OKT2 whe suitered an iriiurytd his thigh as e reauit of being shot by QKT1 was unable to escape OKT2 did tried to escape (mm the Sfflfle by jumping down to the ground floor oi the parking buiidlng and hiding in the area near the parking but ing but PW10 managed in find him. [15] The investigation oiiioer ('SP6") and his team arrived at the scene at approxtrriaiaty 11.45 pm and wtiect the iotidrwing items such as a pair :71 samba biack/brown siippers size to, a blue I-shin with a mtmd wllar (size a sin hiRvVigK:DIuU|Z‘15tJi5fi -use s.ii.i Ilnvihli M“ be used M mm Die niinihaiily MVM5 dnunvinnl via nFit.ING Wflxi XL) and diced swabbing taken irorn the (races at blood drdps round on me well oi the corridor outside ihe parking iot ai the 2nd Hour‘ on the mi of the sliver-colored Psmdua Kancil with regIstra|iorI rio: WHP 2986 which parked at the side of the parking building and on the red sons iaceted near me ience [16] Aiter me investigation st the scene, SP5 and his team were instrucied to oanlinuethe investigation and wanna room no. 207, 2nd iioor, Sun Beans Hotsi (the haiei room) which is located at Jsian PJS 8/ti, Deiai-an Meritari, Petaiing Jaye, seiangor (iocaisd appmxiniaieiy ma mslals irdni the scene) Police investigation showed that me hotei mom had been rented by the accused heiare the incident. SP6 and his iesni arrived at the hinei mum at spproxirristeiy 12.40 am on 29 D9 2015. upon investigation, SP6 and his team iound the ioiiawiiig Items‘ iii a ysllnw Izullel wntien s A E 9x1913 on the quihh mattress; I a brawn trousers oflhe brand "BcriItori“ size aim on a brawn uarpet «our. (Hi) s shon-sissvea ooiiared shirt with "Umvelsili Maiaya" written on il s(iAd( an the handle of the cupboard 4001'. (iv) 2 white digaieine minis an me brawn carpet iidei: (V) 2 Izmwn cigarelle humus an the blown csrpei noon (Vi) 3 hngerprints (F1 to F3) an a move Iransparenl piaslic home; and (W) t fingerpnnl impression (F4) on the green catered pissuc wmtari "niemati" in the room [17] Ali the items seized was sent in me chemist namely SP12 Based 7 sin hiRvVigK:DIQU|Z‘15IJY5fi 'NnI2 s.ii.i Illvihli wiii be HSQG M van; me niigiruiily MVM5 mm. VI] nFiuNG WM! on me report MSP12, «here was a presence or me DNA MOKTZ and on: which snow Ihai ham 0! them were in me iroiei room before me incident Ingeiher with me deceased accused. [rs] For me complete rams on me veslngaiion by the police, we respectfully railed an me grounds at judgment by me learned High coun Judge who had Dulhned the material (365 0! prosecution case. Finding ov me Iourrrud trlnl Judgn at the clan of tho prosecution‘: cnu [19] inai wage are best surnrried up as lollows: Al the and of me pmseculicn case, the key findings or me iearned (a) mu regard to OKTI, Ihe ieernea High caun Judge satisfied manna prosecution had pmvsd aH me elemenis dune oflenca which are as roiiow - (ij OKT1 had discharged a iirearm, (in OKT1 nad discharged a firearm ar me iirne oi his eomrnming or allsmpllng in Dammit or abetting the Gammissiun at a ecneduied mverrce, and (iii) OKTI nad discharged a nreann with intent ID cause deem or nun to any Person‘ shaii, rrmwnnsiandrng that no run is caused. in) The eiemenre were maven by an overwheiming evidence 01 PW“) and PWB (lnsp Nor Harman bin Ab Hamid). The siN hifiwviaxm-uulzysuiw -we s.n.i In-nhnv win he used m mm a. niinirraiily MIN; dun-mm VII arium pm learned Hwgh Coun Judge was of ms w (hat om has me mlanflan co cause death at injury to PWIO based on the inference N PW10 had not amperaled or resisted or relused In hand over nzs bebngwngs lo om, ne woma have been shot by om. om used me gun [PZIA] which ms ewdence shuwed «no: it \s runcnener The shalwas fired oy cm and caused wruury to OKT2. (c) on me charge agamsl one and mm, me Ieerneo won Court Judge held «nenne proeecuxion had sueeessmuy proved (heir case m which 2111 me e\emen(s nl ma pwenoe were sansaea The elements ere: (1) a nreenn is dvscharged by any person at me |ime oi ms oornrnimng or allemplmg lo cummxt or abemng me oornnussion 0! a schsdmed cflencer on a nreernn is discharged with mtem to causedeath or hurl lo any person‘ (m) each of me eeemnpuoee Vn respsm at me owenue presem at me spene or me nomrmssxon ur attempted commission or abeimelll: uy) eaon onne awornphpes may reasonably be presumed to have known that such person was carrying 111 neo in ms posssssxan or under his custody or wnlrol me nreernn and (y) unvess were is prove that me aeoemphoss had Iaken all reasonable seeps |o prevent the discharge. (4; Evraenee by Pww showed that an me accused were at the s rn prfiyvrexrouuulzysuvw -one s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m yaw n. nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n wa .nuns wrm scene and cam ' ed a gang-robbery an FW1D. PW1D also confirmed that OKT2, OKT3 and Falsal [the masses accused] fallen lo lake all raasanabla steps to prevem om lmm firing ma gun. (e) The laamaa High Cflurl Judge also made a llnalng mal PW1D VS a credlble wimess and his Iesllmnrly was sampled by me Hlgh Court afler a maximum asaassmanl at his cred lmscwonnlness. In «an, ammlng lo the learned High om Judge, SF1D Is a vlchm 01 [N5 Incidem and has teamed honestly abou| what happened lo mm durlng ms irlolderll and [20] Therefore, the learned Hlgh Conn Judge louna a prime lama case had been established by the prosecullon agalnsl all the Appellants and ordered me Appellants |o erller melr delenoe. Dohllm [21] OKT1 gave his evidence on oath. oKT1's defence was as follows‘ (ls) OKT 1 ls/ah rnerls//ms parlggl/an lelsforl daripada kawamlya bemama Faisal (lammlm yang zelah me/llrlggal dlmla). Ba/lau msmlnla OKT1 dalang bequmparlya dl Iampsk lalak karate Blok 5 m Msnlarv com Falsal (vsnuaull yang lalan menlnggal durlla} llnggal dl‘ Mentan Court :1. Blok c. (D) Alas pelmfnlsan Falaal, OKT1 valan pergl ks rempal lalak ksrsra Blok E msslml aan mallhal Faisal Slldflh bevads :1! sin: bersama OKT2 darl oK13. Falsal membsmbhu ada slam in

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

B-05(M)-43-02/2021

PERAYU WAN MUHAMMAD AZRAMI BIN WAN ZULLKIFLI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Criminal Appeal – Section 3 and section 3A of the Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act 1971 [Act 37] (“FIPA”) – Whether the firearm was discharged whilst committing robbery – Section 3 of the FIPA also makes it clear that the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that no hurt is caused to the victim – Issue on the credibility of the only eye witness – It is trite that the evidence is weighed and not counted pursuant to section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 – All appeals on conviction are dismissed – Appeals against the sentence are allowed.

05/01/2024

YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

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05/01/2024 08:39:49 B-05(M)-43-02/2021 Kand. 38 S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N fK5cjpHPzkaUIqNUGJtH2w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a—n5(M)~a3~o2/2021 Kand. as 22 u 3:/on/mu ; IN THE COURT or APPEAL MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) FPEA BETWEEN wAN MUNAMMAD AZRAMI EIN WAN ZULLKIFLI APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PRosEcuToR . RESPONDENT HEARD TOGETHER wrm mn BETWEEN MOHD ASRIZAL BIN MOHD. IERAHIM voNG APPELLANT AND Puauc PROSECINOR HEARD TOGETHER WITH sw IKsnIhMPxxaUIaNUG./IM2w 3, Nat! Sum INNDEY WI“ be M M mm u. DIIEIMIIIY mm; nnnmvgnl VII EFILING VWLII BETWEEN MAT SALLEN BIN NOH APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDENT [In Ihs Maner a! (he Hwgh com o! Makaya at Shah Alam. 1n|he Slate olSe\an9ar Darul Ehsan Cnmlnal Trial Nu: BA-45D-1-D3/2018 and BA.45D-2—n3/2015 Between Pubhc Pmsecumr And 1. Mohd Asnz/cl! bin Mchd Ibramm wan Muhammad Azmml mn Wan zmkm: 3, Ahmad Favsal mu Muda (DNAA PADA 5/10/2017) 4 Ma! SaHeh bin Nah] CDRAM: HADHARIAH ElN'flS‘1EDtSMAlL,JCA AZMAN am ABDULLAH, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN. JCA 1 sw vKsn1hHPxxau\aNuG./wzw mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used M mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; mm. VII mum pm E (E) {'1} (9) (U (9) ". Name 'pushsr‘ fidak drketahur. Dakar waklu magnb, mereka ms/ma! seorang /e/ski /ndfa (SP10) dalarlg he Srlu. OKT1 msimsi Faisal isms pergf ks arah lelaki India Isrsebul den ksmudianya me/ihar Faisal darn /5/ski /mire tersebul bargelul. mm mervdengar Faisal menjsm kspsda Islski India rsrsebul dan msmmls dadah dan wang dar/pads ieiaki India tersebux. Lslskl India fslsebul ssorang "pushef dadah OKT1 Iidak manganalf ieiaki India Ierssbul Ssmasis Faisal dsn /e/uki India nu beige/uf, OKT1 dalsng melvghamp/N mslska den srah bslakalig dim peigi ks ssbe/ah kiri mansks/u oxrz bevada di' sebe/an Kanan msleka. Semsss nu, OKT1 Ierdengal bdrm satu isrupan flan msiinai OKT2]a1uh in situ OKT1 Iiada penqstahuan punca lelupan flan ape yang Ie/ah be!/aku OKT1 Nada perrgeiahuan dan iuiak nampak Faisal msmbawa pistol di fsmpal ks/sdlan OKT1 trdak nampak sesiapa msmsgang pistol in iampai ke/adian. OKT1 msnsfikan memegang pistol d! lamps! kaiaaian dun tldak psmah iengok alsu memegang pistol [P21/1] Ierssbul sebelum kejadfan. OKT1 lidak msmbawa pisioi Iersebut ks lempatkejadian. oxn mengaku hsndsk me/akukan samun [slept msnsfikan msnggurieksn pisioi tslsebul dan mensflksn ads melepaskzvm Ismbakan msnggunakan pistol Ierssbur. OKT1 me/vysvakan piszoi tsrsslzut dlplmyal oleh Faisal. Se/spas dilangkap polls darn semasa belada ai daiam Vaksp, Faisal membelilshu OKT1 bahawa pistol iarssoui milikinya 1: sin ¥K5nlhHPxuU\uNUG1lM2v« -um sum n-nhnrwm be used m mm u. nrW\ruU|Y MIN: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm E [22] False! tslah msnmggsl dunra kalans sakll da/am pam (fr) Fstssl trnggar dl Brok 0 dr Maman com dan pairs ls/ah msnangkap Farsar .1.‘ Sim. Faisal datarlg dengan Mrs ks ruman OKT1 dart porrs zerah melrarrgkap OKT1 (r) oxrr zrdak pernarr pergr ks Hotel Sun Beans dan nada pengemnuan srapa yang menyewa :11 mm hater lslsebut. 0) Prhek porrs fidak memmpas prmr lsrsabul daripsda DKT1. Pihak polrs tslah mslampas prslal tsrssbul darrpada relara Indra lelsebuf OKT2 gave an unswcm slalemenl and his derence was as rorraws: Pads 227.129.2015, OKT2 bersama OKT1 nan oxm barada m Rsszoran Subaldsrr dl Sungal way uniuk maker! malsm (S) Sslspas makan maram, paua jam Vsbih kurang 7.30 nraram, meleka 1e/ah Pelyr ke B/ck 5 ar Mermsri Court, Su/rway dengan msmsikr‘ kerela P9/odua Vrva yang drpandu o/sh OKT3 unluk bsrshsl dirumah 0x71. ([7) Ssrnass dr dalam ksrsts, oxn man msnenma aangguan maron daripada sanmng kswarmya yang bslnama Faisal rcenuaun yang Ielah manrnggal dunxa) unluk darang ke tempa! rerak kerela Bluk E m Menlarr Cour! unluk be!/umpa dsngsn Farsa/. OKT1 dan Farsar ads/ah kawan dan OKT2 jugs mengsna/I Farsar mels/ul ox r1 Apabila rnasuk ks da/am kawasarr Iazak ksrsta Blok 5 dr‘ Mentari ca-m, tsrluduh kedus nampak Faisar ke/ual den rangge rempar rem kerela den berja/arr menu/u ks arah (9) 5907.309 )9/akr Indra yang jugs bsrada .1: sim. :2 srNrKsn1hMr>zuuruNuG1xM2w -ma sanar mnnarwrrr be used a mm a. annrn.rrIy mm. flan-mm a. .num wrur E (I1) (9) (0 (9) (rt) Sampar dr mu, OKT1 dan OK12 keluar dan kerela Psrodua Viva (arssbut. Tmawan OK72 nampek pevgeluznn d: annals Faisal den »e/am‘ /ndia nu, oxn ndak ks/usr den bsrads dl dn/am kersla Pemdua V/vs Islsabul pads sellsp mass darn duduk di bshagmn pemsndu karsls Parodua Viva Islssbuf oxn Isms psrgr menohmg meleraiksn pelga/utan dr anlara Farsal dan Is/akr‘ India ifu Semasa berbual dennkran, OKT2 Ierdengar snru bunyiseurnparna Iembakan dan rem /atuh dr ms (Ishtar. Se/spas jafuh dr am: /anlar, oxrz nampak psha kanannw lurks/vs tnmbakan OKT2 Isms msrsngkak kc bslakang ssbuah karsls di Iempaf Isaak kalsla telsebuf dan pads mass nu nampak sam bends seumpama pistol df nzas ranrai Lslakf India fersebul mengambil bends (nmou rersebur dan menyacukan Kenada keflala OKT2 dan irvimenysbabksn rerzudun ksdua be/ass ram. Pads mass /Iu, om: nsmpsk OKT1 mslsriksn dm dsn srlu dengan menark/ Ksrsls Pemdua vm den bslgerak keluardari kswssan /atak kersls fsrsabut OKT2 ndak nampak Fsrsal pelgi ks mana serepas keladusn Iersebul. OK12 rinda pengeznnuan sebab psrgs/man dr anisla Fmssl dan /e/akr India iersebul Lslakl /ndls nu mansnyakan lsrtuduh kadua dslsng dart mama dan msmysk paha kanan (srtuduh ksdua yang cedars dan msnysnabkan OKT2 msnjent kesakrean. oI<r2 yang ndak dupe! Dena/an Is/an bsljaya melangkak sehingga ke limgga den berg-mng ks be/kom dl tlngkal 3 Ismpat /max karsta lerssbuf dsn kamudrsn mun ks bswah dan msndalal dr afas ssbuah kerala kancfl. as S!N¥K5nlhHPxh.aU\uNL1G1lM2w Nuns snnnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nnnmun mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm E l/') [23] lu|luws' (5) (I7) (5) (I1) (9) OKT2 maslh cubs mersngkak ke srah sam (fang lampu dan lslakl mm: ievssbm msmukul Ierfuduh kedua. fldak lama ksmudian, pans (tbs dr kawassn tersebul dam membawanys ke Pusaf Perubaran Umvelsilr Malaya -mm lawman. oKr:> (rad: pengelahusn mengsnar‘ kswu/udan prsm: dan pe/um yang dfgunskan da/sm kss w sabslum, semasa dan selspss ksjsdisn Ismbskan bsrlaku. OKTJ Qave ms ewdence on cam and his devence version was as was bemsra 49 tahun dsn msmpunyal/chm kurang on [man kadal m kawassn RBIHSII Panjang, Kc/anfen yang cnsewakan kepsda psnyewa—penyswa Pada 25/9/2015, on: bevsama dengan oxrz bonolak dart Ke/aman ke Kuala Lumpur. oxn msncadangkan marska menyswa kemla unluk ks Kuala Lumpul Kevsla lsrsebur dissws alas nams oxra kslans any msmpunyar Vesen mamsndu Sampal ur Kuala Lumpur, pada [am Isom kulang 5.30 petang. OKT2 telah menerims panggr/an le)eIon dal/pads seovsng kawtmnya be/name Faisal. Faisal ls/ah msmmls axrz darn OKT3 perg! ks lsmpak Islak kslsta dl Slok D Martian cam. Ssmpsl .1: temps: Ielsk karate m‘ Mervfari cam, OKT3 ms/iha! OKT1 dan Faisal zeta): berada disifll om Ie/ah lurun deli kevera V/‘Va Iersebut dsn Faisal puls msngamhkan OKT3 psrgi ms/arakkan ksrsla Vrva yang dipsndunya :1: (amps! Ielak ksrela d: silu. OK73 diberifahu :4 sw vKsn1hH>>z>au\uNuGnM2w -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm E (I7 (9) ('7) (V) [24] (la) (DJ olsh False! bamawa ada '.I0b' L/nluk dllakukall tewpl tldak msmberltahll xerluduh kellgs apskah './almersebuv. Alas arahall OKT1, OKT3 lslan melellskkarl ksrstarlya pads /alak Iebifl kurang 50 mats: dari lsmpal belieu be!/umpa dsngarl Faisal dan marlunggu dl da/am kereta Vlvs tsrselwr Semass msrllmggu Ieblll kulallg 30 mini! dl da/am ksnzfa Vlva Ialssblll, OKT3 Kirdsngsr blmyl lslupan meuam I6}/iif mslslup oxra berasa takul manderlgar burly! /siuparl tersebut dan menurlggu /eblh kurarlg 15 mlnn an S/Iu sebs/um merrlandu ksrsla Viva M/url dart barlgurlsn Islak ksrsla flan Deredar dari silu. one Ildak msmbawa prslal [F'21A] Iarssbur darl mm psngslalluan siapa yang membawa plslollezseburke arm was [uga mm perlgstahusn mengsrlai plsml yang digunakarl oleh OKT1 semssa kejadiarl tersebut. OKT3 Ildak lenlmsl dalam samun bsrkumpularl dengan bersanlalakan plshl lsrsehul. The aalence also called arlclhsr wilnsss. Munammad Rldhuan bln Abdul Razak (‘*Dw4")l Evlderlce by DW4 was as lullo Pads 28/9/2015, [am Ieblh kwang 5.30 h/Ilgga 7.30 malam, 504 bsrsda dl Sunway Merltarl relapi Ifdak mgatmmah yang bsllau bevads sm bevehal (/spak) Esrsama kawannya bsmama Hasii den tslah bsrlamu derlgan OKT1 sm merlgems/l‘ OKT1 se/sk swal lanun 2:215 darl dapal merlgscam OKT1 dl Mahkamah OKT1 lalah marlsrima panggf/an rsls/‘on darlpada seorang 15 SW lK5clhHPzlaUluNUG1lM2w -um Smnl ...m.mm be flied M mm .. mm-y MIN: dun-mm VI] .mm mm E kawzmnys bsmsma Faisal. sm ms/ihatmuka DKT1 neumah den oxn keluar darl rumsh urlluk Izerjumpa Faisal. mm I/dsk msmbsrilshu SDI msngapa FEVSEII mahu Der/umpa mm. sm /uga mengenan Faisal dan psmsh bsrjumpa dsngan Faisal sebelum W (C) Sslapas lebih kurang so nrngga 40 miml kamudralv, sm rnelmar OKT1 bank he rumsh den kelfhatan ke/am-kabu! dan gs/Leah Apsblls drtanya nlsh sm rmmgapa OKT1 :15/am Keadssn bsgffu, OKT1 manjawab rrsda spa-ape flan rem mssuk ks as/am bflfknya (.1; Se/spas rm, scu pun be/rk ks rumahnya. Pavia kessokan harmya di sebe/ah Iengsharl, sm manerima panggilan rs/eron darfpeds Hssrl yang msmbsrilahu oxn le/sh d/Iangkap pobs ksrsna Iarmzal dalam kes samurv. (9) sm msnyazakan yang semssa sm be/-ads m rumah mm bamama Hasif, SD41 lidak rvampak OKT1 msmsgang alau msmbawa EPBJDE senjala dun nampsk OKT1 keluar den" Iumah be!/‘umpa Farsal da/am kasdsan sehslai sspinggang (I) We/at/pun sm dsn oxrv bsrkawalv, SDA trdak pemah dlrmnla oéeh lsrtuduh panama membevrkan kelsrangan sedemxkian dw mahkamah Finding ulthn loamod mu! judgl ax ml and of ma dIfInca's cas- At me oonc\us\on of the mm, A was me findmg 01 ms learned man page mal me defence had lafled to cast a reasonams doubt on the prosacuIAun's case consequently, me Appensnzs were convicted (or me offence as per me charges. 15 sw vKsn1hHPxxau\aNuG./xM2w -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm $ The ieamea High court Juage, in coming in his decision‘ new as louows (a) The om-s aetenae basically was on the euegeuen iaai Faisa¥ (lhe deceased accused) was me masienniaa ei me gang-rubbery agains|FW1D. in una regem, me ieameu High Caurl Judge was M the view !ha( Faisal had before the M57 and II was easy hr the AppeHanls Io pm all the blame on Faieai as he eauia rim appear in wan to give his iesiimeny. During me incident, Faisal is noi the one who have ngm wan I‘-‘W10 aesades, while de4endmg runiseié, om had admmad that he intended In cummil gang-robbery againsl FW1O and had done so iegeiner wiia OKTZ, OKTS and Faisai (me aeeeaeea accused) om aniy demad carrying me gun and having shat OKT2. in) with regard to me detence made by OKT2, |ha learned High Court Judge found mai there were many inaienai discrepancies in oKT2's slalsmenl as compared la me sieiarneni iea by mm and o><r3. Those material contradiciians have affecledlI1ede1ensecfOKT2 and as such me mun (mind that OKTZ is an: E ciedible wiinese. OKT2‘s defense has also failed lo rebumie areaunipnon of knevneage aboui me gun used by mm uunng Ihe ineiaeni and on me balance of probamlmes iaiiea |n casl ieasoneaie duub me p1osecuIicn's case. (c) The delenee ov OKT3 was via! he was 50 rneiers from where iris figni took place and Inns he had no knawieage Iha| OKT1 :7 SN ¥K5clhHPxkaUVuNUG./lM2w -we Sum ...n.. M“ be used m mm ea nvVmruH|y MIN; dun-mm via muaa WM! E (<1) carrying ar had in Ms pnssessinn or under N5 cus1udY or control of ma firearm Tne teamed High Cour! Judge upon cunstdenng ms mailer hold tna same vtew as for on: that there were many rnatenat dtacrapanotes tn me statement or mm. Sum malenal oonlrsdlcltons have auaaaa nis ae1anss.rhara1ora,ma court was anna viewlhat oxn ts not a craatata wflness and ms defense failed to rebut the praaunrpnan of knuwtadga aboul tna gun used by om during tna moment, on tna balance of praaammres, om latled to cast reasonable doubt tn me prosecutions case Based an the arorasata reasons. ms taarnau High couruudga mnvtmed tna Appauans (or me ufiances as per charges and ma Aupeflants were senlenoed |u uaatn by nanging. nris app-an [27] Belore us are three appaats wtm tnrea dmeren(Pa|1inn ul AppeaL However. grmmds that ts stmm ed before us may be summarised as follows: (t) the delenoe o1|he Appauancs had rarsaa reasonable doubt In me amsacunows case OKT1 am not are ar cause death or Injury to FW1D and was meratyan allempl to ND PW10 There ts no avtderrcato clearty show|ha(OKT1 ahottna gun It coma also be FW1D or Faisal matsnat msgun lhalcaussd the tmury to OKT2. ot<'r2 and on: am not mat Knowlhaiob-(T1 was carrying or had V1 ms pussessiun or under his custody or I! srNvKsn1hHPznau\uNuG./xnzw Nuns Sum ...ns.. M“ as used m mm as nflmnnflly MW; dun-mm wa .rtuua wnxt comm! me firearm: and (fr) (he evidenoaalP\N1U is nm credible. There arsmserepanmss Vn his statements. Our am: on [28] II is firs: apposwa that secuon 3 and secfian 3A of FIFA be staxsd as Iellaws: “a. Penalty vac dilcllamlnn a Wnarvn In um commiulnn of . schtdnlud Minna- Any person who ellha urns oinis mnmmng ur auunpmng m eonmm av axmwa ms wmmusmn ova schedmefl nflevme «mama. n firearm wnh Imam m mun damn av nun In any person‘ snau. rK>lw\Ihslandmg (MI no mm m caused Iheqeby, he numshed wnh Ampnlonmam lav a term of not um «nan mm yams bul nm exaeedmu my years Md mm wnzppmg mm um Ins man mm mm u. Penllly mmompllcu In us: of dlsch-rpl wnrunn Wheve, wnn Vmum be cause deem xx mm to any person, . flmarm Vs dmcharged by any pawn al the hms av ms uummmlnu nr allemplmg la oommn or abelunq me mnmnumn ula sdwdulud mm, each ov ms accamnhces Vn vespeci av Ihe meme Blue!“ at his wens no me wmmlumn or anammsa umnmmn er abelmsnl mam who may reamnably an pcasumad to have kmmvv max such persan was urvymg mm In ms pnsseuslnn mumernu custody ortxmvulmsfivearm shafl, miwrltvslanflmg mat nn mm Vs caused by me dwchavge omeov, be punllhed wnn lmprlsonmem For a |emv an MC less (Mn «niny my. but mu exoaodilvg [any yuan and wvm wfuppma wnn nan ms mm mm slmkes‘ unless he pmvea mu ha nm Vzknn an mawnahls slaps In pvsvenl the flvscharga ~ N vK5c:pH>>z»au\uNuG1xM2w Nuns smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm $ Issln (I): The dorurrcu ofrlru Appellants mu nlsoa ruasanablo doubt to the prosocur/on’: can [29] ll was submlued by me counsels :71 all lne Appellanls lnal lnelr delenoa had raised doubl lo the pwsecutlan's case. [:0] ln lnls regard, lar ol<Tl, the counsel suhmlIIedlhatOKT1 ls not me one who snal ms gun. ll could also he PW‘lfl or Faisal llns daoeased accused) who s|'lo| the gun. Tnus, lnis lulluwsd by me submisslan alarm and OKT3 lllal lmlll did not “Val know Anal OKT1 was carrying or had In ms possession or under nlscuslady or control llrefireann The learned ouunsel had referved to me case ol Pub/lo Pmecular v. Dng Fah clrsng (1996) 1 cu 501 on wnellrer dlscharge ol lne firearm was an acl separate and dlsllrlal lrern lne rubbery as lollows: -ma accused a-scnargsd N5 firearm ml al ms vlollm: and i| wns ml proved mar rm amused dlxcharued a «warm an we llma or commmlng me lvbbelv. [31] We have wnsidsred lhe Appellanls' delsnoe and (hell submlsslurl. Hawever. we are ::ons|l-aim la depart lmrn me nnalng ol lne learned High Court Judge. We reler lo lhe case at Lu my chin @ Lon rock song A on v Gall Yook cnln A Anar[2l7D3) 2 ML: 97 w n held as lollows: “Ganerallyl an zppellals mun wlll nal lnlelverle unless ln. lnsl mun was smwn la be plainly wrong In arrwlrlg at Its declslon or wrlete there had been no nr lnsmuml judlclal appmlallan ul me avlderlce. Judlnial appreolatknn or evldence mearll man . Judge who was rsqulrea lu aaruunale upon 3 dlsnme musl amve al hls dadsmvl on an lull. man by nssasslflgl welgnlng snu, for gum: reasons ellher anosvltrlg or :9 slN lKsnlhMl>zl«auluNUG./lM2w -ans Sallal ...n.r wlll as HSQG M mm s. nllnlrrallly Mlhls m.l.n VI] aFluNG Wflxl E JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introductian [1] There are mree (3; separate appeals before «ma Caurl emanating lvom ma aemsma 111 the High com dated 17.02 2021 In aonvimmg and sentencing me Appeuama. [2] At me Hugh cam, ma |naJ mvolveu A accused as iollows. (1) Mohd Asrizal am Mohd Ibrahim (Appellam in Appaa1 No. a 05041414-oz/2021 and hereinafter win he referred m as -om-) Wan Muhammad Azraml bin Wan Zlllklm (Appellant in Appeal No. E-05|M)A3—D2J2D21 and hereinafter wiH be referred to as 'DKT2') Ahmad Fmsal ma Muda (mscnargaa not amaunfing w acquillal on 05 10.2017 due to ma reason that the accused had been died) Mae Saneh mn Nah (nppeuaae m Appeal No. B-D5(M)-5I- 03/2021 and herzinafler will be reranaa In as “om:-1 (M 1111) (W) [3] DKT1 was charged as leflcwsz "Bahama kamupada 23/9/21215, jam mam kuung 11130»: bensmpal m lenuaal /slak kemla Blok D, Apanmenr Maman Court J3/an as as, Para/my Jaya m damn dasran Para/mg. aa/am Nsgslt selangor Dam Ehmn, man drdaputt mnleplskan Iumbslqm ssryalu Ipr samasa maraman mmpakarv mumuaa dangan ma: maax msnyubahkan lmnlannrv zltau kezsderaan ks am Pralap M Ramasamy No. K/F‘: s31ao:Hza—5297 Oleh yang darmlaarv kamu Istafl 3 S!NvKsnlhHPzuU\aNL1G1lM2v.1 -ma 5.11.1 n-vwhnrwm be used m mm 1.. WW1-y mm: dun-mm wa nF\uNG wrm rarewng rna wfvme or any pen A7! are evidence pram belam him H. mm. when ducktmg wnamar to awapr M m rerem ms enema er a wnnese. near it agmrm Ie\evin| cm rnua. ne mustuk: rnru awuum ma presenee erasseme arany rmlwe um. wnnass may hive rn gmng ma ervldsnce wnara aontampulary documems exlmedr he nrusx teal ma mu mdenea M a wflnul pgamxlthue. He must also test me avraenee era nenssmarwuness agninsl rna nmbamlmss mm eaa-. Thu vrvlclph oeIma\ In anpe\IatemlerVemnoe\slha1e dedsmn antved n||1y n ma! mun wvlhouljudwcm apprvaahun afmu -vraanes may be set asrae an swam’ [32] In oonsraenng mesa apnea‘: we fulluw «ms uourr earlier declsinn In the case of Fling: Axman bin Amfmnzukilwn Pundakwa Rnya [2021] 2 MLJ 7714202111 LNS10B\nwh\ch Hrs Lordship Abdm Kanm Abdm Jam JCA stated max m deuermrnrng whether the firearm was arsmarge-1 whusr cnmmiuing robbery, me whom rncruent snoum be vreweu as a smgle transacmn [331 wnan we evahlaled me «me and eviaenee m this case, we laund Lha| me ewdenoe ms corroborated. It is not only me evrdsnoe by PW1u who is the Vilmm H’! tms case but also evsdenee tram the report 0| SP12 slated Mat (here was 3 presence at the DNA at OKT2 and OKT3 m the hole! roam (ram wmcn tsw Hams were seized includmg rne buHet whwch re identxcal tome one tmmd the scene It is dflfrcmt to amva at me decision he! one happen an 07 a sudden [341 The uerence also failed to rebut that there rs a discharged offirearm VII which happened at the tame of the wmmisswon at the robbery. Secliun 3 ol the FVPA alsn makes it dear Ilia! the offence is said to be committed notwithstanding that nu mm Is caused in the warm. u Is anougn enaunara Is e discharged olfirearm annennre er mmmlltlng or enampong to commit N vK5crpM>>zuu\uNuG1rM2w nse e.n.r n-nhnrwm re used m mm s. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm VI] anum wrm nv apelling lne ocrnnusslon oi a scheduled olvence enunreraled in lhe scnodule \o lne Act which in lnis case a robbery It is too bad mal H1 lnie case, me snol had caused inlury lo OKTZ. The use oi gun H’! a robbery IS a claar Indication that there IS an intention lo cause death or senous injury In the Vlcllm and such lndlcalinn 07 intention becomes unclaimed when mere is a dlsoharged of nreann nalwllhslandlng lnal na nurl is caused in me Victim. PW“) 1351 Tne counsel ior one also supniilled me: an adverse presunrplldn under sac|lon1141g|nHhe Evidence Aol should be lnvaked in «ma case an the reason mal lna prosecution lalled to prove that me gun belongs in any Appellanls. All |he Appellants suggesleol mat il Faisal line deceased accused) who might bring me gun 1o me scene In wnlon lney had no knowledge aboul IL The prcsecullon was said lulled m produoe 112 slalemant D7 Faisal. [as] In we regard, we raler lo lne case at any Mdoi seng A on v. FF[1|l15]1 LNS nzl wnlcn Abdul Rahman Sehli, ucn [as no lnen was) aralad as follows’ ‘I59! Flmnur, even wnnaul SD7‘s evidence lne preaaoullon slrasdy nau sufflusm uvldawa in aslzbllsh a WINE case case aaeinir all in. apgellnnls 1n... the (allure In cull him as e wlweculion wllrlusa is oi nu nnmequenne as com um reaulr lira gun in me pmsewlmri use I1 is are law lnal an adverse rnleenoe canrlm he dram. «or lailureiaoalla wllness man in» prosaaulion ner dlschanled na buruun As my Purlfl New (‘J said In Chas xcs-n Long v FP[1996]I sm sin :1 pigs: 523-524 “The eooellenra mnlentlcn lsmalll-1e lallrna ml the nmsecullun re adduoe evidence oi lnosa ome< eaniolae rneanl rnar rne mun could preaunia lnal me evidence would have we aialrm lna proeacunon nial is man ware no such um 22 N ¥K5c|DHPz>uUVuNUG1lM2v.l None a.n.l In-vlhnrwm re used m mm 1.. nflmnaflly sun. dun-mm Va aFluNG WM! Such nvgumsnls are wmmorfly made. cemmbnny mu‘ such arguments nra mum mam The mm‘ mm nmave In anw any such presumvmn umess me wuness nol pvoduaed Vs eruermnl In me pmsecuuu-vs case Any crvmna\ nransacmn may be busewea bye numberevwnnmex ms um naculary «mus prosewuun In pmflues every snngxe one 07 Imae wilnessm M on pmecnuun need lndu wslo amuse mnesseswnose evtdenoe can bebeneved w as In ssxauun me as» beyom rsaitwnnma daum out at 2 number no wumses, n maymen urfly In nsuusrytn bung m Me or awn, as mg as lmse wmesses flduafly poodueefl are Ibla to gwe evmence buns nranseaxon, man: We no masnn way an In: yes slvuuld he cam mt my any prnumphon would be amm me: me evxaenee al these witnesses ml pmaubea ww\d havu been against me vmsecumn ' [37] \n our present appeals‘ Pww was We In give evidence of me tmnsacubn as he was the victim and the sole eye-wuness. Pwm able m mlorm the com! me suuaman at me me o1 me mcmenl. He can remember OKT who salt In me car which far fmm mm in wmch «ms [am Is not disputed by OKT. Tms Issue Is also rela|et1 la the next issue on me cred: my oi PW1D. Issue (N): The evidence ol PW10 Is not cndlbla [33] AM «he eeunser of we Appeflanls raised lhis wssue on the pomt that me learned Hwgh Court Judge was in enur in rewlng on me ewaenee ol Pwm m wmch we are aware ma: PW10 ws me only eye wnness For me prosecunon The AppeHanls cbmenaea lhsl mere are alscrepancies m me evwdenoe Wed Dy PWlU‘ |u name a few, FW1D m his testimony during the exarmnahan In chief stated that when the gun was pointed at him. OKT2 had asked our me bag to be handedltzwer In ms ocHeague on me Ien and N vK5qpM>>z>au\uNuG1xM2w Mme em n-nhnrwm be be... m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm be nfluNG wrm during the crass-sxammatinn, wwm sand met when he lned to push away the gun‘ a shot was fired However, 0: eenlramcnon, dnnng me re exammaficn when PW10 was asked by Ihe pmsscumr to explam why he did nox agree that me shaoung happened by acckienl, PW1D then changed his evidence by saying that the accused had already tried to sham when the pistol was painted [39] The weamed counsel vcruKTI drawn this cnunanenunn |o|he mse ov Rad?" Irwan Iakunduu bln II ganl lwn Ponaakws Ray: [2017] 5 MLJ 736 which hem as loHows: 1221 aemasanun ponuhuan luml keyed: naked myuun dan panuhakiman hahnn mama. kaml harsemgu bnhswa ham mar: wan bemalmmg sspammnya kenada kalsrsnuan nsan am dalnm mznsabflkan peliyu delvgan pelluduhan Hakim lucava vanah mananmz kelenanuan SP1 seas.-a bu|a(-hula! din Mas nna. mukl Mada vahdl lanpa mambuat pemmbangan Iemadap vahxa hahawa sm searing esxn yang aamepenunssn uanpadn maranean ma \elah mheflkan aneh sew sewdm sann beldauflun kepeuu: keulunman kaieranqan dawn $125 an hadapan kann max syak ug. bnhawn sm adahh Ieoranq Saks! yang rnsmpunm kenanmlan damn. kes lm. Kzhernngin sm svwllimya dhehu dan dhsmna denaan sacara hsmalnwafl men haxhn bican dnn mevangan anus: sedemhaan new mnmwukan ketaranqan yang Iann sehzgal sakangan. Fads pandangsn kann mmngsn sew bukzmah ketevanwan yang kukuh umuk memauansamuanuaaxas nemyu anah hakum means munladw ialu flzpalan dan Keuumsan yang selamal umuk dmenaImnk2n' [40] vwm regard to this Issue, we are of the View lha| the learned High court Judge is the one who had the audwo and wsual advantage In observe the demeanour of lhe wunesses Hence, he was cleany antmsd to make 2. n vK5cwM>>zhau\uNuG1xM2w Nuns a.nn n-nhnrwm be used a mm a. nflmnsflly mm: dun-mm ha snum Wm iindtngs wiin regard to me Crsdlblllly oi ins wnneeaes. As an appeiiaie court‘ we eneuid be slow to inienere witn sucn findings unieee it can be sndwn before us tnet tne rindings were perverse and against eii eyeiieoie evidence. in true present case‘ we see no reason to disium tne iindind oi the learned Hign coun Judge. [41] we are guided by the decision oi Raja Azlari snan FJ (as His Highness then was) in me case at Public Prosecutor Vflnluk Hejmemn bln HI]: Idris (Na 2) [1377] 1 ML] 15 wrticrt stated that: -. in my opinion. tne dtscIeDSlII:\es lhsis wiii emeys be hamuse in ma cncurrmancee VI wvncn events havflfinsdy -very wilnan does not remnmer ine eerne mind and no does not rumomb-er eooneteiy eveI'Y stngla ining inei neooened rne quesunn is Mtelhar exisienoa oi oenein discrepancies is sutncieni In doetruy lhetrcvedlhlhly mate is no ruie onaw tnai thn testimony or s mneu must em-er no beliavod in nu entnery or non at on A oourt is luHy oernoeient_ lor good and oogeni reasons. to eooeot ene nan enne iesnrndny die wriness and meet tne otner. in tno eosonce et any Dunlvadiclion. huwsvav‘ and in me aueenoe or any innereni irnpmonoiiny, tne zvideno: dr enywnnees, wnetner . ooiice mines: or um. ma dives evedenca on emnnenon. sneuid nonnetry be summed.‘ [42] As to wneiner the court accept Just a singie witness to prove me ceee of me prosecuuan? It is inie that the evidence IS weigned end not counted puiedent to section 134 ottne Evidence Act 1950. The iaw IS ciear tnat “Na penrcuier number or wrtneseee snail in any case be required to. the prooioreny tacit In Ravisnlal end DhiIa[Ial’s Law or Crimes (27lh Ed) at pp 1965-1969, it stated tnei, ‘it is now a wen senied principie of law tnnt oonviction can he susieined on me sole |esIimany onne pmsecutnx. it it inspires confidence.” zs N ¥K§c|DHPxbuU\uNUG1lM2w None e.n.i In-vihnrwm be used a mm ms nflmneflly enn. dun-mm wa eriurtc wnxi [431 Coming bad< le nurcase‘ me learned High Ccuruudge ma nal only considered the evidence or PW10 bull also other corraborallvs evidence. Therefore. we are l1o| corlvlncad lnal ma learned Hlgh cpurl Judge was wrong. conclusion [44] ln lne upshot, having psrussd lne appeal reams. ins gmunds pl judgement and the wnllen suhmissiorls by names and based an me aloresald reasons, we unanimously find lnal (here ls no merit in ma Appellanls' appeals on oonvlctlon. All appeals on ppnwcllon are hereby dlsmlssed. [45] Wlth regard cp the appeals agalnsl senlenee, il is lnle law man when me punisnmenl lo any prlenee IS amended lo a heavier punishment‘ it l5 lne lnlenlion el llie Panlanlenl la pereawa such oflenua as serious. Tperelare, in amvlng In our dec ion for appeal agalnsl senlence in mesa appeals‘ we are guide: by me ueclslpn Abdul Mallk lshak JCA in lna case of Yong /or Mun vPubIil: PrnsecuIor[20I11 ls MLJ 209 as follows 152] wa wlll now leiel In me Hal-lsam ln ame< In undalshnd ms lmu pulppse and Irl\erl|l0rl ollne An N we lnlm palllanlenlaly sllllriu allhe ‘Dewari R.i‘aya\‘ (Haul: pl Repruenlaflves) an 27 July 1971‘ lne Homumble Allnmey General mi Sn Abdul Kndlr pln Yuwl me-l uld al p 3850 in me Narlsard wlul we are pnnplng have ll an 2marldmsrl| im an erihanosd. a higher, panany lprcmnnnlllng mbbsry and mnapping am pmel elienees as slaled mam, laui «ypas, If may use luaaims, at my used penukul. paku. or palanp e« any other wenpnn ll .usl llka urdlrury annla Emwllalwe ale going In klll s lha use Milreamlsl zs N lK5clDHPzlaUluNUG1lH2w Nuns Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be used a mm ms pflnlrullly Mlhls dnunvlnnl wa nFluNG Wflxl 5 bomb ma wands‘ when cummlmng climax huzuia was -s an me mama»: new [351 From me aaaax-s m Pumamenl as seen lmm ma H-nurd, an an wi: hem w| m neoewly, so to sneak. in ma on us: M fivaarmx to mmm1|'urmu‘l payvofl ho\d—ups‘ mama enharw dealt: ann,a.y [us] On ma mu‘ m a 2 gm” rvusoamage cl juslme ml to mrwu the aaaeuanum aammunng ma uwmm as par ma amended charge m ex?! war.‘ [46] be pumshsd wym severe pumshmenl. Huwever, afler takmg me can eralmn me mmgafion put larwam by me delencs counsms av ma Appauams, we agree to sax asme ma senlanee Imposed by me High Cam and sentence ma AppaHan(s war. a primnment for a term 0130 years. We a\so make an war [or I2 slrokas 0! M1 ng m OKT3 and mm. Na senlenceoiwhvppmg to on: because he had anamea me aga 0150 years old. Tharebre, we are Mme conswdaved viaw mat senous ouence should «gm (AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH) Judge Cuurl o1 AvPea\ Msmysla Fu(m[aya Due M Decision : I7 Augun 2023 Ground: mum : In nacemxm 2m: :7 N vK5cwM>>z»au\uNuG1zM2w Nuns am n-nhnrwm be used a mm a. nrW\ruU|:I mm: dun-mm Va .mm mm § Loaul Ronmonmlon For OKT1 (Appeuam in Appeal No. E»fl5(M)4A—D2/2021) For oK1'2 (Appenam wn Appsa\ No. E—o5|My43—02/2021) For mcr: (Appellant in AppaaY N0 E415(M}51—|73/2021) For an Ruapnndnnt sw vKsn1hH>>xxau\aNuG./xM2w sanm Basmr (together mm Najuhah zmkmi; [Messrs. Salxm Easlw, Ruswwza 5 Ca] Srsekam PiHe\ [Messrs. Sreekanl Plllai] Afifuddm hm Ahmad Hafifi (together wm: Muhammad Ammm bin Jamamddin) [Msssm Sa\ehuddm Saidm A Assoc] Mohd Falruz bvn Johan [Anon-ey Gene.-ars Chambers] 2; mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm I4] [51 nmaxmn mm kasalahln y-ng boleh ammm dr nmn soksyerl :9 Akin San/ala Am mnnm Lnmn Euurll 1971.- OKT 2 wa: charged as Inflows. "Bahawa kamu berslnmuma derwan (1) many yang tulalv mm/nggal mm den Matsa/Ian Mn Nan {Na K/P'71G7290.’l—5H1)psda 22/9/2915. mm mm kunng 19347 hrs beriampal an lompn! lcluk lmmfi am D, Aamrmnt Mann-n com, man P15 819. Psfalmg Jays, ur da/um durirv Putahng, dulam Negm Sa/angel Daml Ehnn, mm: malakukarl rovmakan bcrkulvloulm oongan ssomng rskan Kama mama Muhd Aural om Monti rmnnn Yong (No K/P E5C|6UD—l7J—5179)IvIah melspsskan Iembakurv nu/5!: am amen nm hmdnk menysb-bklrv kurvlaban atxu lmnadsrasn K2 ntas Pump «/1 Ramasamy No K/P5310175-06-5297 ynnq man. Iwmu mompunyal penaemn-an ralmn kamu membave aervlala apt asmasa me/akukan rwnpakan men yang aunmn um Inlalv rm/akukan mm hasaranan yang owon dmukum drbawah saksyan 3A Aida San/sra A». (Forum Lsbm Bars!) 1971." Wmle OKT3 was charged as renews: ‘Sahara um bw:ama—ssma Hangar: 4:; mung /ayryang Isran d/tuduh, pm 25/9/2015, [am noon kuung 1930 his boflsmpakdr renwa!/stair mm smk 2, Apartment Mentali cam, ./Elan ms an, Pslalmg Jays‘ u. flnlum nusrah Ptlllml dalam Nsgen S9/anger mm Ehsm, rsmasa Irlslekukan mmpukfln borkt/Nlflularv dmgan swung rakan kamu nomn Mona mm: bin Mona rmnnn Yong (No K/P'550609—0a6179HsIsh melapnsksn Icmbakarv semen apt dangan nlal hendak nmnyobabhn komahan mu ksnedemon KG 515.: Fran!!! M Ramasamy Nu xx»: 531003455297 yang mm kamu mempwlysl nanvmnuan rakarv Mama msmoswa ssryafa um‘ samass melakukun mmpaksrv own yang dcmwan kamu is/an merakukun sunlu mananzn mg Dom: drhukum .12 bawah sukxyun 34 Am Senlala Apl (Penam Liam Bern!) W71 ' sm rK5cwH>>zuuh:NuG1xM2w mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my me mm-y mm: m.n.n y.. mum pm E [6] AI me curlcluslon dune trial, lne learned Hlgh Court Judge lmmd lrral all the Appellarrls gullry rne charges The appellants ware sentenced to dream by hanging. 171 Aggrleved wrm lne convlciiun and sanlende, me Appellarrla ndw appealed la «ms Court. we neard me appeals on me l7 us 2023. Al me conclusion cf lne sularnrssldrrs, we dlsrnlased lhe Appellants’ appeal nn CON/lc1l07I um we allowed me appeals on aerrlanoe. we now provlde our reasons lorlna decision. ‘rho ProIacudon'I can [5] The presecmlorr-a case was establlshad by me evidence cl ils wltnssses and accepted by the learned trial judge. Pm m a nutshell, Apaellanls were crrarged mm an ollance under lhs Flreamls (Increased Penalty) A51 1971 [A6137] ('FlPl\“) [9] ln me oammlsslon of an elvance (a gang»rubbery) with me lrrlenllan to cause deam er lrllury tn one Pralap a/l Ramasamy(‘PW1D”). OKT2 and OKT3 being me adcdrn ' in me case of dlscnarge of me nrearrn oomrvlined by DKT1 were cnarged under secllan 3A of me sarne Act. ArloUleraccused,Ahmat1 Falsal am Muda, hasdled and he was drscnarged wllJ1oulacqul|lal(“DNAA')by andlner l-lign ccun Judge on us lu.2m7 OKTI was charged undersectlan 3 of l=lFA ufdischarglrlg a firearm [10] me dwenoe was commllled on may ms at appmxlmalely 7 30 pm al lhe Darkmg Inl cl Elak D, Apanrrrenl Menlari cdun, Jalan PJ5 em, Pelallng Jays, salangor uaml Ehsan. 5 am lKsclhHPzxaUlaNUG./lM2w -we s.n.l Men M“ be used a mm re anrmun mm; dun-mm vn AFVLING wnxl E [11] when PW10 was about ta enter his cat and pul his taptdg in the back. he saw three men get out otthe viva ear who then came Iawsms him. one at the men came from the tram (whn was identit'ied as DKT1 by Pwto) white the other twd man train the back PWIO stitt recognize and remember the faces at the two men who earne trdin hehind and eppraaehed him where une or the men was tdentiried as OKTZ while the other man was the accused who had died. [12] white OKTI was hotdtng the gun and painted it at PWIfl‘s chest, there was a stmggte hetween them which resutted in OKTl «ring a shot using the gun Hawever. it was a had break. The shot hit oK'tz's h and caused injury. [13] After the shot. PWIO managed to grah the gun from 0KT1‘s hands and distanced himsetumin the aecused. OKY1 and another accused [who had died) managed to escape in the Viva car where there was a driver waiting tor them in the car PW1D identmed the man who was driving the viva car during the tnutdenl as OKT3 Awarding to Pwtt), the identmcatiun ot ot<T:s could be made because the mirrar er the viva car was atmoet completely open during the incident and FW10 mutd see the fame atoms. [14] OKT2 who surtered an inturytd his thigh as a iesutt of being shot by QKT1 was unable to escape OKT2 did tried to escape (mm the Sfflfle by jumping down to the ground floor at the panting euitdtng and hiding in the area near the parking but ing btttPw10 managed ta find him. [15] The investigation officer ('SP6") and his team arrived at the scene at aaprdxtinatety 11.45 pm and wttedt the tottdwing items such as a pair in samba htack/brown slippers size to, a blue I-shin with a mtmd wllar (size a sin ¥K5clhHPxhaU\uNUG./tM2w 'NnI2 s.ii.i ...n.i M“ be used M mm lite aiini.ii-y MIN; dun-vtnnt VII .ntiha WM! XL) and diced swabbing taken irorn the (races at blood drdps round on me well oi the corridor outside ihe parking iot ai the 2nd Hour‘ on the mi of the sliver-colored Psmdua Kancil with regIstra|iorI rio: WHP 2986 which parked at the side of the parking building and on the red sons iaceted near me ience [16] Aiter me investigation st the scene, SP5 and his team were instrucied to oanlinuethe investigation and wanna room no. 207, 2nd iioor, Sun Beans Hotsi (the haiei room) which is located at Jsian PJS 8/ti, Deiai-an Meritari, Petaiing Jaye, seiangor (iocaisd appmxiniaieiy ma mslals irdni the scene) Police investigation showed that me hotei mom had been rented by the accused heiare the incident. SP6 and his iesni arrived at the hinei mum at spproxirristeiy 12.40 am on 29 D9 2015. upon investigation, SP6 and his team iound the ioiiawiiig Items‘ iii a ysllnw Izullel wntien s A E 9x1913 on the quihh mattress; I a brawn trousers oflhe brand "BcriItori“ size aim on a brawn uarpet «our. (Hi) s shon-sissvea ooiiared shirt with "Umvelsili Maiaya" written on il s(iAd( an the handle of the cupboard 4001'. (iv) 2 white digaieine minis an me brawn carpet iidei: (V) 2 Izmwn cigarelle humus an the blown csrpei noon (Vi) 3 hngerprints (F1 to F3) an a move Iransparenl piaslic home; and (W) t fingerpnnl impression (F4) on the green catered pissuc wmtari "niemati" in the room [17] Ali the items seized was sent in me chemist namely SP12 Based 7 sin VK5dlhHPzkaU\uNUG./lM2w 'NnI2 s.ii.i Illvihli wiii be HSQG M mm we niiniruiily MVM5 m.i.n VI] nFiuNG WM! E on me report MSP12, «here was a presence or me DNA MOKTZ and on: which snow Ihai ham 0! them were in me iroiei room before me incident Ingeiher with me deceased accused. [rs] For me complete rams on me veslngaiion by the police, we respectfully railed an me grounds at judgment by me learned High coun Judge who had Dulhned the material (365 0! prosecution case. Finding ov me Iourrrud trlnl Judgn at the clan of tho prosecution‘: cnu [19] inai wage are best surnrried up as lollows: Al the and of me pmseculicn case, the key findings or me iearned (a) mu regard to OKTI, Ihe ieernea High caun Judge satisfied manna prosecution had pmvsd aH me elemenis dune oflenca which are as roiiow - (ij OKT1 had discharged a iirearm, (in OKT1 nad discharged a firearm ar me iirne oi his eomrnming or allsmpllng in Dammit or abetting the Gammissiun at a ecneduied mverrce, and (iii) OKTI nad discharged a nreann with intent ID cause deem or nun to any Person‘ shaii, rrmwnnsiandrng that no run is caused. in) The eiemenre were maven by an overwheiming evidence 01 PW“) and PWB (lnsp Nor Harman bin Ab Hamid). The sin iKsn1hHi>xxauidNuG./iM2w -we s.n.i In-nhnv win he used m mm a. niinirraiily MIN; dun-mm VII arium pm learned Hwgh Coun Judge was of ms w (hat om has me mlanflan co cause death at injury to PWIO based on the inference N PW10 had not amperaled or resisted or relused In hand over nzs bebngwngs lo om, ne woma have been shot by om. om used me gun [PZIA] which ms ewdence shuwed «no: it \s runcnener The shalwas fired oy cm and caused wruury to OKT2. (c) on me charge agamsl one and mm, me Ieerneo won Court Judge held «nenne proeecuxion had sueeessmuy proved (heir case m which 2111 me e\emen(s nl ma pwenoe were sansaea The elements ere: (1) a nreenn is dvscharged by any person at me |ime oi ms oornrnimng or allemplmg lo cummxt or abemng me oornnussion 0! a schsdmed cflencer on a nreernn is discharged with mtem to causedeath or hurl lo any person‘ (m) each of me eeemnpuoee Vn respsm at me owenue presem at me spene or me nomrmssxon ur attempted commission or abeimelll: uy) eaon onne awornphpes may reasonably be presumed to have known that such person was carrying 111 neo in ms posssssxan or under his custody or wnlrol me nreernn and (y) unvess were is prove that me aeoemphoss had Iaken all reasonable seeps |o prevent the discharge. (4; Evraenee by Pww showed that an me accused were at the s srn vKsn1hH>>zuu\uNuG1xM2w -one s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m yaw n. nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n wa .nuns wrm E (9) scene and cam ' ed a gang-robbery an FW1D. PW1D also confirmed that OKT2, OKT3 and Falsal une ueceesaa accused] fallen lo lake all reasanable steps to preverll am from firing ma gun. The learned High Caurl Judge also made El flrldlngtha|PW1D VS a credlble wimess and ms Iesllmnrly was aooepled by me Hlgh Court afler a maximum asaassmenl at nls cred lmscwonnlness. In lea, accomlng lo the learned High om Judge, SF1D Is a vlchm 01 [N5 Incidem and has teamed mneslly aboul what nappenea lo mm durlng me lnmlenl and [20] Therefore, me learned Hlgh Colm Judge louna a pnma lame case had been established by the prosecullon agalnsl all the Appellants and ordered me Appellants |o erller melr delenoe. Dohlloo [21] (H) (D) OKT1 gave nls evidence on oath. 0KT1's defence was as iul|oms' OKT 1 ls/ah mans//ms parlggl/an Ielsforl daripada kawamlya bememe Faisal (lammlm yang xelah me/llrlggal dlmla). Ba/lau memlnle OKT1 dalang bequmparlya dl Iampsk lelak karate Blok 5 an Msnlarv com Falsal (lsnuduh yang lelan menlnggal durlla} llnggal dl‘ Mentan Court :1. Blok c. Alas pelmfnlsan Felaal, OKT1 velan pergl ks rempal lelak ksrsra Blok E tsrssbul den mellhal Felsel suden bevads :1! any bersama OKT2 darl oK13. Falsal membsmbhu ada slam in am lK5nlhHPzh.:UluNUG1lM2w ‘Nah! s.n.l In-vlhnrwlll be used m mm ms nflnlrullly mm: dnunvlnnl wa .mm mm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

MA-22NCvC-28-08/2019

PLAINTIF Binary Group Services Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Karen Yap Chew Ling

" Application for an order for committal - Defendant failed to comply with order of Court for transfer of a Telegram Group to Plaintiff's assigned representative- there was an appeal and stay - Defendant admits that she has no rights or interest in the Telegram Group - attempts made to transfer but failed due to technical reasons - transfer finally made after Defendant's appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed - whether Defendant was in contempt of Court order - Held: the Defendant was not legally in contempt since the transfer was finally carried out - this was a case of delayed compliance and not non-compliance - warning given with punitive costs".

04/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9ff1c957-718b-4bf4-a8e4-106fe7decf88&Inline=true

02/02/2024 15:19:13 MA-22NCvC-28-08/2019 Kand. 309 S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N V8nxn4tx9Euo5BBv597PiA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—22ucvc—2a—os/2019 Kand. 309 azmz/2224 ]E'lB']3 IN mi HIGH COURT or MALAYA AT MELAKA CIVIL A-2 - 2019 BETWEEN EINARV GROUP sERvIcEs sou. Bun! (OOIIIPANV No : 650294-V) PLAINTIFF AND KAREN VAP cHIEw LING (NRIC : 31011544-6338) DEFENDANT MATTER BEFORE THIS COURT [1] This a de<:IsIan on an appncaumn In enclosure 132 by me PIaInIIfi rm an order of oammmal agamst me Davendanx Tms apphcalvon l$ premised on me Delendanfs YaIIuIa In amde by me Judgment av «ms Cour! dated 17 3 2021 I‘JuagememI BACKGROUND FACTS [2] me Judgement was passed at the and M a mal by Judu:Ia\ Comrmssmner Marameu mmr Mahummed when she sex as me presiding Judge arms Cam In cwll sml number MA-ZZNCVCVZSV 06/20|9(‘Sun') [J] Tne Fkamllff msmuted an acuon against me Devenaern who was menrampleyae at me material Urns The Plamufra cause ovacnon was premrsed on a «on at aeoen. breach o1 confidence, uonversmn ol eonfldermal mformalmn and Dreanh at naucuary Gums Al the and cf me Inal‘ me Juurcm comrnmuuner lolmd m lavar 0! me Plamuw and made cenem orders mchxiung an order under paragrapn AA farlhe Defsndamm \mp\ement all proper and necessary slaps and precesyal to transfer uwnerxrup or me Tewegram Gwup Ia me PI-rnws nominated represennemes wnhm 7 days fmm me date oflhe Judgrnern The iull Judgment can be «mm In Binary Gnu» swim Sun. and. v. Klnn Vlp cmw Ling [2021] 1 LNS 153,- [2021] ML!!! :3: r~ vanxnoLx3Eua5am5«z7PrA mm. smm mnmrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm degrecs av blamowerlmness as aesonbea In How/in Trnnsporl udsmor v. Trnruporrnnd Gomralwnrkurunlon Nlflonnl Industrial Rolnrlons com [1373] 1 CR 1 revened In in IJM corpnrarion Bhd. v. Ham Kumpunn Sdn. and. (pan 1) (xupva) must be considered - “Whenlhem Ii fallurem compvy mm : oaun amen Ihs Courts are cagmsanl M the «nu ma: [here are various degvees ml nan- mmpflanse Ln Howltl Transport Ltd 5 Arm v Transport and General Won<srs'Umon Nanona/ Induamal Relalrans Courf [1973] 1 CR 1‘ su John Donnldscn explamed ma vlrlaua dagreo: of aaciance ur mnwmullame av : caun older “Noncamp/Vince mm a court may can have a wvds range al quannas (1 may 5! the top and or me aca/a, con:/5! 0/ a Na! delmrvce ol ma noun‘: aulhnnty Gomg, down we scale, :1 may not amount to net defiance, but name! to a pasame gnanng of me comrs order Gomg down the scale sn//luflher‘ n may amount m a nalr-named or, perhaps, aulourabra anamp: m comply wan ma court‘: may And. at ma nonam end aims sea/a, mam may have been a ganmne, wnolawaanaa use ul me out endeavours Io .m.am.5aa.m.. 41.! M nunharwmlxeuledmvanyInear1g\nnHIyM1MI m.m.v...naNa W comply mm the onisr, wmcn nevertheless has been unsuccessful In each case mere :s a breach afms courrs order In each case 10 use me Ischmcalmes of me law there rs a ‘camempl o/ noun‘ But mo qua/try olme non-compflancs vanes ovsran enormous range The pena/Has which wlllbe wposed by (ms court Ior contempt wm equally vary over an enormous range and mu mflscf the ouamy olme non-comphsnca They wr/L m fan!‘ nllscl fanhfillly me courrs view ollhe ssmzusmzss olrhe conduct olme person lo whom ms order was addressed" [15] Thu: was exemplified m L-kshmlmnyanan V4 Muimumu (won; and 2-lnuddln pm Munnmmnd v. Atscn Lu: A Anor (mm). In Lakshimanan, Kc Vohrah J (as His Lordship men was) owned mat smoe me conlemncr had oalwereo the Keys to me nremweaas and pavd me fine, amen Lana, lherewzs no cause lav an ordar fov communal to be maue Imce (here was no «oval dwsubemence In Iainuddin bin Muhnmm-Id (supva), the coun of Appeal held that a wammg was suifimem smce me oeaenaarvt had aumphad mm the order of the own on the delivery 0! ha or the assets despne m bemg 40 days me: KC Vomah JCA m vanxnoulsuasaausnwun mu. sow nmhnrwm .. u... m may he mom-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! expressed the view that the defendant was not ‘an obdurals oomemnol who continued ta daiy the order to drsc/use ms assets".- "As my Named brolher has observed the essence was whether ma sppallanl mu m Incl drsdoaa all ms assets. Ha an, although he was late m nnng them It »s net as :1 he was an obdurate cnnfemnor who aorllmued to defy the ardeno amass ms assets. In regard to sentences for contempt Lard Durvahison MR ohsslvsdm ugmvaor v ugmreor mag) v FLR 414 5!pp416-417 mar mere am My drllemnt calsgonss avsenzences. Sentences for conlempt real/y ran /nlo two anrsmnr caleqonu There is me purely pumllva senlenee wnsm ma camemnor /s bemg pumshsd Ior meacn A common example, uf course, is s mmnolssranun we: wnm the respondent does molest me petmons/andlhak rs an olleneo folwmch nu has re benumshsd /n fixing me sentence there can well be an element oi astsnsnce m dale! mm /mm doing :1 zgam and (0 dam other: lrnm dmng it my rs one calsgory m vamnauisuasaaysmvnn mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! There /s a second category wmch /mrgllt descrvbe as - coercrvs smencs. when! Ms conlsmnar has been omsnaa to do samammg and :5 refusmg to do :1 orzome, a sanlsncs m mar use alsu has a pumllvs e/smsnl smcs my has to be pumshsd Ia! namng /am: lo du so up to the mamanl aims court hearmg mu, nevertheless, rt also has a coerm/e element " [15] Guided by both daemons «ms Court womd we we aim: view‘ n ma disobedience Is not Iclal and compnanee was finally pennmea, alben site! some de\ay, than me. Cmmwould havelhe uusaenon In nm Islua : warrant cl oommmal In Ampnson me cancemnorana wnslead imposes fine anus! wssue a stem wammg In any case. as also expressed by KC Vnhvah JCA m lnirmddln am Muhlmmld (supra). m cansmenng what pumshmanl In Impose‘ the noun has to take me awuum an rewevam cucummnoes, mcmamg mo nature 0! (ha eonlernpl and mmganng cvcumslanoes [17] Comm back to me iacts cl «ms case, :1 us mi: ccurrs mew mac smoe m Is not mspmed mat the Defendant had no proprmary mterasl m the Te\egram Group and mus ws evinced by her euons .m.L.m.m.m.. 41.! M nmhnrwmlxeuledmvaflyInenr1g\nnHIyM1MI m.m.v...n_.m W to enact trarrster ta the Ptarntrrv pnor |a and even aflrer the Judgement tsee the Detendanta Affidawl rn Repty WI enclosure 191)‘ there was no reason tor her to suspend that etten and seek repneve under the stay of execulwn orders issued by We Court and then later by the court o1AppeiI The Detendant could have omtlted paragraph 4A oflhe Judgement under both apghultans tor stay at canttnued lo enact the transter desptle the stay, but that ms not cane [151 Be that as rt may‘ thrs court cannal taunt the Defendant tor aetrng wflhm her Iegll nghls In file the appeal egamst the Judgement, the appttcalmn tor stay and deteroarnptranue wrtn the Judgement, In pamomar paragraph AA mm the stay anphcatton rs heard and the substirmve appear tirrauy heard ll ts not hr the Calm In question the rnent at the stay orders and whether the urrdtsputed obltgalron under paragraph AA 01 the Judgment could have been dean dmerencty by the courts when the slay applocanons were heard Once granted, the Detendant had the ngm ta aruay the term oi the stay ardent urrnt the euesuntwe -ppm was nnauy heard and dtsposed IS u.mn.rsu.sae.m.. $1.. s.r.t...r..mn.,.u...amy....nhmnysnn.ut..r.r.w..rt.ue W [19] For ihal reason Anus court cannvl therefore scam «nan me Defandlnt was, \n the wards ov KC vanmh ac»: m lllnudcfin bin Iluhlmmndtsupfa), an obduute oumemnor on an aqual hams. lms cmm c-nnm nnu me Deaenuant la have the highest degme M Nlmewurlmness as descnbed m Hawin Transport Lld G Annusupraj [20] on lhalscnrs‘ «ms Coun cannocagree mm munsellorlhe Pnammv that uunng mane poems ov me belwaen me date or Judgement unm me mcenm slay‘ then me period me stay at appncauon was mea at me com afAppea| and men grinled and finaHy between the date when one Deiendanfs subsxannve appea\ was msnussed and me (under urvemea, me Delendlnl was In a sure 01 purposetm defiance towards me Judgement Agreeably‘ technically‘ me Defendant was still bound to comply wan me Judgement within any ol muse nmes‘ and technically mere was nonwmpnance, but the Defiendantwas emu acnvely pursumg her inns! and Ihlrafora ha! pnsweness In anlmpanan of In outcome that may be m nev lavnut Is not unreasonable 15 m vanxnomsuasaavsmfiun mm. s.n.\ ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII munc Wm! [zl] ma facts III the pmsenl must lhevalure pa dlstlnwulshad wan lnpse In Golden suruupral where me cpnlelnrlor cpnllnueu lo defy cprnpllanpe at me order even allerexhausnrlp all appeals up la the Federal spun and sought to Cuflllrlue lllloallng me dlspflle by filing appllcalluns lo mvlew the Fzderal Coull declsben ln opnlrasl, whal we nave here nw ls lnalaller Iuslng me appeal at the calm of Appeal‘ lhe Delermanl prueeeded lo comply wnn paragraph 4A desplle lna an-qolrlg appeal lo me Faderal Court on olner aspeas ol lne Judgmerll ll means mal me Delenoanl had abandoned any appeal igalnsl paragraph 4A and ngmly sal proceeded to allecnne lranller olma Telegraph Gmup Annlhlr dlsllrlgulshlng faam IS lnal In Golden star laupra) me oommlllal appllcamn was llla-1 afler me Federal courl nad dismissed me defendarl(s':ub1lalVnve appeal and nol Iflerthe appeal wn med al the Hlgh com [22] ms cpurl also Igrees mm me Delarldanl lnal ma lacla In polh IJM corpor-mm (supray and Turn Sri Dnluk Nndnjn Rnmlnl (aupval are ulsu dlslrngmsnapla In znal In elch o1 lnpsa ems (here was a dellberlle and acllve preach pl a calm Inyunchon Ina: barred the respondents lrom commmlng uenaln aaa, namely rn varlxnoLxIEua5aEv54a7PlA ma Snrlnl In-vlhnrwlll a. o... w may he pflnlnallly Mlhln dun-mm VII nFluNG pm oonunuea wssuance at lellers and pubhcalvon av amcles WM: adrrmedly m not» cues and In Ihe presant use me oommmal apphcalvans am premised on n nun-compliance of u mun amen me he! ma: me can befovelms coun Involves a passwe rmn— compliance pemng an appeal mus! be gwan mwerem mnsuiersmon [23] wmlsnne Defendant may have (akan Idvanlaga of me prams ov Vaw auananle In any vmgam memonous or Mnerwlse‘ this coun does nm vwew me Defendanfs amen In filing me appea\ and me slay apphcauon as an attempt to circumvent the Juagemem unhke m the case at Mllilm luck: 1- co. (M) Sdn. arm. v. Chamqulp (M) sun. Shd. &Anor[1994)3 ELJ 125; [1994] 3 MLJ 40. where me defemanls redirected the supply 0! products via 3 «mm parly so as to cncumvem me vruuncnan mdor or as an abuse of the prom; nl court as what happsned m Golden sm (supra) Thevelare, the Detendanrs conduct uannm be descnbed as one that Is recmcmam deliberately and acuvely camempxuous lowams me Judgement ummanely, me Teregmm Group was uansievreu do me Plamm uam.um.5aa.m. $1.. s.n.‘...u..mm.,.u....umy....WWmw.m.u.m..nuua W [241 Nolwllhstandlng all ma above, It as lnn Court‘: duly Io vemlnd ma Defendant than any cowl aide! must be respected as a requlremen| al law and any dellherale vebufl or non-wmpllarlue of such an order will amnunt to B contemptuous 31:1 mil rs pumshabie wllh lmpvlsonmenl at worst and W101‘! a stem walrllllg at the very laasl ll not lar the final compliance mm lneluaglnem fnllwvlng me daclslon of me CDUI1 al Appeal, lnls Calm would new: no hasllanoa lo lmpoae a slrlcl punlshmem [25] Whllsl nar conduct was nol legally aamarnpluous, ll-ls calm wlll say lnal gwen ma Delerldanfs aflmlsslnn lo we Plarnlnrs Llndlspuled nglus and inleresls In me Telegram Group‘ har conduct ln suspundlng her allons lo allacl the lrunalar lull because 0! the slay orders Ind pending appeal was plolesslonally dlshonorable ‘male was rrpllllng to slap hev lrum Curlllnulng her ellorls la llinsfer me Telegram Gmup and engiglng war. the Plalnllll ln lnnl process wrmouz plelualce la her sulaslanuva appeal, pm lllal was not done That acllon or rnamlon had pveludioed me Plalnmrs buslness lmsveils ln the Telegram Group lor mom man a year and waslad nol only mall llme and seals bul also thls courrs I9 .n.n.nm.5aa.m.n $1.! a.r.l...n.rnl.,.l.....aml,....mn.ny.nn.aaa.m.r...nnwa an DECISION [26] Mamlng the game approlch xaken by the Com oi Appeal In Zlinudddln bin Mulummld (supvlj, mus Applucauan 1| Khetedmu dwanussed wnm punmve order to: com on RM2D,00D to be pam In In: Plalnlwfl and wm. a stem wamlng to ma Defendant MOHD RADZI am I(abuL HAMID JIIDGE men COURT MELAKA Dated W5 3'“ January 2024 For mg F nmv Cwk Elaine Yap Yemxn Elavne Yap Law Omoe Peguambera dan Paguamcala C-S»2. 11 Man! NW8 3 Jalan Km I. Mont Klara 50460 Kuala Lumpur Fgr mg Resgondenc Enclk Jae! Llm (cm Chew Pen Vmg) mun Joel 3. Mai Peguamcara s. Peguamhela A—27—15. Manara um Bangsar No 5. Jalan Bangsar mama! sauna Kuala Lumpuv m m van.m.m.saa.wm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm UMDISPUTED FACTS [41 It Is not dnsputed mat ~ (a) me Defendant filed an appeax agamsl me Judgment on 24 3 2021‘ (by me Dafendanl man filed an -ppucamon (or 2 stay nu! ma Judgement on 25 3 2021 vauowmg man an mlanm say was granlad pendmg an apphcahon to be med at the Coun 0VAppea\. (c) the appncaunn for stay -x the court of Appux wu med on a 7 2021 and vauowmg that no Caun a1Appea\ grxnlod me slay av execuuon of me Judgement an 3 3.2021, (:1) me Dsvanannrs subsxamwe IPDMI was msmmed by me cum av Apnea! on M 52022 and s mnmon was Ned lar leave to appeal In me Federal court, vlnxMLxBEuu5EEv!m7F|A $1.. s.n.‘...u..mm.,.u.....nM,....mmmw.m.u.m..n_.m W (eh there Is nu stay of are High Cuurl Juegemem since we dismissal M me substanlrve eppeew, to me Devendent men finally aflecied transfer nnhe Tebgram Gmup on 2 7.2022, some 1 year and 4 months afler me dale at the Judgment and some 2 months afler me msmrssal elme appeal by me Cwrl ouppeel, and (up Ihere rs nu ma! Ianure by me Defendant to ocmp4y wrm the Court‘: Juugemem but e laflure Io compw mm the Judgment wnhm me me preseneea ARGUIIIENTS av PARTIES For me Plernrrfi [5] Caunszl «or me Plavrmfl slated mat a Telegram Graup was sex up by me Devendanz at the request of me Plavmfl arm served as me Fkamhffs messaqmg plallorm for rt; busmess members The deer lhanhe Plamllfl has pmpnerery rights In me Teiegrem Group wee not arspmea by me Defendant In me sure In fact me De4endant eemmee m endosuves I55 and tea mer me Telegram Group wee m vanxnoLxIEue5aav5a7PrA we Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e med m my r... “mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG v-mm 59.4 up on the In3m.IL1IonS Mme CED M the Plalnllfl and that the Telegram Group was created [or work purposes The Apphcallon was filed after the Defendant had failed (0 mac! the lllnllel of the Telegram Gvoup ID the Plamtllfs nammaled representatwe aner me and al 7 days Item me dale onne Judgement [6] II was conlended rarme Plamufl, Inter-aha‘ that - (a) mere was no bona fide ewon by the nmendann to affect me xrensher onne Tmegram Group pnor to me Judgement, (b) mere was nu hona (me even to comp\y wvlh me Juagemem dated 173 2021‘ (ch mere has been no apmagy irom me Delemianno mus Court (at me Devendenx had not shown any remorse over hev nnn— cumpllanee and demcnslraled a recalcnrant altitude‘ and (e) wmlst me P\amhf1Is nm seem; a cus|advI¥ order, this com must order me Delendanl to pay a «me w-nmeneurace wnn ner conduct m van.m.:su.see.wnA ‘Nair s.n.\ ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-nnnl VII mum pm.‘ [7] In support ar narargumems, Caunsel lnrthe Hammvravanau to ma daemons m Goldtn sm 5 On v. ung Pour mu 5 on [2011] J cuua/(202112 Mu 259,- Im Corporation and. v. Hana Kumpulan Sdn. amt. (Pam) mac) 3 Cu 301 Tan sn Damk Nadni v. Munli subramanlam [2017] 1 LNS 225.1 and Arab Malaysian Pmna Rully Sdn. Bhd. v. Sn‘ KIllngkah- Rnkln onglnunng JV sdn. Ehd. 3. Or: [2000] 2 cu 532 J [51 Counsel forms naianazm argued max nwas not dlsputzd that me oavenaann does not have any pmpneury ngms or Interests vn me Telegram Group and manna Dacanuanz had acted aocmmngly when sne complied wma the Judgemem arm affected me lrarvsler an 2 1 2022 Ha Inablhly |a edlscl transfer ov lh: Telegram Gvoup due |o |echn\czl reasons was sumuenlly exmamed and brougm to ma anennon of xna Plamnn and/ov their schalars, and an that reason sna cannot be huked lav any dehys Tnoaa dellys cannax be regarded 35 cunuarnpmaus uawams ma Judgmem [9] \n summary II was lunher argued, mteraha, mat.» (a) mere was no wmfux dwaregard m comnlylng wnn me Judgment smee me Defendam mo decided In appeax against me Juagamem and Vollowmg mm mm: Nance av Appew an apphcauon Is: stay was med‘ (42) both me appea\ and apphcanon for stay was meu expemenuy, (e) the Defendant‘: amen m not pemrmmq me lranslaroflhe Telegmm Group pendmg me appeal and my was teasonahle. (0 me Defendant complied mm me Judgement when she lost me substanlwe appeal at me Cour! v1Appeal: (g) this Is not a case where mere has been a mu nan» cnmpluance but of a late comphance, and m vanxnouisuasaavsnmn we smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm (h) xakmg mm consldelamn ma sxeps taken by me Devmaant m the appeal process and that there has been a mmpluance alberl late. the degree of bbmewortmness Is rm mgr: [10] Remence was made In Me decwslonl WI T!!! Sri DIM’ (Dr) Ronlilsmnll a Or: v. Llm Pang Cnuang @ Semgu um I on (201213 MLJ 455 /12012} 2 cu m; Medi.lCoIp News PR: Ln 5 Or: v. uearaaanc (Jonor aanm; Sdn and .: 0:: 12-7101 5 ML! 552 / [2010] 4 Am 70,- Lnkthminanylmn y. Marimulha [199]] 1 MLJ 277 and Inlnuddin bln Huhummud V. Auto Ltd 3: Anor[2M2]1ML./ 1/[2001] 2 AM}? ll DELIBERATIONS [11] Tu begun wnm. K 1: quite clear to mus cmm mat the nevanaarut makes no clavm at ownersrup on the Texegrarn Group The Telegram Gvoup was a commumcallons pl-mmn sarvmg ma Plammrs uusmess comm-may and n (herelave bewarugeu lo me Hamufl That being me case, me oevenuam had me duly |o uamler Ihal mallovm In ms Framnfl a\ (he end of her tenure as an emptoyee at me Plainmt In true Conn‘: mind. srnoetne Telegram Group was sat up by me Detenrtam as part at her dnlIes,ll1entlIe ohtrgatrnn to trarrster the Telegram Group to the Ptarmrtrs asergrred repreaerrtatrve should be pertunrren trmety‘ wrretrrar or not a demand rs tormauy rnaoe tn enclnsura197 me Delendant adrrrnted that srre had enueavarea ta ewect transfer at the Telegram Group prior ta and rrrrnreeratety atter the Judgment but tartan due to tecnnrcar reasons [12] In determining the martts oMh\sApplIcaItorL tnrr. coun sneuut um concern rrsettwrtrr how the Detendanr conducted hersett wnrr tne Ptarntm pm! to the Judgment dated 17 3 2021 ‘mat nratter tras been etean wrtn by mat Judgment wnat rt rs cmoemed with new re the Defendant's canducl pest ruagerrrant The Ptarntm argues mat narwrrrrrrtanerng the aarrrptrance wnh paragraph 4A Ind tne lranslev betng finally pertenrrea on 2 72022‘ for those penods between the date at Judgement unltl the tnbenm slay, then between trre penod the stay at appltcallon was men at the cam of Aapaat and men gvinlad and trnawy eetween |he eater when the Detena-nu appeal wls dismissed and ttre transfev was m vanxnotnsuasaavsavfirn war. smut ...n.rwrrr .. u... m mm .. nnmruuly mm: dnuumrrt VII murtc v-mat [13] [16] anuauy aomeved, me Devendam was m contempt DI the Judgemenl and that contempt cannot go unpumshed II ws me law as deeded m Eric Lnu um Hing v. Emnun ./ny: Sdn.EIId 5 Or: [2007] 2 Mu 511,- won cnao Kenny v MEI Holdings and. A Anna» and anomer appeal (199112 MLJ 211; [1993] 3 CL! 210,- and PCP Consvucllan Sdn. and. v. Lelp Modulation Sdn. BIIL1. (Asian Inlomlliunnl Arblnrllion cenm, Inmvenor) [21119] 4 MLJ 7&7; [2019] 5 cu 1, that respect lor and mmpnamze wnh a noun order as expeued of any party as pan of me requuemems oflhe aammnsxrauon of Vaw and msnce and thal a oelmeraxe o-sooeamnce olanyavusrwlfl amount In a eaneampmous act Nonethekess «ms Cnurl agmea wnn Connie! Var mo Devenaanc Ihal |hIs casa mus! be evalualed msuna «om those cases where me ocmemp1wasM\ suomhalthe order Mcourl was wmmuy and bolally vgnared‘ reducing the orders to no more vmpaflant than me paper may were nrmled on Tm where me case mvoma lane oompnanca as apposed to local nan-complmnoe‘ me vanous

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-83-7823-11/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH NOR AINI BINTI ALI

Seksyen 420-penipuan-pembelian bitcoin yang tidak wujud-pemikiran terkemudian(afterthought)-pembelian bertukar kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat- penerimaan keterangan Whatsapp tanpa sijil 90A

04/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=79d51f2f-a95c-486c-bb1a-84f0482aaf90&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-7823-11/2021) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN NOR AINI BINTI ALI ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh (OKT) adalah seperti berikut: Bahawa kamu, Nor Aini Binti Ali (No KP: 670311-05-5096) di antara 11/01/2018 sehingga 12/01/2018 di Jalan Bangsar, dalam Daerah Brickfields, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur telah menipu Trisno Asyraf bin Zainol Abidin (No. KP:721108-02-5323) dengan memperdayakannya untuk mempercayai bahawa kamu akan membelikan dan menyerahkan Bitcoin kepadanya sebanyak 1 unit dan dengan itu kamu secara curangnya mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan RM54,365.00 sebagai bayaran untuk mendapatkan Bitcoin tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan kerana telah melakukan penipuan. [2] OKT tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Seramai 7 orang saksi telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di peringkat pendakwaan. 04/01/2024 16:19:54 WA-83-7823-11/2021 Kand. 58 S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [3] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie, maka OKT diminta untuk membela diri. Setelah OKT memberikan keterangan bersumpah, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKT gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas pertuduhan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah telah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas kesalahan. Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan ke atas OKT dengan kos pendakwaan RM1500. B. RINGKASAN FAKTA [4] Pengadu (SP1) telah berkenalan dengan OKT dan telah melabur dengan OKT. Kemudian, SP1 telah bersetuju membeli 1 unit Bitcoin dengan harga RM54,365. SP1 telah membuat bayaran melalui pindahan wang sebanyak dua kali pada 11/1/2018 dan 12/1/2018. Adalah dipersetujui bahawa SP1 akan menerima 1 unit Bitcoin selepas 7 sehingga 14 hari setelah pembayaran dibuat. [5] SP1 telah menuntut pembelian Bitcoin tersebut daripada OKT namun OKT menyatakan bahawa Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan. Akhirnya, SP1 telah membuat laporan polis pada 2/12/2028 kerana SP1 berasa telah ditipu oleh OKT dan OKT gagal menunjukkan bukti bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin melalui Kraken. C. PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [6] Menurut seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga di dalam seksyen 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Peruntukan tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila kes pendakwaan berakhir, mahkamah akan menimbangkan sama ada pendakwaan telah membuat suatu prima facie kes terhadap tertuduh. [7] Pengujian kes secara prima facie telah diputuskan di dalam kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 302 di mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt” “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the otherside. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s. 180(2) and (3)...” [8] Begitu juga di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP (2003) 1 CLJ 734 dinyatakan sebagai; “A jugde sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and ask himself the question “ if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contain in the prosecution case?”If the answer was in the negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal…” D. PEMBUKTIAN PERTUDUHAN [9] Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan menyatakan: Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property “Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived, whether or not the deception practised was the sole or main inducement, to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine.” [10] Elemen pertuduhan seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah: i. OKT telah menipu. ii. OKT telah mendorong: a) yang mana harta itu tidak dimiliki oleh tertuduh; atau b) membuat, mengubah atau memusnahkan keseluruhan atau mana- mana bahagian suatu sekuriti yang berharga; atau c) apa-apa yang ditandatangani atau dimeterai dan boleh diubah menjadi suatu sekuriti yang berharga. iii. dia melakukannya dengan tidak jujur. [11] Seksyen 415 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinsikan penipuan seperti berikut: Cheating 415. Whoever by deceiving any person, whether or not such deception was the sole or main inducement,- S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to any person in body, mind, reputation, or property, is said to “cheat”. [12] Defini tidak jujur juga dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 24 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu sesiapa yang membuat apa-apa dengan tujuan menyebabkan keuntungan salah kepada seseorang atau kehilangan salah kepada seseorang lain tidak kira sama ada perbuatan itu menyebabkan kehilangan salah atau keuntungan salah sebenar. Elemen pertama: terdapat penipuan [13] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa elemen pertama dibuktikan melalui keterangan SP1. SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT bagi urusan pembelian Bitcoin. Menurut keterangan SP1, SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT melalui Wan Norain dan OKT yang telah menghubungi SP1 melalui WhatsApp pada 7/11/2017. Ketika itu, SP1 berminat dengan perdagangan mata wang kripto dan OKT melakukan personal ‘trading’ dalam ‘cyptocurrency’. SP1 telah berjumpa dengan OKT pada 23/12/2017 di Starbucks berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 pernah berurusan dengan OKT sebelum ini di mana OKT telah menawarkan perkhidmatan ‘trading’ dan SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM30,000 dengan OKT. [14] SP1 telah membuat keputusan untuk membelian satu unit Bitcoin dengan OKT. SP1 telah membuat bayaran seperti yang diminta oleh OKT. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa SP1 akan menerima Bitcoin dalam masa 7 sehingga 14 hari namun OKT telah memberikan alasan bahawa akaun platform Kraken milik OKT ada masalah menyebabkan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin kepada SP1. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [15] Keterangan SP1 adalah disokong oleh ekhibit P4 yang merupakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan OKT. Perbualan tersebut menunjukkan terdapat persetujuan harga bagi pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Sekian lama, SP1 tidak mendapat Bitcoin, SP1 telah berhubung dengan khidmat pelanggan Kraken untuk bertanyakan situasi Bitcoin yang tidak dapat dipindahkan. Setelah mendapat jawapan daripada pihak Kraken, SP1 mendapati bahawa asalan diberikan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak bermungkinan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin dalam tempoh masa yang panjang. SP1 berasa OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin dan Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan kerana akaun OKT ada masalah. Pihak khidmat pelanggan kraken menyatakan bahawa tidak bermunasabah bahawa akaun kraken tergantung begitu lama sehingga tidak membolehkan pemindahan Bitcoin. [16] Oleh itu, OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan Bitcoin telah dibeli dan tidak dapat dipindahkan. Elemen kedua: Mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang berjumlah RM54365 [17] Melalui slip transaksi (ekshibit P3A-B) dan juga penyata bank milik OKT (ekshibit D13 dan P29), terdapat kemasukkan wang berjumlah RM54,365 ke dalam akaun milik OKT. [18] OKT telah mendorong SP1 untuk menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin. OKT telah menawarkan harga yang lebih rendah daripada harga pasaran dan menyatakan Bitcoin akan diperolehi dalam masa 7-14 hari telah mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365. Elemen ketiga: Tertuduh melakukannya dengan tidak jujur [19] Pembayaran telah dibuat kepada akaun milik OKT dan OKT telah menerima wang tersebut namun wang tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [20] SP1 tidak menerima 1unit Bitcoin dan wang yang dibayar kepada OKT tidak dikembalikan oleh OKT. OKT telah menyebabkan SP1 kehilangan wang tersebut dan sehingga kini masih tidak dipulangkan kepada SP1. OKT telah mendapat keuntungan salah di mana duit tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. [21] SP1 tidak akan menyerahkan RM54,365 kepada OKT sekiranya OKT tidak menjanjikan untuk membelikan satu unit Bitcoin untuk SP1. Kesimpulannya, kesemua elemen pertuduhan berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. E. ISU [22] Pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan pelbagai isu dan menyatakan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen pertuduhan kerana pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel di mana OKT telah menyatakan telah membeli Bitcoin. [23] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa kredibiliti keterangan SP1 adalah boleh dipercayai di mana keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan disokong. [24] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 telah bertukar fikiran dan telah menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin selepas perjumpaan SP1 dengan OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan. Adalah versi pembelaan bahawa SP1 telah mencadangkan agar RM54,365 digunakan sebagai pinjaman modal bersyarat untuk mengembangkan perniagaan syarikat OKT atas tiga syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat tersebut adalah abang SP1 dilantik sebagai CEO syarikat, keahlian SP1 sebagai 001 dan SP1 sebagai penasihat peribadi OKT. [25] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa SP1 telah memberikan keterangan bahawa OKT membuat semua keputusannya dengan sendiri kerana OKT yang bertanggungjawab terhadap syarikatnya. SP1 juga telah menjelaskan bahawa SP1 tidak memberitahu SP2 adalah abangnya kerana SP1 tidak ingin OKT untuk bertindak berat sebelah dan ingin OKT untuk bersikap objektif dalam pelantikan CEO memandangkan SP1 dan OKT adalah kawan ketika itu. SP1 juga telah S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menjelaskan fakta bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah adik beradik sudah pastinya akan diketahui oleh OKT. [26] SP2 memberikan keterangan bahawa SP2 tidak tahu menahu berkenaan dengan apa-apa syarat yang diletakkan berkenaan dengan lantikan beliau. SP2 telah menjelaskan lantikannya atas berdasarkan temu duga yang telah diadakan dan meritnya. [27] Berkenaan dengan syarat keahlian 001, SP1 telah menjelaskan bahawa keahlian sebagai 001 telah diberikan oleh OKT sendiri. SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM18600 sebagai ahli dan mempunyai 31 akaun di mana setiap akaun adalah bernilai RM600. SP1 juga telah memberikan keterangan bahawa tiada sebarang lantikan rasmi bagi keahlian 001. [28] Pihak pembelaan juga menimbulkan isu bahawa dokumen telah diserahkan selepas perbicaraan bermula. Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa pihak pembelaan telah diberikan masa yang mencukupi untuk meneliti dokumen- dokumen tersebut kerana telah diberikan penangguhan yang sewajarnya untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan ini sama sekali tidak memprejudiskan OKT. [29] Pihak pembelaan telah menyatakan tindakan SP1 untuk menghantar “bill collector” adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Namun pihak pendakwaan bergantung keterangan SP3, yang dikatakan pengutip hutang telah menafikan dakwaan bahawa dia telah dilantik oleh SP1 dan SP3 telah menyatakan beliau menolong untuk mengenal pasti kedudukan OKT. [30] Pihak pembelaan turut mempersoalkan penerimaan bukti tangkapan skrin Whatsapp ekhibit P4 sebagai bukti tanpa diperiksa oleh pihak forensik. Mahkamah telah menolak bantahan peguam dan menerima bukti tangkapan skrin di mana perbualan asal dalam telefon bimbit telah dikemukakan. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 F. PEMBELAAN [31] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah menerima wang berjumlah RM54,365 yang dipindahkan oleh SP1. OKT juga mengesahkan perbualan awalan mengenai pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Namun OKT telah menyatakan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin tersebut telah berubah kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [32] Rumusan pembelaan daripada keterangan OKT adalah OKT telah diberikan kebenaran untuk menggunakan wang tersebut selepas OKT bersetuju tiga syarat yang diberikan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat yang dikenakan adalah bahawa SP2 dilantik sebagai CEO, SP1 sebagai ahli 001 dan penasihat peribadi OKT. [33] OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT telah mematuhi syarat dengan melantik SP2 sebagai CEO. OKT bertindak memperhentikan SP2 atas alasan bahawa SP2 telah bertindak bertentangan dengan hala tuju syarikat. [34] OKT juga menyatakan bahawa SP1 sering memberikan pendapatan dan nasihat serta membantu dalam penyediaan misi dan visi untuk Midas Touch. OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menjadi ahli 001 dan boleh dilihat melalui laman sesawang. [35] OKT telah mengemukakan bukti-bukti seperti penyata kiraan dan penyata bank bagi menyokong perbelanjaan syarikat yang menggunakan wang tersebut bagi pembayaran gaji, kos kepada ‘web developer’, bil dan sebagainya. [36] Pembelaan OKT adalah bahawa OKT tidak menipu SP1 kerana SP1 sendiri yang membuat keputusan untuk menangguhkan pembelian dan telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat kepada OKT. OKT telah menerima tawaran tersebut. G. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [37] Mahkamah akan menjawab bantahan mengenai penerimaan ekshibit P4. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Pannir Selvam a/l Sinnaiyah & Anor v Tan Chia Foo & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 384 di Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “(3) The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention based on the parallels drawn to the case of Lim Choon Hau v Simpson Wong where the court held that Whatsapp messages were direct evidence of the receipt of money as a friendly loan from the plaintiff. The documents produced by a computer still admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it was admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. The court viewed that the WhatsApp messages were relevant and admissible as they demonstrated the connection to the facts in issue so as to form part of the same transaction. It triggered the application of s 6 of the Evidence Act (see paras 57, 61 & 67).” [38] Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan kebolehterimaan keterangan whatsapp walaupun tiada sijil 90A seperti di bawah: [60] I am unable to agree with this submission, in view of the fact that he did not provide any authorities to support his contention that all WhatsApp messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, bearing in mind that the maker of those messages, who was SP2, was cross-examined. [61] Secondly, even if those messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, there are authorities such as Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 MLJ 317; [2014] 1 LNS 412 (CA) and Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 739; [2016] 6 CLJ 266 to say that documents produced by a computer may still be admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it is admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. [39] Peguam bela hanya membantah keterangan P4 kerana tiada sijil 90A dibekalkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan telefon bimbit tidak dihantar untuk pemeriksaan forensik. [40] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 di mana Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 menyatakan seperti berikut berkenaan pemakaian Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan: Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Shaik Daud: Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 menjadikan rekod komputer yang dibuat semasa penggunaan biasa boleh diterima jika yang berikut dibuktikan, iaitu bahawa: (i) dokumen-dokumen dihasilkan oleh sebuah komputer; dan (ii) rekod komputer dihasilkan semasa penggunaan biasa. Bukti boleh dikemukakan sama ada dalam bentuk sijil yang ditandatangani oleh satu-satunya orang yang bertanggungjawab tentang komputer yang menghasilkan cetakan sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh s 90A(2), atau oleh seorang pegawai bank. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Mahadev Shankar: Zainal tidak dicabar oleh perayu atas kejituan catatan dokumen yang dikemukakan. Sebaliknya, rayuan adalah berdasarkan fakta bahawa tiada sijil telah dikemukakan di bawah s 90A(2) yang mana, perayu menghujahkan, bermakna bahawa pihak pendakwa telah gagal membuktikan kesnya. Hujah ini adalah berdasarkan falasi, kerana Zainal bertanggungjawab atas semua pengendalian di bank dan dengan itu adalah bertanggungjawab atas urusan aktiviti bank yang dijalankan oleh komputer tersebut. Sekiranya dia memilih untuk menyediakan suatu sijil, dia boleh berbuat demikian dan di bawah s 90A(2), dokumen-dokumen akan diterima sebagai keterangan seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 90A(1). Keterangan viva voce seseorang dalam kandang saksi lebih penting daripada suatu sijil yang dikeluarkan olehnya (lihat ms 13G—I). Seksyen 90A(1) merupakan suatu pengemaskinian ‘rukun keterangan paling baik’ dengan realiti zaman elektronik, dan kini ia tidak lagi perlu untuk memanggil juruwang atau kerani bank yang memasukkan data dengan syarat dia berbuat demikian semasa penggunaan biasa komputer (lihat ms 14A—D). S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [41] Pemakaian sijil seksyen 90A juga dibincangkan dalam kes Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] MLJU 385 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: (i)Tape recording evidence or CCTV recording, etc. at common law will be admissible based on 'res gestae' principles as truth of its contents although they may be hearsay or even self serving statement. Section 6 of EA 1950 and also other sections give statutory recognition to 'res gestae' principle in the widest form and is not restricted to the common law parameters. The test for relevancy is set out in the section itself in no uncompromising terms. There appears to be no comprehensive formula for its admissibility save as to guidelines suggested and/or imposed by courts all for good reasons. [See Amrrita Lai Hazra v Emperor 42 Cal 957; Bandahala bin Undik v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 CLJ 708 ]. The said section 6 of EA 1950 reads as follows: "Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places." (ii)At common law any form of tape recording, video recording, etc.; if relevant is made admissible if the court is satisfied of its accuracy and that it has not been tampered with, etc. The jurisprudence relating to its admissibility as well as sections 3 and 61 of EA 1950 is set out in Janab's Key to Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 2nd edition and it reads as follows: "Document before the 1993 Amendment A 851 to the Act was defined in section 3 of the Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter. Under the new amendment it includes any matter embodied in a disc, tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever. A wide and extended meaning has been given to the definition 'document'. Previously documents at least related to things which could not be easily tampered with. Now documents include items which could be easily tampered with. It is submitted that the admission S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of such documents which could be easily tampered with must be admitted with caution." In R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 465 Marshall J observed: "… for many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The print as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording conversations. We see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such documents when produced for the inspection of the court are referred to as documentary evidence. Thus, documentary evidence may include not only documents in writing but also maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, discs, tapes videotapes, films and negatives (see Cross on Evidence)." (iii)The amendments in relation to documents to EA 1950 do not in any way affect the common law position as set out in R v Maqsud Ali. The amendments S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 allow further hearsay documents which may be difficult to be made admissible under the common law because of the hearsay rule and its prejudicial effect, to be made admissible provided the criteria set out in the amendments are complied with. The new amendments such as section 90A do not displace common law rules as to admissibility. That is to say if the party cannot admit a document in consequence of the common law restriction then he may get the document admitted under any of the new provisions such as section 90A, etc. [42] Mahkamah mendapati mendapati peguam bela tidak berhujah bahawa perbualan Whatsapp adalah tidak revelan dan hanya membantah kerana ketiadaan sijil 90A. Mahkamah mendapati P4 adalah keterangan yang relevan di mana penawaran pembelian Bitcoin dan persetujuan serta transaksi dilakukan adalah perbualan yang terkandung dalam P4. Mahkamah berpuas hati ketulenan perbualan Whatsapp apabila SP1 masih menyimpan keseluruhan perbualan Whatsapp dan telefon bimbit yang mengandungi kesemua perbualan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dalam keadaan baik. Malah di peringkat pembelaan, OKT tidak menafikan kandungan Whatsapp dan bersetuju bahawa itu adalah perbualan antara OKT dan SP1. Oleh itu, ketiadaan sijil 90A tidak menjejaskan kebolehterimaan ekshibit P4. [43] Pihak pembelaan ada menimbulkan isu ketidakaturan prosedur kawad cam. Daripada keterangan kesemua saksi, adalah fakta bahawa OKT dan SP1 mengenali antara satu sama lain untuk satu tempoh masa yang panjang dan berurusan dalam perdagangan mata wang kripto dan isu pengecaman OKT adalah tidak diperlukan dan pengecaman daripada kandang adalah memadai. [44] Pemindahan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin adalah fakta tidak dipertikaikan. Persoalan utama dalam kes ini adalah sama ada terdapat penipuan dilakukan OKT atau terdapat pinjaman modal bersyarat yang dikatakan oleh OKT. [45] SP1 bertegas bahawa tiada perubahan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin dan tidak pernah menawarkan syarat seperti mana yang dicadangkan oleh peguam bela S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 manakala OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menukarkan pembelian tersebut kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [46] OKT telah bersetuju pada tiada keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Alasan ketiadaan dokumen bertulis adalah OKT telah menyuruh SP1 menyediakan perjanjian tersebut namun SP1 tidak berbuat demikian sehingga hari ini. [47] Memandangkan ketiadaan keterangan bertulis, maka Mahkamah perlu menilai kredibiliti keterangan lisan saksi-saksi. Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, peguam bela hanya meletakkan cadangan bahawa SP1 telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Namun, peguam bela tidak pernah bertanyakan soalan tentang penyedian dokumen bagi pinjaman modal bersyarat oleh SP1. SP1 hanya diajukan penyediaan dokumen untuk pelantikan CEO dan misi,visi bagi Midas Touch yang menjurus kepada penglibatkan SP1 dalam syarikat OKT. [48] Keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten di mana SP1 menyatakan bahawa tidak berkemungkinan untuk SP1 untuk menukarkan tujuan asal kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat apabila SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut. [49] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 yang bertukar fikiran dan yang menyuruh menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin dalam masa 3 hari. Pada 1 sehingga 3 Februari 2018, di mana SP1 telah berjumpa OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan dan mencadangkan duit RM54,365 akan disumbangkan ke dalam sekiranya 3 syarat dipatuhi dan sekiranya OKT masih belum membeli Bitcoin. [50] Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan telah mengajukan soalan- soalan yang kurang relevan yang berkenaan pelaburan RM30,000 secara terperinci. Namun, aduan SP1 dan pertuduhan adalah berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 bersetuju bahawa SP1 membuat perdagangan dan pelaburan dengan OKT namun SP1 menyatakan SP1 tertipu dengan pembelian Bitcoin kerana beliau tidak menerima Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [51] Mengikut perbualan awalan, SP1 dimaklumkan bahawa pembelian Bitcoin adalah melalui akaun kraken. SP1 menunggu pemindahan Bitcoin oleh OKT namun tidak dilakukan atas alasan bahawa terdapat masalah dengan akaun kraken. SP1 telah berasa tertipu setelah menyoal perkara ini dengan pihak kraken bahawa mustahil akaun kraken disekat sekian lama walaupun digodam. [52] Namun, kini versi OKT adalah OKT tidak semestinya perlu membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken memandangkan terdapat pelbagai cara pembelian Bitcoin dapat dibuat. Kemudian, OKT menerangkan prosedur pembelian Bitcoin melalui kraken adalah jauh lebih susah kerana perlu menukarkan kepada mata wang fiat terlebih dahulu bagi tujuan pembelian kripto. OKT menyatakan akaun OKT adalah pada peringkat permulaan (starter) maka memerlukan banyak transaksi dilakukan bagi tujuan pembelian Bitcoin malah perlu menunggu masa yang lama. [53] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sekiranya OKT berasa sukar untuk membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken, mengapakan OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT akan melakukan transaksi menggunakan kraken. Keterangan OKT adalah tidak konsisten di mana OKT pada mula mendekati pengadu dengan penggunaan akaun kraken di mana kini OKT menyatakan bahawa pembelian dengan kraken adalah sukar. OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa apa-apa tindakan penukaran mata wang fiat untuk pembelian Bitcoin. Dalam perbualan Whatsapp P4, OKT mengesa pengadu membayar dan OKT akan transfer duit ke dalam akaun kraken. [54] OKT menyatakan OKT cuba meningkatkan tahap akaunnya ke peringat pertengahan (intermediate) sejak 2017 namun hanya tahun 2023, pihak kraken telah memberikan verifikasi akaun pertengahan. Apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah perbualan dengan kraken bahawa OKT akhirnya mendapat akaun pertengahan setelah sekian lama dipohon. OKT tidak pernah menunjukkan bahawa akaun OKT dibuka sejak bila dan sejak bila permohonan pernah dibuat. OKT hanya mengemukakan perbualan pada tahun 2023 selepas OKT telah dituduh di Mahkamah dan perbicaraan telah lama berjalan. Oleh itu, nilai keterangan mengenai pengiktirafan akaun pertengahan pada tahun 2023 adalah amat rendah dan tidak membantu menyokong keterangan OKT. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [55] OKT dipersoalkan sekiranya tidak menggunakan kraken, mengapakah OKT masih gagal membuat pembelian menggunakan aplikasi lain sedangkan OKT menyatakan bahawa akaun kraken OKT adalah terhad. OKT memberikan alasan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM dan harga Bitcoin menaik. Namun, perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa peringkat pendakwaan. Dakwaan bahawa Bitcoin naik mendadak menyebabkan OKT tidak membelikan Bitcoin tidak pernah ditimbulkan kepada saksi pendakwaan. OKT telah mengemukakan Ekshibit D39A-E bagi menunjukkan harga pasaran Bitcoin. Namun, D39 A,C,D dan E adalah tidak relevan memandangkan harga pasaran adalah bukan tahun 2018. [56] Sekiranya merujuk kepada D39B, tidak menunjukkan perubahan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT kerana graf tersebut menunjukkan harga tahun 2018 sehingga 2020. Keterangan OKT sekali lagi tidak disokong oleh ekshibit D39B. [57] OKT turut menyatakan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM menyebabkan OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin. Namun, OKT setuju dengan cadangan bahawa pembelian mata wang kripto adalah boleh dilakukan pada bila-bila dan tiada waktu penutupan bagi pembelian mata wang asing. OKT menyatakan SP1 yang memberikan kelonggaran masa untuk membeli Bitcoin. Perkara ini sekali lagi tidak pernah ditimbulkan sewaktu peringkat pendakwaan. SP1 tidak pernah ditanya bahawa beliau yang memberi kelonggaran masa kepada OKT membeli Bitcoin dan juga harga Bitcoin menaik. [58] Semasa peringkat pemeriksaan balas, OKT telah menyatakan OKT mempunyai nota yang mencatat persetujuan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Apabila ditanya mengapa perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan di peringkat pendakwaan mahupun pemeriksaan utama di peringkat pembelaa dan OKT menjawab bahawa beliau tidak ditanya. Semasa pemeriksaan utama, OKT hanya menyatakan tiada perjanjian kerana SP1 tidak menyediakan. OKT juga tidak memaklumkan nota tersebut kepada pegawai penyiasat. Nota tersebut tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah hanya ditimbulkan semasa pemeriksaan balas. [59] Berkenaan dengan syarat yang dikatakan dikenakan oleh SP1, Mahkamah mendapati OKT yang mempunyai kuasa penuh pelantikan SP2 di mana OKT S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 telah menolak draf surat yang disediakan oleh SP1 dan menggunakan surat syarat perlantikan oleh syarikat. Adalah jelas OKT mempunyai kuasa penuh dalam pengurusan syarikat dan keputusan muktamad adalah pada OKT dan bukan pada SP1. Ketika itu, syarikat OKT memerlukan modal dan OKT juga menyatakan OKT tidak dapat pinjaman bank atas sebab tiada rekod pinjaman. Atas faktor tersebut, OKT menyatakan telah menerima pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah mustahil sebuah syarikat boleh memperoleh satu pinjaman bersyarat tanpa syarat pemulangan. OKT menyediakan perjanjian bagi pelaburan lain seperti pelaburan RM30,000 namun tidak menyediakan apa-apa dokumen untuk jumlah wang yang lebih besar. OKT yang menyediakan perjanjian untuk RM30,000 sebelum wujudnya penawaran Bitcoin kepada SP1. Malah, OKT telah mengemukakan kesemua email untuk lampirkan pemulangan bagi pelaburan trading tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak munasabah bahawa tiada satu keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat seperti yang didakwa oleh OKT. OKT juga gagal menjelaskan secara terperinci berapa jumlah bayaran balik dan tempoh pulangan pinjaman tersebut. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah diragui dan tidak kredibel. [60] Mahkamah merujuk Public Prosecutor v Subahir bin Salmin [2009] MLJU 670 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Mahkamah yang mempercayai versi pembelaan. “ However, in respect of the First Charge, I do not agree with the acquittal of the Respondent. I find that the trial Judge had erred in fact and in law. The main reason why she acquitted the Respondent was because she believed in the Defence story that there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to assist SP1 to get 3 months of full salary and his overtime pay even though SP1 did not work the full months for September, October and November 2001. Here, I agree with the Prosecution's submission that the Defence did not raise specifically and in detail the existence of such an agreement of the Company's Management in the course of cross-examining the Prosecution's witness, in particular SP7 i.e. on the question whether it was on the orders of the Company's Management that SPI's kon card was to be S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 filled in that manner so that SP1 could be paid in full even though he was on medical leave. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that at page 124 of the Appeal Record, the Defence Counsel had questioned SP7 regarding such agreement of the Company's Management to help SP1 but SP7 merely replied "tidak ingat". A perusal of the evidence at page 124 of the Appeal Record shows that SP7 was cross-examined on whether he had discussed with the Respondent and SD2 regarding compensation to be paid. SP7 replied that he could not remember. SP7 was then asked whether the salary for October and November 2001 was paid in full as compensation since SP1 did not have insurance and SOCSO. Again SP7 replied that he could not remember. As submitted by the Appellant, even if SP7 could not remember, the Defence should have pursued the matter further and asked SP7 specifically and in detail whether there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to pay SP1 the full salaries for October and November 2001 in order to assist SP1 who had no insurance or SOCSO. Since the Defence failed to raise this agreement specifically during the cross-examination of the Prosecution witnesses, it means that what the Defence later raised during the Defence stage should be rejected on the ground that the evidence regarding the agreement by the Company's Management is a mere concoction or fabrication, or an afterthought. The law regarding this issue is trite.” [61] Walaupun OKT menimbulkan perjanjian modal bersyarat di peringkat pendakwaan, namun OKT tidak menyatakan apa syarat lain selain syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. OKT tidak pernah menyentuh apa-apa perkara tentang pemulangan pinjaman modal bersyarat dan tempoh pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati pinjaman modal bersyarat merupakan satu pemikiran terkemudian oleh OKT. Berdasarkan keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut namun OKT tiada niat untuk membeli Bitcoin bagi SP1. Hal ini dapat dilihat bahawa alasan-alasan dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan konsisten. Sekiranya OKT mempunyai niat membeli Bitcoin untuk SP1, sepertimana yang dinyatakan OKT mempunyai pelbagai cara lain dan tidak semestinya membeli S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 melalui Kraken namun OKT tidak berbuat demikian. OKT telah mengesa SP1 membuat bayaran segera bagi tujuan pembelian namun OKT kini menyatakan dalam tempoh 3 hari pertama, OKT tidak membeli kerana sibuk dan harga Bitcoin naik. Namun dilihat daripada ekshibit D39B, tiada kenaikan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT. OKT menyatakan OKT mengajak SP1 membeli Bitcoin dengan sendiri dengan menggunakan akaun Luno SP1. Keterangan bertentangan dengan perbualan Whatsapp, di mana OKT yang beria-ria untuk menawarkan penjualan Bitcoin kepada OKT (ekshibit P4(2)). [62] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah tidak kredibel dan konsisten dan bersifat pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) berkenaan dengan isu penyediaan dokumen perjanjian. OKT sering bertanyakan kepada SP1 dalam membantu OKT mendraf dokumen dan semua dokumen didraf oleh SP1 seperti perlantikan CEO, visi dan misi Midas Touch. Namun OKT menyatakan SP1 tidak membuat draf dengan pinjaman modal bersyarat walaupun diminta. Mahkamah kurang mempercayai keterangan OKT di mana sekiranya jumlah pinjaman dikatakan adalah tinggi dan ianya melibatkan kepentingan pengadu, adalah mustahil SP1 enggan untuk mendraf satu perjanjian untuk memastikan kepentingannya terjamin dan juga pulangannya. [63] OKT telah menyatakan OKT akan memindahkan Bitcoin selepas 7-14 hari kemasukkan duit. Perkara ini tidak dapat dilakukan dengan akaun OKT sebagai starter dan ianya dalam pengetahuan OKT kerana pembelian melalui akaun starter memerlukan masa yang amat panjang memandangkan akaun starter mempunyai hak transaksi. SP1 telah bertanyakan sekiranya harga naik, SP1 masih boleh membeli dengan harga yang dipersetujui. Kini alasan alasan harga naik, OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin amat bercanggah dengan perbualan Whatsapp OKT dengan pengadu seperti di P4. [64] Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah memperdayakan SP1 membayar wang berjumlah RM54365 untuk pembelian Bitcoin di mana OKT tidak ada niat membeli atau membeli Bitcoin dan telah menipu pengadu bahawa Bitcoin telah dibeli tetapi Bitcoin tersebut tidak wujud. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati OKT gagal S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 menimbulkan keraguan munasabah dan OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. H. HUKUMAN [65] Antara faktor mitigasi yang dikemukakan oleh peguam bela adalah seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh berumur 56 tahun; (b) Merupakan ibu tunggal sejak kematian suami tahun 2008; (c) Mempunyai 15 cucu dan OKT menanggung 6 cucu yang tinggal bersamanya; (d) Memberikan kerjasama baik dengan pihak polis; (e) mempunyai masalah kesihatan hyperthroid sejak 2008 dan masih menerima rawatan sehingga sekarang; dan (f) Pesalah pertama [66] Peguam bela terpelajar memohon agar satu hukuman di bawah peruntukkan seksyen 294 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah diberikan berdasarkan faktor mitigasi diberikan. [67] Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan ‘victim impact statement’ oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kerugian wang yang banyak disebabkan penipuan OKT. Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman penjara dikenakan untuk melindungi kepentingan awam. Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa transaksi sebegini tidak dikawal selia dan memberikan ruang kepada penipuan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan terdapat keuntungan salah oleh OKT dan jumlah tersebut adalah tinggi. Pihak pendakwaan telah merujuk tred hukuman dalam kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818 di Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 24 bulan bagi kerugian RM33,300. Pihak memohon kos pendakwaan kerana terdapat 7 saksi dipanggil dan perbicaraan mengambil tempoh masa yang lama. [68] Peguam bela memohon pertimbangan bahawa OKT merupakan pesalah pertama dan peguam bela membantah terhadap kos. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [69] Mahkamah telah menolak permohonan peguam untuk bon berkelakuan baik kerana ianya tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Seksyen 294(6) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah menyatakan bon tidak boleh diberikan untuk kesalahan serius dan tafisran ksesalahan serius adalah di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah tergolong kesalahan serius dan tidak boleh diberikan pertimbangan bon seperti yang dipohon. [70] Mahkamah perlu menjatuhkan hukuman berdasarkan undang-undang dan prinsip kehakiman. Mahkamah merujuk kes Public Prosecutor v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 and PP v Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 MLJ 401.Seksyen 420 memperuntukkan hukuman penjara tidak kurang daripada 1 tahun dan tidak lebih 10 tahun dan sebatan dan juga boleh dikenakan denda. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara kurang 1 tahun. Mahkamah juga tertakluk kepada bidang kuasa di bawah seksyen 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 di mana Mahkamah Majistret tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara melebihi 5 tahun. Memandang OKT merupakan perempuan, maka sebatan tidak boleh dikenakan mengikut seksyen 289(c) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [71] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam kes ini dan tujuan hukuman diberikan. Mahkamah mempertimbangan hukuman penjara adalah wajar dikenakan dan bukan hukuman alternatif mengambil kira tujuan hukuman diberikan adalah berbentuk pengajaran kepada OKT dan juga masyarakat secara umum. Mahkamah mengambil kira faktor mitigasi seperti usia, kesihatan dan rekod OKT dalam mempertimbangkan tempoh pemenjaraan. Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara satu tahun dan 6 bulan. [72] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan usia, tahap kesihatan OKT serta tiada rekod kesalahan lampau OKT. OKT telah berusia 56 tahun dan mempunyai masalah kesihatan seperti hyperthyroidism. Namun begitu, tindakan OKT telah menyebabkan kerugian tinggi kepada pengadu perlu diberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya. Berdasarkan kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818, Mahkamah ini telah memendekkan tempoh hukuman penjara dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor dinyatakan di atas. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [73] Untuk permohonan kos pendakwaan, Mahkamah boleh menetapkan kos mengikut sekyen 427 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan Mahkamah mengawardkan RM1500 sebagai kos pendakwaan yang perlu dibayar seminggu dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan sekiranya gagal bayar, OKT dikenakan penjara 1 bulan. Mahkamah mengambil kira jumlah hari perbicaraan banyak dan masa yang panjang di mana kos yang terlibat apabila SP1 dan saksi awam lain telah hadir beberapa kali ke Mahkamah dan kos terlibat apabila terdapat penangguhan perbicaraan pada 4 dan 25 November 2022 oleh pihak peguam bela dan OKT. [74] Peguam bela telah memohon penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara. Alasan dikemukakan adalah tahap kesihatan OKT yang tidak baik dan memerlukan rawatan. Timbalan pendakwa raya membantah permohonan kerana OKT tidak mempunyai komplikasi dan masalah kesihatan serius. Laporan perubatan menyatakan OKT dalam keadaan stabil. [75] Mahkamah mendapati alasan OKT ada sejarah perubatan hyperthyrodism tidak memadai untuk satu penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman kerana laporan menunjukkan bahawa OKT bukan “in Thyroid Storm” dan keadaan OKT adalah stabil. Hukuman penjara tidak menafikan OKT untuk mendapat perhatian rawatan susulan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Khairul Azlan bin Mohd Napi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2022] 7 MLJ 867 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: “(3) Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code had provided that when an appeal was filed, it did not automatically render the sentence passed to be stayed. Based on the affidavit filed and the reasons submitted the court found that the health problems faced by the applicant did not justify the granting of the application for stay of execution. This was because the medical officer’s report was only in respect of the illness suffered by the applicant. The medical officer did not clearly state whether the applicant required specific and periodic treatment that could not be provided in prison. The issue of the possibility that the applicant would be exposed to the Covid-19 virus was not supported by any document or confirmation that the applicant would be infected with the virus simply because he was placed in the prison. What was at stake in this case was S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 the presumption and likelihood that it would happen to the applicant. This was not sufficient to show that it was a special circumstance to allow the execution of the sentence to be stayed” [76] Berkenaan dengan alasan penjagaan cucu, juga bukan satu keadaan khas yang memadai dalam memberikan penangguhan pelaksanaan di mana tiada apa-apa keterangan oleh OKT bahawa OKT merupakan penjaga sah dari segi undang dan cucu-cucu tidak lagi mempunyai ibu bapa lagi atau penjaga yang sah. OKT menolong untuk menjaga cucu tidak memadai untuk suatu hukuman digantungkan. OKT mempunyai ahli keluarga lain seperti anak OKT yang boleh menjaga anak atau anak buahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menolak permohonan peguam bela untuk penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret MahkamahKuala Lumpur S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-04T16:29:00+0800

Tika 2.6.0

WA-83-7823-11/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH NOR AINI BINTI ALI

Seksyen 420-penipuan-pembelian bitcoin yang tidak wujud-pemikiran terkemudian(afterthought)-pembelian bertukar kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat- penerimaan keterangan Whatsapp tanpa sijil 90A

04/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=79d51f2f-a95c-486c-bb1a-84f0482aaf90&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-7823-11/2021) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN NOR AINI BINTI ALI ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh (OKT) adalah seperti berikut: Bahawa kamu, Nor Aini Binti Ali (No KP: 670311-05-5096) di antara 11/01/2018 sehingga 12/01/2018 di Jalan Bangsar, dalam Daerah Brickfields, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur telah menipu Trisno Asyraf bin Zainol Abidin (No. KP:721108-02-5323) dengan memperdayakannya untuk mempercayai bahawa kamu akan membelikan dan menyerahkan Bitcoin kepadanya sebanyak 1 unit dan dengan itu kamu secara curangnya mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan RM54,365.00 sebagai bayaran untuk mendapatkan Bitcoin tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan kerana telah melakukan penipuan. [2] OKT tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Seramai 7 orang saksi telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di peringkat pendakwaan. 04/01/2024 16:19:54 WA-83-7823-11/2021 Kand. 58 S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [3] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie, maka OKT diminta untuk membela diri. Setelah OKT memberikan keterangan bersumpah, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKT gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas pertuduhan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah telah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas kesalahan. Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan ke atas OKT dengan kos pendakwaan RM1500. B. RINGKASAN FAKTA [4] Pengadu (SP1) telah berkenalan dengan OKT dan telah melabur dengan OKT. Kemudian, SP1 telah bersetuju membeli 1 unit Bitcoin dengan harga RM54,365. SP1 telah membuat bayaran melalui pindahan wang sebanyak dua kali pada 11/1/2018 dan 12/1/2018. Adalah dipersetujui bahawa SP1 akan menerima 1 unit Bitcoin selepas 7 sehingga 14 hari setelah pembayaran dibuat. [5] SP1 telah menuntut pembelian Bitcoin tersebut daripada OKT namun OKT menyatakan bahawa Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan. Akhirnya, SP1 telah membuat laporan polis pada 2/12/2028 kerana SP1 berasa telah ditipu oleh OKT dan OKT gagal menunjukkan bukti bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin melalui Kraken. C. PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [6] Menurut seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga di dalam seksyen 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Peruntukan tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila kes pendakwaan berakhir, mahkamah akan menimbangkan sama ada pendakwaan telah membuat suatu prima facie kes terhadap tertuduh. [7] Pengujian kes secara prima facie telah diputuskan di dalam kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 302 di mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt” “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the otherside. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s. 180(2) and (3)...” [8] Begitu juga di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP (2003) 1 CLJ 734 dinyatakan sebagai; “A jugde sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and ask himself the question “ if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contain in the prosecution case?”If the answer was in the negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal…” D. PEMBUKTIAN PERTUDUHAN [9] Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan menyatakan: Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property “Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived, whether or not the deception practised was the sole or main inducement, to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine.” [10] Elemen pertuduhan seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah: i. OKT telah menipu. ii. OKT telah mendorong: a) yang mana harta itu tidak dimiliki oleh tertuduh; atau b) membuat, mengubah atau memusnahkan keseluruhan atau mana- mana bahagian suatu sekuriti yang berharga; atau c) apa-apa yang ditandatangani atau dimeterai dan boleh diubah menjadi suatu sekuriti yang berharga. iii. dia melakukannya dengan tidak jujur. [11] Seksyen 415 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinsikan penipuan seperti berikut: Cheating 415. Whoever by deceiving any person, whether or not such deception was the sole or main inducement,- S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to any person in body, mind, reputation, or property, is said to “cheat”. [12] Defini tidak jujur juga dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 24 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu sesiapa yang membuat apa-apa dengan tujuan menyebabkan keuntungan salah kepada seseorang atau kehilangan salah kepada seseorang lain tidak kira sama ada perbuatan itu menyebabkan kehilangan salah atau keuntungan salah sebenar. Elemen pertama: terdapat penipuan [13] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa elemen pertama dibuktikan melalui keterangan SP1. SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT bagi urusan pembelian Bitcoin. Menurut keterangan SP1, SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT melalui Wan Norain dan OKT yang telah menghubungi SP1 melalui WhatsApp pada 7/11/2017. Ketika itu, SP1 berminat dengan perdagangan mata wang kripto dan OKT melakukan personal ‘trading’ dalam ‘cyptocurrency’. SP1 telah berjumpa dengan OKT pada 23/12/2017 di Starbucks berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 pernah berurusan dengan OKT sebelum ini di mana OKT telah menawarkan perkhidmatan ‘trading’ dan SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM30,000 dengan OKT. [14] SP1 telah membuat keputusan untuk membelian satu unit Bitcoin dengan OKT. SP1 telah membuat bayaran seperti yang diminta oleh OKT. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa SP1 akan menerima Bitcoin dalam masa 7 sehingga 14 hari namun OKT telah memberikan alasan bahawa akaun platform Kraken milik OKT ada masalah menyebabkan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin kepada SP1. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [15] Keterangan SP1 adalah disokong oleh ekhibit P4 yang merupakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan OKT. Perbualan tersebut menunjukkan terdapat persetujuan harga bagi pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Sekian lama, SP1 tidak mendapat Bitcoin, SP1 telah berhubung dengan khidmat pelanggan Kraken untuk bertanyakan situasi Bitcoin yang tidak dapat dipindahkan. Setelah mendapat jawapan daripada pihak Kraken, SP1 mendapati bahawa asalan diberikan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak bermungkinan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin dalam tempoh masa yang panjang. SP1 berasa OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin dan Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan kerana akaun OKT ada masalah. Pihak khidmat pelanggan kraken menyatakan bahawa tidak bermunasabah bahawa akaun kraken tergantung begitu lama sehingga tidak membolehkan pemindahan Bitcoin. [16] Oleh itu, OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan Bitcoin telah dibeli dan tidak dapat dipindahkan. Elemen kedua: Mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang berjumlah RM54365 [17] Melalui slip transaksi (ekshibit P3A-B) dan juga penyata bank milik OKT (ekshibit D13 dan P29), terdapat kemasukkan wang berjumlah RM54,365 ke dalam akaun milik OKT. [18] OKT telah mendorong SP1 untuk menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin. OKT telah menawarkan harga yang lebih rendah daripada harga pasaran dan menyatakan Bitcoin akan diperolehi dalam masa 7-14 hari telah mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365. Elemen ketiga: Tertuduh melakukannya dengan tidak jujur [19] Pembayaran telah dibuat kepada akaun milik OKT dan OKT telah menerima wang tersebut namun wang tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [20] SP1 tidak menerima 1unit Bitcoin dan wang yang dibayar kepada OKT tidak dikembalikan oleh OKT. OKT telah menyebabkan SP1 kehilangan wang tersebut dan sehingga kini masih tidak dipulangkan kepada SP1. OKT telah mendapat keuntungan salah di mana duit tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. [21] SP1 tidak akan menyerahkan RM54,365 kepada OKT sekiranya OKT tidak menjanjikan untuk membelikan satu unit Bitcoin untuk SP1. Kesimpulannya, kesemua elemen pertuduhan berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. E. ISU [22] Pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan pelbagai isu dan menyatakan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen pertuduhan kerana pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel di mana OKT telah menyatakan telah membeli Bitcoin. [23] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa kredibiliti keterangan SP1 adalah boleh dipercayai di mana keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan disokong. [24] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 telah bertukar fikiran dan telah menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin selepas perjumpaan SP1 dengan OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan. Adalah versi pembelaan bahawa SP1 telah mencadangkan agar RM54,365 digunakan sebagai pinjaman modal bersyarat untuk mengembangkan perniagaan syarikat OKT atas tiga syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat tersebut adalah abang SP1 dilantik sebagai CEO syarikat, keahlian SP1 sebagai 001 dan SP1 sebagai penasihat peribadi OKT. [25] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa SP1 telah memberikan keterangan bahawa OKT membuat semua keputusannya dengan sendiri kerana OKT yang bertanggungjawab terhadap syarikatnya. SP1 juga telah menjelaskan bahawa SP1 tidak memberitahu SP2 adalah abangnya kerana SP1 tidak ingin OKT untuk bertindak berat sebelah dan ingin OKT untuk bersikap objektif dalam pelantikan CEO memandangkan SP1 dan OKT adalah kawan ketika itu. SP1 juga telah S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menjelaskan fakta bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah adik beradik sudah pastinya akan diketahui oleh OKT. [26] SP2 memberikan keterangan bahawa SP2 tidak tahu menahu berkenaan dengan apa-apa syarat yang diletakkan berkenaan dengan lantikan beliau. SP2 telah menjelaskan lantikannya atas berdasarkan temu duga yang telah diadakan dan meritnya. [27] Berkenaan dengan syarat keahlian 001, SP1 telah menjelaskan bahawa keahlian sebagai 001 telah diberikan oleh OKT sendiri. SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM18600 sebagai ahli dan mempunyai 31 akaun di mana setiap akaun adalah bernilai RM600. SP1 juga telah memberikan keterangan bahawa tiada sebarang lantikan rasmi bagi keahlian 001. [28] Pihak pembelaan juga menimbulkan isu bahawa dokumen telah diserahkan selepas perbicaraan bermula. Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa pihak pembelaan telah diberikan masa yang mencukupi untuk meneliti dokumen- dokumen tersebut kerana telah diberikan penangguhan yang sewajarnya untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan ini sama sekali tidak memprejudiskan OKT. [29] Pihak pembelaan telah menyatakan tindakan SP1 untuk menghantar “bill collector” adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Namun pihak pendakwaan bergantung keterangan SP3, yang dikatakan pengutip hutang telah menafikan dakwaan bahawa dia telah dilantik oleh SP1 dan SP3 telah menyatakan beliau menolong untuk mengenal pasti kedudukan OKT. [30] Pihak pembelaan turut mempersoalkan penerimaan bukti tangkapan skrin Whatsapp ekhibit P4 sebagai bukti tanpa diperiksa oleh pihak forensik. Mahkamah telah menolak bantahan peguam dan menerima bukti tangkapan skrin di mana perbualan asal dalam telefon bimbit telah dikemukakan. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 F. PEMBELAAN [31] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah menerima wang berjumlah RM54,365 yang dipindahkan oleh SP1. OKT juga mengesahkan perbualan awalan mengenai pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Namun OKT telah menyatakan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin tersebut telah berubah kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [32] Rumusan pembelaan daripada keterangan OKT adalah OKT telah diberikan kebenaran untuk menggunakan wang tersebut selepas OKT bersetuju tiga syarat yang diberikan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat yang dikenakan adalah bahawa SP2 dilantik sebagai CEO, SP1 sebagai ahli 001 dan penasihat peribadi OKT. [33] OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT telah mematuhi syarat dengan melantik SP2 sebagai CEO. OKT bertindak memperhentikan SP2 atas alasan bahawa SP2 telah bertindak bertentangan dengan hala tuju syarikat. [34] OKT juga menyatakan bahawa SP1 sering memberikan pendapatan dan nasihat serta membantu dalam penyediaan misi dan visi untuk Midas Touch. OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menjadi ahli 001 dan boleh dilihat melalui laman sesawang. [35] OKT telah mengemukakan bukti-bukti seperti penyata kiraan dan penyata bank bagi menyokong perbelanjaan syarikat yang menggunakan wang tersebut bagi pembayaran gaji, kos kepada ‘web developer’, bil dan sebagainya. [36] Pembelaan OKT adalah bahawa OKT tidak menipu SP1 kerana SP1 sendiri yang membuat keputusan untuk menangguhkan pembelian dan telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat kepada OKT. OKT telah menerima tawaran tersebut. G. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [37] Mahkamah akan menjawab bantahan mengenai penerimaan ekshibit P4. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Pannir Selvam a/l Sinnaiyah & Anor v Tan Chia Foo & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 384 di Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “(3) The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention based on the parallels drawn to the case of Lim Choon Hau v Simpson Wong where the court held that Whatsapp messages were direct evidence of the receipt of money as a friendly loan from the plaintiff. The documents produced by a computer still admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it was admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. The court viewed that the WhatsApp messages were relevant and admissible as they demonstrated the connection to the facts in issue so as to form part of the same transaction. It triggered the application of s 6 of the Evidence Act (see paras 57, 61 & 67).” [38] Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan kebolehterimaan keterangan whatsapp walaupun tiada sijil 90A seperti di bawah: [60] I am unable to agree with this submission, in view of the fact that he did not provide any authorities to support his contention that all WhatsApp messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, bearing in mind that the maker of those messages, who was SP2, was cross-examined. [61] Secondly, even if those messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, there are authorities such as Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 MLJ 317; [2014] 1 LNS 412 (CA) and Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 739; [2016] 6 CLJ 266 to say that documents produced by a computer may still be admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it is admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. [39] Peguam bela hanya membantah keterangan P4 kerana tiada sijil 90A dibekalkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan telefon bimbit tidak dihantar untuk pemeriksaan forensik. [40] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 di mana Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 menyatakan seperti berikut berkenaan pemakaian Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan: Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Shaik Daud: Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 menjadikan rekod komputer yang dibuat semasa penggunaan biasa boleh diterima jika yang berikut dibuktikan, iaitu bahawa: (i) dokumen-dokumen dihasilkan oleh sebuah komputer; dan (ii) rekod komputer dihasilkan semasa penggunaan biasa. Bukti boleh dikemukakan sama ada dalam bentuk sijil yang ditandatangani oleh satu-satunya orang yang bertanggungjawab tentang komputer yang menghasilkan cetakan sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh s 90A(2), atau oleh seorang pegawai bank. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Mahadev Shankar: Zainal tidak dicabar oleh perayu atas kejituan catatan dokumen yang dikemukakan. Sebaliknya, rayuan adalah berdasarkan fakta bahawa tiada sijil telah dikemukakan di bawah s 90A(2) yang mana, perayu menghujahkan, bermakna bahawa pihak pendakwa telah gagal membuktikan kesnya. Hujah ini adalah berdasarkan falasi, kerana Zainal bertanggungjawab atas semua pengendalian di bank dan dengan itu adalah bertanggungjawab atas urusan aktiviti bank yang dijalankan oleh komputer tersebut. Sekiranya dia memilih untuk menyediakan suatu sijil, dia boleh berbuat demikian dan di bawah s 90A(2), dokumen-dokumen akan diterima sebagai keterangan seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 90A(1). Keterangan viva voce seseorang dalam kandang saksi lebih penting daripada suatu sijil yang dikeluarkan olehnya (lihat ms 13G—I). Seksyen 90A(1) merupakan suatu pengemaskinian ‘rukun keterangan paling baik’ dengan realiti zaman elektronik, dan kini ia tidak lagi perlu untuk memanggil juruwang atau kerani bank yang memasukkan data dengan syarat dia berbuat demikian semasa penggunaan biasa komputer (lihat ms 14A—D). S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [41] Pemakaian sijil seksyen 90A juga dibincangkan dalam kes Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] MLJU 385 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: (i)Tape recording evidence or CCTV recording, etc. at common law will be admissible based on 'res gestae' principles as truth of its contents although they may be hearsay or even self serving statement. Section 6 of EA 1950 and also other sections give statutory recognition to 'res gestae' principle in the widest form and is not restricted to the common law parameters. The test for relevancy is set out in the section itself in no uncompromising terms. There appears to be no comprehensive formula for its admissibility save as to guidelines suggested and/or imposed by courts all for good reasons. [See Amrrita Lai Hazra v Emperor 42 Cal 957; Bandahala bin Undik v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 CLJ 708 ]. The said section 6 of EA 1950 reads as follows: "Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places." (ii)At common law any form of tape recording, video recording, etc.; if relevant is made admissible if the court is satisfied of its accuracy and that it has not been tampered with, etc. The jurisprudence relating to its admissibility as well as sections 3 and 61 of EA 1950 is set out in Janab's Key to Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 2nd edition and it reads as follows: "Document before the 1993 Amendment A 851 to the Act was defined in section 3 of the Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter. Under the new amendment it includes any matter embodied in a disc, tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever. A wide and extended meaning has been given to the definition 'document'. Previously documents at least related to things which could not be easily tampered with. Now documents include items which could be easily tampered with. It is submitted that the admission S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of such documents which could be easily tampered with must be admitted with caution." In R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 465 Marshall J observed: "… for many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The print as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording conversations. We see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such documents when produced for the inspection of the court are referred to as documentary evidence. Thus, documentary evidence may include not only documents in writing but also maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, discs, tapes videotapes, films and negatives (see Cross on Evidence)." (iii)The amendments in relation to documents to EA 1950 do not in any way affect the common law position as set out in R v Maqsud Ali. The amendments S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 allow further hearsay documents which may be difficult to be made admissible under the common law because of the hearsay rule and its prejudicial effect, to be made admissible provided the criteria set out in the amendments are complied with. The new amendments such as section 90A do not displace common law rules as to admissibility. That is to say if the party cannot admit a document in consequence of the common law restriction then he may get the document admitted under any of the new provisions such as section 90A, etc. [42] Mahkamah mendapati mendapati peguam bela tidak berhujah bahawa perbualan Whatsapp adalah tidak revelan dan hanya membantah kerana ketiadaan sijil 90A. Mahkamah mendapati P4 adalah keterangan yang relevan di mana penawaran pembelian Bitcoin dan persetujuan serta transaksi dilakukan adalah perbualan yang terkandung dalam P4. Mahkamah berpuas hati ketulenan perbualan Whatsapp apabila SP1 masih menyimpan keseluruhan perbualan Whatsapp dan telefon bimbit yang mengandungi kesemua perbualan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dalam keadaan baik. Malah di peringkat pembelaan, OKT tidak menafikan kandungan Whatsapp dan bersetuju bahawa itu adalah perbualan antara OKT dan SP1. Oleh itu, ketiadaan sijil 90A tidak menjejaskan kebolehterimaan ekshibit P4. [43] Pihak pembelaan ada menimbulkan isu ketidakaturan prosedur kawad cam. Daripada keterangan kesemua saksi, adalah fakta bahawa OKT dan SP1 mengenali antara satu sama lain untuk satu tempoh masa yang panjang dan berurusan dalam perdagangan mata wang kripto dan isu pengecaman OKT adalah tidak diperlukan dan pengecaman daripada kandang adalah memadai. [44] Pemindahan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin adalah fakta tidak dipertikaikan. Persoalan utama dalam kes ini adalah sama ada terdapat penipuan dilakukan OKT atau terdapat pinjaman modal bersyarat yang dikatakan oleh OKT. [45] SP1 bertegas bahawa tiada perubahan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin dan tidak pernah menawarkan syarat seperti mana yang dicadangkan oleh peguam bela S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 manakala OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menukarkan pembelian tersebut kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [46] OKT telah bersetuju pada tiada keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Alasan ketiadaan dokumen bertulis adalah OKT telah menyuruh SP1 menyediakan perjanjian tersebut namun SP1 tidak berbuat demikian sehingga hari ini. [47] Memandangkan ketiadaan keterangan bertulis, maka Mahkamah perlu menilai kredibiliti keterangan lisan saksi-saksi. Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, peguam bela hanya meletakkan cadangan bahawa SP1 telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Namun, peguam bela tidak pernah bertanyakan soalan tentang penyedian dokumen bagi pinjaman modal bersyarat oleh SP1. SP1 hanya diajukan penyediaan dokumen untuk pelantikan CEO dan misi,visi bagi Midas Touch yang menjurus kepada penglibatkan SP1 dalam syarikat OKT. [48] Keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten di mana SP1 menyatakan bahawa tidak berkemungkinan untuk SP1 untuk menukarkan tujuan asal kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat apabila SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut. [49] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 yang bertukar fikiran dan yang menyuruh menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin dalam masa 3 hari. Pada 1 sehingga 3 Februari 2018, di mana SP1 telah berjumpa OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan dan mencadangkan duit RM54,365 akan disumbangkan ke dalam sekiranya 3 syarat dipatuhi dan sekiranya OKT masih belum membeli Bitcoin. [50] Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan telah mengajukan soalan- soalan yang kurang relevan yang berkenaan pelaburan RM30,000 secara terperinci. Namun, aduan SP1 dan pertuduhan adalah berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 bersetuju bahawa SP1 membuat perdagangan dan pelaburan dengan OKT namun SP1 menyatakan SP1 tertipu dengan pembelian Bitcoin kerana beliau tidak menerima Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [51] Mengikut perbualan awalan, SP1 dimaklumkan bahawa pembelian Bitcoin adalah melalui akaun kraken. SP1 menunggu pemindahan Bitcoin oleh OKT namun tidak dilakukan atas alasan bahawa terdapat masalah dengan akaun kraken. SP1 telah berasa tertipu setelah menyoal perkara ini dengan pihak kraken bahawa mustahil akaun kraken disekat sekian lama walaupun digodam. [52] Namun, kini versi OKT adalah OKT tidak semestinya perlu membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken memandangkan terdapat pelbagai cara pembelian Bitcoin dapat dibuat. Kemudian, OKT menerangkan prosedur pembelian Bitcoin melalui kraken adalah jauh lebih susah kerana perlu menukarkan kepada mata wang fiat terlebih dahulu bagi tujuan pembelian kripto. OKT menyatakan akaun OKT adalah pada peringkat permulaan (starter) maka memerlukan banyak transaksi dilakukan bagi tujuan pembelian Bitcoin malah perlu menunggu masa yang lama. [53] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sekiranya OKT berasa sukar untuk membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken, mengapakan OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT akan melakukan transaksi menggunakan kraken. Keterangan OKT adalah tidak konsisten di mana OKT pada mula mendekati pengadu dengan penggunaan akaun kraken di mana kini OKT menyatakan bahawa pembelian dengan kraken adalah sukar. OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa apa-apa tindakan penukaran mata wang fiat untuk pembelian Bitcoin. Dalam perbualan Whatsapp P4, OKT mengesa pengadu membayar dan OKT akan transfer duit ke dalam akaun kraken. [54] OKT menyatakan OKT cuba meningkatkan tahap akaunnya ke peringat pertengahan (intermediate) sejak 2017 namun hanya tahun 2023, pihak kraken telah memberikan verifikasi akaun pertengahan. Apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah perbualan dengan kraken bahawa OKT akhirnya mendapat akaun pertengahan setelah sekian lama dipohon. OKT tidak pernah menunjukkan bahawa akaun OKT dibuka sejak bila dan sejak bila permohonan pernah dibuat. OKT hanya mengemukakan perbualan pada tahun 2023 selepas OKT telah dituduh di Mahkamah dan perbicaraan telah lama berjalan. Oleh itu, nilai keterangan mengenai pengiktirafan akaun pertengahan pada tahun 2023 adalah amat rendah dan tidak membantu menyokong keterangan OKT. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [55] OKT dipersoalkan sekiranya tidak menggunakan kraken, mengapakah OKT masih gagal membuat pembelian menggunakan aplikasi lain sedangkan OKT menyatakan bahawa akaun kraken OKT adalah terhad. OKT memberikan alasan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM dan harga Bitcoin menaik. Namun, perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa peringkat pendakwaan. Dakwaan bahawa Bitcoin naik mendadak menyebabkan OKT tidak membelikan Bitcoin tidak pernah ditimbulkan kepada saksi pendakwaan. OKT telah mengemukakan Ekshibit D39A-E bagi menunjukkan harga pasaran Bitcoin. Namun, D39 A,C,D dan E adalah tidak relevan memandangkan harga pasaran adalah bukan tahun 2018. [56] Sekiranya merujuk kepada D39B, tidak menunjukkan perubahan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT kerana graf tersebut menunjukkan harga tahun 2018 sehingga 2020. Keterangan OKT sekali lagi tidak disokong oleh ekshibit D39B. [57] OKT turut menyatakan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM menyebabkan OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin. Namun, OKT setuju dengan cadangan bahawa pembelian mata wang kripto adalah boleh dilakukan pada bila-bila dan tiada waktu penutupan bagi pembelian mata wang asing. OKT menyatakan SP1 yang memberikan kelonggaran masa untuk membeli Bitcoin. Perkara ini sekali lagi tidak pernah ditimbulkan sewaktu peringkat pendakwaan. SP1 tidak pernah ditanya bahawa beliau yang memberi kelonggaran masa kepada OKT membeli Bitcoin dan juga harga Bitcoin menaik. [58] Semasa peringkat pemeriksaan balas, OKT telah menyatakan OKT mempunyai nota yang mencatat persetujuan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Apabila ditanya mengapa perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan di peringkat pendakwaan mahupun pemeriksaan utama di peringkat pembelaa dan OKT menjawab bahawa beliau tidak ditanya. Semasa pemeriksaan utama, OKT hanya menyatakan tiada perjanjian kerana SP1 tidak menyediakan. OKT juga tidak memaklumkan nota tersebut kepada pegawai penyiasat. Nota tersebut tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah hanya ditimbulkan semasa pemeriksaan balas. [59] Berkenaan dengan syarat yang dikatakan dikenakan oleh SP1, Mahkamah mendapati OKT yang mempunyai kuasa penuh pelantikan SP2 di mana OKT S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 telah menolak draf surat yang disediakan oleh SP1 dan menggunakan surat syarat perlantikan oleh syarikat. Adalah jelas OKT mempunyai kuasa penuh dalam pengurusan syarikat dan keputusan muktamad adalah pada OKT dan bukan pada SP1. Ketika itu, syarikat OKT memerlukan modal dan OKT juga menyatakan OKT tidak dapat pinjaman bank atas sebab tiada rekod pinjaman. Atas faktor tersebut, OKT menyatakan telah menerima pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah mustahil sebuah syarikat boleh memperoleh satu pinjaman bersyarat tanpa syarat pemulangan. OKT menyediakan perjanjian bagi pelaburan lain seperti pelaburan RM30,000 namun tidak menyediakan apa-apa dokumen untuk jumlah wang yang lebih besar. OKT yang menyediakan perjanjian untuk RM30,000 sebelum wujudnya penawaran Bitcoin kepada SP1. Malah, OKT telah mengemukakan kesemua email untuk lampirkan pemulangan bagi pelaburan trading tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak munasabah bahawa tiada satu keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat seperti yang didakwa oleh OKT. OKT juga gagal menjelaskan secara terperinci berapa jumlah bayaran balik dan tempoh pulangan pinjaman tersebut. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah diragui dan tidak kredibel. [60] Mahkamah merujuk Public Prosecutor v Subahir bin Salmin [2009] MLJU 670 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Mahkamah yang mempercayai versi pembelaan. “ However, in respect of the First Charge, I do not agree with the acquittal of the Respondent. I find that the trial Judge had erred in fact and in law. The main reason why she acquitted the Respondent was because she believed in the Defence story that there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to assist SP1 to get 3 months of full salary and his overtime pay even though SP1 did not work the full months for September, October and November 2001. Here, I agree with the Prosecution's submission that the Defence did not raise specifically and in detail the existence of such an agreement of the Company's Management in the course of cross-examining the Prosecution's witness, in particular SP7 i.e. on the question whether it was on the orders of the Company's Management that SPI's kon card was to be S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 filled in that manner so that SP1 could be paid in full even though he was on medical leave. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that at page 124 of the Appeal Record, the Defence Counsel had questioned SP7 regarding such agreement of the Company's Management to help SP1 but SP7 merely replied "tidak ingat". A perusal of the evidence at page 124 of the Appeal Record shows that SP7 was cross-examined on whether he had discussed with the Respondent and SD2 regarding compensation to be paid. SP7 replied that he could not remember. SP7 was then asked whether the salary for October and November 2001 was paid in full as compensation since SP1 did not have insurance and SOCSO. Again SP7 replied that he could not remember. As submitted by the Appellant, even if SP7 could not remember, the Defence should have pursued the matter further and asked SP7 specifically and in detail whether there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to pay SP1 the full salaries for October and November 2001 in order to assist SP1 who had no insurance or SOCSO. Since the Defence failed to raise this agreement specifically during the cross-examination of the Prosecution witnesses, it means that what the Defence later raised during the Defence stage should be rejected on the ground that the evidence regarding the agreement by the Company's Management is a mere concoction or fabrication, or an afterthought. The law regarding this issue is trite.” [61] Walaupun OKT menimbulkan perjanjian modal bersyarat di peringkat pendakwaan, namun OKT tidak menyatakan apa syarat lain selain syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. OKT tidak pernah menyentuh apa-apa perkara tentang pemulangan pinjaman modal bersyarat dan tempoh pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati pinjaman modal bersyarat merupakan satu pemikiran terkemudian oleh OKT. Berdasarkan keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut namun OKT tiada niat untuk membeli Bitcoin bagi SP1. Hal ini dapat dilihat bahawa alasan-alasan dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan konsisten. Sekiranya OKT mempunyai niat membeli Bitcoin untuk SP1, sepertimana yang dinyatakan OKT mempunyai pelbagai cara lain dan tidak semestinya membeli S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 melalui Kraken namun OKT tidak berbuat demikian. OKT telah mengesa SP1 membuat bayaran segera bagi tujuan pembelian namun OKT kini menyatakan dalam tempoh 3 hari pertama, OKT tidak membeli kerana sibuk dan harga Bitcoin naik. Namun dilihat daripada ekshibit D39B, tiada kenaikan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT. OKT menyatakan OKT mengajak SP1 membeli Bitcoin dengan sendiri dengan menggunakan akaun Luno SP1. Keterangan bertentangan dengan perbualan Whatsapp, di mana OKT yang beria-ria untuk menawarkan penjualan Bitcoin kepada OKT (ekshibit P4(2)). [62] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah tidak kredibel dan konsisten dan bersifat pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) berkenaan dengan isu penyediaan dokumen perjanjian. OKT sering bertanyakan kepada SP1 dalam membantu OKT mendraf dokumen dan semua dokumen didraf oleh SP1 seperti perlantikan CEO, visi dan misi Midas Touch. Namun OKT menyatakan SP1 tidak membuat draf dengan pinjaman modal bersyarat walaupun diminta. Mahkamah kurang mempercayai keterangan OKT di mana sekiranya jumlah pinjaman dikatakan adalah tinggi dan ianya melibatkan kepentingan pengadu, adalah mustahil SP1 enggan untuk mendraf satu perjanjian untuk memastikan kepentingannya terjamin dan juga pulangannya. [63] OKT telah menyatakan OKT akan memindahkan Bitcoin selepas 7-14 hari kemasukkan duit. Perkara ini tidak dapat dilakukan dengan akaun OKT sebagai starter dan ianya dalam pengetahuan OKT kerana pembelian melalui akaun starter memerlukan masa yang amat panjang memandangkan akaun starter mempunyai hak transaksi. SP1 telah bertanyakan sekiranya harga naik, SP1 masih boleh membeli dengan harga yang dipersetujui. Kini alasan alasan harga naik, OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin amat bercanggah dengan perbualan Whatsapp OKT dengan pengadu seperti di P4. [64] Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah memperdayakan SP1 membayar wang berjumlah RM54365 untuk pembelian Bitcoin di mana OKT tidak ada niat membeli atau membeli Bitcoin dan telah menipu pengadu bahawa Bitcoin telah dibeli tetapi Bitcoin tersebut tidak wujud. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati OKT gagal S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 menimbulkan keraguan munasabah dan OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. H. HUKUMAN [65] Antara faktor mitigasi yang dikemukakan oleh peguam bela adalah seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh berumur 56 tahun; (b) Merupakan ibu tunggal sejak kematian suami tahun 2008; (c) Mempunyai 15 cucu dan OKT menanggung 6 cucu yang tinggal bersamanya; (d) Memberikan kerjasama baik dengan pihak polis; (e) mempunyai masalah kesihatan hyperthroid sejak 2008 dan masih menerima rawatan sehingga sekarang; dan (f) Pesalah pertama [66] Peguam bela terpelajar memohon agar satu hukuman di bawah peruntukkan seksyen 294 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah diberikan berdasarkan faktor mitigasi diberikan. [67] Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan ‘victim impact statement’ oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kerugian wang yang banyak disebabkan penipuan OKT. Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman penjara dikenakan untuk melindungi kepentingan awam. Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa transaksi sebegini tidak dikawal selia dan memberikan ruang kepada penipuan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan terdapat keuntungan salah oleh OKT dan jumlah tersebut adalah tinggi. Pihak pendakwaan telah merujuk tred hukuman dalam kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818 di Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 24 bulan bagi kerugian RM33,300. Pihak memohon kos pendakwaan kerana terdapat 7 saksi dipanggil dan perbicaraan mengambil tempoh masa yang lama. [68] Peguam bela memohon pertimbangan bahawa OKT merupakan pesalah pertama dan peguam bela membantah terhadap kos. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [69] Mahkamah telah menolak permohonan peguam untuk bon berkelakuan baik kerana ianya tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Seksyen 294(6) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah menyatakan bon tidak boleh diberikan untuk kesalahan serius dan tafisran ksesalahan serius adalah di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah tergolong kesalahan serius dan tidak boleh diberikan pertimbangan bon seperti yang dipohon. [70] Mahkamah perlu menjatuhkan hukuman berdasarkan undang-undang dan prinsip kehakiman. Mahkamah merujuk kes Public Prosecutor v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 and PP v Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 MLJ 401.Seksyen 420 memperuntukkan hukuman penjara tidak kurang daripada 1 tahun dan tidak lebih 10 tahun dan sebatan dan juga boleh dikenakan denda. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara kurang 1 tahun. Mahkamah juga tertakluk kepada bidang kuasa di bawah seksyen 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 di mana Mahkamah Majistret tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara melebihi 5 tahun. Memandang OKT merupakan perempuan, maka sebatan tidak boleh dikenakan mengikut seksyen 289(c) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [71] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam kes ini dan tujuan hukuman diberikan. Mahkamah mempertimbangan hukuman penjara adalah wajar dikenakan dan bukan hukuman alternatif mengambil kira tujuan hukuman diberikan adalah berbentuk pengajaran kepada OKT dan juga masyarakat secara umum. Mahkamah mengambil kira faktor mitigasi seperti usia, kesihatan dan rekod OKT dalam mempertimbangkan tempoh pemenjaraan. Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara satu tahun dan 6 bulan. [72] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan usia, tahap kesihatan OKT serta tiada rekod kesalahan lampau OKT. OKT telah berusia 56 tahun dan mempunyai masalah kesihatan seperti hyperthyroidism. Namun begitu, tindakan OKT telah menyebabkan kerugian tinggi kepada pengadu perlu diberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya. Berdasarkan kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818, Mahkamah ini telah memendekkan tempoh hukuman penjara dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor dinyatakan di atas. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [73] Untuk permohonan kos pendakwaan, Mahkamah boleh menetapkan kos mengikut sekyen 427 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan Mahkamah mengawardkan RM1500 sebagai kos pendakwaan yang perlu dibayar seminggu dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan sekiranya gagal bayar, OKT dikenakan penjara 1 bulan. Mahkamah mengambil kira jumlah hari perbicaraan banyak dan masa yang panjang di mana kos yang terlibat apabila SP1 dan saksi awam lain telah hadir beberapa kali ke Mahkamah dan kos terlibat apabila terdapat penangguhan perbicaraan pada 4 dan 25 November 2022 oleh pihak peguam bela dan OKT. [74] Peguam bela telah memohon penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara. Alasan dikemukakan adalah tahap kesihatan OKT yang tidak baik dan memerlukan rawatan. Timbalan pendakwa raya membantah permohonan kerana OKT tidak mempunyai komplikasi dan masalah kesihatan serius. Laporan perubatan menyatakan OKT dalam keadaan stabil. [75] Mahkamah mendapati alasan OKT ada sejarah perubatan hyperthyrodism tidak memadai untuk satu penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman kerana laporan menunjukkan bahawa OKT bukan “in Thyroid Storm” dan keadaan OKT adalah stabil. Hukuman penjara tidak menafikan OKT untuk mendapat perhatian rawatan susulan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Khairul Azlan bin Mohd Napi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2022] 7 MLJ 867 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: “(3) Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code had provided that when an appeal was filed, it did not automatically render the sentence passed to be stayed. Based on the affidavit filed and the reasons submitted the court found that the health problems faced by the applicant did not justify the granting of the application for stay of execution. This was because the medical officer’s report was only in respect of the illness suffered by the applicant. The medical officer did not clearly state whether the applicant required specific and periodic treatment that could not be provided in prison. The issue of the possibility that the applicant would be exposed to the Covid-19 virus was not supported by any document or confirmation that the applicant would be infected with the virus simply because he was placed in the prison. What was at stake in this case was S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 the presumption and likelihood that it would happen to the applicant. This was not sufficient to show that it was a special circumstance to allow the execution of the sentence to be stayed” [76] Berkenaan dengan alasan penjagaan cucu, juga bukan satu keadaan khas yang memadai dalam memberikan penangguhan pelaksanaan di mana tiada apa-apa keterangan oleh OKT bahawa OKT merupakan penjaga sah dari segi undang dan cucu-cucu tidak lagi mempunyai ibu bapa lagi atau penjaga yang sah. OKT menolong untuk menjaga cucu tidak memadai untuk suatu hukuman digantungkan. OKT mempunyai ahli keluarga lain seperti anak OKT yang boleh menjaga anak atau anak buahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menolak permohonan peguam bela untuk penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret MahkamahKuala Lumpur S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-04T16:29:00+0800

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-565-08/2023

PLAINTIF CHAN CHEE CHIN @ CHUN CHOO CHIN DEFENDAN 1. ) LEE YOON HUAT 2. ) YOH SHEUE SHYUAN 3. ) CHIN YIK KEIN 4. ) SINTARI SDN BHD

Company – striking out under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 – whether the claim is plainly or obviously unsustainable against the 4th Defendant - Whether the suit against the 4th Defendant should be Struck Out – Whether the 4th Defendant presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon - No Cause of Action or any remedy pleaded against the 4th Defendant

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a8a36bce-1ce1-43f5-aa0d-381b202384ef&Inline=true

GOJ SINTARI SB 018 (grounds striking out 4th Defendant).pdf 04/01/2024 17:00:30 WA-22NCC-565-08/2023 Kand. 43 S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCC—565—DB/2023 Kand. 43 24,01,201; 1, \N THE HVGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCXAL DIVISION) WRIT OF summons No.: wA-22m:c.5s5-omnza BETWEEN CHAN CHEE CHIN @ CHUN CH00 CHIN (NRIC Na..49D12D—71—5305) . PLAINWFF AND 1 LEE vooN HLIAT (NRIC No.: 78620-05-5273) 2 VOH SHEUE SHYUAN (NRIC Na.. 751005-10-5302) 3 CHIN wk KE\N (NRIC Na..590507»10-6033) A swum SDN arm (company No zuaaomozass) .DEFENDANTS 2 5w zmuNOEcnuDuDY§I:\I:oE7w mm Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 5% Grounds ouudg m lnImdIu:t' n The AW Defendanl above named have applied |u slnke am the Plammrs claun under Order 15 rule 19 olthe Rules of com 2012 The argument pul «arm by the 4* De¢end.ann has on the lad that were was no cause ai men or even any remedies claimed by me Plaunhll m us c\a|m against me 4*" Defendant Alter reviewing the Statement 0! cwaxm, Hind that the Al" Delendant has suooessiully shown to mus Cnurl (ha| the clam agamst it should be struck out mm that «ms \s a p\am and obvluus case where the pawerlu strike out should be exercwsed Law on smkmg out smking om a dawn \s a draocman power pmwued «u «ms Cuufl under Order we nne 19 n snmm unly be exemseu when «ms Cmm finds me: the clam: is mam and obvmusxy unsustainame mm m becomes nmpossmle (or the case to succeed. I re(er to me decwsxon ollhe Supreme Coun In Bandar Eulldur Sdn Blvd .1 ms v United Mllnyan Ennklnq Corporation Bhd mm] 4 CLJ 7 where Mohamed Dzawddln FCJ held — sw zmumozcnuonbtqmcozvw -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm "The prrncrples upon wmch lhe Courl acls rri exercrsing its power urraar any oi ma ieur lrrnbs am is r. 191 Rules oi the Hlgh flare well semen ll IS anly In plaln arm ocyraus cases lhal recourse sncula be had la lhe summary process under lhls rule (per cley M R in Hubbuck v Wl/klnson [1399] 1 as as, p all, and llus summary procedure can nrily be adopted when ri can be clearly seen ihal a clalm or answer IS on me lace of ll “obviously unsustainable“ iAllonrey- General er Duchy or Lancaster v. L. 8. rvw Ry. Co [1592] 3 Ch 274, CA) ll cannot be exercised by a rnrnure examlnellan urine documenls and iacls alme case, In order lu see wlreiher the party has a cause uf aclrcn er a delence iwenlock v Malaneymss 1WLR123E,[1965]2 AH ER 371, CA) The auihovllles mrlher show «ha: rl ihere a poinl oi law requires serious discussion‘ an objeclron should be |aken on (he pleamngs and lhe pornl sei down ior argument lmdero 33 r. giwhrch rs lnpara rnalsrra wrln cure as r. 2 Rules cl lhe Hlgh E (Hubbuc)< y. wrlkrrrsan) (supra) The ccun must be sallslled lhal ihere is na reasonable cause cl amlon ar that me claims are irwclous or vexaliuus urihal me defences lalsed are HUI arguable" 5 There are lwn ways in whlch a claim may be plainly or obviously urrsusrarnanlc as explained by lha srrrgapora calm oi Appeal in The Bung: Melltli (201214 sue 545, where v K Rarah JA slated - ‘39 In curvrew, lhrs analylrcal, iacl—law crslrnnran can srrnrlarly be apphed lo 0 18 r l9i1)(b) arlhe ROC orthe lnherenliurlsdlnlon or me courllo strike oui Imsusialnable aclions, such a d clion helps lo more clearly elucidaie whai a own means when l! holds (Hal an ecllon ls "pIalrl\y or abvlously" unsustainable Applylng ms 3 IN zmulwzcvuonbtgblcozvw wane s.rr.r M... will re used m yaw re mrrrmr-r sun; nnmmnrrl vn muha wrul conceptual pnsm. a “plalnly or Obviously“ unsustainable actton would be one whtcn is either (5) Legallyunsustatnable lf‘l|may|:leclearasamaIIeruHawa| the outset that even it a party were to succeed in brdtrtng all the «acts that he divers to prove he will nul be entttled to the remedy that he seeks“, or to) Factually unsustatnable tilt is “passlble to saywtth conndence beldre trial ma| the tactual basts tor the claim is lancttul because it is enttrely without substance, [tcr example‘ ti tt ts] clear heyund questton that the statement ol tans contradtcted by at the documents or other rnatertal on whtch tt ts based“.' 7 The above was adopted by the Federal court tn Tel wet Many A on v Malaysia Allllnas Him 5 other Appeals [2fl1K]9 cu 425 8 ll ts true that tithe pleadings disclose a reasonable cause ol acttun and tr it could be shown that there are “issues of law that need to be elaborated and argued tn great detail and for mature consideration“, then this court should not strike out the sutt. 9. lsnould also constder «there are relevant lactual issues that redutre deliberation at the «acts through witnesses llthere are such tssues, thts Courl should not utilize its powers to slrlke out the claim was! order 18 ntIe19 Rules ol court 2012. to. At the same time, I am aware olmy duty to constder the clatnt and the amdavtt evidenee tn tutaltty to determine whether there extsts a N zntul|1OEcDuDnDY§blI:DE7w use Slim M... will be used M mm me nllfllnnllw Mtms mam. vn AFVLING wet 5% 11 reasonable cause 0! acllorl lhal oughl lo be relerrea to at lrlal. For lhrs purpuse, I reproduce lha umgmahl or Molld Azml sc.l In Bank lveqm Mahysla v Molld lsmall (19921 1 cu Rep 14, where hrs Lurdshlp quoted the Judgmenl allhe Prlvy Cuuncll VI Eng Mee Yong v Lelcnumarran 119791 1 LNS 1a, which is repmduced heveln — ‘Although m the normal way ll ls hm appropnale lor a Judge lo aI|emp| lo resolve cohlllcls ol evldenoe an amdavlh lhrs does no: mean lhal he ls bound to anneal uncrlhcally. as ralslng a mspule ol lacl whlch calls «or lunher lnvesllgallcln, every slalernehr an an affldavit however equlllucal, Vacklng In preclslon‘ lnDl:nsIs|erl( wrlh uhalspuled contemporary documenls or other slalemehls by me same deporlerll, or rnherenlly lrnprobable ln ltse may be.“ l also note lhal lhe Delehaams also argue lhal lhe alarm ls abuslve and relles on Order 92 rule 4 ollhe Rules ol Coun For lhls purpose. l have laken Inlo aocounl the exnlarreuon glven by (he caun cl Appeal as whal ls lahlarnaunl lo abuslve behavlour In ZalnaIAbldIn bin mmlu @ s luanlam VKeIa]nn Malaysla [ma] 5 ML! x53.- “[16]The ealegones er abuse uf prunes: are never closed and MH cerlalnly prnlrlerale pursuanl lo lhe myriad of clrcumslances avallable from lhe lactual rhalrlx lourld V7 each parucular case“ l also reler |o lhe declslorl alrhe coun ai Appeal In Hmpah Permal Sdn Bhd V Siblh Fares! Industries Sdn Blvd [21711] 1 CLI Z35 sw zmlAN0EcDuDnDY§blI:oE7w -use s.n.r M... wlll be used m mm me uumlh mm; nnmmnnl vn muhe wrul 5% 12. c. Gwen lne above, lor lne Delendanls lo suooesslully smke out me clam they musl snow mal me olalm as pleaded oy lne Plalntllls IS so obvlausly or plalnly unsuslamable wnemer lh s should he Slluck On! No Cause of Action or any remudy ploadud agaansl (ha 4'" Dehndaut. 13. 14 15 15 11 l nave perused me slalamenl ol Clalm and nnd lnal lna Plalnllll nas not pleaded any cause ol acnon agalnsl lne 4"‘ Defendanl The claim revolves around me shares held by me 1*‘ lo we 3"‘ uelendanls thal allegedly were held on trust on me Plalnlilrs behalf or belong to me F-lalnnlv, There ls no claim lnal was pameularized by me Plalrlllff agalrlsl me 4*" Delendanl. l also nole mal me remedies clalmed by me Plaintlll are solely agalnst me 1“ to 3”‘ Defendants. No vemedles are slaled in the sald stalernenl ol Clalm agalnsl me 4'" Delendanl. Aoourdlng no me Plalnllll, me only reasun why he added Ihe 4'" Delendam is because ne wanled tn ensure mat, if he ls successful, me 4*" Defendant wlH cause me shares claimed agalns| me 1“ lo 3'“ Delendanl to be Iranslerved lo mm In olner words. he says mal the 4* Defendanl should be relalrled as a nonnnal Delendanl Alter curlsldenng the last: and me pleaded case befure me l llnd lnal lne Dunflnued presence onne 41" uelendan IS not necessary Desplle 1ne lam lnal me dlspule concerns we lhls pmceedlng 5 sn zrnul|1OEclluDnDY§blI:oE7w -use s.n.1 Ilumhll wlll 1. used m mm 1.. annnnn Mvns nnmmnnl vn mune wrul 5% ta. ta. 20. 2t. 22. shares held by the 1“ to 3"’ Detendant tn the 4“ Deterldanlt the presence at the 4'" Delendant ts not necessary The tssuee that are pleaded that need to be dectded by thts court are only ecncerntng the telattanshtp and the aclluns solely between the Platnttrt and the other Delendants The pleaded case does not make any allegattons or tnvolve any acts ol the 4"‘ Defendant. l note that the Platnttll relers to the dectstan at the Htgh court tn Syarikar Fain Sdn Bhd y Faiz sdn Bhd (2011) J CLJ J46 but I do not belteve that the satd case asstst the Plaintitv The taets cl thts case, as pleaded. shows that its presence ts not necessary to ensure that all matters in dtspute may be ettectually and completely determtned and adtudtcated upon The dtspute enly concerns the Platntth and the other Delendants They do dencern shares tn the 4*" Delendant bul that does not mean that the 4'" l:-elendant should be made a pany tn this suil More so when aauneel tor the 4“ Delendant has glven nts unflertaklrlg that hts attent wtll ccmply wtth any orders of court tlthts Cuun was to hnu that the shares tn the 4"’ Delendant should be ttansterred tc the Plainlifiltum the 1" ta am Delenuants l have also corlsldeled the Platnttvrs rettance on Ambusa Maya v IJM Flanmlon Barhnd [2021] 1 LNS 1606 and Wong Klen Ylp v Eyud splnl MIII sdn End [2022] 5 CLJ 259 The facts and the pleaded case tn Wong Kien vtp y Eyavd spiral Mill sun aha tsupra) are suastanttally dttlerent to the pleaded case belcre me In that case. the clatm ccnoetns an appllcahmt under 7 sth zrnlAl‘}0EcDuDnDY§blI:DE7w ‘Nab! s.tt.t mmhlv wt“ be used M mm me nlWlruH|Y Mvtls nnmmnhl vn AFVLING wrtll 23. 24 secllon 345 a! me Companies Ac| that dawns «he aways 0! me company were urmenaken appresswely agamsl a member of me company. In muse types oi cases, we company has in be made a party to me sum as lhe rehefs dawned mu have an Impact on me decisions made prewously m we company and any unlawvul vesmunon ol dvenors may have m be changed. Vn «ms case, no such relnels are dawmed. The only mnnechon wwlh the 4"‘ Delendant VS Ihe dawn hr the shares In the sand company regwstered under me name onne other nerenaams, lo be tvansferred to the Flalnlifl. ms does not requive me 4*" Devenuam as that order may be emorceaoue against me other Delendants and as s|aled by me 4* Delendanfs ommsew, ms clwenl win commy with an omers or the Court relating to the Sam shares or any others made to Conn. To be dear, on the issue or lashes / Iimmanon , I do nol make any ruhng on «ms as «ms Is a mailer to be deemed belween me Fm-«in and me amer Debndanls. The omy reason 1 aHow mis smkmg out appncanan Is due to me (sol |ha( me meamngs do no: smm any reasaname cause oi acuon or even any remedy agamst me 4“ Delendam. 0 Order: M Ihis Court 25 Forlhe afcresawd reasons, I slnke omlhe Plammvrs claim mm casts Dated 22nd December 2023 alu‘ lndera Muhd Anef Emran bin Anfln Judge Hugh com o! Malaya at Kuala Lumpur N00 5 Sm: Shyr Jinn (ogemer wnn Kelsey Kuek «or Plalnufl Messrs Van 5. Sum Advucales & Sullcllms V H Yet; for 151, 2nd and 4m Delendam Messrs Shul Tax Advoca|es 8. soluenors Chm Yuk Kenn am Delenclanl (Llnrepresenledj

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

JA-24NCvC-345-04/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) LEE TIN YONG 2. ) CHONG SOK WAH 3. ) LEE MIN HAO RESPONDEN 1. ) kementerian dalam negeri, malaysia 2. ) PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

Application for citizenship- proof of place of birth on ‘Jus Soli’- proof of endorsement by Doctor and stamping of clinic - Jus Sanguinis whether proven - the meaning of the word ‘found’ in presumption sec 19B - absence of affidavits by Doctor and/or ‘friend’ but identity of friend said to be unknown - whether satisfy the tests in CCH.

04/01/2024

YA Puan Nurulhuda Nur'aini Binti Mohamad Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6f5b2e0e-7b70-4bc2-aee3-273f0ccac3c0&Inline=true

ap311223-JA-24NCvC-345-04-2022.lty-cms040124 Page 1 of 22 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: JA-24NCvC-345-04/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai suatu permohonan untuk perintah deklarasi Dan Dalam perkara mengenai seksyen 41 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Perkara 14(1)(b) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan Jadual Kedua, Bahagian II, Seksyen 1(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan Jadual Kedua, Bahagian III, Seksyen 19(b) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan Jadual Kedua, Bahagian II, Seksyen 1(e) Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan 04/01/2024 12:36:58 JA-24NCvC-345-04/2022 Kand. 47 S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 22 Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. LEE TIN YONG (NO. K/P: 640807-01-5605) 2. CHONG SOK WAH (P) (NO. K/P: 670628-01-5244) 3. LEE MIN HAO Sijil Kelahiran Daftar No.: 00017014 (No. Siri: 000838 XA) …PEMOHON-PEMOHON DAN 1. KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI 2. PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN, MALAYSIA …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] This is a case by both applicant appellant seeking for this Court’s power to exercise its discretion to confer citizenship on the 3rd applicant appellant LMH, such application having been rejected by the Respondent, earlier. This brings into focus the affidavits filed by both party and the history that bring about the 3rd applicant into the 1st and 2nd applicants’ care (the 1st and 2nd applicant hereafter referred to as ‘representatives’ and the 3rd applicant as ‘LMH’). S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 22 [2] The representatives are both of Malaysian citizen and are husband and wife. At the time when an application for the identity card (IC) of LMH was made when he reached 12 years old and arising from a series of recalling of the birth certificate of LMH by the Respondent, with changes were then made concerning important information of the representatives reflected as ‘parents’ in the said application form and new birth certificate reissued by the Respondent deleting the representatives identity as ‘parents’ and rejecting the said application for LMH’s IC, moved the representatives to seek for an intervention to resolve it by an adoption order dated 10.7.2014, given by the Session Court of Johore Bahru for LMH to be registered as adopted son of both the representatives being LMH’s adoptive parents. The background history adduced by both parties [3] LMH had a birth certificate (BC) AV37927 registered as being born on 1.6.2001 with both representatives reflected as ‘father’ and ‘mother’ respectively on it. On him obtaining the age of 12 years old, the 1st applicant (adoptive father) applied for LMH’s identity card but was rejected by the 1st Respondent with the birth certificate of LMH confiscated and invalidated by the 1st Respondent. [4] The reason for this invalidation (as disclosed by the Respondent’s affidavit) is that arising from different facial appearance of LMH compared to the representatives, drove the Respondent to investigate, it was revealed that the representatives were not the biological parents of LMH. This moved an application be made by the 2nd applicant (adoptive mother) for the changes to the crucial information relating to the mother’s name including IC number, religion and race to be replaced with ‘no information’ (maklumat tiada) and the citizenship status of both biological mother and S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 22 LMH to be ‘non-citizen’ made by the adoptive mother (see: exhibit ‘RJ-5’ of enclosure 5 Respondent’s AIR). [5] The place of birth however was maintained as per the original BC to be ‘Poliklinik Suria’ as no amendment was sought by the adoptive mother. In order for these changes to be made, the first BC had to be handed back to the Respondent. A new BC AV37927 dated 25.2.2014 serial number 001098XA with all these amendments was then issued (2nd BC) by the Respondent. [6] In the meantime, acting on the advice (by the Respondent) for a formal adoption be made and having done so, armed with the seal adoption order dated 10.7.2014, an application was made with the Registration Department to have the adoption registered in the Adoption Register. This was followed with a new BC (3rd BC) in red paper with register number 00017014 serial number 000838XA signed by the 2nd Respondent and registration date as 8.10.2014, issued. [7] The applicants contend that the issuance of the 2nd BC written on it ‘place of birth’ of LMH to be ‘Poliklinik Suria Johor Bahru’ itself is an endorsement by the Respondents that LMH was born in the Federation of Malaysia without any other citizenship of other states and similarly the biological mother of LMH would also be the citizen of Malaysia and no other. [8] On 6.11.2014, the 1st applicant submitted an application in Form B, to the Registration Department to move them to allow LMH’s registration for citizenship under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution but was S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 22 rejected by the National Registration and Societies Division, Ministry of Home Affairs on 25.5.2017 without giving any reasons. [9] Both the applicants further deposed that they have no information or knowledge of the biological parents of LMH and the introduction to LMH’s existence said to have been unwanted, abandoned or exposed, was made sometime in May 2001 by a friend whose identity, unfortunately was unknown to the 1st applicant and with no further deposition by the 2nd applicant. The only information that seems to be in their knowledge is that LMH was born in ‘Poliklinik Suria’ in the care of Dr. Raghu Sukumaran and endorsement by the said clinic appeared on the BC application form AV37927 (see: exhibit ‘RJ-3’ and ‘RJ-4’ of enclosure 5). [10] The Respondents in their affidavit in reply deposed that with no information of the LMH’s biological parent mother which could have been obtained through the unidentified friend of both the applicants, it could neither be said that the mother would have been a citizen nor was she not a citizen of any other state. Furthermore, there was no other evidence that LMH was unwanted, abandoned or exposed as there was no facts to suggest LMH was found unattended, found at a rubbish dump, public toilet or place of worship. [11] The Respondents further averred that the place of birth ‘Poliklinik Suria’ was maintained in the BC as the exercise carried out by the Respondent at that point of time was merely to rectified any piece of information found to be incorrect and as the place of birth as reflected in the said application form with the stamp of the clinic appearing was never part of the information that required any amendments be made by the 2nd applicant, this information was left untouched by the Respondents. S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 22 [12] To the Respondents’ view, even if the place of birth would, as argued by the applicant, would have satisfied the principle of ‘Jus Soli’, the applicants have failed to fulfill the ‘Jus Sanguinis’ requirement. The act of both the applicants in being mum of these crucial facts, taking them to be a true declaration on their part and only admitting them to be wrong subsequently, work against them. [13] The absence of any police report or report to the Registrar under section 9 of the Births And Deaths Registration Act 1957 (Revised - 1983) that requires any information concerning the finding of new-born child found exposed, to be given to Registrar or a report to the Welfare Department is suspect. These were the reasons, the application for LMH’s IC and citizenship rejected was rejected by the Respondents. The law on citizenship in the Federal Constitution [14] The provisions on citizenship in the Federal Constitution can be found in Part III, with further and better particulars can be seen in the 1st and 2nd schedule as referred to in Part III of the Federal Constitution. In the application before this Court, the applicants relied on Article 14(1)(b) Federal Constitution ‘Citizenship by operation of law persons born on or after Malaysia day’, sections 1(b) and 1(e) of 2nd schedule Part II and section 19B Part III 2nd schedule of the Federal Constitution. [15] The relevant provisions of the Federal Constitution are extracted as follows: “Part III Article 14 (Citizen by operation of law) 14. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the following persons are citizens by operation of law, that is to say: S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 22 (a) ... (b) every person born on or after Merdeka Day, and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule... (Also, in Part III) Article 31 (Application of Second Schedule) 31. Until Parliament otherwise provides, the supplementary provisions contained in Part III of the Second Schedule shall have effect for the purposes of this Part. ... SECOND SCHEDULE ... PART II [Article 14(1)(b)] CITIZENSHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW OF PERSONS BORN ON OR AFTER MALAYSIA DAY 1. Subject to the provisions of Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say: (a) every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation; and... ... (e) every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph. 2. (1) ... (2) ... (3) For the purposes of paragraph (e) of section 1 a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 22 within one year afterwards by virtue of any provisions corresponding to paragraph (c) of that section or otherwise. PART III [Article 31] SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP Interpretation ... 19B. For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any newborn child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth.” [16] Guided by the principle set in the cases (see: CTEB & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 CLJ 471; [2021] 4 MLJ 236 and CCH & Anor v. Pendaftar Besar Bagi Kelahiran Dan Kematian, Malaysia [2022] 1 CLJ 1) which held that: “[49] … fundamental rights and provisions must be construed as broadly as possible… provisions which limit those rights must be construed as narrowly as possible… [50] When construing a word or words in the FC protective of or guaranteeing a fundamental right, the court should give their widest possible meaning without changing or warping the ‘base’ meaning. And when construing interrelated provisions, the Court should read them as a whole having regard to the purpose and intent of those provisions and harmonise their S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 22 collective meaning rather than put them at odds with another”. this Court proceeded to hear submissions by both parties on the effect of the available evidence in relation to these provisions in the Federal Constitution. Submissions by parties [17] It is the submission of the representatives that LMH’s 1st BC including his Malaysian passport was obtained legitimately without involving any syndicate, fraud, misrepresentation or corruption. For these reasons, the forfeiture of LMH’s citizenship is unlawful, unconstitutional, illegally forfeited and without legal justification. [18] It was further submitted that the application for the changes as per exhibit ‘RJ-5’ was made unwillingly but on the instruction by the Respondent with some of the changes including the ‘citizenship status’ as contended by the representatives was written by the JPN officer without obtaining the consent of the representatives. In addition, the representatives said the Respondent has failed to deny that the applicants had satisfied the Jus Sanguinis principle hence it must be taken that the failure to rebut only means an admission on the part of the Respondent that the Jus Sanguinis principle has been satisfied by the applicants. [19] With the retaining of the status of the place of birth by the Respondent and with LMH at all material time was abandoned, found exposed and/or unwanted by the birth parents by virtue of the fact that there is no information of LMH’s biological parents up to this date, the S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 22 principles of Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis have been satisfied by the applicants. [20] The Respondent on the other hand argued that the citizenship status of LMH must be determined not only based on the place of birth (Jus Soli) but must also qualify the ‘Jus Sanguinis’ requirement. This following the principle decided by the Court of Appeal in Than Siew Beng & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2017] 8 CLJ 16, [2017] 5 MLJ 662. [21] It was further argued by the Respondent that the representatives being adoptive parents are not recognized by law as the biological parents of LMH as pronounced by the decision of Abang Iskandar COA (as he then was) in Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran Dan Kematian Malaysia v Pang Wee See & Anor [2017] 7 CLJ 33; [2017] 3 MLJ 309. The applicants in their submission in reply submits that this case did not discuss if adoptive parents can fill up the Application Form for Registration of birth with their own details. In any event, it was argued by the applicants that with LMH found exposed, abandoned and/or unwanted by the biological parents, the Jus Sanguinis principle has been satisfied. Findings by this Court [22] The latest decision by the Federal Court in CCH (supra) would provide the necessary guide to this Court in coming to a determination on the issues raised. As can be gathered from the affidavits and submissions specifically submission by the Respondent, there appears to be a consensus that the place of birth remains to be ‘Poliklinik Suria Johor’ and hence, to this Court’s view, the principle of Jus Soli would have been S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 22 satisfied even without the application of the presumption under section 19B. [23] This can be seen from the decision in CCH that states as follows: "[52] Section 1(a) of Part II very clearly adopts the concepts of jus soli (citizenship based on birthplace) and jus sanguinis (citizenship based on blood relation). Section 19B in turn contains two presumptions - one of which relate to jus sanguinis. [53] The operative words in s. 19B are "any newborn child found exposed in any place". The purpose of this section, when read in context, must be to cover newborn children who are left and discovered in a place without any trace of their biological parents. We take judicial notice of the harsh realities of life: this includes newborn children left abandoned near dumpsites, baby hatches, public or school toilets, places of worship and so on. A literal meaning of "exposed" suggests a newborn child who was "discovered" exposed at any of these locations. [54] As such, the broadest possible interpretation of the word "found exposed" is to accord it a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place of birth by the birth mother whose identity is unknown. The operative word "exposed" in s. 19B must therefore encompass the plight of abandoned newborn children, otherwise the overarching intent of preventing statelessness would be defeated or rendered illusory”. S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 22 [24] As a matter of repetition but necessary, section 1(a) of Article 14(1)(b) Part II of Schedule II is reproduced once more as follows: “1. Subject to the provisions of Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say: (a) every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation; …” [25] Section 1(a) encompasses both these principle of Jus Soli “born within the Federation” and the Jus Sanguinis “parents one at least at the time of birth a citizen or permanent resident of the Federation”. With the requirement of LMH stated to be born in ‘Poliklinik Suria Johor’ and nothing to the contrary to rebut this, this Court agrees that the Jus Soli principle is met. The next determination is on the principle of Jus Sanguinis. [26] The applicants (representatives) in their submission suggested that the word ‘unwanted’ can be read into the meaning of the word ‘exposed’ that would then trigger the presumption under section 19B. This would, based on this Court’s observation, probably be in tandem with the decision in CCH that uses the word ‘abandoned’ interchangeably. For easy reference, section 19B is produced again below: SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP “Interpretation ... S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 22 19B. For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any newborn child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth. (emphasize mine) [27] In order for the presumption to be triggered, the basic fact that “the newborn child found exposed in any place” must first be satisfied. For this purpose, the Federal Court in CCH ventilated further on the duty task on the Court’s shoulder in relation to interpretation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution. One crucial reminder highlighted by the Federal Court that guides this Court in the analysis, is found at page 17 as follows: “[45] Before proceeding to examine s. 19B with those principles in mind, we seek to remind ourselves of other important concepts on constitutional interpretation. [46] Citizenship no doubt is governed by Part III of the FC, but it is also a concept so inextricably linked to the right to life and personal liberty contained in art. 5(1). As such, any provisions on it must be construed as widely as possible”. [28] In coming to this decision in interpreting the Constitution, the dissenting judgment of the Federal Court in an earlier case of CTEB (supra) was relied by the panel in CCH as follows: “… the dissenting judgment of this court in CTEB & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 CLJ 471; [2021] 4 MLJ 236 (“CTEB”) where it was stated that Part III which S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 22 contains enabling provisions is meant to aid or assist in the interpretation of Parts I and II, and not to qualify or conditionalise the application of Parts 1 and II to Part III. The dissenting judgment had commented on s. 19B of Part III, as follows: [161] Both ss. 19A and 19B of Part III are constitutional presumptions as to births. Section 19A codifies in part the international principle of flag state jurisdiction and applies in relation to persons who are born on a vessel such that their birth there is attributed to the place of registration of the vessel. Section 19B applies in relation to children who are found abandoned in any given place such that the place of abandonment is treated as their place of birth and where their mother is also permanently resident there. [162] All the above sections, namely ss. 17, 19, 19A and 19B exist as supplementary or filler sections – so to speak – to supplement or to close any gaps or to resolve technicalities that may arise when the person’s parents’ identity is in issue or even if their own place of birth is in issue so long as that is a relevant question for the purposes of Part I or Part II respectively”. [29] With this forming the framework on the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the Federal Court proceeded to analyse the facts and evidence presented in CCH before coming to a finding as below: “[53] The operative words in s. 19B are "any newborn child found exposed in any place". The purpose of this section, when read in context, must be to cover newborn children who are left and discovered in a place without any trace of their biological parents. We take judicial notice of the harsh S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 22 realities of life: this includes newborn children left abandoned near dumpsites, baby hatches, public or school toilets, places of worship and so on. A literal meaning of "exposed" suggests a newborn child who was "discovered" exposed at any of these locations. [54] As such, the broadest possible interpretation of the word "found exposed" is to accord it a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place of birth by the birth mother whose identity is unknown. The operative word "exposed" in s. 19B must therefore encompass the plight of abandoned newborn children, otherwise the overarching intent of preventing statelessness would be defeated or rendered illusory. [55] In the present case, we took pains to emphasise that throughout the course of this case, it has been an accepted fact that the child is an abandoned child who was born in Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. This fact was acknowledged in the adoption order and in the third birth certificate... [56] …The follow-up words in s. 19B are contained in the phrase “until the contrary is shown”. Meaning, any person who claims that the child was not “found exposed” or otherwise abandoned by the mother as the case may be, bears the burden of showing the identity of the mother and more importantly, that the mother is not permanently resident at the place of the finding”. [30] The duty is now on this Court to ascertain whether the presumption is triggered. This Court, relying on the unanimous decision of the Court of S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 22 Appeal in Pang Wee See (supra) that ruled ‘the word "parents" in Article 14(1)(b) read with Section 1(a), Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution refers to biological parents’, hence the applicants (representative) had not fulfilled the crucial biological, or the jus sanguinis, criterion as envisaged under the said article. [31] It must be remembered that section 1(a) of Article 14(1)(b) is divided into 2 limbs being the Jus Soli and the Jus Sanguinis when it provides “every person born within the Federation” as the 1st limb focusing on Jus Soli and “of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation” being the second limb on Jus Sanguinis. Thus, applying the meaning of the word ‘parents’ based on Pang Wee See as above, the applicants have not satisfied the Jus Sanguinis principle. [32] Hence, even if there was consensus by the Respondent on the Jus Soli principle having been met by the applicants, the satisfaction of the 1st limb does not mean it equally satisfy the 2nd. No facts were put forward by the applicants to show that the biological parents of LMH are either at the time of birth, a citizen or a permanent resident of Malaysia. [33] To begin with, the presumption in section 19B as decided in CCH is tied to the place of birth. In CCH, the finding was that the child was born in HUKM and abandoned. Following this, the analysis of the Federal Court in CCH, even if the parents’ identity is in issue or even if their own place of birth is in issue, but with the finding that the child was born in HUKM and abandoned (CCH supra), it thus moved the Federal Court to come to a finding with the aid of the presumption that the mother, permanently resident there. S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 22 [34] Acting on the assumption that this Court is wrong on the determination of Jus Sanguinis by relying on Pang Wee See (supra), based on the Federal Court decision in CCH, moved this Court to ventilate and see if the presumption under section 19B is triggered hence, the need to determine if in fact the child is ‘found exposed’ or abandoned (which is used interchangeably in CCH) and if the aid of section 19B comes into play.1 [35] The identity of the mother would and could have been obtained by the applicants by the fact that there was available, an endorsement of the Doctor in exhibit ‘RJ-3’ who would have probably performed the delivery at the polyclinic Suria and it could have been sought from the individual called ‘friend’ by the applicants (representative) in their affidavits yet said of unknown identity, inevitably posed further dilemma to this Court. [36] This was added by the absence of a police report or report to the Registrar as required under section 9 of the Births And Deaths Registration Act 1957 (Revised - 1983) as follows: “PART II - REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS Section 9. Information concerning finding of new-born child to be given to Registrar within fourteen days. Where any living new-born child is found exposed, it shall be the duty of the person finding the child, and of any person in whose charge the child may be placed, to give to the best of his knowledge and belief to the Registrar, before the expiration of fourteen days from the date on which the child was found, such 1 19B. For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any newborn child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 22 information of the particulars required to be registered concerning the birth of the child as the informant possesses, and in the presence of the Registrar to sign the register: Provided that the giving of information and the signing of the register by any one of the said persons shall act as a discharge of any duty under this section of any other of them.” [37] In CCH, there was no reference made to the case of Pang Wee See (supra) and to section 9 of the Births And Deaths Registration Act 1957, thus how the effect of its absence would have a bearing on the decision of the Court is unknown. As the applicants (representatives) failed to carry out such attempt to ascertain this as opposed to ‘attempted but failed’, this Court is of the view the presumption under section 19B ought not to apply. This decision on the application of the presumption would apply across the board in other cases as well where issue of application of presumption is concerned. [38] The argument by the applicants that the word ‘unwanted’ to be inclusive in the word ‘exposed’, this Court once again finds it necessary to refer to the extract of the Federal Court judgment in CCH as follows: “[53] The operative words in s. 19B are "any newborn child found exposed in any place". The purpose of this section, when read in context, must be to cover newborn children who are left and discovered in a place without any trace of their biological parents. We take judicial notice of the harsh realities of life: this includes newborn children left abandoned near dumpsites, baby hatches, public or school toilets, places of worship and so on. A literal meaning of S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 22 "exposed" suggests a newborn child who was "discovered" exposed at any of these locations. [54] As such, the broadest possible interpretation of the word "found exposed" is to accord it a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place of birth by the birth mother whose identity is unknown. The operative word "exposed" in s. 19B must therefore encompass the plight of abandoned newborn children, otherwise the overarching intent of preventing statelessness would be defeated or rendered illusory.” (emphasis mine) [39] The word ‘found’ must be accorded the same meaning as decided by the apex court in other cases and one case in particular that crosses this Court’s mind is the case of PP v Tan Tatt Eek & Other Appeals [2005] 2 MLJ 685, where Ahmad Fairuz CJ said as follows: “[43] As for s 37(da) of the Act, it does not start with 'any person who is deemed in possession' shall be presumed to be trafficking, in which case it will be considered a consequence of s 37(d) of the Act. Instead, the word 'found' is inserted and so there must be a finding of possession first before the presumption of trafficking comes about. It is, therefore, my considered opinion that the decision in Muhammed bin Hassan is correct”. (emphasis mine) [40] Augustine Paul FCJ in the same case, discussing the application of presumptions said at page 737 as follows: S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 22 “[159] A presumption of law (like s 37(d)) is a rule of law (see Field's Law of Evidence (12th Ed) Vol I p 388). It arises when the rule of law is applied to facts that require to be proved and have in fact been proved. It is therefore a conclusion of law. Thus, a presumption of law must ordinarily come within the meaning of 'found in possession' in s 37(da); thereby bringing 'deemed' possession within its ambit. At this stage it is perhaps necessary to refer to the part of the judgment in Muhammed bin Hassan where it was held that there is '…no material difference …' between 'proved to have had in possession' and 'found in possession'. It was then concluded that both necessitate a finding or proof of possession beyond reasonable doubt based on evidence”. (emphasis mine) [41] Acting on this earlier decision of the Federal Court in Tan Tatt Eek (supra) that the word ‘found’ must mean affirmative finding based on evidence, the next exercise is for this Court to analyze if there is such proof by the applicants (representatives). This Court, having perused the affidavits of both parties, is of the view that in the absence of the affidavits by the Doctor or ‘friend’, there is no such proof of ‘abandoned’ or ‘exposed’ or even ‘unwanted’ of the mother by way of affirmative evidence but merely a conjecture by way of affidavits assertion. This Court, therefore is of the view that the principle in CCH that ‘the child was found without any trace of the biological parents’ or ‘unwanted’ has not been satisfied by the applicants (representatives). [42] As to the application under Article 15A, this Court repeats its stand in the earlier decision of this Court in OMY & Ors v. Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Anor [2024] 1 CLJ 316 as follows: S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 22 “Application under Article 15A is an application made to the Federal Government as provided specifically by the Federal Constitution as follows: Special power to register children 15A. Subject to Article 18, the Federal Government may, in such special circumstances as it thinks fit, cause any person under the age of twenty-one years to be registered as a citizen. That being the case, it is not for this Court to encroach the clear provision of the Federal Constitution and must leave it to the wise decision of the relevant authority. This approach is consistent with the stand taken by Ahmad Kamal Shahid J in Auengchoon & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara Malaysia & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 336”. [43] For all these reasons above, the application in enclosure 1 is dismissed. Having decided so, this Court in ensuring that the child is continuously protected, is guided by the fact that an adoption order has been issued earlier by the Session Court. Signed (NURULHUDA NUR’AINI BTE MOHAMAD NOR) Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Dated: 31.12.2023 S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 22 COUNSEL For the applicant: Mr. Alvin Chang Teck Kiam Tetuan Alvin’s Chang Chamber 02-10 Block F Komersil Southkey Mozek Persiaran Southkey Mozek Persiaran Southkey 1 Kota Southkey 80150 Johor Bahru. For the Respondents: Pn. Zahilah Mohammad Yusoff Senior Federal Counsel Johore State Legal Advisor’s Office Aras 2 Bangunan Dato’ Jaafar Muhammad Kota Iskandar 79100 Nusajaya Johor. S/N Di5bb3B7wkuu4yc/DMrDwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C(ARB)-47-08/2021

PEMOHON RANHILL PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD RESPONDEN THYSSENKRUPP INDUSTRIES (M) SDN BHD

Whether the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and/ or (v) of AA 2005 as the Arbitrator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction by considering issues that were not pleaded or raised by the DefendantWhether the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and/ or (ii) of the AA 2005 as the Arbitrator had acted in breach of the rules of natural justice during the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the Award when he –(a) considered issues that were not pleaded by the Defendant; and/ or(b) failed to consider the Plaintiff’s main defence in the arbitration proceedings

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Hajah Aliza binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=cab8d85d-e796-41b0-8352-db1895ccd04c&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C(ARB)-47-08/2021 BETWEEN RANHILL PROCESS SYSTEMS SDN BHD (PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS RANHILL E&C SDN BHD) (Company No.: 200601022600 (742354-X)) ... PLAINTIFF AND THYSSENKRUPP INDUSTRIES (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 201201029480 (1013967-A)) ... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This was an application by the Plaintiff to set aside the Final Award (Save as to Quantum of Costs) dated 30.4.2021 by the learned Arbitrator, Donation Felix Dorairaj (‘Award’) pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv), 37(1)(a)(v), 37(2)(b)(i) and/ or 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act 2005 (‘AA 2005’). 04/01/2024 10:45:58 WA-24C(ARB)-47-08/2021 Kand. 33 S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] The main issue which arose for consideration was whether the Arbitrator had acted (i) in excess of his jurisdiction by making inferences and findings on issues that were not pleaded by the Defendant; and (ii) in breach of the rules of natural justice by not affording the parties an opportunity to submit on these issues before making his determination. [3] After due deliberation of the affidavit evidence and submissions by the parties, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s application with costs of RM15,000.00, subject to allocatur. [4] My full reasons for the decision are set out in the subsequent part of this judgment. The Cause Papers [5] The cause papers in relation to the application are as follows: (a) the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons (‘O.S.’) dated 26.8.2021 (encl. 1); (b) the Plaintiff’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Chief Executive Officer, Hishamuddin Bin Hanif on 26.8.2021 (encls. 2 - 4); S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (c) the Plaintiff’s Further Affidavit affirmed by the same deponent on 8.9.2021 (encl. 5); (d) the Defendant’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Director, Sheetal Sushil Kulkarni on 27.10.2021 (encl. 6); (e) the Defendant’s AIR (1) affirmed by the same deponent on 22.11.2021 (encl. 7); and (f) the Plaintiff’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 6.12.2021 (encl. 8). Background Facts [6] The Plaintiff, who was the Respondent in the arbitration, has its registered address at Level 14, Wisma Perkeso, 155 Jalan Tun Razak, 50400 Kuala Lumpur. [7] The Defendant, as the Claimant in the arbitration, has its registered and business address at F-2-11, 2nd Floor, Block F, Pusat Komersil Jalan Kuching, No. 115 Jalan Kepayang, Off Jalan Kuching, 51200 Kuala Lumpur. [8] Tanjung Bin Energy Issuer Bhd. Malaysia (‘Tanjung Bin’) is the owner and manager of the construction of a 1,000-megawatt power station located at Tanjung Bin, Johor (‘Project’). S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [9] Tanjung Bin appointed Alstom Services Sdn Bhd (‘Alstom’) to provide services, among others, for the erection and commissioning of a coal handling plant for the Project. [10] Alstom then appointed the Defendant to carry out the engineering, procurement, erection and commissioning of the said coal handling plant. [11] By a Letter of Intent dated 12.4.2013 (‘LoI’), the Defendant appointed the Plaintiff to carry out the erection and commissioning, cold trials, hot trials and PG Test and substantial completion of the coal handling plant for the Project (‘Works’) at the contract price of RM24,500,000.00 [12] According to the LoI, the work to be undertaken by the Plaintiff were essentially to arrange – (a) the required cranes, tools tackles, consumables, lifting equipment and tractors/ trailers for shifting of material to achieve the set targets; (b) sufficient number of manpower; and (c) the construction power supply and power supply for the contractor’s office, stores and miscellaneous work. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [13] On 15.5.2013, the Defendant issued a Work Order to the Plaintiff which included Annexure I to Annexure XIII as documents that form part of the agreement. [14] Annexure XII Key Dates sets out the dates on which the respective parties are to meet their contractual obligations and the sequence of work as follows: Delivery of Material - Defendant Access to site - Alstom/ Defendant Erection - Plaintiff Commissioning - Plaintiff Performance test - Plaintiff [15] The materials were to be supplied by the Defendant’s related company based in India. [16] After the Plaintiff had mobilised to site, it alleged, among others, that there was shortage of material received, significant delays to the erection works resulting from late delivery of the materials by the Defendant, important modifications needed to the Works and delay in the drawings. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [17] The Plaintiff asserted that delays caused to the Project by the Defendant continued and as at 26.4.2014, the general progress of the Works was around 16.1% actual against 53.2% as planned. [18] On 22.4.2014, the parties met to discuss the progress of the Works (‘Meeting’). [19] The Plaintiff claimed that the failure of the Defendant to supply the materials to the Plaintiff had a drastic and sizable impact on the manner in which the Works were carried out. This resulted in a substantial increase in costs and expenses for the Plaintiff. [20] After the Meeting, the Plaintiff alleged that the delay continued even though the Plaintiff had sent e-mails dated 20.5.2014, 22.5.2014 and 29.7.2014 requesting the Defendant to provide the necessary materials. [21] On 8.9.2014, the Plaintiff requested monthly monetary support of RM1.1 million because it was placed in financial hardship as the milestone system invoicing penalised the Plaintiff for delays that it claimed were caused by the Defendant. [22] This was followed with the Plaintiff’s request, on 3.10.2014, for a meeting with the Defendant’s board members in India to address the issues on the Project, the delays and the financial issues. By 11.10.2014, the general progress was about 54.8% actual against 71.5% as planned. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [23] In mid-October 2014, the parties commenced discussions whereby the Plaintiff was prepared to agree and allow the Defendant to appoint a sub-contractor to carry out the Works on condition that, if there are any increased costs beyond the original contract amount, such increased costs will be absorbed by the Defendant. [24] However, on 15.10.2014, the Plaintiff expressed its disappointment of the de-scoping of activities which purportedly were not as what was agreed during the meeting in India. [25] The Defendant proceeded to appoint new contractors to replace the Plaintiff. Thereafter, the Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff had abandoned the works in November 2014 and as a result, it is entitled to recover all its costs, expenses and losses from the Plaintiff. [26] In the arbitration, the Defendant claimed the sum of RM8,680,800.29 as the additional amounts paid to contractors to complete the Works and agreed liquidated damages in the sum of RM2,450,000.00 pursuant to Clause 21.1 of the Commercial Terms and Conditions (‘Commercial T&C’) and the sum of RM4,900,000.00 pursuant to Clause 22.1 of the Commercial T&C. [27] The Plaintiff counterclaimed for, among others, the sum of RM4,632,155.00 for unpaid progress claims, RM5,900,000.00 for works carried out, RM2,450,000.00 for return of the value of the performance guarantee, RM800,000.00 for the retentions sums S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 deducted by the Defendant and assessment of damages for losses incurred as a result of the Defendant’s delays and loss of profit. [28] The Arbitrator ultimately determined that – (a) the sum of RM4,065,538.67 is to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from 5.11.2015 to realisation; (b) costs of legal representation on a party and party basis and costs of arbitration including the Arbitrator’s fees to be borne by the Plaintiff; and (c) the Plaintiff’s counterclaim is dismissed. The Grounds of Application [29] The Plaintiff relied on two main grounds in its quest to set aside the Award: (a) The Arbitrator acted in excess of his jurisdiction by considering issues that were not pleaded or raised by the Defendant in the Points of Claim dated 4.7.2018. The Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and/ or (v) of AA 2005; and S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (b) The Arbitrator acted in breach of the rules of natural justice during the arbitral proceedings and in connection with the making of the Award when he deprived the Plaintiff the opportunity to address the issues which were raised by the Arbitrator in the Award and/ or failed to consider the Plaintiff’s main defence in the arbitration proceedings. The Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and/ or (ii) of the AA 2005. The Legal Principles [30] The relevant subparagraphs of s 37 AA 2005 for purposes of the instant application are as quoted below: “Application for setting aside 37. (1) An award may be set aside by the High Court only if – (a) the party making the application provides proof that – … (iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 the terms of the submission to arbitration; (v) subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or … (b) the High Court finds that – … (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. (2) Without limiting the generality of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), an award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia where – … (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred – (i) during the arbitral proceedings; or S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (ii) in connection with the making of the award. (3) Where the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside. ….”. [31] An award made by an arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement shall be final and binding on the parties (see sub-s 36(1) AA 2005) and cannot be challenged except on the limited grounds as set out in s 37 AA 2005. [32] Section 8 AA 2005 limits the intervention by the court in matters governed by the AA 2005 to strictly such matters as expressly provided in the Act itself. This is consistent with the minimalistic approach in intervention in arbitration and arbitration related matters (see Magna Prima Construction Sdn Bhd v Bina BMK Sdn Bhd and another case [2015] 11 MLJ 841).”. [33] In deciding whether the Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms or scope of submissions to arbitration and whether the Award contains decision on matters beyond the scope S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 of the submission to arbitration, I must first determine the dispute that was referred to the Arbitrator by reference to the pleadings which were submitted by the parties during arbitration. In PT Prima International Development v Kempinski Hotels SA and other appeals [2012] 4 SLR 98, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that: “[32] An arbitration agreement is merely an agreement between parties to submit their disputes for arbitration. The disputes submitted for arbitration determine the scope of the arbitration. It is plain that the scope of an arbitration agreement in the broad sense is not the same as the scope of the submission to arbitration. The former must encompass the latter, but the converse does not necessarily apply, in that the particular matters submitted for arbitration may not be all the matters covered by the arbitration agreement. The parties to an arbitration agreement are not obliged to submit whatever disputes they may have for arbitration. Those disputes which they choose to submit for arbitration will demarcate the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in the arbitral proceedings between them. An arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to resolve disputes which have not been referred to it in the submission to arbitration. Simply put, a party cannot raise a new dispute in an arbitration without the consent of the other party. These propositions flow inexorably from the consensual nature of arbitration. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [33] The role of pleadings in arbitral proceedings is to provide a convenient way for the parties to define the jurisdiction of the arbitrator by setting out the precise nature and scope of the disputes in respect of which they seek the arbitrator’s adjudication. …”. [34] Closer to home, the High Court in Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 11 MLJ 561 found that: “[82] From the facts and circumstances in this arbitration, it was quite apparent that the final award involved a 'new difference or such matters which would have been irrelevant to the issues requiring determination' by the learned arbitrator. The 'new difference' being the matter of length or quantity of hard rock which was irrelevant to the issue of entitlement to the extra-over claims because there was no dispute on this as seen from the documentation and conduct of the parties, especially the defendant. [83] The submissions of the parties, again, of the defendant, are also insightful and they support the above conclusions. From the submissions, it is quite obvious that the matter of the quantum as understood by the learned arbitrator was not of concern at all to the parties; especially to the defendant …” S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (the decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal; see Kerajaan Malaysia v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 617). [35] The burden lies on the Plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a “new difference” which was not relevant to the determination of the dispute, and it was not an issue in dispute between the parties. In determining whether there is a “new difference”, the parties’ pleadings and submissions during the course of the arbitration are relevant considerations. [36] Although the Plaintiff did not cite subparagraph 37(1)(b)(ii) AA 2005 in the O.S., it is well accepted that a party who is applying to set aside an award pursuant to subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) or (ii) of the AA 2005 is in fact claiming that the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. Subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the AA 2005 are not stand-alone provisions as the words “Without limiting the generality of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii)” shows. In Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor [2019] 1 CLJ 1 the Federal Court said: “[55] Section 37(2)(b)(ii) of the AA 2005 provides that an award made by an arbitral tribunal would be in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia if a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award. The circumstances stated in s. 37(2) are by no means exhaustive. Other appropriate circumstances may also fall S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 under the category of “public policy” in view of the opening phrase “without limiting the generality of sub- para (1)(b)(ii)” as appears in s. 37(2) of the AA 2005. However, it must be appreciated that the concept of public policy generally is itself a broad concept. But in applying the concept for the purpose of setting aside an award under s. 37 of the AA 2005, the concept of public policy ought to be read narrowly and more restrictively. The court’s intervention should be sparingly used. The court must be compelled that a strong case has been made out that the arbitral award conflicts with the public policy of Malaysia. As clearly stated by the Court of Appeal in Sigur Ros (with which we agree): “The concept of public policy must be one taken in the higher sense where some fundamental principle of law or justice is engaged, some element of illegality, where enforcement of the award involves clear injury to public good or the integrity of the court’s process or powers will be abused.”.” [37] Section 20 AA 2005 provides that “The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a fair and reasonable opportunity of presenting that party’s case.”. [38] In the judgment of this Court in SJIC Bina Sdn Bhd v Iskandar Regional Development Authority and another case [2020] MLJU 2366 (the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 20.1.2022), the legal principles that can be distilled from Jan De Nul’s case was summarised in paragraph 47 as follows: S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 “(a) the concept of public policy generally is itself a broad concept and the term “public policy” is commonly used to signify some matter which concerns public good and public interest; (b) the term “public policy” in subpara 37(1)(b)(ii) AA 2005 covers a scope of public policy elements as used generally but in subpara 37(2)(b)(ii), the scope is more specific since it categorises a breach of the rules of natural justice which occurred in connection with the making of an award as being in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia; (c) in applying the concept of public policy for the purpose of setting aside an award under s 37 AA 2005, the concept of public policy ought to be read narrowly, more restrictively and taken in the higher sense where some fundamental principle of law or justice is engaged, some element of illegality, where enforcement of the award involves clear injury to public good or the integrity of the court’s process or powers will be abused; (d) the public policy ground for setting aside an arbitral award could be invoked where a violation of the most basic and fundamental notions or principles of morality and justice is proven. It covers fundamental principles S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 of law and justice in both substantive and procedural aspects; (e) instances such as “patent injustice”, “manifestly unlawful and unconscionable”, “substantial injustice”, “serious irregularity” and other similar flaws in the arbitral process and award would fall within the applicable concept of public policy but these do not mean injustice which is more than de minimis. What is required is that the injustice had real effect and had prejudiced the basic rights of the applicant and where the upholding of the arbitral award would shock the conscience, be clearly injurious to the public good or wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public; (f) the circumstances stated in sub-s 37(2) AA 2005 are not exhaustive and other appropriate situations may also fall under the category of “public policy” in view of the opening phrase “without limiting the generality of sub- para (1)(b)(ii)” as appears in sub-s 37(2); and (g) the court’s intervention should be sparingly used. The court must be compelled that a strong case has been made out that the arbitral award conflicts with the public policy of Malaysia before an order can be made to set aside the award.”. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [39] In yet another illuminating decision in Master Mulia Sdn Bhd v. Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 MLRA 51, the Federal Court held that: “[53] In the light of the above, we think that the guiding principles on the exercise of residual discretion when an application for setting aside an award is grounded on breach of natural justice may be stated as follows: First, the court must consider: (a) which rule of natural justice was breached; (b) how it was breached; and (c) in what way the breach was connected to the making of the award; Second, the court must consider the seriousness of the breach in the sense of whether the breach was material to the outcome of the arbitral proceeding; Third, if the breach is relatively immaterial or was not likely to have affected the outcome, discretion will be refused; Fourth, even if the court finds that there is a serious breach, if the fact of the breach would not have any real impact on the result and that the arbitral tribunal would not have reached a different conclusion the court may refuse to set aside the award; S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Fifth, where the breach is significant and might have affected the outcome, the award may be set aside; Sixth, in some instances, the significance of the breach may be so great that the setting aside of the award is practically automatic, regardless of the effect on the outcome of the award; Seventh, the discretion given the court was intended to confer a wide discretion dependent on the nature of the breach and its impact. … …” (see too, Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 86, TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972, AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2015] 3 SLR 488 and Intraline Resources Sdn Bhd v. Exxonmobil Exploration And Production Malaysia Inc [2017] 1 LNS 1022). [40] In the context of an application grounded on subparagraph 37(1)(b)(ii) read with subparagraph 37(2)(b)(ii) AA 2005, even though the Court may find that a breach of the rules on natural justice has been established or that an arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy under s 37 AA 2005, it does not necessarily mean that the Award must S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 be set aside as a matter of course. The power of the Court to set aside the Award is discretionary and will not be exercised automatically in every case where the complaints are established [see paragraph 56 in Jan De Nul’s case [supra, at p 429 citing Kyburn Investments Ltd v Beca Corporate Holdings Ltd [2015] 3 NZLR 644 and Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd v. Master Mulia Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 291 (CA)]. [41] In Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd v Iswarabena Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2020] 6 MLRA 124, the apex court further elucidated that: “[139] Like any other exercise of discretion, the discretion to set aside an award for breach of the rules of natural justice must be exercised judiciously and only when it is just to do so. The authorities are clear that in considering whether the discretion should be exercised, the court must undertake an evaluation of relevant factors such as those identified in Kyburn, amongst which would be the seriousness, magnitude or materiality of the breach, its nature and its impact, whether the breach would have any effect on the outcome of the arbitration and leaving room for 'casual breach or occasional error'. Costs of rehearing and delay in raising the complaint are further relevant factors to be taken into account in the evaluation process. [140] Kyburn explained the position in the following terms: “... a finding of a breach of the rules of natural justice does not mean that the arbitral award must be set aside, that the power S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 of the court to set aside an award is discretionary and will not be exercised automatically in every case. The discretion enables the court to evaluate the nature and impact of the particular breach in deciding whether the award should be set aside, the policy of encouraging arbitral finality will dissuade the court from exercising discretion when the breach is relatively immaterial or was not likely to have affected the outcome.” [141] The “very low” threshold for s 37 as decided in Petronas Penapisan and Sigur Ros must be understood in the context it was made, ie that compared to s 42, the threshold under s 37 is “very low”. In other words, it is “very low” relative to the threshold under s 42. It must be remembered that the grounds enumerated in s 37 are exhaustive and as such the court cannot set aside an award for reasons other than those that are listed. [142] The grounds enumerated in s 37 need to be construed narrowly as they represent exceptions to the finality of arbitration awards (s 36). This is to avoid devaluing the arbitration agreement that arbitral awards are final and binding and also to preserve the autonomy of the forum selected by the parties by minimising judicial interference in arbitral awards: Jan De Nul (supra). S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [143] This narrow and restrictive definition is important in terms of the public policy ground which this court in Jan De Nul interpreted as only encompassing violations of the “most basic notions of morality and justice or such violations that offend the fundamental principle of law and justice, some element of illegality, where enforcement of the award involves clear injury to public good or the integrity of the Court's process and powers will thereby be abused”. What is required is that the injustice had real effect and had prejudiced the basic rights of the applicant. We do not find this to be the case in the present appeals.” (see too, paragraph 109 of the judgment where the Court held that even if the arbitrator was wrong in not giving the parties the opportunity to submit, the breach must be such gravity and materiality that the party can be said to have been denied due process). [42] In the case which was referred to by the Plaintiff, China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and another [2020] 1 SLR 695 at p 728, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that “… in determining whether a party had been denied his right to a fair hearing by the tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings, the proper approach a court should take is to ask itself if what the tribunal did (or decided not to do) falls within the range of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribunal in those circumstances might have done. This inquiry will S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 necessarily be a fact-sensitive one, and much will depend on the precise circumstances of each case …”. [43] Guided by the abovesaid legal principles, I shall now proceed to examine the Plaintiff’s grounds in support of its application. 1st Ground: Whether the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and/ or (v) of AA 2005 as the Arbitrator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction by considering issues that were not pleaded or raised by the Defendant [44] The Plaintiff submitted three instances where the Arbitrator had considered issues which are not part of the Defendant’s pleaded case. Each of the alleged occurrences is discussed below. (a) The Arbitrator referred to the Points of Claim and suggested that the Defendant was relying on implied terms as the basis of its complaint when this was not the Defendant’s pleaded case [45] The Arbitrator identified two fundamental issues, mainly whether there was a breach of the contract and if there was, which party was in default. To the Arbitrator, the issues as suggested by the parties in their respective submissions are ancillary to the fundamental issues. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [46] In relation to the issue as to whether there was a breach of the contract, the Plaintiff averred that the Points of Claim do not specifically refer to any particular breach by the Plaintiff but rather it is broadly alleged that there was substantial delay by the Plaintiff. It was further averred that, in paragraphs 71, 75, 80 and 81 of the Award, the Arbitrator suggested that, although the Defendant did not plead any implied term, the Defendant was nonetheless relying on implied terms as the basis of its complaint. Hence, the Arbitrator had considered issues that were not pleaded by the Defendant in the Points of Claim and had acted in excess of his jurisdiction (see paragraphs 68 and 69, AIS). [47] The Plaintiff asserted that it is wrong for the Arbitrator to assume that such terms are to be implied into the contract without it being pleaded, and no matter how common its usage may be in a particular industry, as there is a process to determine whether a term can be implied into a contract, and this could potentially be a matter of significant dispute. In this regard, the Plaintiff relied on the decision of the Federal Court in See Leong Chye v United Overseas Bank Berhad [2019] 1 MLJ 25 which had elucidated on the types of implied terms in these words: “[74] The law on implied terms has been succinctly summarised in the case of Sababumi (Sandakan) Sdn Bhd v Datuk Yap Pak Leong [1998] 3 MLJ 151 which was also extensively cited in the Court of Appeal judgment. The relevant paragraphs in Sababumi’s case at pp 169 – 170 are reproduced as follows: S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Implied terms are of three types. The first and most important type is an implied term which the court infers from evidence that the parties to a contract must have intended to include it in the contract though it has not been expressly set out in the contract. The implied term contended for in this appeal belongs to this type and much more about this later. The second type of implied term is one by operation of law, and not based on the inference just explained. By operation of law, I mean that a large number of specific implied terms have been held in to arise from previous decided cases on certain specific facts. Such ratio decidendi in respect of such decided implied terms are normally adopted by courts in subsequent cases on similar facts as a matter of course without the necessity of any court to decide afresh whether it ought to draw the inference as explained above. Thus, such implied terms come from decided cases exclusively. Thus, in a contract of employment, there is an implied term that the employee will serve his employer faithfully, and not to act against the employer’s interest, and again there is another implied term that the S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 employer will provide a safe system of work. Many of such decided and specific implied terms have been incorporated into statutes such as the Sale of Goods Act 1957 and others; it is not necessary to discuss it further except to emphasise that such an implied term of this particular type may sometimes be excluded by parties by an agreement to the contrary and more importantly, it is not dependent on the court having to draw an inference explained above. The third kind of an implied term is one that is implied by custom or usage of any market or trade which is reasonable, and again it is not dependent on a court’s inference explained above but by virtue of such a custom or usage from the market or trade. Interestingly, s 92(e) of the Evidence Act 1950 seems to be custom-made to prove logistical support for this particular type of implied term. It will be remembered that s 92(e) aforesaid is one of the exceptions to the rule against evidence to contradict or vary any terms of a written contract. …”. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [48] Mr. Sanjay Mohan submitted for the Plaintiff that in so far as the third category of implied terms is concerned, evidence must be led to establish that usage or custom was such to imply such a term, but this was not done by the Defendant in the arbitration proceedings. [49] It was further submitted that the finding by the Arbitrator on the issue of implied terms has grave consequences as the Arbitrator ultimately went on to find, in paragraph 109 of the Award, that the Plaintiff was in delay and therefore in breach of the contract and the damages sought by the Defendant was then assessed. [50] I shall begin the analysis with the Points of Claim. I find that the Points of Claim, when read in its entirety, shows that the Defendant had pleaded, among others, the Contract between the parties consisting of the LoI, the Work Order, the scope of works and the Commercial T & C; the completion dates for the Works; the delay by the Plaintiff; and the entitlement to recoup costs, expenses and losses and to claim for liquidated damages. [51] Whilst it is true that the words “breach of contract” cannot be found in the Points of Claim, nevertheless the Defendant had pleaded the essential ingredients for the Arbitrator to identify the cause of action, which was essentially for breach of contract. A cause of action is the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim (per Esher M.R. in Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 and applied in Bennett v. White [1910] 2 K.B. 643 and referred to in Tuan Haji Ishak Ismail v. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Leong Hup Holdings Berhad & Other Appeals [1996] 1 CLJ 393 at p 409). [52] At the arbitration, the Plaintiff did not make any submission as to the absence of the words “breach of contract” in the Defendant’s pleadings. Instead, in subparagraph 24(b) of the Written Submissions (Post Hearing), the Plaintiff itself suggested that one of the main issues to be tried is “Whether the Claimant breached the terms of the contract between the parties in failing to provide the material and access to site to enable the Respondent to carry out the erection and commissioning works and the consequences of such a failure?”. This was recognised by the Arbitrator in subparagraph 68(b)(ii) of the Award. [53] Moving on to the Points of Defence & Amended Counterclaim dated 31.8.2018, the Plaintiff’s pleaded position was that the Defendant was in breach of its express and/ or implied terms of the contract when the Defendant failed to, among others, provide adequate material to the Plaintiff, make prompt payments, and properly administer the contract. This is evident from paragraphs 21, 24 and 37 of the Points of Defence. In this sense, the Arbitrator correctly observed in paragraph 72 of the Award that “The Respondent in its Defence and Amended Counterclaim is more explicit.”. [54] Pertinently, and as submitted by the Defendant’s counsel, nowhere in the Points of Defence and Written Submissions did the Plaintiff contend that the Defendant did not plead breach of contract in the Points of Claim and as such, none of the Defendant’s witnesses were S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 cross-examined on this point. It was only in the instant application that the Plaintiff attempted to persuade this Court to set aside the Award on the ground that the Arbitrator had decided on a “new difference” which was not relevant to the determination of the dispute and was not an issue in dispute between the parties. [55] Although in the AIS, the Plaintiff had highlighted paragraphs 71, 75, 80 and 81 of the Award, the decision on whether the Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration and/ or the Award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration entails a reading of the entire section in the Award on the issue of whether there was a breach of the contract i.e. from paragraphs 71 to 82. [56] Having read the said paragraphs, suffice for present purposes to re- produce the following passages from the Award to accentuate the findings and conclusions of the Arbitrator: “77. Although the Claimant does not refer specifically to breach or breaches of contract by the Respondent, it is fairly obvious that a reading of pleadings and submission that the Claimant alleges that there was substantial delay by the Respondent in meeting with the contractual key dates and as well as recovery plan. This in essence was the breach. … S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 80. As there is no express provision in the contract for either the Respondent to carry out the works regularly and diligently neither is any express provision for the Claimant to provide timely access to work fronts and/or supply of materials, it is however trite law that these obligations are implied in any engineering or building contracts. 81. I thus find that although the Claimant has not expressly pleaded either a breach of the express terms of the contract or an implied term from the pleadings it is fairly clear that the Claimant’s complaint as can be gathered from its Points of Claim is that the Respondent was in breach of the implied terms of the contract in that it failed to carry out the works regularly and diligently.” (emphasis added). [57] In my considered view, the Arbitrator’s finding that the Plaintiff had breached the implied terms of the Contract in that the Plaintiff failed to carry out the Works regularly and diligently fell within the terms of submission to arbitration and the Award cannot be said to contain matters beyond the scope of the said submission. The Plaintiff has not provided proof that the Award, when read and understood as a whole S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 in depicting how the Arbitrator approached the issues, comes within either subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) or (v) of the AA 2005. (b) The Arbitrator recognised that the Defendant’s pleaded position was that the Plaintiff had purportedly abandoned the works in September 2014, but he made a finding that the abandonment took place in December 2014 [58] In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Points of Claim, the Defendant pleaded that, upon commencing the works, the Plaintiff had periodically issued invoices and in respect of Invoice Nos. 17, 18 and 1A/W, the Defendant refused to make payment on the ground, among others, that the Plaintiff stopped partial work sometime in May 2014 and abandoned the works sometime in September 2014 without assigning any reasons whatsoever. The Arbitrator acknowledged this pleading in paragraph 111 of the Award. [59] The Plaintiff’s grouse was with paragraph 112 of the Award where the Arbitrator went on to find that “There was no evidence adduced by the Claimant to support this allegation in the pleading. In fact, if at all there was abandonment it was in December 2014 as evidenced by the e- mail on 27.12.2014 at RBD/1A/9.”. Again, the Plaintiff argued that, in doing so, the Arbitrator had considered matters that were not pleaded, and this impacted on the overall Award. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [60] However, the Plaintiff has conveniently omitted to mention the subsequent pleadings by the respective parties on the issue of abandonment. [61] Basically, the Plaintiff denied the Defendant’s assertions that the Plaintiff had abandoned the works and the Defendant was put to strict proof. Specifically in subparagraph 31(i) of the Points of Defence, it was pleaded that the Plaintiff did not abandon the site, and in any event, the Defendant had removed the works from the Plaintiff and gave these to the Defendant’s sub-contractors. The Plaintiff elaborated with more facts and repeated its denial that it had abandoned the works in paragraphs 32 and 41, respectively, in the Points of Defence. [62] The Defendant then retorted in the Amended Reply that the Plaintiff had pre-planned the move to abandon the works and had in fact abandoned the site. This occurred soon after it was intimated that some of the Plaintiff’s works were to be de-scoped. Specific replies to paragraph 32 of the Points of Defence were also provided (see paragraphs 41 and 43 - 47 of the Amended Reply). [63] In paragraph 68 of the Award, the Arbitrator acknowledged that, in the submissions of the parties, they had suggested one of the issues for determination was “whether the Claimant is entitled for the additional cost incurred by it for carrying out the de-scoped and abandoned works of the Respondent”. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [64] In paragraph 135 of the Award, the Arbitrator reiterated that “The evidence also shows that the Respondent abandoned the work that was not descoped as the Claimant took over the same on 22.12.2014 as confirmed by its email of even date (RBD/V1A/9) & I so hold.”. [65] In the light of the pleaded case of the parties and their submissions before the arbitral tribunal, it was well within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to assess the evidence and make a finding of fact on the issue as to whether the Plaintiff had abandoned the works, and if so, when did this abandonment took place. The Arbitrator found that “Contrary to what is alleged in the Claimant’s pleadings the evidence suggests there was descoping followed by abandonment of the remaining works.” and “Although the Claimant has not specifically pleaded for losses arising from descoping and sought only to rely on abandonment, the evidence adduced during the evidence taking stage compels me to deal with the issue of descoping of the Respondent’s works and its validity thereof.” (see paragraphs 113 and 118 of the Award). The Arbitrator then proceeded to discuss the issue of “Descoping of Works” in paragraphs 119 - 145 of the Award in detail. [66] In the final analysis, I am of the view that there is nothing egregious on the part of the Arbitrator and the Plaintiff’s unhappiness was essentially with the Arbitrator’s finding which was not in consonance with the stance taken by the Plaintiff in the arbitration. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [67] Akin to 1st Ground (a), I am not persuaded that the Plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving that the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and/ or (v) of the AA 2005. (c) The Arbitrator made a finding that there was an agreement reached between the parties on the issue of descoping when the Plaintiff’s pleaded position was otherwise and the Defendant did not raise the issue of any agreement on this matter [68] Continuing with what was previously stated in paragraph 58 of this judgment, the Defendant had pleaded that it had issued a letter dated 7.11.2014 to the Plaintiff wherein a detailed and revised scope of works and responsibilities were issued to the Plaintiff. This was done to allow the Plaintiff to resume the work diligently and efficiently. However, despite giving several opportunities to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was still unable to perform the reduced scope of works and this resulted in the works being removed and other contractors were appointed to handle the same (see subparagraphs 15(d) and (e) of the Points of Claim). [69] In the Points of Defence, the Plaintiff pleaded that it had responded to the Defendant’s letter dated 7.11.2014 and that “… the Claimant’s decision to appoint the respondent’s subcontractor directly without having a clear agreement as to the subcontractors scope of work amounts to interference with the Respondent’s contractual rights and a breach of the express and/or implied terms of the subcontract …”. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [70] The Defendant, in the Amended Reply, did not allege that an agreement was reached between the parties on the issue of descoping (see paragraphs 49 - 55). Instead, the Defendant stated in paragraph 55, among others, that “… The Respondent was neither agreeing to de-scoping nor was it allowing the Claimant to go ahead with the mitigation plan and was causing hindrance to the works at site, thereby causing harm and nuisance to the end customers, Alstom and Malakoff, who instructed the Claimant to terminate the services of the Respondent. But still, the Claimant had nevertheless provided ample time to the Respondent to recoup, but unfortunately, as admitted by the Respondent, they chose abandonment as an option to avoid the losses, thereby putting the Claimant at a huge risks and loss in the Project.”. [71] In the Award, the Arbitrator traced the narrative regarding descoping based on the documents and tested the same against the oral evidence at the hearing (see paragraphs 119 - 130 of the Award). The Arbitrator referred to the parties’ submissions as follows: “131. In its written submission, the Respondent reiterated its position that the descoping was never agreed by the Respondent and despite non-agreement the Claimant proceeded to descope and later took over the Respondent's works. As such, the Claimant was in breach of the contract in that it prevented the Claimant from completing its work and as such it was deprived of S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 the profit that it would have derived in carrying out and completing the works. It is therefore claims 10% of the contract sum. 132. The Claimant on the other hand in its written submission was of the view that the Respondent had agreed to the descoping as the Claimant had already made additional payments to the Respondent. In addition the Claimant had given details of descoping. Thus it was an afterthought by the Respondent to convey that there was misunderstanding while accepting descoping the work.”, before concluding that – “133. Having analysed the oral and documentary evidence and written submission and bearing in mind that the contract does not provide for descoping. I find that on the balance of probabilities the Respondent had consented to the descoping of its works. I make this finding on the basis of the evidence of RW2 at cross examination and re-examination which I have cited at paragraphs 128, 129, 130 and 131. 134. I note RW2's evidence of agreement was subject to a clear demarcation being drawn up as to the works that were to be descoped and the works remained to be S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 done by the Respondent. The evidence shows that this was eventually agreed.”. [72] The Plaintiff’s grievance was that the Defendant’s position in its submission before the arbitral tribunal was inconsistent with its pleadings. The Defendant did not plead that there was an agreement between the parties for the Plaintiff to compensate the Defendant for the increased costs of completing the works. The Arbitrator nevertheless made a finding that there was such an agreement and went on to award damages to the Defendant on this basis. [73] Upon close scrutiny of the parties’ pleadings, the fact that the Defendant had issued a letter dated 7.11.2014 on the revised scope of works or de-scoping of the Plaintiff’s works was raised in the pleadings (see, among others, subparagraphs 15(d) and (e) in the Points of Claim; paragraph 34 in the Defence; paragraphs 19, 20, 41, 49 - 51 and 54 in the Amended Reply; and paragraph 5 in the Reply to Amended Defence To Counterclaim). [74] Evidence was also adduced on this matter and the Arbitrator had dutifully considered the same together with the written submissions by the parties (refer paragraphs 118 - 145 of the Final Award). The Arbitrator ultimately made a finding of fact, based on the evidence, that there was an agreement to descope but not that the cost of descoping is capped at RM24.5 million. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s ground of challenge that the Arbitrator acted in excess of jurisdiction S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 and that the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and/ or (v) of the AA 2005 is simply unfounded. [75] Before I proceed to the 2nd ground, and for the sake of completeness, the Plaintiff also took issue with the findings of the Arbitrator that there was no agreement between the parties for the costs of descoping not to exceed RM24.5 million on the ground that there is estoppel on the part of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff asserted that the issue of estoppel was not raised in the Defendant’s pleadings. However, the Arbitrator reasoned that, between the period when the letter dated 7.11.2014 was issued until 20.11.204, the Plaintiff had received monies and payments were also made to the Plaintiff’s sub-contractors without any qualifications by the Plaintiff (see subparagraph 145(ii) of the Award). [76] In my considered view, even though estoppel was not expressly mentioned in the Defendant’s pleadings in the arbitration, the Arbitrator’s findings on estoppel cannot be faulted as it was premised on the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties and as analysed by the Arbitrator (see paragraphs 119 - 145 of the Award). I agree with the Defendant’s submission that the Arbitrator had made a finding of fact that the issue of capping the cost of descoping was neutralised by the Plaintiff’s conduct as it had continued to receive monies and did not make any qualifications in respect of the payments by the Defendant to the Plaintiff’s sub-contractors. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [77] Based on the evidence as a whole, including by RW2 when cross- examined, the Arbitrator was inclined to conclude that the Plaintiff was more interested in leveraging itself by refusing to issue the letter of no objection and kept asking for more money rather than to finalise the descoping process expeditiously, and hence the Plaintiff was estopped from arguing on the issue of the cap on the cost of descoping. 2nd Ground: Whether the Award should be set aside pursuant to subparagraphs 37(2)(b)(i) and/ or (ii) of the AA 2005 as the Arbitrator had acted in breach of the rules of natural justice during the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the Award when he – (a) considered issues that were not pleaded by the Defendant; and/ or (b) failed to consider the Plaintiff’s main defence in the arbitration proceedings [78] With regards to 2nd Ground (a) above, apart from the submissions which have been canvassed under 1st Ground (a), the Plaintiff additionally affirmed that the Arbitrator has acted in breach of the rules of natural justice because, if the Arbitrator intends to draw any inference on matters not raised by either party, he should have given the parties an opportunity to address the same (see paragraph 72, AIS). Had the Arbitrator done that, the Plaintiff would have drawn his S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 attention to the decision of the Federal Court in Damansara Realty Sdn Bhd v Bungsar Hill Holdings Sdn Bhd [2011] 6 MLJ 464 which held that the facts which result in the inference of an implied term need to be pleaded whereas in the present case, no such facts were pleaded to justify the Arbitrator reaching his conclusion at paragraph 80 of the Award. [79] In view of my findings in relation to 2nd Ground (a) as addressed earlier, there was nothing for the Arbitrator to refer back to the parties in the course of making the Award. Hence, the Plaintiff’s contention that the Arbitrator had acted in breach of the rules of natural justice during the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the Award is unsubstantiated. [80] Proceeding next to 2nd Ground (b) above, Mr. Sanjay Mohan submitted for the Plaintiff that the Arbitrator had breached the rules of natural justice in connection with the making of the Award as he failed to consider the Plaintiff’s defence that descoping was never agreed by the parties and nor was the monetary value of the descoped works. [81] The Award was attacked for several reasons, among others, that – (a) the Arbitrator failed to consider that the Defendant is not entitled to recover the difference between the contract value and the costs it actually incurred to complete the balance works and that the sub-contractors engaged by the Defendant were essentially the sub-contractors of the Plaintiff, therefore, there should be no S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 additional costs incurred or these are not recoverable from the Plaintiff; (b) the Arbitrator failed to appreciate that the Plaintiff should be paid for the works it had carried out and that the Defendant benefitted from the works carried out by the Plaintiff without being paid; (c) the Arbitrator’s reasoning is flawed because the parties had not agreed for the descoping of the Defendant’s works, the contract is a fixed sum contract and the damages incurred by the Defendant for engaging subcontractors are already reflected in the agreed contract sum; and (d) the Arbitrator decided the Defendant had failed to prove its claim and yet, he proceeded to award damages to the Defendant on the basis that the Plaintiff did not cross examine the Defendant’s witnesses on the issue of damages. As for the damages awarded, the learned counsel argued, among others, that this was not based on the Defendant’s pleaded case, there is no evidence of the need to carry out any rectification works, the value of the omitted works has not been assessed and there is no evidence to support the Defendant’s claim of RM8.68 million increased costs. [82] With regards to subparagraph 81(d) above, a perusal of the Points of Claim and the Award shows that the Plaintiff has mischaracterized the Arbitrator’s findings. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [83] Firstly, at paragraph 154 of the Award, the Arbitrator had no hesitation in finding that the Defendant “… has not fully made out its claim for damages of RM24,998,525.30. …” (emphasis added) as particularised in the table in paragraph 17 of the Points of Claim, which runs to almost three pages long. After giving his reasons for this decision, the Arbitrator set out the items for which he had rejected in paragraph 155 of the Award, amounting to RM4,615,261.62, before stating that – “156. Having come to the above conclusion, I have no hesitation in accepting the other particulars of contractors and work carried out in the tables at pages 12, 13 and 14 of the Points of Claim as they were not subject to examination by the Respondent’s counsel & therefore deemed to have accepted the same. …” (emphasis added), and concluding the total additional cost incurred was RM20,383,563.68. Clearly, the Arbitrator did not decide that the Defendant had failed to prove its claim in its entirety as was submitted to this Court. [84] Secondly, as to the Arbitrator’s decision on the award of damages, after having read the section of the Award on “Damages” from paragraphs 146 - 162, the Arbitrator has evidently considered the oral and documentary evidence in assessing the matter at hand. He is not bound to “slavishly adopt the position advocated by one party or the S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 other” (see Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 at p 463). [85] In examining the challenge against the Award on the ground of breach of the rules of natural justice, I was guided by the legal principles as alluded to in the earlier part of this judgment and I have, as advocated by the learned counsel for the Defendant, assessed the Plaintiff’s application based on its own facts and premised upon the pleadings, all the evidence which was unfolded during the arbitration hearing, including the re-examination of CW2, and the Award read as a whole. [86] In the final analysis, all of the Plaintiff’s contentions are substantially an appeal on the legal merits of the Award, disguised and presented, as is the norm in applications of this nature, as a challenge based on an alleged breach of natural justice. [87] In the upshot, the Plaintiff has not fulfilled the Jan De Nul’s test of there being a violation of the most basic notions of morality and justice to justify a setting aside of the Award on the ground that it is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia as the rules of natural justice have been breached. S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 Conclusion [88] Based on all the aforesaid reasons, the Plaintiff’s application was dismissed with costs of RM15,000.00, as suggested by the Plaintiff’s counsel and accepted by the Defendant’s counsel, subject to allocatur. Dated: 8 December 2023 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff: Sanjay Mohanasundram (Mak Kit Teng with him) Messrs. Sanjay Mohan Advocates & Solicitors Unit 5.01 Level 5 WORK@Clearwater Jalan Changkat Semantan 50490 Kuala Lumpur S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 For the Defendant: Avinash Singh Gill Messrs. Avinder Gill Chambers Advocates & Solicitors F-1-11, First Floor, Block F Pusat Komersil Jalan Kuching No. 115, Jalan Kepayang Off Jalan Kuching 51200 Kuala Lumpur Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2015] 3 SLR 488 Bennett v. White [1910] 2 K.B. 643 Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 CAJ and another v CAI and another appeal [2021] SGCA 102 China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and another [2020] 1 SLR 695; [2020] SGCA 12 Damansara Realty Sdn Bhd v Bungsar Hill Holdings Sdn Bhd [2011] 6 MLJ 464 S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam Dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang and another appeal [2015] 4 MLJ 766 Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 80 Intraline Resources Sdn Bhd v. Exxonmobil Exploration and Production Malaysia Inc [2017] 1 LNS 1022; [2017] MLJU 1299 Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor [2019] 1 CLJ 1 Johawaki Development Sdn Bhd v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan and another Summon [2020] MLJU 660 Kerajaan Malaysia v. Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 617 Kyburn Investments Ltd v Beca Corporate Holdings Ltd [2015] 3 NZLR 644 Master Mulia Sdn Bhd v Sigur Rus Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 MLRA 51; [2020] 12 MLJ 198; [2020] 9 CLJ 213 Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd v. Iswarabena Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2020] 6 MLRA 124; [2020] 9 CLJ 466 Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 11 MLJ 561 S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v. Ahmani Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 403 PT Prima International Development v Kempinski Hotels SA and other appeals [2012] 4 SLR 98; [2012] SGCA 35 Read v. Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128 SDA Architects (sued as a firm) v Metro Millennium Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 627 See Leong Chye v United Overseas Bank Berhad [2019] 1 MLJ 25 Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd v. Master Mulia Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 291 (CA) Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 86 The Government of India v Cairn Energy India Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] 9 MLJ 149 TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972 Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 Tuan Haji Ishak Ismail v. Leong Hup Holdings Berhad & Other Appeals [1996] 1 CLJ 393 S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 V. Veeriah v. General Manager, Keretapi Tanah Melayu [1974] 1 MLJ 201 Legislation: Arbitration Act 2005, ss 8, 20, 36 & 37 Rules of Court 2012, O. 69 Other source(s) referred to: Chow Kok Fong, Construction Contracts Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014 S/N Xdi4ypbnsEGDUtsYlczQTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-83-7823-11/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH NOR AINI BINTI ALI

Seksyen 420-penipuan-pembelian bitcoin yang tidak wujud-pemikiran terkemudian(afterthought)-pembelian bertukar kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat- penerimaan keterangan Whatsapp tanpa sijil 90A

04/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=79d51f2f-a95c-486c-bb1a-84f0482aaf90&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-7823-11/2021) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN NOR AINI BINTI ALI ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh (OKT) adalah seperti berikut: Bahawa kamu, Nor Aini Binti Ali (No KP: 670311-05-5096) di antara 11/01/2018 sehingga 12/01/2018 di Jalan Bangsar, dalam Daerah Brickfields, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur telah menipu Trisno Asyraf bin Zainol Abidin (No. KP:721108-02-5323) dengan memperdayakannya untuk mempercayai bahawa kamu akan membelikan dan menyerahkan Bitcoin kepadanya sebanyak 1 unit dan dengan itu kamu secara curangnya mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan RM54,365.00 sebagai bayaran untuk mendapatkan Bitcoin tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan kerana telah melakukan penipuan. [2] OKT tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Seramai 7 orang saksi telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di peringkat pendakwaan. 04/01/2024 16:19:54 WA-83-7823-11/2021 Kand. 58 S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [3] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie, maka OKT diminta untuk membela diri. Setelah OKT memberikan keterangan bersumpah, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKT gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas pertuduhan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah telah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas kesalahan. Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan ke atas OKT dengan kos pendakwaan RM1500. B. RINGKASAN FAKTA [4] Pengadu (SP1) telah berkenalan dengan OKT dan telah melabur dengan OKT. Kemudian, SP1 telah bersetuju membeli 1 unit Bitcoin dengan harga RM54,365. SP1 telah membuat bayaran melalui pindahan wang sebanyak dua kali pada 11/1/2018 dan 12/1/2018. Adalah dipersetujui bahawa SP1 akan menerima 1 unit Bitcoin selepas 7 sehingga 14 hari setelah pembayaran dibuat. [5] SP1 telah menuntut pembelian Bitcoin tersebut daripada OKT namun OKT menyatakan bahawa Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan. Akhirnya, SP1 telah membuat laporan polis pada 2/12/2028 kerana SP1 berasa telah ditipu oleh OKT dan OKT gagal menunjukkan bukti bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin melalui Kraken. C. PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [6] Menurut seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga di dalam seksyen 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Peruntukan tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila kes pendakwaan berakhir, mahkamah akan menimbangkan sama ada pendakwaan telah membuat suatu prima facie kes terhadap tertuduh. [7] Pengujian kes secara prima facie telah diputuskan di dalam kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 302 di mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt” “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the otherside. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s. 180(2) and (3)...” [8] Begitu juga di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP (2003) 1 CLJ 734 dinyatakan sebagai; “A jugde sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and ask himself the question “ if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contain in the prosecution case?”If the answer was in the negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal…” D. PEMBUKTIAN PERTUDUHAN [9] Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan menyatakan: Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property “Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived, whether or not the deception practised was the sole or main inducement, to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine.” [10] Elemen pertuduhan seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah: i. OKT telah menipu. ii. OKT telah mendorong: a) yang mana harta itu tidak dimiliki oleh tertuduh; atau b) membuat, mengubah atau memusnahkan keseluruhan atau mana- mana bahagian suatu sekuriti yang berharga; atau c) apa-apa yang ditandatangani atau dimeterai dan boleh diubah menjadi suatu sekuriti yang berharga. iii. dia melakukannya dengan tidak jujur. [11] Seksyen 415 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinsikan penipuan seperti berikut: Cheating 415. Whoever by deceiving any person, whether or not such deception was the sole or main inducement,- S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to any person in body, mind, reputation, or property, is said to “cheat”. [12] Defini tidak jujur juga dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 24 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu sesiapa yang membuat apa-apa dengan tujuan menyebabkan keuntungan salah kepada seseorang atau kehilangan salah kepada seseorang lain tidak kira sama ada perbuatan itu menyebabkan kehilangan salah atau keuntungan salah sebenar. Elemen pertama: terdapat penipuan [13] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa elemen pertama dibuktikan melalui keterangan SP1. SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT bagi urusan pembelian Bitcoin. Menurut keterangan SP1, SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT melalui Wan Norain dan OKT yang telah menghubungi SP1 melalui WhatsApp pada 7/11/2017. Ketika itu, SP1 berminat dengan perdagangan mata wang kripto dan OKT melakukan personal ‘trading’ dalam ‘cyptocurrency’. SP1 telah berjumpa dengan OKT pada 23/12/2017 di Starbucks berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 pernah berurusan dengan OKT sebelum ini di mana OKT telah menawarkan perkhidmatan ‘trading’ dan SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM30,000 dengan OKT. [14] SP1 telah membuat keputusan untuk membelian satu unit Bitcoin dengan OKT. SP1 telah membuat bayaran seperti yang diminta oleh OKT. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa SP1 akan menerima Bitcoin dalam masa 7 sehingga 14 hari namun OKT telah memberikan alasan bahawa akaun platform Kraken milik OKT ada masalah menyebabkan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin kepada SP1. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [15] Keterangan SP1 adalah disokong oleh ekhibit P4 yang merupakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan OKT. Perbualan tersebut menunjukkan terdapat persetujuan harga bagi pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Sekian lama, SP1 tidak mendapat Bitcoin, SP1 telah berhubung dengan khidmat pelanggan Kraken untuk bertanyakan situasi Bitcoin yang tidak dapat dipindahkan. Setelah mendapat jawapan daripada pihak Kraken, SP1 mendapati bahawa asalan diberikan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak bermungkinan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin dalam tempoh masa yang panjang. SP1 berasa OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin dan Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan kerana akaun OKT ada masalah. Pihak khidmat pelanggan kraken menyatakan bahawa tidak bermunasabah bahawa akaun kraken tergantung begitu lama sehingga tidak membolehkan pemindahan Bitcoin. [16] Oleh itu, OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan Bitcoin telah dibeli dan tidak dapat dipindahkan. Elemen kedua: Mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang berjumlah RM54365 [17] Melalui slip transaksi (ekshibit P3A-B) dan juga penyata bank milik OKT (ekshibit D13 dan P29), terdapat kemasukkan wang berjumlah RM54,365 ke dalam akaun milik OKT. [18] OKT telah mendorong SP1 untuk menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin. OKT telah menawarkan harga yang lebih rendah daripada harga pasaran dan menyatakan Bitcoin akan diperolehi dalam masa 7-14 hari telah mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365. Elemen ketiga: Tertuduh melakukannya dengan tidak jujur [19] Pembayaran telah dibuat kepada akaun milik OKT dan OKT telah menerima wang tersebut namun wang tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [20] SP1 tidak menerima 1unit Bitcoin dan wang yang dibayar kepada OKT tidak dikembalikan oleh OKT. OKT telah menyebabkan SP1 kehilangan wang tersebut dan sehingga kini masih tidak dipulangkan kepada SP1. OKT telah mendapat keuntungan salah di mana duit tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. [21] SP1 tidak akan menyerahkan RM54,365 kepada OKT sekiranya OKT tidak menjanjikan untuk membelikan satu unit Bitcoin untuk SP1. Kesimpulannya, kesemua elemen pertuduhan berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. E. ISU [22] Pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan pelbagai isu dan menyatakan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen pertuduhan kerana pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel di mana OKT telah menyatakan telah membeli Bitcoin. [23] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa kredibiliti keterangan SP1 adalah boleh dipercayai di mana keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan disokong. [24] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 telah bertukar fikiran dan telah menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin selepas perjumpaan SP1 dengan OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan. Adalah versi pembelaan bahawa SP1 telah mencadangkan agar RM54,365 digunakan sebagai pinjaman modal bersyarat untuk mengembangkan perniagaan syarikat OKT atas tiga syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat tersebut adalah abang SP1 dilantik sebagai CEO syarikat, keahlian SP1 sebagai 001 dan SP1 sebagai penasihat peribadi OKT. [25] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa SP1 telah memberikan keterangan bahawa OKT membuat semua keputusannya dengan sendiri kerana OKT yang bertanggungjawab terhadap syarikatnya. SP1 juga telah menjelaskan bahawa SP1 tidak memberitahu SP2 adalah abangnya kerana SP1 tidak ingin OKT untuk bertindak berat sebelah dan ingin OKT untuk bersikap objektif dalam pelantikan CEO memandangkan SP1 dan OKT adalah kawan ketika itu. SP1 juga telah S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menjelaskan fakta bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah adik beradik sudah pastinya akan diketahui oleh OKT. [26] SP2 memberikan keterangan bahawa SP2 tidak tahu menahu berkenaan dengan apa-apa syarat yang diletakkan berkenaan dengan lantikan beliau. SP2 telah menjelaskan lantikannya atas berdasarkan temu duga yang telah diadakan dan meritnya. [27] Berkenaan dengan syarat keahlian 001, SP1 telah menjelaskan bahawa keahlian sebagai 001 telah diberikan oleh OKT sendiri. SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM18600 sebagai ahli dan mempunyai 31 akaun di mana setiap akaun adalah bernilai RM600. SP1 juga telah memberikan keterangan bahawa tiada sebarang lantikan rasmi bagi keahlian 001. [28] Pihak pembelaan juga menimbulkan isu bahawa dokumen telah diserahkan selepas perbicaraan bermula. Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa pihak pembelaan telah diberikan masa yang mencukupi untuk meneliti dokumen- dokumen tersebut kerana telah diberikan penangguhan yang sewajarnya untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan ini sama sekali tidak memprejudiskan OKT. [29] Pihak pembelaan telah menyatakan tindakan SP1 untuk menghantar “bill collector” adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Namun pihak pendakwaan bergantung keterangan SP3, yang dikatakan pengutip hutang telah menafikan dakwaan bahawa dia telah dilantik oleh SP1 dan SP3 telah menyatakan beliau menolong untuk mengenal pasti kedudukan OKT. [30] Pihak pembelaan turut mempersoalkan penerimaan bukti tangkapan skrin Whatsapp ekhibit P4 sebagai bukti tanpa diperiksa oleh pihak forensik. Mahkamah telah menolak bantahan peguam dan menerima bukti tangkapan skrin di mana perbualan asal dalam telefon bimbit telah dikemukakan. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 F. PEMBELAAN [31] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah menerima wang berjumlah RM54,365 yang dipindahkan oleh SP1. OKT juga mengesahkan perbualan awalan mengenai pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Namun OKT telah menyatakan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin tersebut telah berubah kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [32] Rumusan pembelaan daripada keterangan OKT adalah OKT telah diberikan kebenaran untuk menggunakan wang tersebut selepas OKT bersetuju tiga syarat yang diberikan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat yang dikenakan adalah bahawa SP2 dilantik sebagai CEO, SP1 sebagai ahli 001 dan penasihat peribadi OKT. [33] OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT telah mematuhi syarat dengan melantik SP2 sebagai CEO. OKT bertindak memperhentikan SP2 atas alasan bahawa SP2 telah bertindak bertentangan dengan hala tuju syarikat. [34] OKT juga menyatakan bahawa SP1 sering memberikan pendapatan dan nasihat serta membantu dalam penyediaan misi dan visi untuk Midas Touch. OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menjadi ahli 001 dan boleh dilihat melalui laman sesawang. [35] OKT telah mengemukakan bukti-bukti seperti penyata kiraan dan penyata bank bagi menyokong perbelanjaan syarikat yang menggunakan wang tersebut bagi pembayaran gaji, kos kepada ‘web developer’, bil dan sebagainya. [36] Pembelaan OKT adalah bahawa OKT tidak menipu SP1 kerana SP1 sendiri yang membuat keputusan untuk menangguhkan pembelian dan telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat kepada OKT. OKT telah menerima tawaran tersebut. G. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [37] Mahkamah akan menjawab bantahan mengenai penerimaan ekshibit P4. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Pannir Selvam a/l Sinnaiyah & Anor v Tan Chia Foo & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 384 di Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “(3) The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention based on the parallels drawn to the case of Lim Choon Hau v Simpson Wong where the court held that Whatsapp messages were direct evidence of the receipt of money as a friendly loan from the plaintiff. The documents produced by a computer still admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it was admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. The court viewed that the WhatsApp messages were relevant and admissible as they demonstrated the connection to the facts in issue so as to form part of the same transaction. It triggered the application of s 6 of the Evidence Act (see paras 57, 61 & 67).” [38] Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan kebolehterimaan keterangan whatsapp walaupun tiada sijil 90A seperti di bawah: [60] I am unable to agree with this submission, in view of the fact that he did not provide any authorities to support his contention that all WhatsApp messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, bearing in mind that the maker of those messages, who was SP2, was cross-examined. [61] Secondly, even if those messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, there are authorities such as Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 MLJ 317; [2014] 1 LNS 412 (CA) and Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 739; [2016] 6 CLJ 266 to say that documents produced by a computer may still be admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it is admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. [39] Peguam bela hanya membantah keterangan P4 kerana tiada sijil 90A dibekalkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan telefon bimbit tidak dihantar untuk pemeriksaan forensik. [40] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 di mana Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 menyatakan seperti berikut berkenaan pemakaian Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan: Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Shaik Daud: Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 menjadikan rekod komputer yang dibuat semasa penggunaan biasa boleh diterima jika yang berikut dibuktikan, iaitu bahawa: (i) dokumen-dokumen dihasilkan oleh sebuah komputer; dan (ii) rekod komputer dihasilkan semasa penggunaan biasa. Bukti boleh dikemukakan sama ada dalam bentuk sijil yang ditandatangani oleh satu-satunya orang yang bertanggungjawab tentang komputer yang menghasilkan cetakan sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh s 90A(2), atau oleh seorang pegawai bank. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Mahadev Shankar: Zainal tidak dicabar oleh perayu atas kejituan catatan dokumen yang dikemukakan. Sebaliknya, rayuan adalah berdasarkan fakta bahawa tiada sijil telah dikemukakan di bawah s 90A(2) yang mana, perayu menghujahkan, bermakna bahawa pihak pendakwa telah gagal membuktikan kesnya. Hujah ini adalah berdasarkan falasi, kerana Zainal bertanggungjawab atas semua pengendalian di bank dan dengan itu adalah bertanggungjawab atas urusan aktiviti bank yang dijalankan oleh komputer tersebut. Sekiranya dia memilih untuk menyediakan suatu sijil, dia boleh berbuat demikian dan di bawah s 90A(2), dokumen-dokumen akan diterima sebagai keterangan seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 90A(1). Keterangan viva voce seseorang dalam kandang saksi lebih penting daripada suatu sijil yang dikeluarkan olehnya (lihat ms 13G—I). Seksyen 90A(1) merupakan suatu pengemaskinian ‘rukun keterangan paling baik’ dengan realiti zaman elektronik, dan kini ia tidak lagi perlu untuk memanggil juruwang atau kerani bank yang memasukkan data dengan syarat dia berbuat demikian semasa penggunaan biasa komputer (lihat ms 14A—D). S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [41] Pemakaian sijil seksyen 90A juga dibincangkan dalam kes Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] MLJU 385 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: (i)Tape recording evidence or CCTV recording, etc. at common law will be admissible based on 'res gestae' principles as truth of its contents although they may be hearsay or even self serving statement. Section 6 of EA 1950 and also other sections give statutory recognition to 'res gestae' principle in the widest form and is not restricted to the common law parameters. The test for relevancy is set out in the section itself in no uncompromising terms. There appears to be no comprehensive formula for its admissibility save as to guidelines suggested and/or imposed by courts all for good reasons. [See Amrrita Lai Hazra v Emperor 42 Cal 957; Bandahala bin Undik v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 CLJ 708 ]. The said section 6 of EA 1950 reads as follows: "Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places." (ii)At common law any form of tape recording, video recording, etc.; if relevant is made admissible if the court is satisfied of its accuracy and that it has not been tampered with, etc. The jurisprudence relating to its admissibility as well as sections 3 and 61 of EA 1950 is set out in Janab's Key to Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 2nd edition and it reads as follows: "Document before the 1993 Amendment A 851 to the Act was defined in section 3 of the Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter. Under the new amendment it includes any matter embodied in a disc, tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever. A wide and extended meaning has been given to the definition 'document'. Previously documents at least related to things which could not be easily tampered with. Now documents include items which could be easily tampered with. It is submitted that the admission S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of such documents which could be easily tampered with must be admitted with caution." In R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 465 Marshall J observed: "… for many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The print as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording conversations. We see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such documents when produced for the inspection of the court are referred to as documentary evidence. Thus, documentary evidence may include not only documents in writing but also maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, discs, tapes videotapes, films and negatives (see Cross on Evidence)." (iii)The amendments in relation to documents to EA 1950 do not in any way affect the common law position as set out in R v Maqsud Ali. The amendments S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 allow further hearsay documents which may be difficult to be made admissible under the common law because of the hearsay rule and its prejudicial effect, to be made admissible provided the criteria set out in the amendments are complied with. The new amendments such as section 90A do not displace common law rules as to admissibility. That is to say if the party cannot admit a document in consequence of the common law restriction then he may get the document admitted under any of the new provisions such as section 90A, etc. [42] Mahkamah mendapati mendapati peguam bela tidak berhujah bahawa perbualan Whatsapp adalah tidak revelan dan hanya membantah kerana ketiadaan sijil 90A. Mahkamah mendapati P4 adalah keterangan yang relevan di mana penawaran pembelian Bitcoin dan persetujuan serta transaksi dilakukan adalah perbualan yang terkandung dalam P4. Mahkamah berpuas hati ketulenan perbualan Whatsapp apabila SP1 masih menyimpan keseluruhan perbualan Whatsapp dan telefon bimbit yang mengandungi kesemua perbualan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dalam keadaan baik. Malah di peringkat pembelaan, OKT tidak menafikan kandungan Whatsapp dan bersetuju bahawa itu adalah perbualan antara OKT dan SP1. Oleh itu, ketiadaan sijil 90A tidak menjejaskan kebolehterimaan ekshibit P4. [43] Pihak pembelaan ada menimbulkan isu ketidakaturan prosedur kawad cam. Daripada keterangan kesemua saksi, adalah fakta bahawa OKT dan SP1 mengenali antara satu sama lain untuk satu tempoh masa yang panjang dan berurusan dalam perdagangan mata wang kripto dan isu pengecaman OKT adalah tidak diperlukan dan pengecaman daripada kandang adalah memadai. [44] Pemindahan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin adalah fakta tidak dipertikaikan. Persoalan utama dalam kes ini adalah sama ada terdapat penipuan dilakukan OKT atau terdapat pinjaman modal bersyarat yang dikatakan oleh OKT. [45] SP1 bertegas bahawa tiada perubahan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin dan tidak pernah menawarkan syarat seperti mana yang dicadangkan oleh peguam bela S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 manakala OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menukarkan pembelian tersebut kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [46] OKT telah bersetuju pada tiada keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Alasan ketiadaan dokumen bertulis adalah OKT telah menyuruh SP1 menyediakan perjanjian tersebut namun SP1 tidak berbuat demikian sehingga hari ini. [47] Memandangkan ketiadaan keterangan bertulis, maka Mahkamah perlu menilai kredibiliti keterangan lisan saksi-saksi. Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, peguam bela hanya meletakkan cadangan bahawa SP1 telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Namun, peguam bela tidak pernah bertanyakan soalan tentang penyedian dokumen bagi pinjaman modal bersyarat oleh SP1. SP1 hanya diajukan penyediaan dokumen untuk pelantikan CEO dan misi,visi bagi Midas Touch yang menjurus kepada penglibatkan SP1 dalam syarikat OKT. [48] Keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten di mana SP1 menyatakan bahawa tidak berkemungkinan untuk SP1 untuk menukarkan tujuan asal kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat apabila SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut. [49] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 yang bertukar fikiran dan yang menyuruh menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin dalam masa 3 hari. Pada 1 sehingga 3 Februari 2018, di mana SP1 telah berjumpa OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan dan mencadangkan duit RM54,365 akan disumbangkan ke dalam sekiranya 3 syarat dipatuhi dan sekiranya OKT masih belum membeli Bitcoin. [50] Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan telah mengajukan soalan- soalan yang kurang relevan yang berkenaan pelaburan RM30,000 secara terperinci. Namun, aduan SP1 dan pertuduhan adalah berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 bersetuju bahawa SP1 membuat perdagangan dan pelaburan dengan OKT namun SP1 menyatakan SP1 tertipu dengan pembelian Bitcoin kerana beliau tidak menerima Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [51] Mengikut perbualan awalan, SP1 dimaklumkan bahawa pembelian Bitcoin adalah melalui akaun kraken. SP1 menunggu pemindahan Bitcoin oleh OKT namun tidak dilakukan atas alasan bahawa terdapat masalah dengan akaun kraken. SP1 telah berasa tertipu setelah menyoal perkara ini dengan pihak kraken bahawa mustahil akaun kraken disekat sekian lama walaupun digodam. [52] Namun, kini versi OKT adalah OKT tidak semestinya perlu membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken memandangkan terdapat pelbagai cara pembelian Bitcoin dapat dibuat. Kemudian, OKT menerangkan prosedur pembelian Bitcoin melalui kraken adalah jauh lebih susah kerana perlu menukarkan kepada mata wang fiat terlebih dahulu bagi tujuan pembelian kripto. OKT menyatakan akaun OKT adalah pada peringkat permulaan (starter) maka memerlukan banyak transaksi dilakukan bagi tujuan pembelian Bitcoin malah perlu menunggu masa yang lama. [53] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sekiranya OKT berasa sukar untuk membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken, mengapakan OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT akan melakukan transaksi menggunakan kraken. Keterangan OKT adalah tidak konsisten di mana OKT pada mula mendekati pengadu dengan penggunaan akaun kraken di mana kini OKT menyatakan bahawa pembelian dengan kraken adalah sukar. OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa apa-apa tindakan penukaran mata wang fiat untuk pembelian Bitcoin. Dalam perbualan Whatsapp P4, OKT mengesa pengadu membayar dan OKT akan transfer duit ke dalam akaun kraken. [54] OKT menyatakan OKT cuba meningkatkan tahap akaunnya ke peringat pertengahan (intermediate) sejak 2017 namun hanya tahun 2023, pihak kraken telah memberikan verifikasi akaun pertengahan. Apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah perbualan dengan kraken bahawa OKT akhirnya mendapat akaun pertengahan setelah sekian lama dipohon. OKT tidak pernah menunjukkan bahawa akaun OKT dibuka sejak bila dan sejak bila permohonan pernah dibuat. OKT hanya mengemukakan perbualan pada tahun 2023 selepas OKT telah dituduh di Mahkamah dan perbicaraan telah lama berjalan. Oleh itu, nilai keterangan mengenai pengiktirafan akaun pertengahan pada tahun 2023 adalah amat rendah dan tidak membantu menyokong keterangan OKT. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [55] OKT dipersoalkan sekiranya tidak menggunakan kraken, mengapakah OKT masih gagal membuat pembelian menggunakan aplikasi lain sedangkan OKT menyatakan bahawa akaun kraken OKT adalah terhad. OKT memberikan alasan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM dan harga Bitcoin menaik. Namun, perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa peringkat pendakwaan. Dakwaan bahawa Bitcoin naik mendadak menyebabkan OKT tidak membelikan Bitcoin tidak pernah ditimbulkan kepada saksi pendakwaan. OKT telah mengemukakan Ekshibit D39A-E bagi menunjukkan harga pasaran Bitcoin. Namun, D39 A,C,D dan E adalah tidak relevan memandangkan harga pasaran adalah bukan tahun 2018. [56] Sekiranya merujuk kepada D39B, tidak menunjukkan perubahan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT kerana graf tersebut menunjukkan harga tahun 2018 sehingga 2020. Keterangan OKT sekali lagi tidak disokong oleh ekshibit D39B. [57] OKT turut menyatakan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM menyebabkan OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin. Namun, OKT setuju dengan cadangan bahawa pembelian mata wang kripto adalah boleh dilakukan pada bila-bila dan tiada waktu penutupan bagi pembelian mata wang asing. OKT menyatakan SP1 yang memberikan kelonggaran masa untuk membeli Bitcoin. Perkara ini sekali lagi tidak pernah ditimbulkan sewaktu peringkat pendakwaan. SP1 tidak pernah ditanya bahawa beliau yang memberi kelonggaran masa kepada OKT membeli Bitcoin dan juga harga Bitcoin menaik. [58] Semasa peringkat pemeriksaan balas, OKT telah menyatakan OKT mempunyai nota yang mencatat persetujuan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Apabila ditanya mengapa perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan di peringkat pendakwaan mahupun pemeriksaan utama di peringkat pembelaa dan OKT menjawab bahawa beliau tidak ditanya. Semasa pemeriksaan utama, OKT hanya menyatakan tiada perjanjian kerana SP1 tidak menyediakan. OKT juga tidak memaklumkan nota tersebut kepada pegawai penyiasat. Nota tersebut tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah hanya ditimbulkan semasa pemeriksaan balas. [59] Berkenaan dengan syarat yang dikatakan dikenakan oleh SP1, Mahkamah mendapati OKT yang mempunyai kuasa penuh pelantikan SP2 di mana OKT S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 telah menolak draf surat yang disediakan oleh SP1 dan menggunakan surat syarat perlantikan oleh syarikat. Adalah jelas OKT mempunyai kuasa penuh dalam pengurusan syarikat dan keputusan muktamad adalah pada OKT dan bukan pada SP1. Ketika itu, syarikat OKT memerlukan modal dan OKT juga menyatakan OKT tidak dapat pinjaman bank atas sebab tiada rekod pinjaman. Atas faktor tersebut, OKT menyatakan telah menerima pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah mustahil sebuah syarikat boleh memperoleh satu pinjaman bersyarat tanpa syarat pemulangan. OKT menyediakan perjanjian bagi pelaburan lain seperti pelaburan RM30,000 namun tidak menyediakan apa-apa dokumen untuk jumlah wang yang lebih besar. OKT yang menyediakan perjanjian untuk RM30,000 sebelum wujudnya penawaran Bitcoin kepada SP1. Malah, OKT telah mengemukakan kesemua email untuk lampirkan pemulangan bagi pelaburan trading tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak munasabah bahawa tiada satu keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat seperti yang didakwa oleh OKT. OKT juga gagal menjelaskan secara terperinci berapa jumlah bayaran balik dan tempoh pulangan pinjaman tersebut. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah diragui dan tidak kredibel. [60] Mahkamah merujuk Public Prosecutor v Subahir bin Salmin [2009] MLJU 670 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Mahkamah yang mempercayai versi pembelaan. “ However, in respect of the First Charge, I do not agree with the acquittal of the Respondent. I find that the trial Judge had erred in fact and in law. The main reason why she acquitted the Respondent was because she believed in the Defence story that there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to assist SP1 to get 3 months of full salary and his overtime pay even though SP1 did not work the full months for September, October and November 2001. Here, I agree with the Prosecution's submission that the Defence did not raise specifically and in detail the existence of such an agreement of the Company's Management in the course of cross-examining the Prosecution's witness, in particular SP7 i.e. on the question whether it was on the orders of the Company's Management that SPI's kon card was to be S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 filled in that manner so that SP1 could be paid in full even though he was on medical leave. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that at page 124 of the Appeal Record, the Defence Counsel had questioned SP7 regarding such agreement of the Company's Management to help SP1 but SP7 merely replied "tidak ingat". A perusal of the evidence at page 124 of the Appeal Record shows that SP7 was cross-examined on whether he had discussed with the Respondent and SD2 regarding compensation to be paid. SP7 replied that he could not remember. SP7 was then asked whether the salary for October and November 2001 was paid in full as compensation since SP1 did not have insurance and SOCSO. Again SP7 replied that he could not remember. As submitted by the Appellant, even if SP7 could not remember, the Defence should have pursued the matter further and asked SP7 specifically and in detail whether there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to pay SP1 the full salaries for October and November 2001 in order to assist SP1 who had no insurance or SOCSO. Since the Defence failed to raise this agreement specifically during the cross-examination of the Prosecution witnesses, it means that what the Defence later raised during the Defence stage should be rejected on the ground that the evidence regarding the agreement by the Company's Management is a mere concoction or fabrication, or an afterthought. The law regarding this issue is trite.” [61] Walaupun OKT menimbulkan perjanjian modal bersyarat di peringkat pendakwaan, namun OKT tidak menyatakan apa syarat lain selain syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. OKT tidak pernah menyentuh apa-apa perkara tentang pemulangan pinjaman modal bersyarat dan tempoh pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati pinjaman modal bersyarat merupakan satu pemikiran terkemudian oleh OKT. Berdasarkan keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut namun OKT tiada niat untuk membeli Bitcoin bagi SP1. Hal ini dapat dilihat bahawa alasan-alasan dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan konsisten. Sekiranya OKT mempunyai niat membeli Bitcoin untuk SP1, sepertimana yang dinyatakan OKT mempunyai pelbagai cara lain dan tidak semestinya membeli S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 melalui Kraken namun OKT tidak berbuat demikian. OKT telah mengesa SP1 membuat bayaran segera bagi tujuan pembelian namun OKT kini menyatakan dalam tempoh 3 hari pertama, OKT tidak membeli kerana sibuk dan harga Bitcoin naik. Namun dilihat daripada ekshibit D39B, tiada kenaikan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT. OKT menyatakan OKT mengajak SP1 membeli Bitcoin dengan sendiri dengan menggunakan akaun Luno SP1. Keterangan bertentangan dengan perbualan Whatsapp, di mana OKT yang beria-ria untuk menawarkan penjualan Bitcoin kepada OKT (ekshibit P4(2)). [62] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah tidak kredibel dan konsisten dan bersifat pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) berkenaan dengan isu penyediaan dokumen perjanjian. OKT sering bertanyakan kepada SP1 dalam membantu OKT mendraf dokumen dan semua dokumen didraf oleh SP1 seperti perlantikan CEO, visi dan misi Midas Touch. Namun OKT menyatakan SP1 tidak membuat draf dengan pinjaman modal bersyarat walaupun diminta. Mahkamah kurang mempercayai keterangan OKT di mana sekiranya jumlah pinjaman dikatakan adalah tinggi dan ianya melibatkan kepentingan pengadu, adalah mustahil SP1 enggan untuk mendraf satu perjanjian untuk memastikan kepentingannya terjamin dan juga pulangannya. [63] OKT telah menyatakan OKT akan memindahkan Bitcoin selepas 7-14 hari kemasukkan duit. Perkara ini tidak dapat dilakukan dengan akaun OKT sebagai starter dan ianya dalam pengetahuan OKT kerana pembelian melalui akaun starter memerlukan masa yang amat panjang memandangkan akaun starter mempunyai hak transaksi. SP1 telah bertanyakan sekiranya harga naik, SP1 masih boleh membeli dengan harga yang dipersetujui. Kini alasan alasan harga naik, OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin amat bercanggah dengan perbualan Whatsapp OKT dengan pengadu seperti di P4. [64] Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah memperdayakan SP1 membayar wang berjumlah RM54365 untuk pembelian Bitcoin di mana OKT tidak ada niat membeli atau membeli Bitcoin dan telah menipu pengadu bahawa Bitcoin telah dibeli tetapi Bitcoin tersebut tidak wujud. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati OKT gagal S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 menimbulkan keraguan munasabah dan OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. H. HUKUMAN [65] Antara faktor mitigasi yang dikemukakan oleh peguam bela adalah seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh berumur 56 tahun; (b) Merupakan ibu tunggal sejak kematian suami tahun 2008; (c) Mempunyai 15 cucu dan OKT menanggung 6 cucu yang tinggal bersamanya; (d) Memberikan kerjasama baik dengan pihak polis; (e) mempunyai masalah kesihatan hyperthroid sejak 2008 dan masih menerima rawatan sehingga sekarang; dan (f) Pesalah pertama [66] Peguam bela terpelajar memohon agar satu hukuman di bawah peruntukkan seksyen 294 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah diberikan berdasarkan faktor mitigasi diberikan. [67] Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan ‘victim impact statement’ oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kerugian wang yang banyak disebabkan penipuan OKT. Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman penjara dikenakan untuk melindungi kepentingan awam. Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa transaksi sebegini tidak dikawal selia dan memberikan ruang kepada penipuan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan terdapat keuntungan salah oleh OKT dan jumlah tersebut adalah tinggi. Pihak pendakwaan telah merujuk tred hukuman dalam kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818 di Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 24 bulan bagi kerugian RM33,300. Pihak memohon kos pendakwaan kerana terdapat 7 saksi dipanggil dan perbicaraan mengambil tempoh masa yang lama. [68] Peguam bela memohon pertimbangan bahawa OKT merupakan pesalah pertama dan peguam bela membantah terhadap kos. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [69] Mahkamah telah menolak permohonan peguam untuk bon berkelakuan baik kerana ianya tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Seksyen 294(6) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah menyatakan bon tidak boleh diberikan untuk kesalahan serius dan tafisran ksesalahan serius adalah di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah tergolong kesalahan serius dan tidak boleh diberikan pertimbangan bon seperti yang dipohon. [70] Mahkamah perlu menjatuhkan hukuman berdasarkan undang-undang dan prinsip kehakiman. Mahkamah merujuk kes Public Prosecutor v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 and PP v Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 MLJ 401.Seksyen 420 memperuntukkan hukuman penjara tidak kurang daripada 1 tahun dan tidak lebih 10 tahun dan sebatan dan juga boleh dikenakan denda. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara kurang 1 tahun. Mahkamah juga tertakluk kepada bidang kuasa di bawah seksyen 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 di mana Mahkamah Majistret tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara melebihi 5 tahun. Memandang OKT merupakan perempuan, maka sebatan tidak boleh dikenakan mengikut seksyen 289(c) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [71] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam kes ini dan tujuan hukuman diberikan. Mahkamah mempertimbangan hukuman penjara adalah wajar dikenakan dan bukan hukuman alternatif mengambil kira tujuan hukuman diberikan adalah berbentuk pengajaran kepada OKT dan juga masyarakat secara umum. Mahkamah mengambil kira faktor mitigasi seperti usia, kesihatan dan rekod OKT dalam mempertimbangkan tempoh pemenjaraan. Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara satu tahun dan 6 bulan. [72] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan usia, tahap kesihatan OKT serta tiada rekod kesalahan lampau OKT. OKT telah berusia 56 tahun dan mempunyai masalah kesihatan seperti hyperthyroidism. Namun begitu, tindakan OKT telah menyebabkan kerugian tinggi kepada pengadu perlu diberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya. Berdasarkan kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818, Mahkamah ini telah memendekkan tempoh hukuman penjara dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor dinyatakan di atas. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [73] Untuk permohonan kos pendakwaan, Mahkamah boleh menetapkan kos mengikut sekyen 427 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan Mahkamah mengawardkan RM1500 sebagai kos pendakwaan yang perlu dibayar seminggu dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan sekiranya gagal bayar, OKT dikenakan penjara 1 bulan. Mahkamah mengambil kira jumlah hari perbicaraan banyak dan masa yang panjang di mana kos yang terlibat apabila SP1 dan saksi awam lain telah hadir beberapa kali ke Mahkamah dan kos terlibat apabila terdapat penangguhan perbicaraan pada 4 dan 25 November 2022 oleh pihak peguam bela dan OKT. [74] Peguam bela telah memohon penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara. Alasan dikemukakan adalah tahap kesihatan OKT yang tidak baik dan memerlukan rawatan. Timbalan pendakwa raya membantah permohonan kerana OKT tidak mempunyai komplikasi dan masalah kesihatan serius. Laporan perubatan menyatakan OKT dalam keadaan stabil. [75] Mahkamah mendapati alasan OKT ada sejarah perubatan hyperthyrodism tidak memadai untuk satu penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman kerana laporan menunjukkan bahawa OKT bukan “in Thyroid Storm” dan keadaan OKT adalah stabil. Hukuman penjara tidak menafikan OKT untuk mendapat perhatian rawatan susulan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Khairul Azlan bin Mohd Napi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2022] 7 MLJ 867 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: “(3) Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code had provided that when an appeal was filed, it did not automatically render the sentence passed to be stayed. Based on the affidavit filed and the reasons submitted the court found that the health problems faced by the applicant did not justify the granting of the application for stay of execution. This was because the medical officer’s report was only in respect of the illness suffered by the applicant. The medical officer did not clearly state whether the applicant required specific and periodic treatment that could not be provided in prison. The issue of the possibility that the applicant would be exposed to the Covid-19 virus was not supported by any document or confirmation that the applicant would be infected with the virus simply because he was placed in the prison. What was at stake in this case was S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 the presumption and likelihood that it would happen to the applicant. This was not sufficient to show that it was a special circumstance to allow the execution of the sentence to be stayed” [76] Berkenaan dengan alasan penjagaan cucu, juga bukan satu keadaan khas yang memadai dalam memberikan penangguhan pelaksanaan di mana tiada apa-apa keterangan oleh OKT bahawa OKT merupakan penjaga sah dari segi undang dan cucu-cucu tidak lagi mempunyai ibu bapa lagi atau penjaga yang sah. OKT menolong untuk menjaga cucu tidak memadai untuk suatu hukuman digantungkan. OKT mempunyai ahli keluarga lain seperti anak OKT yang boleh menjaga anak atau anak buahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menolak permohonan peguam bela untuk penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret MahkamahKuala Lumpur S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-04T16:29:00+0800

Tika 2.6.0

WA-83-7823-11/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH NOR AINI BINTI ALI

Seksyen 420-penipuan-pembelian bitcoin yang tidak wujud-pemikiran terkemudian(afterthought)-pembelian bertukar kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat- penerimaan keterangan Whatsapp tanpa sijil 90A

04/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=79d51f2f-a95c-486c-bb1a-84f0482aaf90&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-7823-11/2021) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN NOR AINI BINTI ALI ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh (OKT) adalah seperti berikut: Bahawa kamu, Nor Aini Binti Ali (No KP: 670311-05-5096) di antara 11/01/2018 sehingga 12/01/2018 di Jalan Bangsar, dalam Daerah Brickfields, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur telah menipu Trisno Asyraf bin Zainol Abidin (No. KP:721108-02-5323) dengan memperdayakannya untuk mempercayai bahawa kamu akan membelikan dan menyerahkan Bitcoin kepadanya sebanyak 1 unit dan dengan itu kamu secara curangnya mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan RM54,365.00 sebagai bayaran untuk mendapatkan Bitcoin tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan kerana telah melakukan penipuan. [2] OKT tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Seramai 7 orang saksi telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan di peringkat pendakwaan. 04/01/2024 16:19:54 WA-83-7823-11/2021 Kand. 58 S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [3] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie, maka OKT diminta untuk membela diri. Setelah OKT memberikan keterangan bersumpah, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKT gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas pertuduhan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah telah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas kesalahan. Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan ke atas OKT dengan kos pendakwaan RM1500. B. RINGKASAN FAKTA [4] Pengadu (SP1) telah berkenalan dengan OKT dan telah melabur dengan OKT. Kemudian, SP1 telah bersetuju membeli 1 unit Bitcoin dengan harga RM54,365. SP1 telah membuat bayaran melalui pindahan wang sebanyak dua kali pada 11/1/2018 dan 12/1/2018. Adalah dipersetujui bahawa SP1 akan menerima 1 unit Bitcoin selepas 7 sehingga 14 hari setelah pembayaran dibuat. [5] SP1 telah menuntut pembelian Bitcoin tersebut daripada OKT namun OKT menyatakan bahawa Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan. Akhirnya, SP1 telah membuat laporan polis pada 2/12/2028 kerana SP1 berasa telah ditipu oleh OKT dan OKT gagal menunjukkan bukti bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin melalui Kraken. C. PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [6] Menurut seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga di dalam seksyen 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Peruntukan tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila kes pendakwaan berakhir, mahkamah akan menimbangkan sama ada pendakwaan telah membuat suatu prima facie kes terhadap tertuduh. [7] Pengujian kes secara prima facie telah diputuskan di dalam kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 302 di mana mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt” “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the otherside. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s. 180(2) and (3)...” [8] Begitu juga di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP (2003) 1 CLJ 734 dinyatakan sebagai; “A jugde sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and ask himself the question “ if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contain in the prosecution case?”If the answer was in the negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal…” D. PEMBUKTIAN PERTUDUHAN [9] Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan menyatakan: Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property “Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived, whether or not the deception practised was the sole or main inducement, to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine.” [10] Elemen pertuduhan seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah: i. OKT telah menipu. ii. OKT telah mendorong: a) yang mana harta itu tidak dimiliki oleh tertuduh; atau b) membuat, mengubah atau memusnahkan keseluruhan atau mana- mana bahagian suatu sekuriti yang berharga; atau c) apa-apa yang ditandatangani atau dimeterai dan boleh diubah menjadi suatu sekuriti yang berharga. iii. dia melakukannya dengan tidak jujur. [11] Seksyen 415 Kanun Keseksaan mendefinsikan penipuan seperti berikut: Cheating 415. Whoever by deceiving any person, whether or not such deception was the sole or main inducement,- S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to any person in body, mind, reputation, or property, is said to “cheat”. [12] Defini tidak jujur juga dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 24 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu sesiapa yang membuat apa-apa dengan tujuan menyebabkan keuntungan salah kepada seseorang atau kehilangan salah kepada seseorang lain tidak kira sama ada perbuatan itu menyebabkan kehilangan salah atau keuntungan salah sebenar. Elemen pertama: terdapat penipuan [13] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa elemen pertama dibuktikan melalui keterangan SP1. SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT bagi urusan pembelian Bitcoin. Menurut keterangan SP1, SP1 telah berkenalan dengan OKT melalui Wan Norain dan OKT yang telah menghubungi SP1 melalui WhatsApp pada 7/11/2017. Ketika itu, SP1 berminat dengan perdagangan mata wang kripto dan OKT melakukan personal ‘trading’ dalam ‘cyptocurrency’. SP1 telah berjumpa dengan OKT pada 23/12/2017 di Starbucks berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 pernah berurusan dengan OKT sebelum ini di mana OKT telah menawarkan perkhidmatan ‘trading’ dan SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM30,000 dengan OKT. [14] SP1 telah membuat keputusan untuk membelian satu unit Bitcoin dengan OKT. SP1 telah membuat bayaran seperti yang diminta oleh OKT. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa SP1 akan menerima Bitcoin dalam masa 7 sehingga 14 hari namun OKT telah memberikan alasan bahawa akaun platform Kraken milik OKT ada masalah menyebabkan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin kepada SP1. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [15] Keterangan SP1 adalah disokong oleh ekhibit P4 yang merupakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan OKT. Perbualan tersebut menunjukkan terdapat persetujuan harga bagi pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Sekian lama, SP1 tidak mendapat Bitcoin, SP1 telah berhubung dengan khidmat pelanggan Kraken untuk bertanyakan situasi Bitcoin yang tidak dapat dipindahkan. Setelah mendapat jawapan daripada pihak Kraken, SP1 mendapati bahawa asalan diberikan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak bermungkinan OKT tidak boleh memindahkan Bitcoin dalam tempoh masa yang panjang. SP1 berasa OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin dan Bitcoin tidak dapat dipindahkan kerana akaun OKT ada masalah. Pihak khidmat pelanggan kraken menyatakan bahawa tidak bermunasabah bahawa akaun kraken tergantung begitu lama sehingga tidak membolehkan pemindahan Bitcoin. [16] Oleh itu, OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan Bitcoin telah dibeli dan tidak dapat dipindahkan. Elemen kedua: Mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang berjumlah RM54365 [17] Melalui slip transaksi (ekshibit P3A-B) dan juga penyata bank milik OKT (ekshibit D13 dan P29), terdapat kemasukkan wang berjumlah RM54,365 ke dalam akaun milik OKT. [18] OKT telah mendorong SP1 untuk menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin. OKT telah menawarkan harga yang lebih rendah daripada harga pasaran dan menyatakan Bitcoin akan diperolehi dalam masa 7-14 hari telah mendorong SP1 menyerahkan wang sebanyak RM54,365. Elemen ketiga: Tertuduh melakukannya dengan tidak jujur [19] Pembayaran telah dibuat kepada akaun milik OKT dan OKT telah menerima wang tersebut namun wang tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [20] SP1 tidak menerima 1unit Bitcoin dan wang yang dibayar kepada OKT tidak dikembalikan oleh OKT. OKT telah menyebabkan SP1 kehilangan wang tersebut dan sehingga kini masih tidak dipulangkan kepada SP1. OKT telah mendapat keuntungan salah di mana duit tersebut tidak digunakan untuk pembelian Bitcoin. [21] SP1 tidak akan menyerahkan RM54,365 kepada OKT sekiranya OKT tidak menjanjikan untuk membelikan satu unit Bitcoin untuk SP1. Kesimpulannya, kesemua elemen pertuduhan berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. E. ISU [22] Pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan pelbagai isu dan menyatakan pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen pertuduhan kerana pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel di mana OKT telah menyatakan telah membeli Bitcoin. [23] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa kredibiliti keterangan SP1 adalah boleh dipercayai di mana keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan disokong. [24] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 telah bertukar fikiran dan telah menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin selepas perjumpaan SP1 dengan OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan. Adalah versi pembelaan bahawa SP1 telah mencadangkan agar RM54,365 digunakan sebagai pinjaman modal bersyarat untuk mengembangkan perniagaan syarikat OKT atas tiga syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat tersebut adalah abang SP1 dilantik sebagai CEO syarikat, keahlian SP1 sebagai 001 dan SP1 sebagai penasihat peribadi OKT. [25] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa SP1 telah memberikan keterangan bahawa OKT membuat semua keputusannya dengan sendiri kerana OKT yang bertanggungjawab terhadap syarikatnya. SP1 juga telah menjelaskan bahawa SP1 tidak memberitahu SP2 adalah abangnya kerana SP1 tidak ingin OKT untuk bertindak berat sebelah dan ingin OKT untuk bersikap objektif dalam pelantikan CEO memandangkan SP1 dan OKT adalah kawan ketika itu. SP1 juga telah S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menjelaskan fakta bahawa SP1 dan SP2 adalah adik beradik sudah pastinya akan diketahui oleh OKT. [26] SP2 memberikan keterangan bahawa SP2 tidak tahu menahu berkenaan dengan apa-apa syarat yang diletakkan berkenaan dengan lantikan beliau. SP2 telah menjelaskan lantikannya atas berdasarkan temu duga yang telah diadakan dan meritnya. [27] Berkenaan dengan syarat keahlian 001, SP1 telah menjelaskan bahawa keahlian sebagai 001 telah diberikan oleh OKT sendiri. SP1 telah melabur sebanyak RM18600 sebagai ahli dan mempunyai 31 akaun di mana setiap akaun adalah bernilai RM600. SP1 juga telah memberikan keterangan bahawa tiada sebarang lantikan rasmi bagi keahlian 001. [28] Pihak pembelaan juga menimbulkan isu bahawa dokumen telah diserahkan selepas perbicaraan bermula. Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa pihak pembelaan telah diberikan masa yang mencukupi untuk meneliti dokumen- dokumen tersebut kerana telah diberikan penangguhan yang sewajarnya untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen tersebut dan ini sama sekali tidak memprejudiskan OKT. [29] Pihak pembelaan telah menyatakan tindakan SP1 untuk menghantar “bill collector” adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Namun pihak pendakwaan bergantung keterangan SP3, yang dikatakan pengutip hutang telah menafikan dakwaan bahawa dia telah dilantik oleh SP1 dan SP3 telah menyatakan beliau menolong untuk mengenal pasti kedudukan OKT. [30] Pihak pembelaan turut mempersoalkan penerimaan bukti tangkapan skrin Whatsapp ekhibit P4 sebagai bukti tanpa diperiksa oleh pihak forensik. Mahkamah telah menolak bantahan peguam dan menerima bukti tangkapan skrin di mana perbualan asal dalam telefon bimbit telah dikemukakan. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 F. PEMBELAAN [31] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah menerima wang berjumlah RM54,365 yang dipindahkan oleh SP1. OKT juga mengesahkan perbualan awalan mengenai pembelian 1 unit Bitcoin. Namun OKT telah menyatakan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin tersebut telah berubah kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [32] Rumusan pembelaan daripada keterangan OKT adalah OKT telah diberikan kebenaran untuk menggunakan wang tersebut selepas OKT bersetuju tiga syarat yang diberikan oleh SP1. Tiga syarat yang dikenakan adalah bahawa SP2 dilantik sebagai CEO, SP1 sebagai ahli 001 dan penasihat peribadi OKT. [33] OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT telah mematuhi syarat dengan melantik SP2 sebagai CEO. OKT bertindak memperhentikan SP2 atas alasan bahawa SP2 telah bertindak bertentangan dengan hala tuju syarikat. [34] OKT juga menyatakan bahawa SP1 sering memberikan pendapatan dan nasihat serta membantu dalam penyediaan misi dan visi untuk Midas Touch. OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menjadi ahli 001 dan boleh dilihat melalui laman sesawang. [35] OKT telah mengemukakan bukti-bukti seperti penyata kiraan dan penyata bank bagi menyokong perbelanjaan syarikat yang menggunakan wang tersebut bagi pembayaran gaji, kos kepada ‘web developer’, bil dan sebagainya. [36] Pembelaan OKT adalah bahawa OKT tidak menipu SP1 kerana SP1 sendiri yang membuat keputusan untuk menangguhkan pembelian dan telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat kepada OKT. OKT telah menerima tawaran tersebut. G. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [37] Mahkamah akan menjawab bantahan mengenai penerimaan ekshibit P4. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Pannir Selvam a/l Sinnaiyah & Anor v Tan Chia Foo & Ors [2021] 7 MLJ 384 di Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “(3) The court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention based on the parallels drawn to the case of Lim Choon Hau v Simpson Wong where the court held that Whatsapp messages were direct evidence of the receipt of money as a friendly loan from the plaintiff. The documents produced by a computer still admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it was admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. The court viewed that the WhatsApp messages were relevant and admissible as they demonstrated the connection to the facts in issue so as to form part of the same transaction. It triggered the application of s 6 of the Evidence Act (see paras 57, 61 & 67).” [38] Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan kebolehterimaan keterangan whatsapp walaupun tiada sijil 90A seperti di bawah: [60] I am unable to agree with this submission, in view of the fact that he did not provide any authorities to support his contention that all WhatsApp messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, bearing in mind that the maker of those messages, who was SP2, was cross-examined. [61] Secondly, even if those messages amounted to documents produced by a computer, there are authorities such as Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 MLJ 317; [2014] 1 LNS 412 (CA) and Mohamad Fauzi bin Che Rus v JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 739; [2016] 6 CLJ 266 to say that documents produced by a computer may still be admissible in the absence of fulfilment of the requirements under s 90A of the Evidence Act, if it is admissible under another exception to the rule against hearsay. [39] Peguam bela hanya membantah keterangan P4 kerana tiada sijil 90A dibekalkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan telefon bimbit tidak dihantar untuk pemeriksaan forensik. [40] Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 di mana Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 menyatakan seperti berikut berkenaan pemakaian Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan: Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Shaik Daud: Seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 menjadikan rekod komputer yang dibuat semasa penggunaan biasa boleh diterima jika yang berikut dibuktikan, iaitu bahawa: (i) dokumen-dokumen dihasilkan oleh sebuah komputer; dan (ii) rekod komputer dihasilkan semasa penggunaan biasa. Bukti boleh dikemukakan sama ada dalam bentuk sijil yang ditandatangani oleh satu-satunya orang yang bertanggungjawab tentang komputer yang menghasilkan cetakan sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh s 90A(2), atau oleh seorang pegawai bank. Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Mahadev Shankar: Zainal tidak dicabar oleh perayu atas kejituan catatan dokumen yang dikemukakan. Sebaliknya, rayuan adalah berdasarkan fakta bahawa tiada sijil telah dikemukakan di bawah s 90A(2) yang mana, perayu menghujahkan, bermakna bahawa pihak pendakwa telah gagal membuktikan kesnya. Hujah ini adalah berdasarkan falasi, kerana Zainal bertanggungjawab atas semua pengendalian di bank dan dengan itu adalah bertanggungjawab atas urusan aktiviti bank yang dijalankan oleh komputer tersebut. Sekiranya dia memilih untuk menyediakan suatu sijil, dia boleh berbuat demikian dan di bawah s 90A(2), dokumen-dokumen akan diterima sebagai keterangan seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 90A(1). Keterangan viva voce seseorang dalam kandang saksi lebih penting daripada suatu sijil yang dikeluarkan olehnya (lihat ms 13G—I). Seksyen 90A(1) merupakan suatu pengemaskinian ‘rukun keterangan paling baik’ dengan realiti zaman elektronik, dan kini ia tidak lagi perlu untuk memanggil juruwang atau kerani bank yang memasukkan data dengan syarat dia berbuat demikian semasa penggunaan biasa komputer (lihat ms 14A—D). S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [41] Pemakaian sijil seksyen 90A juga dibincangkan dalam kes Mohd Khayry bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [2014] MLJU 385 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: (i)Tape recording evidence or CCTV recording, etc. at common law will be admissible based on 'res gestae' principles as truth of its contents although they may be hearsay or even self serving statement. Section 6 of EA 1950 and also other sections give statutory recognition to 'res gestae' principle in the widest form and is not restricted to the common law parameters. The test for relevancy is set out in the section itself in no uncompromising terms. There appears to be no comprehensive formula for its admissibility save as to guidelines suggested and/or imposed by courts all for good reasons. [See Amrrita Lai Hazra v Emperor 42 Cal 957; Bandahala bin Undik v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 CLJ 708 ]. The said section 6 of EA 1950 reads as follows: "Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places." (ii)At common law any form of tape recording, video recording, etc.; if relevant is made admissible if the court is satisfied of its accuracy and that it has not been tampered with, etc. The jurisprudence relating to its admissibility as well as sections 3 and 61 of EA 1950 is set out in Janab's Key to Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 2nd edition and it reads as follows: "Document before the 1993 Amendment A 851 to the Act was defined in section 3 of the Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter. Under the new amendment it includes any matter embodied in a disc, tape, film, sound track or other device whatsoever. A wide and extended meaning has been given to the definition 'document'. Previously documents at least related to things which could not be easily tampered with. Now documents include items which could be easily tampered with. It is submitted that the admission S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of such documents which could be easily tampered with must be admitted with caution." In R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 465 Marshall J observed: "… for many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The print as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording conversations. We see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such documents when produced for the inspection of the court are referred to as documentary evidence. Thus, documentary evidence may include not only documents in writing but also maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, discs, tapes videotapes, films and negatives (see Cross on Evidence)." (iii)The amendments in relation to documents to EA 1950 do not in any way affect the common law position as set out in R v Maqsud Ali. The amendments S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 allow further hearsay documents which may be difficult to be made admissible under the common law because of the hearsay rule and its prejudicial effect, to be made admissible provided the criteria set out in the amendments are complied with. The new amendments such as section 90A do not displace common law rules as to admissibility. That is to say if the party cannot admit a document in consequence of the common law restriction then he may get the document admitted under any of the new provisions such as section 90A, etc. [42] Mahkamah mendapati mendapati peguam bela tidak berhujah bahawa perbualan Whatsapp adalah tidak revelan dan hanya membantah kerana ketiadaan sijil 90A. Mahkamah mendapati P4 adalah keterangan yang relevan di mana penawaran pembelian Bitcoin dan persetujuan serta transaksi dilakukan adalah perbualan yang terkandung dalam P4. Mahkamah berpuas hati ketulenan perbualan Whatsapp apabila SP1 masih menyimpan keseluruhan perbualan Whatsapp dan telefon bimbit yang mengandungi kesemua perbualan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dalam keadaan baik. Malah di peringkat pembelaan, OKT tidak menafikan kandungan Whatsapp dan bersetuju bahawa itu adalah perbualan antara OKT dan SP1. Oleh itu, ketiadaan sijil 90A tidak menjejaskan kebolehterimaan ekshibit P4. [43] Pihak pembelaan ada menimbulkan isu ketidakaturan prosedur kawad cam. Daripada keterangan kesemua saksi, adalah fakta bahawa OKT dan SP1 mengenali antara satu sama lain untuk satu tempoh masa yang panjang dan berurusan dalam perdagangan mata wang kripto dan isu pengecaman OKT adalah tidak diperlukan dan pengecaman daripada kandang adalah memadai. [44] Pemindahan wang sebanyak RM54,365 bagi pembelian Bitcoin adalah fakta tidak dipertikaikan. Persoalan utama dalam kes ini adalah sama ada terdapat penipuan dilakukan OKT atau terdapat pinjaman modal bersyarat yang dikatakan oleh OKT. [45] SP1 bertegas bahawa tiada perubahan tujuan asal pembelian Bitcoin dan tidak pernah menawarkan syarat seperti mana yang dicadangkan oleh peguam bela S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 manakala OKT menyatakan bahawa SP1 telah menukarkan pembelian tersebut kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat. [46] OKT telah bersetuju pada tiada keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Alasan ketiadaan dokumen bertulis adalah OKT telah menyuruh SP1 menyediakan perjanjian tersebut namun SP1 tidak berbuat demikian sehingga hari ini. [47] Memandangkan ketiadaan keterangan bertulis, maka Mahkamah perlu menilai kredibiliti keterangan lisan saksi-saksi. Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, peguam bela hanya meletakkan cadangan bahawa SP1 telah menawarkan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Namun, peguam bela tidak pernah bertanyakan soalan tentang penyedian dokumen bagi pinjaman modal bersyarat oleh SP1. SP1 hanya diajukan penyediaan dokumen untuk pelantikan CEO dan misi,visi bagi Midas Touch yang menjurus kepada penglibatkan SP1 dalam syarikat OKT. [48] Keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten di mana SP1 menyatakan bahawa tidak berkemungkinan untuk SP1 untuk menukarkan tujuan asal kepada pinjaman modal bersyarat apabila SP1 dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut. [49] Pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa SP1 yang bertukar fikiran dan yang menyuruh menangguhkan pembelian Bitcoin dalam masa 3 hari. Pada 1 sehingga 3 Februari 2018, di mana SP1 telah berjumpa OKT di Hotel Royal Chulan dan mencadangkan duit RM54,365 akan disumbangkan ke dalam sekiranya 3 syarat dipatuhi dan sekiranya OKT masih belum membeli Bitcoin. [50] Semasa peringkat pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan telah mengajukan soalan- soalan yang kurang relevan yang berkenaan pelaburan RM30,000 secara terperinci. Namun, aduan SP1 dan pertuduhan adalah berkenaan dengan pembelian Bitcoin. SP1 bersetuju bahawa SP1 membuat perdagangan dan pelaburan dengan OKT namun SP1 menyatakan SP1 tertipu dengan pembelian Bitcoin kerana beliau tidak menerima Bitcoin. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [51] Mengikut perbualan awalan, SP1 dimaklumkan bahawa pembelian Bitcoin adalah melalui akaun kraken. SP1 menunggu pemindahan Bitcoin oleh OKT namun tidak dilakukan atas alasan bahawa terdapat masalah dengan akaun kraken. SP1 telah berasa tertipu setelah menyoal perkara ini dengan pihak kraken bahawa mustahil akaun kraken disekat sekian lama walaupun digodam. [52] Namun, kini versi OKT adalah OKT tidak semestinya perlu membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken memandangkan terdapat pelbagai cara pembelian Bitcoin dapat dibuat. Kemudian, OKT menerangkan prosedur pembelian Bitcoin melalui kraken adalah jauh lebih susah kerana perlu menukarkan kepada mata wang fiat terlebih dahulu bagi tujuan pembelian kripto. OKT menyatakan akaun OKT adalah pada peringkat permulaan (starter) maka memerlukan banyak transaksi dilakukan bagi tujuan pembelian Bitcoin malah perlu menunggu masa yang lama. [53] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa sekiranya OKT berasa sukar untuk membeli Bitcoin melalui kraken, mengapakan OKT menyatakan bahawa OKT akan melakukan transaksi menggunakan kraken. Keterangan OKT adalah tidak konsisten di mana OKT pada mula mendekati pengadu dengan penggunaan akaun kraken di mana kini OKT menyatakan bahawa pembelian dengan kraken adalah sukar. OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa apa-apa tindakan penukaran mata wang fiat untuk pembelian Bitcoin. Dalam perbualan Whatsapp P4, OKT mengesa pengadu membayar dan OKT akan transfer duit ke dalam akaun kraken. [54] OKT menyatakan OKT cuba meningkatkan tahap akaunnya ke peringat pertengahan (intermediate) sejak 2017 namun hanya tahun 2023, pihak kraken telah memberikan verifikasi akaun pertengahan. Apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah perbualan dengan kraken bahawa OKT akhirnya mendapat akaun pertengahan setelah sekian lama dipohon. OKT tidak pernah menunjukkan bahawa akaun OKT dibuka sejak bila dan sejak bila permohonan pernah dibuat. OKT hanya mengemukakan perbualan pada tahun 2023 selepas OKT telah dituduh di Mahkamah dan perbicaraan telah lama berjalan. Oleh itu, nilai keterangan mengenai pengiktirafan akaun pertengahan pada tahun 2023 adalah amat rendah dan tidak membantu menyokong keterangan OKT. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [55] OKT dipersoalkan sekiranya tidak menggunakan kraken, mengapakah OKT masih gagal membuat pembelian menggunakan aplikasi lain sedangkan OKT menyatakan bahawa akaun kraken OKT adalah terhad. OKT memberikan alasan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM dan harga Bitcoin menaik. Namun, perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan semasa peringkat pendakwaan. Dakwaan bahawa Bitcoin naik mendadak menyebabkan OKT tidak membelikan Bitcoin tidak pernah ditimbulkan kepada saksi pendakwaan. OKT telah mengemukakan Ekshibit D39A-E bagi menunjukkan harga pasaran Bitcoin. Namun, D39 A,C,D dan E adalah tidak relevan memandangkan harga pasaran adalah bukan tahun 2018. [56] Sekiranya merujuk kepada D39B, tidak menunjukkan perubahan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT kerana graf tersebut menunjukkan harga tahun 2018 sehingga 2020. Keterangan OKT sekali lagi tidak disokong oleh ekshibit D39B. [57] OKT turut menyatakan bahawa OKT sibuk dengan majlis AIM menyebabkan OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin. Namun, OKT setuju dengan cadangan bahawa pembelian mata wang kripto adalah boleh dilakukan pada bila-bila dan tiada waktu penutupan bagi pembelian mata wang asing. OKT menyatakan SP1 yang memberikan kelonggaran masa untuk membeli Bitcoin. Perkara ini sekali lagi tidak pernah ditimbulkan sewaktu peringkat pendakwaan. SP1 tidak pernah ditanya bahawa beliau yang memberi kelonggaran masa kepada OKT membeli Bitcoin dan juga harga Bitcoin menaik. [58] Semasa peringkat pemeriksaan balas, OKT telah menyatakan OKT mempunyai nota yang mencatat persetujuan pinjaman modal bersyarat. Apabila ditanya mengapa perkara ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan di peringkat pendakwaan mahupun pemeriksaan utama di peringkat pembelaa dan OKT menjawab bahawa beliau tidak ditanya. Semasa pemeriksaan utama, OKT hanya menyatakan tiada perjanjian kerana SP1 tidak menyediakan. OKT juga tidak memaklumkan nota tersebut kepada pegawai penyiasat. Nota tersebut tidak dikemukakan di Mahkamah hanya ditimbulkan semasa pemeriksaan balas. [59] Berkenaan dengan syarat yang dikatakan dikenakan oleh SP1, Mahkamah mendapati OKT yang mempunyai kuasa penuh pelantikan SP2 di mana OKT S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 telah menolak draf surat yang disediakan oleh SP1 dan menggunakan surat syarat perlantikan oleh syarikat. Adalah jelas OKT mempunyai kuasa penuh dalam pengurusan syarikat dan keputusan muktamad adalah pada OKT dan bukan pada SP1. Ketika itu, syarikat OKT memerlukan modal dan OKT juga menyatakan OKT tidak dapat pinjaman bank atas sebab tiada rekod pinjaman. Atas faktor tersebut, OKT menyatakan telah menerima pinjaman modal bersyarat tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah mustahil sebuah syarikat boleh memperoleh satu pinjaman bersyarat tanpa syarat pemulangan. OKT menyediakan perjanjian bagi pelaburan lain seperti pelaburan RM30,000 namun tidak menyediakan apa-apa dokumen untuk jumlah wang yang lebih besar. OKT yang menyediakan perjanjian untuk RM30,000 sebelum wujudnya penawaran Bitcoin kepada SP1. Malah, OKT telah mengemukakan kesemua email untuk lampirkan pemulangan bagi pelaburan trading tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak munasabah bahawa tiada satu keterangan bertulis mengenai pinjaman modal bersyarat seperti yang didakwa oleh OKT. OKT juga gagal menjelaskan secara terperinci berapa jumlah bayaran balik dan tempoh pulangan pinjaman tersebut. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah diragui dan tidak kredibel. [60] Mahkamah merujuk Public Prosecutor v Subahir bin Salmin [2009] MLJU 670 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi tidak bersetuju dengan dapatan Mahkamah yang mempercayai versi pembelaan. “ However, in respect of the First Charge, I do not agree with the acquittal of the Respondent. I find that the trial Judge had erred in fact and in law. The main reason why she acquitted the Respondent was because she believed in the Defence story that there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to assist SP1 to get 3 months of full salary and his overtime pay even though SP1 did not work the full months for September, October and November 2001. Here, I agree with the Prosecution's submission that the Defence did not raise specifically and in detail the existence of such an agreement of the Company's Management in the course of cross-examining the Prosecution's witness, in particular SP7 i.e. on the question whether it was on the orders of the Company's Management that SPI's kon card was to be S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 filled in that manner so that SP1 could be paid in full even though he was on medical leave. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that at page 124 of the Appeal Record, the Defence Counsel had questioned SP7 regarding such agreement of the Company's Management to help SP1 but SP7 merely replied "tidak ingat". A perusal of the evidence at page 124 of the Appeal Record shows that SP7 was cross-examined on whether he had discussed with the Respondent and SD2 regarding compensation to be paid. SP7 replied that he could not remember. SP7 was then asked whether the salary for October and November 2001 was paid in full as compensation since SP1 did not have insurance and SOCSO. Again SP7 replied that he could not remember. As submitted by the Appellant, even if SP7 could not remember, the Defence should have pursued the matter further and asked SP7 specifically and in detail whether there was an agreement by SP7, SD2 and the Respondent to pay SP1 the full salaries for October and November 2001 in order to assist SP1 who had no insurance or SOCSO. Since the Defence failed to raise this agreement specifically during the cross-examination of the Prosecution witnesses, it means that what the Defence later raised during the Defence stage should be rejected on the ground that the evidence regarding the agreement by the Company's Management is a mere concoction or fabrication, or an afterthought. The law regarding this issue is trite.” [61] Walaupun OKT menimbulkan perjanjian modal bersyarat di peringkat pendakwaan, namun OKT tidak menyatakan apa syarat lain selain syarat dikenakan oleh SP1. OKT tidak pernah menyentuh apa-apa perkara tentang pemulangan pinjaman modal bersyarat dan tempoh pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati pinjaman modal bersyarat merupakan satu pemikiran terkemudian oleh OKT. Berdasarkan keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah menipu SP1 dengan menyatakan OKT telah membeli Bitcoin tersebut namun OKT tiada niat untuk membeli Bitcoin bagi SP1. Hal ini dapat dilihat bahawa alasan-alasan dikemukakan oleh OKT adalah tidak munasabah dan konsisten. Sekiranya OKT mempunyai niat membeli Bitcoin untuk SP1, sepertimana yang dinyatakan OKT mempunyai pelbagai cara lain dan tidak semestinya membeli S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 melalui Kraken namun OKT tidak berbuat demikian. OKT telah mengesa SP1 membuat bayaran segera bagi tujuan pembelian namun OKT kini menyatakan dalam tempoh 3 hari pertama, OKT tidak membeli kerana sibuk dan harga Bitcoin naik. Namun dilihat daripada ekshibit D39B, tiada kenaikan mendadak yang dikatakan oleh OKT. OKT menyatakan OKT mengajak SP1 membeli Bitcoin dengan sendiri dengan menggunakan akaun Luno SP1. Keterangan bertentangan dengan perbualan Whatsapp, di mana OKT yang beria-ria untuk menawarkan penjualan Bitcoin kepada OKT (ekshibit P4(2)). [62] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT adalah tidak kredibel dan konsisten dan bersifat pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) berkenaan dengan isu penyediaan dokumen perjanjian. OKT sering bertanyakan kepada SP1 dalam membantu OKT mendraf dokumen dan semua dokumen didraf oleh SP1 seperti perlantikan CEO, visi dan misi Midas Touch. Namun OKT menyatakan SP1 tidak membuat draf dengan pinjaman modal bersyarat walaupun diminta. Mahkamah kurang mempercayai keterangan OKT di mana sekiranya jumlah pinjaman dikatakan adalah tinggi dan ianya melibatkan kepentingan pengadu, adalah mustahil SP1 enggan untuk mendraf satu perjanjian untuk memastikan kepentingannya terjamin dan juga pulangannya. [63] OKT telah menyatakan OKT akan memindahkan Bitcoin selepas 7-14 hari kemasukkan duit. Perkara ini tidak dapat dilakukan dengan akaun OKT sebagai starter dan ianya dalam pengetahuan OKT kerana pembelian melalui akaun starter memerlukan masa yang amat panjang memandangkan akaun starter mempunyai hak transaksi. SP1 telah bertanyakan sekiranya harga naik, SP1 masih boleh membeli dengan harga yang dipersetujui. Kini alasan alasan harga naik, OKT tidak membeli Bitcoin amat bercanggah dengan perbualan Whatsapp OKT dengan pengadu seperti di P4. [64] Mahkamah mendapati OKT telah memperdayakan SP1 membayar wang berjumlah RM54365 untuk pembelian Bitcoin di mana OKT tidak ada niat membeli atau membeli Bitcoin dan telah menipu pengadu bahawa Bitcoin telah dibeli tetapi Bitcoin tersebut tidak wujud. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati OKT gagal S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 menimbulkan keraguan munasabah dan OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. H. HUKUMAN [65] Antara faktor mitigasi yang dikemukakan oleh peguam bela adalah seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh berumur 56 tahun; (b) Merupakan ibu tunggal sejak kematian suami tahun 2008; (c) Mempunyai 15 cucu dan OKT menanggung 6 cucu yang tinggal bersamanya; (d) Memberikan kerjasama baik dengan pihak polis; (e) mempunyai masalah kesihatan hyperthroid sejak 2008 dan masih menerima rawatan sehingga sekarang; dan (f) Pesalah pertama [66] Peguam bela terpelajar memohon agar satu hukuman di bawah peruntukkan seksyen 294 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah diberikan berdasarkan faktor mitigasi diberikan. [67] Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan ‘victim impact statement’ oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kerugian wang yang banyak disebabkan penipuan OKT. Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman penjara dikenakan untuk melindungi kepentingan awam. Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa transaksi sebegini tidak dikawal selia dan memberikan ruang kepada penipuan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan terdapat keuntungan salah oleh OKT dan jumlah tersebut adalah tinggi. Pihak pendakwaan telah merujuk tred hukuman dalam kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818 di Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 24 bulan bagi kerugian RM33,300. Pihak memohon kos pendakwaan kerana terdapat 7 saksi dipanggil dan perbicaraan mengambil tempoh masa yang lama. [68] Peguam bela memohon pertimbangan bahawa OKT merupakan pesalah pertama dan peguam bela membantah terhadap kos. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [69] Mahkamah telah menolak permohonan peguam untuk bon berkelakuan baik kerana ianya tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Seksyen 294(6) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah menyatakan bon tidak boleh diberikan untuk kesalahan serius dan tafisran ksesalahan serius adalah di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan adalah tergolong kesalahan serius dan tidak boleh diberikan pertimbangan bon seperti yang dipohon. [70] Mahkamah perlu menjatuhkan hukuman berdasarkan undang-undang dan prinsip kehakiman. Mahkamah merujuk kes Public Prosecutor v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 and PP v Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 MLJ 401.Seksyen 420 memperuntukkan hukuman penjara tidak kurang daripada 1 tahun dan tidak lebih 10 tahun dan sebatan dan juga boleh dikenakan denda. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara kurang 1 tahun. Mahkamah juga tertakluk kepada bidang kuasa di bawah seksyen 87(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 di mana Mahkamah Majistret tidak boleh menjatuhkan hukuman penjara melebihi 5 tahun. Memandang OKT merupakan perempuan, maka sebatan tidak boleh dikenakan mengikut seksyen 289(c) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [71] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam kes ini dan tujuan hukuman diberikan. Mahkamah mempertimbangan hukuman penjara adalah wajar dikenakan dan bukan hukuman alternatif mengambil kira tujuan hukuman diberikan adalah berbentuk pengajaran kepada OKT dan juga masyarakat secara umum. Mahkamah mengambil kira faktor mitigasi seperti usia, kesihatan dan rekod OKT dalam mempertimbangkan tempoh pemenjaraan. Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara satu tahun dan 6 bulan. [72] Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan usia, tahap kesihatan OKT serta tiada rekod kesalahan lampau OKT. OKT telah berusia 56 tahun dan mempunyai masalah kesihatan seperti hyperthyroidism. Namun begitu, tindakan OKT telah menyebabkan kerugian tinggi kepada pengadu perlu diberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya. Berdasarkan kes Tan Wee Eng vs PP [2019] MLJU 818, Mahkamah ini telah memendekkan tempoh hukuman penjara dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun dan 6 bulan setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor dinyatakan di atas. S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [73] Untuk permohonan kos pendakwaan, Mahkamah boleh menetapkan kos mengikut sekyen 427 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan Mahkamah mengawardkan RM1500 sebagai kos pendakwaan yang perlu dibayar seminggu dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan sekiranya gagal bayar, OKT dikenakan penjara 1 bulan. Mahkamah mengambil kira jumlah hari perbicaraan banyak dan masa yang panjang di mana kos yang terlibat apabila SP1 dan saksi awam lain telah hadir beberapa kali ke Mahkamah dan kos terlibat apabila terdapat penangguhan perbicaraan pada 4 dan 25 November 2022 oleh pihak peguam bela dan OKT. [74] Peguam bela telah memohon penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara. Alasan dikemukakan adalah tahap kesihatan OKT yang tidak baik dan memerlukan rawatan. Timbalan pendakwa raya membantah permohonan kerana OKT tidak mempunyai komplikasi dan masalah kesihatan serius. Laporan perubatan menyatakan OKT dalam keadaan stabil. [75] Mahkamah mendapati alasan OKT ada sejarah perubatan hyperthyrodism tidak memadai untuk satu penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman kerana laporan menunjukkan bahawa OKT bukan “in Thyroid Storm” dan keadaan OKT adalah stabil. Hukuman penjara tidak menafikan OKT untuk mendapat perhatian rawatan susulan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Khairul Azlan bin Mohd Napi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2022] 7 MLJ 867 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: “(3) Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code had provided that when an appeal was filed, it did not automatically render the sentence passed to be stayed. Based on the affidavit filed and the reasons submitted the court found that the health problems faced by the applicant did not justify the granting of the application for stay of execution. This was because the medical officer’s report was only in respect of the illness suffered by the applicant. The medical officer did not clearly state whether the applicant required specific and periodic treatment that could not be provided in prison. The issue of the possibility that the applicant would be exposed to the Covid-19 virus was not supported by any document or confirmation that the applicant would be infected with the virus simply because he was placed in the prison. What was at stake in this case was S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 the presumption and likelihood that it would happen to the applicant. This was not sufficient to show that it was a special circumstance to allow the execution of the sentence to be stayed” [76] Berkenaan dengan alasan penjagaan cucu, juga bukan satu keadaan khas yang memadai dalam memberikan penangguhan pelaksanaan di mana tiada apa-apa keterangan oleh OKT bahawa OKT merupakan penjaga sah dari segi undang dan cucu-cucu tidak lagi mempunyai ibu bapa lagi atau penjaga yang sah. OKT menolong untuk menjaga cucu tidak memadai untuk suatu hukuman digantungkan. OKT mempunyai ahli keluarga lain seperti anak OKT yang boleh menjaga anak atau anak buahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menolak permohonan peguam bela untuk penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret MahkamahKuala Lumpur S/N Lx/VeVypbEi7GoTwSCqvkA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-04T16:29:00+0800

Tika 2.6.0

WA-25-51-03/2023

PEMOHON NAZMI BIN MAMAT RESPONDEN 1. ) IKHMAS JAYA SDN BHD 2. ) MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA

Application by the 1st Respondent to set aside the Ex-Parte Order dated 4.4 2023 for leave to commence judicial review - Failure to file the Affidavit Verifying the Facts and Failure to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and append relevant exhibits to the court.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c8e3f94d-fdc0-469e-a440-79d0581051c4&Inline=true

04/01/2024 11:43:15 WA-25-51-03/2023 Kand. 52 S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—51—03/2023 Kand. 52 an/m;2n2L 11:43-13 mum mnxamm mam MALAVA nu KUALA Luuwun mum wuuvm wznssxuwm KUALA LUPIPUI. muvsu (BANMSIAN KUASNKUASA sous) pazma >4 umux ssmxm mum u wuss Da\zm Perxsr: Psrmomnan meh Pemnhun unluk Penman Cemoran din Mandamus m Bawah Amran 53, Kaedah— xua-n Manknmnh 2012 :3... Damn Perkzam Seksyan 2am ma Pemubungan Pnmsnhaln 1:57 Dan Dalam Parker: Award Mahkamah Pnluuhnn No 2579 Tihlm 2922 benankh om Dsombev 21:22 Dan Dllam Punurn aw Eswah Alumn 92 Kaedah 4. Kaadah-Kaedah Mahkzmah 2012 mum mzm aw MAMAT PEMOHON pm 1 mamas nusnn sun nssvouosu rznmm 2 MAHKAMAH psnusnmm muwsm nzspouusu KEDuA me Inn no sm YmyMDwn|a>.aMnuwaaRxA :.~.» “Nam smnw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m mm, .. nr1g\n|HIy mm: dnuumnl VI mum pm Judglnanl (Enclosure I7) lnlroduczion 1 The Apphcant, byway dl an ex-pane Ipphcahon mad the Appncanrs Ndlclfil revlew (JR) Appllcallnn an 2 3 2023 and on 3 4.2023, (ms Honourable Cour! gmnled lne Apphcant leave (or JR lor the IDHUMHQ nrdars. - a bahawa kebenaran dlberi kepada Pemcrlan yang lersebul di ala: bagl rnamuhorl sualu Permlah Oerlmrarl unluk dlkemukakan ke Mahkamah yang Mulls mi yang benuluan unluk mengeneplkan alau membalalkan sebahagian danpada kepumsan Mahkalnah Pevusahaan Award No. 2579/2022 benarikh 3 12.2022 berkelvaan penglraarl gap kebelakangan (backwages) den gall ganll pemuhhan. l: bahawa kehenaran amen kepada Pamnon yang lelsanuldl alas bagl memohcn sualu Perlnlah Mandamus henujuan supaya gengnuan gall kehalakangan (backwsges) dan gap germ pemuhhan dllakukan samula dmadapan seorang Pengerusl Dam Responden Kedua. 2 The relevanl cause papers, lncludlng Ex—ParIe Order daled 3 4 202:: duly served on me 1“ Respondent an 11 A 2023. 3 On 31 52023, the 15' Respondent Ned a Nollce 07 Apphcallcrl (Enclosure 14) under Order 32 Rule 5 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of me Rules ol Ctlufl 2012 (noc) and/or lnherenl powar of me com (0 sehaslde the Ex-Parke Older dated 3.4.2023 (0! leave In commence JR 4. on 12.6.2023. me Appllcanl filed a Nollce emppllcallon (Erlulolulo I1) under older 3 Rule 5 and/or order IA and/or Order 92 Rule 4 unne ROG andlor lnheren| power cl lne com to seek (he lollowlng mllsis. — 1. Pemnhon dlbenkan kebenaran dan Ianlulan masa unluk nnamlallkan Afidavll Sokungan yang dllkrarksn olen Nazml bln Mamal 1 3 2023 kedalam Elecuume Flhng Syslsm (EF5). pm 2 one an nnr/MDwn|anaHnuwaaRxA .~_» «mm. snn ...n..mn .. met! In my me nnuu-y -mm: glam. VI mung Wm! 2 K05 auadikan kos aalarn kausa, dan 3. Lain-lain remdan/eleu penmen yang aianggep wslar dan Sual rnantaazolen Mankarnan yang Muliai . 5 In essence, me Apphcanlflled an appllcafionlcran exlenslan alums 1:: seek leave lor 1ne Applrcann-s Amaavl1 to be filed mm the 51:3, 5, Bo1n Enclosures M and 17 are fixed |o be neard1oge1ner.A«er1ne hearlng, I had allowed 1he 1' Respendenfs appI1ca1iun1c sel-aslde me Ex—Fan.e Order aaled 342023 lar leave |o commence JR [Enclosure 14) and dlsmlssed 1ne Applrcarws apphcannn V7 Enclosure 17. 7 Yhis ludgmerll canvarns me lull reasons lor rny Enclosure 17 dEI:l5lO7l.Tl'1e grounds onudgrnenuor Enclosure 14 wrll be prepared separately vrcnr lms ludgmenx Bnckgwund ram 3. The narrallon 01 me background veers nerein VS adopled wnn and/or wllhoul m0dWica\IOH (mm the names‘ written submlsslons. 9 Upon belrlg served vnzn lne relevanl cause papers Includlng me Ex- Pafle Order daled 3 4.2D23,Iha1" Respondent dlsoavered that the Apphcanl has never filed any Amda1n1verllying lne Fads rehed an in mi: JR Appllcallon. whether at [he leave stage or lha subslanlwe SW93. 10 The eenlenls 0! me order 53 slalemenl are not supponed nor affirmed by any Amdavll vemylng lne Facls ruhed an VI (ms sppllcatlon 11. The Applrcanx has not and/av nas failed to append or enclose or e-<nlpl1 any documents and/or exnmns relevant to venfy the content ol me Order 53 slalemenl 12 The Apphcanl nas valled In fully and irankly drscloee all rnalerlal lacls to me coon In |he eanlenls lfllhe Order 53 Slalement me 3 our: sru Tvnn/MDwn|an0HnuwBaRxA .~.»«w1.. s.n.1 luvlhnrwm rs. u..a e M», 1... nflglnlllly mull: dnuavlml VI mum ml 13 14. 15. 16. 17 The Apphcam has lallea lo disdose all malerlal laels and nas nol exhlblled me mnerlal uhlblls in we own lhruugh any Nflda venlylng lne Facts relied un, lrlcludlng hut nel llrnlled In lalllng lo wrrml.- . me cause papers all me slage at proceedlngs in Ihe lnduslrlal Cour! under Secllon zalal ol me lndustrlal Relallons An 1967‘ H. lncludlng me slalemenl ol case, Bunale of Clalmarvfs Documenls, clelmanrs wllness slexemenl, clannanrs wrmen Submissrnns, Pmceedlrlgs Notes. and Award No. 2579/2022. Fmrn me n g of lnls JR Applicallorl unul lodey, no Alfiaevn Venfymg the Facts relled on nes been filed bylhe Applucanl In [ms Appllcahcn Io verlly me Order 53 S|aI:menl rne Appllcarl| has never served to the 1- mspenaenl any Amdavlt Verifying (he Facts rehod on |haI has been duly filed In |hls Honourable Court. ee lne Applleanl has never filed an Alllaavll venlylng lne Facls relled on be4are lnis Honourable coun, -nu me com and ma Respcnuenls have also never been served wlln any Amdavil venlylng lne Relerrea Fads lnal has been duly filed m Cnurl — I. il ls lmpcsslble lor the 151 Respondent to file any Amaevll In Reply In llus JR Appllcauon; the Courl and Pames cannm examlne and confirm me aocuracyarld correclness ol me cement ol lhe Order 53 Slalamenlz m. me Respanaenls' abllily Io respenu lo we appllcalmn has been napnmrely prejudiced However, on 12 6 2023, about lhree monlns laler aner me fillng for leave, me Aaphcanl seugnl (or an exlenslorl nl urns lo me me Alfldavll Venfying me Feels. Dale A ufi lo srn fins/MDwn|anaHnuwaaRxA .~,» “Nana Smul luvlhnrwlll be HIGH e my r... nflglnlllly MIN: dnuavlml v. mum vtmxl ta According to the 1' Respondent. this is clearly an aflenhoughi at the Applicsm to remedy the iatal inegularities and iundarnenlal flaw in the Annlicanfs leave application. I9 According to the Applicant, onor to the hling oi the applicauon (Enclosure 1) on 2.3.2023 the Applicant had sworn in Amdavil in support of Enclosure 1 on t 3 2023 (Applicants Afildavlt). zu However, the Applicants solicitors had awoently med the same Enotusure 1 documents instead oi the Applicants Amdauil as the Aiiioavit soltongan under Enclosure 3 The Applicants sol tor contends that this was at all material times an unintended human enor (see; enclosure 16) 2t The Applicants solicitors hao then served all the hard copies oi the Enclosure 1 aopllcation along with the Applicants Affidavil to the Attorney General s chainoers (use). The AGC upon Demsmg ano ensuring that all the oocurrients were in order then proceeded to issue their non-ooieotion letter which is Enclosure 4. 22. The Cowl upon receiving the -1pp|ica|I0ri as WGH Is Enclosure 4 men proceeded to grant Enclosure to in iavour oi the Apullcanl. 2: The Applicants solicitors had then served the harocooies oi Enclosure 1. Enclosure 2. the Applicant's Affidawli Enclosure 8 and Enclosure to to the 1" Respondent by hand on it .4.2o23. lsee Exhibit NA.3 of Eliclosurv I8). 24 The I“ Respondent had then mud in let Enclosure i4 citing the human error or the Applicarifs solioitois in riiing the Aoplicants Aiiidavit as the basis or! their application 25 The Applicants solicitor upon realising this error had med in Enclosure is explaining the unionunate ordeal in this Ho curable court as well as attaching the Appllcarifs Aiiioavit as Exh FRAZ in Enclosure I5. 26 Further, the Applicaru hasalso med Enclosure t7to seek the court's leave to upload the Applicants Amdauit into the Electronic Filing system (EFS) of the court van s or II! SIN fin:/MDwn|ahOHnuWBERxA .~.» “Nah: s.n.i luvihnrwm be mad a navy i... nflglnlllly MVMI dnuavinril VI aFluNfl wrixl The decision at me court 27 In gist, the Applicants grounds tor the application are as toltow . I it was an henast mistake by the Applimnt solieners; ii. Tneie is no degree at pretudtoe against tne 1“ Respondent, and iii The Applicant had allegedly served -the emdavit“ to the A60 and the parties 25 The Applicant claimed that there is an honest and genuine ennr that has been mine by the Applicant‘: solicitors The Appllclrlfs tnleras| is at stake and dismissing an entire JR entirely on a nunian errorwilt seveteiy preludloe ttie Applicants ngnt to be tieard in law 29. The Appilcanfs solicitor IS deepiy tegrellul and remnrseful of his action and stnoereiy apologizes tor nis error as evtdenoed in Enclosure 15 30 land that the mistake and ‘honest and genuine error‘ as claimed by the Applicant‘; solicitor is an untenable and insutrieient excuse because — an 1 wittiin ma Apptioarit a amdeuit and their autarniesiori, they have admitted that it was the solicitors tault and dwn doing that they tailed to tile the Atrtdavit veritying the Facts, 30.2 The delay oi three months or more than 90 days even alter the parties have entered the lnlenparles stage eiaborales the seventy ot the Applicant's delay; at) 3 The irijuslloe is so severe to the court and the 1“ Respondent that rt this extension is allowed, it would mean that Ihe Applicant has negligently deprived and/or suppressed the court and AGO from an Amdaintventying the Facts during the leave stage. and has misled the court into thinking that an amdayit was filed when there was none to begin with and so 4 The leave was granted wltnauttully complying witli mandatory requirements at order 53 Mme ROC rueiav 10 SIN Tvnr/MDwn|ahOHnuWBERxA .._» "Nair s.ii.i nanhnrwlll be u... In vanity i... nnginliily MVMI dnunvlml VI aFit.tNa aiiai 31. 32 33 34 35 The Federal Com m the case of Chln Hua sawmill cu Sdn Bhd v. Tuln Vulufl bln ‘nun Monlmod [1971] 1 MLRA 134; ]1974]1 Mu sa hem lhat a schcvlor rrusoake Is not a ground 10 gram specral leave for exnensroh 0! [me as loHcws — - ram rs . cum ldmilslnn am the failun In um ch. mm‘:- was dun In rm sollcllofl mlluku. Nudlus to say, um mm mlsuku ls rm - gmund for nrlnlmq Ipcclal Inn. Thai must be an «ar me uhwous reason lha| ]| ]s but pusslbls In draw a dmflmg Vine balwiirv a rmslaka mum nun supwn nrr xaruu M a d]scrul\:nafY Bower mud (ha| wmeh whnot A mismku vs a rnislaku whallver may mm: mm 191 In. As to wheuharor her: Mr Foo . ml akeamuunu |o hegnrger-ee wt axuvass noopwvan ' (emphasvs added) In the mslantcase, me Applwcanl mere\y rehed an the lemma] ]| was allegedly an honas| Imslake when It was a blalam msregard of We mandalcry nature 0! Order 53 of me ROG procedure which, the Anphcam as an advocate and suhculor and an nfhcer 09 the Com has nsghgervfly flouled. Thersficre‘ V Mew |ha| (he Applicant snhcumrs "honesl m]sfaKe' as an untenatfle and insuffimenl ground lar an extension of «me The Applicanx vunher sunmmea that dlsrmssing ah apphcalvon due [a a Ming error by me Applrcahrs sohcnors mu severe\y pre]ud|ce me Appllcanl 1] rs lo be nnled men under order 53 oflhe ROG. a Statement and Aflndavn larms pan rmhe pleading ovarry JR appucaxron aha mus| therefore be comnlled wilh The Court cl Appea] in she case a] DKLS $unIhlnn Sdn Bhd v. Karaiaan Nugori Pulau Huang .1. Almr [2019] 1 MLJ S71: [2019] 3 cu sis: [2019] 2 MLRA 471 hem the mandawry nature oi me Ordav 53 5(B|Bm6Hl me me Amaavu verrryrng the Faces as ¢onows:- [ca] Fnrmnr, Imderfi 5: r3(2)lrI annlncauur lorleave lorluaicinl mvilw mull be run. Ix-vlrll we must bu nrpperua by mung am the naum ma ducnpliml ea In: apenrcarrr. the nlnel .arr.m Ind mu ground: In vthleh n I: taught me by -mama rmityirru are facts Iellnd arr. ma: mdlr Ix mandatory. n nrrvur cmphlshl! mu nrlnclplltluu pifly ls bound hy his or... plndlng and mi: ml: in rrummery In nlluu. Vn Bag: 7 ma em ]'vh|yMDwhnahaHhuwaaRxA ,.~.» “Nana s.r.r mmhnrwm r. HIGH m vuflj r... nr1g\ruHIy mm]: dnuumnl VI mum vans] [51] We wen meme manna appellanvs sunmnm: mu emaavlu«m- Iuppoll mmemll mononm nquinmnnln .. meneme eye 51 r 3(2). sou. email not luv: Iuppnflod the iflvellanrs apuiemsan lar luasml uvbcw“ (emphssls added) as cummg back to the (acts In me presenl case, I find lhal lhe Apphcam has: - Y. Falled lo dlsclose and plead me parliculars and pmceedlngs of me lndustrlal Court In lull ln me order 53 Slalemenl: V1 Fallee Io file an Affidavll Verifying the FacLs Veiled on to support me Older 53 Slalemenll Ill Failed lp annex or exhlbrl ell pl me cause papers ol me lnuuslnal Cowl proceedlngs dunng me ex—pane leave slage. w. Caused me Court le be deprlved and suppressed lmm me lull appreaaliurl :71 all the cause papers at me Industrial Ccurl prooeedlrlgs: and v selemlvely choose whlch apcumems lo exlubil and K) produce helare ms 37 Based on the above. I am olme VIEW ma: me Appllcanl snllcllors‘ lallura |u enclose all uelells and aocumens VI lhelr pleeamgs wllmn the Order 53 slelemenl ls lalal as ls lhus preludiael lllhls leave was nul set aslde. as Furmer. lhe Applieanl submlls mal |he “Amaavlr was servedlu me Aec However, l find that the “Amdavll“ lhal was allegedly sewed In me AGC was an unslamped, Llnpild and unnlea Alvleavll |ha\ has no pmt7a|ive value before lms cum :9. Tnelelure, ll ls my vlew max servmg span unlllea. unpala and unslamved dcl:umen| lo the AGC Ind me names IS as good as servmg an empty and blank piece ol paper wlm npmng la slmw ler ll Page a nun em Wnr/MDwn|aaaHnuwaaRxA .~.» “Nppe Sam! navlhnrwm be mad a vuny .. nflglnlllly mm: dnuavlml VI erlum Wm! 40. Based on the above, this cnun Is al the mew man no wfiuavu" was wveu lo the AGC and in me pamus a1aH malenal nmes. mus In breach of mandatory Order 53 Rifle A ofme ROC Cunclulion 41 Premsed on the aforesaid reasons. I dvsrmssed the Applicant‘: appncauon (Enclosure 17) mm casts of RM son an sumac! no me aflocalcv lee. Daled 02+ January 2024 /\/\_/x./\ Ahmad Kamal bun Md Shahld Judge mgr. coun Kuala Lumpur Pan g M m sm my/MDwn|a».aHnuwaaRxA .~.» “Nam smnw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M, .. mm.m, mm: dnuamnl VI mum pm Cuunsol For me Applicam For me 1-‘ Respondent Dr Palhma Raj Ramasamy (Encxk R M Murah wmh him) Texuan Pamma Ra] Ramasamy 3. Co Peguambela uan Feguamcara Private Suits 91. Lcl L02, Lave! 1, Gle Damansava, 599. Jalan Damansara‘ Taman Tun Dr Ismaix. sown Kuala Lumpur. (Ru, Tuisn — PRRCO/JR/0264/NM/D3/2D23) Encwk Mohammad Haxkal Admn bin Mohd Nalm (cm Nu! lrdma Syamrah wnxh mm) Teluan Ahmad Demel Ruben 5 Co Peguambela dan Peguamcala 45:9»:-1o. c3~2~1 1, ca-2-12 Smaris Dmamas. Jalan Dmamas 1. 50430 Kuala Lumpur vuexnnuo sm numuummnuwaam .~,» “Nam smuw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m my .. mm.m, mum: dnuamnl VI mum pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-51-03/2023

PEMOHON NAZMI BIN MAMAT RESPONDEN 1. ) IKHMAS JAYA SDN BHD 2. ) MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA

Application by the 1st Respondent to set aside the Ex-Parte Order dated 4.4 2023 for leave to commence judicial review - Failure to file the Affidavit Verifying the Facts and Failure to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and append relevant exhibits to the court.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c8e3f94d-fdc0-469e-a440-79d0581051c4&Inline=true

04/01/2024 11:43:15 WA-25-51-03/2023 Kand. 52 S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TfnjyMD9nkakQHnQWBBRxA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—51—03/2023 Kand. 52 an/m;2n2L 11:43-13 mum mnxamm mam MALAVA nu KUALA Luuwun mum wuuvm wznssxuwm KUALA LUPIPUI. muvsu (BANMSIAN KUASNKUASA sous) pazma >4 umux ssmxm mum u wuss Da\zm Perxsr: Psrmomnan meh Pemnhun unluk Penman Cemoran din Mandamus m Bawah Amran 53, Kaedah— xua-n Manknmnh 2012 :3... Damn Perkzam Seksyan 2am ma Pemubungan Pnmsnhaln 1:57 Dan Dalam Parker: Award Mahkamah Pnluuhnn No 2579 Tihlm 2922 benankh om Dsombev 21:22 Dan Dllam Punurn aw Eswah Alumn 92 Kaedah 4. Kaadah-Kaedah Mahkzmah 2012 mum mzm aw MAMAT PEMOHON pm 1 mamas nusnn sun nssvouosu rznmm 2 MAHKAMAH psnusnmm muwsm nzspouusu KEDuA me Inn no sm YmyMDwn|a>.aMnuwaaRxA :.~.» “Nam smnw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m mm, .. nr1g\n|HIy mm: dnuumnl VI mum pm Judglnanl (Enclosure I7) lnlroduczion 1 The Apphcant, byway dl an ex-pane Ipphcahon mad the Appncanrs Ndlclfil revlew (JR) Appllcallnn an 2 3 2023 and on 3 4.2023, (ms Honourable Cour! gmnled lne Apphcant leave (or JR lor the IDHUMHQ nrdars. - a bahawa kebenaran dlberi kepada Pemcrlan yang lersebul di ala: bagl rnamuhorl sualu Permlah Oerlmrarl unluk dlkemukakan ke Mahkamah yang Mulls mi yang benuluan unluk mengeneplkan alau membalalkan sebahagian danpada kepumsan Mahkalnah Pevusahaan Award No. 2579/2022 benarikh 3 12.2022 berkelvaan penglraarl gap kebelakangan (backwages) den gall ganll pemuhhan. l: bahawa kehenaran amen kepada Pamnon yang lelsanuldl alas bagl memohcn sualu Perlnlah Mandamus henujuan supaya gengnuan gall kehalakangan (backwsges) dan gap germ pemuhhan dllakukan samula dmadapan seorang Pengerusl Dam Responden Kedua. 2 The relevanl cause papers, lncludlng Ex—ParIe Order daled 3 4 202:: duly served on me 1“ Respondent an 11 A 2023. 3 On 31 52023, the 15' Respondent Ned a Nollce 07 Apphcallcrl (Enclosure 14) under Order 32 Rule 5 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of me Rules ol Ctlufl 2012 (noc) and/or lnherenl powar of me com (0 sehaslde the Ex-Parke Older dated 3.4.2023 (0! leave In commence JR 4. on 12.6.2023. me Appllcanl filed a Nollce emppllcallon (Erlulolulo I1) under older 3 Rule 5 and/or order IA and/or Order 92 Rule 4 unne ROG andlor lnheren| power cl lne com to seek (he lollowlng mllsis. — 1. Pemnhon dlbenkan kebenaran dan Ianlulan masa unluk nnamlallkan Afidavll Sokungan yang dllkrarksn olen Nazml bln Mamal 1 3 2023 kedalam Elecuume Flhng Syslsm (EF5). pm 2 one an nnr/MDwn|anaHnuwaaRxA .~_» «mm. snn ...n..mn .. met! In my me nnuu-y -mm: glam. VI mung Wm! 2 K05 auadikan kos aalarn kausa, dan 3. Lain-lain remdan/eleu penmen yang aianggep wslar dan Sual rnantaazolen Mankarnan yang Muliai . 5 In essence, me Apphcanlflled an appllcafionlcran exlenslan alums 1:: seek leave lor 1ne Applrcann-s Amaavl1 to be filed mm the 51:3, 5, Bo1n Enclosures M and 17 are fixed |o be neard1oge1ner.A«er1ne hearlng, I had allowed 1he 1' Respendenfs appI1ca1iun1c sel-aslde me Ex—Fan.e Order aaled 342023 lar leave |o commence JR [Enclosure 14) and dlsmlssed 1ne Applrcarws apphcannn V7 Enclosure 17. 7 Yhis ludgmerll canvarns me lull reasons lor rny Enclosure 17 dEI:l5lO7l.Tl'1e grounds onudgrnenuor Enclosure 14 wrll be prepared separately vrcnr lms ludgmenx Bnckgwund ram 3. The narrallon 01 me background veers nerein VS adopled wnn and/or wllhoul m0dWica\IOH (mm the names‘ written submlsslons. 9 Upon belrlg served vnzn lne relevanl cause papers Includlng me Ex- Pafle Order daled 3 4.2D23,Iha1" Respondent dlsoavered that the Apphcanl has never filed any Amda1n1verllying lne Fads rehed an in mi: JR Appllcallon. whether at [he leave stage or lha subslanlwe SW93. 10 The eenlenls 0! me order 53 slalemenl are not supponed nor affirmed by any Amdavll vemylng lne Facls ruhed an VI (ms sppllcatlon 11. The Applrcanx has not and/av nas failed to append or enclose or e-<nlpl1 any documents and/or exnmns relevant to venfy the content ol me Order 53 slalemenl 12 The Apphcanl nas valled In fully and irankly drscloee all rnalerlal lacls to me coon In |he eanlenls lfllhe Order 53 Slalement me 3 our: sru Tvnn/MDwn|an0HnuwBaRxA .~.»«w1.. s.n.1 luvlhnrwm rs. u..a e M», 1... nflglnlllly mull: dnuavlml VI mum ml 13 14. 15. 16. 17 The Apphcam has lallea lo disdose all malerlal laels and nas nol exhlblled me mnerlal uhlblls in we own lhruugh any Nflda venlylng lne Facts relied un, lrlcludlng hut nel llrnlled In lalllng lo wrrml.- . me cause papers all me slage at proceedlngs in Ihe lnduslrlal Cour! under Secllon zalal ol me lndustrlal Relallons An 1967‘ H. lncludlng me slalemenl ol case, Bunale of Clalmarvfs Documenls, clelmanrs wllness slexemenl, clannanrs wrmen Submissrnns, Pmceedlrlgs Notes. and Award No. 2579/2022. Fmrn me n g of lnls JR Applicallorl unul lodey, no Alfiaevn Venfymg the Facts relled on nes been filed bylhe Applucanl In [ms Appllcahcn Io verlly me Order 53 S|aI:menl rne Appllcarl| has never served to the 1- mspenaenl any Amdavlt Verifying (he Facts rehod on |haI has been duly filed In |hls Honourable Court. ee lne Applleanl has never filed an Alllaavll venlylng lne Facls relled on be4are lnis Honourable coun, -nu me com and ma Respcnuenls have also never been served wlln any Amdavil venlylng lne Relerrea Fads lnal has been duly filed m Cnurl — I. il ls lmpcsslble lor the 151 Respondent to file any Amaevll In Reply In llus JR Appllcauon; the Courl and Pames cannm examlne and confirm me aocuracyarld correclness ol me cement ol lhe Order 53 Slalamenlz m. me Respanaenls' abllily Io respenu lo we appllcalmn has been napnmrely prejudiced However, on 12 6 2023, about lhree monlns laler aner me fillng for leave, me Aaphcanl seugnl (or an exlenslorl nl urns lo me me Alfldavll Venfying me Feels. Dale A ufi lo srn fins/MDwn|anaHnuwaaRxA .~,» “Nana Smul luvlhnrwlll be HIGH e my r... nflglnlllly MIN: dnuavlml v. mum vtmxl ta According to the 1' Respondent. this is clearly an aflenhoughi at the Applicsm to remedy the iatal inegularities and iundarnenlal flaw in the Annlicanfs leave application. I9 According to the Applicant, onor to the hling oi the applicauon (Enclosure 1) on 2.3.2023 the Applicant had sworn in Amdavil in support of Enclosure 1 on t 3 2023 (Applicants Afildavlt). zu However, the Applicants solicitors had awoently med the same Enotusure 1 documents instead oi the Applicants Amdauil as the Aiiioavit soltongan under Enclosure 3 The Applicants sol tor contends that this was at all material times an unintended human enor (see; enclosure 16) 2t The Applicants solicitors hao then served all the hard copies oi the Enclosure 1 aopllcation along with the Applicants Affidavil to the Attorney General s chainoers (use). The AGC upon Demsmg ano ensuring that all the oocurrients were in order then proceeded to issue their non-ooieotion letter which is Enclosure 4. 22. The Cowl upon receiving the -1pp|ica|I0ri as WGH Is Enclosure 4 men proceeded to grant Enclosure to in iavour oi the Apullcanl. 2: The Applicants solicitors had then served the harocooies oi Enclosure 1. Enclosure 2. the Applicant's Affidawli Enclosure 8 and Enclosure to to the 1" Respondent by hand on it .4.2o23. lsee Exhibit NA.3 of Eliclosurv I8). 24 The I“ Respondent had then mud in let Enclosure i4 citing the human error or the Applicarifs solioitois in riiing the Aoplicants Aiiidavit as the basis or! their application 25 The Applicants solicitor upon realising this error had med in Enclosure is explaining the unionunate ordeal in this Ho curable court as well as attaching the Appllcarifs Aiiioavit as Exh FRAZ in Enclosure I5. 26 Further, the Applicaru hasalso med Enclosure t7to seek the court's leave to upload the Applicants Amdauit into the Electronic Filing system (EFS) of the court van s or II! SIN fin:/MDwn|ahOHnuWBERxA .~.» “Nah: s.n.i luvihnrwm be mad a navy i... nflglnlllly MVMI dnuavinril VI aFluNfl wrixl The decision at me court 27 In gist, the Applicants grounds tor the application are as toltow . I it was an henast mistake by the Applimnt solieners; ii. Tneie is no degree at pretudtoe against tne 1“ Respondent, and iii The Applicant had allegedly served -the emdavit“ to the A60 and the parties 25 The Applicant claimed that there is an honest and genuine ennr that has been mine by the Applicant‘: solicitors The Appllclrlfs tnleras| is at stake and dismissing an entire JR entirely on a nunian errorwilt seveteiy preludloe ttie Applicants ngnt to be tieard in law 29. The Appilcanfs solicitor IS deepiy tegrellul and remnrseful of his action and stnoereiy apologizes tor nis error as evtdenoed in Enclosure 15 30 land that the mistake and ‘honest and genuine error‘ as claimed by the Applicant‘; solicitor is an untenable and insutrieient excuse because — an 1 wittiin ma Apptioarit a amdeuit and their autarniesiori, they have admitted that it was the solicitors tault and dwn doing that they tailed to tile the Atrtdavit veritying the Facts, 30.2 The delay oi three months or more than 90 days even alter the parties have entered the lnlenparles stage eiaborales the seventy ot the Applicant's delay; at) 3 The irijuslloe is so severe to the court and the 1“ Respondent that rt this extension is allowed, it would mean that Ihe Applicant has negligently deprived and/or suppressed the court and AGO from an Amdaintventying the Facts during the leave stage. and has misled the court into thinking that an amdayit was filed when there was none to begin with and so 4 The leave was granted wltnauttully complying witli mandatory requirements at order 53 Mme ROC rueiav 10 SIN Tvnr/MDwn|ahOHnuWBERxA .._» "Nair s.ii.i nanhnrwlll be u... In vanity i... nnginliily MVMI dnunvlml VI aFit.tNa aiiai 31. 32 33 34 35 The Federal Com m the case of Chln Hua sawmill cu Sdn Bhd v. Tuln Vulufl bln ‘nun Monlmod [1971] 1 MLRA 134; ]1974]1 Mu sa hem lhat a schcvlor rrusoake Is not a ground 10 gram specral leave for exnensroh 0! [me as loHcws — - ram rs . cum ldmilslnn am the failun In um ch. mm‘:- was dun In rm sollcllofl mlluku. Nudlus to say, um mm mlsuku ls rm - gmund for nrlnlmq Ipcclal Inn. Thai must be an «ar me uhwous reason lha| ]| ]s but pusslbls In draw a dmflmg Vine balwiirv a rmslaka mum nun supwn nrr xaruu M a d]scrul\:nafY Bower mud (ha| wmeh whnot A mismku vs a rnislaku whallver may mm: mm 191 In. As to wheuharor her: Mr Foo . ml akeamuunu |o hegnrger-ee wt axuvass noopwvan ' (emphasvs added) In the mslantcase, me Applwcanl mere\y rehed an the lemma] ]| was allegedly an honas| Imslake when It was a blalam msregard of We mandalcry nature 0! Order 53 of me ROG procedure which, the Anphcam as an advocate and suhculor and an nfhcer 09 the Com has nsghgervfly flouled. Thersficre‘ V Mew |ha| (he Applicant snhcumrs "honesl m]sfaKe' as an untenatfle and insuffimenl ground lar an extension of «me The Applicanx vunher sunmmea that dlsrmssing ah apphcalvon due [a a Ming error by me Applrcahrs sohcnors mu severe\y pre]ud|ce me Appllcanl 1] rs lo be nnled men under order 53 oflhe ROG. a Statement and Aflndavn larms pan rmhe pleading ovarry JR appucaxron aha mus| therefore be comnlled wilh The Court cl Appea] in she case a] DKLS $unIhlnn Sdn Bhd v. Karaiaan Nugori Pulau Huang .1. Almr [2019] 1 MLJ S71: [2019] 3 cu sis: [2019] 2 MLRA 471 hem the mandawry nature oi me Ordav 53 5(B|Bm6Hl me me Amaavu verrryrng the Faces as ¢onows:- [ca] Fnrmnr, Imderfi 5: r3(2)lrI annlncauur lorleave lorluaicinl mvilw mull be run. Ix-vlrll we must bu nrpperua by mung am the naum ma ducnpliml ea In: apenrcarrr. the nlnel .arr.m Ind mu ground: In vthleh n I: taught me by -mama rmityirru are facts Iellnd arr. ma: mdlr Ix mandatory. n nrrvur cmphlshl! mu nrlnclplltluu pifly ls bound hy his or... plndlng and mi: ml: in rrummery In nlluu. Vn Bag: 7 ma em ]'vh|yMDwhnahaHhuwaaRxA ,.~.» “Nana s.r.r mmhnrwm r. HIGH m vuflj r... nr1g\ruHIy mm]: dnuumnl VI mum vans] [51] We wen meme manna appellanvs sunmnm: mu emaavlu«m- Iuppoll mmemll mononm nquinmnnln .. meneme eye 51 r 3(2). sou. email not luv: Iuppnflod the iflvellanrs apuiemsan lar luasml uvbcw“ (emphssls added) as cummg back to the (acts In me presenl case, I find lhal lhe Apphcam has: - Y. Falled lo dlsclose and plead me parliculars and pmceedlngs of me lndustrlal Court In lull ln me order 53 Slalemenl: V1 Fallee Io file an Affidavll Verifying the FacLs Veiled on to support me Older 53 Slalemenll Ill Failed lp annex or exhlbrl ell pl me cause papers ol me lnuuslnal Cowl proceedlngs dunng me ex—pane leave slage. w. Caused me Court le be deprlved and suppressed lmm me lull appreaaliurl :71 all the cause papers at me Industrial Ccurl prooeedlrlgs: and v selemlvely choose whlch apcumems lo exlubil and K) produce helare ms 37 Based on the above. I am olme VIEW ma: me Appllcanl snllcllors‘ lallura |u enclose all uelells and aocumens VI lhelr pleeamgs wllmn the Order 53 slelemenl ls lalal as ls lhus preludiael lllhls leave was nul set aslde. as Furmer. lhe Applieanl submlls mal |he “Amaavlr was servedlu me Aec However, l find that the “Amdavll“ lhal was allegedly sewed In me AGC was an unslamped, Llnpild and unnlea Alvleavll |ha\ has no pmt7a|ive value before lms cum :9. Tnelelure, ll ls my vlew max servmg span unlllea. unpala and unslamved dcl:umen| lo the AGC Ind me names IS as good as servmg an empty and blank piece ol paper wlm npmng la slmw ler ll Page a nun em Wnr/MDwn|aaaHnuwaaRxA .~.» “Nppe Sam! navlhnrwm be mad a vuny .. nflglnlllly mm: dnuavlml VI erlum Wm! 40. Based on the above, this cnun Is al the mew man no wfiuavu" was wveu lo the AGC and in me pamus a1aH malenal nmes. mus In breach of mandatory Order 53 Rifle A ofme ROC Cunclulion 41 Premsed on the aforesaid reasons. I dvsrmssed the Applicant‘: appncauon (Enclosure 17) mm casts of RM son an sumac! no me aflocalcv lee. Daled 02+ January 2024 /\/\_/x./\ Ahmad Kamal bun Md Shahld Judge mgr. coun Kuala Lumpur Pan g M m sm my/MDwn|a».aHnuwaaRxA .~.» “Nam smnw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M, .. mm.m, mm: dnuamnl VI mum pm Cuunsol For me Applicam For me 1-‘ Respondent Dr Palhma Raj Ramasamy (Encxk R M Murah wmh him) Texuan Pamma Ra] Ramasamy 3. Co Peguambela uan Feguamcara Private Suits 91. Lcl L02, Lave! 1, Gle Damansava, 599. Jalan Damansara‘ Taman Tun Dr Ismaix. sown Kuala Lumpur. (Ru, Tuisn — PRRCO/JR/0264/NM/D3/2D23) Encwk Mohammad Haxkal Admn bin Mohd Nalm (cm Nu! lrdma Syamrah wnxh mm) Teluan Ahmad Demel Ruben 5 Co Peguambela dan Peguamcala 45:9»:-1o. c3~2~1 1, ca-2-12 Smaris Dmamas. Jalan Dmamas 1. 50430 Kuala Lumpur vuexnnuo sm numuummnuwaam .~,» “Nam smuw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m my .. mm.m, mum: dnuamnl VI mum pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

B-05(M)-11-01/2022

PERAYU Soo Ting Yu RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Criminal Law – Dangerous drugs – Trafficking – Appeal against conviction and sentence - Dangerous Drugs found under the bed in a hotel room occupied by the appellant – Whether the appellant had pointed to the bed when asked where the drugs were – Whether this evidence is admissible under the Evidence Act – Whether the High Court Judge had erred in finding that the appellant was guilty of trafficking – Whether, finding of fact was based on evidence adduced in case – Whether the trial judge had misdirected herself when she failed to appreciate the defense case.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P SuppiahKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bdb3dba3-4535-4e90-aef3-3e42d56f7113&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: B-05(M)-11-01/2022 BETWEEN SOO TING YU - APPELLANT [NO. K/P: 900815-08-6487] AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - RESPONDENT [In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam, Selangor Criminal Trial No: BA-45A-81-08/2019 Between Public Prosecutor And Soo Ting Yu (No. K/P: 900815-08-6487] CORAM: HADHARIAH SYED ISMAIL, JCA AZMAN ABDULLAH, JCA S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH, JCA 04/01/2024 09:55:40 B-05(M)-11-01/2022 Kand. 38 S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death in the High Court on the following charge: “Bahawa kamu pada 29.3.2019, jam lebih kurang 7.00 malam, bertempat di “South City Hotel’ beralamat No. 18 Jalan Temenggung 13/9 Bandar Mahkota Cheras, di dalam Daerah Hulu Langat di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah didapati memperedarkan dadah berbahaya iaitu Ketamine seberat 1687.1 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” [2] He appealed against his conviction. We heard the appellant’s appeal on 20 November 2023. After hearing counsel for the appellant, we dismissed his appeal on conviction but allowed his appeal on sentence by commuting his death sentence and substituting it with a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years and 12 strokes of the cane. We now give the grounds for our decision. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 The Prosecution’s Case [3] The evidence led by the prosecution was as follows. On 29 March 2019, acting on information received, a police team headed by PW6 went to the hotel South City Hotel, Kuala Lumpur around 7.00 pm. After obtaining the necessary information from the receptionist (PW4) at the counter, they proceeded to room 307. The appellant opened the room door when the police knocked on it. He was alone and was the registered hotel guest. The hotel receptionist’s evidence established that the appellant had checked into the room approximately about an hour before the police came there and that the appellant had with him a black travelling bag. [4] Once in the room, the police searched the appellant but found no incriminating items on him. Whereupon, according to PW6, he has asked the appellant where the drugs were, and the latter had pointed towards the bed. Upon searching the bed, the police found a black plastic concealed under the bed. Inside it they found drugs kept in six separate plastic packings. The police also found the appellant’s personal effects like his identity card, passport and handphone on a table in the room. [5] PW6 then prepared a seizure list of all the items seized which was duly signed by the appellant. The search list stated, among others, that the drugs were found as a result of the appellant pointing to the bed. PW6 later lodged a police report, exhibit P29, that was consistent with his evidence in court as to how the drugs were discovered. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] The drugs were subsequently sent for analysis and found to contain 1687.1 grams of ketamine, a dangerous drug under the First Schedule to the DDA. [7] The learned Judicial Commissioner (JC), at the end of the prosecution's case, on a maximum evaluation found that the prosecution had successfully proven a prima facie case and called upon the appellant to make his defence. She accepted PW6’s evidence that the drugs were recovered as a result of the conduct of the appellant in pointing to the bed when asked about the drugs. The learned JC held that the appellant’s conduct showed that he had the requisite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of the drugs and was therefore in actual possession of it. She also held that as the quantity of drugs concealed under the bed was large, an irresistible inference could be drawn that the appellant was in possession of the drugs for the purpose of distribution or trafficking. [8] In her grounds of judgment, on the ingredient of trafficking it was held: “In this present case, the submission by the prosecution is that the accused commits an act of either keeping, storing or concealing of the drugs under the definition of trafficking. This court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution satisfies all these 3 acts and called for the accused to enter his defence.” S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] In calling for the appellant to enter his defence, the learned JC intimated to him that the defence was called based on direct possession and direct trafficking. [10] The appellant’s defence was simply one of denial and protestation of innocence. He was at the time working in Taiping for a company that installed air conditioners. He lived with his parents. According to the appellant on the date in question, he took a bus to Kuala Lumpur as one Alex, had promised to find him a job there. He did not know what was the job Alex intended to offer him. Alex was someone he had met and befriended on “WeChat”. [11] On arriving in Kuala Lumpur, he contacted Alex and the latter told him to first check into a hotel. He asked Alex to suggest a hotel and the latter mentioned South City Hotel. The appellant stated that he then checked into South City Hotel around 6.00 pm where he was resting when there was a sudden knock on his room door. [12] The appellant accepted that the police found the drugs under the bed, but denied he had pointed to the bed. He maintained that he was not aware of the presence of the drugs under the bed and the drugs were discovered when the police searched the room. His defence was that he had been framed by Alex or the drugs had been left behind by a hotel guest. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] The appellant called his mother as a witness (DW2). She corroborated his claim that he had come to Kuala Lumper in respect of a job offered to him by Alex. Under cross examination she acknowledged that she had never met Alex and was unsure if indeed he existed. She also accepted that all that she knew about the appellant’s trip to Kuala Lumpur was based on what he had told her. [14] At the end of the defence case, the learned JC preferred the prosecution’s version of the facts and found that the explanation of the appellant in his defence did not raise any reasonable doubt as to the truth of the case for the prosecution. She rejected the appellant's defence that others had access to the room and that the appellant had been framed up by Alex or could have been left behind by a hotel guest. The learned JC held that the evidence supported the prosecution’s case that the appellant had intended to traffic in the drugs found in his possession in the hotel room. The Appeal [15] Counsel for the appellant raised two main grounds of appeal. We wish to point out that these grounds were mainly concerned with the trial judge’s findings of fact with regard to the appellant’s defence that he was unaware of the presence of the drugs found under the bed and that he had been framed by Alex or the drugs could have been left behind by an earlier hotel guest. We were of the opinion that the learned JC’s findings, as set out in the preceding paragraphs were amply supported based on the evidence S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 presented to her. The learned JC had the advantage of having seen the PW6 and the appellant give evidence in the witness-box and was thus in the better position to determine their credibility. Nevertheless, we set out below the appellant’s contentions and our reasons for rejecting them [16] The first contention raised was that the learned JC had failed to give adequate consideration to the evidence which showed that the appellant did not have exclusive possession of the hotel room and the drugs found therein. It was submitted that the fact that the appellant had been in the room for only about an hour before the police raided it on information they had received, demonstrated that someone had access to the room and had planted the drugs to frame the appellant. [17] It was argued that the police ought to have investigated who were the hotel guests who had occupied room 307 and had access to the room prior to the appellant checking in. But, this was not done. As a result of their failure to do so, it was argued, the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant had exclusive possession of room 307 and third parties had no access to it. The conviction was therefore not safe. [18] It was also submitted that the only evidence to link the appellant with the drugs was the testimony of PW6 who alleged that the appellant had showed the police where the drugs was concealed. It was argued that PW6’s testimony ought to have been rejected as his evidence on this issue was not credible. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [19] We found that this contention was without merit. The learned JC found that the appellant had possession of the drugs found in the room. This was premised largely on the acceptance of PW6’s evidence. The evidence before the trial judge was that the appellant was alone when he checked into the hotel. The said room was registered in the name of the appellant. There was no other person in the room except the appellant when the police party entered the room. The drugs were discovered as a result of the appellant showing the police where it was. The contemporaneous documents, namely the search list (P28) and the police report by PW6 were consistent with PW6’s testimony that the drugs were discovered as a result the appellant showing them where it was. [20] It cannot be gainsaid that no other person could have entered room 307 after the appellant had use of it or have left the black plastic and its contents in the room. The fact that the appellant knew that the drugs were under the bed, suggested that he was the one who had concealed it under the bed. He had knowledge of it and was in possession of it. See Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 MLJ 237. [21] It is trite law that information admissible under s 27 of the Evidence Act 1952 includes an accused's statement, or his act or conduct such as pointing out which led distinctly to the discovery of a fact. For such information to be admissible, there was no duty on the prosecution to prove voluntariness of the information. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [22] In this regard, it is instructive to refer to two judgments of the Federal Court in Siew Yoke Keong v PP [2013] 3 MLJ 630 and Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy v Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 367. [23] In the first case, the Federal Court held: “In addition, it must be added that the evidence of Siew leading PW6 and the police team to the first house and pointing out the place where the bunch of eight keys was found, and later pointing out the place where the key to the safe was found would also be relevant and admissible as conduct under s 8 of the Evidence Act. In this regard in Prakash Chand v State AIR 1979 SC 400, the Supreme Court of India said: For example, the evidence of the circumstances, simpliciter, that an accused person led a police officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under s8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any information contemporaneously with or antecedent to any such conduct falls within the purview of s 27 of the Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradesh Administration v OM Prakas AIR 1972 SC 975).” S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [24] And, in Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy v Public Prosecutor , it was held that although the evidence under section 27 of Evidence Act 1950 was rejected, the conduct of the appellant was relevant under section 8 of Evidence Act 1950 . It was explained: “The inadmissibility of the information supplied by the appellant does not affect the admissibility of the evidence of her subsequent conduct under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 irrespective of s 27. As Chinnappa Reddy J said in Prakash Chand v State AIR 1979 SC 400 at p 404: The evidence of the circumstances, simpliciter, that an accused person led a police officer and pointer out the place where stolen articles of weapon which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under s 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously will or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of s 27 of the Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradash Administration v OM Prakash AIR 1972 SC 975).” [25] The cases illustrate that the conduct of the appellant in pointing to the bed which led to the discovery of the drugs was relevant and admissible under sections 27 and 8 of the Evidence Act. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [26] We shall now deal with the second ground of appeal, which pertains to the appellant’s complaint that the learned trial judge failed to consider the defence version of the facts at the close of the case. [27] The appellant’s defence was a blanket denial of any knowledge of the drugs. The drugs did not belong to him and could have been left by the hotel guests who had occupied the room before he entered it or by Alex to frame him. The appellant acknowledged he did not know the full name or any anything about Alex. [28] In the instant case, the learned JC was presented with two conflicting versions of events. Having had the opportunity to observe both PW6 and the appellant in the witness box, the learned JC found the appellant’s evidence ‘unconvincing’ and chose to accept the prosecution’s narrative instead. In her grounds of judgment, she explained: “[42] The defence of the accused in short is that the drugs were planted either by Alex or another occupier who had stayed there. It Is not disputed the drugs were found in a black plastic bag underneath the bed. This can only be done If the accused’s occupation of the room number 307 was determined earlier by Alex and arrangement made with the hotel via the receptionist on duty that day SP4, to allocate room number 307 to the accused. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [43] However, SP4 was never cross-examined to this effect. The burden on the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt… [44] The defence’s suggestion and cross-examinations that Alex or another occupier planted the drugs there, to his Court’s assessment is found to be unreasonable, improbable and unlikely. As said earlier, drugs are high value subject matter which no one would leave it unattended, not unless the informer would be rewarded equivalent to or more than the price value of the said drugs. In this present case, there was no such suggestion to rationalize the accused’s defence put forward. [47] The discovery of the drugs underneath the bed arose from the act of the accused pointing to SP6 of the said drugs. This fact on the discovery has been encapsulated in the police report P 29 and the search list P 28. The accused in his defence said SP6 had ransacked the room and his black back. However, nothing was suggested as to why the accuse signed P 28 through cross examination of SP6 or in the accused’s own version of the story. The accused can understand Bahasa Malaysia as he had opted through his counsel to testify in Bahasa Malaysia, when he gave his defence hence, there is nothing before this court to come to the finding that he could not understand what was written in P28.” S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [29] The learned JC was perfectly entitled to choose either the prosecution’s or defence narration of facts. In this regard, we refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Liam Heng Boon [2012] 1 LNS 1455 wherein it was observed: “Here was a case where the learned High Court Judge was confronted with two versions. On version from the prosecution and the other version was from the appellant. His Lordship preferred the prosecution’s version and he made a finding that the appellant’s version was not probable having viewed the Yamaha motorcycle himself and after considering the demonstration by the appellant of placing those exhibits in the compartment of the Yamaha motorcycle. Confronted with two divergent versions as to the recovery of the offending drugs, we recalled to mind the sage words of Thomson CJ in PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] 1 LNS 129; [1962] MLJ 257: When a police witness says something that is note inherently improbable his evidence must be in the first instance be accepted. If his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or it shaken by cross-examination the it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent probability the evidence of any witness, whether a police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [30] On the evidence, we saw no reason to disagree with the JC’s assessment of the testimonies of PW6 and the appellant, especially since it was not demonstrated to us why PW6, a police officer attached to the Royal Malaysian Police and acting in his official capacity, should have had any cause to render an account of events completely different from that told by the appellant, unless his account were true. The defence, which the appellant had relied on, that Alex could have planted the drugs, did not cast any doubt on the truth of the evidence that the appellant had exclusive possession of room 307, and was also in possession of the black plastic and contents. [31] The fact that the accused knew that the drugs were concealed under the bed, indicated then only the appellant and not any hotel guest or Alex could have so concealed those drugs. There is no gainsaying that if any hotel guest or Alex concealed those drugs without the knowledge of the appellant, then it could not have been possible for the appellant to have known that drugs were so concealed. It was clear on the facts that only the appellant could have concealed those drugs. To conceal those drugs, the appellant would first have had to have physical custody or control of it. [32] Additionally, as pointed out by the learned JC, there was unchallenged evidence (P33) that the street value of one gram of ketamine was about RM130.00. This means the approximate value of one kg of ketamine was about RM50,000.00. In the instant appeal, the net weight of the ketamine found under the bed was close to 2 kg. Given the high value S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 of the drugs found under the bed, it was improbable that anyone would have just left it there. In Napalai Narapattarawong v Public Prosecutor [2019] MLJU 1077, the Court of Appeal in rejecting a similar defence, observed: “Another part of appellant’s evidence that attracted our comment was when she said that the drugs could be left inside the room by the previous guest. This is just a mere conjecture without truth. The drugs, 322.03 grammes of Cocaine were highly valuable. It is illogical for those who own the things would simply left it in the room just like that.” [33] For these reasons, we find the appellant’s complaint that the learned JC failed to consider the defence version of the facts at the close of the case is devoid of merit. Conclusion [34] Having considered the evidence on record in totality, we are satisfied that any reasonable tribunal armed with the facts in this case would have come to the same conclusion as the learned JC about the weight to be given to the appellant's evidence, for the reasons given, offence of trafficking had been clearly made out. No reasonable doubt had not been cast on the prima facie case. Suffice to say, that we are satisfied, beyond all reasonable doubt, that conviction was the correct verdict. S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [35] We therefore unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. [36] On sentence, we commuted the death sentence and substituted it with 30 years imprisonment and 12 strokes of the cane as there were strong mitigating factors here which did not warrant the death sentence. Dated: 4 January 2024 -sgd- (S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya Counsel/ Solicitors For the Appellant: Joseph Tan [Messrs Tan Chee Keong & Co.] For the Respondent: Zaki Asyraf bin Zubir Deputy Public Prosecutor (Attorney General’s Chambers) S/N o9uzvTVFkE6u8z5C1W9xEw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-09-200-05/2022

PERAYU GENNEVA SDN BHDPIHAK KETIGADato Vengadasalam Letchumi Kandan

Criminal Law – Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 – Application by the Public Prosecutor under section 55 for a forfeiture order in respect as properties seized from the appellant and four others – Sessions Court issuing statutory notice under section 61 – Whether the third parties who responded to the statutory notice are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court upon a dismissal of the prosecution’s forfeiture application – Whether the claims of the third parties are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P SuppiahKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7c794e4c-0bd8-4fa3-972b-ef5b9956c09f&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W-09-200-05/2022, W-09-201-05/2022, W-09-202-05/2022, W-09-204-05/2022 & W-09-205-05/2022 BETWEEN GENNEVA SDN. BHD. … APPELLANT AND DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 370808-10-5437] & 175 OTHERS … RESPONDENTS [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Trial No: WA-42(Ors)-17-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-24-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-25-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-27-09/2021 & WA-42(Ors)-29-09/2021 Between GENNEVA SDN. BHD. …APPELLANT And 1. CHAN CHEE WEI 2. GAN PHUI MUN 3. LYNN WONG BINTI ABDULLAH 4. TETUAN GOOI & AZURA 5. LILY WONG 6. GAN CHEE SHENG 7. PAUL LEE CHU KOB 8. LAU AH MOI 9. CHANDRA LINGAM A/L RASAPPAN 04/01/2024 11:29:03 W-09-200-05/2022 Kand. 66 S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 10. MEA FATT LEONG 11. YEE CHOOI LIN 12. KAMALA DEVI A/P VYRAVAN 13. MAHA DAWE A/P BALAKRISHNAN 14. YEE SOON HOE 15. MALLIKA A/P MARIMUTHU 16. YEE CHOY WAH 17. YEE CHOOI LAN 18. MURUGAN A/L GOVINDARAJOO 19. YEE SO MOI 20. PADMAVANTHY A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 21. PRINTA DEVI A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 22. HONG SIEW TUO 23. AJANTHA A/P SINNIAH 24. RATNA SABAPATHY A/L MUNUSAMY 25. RUBASHINI A/P GOPAL 26. ANURATHA A/P SINNIAH 27. K NAGARAJAN A/L KULANDAIVELU 28. SKHARUNAGHERAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 29. KAMNIAMMAH A/P KATHIRAVALU 30. VIJEY NAIR A/L GOPAL 31. K NESHI A/P OTHIYIL KOTTAN 32. KAREN VOON WAI KEEN 33. M SHANKAR A/L MASLAMANI 34. SUGUMARAN NAYAR A/L BALAKRISHNAN 35. PATHEPEN A/L ELUMALAY 36. POONGKOTHAI A/P SINAH SAMY 37. SAROJINI A/P SINAHSAMY 38. SIMON A/L S THOMAS 39. SIVAANANTHAN A/L V. KARUNAKARAN 40. JANE SELVI A/P SUBRAYAN @ MICHAEL 41. ADULAHIT @ ABDUL RAHIM B NAHUR GHANI 42. BALACHANDRAN A/L PONNAMBALAM 43. BALAMURALE A/L VELU S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 44. JAYANTHI A/P KATAN @ KATHAN 45. JAYASEELAN A/L PERIASAMY 46. KANAKAVALLY A/P GOVINDARAJOO 47. KATHAN A/L LETCHUMANAN 48. KRISHNAN A/L MANIAM 49. KRISHNAN A/L RAMASAMY 50. PARITHA BEGUM BINTI FAKEER MOHD 51. PERUMAL A/L SOCKALINGAM 52. RAJA SEKARAN A/L PALANIVELU 53. SARASWATHY A/P KATHAN 54. SIVAPRAGASAM A/L NADESIN 55. VASUDEVAN A/L ARUMUGAM 56. YOBURAJ A/L THOMAS 57. THAMILSELVI A/P NADESIN 58. AVINASH PRATHAP A/L RAMASAMY 59. APPAMAHA A/P APPALASAMY 60. ARIVALGAN A/L VELU 61. K.P MANOJ A/L TARUR HARI GOVINDAN 62. AYAHSAMY A/L A MUNUSAMY 63. PRASATH A/L RAMASAMY 64. RAMASAMY A/L ENKANAN 65. GUNALAN A/L CHINNATHAMBI 66. KALAI CHELVI A/P PANIEER CHELVAM 67. RAVI CHANDAR A/L MURUGUSON 68. KANNAKI A/P VELU 69. ANANTHAKRISHNAN A/L RENGASAMY 70. ARUMUGAM A/L PERUMAL 71. KARTHIGAYAN A/L ANNADORAI 72. FREDDY MOSES 73. MAHENDRAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 74. PARAMESWARAN A/L KHARTIGASU 75. PANNERSELVAM A/L PALANISAMY 76. PREMA LATHA A/P RAMAN NAIR 77. RAJANDARAN A/L MANICKAM S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 78. SARASWATHY A/P DORASAMY 79. RAMANATHAN A/L CHINNU 80. SAROJA A/P KARUPPAN 81. SELVARAJAH A/L MUNIANDY 82. SHANTHI A/P DORASAMY 83. TAMILARASAN A/L ANNAMALAI 84. THANALETCHUMY A/P BJ APPARAO 85. VANUKUPPAL A/L SUPRIMIANAM 86. AB FATAH BIN HUSIN 87. P R CHITRA DEVI A/P K PERIASAMY 88. HARIDAS A/L P K NAMBIAR 89. KIU MING SING 90. LINGKESVARI A/P N. RAJAINDREN 91. RAJANDRA PRASAD A/L KASY 92. SAJIV NAIR A/L MADAWAN NAIR 93. SELVARANI A/P K PERIASAMY 94. SHANTHI A/P MASILAMONEY 95. TANAPPAL A/L K. PERIASAMY 96. TEO SAW GIN 97. TEO WOON HUE 98. KARTTHIYAVALLEE A/P VEERAPPAN 99. KUMARI NALINI A/P P SUBRAMANIAM 100. PARAMAGURU A/L KANDASAMY 101. RAVICHANDRAN A/L PONNUSAMY 102. YOGESVARAN A/L KRISHNA KUTTY 103. AW YEE CHOW 104. BALAKRISHNAN A/L M KARUPPIAH 105. CHAN SOI CHI @ CHAN SAI CHAI 106. CHANDRAN SELVARAJAH 107. SARASVATHI MANOKARI A/P VELAUTHAM 108. GEETHA A/P RAMALINGAM 109. GRACE A/P V M KURIAN 110. JEYASINGAM A/L VELUPPILLAI 111. KARUNAKARAN A/L GANAPATHY S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 112. R KAVIN KUMAAR A/L RAMACHANDRAN 113. KUMARAN A/L PADMANABHAN 114. MARIMUTHU A/L SUPPIAH 115. NIRMALA A/P BALAKRISHNAN 116. RAGURAMAN A/L RAMAN 117. RAJASVAREE A/P V. KRISHNAN 118. RUTHRA DEVI A/P ETHIRAJULOO NAIDU 119. SATHISH A/L K. SUKUMARAN 120. SREERATHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 121. SUDHA A/P K SUKUMARAN 122. SUNITHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 123. ASOHAN A/L P. RAGAVAN 124. ASOKAN A/L RAMAN NAIR 125. CINTHY NAIR A/P CHANDRASEKHARAN 126. GEETA A/P N MOHAN DAS 127. JAYALAKSHMI A/P R SRINIVAS 128. NALINI A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 129. PUI SAU LUNG 130. SAKUNDALA A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 131. SANTHI @ SUSEELA A/P R S PILLAY 132. SHANDHA A/P T.K.N. NAIR 133. SUJADHA A/P KRISHNAN 134. USHA NAIR A/P T R NAIR 135. VARGIS A/L CHERIAN 136. CHE ENGKU RAMLAH BINTI ENGKU MAT 137. GOPINATHAN SURESH A/L P M G NAIR 138. CHING E KIAU @ CHENG HOON KIAU 139. JEEVARATNAM A/L RENGASAMY 140. K. VIJAYANDRAN A/L K.V. KANDASAMY 141. LIM CHENG HUI 142. MALIGA A/P RENGASAMY 143. LIM LEAN SENG 144. SHANMUGAM A/L MOTTAYAN 145. LOH BEE CHIN S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 146. LOH BEE GUEK 147. MAHAMED ISMAIL BIN MOHAMED YUSOFF 148. MOHD NASIR BIN MAT AIL 149. MUNUSAMY A/L RANGGASAMY GAMEDAN 150. NG CHUEE EYA @ NG POH IM 151. NG KUM HENG 152. PADMINI SUBRAMANIAM 153. RAMAT BIN DAUD 154. RAJENDRAN A/L YAM MURUAYA 155. ROZIATON BINTI ABU BAKAR 156. SANTHI D/O PERUMAL 157. SUBAHASHINI A/P K.N.S NAIR 158. SUBRAMANIAM A/L RAMASAMY 159. THILAGA A/P POONGAVANAM 160. VEGIA A/P CHANDRASEKARAN 161. WENG AH SHOM 162. LEE LI HUI 163. ZURKURNAI BIN YUSOF 164. TEENATHAYALAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 165. PERUMAH S/O ALAGAPPA SERUVAI 166. TAN POH TIANG @ TAN POH TIN 167. TING SUNG TIING 168. DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN 169. SANKARAN A/L GOPALAN 170. ELAN KOVAN A/L KUMARASAMY 171. A VASANTHA A/P VIATHAINATHAN 172. MANGALESWARY NADARAJAH 173. THAMASEGARAN A/L VIATHAINATHAN 174. CHIN WON HEE 175. ANITA KOCH 176. YEAP SWAN KIM @ YEAP GAIK IMM …RESPONDENTS/ THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 CORAM: VAZEER ALAM MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI IBRAHIM, JCA S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The primary issue in these appeals concerns the rights of third parties to adjudicate their claims under section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism, Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001 (“the Act”). Background facts [2] In 2019, the Public Prosecutor filed an application for a forfeiture order under section 55 of the Act in respect of properties seized from the appellant and four others. Thereupon, the sessions court issued the statutory notice under section 61 of the Act by way of gazette calling upon third parties who claimed an interest in the said properties to show cause why the properties shall not be forfeited to the government. [3] The respondents in these appeals are the third parties who responded to the notice. Both the appellant and the respondents filed S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 affidavits to contest the application. [4] On 27 August 2021, the sessions court dismissed the forfeiture application by the Public Prosecutor. The learned sessions judge went on to hold that in view of the dismissal, section 61 does not empower her to adjudicate the respondents claims. Dissatisfied, the prosecution and the respondents lodged their respective appeals to the High Court against the aforesaid decisions. [5] On 29 April 2022, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) having considered the arguments found that the sessions judge had not decided on the respondents claims and did not specify in her decisions whether the said claims were allowed or dismissed. [6] Consequently, in respect of the respondents appeals the High Court: a. exercised its revisionary powers under section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, and section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Code to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication; and b. dismissed the respondents appeals without prejudice to their right to re-file an appeal against the sessions court decision in respect of their claims. [7] In respect of the prosecution’s appeal, the High Court stayed the prosecution’s appeal until the respondent’s claims are adjudicated by the sessions court. S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [8] On 11 May 2022, the appellant lodged the instant appeal against the High Court decision to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication. Submissions [9] It is the appellant’s contention that under section 61, the court is required to adjudge the claims of third parties only if and when the prosecution succeeds in its forfeiture application. It says that as the prosecution’s forfeiture application in the instant case was dismissed by the sessions judge, it was not incumbent upon the court to deal with the respondents claims. It argues that the Judge consequently erred in remitting the respondents claims to the sessions court for adjudication when the prosecution failed to prove that the subject matter of the forfeiture application are forfeitable properties. [10] Conversely, the respondents contend that their claims are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application. They say that the opening words of s.61 makes it clear that the dismissal of the forfeiture application does not take away or detract from their rights to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court. Statutory Provisions [11] Before we consider, the rival submissions before us, it is convenient to set out the statutory provisions relevant to the appeal. They are: - S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Section 55 “(1) Subject to section 61, in any prosecution for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the court shall make and an order for the forfeiture of any property which is proved to be- (a) The subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission of such offence; (b) Terrorist property; (c) The proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) The instrumentalities of an offence, Where- (aa) the offence is proved against the accused; or (bb) the offence is not proved against the accused but the court is satisfied that- (i) The accused is not the true and lawful owner of such property; and (ii) No other person is entitled to the property as a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. (2) Where the offence is proved against the accused but the property referred to in subsection (1) has been disposed of, diminished in value or cannot be traced, the court shall order the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is equivalent to, in the opinion of the court, the value of the property, and any such penalty shall be recoverable as a civil debt due to the Government of Malaysia and shall not be subject to any period of limitation prescribed by any written law. (3) In determining whether the property is- (a) the subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence; (b) terrorist property; (c) the proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) the instrumentalities of an offence, The court shall apply the standard of proof required in civil proceedings. Section 61 (1) The provisions in this Part shall apply without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. (2) The court making the order of forfeiture under subsection 28L (1) or section 55 or the judge to whom an application is made under subsection 28L (2) or 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited. (3) A third party’s lack of good faith may be inferred, by the court or an enforcement agency, from the objective circumstances of the case. (4) The court or enforcement agency shall return the property to the claimant when it is satisfied that - (a) the claimant has a legitimate legal interest in the property; (b) no participation, collusion or involvement with respect to the offence under subsection 4(1) or Part IVA or a terrorism financing offence which is the object of the S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proceedings can be imputed to the claimant; (c) the claimant lacked knowledge and was not intentionally ignorant of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its illegal use; (d) the claimant did not acquire any right in the property from a person proceeded against under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that any right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the eventual subsequent forfeiture of the property; and (e) the claimant did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the property. Whether third parties’ claims can be adjudicated under s.61 before a forfeiture order is made [12] This is not the first time that this question has been raised in the Malaysian courts. It has come under the scrutiny of the court in several cases. In Thong Kian Oon & Ors v [2012] 8 CLJ 119, Ghazali Cha J stated: “Based on the evidence adduced by learned DPP, I am of the opinion that the evidence adduced is insufficient to satisfy me that the properties are the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order against all the respondents are dismissed. As such, notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act. Therefore, the application for forfeiture is dismissed and all the properties must be released immediately to the respondents respectively.” S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [13] In PP v Mohd Bakri Samsu & Anor [2016] 5 CLJ 824,’Noorin Badaruddin J opined the same view: “In the upshot, based on the affidavits and exhibits, this court found that the applicant failed to establish on balance of probabilities that the properties seized from the respondents were the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order was denied. Consequently, the notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act.” [14] Thereafter, in Azmi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2016] 3 MLJ 98, this Court on the same issue explained as follows; “We agree with the learned SCJ that the prosecution had proven on the balance of probability that the properties in question are proceeds of an unlawful activity which constitutes the subject matter of the offence. As the SCJ was the court making the order of forfeiture under s 55 at the end of a prosecution that had resulted in a conviction of the accused, it was incumbent upon the SCJ to issue the third party notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA before any final order on forfeiture can be made in respect the said properties. We are in agree with the learned SCJ that the evidence led in this case would necessitate the giving of the notice to third parties by way of publication in the gazette who may then stake their claims by proving themselves to be bona fide owners of the seized monies, in which case the monies shall be returned to them. But if they fail to prove that they are entitled to the seized properties, then the monies shall be ordered to be forfeited to government revenue.... We S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 agree with learned deputy that a forfeiture order is subject to giving prior notice to third parties as is clearly borne out in the wordings to s 55(1) of the AMLATFA itself. Indeed, in this case, no forfeiture order had been made by the learned SCJ and there is basis for her to issue the statutory notice in order to facilitate the process pertaining to the eventual forfeiture of the seized properties which are the subject-matter of the offence before her. We therefore see no merit in the complaint of the accused person in regard to the issue of the notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA. On account of the above, the appeal by the accused person against the order on the s 61 notice under AMLATFA is dismissed.” (emphasis added) [15] However, in PP v Taiko Fertiliser& Yang Lain [2019] 4 CLJ 480, this Court expressed a different view on the issue. There, the ('the prosecution') sought two orders, the first to publish a notice in the Gazette to call upon any third parties who claimed to have any interest in the seized moveable properties to appear before the court to show cause; and the second, the forfeiture of the moveable properties. The High Court only dealt with the forfeiture application and dismissed it. It did not deal with the prayer for an order to publish a notice in the Gazette. The prosecution appealed. [16] The prosecution submitted that the trial judge should not have heard the forfeiture application without first ordering for the notice in the Gazette to be published as mandated by s. 61(2) of the Act. The respondents argued that before the mechanism under s. 61(2) of the Act could be generated, the trial judge must first decide whether the prosecution's application for a forfeiture order under s. 56(1) of the S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Act bore any merits. In other words, the trial judge must first issue an order of forfeiture before the procedure under s. 61(2) of the Act could be exercised. The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent’s submission and explained: “Kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan TPR bahawa hanya satu isu sahaja yang harus kami tentukan dalam rayuan ini iaitu sama ada hakim bicara dikehendaki di bawah s.61(2) untuk mempertimbangkan terlebih dahulu permohonan untuk disiarkan satu notis dalam Warta sebelum mempertimbangkan sama ada harta-harta yang disenaraikan dalam notis usul berkenaan wajar dilucut hak atau tidak di bawah s. 56, AMLATFPUA 2001. Harus juga dicatatkan bahawa ungkapan "subject to s. 61 " di bawah s. 56(1) itu merujuk s. 61 secara keseluruhan dan bukan sekadar s. 61(2) sahaja. Berdasarkan kes Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao, supra, keseluruhan peruntukan s. 61 khususnya s. 61(2) hendaklah diberikan keutamaan terlebih dahulu. Keabsahan (validity) takrifan ini diperkukuhkan dengan penggunaan ungkapan "... the judge to whom an application is made under... s. 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette..." dalam s. 61(2) itu sendiri. Dalam hal ini, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR bahawa dengan penggunaan perkataan "shall" dalam s. 61(2) itu menjadikannya satu kehendak yang wajib diikuti sebelum sesuatu perintah pelucuthakkan di bawah s.56 dibuat oleh hakim.” S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [17] Lastly, in the Federal Court case of Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 MLJ 1, Mary Lim FCJ observed: “In considering whether or not to grant the order of forfeiture, the High Court is mandatorily obliged under s 61(1) to cause to be published a notice in the Gazette ‘calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the Court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited’. This is regardless whether there is prosecution for an offence under the Act – see ss 55(1) and 56(1). However, it must not be over looked that the forfeiture proceedings are principally between the PP and the accused, Amar, as s 61 is only engaged where there are third parties laying some claim or interest in the properties seized. If there are none, the proceedings will proceed only between these two key players. This position must be properly appreciated because it appears to have been overlooked simply because the two applications, by PP and by the third parties, were heard together. Hence, in the proceedings at the High Court, affidavits were filed by Amar in protest of the forfeiture orders sought by the PP. I pause here to make this observation. As pointed out a moment ago, the PP must satisfy the High Court that the property is of any of the character or nature prescribed in s 56(1)(a) to (d). It is only upon satisfying the High Court that the property is liable to be forfeited and thereafter, the High Court deals with the rights or interests of any third parties. As held in Public Prosecutor v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors, s 56 does not absolve the PP from proving on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized come under the purview of the Act and were procured or are the proceeds of an unlawful or illegal activity. The PP must prove on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized were S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 procured in connection with the commission of the predicate offence or are of the character for which the order for seizure was issued. See also Public Prosecutor v Billion Nova Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1823; [2016] 2 CLJ 763; [2016] AMEJ 0162.” (emphasis added) [18] The foregoing cases exemplify that no order for forfeiture can be made until the claims of third parties to the seized properties is heard, and to establish its rights to forfeiture, the prosecution must, first, prove that the properties it seeks to forfeit are forfeitable properties, namely, that they are the subject matter or evidence relating to the commission of the offence under s.4 (1) of the Act. [19] It is only upon the prosecution establishing that the seized properties are forfeitable properties, that the court enters a preliminary forfeiture order. And, it is only upon the making of the preliminary forfeiture order is the court required to publish the requisite notice in the Gazette under s.61 (2) of the Act to commence the ancillary proceedings to determine the rights of the third parties to the forfeited properties. This stands to reason as it cannot be gainsaid that it would be an absolute waste of judicial time if the forfeiture application and the claims of the third parties are heard simultaneously and, at the conclusion of the proceedings it is found that the properties are not forfeitable properties. [20] It bears mention that the government does not have a clear title to the property until the ancillary proceedings under s.61 is concluded. It is only upon the adjudication of the third parties claims, that the preliminary forfeiture order can be made final. S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [21] For the reasons given, we are unable to share the judge’s view that the sessions court ought to have proceeded with the ancillary proceedings in respect of the respondents claims on dismissing the forfeiture application. The learned judge erred in holding that the ancillary proceedings under section 61 is separate and independent from the forfeiture application. The mechanics of the ancillary proceedings must follow the procedure laid down in sections 55,56 and 61 of the Act. [22] We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court to remit the respondents claims to the sessions court and reinstate the respondents appeals. We further direct that the High Court first hears the prosecution’s appeal against the dismissal of its forfeiture application by the sessions judge. If the said appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court if affirmed, it would follow that the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ appeals would fail without prejudice to the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ rights to institute separate civil proceedings against the appellant in respect of their respective legal rights to the properties in question. However, if the appeal is allowed, then the respondents claims would be remitted to the sessions judge for adjudication in accordance to the provisions of the Act. Dated: 4 January 2024 -Sgd- (S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Counsel/ Solicitors For the Appellant: Gooi Soon Seng Choong Kak Sen & Belinda Low Siet Yan (with him) [Messrs Gooi & Azura & Associate] For the Respondent: Nik Azila Shuhada Tong Wei Hang & Ong Tze Xian (with her) (Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co.) Segeram Mathagan [Messrs. S. Mathavan & Nur Hafizah] Navinderan Subramaniam Komal Vijay Sheth [Messrs. Preakas & Partners] S/N TE55fNgLo0XK9bmVbAnw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24C-11-02/2023

PEMOHON DITROLIC SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD.

- 3 Originating Summonses.- both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed.- the Enforcement OS is allowed.- a total costs of RM8,000.00 subject to allocatur fee shall be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic accordingly.

04/01/2024

YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ff561ad7-13de-45d9-9940-a52aeb5258c0&Inline=true

GOJ - Samaiden v Ditrolic.pdf 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-2-01/2023 BETWEEN SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) AND DITROLIC SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-11-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. FF (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) 04/01/2024 09:05:19 BA-24C-11-02/2023 Kand. 36 S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-19-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) JUDGMENT (3 Originating Summonses) A. INTRODUCTION [1] On 15.07.2022, Samaiden Sdn. Bhd. (Samaiden) had commenced an Adjudication Proceeding pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA 2012) against Ditrolic Sdn. Bhd. (Ditrolic) to claim for a sum of RM2,539,140.99 as the unpaid sum. The Adjudicator decided in favour of Samaiden in his Adjudication Decision (AD). S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [2] As a result of the AD, the followings were filed by the parties: (i). OS No. BA-24C-02-01/2023 (Enforcement OS) was filed by Samaiden against Ditrolic to enforce the AD. (ii) OS No. BA-24C-11-02/2023 (Setting Aside OS) was filed by Ditrolic to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012; and (iii) OS No. BA-24C-19-02/2023 (Stay of Execution of the AD OS) was filed by Ditrolic pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012. [3] Since there are 3 OSs filed in relation to this AD, the parties agreed to having all the OSs heard together and for the decision to be delivered together. Since this is a cross suit between the parties, for ease of reference the parties will be referred to henceforth with the acronym of Samaiden and Ditrolic wherever applicable. B. BRIEF BACKGROUND [4] contractor to carry out n, Commissioning and Associated Works In Relation to the Development of A 100MWAC Large Scale Solar Photovoltaic Plant Over The Land Held Under PN257319, Lot 9089, Mukim S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [5] By a Letter of Award [Ref. No.: DSB/LOA/LSS3/Kerian/WP3/01] -Piling, Mechanical and Photocoltaic (PV) Installation) between Ditrolic and Agreement are collect Samaiden as its sub- 000,000.00. [6] In this respect, Samaiden was -contractor for two work packages in the Project, namely Work Package 3 (WP 3) and Work Package 4 (WP 4). The present case is in relation to WP 3 of the Project. [7] Both WP 3 and WP 4 are required to be interfaced with each other and as such both these work packages were awarded to Samaiden so that the works can be carried out properly, effectively and efficiently planned, coordinated and executed. [8] Due to delay and non-completion of works, Ditrolic had exercised its contractual entitlement for set-offs/deductions for such delay (Liquidated Damages (LAD)) and for numerous payments made on behalf of Samaiden by Ditrolic. C. ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS [9] Due to non-payment of claims made by Samaiden from Ditrolic, Samaiden issued a payment claim dated 24.5.2022 to Ditrolic for which, Ditrolic did not respond. S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] Samaiden then issued a Notice of Adjudication dated 15.7.2022 to Ditrolic and served the Adjudication Claim dated 23.9.2022 to Ditrolic. For which Ditrolic had responded via its Adjudication Response dated [11] Upon conclusion of the Adjudication Proceedings, on 19.12.2022, the Adjudicator delivered his decision in favour of Samaiden and ordered Ditrolic to pay Samaiden within fourteen (14) days from the date of the AD as follows: Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the adjudicated amount of RM2,534,315.99; (ii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on the outstanding Work done for Certificate No. 7 from 21.4.2022 until 23.9.2022 in the amount of RM53,810.82; (iii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest for certified paid amount at the rate of 5% per annum in the amount of RM4,621.95; (iv) The rate of interest payable is 5%n per annum simple interest from the date of this award until realisation; and (v) Ditrolic shall bear 100% of the costs of the adjudication proceeding. These costs include: AIAC Registration Fee of RM265.00 (inclusive of 6% SST); and S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] On 11.10.2023, this court heard all 3 OSs together and dismissed the Setting Aside OS and the Stay of Execution of the AD OS, whereas the Enforcement OS was allowed. [13] Being dissatisfied with the decision, a Notice of Appeal has been filed by Ditrolic for which this Grounds of Judgement is written. D. OBJECT CIPAA 2012 [14] CIPAA 2012 is a creature of the legislation intended to facilitate speedy and regular payments in the construction industry. As cash flow is the utmost important factor in the construction industry, CIPAA provides interim measures to disputing parties to solve payment issues expeditiously so as not to jeopardise the continuance of the construction contract entered into by them. (see Martego Sdn Bhd v. Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] 8 CLJ 433; [2019] 5 AMR 516 FC; Bertam Development Sdn Bhd v. R&C Cergas Teguh Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 2228) E. ISSUES [15] application to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 is premised on the following grounds: i. Adjudicator failed to give Ditrolic an opportunity to submit on the issue of time set at large (which was only raised in S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 adjudication reply stage) before making a determination on the same; ii. Adjudicator has committed an error in his own jurisdiction in deciding that the comprehensive submission on the issue LAD of RM2,200,000.00 should be dealt by an arbitrator; and iii. Adjudicator has failed to consider and/or not deal with consider/determine the defence of set-off in equity and counterclaim by Ditrolic. [16] Ditrolic stay of execution of the AD pursuant to s16 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows: i. An arbitration proceeding has commenced pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012; ii. that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD; and iii. that there are special circumstances to warrant a stay of execution i.e Samaiden is financially weak. [17] application to enforce the AD pursuant to s.28 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows; i. that the Adjudicated Amount is not paid by Ditrolic; and ii. that the AD is neither set aside nor stayed. S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 F. FINDINGS OF THE COURT I. Setting Aside OS [18] As all the three (3) reasons raised by Ditrolic which makes up the grounds for which the AD should be set aside centres around the issue of set off for LAD raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, I will address all these issues together. Whether there is a denial of natural justice? 15(b) [19] The principle of natural justice that is said to have been denied here is the right to being heard, audi alteram partem. In Adjudication Proceedings, the Adjudicator has the duty to accord procedural fairness to the parties during the course of the proceedings whereby the issues raised by both parties are to be considered and a decision is to be derived therefrom. In the case of ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn. Bhd. v. Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd & another appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522; [2016] MLJU 1776, the Court of Appeal held: "[19] When one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of "procedural fairness" which needs to be accorded to the parties in a dispute of a hearing. In this appeal the Appellants complaint on the breach of natural justice is contained in pages 15-19 of his written submission. We informed counsel for the Appellant that it appeared that his complaint about the decision of the adjudicator related substantially to the manner in which the adjudicator arrived at his decision after evaluating the evidence provided to him and that would only be S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 questioning the findings of fact by the adjudicator Learned counsel for the Appellant was not able to convince us that our view was wrong when we also pointed out to him that in his submission he had contended that the adjudicator had premised his decision on "his own assessment" (see paragraph 11.4 of submission). ... [21] There were no complaints by the Appellant that the adjudicator had got the disputes on a completely wrong footing. In fact, no complaint was made at all and the adjudication process was carried out premised on those issues. If we were to consider the complaints of the Appellant, we would be looking into the merits of the decision of the adjudicator. In the context of section 15 of CIPAA 2012, it cannot be the function of the Court to look into or review the merits of the case or to decide the facts of the case. The facts are for the adjudicator to assess and decide on. The Court's function is simply to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had committed an error of law during that process. Such error of law relates to whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the Appellant In the context of this case, the complaints of the Appellant were nothing but complaints of factual findings of the adjudicator (Emphasis added) [20] decision (as he then was) in the case of MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v. Wazam Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] 1 LNS 891; [2020] MLJU 208. In this case, it was held that it is sufficient to dislodge a complaint of breach of natural justice if the Learned Adjudicator had given S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 just one reason and His Lordship also set out a list of circumstances which should not justify the setting aside of the AD. [21] The question that needs to be asked is whether Ditrolic was denied the right to being heard as alleged? In this case, as seen in the AD, the Adjudicator had deliberated on all the issues raised by both Ditrolic and Samaiden at the Adjudication Proceedings at length before coming to his conclusion. [22] No where in the Adjudication Proceedings that is seen where Ditrolic had requested disallowed or denied Ditrolic the right to do so. Since, this issue was already known to Ditrolic when it was previously raised in other Adjudication Proceedings between parties, to the very least, Ditrolic should have requested to reply or submit on this issue when the same was raised at this proceeding. [23] Furthermore, since the issue of LAD was raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, it is only natural that Samaiden would respond to this issue in its reply. It is not a new issue raised by Samaiden as how it has been made out to look. The Adjudicator would naturally think that the same i.e. Samaiden had responded to the LAD issue raised by Ditrolic. reply, it has to be requested by Ditrolic to do so. S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [24] Since the Adjudicator had deliberated the issue of LAD at paragraphs 162 to 178 of the AD, it can very well be seen that the Adjudicator had given due considerations to the issue of LAD raised by Ditrolic. If the Adjudicator had not considered this issue of LAD at all then it would be right for Ditrolic to claim that it was denied the right to be heard or that the Adjudicator had not exercised procedural fairness in conducting the Adjudication Proceedings but that not being the case, I do not see how was Ditrolic denied the right to be heard as claimed. [25] Be that as it may, it must be realised that from the outset the Adjudicator had in his findings found that Samaiden was entitled for its claim of RM2,539,140.99. The issue of LAD was only to ascertain whether the sum sought by Ditrolic for LAD can be allowed, if so the sum of RM2,200,000.00 will be deducted from the allowed claim. In this case, it is the considered view of the Learned Adjudicator that the issue in relation to LAD is best to be dealt with by an arbitrator and as such, no deductions were made to the allowed claim. Hence, the allowed sum of RM2,539,140.99 still remains under the contract. [26] I find that the Adjudicator had used the powers conferred upon him pursuant to s. 25 of CIPAA 2012 in deliberating all the issues raised before him at the Adjudication Proceedings. The Adjudicator had considered each and every issue raised by both parties at the Adjudication Proceedings and deliberated on the same before arriving to his decision. Not being satisfied dings cannot be the basis for the AD to be set aside under this limb. S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [27] As stated in the case of Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 8 CLJ 728 : e adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s.15 is not an [28] As such, whether the Adjudicator had assessed the issues raised correctly or not is not up to this court to determine as the decision of the Adjudicator cannot be reviewed on its merits. Merely being unsatisfied with [29] In the upshot, having failed to establish s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 against the Adjudicator, Ditrolic has failed to discharge its burden on a balance of probabilities to set aside the AD. As such, this application to set aside the AD is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. II. Stay of Execution OS [30] One of the 3 reasons Ditrolic had applied for Stay of Execution of the AD is because of its allegation that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD. Since this issue has been dealt and dismissed in the setting aside application, this is no longer a ground which I will consider in this stay application. [31] The other reason for this application is pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012 i.e the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 contention that arbitration has been commenced and as such, stay of execution should be granted. [32] In this case, ation proceeding is not able to proceed further than its commencement as pursuant to Clause 22 of the LOA, the parties are contractually bound to bring their dispute to the Senior Management Settlement Consultation prior to it being brought to arbitration. Therefore, if the AD is stayed by a mere commencement of arbitration, the objective of CIPAA will surely be defeated. [33] The Federal Court case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2019] 5 CLJ 479 His Lordship Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin PCA had in delivering the judgement stated the following: s. 16 of CIPAA would allow some degree of flexibility to the courts to stay the award where there are clear errors, or to meet the justice of the individual case. It is accepted that a stay of the award ought not be given readily and [34] In seeing the need to prevent abuse of s16 CIPAA 2012, I fall back on what was said by Lee Swee Seng J (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v. Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2019] 1 LNS 757; [2019] MLJU 1393. His Lordship in his judgment had succinctly reasoned that in spite of s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012, allowing a stay merely on the fact that the arbitration had commenced with the service of a notice to arbitrate would render the entire purpose of the CIPAA futile and statutory adjudication wholly ineffective to ensure cashflow in the construction industry. It was further explained in the following terms: S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 erved. If stay should be granted the moment there is a pending arbitration or litigation, then a losing party in an Adjudication would be tempted just to commence these proceedings with the sure and certain expectation that a stay would invariably be granted by the Court of the Adjudication Decision. That would scuttle and stultify the application of the CIPAA designed to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry such that a party that is already out of pocket for the work done is not put to further [35] The final reason is that the financial standing of Samaiden is weak and as such, if Ditrolic is successful at the arbitration, Samaiden will not be able to pay back the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. In this regard, in the absence of any cogent evidence to substantiate this ground, I am convinced by the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) report that Samaiden is a solvent concern. [36] Therefore, if the decision at arbitration is subsequently made in favour of Ditrolic, Samaiden will be able to repay Ditrolic the adjudication amount. As such, this contention to establish this argument to this court. On the contrary, based on the CCM report, Samaiden has assets worth much more than what is required should it have to repay the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. Mere fear does not warrant for a stay to be granted. [37] Hence, the Stay of Execution OS is dismissed with no order as to costs. S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 III. Enforcement OS [38] As guided by Her Ladyship Mary Lim Thiam Suan JCA (as she then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 229, the court may exercise its discretion to grant leave under s. 28(1) and (2) CIPAA to enforce an adjudication decision if the following three conditions (3 Conditions) are met: for leave under s. 28 CIPAA; (2) the party against whom an adjudication decision is made, has failed to pay the adjudicated amount on the date specified in the adjudication decision; and ( [39] In this case, in the absence of any evidences to say otherwise, all 3 conditions have been satisfied and since the Setting Aside and the Stay of Execution of the AD have been dismissed, Enforcement OS is allowed with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. G. CONCLUSION [40] Premised on the above evidences and reasons: (i) both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed; S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 1xpW/94T2UWZQKUq61JYwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24C-2-01/2023

PEMOHON SAMAIDEN SDN BHD RESPONDEN DITROLIC SDN BHD

- 3 Originating Summonses.- both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed.- the Enforcement OS is allowed.- a total costs of RM8,000.00 subject to allocatur fee shall be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic accordingly.

04/01/2024

YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c2358429-e1d9-4b5e-960f-9e21dd6d9330&Inline=true

GOJ - Samaiden v Ditrolic.pdf 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-2-01/2023 BETWEEN SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) AND DITROLIC SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-11-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. FF (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) 04/01/2024 09:21:23 BA-24C-2-01/2023 Kand. 27 S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-19-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) JUDGMENT (3 Originating Summonses) A. INTRODUCTION [1] On 15.07.2022, Samaiden Sdn. Bhd. (Samaiden) had commenced an Adjudication Proceeding pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA 2012) against Ditrolic Sdn. Bhd. (Ditrolic) to claim for a sum of RM2,539,140.99 as the unpaid sum. The Adjudicator decided in favour of Samaiden in his Adjudication Decision (AD). S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [2] As a result of the AD, the followings were filed by the parties: (i). OS No. BA-24C-02-01/2023 (Enforcement OS) was filed by Samaiden against Ditrolic to enforce the AD. (ii) OS No. BA-24C-11-02/2023 (Setting Aside OS) was filed by Ditrolic to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012; and (iii) OS No. BA-24C-19-02/2023 (Stay of Execution of the AD OS) was filed by Ditrolic pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012. [3] Since there are 3 OSs filed in relation to this AD, the parties agreed to having all the OSs heard together and for the decision to be delivered together. Since this is a cross suit between the parties, for ease of reference the parties will be referred to henceforth with the acronym of Samaiden and Ditrolic wherever applicable. B. BRIEF BACKGROUND [4] contractor to carry out n, Commissioning and Associated Works In Relation to the Development of A 100MWAC Large Scale Solar Photovoltaic Plant Over The Land Held Under PN257319, Lot 9089, Mukim S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [5] By a Letter of Award [Ref. No.: DSB/LOA/LSS3/Kerian/WP3/01] -Piling, Mechanical and Photocoltaic (PV) Installation) between Ditrolic and Agreement are collect Samaiden as its sub- 000,000.00. [6] In this respect, Samaiden was -contractor for two work packages in the Project, namely Work Package 3 (WP 3) and Work Package 4 (WP 4). The present case is in relation to WP 3 of the Project. [7] Both WP 3 and WP 4 are required to be interfaced with each other and as such both these work packages were awarded to Samaiden so that the works can be carried out properly, effectively and efficiently planned, coordinated and executed. [8] Due to delay and non-completion of works, Ditrolic had exercised its contractual entitlement for set-offs/deductions for such delay (Liquidated Damages (LAD)) and for numerous payments made on behalf of Samaiden by Ditrolic. C. ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS [9] Due to non-payment of claims made by Samaiden from Ditrolic, Samaiden issued a payment claim dated 24.5.2022 to Ditrolic for which, Ditrolic did not respond. S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] Samaiden then issued a Notice of Adjudication dated 15.7.2022 to Ditrolic and served the Adjudication Claim dated 23.9.2022 to Ditrolic. For which Ditrolic had responded via its Adjudication Response dated [11] Upon conclusion of the Adjudication Proceedings, on 19.12.2022, the Adjudicator delivered his decision in favour of Samaiden and ordered Ditrolic to pay Samaiden within fourteen (14) days from the date of the AD as follows: Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the adjudicated amount of RM2,534,315.99; (ii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on the outstanding Work done for Certificate No. 7 from 21.4.2022 until 23.9.2022 in the amount of RM53,810.82; (iii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest for certified paid amount at the rate of 5% per annum in the amount of RM4,621.95; (iv) The rate of interest payable is 5%n per annum simple interest from the date of this award until realisation; and (v) Ditrolic shall bear 100% of the costs of the adjudication proceeding. These costs include: AIAC Registration Fee of RM265.00 (inclusive of 6% SST); and S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] On 11.10.2023, this court heard all 3 OSs together and dismissed the Setting Aside OS and the Stay of Execution of the AD OS, whereas the Enforcement OS was allowed. [13] Being dissatisfied with the decision, a Notice of Appeal has been filed by Ditrolic for which this Grounds of Judgement is written. D. OBJECT CIPAA 2012 [14] CIPAA 2012 is a creature of the legislation intended to facilitate speedy and regular payments in the construction industry. As cash flow is the utmost important factor in the construction industry, CIPAA provides interim measures to disputing parties to solve payment issues expeditiously so as not to jeopardise the continuance of the construction contract entered into by them. (see Martego Sdn Bhd v. Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] 8 CLJ 433; [2019] 5 AMR 516 FC; Bertam Development Sdn Bhd v. R&C Cergas Teguh Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 2228) E. ISSUES [15] application to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 is premised on the following grounds: i. Adjudicator failed to give Ditrolic an opportunity to submit on the issue of time set at large (which was only raised in S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 adjudication reply stage) before making a determination on the same; ii. Adjudicator has committed an error in his own jurisdiction in deciding that the comprehensive submission on the issue LAD of RM2,200,000.00 should be dealt by an arbitrator; and iii. Adjudicator has failed to consider and/or not deal with consider/determine the defence of set-off in equity and counterclaim by Ditrolic. [16] Ditrolic stay of execution of the AD pursuant to s16 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows: i. An arbitration proceeding has commenced pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012; ii. that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD; and iii. that there are special circumstances to warrant a stay of execution i.e Samaiden is financially weak. [17] application to enforce the AD pursuant to s.28 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows; i. that the Adjudicated Amount is not paid by Ditrolic; and ii. that the AD is neither set aside nor stayed. S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 F. FINDINGS OF THE COURT I. Setting Aside OS [18] As all the three (3) reasons raised by Ditrolic which makes up the grounds for which the AD should be set aside centres around the issue of set off for LAD raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, I will address all these issues together. Whether there is a denial of natural justice? 15(b) [19] The principle of natural justice that is said to have been denied here is the right to being heard, audi alteram partem. In Adjudication Proceedings, the Adjudicator has the duty to accord procedural fairness to the parties during the course of the proceedings whereby the issues raised by both parties are to be considered and a decision is to be derived therefrom. In the case of ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn. Bhd. v. Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd & another appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522; [2016] MLJU 1776, the Court of Appeal held: "[19] When one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of "procedural fairness" which needs to be accorded to the parties in a dispute of a hearing. In this appeal the Appellants complaint on the breach of natural justice is contained in pages 15-19 of his written submission. We informed counsel for the Appellant that it appeared that his complaint about the decision of the adjudicator related substantially to the manner in which the adjudicator arrived at his decision after evaluating the evidence provided to him and that would only be S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 questioning the findings of fact by the adjudicator Learned counsel for the Appellant was not able to convince us that our view was wrong when we also pointed out to him that in his submission he had contended that the adjudicator had premised his decision on "his own assessment" (see paragraph 11.4 of submission). ... [21] There were no complaints by the Appellant that the adjudicator had got the disputes on a completely wrong footing. In fact, no complaint was made at all and the adjudication process was carried out premised on those issues. If we were to consider the complaints of the Appellant, we would be looking into the merits of the decision of the adjudicator. In the context of section 15 of CIPAA 2012, it cannot be the function of the Court to look into or review the merits of the case or to decide the facts of the case. The facts are for the adjudicator to assess and decide on. The Court's function is simply to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had committed an error of law during that process. Such error of law relates to whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the Appellant In the context of this case, the complaints of the Appellant were nothing but complaints of factual findings of the adjudicator (Emphasis added) [20] decision (as he then was) in the case of MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v. Wazam Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] 1 LNS 891; [2020] MLJU 208. In this case, it was held that it is sufficient to dislodge a complaint of breach of natural justice if the Learned Adjudicator had given S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 just one reason and His Lordship also set out a list of circumstances which should not justify the setting aside of the AD. [21] The question that needs to be asked is whether Ditrolic was denied the right to being heard as alleged? In this case, as seen in the AD, the Adjudicator had deliberated on all the issues raised by both Ditrolic and Samaiden at the Adjudication Proceedings at length before coming to his conclusion. [22] No where in the Adjudication Proceedings that is seen where Ditrolic had requested disallowed or denied Ditrolic the right to do so. Since, this issue was already known to Ditrolic when it was previously raised in other Adjudication Proceedings between parties, to the very least, Ditrolic should have requested to reply or submit on this issue when the same was raised at this proceeding. [23] Furthermore, since the issue of LAD was raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, it is only natural that Samaiden would respond to this issue in its reply. It is not a new issue raised by Samaiden as how it has been made out to look. The Adjudicator would naturally think that the same i.e. Samaiden had responded to the LAD issue raised by Ditrolic. reply, it has to be requested by Ditrolic to do so. S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [24] Since the Adjudicator had deliberated the issue of LAD at paragraphs 162 to 178 of the AD, it can very well be seen that the Adjudicator had given due considerations to the issue of LAD raised by Ditrolic. If the Adjudicator had not considered this issue of LAD at all then it would be right for Ditrolic to claim that it was denied the right to be heard or that the Adjudicator had not exercised procedural fairness in conducting the Adjudication Proceedings but that not being the case, I do not see how was Ditrolic denied the right to be heard as claimed. [25] Be that as it may, it must be realised that from the outset the Adjudicator had in his findings found that Samaiden was entitled for its claim of RM2,539,140.99. The issue of LAD was only to ascertain whether the sum sought by Ditrolic for LAD can be allowed, if so the sum of RM2,200,000.00 will be deducted from the allowed claim. In this case, it is the considered view of the Learned Adjudicator that the issue in relation to LAD is best to be dealt with by an arbitrator and as such, no deductions were made to the allowed claim. Hence, the allowed sum of RM2,539,140.99 still remains under the contract. [26] I find that the Adjudicator had used the powers conferred upon him pursuant to s. 25 of CIPAA 2012 in deliberating all the issues raised before him at the Adjudication Proceedings. The Adjudicator had considered each and every issue raised by both parties at the Adjudication Proceedings and deliberated on the same before arriving to his decision. Not being satisfied dings cannot be the basis for the AD to be set aside under this limb. S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [27] As stated in the case of Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 8 CLJ 728 : e adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s.15 is not an [28] As such, whether the Adjudicator had assessed the issues raised correctly or not is not up to this court to determine as the decision of the Adjudicator cannot be reviewed on its merits. Merely being unsatisfied with [29] In the upshot, having failed to establish s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 against the Adjudicator, Ditrolic has failed to discharge its burden on a balance of probabilities to set aside the AD. As such, this application to set aside the AD is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. II. Stay of Execution OS [30] One of the 3 reasons Ditrolic had applied for Stay of Execution of the AD is because of its allegation that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD. Since this issue has been dealt and dismissed in the setting aside application, this is no longer a ground which I will consider in this stay application. [31] The other reason for this application is pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012 i.e the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 contention that arbitration has been commenced and as such, stay of execution should be granted. [32] In this case, ation proceeding is not able to proceed further than its commencement as pursuant to Clause 22 of the LOA, the parties are contractually bound to bring their dispute to the Senior Management Settlement Consultation prior to it being brought to arbitration. Therefore, if the AD is stayed by a mere commencement of arbitration, the objective of CIPAA will surely be defeated. [33] The Federal Court case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2019] 5 CLJ 479 His Lordship Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin PCA had in delivering the judgement stated the following: s. 16 of CIPAA would allow some degree of flexibility to the courts to stay the award where there are clear errors, or to meet the justice of the individual case. It is accepted that a stay of the award ought not be given readily and [34] In seeing the need to prevent abuse of s16 CIPAA 2012, I fall back on what was said by Lee Swee Seng J (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v. Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2019] 1 LNS 757; [2019] MLJU 1393. His Lordship in his judgment had succinctly reasoned that in spite of s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012, allowing a stay merely on the fact that the arbitration had commenced with the service of a notice to arbitrate would render the entire purpose of the CIPAA futile and statutory adjudication wholly ineffective to ensure cashflow in the construction industry. It was further explained in the following terms: S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 erved. If stay should be granted the moment there is a pending arbitration or litigation, then a losing party in an Adjudication would be tempted just to commence these proceedings with the sure and certain expectation that a stay would invariably be granted by the Court of the Adjudication Decision. That would scuttle and stultify the application of the CIPAA designed to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry such that a party that is already out of pocket for the work done is not put to further [35] The final reason is that the financial standing of Samaiden is weak and as such, if Ditrolic is successful at the arbitration, Samaiden will not be able to pay back the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. In this regard, in the absence of any cogent evidence to substantiate this ground, I am convinced by the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) report that Samaiden is a solvent concern. [36] Therefore, if the decision at arbitration is subsequently made in favour of Ditrolic, Samaiden will be able to repay Ditrolic the adjudication amount. As such, this contention to establish this argument to this court. On the contrary, based on the CCM report, Samaiden has assets worth much more than what is required should it have to repay the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. Mere fear does not warrant for a stay to be granted. [37] Hence, the Stay of Execution OS is dismissed with no order as to costs. S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 III. Enforcement OS [38] As guided by Her Ladyship Mary Lim Thiam Suan JCA (as she then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 229, the court may exercise its discretion to grant leave under s. 28(1) and (2) CIPAA to enforce an adjudication decision if the following three conditions (3 Conditions) are met: for leave under s. 28 CIPAA; (2) the party against whom an adjudication decision is made, has failed to pay the adjudicated amount on the date specified in the adjudication decision; and ( [39] In this case, in the absence of any evidences to say otherwise, all 3 conditions have been satisfied and since the Setting Aside and the Stay of Execution of the AD have been dismissed, Enforcement OS is allowed with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. G. CONCLUSION [40] Premised on the above evidences and reasons: (i) both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed; S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KYQ1wtnhXkuWD54h3W2TMA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-B52NCC-53-05/2023

PLAINTIF SUNMAJU SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) TTMC TRADE SDN BHD 2. ) LIM BEE LIAN 3. ) CHAN CHING LUNG 4. ) FU YANG 5. ) LUMINOR CREDIT SDN BHD

sama ada permohonan Plaintif di bawah Aturan 14 ROC 2012 adalah tepat bagi tuntutan melibatkan Defendan-Defendan yang bertanggungan secara bersama dan berasingan bagi kes ini - sama ada perbicaraan secara viva voce adalah perlu bagi tuntutan yang terang dan jelas selaras dengan Aturan 14 ROC 2012 - sama ada pihak Defendan Kelima boleh menggunakan perjanjian yang ditandatangani dengan pihak Ketiga sebagai pembelaan dalam tuntutan ini - sama ada Plaintif mempunyai privi pada perjanjian yang ditandatangani oleh pihak Defendan Kelima dan pihak Ketiga dalam perjanjian lain.

04/01/2024

Puan Rafiqha Hanim binti Mohd Rosli

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8ae784d3-8262-4eb0-a3f8-0e435a347af1&Inline=true

04/01/2024 13:39:30 BA-B52NCC-53-05/2023 Kand. 71 S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 04TnimKCsE6jA5DWjR68Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal EA—B52llCC—53—D5/2023 Kand. 71 an/on/2024 13:39-30 mum MANKAMAH sEsvEN m SHAH mm mum NEGERV ssuweon mam zusm. muwsux zmuHmn ANTARA sumwwu sum am: [No smm I997nIn1964s(o34a45-W7] muunr DAN 1 mm: mm: sDN sun [No syanm zowmumsv uzsuaxml 2 umaseunu we m>:usnnza—2:,mu> 3 cum CHINGLUNG (No K» 515723205594” 4 ru mus mu Passwn 547556297) 5 LUMVNDR cnzuw sun sun [No S‘/Blikal‘ znasomoznaz 4579133.»)! osrsnumosrsuum uumuu 7 L < Im mum. mm pmmuhuuan mm mm: bumnkn zm Jun, 2013 unmk mam Fevlwhukxman Tems as huwih Am... 1: mm 2012 mac 2912) vim dmasukka/I tamadap pmak Dflendnn-Delendan Iermasuk seem» Kelmus bsmaman Dads Iunluun—1.urmnan aw bawsh. m Aumhsh ynnu mumg sehmynk RM§2A,Eoo an, no had’-In alas F«M52unn on ma kids! ass smahun aarinaua mkn 1 N mmmmsa.».suwmaaa peml‘a\lar\Wr1lS:m:n sehlnill cam: vanyfibeavln pm-um my km, dun my re\ia1—¢Mref want]-my: avau sualrmyfi Yaw ammman snuaw can adflolah Mamumah Yang MuHa w 2 Berdasaykan muahin -an: kesemua akshlbn dahm kn ma. 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M .. mm M». .....u.... or .2.....L .»..»..by .....:.....g ».. xmm .... mu. sm .ummxc.sw.summa w... 5.... .......wm .. ..... .. my .. .nm...u-y mm: ........ .. .mm Wm! mm mm mum :4, gm nsscunnx Mum, HM [mm g Z7 pm;:uz_/3m».¢c...mmp,;.(.u.:.m..: Sunmrwxudzmmlpmzrdwn n 11 pm¢.4m:.:.m. umvlnble/m mm and weaunw dLrpo.r/In»! um amen by a phzlnrr .» a cowwerdavm we dc/'t'ndaru. nlthawa malwhtn lhcvvuna mm EJIA7Vhlfi14‘lflVIdll7W I4v ...4.m..u ..:..-... a. m . , “Z... .... ». .u...¢ .. 4.. My dug M gm ..».umm.u.4 1.. .n...u.o.u mu Imus m ».»...u [uumu 5.. gay.‘ Fmurm. M1. :4. . new 2 Mu M5 2. xsvurusm msedlakan Meh 27 Eamusrkan pada mm nan dapefan Mahkaman swan! 41 ans‘ Mihkumuh am marldnpifl blhiwn knlamul u.r.»a.mm..mr. D31-man Kaflma dahmnndakxn m telah nagnlmemmbuvknn .m....g wsu ynng pm dmcarukan sshavmmahn yana diuumskan am“. km scum as! um mcsasmuzv KERAIAAM v u 1 1 1 2a Mahkamatn Tm bevvurmannan bahnm kesemun nénnnfian lnrmasuk mm. Dflsmdsn Ksflma mm. mm. was warm dam nem. dwlunnskan um. um-we wman Iermusuk Detendan Kefima mm umm oxen uImm:n,Lamp1rIn 1 ammn dangan mmamx RM 5,000 on n aasu sssvau (my sum ALAM 15 nusmazn mu 1. sw nummKcsE6¢.5rJWyRnaG um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm ans gag £4 nun gr. cunmn mcHoLAs Gomez rrsrum mmma smsn van»: 5 col :2 : AN :2 M nu mm mm as [rEruAN Foo nun swowe 5. ca. (xunm LUMPURD] pseuun nzranmu xsuun MUHAMMAD AZRUL nnzuo am KHVRULLAH uunm. masm awn AED »<»w.n> Irsrum NAIMI mm crw/mews) .5 N mvmmkcsiwtfinwyfirsarn c. men amen: o 10 man Plainlif mum sehuah synnkn yam dbemldnnkan dl Mali)/Ila an hawah Akla synnm 2019 um memvunym menu! panuaanan mamlnrl W Le! saw, Jalan Subunflr Wamaung am sumaav Ewan, s-«xv-n u1n,Amea Shah man, Sdanqm Duul Ehnn Wuk Deb/man Fenami mun umuh mnm yam nluflbcdankan ax Mumyshz aw nawan ma syankm ms dun munpunyau an 1| manna: dv No. snag man SIEM. ucamna compnx UNJaJin wgm, saaso, mu. Lumpuv Wflayah F-nduman din lampu pnvnmgnn .1: D-15411, Sam 2‘ Empire n.n..nu.-, Jilin wu mm. mm, Pelahm Java. Selanmr Dnul Ehmn. Plllak uevman Ksdul amen saomrlg mum a.n mmupnkan saw: glaring Pamjnrlh n.1.ng.n Panama. r-mak nevanaan mus swan uoriflfi ungmau dun mamvnknn smnh uarang Fsrlgnruh .1... Pemegnng Salum wenaan Pammn Plhzk wsnaan Koempil mun naming Indwmu dun mlmplknn snhh woven: Fwgamh an Fumnglnq S-Ihlm Dalandlrl Parmmn Fmak msnuan Kaflma adahh “wan wa-wax ylnu mpsmdlnkzn m Manayma dl buwah Am syunm em on mampmwI|ilimJ|ba|'1aflard\ Lust 1: Emmqu: rm: 3. ao3.n.ua, Merwa an 1P\|\ar 1;, KL Em c. .No 3 mn s.ng..n mm mm. Lmngun Wxlnyah Parsnkuman Gan msmpunyu\ nlamm mmmgaan an Suile 13 m a. Su1Ie1:.D2,beveHCI‘l'he Gavdemsoulh Inner‘ Mu Vafley Chy‘ Unukanm sync mm. sum Kua\a Lurnpw, wumn Psrsekulunn MI\a\m mm Flnlrwln Jllmnnn hemlhs (sulapas rnx mnjuk ssbagal Pauarqiin .Jam\nnn (ersebtll) vlhak navenann Karma. xauaa den Klemval lelah secure beruma an hevaslnuan am. lam bsnalulu mm 5135 sm nummKcsE6¢.5rJ\MRnaG mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. g... w may he nnmnmly mm: dun-mm VII mum pm <1 13 hallsan mm Plslnlfl. den ax mas wummaan kavemui Dlandun klcusu Daflndavu Kenn. pm P\amliVHln m-v\bIka\kln mmylk dial! Dunn: ma mas: ylnv snmn, am psflmntaan Mum uavaman, umak Phmtnlnlan mamuman wam kamudlhxn kudrlkupanl pm Dnflndxn Perlaml din kaumul wink ummm Km; mg. .1." Ksempi (slush u..em;.. unluk membenknn mum jnmimn mm phnk mam... «mu. Knhui dun Kaamnnt nkan memhnyav mam vihak PMMM seam lummh y-M: Inmmang ma pom mbayar men mm Dclendan Fsnamn kepadn um P\3\m1l, Ien.sk\uk pen: termnarma am syamayam yunv ulny-taxan ax dnlam Peflarlllnn Jnmman lenebm sewn rm: dmyahkan mm mm vs-1. Malaml mam Suv-a1AkuJ:N1benavfnn1Ehb Dklmban 2022 «man; Nnak Dofsndun Kmima mm: Max P|a\m1Nse\lPu\n\ ovum ublnll m....p u-mun‘ mm mm." Kulmu (sun mum ‘am m.1..,.. mm m. mun p. k mmm mm: mambakalknn 1sn,om Lust rmnyak mam Isms Emu s vmuxmm wise! «man nimsk necmm Penarnl mm Deflenuan Kzfima nkan membayurDvhakP\a1nn1seJumlah nmsmaou w, s-uagumna yang dmvmakam dawn sebagal EksIa\nTF—2 su...,.my., mam psmunlnan pm Dalmvdnn Panama :13" bavgammw kevIn1aPe-ialuian Jamman lersehutdnnlmullnlllemebm. plhak Pvalnlmmah menlum dun mermhamavseran wanna Uter mm)/ak mm Jan: Euro 5 /ndu:ma!D(a.IsI kauada vomr Dammv wz m atas Irahan pmak D-I-noun Panama Vina bum amrm aaam fldwmm-oukum-n mhxwah nbigmmim ylng dlnyaialun dalam Ewan rrr.:- to “Pmwase omw herurlm mun mummzmz yang mmuam om. pmak Drflendan Panama mm pmak vmnml; (ny -omuy omr bsflnnkh mm Dlsemlzev 2022 yum] mkemum um um Fmnnfknvnda um Dsfmdan Penamn, flan sm nummKcsE6¢.5rJWyRnaG mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm mm mm bulankn mo ummu 2u22 yinw uwmmymn um um Phmlil x..;.a. pm Dflenann Perurru umuk tum!-h RM§2J,ann.m2 daugin mam upom m mm»- m 1 msusaiuym muxm Elli Mun « w mm smzam mmm on mszm» no mum wasp mm m 14 mm" mm kcmrik pmjuman nan pambeflan u-ma dun poulnnan Jamlr-an aa alas, Akuprw munm I-an flluuhtamsdkzn d1IlIm|(Fla\nMfllLu|§m. Jman Subang, Knmpcmq Sum . Eumh, sum" um, Alma sm. Allm, sgxmm om Ehsan. 15 A12: panjmhn din pinlodhn m an dun kuemua mum um Axum; Iersebm, mm Phsmfl man membeknlkan minyak mum menu: mm. suanu mm Darwm 1:22 beninszvkan nmhan mm Dmenmn mm. Namm mum. kanamua names" new. man. amen dun/amu ma! unmk mumhiyhrlumhh RMs24,aou.ou «mam kauadv mnak Fhlrvlil Wa\aupIm tudapal pmumnan ma\a\u\ sum mnlulawu dIbua| ssvem r-wv nnralakau dllim mm mm [spam dl Dawn?! 6! iesahnan sum nmlman hsflsvikh zanh Ann: ma dadpada pnguamcara um PI:Im1Ha\In,Tem:n Ralmrsmnvenan s on lupin: pm DMInd:n Panama‘ my sesalman sunal mm. berm-my mm Ann: zaza dnnvartn Pbfiuammra Wank mawwiamu, Yeluan Rannausingn Vsiana Co. kepflla Dmak um-nan mu. Ksflua flan mmpm: flan my sasnhnnn s4nI| mnmun n.n...n. mm Mic 2023 a-mun. Peuumntamnhnk nammm, mm. mpmmswn Vuuh :. Cu my Imha><DMemianKamII. sm ruvmmxcsiagxfirlwyknan mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm n. mung; mu ngggufl ugmggugu 15 Aanxam muuuux suam undana-undnna yum; mimpsn law mu wklrnnyl usualu mnlulan IN auarah Imanu dun mm (mm Ind nowou57 -an-m mum Flalnm mam Kai um, Mahkamah mm mempusknn mnhmn mu mum kmarxnoln Iocara ma vow mars: aangan Alumni 1: ROC zmz berduavkmw Kan n n P 7 ex; vu mm sun. am an mu ngn; Muhkxmah Parseuuman yana mm mamumskan sspem m bnwnh ‘For (M puryasexoiarv wppltcamm umleril u Lhzprrhmlnnry requlmmuv: art: [I] mgdafmvdantmuathrzvsermeredan anpzamncer {u} mt :mmm:vvr of Mzlm mun haw bun nrved an the dzfznduwc and (mi mg amam m xupporw om. appllmnurl muxt (amply W» m rmmmamo/;2.am._a_u I/mew, cm wrlstderwlwnx an: swmllmt m plulnryf will have emzbmned nprlrna [auemu and n. mm enmlrd m fiutgmrnt The mm. then 101/5 m the 4!/bndantto mm m: Cnurrwny/udgmyvuhnuldnutbzwven RV-:m:M:m[SMfl.1.(.r. Maw‘ 11. Sewn Km nammn Mnhkam-h pug: ulkudlun Veg! dengun Keoulusan dalam kss Mug NEGARA mum; V mun Iggg 5; ggnax I. gu n_ug1cu 5,214 Mnhkamah mom mg man muwmikau mam aw bswalv -1/mm an u..L4,.P,umuan, the may rt/aludgz dun mu end u: soon as a/mm aserkd By on: my, and mm». dupulrdby thsachzr an mam um". ma mmm dvmzl hr «mu :: cqulvocnt ur new In prlcklan .2. '4 mparvxlstenr my 6 sw nummKcsE6¢.5rJWyRnaG mm smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm undvxpuud mnlcmpnmvy dacumenu av Dmenmnzmrnu by N1: samrdaponarvtarls Inhrrtnlly Vmpmbnhlt m mm mm thtludgz has mm» rqemm axseruon oraeml. the/thy mam; thy Lsmcasnnt Mable In ouruplvllan. unrmmbpnmpreu coma m, 1: [mint :1 m nu mum». no march! my ducrvmm Iudrcvalll mm:-ran a umnmuon rm apmpum mun/mg mzlssuex nffim ar law, an Cam: muxkgn one my [mg and dc-wrmlne whether they are Lnabl: 7MSDNna'P7e vxsvmmmes urnssodbl me xnzttmem‘ mm 2 mmwsw if/Em: ma mar o: shown. rn: dtfrnmmrupnnd mymw Hlalfhllr :; a mum: um: ~ I! Mankamnh Inn beruandatwiu banawa um. nu ma as-nu fllmcamknn mamlmlalvgkln mnnnan P1amm lnmldap kuuvml Dnllmlln yang dinuat mm mmm am be-vuingan mmmsuklnh lamaflnp Ddlandun Kslmu mm Jmas dun ny-Is sum memenum kesemu: pm synnn yang fl\m]u>< um K95 runoxn ooummv FOR ronsnau nun: v. um um um. ann. am 4 cu an 2.1 «saw. 19 Mnhknmnh iuaa bervfinflnfluan mm mrmnan seaam Bsvsama flan bevagingln mm bevsesuuhn aangan kn wm sabawmmam yang man auausm clan Mahknmah Pariakuluan dnlam Kai Lguaggnx uvuum n AN muuvma 21 7 E y...,; memplrmmkin mum nylla npcm .1, biwnh ~mmw 1m smmvy. and/ammsmm:L.am:.:y~aenmr Prmaplcx [15] jam: Llablllt;/amt: whcn my 1:! mun-' mm ,..muy Drumuemduzhe xamerhlrw mmrmntmmrwazmmu pmmht, and wn-rwugntivr no/mm. my arm person mama ma amen: 1" me we U/fljnlntpromlu, m. ablwnnurv u saw: and war: r: 1; extltwuuhed by a Iudamzntumi rkuu m usutt agnmrznny mommm: ,.m..mm xuln re. Vallumm Adam/I193! Imflaw Mum :79. AIR ma Hum Aw sm nummKcsE6¢.5rJWyRnaG mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm I17! Swen] wire/, an khsucherhanll, mm whrn lwuar mart PEIXM: makt xenarnbz pvwnurs m nrmthrr. wfmkhtrw m. mmrnnxuumtnzmby Ifillrlnzlrmaumzvm Hutu mm man am ubflpannn nr pmmkt, ax mmparrd :2. MM Ilnbllltr where am Lr oneablwutlnn wpmmu; /15] Ajolncnndnvrmlummtxtuduiimnzfifimalnmlflmmgr joint nndjqverul unm, am, when M. or mm pm»: In 21.: mme1nrvument1omflYP"=mr‘x¢ mac themme thing and ulm mnmy make upnr-1:4 pmmuvx no 1117 mg mm: mlrv/I-Iulnr nnnmnu Immmy am: 71:2 121 ontlmnl onlwaunn and m ax mnnyxtvrml nhlwman: ax {hm are/om andmeml pmmum xeeln Re vamAAaI Adnmufiuural. [79] n 1; llkzjolnt Ilablllty In mm m: mpmmlmrx arr not cumulatively mm m Ma!P¢76r1vvanz¢ by one tilxhmys all: but 1: 1: /we [mm mm: o/ the mum mm povrmlngflilm llablllg/: m Bumzwx, /mdrrw, ‘lain: aomnanxv (‘May an I.‘armazLr vol 1, hneml Prtnuplrs am an“ (Landau. Thummn mm 201!) PWa:1391- unsnzp 1391. pa} In all Ma: fawn“: me mum when has tilamavyed the Inzbtllb’ may liven «ska umpumunamnare/>vm each am. mm mm The zvzduzor huwrver uatnbmy mm. ngalnmny anearall nlthtdebmrxfi Tn: Pnrtnun In Mnluysvn [11] In rlux Iummman In any awn: mg zvmmun law .5 lrmpphmnln ax wr nr-I gavtmzd by thtaznlratxx M 1§5fl.Seman u 11:»: Cnrmnns ArL195fl{A¢tx.'h§]("tha Eontmzt m7 zx nu reltvant prwlsvan relaww Mlmvvi llabrlvzy mm: sm mrmxcnzwsumma mm. smm nmhnrwm .. med m may he nVW‘Hl‘W -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! m wm two av mm! Dtnonx makl mm pvumm, mg prumuw may, in mmm. afpxprul agramrnr m m contrary, mnlptlany armor man 9/ :11: mm prumlxars m p-r1-mu m: we nftlre Ilrumlst. (mnhnxlsadded) 1251 Sudan :4 nrmcmmumx; Mpm mnzrrla mm :3 1.)] me Imam Eanmx: Art, 1972 um. Valllbnnl mm;:(mpm1,s/ wama ubatrwd mm» Vmvrxmn. _ mm m. Hahmryan nH mntrmujamrnrvdm/(ml, nrmallnwx m. pwmlxz: a. ill: on: W mom a; m. mmr lamzpmmvmrx as h: chuaszs, andcxcludzx M: rwhtn/"any .2». of mm in mm Wang M» an :47-pmmuar av LD- Pumlxarx. ts» aim. I/mun olln-an V. Ezm Bzngnl mm Stzarner Szrwce umrua ms Imilaw cm x77, Am 199 [M195] 1251 m summlu’ zvuvrfnv-2, Imlzxx a cunnury mtennan vs ow!-axxd n. the mnwcc alljamc mnrmm emuvzv Import .2 M1 uanmzy [or m. mm. mm n[th:pmmbur:, :a,w.me rt]: 42 mm r»am Lbnrmtma. 1572 saw Pollack AG Mulltr mm Cnnbucr and Spuvlic Rah:/A:u— vol 1. xsmm. [Imim L:uSNcur,ZW9}.n:I1 xa43—xm ms wnemtntdcbuanmnuylmurkdtat/lPmmmeuhabl1 /or me whale amount xezflhanld Muhdlun V. ma EhnnrmbnaVakm:tsv:wAII'(x9s9Scs9. fln m m Izsz mm a sm ruvmmxcsiagxfirlwyknan mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm n pay mm mm M In Me undtrivlrw mhonnleimmmr lmbmty as oupored ».;,.:.n: and xzvrml luzbululy. rm .2; men- dlntnnu «run; In mp numb" ufpvvmlxrs mm, and not me numbzrnfbmmmnx who made a pakjmfiarpmmbe. In :2. am 0]/alnt uanmgr, them n MIC womb: and two ar mwvprvmuvrx Em n hnble m Na: mm 11/»: pmmm .ma4.n: 2a sanuwnganamganuapaxnnusnua, Mahkamahhevpnndlvvgnnadalin mu mm. nmmlan mm Piamm mnaaap Kessmua Dsfmflsn mun hernias den bemIurI| mnmandanokan knwmna um»-usan adnhsh bennnmuman secara bevsama .12.. bafilmgan mm. pm waunm Ala: pandangan Inn, Mahkamah vucaya bnhaws mm vmnm bsmak urwuk mambawa hmmannyu hemadap kesamua Dufundan dnhnm kum1me1n\uH:am\n\ 21 Mahkamah mg: bamnvvdarvnan hchawa ;um\a.VI yang awnnn mun Iauvfldak dlhaylfsunwuhpvun nlhakPlninmIr1ah mlrlyarlhkan mmy1kDIsnHsIsso\n mwmlkul peslnan dun nmhan mm Defandln Panama Fm; nu udak dmafikan mar. panarn Dslandan Panama sdmgga Kehmn wlllupun lzvdupet Nqahandurlpada p(hakDsYmu1an Kehma mm muck: mangnmmmn pmnman din penjualan uevsabul‘ namun is man bonny: dibukukan ssbnfiknyl Nah mmx mam. 22 naparan Manmnan mu man ummn me\a\u\ sualu mm.“ Dmorncnankh 1am: Ehumbar 2022 yang mxsmaman olsh pmak Defends" Fennmn hand: to syn fl4YmmKCiE61A5DWVRnEG Nuns smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnH|Y mm: dun-mm VII .nuNG pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

MA-12BNCvC-10-09/2022

PERAYU GOLD MART SDN BHD RESPONDEN SHAKILONE THARMASEELAN

"Section 40, 47 & 56 Contracts Act - Appeal by Defendant/Developer against decision of Sessions Court in finding in favor of Plaintiff/Purchaser that the Defendant had committed a breach of SPA - failure to deliver property within stipulated 48 months - whether time was an essence of the SPA - whether payment of LAD only remedy available to Plaintiff - scheme by third party to buy out all units - whether Defendant's desire to carry out scheme and failure to continue with works and complete project amounted to a repudiatory breach of the SPA - Held: although time was not an essence of the SPA, the Defendant committed a repudiatory breach of the SPA entitling the Plaintiff to terminate the SPA when it intended to carry out the scheme and failed to complete the project - no time line fixed for completion - payment of LAD was not the only remedy available to the Plaintiff - Appeal dismissed".

04/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d5d0a08b-8d79-48ab-b5c1-c7d5b286e284&Inline=true

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(No. SVARIKAT : 2noan1oas9oa(w:In7»1')} APPELANT AND SHAKILOME TMARMASEELAN (NO. K/F : 921230-04-5315) RESPONDENT [DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAN SESVEN DI MELAKA DALAM NEGERI MELAKA, MALAVSIA GUAMAN uo.: MA-A52NCvc-eo-11/2021] BETWEEN SHAKILONE THARMASEELAN PLAINTIFF (NO. KIP ; 921 2104145175) AND GOLD MARY SDN. BHD. [ND.SVAR|KA . 0fiaD1006S03(BD8197-T)] . DEFENDANT l sw InDmXmNqDI1w:NsubmA mm Sum IHIWDIY WW be HSQG M mm u. nIVfl\ruIV|y mm; dun-mm VII nFIuNG pm M MATTER BEFORE THIS COURT [1] ms a ttectston on an appeal nrougnt by the Defendant agamst the decvslun at the Sessmns Court an aazuzz mal gave judgment tn lava! ollhe Ptarntrw at me and at a MI mat (Appear) BACKGROUND FACTS [21 The Plarnmfs claim arose out of a dispute pursuant \u at Sale A Purcnaso Agmement dated 172021 (‘SPA‘) execulafl by me Plarnttn as me purduaser and me Dedenuant as me Deve\opevNendor The mspute relates tn the Detenuant 3 Dream at an obligatron under clause t5 1 or the SPA ta aetwer vacant ppsumuon at a untt oi apanmerfl :| Hamnur ctty Man (‘Uml/Frayed) wrmrn 45 months hum the date 01 the SPA [31 The zotat purchase cansuderatron tor the UNI Is RM372t6D4 BA Plarnmt pata a total amount 0! RM95.5-$2 75 pursuant tn clause 4 m tnDQ1XmNqm1vn¢vVsubtnA ‘Nair s.n.t ...m.mut .. u... M my r... nrwhrnflly MW: flan-mm VII murtc v-mm [52] Havmg scrutinised lne amended dolance, we are mclmed la agree mm the delendents that they nave sulnclentty done so For lnsIance‘— (8) para 19 states tnat tne FDA ‘cleerty mdrcales met as essenca VS Ihe[?011] 5 MLJ 454 at cuundertakmg by oamansere Really (the plalnltfi) al development an tne development pmperry during the 15 year term Thus development ls e mndamental term olma FDA and 7095 In [IS roots‘. (bl pm 22 smes mat the ‘development ol tne pro/ecf by Damsnsarla Realty was (he hilson d'etre' ol the PDA and because me development was gomg to be complex. I! would like me. hence the 15 year term‘, and re) para 23 states met the ‘delendants contend therefore that Damansara Rea/Iy (Ihd D/nlnrm /S to pmcura that the dsvalapmanl is not only begun, am also completed Wlfhm tne said 15 year term‘ IN \EDQ1XmNbzflflw¢VVsukmA me. am nmhnrwm a. U... a may t... mm-y am. dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max [531 Aceonnng/y, n IS In our eenememe aprmon mar me defendants have sulfctenlly pleaded that (me of psflnlmance Is oltlre essence o/me FDA To accede to me planmrrs argument would mean met me rrmocelvtparry would have to sxpresslyp/ead that Urns was ol the essence of ms eonneer, er mum the law does not reqmrs (see Supenntanden! ol Lands and Surveys (my an) 5 Ann! u Harmf Em Matusm 5 Ors 1199413 ML.l 135) We Merslore now me: as long as me mnucenf party has sufltcrenl/y msedmaltar: or ram whmh su/licmnlly Show that Inms was aims essence that would be suffrcrenl rm me purposes olplsadmgs We are runner onne wsw that me plamhfl was no! In any way taken Lvy surpnee ur pm/udrced by [he amtssmlv 0/ me aerenuenze Io mead the axes! woms “ [131 Havmg read paragraphs 19 and 2a oflhe Statement of Defence. It \s Iamy dear that the Defendam had stated Ihae Ihal Che P\a|nlIW's rehefwas omy for LAD m me event 04 dehvery afvacant possesllon Although dauss V5 3 aflha SPA was not pimculafly ralarred la, n \s [ms Conn‘: view that paragvaphs 19 and 20 wee sufficvenl in Indicate (he Defendant‘: pnsmon that dehvery 07 vacnnl passessmn wllhln the sllpulaled ponad was not an n m mnmxmmnnwzvvsemn ‘Nana sew nmhnrwm e. med m my e. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! essence M the SPA Tms coun meredare msagres mm (he Flalnufl on mus wssue [19] Mnvng on, A shame be flrsl sraxau max used an me evidence and dellbemuens of me Learned Ssssxans com Judge and reference (0 the decision In cm-mophu Wen Jinn v. Bujnya Timu Squnru Sdn. End. [2011] 1 LNS 754 and Sun commerce Sdn. End. v. Soon Chin cnye 4 Or: [2022] MLJU 602 «ms Cowl agrees max me Prmect vs a oommevaax devempmenl canslslmg D! a shopping mall, hotel and accommodauon nuns and nut a housmg develupmemwnhm me meamng oune HDA That bemg me posl n names are «as In contract under «rm terms or the SPA my n s we Vaw mat a coun wwll vnlerprel terms av conlnacl based on us glam and unammguous conslmcimn and meaning (see me Cnun at Appeax decxsmn m Syarikal Blnaan man J-lyn ( A Firm] v. Kopemi semaguna sungai Gluqor Bem:d(1W9) AMR so and SPM mmbr-ne swncn sun. and. v. Kmjun Nlgori Sollnaor mm; 1 MLJ 154) As was flecldad -n Perbadanan Komqum Megan Selangor v. smngor coumry u !N\EDQ1XmNqflflvn:vViuM1A -we smm ...m.mm be used m mm s. mm-y mm. dun-mm VII muNG pm Club sen. and. [2016] I CLJ 211 wnen me language or e dncumanl .5 Dlaln and unemmguoue and appnee aocur-amyto me enstmg me men me mlanllm er the pamas to me document should be gathered from me Vanguage eune document nseu [21] This hnngs us In me construcinn at clause 22 ov me SPA In thvs Appeal It would be necessary In reproduce the said dausa appearing below — "Time my be en essence er the wnnea m relation in a// pml/mans ohms Agrsemsnr u emu mm to lamphams added) any ptlymantdue and payaore by (he Pu/chase/lo me Dsvsmpsl In aeconsenoe mm me (anus and comimans onms Agmemsn!‘ [221 By companson. dause 371 el me SPA m me case 0! ram Haldlnvs (sums) relerred lo by lhe Plenum leads as follows — "T1me sneu be an essence In re/anon to en me pmwsmns of (ms Agreement em: plrlicultriy mass which aim Iv (smulvasls added) me paymon: or malalmervl ol me Pumnesa pm or any pan lharea/and me payment afafl memes due by me Purchaser In me Developer Ilnl1BIH1IS Agreement‘ 11 m xwmxmwqnnwzvvsemn we. sen» nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m may he nrW\nnU|Y mm: dnuumnl y.. mum Wm! [23] Reading clause 22 of me SPA In this Appeax, n Is qune dearlo «me coun man me words “as shall ralsla Io“ Ammedxalsly ¢eI|-mung the words “In relation to all pmwsmns c-mus Aglssmsnf" sewed to grve meanmg to “all pmVIsrons' and thereby hmmnw and confimng me pvovxsmni wnereume as an essence Ipphes‘ which In only wnn regeme to any payment me «am the Plamxlfl as «me purcneser lo me Delendanl as me Developer It lnevekzre excluded all vlher ubhgatmns wnere «me :5 stipulated Hence. dause 22 cleany msnngmshee R524! man «he wards “and pemcursny those wmn relate m' m clause 371 ml me SPA m mu HoIA1Ings(supra)wh|c7I m ms Caurfs mmd merely added empnasus to me type of ounganan where mne apphes wvlhoul limmng n The ewecz and consequences cl eecn oi me two pruvmans ave meretore anmncx and carmc| be considered In be equal in eanh other [24] II was decided wn oamanma Rnlry and, (supra) mm mm: may run neoassanly not be en essence m me absence of sum Isrm m a oonlvacl and conversely, me my n01 necessanly be an essence even If provided as such Each camracl must be cunsxmee on M lam: guided by we conduct and eeanngs of me rNmDmxmNqm1»¢vvsemA me am.‘ ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m my n. mm-y mm: dnuumnl wa mune v-ms! pames under the canlraca Be mm as re may. me Federal Cnurt also expressed me vlew mac whllsl u Is prlma ladle aoueplad that «me Is an sssenre ln sanslrucvron contracts‘ ll rs reuuneule either by words sr conduct DI pames [251 Undoubtedly, ll la llre rrrleresl cl properly buyers rd secure delwery vncznl pdssessrdn or men pvoperty wnmn me Ilme shpnlalzd DI scones! Iheleaflev and r1 mus1 be In merr mlnds that wheve llme ls eupuleled ln s SPA, a must an ssenceoflrle conlrad srrrde the purchase of me pvoperty ls governed by a wnmn connect me Durchsser mus! exemrse seulrun lo ensure mal me edrrlrsd prdvldee var lune ss an essenee wrm regsrde In denuery dl vacant possegmn ll Is the duzy ollrre purchaser to know what ne has agreed In when me 5:»: Is signed By egnrng me SPA the Plarnull ln «ms Appeal ls assumed lo have read and sdvrsed mmselr dl me elven ar lndlvldunl clauses srngul.-my and me SPA as n whole blndlng document [25] Thus, as lsr as clause 2: rs concerned “we Plalrmff ls assumed to neue read and advlsad mmsell el me peculramy dl lrre dralllng on men provlslon ll ls clearly legible Iha| clause 22 eflecwely rNlnDmxmNqnl1w¢vvsumA mu. s.r.r nuvlhnrwm s. u... w my r... nflmrruflly mm. dnuuvlnrrl VII .nuue Wm! excluded me dale v1 dellmy ul vacanl paaaeasron Is an essence Slncelhe SPA and ln panlculir clause 22 was prepared by me Delendam as me developer men It would have been om/laus In one Plalnlrfl man are Delendam did nm rncand for me date at oellvary nl vacant pasaessldn to be an essence The Flamml could have seugnl la ablect to me dranlng al mal clause In lne ldrln ll was presented or sougmw amend il but nenller was dune Ha muld have alsa wllhdriwrl lrarn ma pumnnae me lerm was not salrs1aclory lo hum am ne am not Tnereldre. wnen me Plalnllfl made me declslan to execule me SPA on 1 7 2021 wlm all lanna lntacll me Plalnllfl mus! be laken lo have agreed lo clause 22 Min all lls oansequences. [271 To argue lnal deaplle new clause 22 Is clznsuuclod il ls lhe lnlanllan of name! under the contraci |7Ia| lime Inf uellvery U1 vacant pdaseeelon la an essence Is to attemmlo rncdliy av vary a lermlhal has been expressly prowded Unless alnemrae modlfied orvarled by agreement M panles or by wndum‘ (HIS Cuurl Izanrlol Imam my ulnar rneanrng to cl-use 22 As sxprassed by Lord Hoffman In Anomey General nlflel/12 v. Blllu Tuocom rNlnDmxmNqnl1w¢vvsamA ‘Nair Smnl nuvlhnrwm r. d... M my r... nflmnnllly em. dnnuvlnrll wa nFluNG Wm! Limlredmos] UKFC 11 and velerred la wlxn approval by Gopal Sn Ram FCJ ln Borjnyl rlmee squere v. M ConeoptSdn. Ehd. pom) 1 cu us - "The noun nes ne power to improve upan lne lnslrurnenl wnlcn ll ls celled upnrl la conslrue, wnelrrer ll as e conlreu, a slalule or amcles olessoclarran lr cennal lnfmduce lernrs to make ll taller or more reesonelzle ll is concerned only lo dlscover what the lnsrrurnenl rneens Howsven lnel rneenlng Is not neeessanly or always me: me aumors orpemes (0 me dncunlenl would nave lnlended It ls me msanlng wnrcn lne lnslrurnenl would convey lo a lensonahle person Ilavlng ell me background knowledge whlch would reasonably be avalllsble lo we audlence Io wnom me insmlmenf IS addressed sss lnueslors carnpensanon Scheme l.ld v West smrnwrcn surldlng Society [1995] 1 WLR ass, 912- 913 I! As lhls ob/euive rneenrng wnrcn ls eonuennonally called me rnlennon or me pemes, er the lnrenlren of Psmernenl, or llre lnlenlrcn of wnerever person nr body was or I: deemed Ia neue been me aulner ol me lnstlumenl ‘ ua rn xnumxnwwnnvrzvvsemn me. am.‘ nmhnrwm .. u... w my me nflmnnfily mm: dnuumnl y.. mum Wm! [29] Thus‘ on me conetmctron and rmerpretatrcn at clause 22 cf the SPA‘ tms court agrees mm the Detendant that tune wls not Intenfled to be an essence wrm regards to the date or nelwery 0! Vacant possessron In the respect tnrs Cnurl drsagrees wrtn the rinarng evtne sessrene caun fiecond rssus whether me gemgg gl LAD rs me only rsmegy a.w.Iam&r‘.v.lns.Eur'crtrl [231 srnee this Court finds tnat tune for dehvely cl vacant passasilon rs nm the essence 0' the SPA‘ Ihen wnuld the payment 07 LAD pursuant to dense 15 3 or me SPA be tne only remeey available lo the Hatntfl’ [ac] Now In crm Chay Loersuprat, rt wislaund that time was run an enema 0101: Sale and Purchase agreement In confirming tne decumn at the mat com me srngapore court at Appear agreed mat ttre wrchaser did run have the ngm to ternunate the agreement lakmg tnrtc account the fact mat the developer had liken Vrerh slaps |0 ovmptale lha conslmzmm 07 the lnltlmenl and thereture LAD was me only renreay evarlame tome is nr rnDmxntNqm1w¢vVset~mA we s.n.r ...ne.mrrr a. LAIQ4 m my r... anmnauly mm: dnuumnl VII .nune v-mat purdlisel The Cowl of Anna! opmed that me Durmasar was prumalum In lermmatmg me SPA smae me developer had mamexea a new nme lorcnmplemn unne apartment wnanme Court wvshei nu nrghugm 45 max annough Ihe purchasefs action was we Io be prumalure me com ol Appeal expressed the mew manna uevemper us not emmea to assume that they can cotmnue to delay Ihe project rnuennmexy because mey are pvepavad lo pay LAD In me avem me daily \s so greaz me! n evmoes me aevaumng pany‘s rmenunn to no mngev be bound by the auman men at such Iime the aeraumng party can be smdlo have common a repudlzlury breach enmhng the purmem In uermrnate me oonlracl ”IV9] /I rs common gruur-dmat forms purpose o/ms agreement, I/‘ms rs nol ol ms essence As /at whan a delay In such a case may result rn me aeraunmg parry bemg rsgalded as nsvmg mpudmred the contract, we Io//uwmg Wolds ol Dsvlm ./ in Umvslsal Cargo camers Corp v man[1957]2 as 401 426 an! instructive‘- rNxnDmxmNqm1w¢vVsumA mu. sum nmhnrwm .. u... m my r... unmmuly mm: dnuumnl vu muue v-max and Schedule 2 at me SPA and a Develops! lnslalmem Fran (‘DIP’) The DIP allowad ma Plarmm m paylhe bllanca purchase pnoe m lnstalmenvs 0! RM 366.10 pal month Inn 180 monma [41 Sometime rn November mm: the Plamm along w-ur an mm purchasers 01 um m the Proms! was mlunned by me Deverraam mat they wrll not be wnnnumg Wm the oomplauan at the Prnreci and than another party known as Tayruna Capital and Wealth Express Hora-ngs Pie Ltd (‘Wealth Express‘) wm buy back an unsold Md WM unns (mm the Delandanl and 3H purchasers mcmding me Plaumn (‘Souems‘) [5] The Scheme waa aubrecno Tayruna CapIla\ and Wealth Emma many. nerng me to acruava ma-/. buy back 0! an unlls m me Harbor cny pro]ec1 and seI>und\y. me Delendam and us purchasecs having fulfilled an obhgallons m raranan to the buy back All muse manara appear m ducuments lopearing hem pages 27w-279 Mme Record a1Appaal and snnlvrned ay ma aral en/rdence av ow! rNrnDmxmNqnr1w¢vvsamA ma sanar mmnarwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mrmrr-y mm: dnuumrrl VII mum v-mar Where I/me As no! arms essence ofrha comm-In other was, when daily 1: only A nraecn ar wanamy-new long mustlha delay last before me aggnsvedpany rs enmledlo mrow up we cor-(raw The meorerrcm answer is norm doubt The sggrrsvsd party rs IB/revud Mam ms an/rganons when the delay lzscames so long as 2.: go to the ma! arms mnmact and amounuo a Ispudranon am [201 As for when a delay may be regarded as rravmg gone to the mo! arm contract, ms Loldsmp smd man: has been settled by. long lma alaulharmss ma: ms yamsbck by wmcrv such a delay rs (0 be measured rs notmar are reasanzme penod olnme /rrsread, delay In perlarmsncs of contractual obrrganans whrch goes la ms ruor of me contract may be onarxcramsd as dslay man frustrates ms contract (241 Although there are duverenr ways 0! exprsssmg ms us: my repudiation, may we no! Inconsistent mm one another In The N.-min‘ Federal Commerce 5 Nawgarlon Co Ltd v Malena Alpha Inc 54 Ors 1379 A 7§Z 779. Lord Lwberfame aptly observed. sllsrrafsmng m a numbs: amass Iomvu/allons, that me vurraus Iormulahons by me aulhormss as to when a bleach amounts to a rm mumxmwqnnwzvvsumn mm. smm mmhnrwm .. U... w my r... mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max repudiation iaplcsent /11 other woms app/rcenans ro diflamnt mnzmczs anna common pnmztpls that to amount Io mpumauon a breach musl gala me Ioatolme conlracl ' I35] Tne sensible way ol mlerprafmg me agmament .s manna target rials Inr nanamg over the new apenmsncs rs 25 August 1999 buftlmele rs any delay winch does no! go to me rootolthe contract the apps//ants must be compensated mm damages at me vale ar 40 per cen: per annum on we agreed sum in me bankers guarantee As for ma appeuents‘ cormom me: me respondents an: no! snmlsd to buy nine /0: Ilmmu/vos In! me pumoss of delaying me pnuecl, we agrse that me Iesuandzms are not enmred to assume ma: may can oonnnue to may one pm/out mdefiruraly mainly because may are prepared la pay /iqmdarea damages /n Umvarsal Cargo Carriers (195712 09 401, 430, Devrm J Issued a frme/y zenunaer that ‘a party 10 a cantraci may not purchase Indefinite delay by paying damages’ A nma mu was when me aeray rs sn glen! that me aereumng parry is guilty o/rspumamry cunducl " 11 INwnDQ1XmNqflflw¢vVsut~mA me. am ...m.mm .. U... a my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [311 Guvded by me views expressed epave «nus Court would dnsapree wnn me Delendam mac cnue Cnny Ln Vs amhonry luv lhe pmpcsmon than mere ume 45 not an essence enne connect am there rsa pnmsnon on umer Vale aeuverv of veeem possession‘ [hen the payment 0! LAD wm pe me onrv remedy avanlame mp me pureneeer In this courts vrew the has and urcurnscenees surmundmg Iha developers eonavm remam matena\ m delerrmmng wnemer me developer me me ngm to Insist lhal payment at LAD would pe the nmy rerneay evauaple up me purchaser The declsmn rn Chaa Chay Lu mus! (herehre be construed based on us has For mm reeepnnne some not Inclined zp accepllhal me pecvsron Van-Coal (supramuat referred wrm appmvfl me eemsmn In cnua cnay Lee Is lunher eunnpmy (or (he e-rne proposmon snnnariy me decwsmn In V-n-opal (supra) nnm be reee based on ws own has [:52] The has In Vcn coal (suprn) show lhal me pnmiry Issue mere was on me cuesnen wnemer me supennlendnng pmcer for me cunltact was carrea m relusmg the requst lav exvens-on ai nrne and later (enmnalmg me conflict when the wnmictnr was mu m progress 0! campmmg |he works Lee swee seng J (As ms 2; re rnumxmwqmmzrvsemn we. sew mmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m my r... mm-v mm: dnuumrrl VII mum WM Lovasmp Ihen was) veievred m Cnun Chay Lu (supra) lor me posmun :7! HM mm where Ihe breach um nu! go to me max :2! me ::ontrac1 me employer «M nut have me nghl lo temunale me cuntvad on the basis of repudlahon by the comrauur and mac m such a summon the anly vemedy In the emplom \s to: LAD [331 As war me deuslon -n Korqialn Mulaysfl v KCSB Konsonium Sdn. Bird. [2017] MLJII, the cm mare concerned In applncahon la smke omme F\amt|VFs Slalemenl on (Ham on me basis that me acllun was lune barred Thus muse pans ov me decxstan wneve Ihe Laavnecumge msoussaed ma tsaue mums and LAD mum not ba taken as de1emunanva at me ngms at me party smce me mu teas ovme claim had yel in be med [341 It \s Ihis ceurrs mew that me Dwvwsxcn 0! LAD does not set Mme lor wmpllhon to he at large Where the dmay ‘s so prolangod mac n evlnces (ha breaching parly s mamy or vefusal to pervorm me conuad or that the contract WM! be compleaed not upon terms that was agreed between "I6 parties then flme WI“ nu Inngar be mdefimlely at me at the benefit al the uelaumng party The INmDmXmNqm1»¢vVsumA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! defawlmg parly wauld have cammmed a repudwatory breach enlmnng me mnocem pany to terrrwlale the contract [35] This bnngs me amcuasuan in semen 5612) at me cmnacxs Act that prowess where we ws rm shpulaled as an essence ov a contract then me mnooem Darly Is nut ermlled to cemunate the conuam butcan un\y have reooulseto compensanon Although that provlsxan does not permit a cnmrad to be |ermInaled nor rendered vm a Is omy apphcable where the oanlracl rs pefiormed um Vale In smmiona where me promlsar has refused to pervcnn at has msabled mmselllram peflomung me contract :1 usms Couns mew man seam 40 or me Comvac1AclwHIbe avauable ta Ihe pmnusee Thus where ma contract ws abandoned by me promnsor and mat abandcnmam us evmced by me pmmlsors mablllly or unwuumgnessco :nmp\e1e lheconlrad or he Intends to fulfil me contract only In a manner sunscannally -ncnnsuslenlwnh ms unluganons and nnl In any olhev way u I: then avallableto me promlsee under semen AU alme Contracs M1 to (errmnate ma same A5 held by Loni Wright in Ros: Tsmylh 5 co. Lld v. m Bnllay A no [1940] ZAII ER 50- m mumxmwqnnnzvvsmm mm. saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum pm “/ do no! 58}/Ina! nis necessary (0 show met me parry alleged to have Iupudmled should nave an actual Inlsnvon no! to 1mm me eonznacr He may mlsnd In lac! to mm: :1, but may be detelmmed to do sa only In a manner subslanha//y rnmnsmtanl wnn hrs omgaoons and no! In any olher way “ [36] conung back In mus Appeax. even though clause 22 had resulted nu «me not n: In an essence wnn reqams la dalwery cf vacant possession, me Plalmmwcuid have mengmtolermmatslhe SPA mne fads showmsnha Devendanrs breach vn lamng to oommele the SPA ameumad lo renuanmon through any nu av-nung an mtermon to no hangs! be bound by me SPA ov me: ne nenanannz Intends In Mm me SPA only m a manner suusxanmally vnconsxslanfi wnn men obhgallons undev me SPA In such suumon, the Daymenl ol [DA mu um be me my remedy avallabb «a me Flamml Tmni issue wheme: me Derendanz commuted a breach and that [31] II his been accepted that me terms 'vefusa\ m perform’ and “disabled to penorm“ wn semen 40 0! the CorI|rac'sAc1 embames rNmDmxnwNqm1»¢vvsnmA mm. snn ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m may he nwnmun mm: dnuumnl wa munc Wm! the common law concepts of venudlatlon and fundamental breach (see Contact Lnw In Mmytn by among my Fang and the dectsmn In Hun Elli Lin L Anal V. Mnllm Jlyl (Mohhn) Sdn. and (199911 Mu 544) [as] It Is ah Indlsputable cat: that the Devenaam had lafled to dehver vacant posseeuen of the umt oh 1 7 2021 am K IS Hal dwwuted that the Pmeot has not been mmplelea by the Defendant up nu the time of the lnal Based on the Archllecfs oemflcallun appeanng at page 173 ml the Record omppeal, the project run only achieved 70% phystcel progress by 1 7 2019 me lhem hea not been any lurthsr progress sthee that date mm the pmposed scheme sunaced m 2020 Based on those lads them was ueany a breach of the Dofertdinfi obhgaiton lo delwar vacant Dossesswon wnmh the wpmaten penau [391 NW based on all those vans can it be said than the breach went In the real L71 the mnlvam m 1113! [ha Ddendanl had evmoed IIS mtehuon (a not Mm Ms obhganons under the SPA arlhal K vnu only be YIMIVBG H'II:0I'Vi\SlBflI MIR lhe Defendant 3 Dbhglflons undef the SPA and not any other, marshy rapudtalmg the span 2: rNtnDmxmNqm1n¢vVsuwtA ‘Nair em.‘ ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m my n. mm-y mm: dun-mm n. nF\uNG v-ms! In Ru!-It Mununmy v. Lim ran 5 Sans Sdn. Blvd. [1985] 2 ML! 135 me Suprame Coun explained revudlamm In ma [allowing mnnner~ "/1 show he observed (ha! /10! every relusal to perform some pan ol a comma‘ wm amount m 5 Iununcnanon Even a deliberate breach wt/I nor necessanly em/(Ie me mmmm party In ass: mmser! as cnscnmgsa, syncs rt may samehme be met such a much am appmanazary be sanclvonad by damages (see Sursse Allanbque scam v NV Ronerdamsche Kc/en Centrale [1967] 1 Ac 357, 435) It rs not a mars rslusal aromrsslon olane olthe confmcrmg p-mes to do something winch ns ought to do mar wvll /usniy the arms; m repudralmg the contract, bu! (here must be an absolute refusal m perrann hrs part olme contract (see Freem v am 1574 LP 9 CF 205, 21:) "Mars rs an aosoms Islusal la perlbmv, ma omerpany may lmalmmse/Ins ducharged sum of an express relusal, however, me lest »s to ascansm whether (he action or scams or me party m dslaull am such as to lead a Ivssonabls person to con:/ms me: he no Iangar menus to be bound by :1: pravlsrons Where such an mversnce cannot be INmDmXmNqm1w¢vVsumA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! dravm the mnocenz parry wr/I be enmlsd to claim damages rar breach, but not to treat mmse/I as d/schalgsd " [401 In mus cows consideration. me anlwer is In me snfirmallve The upping point against me Delendant I! wnen n rm evmoed ns desire co \mp\emem the smeme, agreed to sell all us unsold and avanaue ums vl me Fvcjecl lo weann Express and promuled to an purchasers Includmg the Plalnlm me buy-back of all units by weann Express That deany showed that me Defendant had no mlenlmn In contmue wnn rls obhoalions to complete ms sm Even if the Delendarvfs Inlenllun was to seek a Sollmon Ia oompmsale ma P\aInW that Intention was pLam\y mconsnslenl Wm’! Ki obhgallons as Ihe Deve\nperNendcr under the SPA 10 cnnsvun and dehver the completed um: (um: Walntlfl [41] In mus com‘; view there had been an abandonment of Daisnaanrs ahngamons under the SPA Undev clause 2 ol the SPA n is me Defendanl wha sold me Unn to ma Plamnri and by clluse 15.1 n :5 me Ddendunfs ozmganon to commele and dshver vacant possassxon av [he um: In one P\amuW, non Tayruna Capnal nu! Wealth Express By pmmanng the buy-back a! me rNmDmxmNqm1w¢vvsumA ‘Nana s.nn ...n.mn a. med w my me nrW\nnU|Y mm: dnuumnl wa mum v-max Plaintiffs uncnmnlalsd unn by wennn Express and not conllnumg wnh RB ohllgnlnom In campbele (he Project the Ddendunl had eflecfively abanmnment Its obligations under me SFA That abandonment Is also evidenced by me can mat since the V351 oemflcate 01 progress of warts dated 1 72019 Imtvl the lnal cammencad on 5 7 2022 which we a vanes 00 3 years, lheve had been no completion M nne Frmecl [421 Tne fads here should (herefure be msmgu-shed mun muse -n cnu. cmy Lee (supra) and ven- coaueupre; wnere me vendur had undanakan dear and defmne slaps to eempxeue me coma Vn mus case the Delendanl had ceased works after 70% curnplemon and euugm lo and Rs obhqallons undef me SPA xnmugn me Schema Tnereme. wmlst admmedly «me us not a case wnere no action had been taken enogemer Io oommenoe and commete me mnuacn as was In Damansara Reeny (supra), me Defendanfs desue to execute me Scheme and me absence cl Dmgruss al works was suflluenl awdence that me Dahndanl had no unnenuon tn Iurmer (mm as obhgmnns under the SPA m mumxmmnnwzvvsumn we s.nn nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mune Wm! [6] The Scheme was prssentea la all purdlasers mduding the Plallmfl ma a Iensr dated 3 12 znzu rsmad by sollulars Iwrlg our Wealth Express (‘Scheme Oflefb and a meehng was held vla zoom uetween me Defendant and aH purchasers rncmdrng the Phlnhfl In that meemng ms Devsnaann encmnagafl all purthisefs la pamclpale m we Scheme so man they Lzln nape to remup at Ieasi 60% av mnnles may have paid under the SPA n was axplimed byme neqenaannnhe purchasers agreed ro pamcrpars rn me Scheme may need not oonunue payments undev men DIP [71 Feanng xhat he will lose ms wwesxmenr (he mmnm cum to panrcrp-re In me smeme by choosmg opnon Ons our ofthenvee options praenlsd He mdlcaled ms Interest and agreement In pamcrpaxe In me Scheme under opmn One by smalng at me spans prowaeu m me Scheme oner an 5 12 2:120 [B] unconunacexy for the Pwarnuvf, mere was no progress on me Scheme unm ma dale Vov deuvery uhtacanl posnesslnn onne unn armed on 172021 and me srtuamn continued Inereaner Someume rn Octaber 2021 ms Plarnmv had name :11 a wmdmg up pehllun Ne WA-ZBNCC-20-05/2021 (much was Water dnsmrssed) m rwmxmwqnnwzvvmmn mm. smm ...n.mm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm v-max [43] Thanhe Dehnaanr rm: no clear parn Io samplers me SPA in me even! me prwused Scheme cenea was evvdenl m DW|‘s answer In cmss exanunemn Nmwrcnsvamrng that am mslsled that me cansnruaron was sun ongomg The Delendanl ma nm abandon the Draped. and Ihal me DIP wwll resume and me pvcjecl mu be eprnplered In me even! me proposed Scheme !aHed, yet no evraence was oflered to Show any Dmgress o1 works smue 1 1 zms and nu eprnpleuen man was ulfeved to show new and wnen me pinned wm be eurnpsered wnn a derrnne dare lo! oomwencn Enecmsxy. the me for cnmmetvan of me Pro;e<:1 was Indalmnely an Varge [44] It mustbe rrmea lhallrve Plarnmrs agrwnem rp pamapane rn rne Schuma ans not amount to : bmdlng mnlmci between mm and Wealth Express and am not rn anyway release rne oevenuan: «rem Ks obhgatlons under me SPA as snhelmve when zne Plamw Indicated his agreement‘ me SPA was sun subsrsung pendrnp aclua\ rrnplemencatrun of the scheme Further‘ the scheme was cundmonal upon vumumenr av me 2 conemons sun-u earner and me: made me P\amhH's agrasmenl merexy an rnarceme mleresl or apploval and nor bmdmg between rne parues weann rNrnDmxnrNqm1»¢vvspmA ‘Nana s.n.r mmhnrwm .. med w my r... nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl wa mum v-max Expless's sancncrs wetter diled 3122020 was M51 a lenzr sookmg tna Plawnmfs wares! and Igveement to pimcxpula .n the Scheme and mum nm In any measure amounl In a contract raeastng the Detendanttwm ts obligations undertne SPA In any event there was no further develcpmenl on Ihe Scheme since the date M512 2020 when the my-ntuw indicated ms agreement lo pamc-pats III tne Scheme unhl whan the date (or aenvary or vacant poasessxcn arrived on 1 7 2u21 [asp For tnasa reasons. tms Court does nomnatnannemaantm letter of levmlninon dated 25 10 2021 wmch was mere\y4 months HRH the due date In: dehvery of vacant possession on 1 7 2:121 was WI way premature llwnmd have been pvemamr: nan mecondmuns precedent and necessary agreemanls lo the Scheme was executed by all panes and me Scheme was tn the must 0! camnxetien It wnuld also nave been prematute fllhe Detennent had BCIUSIIY Ebled 3 Dian Var CGIYIDIMIOH cf the Prwecl (:7 3|‘ vi! purcttasets Ind fixed a uate tor eenvery cl vacant possession as was done Vn cnua cnay Lee (supra) and Ven«CoaI (supra) Nsnher vflhe 2 course of events happened VI tn-s case Elmer way there was na\ gomg to be delivery untte Uml lo the Flalnml 11 m tnumxmwqmmzvvsumn wn. snnnw nmhnrwm .. v... m mm he mm-v mm: dnuumnl v.. muNG Wm! [46] This coun dues nor agree «nu ma aeorsron m Lssc Dovnlopmlm sun, and. v. Thomas M. mnmynnr and Anor (ZZOUIMLI 1 suppansthe Deqenaanrsargunrennnet rnere ned not been a lavlure ofl consIderatIcn smce me Defendant nad completed :1 Vans! 70% of me SPA unhka In Damlnnrz RI Iry (suptajwhere me ourmuctnr nan anogexner varied to commence wnstrudlon The pom! av dmerenue rs Nus. m Clma cnav Lee (Iupm), Von-Coal (supn) and Lssc Davolopmanl (supra) rnere were Icuan reken to complete me properly and {many denvered me same, bul here me acuon ro complete the properly ended when me De4enuerr| evmced the rmenuon to carry out me soheme and scoppea work on me Prawn ro borvuw me words more Federal Cowl m Dnmnnun ReIl¢y(sup1a),' r is cs/la/my a Case cl repumatron am also Involves a Iundamenlal breach a! an exisvmg oblrgabon wmcn gives Ilse tu me inewtable ooncmsmn me: the promo orbalyam would no! be Ium/lea by won me dus dale" [471 For me sake M brevny‘ rcwouxo he re\ev:n(fo recerro me declswn rn Lnw mm Ung .4. Anal Anal v. rurmmm sun‘ Blvd. (ms) 2 cu m wnrcn was amused by Federa\ com In Barfly-I 2; m rnnmxnmqnrwnzvvsowrn we smm ...m.mm .. med w my r... mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm mm squm mom Annougn the Fedural Court \n that oaoa dbd no! agrae with the findmg 07 lhe High Coun on the manar M resmulmn and asseasmenn oi damages‘ n mo however oplrve that me decision was an correct cnlhe maI1e( ollemunallon enna contract by the purchasev Vn (h3( use [here WIS 2 dehy In dehvenng the pvopeny not only when Illa dale fell due but UNIV the Inal Thus was no progress or works because of a dlspme beaween the defendant and NS emphzyer a nun! venture ccnsonlum The Fadaral com agreed |hal there was a lauure of total eansmaranon due to a Imal aoanuanmem 5! me pmed [431 Thus com does not find as argued by Counsel lnrlhe uavonoan: Ihlt amoe [ha Defendant had eompleled ID stage; 07 ouns1mc1|on,the Plamml having pad 95% M the Purchase Pnee (whldi (Ills Court does nm find in be the tact) and there was an CW5! from Weihh EXWEH (D purchase the Uml [ram "19 PIIMIM Iher: was a dsllmfe value In Ihe Unit and lhsrefnre there was no fame ovwnaoevauon The case or 1.55:: Develwmcm (supra) was relied on as SLIDPDHIHQ (PMS argument In lhal case vmal is Ian xo be done was wit me wnnman ov uulrly and cenmczlmn of (mass rNmDmxmNqm1»¢vvsamA ma a.nn nmhnrwm .. med w mm o. nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-max [491 In (ms Caun's mew mere can us no vnlua no me Puarmm when mete rs no asmry or the unn Urml me Uml I5 dewerad the marnmr has no porwerloemer and emoy any value m me propeny In addmnn. me P\arnml can c eruoy me guaranteed moume under the Tenancy Agreement dated 172011 which wanna have ccmmwcod s monms auer the -ssoanoe or the Ccrtmcaie ol Campleuun and compuarroe (‘(300) ms coun does not agree based on me cemficahon of progress of works dated 1 7 2919 more was 90% oomulocrorr cl we Dhyslcal works done What value rsmer: In mo Umlwhen mere rs no O€IIVl§.B|BC17lCaIW|fII'flr pmmomg, gas piping arm no mad selvmg the buI|d\ng7 Even H mm more purchase Wee was paw, there can be no vamewhen all those matters are not conslruaad and salivary or vacunt possesmrr nulanly gwerr on the due dale but with no oomprenon date a all In srgm That ranure satisfies me test set nut In Dimansari Rnaity (supra) (hat a reasonanre and cnmmemally sombre man would look upon the pm]ac| as having lmle or m: value an aH rm rnumxmwqnrmzvvsomn ‘None Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe o... w my r... mrmrr-y mm: dnuumrrl VII mum v-ma! [so] To add lhls court does not agree that the lat: that wealth Express hue ulfeved the Plalnllfltn buy back ottne umt en a 50% cash payment together wlth some other nnanclal taalulee pursuant to the Scheme sllowsd that there 15 cenamly value If! the unn la the Plllrlml The Ivldsnoe at nwt, the lane dame 4 11 ZCQD and Q&A on 23 V0 2020 showed that Tltymnn Clpllal and wealth Expvess hau melt own busmess plane lortne Project what theae buslness plans am not ln evmanee Thus. whether those buslness plans are drlven by the value EH11! UN! and IN cthev unlts tn the Protect are at besl only speculatwe [51] Funhannoret u raoayment at the purchase prvoe does not automallully equals lnlo the unlt havlng present value whllsl ll could be al some lmure value te wealtn Express t1 the untt becomes part ants buslness plane, the unttoenalnly has no value ta the Plllnnfl at the nlatenal ltme Even «the l=lamttll reeawes 100% buy heat on me purchase prloe ll sllll does not mean that the repayment IS pvemlsed on the value at the unn what IS applrenl to tlna Calm ta that the buy-buck IS merely to oompenaata the Platntmlol montea pata not a payment based an 15 m lEDQ1XmNqfll1w¢VVsnt1ltA ‘Nair a.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. u... w my t... nflmnnllly am. dnuuvlnht VII mane mat some vamaiwan of me Uml In essence mere was no real gem ior ma Flamufl [52] To conclude, nus Counfinds than me Defiendanl had commmed a repudmary branch of me sm enlvmng lh: Plimnflln lermnnme me same Founh rssue whether the Plamt/W had wan/ed ms mhrs Io relvnfnatg m [531 The Delandanl argues that me Fkalnlifl had wawaa ms rlgms In terminate the SPA and Icquvesoed In the anensxnn uH\mB VII! the Defendam |0 deliver vacanl pnssessxon M (he UNI when he took 4 manms past me due date var dellvety m terminate me SPA Rehanee was made on me decvsmn m Borinyl nmu Squln Sdn. Blvd. (supra) and Sim Cnlo Hunt v. wong Tod Ful [Wu] 1 ML! 151 [54] Tu um aeqmescanoe me Delandant muslshowlhalma Flamlm had agveed whelhev by welds or conduct that he had accepted me Defendams breach and permitted me Deflandanlnmalo 2: m mnmxmwqnnnzvvsumm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm complete we sm That penmswn can be evmced mnmgn any actmn 94 (he P\amlIfl‘ such as anlenng mm fresh dwcussuons on a new camplenon date or by being many sllenl [551 Hawng Conscdsred all me ram, (his cum does nm find mat a mom 4 menu: mu lapse or me one var vacnnl posmesswon amounted to a waiver av acqmescenee The ma-mmnaa acvea reasonably In wan my me outcome a! me Scheme up to the Vast day when vacanl possessvon was In he dehveted and men acted kc levmlnata ma SPA when «here was nu pressed 5! conduswan m sight wnemer under me Scheme or the SPA There wu no conduct an Ihe part at the Plalntflf that was Inconsistent wnth his Intention to semre due peflormanee M me Scheme or the Dsfafldznfs nbllgihorls in saliva! vacant possessor: M lhe Unit by the 45"‘ mcnm [551 The vaas we must Ihevelore be anaungmsned [ram Eujnya Timos 5t1lllfl(S\.IDVE) wnere me purchaser oonmnued In engage m dmcussuons mm the devakzper an me new cnmp\e11un dams and were were 2 extensions until the Drmecl was finally completed whilst In Slm Cnlo mm (supva) me purchaser had an m mumxmwqmmzvvsumn mm. smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nnmnmy mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! allowed work |o be cormnued and went further by ordering exua work to be done [57] Tmscoun agrees that gmded by sedlon em Mme Limmon Act 1953 and me deaswans m Alupmp new/upmm Sdn. and. v. Loony cnu Kong 5. Anor[2Dl75]1; Tln Vnng Long 5. Anar v. Newacres Sdn. am. 11992] 1 ML! 259 and Yap Lan (P) A. Ors v. Kong s e Kunn [ms] ML./U m, mere .s no delay amaummg to e wawer nracqmescencethzl predudes me Plamml lmm Lakmg achnn to uemunaae me sm Fifth! wry n I email was ob! mod to No Home to make rune an essence [531 The Defendant argues that smee lime was ncl an essence me pnamnu cannot Act us lermmlle me SPA mmem firs! gwmg me Defendant veasonable «me lo complete me SPA and to make time an essence Reference was made to seem 47 of the Contracts A41 1950 and me demsmns m 6: am d/o Somoo yo S/nnrllv (mu) 2 ML! 290,- Forum] Dcvolopmonl Corponlion v. Kmm Cnln B00 .4. Anor[1§DJ] JMLJ 151; Mack Nunllon ss !N\EDQ1XmNqflflvn:vVsuM1A ‘Nata smm ...m.mm be used m mm ms mm-y MW: dun-mm VII mum v-mm Foundryfsulnq u . firm) v. Nag: Tembaga s4». and. (19911 1 MLJ as and com» Khoon T90 v. Crimson Development Sdn. Bind. mm] 3 cu 79 and scrim rims Squan Sdn. and. v. M-Concoptsdn. Bind. 121711111 ML! 597 [591 m Ganam d/o Somoo (supra) me Federa\ Court held » “In a contract [arms sa)e a/Iarvdlhe nme fixed by me parties in! comwerrun orpsflormance ns rm! to be smcuy conwuea unless u .5 [he mfevman cfme Dames me: me should as arms essence DIMG COIVIIHCI [S59 Jamshod V Euqoqr MP 1915 PC 53 Slvckney v Keen/e /19151 AC ass, Warren V Tay Say Gsak s Or: 1195511 ML./ :4 and mum 55(1) olthe Canfrac1Acf 1950) /Ivlenllon may erther be express m Imp/led and them are mme case: In which runs ;s aims essence oflhe contract (a) where ms canrmclaxllrvss/y slates Mat ms sha/lbs aflhs essance all/19 contract [Slsedman V Dnnk/aI1915] 1 AC 275 and Enck/as V Snal/[V916] ZAC 5991 m where we was not angina!/y allhs essence nfme ccnlract am has been made so by Me parry gn/mg a name (:7 me n m mnmxmwqnnnzvvsumm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm that was Dvesenled by we purchasers of pmpcmes .n Ihe Prqect Maine! the Defendant It was then Ihll the Pllvmlff oecxded In lermmale the SPA and $eek a return ol his monnzs A level 0' Iermmallon was then wssued by me Plemms eencms on 25 10 2021 The Plalnml and um receive renaymenl :11 his monies and neuter me: me Delendant commons me sun and dehver vacant passessuun 01 the unu DECISION OF THE SESSIONS COURT [9] Ame end nvme man, the ma! cam Ynund and held mar 1a)|ne Prqocx was s commercm prqec: me not : housmg aceammoaanon pmpd govemed by me Housmg Devewpmenl (comm: 5. Luoensmg) A51 1966 1‘HDA'| and Housmg Developmem (Central and L\oensIng)ReguIIl\ons1989 (by our mat reason me Pernod lav aeuvery alvacanl possession oflhe Umlwal 45 mnnms as pvowaea undav me SPA and M1136 monms as pmmea under me HDA, (cj men under dense 22 0! the SPA me period for dewery oi vacanl possession 01 me Uml was an essence of me conlvact. my mare was . braaw cummmed by me Devenaem undzr cbause 22 when ll valued m delwer me mm by me me rNmDmxmNqm1»¢vvsemA ‘Nana em nmhnrwm s. med m mm s. mm-y em. dnuumnl VII mum Wm! amer Such noncs can anly be gman after me other puny has been gumy ol unmasonama delay ana the me menhnned m ma name must be msansme [slrcknsy v Keeble (sullffill " rcr where mm: the nature of me nmneny oms may be consrdeledlo be of the essence of (I19 contract [Tllley V Thoma: (V567) 3 CH APP 51] [so] In Porung Davelapment Corpwafian Isupva) the Cuun held — "In my opinion, a wnnen name yrvmy ms to wmplelu me delrvaly rs necessary since mm: by which me cvntlacf was to be complatad has not been strpulslad, narmsde the essence allha wrmac! Accordmy to 9 Hslsaurys Law orsng/and mn Ed) hare 4.-35 - /ncasos wnsm zinve rs not angina//y arms essence o/ma common 0! when? a slrpulehorv making me of the essence has Dean wail/Dd‘ we may be made at m. assoncs, wham mare as unreasonable ae/ay, By a Home Imm me parry wharsnotm u m mnmxnmqnnwzvvsumn mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa Wm! deiaun Iixmg a reasonable time for performance and srazmg mat, in me even! or notrperfannanoe wunm me nrrm so fixed. he intends to {marine contract as broken The mus soflxad rrmsme ruasonable rravrng regard to me state allnmgs at me (me when (no name Is given, and to all me ctrcumslarrces ollhe case In Green V Ssvin 3, Fly I stared at p 599-— One cl (he snfliest cases on ll-us doclnne or engramng runs by name rs n-yvor V Emwn 2 Beav 1511, zandllvere Loni Langdsle‘ the man Master of me Rolls‘ expressed ms wew m mrs way- Where me contract and ms cmmmsrances are such max «me 5 not In this court cansrdaradla be olfhs essence ollhe can!ruc!— m such case, 1/ any unnecessary dslay »s mated by one party the olhsrnas a ngnt to /rnur a reasonabre nrne wvmm wrucn ms contract she" be perveczed by the omer ' Sn m Kmg y Vwson s Bvav 124, the same Mastarollha R0": /3»: aawn me pnnup/9 In those words ‘Though rims may not in cl me asserwn or a caruracr, yst men men: Is greaz and Impruperdelay on one me, (he umer parry has a right to fix a reasonable urns mrmn which ma curmncr Is to be completed ' Sn agam In Pegg V VI/rsnen 15 Beav 239. Sir John Rom///y and -/ concur also m Ina dsctsrnns. rm mumxmuqnmrvmm mm. smm mmhnrwm .. U... w my me mruuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! that where trme rs not ongrne//y at me essence ol lhs cameo; 1: may m ms case ollmpmpsr delay, me made so by nohcs ' [sq Now, in dehhemmg on this xssue It ws «me Court‘: mew that one very wmparunt and mmngmshmg pom! musl be nolsd Those cases m chug chay Lee (supra). Van-Coal (supla), Buajaya Times squm (supra), Penang Development Corporation (supra) Hack Nun! Iran Foundry mum and Lssc Dwulogmlnt (supva) saw adull complenan of me properly albew me [621 As (or me decisvon m Elna)! Khoon no (suma) n is dear (rom lhu has me: me Durchaser had rammed passive [or ts monlhs aner expiry 01 me eampuemn data mm: any mgenl reasons given belure «ekmg ecuen to termmale me agreement u must also be now me: nu man can me Ievmlnahnn was merely pmlmsed on me tenure olthe detendant to oommele me pmpeny by me comvlehun cane and no! on any repndlalory breach Vn acumen, there was ewaence mu me defandum had earned on win the works A; m xnnmxmwqnnnzvvsemm we. sew n-nhnrwm be LAIQ4 m my e. mm-y em. dun-mm VII mum Wm! [63] This Caun holds the view based enme veers aflhls case.sec1ran 47 at me Conlrictx Act mar permne campxeuon M the pmrmse ww.l1|n a reasonable lmle has no apphcalvon here The Defendant’; repudrmory breach does run obhgala me F\aml|f1 In make rune an essence of me SPA and gwa rusonnble me lo me Defendantln aelrvervamm pcssessmn onne unn There was no purpose to rsqurre me Deieneem lo eommele and dehver me Unneay. wrrmn 30 says when me Defendant had Ilraady named to partake m the seneme thereby pulling In em any expeaalmn thatme Detendamwru deliver vecam possession onne um: At an marerral mas up (0 me man ol lms case we Defendant me only Taymna camel, Woakfl Exnress and the Scheme In as srgm Thus. me Dehndant had depnvsn use" of the ngm no any Vegmmale expecratron to be given nnllm In complete me Project em dehvenhe Umlwllhm aoenam nme \nm\sCuurI‘s mew. such rrgm can un\y anse had me Detendam wnlmued Io carry out an works under the SPA and presemee re the Plarnrin a dear camp\e1Icr| Man and dare tor uehvary ol vazanl poesessron m rnumxmwnnwzvvsumn ‘Nair Snr1n\nuuhnrwH\I>e med w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII nF\uNG WM CONCLUSION AND DECISION [54] Aflev ruvmg consmerea all arguments and [acts (hrs coun finds nu rnem m the Datanuanvs Appea\ The Appeal us mmvme uusmssau and me declswn 0V the Susan: com ws hereby amvmed Costs 0! RMSJJDUOO Is herelzy ovdered agamst me Defendant /\u.‘.>:.....K IIOHD RADZI HIM AEDUL\HAMID JUDGE HIGH COURT MELAKA Dated ms » 3"’ nuanuary 2024 For me Plamnfi Enclk Choon Jun Hang mum Ghee Swah La Kee & Partners Fsgnambela dun Peguamcan 25, Ja\an KLJ14, Tamar: Kata Laksamana Jaya 75250. Melaka Fur me rust Delandanl Enclk M Rwshee Yetuan Munawar .5 Assoaanes Poguambela din Peguamcara 7-1, Jam 22A/70A, Wlsrna CKL. Des: Sn Hanamas 50450. Ku:Va Lumpuv 45 m mnmxmwqnnnzvvsumm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm pmvxued, and la) mere was no wawer av aequuasoence by the Plannlllfthat depnved mm the ngm la lemunate the SPA ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL [10] The core wssuei o1 mus Appeav are — (1) wheiher [me Is an essence under clause 2 Mine SPA, on whether me F\a|nMs remedy \s only lxmned to payment at lxquniaied ascedalned damages FLAD‘) under clause 15 3 or me SPA (<2) vmemer me Delendanfs breach at the SPA amounted to a vepudianun onne mntracl. my wnemer me Fl mm had cammmau any waiver M nu nghls at acquesoed |o me extenslon aims, and (0 when-er the Pkalnllfl was abngated to awe nmme making «me an essence M me SPA bdnve Issumg ma name of Ielmnahan m mnmxmwqnnnzvvsmnn mm. s.n.\ ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nflmnnflly mm: dun-nun! VII munc pm DELIBERATIDNS av THIS COURT [11] To stale hnefiy‘ n us me Law um m neanng an appeal ma appsnaxe counwm mlrann from mterlarmg mn Ihe dsclsmn of me lnal mun unless mere mu been an arm In sppmng the law or m underslandmg or evaluating me lacis (see Ramam v. Cumanumy G Anor (195411 LNS 237,- Eastern 4 Oriental Hotel (1951; Sdn. aha. v. Ellulout Boarya Fcrnlndu (Anor [mu] 2 cu 734 and Slvllirlylm P-rlnumy v. Ptnulmy 5 Anal [1955] 4 cu 545) First Issu I n [12] ll 15 me P\amlif1's contention that under dause 22 alme SPA me IS an essenne and lhavsfma ms Plalnlm -s snmled lo terrmnale ms SPA wnen me Dasnaann breached the SPA aller vamng |o dehver me pmpeny to me Pkalnml by 1 72021 or at any dame thereafler It was srguaa that by onemlon at sacnen 4o 01 me Canlracts Act 1950 wnen a party In a mmraci wmch m ms case I: |ha Defendant nas mused or «abuse mmssmnzm pervomung us oonlvaclual obhgallons men me pvomlsee which m «ms case Is m mnmxmmnnnzvvsmnn mm. smm n-nhnrwm s. LAIQ4 m mm s. nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n wa mum pm the Plamlvff can (amunate the SPA In suppon M ms argument Course! refened to me decwslon m Hm Holdings Sun. and. v. 15500 Dwelopmem son. EM. 5 Anor[2a11] MLJLI 1441 [131 The Plamm furlher argues max Ihe nemuanra argument mac lime was not an essanee 07 the SPA was not §pecIlIL::Hy meadad by me Defendant m M: Svalemenl ml Defence and mm the name: as pleaded al paragraphs 11 m 14 mm Defendant‘: StaIemen(alDe1enoe was us that Ihe compneuon of me man was delayed due to me Coma panama as an event :71 Iowa maieurs. Remence was made nu ma daemon in Glql Englnoonng 5. Conflruzllnn Sdn. and v, Ylp cm. sang 1. Sons Sdn. mm. a Anor[2015] a MLJ 449. [14] On the mar hand the Delendanl argues that the very ward: used In secuon 22 M the SPA shows Ihat Mme \s only an essence wllh regards to payment due lrum ms Plamlm as the buyer to me Defendant as the Devalnpel and not VI any othev aspect a!‘ the SPA Learned Cuunse\ sought to dlslmguwsh the words used m secnnn 22 vflhe spa m this Appem and that war. was found m clause 37 1 of me SPA nu ma: Holdings (supray Thus relying m mnmxmmnnnzvvsmnn mu sum n-nhnrwm be u... w may he nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm vu mum v-vrm on secllen 94 allne Ewdanoe Am 1955‘ 7| was also argued that (I'll: coun rnual apply lne plaln language :3! me sonlraa [151 ll us also the Dalanpanls oantannan max apart from the Plilll language ol clause 22 av |he SPA me was never lnlendea lo be an essence wlln respect In vaeam dellvery cl me properly slnce lna SPA nad a pmylslon ol paynlenl uf LAD lpr late dehvery al yacanl possosalorl plnsuanne elaues ls 3 Reference was made lo we ueclslons In sedaya rlme squares sun. and. y. M Concept Sun. and. [201] l MLJ 597,- Elm: cnay Lea and athurs y. Primiel Pmpambs Pea LMIIWDI SLR (R; 484; and Kunjun Malayala v. V-n-Coalkuoumn Sdn. an-1.12014] 1v MLJ 11: [15] on lnelssue whelnarllma as an essence enne SPA was pleaded ln the slalarnanl of Defence‘ counsel lcr me Delonuanl argued lnal allnougn ll was nal specmsally pleaded‘ relaranea was made In ma mane: generally ln plragraphs 19 and 2a allne slalernenl cl Delerlee Tnua ll I! not correct In scale that me maner was not pleaaep at all In any event II was submmed lnal lne Plalnllll was no: caugm by surpnse by me lssue as evldenoe was lean and m lnumxnuwqlmnzvvaamln ma a.n.l Ia-vlharwm a. u... a may he nflnlnallly sun. dun-vlanl VII mum Wm! pnmes had submmed on lhls xssue belnre the ma: mun Rafafanoe was made la the daemon In superintendent of Lands 5 Survtyl I0 Div) 5 Anor v. mmnoln Mlwsln 5 an [1594] 3 MLJ 1055. [17] Dealing firs! Wllh the Plaunlllfs avgumenl that urns not bemg an essenoe ems sum was not pleaded mlhe Slatament M Delence, this Court reteys to me Fedem cams deliberation on a smlar pmnl in omenun Ruhy Bhd v. aungsu ~11: Holdings Sdn. Blvd. 4! AnoI[2011] G MLJ ‘M where V! was he\d - “[51] Now we are mtndfu/aim.-3 rationale survmmdmg pleeamgs was we purpose bemnap/eeamgs »s so that me omer me rs not taken by surpnss and Is gwen ms oppormmry to rem an asssmnn or an allegalmn at me eamestpnssrb/e moment II‘ also helps to narrow new the Issues to be med me rssus lhelslure IS wnemer me amended delence has suifcrsnfly lard down the defendants eseemon ma: Irma was 0/ me essence m me perfumvancs oi me FDA in m mnmxmwqnnnzvvsemnn we. we ...m.mm .. med m my e. mm-y em. dnuumnl VII mum v-mm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

W-09-204-05/2022

PERAYU GENNEVA SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) Tan Poh Tiang @ Tan Poh Tin 2. ) Ting Sung Tiing

Criminal Law – Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 – Application by the Public Prosecutor under section 55 for a forfeiture order in respect as properties seized from the appellant and four others – Sessions Court issuing statutory notice under section 61 – Whether the third parties who responded to the statutory notice are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court upon a dismissal of the prosecution’s forfeiture application – Whether the claims of the third parties are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P SuppiahKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6da26c7d-8434-46c3-b701-6fc30624146d&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W-09-200-05/2022, W-09-201-05/2022, W-09-202-05/2022, W-09-204-05/2022 & W-09-205-05/2022 BETWEEN GENNEVA SDN. BHD. … APPELLANT AND DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 370808-10-5437] & 175 OTHERS … RESPONDENTS [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Trial No: WA-42(Ors)-17-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-24-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-25-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-27-09/2021 & WA-42(Ors)-29-09/2021 Between GENNEVA SDN. BHD. …APPELLANT And 1. CHAN CHEE WEI 2. GAN PHUI MUN 3. LYNN WONG BINTI ABDULLAH 4. TETUAN GOOI & AZURA 5. LILY WONG 6. GAN CHEE SHENG 7. PAUL LEE CHU KOB 8. LAU AH MOI 9. CHANDRA LINGAM A/L RASAPPAN 04/01/2024 12:22:45 W-09-204-05/2022 Kand. 70 S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 10. MEA FATT LEONG 11. YEE CHOOI LIN 12. KAMALA DEVI A/P VYRAVAN 13. MAHA DAWE A/P BALAKRISHNAN 14. YEE SOON HOE 15. MALLIKA A/P MARIMUTHU 16. YEE CHOY WAH 17. YEE CHOOI LAN 18. MURUGAN A/L GOVINDARAJOO 19. YEE SO MOI 20. PADMAVANTHY A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 21. PRINTA DEVI A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 22. HONG SIEW TUO 23. AJANTHA A/P SINNIAH 24. RATNA SABAPATHY A/L MUNUSAMY 25. RUBASHINI A/P GOPAL 26. ANURATHA A/P SINNIAH 27. K NAGARAJAN A/L KULANDAIVELU 28. SKHARUNAGHERAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 29. KAMNIAMMAH A/P KATHIRAVALU 30. VIJEY NAIR A/L GOPAL 31. K NESHI A/P OTHIYIL KOTTAN 32. KAREN VOON WAI KEEN 33. M SHANKAR A/L MASLAMANI 34. SUGUMARAN NAYAR A/L BALAKRISHNAN 35. PATHEPEN A/L ELUMALAY 36. POONGKOTHAI A/P SINAH SAMY 37. SAROJINI A/P SINAHSAMY 38. SIMON A/L S THOMAS 39. SIVAANANTHAN A/L V. KARUNAKARAN 40. JANE SELVI A/P SUBRAYAN @ MICHAEL 41. ADULAHIT @ ABDUL RAHIM B NAHUR GHANI 42. BALACHANDRAN A/L PONNAMBALAM 43. BALAMURALE A/L VELU S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 44. JAYANTHI A/P KATAN @ KATHAN 45. JAYASEELAN A/L PERIASAMY 46. KANAKAVALLY A/P GOVINDARAJOO 47. KATHAN A/L LETCHUMANAN 48. KRISHNAN A/L MANIAM 49. KRISHNAN A/L RAMASAMY 50. PARITHA BEGUM BINTI FAKEER MOHD 51. PERUMAL A/L SOCKALINGAM 52. RAJA SEKARAN A/L PALANIVELU 53. SARASWATHY A/P KATHAN 54. SIVAPRAGASAM A/L NADESIN 55. VASUDEVAN A/L ARUMUGAM 56. YOBURAJ A/L THOMAS 57. THAMILSELVI A/P NADESIN 58. AVINASH PRATHAP A/L RAMASAMY 59. APPAMAHA A/P APPALASAMY 60. ARIVALGAN A/L VELU 61. K.P MANOJ A/L TARUR HARI GOVINDAN 62. AYAHSAMY A/L A MUNUSAMY 63. PRASATH A/L RAMASAMY 64. RAMASAMY A/L ENKANAN 65. GUNALAN A/L CHINNATHAMBI 66. KALAI CHELVI A/P PANIEER CHELVAM 67. RAVI CHANDAR A/L MURUGUSON 68. KANNAKI A/P VELU 69. ANANTHAKRISHNAN A/L RENGASAMY 70. ARUMUGAM A/L PERUMAL 71. KARTHIGAYAN A/L ANNADORAI 72. FREDDY MOSES 73. MAHENDRAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 74. PARAMESWARAN A/L KHARTIGASU 75. PANNERSELVAM A/L PALANISAMY 76. PREMA LATHA A/P RAMAN NAIR 77. RAJANDARAN A/L MANICKAM S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 78. SARASWATHY A/P DORASAMY 79. RAMANATHAN A/L CHINNU 80. SAROJA A/P KARUPPAN 81. SELVARAJAH A/L MUNIANDY 82. SHANTHI A/P DORASAMY 83. TAMILARASAN A/L ANNAMALAI 84. THANALETCHUMY A/P BJ APPARAO 85. VANUKUPPAL A/L SUPRIMIANAM 86. AB FATAH BIN HUSIN 87. P R CHITRA DEVI A/P K PERIASAMY 88. HARIDAS A/L P K NAMBIAR 89. KIU MING SING 90. LINGKESVARI A/P N. RAJAINDREN 91. RAJANDRA PRASAD A/L KASY 92. SAJIV NAIR A/L MADAWAN NAIR 93. SELVARANI A/P K PERIASAMY 94. SHANTHI A/P MASILAMONEY 95. TANAPPAL A/L K. PERIASAMY 96. TEO SAW GIN 97. TEO WOON HUE 98. KARTTHIYAVALLEE A/P VEERAPPAN 99. KUMARI NALINI A/P P SUBRAMANIAM 100. PARAMAGURU A/L KANDASAMY 101. RAVICHANDRAN A/L PONNUSAMY 102. YOGESVARAN A/L KRISHNA KUTTY 103. AW YEE CHOW 104. BALAKRISHNAN A/L M KARUPPIAH 105. CHAN SOI CHI @ CHAN SAI CHAI 106. CHANDRAN SELVARAJAH 107. SARASVATHI MANOKARI A/P VELAUTHAM 108. GEETHA A/P RAMALINGAM 109. GRACE A/P V M KURIAN 110. JEYASINGAM A/L VELUPPILLAI 111. KARUNAKARAN A/L GANAPATHY S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 112. R KAVIN KUMAAR A/L RAMACHANDRAN 113. KUMARAN A/L PADMANABHAN 114. MARIMUTHU A/L SUPPIAH 115. NIRMALA A/P BALAKRISHNAN 116. RAGURAMAN A/L RAMAN 117. RAJASVAREE A/P V. KRISHNAN 118. RUTHRA DEVI A/P ETHIRAJULOO NAIDU 119. SATHISH A/L K. SUKUMARAN 120. SREERATHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 121. SUDHA A/P K SUKUMARAN 122. SUNITHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 123. ASOHAN A/L P. RAGAVAN 124. ASOKAN A/L RAMAN NAIR 125. CINTHY NAIR A/P CHANDRASEKHARAN 126. GEETA A/P N MOHAN DAS 127. JAYALAKSHMI A/P R SRINIVAS 128. NALINI A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 129. PUI SAU LUNG 130. SAKUNDALA A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 131. SANTHI @ SUSEELA A/P R S PILLAY 132. SHANDHA A/P T.K.N. NAIR 133. SUJADHA A/P KRISHNAN 134. USHA NAIR A/P T R NAIR 135. VARGIS A/L CHERIAN 136. CHE ENGKU RAMLAH BINTI ENGKU MAT 137. GOPINATHAN SURESH A/L P M G NAIR 138. CHING E KIAU @ CHENG HOON KIAU 139. JEEVARATNAM A/L RENGASAMY 140. K. VIJAYANDRAN A/L K.V. KANDASAMY 141. LIM CHENG HUI 142. MALIGA A/P RENGASAMY 143. LIM LEAN SENG 144. SHANMUGAM A/L MOTTAYAN 145. LOH BEE CHIN S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 146. LOH BEE GUEK 147. MAHAMED ISMAIL BIN MOHAMED YUSOFF 148. MOHD NASIR BIN MAT AIL 149. MUNUSAMY A/L RANGGASAMY GAMEDAN 150. NG CHUEE EYA @ NG POH IM 151. NG KUM HENG 152. PADMINI SUBRAMANIAM 153. RAMAT BIN DAUD 154. RAJENDRAN A/L YAM MURUAYA 155. ROZIATON BINTI ABU BAKAR 156. SANTHI D/O PERUMAL 157. SUBAHASHINI A/P K.N.S NAIR 158. SUBRAMANIAM A/L RAMASAMY 159. THILAGA A/P POONGAVANAM 160. VEGIA A/P CHANDRASEKARAN 161. WENG AH SHOM 162. LEE LI HUI 163. ZURKURNAI BIN YUSOF 164. TEENATHAYALAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 165. PERUMAH S/O ALAGAPPA SERUVAI 166. TAN POH TIANG @ TAN POH TIN 167. TING SUNG TIING 168. DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN 169. SANKARAN A/L GOPALAN 170. ELAN KOVAN A/L KUMARASAMY 171. A VASANTHA A/P VIATHAINATHAN 172. MANGALESWARY NADARAJAH 173. THAMASEGARAN A/L VIATHAINATHAN 174. CHIN WON HEE 175. ANITA KOCH 176. YEAP SWAN KIM @ YEAP GAIK IMM …RESPONDENTS/ THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 CORAM: VAZEER ALAM MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI IBRAHIM, JCA S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The primary issue in these appeals concerns the rights of third parties to adjudicate their claims under section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism, Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001 (“the Act”). Background facts [2] In 2019, the Public Prosecutor filed an application for a forfeiture order under section 55 of the Act in respect of properties seized from the appellant and four others. Thereupon, the sessions court issued the statutory notice under section 61 of the Act by way of gazette calling upon third parties who claimed an interest in the said properties to show cause why the properties shall not be forfeited to the government. [3] The respondents in these appeals are the third parties who responded to the notice. Both the appellant and the respondents filed S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 affidavits to contest the application. [4] On 27 August 2021, the sessions court dismissed the forfeiture application by the Public Prosecutor. The learned sessions judge went on to hold that in view of the dismissal, section 61 does not empower her to adjudicate the respondents claims. Dissatisfied, the prosecution and the respondents lodged their respective appeals to the High Court against the aforesaid decisions. [5] On 29 April 2022, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) having considered the arguments found that the sessions judge had not decided on the respondents claims and did not specify in her decisions whether the said claims were allowed or dismissed. [6] Consequently, in respect of the respondents appeals the High Court: a. exercised its revisionary powers under section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, and section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Code to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication; and b. dismissed the respondents appeals without prejudice to their right to re-file an appeal against the sessions court decision in respect of their claims. [7] In respect of the prosecution’s appeal, the High Court stayed the prosecution’s appeal until the respondent’s claims are adjudicated by the sessions court. S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [8] On 11 May 2022, the appellant lodged the instant appeal against the High Court decision to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication. Submissions [9] It is the appellant’s contention that under section 61, the court is required to adjudge the claims of third parties only if and when the prosecution succeeds in its forfeiture application. It says that as the prosecution’s forfeiture application in the instant case was dismissed by the sessions judge, it was not incumbent upon the court to deal with the respondents claims. It argues that the Judge consequently erred in remitting the respondents claims to the sessions court for adjudication when the prosecution failed to prove that the subject matter of the forfeiture application are forfeitable properties. [10] Conversely, the respondents contend that their claims are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application. They say that the opening words of s.61 makes it clear that the dismissal of the forfeiture application does not take away or detract from their rights to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court. Statutory Provisions [11] Before we consider, the rival submissions before us, it is convenient to set out the statutory provisions relevant to the appeal. They are: - S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Section 55 “(1) Subject to section 61, in any prosecution for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the court shall make and an order for the forfeiture of any property which is proved to be- (a) The subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission of such offence; (b) Terrorist property; (c) The proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) The instrumentalities of an offence, Where- (aa) the offence is proved against the accused; or (bb) the offence is not proved against the accused but the court is satisfied that- (i) The accused is not the true and lawful owner of such property; and (ii) No other person is entitled to the property as a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. (2) Where the offence is proved against the accused but the property referred to in subsection (1) has been disposed of, diminished in value or cannot be traced, the court shall order the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is equivalent to, in the opinion of the court, the value of the property, and any such penalty shall be recoverable as a civil debt due to the Government of Malaysia and shall not be subject to any period of limitation prescribed by any written law. (3) In determining whether the property is- (a) the subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence; (b) terrorist property; (c) the proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) the instrumentalities of an offence, The court shall apply the standard of proof required in civil proceedings. Section 61 (1) The provisions in this Part shall apply without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. (2) The court making the order of forfeiture under subsection 28L (1) or section 55 or the judge to whom an application is made under subsection 28L (2) or 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited. (3) A third party’s lack of good faith may be inferred, by the court or an enforcement agency, from the objective circumstances of the case. (4) The court or enforcement agency shall return the property to the claimant when it is satisfied that - (a) the claimant has a legitimate legal interest in the property; (b) no participation, collusion or involvement with respect to the offence under subsection 4(1) or Part IVA or a terrorism financing offence which is the object of the S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proceedings can be imputed to the claimant; (c) the claimant lacked knowledge and was not intentionally ignorant of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its illegal use; (d) the claimant did not acquire any right in the property from a person proceeded against under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that any right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the eventual subsequent forfeiture of the property; and (e) the claimant did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the property. Whether third parties’ claims can be adjudicated under s.61 before a forfeiture order is made [12] This is not the first time that this question has been raised in the Malaysian courts. It has come under the scrutiny of the court in several cases. In Thong Kian Oon & Ors v [2012] 8 CLJ 119, Ghazali Cha J stated: “Based on the evidence adduced by learned DPP, I am of the opinion that the evidence adduced is insufficient to satisfy me that the properties are the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order against all the respondents are dismissed. As such, notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act. Therefore, the application for forfeiture is dismissed and all the properties must be released immediately to the respondents respectively.” S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [13] In PP v Mohd Bakri Samsu & Anor [2016] 5 CLJ 824,’Noorin Badaruddin J opined the same view: “In the upshot, based on the affidavits and exhibits, this court found that the applicant failed to establish on balance of probabilities that the properties seized from the respondents were the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order was denied. Consequently, the notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act.” [14] Thereafter, in Azmi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2016] 3 MLJ 98, this Court on the same issue explained as follows; “We agree with the learned SCJ that the prosecution had proven on the balance of probability that the properties in question are proceeds of an unlawful activity which constitutes the subject matter of the offence. As the SCJ was the court making the order of forfeiture under s 55 at the end of a prosecution that had resulted in a conviction of the accused, it was incumbent upon the SCJ to issue the third party notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA before any final order on forfeiture can be made in respect the said properties. We are in agree with the learned SCJ that the evidence led in this case would necessitate the giving of the notice to third parties by way of publication in the gazette who may then stake their claims by proving themselves to be bona fide owners of the seized monies, in which case the monies shall be returned to them. But if they fail to prove that they are entitled to the seized properties, then the monies shall be ordered to be forfeited to government revenue.... We S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 agree with learned deputy that a forfeiture order is subject to giving prior notice to third parties as is clearly borne out in the wordings to s 55(1) of the AMLATFA itself. Indeed, in this case, no forfeiture order had been made by the learned SCJ and there is basis for her to issue the statutory notice in order to facilitate the process pertaining to the eventual forfeiture of the seized properties which are the subject-matter of the offence before her. We therefore see no merit in the complaint of the accused person in regard to the issue of the notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA. On account of the above, the appeal by the accused person against the order on the s 61 notice under AMLATFA is dismissed.” (emphasis added) [15] However, in PP v Taiko Fertiliser& Yang Lain [2019] 4 CLJ 480, this Court expressed a different view on the issue. There, the ('the prosecution') sought two orders, the first to publish a notice in the Gazette to call upon any third parties who claimed to have any interest in the seized moveable properties to appear before the court to show cause; and the second, the forfeiture of the moveable properties. The High Court only dealt with the forfeiture application and dismissed it. It did not deal with the prayer for an order to publish a notice in the Gazette. The prosecution appealed. [16] The prosecution submitted that the trial judge should not have heard the forfeiture application without first ordering for the notice in the Gazette to be published as mandated by s. 61(2) of the Act. The respondents argued that before the mechanism under s. 61(2) of the Act could be generated, the trial judge must first decide whether the prosecution's application for a forfeiture order under s. 56(1) of the S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Act bore any merits. In other words, the trial judge must first issue an order of forfeiture before the procedure under s. 61(2) of the Act could be exercised. The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent’s submission and explained: “Kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan TPR bahawa hanya satu isu sahaja yang harus kami tentukan dalam rayuan ini iaitu sama ada hakim bicara dikehendaki di bawah s.61(2) untuk mempertimbangkan terlebih dahulu permohonan untuk disiarkan satu notis dalam Warta sebelum mempertimbangkan sama ada harta-harta yang disenaraikan dalam notis usul berkenaan wajar dilucut hak atau tidak di bawah s. 56, AMLATFPUA 2001. Harus juga dicatatkan bahawa ungkapan "subject to s. 61 " di bawah s. 56(1) itu merujuk s. 61 secara keseluruhan dan bukan sekadar s. 61(2) sahaja. Berdasarkan kes Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao, supra, keseluruhan peruntukan s. 61 khususnya s. 61(2) hendaklah diberikan keutamaan terlebih dahulu. Keabsahan (validity) takrifan ini diperkukuhkan dengan penggunaan ungkapan "... the judge to whom an application is made under... s. 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette..." dalam s. 61(2) itu sendiri. Dalam hal ini, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR bahawa dengan penggunaan perkataan "shall" dalam s. 61(2) itu menjadikannya satu kehendak yang wajib diikuti sebelum sesuatu perintah pelucuthakkan di bawah s.56 dibuat oleh hakim.” S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [17] Lastly, in the Federal Court case of Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 MLJ 1, Mary Lim FCJ observed: “In considering whether or not to grant the order of forfeiture, the High Court is mandatorily obliged under s 61(1) to cause to be published a notice in the Gazette ‘calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the Court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited’. This is regardless whether there is prosecution for an offence under the Act – see ss 55(1) and 56(1). However, it must not be over looked that the forfeiture proceedings are principally between the PP and the accused, Amar, as s 61 is only engaged where there are third parties laying some claim or interest in the properties seized. If there are none, the proceedings will proceed only between these two key players. This position must be properly appreciated because it appears to have been overlooked simply because the two applications, by PP and by the third parties, were heard together. Hence, in the proceedings at the High Court, affidavits were filed by Amar in protest of the forfeiture orders sought by the PP. I pause here to make this observation. As pointed out a moment ago, the PP must satisfy the High Court that the property is of any of the character or nature prescribed in s 56(1)(a) to (d). It is only upon satisfying the High Court that the property is liable to be forfeited and thereafter, the High Court deals with the rights or interests of any third parties. As held in Public Prosecutor v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors, s 56 does not absolve the PP from proving on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized come under the purview of the Act and were procured or are the proceeds of an unlawful or illegal activity. The PP must prove on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized were S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 procured in connection with the commission of the predicate offence or are of the character for which the order for seizure was issued. See also Public Prosecutor v Billion Nova Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1823; [2016] 2 CLJ 763; [2016] AMEJ 0162.” (emphasis added) [18] The foregoing cases exemplify that no order for forfeiture can be made until the claims of third parties to the seized properties is heard, and to establish its rights to forfeiture, the prosecution must, first, prove that the properties it seeks to forfeit are forfeitable properties, namely, that they are the subject matter or evidence relating to the commission of the offence under s.4 (1) of the Act. [19] It is only upon the prosecution establishing that the seized properties are forfeitable properties, that the court enters a preliminary forfeiture order. And, it is only upon the making of the preliminary forfeiture order is the court required to publish the requisite notice in the Gazette under s.61 (2) of the Act to commence the ancillary proceedings to determine the rights of the third parties to the forfeited properties. This stands to reason as it cannot be gainsaid that it would be an absolute waste of judicial time if the forfeiture application and the claims of the third parties are heard simultaneously and, at the conclusion of the proceedings it is found that the properties are not forfeitable properties. [20] It bears mention that the government does not have a clear title to the property until the ancillary proceedings under s.61 is concluded. It is only upon the adjudication of the third parties claims, that the preliminary forfeiture order can be made final. S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [21] For the reasons given, we are unable to share the judge’s view that the sessions court ought to have proceeded with the ancillary proceedings in respect of the respondents claims on dismissing the forfeiture application. The learned judge erred in holding that the ancillary proceedings under section 61 is separate and independent from the forfeiture application. The mechanics of the ancillary proceedings must follow the procedure laid down in sections 55,56 and 61 of the Act. [22] We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court to remit the respondents claims to the sessions court and reinstate the respondents appeals. We further direct that the High Court first hears the prosecution’s appeal against the dismissal of its forfeiture application by the sessions judge. If the said appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court if affirmed, it would follow that the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ appeals would fail without prejudice to the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ rights to institute separate civil proceedings against the appellant in respect of their respective legal rights to the properties in question. However, if the appeal is allowed, then the respondents claims would be remitted to the sessions judge for adjudication in accordance to the provisions of the Act. Dated: 4 January 2024 -Sgd- (S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Counsel/ Solicitors For the Appellant: Gooi Soon Seng Choong Kak Sen & Belinda Low Siet Yan (with him) [Messrs Gooi & Azura & Associate] For the Respondent: Nik Azila Shuhada Tong Wei Hang & Ong Tze Xian (with her) (Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co.) Segeram Mathagan [Messrs. S. Mathavan & Nur Hafizah] Navinderan Subramaniam Komal Vijay Sheth [Messrs. Preakas & Partners] S/N fWyibTSEw0a3AW/DBiQUbQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-09-202-05/2022

PERAYU GENNEVA SDN BHD RESPONDEN CHIN WOON HEE

Criminal Law – Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 – Application by the Public Prosecutor under section 55 for a forfeiture order in respect as properties seized from the appellant and four others – Sessions Court issuing statutory notice under section 61 – Whether the third parties who responded to the statutory notice are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court upon a dismissal of the prosecution’s forfeiture application – Whether the claims of the third parties are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P SuppiahKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a645e018-8f1f-44b6-8ecf-364b8e16218f&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W-09-200-05/2022, W-09-201-05/2022, W-09-202-05/2022, W-09-204-05/2022 & W-09-205-05/2022 BETWEEN GENNEVA SDN. BHD. … APPELLANT AND DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 370808-10-5437] & 175 OTHERS … RESPONDENTS [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Trial No: WA-42(Ors)-17-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-24-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-25-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-27-09/2021 & WA-42(Ors)-29-09/2021 Between GENNEVA SDN. BHD. …APPELLANT And 1. CHAN CHEE WEI 2. GAN PHUI MUN 3. LYNN WONG BINTI ABDULLAH 4. TETUAN GOOI & AZURA 5. LILY WONG 6. GAN CHEE SHENG 7. PAUL LEE CHU KOB 8. LAU AH MOI 9. CHANDRA LINGAM A/L RASAPPAN 04/01/2024 12:19:44 W-09-202-05/2022 Kand. 63 S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 10. MEA FATT LEONG 11. YEE CHOOI LIN 12. KAMALA DEVI A/P VYRAVAN 13. MAHA DAWE A/P BALAKRISHNAN 14. YEE SOON HOE 15. MALLIKA A/P MARIMUTHU 16. YEE CHOY WAH 17. YEE CHOOI LAN 18. MURUGAN A/L GOVINDARAJOO 19. YEE SO MOI 20. PADMAVANTHY A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 21. PRINTA DEVI A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 22. HONG SIEW TUO 23. AJANTHA A/P SINNIAH 24. RATNA SABAPATHY A/L MUNUSAMY 25. RUBASHINI A/P GOPAL 26. ANURATHA A/P SINNIAH 27. K NAGARAJAN A/L KULANDAIVELU 28. SKHARUNAGHERAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 29. KAMNIAMMAH A/P KATHIRAVALU 30. VIJEY NAIR A/L GOPAL 31. K NESHI A/P OTHIYIL KOTTAN 32. KAREN VOON WAI KEEN 33. M SHANKAR A/L MASLAMANI 34. SUGUMARAN NAYAR A/L BALAKRISHNAN 35. PATHEPEN A/L ELUMALAY 36. POONGKOTHAI A/P SINAH SAMY 37. SAROJINI A/P SINAHSAMY 38. SIMON A/L S THOMAS 39. SIVAANANTHAN A/L V. KARUNAKARAN 40. JANE SELVI A/P SUBRAYAN @ MICHAEL 41. ADULAHIT @ ABDUL RAHIM B NAHUR GHANI 42. BALACHANDRAN A/L PONNAMBALAM 43. BALAMURALE A/L VELU S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 44. JAYANTHI A/P KATAN @ KATHAN 45. JAYASEELAN A/L PERIASAMY 46. KANAKAVALLY A/P GOVINDARAJOO 47. KATHAN A/L LETCHUMANAN 48. KRISHNAN A/L MANIAM 49. KRISHNAN A/L RAMASAMY 50. PARITHA BEGUM BINTI FAKEER MOHD 51. PERUMAL A/L SOCKALINGAM 52. RAJA SEKARAN A/L PALANIVELU 53. SARASWATHY A/P KATHAN 54. SIVAPRAGASAM A/L NADESIN 55. VASUDEVAN A/L ARUMUGAM 56. YOBURAJ A/L THOMAS 57. THAMILSELVI A/P NADESIN 58. AVINASH PRATHAP A/L RAMASAMY 59. APPAMAHA A/P APPALASAMY 60. ARIVALGAN A/L VELU 61. K.P MANOJ A/L TARUR HARI GOVINDAN 62. AYAHSAMY A/L A MUNUSAMY 63. PRASATH A/L RAMASAMY 64. RAMASAMY A/L ENKANAN 65. GUNALAN A/L CHINNATHAMBI 66. KALAI CHELVI A/P PANIEER CHELVAM 67. RAVI CHANDAR A/L MURUGUSON 68. KANNAKI A/P VELU 69. ANANTHAKRISHNAN A/L RENGASAMY 70. ARUMUGAM A/L PERUMAL 71. KARTHIGAYAN A/L ANNADORAI 72. FREDDY MOSES 73. MAHENDRAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 74. PARAMESWARAN A/L KHARTIGASU 75. PANNERSELVAM A/L PALANISAMY 76. PREMA LATHA A/P RAMAN NAIR 77. RAJANDARAN A/L MANICKAM S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 78. SARASWATHY A/P DORASAMY 79. RAMANATHAN A/L CHINNU 80. SAROJA A/P KARUPPAN 81. SELVARAJAH A/L MUNIANDY 82. SHANTHI A/P DORASAMY 83. TAMILARASAN A/L ANNAMALAI 84. THANALETCHUMY A/P BJ APPARAO 85. VANUKUPPAL A/L SUPRIMIANAM 86. AB FATAH BIN HUSIN 87. P R CHITRA DEVI A/P K PERIASAMY 88. HARIDAS A/L P K NAMBIAR 89. KIU MING SING 90. LINGKESVARI A/P N. RAJAINDREN 91. RAJANDRA PRASAD A/L KASY 92. SAJIV NAIR A/L MADAWAN NAIR 93. SELVARANI A/P K PERIASAMY 94. SHANTHI A/P MASILAMONEY 95. TANAPPAL A/L K. PERIASAMY 96. TEO SAW GIN 97. TEO WOON HUE 98. KARTTHIYAVALLEE A/P VEERAPPAN 99. KUMARI NALINI A/P P SUBRAMANIAM 100. PARAMAGURU A/L KANDASAMY 101. RAVICHANDRAN A/L PONNUSAMY 102. YOGESVARAN A/L KRISHNA KUTTY 103. AW YEE CHOW 104. BALAKRISHNAN A/L M KARUPPIAH 105. CHAN SOI CHI @ CHAN SAI CHAI 106. CHANDRAN SELVARAJAH 107. SARASVATHI MANOKARI A/P VELAUTHAM 108. GEETHA A/P RAMALINGAM 109. GRACE A/P V M KURIAN 110. JEYASINGAM A/L VELUPPILLAI 111. KARUNAKARAN A/L GANAPATHY S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 112. R KAVIN KUMAAR A/L RAMACHANDRAN 113. KUMARAN A/L PADMANABHAN 114. MARIMUTHU A/L SUPPIAH 115. NIRMALA A/P BALAKRISHNAN 116. RAGURAMAN A/L RAMAN 117. RAJASVAREE A/P V. KRISHNAN 118. RUTHRA DEVI A/P ETHIRAJULOO NAIDU 119. SATHISH A/L K. SUKUMARAN 120. SREERATHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 121. SUDHA A/P K SUKUMARAN 122. SUNITHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 123. ASOHAN A/L P. RAGAVAN 124. ASOKAN A/L RAMAN NAIR 125. CINTHY NAIR A/P CHANDRASEKHARAN 126. GEETA A/P N MOHAN DAS 127. JAYALAKSHMI A/P R SRINIVAS 128. NALINI A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 129. PUI SAU LUNG 130. SAKUNDALA A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 131. SANTHI @ SUSEELA A/P R S PILLAY 132. SHANDHA A/P T.K.N. NAIR 133. SUJADHA A/P KRISHNAN 134. USHA NAIR A/P T R NAIR 135. VARGIS A/L CHERIAN 136. CHE ENGKU RAMLAH BINTI ENGKU MAT 137. GOPINATHAN SURESH A/L P M G NAIR 138. CHING E KIAU @ CHENG HOON KIAU 139. JEEVARATNAM A/L RENGASAMY 140. K. VIJAYANDRAN A/L K.V. KANDASAMY 141. LIM CHENG HUI 142. MALIGA A/P RENGASAMY 143. LIM LEAN SENG 144. SHANMUGAM A/L MOTTAYAN 145. LOH BEE CHIN S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 146. LOH BEE GUEK 147. MAHAMED ISMAIL BIN MOHAMED YUSOFF 148. MOHD NASIR BIN MAT AIL 149. MUNUSAMY A/L RANGGASAMY GAMEDAN 150. NG CHUEE EYA @ NG POH IM 151. NG KUM HENG 152. PADMINI SUBRAMANIAM 153. RAMAT BIN DAUD 154. RAJENDRAN A/L YAM MURUAYA 155. ROZIATON BINTI ABU BAKAR 156. SANTHI D/O PERUMAL 157. SUBAHASHINI A/P K.N.S NAIR 158. SUBRAMANIAM A/L RAMASAMY 159. THILAGA A/P POONGAVANAM 160. VEGIA A/P CHANDRASEKARAN 161. WENG AH SHOM 162. LEE LI HUI 163. ZURKURNAI BIN YUSOF 164. TEENATHAYALAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 165. PERUMAH S/O ALAGAPPA SERUVAI 166. TAN POH TIANG @ TAN POH TIN 167. TING SUNG TIING 168. DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN 169. SANKARAN A/L GOPALAN 170. ELAN KOVAN A/L KUMARASAMY 171. A VASANTHA A/P VIATHAINATHAN 172. MANGALESWARY NADARAJAH 173. THAMASEGARAN A/L VIATHAINATHAN 174. CHIN WON HEE 175. ANITA KOCH 176. YEAP SWAN KIM @ YEAP GAIK IMM …RESPONDENTS/ THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 CORAM: VAZEER ALAM MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI IBRAHIM, JCA S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The primary issue in these appeals concerns the rights of third parties to adjudicate their claims under section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism, Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001 (“the Act”). Background facts [2] In 2019, the Public Prosecutor filed an application for a forfeiture order under section 55 of the Act in respect of properties seized from the appellant and four others. Thereupon, the sessions court issued the statutory notice under section 61 of the Act by way of gazette calling upon third parties who claimed an interest in the said properties to show cause why the properties shall not be forfeited to the government. [3] The respondents in these appeals are the third parties who responded to the notice. Both the appellant and the respondents filed S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 affidavits to contest the application. [4] On 27 August 2021, the sessions court dismissed the forfeiture application by the Public Prosecutor. The learned sessions judge went on to hold that in view of the dismissal, section 61 does not empower her to adjudicate the respondents claims. Dissatisfied, the prosecution and the respondents lodged their respective appeals to the High Court against the aforesaid decisions. [5] On 29 April 2022, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) having considered the arguments found that the sessions judge had not decided on the respondents claims and did not specify in her decisions whether the said claims were allowed or dismissed. [6] Consequently, in respect of the respondents appeals the High Court: a. exercised its revisionary powers under section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, and section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Code to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication; and b. dismissed the respondents appeals without prejudice to their right to re-file an appeal against the sessions court decision in respect of their claims. [7] In respect of the prosecution’s appeal, the High Court stayed the prosecution’s appeal until the respondent’s claims are adjudicated by the sessions court. S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [8] On 11 May 2022, the appellant lodged the instant appeal against the High Court decision to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication. Submissions [9] It is the appellant’s contention that under section 61, the court is required to adjudge the claims of third parties only if and when the prosecution succeeds in its forfeiture application. It says that as the prosecution’s forfeiture application in the instant case was dismissed by the sessions judge, it was not incumbent upon the court to deal with the respondents claims. It argues that the Judge consequently erred in remitting the respondents claims to the sessions court for adjudication when the prosecution failed to prove that the subject matter of the forfeiture application are forfeitable properties. [10] Conversely, the respondents contend that their claims are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application. They say that the opening words of s.61 makes it clear that the dismissal of the forfeiture application does not take away or detract from their rights to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court. Statutory Provisions [11] Before we consider, the rival submissions before us, it is convenient to set out the statutory provisions relevant to the appeal. They are: - S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Section 55 “(1) Subject to section 61, in any prosecution for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the court shall make and an order for the forfeiture of any property which is proved to be- (a) The subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission of such offence; (b) Terrorist property; (c) The proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) The instrumentalities of an offence, Where- (aa) the offence is proved against the accused; or (bb) the offence is not proved against the accused but the court is satisfied that- (i) The accused is not the true and lawful owner of such property; and (ii) No other person is entitled to the property as a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. (2) Where the offence is proved against the accused but the property referred to in subsection (1) has been disposed of, diminished in value or cannot be traced, the court shall order the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is equivalent to, in the opinion of the court, the value of the property, and any such penalty shall be recoverable as a civil debt due to the Government of Malaysia and shall not be subject to any period of limitation prescribed by any written law. (3) In determining whether the property is- (a) the subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence; (b) terrorist property; (c) the proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) the instrumentalities of an offence, The court shall apply the standard of proof required in civil proceedings. Section 61 (1) The provisions in this Part shall apply without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. (2) The court making the order of forfeiture under subsection 28L (1) or section 55 or the judge to whom an application is made under subsection 28L (2) or 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited. (3) A third party’s lack of good faith may be inferred, by the court or an enforcement agency, from the objective circumstances of the case. (4) The court or enforcement agency shall return the property to the claimant when it is satisfied that - (a) the claimant has a legitimate legal interest in the property; (b) no participation, collusion or involvement with respect to the offence under subsection 4(1) or Part IVA or a terrorism financing offence which is the object of the S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proceedings can be imputed to the claimant; (c) the claimant lacked knowledge and was not intentionally ignorant of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its illegal use; (d) the claimant did not acquire any right in the property from a person proceeded against under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that any right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the eventual subsequent forfeiture of the property; and (e) the claimant did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the property. Whether third parties’ claims can be adjudicated under s.61 before a forfeiture order is made [12] This is not the first time that this question has been raised in the Malaysian courts. It has come under the scrutiny of the court in several cases. In Thong Kian Oon & Ors v [2012] 8 CLJ 119, Ghazali Cha J stated: “Based on the evidence adduced by learned DPP, I am of the opinion that the evidence adduced is insufficient to satisfy me that the properties are the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order against all the respondents are dismissed. As such, notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act. Therefore, the application for forfeiture is dismissed and all the properties must be released immediately to the respondents respectively.” S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [13] In PP v Mohd Bakri Samsu & Anor [2016] 5 CLJ 824,’Noorin Badaruddin J opined the same view: “In the upshot, based on the affidavits and exhibits, this court found that the applicant failed to establish on balance of probabilities that the properties seized from the respondents were the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order was denied. Consequently, the notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act.” [14] Thereafter, in Azmi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2016] 3 MLJ 98, this Court on the same issue explained as follows; “We agree with the learned SCJ that the prosecution had proven on the balance of probability that the properties in question are proceeds of an unlawful activity which constitutes the subject matter of the offence. As the SCJ was the court making the order of forfeiture under s 55 at the end of a prosecution that had resulted in a conviction of the accused, it was incumbent upon the SCJ to issue the third party notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA before any final order on forfeiture can be made in respect the said properties. We are in agree with the learned SCJ that the evidence led in this case would necessitate the giving of the notice to third parties by way of publication in the gazette who may then stake their claims by proving themselves to be bona fide owners of the seized monies, in which case the monies shall be returned to them. But if they fail to prove that they are entitled to the seized properties, then the monies shall be ordered to be forfeited to government revenue.... We S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 agree with learned deputy that a forfeiture order is subject to giving prior notice to third parties as is clearly borne out in the wordings to s 55(1) of the AMLATFA itself. Indeed, in this case, no forfeiture order had been made by the learned SCJ and there is basis for her to issue the statutory notice in order to facilitate the process pertaining to the eventual forfeiture of the seized properties which are the subject-matter of the offence before her. We therefore see no merit in the complaint of the accused person in regard to the issue of the notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA. On account of the above, the appeal by the accused person against the order on the s 61 notice under AMLATFA is dismissed.” (emphasis added) [15] However, in PP v Taiko Fertiliser& Yang Lain [2019] 4 CLJ 480, this Court expressed a different view on the issue. There, the ('the prosecution') sought two orders, the first to publish a notice in the Gazette to call upon any third parties who claimed to have any interest in the seized moveable properties to appear before the court to show cause; and the second, the forfeiture of the moveable properties. The High Court only dealt with the forfeiture application and dismissed it. It did not deal with the prayer for an order to publish a notice in the Gazette. The prosecution appealed. [16] The prosecution submitted that the trial judge should not have heard the forfeiture application without first ordering for the notice in the Gazette to be published as mandated by s. 61(2) of the Act. The respondents argued that before the mechanism under s. 61(2) of the Act could be generated, the trial judge must first decide whether the prosecution's application for a forfeiture order under s. 56(1) of the S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Act bore any merits. In other words, the trial judge must first issue an order of forfeiture before the procedure under s. 61(2) of the Act could be exercised. The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent’s submission and explained: “Kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan TPR bahawa hanya satu isu sahaja yang harus kami tentukan dalam rayuan ini iaitu sama ada hakim bicara dikehendaki di bawah s.61(2) untuk mempertimbangkan terlebih dahulu permohonan untuk disiarkan satu notis dalam Warta sebelum mempertimbangkan sama ada harta-harta yang disenaraikan dalam notis usul berkenaan wajar dilucut hak atau tidak di bawah s. 56, AMLATFPUA 2001. Harus juga dicatatkan bahawa ungkapan "subject to s. 61 " di bawah s. 56(1) itu merujuk s. 61 secara keseluruhan dan bukan sekadar s. 61(2) sahaja. Berdasarkan kes Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao, supra, keseluruhan peruntukan s. 61 khususnya s. 61(2) hendaklah diberikan keutamaan terlebih dahulu. Keabsahan (validity) takrifan ini diperkukuhkan dengan penggunaan ungkapan "... the judge to whom an application is made under... s. 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette..." dalam s. 61(2) itu sendiri. Dalam hal ini, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR bahawa dengan penggunaan perkataan "shall" dalam s. 61(2) itu menjadikannya satu kehendak yang wajib diikuti sebelum sesuatu perintah pelucuthakkan di bawah s.56 dibuat oleh hakim.” S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [17] Lastly, in the Federal Court case of Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 MLJ 1, Mary Lim FCJ observed: “In considering whether or not to grant the order of forfeiture, the High Court is mandatorily obliged under s 61(1) to cause to be published a notice in the Gazette ‘calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the Court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited’. This is regardless whether there is prosecution for an offence under the Act – see ss 55(1) and 56(1). However, it must not be over looked that the forfeiture proceedings are principally between the PP and the accused, Amar, as s 61 is only engaged where there are third parties laying some claim or interest in the properties seized. If there are none, the proceedings will proceed only between these two key players. This position must be properly appreciated because it appears to have been overlooked simply because the two applications, by PP and by the third parties, were heard together. Hence, in the proceedings at the High Court, affidavits were filed by Amar in protest of the forfeiture orders sought by the PP. I pause here to make this observation. As pointed out a moment ago, the PP must satisfy the High Court that the property is of any of the character or nature prescribed in s 56(1)(a) to (d). It is only upon satisfying the High Court that the property is liable to be forfeited and thereafter, the High Court deals with the rights or interests of any third parties. As held in Public Prosecutor v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors, s 56 does not absolve the PP from proving on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized come under the purview of the Act and were procured or are the proceeds of an unlawful or illegal activity. The PP must prove on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized were S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 procured in connection with the commission of the predicate offence or are of the character for which the order for seizure was issued. See also Public Prosecutor v Billion Nova Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1823; [2016] 2 CLJ 763; [2016] AMEJ 0162.” (emphasis added) [18] The foregoing cases exemplify that no order for forfeiture can be made until the claims of third parties to the seized properties is heard, and to establish its rights to forfeiture, the prosecution must, first, prove that the properties it seeks to forfeit are forfeitable properties, namely, that they are the subject matter or evidence relating to the commission of the offence under s.4 (1) of the Act. [19] It is only upon the prosecution establishing that the seized properties are forfeitable properties, that the court enters a preliminary forfeiture order. And, it is only upon the making of the preliminary forfeiture order is the court required to publish the requisite notice in the Gazette under s.61 (2) of the Act to commence the ancillary proceedings to determine the rights of the third parties to the forfeited properties. This stands to reason as it cannot be gainsaid that it would be an absolute waste of judicial time if the forfeiture application and the claims of the third parties are heard simultaneously and, at the conclusion of the proceedings it is found that the properties are not forfeitable properties. [20] It bears mention that the government does not have a clear title to the property until the ancillary proceedings under s.61 is concluded. It is only upon the adjudication of the third parties claims, that the preliminary forfeiture order can be made final. S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [21] For the reasons given, we are unable to share the judge’s view that the sessions court ought to have proceeded with the ancillary proceedings in respect of the respondents claims on dismissing the forfeiture application. The learned judge erred in holding that the ancillary proceedings under section 61 is separate and independent from the forfeiture application. The mechanics of the ancillary proceedings must follow the procedure laid down in sections 55,56 and 61 of the Act. [22] We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court to remit the respondents claims to the sessions court and reinstate the respondents appeals. We further direct that the High Court first hears the prosecution’s appeal against the dismissal of its forfeiture application by the sessions judge. If the said appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court if affirmed, it would follow that the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ appeals would fail without prejudice to the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ rights to institute separate civil proceedings against the appellant in respect of their respective legal rights to the properties in question. However, if the appeal is allowed, then the respondents claims would be remitted to the sessions judge for adjudication in accordance to the provisions of the Act. Dated: 4 January 2024 -Sgd- (S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Counsel/ Solicitors For the Appellant: Gooi Soon Seng Choong Kak Sen & Belinda Low Siet Yan (with him) [Messrs Gooi & Azura & Associate] For the Respondent: Nik Azila Shuhada Tong Wei Hang & Ong Tze Xian (with her) (Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co.) Segeram Mathagan [Messrs. S. Mathavan & Nur Hafizah] Navinderan Subramaniam Komal Vijay Sheth [Messrs. Preakas & Partners] S/N GOBFphPtkSOzzZLjhYhjw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-09-201-05/2022

PERAYU GENNEVA SDN BHD RESPONDEN YEAP SWAN KIM @ YEAP GAIK IMM

Criminal Law – Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 – Application by the Public Prosecutor under section 55 for a forfeiture order in respect as properties seized from the appellant and four others – Sessions Court issuing statutory notice under section 61 – Whether the third parties who responded to the statutory notice are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court upon a dismissal of the prosecution’s forfeiture application – Whether the claims of the third parties are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application.

04/01/2024

YA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P SuppiahKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b2301eb7-1a91-418a-b9c6-02f89d558b97&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W-09-200-05/2022, W-09-201-05/2022, W-09-202-05/2022, W-09-204-05/2022 & W-09-205-05/2022 BETWEEN GENNEVA SDN. BHD. … APPELLANT AND DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 370808-10-5437] & 175 OTHERS … RESPONDENTS [In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Trial No: WA-42(Ors)-17-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-24-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-25-09/2021, WA-42(Ors)-27-09/2021 & WA-42(Ors)-29-09/2021 Between GENNEVA SDN. BHD. …APPELLANT And 1. CHAN CHEE WEI 2. GAN PHUI MUN 3. LYNN WONG BINTI ABDULLAH 4. TETUAN GOOI & AZURA 5. LILY WONG 6. GAN CHEE SHENG 7. PAUL LEE CHU KOB 8. LAU AH MOI 9. CHANDRA LINGAM A/L RASAPPAN 04/01/2024 12:13:27 W-09-201-05/2022 Kand. 61 S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 10. MEA FATT LEONG 11. YEE CHOOI LIN 12. KAMALA DEVI A/P VYRAVAN 13. MAHA DAWE A/P BALAKRISHNAN 14. YEE SOON HOE 15. MALLIKA A/P MARIMUTHU 16. YEE CHOY WAH 17. YEE CHOOI LAN 18. MURUGAN A/L GOVINDARAJOO 19. YEE SO MOI 20. PADMAVANTHY A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 21. PRINTA DEVI A/P RAMAKRISHNAN 22. HONG SIEW TUO 23. AJANTHA A/P SINNIAH 24. RATNA SABAPATHY A/L MUNUSAMY 25. RUBASHINI A/P GOPAL 26. ANURATHA A/P SINNIAH 27. K NAGARAJAN A/L KULANDAIVELU 28. SKHARUNAGHERAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 29. KAMNIAMMAH A/P KATHIRAVALU 30. VIJEY NAIR A/L GOPAL 31. K NESHI A/P OTHIYIL KOTTAN 32. KAREN VOON WAI KEEN 33. M SHANKAR A/L MASLAMANI 34. SUGUMARAN NAYAR A/L BALAKRISHNAN 35. PATHEPEN A/L ELUMALAY 36. POONGKOTHAI A/P SINAH SAMY 37. SAROJINI A/P SINAHSAMY 38. SIMON A/L S THOMAS 39. SIVAANANTHAN A/L V. KARUNAKARAN 40. JANE SELVI A/P SUBRAYAN @ MICHAEL 41. ADULAHIT @ ABDUL RAHIM B NAHUR GHANI 42. BALACHANDRAN A/L PONNAMBALAM 43. BALAMURALE A/L VELU S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 44. JAYANTHI A/P KATAN @ KATHAN 45. JAYASEELAN A/L PERIASAMY 46. KANAKAVALLY A/P GOVINDARAJOO 47. KATHAN A/L LETCHUMANAN 48. KRISHNAN A/L MANIAM 49. KRISHNAN A/L RAMASAMY 50. PARITHA BEGUM BINTI FAKEER MOHD 51. PERUMAL A/L SOCKALINGAM 52. RAJA SEKARAN A/L PALANIVELU 53. SARASWATHY A/P KATHAN 54. SIVAPRAGASAM A/L NADESIN 55. VASUDEVAN A/L ARUMUGAM 56. YOBURAJ A/L THOMAS 57. THAMILSELVI A/P NADESIN 58. AVINASH PRATHAP A/L RAMASAMY 59. APPAMAHA A/P APPALASAMY 60. ARIVALGAN A/L VELU 61. K.P MANOJ A/L TARUR HARI GOVINDAN 62. AYAHSAMY A/L A MUNUSAMY 63. PRASATH A/L RAMASAMY 64. RAMASAMY A/L ENKANAN 65. GUNALAN A/L CHINNATHAMBI 66. KALAI CHELVI A/P PANIEER CHELVAM 67. RAVI CHANDAR A/L MURUGUSON 68. KANNAKI A/P VELU 69. ANANTHAKRISHNAN A/L RENGASAMY 70. ARUMUGAM A/L PERUMAL 71. KARTHIGAYAN A/L ANNADORAI 72. FREDDY MOSES 73. MAHENDRAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 74. PARAMESWARAN A/L KHARTIGASU 75. PANNERSELVAM A/L PALANISAMY 76. PREMA LATHA A/P RAMAN NAIR 77. RAJANDARAN A/L MANICKAM S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 78. SARASWATHY A/P DORASAMY 79. RAMANATHAN A/L CHINNU 80. SAROJA A/P KARUPPAN 81. SELVARAJAH A/L MUNIANDY 82. SHANTHI A/P DORASAMY 83. TAMILARASAN A/L ANNAMALAI 84. THANALETCHUMY A/P BJ APPARAO 85. VANUKUPPAL A/L SUPRIMIANAM 86. AB FATAH BIN HUSIN 87. P R CHITRA DEVI A/P K PERIASAMY 88. HARIDAS A/L P K NAMBIAR 89. KIU MING SING 90. LINGKESVARI A/P N. RAJAINDREN 91. RAJANDRA PRASAD A/L KASY 92. SAJIV NAIR A/L MADAWAN NAIR 93. SELVARANI A/P K PERIASAMY 94. SHANTHI A/P MASILAMONEY 95. TANAPPAL A/L K. PERIASAMY 96. TEO SAW GIN 97. TEO WOON HUE 98. KARTTHIYAVALLEE A/P VEERAPPAN 99. KUMARI NALINI A/P P SUBRAMANIAM 100. PARAMAGURU A/L KANDASAMY 101. RAVICHANDRAN A/L PONNUSAMY 102. YOGESVARAN A/L KRISHNA KUTTY 103. AW YEE CHOW 104. BALAKRISHNAN A/L M KARUPPIAH 105. CHAN SOI CHI @ CHAN SAI CHAI 106. CHANDRAN SELVARAJAH 107. SARASVATHI MANOKARI A/P VELAUTHAM 108. GEETHA A/P RAMALINGAM 109. GRACE A/P V M KURIAN 110. JEYASINGAM A/L VELUPPILLAI 111. KARUNAKARAN A/L GANAPATHY S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 112. R KAVIN KUMAAR A/L RAMACHANDRAN 113. KUMARAN A/L PADMANABHAN 114. MARIMUTHU A/L SUPPIAH 115. NIRMALA A/P BALAKRISHNAN 116. RAGURAMAN A/L RAMAN 117. RAJASVAREE A/P V. KRISHNAN 118. RUTHRA DEVI A/P ETHIRAJULOO NAIDU 119. SATHISH A/L K. SUKUMARAN 120. SREERATHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 121. SUDHA A/P K SUKUMARAN 122. SUNITHA A/P KAMALAK SHAN 123. ASOHAN A/L P. RAGAVAN 124. ASOKAN A/L RAMAN NAIR 125. CINTHY NAIR A/P CHANDRASEKHARAN 126. GEETA A/P N MOHAN DAS 127. JAYALAKSHMI A/P R SRINIVAS 128. NALINI A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 129. PUI SAU LUNG 130. SAKUNDALA A/P T. RAMAN NAIR 131. SANTHI @ SUSEELA A/P R S PILLAY 132. SHANDHA A/P T.K.N. NAIR 133. SUJADHA A/P KRISHNAN 134. USHA NAIR A/P T R NAIR 135. VARGIS A/L CHERIAN 136. CHE ENGKU RAMLAH BINTI ENGKU MAT 137. GOPINATHAN SURESH A/L P M G NAIR 138. CHING E KIAU @ CHENG HOON KIAU 139. JEEVARATNAM A/L RENGASAMY 140. K. VIJAYANDRAN A/L K.V. KANDASAMY 141. LIM CHENG HUI 142. MALIGA A/P RENGASAMY 143. LIM LEAN SENG 144. SHANMUGAM A/L MOTTAYAN 145. LOH BEE CHIN S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 146. LOH BEE GUEK 147. MAHAMED ISMAIL BIN MOHAMED YUSOFF 148. MOHD NASIR BIN MAT AIL 149. MUNUSAMY A/L RANGGASAMY GAMEDAN 150. NG CHUEE EYA @ NG POH IM 151. NG KUM HENG 152. PADMINI SUBRAMANIAM 153. RAMAT BIN DAUD 154. RAJENDRAN A/L YAM MURUAYA 155. ROZIATON BINTI ABU BAKAR 156. SANTHI D/O PERUMAL 157. SUBAHASHINI A/P K.N.S NAIR 158. SUBRAMANIAM A/L RAMASAMY 159. THILAGA A/P POONGAVANAM 160. VEGIA A/P CHANDRASEKARAN 161. WENG AH SHOM 162. LEE LI HUI 163. ZURKURNAI BIN YUSOF 164. TEENATHAYALAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM 165. PERUMAH S/O ALAGAPPA SERUVAI 166. TAN POH TIANG @ TAN POH TIN 167. TING SUNG TIING 168. DATO’ VENGADASALAM LETCHUMI KANDAN 169. SANKARAN A/L GOPALAN 170. ELAN KOVAN A/L KUMARASAMY 171. A VASANTHA A/P VIATHAINATHAN 172. MANGALESWARY NADARAJAH 173. THAMASEGARAN A/L VIATHAINATHAN 174. CHIN WON HEE 175. ANITA KOCH 176. YEAP SWAN KIM @ YEAP GAIK IMM …RESPONDENTS/ THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 CORAM: VAZEER ALAM MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI IBRAHIM, JCA S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The primary issue in these appeals concerns the rights of third parties to adjudicate their claims under section 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism, Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001 (“the Act”). Background facts [2] In 2019, the Public Prosecutor filed an application for a forfeiture order under section 55 of the Act in respect of properties seized from the appellant and four others. Thereupon, the sessions court issued the statutory notice under section 61 of the Act by way of gazette calling upon third parties who claimed an interest in the said properties to show cause why the properties shall not be forfeited to the government. [3] The respondents in these appeals are the third parties who responded to the notice. Both the appellant and the respondents filed S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 affidavits to contest the application. [4] On 27 August 2021, the sessions court dismissed the forfeiture application by the Public Prosecutor. The learned sessions judge went on to hold that in view of the dismissal, section 61 does not empower her to adjudicate the respondents claims. Dissatisfied, the prosecution and the respondents lodged their respective appeals to the High Court against the aforesaid decisions. [5] On 29 April 2022, the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) having considered the arguments found that the sessions judge had not decided on the respondents claims and did not specify in her decisions whether the said claims were allowed or dismissed. [6] Consequently, in respect of the respondents appeals the High Court: a. exercised its revisionary powers under section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, and section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Code to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication; and b. dismissed the respondents appeals without prejudice to their right to re-file an appeal against the sessions court decision in respect of their claims. [7] In respect of the prosecution’s appeal, the High Court stayed the prosecution’s appeal until the respondent’s claims are adjudicated by the sessions court. S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [8] On 11 May 2022, the appellant lodged the instant appeal against the High Court decision to remit the respondents’ claims to the sessions court for adjudication. Submissions [9] It is the appellant’s contention that under section 61, the court is required to adjudge the claims of third parties only if and when the prosecution succeeds in its forfeiture application. It says that as the prosecution’s forfeiture application in the instant case was dismissed by the sessions judge, it was not incumbent upon the court to deal with the respondents claims. It argues that the Judge consequently erred in remitting the respondents claims to the sessions court for adjudication when the prosecution failed to prove that the subject matter of the forfeiture application are forfeitable properties. [10] Conversely, the respondents contend that their claims are separate and independent of the prosecution’s forfeiture application. They say that the opening words of s.61 makes it clear that the dismissal of the forfeiture application does not take away or detract from their rights to have their claims adjudicated by the sessions court. Statutory Provisions [11] Before we consider, the rival submissions before us, it is convenient to set out the statutory provisions relevant to the appeal. They are: - S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Section 55 “(1) Subject to section 61, in any prosecution for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the court shall make and an order for the forfeiture of any property which is proved to be- (a) The subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission of such offence; (b) Terrorist property; (c) The proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) The instrumentalities of an offence, Where- (aa) the offence is proved against the accused; or (bb) the offence is not proved against the accused but the court is satisfied that- (i) The accused is not the true and lawful owner of such property; and (ii) No other person is entitled to the property as a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. (2) Where the offence is proved against the accused but the property referred to in subsection (1) has been disposed of, diminished in value or cannot be traced, the court shall order the accused to pay as a penalty a sum which is equivalent to, in the opinion of the court, the value of the property, and any such penalty shall be recoverable as a civil debt due to the Government of Malaysia and shall not be subject to any period of limitation prescribed by any written law. (3) In determining whether the property is- (a) the subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence; (b) terrorist property; (c) the proceeds of an unlawful activity; or (d) the instrumentalities of an offence, The court shall apply the standard of proof required in civil proceedings. Section 61 (1) The provisions in this Part shall apply without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. (2) The court making the order of forfeiture under subsection 28L (1) or section 55 or the judge to whom an application is made under subsection 28L (2) or 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited. (3) A third party’s lack of good faith may be inferred, by the court or an enforcement agency, from the objective circumstances of the case. (4) The court or enforcement agency shall return the property to the claimant when it is satisfied that - (a) the claimant has a legitimate legal interest in the property; (b) no participation, collusion or involvement with respect to the offence under subsection 4(1) or Part IVA or a terrorism financing offence which is the object of the S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proceedings can be imputed to the claimant; (c) the claimant lacked knowledge and was not intentionally ignorant of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its illegal use; (d) the claimant did not acquire any right in the property from a person proceeded against under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that any right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the eventual subsequent forfeiture of the property; and (e) the claimant did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the property. Whether third parties’ claims can be adjudicated under s.61 before a forfeiture order is made [12] This is not the first time that this question has been raised in the Malaysian courts. It has come under the scrutiny of the court in several cases. In Thong Kian Oon & Ors v [2012] 8 CLJ 119, Ghazali Cha J stated: “Based on the evidence adduced by learned DPP, I am of the opinion that the evidence adduced is insufficient to satisfy me that the properties are the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order against all the respondents are dismissed. As such, notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act. Therefore, the application for forfeiture is dismissed and all the properties must be released immediately to the respondents respectively.” S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [13] In PP v Mohd Bakri Samsu & Anor [2016] 5 CLJ 824,’Noorin Badaruddin J opined the same view: “In the upshot, based on the affidavits and exhibits, this court found that the applicant failed to establish on balance of probabilities that the properties seized from the respondents were the subject matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-s. 4(1) of the Act. As such the application for the forfeiture order was denied. Consequently, the notice under s. 61 of the Act is premature. Section 61 only comes into play when the court makes the order of forfeiture under s. 56 of the Act.” [14] Thereafter, in Azmi bin Osman v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2016] 3 MLJ 98, this Court on the same issue explained as follows; “We agree with the learned SCJ that the prosecution had proven on the balance of probability that the properties in question are proceeds of an unlawful activity which constitutes the subject matter of the offence. As the SCJ was the court making the order of forfeiture under s 55 at the end of a prosecution that had resulted in a conviction of the accused, it was incumbent upon the SCJ to issue the third party notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA before any final order on forfeiture can be made in respect the said properties. We are in agree with the learned SCJ that the evidence led in this case would necessitate the giving of the notice to third parties by way of publication in the gazette who may then stake their claims by proving themselves to be bona fide owners of the seized monies, in which case the monies shall be returned to them. But if they fail to prove that they are entitled to the seized properties, then the monies shall be ordered to be forfeited to government revenue.... We S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 agree with learned deputy that a forfeiture order is subject to giving prior notice to third parties as is clearly borne out in the wordings to s 55(1) of the AMLATFA itself. Indeed, in this case, no forfeiture order had been made by the learned SCJ and there is basis for her to issue the statutory notice in order to facilitate the process pertaining to the eventual forfeiture of the seized properties which are the subject-matter of the offence before her. We therefore see no merit in the complaint of the accused person in regard to the issue of the notice under s 61 of the AMLATFA. On account of the above, the appeal by the accused person against the order on the s 61 notice under AMLATFA is dismissed.” (emphasis added) [15] However, in PP v Taiko Fertiliser& Yang Lain [2019] 4 CLJ 480, this Court expressed a different view on the issue. There, the ('the prosecution') sought two orders, the first to publish a notice in the Gazette to call upon any third parties who claimed to have any interest in the seized moveable properties to appear before the court to show cause; and the second, the forfeiture of the moveable properties. The High Court only dealt with the forfeiture application and dismissed it. It did not deal with the prayer for an order to publish a notice in the Gazette. The prosecution appealed. [16] The prosecution submitted that the trial judge should not have heard the forfeiture application without first ordering for the notice in the Gazette to be published as mandated by s. 61(2) of the Act. The respondents argued that before the mechanism under s. 61(2) of the Act could be generated, the trial judge must first decide whether the prosecution's application for a forfeiture order under s. 56(1) of the S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Act bore any merits. In other words, the trial judge must first issue an order of forfeiture before the procedure under s. 61(2) of the Act could be exercised. The Court of Appeal rejected the respondent’s submission and explained: “Kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan TPR bahawa hanya satu isu sahaja yang harus kami tentukan dalam rayuan ini iaitu sama ada hakim bicara dikehendaki di bawah s.61(2) untuk mempertimbangkan terlebih dahulu permohonan untuk disiarkan satu notis dalam Warta sebelum mempertimbangkan sama ada harta-harta yang disenaraikan dalam notis usul berkenaan wajar dilucut hak atau tidak di bawah s. 56, AMLATFPUA 2001. Harus juga dicatatkan bahawa ungkapan "subject to s. 61 " di bawah s. 56(1) itu merujuk s. 61 secara keseluruhan dan bukan sekadar s. 61(2) sahaja. Berdasarkan kes Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao, supra, keseluruhan peruntukan s. 61 khususnya s. 61(2) hendaklah diberikan keutamaan terlebih dahulu. Keabsahan (validity) takrifan ini diperkukuhkan dengan penggunaan ungkapan "... the judge to whom an application is made under... s. 56(1) shall cause to be published a notice in the Gazette..." dalam s. 61(2) itu sendiri. Dalam hal ini, kami bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR bahawa dengan penggunaan perkataan "shall" dalam s. 61(2) itu menjadikannya satu kehendak yang wajib diikuti sebelum sesuatu perintah pelucuthakkan di bawah s.56 dibuat oleh hakim.” S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [17] Lastly, in the Federal Court case of Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 MLJ 1, Mary Lim FCJ observed: “In considering whether or not to grant the order of forfeiture, the High Court is mandatorily obliged under s 61(1) to cause to be published a notice in the Gazette ‘calling upon any third party who claims to have any interest in the property to attend before the Court on the date specified in the notice to show cause as to why the property shall not be forfeited’. This is regardless whether there is prosecution for an offence under the Act – see ss 55(1) and 56(1). However, it must not be over looked that the forfeiture proceedings are principally between the PP and the accused, Amar, as s 61 is only engaged where there are third parties laying some claim or interest in the properties seized. If there are none, the proceedings will proceed only between these two key players. This position must be properly appreciated because it appears to have been overlooked simply because the two applications, by PP and by the third parties, were heard together. Hence, in the proceedings at the High Court, affidavits were filed by Amar in protest of the forfeiture orders sought by the PP. I pause here to make this observation. As pointed out a moment ago, the PP must satisfy the High Court that the property is of any of the character or nature prescribed in s 56(1)(a) to (d). It is only upon satisfying the High Court that the property is liable to be forfeited and thereafter, the High Court deals with the rights or interests of any third parties. As held in Public Prosecutor v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Ors, s 56 does not absolve the PP from proving on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized come under the purview of the Act and were procured or are the proceeds of an unlawful or illegal activity. The PP must prove on a balance of probabilities that the properties seized were S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 procured in connection with the commission of the predicate offence or are of the character for which the order for seizure was issued. See also Public Prosecutor v Billion Nova Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1823; [2016] 2 CLJ 763; [2016] AMEJ 0162.” (emphasis added) [18] The foregoing cases exemplify that no order for forfeiture can be made until the claims of third parties to the seized properties is heard, and to establish its rights to forfeiture, the prosecution must, first, prove that the properties it seeks to forfeit are forfeitable properties, namely, that they are the subject matter or evidence relating to the commission of the offence under s.4 (1) of the Act. [19] It is only upon the prosecution establishing that the seized properties are forfeitable properties, that the court enters a preliminary forfeiture order. And, it is only upon the making of the preliminary forfeiture order is the court required to publish the requisite notice in the Gazette under s.61 (2) of the Act to commence the ancillary proceedings to determine the rights of the third parties to the forfeited properties. This stands to reason as it cannot be gainsaid that it would be an absolute waste of judicial time if the forfeiture application and the claims of the third parties are heard simultaneously and, at the conclusion of the proceedings it is found that the properties are not forfeitable properties. [20] It bears mention that the government does not have a clear title to the property until the ancillary proceedings under s.61 is concluded. It is only upon the adjudication of the third parties claims, that the preliminary forfeiture order can be made final. S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [21] For the reasons given, we are unable to share the judge’s view that the sessions court ought to have proceeded with the ancillary proceedings in respect of the respondents claims on dismissing the forfeiture application. The learned judge erred in holding that the ancillary proceedings under section 61 is separate and independent from the forfeiture application. The mechanics of the ancillary proceedings must follow the procedure laid down in sections 55,56 and 61 of the Act. [22] We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court to remit the respondents claims to the sessions court and reinstate the respondents appeals. We further direct that the High Court first hears the prosecution’s appeal against the dismissal of its forfeiture application by the sessions judge. If the said appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court if affirmed, it would follow that the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ appeals would fail without prejudice to the respondents/Third Party Claimants’ rights to institute separate civil proceedings against the appellant in respect of their respective legal rights to the properties in question. However, if the appeal is allowed, then the respondents claims would be remitted to the sessions judge for adjudication in accordance to the provisions of the Act. Dated: 4 January 2024 -Sgd- (S.M. KOMATHY SUPPIAH) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Counsel/ Solicitors For the Appellant: Gooi Soon Seng Choong Kak Sen & Belinda Low Siet Yan (with him) [Messrs Gooi & Azura & Associate] For the Respondent: Nik Azila Shuhada Tong Wei Hang & Ong Tze Xian (with her) (Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co.) Segeram Mathagan [Messrs. S. Mathavan & Nur Hafizah] Navinderan Subramaniam Komal Vijay Sheth [Messrs. Preakas & Partners] S/N tx4wspEaikG5xgL4nVWLlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-23CY-53-10/2019

PLAINTIF DR ZAKIR ABDUL KARIM NAIK DEFENDAN RAMASAMY A/L PALANISAMY

1. These actions are grounded on the tort of defamation against the defendant. In Suit 53, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had maliciously libelled him on 10.04.2016, 01.10.2017, 09.08.2019, while on 20.8.2019, maliciously slandered him in an online interview on India Today. In Suit 70, the plaintiff claimed the defendant had maliciously libelled him on 08.11.2019. The plaintiff alleged the publications are defamatory of him. 2. The defendants deny the allegations and pleaded fair comment, justification and qualified privilege.3. After full trial, I find for the plaintiff and awarded damages and cost.

04/01/2024

YA Puan Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b1e8209c-7e1c-46b7-89b5-0a61b826e57a&Inline=true

69 DR ZAKIR ABDUL KARIM NAIK V P RAMASAMY 23CY-53-10-2019 & 23CY-70-12-2019 L.1.pdf WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-23CY-53-10/2019 ANTARA 5 DR ZAKIR ABDUL KARIM NAIK (NO. MYPR: 651018-75-5049) PLAINTIF DAN 10 RAMASAMY A/L PALANISAMY DEFENDAN (didengar bersama) 15 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-23CY-70-12/2019 ANTARA 20 DR ZAKIR ABDUL KARIM NAIK (NO. MYPR: 651018-75-5049) DAN 25 RAMASAMY A/L PALANISAMY JUDGMENT 30 (Enclosure 1) INTRODUCTION [1] In a nutshell: 1.1 There are two suits involving similar parties with similar issues. (a) Suit WA-23CY-53-10/2019, (Suit 53), and 35 (b) Suit WA-23CY-70-12/2019, (Suit 70). 04/01/2024 16:05:26 WA-23CY-53-10/2019 Kand. 103 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 2 (c) Both suits are by Dr Zakir Naik against Ramasamy. Both cases are grounded on alleged acts of defamation committed by the latter against the former on four (4) separate libellous and one (1) slanderous occasion. 40 1.2 Dr Zakir Abdul Karim Naik (Dr Zakir), the plaintiff, is a permanent resident of Malaysia. 1.3 The defendant, Ramasamy s/o Palaniasamy (Ramasamy), was the Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang at the time of the alleged tortuous offences. 45 [2] In Suit 53, Dr Zakir claimed Ramasamy had maliciously libelled him on three (3) separate occasions (10.04.2016, 01.10.2017, 09.08.2019), while on 20.8.2019, maliciously slandered him in an online interview on India Today. 2.1 Dr Zakir contended that the four defamatory publications were 50 unsupported, were published with malice, hatred, envy, and spite, had disparaged, and ridiculed him to the general public, and as a result, has caused him losses and damage. 2.2 In Suit 70, Dr Zakir claimed Ramasamy had maliciously libelled him by publishing defamatory materials on 08.11.2019. Dr Zakir took the 55 legal position that the publications, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had been published and republished. 2.3 Ramasamy, in denying the two foregoing suits, argued: (a) For Suit 53: 60 (i) The defence of justification and fair comment applies to 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th defamatory publications, and (ii) In the alternative, claimed qualified privilege as it was raised for public concern and interest. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 3 (b) For Suit 70: 65 (i) The defence of justification and fair comment applies to the defamatory publication, and (ii) In the alternative, claimed qualified privilege as it was raised for public concern and interest. 70 [3] On 02.11.2023: 3.1 After hearing parties with their respective arguments, all things considered, this Court find Dr Zakir has succeeded in proving his case on the balance of probabilities; therefore, this Court finds in favour of Dr Zakir and allowed Suit 53 and Suit 70 against 75 Ramasamy. 3.2 Ramasamy was ordered to pay cumulatively RM1,520,00.00 comprising: (i) RM 1 million in general damages for the five defamatory publications. 80 (ii) RM100,000 compensatory damages for the five defamatory publications. (iii) RM100,000 aggravated damages for the five defamatory publications. (iv) RM250,000 exemplary damages for the five defamatory publications. (v) RM70,000 in global costs payable within thirty (30) days from the Order. 85 3.3 Aggrieved, Ramasamy filed this appeal against my decision in Suit 53 and Suit 70. Since these two suits were heard together, dealing with similar facts, I will prepare a single written grounds of judgment to avoid duplicity. My reasons are as follows: [4] The witnesses at the trial are: 90 (a) Plaintiff PW1: Dr Zakir Naik Abdul Karim Naik (b) Defendant DW1: P Ramasamy a/l Palanisamy 95 4.1 Parties agreed in Court (23.08.2022) to only call PW1 and DW1 as witnesses to offer evidence at the trial of Suit 53 and Suit 70. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 4 4.2 Parties also agreed that for Suit 53 and Suit 70, all Part C documents would be taken as Part B documents. 4.3 Ramasamy does not dispute the publication of the five alleged 100 defamatory publications. BRIEF FACTS [5] In a nutshell, Suit 53 and Suit 70 are grounded on five defamatory publications by Ramasamy against Dr Zakir over a period of three and 105 half years (10.04.2016 - 08.11.2019). It is claimed that Ramasamy, on these five separate occasions, maliciously published offending materials that are defamatory of Dr Zakir, as follows: 5.1 First Defamatory Publication: 110 (a) Ramasamy called Dr Zakir a satan in his Facebook post on 10.04.2016. The full text of that post in a nutshell says: Let us get "Satan" Zakir Naik out of this country! The "Satan" Zakir Naik is in the country as a result of the invitation by the Terengganu state government. 115 He is a Muslim preacher and evangelist who has nothing but hatred and contempt for non-Muslims. He has been banned in Canada and the UK for his hate lectures. Even some sections of Muslims in India have termed him as a liar, man of half- truth and purveyor of hate. 120 Peace-loving Malaysians, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims, should lodge nationwide police reports against Zakir Naik and his son. Hindu/Indian NGOs and individuals should take the lead in making the police reports. PSAT will be taking the lead in lodging police reports in Penang tomorrow. 125 Ask Zakir Naik to go back to India so that he could do all his preaching there." (sic) (b) Dr Zakir took the position that the statements above, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had 130 been published and republished. It was malicious and spurious S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 5 and had imputed/insinuated to the public at large that Dr Zakir is: (1) An evil man. (2) He is a cause of disharmony among the multiracial citizens of 135 Malaysia: (3) The Terengganu State Government made a huge mistake by inviting him to lecture in Terengganu. (4) Dr Zakir is not an honest Muslim preacher in propagating the teachings of Islam and 140 (5) Dr Zakir had committed an offence or offences in other countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom. (c) On receiving a critical public reaction, Ramasamy removed the alleged defamatory posting, but he allegedly did not directly 145 apologise to Dr Zakir over the issue. 5.2 Second Defamatory Publication: (a) On 01.10.2017 (approximately 17 months after the first defamatory publication), Ramasamy published another 150 defamatory publication on Dr Zakir in an article he penned named In the said article, Ramasamy allegedly issued the following defamatory statements. In a nutshell: (i) 155 Malaysia. (ii) It only makes sense for Malaysia to hand over those suspected of committing crimes in India to the Indian authorities. (iii) India wants Dr Zakir for suspected terrorist-related activities and links with the underworld. 160 (v) Dr Zakir's preaching had something to do with the terrorist attacks in a cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh, some time back. The Indian authorities also have evidence that Naik was responsible for instigating some youths in Kera/a to take part in Islamic State-related (IS) activities. (vi) Naik alleged long-established links with Mumbai's underworld. It 165 surfaced recently that Iqbal Kaskar, the brother of Dawood Ibrahim, also one of India's most wanted criminals, had links with Naik. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 6 (vii) Iqbal Kaskar was the chief financial officer responsible for raising funds from underworld activities to finance Naik's Islamic Research Foundation (IRF). 170 (viii) But surely, they cannot be silent over a person suspected of bringing death and destruction onto innocent people by engaging in the worst forms of preaching, leading to terrorist activities. (ix) Events are slowly but surely unfolding that even Saudi Arabia is not willing to provide sanctuary to Naik, given the overwhelming 175 evidence against him for inciting terrorist activities. (x) It (Malaysia) continues to harbour suspected criminals who come in the guise of religious scholars and preachers. (b) Dr Zakir took the position that the statements above, in their 180 natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had been published and republished. It was malicious and spurious and had imputed/insinuated to the public at large that Dr Zakir is: (1) Is the most wanted criminal nationwide. 185 (2) He is evading arrest. (3) He is involved in illegal activities. (4) He should be handed over to the Indian Government to stand trial for crimes committed in India. (5) The Malaysian Government should not give him sanctuary as it is 190 equivalent to harbouring and/or sheltering a criminal. (6) He is a leader of an internationally organised criminal group. (7) He is a double agent, whereby he has an ulterior motive to spread far-right ideology among peace-loving Malaysians. (8) He is a mastermind in coordinating criminal activities across the 195 globe and (9) He is not a trustworthy Muslim preacher and has no interest in propagating peace and harmony among Malaysians. 5.3 Third Defamatory Publication 200 (a) On 09.08.2019 (approximately 22 months after the 2nd defamatory publication), in an article he penned, Ramasamy said that Naik Should Not Question the Loyalty of Hindus in Malaysia . In a nutshell, the article in a nutshell says: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 7 (i) Among the non-Muslims in Malaysia, Naik is not objectionable 205 because he is a fugitive running from the law or for his lectures on Islam, but for his mischievous comparative perspective on religions. (ii) By using this comparative perspective, Naik has unduly angered the non-Muslims by disparaging and belittling their faiths. In fact, by doing this, he has found a way to be accepted by some sections of 210 the right-wing conservative Islamic force. (iii) By engaging in this comparative approach, which is hardly comparative in the true sense of the word, he has belittled faiths other than Islam. (iv) This is the core of the problem and why Naik should not be allowed 215 to touch on other religions because it will enable other faiths to be used as a punching bag by him. (v) He couldn't help himself from mischief that was hurtful to Hindus in Malaysia. (vi) This mischievous and frivolous comment was uncalled for. 220 (vii) Isn't it treasonous to say that Hindus are a bunch of disloyal elements in the country? Does he realise that more than 80% of the Hindus voted for the PH government under the leadership of Mahathir? (viii) He is not loyal to India. Why run away from the country that has the second highest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia? 225 (ix) If Naik is true to his religion, he should return to India and face the government rather than create mischief in Malaysia. (x) Unfortunately, some Malaysians allow themselves to be manipulated by Naik for selfish reasons. The result is that Naik and Malaysians of all faiths will suffer the consequences of his actions. 230 (b) Dr Zakir took the position that the statements above, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had been published and republished. It was malicious and spurious and had imputed/insinuated to the public at large that Dr Zakir is: 235 (1) He is a dishonest person who would abuse the Islamic religion for his selfish purpose. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 8 (2) He has unfairly and dishonestly accused Malaysian Hindus of being disloyal to Malaysia. (3) He calculatedly attempted to create a gap among multi-ethnic and 240 multi-religious Malaysians to obtain the support of the Malaysian Muslim community to enjoy immunity and privilege for his continued stay in Malaysia. (4) He is dishonestly leveraging and taking advantage of the current polemic relating to race and religion in the country for his survival 245 and benefit. (5) He has dubious motives for splitting the Malaysian population and bringing about disharmony and disunity among them. (6) He does not deserve to be accorded a permanent residency in Malaysia. 250 (7) He is being used for specific political purposes and/or by political parties, and for that purpose, will use them to further his ambitions and, therefore, is partisan in Malaysian politics and (8) He is a criminal and has committed several offences under the Penal Code and the Sedition Act. 255 5.4 Fourth Defamatory Publication (a) On 20.08.2019 (approximately 11 days after the 3rd defamatory publication), Ramasamy slandered Dr Zakir in an interview on India Today. In the said interview Zakir Naik Crackdown 260 Penang Deputy CM Exclusive Interview with India Today on Zakir Ban , in a nutshell, he was recorded as saying: (i) Zakir Naik questioned the loyalty of Hindus in Malaysia; he attacked them, saying that they were more loyal to the BJP or Modi government. Then, he said that the Chinese in Malaysia should 265 leave Malaysia first before he could leave. And this has angered the non-Muslim communities in Malaysia. (ii) He is trying to camouflage what is said in Kelantan, which was attacking the non-Muslims in Malaysia. (iii) He has gone overboard in this country, and he has increased the 270 tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in the nation. (iv) I think Zakir Naik is not contributing to the peace and harmony of the various communities in Malaysia. (v) And I have said before, he is a venom, he is a poison to Malaysia. (vi) His apology should not fool us because he is not a well-meaning 275 man; he is a hatemonger, and he engages in comparative religion S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 9 basically to lambast religions other than Islam. So, we don't want him in this country because we have so many problems in Malaysia, and and creating problems. 280 (vii) He cannot use his PR status to come here and do his hatemongering, especially inciting the Muslims against the non- Muslims and vice versa. (viii) And he's just a coward, running from one country to another. We don't expect a champion of Islam or a champion of any religion to 285 run away to escape the law. If he is indeed a Muslim, he should face the Indian laws squarely and show Indian Muslims in India that he is the saviour of the Indian Muslims. (ix) government. 290 (x) I just want to expose him as a fraud: a trickster and a fugitive. (b) Dr Zakir took the position that the statements above, in their natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had been published and republished. It was malicious and spurious 295 and had imputed/insinuated to the public at large that Dr Zakir: (1) Is an unprincipled and/or unethical person who would abuse the Islamic religion for his personal gain and/or purpose. (2) Has dishonestly accused the Malaysian Hindus of disloyalty to Malaysia and the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir. 300 (3) Has calculatedly attempted to create a gap among the multi-ethnic religious Malaysians with the dubious motive of splitting the same and causing disharmony and disunity among them. (4) He, purportedly a fraudster, a trickster, and a fugitive, should not be given permanent resident status in Malaysia. 305 (5) He is a criminal who should stand trial and not act as a coward, running from one country to another. (6) He is a convict who has run away from the Indian authorities to seek refuge in Malaysia and (7) He is a venom, a poison, a fraudster, a trickster, a fugitive, and a 310 hate monger who is seeking asylum in Malaysia. 5.5 Dr Zakir claims that the four unfounded defamatory publications were published with malice, hatred, envy, and spite, have S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 10 disparaged and ridiculed him to the general public, and had caused 315 him losses and damage. It had adversely impacted him: (1) Tarnishing, smearing, and damaging his reputation, standing and/or credibility in the eyes of the public. (2) Causing him to suffer grave humiliation, untold ridicule and/or severe embarrassment in the eyes of the public. 320 (3) Inflicting him with scandal, odium, and utter contempt in the eyes of the public. (4) Exposing him to personal harm by inciting public anger, hatred and/or racial tension against him. (5) Causing mental anguish, trauma, and distress, and 325 (6) Causing fear for his safety and that of his family. 5.6 Dr Zakir's claims against Ramasamy: (1) General damage. (2) Exemplary damages. 330 (3) Aggravated damages All are to be assessed by the Court. (4) He seeks a mandatory injunction to compel Ramasamy to remove the offending defamatory statements and a prohibitory injunction to restrain Ramasamy from such further tortuous conduct. 335 (5) He also seeks a formal apology to be published in the mainstream media within seven days of the Order of the Court. (6) Costs. 5.7 It was alleged in Suit 70 that: 340 Fifth Defamatory Publication (a) On 08.11.2019 (approximately 2.5 months after the 4th defamatory publication), Ramasamy made another defamatory remark against Dr Zakir in an article entitled DAP leader accuses Zakir camp of faking Tamil Tigers revival . In a 345 nutshell, Ramasamy was quoted as saying: (i) The recent arrest of 12 individuals over their alleged links to the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam is the work of controversial preacher Zakir Naik's supporter, said Penang Deputy Chief Minister II P. Ramasamy. 350 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 11 (ii) Ramasamy accused the Indian-born preacher's camp and "forces" of creating fake news about the revival of the LTTE in Malaysia to divert attention from India's bid to extradite him on charges of money laundering. (iii) Ramasamy told The Malaysian Insight that there are "forces" 355 working in the direction of reviving the LTTE threat to distract from other issues. (iv) Some agencies want to assert their authority (concerning these arrests)." he said. (v) Zakir's supporters created doctored Facebook postings which 360 implicated the 12 individuals. Including two DAP assemblymen attempting to revive the LTTE in the country, Ramasamy said. (vi) Zakir Naik is one factor in this resurrection. After our opposition to him, his followers started spreading lies that I was LTTE from my Facebook page." he said, and 365 (vii) Zakir's supporters created Facebook postings that were cleverly doctored to reveal images of local Indian leaders taking part in the so-called 'LTTE events'." (b) Dr Zakir took the position that the statements above, in their 370 natural and ordinary meaning, are defamatory of him that had been published and republished. It was malicious and spurious and had imputed/insinuated to the public at large that Dr Zakir: (1) Has instructed and persuaded the Malaysian authorities through "back-door dealings" to take severe and stern actions against the 375 supporters of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") in Malaysia to divert the attention from himself. (2) Has manipulated and /or lobbied the Malaysian authorities for his benefit and /or advantages. (3) Is the architect or mastermind of the arrest of the supporters of LTTE 380 in Malaysia and (4) It is being used for certain political purposes and/or political parties; he will use them to further his ambitions and, therefore, is a partisan in Malaysian politics. 385 (c) Dr Zakir claims that the offending 5th Defamatory statement above was actuated by malice, hatred, envy, and spite without S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 12 verifying the truth in those statements in its publication. It defames Dr Zakir. He claims that the impugned statement had: (1) Tarnished, smeared, and damaged his reputation, standing and/or 390 credibility in the eyes of the public. (2) Causing him to suffer grave humiliation, untold ridicule and/or severe embarrassment in the eyes of the public. (3) Inflicting him with scandal, odium, and utter contempt in the eyes of the public. 395 (4) Exposing him to personal harm by inciting public anger, hatred and/or racial tension against him. (5) Causing mental anguish, trauma, and distress, and (6) Causing fear for his safety and that of his family. 400 (c) Dr Zakir's claims against Ramasamy: (1) General damages. (2) Exemplary damages. (3) Aggravated damages. All are to be assessed by the Court. 405 (4) He seeks a mandatory injunction to compel Ramasamy to remove the offending defamatory statements and a prohibitory injunction to restrain Ramasamy from such further tortuous conduct. (5) He also seeks a formal apology to be published in the mainstream media within seven days of the Order of the Court. 410 (5) Costs. 5.8 Ramasamy, in his defence: (a) For Suit 53: (i) The defence of justification and fair comment applies to 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 415 and 4th defamatory publications, and (ii) In the alternative, claimed qualified privilege as it was raised for public concern and interest. (b) For Suit 70: 420 (i) The defence of justification and fair comment applies to the 5th defamatory publication and (ii) In the alternative, claimed qualified privilege as it was raised for public concern and interest. 425 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 13 [6] PARTIES SUBMISSIONS I have duly observed and considered the parties' arguments in canvassing for their positions in Suit 53 and Suit 70, as follows: 430 6.1 Dr Zakir cited the requirement of O.78, r.3 RC 2012, on the need to give particulars in a defamatory action. It would require Dr Zakir to establish that the five separate impugned publications (1) bear defamatory imputations in their natural and ordinary meaning, (2) they refer to Dr Zakir, and (3) they have been published to third 435 parties: Ayob Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152; 1 MLJ 315. 6.2 It was said in Chew Peng Cheng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2008] 8 CLJ 418, HC that a defamatory imputation is any imputation which 440 may tend 'to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally', 'to cut him off from society' or 'to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule', is defamatory of him. An imputation may be defamatory whether or not it is believed by those to whom it is published. 445 First Defamatory Publication 6.3 Dr Zakir argued that there can be no doubt that the first defamatory publication in Ramasamy's Facebook posting on 10.04.2016 (refer paragraph 5.1(a) above) is defamatory. It has been published and 450 republished or caused to be published or republished. After a critical public criticism, Ramasamy later removed the impugned publication from his Facebook account. 455 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 14 Dr Zakir argued: (a) Penang (b) . Ramasamy agreed in his evidence that the word satan is 460 derogatory of Dr Zakir: NOP, vol.4, pg.948, enclosure 72. (c) Ramasamy's attempts to soften the severity of his statement by associating it with a metaphorical use of the word satan is untenable since the first impugned publication is clearly absent of such a suggestion. This assertion goes against the grain of 465 his overall evidence on the first impugned defamatory publication. (d) There is no compelling evidence that Dr Zakir had delivered hate speeches or harboured hatred and contempt against non- Muslims, as alleged by Ramasamy. 470 (e) There is no compelling evidence that Dr Zakir had ever been banned in Canada on the grounds of hate lectures, as alleged by Ramasamy. (f) The alleged travel ban in the UK had already lapsed in 2013, several years before the first impugned defamatory publication. 475 Ramasamy admitted in his evidence he had no evidence that Dr Zakir was banned from entering the UK. Ramasamy even agreed that the statement that Dr Zakir was prohibited from entering Canada and the UK was unjustified. (g) On 12.04.2016, Ramasamy issued a press release expressing 480 his regret to the Malaysian public for the uneasiness caused by his impugned publication. He merely targeted Dr Zakir and not the Malaysian public. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 15 6.4 At the trial: 485 (a) Ramasamy admitted that he published the first impugned defamatory publication and removed it one or two days later. In Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v Eagle One Investment Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS, CA observed that in determining whether the article is defamatory, the article must 490 be objectively read using the standard of an ordinary reasonable man. The truth or otherwise of the contents is another indicator of whether the article is defamatory. The introduction and conclusion mentioned in the article are also indicators of what the writer is trying to convey. Whether the 495 writer had tried verifying the contents will give a glimpse of the writer's intention in writing the article. (b) That posting was meant for the public at large: Rekha Munisamy v Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 7 CLJ 353, CA: the impugned statements made in the Facebook 500 posting were for public consumption. Lim Guan Eng v Ramzan Zakaria [2022] 1 LNS 1108, HC affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2023 to the public and evidence of such accessibility were the comments made by the various third parties. 505 (c) The Court of Appeal in Raja Syahrir Abu Bakar & Anor v Manjeet Singh Dhillon & Other Appeals [2019] 4 CLJ 301, CA, that those responsible for such re-publication of the defamatory materials are equally liable in defamation. (d) There is no issue that the impugned defamatory publication 510 refers to Dr Zakir: Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan Kassim & Another S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 16 Appeal [2021] 4 CLJ 155, FC observed that the impugned statement had explicitly named the plaintiff. (e) Publication of the impugned defamatory statements to third parties is not an issue, as seen from the public reception and 515 responses it had made. It had been communicated to third parties in a manner that had conveyed defamatory imputations about Dr Zakir: Box 55 Sociedad Limitada & Ors v Drive M7 Sdn Bhd [2018] 1 LNS 1715, HC citing Gatley On Libel and Slander (9th Ed) at p 134, that the fundamental principle is that 520 the matter must be communicated to a third party in such a manner as to be capable of conveying the defamatory imputations about the plaintiff. (f) Ramasamy: (i) In light of the untruthfulness of his impugned statements, 525 he displayed no remorse by contesting whether he had indeed, as claimed, apologised to Dr Zakir for vilifying him in that impugned publication. (ii) I take cognisance of his evasive demeanour, which reflects on the credibility of his evidence in this proceeding. 530 (iii) He took the position notwithstanding the two articles regrets calling Dr Zakir Naik Syaitan, and (2) Ramasamy apologises for calling Dr Zakir Naik satan, that he did not apologise to Dr Zakir. 535 (iv) stand on the issue of an apology is grounded in the fact that if an apology can be established, it would amount to an admission of liability for defamatory Facebook posting as ruled in Dr Awang Adek Hussin v The Edge Communications Sdn Bhd & Ors [2012] 10 540 CLJ 340, HC. (v) The Court of Appeal in Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim Shian Ghee T/A L & G Consultants & Education Services [2009] 4 CLJ 113, CA observed that the letter of S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 17 apology attempted only to justify rather than express 545 remorse and regret for what had been done. It explains the granting of aggravated damages. 6.5 Ramasamy pleaded justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege as his defences to the first impugned defamatory 550 publication. He did not dispute the first defamatory publication but argued on the Lucas-Box plea of justification over the impugned publication (Lucas-Box case [1986] 1 WLR). In Tan Sri Dr Muhammad Shafee Abdullah v Tommy Thomas & Ors [2018] 12 MLJ 98, CA, the Court was asked to consider two different 555 interpretations put to the Court: (i) First, a defendant is now required to plead the alternative meaning he ascribes to the writing of which the plaintiff complains if that differs from the meaning pleaded by the plaintiff. (ii) Second, the defendant must make clear what version of the facts he 560 asserts to be true. (iii) A defendant in pleading justification is not obliged to ascribe a meaning to the words complained of; the defendant is, however, obliged to claim justification to clarify the meaning he seeks to justify. (iv) The essence of the decision of Lucas-565 justification must be pleaded to inform the plaintiff and the Court precisely what meaning the defendant will seek to justify. This is, however, an altogether different matter from saying that the defendant is obliged to say, yea or nay, whether that meaning is the one which the writing bears. 570 (a) In considering this plea, I observed a landmark ruling by the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd (Appellant) v Tony Pua Kiam Wee (Respondent) [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC on the application of the common law defences in 575 defamation in Malaysia vis-à- - S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 18 (i) Reynolds v Times Newspaper [2001] 2 AC 127, HL: it was held by the House of Lords that there are two requirements to qualify for the Reynold privilege: 580 (1) The publication concerned a matter of public interest; and (2) Reasonable and fair steps were taken to gather, verify, and publish the information. The House of Lords affirmed that the traditional ambit of 585 qualified privilege should be extended somewhat and that it was available concerning political information. The Federal Court opined that the public interest element in the defence should not be equated with only journalists 590 or media outlets. It should apply to anyone who publishes or discloses material of public interest in any medium that meets and satisfies the test of responsible journalism. Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohammed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 was referred to where the basis of 595 qualified privilege defence is grounded on public policy and convenience that the law will let a person make defamatory statements without incurring legal liability. 600 consider in responsible journalism: (1) The seriousness of the allegation, the more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed, and the individual harmed, if the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 605 (2) The nature of the information and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern. (3) The source of information. (4) The steps taken to verify the information. (5) The urgency of the matter. 610 (6) Whether the comment was sought from the appellant. (7) the story. (8) The tone of the impugned article, and (9) The circumstances of the publication, including the timing. 615 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 19 (ii) Lucas-Box v Associated Newspapers Group PLC & Ors [1986] 1 All ER 177, CA, UK propounded the Lucas- Box Justification defence for defamation by ascribing and the impugned words or publication: 620 (1) If a plaintiff, in its defamation pleadings, ascribes a natural and ordinary meaning to the impugned words, the defendant may then rely on stating in his defence what he alleged was the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of and (2) A defendant in defamation proceedings who wishes to rely on a 625 plea of justification must make clear in the particulars of justification the case he is seeking to set up and must accordingly state clearly and explicitly the meaning he seeks to justify. 630 To rely on the Lucas-Box Justification, it cannot be merely argued on submissions, but the Lucas-Box must be appropriately pleaded in the statement of defence. In case, even though Tony Pua failed the Reynolds Privilege defence, The Federal Court found 635 he succeeded in pleading and proving the Lucas-Box Justification pleaded in his statement of defence. The Federal Court that the impugned words could bear the reasonable meaning ascribed by the respondent. Therefore, the 640 Federal Court agreed with the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the respondent had succeeded in the defence of justification. The Court of Appeal held that a defendant seeking to rely on the defence of justification must make clear the particulars of the case he is seeking to set up and 645 accordingly state clearly and explicitly the meaning that he seeks to justify. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 20 This would be consistent with the rules laid down in Prior v Wilson (1856) 1 C.B (NS) 95 that where a statement contains an innuendo, the words must be justified both in 650 terms of the meaning of the innuendo and as later held in Watkin v Hall (1868) LR 3 QB 396 in terms of their ordinary and natural meaning. (1) 655 journalist, provided the requirements of Responsible Journalism (Lord Nicholls) are met. (2) In the defence of Reynolds Privilege, the respondent has to prove that responsible and fair steps were taken to gather, verify and publish the information. It is insufficient to merely 660 have an honest belief that the statement(s) were true. (3) Since the Reynolds Privilege defence failed in Syarikat Bekalan this question on the existence of malice. (4) 665 the plea of reasonable grounds for suggesting does not amount to a valid plea for the defence of justification. 670 (b) To support his defence, Ramasamy cited: (i) Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371, CA that the ordinary and natural meaning of an impugned statement may include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any 675 special but only general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction would draw from the words. (ii) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393, HC observed that the words complained of must be considered as a whole, 680 bearing in mind, inter-alia, the context in which they were used. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 21 (iii) Duncan v Baird (2014) 86 WIR 271, CA Eastern Caribbean States had remarked that on the use of metaphors in the law of defamation, the authors of Gatley 685 it has been said the use the use of metaphors throughout the brief passage containing the words complained of indeed distinguishes the words as comment and not statements of fact. 690 (c) In the circumstances: (i) Ramasamy claimed that the word satan, considered as a whole, was used metaphorically against Dr Zakir for allegedly undermining or mocking other faiths. It should not 695 be taken to label Dr Zakir as a devil or a man of evil. (ii) Ramasamy argued that in pleading justification, what he intended to mean in the first impugned defamatory publication was: (1) Dr Zakir is a Muslim preacher who delivers hate 700 lectures/speeches (in this context, hate speeches are speeches that tend to denigrate, mock, disparage or encourage violent reactions to particular groups of people based on race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation). (2) Because of his hate lectures/speeches, Dr Zakir has been 705 banned from delivering lectures in Canada and the United Kingdom. (3) The Plaintiff had committed a grievous wrong. (4) The Plaintiff ought to be deported from Malaysia because of his hate lectures/speeches. 710 (iii) comparative religions, he does not have academic qualifications in it. He may not have sufficient expertise in the field of comparative religion (Islam, Christianity, 715 and Hinduism). It was established at the trial that he S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 22 does not have a formal qualification on the subject, as . He reads only what is required. (iv) Ramasamy: 720 (1) Argued on an incident sometime in September 2012 or in Sri Nagar in 2003 where Dr Zakir was alleged to have made controversial statements in India during the Hindu festival of Vinayaka Chaturthi to honour the birthday of Lord Ganesha. (2) Dr Zakir was alleged to have supposedly challenged the Hindus 725 to prove that Lord Ganesha was a deity and further [Lord Ganesha], how will he recognise me if I fall into any 730 (3) He knows that eating prasad is haram. (4) In making the above statements, Dr Zakir mocks the Hindu God, Lord Shiva, by questioning how God recognises his followers if they fall into difficulty: NOP, enclosure 68, pg.189. 735 (5) Shah Alam, where he again supposedly mocked and insulted Christianity and Hinduism by saying (for ease of reference) as follows: 740 am a Hindu. At (Enclosure 46, Tab 1, Bundle, 1 pg.1589) 745 Christianity. They believe in one God, but they say, Father, Holy Spirit, and the Son. They talk about one, but they practically believe in the Trinity. So, Islam is the only religion 750 which speaks and practices Tauhid monotheism. This inspires the person about the one true God unity. Unlike other religions, nowhere can you see that you know that Gods are fighting among themselves; one God is taking the help of another God, and the Devil can defeat the God. So, all these things, a normal 755 God die? In some religions, God dies also. So, if God dies, who rules the world? So, when you see all these things, logically S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 23 people normally blindly follow. These blind beliefs are not there 760 (Enclosure 46, Tab 2, Bundle 1, pg.1590) 765 there are many things which I don't agree with the Veda. I'm not going to tell you about that. Why? Because that 770 (Enclosure 46, pg, 1591) 775 Swami Dayananda Saraswati, the Veda is one thousand three hundred and ten million years old. But the majority of the scholar student of Hinduism says the Veda is approximately four thousand years old. Today, the scholars say we don't know to whom the Veda was revealed. In which part of the world, it 780 came. There are differences. Quran, everything is authentic. Yet, the scholars believe even though we don't know what the exact age of the Veda is, even though we don't know where and which part of the world it came the first time, even though we don't know which stage it came to, yet the Hindus as a 785 So, if you get me a scripture which is lower and does not contradict and does not contradict, it cannot overrule the Vedas. And if you tell me that there are verses in the Veda 790 talking about, then there is a contradiction. So, you, as a Hindu, have to try and find where the contradiction is at. No book of Almighty God, if it is in its true form, can have any 795 contains obscene things. So, as a student of comparative 800 Even if you give me a million dollars, I cannot read. Even if you give me a million US dolla805 allow me to read obscene things in front of an audience. You S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 24 understand? But I am not here to degrade the Bible. I am talking about common things. Same thing as the Hindu scripture. As far as the Quran is concerned, its language is so 810 sublime. You can read anywhere in the world. You can read to your wife, you can read to your children, you can read to your . 815 based on that, I have done research on the Hindu scriptures, on the Jewish scriptures, on the Christian scriptures. Unfortunately, people of most religions blindly follow what is mentioned by the church and what is mentioned by the temple. 820 (Enclosure 46, Tab 4, Bundle 1, pp, 1592-1593) land of the Indus. 825 Even today, when I go to Saudi Arabia, they call me Hindi, Hindi. Hindi. So, Hindu is a geographical definition. The word Indus. So, Hindu is a geographical definition for the people living in the land of the Indus Valley. By geographical definition, 830 I am a Hindu. By geographical definition, I'm a Hindu and a Muslim. Indian Muslim, Hindu Muslim. But if you say Hindu means who believes in worshipping, then I'm not a Hindu. I point to Swami Vivekananda. Hinduism is a misnomer. The 835 Vedas. Hinduism is a misnomer. It was a word, a title given by the Arabs when they came to India, and today, they also got stuck on it. Even today, when I go to Saudi Arabia, they call me Hindi, Hindi. Yes, I am a Hindi. And I am proud to be a Hindi. But I don't believe in doing idol worship. So, coming to 840 it can be Sanata Dharma. I agree with you. Sanata Dharma believes that God is one and God has no images. Show me one person who is a pure follower of Sanata Dharma who says that God has got an image. That means you have not studied 845 (Enclosure 46, Tab 5, Bundle 1, pp, 1594-1595) (v) Ramasamy argued that the above passages allegedly 850 insulted Hinduism and Christianity. Dr Zakir had repeated these statements at the trial. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 25 Ramasamy cited: 855 (1) A news report by the BBC in the UK on 18.06.2010 (nine years before the present suits). Dr Zakir had been prohibited from entering the UK at the time, on alleged unacceptable behaviour. (2) A news report by the Toronto Star on 22.06.2010. Dr 860 Zakir had been disallowed to enter Canada. (3) A news report in the Livemint ePaper on 19.06.2017: Dr Zakir Naik, invited to Lebanon, faces calls to ban his entry. (4) A news report by the Asia Sentinel on 21.08.2019 865 claimed Dr Zakir is banned in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Australia, the UK, Canada, and many Middle Eastern nations. 6.6 Therefore, Ramasamy claims that his statement on the ban imposed 870 on Dr Zakir is justified. 6.7 Ramasamy also pleaded fair comment on the impugned first defamatory publication and cited Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 875 MLJ 242, where it was said that if a defendant can prove that the defamatory statement is an expression of opinion on a matter of public interest and not a statement of fact, they can rely on the defence of fair comment. The courts have said that whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large so that they may be 880 legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on or what may happen to them or others, then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment he is required to prove the following requirements: (i) The defamatory statements are made based on facts. 885 (ii) The defamatory statements are comments and not statements of facts; and S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 26 (iii) The defamatory statements involve matters of public interest. Ramasamy claimed to have such moral or social duty to make the 890 to the Hindu and Christian faith. It is of public interest. The use of the word satan metaphorically makes it a statement of comments rather than facts. 6.8 Ramasamy also claimed qualified privilege to insulate him against 895 the first defamatory publication and cited Nurul Izzah binti Anwar v Tan Sri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & Anor [2018] MLJU 472 that had observed that the burden lies on the defendant to establish qualified privilege on which the impugned words were published. It had been addressed earlier that establishing qualified privilege requires two 900 criteria, i.e., one, there is a legal, moral, or social duty to make the statement on one side. The other is that there is a corresponding interest to receive it. However, if it is tainted with malice, this defence will not be available (see Rajagopal v. Rajan [1971] 1 LNS 117). For this defence to succeed, the defendant must at least specify the 905 legal, moral, or social duty of the defendant to make such comments: (a) Ramasamy argued that he had a public or private duty to publish the impugned defamatory statement as the then Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang. 910 (b) The public had a corresponding interest in receiving the impugned publication of hate lectures/speeches by Dr Zakir. (c) He had no malice in making the impugned first defamatory publication. 915 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 27 6.9 Considering the parties' respective arguments, and on a balance of probabilities, I find in favour of Dr Zakir, and it is my judgment that Ramasamy has failed to establish his proferred defences to the first defamatory publication: (a) Justification: 920 (i) The burden is on Ramasamy to establish the truth or substantially the truth of his impugned statements that are defamatory of Dr Zakir. Section 8 of the Defamatory Act 1957 is an absolute defence if the requirement is proven: Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua 925 Kian Wee [2015] 8 CLJ 477, FC. (ii) In light of evidence above, I cannot see how justification can apply in those circumstances, when the truth or substantially the truth of the statement is proven unfounded at the trial. 930 (iii) Ramasamy had, during his evidence, even admitted as much (NOP, vol.4, pg.960, enclosure 72). (b) Fair Comment: (i) Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957 requires that the 935 impugned defamatory statement be a comment, not a statement of facts. The comment must be based on true facts and is a matter of public interest. (ii) To reiterate the foregoing, the truth or substantially the truth of the impugned statement is proven unfounded at the 940 trial. (iii) Evidently, the impugned statement is not a comment in its present form. It is an instigation premised on an assumed statement of facts from unsupported sources. (iv) On using satan to vilify Dr Zakir, Ramasamy admitted that 945 the word does not constitute a fair comment (NOP, vol.4, pg.959, enclosure 72). (v) Dr Zakir cited Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Mohd Rafizi Ramli [2022] 5 CLJ 487, FC that observed it is important as the first task to ascertain 950 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 28 whether the impugned statement is a statement of fact or is it the respondent's opinion and inferences made from the facts. The necessity to decide this is fundamental to determine whether the defence of fair comment is available to the respondent. This is because "if the imputation is one 955 of fact, the defence must be justification or privilege" (see Gatley on Libel and Slander, 11th edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) and therefore, the respondent could not rely on the (vi) The presence of malice on the part of Ramasamy would 960 disentitle the defence. (c) Qualified Privilege: (i) In Chew Peng Heng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2015] 10 CLJ 197 [2008] 5 MLJ 577; [2008] 8 CLJ 418, HC says 965 that: (1) The defence of qualified privilege needs two criteria, i.e., one, there is a legal, moral, or social duty to make the statement on one side. The other is that there is a corresponding interest to receive it. However, if it is tainted with malice, this defence will 970 not be available (see Rajagopal v. Rajan [1971] 1 LNS 117). (2) For this defence to succeed, the defendant must at least specify the legal, moral, or social duty of the defendant to make such comments. The defendant has failed to establish this in the present case satisfactorily. This was not stated either in his 975 defence or in his submissions. (ii) It requires that the impugned statement was made without malice: Tengku Awang & Yang Lain (2010) 7 CLJ 856, HC 980 espoused the three elements required, (1) the occasion must be fit, (2) it has reference to the occasion, and (3) it must be honest and for the right reason (no malice). (iii) Evidently, from the foregoing paragraphs, the defence 985 does not apply. The Federal Court in Dato' Dr Low bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeals [2017] 8 CLJ 369, FC observed that: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 29 (1) Malice is a necessary element in an action for libel. The law prevents the inference of malice in the publication of 990 statements which are false in fact and injurious to the character of another if such statements are fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral or in the conduct of his affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned. 995 (2) It affords a qualified defence depending on the absence of actual malice (see Toogood v. Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181, [1834] EngR 363, [1834] 1 Cr M & R 181, [1834] 149 ER 1044). (3) The prima facie defence of qualified privilege is not 1000 available if it is shown that a defendant has been actuated by actual or express malice or if he has used the occasion for some indirect or wrong motive. (4) Since I have determined that Ramasamy was malicious in targeting and vilifying Dr Zakir, this defence will also be denied. 1005 6.10 Considering the relevant evidence at the trial: (a) The use of the term satan could never be in an illustrative manner or metaphorically in the circumstances of the case, and I find such an argument misconceived and misplaced. It is a 1010 maliciously derogatory terminology against anyone. I agree with the finding of the Court in Dr Ong Keh Ong v Loh Hon Mun & Ors [2023] 1 LNS 112, HC that it has the effect of lowering the plaintiff in the estimation of the general public. It smacks of malice with the use of the word satan. Fair comment 1015 and qualified privilege must be denied. There are sufficient plethoras of authorities. (b) It was not refuted at the trial that Dr Zakir is an autodidact (a self-taught person) who is already an accomplished and 1020 renowned speaker on comparative religion for many years. I find no compelling evidence by Ramasamy to refute it save for S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 30 suggestive assertions to discredit Dr Zakir. Conjectures and speculation have no probative value. 1025 (c) that to be an expert in comparative religion, one must be formally educated with a paper qualification. (d) I like to borrow the rationale of Albert Einstein: 1030 is based on experiences of an empirical, critical nature, but I say that true knowledge is to be had only through a philosophy of deduction. For it is intuition that improves the world, not just following a trodden path of thought. Intuition makes us look at unrelated facts and then think about them until they can 1035 all be brought under one law. To look for related facts means holding onto what one has instead of searching for new facts. Intuition is the father of new knowledge, while empiricism is nothing but an accumulation of old 1040 It is an accepted reality in the knowledge world that a person's enlightenment is not attested by a piece of paper that says he has successfully completed the desired course. That cannot be the benchmark to authenticate Therefore, I find 1045 formal education is a non-starter. (e) It is my considered judgment, taking the evidence in its totality, that Dr unnecessarily dissected into pieces and taken out of their 1050 intended context to skew an adverse view of the man, which is unjust in the circumstances. I have no reason to disbelieve Dr ndu Vinayaka Chaturthi festival. His answers were sliced up, distorted, and isolated to skewed negativity of the man. From the evidence, I also find no reason 1055 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 31 to disbelieve Dr Zakir's explanation of the UiTM lecture in Shah Alam in 2012. (f) There is no compelling evidence by Ramasamy that Dr Zakir had indeed been banned in Canada. Even the purported ban in the UK had long passed in 2013 and is out of context and 1060 overstretching for the present argument by Ramasamy. (g) I have read the full text of his speeches and concluded that Dr Zakir wanted answers to questions in a discourse that he posed that never came. His question may be brash, or appear harsh, 1065 but in all fairness, I find it was objectively made in seeking answers and clarity. It was on occasions of a comparative intellectual discourse as claimed. Dr Zakir had often said that if someone qualified and knowledgeable can prove him wrong, come forward and correct him, as he is willing to be educated. 1070 (h) However, from the evidence at the trial, there was none, but only distant, defamatory bashing on social media and online platforms by taking his speeches entirely out of context. In Mohamed Hafiz Mohamed Nordin v Eric Paulsen (and 1075 another appeal) [2018] 8 AMR558, CA (Civil Appeal No. W- 02(NCVC)(W)-1668-08/2017), the Court of Appeal reverses the finding of the High Court in holding that the impugned statement was derogatory, calculated to incite hatred and anger amongst the multi-religious groups and ethnicities in Malaysia. The 1080 impugned statement not only described the plaintiff as a fraudster, a liar who incited hatred of the Islamic religion, but also as a person funded and supported by foreign entities, such S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 32 as the United States of America and the European Union. In their natural and ordinary meaning, the impugned statement 1085 meant and was understood to mean by reasonable and ordinary readers of the article that the plaintiff was anti-Islam. character and reputation. The Court of Appeal granted damages of RM100,000.00. 1090 (i) There is no evidence that someone (including Ramasamy) had actually confronted and taken Dr Zakir directly on his questions for intellectual discourse to prove him wrong or put him in his place. After all, as claimed by Ramasamy at the trial, Dr Zakir has 1095 difficult a task. Unlike the UK (The Defamation Act 2013 (UK), the plaintiff must prove harm has been caused), in Malaysia, defamatory statements made on social media are regarded as libel, as held by the court in 1100 Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak [2018] 3 CLJ 522, CA. It is libel actionable per se, so there is no need to prove actual damage suffered due to the defamatory statement: The Law on Defamation Relating to Social Media, Wong Sue Ann and Raymond Mah, https://mahwengkawi.com. 1105 (j) In Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad Azri bin Wan Deris [2014] 9 MLJ 605, HC, the plaintiff filed a defamation 1110 linking him to a sex scandal. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff alleged that the postings implied he was immoral and unqualified S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 33 to hold public office. The plaintiff claimed that the postings had damaged his reputation and caused him and his family to suffer. The High Court 1115 took judicial notice that the Internet is used worldwide. The Court said the defamatory statements were published online, and The Court declared 1120 pay the plaintiff RM800,000 in damages and an additional RM50,000 in costs. The defendant appealed. (k) On 04.12.2015, the Court of Appeal held, dismissing the appeal, that the High Court had not erred in its decision that Papa Gomo 1125 and Wan Muhammad Azri were indeed the same person. The appellant (defendant) was also ordered to pay RM10,000 in costs to the respondent (plaintiff). (l) I have no hesitation in finding that Ramasamy's impugned first 1130 defamatory publication is a personal attack on Dr Zakir. The libellous or slanderous calling of any person a satan is undoubtedly defamatory as it is derogatory of the target's character. The hostility in the impugned statement towards Dr Zakir is evident and very personally targeted. 1135 (m) The impugned statement is an apparent public instigation to turn the Malaysian public, mainly Hindu/Indian NGOs, against Zakir with those unfounded allegations (without at all verifying 1140 the source) in the first impugned defamatory publication S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 34 manifest malice that would automatically disqualify the defences he proferred over his conduct. There was no truth or substantial truth in the impugned statements of the first defamatory publication. 1145 (n) Contrary to the position taken by Dr Zakir, I find that Ramasamy did not offer any formal apology directed personally to Dr Zakir for that personal attack. I can find no such compelling evidence at the trial. The term regret carries a different connotation to an 1150 apology. A person can regret (feel sad, repentant, or disappointed over an action) without even considering apologising. As I have said, I find no evidence of an express apology other than the label placed by the publisher of the articles. That said, however, it goes to the credibility and 1155 character of Ramasamy. It shows no remorse or genuine regret over the impugned defamatory publication, even though it was admitted that it was a derogatory publication and proven unsupported: Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim Shian Ghee (T/A L & G Consultants & Education Services) [2009] 4 CLJ 1160 113, CA. (o) It is my considered judgment that this untoward provocation could have resulted in unnecessary public unrest. I find such conduct highly irresponsible and reprehensible for a person 1165 holding high office in the government (Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang at the time). (p) The defamatory elements of the statement are proven, and so is the publication of that impugned statement. I am inclined to believe on the balance of probabilities, as claimed by Dr Zakir, 1170 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 35 that the impugned defamatory publication carries adverse imputations on Dr Zakir as (a) an evil man, (b) he is a cause of disharmony among the multiracial citizens of Malaysia, (c) the Terengganu State Government made a huge mistake by inviting him to lecture in Terengganu, (d) he is not an honest 1175 Muslim preacher in propagating the teachings of Islam, and (e) he had committed an offence or offences in other countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom. In Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45, CA, Thompson CJ observed that it is sufficient if the plaintiff proves the substance 1180 of it. (q) failed in light of the adverse evidence on the first impugned defamatory publication. It cannot exonerate him from liability 1185 over this publication. I am guided by the Federal Court Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC and I also find Ramasamy had failed the responsible journalism test since he admitted at the trial that he did not take fair steps to gather, verify and publish 1190 the impugned defamatory publication. (r) On using the Lucas-Box justification in his submissions, I have e (Suit 53) and hold that the evidence at the trial does not fit his pleaded defence and is 1195 unproven at the trial on the first defamatory publication. The suggested meaning ascribed by Ramasamy is not appropriately pleaded and proven in his defence. I find it an afterthought. He anchored his pleaded defence on section 8 of S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 36 the Defamation Act 1957 in paragraph 7 for justification and 1200 section 9 for fair comment in paragraph 8 for Suit 53. In addition, the existence of malice denies Ramasamy the pleaded defence for the first defamatory publication. Second Defamatory Publication 1205 [7] On 01.10.2017, approximately 18 months after the first debacle, Dr Zakir asserted that Ramasamy libelled him in a second defamatory publication in an article that he penned Is Malaysia harbouring alleged fugitive Zakir Naik (refer paragraph 5.2(a) above), intending for it to be widely circulated on the FMT news portal. 1210 Dr Zakir argued that: (a) The second impugned defamatory publication is a hateful and unfounded personal attack. The offending article carries damaging and disparaging connotations and imputations that 1215 cast baseless aspersions on Dr Zakir. (b) In authoring the offending article, from the evidence at the trial, Ramasamy sourced the materials from the internet without verifying the truth of the information he wrote. He could not provide compelling evidence of his allegations in the offending 1220 article. 7.1 At the trial: (a) Ramasamy admitted he penned the offending article on the FMT news portal. Dr Zakir cited Nurul Huda Nazlin Hussin v 1225 Mohd Faisal Shamsuddin [2022] 1 LNS 118, HC that observed in that case that the defendant, by his admission, published the impugned words to push the JMB to take action S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 37 on certain matters or to resign from their posts. This is where the pen is mightier than the sword, where false allegations will 1230 bring the plaintiff into disrepute, and society will shun him to achieve his purpose. The defendant did not apologise in this case. Dr Zakir cited Dato' Wan Hashim bin Hj. Wan Daud v. Mazlan bin Ibrahim & Anor [1997] 5 CLJ 140; [1990] 1 MLJ 176 that observed to determine whether the impugned words 1235 were capable of being, or were, fact, defamatory of the plaintiff: (1) The test to be considered is whether such words were calculated to expose him to hatred, ridicule, or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally and 1240 (2) If the words have such a tendency, they could still be defamatory even if they did not lower a plaintiff in the estimation of those to whom they were published. (b) Ramasamy did not deny that he did not verify the facts with Dr 1245 Zakir, nor does he have any evidence to support his writing before publishing the offending article (NOP pg.1029 enclosure 72) (1) Interpol did not issue any Red Notice on Dr Zakir, even though requested by the Indian government on allegations of terrorism, hate speech, and money laundering. 1250 (2) Interpol had issued a certificate (01.12.2017) that Dr Zakir is not subject to an Interpol Red Notice or diffusion and is not known in (Part B, enclosure 40, pg.1289). (3) Interpol certificate (05.08.2019) confirms that Dr Zakir is not subject to an Interpol Red Notice or diffusion (Part B, enclosure 40, pg.1290). 1255 (4) Interpol certificate confirms that Dr Zakir is not subject to an Interpol Red Notice or diffusion. (5) cleared Dr Zakir. (6) That clears Dr Zakir from any unfounded allegations of being an 1260 attacks in etc (Part B, enclosure 40, pp.1197-1199). 1265 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 38 (7) It was established at the trial that whatever investigation by the National Investigation Agency of India died down as there was no plausible evidence on the allegations (SEPW1, enclosure 57, pp.3- 7). (8) Ramasamy conceded at the trial that the foregoing renders his 1270 allegation in the offending article unsupported. They are all baseless (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1013-1014). (9) Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ramasamy remained defiant and refused to withdraw the offending article or take corrective measures for the injury it caused Dr Zakir. It is an apparent reflection of the 1275 intent on the part of Ramasamy in the second impugned defamatory publication. (10) of connection with the Dhaka attack and ISIS: (i) Dr Zakir vehemently denied it. 1280 (ii) It was established at the trial before publishing the offending article that Ramasamy did not seek any verification from Dr Zakir (NOP, enclosure 72, pg.1040). (iii) Dr Zakir clarified the position in his re-examination. (iv) Concerning the malicious allegation by Ramasamy of Dr 1285 in Dhaka, Ramasamy conceded that the Bangladeshi government never requested the extradition of Zakir Naik (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.977-978). (11) Dr Zakir cited Abd Kudus Ahmad v Datuk M Kayveas & Anor [2014] 1 LNS1396 that observed in that case that the defendants 1290 were not entitled to report the unproven allegations of corruption against the plaintiff in such a manner as to show that there was sufficient evidence against the plaintiff, i.e., in the form of a clear pre- judgment of the plaintiff's guilt. (12) The allegation concerning IRF, and money laundering is entirely 1295 groundless: (i) Not only did Interpol clear Dr Zakir, but the Indian Appellate Tribunal had also disallowed the Enforcement Directorate from seizing (SEPW1: enclosure 57, pp.10-11). (ii) Mr Justice Manmohan Singh determined that there was no 1300 evidence linking Dr Zakir to money laundering and inciting youths to engage in violent activities. (iii) The justice found nothing objectionable (Part B, enclosure 40, pp.1202-1206). 1305 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 39 (c) The offending article explicitly refers to Dr Zakir and has garnered widespread publication. There can be no dispute to that: (i) There was no professionalism in authoring the offending article that had defamed Dr Zakir. 1310 (ii) Lim Guan Eng & Anor v New Straits Time Press (M) Berhad & Anor [2015] 1 LNS 1140 was cited in addressing the application of the Reynolds privilege for responsible journalism. (iii) The Court, in that case, observed that the tone and the 1315 language of the said article were reported in professional language (such as the title of the article only used the word "Indian-interest group claims thugs interrupted meeting") with no sensationalising made to both the personalities (SP1 and SP2) as what Malaysiakini did. 1320 (iv) Also, in that case, the defendant used the words "claims " and "believed " in the article, which indicates responsible journalism. (v) Unlike in the instant case, evidently, no professionalism was applied in authoring the offending article that 1325 personally targeted Dr Zakir. It was maliciously published to injure Dr Zakir. (vi) The principles that can be distilled from Lim case (supra) are: (1) The offending article could have adverse connotations or 1330 imputations against the plaintiff that leave a direct impression in the reader's mind. (2) The offending article tends to lower the plaintiff in the approximation of right-thinking members of society. (3) The offending article is thus defamatory of the plaintiff. 1335 (4) The late Gopal Sri Ram in Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 observed that do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning attribute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or lack of integrity on his part? If the 1340 question invites an agreeing response, then the words complained of are defamatory, citing JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Richard Malanjum J in Tun S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 40 & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ. 1345 7.2 Ramasamy pleaded justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege as his defences to the second defamatory publication. It was established at the trial that in the offending article was grounded on unverified online Indian 1350 sources. 7.3 Ramasamy did not dispute the publication, but as with the first defamatory publication, he repeated the Lucas-Box justification for the second impugned defamatory publication. He argued that the 1355 meaning he reasonably ascribed to the impugned statements in their natural and ordinary meaning is inconsistent with the defamatory meanings taken by Dr Zakir. Ramasamy meant: (1) (2) That the plaintiff was wanted in India for suspected terrorist-related 1360 activities and links to the Indian underworld, including Dawood I (3) The allegations were also that funds from Dawood Ibrahim's underworld activities were used to finance the IRF. (4) If that were the case, it would not augur well for diplomatic relations 1365 between India and Malaysia. (5) Malaysia should extradite Indian fugitives, including the plaintiff, to India and vice versa. (6) That the plaintiff appeared to be in Malaysia despite apparent denials by the then Deputy Home Minister of Malaysia. 1370 (7) It therefore appeared that Malaysia was harbouring the plaintiff. Malaysia should not harbour the plaintiff. (8) Malaysia should come clean on the presence or otherwise of the plaintiff in Malaysia. (9) 1375 something to do with the terrorist attacks in Dhaka and had instigated some youths in Kerala to take part in ISIS activities. (10) While Malaysia had taken a tough stand about ISIS, it harboured the plaintiff. 1380 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 41 7.4 Ramasamy pleaded justification for the second defamatory publication: (a) The Dhaka attack on 1.7.2016 was widely reported, resulting in the death of civilians and security forces. Dr Zakir was alleged to have influenced the attackers. 1385 (b) Dr Zakir admitted in his evidence that he was accused of allegedly being linked with the Dhaka Attack on the allegation that his teachings influenced the attackers. (c) On 07.07.2016, the Hindustan Times reported that the Indian government was launching a probe on Dr Zakir as a 1390 consequence thereof. Probes on his speeches and request by an MP for a probe on the funding of his organisation IRF (Islamic Research Foundation), the banning of IRF. (d) take action against Dr Zakir. Sometime in November 2016, the 1395 Indian Government banned IRF for five years. (e) The authorities had lodged an investigation of suspected money laundering against Dr Zakir and IRF. (f) On 27.02.2017, the Indian authorities summoned Dr Zakir to return to India to face the money laundering probe. Finally, an 1400 arrest warrant was issued in India on 13.0 refusal to attend the probe. (g) 1405 (i) Refusal to appear in the probe resulted in the authority the India Criminal Procedure Code. (ii) His Indian Passport was revoked on 18.7.2017. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 42 (iii) On 12.10.2018, the Indian authority ordered the 1410 attachment of properties belonging to Dr Zakir. (iv) A charge sheet was filed by the Indian authority against Dr Zakir on 26.10.2017, and they wanted him to return. (v) On 14.10.2019, the India Times reported that Dr Zakir and two hardline preachers of Pakistan were involved in a love 1415 jihad case, where one of the individuals involved was radicalised and forced into Islam. (vI) Subsequently, Dr Zakir moved to Malaysia and was granted permanent resident status in 2016. Therefore, Ramasamy argued it is an issue whether Malaysia is 1420 harbouring Dr Zakir, who is wanted in India. 7.5 Ramasamy pleaded fair comment on the second defamatory publication: (a) From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the Malaysian 1425 government has refused to extradite Dr Zakir to India. As the then Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang, Ramasamy has a social and moral duty to publish the impugned defamatory statement as a matter of public interest. (b) Taken as a whole, the second defamatory statement is an 1430 opinion or comment of Ramasamy grounded on true facts on the issue and not a statement of fact. 7.6 Ramasamy also pleaded qualified privilege on the second defamatory publication. 1435 (a) He argued that there can be no doubt that there was a reciprocal interest between him and the Malaysian public receiving the impugned statement concerning the Malaysian government harbouring Dr Zakir, a wanted man in India. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 43 (b) The impugned statement was made for the welfare of 1440 Malaysian society, and Ramasamy should be protected by qualified privilege. 7.7 Considering the totality of the evidence and parties' respective arguments, and on the balance of probabilities, I also find in favour 1445 of Dr Zakir, and it is my judgment that Ramasamy has failed to establish his proferred defences to the second defamatory publication: (a) Justification: (i) The burden is on Ramasamy to establish the truth or 1450 substantially the truth of his impugned statements that are defamatory of Dr Zakir. Section 8 of the Defamatory Act 1957 is an absolute defence if the requirement is proven. It is incumbent on Ramasamy to prove the truth or substantially the truth of his impugned statement in the 1455 offending article: Loh Li Sze v Eugene Chong Haou Inn & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1620. (ii) In light of the evidence in the foregoing paragraph, I cannot see how justification can apply when the truth or substantially the truth of the statement is proven 1460 unfounded at the trial when his allegation was successfully debunked. (iii) During his evidence, Ramasamy even admitted that his offending article is based on unverified sources (NOP, enclosure 72, pp 975-976, pg.979, enclosure 72). 1465 (b) Fair Comment: (i) Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957 requires that the 1470 impugned defamatory statement be a comment, not a statement of facts. The comment must be based on true facts and is a matter of public interest. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 44 (ii) To reiterate the foregoing, the truth or substantially the truth of the impugned statement is proven unfounded at the 1475 trial. (iii) Evidently, the offending article is not a comment in its present form. As with the first defamatory publication, it is also a provocation premised on an assumed statement of facts from unsupported sources that Dr Zakir had 1480 successfully debunked at the trial. (iv) Dr Zakir cited Chew Mei Fun v Tony Pua Kiam Wee & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1357 that held: (1) To establish fair comment, it must be proven that the statement expresses an opinion grounded on truthful facts. 1485 (2) Obviously, the offending article by Ramasamy is not an expression of an opinion. It is not anchored on the truth or substantial truth of the matter. (3) As rightly cited by Dr Zakir, Abd Kudus Ahmad v Datuk M Kayveas & Anor [2014] 1 LNS1396 had observed that the 1490 defendants were not entitled to report the unproven allegations in the form of a clear pre-judgment of the plaintiff's guilt. (v) The presence of malice on the part of Ramasamy in the circumstances would disentitle the defence. 1495 (l) Qualified Privilege: (i) Ramasamy claimed he was under a moral and social duty to communicate the words complained of, and the public at large had a corresponding interest in receiving the information. Dr Zakir disagreed and said the public had no 1500 corresponding interest but only the police or the authorities. Citing Dr Chong Eng Leong v Tan Sri Harris Mohd Salleh [2017] 10 CLJ 657 that observed: (1) A defendant's conduct in publishing material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the 1505 defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue. (2) In the present case, Ramasamy admitted at the trial that he 1510 never took any steps to verify the contents of his article that S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 45 vilified Dr Zakir when contemporaneous documents were available to debunk his defamatory allegations. (ii) To reiterate Chew Peng Heng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2015] 10 CLJ 197 [2008] 5 MLJ 577; [2008] 8 CLJ 418, 1515 HC that, the defence of qualified privilege needs two criteria, i.e., one, there is a legal, moral, or social duty to make the statement on one side. The other is that there is a corresponding interest to receive it. However, if it is tainted with malice, this defence will not be available (see 1520 Rajagopal v. Rajan [1971] 1 LNS 117). (iii) Evidently, from the foregoing paragraphs, the defence does not apply. The defence of qualified privilege is not available if it is shown that a defendant has been actuated by actual or express malice or if he has used the occasion 1525 for some indirect or wrong motive: Dato' Dr Low bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeals [2017] 8 CLJ 369, FC. Since I have determined that Ramasamy was malicious in targeting and vilifying Dr Zakir, this defence will also be denied. 1530 7.8 Considering the evidence at the trial: (a) Dr Zakir, in his evidence (NOP, enclosure 71, pp.704-706), clarified that: (i) The first time the Indian authority charged him was for 1535 promoting terrorism. To get the Interpol Red Notice, they needed to file the charge. Interpol denied it for lack of evidence in connecting Dr Zakir to terrorism. So, the Indian authority issued a warrant for this. (ii) The second time, the Indian authority laid charges for 1540 giving hate speeches and was asked to attend the probe. Since he was away, he agreed to a video conference, as I a second warrant. (iii) For the third time, the Indian authority laid charges for 1545 money laundering to get the Red Notice from Interpol. Interpol denied it for want of evidence connecting him to S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 46 money laundering. So, the Indian authority issued a third warrant. (iv) The fourth time, the Indian authority proceeded under the 1550 Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) to attach his properties. A warrant was issued. When the matter came up before the High Court, Justice Manmohan Singh chided the Indian authority that he had seen hundreds of Dr re videos, and they could not produce one 1555 video of his lecture where he promoted terrorism. Justice Manmohan Sing denied the application. (v) Dr Zakir asserts that he has never been convicted of these charges in India or any other country. Never in his life has he been convicted of a crime. 1560 (vi) He takes these defamatory actions against Ramasamy because he has maligned him the most. (b) At the trial, Ramasamy, in his evidence, did not raise any . He agreed 1565 that Interpol did not accept the Indian authority's version of the story on Dr Zakir. (c) Ramasamy also acknowledged at the trial in his evidence that Interpol had cleared Dr Zakir from charges of terrorism, hate 1570 speech and money laundering in its decision on 26.10.2018, 2.07.2019, and 26.01.2021 (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1078-1079). In his evidence, Ramasamy also acknowledged that Interpol found the charges against Dr Zakir baseless (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1013-1014). 1575 (d) Ramasamy also acknowledged that in his evidence at the trial, Dr Zakir was in Malaysia lawfully and was also a guest of the Government of Qatar (NOP, enclosure 72, pg.1082). The term fugitive has no application in this context. 1580 (e) Dr Zakir, in his evidence, argued that contrary to the allegation of Ramasamy that he was a fugitive, he equates his relocation S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 47 to hijrah to ensure the preservation of his life from an oppressive authority (NOP encl.87, pp.1158-1160). 1585 (f) Dr Zakir denied any involvement in the Dhaka terrorist attack that Ramasamy linked him to. It was established at the trial that Ramasamy never attempted to clarify the story before publishing it. Ramasamy admitted that notwithstanding the 1590 allegations, the Bangladeshi government never made any request to extradite Dr Zakir to Bangladesh (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.977-978). (g) This second defamatory publication is also a targeted personal 1595 attack on the personality of Dr Zakir, 18 months after the first debacle. In light of the evidence at the trial, I agree with Dr Zakir that the offending article by Ramasamy is defamatory. It carries adverse connotations. 1600 (h) The degree of hostility shown by Ramasamy towards Dr Zakir in the offending article has not abated since the first debacle 18 months earlier. The offending article is constructed to rile up the Malaysian public against Dr Zakir and is grounded on unverified 1605 (i) publishing the offending article, as a responsible author would in authoring such an adverse piece on another. 1610 (j) In such circumstances, Ramasamy must be held accountable, and he has failed the responsible journalism test cited in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC. 1615 (k) It is my considered judgment that the display of lack of objectivity by Ramasamy manifests malice on his part. It is not concerned with the truth of the materials in the offending article but only that it garners widespread notoriety of Dr Zakir S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 48 irrespective of the integrity of the information that the article 1620 contained. (l) The presence of malice would automatically disqualify the defences he is proffering to the Court over his conduct. There was no truth or substantial truth in the impugned statements of 1625 the second defamatory publication. (m) Even after his allegations in the article were successfully debunked at the trial, he showed no remorse or regret. As with the first defamatory publication, this reflects upon his 1630 demeanour. I find such conduct highly irresponsible and reprehensible for a person holding high office in the government (Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang at the time). (n) 1635 second impugned defamatory publication. I am unconvinced of his arguments to exonerate himself. (o) On the plea of the Lucas-Box justification on the second 1640 defence (Suit 53), I hold that the evidence at the trial does not fit his pleaded defence. The suggested meaning ascribed by Ramasamy is not appropriately pleaded in his defence and is unproven at the trial. I find it an afterthought. He anchored his 1645 pleaded defence on section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 in paragraph 16 for justification and section 9 for fair comment in paragraph 17 for Suit 53. In addition. The existence of malice denies Ramasamy the pleaded defences. 1650 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 49 [8] The third and fourth defamatory publication arises from a public lecture Dr Zakir was invited to give in Kelantan on 08.08.2019: 1655 8.1 Third Defamatory Publication On 11.08.2019, approximately 22 months after the second debacle, Ramasamy penned another Naik Should Not Question the Loyalty of Hindus in Malaysia (refer paragraph 5.3(a) above). 1660 Ramasamy admitted during the trial that he did publish the offending article on the FMT news portal on 11.08.2019. 8.2 Fourth Defamatory Publication On 20.08.2019, approximately 9 days after the third defamatory 1665 publication, Ramasamy gave an online interview with India Today (Zakir Naik Crackdown Penang Deputy CM Exclusive Interview with India Today on Zakir Ban) and slandered Dr Zakir. The interview has been transcribed, in a nutshell (refer paragraph 5.4(a) above). 1670 8.3 At the trial (a) There is no issue that both the third and fourth defamatory publications referred to Dr Zakir since he had been explicitly named in both publications. Ramasamy did not dispute at the trial that the impugned publications refer to Dr Zakir. 1675 (b) Dr Zakir argued that the third and fourth defamatory publications carry adverse imputations against him. He cited Roslan Ali v The New Straits Times (M) Bhd & Anor [2017] 1 LNS 1356, which observed that statements or words were defamatory if they tended to lower the plaintiff in the estimation 1680 of right-thinking men or if they would expose him to hatred, S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 50 contempt or ridicule or cause him to be shunned or avoided. It was argued that Ramasamy: (1) Had made baseless allegations against Dr Zakir that are factually incorrect concerning the Hindus and Chinese. 1685 (2) Ramasamy had sensationalised the alleged fugitive status of Dr Zakir in this country when the same is untrue. (3) Accused Dr Zakir of having carried out a mischievous comparative perspective on religion that had created tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia. 1690 (4) Ramasamy had labelled Dr Zakir as poison, venom, fraudster, or trickster. (c) In his evidence, Dr Zakir: (i) Negated the allegations labelled at him 1695 issue by giving a press release on 13.08.2019 to clear the smear campaign to vilify him (Part B, enclosure 35, pp.32.34). (ii) Dr Zakir asserted that he never used the word loyal as suggested in the defamatory publications; the word used was support, which bears a different connotation. 1700 (iii) It was badly misquoted and twisted out of context to skew support for Ramasamy's third and fourth defamatory publications. (d) In his evidence, Dr Zakir (SEPW1(A), enclosure 52, pp.24-27): 1705 (i) Negated the allegations labelled at him on the Chinese issue by giving a press release on 8.8.2019 to clear the smear campaign to vilify him (Part B, enclosure 35, pp.35.37). (ii) Dr Zakir asserts he is a man of peace out on a mission to 1710 spread peace and truth. (iii) But a few hate-mongers, many with political agendas, want to disrupt his mission by misquoting and fabricating information against him. (iv) Information received ought to be verified before acting on 1715 it. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 51 (e) There was never any issue of insulting the Hindus or the Chinese, as alleged by Ramasamy in the third and fourth defamatory publications. 1720 (f) These press releases did not elicit any rebuttal from Ramasamy to challenge the clarification by Dr Zakir (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1043 & 1045). It reflects adversely on the purported truth of unfounded allegations in the third and fourth defamatory publications. 1725 (g) On Zakir, it was argued that: (i) On 21.08.2019, Tun Mahathir Mohamad, the PM at the time, issued a statement, reported in the Metro that the PM 1730 of India did not make any request for the deportation of Dr Zakir to India (Part B enclosure 40, pp.1287-1288). (ii) On 21.08.2019, Datuk Seri Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, MB of Terengganu, issued a statement captured by Metro that pressure from some parties, including several cabinet 1735 ministers, to deport Dr Zakir must be accompanied by concrete arguments to ensure justice is observed (Part B, enclosure 40, pp.1260-1261). (iii) On 16.08.2018, Berita Harian reported the Chairman of the 1740 that Dr Zakir should not be presumed a threat to society as the racial statements are only his personal views (Part B, enclosure 40, pp.1242-1243) (iv) On 16.08.2019, the Mufti of Pahang, Datuk Seri Abdul Rahman Osman, was reported by Metro as saying that he 1745 disagrees with certain parties wanting to deport Dr Zakir as he did not divide the people but only explained the truth about Islam (Part B, enclosure 40, pg.1245) (v) On 15.08.2018, FMT reporters quoted the President of Pas, Tuan Guru Dato Seri Abdul Hadi Awang, as saying 1750 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 52 that credentials to speak on comparative religion (Part B, enclosure 40, pp.1240-1241). Ramasamy elected not to refute these arguments but continued 1755 ranting for the deportation of Dr Zakir. In his evidence, Ramasamy acknowledged that he knew that the PM of India never requested the deportation of Dr Zakir from Tun Mahathir before publishing the third and fourth defamatory publications (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1022-1023). 1760 (h) Dr Zakir denies any allegation that his speeches created disharmony and tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, as alleged. (i) It is not an issue that the impugned third and fourth defamatory publications, such as FMT and India Today. 1765 8.4 Ramasamy pleaded justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege as his defences to the third and fourth impugned defamatory publications. Ramasamy: 1770 (a) dispute the publication of the third and fourth defamatory publications. Similarly, he argues that the impugned publications are not defamatory of Dr Zakir. He argued that what Dr Zakir understood was not what he had ascribed to the two impugned defamatory publications. The 1775 alleged alternative meanings ascribed by Ramasamy in its natural and ordinary reading: (i) Third Defamatory Publication: (a) That the plaintiff is a fugitive from India who is evading legal action for charges pertaining to money laundering and terrorist-1780 related attacks. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 53 (b) That the plaintiff has insulted and belittled religions other than Islam in Malaysia, on the pretext of engaging in comparative religion. (c) The plaintiff should not be allowed to speak about religions 1785 other than Islam in Malaysia. (d) The plaintiff has accused Hindus in Malaysia of being disloyal to the Prime Minister of Malaysia and instead were loyal to the Prime Minister of India. (e) That loyalty to another country could be seen as treasonous. 1790 (f) That by absconding India to avoid the law of the land for charges brought against him as aforesaid, the plaintiff was disloyal to the country of his origin. (g) That some Malaysians were being manipulated by the plaintiff for his own selfish reasons. 1795 (h) If the plaintiff is true to his religion, he ought to return to India and stand trial there. (i) Malaysians of all faiths will suffer the consequences of the 1800 (ii) Fourth Defamatory Publication: (a) That the plaintiff had questioned the loyalty of the Hindus in Malaysia. (b) That the plaintiff had accused the Malaysian Hindus of being 1805 more loyal to the Prime Minister of India. (c) That the plaintiff had said that the Chinese in Malaysia should leave Malaysia before himself. (d) Hindus have angered the non-Muslim community and have 1810 increased tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia. (e) The apology was not sincere, was half-hearted, and was designed to cover up what the plaintiff said in Kota Bharu. (f) Tun Mahathir also felt the plaintiff had overstayed his welcome 1815 in Malaysia. (g) the plaintiff is a fugitive from India evading the Indian justice system. (h) That if the plaintiff was a true Muslim, he would return to India to face the Indian justice system. 1820 (i) That the plaintiff incites hate by using comparative religion as a means to belittle other religions and is a hate monger. (j) That the plaintiff was a fraudster and a trickster. (k) That the plaintiff engaged in selective prosecution, in that the plaintiff did not appear to take action against Malay Muslims 1825 who criticised him but rather lodged police reports against non-Muslims. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 54 8.5 Ramasamy pleaded Lucas-Box justification espoused by the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor v Tony Pua Kiam 1830 Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC, (as addressed in paragraph 6.5 above). He seeks to prove his own reasonable meaning to the words complained of by showing reasonable ground for suggesting the meaning he sought to prove for the third and fourth defamatory publications: 1835 (a) The third and fourth defamatory publications arose from Dr 08.08.2019, where he was alleged to have made offensive remarks against the Malaysian Chinese and Indians. (b) Ramasamy alleged that Dr Zakir had labelled the Malaysian 1840 Chinese as guests/old guests (pendatang) in this country and asked them to go back, sayin Malaysia. It is a racially derogatory term. Calling the Malays, Chinese, and Indians pendatang is taboo as it unfairly questions their Malaysian citizenship and loyalty. 1845 (c) hat Malaysian Hindus support the Prime Minister of India but not the Prime Minister of Malaysia and that Malaysian Hindus are more Indians than Malaysians themselves. This denigrated the Malaysian Hindus. These statements by Dr Zakir were criticised 1850 by MCA President Datuk Seri Wee Ka Siong (Part B enclosure 38, pg.870-872), Marina Mahathir (Part B, enclosure 38, pp.892-893); Lim Kit Siang (Part B, enclosure 38, pp.860); National Patriot Association (Part B, enclosure 38, pp.863-864); Syed Saddiq (Part B, enclosure 38, pp.879-880); Tun Mahathir Mohamad (Part B, 1855 enclosure 38, pp.852-853). S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 55 8.6 Ramasamy pleaded fair comment on the third and fourth defamatory publications: (a) The offensive remarks on Indians and Chinese by Dr Zakir in his lecture in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, are issues of public interest. 1860 As the then Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang, Ramasamy has a legal, social, or moral duty to make the impugned third and defamatory publications as a matter of public interest. (b) The third and fourth defamatory publications constitute fair comments on the impugned statements based on true facts. 1865 8.7 Ramasamy pleaded qualified privilege on the third and fourth defamatory publications: (a) The third and fourth defamatory publications were on the discharge of 1870 Minister II of Penang. (b) Ramasamy and the party receiving the impugned publications have a reciprocal interest in reading it. It was for the welfare of Malaysian society. There was no malice in the offending remarks. 1875 8.8 Considering the totality of evidence, the parties' respective arguments, and on the balance of probabilities, I find in favour of Dr Zakir, and it is my judgment that Ramasamy has failed to establish his proferred defences to the third and fourth defamatory 1880 publications: (a) Justification: (i) Dr Zakir cited Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim v Lim Guan Eng [2023] 1 LNS 1762, CA, where the Court of Appeal observed that: 1885 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 56 (1) A successful defence of justification must commensurate and correspond with the degree of the imputation of the defamatory statement. The tortfeasor cannot resile from his statement of guilt to cower behind lesser truth. (2) In the present case, Ramasamy cannot establish the truth of 1890 his allegations/statements in the third and fourth impugned defamatory publications. (3) During Cross-Examination, Ramasamy admitted that he could not confirm the facts of whether the Plaintiff had been convicted for any fraudulent activities in any Court in Malaysia, or to 1895 commit fraud against anyone, or whether police reports had been lodged against the Plaintiff because he tricked someone: NOP, vol.4, pg.1078-1079, pp.1081-1082, pp.1082-1083, enclosure 72. (4) Ramasamy's allegations in the third and fourth defamatory 1900 publications were successfully negated, leaving his allegation unfounded. He cannot now prove the truth or substantial truth in his impugned defamatory statements. (ii) Similar to the first two defamatory publications, in light of 1905 the evidence before me, I cannot see how justification can apply to the third and fourth defamatory publications when the truth or substantially the truth of the statement is proven unfounded at the trial when his allegation was successfully debunked. 1910 (b) Fair Comment: (i) To reiterate the foregoing, the truth or substantially the truth of the impugned statements in the third and fourth impugned defamatory statements are successfully proven 1915 unfounded at the trial. (ii) Similar to the first two defamatory publications, the third and fourth defamatory publications do not express a comment in their present form. It is also a provocation premised on an assumed statement of unsupported facts 1920 that Dr Zakir had successfully debunked at the trial. (iii) Dr Zakir had earlier cited Chew Mei Fun v Tony Pua Kiam Wee & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1357 that held: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 57 (1) To establish fair comment, it must be proven that the statement expresses an opinion grounded on truthful facts. 1925 (2) Evidently, the offending third and fourth defamatory publications by Ramasamy do not express opinions. (3) It is not anchored on the truth or substantial truth of the matter. (4) Unsupported, the allegations by Ramasamy would be actuated by malice and personal animosity towards Dr Zakir 1930 (iv) The presence of malice on the part of Ramasamy in the circumstances would disentitle the defence. (c) Qualified Privilege: (i) Ramasamy claimed he was under a moral and social duty 1935 to communicate the words complained of, and the public at large had a corresponding interest in receiving the information: (1) Dr Zakir disagreed and said the public had no corresponding interest but for the police or the authorities. Citing Dr Chong 1940 Eng Leong v Tan Sri Harris Mohd Salleh [2017] 10 CLJ 657 that observed a defendant's conduct in publishing material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so far as they were 1945 reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue. (2) In the present case, Ramasamy admitted at the trial that he never took any steps to verify the contents of his article that vilified Dr Zakir when contemporaneous documents were 1950 available to debunk his defamatory allegations. (ii) Evidently, from the foregoing paragraphs, the defence does not apply. The defence of qualified privilege is not available if it is shown that a defendant has been actuated 1955 by actual or express malice or if he has used the occasion for some indirect or wrong motive: Dato' Dr Low bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeals [2017] 8 CLJ 369, FC. Since I have determined that Ramasamy was malicious in targeting and vilifying Dr Zakir, this defence 1960 will also be denied. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 58 8.9 Considering the evidence at the trial: meaning suggested by Ramasamy is an afterthought in trying to conform 1965 with the legal requirement on justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege. (a) Dr Zakir, in his evidence, clarified the position that he had always been misquoted and taken out of context in his 1970 speeches that had maligned him unnecessarily. I have considered his evidence and clarification and find no plausible reason to disbelieve him. Taken in context, the allegation levelled against him is not tenable. Dr Zakir clarified that he never offended the Malaysian Indians and Chinese. I have 1975 examined his clarification in its actual context and find he has been misquoted and maligned. (b) Dr Zakir claims he is not a fugitive as Interpol has refused the 1980 him for terrorism, money laundering, and hate speeches for want of convincing evidence. Even Justice Manmohan Singh of the Indian High for the forfeiture of his properties, was denied on lack of convincing evidence. The learned Judge could not find any 1985 video recording of his alleged hate speeches. Ramasamy himself admitted in his evidence that Interpol had cleared Dr Zakir of all allegations, rendering them baseless, and he has no objection to Justice Manmohan Singh's statement. Ramasamy . 1990 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 59 (c) Contrary to the allegations that he is on the run, Dr Zakir took the position that he is on hijrah to Malaysia for the preservation of his life and safety and the well-being of the ummah. Taking parallels with the hijrah taken by the Prophet from Makkah to 1995 Madinah, that was also a security concern. (d) Before publishing these impugned third and fourth defamatory publications, Ramasamy never sought Dr Zakir to verify and clarify his side of the story for the requirement of responsible 2000 journalism. (e) Dr Zakir gave his version of the Dhaka attack, which I find no reason to disbelieve. Even Ramasamy admitted in his evidence that the Bangladeshi authorities have never requested the 2005 extradition of Dr Zakir on the Dhaka attack. (f) It is evident that the third unfounded defamatory publication is also a targeted personal attack on Dr Zakir, twenty-two (22) months after the second debacle. In light of the evidence at the 2010 trial, I agree with Dr Zakir that the offending article by Ramasamy is defamatory. It carries adverse connotations in that Dr Zakir (1) is an unprincipled and/ or unethical person who would abuse the Islamic religion for his personal gain and/or purpose, (2) has dishonestly accused the Malaysian Hindus of 2015 disloyalty to Malaysia and the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir, (3) he has calculatedly attempted to create a gap among the multi-ethnic religious Malaysians with the dubious motive of splitting the same and causing disharmony and disunity among them, (4) he is, purportedly a fraudster, a 2020 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 60 trickster, and a fugitive, should not be given permanent resident status in Malaysia, (5) he is a criminal who should stand trial and not act as a coward, running from one country to another, (6) he is a convict who has run away from the Indian authorities to seek refuge in Malaysia, and (7) he is a venom, a poison, a 2025 fraudster, a trickster, a fugitive, and a hate monger who is seeking asylum in Malaysia. (g) On the fourth unfounded defamatory publication nine (9) days after the third debacle. I agree that the offending interview is 2030 indeed slanderous of Dr Zakir. It carries adverse connotations that (1) he is a dishonest person who would abuse the Islamic religion for his selfish purpose, (2) he has unfairly and dishonestly accused Malaysian Hindus of being disloyal to Malaysia, (3) he calculatedly attempted to create a gap among 2035 multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaysians to obtain the support of the Malaysian Muslim community to enjoy immunity and privilege for his continued stay in Malaysia, (4) he is dishonestly leveraging and taking advantage of the current polemic relating to race and religion in the country for his 2040 survival and benefit, (5) he has dubious motives for splitting the Malaysian population and bringing about disharmony and disunity among them, (6) he does not deserve to be accorded a permanent residency in Malaysia, (7) he is being used for specific political purposes and/or by political parties, and for that 2045 purpose, will use them to further his ambitions and, therefore, is partisan in Malaysian politics, and (8) he is a criminal and has committed several offences under the Penal Code and the Sedition Act. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 61 (h) The degree of hostility shown by Ramasamy towards Dr Zakir 2050 is evident and has not abated since the first defamatory publication on his Facebook account on 10.04.2016. Undoubtedly, from the evidence at the trial, after approximately three years and four months, it had become very personal. 2055 (i) Similar to the first and second defamatory publications, the third and fourth defamatory publications are also constructed to provoke anger and hatred against Dr Zakir using unverified sources of information in the offending publications. In simply refusing to seek clarification and verification on the damaging 2060 contents of the two impugned defamatory publications, Ra (j) Ramasamy admitted at the trial that he did not attempt to get 2065 defamatory publications, irrespective of the veracity or otherwise of those impugned adverse allegations. It seeks to vilify Dr Zakir to the Malaysian public. It is my considered view that this display of lack of objectivity by Ramasamy manifests malice on his part that is not concerned with the truth of the 2070 materials in the offending publications, but only that it garners widespread notoriety of Dr Zakir irrespective of the integrity of the information that the publications contained. (k) I take cognisance that Ramasamy showed no remorse or regret 2075 for his actions even after all the defamatory allegations in the third and fourth defamatory publications had been debunked at the trial. It reflects upon his demeanour. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 62 (l) The presence of malice would automatically disqualify the defences Ramasamy is proffering to the Court over his conduct. 2080 There was no truth or substantial truth in the impugned statements of the third and fourth defamatory publications. He did not satisfy the responsible journalism test cited by the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC. 2085 (m) On the plea of the Lucas-Box justification, I have examined he evidence at the trial does not fit his pleaded defence on the third and fourth defamatory publications. The suggested meaning 2090 ascribed by Ramasamy is not appropriately pleaded in his defence and is unproven at the trial. I find it an afterthought. He anchored his pleaded defence on section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 in paragraphs 26 and 34 for justification and section 9 for fair comment in paragraphs 27 and 35 for Suit 53. In 2095 addition, the existence of malice denies Ramasamy the pleaded defences. I fi defamatory publications. 2100 [9] Fifth Defamatory Publication (In Suit 70) On 08.11.2019, approximately two and half months after the fourth debacle, Ramasamy targeted and released the fifth defamatory publication against Dr Zakir (refer paragraph 5.7(a) above) in an article entitled DAP leader accuses Zakir camp of faking Tamil Tigers revival 2105 on the Malaysian Insight news portal (three years (3) and six months (6) after the first defamatory publication on 10.04.2016). There is no issue S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 63 that this offending article has been published to the Malaysian public besides Dr Zakir via the Malaysian Insight online news platform. 2110 9.1 At the trial: (a) Ramasamy: (i) Admitted publishing the impugned defamatory article. (ii) However, he asserts that the impugned fifth publication only refers to the supporters of Dr Zakir and only 2115 contextually to Dr Zakir. (iii) As rightly pointed out by Dr Zakir, Ramasamy confirmed that the impugned statement did refer to him (NOP, enclosure 72, pg.1060) (iv) Dr Zakir cited Muhammad Syuhaimi Hj Abdul Jofli & 2120 Anor v Hamirah Izzatie Sabarin [2023] 3 CLJ 599 that referred to and followed Knupffer v. London Express [1944] AC 116, 120 [1944] 1 All ER 495, 113 LJKB 251 in saying that: (1) "The test of whether words that do not specifically name the 2125 [Claimant] refer to him or not is this: Are they such as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the Claimant to believe that he was the person referred to? David Syme v. Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234, 238 (Isaacs J). 2130 (2) This is an objective test. If such people would understand the words, the Claimant doesn't need to prove that there were, in fact, such people who read the offending words. Hence, an individual defamed by name in Cornwall has a cause of action even if he was unknown in that county at the time of 2135 publication: see Gatley on Libel & Slander 12th ed para 7.3; Multigroup Bulgaria Ltd v. Oxford Analytica Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 74, [2001] EMLR 28, 22. (b) Taken in its full context, there is no denying that the impugned 2140 fifth defamatory statement does indeed refer to or implicate Dr Zakir. Ramasamy, during cross-examination, agreed that Dr (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1089-1890). S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 64 (c) I agreed with Dr Zakir's assertion; taken in context, the impugned fifth publication is indeed defamatory of Dr Zakir. He 2145 cited Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah Anwar & Anor [2021] 4 CLJ 327, FC that it was a question of fact to be determined by the standard of an ordinary and reasonable-minded reader if the impugned article is defamatory concerning the impression created in the mind of 2150 such a reader after viewing the entire article (the media power of suggestion). It was argued by Dr Zakir that the offending article was ill-intended, carrying adverse connotations on the LTTE issue against him. It was actuated by malice, hatred, envy, and spite without verifying the truth in those impugned 2155 statements in the offending publication. 9.2 Ramasamy pleaded justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege to defend the fifth defamatory publication (Suit 70). Ramasamy: 2160 (a) Pleaded that the fifth defamatory publication on Tamil tigers LTTE revival did not refer to Dr Zakir, though it specifically mentioned his name in it. He cited: (i) Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim Shian Ghee & Anor [2009] 3 MLJ 665, CA, which observed that the test is 2165 whether reasonable readers generally or a reasonable reader with particular knowledge would understand the statement to refer to the plaintiff. (ii) He also cited Noor Asiah Bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175, which held that 2170 the offending articles, when read as a whole, would lead those who were dealing with the plaintiffs to the conclusion that the articles referred to them and that both the articles S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 65 were defamatory of the plaintiffs and were written with the intention of identifying them. The test is an objective test. 2175 (iii) Ramasamy also cited Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ, FC that observed that it was instead a case whether upon a consideration of the entire statement and not just a minor part, there were matters which were defamatory of 2180 the appellants. The Federal Court preferred to accept the view in Charleston and another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and another [1995] 2 All ER 313 that the publication must be taken to have been viewed as a whole, especially when considering whether any sting 2185 contained in the headlines, for example, had been neutralised by the context when viewed as a whole. (b) Ramasamy argued that in the offending article, he had used the words camp, supporters, forces, and agencies of Dr Zakir. It 2190 was aimed at the supporters and followers of Dr Zakir. (d) Ramasamy further argued that sometime in 2018, after he published the first and second defamatory publication, there 2195 Wong Hai Hung and Kamaruzaman Mohamad) to revive and bring the LTTE issue against him by spreading fake news, to deflect attention from Dr Zakir. Due to fake news over the LTTE issue, twelve individuals were arrested, including politicians from DAP. In the premise, Ramasamy claimed that he needed 2200 to respond by issuing the fifth defamatory publication targeting the supporters of Dr Zakir. (d) The Attorney General discontinued criminal proceedings against the twelve individuals as there was no prospect of 2205 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 66 conviction on the thirty-four preferred charges (Part B, enclosure 23, pp.478-494). Therefore, it was argued that the fifth offending article could not be defamatory to Dr Zakir. 9.3 Ramasamy pleaded justification on the fifth defamatory publication. 2210 He raised the Lucas-Box justification as a defence and repeated his foregoing arguments to justify the natural and ordinary meaning of the fifth impugned defamatory publication. 9.4 Ramasamy pleaded fair comment on the fifth defamatory 2215 publication. He argued that the impugned statements were based on true facts; it was a comment and not a statement of facts involving a public interest matter. 9.5 Ramasamy pleaded qualified privilege on the fifth defamatory 2220 publication, in that he made the offending article in the discharge of his public or private duty; it was fairly made to parties with corresponding interest to receive it for the welfare of the society. 9.6 Considering the totality of evidence before me, the parties' 2225 respective arguments, and on the balance of probabilities, I find in favour of Dr Zakir, and it is my judgment that Ramasamy has failed to establish his proferred defences to the fifth defamatory publication: 2230 (a) Justification: (i) Dr Zakir pointed out that in asserting justification, Ramasamy had mentioned the names of specific individuals who had supposedly uttered statements against him being involved in the LTTE terrorist group. It 2235 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 67 was proven that those names were never mentioned in the offending article. (ii) In denying the defence of justification, Dr Zakir asserted no hold or influence over the government, (2) he is not and 2240 has never been a politician, (3) he is an Islamic preacher beholden to its tenets to promote unity, harmony and brotherhood, (4) he never directed the named individuals by Ramasamy to utter those allegations against Ramasamy, (4) he has no knowledge of the alleged 2245 statement uttered by those individuals, (5) by Ramasamy suggesting in the offending article that it is unreasonable to make such allegations against LTTE, they do not harm anyone, suggest support for LTTE from Ramasamy, (6) LTTE is included in the terrorist list by KDN, and not at the 2250 insistence of Dr Zakir, (7) it is unbecoming of a Deputy Chief Minister of Penang to engage in libel against Dr Zakir. (iii) There is no compelling evidence of the truth or substantial truth in the contents of this offending publication produced 2255 at the trial. (iv) In light of the foregoing, justification cannot apply to the fifth defamatory publication. (b) Fair Comment: 2260 (i) To reiterate the foregoing, the truth or substantially the truth of the impugned statements in the fifth defamatory publication are successfully proven unfounded at the trial. (ii) The present offending publication, as with the first four offending publications, does not express a comment in its 2265 current form. (iii) It is a provocation premised on an assumed statement of unsupported facts that Dr Zakir had successfully debunked at the trial. (iv) Dr Zakir drew my attention to O.78 r.3(2) RC 2012, which 2270 requires the defendant in an action for defamation to plead S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 68 the expression of opinion as distinct from the statement of facts that he relies on. In the present case, Ramasamy has failed to do that, which renders his defence unsustainable: 2275 CLJ; Crowd Care Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ling Lek Foo n Teik v Tan Kai Hee [2014] 9 MLJ 363. (v) I find the fifth defamatory publication to be actuated by malice as there is no compelling evidence from Ramasamy 2280 matter of fact, Ramasamy himself, in his evidence, admitted as much (NOP, enclosure 72, pp.1089-1890). (c) Qualified Privilege: 2285 (i) Ramasamy claimed he was morally and socially obliged to communicate the words complained of. The public at large had a corresponding interest in receiving the information. Still, Dr Zakir, in his evidence, disagreed and said the public had no corresponding interest but for the police or 2290 the authorities to investigate if there is merit in it. It is incorrect for Ramasamy to malign him in such a manner when he had nothing to do with it. (ii) At the trial, Ramasamy could not verify the statements in the fifth impugned defamatory publication. Dr Zakir cited 2295 Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim v Lim Guan Eng [2023] 1 LNS 1762, CA; Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Yong Teck Lee [2018] 1 CLJ, FC on the necessity to verify the truth and accuracy of the impugned information before publishing it or will fail the required threshold for qualified 2300 privilege. (iii) Ramasamy has no compelling evidence that he had taken steps to verify and authenticate the integrity of the information before publishing it in his offending fifth defamatory publication. 2305 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 69 (iv) It is my finding that in the circumstances, the defence of qualified privilege is denied, mainly when the offending publication is actuated by malice to vilify Dr Zakir. 9.7 Considering the evidence at the trial: 2310 (a) From the totality of the evidence at the trial, I am disinclined to s involvement in the revival of the LTTE issue. The evidence does not support NOP, vol.3, 2315 pp.698-700. Though he argued that it was targeted at the supporters of Dr Zakir, I could not help but notice in the 2320 unfounded defamatory publication was also a personal attack on Dr Zakir, three and a half years after the first debacle on 10.04.2016. (b) In light of the evidence at the trial, the offending article by Ramasamy is also defamatory. The position taken by 2325 Ramasamy that the offending publication merely refers to Dr ters only is unsustainable. (c) The offending article carries adverse connotations as claimed by Dr Zakir that he (1) was instrumental in persuading the 2330 Malaysian authorities to take action against the supporters of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") in Malaysia to divert the attention from himself, (2) he has manipulated and/or lobbied the Malaysian authorities for his benefit and/or S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 70 advantages, (3) is the architect or mastermind of the arrest of 2335 the supporters of LTTE in Malaysia, and (4) is being used for specific political purposes and/or political parties; he will use them to further his ambitions and, therefore, is partisan in Malaysian politics. 2340 (d) I observed that the degree of hostility shown by Ramasamy towards Dr Zakir did not abate throughout the three and half years concerning the five impugned defamatory publications. It has become highly personal, with evidence pointing to comparative religious discourses being taken out of context. 2345 (e) Similar to the earlier four defamatory publications, the fifth defamatory publication was also constructed to provoke anger and hatred against Dr Zakir using unverified sources of information in the offending publication. In failing to seek 2350 clarification and verification of the impugned fifth defamatory publication's damaging contents, it is my judgment that seeks to vilify Dr Zakir. 2355 (f) Similar to my finding in the four other defamatory publications, it is my considered view that this display of lack of objectivity by Ramasamy manifests malice on his part that is not concerned with the truth of the materials in the offending publications but only that it garners widespread notoriety of Dr Zakir irrespective 2360 of the integrity of the information in that publication. (g) Ramasamy proceeded without verifying the facts of the offending article that carries such adverse connotations on the S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 71 standing and credibility of Dr Zakir. It is actuated by malice. This 2365 presence of malice would automatically disqualify the defences Ramasamy is proffering to the Court. There was no truth or substantial truth in the impugned statements of the fifth offending publication. Ramasamy failed the responsible journalism test cited by the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan 2370 Air Selangor Sdn Bhd (Appellant) v Tony Pua Kiam Wee (Respondent) [2015] 6 MLJ 187, FC. (h) hardly tangible in light of Dr 2375 , smeared, and damaged anding and credibility to the public, and he must be held accountable. (i) On the plea of the Lucas-Box justification, I have examined 2380 evidence at the trial does not fit his pleaded defence on the fifth defamatory publication. The suggested meaning ascribed by Ramasamy is not appropriately pleaded and is unproven at the trial. I find it an afterthought. He anchored his pleaded defence 2385 on section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 in paragraph 8 for justification and section 9 for fair comment in paragraph 9 for Suit 70. In addition, the existence of malice denies Ramasamy the pleaded defences. 2390 DAMAGES [10] In canvassing for the quantum of damages, Dr Zakir: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 72 10.1 Cited Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569, CA, where the late Gopal Sri Ram JCA referred to and followed 2395 Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice by Price & Duodu (3rd ed, para 20 -04 at p 208) says that the quantum of damages awarded in respect of vindication and injury to reputation and feelings depends on several factors: (1) The gravity of the allegation. 2400 (2) The size and influence of the circulation. (3) The effect of the publication. (4) The extent and nature of the claimant's reputation. (5) The behaviour of the defendant. (6) The behaviour of the claimant. 2405 10.2 Dr Zakir also alludes me to Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586, where it was said that the factors for consideration in the following passage: In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation, the most 2410 important factor is the gravity of the libel; the more closely it (the defamation) touches the personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty, and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The extent of publication is also very relevant; a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a 2415 handful of people. A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation, but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous 2420 publication took place. It was argued that: (a) There is no doubt: (1) Dr Zakir is a renowned and highly respected speaker on Islam and 2425 comparative religion worldwide who has given several thousands of public lectures on the subject worldwide and holds numerous awards and accolades: enclosure 49, paragraph 290, pp.250-251. (2) He has more than 17.5 million followers on his Facebook account and has appeared regularly on many international TV Channels in 2430 over 175 countries worldwide. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 73 (3) He has authored several books on Islam and comparative religion. (4) The foregoing information was unchallenged at the trial. (b) The five defamatory publications circulated to the public coming 2435 from a man of position as Deputy Chief Minister of Penang II had tarnished public eye. (c) There can be no doubt that the five defamatory publications 2440 maliciously maligning Dr Zakir have been published and re- published with wide circulation on the Internet without borders, bringing his standing into disrepute: Lim Lip Eng v Ong Ka Chuan [2022] 5 CLJ 847, FC. Dr Zakir pleaded that: (1) The five defamatory publications are, in the circumstances of the 2445 case, actuated by malice, hatred, envy, and spite sans any verification of the veracity or integrity of the allegations. (2) The publication of the five defamatory materials intended to portray Dr Zakir as a bad person and a threat to Malaysia's national security, peace, and harmony. 2450 (3) The five defamatory publications are unfounded, utter fabrications, spurious, entirely fictitious, and/or have been twisted and slanted for the selfish needs of Ramasamy. (4) The ramifications created by the five defamatory publications constitute grave and vicious libel and slander on Dr Zakir 2455 (5) The five defamatory publications by Ramasamy that have been published and re-published were intended to: (a) Incite public hatred, ill-will and/or contempt of Dr Zakir. (b) Garner cheap publicity for Ramasamy and (c) Humiliate, ridicule, and expose Dr Zakir to physical, mental, 2460 emotional, or psychological harm. 10.3 In support, Dr Zakir cited: (a) Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato Vincent 2465 Tan Chee Yioun [2000] 4 MLJ 77, FC, where the Federal Court awarded a cumulative award of RM7 million for S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 74 aggravating degree of libel. The Court considered that no apology, retraction, or withdrawal can ever be guaranteed to completely undo the harm of the defamatory statements or hurt 2470 the same has caused. (b) Jessy Lai & Anor v Lim Lip Eng [2023] 1 LNS 705, HC, an award of RM2 million was justly awarded. (c) Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Yong Teck Lee [2018] 1 CLJ, FC, RM600,000 was observed by the Federal Court as a 2475 reasonable sum. (d) Mazlan Aliman & Ors v Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan [2016] 1 LNS 971, CA, the Court of Appeal affirmed the HC order awarding RM350,000 as general and aggravated damages with a cost of RM150,000. 2480 (e) Nurul Izzah binti Anwar v Tan Sri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & Anor [2018] MLJU, HC awarded the plaintiff RM400,000 from D1 (Tan Sri Khalid Abu Bakar) and RM600,000 from D2 (Dato Sri Ismail Sabri Yaakob). (f) Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim v Lim Guan Eng [2023] 1 LNS 2485 1762, CA, the Court of Appeal awarded RM250,000 in general damages to the appellant. (g) Lim Guan Eng v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [2017] 9 MLJ 622, HC, was awarded RM300,000 as general and aggravated damages due to the high standing of Lim Guan 2490 Eng. (h) In Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569, CA, the Court of Appeal awarded RM200,000 as a global award of damages. 2495 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 75 10.4 In the circumstances, Dr Zakir prays for the following: (1) RM2,500,000 general damages (500,000 x 5 defamatory publications). (2) RM1,000,000 compensatory damages for all five defamatory publications. (3) RM1,000,000 aggravated damages for all five defamatory publications. 2500 (4) RM1,000,000 exemplary damages for all five defamatory publications. (5) RM200,000 costs for both Suit 53 and Suit 70. (6) A mandatory injunction against Ramasamy compelling him to remove the five defamatory publications from the related websites within seven days from the pronouncement of the judgment under the jurisdictional powers 2505 of the High Court under Section 53 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and its inherent jurisdiction. (7) A permanent injunction against the Defendant to restrain the Ramasamy from publishing, distributing and/or uploading any defamatory statement against Dr Zakir on any medium whatsoever, under the jurisdictional 2510 powers of the High Court under Section 50, 51 (2) and 52 of the Specific Relief Act1950 and its inherent jurisdiction, and (8) An unreserved, unequivocal, and unconditional apology to be published in the following newspapers/news portals/social media within seven days 2515 (i) Berita Harian. (ii) The Star. (iii) Sinar Harian. (iv) Tamil Nesan. (v) Sin Chew Daily. 2520 (vi) Free Malaysia Today (FMT), and (vii) In the circumstances, Dr Zakir prays for order in terms of his prayers with cost. 2525 [11] For the quantum of damages, Ramasamy: 11.1 Cited Restoran Nasi Kandar Irfanah Sdn Bhd v The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] MLJU 1946, HC that said that the current trend and settled principle that 2530 the award of damages in defamation cases should not be overly standing and reputation in society. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 76 11.2 He cited Cheong Fatt Tze Mansion Sdn Bhd v Hotel Continental Sdn Bhd (Hong Hing Thai Enterprise Sdn Bhd, third party) 2535 [2011] 4 MLJ 354 that observed aggravated damages are awarded as a form of higher compensation to show the disapproval of the acts of a defendant which were carried out in such a manner that the plaintiff has suffered more than would normally be expected in such a case. (Tort Law by Catherine Elliot and Frances Quinn (7th 2540 Ed) 2009). Such damage is to compensate the plaintiff an extra sum for the injury to his feelings and pride or dignity. 11.3 He cited M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Fantastic Megaway Sdn Bhd) v Chan Tse Yuen & Co (sued as a firm) [2018] MLJU 360, which observed that exemplary damages 2545 are not compensatory but rather are punitive in nature. The purpose of such an award is to punish the wrongdoer for conduct that has been variously described, among other things, as outrageous, oppressive, appalling, high-handed, or in cynical disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. In Lee Ewe Poh v Dr Lim Teik Man & Anor 2550 [2011] 1 MLJ 835, it was observed that exemplary damages serve the purpose of offering a serious punishment to the defendant to deter others from behaving in the same way, in referring to and following Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard and others [1964] AC 1129, that the fundamental basis of exemplary damage must first be 2555 satisfied by the plaintiff i.e., the plaintiff has to prove the culpability of the first defendant's conduct which must be so outrageous as to deserve punishment or deterrence. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 77 11.4 Ramasamy, therefore, argued that he did not deliberately, in bad faith, publish the five defamatory publications. Therefore, 2560 aggravated and exemplary damages should not be awarded. In the circumstances, Ramasamy prays that Suit 53 and Suit 70 be dismissed with cost. THE LAW 2565 [12] The burden of Proof: It is trite in law that all cases are decided on the legal burden of proof being discharged. The burden of proof in establishing its case is on the plaintiff. It is not the defendant's duty to disprove it. The evidentiary burden is trite that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it 2570 (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). In Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253, 254 (CA) held: "The burden of proof under section 102 of the Evidence Enactment is upon the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side and accordingly, the plaintiff must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not 2575 avail him to turn around and say that the defendant has not established his. The defendant can say it is wholly immaterial whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours". In Johara Bi bt. Abdul Kadir Marican v. Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & 2580 Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139, (FC) held: "It was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the plaintiff has discharged the onus on her to prove her case on a balance of probabilities, the burden did not shift to the defendant, and no matter if the defendant's case was completely unbelievable, the claim against him must in these circumstances be dismissed. 2585 With respect, we agree with this judicial approach." [13] A defamatory statement: 13.1 Is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or cause him to be 2590 shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt, or S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 78 ridicule (see Ummi Hafilda Bte Ali v Ketua Setiausaha Parti Islam (PAS) [2006] 4 MLJ 761 at p.770 per Gill FCJ citing Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237). 2595 13.2 The Federal Court in Raub Australia Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 721, FC observed that it is a question of law in construing the impugned statement as being defamatory or otherwise. It requires an objective test to determine whether (1) the imputation in the statement would lower the 2600 plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally (reasonable men), (2) the imputation would tend to cause others to shun or avoid the plaintiff, and (3) would the words tend to expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule: Gately on Libel and Slander, 12th edition, p.7. 2605 13.3 Or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade, or business [see section 5- Defamation Act 1957 (Act 286) - determine whether, under the circumstances in which the words 2610 were published, reasonable men to whom the publication was made would likely understand it in a defamatory or libellous sense: Allied Physics Sdn Bhd v Ketua Audit Negara (Malaysia) & Anor and Other Appeals [2016] 7 CLJ 347, CA. 2615 13.4 eye of the public depends largely on the facts and circumstances in each case. 13.5 Mere hurt feelings are insufficient for the award of damages under 2620 defamation. The good name and reputation. The law on defamation in Malaysia is S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 79 primarily anchored on the English common law principles except as far as it had been modified by the Act, which is in pari materia with the English Defamation Act 1952 (see Soh Chun Seng v 2625 CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd [2004] 5 CLJ 46). 13.6 Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes words or matters containing untrue imputations against the plaintiff's reputation to a third person. 13.7 Liability for defamation is divided into two categories: libel and 2630 slander. If the publication is made in a permanent form, broadcast, or part of a theatrical performance, it is libel. It is slander if it is in some transient state or is conveyed by spoken words or gestures. [14] The civil law of defamation is primarily based on case law. 2635 Although the Act does not define defamatory matters, it has given some well-known common law principles statutory force. Libel or published defamation, for example, a newspaper article, television broadcast, pictures, and words, can be defamatory (see Civil Trial Guidebook by Marsden Law Book). In Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank 2640 Malaysia Berhad [2002] 7 CLJ 32 Ramly Ali J (at that time) said: statement must bear defamatory imputatio (See also Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152) 2645 In Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hasan Bin Hamzah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 39, HC, it was held: (a) It is a question of law for the court to decide whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used could convey a 2650 defamatory meaning of and concerning the plaintiff. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 80 (b) Libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer. It was irrelevant to consider the meaning the writer and publisher intended to convey on defamation. (c) The question is to be determined by an objective test. 2655 [15] Therefore, based on the above authorities, the plaintiff has to prove the following: (a) the statement was defamatory. (b) it referred to him and 2660 (c) it was published, communicated to a third party Once proven, the burden then shifted to the defendants to prove any of the defences: (a) justification or, in other words, the truth of the utterance. (b) fair comment on a matter of public interest or 2665 (c) that it was made on a privileged occasion. [16] Justification: 16.1 Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957: libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more 2670 distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially i 2675 16.2 In an action for libel or slander: (a) In respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only the truth of every charge is not proved if the words 2680 reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. (b) All that is needed to be established is that the impugned defamatory statements are true or substantially true (see Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen 2685 Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242). S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 81 (c) Justification affords a complete defence against defamation. [17] Fair Comment: 2690 17.1 Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957: allegations of fact and partly of expression of opinion, a defence of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved if the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to such of the facts 2695 17.2 Ramli [2022] 3 MLJ 75, HC reiterates the applicable elements: 2700 (a) The words complained of are comments. (b) The comments are on a matter of public interest or where it will affect the public so that they may be legitimately interested in it. (c) The comments are based on true facts and (d) The comments are ones that a fair-minded person can honestly 2705 make based on the facts. 17.3 In fair comment, if the primary facts are true, in the absence of malice and falsehood, fair comment should succeed: Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli v Dato Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor [2019] 6 2710 MLJ 587, CA. [18] Qualified Privilege: 18.1 Qualified privilege is a defence: (a) Where the impugned statements were published pursuant 2715 to a discharge of legal, social, or moral duty with no ill will or malicious intent. (b) The recipient of the statements had a corresponding interest in receiving them. (c) The impugned statements constitute fair comments and are 2720 covered under qualified privilege. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 82 Lord Atkinson in Watt v Longsden [1930] 1 KB 130: 2725 the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is 2730 18.2 To discover whether such a duty exists, the following question serves as a good test: the great mass of right-minded men in the position of the defendant have considered it their duty under In Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75, HC 2735 said that statements made on a subject matter in which both the defendant and the persons to whom the statements are made have had a legitimate common interest come under one of the classes of statements published on the occasion of qualified privilege. 2740 FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [19] I have examined all-cause papers, the evidence at the trial, and the parties' submissions in canvassing for their position in Suit 53 and Suit 70. Considering the totality of the evidence and my observations and considerations concerning the parties' respective arguments in 2745 paragraphs [6] 6.1-6.10, [7] 7.1-7.8, [8] 8.1-8.9, and [9] 9.1-9.7 above, and in addition to, it is my considered determination: Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hasan Bin Hamzah & Ors (1995] 1 MLJ 3 observed it is for the 2750 Court to determine the question of law whether the allegations of defamation were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning within the context that it was published and understood within that context: Sivananthan v Abdullah Bin Dato Abdul S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 83 Rahman [1984] 1 MLJ 62, HC. In Field v Davis [1955] CLY 1543, 2755 cited in th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2019, p.639), the Court held that when the defendant called a married woman a tramp, it was not defamatory, because it was uttered by the defendant in a fit of temper and were understood by those around as being mere vulgar abuse. 2760 19.2 The Court of Appeal in Abu Hassan Hasbullah v Zukeri Ibrahim [2018] 3 CLJ 726, CA reiterated the basic principles that (1) is the impugned statement defamatory in nature, (2) does the impugned statement refer to the plaintiff, and (3) has the statement been 2765 published to third parties. It must be in the affirmative on all three. In construing the offending paragraph, it is necessary to consider the actual words used within the context in which it was issued, whether it was libellous premised on the foregoing factual matrix of this case. 2770 19.3 Appraising the background and complete facts of the present case, on the balance of probabilities, has succeeded in establishing his claim on defamation in the five impugned publications by Ramasamy. 2775 [20] I am guided by the Court of Appeal in Keluarga Communication v Normala Samsudin [2006] 2 CLJ 46, CA that the test to be applied when considering whether a plaintiff's statement is defamatory is well settled in that it is an objective one that must be given a meaning a reasonable man would understand. In considering whether the words complained 2780 contained any defamatory imputation, it is necessary to consider the whole article, citing Gatley on Libel & Slander, 10th edition: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 84 the fact that the context and circumstances of the publication must be taken into account that the plaintiff cannot pick and choose parts of the publication 2785 which, standing alone, would be defamatory. This or that sentence may be considered defamatory, but there may be other passages which take away Synergy Promenade Sdn Bhd v Datuk Seri Hj. Razali Hj 2790 Ibrahim [2021] 8 CLJ 891, CA. In C. Sivananthan v Abdullah 1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 467 quoting Lord Herschell LC in Australian Newspaper v Bennet [1894] AC pp.287-288: The words have to be considered in the context in which they were spoken: 2795 not infrequently use words, and are understood to use words, not in their natural sense, or as conveying the imputation which, in ordinary circumstances, and apart from their surroundings, they would convey, but extravagantly, and in a manner which would be understood by those who hear or read them as not conveying the grave imputation suggested by a 2800 20.1 In my considered determination, in the context that it was issued, the five offending publications carry libellous and slanderous connotations on Dr Zakir. From the evidence at the trial, the 2805 impugned five defamatory publications undoubtedly refer to Dr Zakir, published on social media and online news platforms, a news medium with no borders. 20.2 Dr Zakir has, therefore, satisfied three essential elements of the tort 2810 of defamation: (1) the five impugned publications are defamatory in nature, (2) the five impugned defamatory publications refer to Dr Zakir, and (3) the five impugned defamatory publication has been published to third parties. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 85 20.3 Ramasamy evidently could not prove the truth or appropriately 2815 justify the five defamatory publications that had libelled and slandered Dr Zakir. I find no convincing evidence to establish the truth or substantially the truth of the five impugned defamatory publications for justification, fair comments, and qualified privilege to apply. His proferred defences are without merits and 2820 unsustainable. I take the evidence by Ramasamy in his defence with an abundance of caution. I am unpersuaded by his arguments. Ramasamy's evidence is primarily untenable to negate Suit 53 and Suit 70 against him. 2825 20.4 The animosity and malice in the unrelenting personal attacks of Dr Zakir in those five impugned defamatory publications by Ramasamy occurred from 10.04.2016 to 08.11.2019 (approximately three and half years). Undoubtedly, from the language and the context in which it was used, it got very personal. Those five impugned 2830 defamatory publications were personal attacks angled to disparage, ridicule and lower Dr Zakir in the eyes of the general public. [21] CONCLUSIONS After appraising the evidence, all the relevant cause papers, and the 2835 written submissions by the respective parties, on the balance of probabilities, I find that Dr Zakir had discharged his burden in establishing his claims in Suit 53 and Suit 70. 21.1 2840 defamatory publications. Accordingly, I entered final judgment for Dr Zakir on Suit 53 and Suit 70 based on a greater weight of evidence. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 86 21.2 After hearing arguments by parties on the quantum of damages and taking into consideration what was said by the Court of Appeal in 2845 Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569, CA, referring to and following the principles in Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice by Price & Duodu (3rd ed, para 20 -04 at p 208) by weighing, in a nutshell: (a) The gravity of the allegation: 2850 The five impugned defamatory publications were very severe, casting such severe unfounded aspersions on Dr Zakir with ill intent to harm the reputation, credibility, honour, and credibility of Dr Zakir. (b) The size and influence of the circulation: 2855 Undoubtedly, Dr Zakir has a massive following worldwide. The Federal Court in Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2000) 4 MLJ 77, FC held that substantial awards were justified based on aggravating libel. It was libel and slander on the online platform with no borders, accessible to anyone with access to the internet. 2860 (c) The effect of the publication: The cumulative effect of the five unfounded defamatory publications for over three and a half years gravely maligned Dr Zakir to all his audiences, foreign and domestic. It exposes him unnecessarily to odium, contempt, 2865 and disrepute to the public. (d) The extent and nature of the claimant's reputation: No definitive and compelling evidence establishes Dr Zakir as a criminal and liar, a trickster, a fugitive, a fraud, a money launderer, and a terrorist. 2870 These unfounded allegations from suggestive and speculative evidence conjured from Ramasamy gravely impacted Dr Zakir's worldwide reputation as a religious preacher and a man of faith. (e) The behaviour of the defendant: 2875 The five defamatory publications' language, contents, and form undoubtedly show malicious intent to gravely harm Dr Zakir over his position in comparative religious approaches. There is no doubt from the evidence that Ramasamy personally targeted and maligned Dr Zakir for three and a half years with no relent. As I had observed, even 2880 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 87 statements was debunked, there was no compelling evidence showing his regret or remorse over maligning Dr Zakir during that period. (f) The behaviour of the claimant: 2885 Dr Zakir displayed exceptional patience and tolerance in facing the severe and aggravated personal attack from Ramasamy until he finally decided to arrest the onslaught and seek civil redress in Suit 53 and Suit 70 over the personal targeting of him by Ramasamy. Dr Zakir showed restraint and did not retort to malign Ramasamy in return. He did not seek to 2890 inflame the situation and go on a confrontation in the media for three and a half years. It is ordered that Ramasamy is liable to pay Dr Zakir cumulative award of damages amounting to RM1,450,000.00, which is fair and 2895 reasonable, comprising: (a) General damages of RM200,000.00 for each defamatory publication. (200,000.00 x 5: RM 1 million). In awarding general damages, I have duly considered the materials in the foregoing guide by the Court of Appeal in Chin 2900 Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569, CA. John Dixon J in Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521 in a case concerning an Australian celebrity Rebel Wilson observed in assessing damages: The purpose of an award of damages are to provide consolation for hurt 2905 feelings, compensation for damage to reputation, and vindication of the imprecise and. Accordingly, damages are at large in the sense that they cannot be arrived at through calculation or the application of a formula. The sum awarded 2910 The level of damages ought to reflect the high value which the law places upon reputation and, in particular, upon the reputation of those whose work and life depends upon their honesty, integrity and judgment. The gravity of the libel and the social standing of the parties are relevant in assessing the quantum of damages necessary to vindicate the plaintiff. The 2915 award must be sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge. At common law, it was legitimate to take into account not only what the plaintiff should receive but also what the defendant ought to pay. The extent of the publication and the seriousness of the defamatory sting are pertinent considerations. In determining the damage done to the 2920 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 88 take into account the grapevine effect arising from the publication of the defamatory material. It is well accepted that injury to feelings may constitute a significant part of the harm sustained by a plaintiff, and for which a plaintiff is to be compensated by damages. Injured feeling includes the hurt, anxiety, loss 2925 of self-esteem, sense if indignity and the sense of outrage felt by the plaintiff. Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub v Abang Mohammad Bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185, HC, Seah J observed 2930 , the heavier the damages (Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 581). The reasons for higher award are that these persons are more vulnerable to defamation as far as they are more well-known, often held public positions of considerable 2935 responsibility and trust, encounter more people and have a wider circle of friends. In Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2000] 4 MLJ 77, FC, the Federal Court awarded a cumulative award of RM7 million for aggravating degree of libel. The Court considered that no 2940 apology, retraction, or withdrawal can ever guarantee to completely undo the harm of the defamatory statements or hurt the same has caused. (b) Compensatory damages of RM20,000.00 for each defamatory 2945 publication. (RM20,000.00 x 5: RM 100,000.00). Apart from general damages, aggravated, and exemplary damages, Dr Zakir asks for compensatory damages of RM1mil for all five defamatory publications that I could not find any refuting arguments from Ramasamy in his submissions 2950 contesting the prayer apart from asking for nominal damages to be awarded. In the circumstances, I allowed RM100,000 out of RM1mil being asked for. S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 89 (c) Aggravated damages of RM20,000.00 for each defamatory publication. (RM20,000.00 x 5: RM 100,000.00). 2955 In awarding aggravated damages (for the harm suffered by Dr Zakir beyond economic harm or general damages, such as anxiety, mental anguish, distress, pain and suffering for three and a half years and more), I am guided the Court of Appeal in Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494, CA, that 2960 observed the Court will consider his motive when the tort was committed. An award of aggravated damages is justified by any kind of high- handed, oppressive, insulting, or contumelious behaviour by the defendant that increases the mental pain and suffering of the 2965 plaintiff (McCarey v Associated Newspaper Ltd [1965] 2 QB 56). The later conduct of Ramasamy in relation to the libel/slander could increase the grief, annoyance, or distress of Dr Zakir, and this would be sufficient basis for the award of aggravated damages (David Syme v Mather [1977] VR 524). 2970 It may be awarded in addition to general damages (Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad & 4 Ors v Nurullah binti Zawawi & Anor [2015] 6 AMR 372, CA). Lord Hailsham in Cassel & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027 said that the natural indignation of the Court at the injury inflicted can 2975 be the ground for awarding aggravated damages. (d) Exemplary damages of RM50,000.00 for each defamatory publication. (RM50,000.00 x 5: RM 250,000.00) In awarding exemplary damages, I am guided by the following: 2980 T Trade winds Properties Sdn Bhd v Zulhkiple Bin Abu Bakar & Ors [2019] 1 MLJ 421, CA S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 90 that had referred to and followed the Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [2018] 1 MLJ 784 that had 2985 ruled: -the two terms now regarded as interchangeable-are additional damages awarded with reference to the conduct of the defendant, to signify disapproval, condemnation or denunciation , and to 2990 punish the defendant. Exemplary damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted with vindictiveness or malice., or where he has acted with a contumelious disregard for the right of the plaintiff. The primary purpose of an award of exemplary damages may be deterrent, or punitive and retributory, and the award may also 2995 have important function in vindicating the rights of the plaintiff (see Rookes v Barnard [1964] 1 All ER 347 Broome v Cassel & Company [1971] 2 QB 345 The Court of Appeal in Sambaga Valli said: 3000 and are not recoverable as a matter of right. The amount of the exemplary considering the character of the , the nature and injury and the means of the defendant. The 3005 quantum of exemplary damages to be awarded must be appropriate to the The categories of cases propounded in Rookes v Barnard [1964] 1 All ER 347 are: 3010 (1) Where the plaintiff has been a victim of oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional acts of servants of the governments (the present case, involving the tortuous act of the then Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang). (2) 3015 calculated by him to bring in profit which exceeds the amount of compensation that he might have to pay the plaintiff (any form of advantage (not necessarily monetary) gained by the defendant in defamation cases suffices Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA); or 3020 (3) Where a statute allows for the award of exemplary damages. In deciding the quantum of the exemplary damage, I have considered the three factors: S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 91 (1) The plaintiff cannot recover such damages unless he himself is 3025 the victim; (2) Since exemplary damages can be used for and against liberty and is a form of punishment without the safeguard of criminal law, it must be used with restraint, and in this regard the size of the award of exemplary damages should be moderate but at the 3030 same time reflecting the gravity of the wrongdoing, sufficient to punish the wrongdoer (Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 AMR 201); and (3) The financial means of the parties, though irrelevant to compensatory damages, are relevant in assessing an award of 3035 exemplary damages. The conduct of the parties, including an honest apology (if any) to show genuine remorse by the defendant is also a relevant consideration (Praed v Graham (1889) 24 QBD 53). In the present case, Ramasamy at the time occupied the position 3040 as the Deputy Chief Minister II of Penang. A very high-ranking government official that command influence. From the totality of the evidence, while in that role, he vilified Dr Zakir in the offending materials. There was no apology (even though reported, he denies it), no 3045 remorse, and retractions or offer of retraction of the impugned defamatory materials (debunked) that I find were intentional and malicious in targeting and vilifying Dr Zakir over three and half years. It has undoubtedly injured Dr Zakir unnecessarily. It is trite law that in deciding quantum of damages, the Court will 3050 consider amongst others the absence of or refusal of retraction S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 92 or apology (Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569, CA). 21.3 Injunctive prayers as prayed are allowed. 3055 It is trite law that, injunctive relief can be granted in appropriate cases to restrain the publication (or further publication) of defamatory materials. It is my judgment that from the repetitive nature of Ramasamy continuously targeting and publishing offending/defamatory materials on Dr Zakir, for over three and half 3060 years unchecked, injunctive reliefs as prayed is necessary to arrest it from recurring in the future. 21.4 Publishing an unreserved, unequivocal, and unconditional apology as prayed is allowed. 3065 In Lord McAlpine of West Green v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) apart from paying damages, the defendant was ordered to apologise in open court. It is trite in law, that an apology is not a defence. In Datuk Harris bin Mohamed Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 3070 MLJ 97, it was ruled that an apology offered too late would be of no effect damages. Mitigation of damages Section 10(1) of the Defamation Act 1957 provides that a defendant may, 3075 provided he gives notice of his intention to do so at the time of delivering his defence, give evidence in mitigation of damages that he had made or offered an apology or at the earliest opportunity afterwards if he did not have such an opportunity before. 3080 Under section 10(2) of the same Act, in an action for libel contained in any newspaper, any defendant who has paid money into court may state in mitigation of damages that such libel was inserted in such newspaper without actual malice and without gross negligence and that, either before the S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 93 commencement of the action or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he 3085 inserted or offered to insert in such newspaper a full apology for the said libel. Seah J in Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub v Abang Mohammad Bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185, HC also observed that an apology both by letter and in open court (accepted 3090 by the plaintiff) is not a complete defence to an action for defamation. Moreover, no apology, retraction or withdrawal can ever be guaranteed completely to undo the harm that it has done, or the hurt caused, although it is a principal factor to consider in assessing damages. 3095 21.5 Global costs of RM70,000.00 was also ordered against Ramasamy, payable within thirty (30) days from today. 3100 Dated 04.01.2024. 3105 HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ 3110 JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 3115 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-23CY-53-10/2019 & WA-23CY-70-12/2019 94 Counsels: 3120 Datuk Haji Akberdin bin Abdul Kader, Datuk Haji Sulaiman Abdullah, Dr Haji Mohd Rafie bin Mohd Shafie, Mohd Reza bin Mohd Rafie, Ummi Kartini bt Abd Latiff, Meor Hafiz bin Salehan, Ardy Suffian bin Datuk Haji Akberdin, PIC Ainul Farihah binti Azizi & Amal Syahmina binti Che Mohd Ruzima 3125 Messrs. Akberdin & Co and Messrs. Chambers of Rafie Mohd Shafie & Associates Counsels for the plaintiff 3130 Razlan Hadri, Ranjit Singh, Ragunath Kesavan, Dat Mureli Navaratnam, Navpreet Singh & Felix Lim Messrs. Mureli Navaratnam Counsels for the plaintiff 3135 S/N nCDosRxt0aJtQphuCbleg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-45A-56-08/2020

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH Li Zhanlin

pertuduhan seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - dadah jenis methemphetamine - berat 1508.9 gram - dadah disorok pada perut dengan wrapping dan bandage - di tahan di kawasan pemeriksaan mesin Xray VSEC KLIA 2 - seksyen 37(d) dan seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - isu berbangkit - ketiadaan cap jari - kelakuan OKT (docile conduct) - kes pembelaan - telah diperdayakan oleh seseorang untuk membawa - alasan serbuk perasa - innocent carrier - kegagalan OKT membuat pertanyaan dan membutakan mata - wilfull blindness - pembelaan terfikir kemudian - afterthought - hukuman - bersesuaian dengan Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati 2023 - hukuman penjara seumur hidup dan 15 sebatan - kepentingan awam

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Norsharidah Binti Awang

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f6687549-57ed-4955-9460-f397c7e43ff0&Inline=true

04/01/2024 14:33:10 BA-45A-56-08/2020 Kand. 142 S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N SXVo9u1XVUmUYPOXxQ/8A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aA—a5A—5s—na/2020 Kand. J42 3'1/01/ZQAL ,m: m DALAM MAHKAMAH nurse: MALAVA nu sum ALAM DALAM MEGERI ssmucon DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERBICARAAN JENAVAH NO. BA-Asitsbnslzozn AMYARA PEN DAKWA RAYA uxwnu Ll zuauuu [No Passport EH451n459) ALASAN PENGHAKJMAN PENDANULUAN [1] on (e\ah dnuduh dervgan panuduhzn seven! belikuh ‘Eahawa kamu pads E/1/2020, jam ream kurang 1.15 pelang herlempal m Pejabal Namomx Km 2‘ dawn Dasrah Sepsng. dalam Nagan sawangnr Dam‘ Ehsan lelah mengedar aaaan berbahaya ssbarat «sea :2 gram Malhamphatamine O\eh Yanfi usmmsn kamu ba\ah mswakukan saw kasavanan as bawah ssksyen a9Bw(au Akla Dsdah Berbahaya 1952 dan bolsh dwhukum an bawah seksyen 395(2) Akla yang sama.' 12} Fihak pendakwaan Ie\ah memanggfl seramal man (5) Draw saks4 sepem beriku|. v sm - Mohd Sazman bin Abdnmah 1F-eyuaaa Sm! Baranu K55} SP2 7 my Szmvana Kumarafl Jayarum (Ami Kvmvaj m. spa - D/Koperax Syarm Azam um Muhammad (durmow) xv 5P4 — S/Vnspekkx Fadzwl um Sudln (Pagawai Tangkapanj v SP5 » mspekmrwamla Alvwz him: Shahnr (Pahwal rorensm VI svs - Kanslaba\ Muhd Zmkhslrl b\n Mokhtar (Psgnwm Femeliksa) vli sw -D/Kuperawulhllmlbm Tamar: v . sPs - Insoeklorwanim Nwaim hinfi Sulaiman ll. KES PENDAKWAAN [:1 Pads 3 1 2:720, iam Va kurzng 11 29 pagw, KL7ns1abe1Muhd Zmkhairi hm Mokmar tsm |elah menahan on as kawasan pemanksaan kesslimavan vsec Main X-Ray No.7 saxmrs, KUA 2, Sepang. Sehngar Dam! Ehsin karana psmenxsaan Iemadap on mendapau leluapal uemalan ax bahaglan nadapan perm on kamudwan |e¥ah msemnkan kepada SI ram bin Sudm qsm un|u akan vznjun. [4] spa xemuawanwar. mamhema on ks Peiahan Narkmik KUA 2 dalam Daarah seam. aavam Nageri Salangar Dam! Ehsan 5PAIe|ah mmjalankan pamanksana (amadap om dzn mendapall Ievdapal anam (5) bungkusan plashk Iuvsmar 7-:-znuo IN sxvmmxvumuwoxxmu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [331 Rwukan kepada kes Rm M x zmun Slhalull v. Public Pmslculnv mu] 3 MLJ no‘ kepumsan Mallkamah Rayuan sepeni bsnkut ‘The manner In which llvs drugs were canoe:/ed on Me sppenanx polnlcd /Irasrsrlbly to hrs knowledge :7! them Ths wrms powder Inside me packet: wax v:sr'b(9. As such, the trial/‘udgs am not an m appcymg 3 .’i7(cII afths mm m plosume me appeuam knew that me packet: eomrnact ma drugs. The appellant ram to rebut ms 3 37(4) pmsumplron ' [341 Fakta kas di da\am kes Reza Mmek Zadeh lxuwaj an mama on man dilahan 4. Lapangan Terbang KLIA uleh plhak Kasmm on maspan m-mum enam 15; nzkaldadah yang msomkkan di da\am mm lapwsan pakalan daflamnya. nnaakan Favayu mambawa dadzh Xersebul dl dalam dua wapwsam paKa\an dalam, csnewak pada dmnya darn Syna ks Msliysta cukup membenluk Dengadaran :11 bawah semen 2 Akla Dsdah Eemahaya 1952 ELEMEN KEEMPAT: on MENGEDAR. [35] Bay memuuxuxan slsman pengedaran, Mahkamah menggunapmx cams‘ penqedafan dw bawah seksyen 2 Akin Dadah Eerbahaya 1952 yang menyalakan sepeni bankul a...«.m IN sxvmmxvumuwoxxmu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm I35! [37] '1rafickvng“ Incmdas ma daingofany ofme (ovluwing acts, me! vs (a say. rnanutacmring, nnpuning, expomng, keeping, cMweaHr\g, buy1nu,ssllInq,q\ving‘ rauannng, staring‘ aam1n»snnnng,nanspor\:ng, carrying, nnaxng, dafivanng‘ procuring, supplymg m dis(nbu|\rrg any dangerous dmg omsvwlse «nan under me aumuntyol Ihh an or me regmanons mane unaar me Am Kecsrangan msnuvuukkan bahawa didah tersabul man umrnpan dungan secara menyomk meraluu bslulsn “wrsppvng' dan ‘bandage“ dv bahagwan hadzpan perm on la Ielah dlsamk nleh uKr umuk amnwa ka sesuam mamas: nagn Iujuan pellgedamn, rnemnnaangkan Jumlah dadah berrbahaya adalah da\am kuanmi yang byk an rnnna beral usrsmnya adikah saberst 1509 9 gram Mamamphstamme ISU-ISU EERBANGKIT [38] [39] Fmak Dembelaan Ie\ah memnangknnan persaman sama ada narruaun mempunyax pengutahuan memandangkan nasn my jam den DNA Sana keberangan mangxkm keadaan sapeni kelakuan man reeks: nenudun udak pula mununjukkan kebersalzhan KETIADAAN cu JARI Hsswl pengessnan cap Jan yang Ielah at ke anas anam pam dadah yang lelah mumps! gagal mangesan apa-aoa Py;-1217730 nap tin. Mahxamah berpendaDa| Dahawa wa lidak «aux Ierhadap hes vsoaakwaan memandanikan dsdandadah Iarsebut harada m dalam kawalan, pugaan ann mwkan Ienuduh sawabdu ma muangkap, m mama daaawadan cflaomk peas bahaman hadsoan perm lanuduh manggunzkan wrapmna" dan ‘bandage’. [40] D: da\am kas PP V. Mlnsor Md finhld 5. Annr [1911] 1 cu 23: dvpuluskan kelarangan cap jari Iidak swgnifikan memandangkun Idsnml lenudun fldak meragukan [411 mnuknn kapada kes Mulanl v. M: pm} 1 L113 um, cusmem skinner, Hakim Mahkamah Psvsskuluan memuluskalr 130} mm regard In ms absence o/me Appellants‘ anger pnm on the Inodnunaring items, we find (ha! not mm walgm can be am-cnm to such avvdsncs stmev because In crvmmallsw. a pouch may sfillbs m possession ofa mmme mmg wunom aclually [mug in pnysrcm wnlscr with /a What n» Iequiled rs that he rs so srtuatsd with mum to 1: ms: he has map-memo deal wrm u as nwnel zo ms mmsron ofsllolher persons man, as we lnlmd sanm, Is the case we ‘ IL KELAKUAN DKT (DOCILE counucn KE11KA PEMERIKSAAN OLEH PEGAWAI TANGKAPAN. nmmn yn sxvmmxvumuwoxxmu Nuns Sum ...n.. WW be used m mm n. mnn.u-y mm; mmn wa mum pm [42] [A31 Menganzi kmakuan nenuuun yang (idak menuaen ape-ape reaksl apahila meein pangwmbas No,7 meepen hunyw dan Vampu menyafla an hallagvan bawah nenwun. Va max semesnnye memaen maksud hahzws tenuduh fldak bavsalah. Mamluk xepeaa kas Ten Hunk Leona v. PP now] I ML! 141 my memuluskan. 151 1: is our vrsw that In order In draw a reveweors Inference (mm me eppeuenrs contemporaneous conduct, ms action or fnscman must be sxammud In me hghl onus snuemzn :1 me mezenemme ms alas wneee me appellant was eennomed by FW5 was the ewe: geze oren mcommg men: In me KLIA Thrs was me enry exn pom! when pessengere drssmbarkmg the plans can enter the KL/A terminal. 2: re common know/edge me: me was weeugmenctresmerea wrlh nemly anyrunm forlhs appellant to make e successful sscspe even iflve had me. From have me epps/rem was man taken by PW5 and his men la FW5’x once rn me KL/A. me eppmxtmere wemng drexenee was we-soo memes Here egam rns sppeuanrs chances are qu/ck getaway ware mmimel smcs no was eseaned and wee within me ruslncied vicrnrry or me KL/A zmverng. And, If we snps//am were In enemp: to wow away or disassuclale mmssrr with me backpack aunng Mrs entire emezren oewmact n would evrdently be nclrceebls. OI course, since me mg: were so curmmg/y canoes/ed‘ (hers em 1. ex: [U] [45] [46] [471 ecu/a no no necessny m take mn dlasllc antrons wnrcn may attract /nslant susplmn So agairvsf mm cncumsmncss, me apnemanrs dam conduct lhmuyhoul the psllod dssmbsd new not have /rvlavmd an absence orknowveugs of me said drugs For ms reason mm rs no misdrrectian by the courts bamw’ aegmu juga di dalam kes nu uy Hwn y. PF mm MLJU 1613, d\ mana Mankaman Rayuan Ielah mengenepman nujanin perayu (OKT)baI1awa kefiadaanlindakan ‘overf oleh Perayu menunyukkan perayu ma pengalalwuan Mahkzmah belpuas nan bahawa pmnk pendakwaan nenaya menmuxukan salu kas pnma lacie (arhadap lanudun sepemmunn pemuaunan Pvhak pamakwaan lam: mangamuknkan kexarangan yang mencukupi hagi menepali satiap a\eman—elaman| penuduhan. Flhak penaakwaan benaya memhuklxkan bahawa tenuduh mempunyal ><awa<an, mean can milvkan serla pengetahuzn lemadap dadah yang dwampu yang disomkkan pada bahaglan hadapan perm terluduh Mahkamah manggunapakal anggapan dw bawah seksyen may Akfa Dudah Berhehaya 1952 menurqukkan nannwa OKT mempunyal pengelahuan dadah leIsabu| Sana milikan mbaca bevsama seksyen 2 Am yang same un|uk dafinisx pengadaran apabHa amt. benzanaya yang aiwoxkan dw bahagxan hadapan pem|t2mAduh dengaruumlah yang banyak »>..,.mm VI. [45] udak mungkm unmk kegunaan lenuduh sanum Va ada\ah untuk Derlieflsran Men (edufluh kepida Dihak mga Mahkamah memanugfl terluduh unluk membela um ssvammanz Dermduhan. Kes FEMBELAAN [49] [50] Adalah meruadx muas Hakim Blcara unluk mampemmhangskan aamua kalarangan wng dlkemukakan olsh nmak Dendakwaan dan memhuat kevmusan sama ada Dsndakwaan wan barley: membukukan Kesnya mmamnauv kemguan yang munasabah seven: muna pemnlukan ax bawah saksyen 182A(1) Kanun Yalacam Janayah Rumkan xepaaa Kes lnlkofly bln ma v.PR [2IJ1ll6Cl..I M, d\ mans am vusuv hm H; wam, Ham Muhkimih Rawan ta\ah memlnuskalv mm; aw: pamrcaman, lugas lvskim bicara aaaran unruk mane//tr mamas mmngan yang Is/sh dlksmukakalv ctr‘ midapsrvnye din memuluskan same ads pmuk uendakwean ts/ah membukwkan s-uslu Ire: 1921111) Ksnun Tatacara Jsnayah/9/as msmperunfukkarl perms! lsrssbuf on dsham menaadskarv Dsrunlukan zmeuum Pan/men deflgan [alas nsenyarakan nalvawa "all ma svldancs adduced oeiom lI'. Psnsksnan mmsran dfbenkan kepada pevkataalv -n//' wng msmberv maksud ma/ampaui ksvaguan Snksysn 7-onuauu £51] [52] kesslurulvsn clan kasamus kekmxngarl, same ads dart plhak psmoelaen suaupun pamkmsn. Apaaapa kelmggalan mu ksgagalun nakvm Diem berbuar dermkiun adalah merupekan sualu salalv ulah darn rm Iwowafarkan Mahkamah Rayuan unluk carruzur Iangan. Kegagaran hakrm blczva mengamw Kim dalv msmbual ahnsrast mans-mans karerangsn nsmbelsan man mampze/umskan perayu Hak same rate din unluk melvdapstkan 75'" m'ul';1enzyu le/an fllnabuf’ on Islam memmh unmk membari kemangan Samara bsvsumpsh nan: mans-mana saknl dlpanqgH dw parinqkal kes pembelaan. Dr parmkan has Devmtulsan on lelah memberi kalarangan sepem benkut. 52.1 on mamberilahu bahawa Mr Wang kenalannyu‘ msmbelikan fiket unluk ks Ma¥aysiz Isbih kumng due ke ma kalw yang mana sauexa oarbalamsan ks Malaysxa aaalan awamun: olsh Mr. Warlfi 522 muan dalang ks Malaysia ax mana Mr. wang memhawa on melanmng, ja\zn«ialan dan mam- makan umuk paukenaxkan pamiagaan kepada oxr om uuanakap ma 43 Januari mo m mana on ta\ah beruda ma ke annual kaH ssbalum Iarikh dhangkap ievsabul mum» 52.: Mr Wang ma bersama on semasa dacang kali ksuga dan Iinqga\ barsama di Mme: Nanysng. 52.4 Pad: 21 Januari 2020, OKT|elaI1 parqw ks KLIA aan [emu dllahan aw sans bsrsima lnberapa paket (Mikel an badan on Mr Wang yung menglkal pakel-paksl tersebul as hadan on. 52 5 Menuvul on, dis ads bsnanyakan apa harang yang dHk2I( oleh Mr. Wang flu mans Mr. Wang berkata nu adalah semuk perasa OKT(vduk menyangka Nu dadah dan vsmaya apa yang Mr. Wang kalakan on ma pengetahusn menganaw barang danish den Hdak lahu begs-mnna mpa bsntuk riadah. Juga on hdak msap dzdah dan mknk muan om warah umuk hsmlaga dengan Mr. Wang dan unluk mengambll hamnys on Udak benanya banyak. Psmiagaan tersebul sdalah pemlaaaan nunaa emu: (mm) 52 s Salalusnya on memben kaxmngsn Mr wang barsarnanya danpada Halal Nanyang kc KLYA. Sampai dl KUA, Mr Wang lslah msnyumh OKT ‘check in" danum dan kemudian dis akan datang ssmasa mulalm mesln psngvnbalan umuk 'chsr:kin'1OKTIsIah mhahan men anggaca nous 527 Jnka mhha| kepada kelerangan om. pemmaannya adalah penafian bahawa dia mempunym pengecanuan menganal berang kes dadah yang dirampas aannya Pnpnlnun IN sxvmmxvumuwoxxmu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm on member! kuerangan bahawa ia merupakan ssrbuk per-Lisa yang (ahh ankac om: erang yang bamama Mr Wang m hadapan pelutrvwi untuk dlhamar kauada pewanggan. [531 on «wax pemah ms nu penama Mr wang an perlngkm kes pendakwaan Juqa Mada keharangan dadah lwrsebul dfleklakkin man Mr Wang sehIngga\ah on mamheri kalarangan dr pakel masux kas Dsmbelaan. Va masa membangkllkan [541 Kelensngim kes menunwkxan bahama on |e\ah melalui «nesan pengimbas sebelum anxnan men sva ow masin mam nn bukanlah muvupakan kalw penama an dalang ke Mslaysxa Menurm on W mempakan ken kehga an da|ang ks Mmaysxa. VII. HUJAHAN FEIIIEELAAN [551 Pmek pembevann Ildak menafikan xarlu da:1ah—dadahIersebu| duecnm an badan lenuduh adahlh dalam mwlikan mmmun, di mana dadah disamkknn dw nadnpan perm OKT. [551 Namun mm psmbalaan Isrluduh adalnh semasa pam- pekel mu mm Dada badannya dan ss|slah benanys kapsda Mr Wang apaxan sahenamya barang yang d-bawnnw, Mr Wang (eflan meyekunkannya bahawa ba|ang—baranu yang dlbamanya adalah semuk paras: unmk masakan. Dakam emkata yang nun «smmun ma na dalam Pwunnn yn sxvmmxvumuwoxxmu -nan smm ...n.mn be used m mm n. mn.ny mm: mmn wa nnum pm VIII. [571 [58] pengeaanuan hahawa bamng-harang yann dlbawanya adalah dadah Jlka dxhhal pada perlakuan Ienuuun wan mampamarkan penakuan bersskali dangan anggapen bahawa on uaaa memnwa Dining dadah Di7Iu;alIkan nlah pmak pembelain hahawa kepada samang yang mak Isrdadah apakah rupa semuk perasa‘ hdak akan Ishu bahawa im an da\amnya ada\alI dadah ANALISA PEMBELAAN TERTIJDUN [55] [so] [61] [621 Tenuduh Iarlall mambangkmn Isnlang secrang panama Mr. Wang yang nenanusaunnlamab mangwkal barang Kes ke bahzgwan perulnya din manyalakan bahawa Ia melupakan ssrhuk perasa umuk amannar Kepada peranggan Nimun begun Ienuaun Iavan gaga\ mambangmkan nama Ml. Wang seam!-awalnya ui peringkal kes pendakwaan sakvunya berur Mr Wang mi wuiud. Mama Mr. Wang mnya nun m perinakat kes pembslusn Tertuduh memberi pamhelaan baham bnrang ks: yang a«kaI meh Mr Wang at1a\ah mampakan serbuk perass seem Vnmkrlya. we on mangelahui bahawa barang |eIsebuI adalah serbuk perssu uaaa keperman baginya untuk manyurakkan barang «menu: dx pm: dengan mengenakan ».,,.muo [51 [6] bsrisw samuk knslzu uzxamn P44, PNA ningga P449, mam dipercayaw dadan yang msmukkan fll nanagwan hadapan pan on. spa (elsh merampu keaemua Davang kas yang dsyaki dadah tarsahul dan ceran menyetahkan kepada Pegawm Panyiasal, Vnsveklm Nnnami mnm Sulalman (spa) unluk Hndakln Ianm spa uemumannya lelah msndapalkan rakamsn cow an iempat ksjadwan (Ewan P6E(1) den 955(2)) dw mana Iahh mammjukkan rakaman kellka on dllahan olah SP6 sewuanya balang kss yang msyaki unaan ns4ah amamar ka Jabalan Kmui Mavaysla unluk dianahsa dan nasu anahsa oVeh Ann Kvma, Dr. Szravnna Kumar all Jayaram (SP2) «amaaag dadsh yang dirampas (PM, Pm mngga P49, Mn) dzn menuesihkan ia adalah dadah bemanaya seheral 1505.9 gram Mamampnecamwna sspam yang annkritkan ax hawah seksyen 2 Akla Dsaan Bnmahaya 1952 dan marupakarv dadah hsrbahaya dw da\em Jadual Panama Akta Dadah Eemahzya 1952. III. seam FEMBUKTIAN [91 Adalah menjadl ass: kepada undang-undang janaynh yang mana plhak penaakwnun periulah msmbuknkan bahawa hardasarkan ke|erangan yang mperalem uanpaaa sakaiaakav yang memberi kelarangan ilu dan berdasarkan kepada exaxnuuksuan yang mkamukakan sebagal bukn an dalsm Pumsuvan I53] I54] planix ‘\vraW1ng' um peminya ssna dibanuii dangan ‘bandage’ la balah aisimnan an uaism mg flan uada kepsmlan imluk on menynmknya Fade naiiaapai Mahkamah. flndakan om sengajn memnuimn main lzrhadap (ukla Vang ialas di hadaparmya man aaiam am kam yang ism -wiwun blindness’ Mamiux kepada kas Mahkamzh nayuaii Roslm bln Slbn Q om-r v. FR {zone} AMR 112 ieiah msnyamakan kegagalan on umuk membufll perisnyann sebsaal ‘wwufl i:iinaiiess“. Mahkamah memumsu/an ‘kvmyina these Drincinlss in ms lads (.7! law insiani case. we are mm M cur eonvisiiaii U181, from ms sviasncs as presented, there can be only an: inrerenoe: ma aspsuam kiiaw wtlzt hs was carrying in me Mo piasiic ms wars iuisii mugs Tris zppeflanl could nol have missed me glaring mm M the drugs siiiaa ms p4asiic used |o wrap mam were Ilansparam. and im were me cwacamsvhags. Yha appeuani musi have ssen wnai he was sanyiiig and ms would be simian: lo salisfy me mans rea eiamsni a1 me appaliant on pnssesslm The (actual memx In unis case is quiis uniiks mass in PP V Tan ran Eek tsumui where the means bag was mange Ill amour am In rain Mohamud v.PP1suprajma piasiis hag ssniaimng me drugs ms nai only mack bu| me dings wsia also wrappsd wim brown Inpes in moss Purzlmzo [55] [53] [67] suuanons. we agnaa man mars us a Hkslihood that ma accused may not know me camancs Vn ma bag na was carrying because we strung amour of the bag or the wrapper may onnmel the wdelmly pr ma dmq. For mxs reason. as natharsd npm ma cases man, (he accusad snouvu oe ICDONSG the bensfl ufme doubt Ihal he has no knmmedgs Mwnat he was canylng. Eu| m nur case. ma appauam muld not nava snux ms aws to mac was o1Mous.The cements mum be seen «gnu Ihmugh been me plastic bags and ma plastic wrappers. may were so nnnsparann mat any reaspnama person carrying [hem mus| have known what was insvds' on oavah dhangkap samasa membawa dadah aavam kuanlm‘ yang ugak banylk aanqan menyomkkan pada bahsgwan palm. Berdasarkan ]um\sn yang (smba| ianu saberal 1505 9 gram mmnampnaumune, ndalah se\ama\ unluk mampuax infsrens banawa dadah (arsabm benuwan untuk p. ak kauga lnl bukan msrupakan szm Darmhkan paswf on bo\eh nampik kirvflungan dadah Islsabnn an dmam plasnk lulsmar. Vulu dllulup aengan 'wrapping' serve an: bandage Kaadaan dadah lersebm naaklan sapam selbuk perasa Fevbualan csrang Iauangan wng dflakukan aloh OKT, lerulama penyembunyian am dadah pada paaan aukuas danger! membawanya kemar danpada Malzysxa menyokonp p... :2 u a. munasabah kawujudan m[uan ;enuyah yang auamng n\eh Akta [ea] Di dalam kss Wjcnnl Onprom v. PP mus] 5 ML] us. dl mana dadah man maapaci pada pake| kvi JEKBKOKT. Haswl pemeriksaan smamsllya tavhadap OKT wan memapau dua lag: paksl dadah mama padz baju on dengun tape. [as] Mahkamah dakam kes lavssbul lalah memumskan 10) Bemubung mew Isa pemlllkan, pemlllk (lortuduhj nendak/an mm mmang permllkanlvya, hsndsklah msngsranm Mat Duhan yang armum dam Ivsrrdaklah msmpurvyai kuasa untuk msmbualvgnya. De/am memutuskan lujuan tslruduh mempumr dsdah dalam mmxannya. mahksmah hsndskialv msngambil pendekalan yang dllevims ska! Ia murupskan sum parsoelan Iakla mm mamnum mums bsrdasarkan ksadazlv sake:/rling m Fakts yang sama /uga melumbu/ken /nrmns kukuh banswa porayu mar tsnlanq peml//Kannyan mengstahul mt dadah yang mmrma dan mempunynr kuass membaangnys.' 1701 Di dalam Kas kila, on sebenamya mangmahm bahawa barang kes iersebut ada\ah dadah nan bukannya ssrbuk perasa mas sebab on un|uk menyorok dadah (menu! di perm semnya In men perasa. om sebenumye ha-nmm [71] [72] mampunyal pannehahuanlzemang dadah lerwbul, yang mans Va Jelas dzpa| amnm dalam plastlk mmnar Cara man Iersaabut dwsoruk danqan mengaunakan Wmpplng‘ flan ‘bandage’ manuniukkan bahzwa on ads pengelahuan tenlang man lelsebul Mangikm kehuangan on, dis msnyalakan bahawa dia flan Mr Wang ta\aI1 pargx ke lempa| kemuan darn on para! dahulu unluk msnuanar masuk. Namun bsgm pemam Iersebul lldak pamah dmsdanqkan o\eh om di parmgkal kes pandakwaan. Kegagmn om barbuil aemmau memmhulkan parsnalan lemang Kehenarsn xemangan on. Fambe\aan on my IIznya\ah mempakan vekaan semina- mala dun salu petkara 'a1|srImugM'. Fembalzan on bahawa din mampakan 'mnocenl carrier‘ aaavan (idak lervekax memandangkan om gagm untuk mengambil Vangkah-larvgkah penanyaan tarhadap kehenaran ape: yang Mr Wang (clan nyaemn bahawa halang Iersebul ||u ssbagaw perasa saklrnnya Mr Wang ml memang wwud yang mafia pads pendapal Mahkamah mi hanyaxah msmpakan rskaan on samzb-mala Sepem mam: mpunuskan dv dalam kes Fendzkwl mm v. Norllnn Punuma SIrI[201E| MLJU 1124, Hans Sham PEA (later (2.1 1 7451.. Should he: /an to emhnrk upon ms cwlss of action, man he will be guilty L7! www D/mdnsss’ >...u u! an [16] .. In other welds, llhe dalrbsralsly ‘shuts n/s syus' ta Ins obvious, bscause he ‘does!!! want to krvL71M'hs Is Isksn to know. [:7] In the prassnlcasi, basadanme swde/1:6, rllsour vrew ms! the Respondent /s not an irmocsm cums! but a rtalflckov As we have alluded to asrlrev, in essence the defence ov flvnocsnf canre: nmeu by me Rsspundervl has no mam because lhs Respondent naa every oopomlmly to check rm herssll what sns was carry/na In our judgment any nmonanra person smnlany circumslanned wml/d have asked what wws rn moss mm. The Rssoomiam hsny rs not 5 nap/ass vrcnm caugm rn ms web of msvnsble cwcumslances beyond Iver conlml Ws find no my allmth In nmnuyx Ix. KESINIFULAN [131 Mamiuk kepada kes PP v. Mom Radxi hinAhu a. «(zoom 1 cu 451, kepumsan Mankamah Perssknfluan |2lah manqganskan Iangkah-Vangkah yang penu dlambfl dw dakam mampemmbangkan kelerangan-keberangan yang dlkemukakan an cmam sesuam kes sepem mama bankul. ‘{1} me close al the plbsecxniank Cass, subject MD evidence 29.1 by the pmssculmn in ns many to a maximum Eva/Mellon Camfufly scrum/sa the Lvadfbllrry DI each of Ms pvussculmnb witnesses Take into account a(/ reasonable irvfslermes (Ha! may be drawn we :5 mo imm malawdanos Iflha awdencs admits ulmommcls mfersncss, than draw me Inference man Is mos! lavourame to lhi accused, (u) ask yaulss/Hire quesvon. In now cafl upon my ancussd to make ms defence and he elscls m rsmam mm am r pmparid to come: mm on ma evidence now below me? mhe answer In that aumlmn ls -vs:-, than a puma lack: cuss has neen made out and [he dskmcs should be r:al)9x1 mne answer It We‘ men, - (m) puma fsela me has mt been made our and the accused should be acqmfls . (Iv) am the defsncs rs called, the accused alscts lo rumsm want, then convrcl. (M afler dufsncs is cane-1, ms accused slocls ta gm evidence, than go mmugh me Maps sat out In Mat v. Public Praucmorlflsaj 1 ms 92,- may MLJ 25:1.‘ [741 Mahkzmah berpuns nan bahawa KeIarangan—k2(emnaan yang dukemukakan oxen on av penngkal psmhelaan Iidak dapat mammhulkan ksmguan yang munsubah Iemadap kes pmak nendakwazn. >...u.m [75] r/5] U71 la (idak dapal msmaunxan angqapan amawan saksyen may Akla Dadah Eerballaya 1952 ax am kebanangksllan mengenai pengslahuan lmlxangan Du sampmg ilu page dangan Jumlah dadah bemahaya sebaral 1505 9 glam Mamamphmamma yang igak banyak membeli warens bahswa dadah (arsahul adalah unluk Dingedaran sepem mans defimm xii bawah seksysn 2 ma Dadah Eemahaya 1952 apma aaaan dismman di bahaglan perm on. Pihak Pendakwaan wan beviaya lvlsmbukukan kes melampaui karuuuan yang munasabih. om dldapan bersalah uan disabilkan sepam mama penuduhan dv bewih ssksyen 3fiB|l)(a) Am Daflsh Berbahaya 1952. Huxumu [75] [79] Mahkamah Is\ah membsn pevum kepada tanuduh unluk mangsmukakan rayuan ssbelum mlnlaluhkan hukuman. Begnu Juqa psluang dibenkan kepads pmak Pendakwa Raw unmk bemmsh «smang hukuman D. antara perkara-perkara yang dihmahkan men lenuuuh zdalzh bahawa OKT berumur 42 vahun dan berasa1 dnnpada Hobs‘, China. s-.,.z1 nun [801 I3‘! [32] [53] [34] on sudah bsrumah langga dan mampunyai dua mang anak Velakv masmg-masmg bsmmurlxma was Lahun din dua belas mum Salam aanpana nu on «man hervemaran lmggw dan lelah hamenli sekulah selak bammur empal belu lahun Eurasa\ nan kaluarga yang mkrn dan masm memounyal {bu yang man Iua Manulul on. dla le\uh dunrdsyakan men saovang yang blmama Mr Wang. IN merupekan kesalahan panama darn memohnn Mahkamah unluk perrimbangkan nukuman. Manama plhak Fendikwa Raya memahrm agar hukuman man narnauap on bemasarkan slasun-alaaan henkm. 53.1 OKT adalsh wargansgara asmg: as 2 on bukan panama nu dansng xe Malaysia dan sudah |enIu mahlr tsmang undang-unding ax negara Inn dan 53.3 Tindakan OKT ada\ah mara \erang—Ismngan benwuan unluk mengoaamaaan Mahkamah telah mengambll klra huiihan huiahan keduz—dua alhaklsnuduh den pendakwsraya [35] [em [35] [B9] Kesalahan yang dflakukan olahlenuduh Bdalah sahgalsenus u psngedamn aaaan lnmahzya Memampholamme saaarau 15m; 9 gvam‘ Tmdskin on berbual demikwan menunlukkan om sanggup mencabav kndaulilan undangmndang Hagan vnl sauna (9rang»|erangan Dengan Iavdapemya pmdazn undang-undanq barksnaan kewahan dl bawah seksyen asa Akla Daaah Bamahaya 1952, pihhan mbcnkan kenada Mahkamah umuk memben hukuman sawa4n nukuman ganhmg sampaw man Hukumsn bsra\ hams dibsnkan memanaangkan mmxan aaaan yang diedaman adalah hanyak saaani mana yang dlpuluskun ur aalam K95 Oleofun V. pp mu] nu ans, Wee Chang Jm. cmeuuaga mammuskan ' when a person is foumim [)5 m paasawan arctmgs such as this. no! rn smart qusnmms wnrcn may be because he is an addrcr but obviously rn such quanmlss as to show posmvely and canv/ncmgly and new mar ne Is angagau in Imllwkmg m (H/5 drug and unless deterrent ssntsncss are imposed Md 5 fins can mzvsr he a «(mm sentence in a case like mm, W: «on or lrufn: wr/I continue In be csmed an in em: pan or me warm’ -.a. 2» I14 30 [90] aersesuman denqan Ana Pamans-man Hukuman Man 2023‘ Mahkamah mu maniamhkan hukuman penjara saumur maup berkuulkuasa danpafla Isnkh auangxap s Januari 2020 dan dxkanakan dangan lima belas (15) sebavan (amadap tan-mm [91] Bsrana-banana ks; mssrahkan kapada pimk pendakwaan Imhlk dflupuskan sewer: ssiesefl rayuan (uonsnm AK amn AWANG) Hakim Mahka ah T\nqgNsniyaI1 m Shah Alum Pmnk-Plhak Pandakwaavv man Lnknun bln Kn|rn [Feuabm Panama! Undang-Undang Nsgen Ssiangur] Pembmaan Encik hmrl bln mmmm rrenuan Zamn 5 Teen] v.g.::..m [9] sesualu pemkzaraan mu. sualu ks: pnma Iacxe perm dnhuklwkan wujud mrhadap uanuaun an akhlr kes pendakwlan. Rulukin cflbual (emadep kes PP v Ilnhd mm Ahu Blkur [zone] 1 cu 457 yang mamutuskan sepanl bankut. 1:) me close 0/ ms pmssuuuonu: L-ass, subject! the ewdsnce led by me pmsecmian m as Ialallly m a max/mum evsrunuon Carwlu//y swmtnlse ma cmdtlulrry al each or me prosecution‘: Mmessss Taks mm account all reasanalzlu inierences that may be drawn finmlhalavrdenca Ifthsavtdsnceadmllso/Mia ormam wmncas, lhsn draw (ha mlemnce ma: rs mos! Favourable to ma accused; on ask yomsor me quesrbn // I now call upon me accused Ia maks Ins delsncs and he alums m rsmsm s/)ent am Ipmmawo convict him on the avnisrlce now before me’? /lths answer to ma: queslron rs 'Vss', rm 9 prfma facts case has been made out and the defence shauldba called. me answerlx wwmen, a pnma Isms case has nu! bean mud: nut and ms accused should be mumect. (m) alter the defence is ca/M1‘ me accused arms to ramam sr/em, than coawcz. vugemm (Iv) ans, dslsncs rs called, the accused Plea: to give svldsncs, than go mmugn me 5169: so.‘ mu m M»! v Pm: Prosecutor mm] 1 ms 52 ' [co] Maksud ‘puma lame‘ lsluh dlhuraikan dalam kes Buluclundrin v. PP mus] z MLJ am as mam (elah mpmuskan sepeni benkul ‘maximum svs/uerron ofthe prosecution's case evidence and rf unmmmed u would warrant the accused: conviction‘ [11] Maksud prime lama main man dipuluskan men Mahkamah Rayuan dv da\am kes Loo| Kow cm: L Annr. v. PP [zonal 2 ML! sapem berikut 7: lhsrsfom fallow: Mal um m on/y one exercrsa lhsfa /ms siflmg alone under 5 ma :1! the CPC has In undertake st lhe close oft»: pmsocuvon case He must subject ma pmsecuzron svrdsncs m maxrmum svaluallarv and In ask himself me question. if! dscuie to ca// upon the nccussd Ia sntsvms defence and he 5/9515 :9 Imam sr/enl, am / pmpslad In mm: mm on me lots/rfy :2! me svtdence contained in ms pmucunon cam/me answens m we nsgnlivs man nu pnma [acre case has been made nu! and me accused would be emmeu to an acquittal.‘ Fug-5130 [121 Berpandukan kepada Has lnl. seueni mana pump yang dvlakankan dw atas canap beban pembuklian nlsh pmak pandakwsin hendaklah dlpemmbangkan dengan menggunakln pnnsw ‘m ' um eva\u5mon'. Iv. ELEMEN-ELEMEN PERTUDUNAN [13] Dawn pemmuhan av bawah sexsyen aaamm Akta Dadah Earbahaya 1952. bebin pembukluan masvak Dada pihak pendakwazn unluk mamnuxukan sismanebmen sepem benkm: .. Bahawa daflah yang dwampas adalah dadah berhahaya sapem yang herseneral di hawah Jadual Panama Akla Dadah Earbahaya 1952 din beralnya adalah sspefll yang dlnyfilakzn di dalam pemlduhalx Eahawa wnuuun msmpunyai kawalnn, jagsan darn milikan terhadap dadah yang mrampas; nu. Bahawa lelluduh mempunyil pengalahuan Iemadnp dadah yang dilampas, dan iv Bahawa Isrluduh menqeaar dadah Iersehul sapem mana dafinlsw psnoadaran di bawah seksyen 2 Ana Dada): Earbahaya155Z. mu all!) ELEMEN PERIAMA: DADAH nus nuum-As ADALAH DADAN BERBAHAVA. [14] Ami Kma (SP2) menyatakan bahawa behsu |eIah msrualankan anahsa |emaflsp enam (5; pals! plasflk man masmg-masmg bananda N3 nlnwa NB dan mempunyal pelekal nombor makma\ yang sama bag! kosemua plasnk [151 or dalam plashk N3 mnggi N8 1Eks\b\t PM hlngga P49) yang mengsnmmgi bahan krklzfl Aemlh aan lslah dmomogankan ssmasa anshsis dzn (alah msngusahkin hahawa dadah karsabul idalah dadah barhahaya saberal muss gram Mamamphelamlne sepem yang dvsenaralkan dmam Jzdual Fsrlama Ana Dadah Berhehaya 12:52. [16] ‘fink nmwx sebarang isu bahawa dadah-dadah yang dvampas danpafla lanuduh msrupakan didah berbahaya qsila mm Lapmn Krrma Eksm Pm ELEMEH KEDUA: om MEMPUNVAI KAWALAN, JAGAAN DAN MILIKAN. my Marujuk kapaaa kes chm Pun L-an v. PP (1955; 1 ML! 237 dipuluskan sspeni bankuc: mars rs a physrca/element and a mental alamem wnrcn must both be W955"! beiona possession rs made out The accused must not on/y he so snuatad (ha! he can deal mm me thing as me belonged to mm.’ P24:-nun IN sxvmmxvumuvvuxxmu -ma Sum ...m.. M“ be used m mm a. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm Va muNG pm [15] [191 [20] I2‘! [221 Adzflah pnmip undang-Imdanq yang manmp banawa unmk msmbukukan plmlllkan. plhak pandahwaan perluluh membuklikan hshawa on msmpunyal jagaan, kawalan dan mmkan sun: pengsfahuan cemadap man yang ma-"pas Pnda 5 Janunn 2020‘ )am Vebih kurang 11 29 pan: Kcnslabla Mohd zmlmam hm Makmar Ielah menahan on m kawasan pamenksaan \/sec Mesm x-Ray No.7 Seklur 5 KLIA 2 Sepang kerana msmhual psmsnksunn lemidap om Eslxau dapsll Ierdapal baniodan di hahaglan hadapan badan OKT. mu menyerahkan kepaaa SM Fadzfl Mn Sudin (spa) umuk Iindakan susulan spa ma». mamhawa on ks Penna! Nurkoflk KUA 2 dan «swan msrualankin pameriksaan. Tardapami bahaglan baaan on dan apabfla dlbuka ads sam Masfik ‘wrapping sma "bandage" wm dapaz amrm ma|s\u\ eksubll P5 (NL71) wamu gambarvmznunjukkan semasa on dwnhan. Semusrlya rwuksn gambar man (2 dan 3; menuruukkan nempec bemolan aan saiu Mastvk ‘w:avDing' darn ‘bandage’ pada bzhagwan peml on Se\aDas umuka ~mappmg' lsrsebu|, spa mengemaman anam (5) bunukusan plasuk mrsina: bsrisw serbuk mean mpercayal man Vang dvsomkkan di bahagwan haflapan pemt on d\’ mm dsdah lerssbul berida dw bawah kawalan flan jagaan on P-nulwao [23] Adavah Javas bahawa cars dadarv tsrsebul dvscmk av bzhagian naamn perm ovcv balah member! vrvfevan bshawi on nenuvuan vmluk vrvenyembunyi kahadlamn dadah-dadsrv Iersabu|danpada pvnak berkuasa Juga dangan om (avssbu| on msmpunyav kuasa unmk mangandavvkarv dadah yang dvsorokkkan. ELEMEM KEIIGA: OKT NIEMPUNVAI PENGETAHUAN TERNADAP DADAH YANG DIRAMPAS. [24] Pihsk pendakwaan marvggunapakav perunlukan anaaapan av bawah ssksyan am; we Daaavv Eevbahaya 1952 yang rvvavvyalakavv hahawa saslapa yang dilumpaidadah barbahayu adalah avanggap mempurvyav pengeuanuan lanlarvg aaaah Ievsebul v25v savaurv manakah unsuv pengelahuan manganai si1a| dadah barbahaya yang psdu dvbukivkan memindangkan aaaan avvxae av bahawa warm on darv (Idnk boven avvvnav dsngan mava kasar karana ada ‘wrapping’ dan dlbavut asnaan -bandage" [25] Pvhak pervdakwasn nnrus merrvbuktlkan on vrvempunyal kawalan, mllikarv dsn vaguan vemaaap dadah-dadah Ielsabul melavui kstaravvgalv langsurvu sebelum menvmhulkan angganan av hawah ssksyen ma) Am Daflah Bevhahaya vssz urvtuk mambuklvkan psrvgstalvuarv. v...mm IN sxvmuvxvumuvwuxxuvu -um s.vv.v ...m.. wvvv be used m mm u. nvvnvvuvvly mm; dun-vvnvvl VI] nrvuvvc wvuv [271 [26] [29] [347] [31] [32] Vnlerens mervoenm pangalahuan Deal on terhadap kshadnan aaaarmaaan buleh d\bua\ menwkm (am:-Vakla safiap kas Msfuluk kepaaa kemerarmen pengaau (spa) bahaw-a mmapat herllolan an bahaawan badan om dan aoamla a-ma aaa salu plashk “wrappmg' Sana dua “handa9e' my dapal umr-an melahu s«smP5a(1)izuu samasa on divahan Rumkan kavaaa Qambar keflua dim «was, :11 man: Iardapat barualan dan Sam pmslik Wrapping" pada perul om Salapas dibuka 'wrappAvvg“ lersebul‘ 5:4 msogaluarkan enam ¢e) bnmgkusan dadah Lukas‘! Iempat maduan dan Langkapan adawl ma ganmar 9 can 10. Manurul sm, samasa on dilangkap ma nampak kegugupan taui tidak melankan dm. naaan bamahaya Malhsmnnalamlne benslak m da\am clam lmsinar Va men a 'hat dengan mau kasar. on cuba menge\ak danpada pihak dengan cam membalul dengan dua ‘bandagd dam ksmudiannya msnggunakan Wrapping“ unwk amt Dada bahagian hadspan perulnya flnaakan OKT seasmman member! mrerens bahawa OKT memnunwn pengeoanuan tenlang fladah (ersebm an mane ra berada dida1amjagaan,kawa1an dan mlllkan on. v-nunula)

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24C-19-02/2023

PEMOHON DITROLIC SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD.

- 3 Originating Summonses.- both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed.- the Enforcement OS is allowed.- a total costs of RM8,000.00 subject to allocatur fee shall be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic accordingly.

04/01/2024

YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7b338738-db43-4f37-93e3-c69a50936389&Inline=true

GOJ - Samaiden v Ditrolic.pdf 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-2-01/2023 BETWEEN SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) AND DITROLIC SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-11-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. FF (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) 04/01/2024 09:19:04 BA-24C-19-02/2023 Kand. 37 S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24C-19-02/2023 BETWEEN DITROLIC SDN. BHD. (Company No.199101018352 (228663-H)) AND SAMAIDEN SDN. BHD. DEFENDANT (Company No. 201301016493 (1046326-H)) JUDGMENT (3 Originating Summonses) A. INTRODUCTION [1] On 15.07.2022, Samaiden Sdn. Bhd. (Samaiden) had commenced an Adjudication Proceeding pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA 2012) against Ditrolic Sdn. Bhd. (Ditrolic) to claim for a sum of RM2,539,140.99 as the unpaid sum. The Adjudicator decided in favour of Samaiden in his Adjudication Decision (AD). S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [2] As a result of the AD, the followings were filed by the parties: (i). OS No. BA-24C-02-01/2023 (Enforcement OS) was filed by Samaiden against Ditrolic to enforce the AD. (ii) OS No. BA-24C-11-02/2023 (Setting Aside OS) was filed by Ditrolic to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012; and (iii) OS No. BA-24C-19-02/2023 (Stay of Execution of the AD OS) was filed by Ditrolic pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012. [3] Since there are 3 OSs filed in relation to this AD, the parties agreed to having all the OSs heard together and for the decision to be delivered together. Since this is a cross suit between the parties, for ease of reference the parties will be referred to henceforth with the acronym of Samaiden and Ditrolic wherever applicable. B. BRIEF BACKGROUND [4] contractor to carry out n, Commissioning and Associated Works In Relation to the Development of A 100MWAC Large Scale Solar Photovoltaic Plant Over The Land Held Under PN257319, Lot 9089, Mukim S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [5] By a Letter of Award [Ref. No.: DSB/LOA/LSS3/Kerian/WP3/01] -Piling, Mechanical and Photocoltaic (PV) Installation) between Ditrolic and Agreement are collect Samaiden as its sub- 000,000.00. [6] In this respect, Samaiden was -contractor for two work packages in the Project, namely Work Package 3 (WP 3) and Work Package 4 (WP 4). The present case is in relation to WP 3 of the Project. [7] Both WP 3 and WP 4 are required to be interfaced with each other and as such both these work packages were awarded to Samaiden so that the works can be carried out properly, effectively and efficiently planned, coordinated and executed. [8] Due to delay and non-completion of works, Ditrolic had exercised its contractual entitlement for set-offs/deductions for such delay (Liquidated Damages (LAD)) and for numerous payments made on behalf of Samaiden by Ditrolic. C. ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS [9] Due to non-payment of claims made by Samaiden from Ditrolic, Samaiden issued a payment claim dated 24.5.2022 to Ditrolic for which, Ditrolic did not respond. S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] Samaiden then issued a Notice of Adjudication dated 15.7.2022 to Ditrolic and served the Adjudication Claim dated 23.9.2022 to Ditrolic. For which Ditrolic had responded via its Adjudication Response dated [11] Upon conclusion of the Adjudication Proceedings, on 19.12.2022, the Adjudicator delivered his decision in favour of Samaiden and ordered Ditrolic to pay Samaiden within fourteen (14) days from the date of the AD as follows: Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the adjudicated amount of RM2,534,315.99; (ii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on the outstanding Work done for Certificate No. 7 from 21.4.2022 until 23.9.2022 in the amount of RM53,810.82; (iii) Ditrolic shall pay Samaiden the late payment interest for certified paid amount at the rate of 5% per annum in the amount of RM4,621.95; (iv) The rate of interest payable is 5%n per annum simple interest from the date of this award until realisation; and (v) Ditrolic shall bear 100% of the costs of the adjudication proceeding. These costs include: AIAC Registration Fee of RM265.00 (inclusive of 6% SST); and S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] On 11.10.2023, this court heard all 3 OSs together and dismissed the Setting Aside OS and the Stay of Execution of the AD OS, whereas the Enforcement OS was allowed. [13] Being dissatisfied with the decision, a Notice of Appeal has been filed by Ditrolic for which this Grounds of Judgement is written. D. OBJECT CIPAA 2012 [14] CIPAA 2012 is a creature of the legislation intended to facilitate speedy and regular payments in the construction industry. As cash flow is the utmost important factor in the construction industry, CIPAA provides interim measures to disputing parties to solve payment issues expeditiously so as not to jeopardise the continuance of the construction contract entered into by them. (see Martego Sdn Bhd v. Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] 8 CLJ 433; [2019] 5 AMR 516 FC; Bertam Development Sdn Bhd v. R&C Cergas Teguh Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 2228) E. ISSUES [15] application to set aside the AD pursuant to s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 is premised on the following grounds: i. Adjudicator failed to give Ditrolic an opportunity to submit on the issue of time set at large (which was only raised in S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 adjudication reply stage) before making a determination on the same; ii. Adjudicator has committed an error in his own jurisdiction in deciding that the comprehensive submission on the issue LAD of RM2,200,000.00 should be dealt by an arbitrator; and iii. Adjudicator has failed to consider and/or not deal with consider/determine the defence of set-off in equity and counterclaim by Ditrolic. [16] Ditrolic stay of execution of the AD pursuant to s16 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows: i. An arbitration proceeding has commenced pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012; ii. that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD; and iii. that there are special circumstances to warrant a stay of execution i.e Samaiden is financially weak. [17] application to enforce the AD pursuant to s.28 of CIPAA 2012 is premised as follows; i. that the Adjudicated Amount is not paid by Ditrolic; and ii. that the AD is neither set aside nor stayed. S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 F. FINDINGS OF THE COURT I. Setting Aside OS [18] As all the three (3) reasons raised by Ditrolic which makes up the grounds for which the AD should be set aside centres around the issue of set off for LAD raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, I will address all these issues together. Whether there is a denial of natural justice? 15(b) [19] The principle of natural justice that is said to have been denied here is the right to being heard, audi alteram partem. In Adjudication Proceedings, the Adjudicator has the duty to accord procedural fairness to the parties during the course of the proceedings whereby the issues raised by both parties are to be considered and a decision is to be derived therefrom. In the case of ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn. Bhd. v. Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd & another appeal [2016] 1 LNS 1522; [2016] MLJU 1776, the Court of Appeal held: "[19] When one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of "procedural fairness" which needs to be accorded to the parties in a dispute of a hearing. In this appeal the Appellants complaint on the breach of natural justice is contained in pages 15-19 of his written submission. We informed counsel for the Appellant that it appeared that his complaint about the decision of the adjudicator related substantially to the manner in which the adjudicator arrived at his decision after evaluating the evidence provided to him and that would only be S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 questioning the findings of fact by the adjudicator Learned counsel for the Appellant was not able to convince us that our view was wrong when we also pointed out to him that in his submission he had contended that the adjudicator had premised his decision on "his own assessment" (see paragraph 11.4 of submission). ... [21] There were no complaints by the Appellant that the adjudicator had got the disputes on a completely wrong footing. In fact, no complaint was made at all and the adjudication process was carried out premised on those issues. If we were to consider the complaints of the Appellant, we would be looking into the merits of the decision of the adjudicator. In the context of section 15 of CIPAA 2012, it cannot be the function of the Court to look into or review the merits of the case or to decide the facts of the case. The facts are for the adjudicator to assess and decide on. The Court's function is simply to look at the manner in which the adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether he had committed an error of law during that process. Such error of law relates to whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the Appellant In the context of this case, the complaints of the Appellant were nothing but complaints of factual findings of the adjudicator (Emphasis added) [20] decision (as he then was) in the case of MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v. Wazam Ventures Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] 1 LNS 891; [2020] MLJU 208. In this case, it was held that it is sufficient to dislodge a complaint of breach of natural justice if the Learned Adjudicator had given S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 just one reason and His Lordship also set out a list of circumstances which should not justify the setting aside of the AD. [21] The question that needs to be asked is whether Ditrolic was denied the right to being heard as alleged? In this case, as seen in the AD, the Adjudicator had deliberated on all the issues raised by both Ditrolic and Samaiden at the Adjudication Proceedings at length before coming to his conclusion. [22] No where in the Adjudication Proceedings that is seen where Ditrolic had requested disallowed or denied Ditrolic the right to do so. Since, this issue was already known to Ditrolic when it was previously raised in other Adjudication Proceedings between parties, to the very least, Ditrolic should have requested to reply or submit on this issue when the same was raised at this proceeding. [23] Furthermore, since the issue of LAD was raised by Ditrolic in its Adjudication Response, it is only natural that Samaiden would respond to this issue in its reply. It is not a new issue raised by Samaiden as how it has been made out to look. The Adjudicator would naturally think that the same i.e. Samaiden had responded to the LAD issue raised by Ditrolic. reply, it has to be requested by Ditrolic to do so. S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [24] Since the Adjudicator had deliberated the issue of LAD at paragraphs 162 to 178 of the AD, it can very well be seen that the Adjudicator had given due considerations to the issue of LAD raised by Ditrolic. If the Adjudicator had not considered this issue of LAD at all then it would be right for Ditrolic to claim that it was denied the right to be heard or that the Adjudicator had not exercised procedural fairness in conducting the Adjudication Proceedings but that not being the case, I do not see how was Ditrolic denied the right to be heard as claimed. [25] Be that as it may, it must be realised that from the outset the Adjudicator had in his findings found that Samaiden was entitled for its claim of RM2,539,140.99. The issue of LAD was only to ascertain whether the sum sought by Ditrolic for LAD can be allowed, if so the sum of RM2,200,000.00 will be deducted from the allowed claim. In this case, it is the considered view of the Learned Adjudicator that the issue in relation to LAD is best to be dealt with by an arbitrator and as such, no deductions were made to the allowed claim. Hence, the allowed sum of RM2,539,140.99 still remains under the contract. [26] I find that the Adjudicator had used the powers conferred upon him pursuant to s. 25 of CIPAA 2012 in deliberating all the issues raised before him at the Adjudication Proceedings. The Adjudicator had considered each and every issue raised by both parties at the Adjudication Proceedings and deliberated on the same before arriving to his decision. Not being satisfied dings cannot be the basis for the AD to be set aside under this limb. S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [27] As stated in the case of Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 8 CLJ 728 : e adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s.15 is not an [28] As such, whether the Adjudicator had assessed the issues raised correctly or not is not up to this court to determine as the decision of the Adjudicator cannot be reviewed on its merits. Merely being unsatisfied with [29] In the upshot, having failed to establish s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 against the Adjudicator, Ditrolic has failed to discharge its burden on a balance of probabilities to set aside the AD. As such, this application to set aside the AD is hereby dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. II. Stay of Execution OS [30] One of the 3 reasons Ditrolic had applied for Stay of Execution of the AD is because of its allegation that there is a clear and unequivocal error in the AD. Since this issue has been dealt and dismissed in the setting aside application, this is no longer a ground which I will consider in this stay application. [31] The other reason for this application is pursuant to s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012 i.e the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 contention that arbitration has been commenced and as such, stay of execution should be granted. [32] In this case, ation proceeding is not able to proceed further than its commencement as pursuant to Clause 22 of the LOA, the parties are contractually bound to bring their dispute to the Senior Management Settlement Consultation prior to it being brought to arbitration. Therefore, if the AD is stayed by a mere commencement of arbitration, the objective of CIPAA will surely be defeated. [33] The Federal Court case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2019] 5 CLJ 479 His Lordship Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin PCA had in delivering the judgement stated the following: s. 16 of CIPAA would allow some degree of flexibility to the courts to stay the award where there are clear errors, or to meet the justice of the individual case. It is accepted that a stay of the award ought not be given readily and [34] In seeing the need to prevent abuse of s16 CIPAA 2012, I fall back on what was said by Lee Swee Seng J (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v. Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2019] 1 LNS 757; [2019] MLJU 1393. His Lordship in his judgment had succinctly reasoned that in spite of s.16(1)(b) of CIPAA 2012, allowing a stay merely on the fact that the arbitration had commenced with the service of a notice to arbitrate would render the entire purpose of the CIPAA futile and statutory adjudication wholly ineffective to ensure cashflow in the construction industry. It was further explained in the following terms: S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 erved. If stay should be granted the moment there is a pending arbitration or litigation, then a losing party in an Adjudication would be tempted just to commence these proceedings with the sure and certain expectation that a stay would invariably be granted by the Court of the Adjudication Decision. That would scuttle and stultify the application of the CIPAA designed to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry such that a party that is already out of pocket for the work done is not put to further [35] The final reason is that the financial standing of Samaiden is weak and as such, if Ditrolic is successful at the arbitration, Samaiden will not be able to pay back the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. In this regard, in the absence of any cogent evidence to substantiate this ground, I am convinced by the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) report that Samaiden is a solvent concern. [36] Therefore, if the decision at arbitration is subsequently made in favour of Ditrolic, Samaiden will be able to repay Ditrolic the adjudication amount. As such, this contention to establish this argument to this court. On the contrary, based on the CCM report, Samaiden has assets worth much more than what is required should it have to repay the adjudication amount to Ditrolic. Mere fear does not warrant for a stay to be granted. [37] Hence, the Stay of Execution OS is dismissed with no order as to costs. S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 III. Enforcement OS [38] As guided by Her Ladyship Mary Lim Thiam Suan JCA (as she then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 229, the court may exercise its discretion to grant leave under s. 28(1) and (2) CIPAA to enforce an adjudication decision if the following three conditions (3 Conditions) are met: for leave under s. 28 CIPAA; (2) the party against whom an adjudication decision is made, has failed to pay the adjudicated amount on the date specified in the adjudication decision; and ( [39] In this case, in the absence of any evidences to say otherwise, all 3 conditions have been satisfied and since the Setting Aside and the Stay of Execution of the AD have been dismissed, Enforcement OS is allowed with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to Samaiden by Ditrolic subject to allocatur fee. G. CONCLUSION [40] Premised on the above evidences and reasons: (i) both the Setting Aside OS and Stay of Execution OS are dismissed; S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N OIcze0PbN0T48aaUJNjiQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AC-A53KJ-125-10/2020

PLAINTIF RAVI A/L LATCHUMANAH DEFENDAN 1. ) Gunalan A/l Gopal 2. ) Yesu Steven A/l GunalanPIHAK KETIGAAM GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD

kemalangan jalan raya - liabiliti dan kuantum - Defendan memplidkan fraud - Defendan -defendan telah gagal memanggil saksi -Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menafikan penglibatan motokar No. PGY4006 dalam kemalangan ini. Defendan Ketiga memplidkan bahawa Plaintif dan/atau ejennya dan/atau wakilnya telah bersepakat dan bersekongkol untuk melakukan frod bagi melakukan tuntutan palsu kemalangan jalanraya - Tuntutan Plaintif dibenarkan dengan kos mengikut skala dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga ditolak. Liabiliti diputuskan 100% di pihak Defendan-Defendan dan Plaintif tidak menyumbang cuai dalam kemalangan ini.

04/01/2024

Puan Rajeswari A/P Kannakiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5351fde3-e293-42ce-99cd-78b1d80f9480&Inline=true

Page | 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TELUK INTAN DI DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN GUAMAN NO.: AC-A53KJ-125-10/2020 ANTARA RAVI A/L LATCHUMANAH … PLAINTIF DAN 1. GUNALAN A/L GOPAL 2. YESU STEVEN A/L GUNALAN 3. AM GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Kurnia Insurance (M) Berhad) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN _______________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN _______________________________________ PENGENALAN [1] Ini adalah rayuan pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua serta pihak Defendan Ketiga terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah ini yang telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif ((liability dan kuantum) selepas satu perbicaraan penuh. LATAR BELAKANG KES [2] Tuntutan Plaintif adalah bagi gantirugi am, gantirugi khas, faedah dan kos terhadap Defendan - Defendan akibat dari satu kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 17.10.2016 jam lebih kurang pukul 6.30 pagi di Jalan Persekutuan Ipoh - Kuala Lumpur di antara motorsikal nombor pendaftaran AGR 2563 yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif dan sebuah motokar nombor pendaftaran PGY 4006 yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama dan dimiliki oleh Defendan Kedua. 04/01/2024 12:17:48 AC-A53KJ-125-10/2020 Kand. 99 S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 2 [3] Defendan Ketiga adalah penanggung insurans kepada motorkar PGY 4006 yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama pada masa material dan telah dibenarkan untuk mencelah di dalam guaman ini dan dinamakan sebagai Defendan Ketiga atas alasan terdapat unsur frod dalam kes ini iaitu bahawa motosikal yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan dengan motokar Defendan dan bahawa Plaintif sebenarnya telah jatuh dari motosikalnya dengan sendiri. VERSI PLAINTIF [4] Pada 17.10.2016, jam lebih kurang pukul jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi, Plaintif sedang menunggang motorsikal nombor pendaftaran AGR 2563 dari Bidor menghala ke Tapah. Apabila Plaintif sedang melalui di KM57 Jalan Ipoh – Kuala Lumpur, iaitu di selekoh tokong, secara tiba-tiba motokar PGY4006 yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama sebagai agen atau kakitangan atau orang yang memandu dengan kebenaran Defendan Kedua telah melanggar motorsikal Plaintif dari arah belakang lalu mengakibatkan berlakunya satu kemalangan di mana Plaintif telah terjatuh ke dalam longkang dan mengalami kecederaan. Plaintif telah dibantu oleh pemandu motokar tersebut yang kemudiannya menghantar Plaintif ke hospital. VERSI DEFENDAN PERTAMA DAN KEDUA [5] Di dalam Pernyataan Pembelaan mereka, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menafikan penglibatan motokar No. PGY4006 dalam kemalangan ini. Secara alternatif, Defendan Pertama dan Kedua memplidkan, sekiranya dibuktikan bahawa Plaintiff terlibat dalam kemalangan dengan motokar PGY4006, maka kemalangan tersebut disebabkan semata-mata atau disumbangkan oleh kecuaian Plaintif sendiri. [6] Walau bagaimanapun Defendan Pertama dan Kedua gagal hadir ke Mahkamah untuk memberikan keterangan bersumpah bagi menyokong versi mereka seperti yang diplidkan sebaliknya selepas pihak Plaintif menutup kes S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 3 mereka, Peguam Defendan Pertama dan Kedua juga telah menutup kes mereka tanpa memanggil sebarang saksi. VERSI DEFENDAN KETIGA [7] Defendan Ketiga ialah penanggung insurans bagi motorkar No. PGY4006. Defendan Ketiga telah mengeluarkan satu polisi insurans No. JVD 2556851 kepada Defendan Pertama untuk motorkar tersebut. Defendan Ketiga menegaskan bahawa tiada kemalangan wujud di antara motorsikal AGR 2563 dan motorkar No. PGY4006 pada 17.10.2016 seperti yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. [8] Defendan Ketiga selanjutnya menyatakan bahawa perlanggaran yang kononnya berlaku pada 17.10.2016 yang melibatkan Plaintif dengan Defendan Kedua tidak pernah berlaku dan sengaja diadakan untuk membolehkan pihak Plaintif membuat tuntutan terhadap pihak Defendan Ketiga. [9] Defendan Ketiga selanjutnya menyatakan bahawa Plaintif dan/atau ejennya dan/atau wakilnya telah bersepakat dan bersekongkol untuk melakukan frod bagi melakukan tuntutan palsu kemalangan jalanraya dan telah memplidkan butiran frod seperti berikut: Butiran-Butiran "Frod" dan "Conspiracy'' i. Bahawa Defendan Pertama iaitu pemilik kenderaan No. PGY 4006 tidak pernah membuat sebarang laporan polis mahupun memaklumkan kepada Defendan Ketiga berkenaan kemalangan ini; ii. Bahawa Defendan Kedua telah bersengkongkol untuk membantu membuat tuntutan palsu terhadap Defendan Ketiga dengan melibatkan motorkar No. PGY 4006 dalam kemalangan yang telah berlaku terhadap motorsikal No. AGR 2563 dengan tujuan membantu Plaintif. iii. Bahawa Plaintif dan Defendan Kedua telah bersekongkol ("conspire") untuk membuat satu percubaan untuk membuat tuntutan palsu ke atas Defendan Ketiga padahal Plaintif telah pun hilang kawalan dan terjatuh dengan sendirinya. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 4 iv. Bahawa Defendan Kedua telah membuat laporan polis No. 002414/17 selepas 9 bulan daripada tarikh konon-kononnya kemalangan berlaku bertarikh 17/10/2016 walaupun tidak mengalami apa-apa kecederaan. v. Bahawa Laporan Perubatan Hospital Tapah bertarikh 26/8/2020 telah menyatakan "Alleged motorbike skidded today', Bahawa Laporan Perubatan bertarikh 11/11/2016 daripada Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun telah menyatakan di bahagian history bahawa "Alleged motorbike skidded' vi. Bahawa surat bertarikh 1/11/2016 daripada Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun telah menyatakan bahawa "37 years old Indian gentleman with no know medical illness, recently involved in a road traffic accident; skidded due to slippery road vii. Bahawa Plaintif sememangnya telah pun terlibat dengan kemalangan yang berpunca daripada diri sendiri dan tidak tidak pemah melibatkan motorkar No. PGY 4006. [10] Defendan Ketiga juga telah melalui tuntutan balasnya memohon relif-relif seperti berikut: a. Bahawa kenderaan motorkar No. PGY 4006 dan motorsikal No. AGR 2563 tidak pernah terlibat dengan kemalangan pada tarikh 17-10-2016 di antara satu sama lain. b. Babawa tuntutan sivil yang dibawa melalui tindakan Saman No. AA- A53KJ-319- 09/2018 yang difailkan di Mahkamah Sesyen Sivil Ipoh adalah satu tuntutan palsu yang berdasarkan kemalangan yang dikatakan konon-kononnya berlaku. c. Satu deklarasi bahawa polisi No. JVD2556851 tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan sejajar dengan seksyen 96(3) Akta PengangkutanJalan 1987 bagi kemalangan yang dikatakan konon-kononnya berlaku diantara motorkar No. PGY 4006 dan motorsikal No. AGR 2563 pada 17-10-2016 yang kononnya berlaku di KM 57 Jalan Ipoh - Kuala Lumpur. d. Bahawa tiada apa-apa jumlah yang kena dibayar oleh Defendan Ketiga sebagai scorang penanggung insurans jika sebelum tarikh liabiliti S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 5 ditanggung, penanggung insurans telah mengambil penetapan daripada mahkamah bahawa polisi insurans itu tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan memandangkan tiada kemalangan melibatkan motorkar No. PGY 4006; e. Bahawa Defendan Ketiga tidak perlu bertanggungan terhadap tuntutan palsu/frod yang dituntut oleh Plaintif; f. Bahawa Plaintif perlu membayar gantirugi am dan gantirugi teladan sejumlah RM 200,000-00 kepada Defendan Ketiga bagi tuntutan palsu/frod; dan g. Kos (atas kadar peguamcara-klien). [11] Sebagaimana Defendan Pertama dan Kedua, Defendan Ketiga juga telah gagal memanggil sebarang saksi untuk memberikan keterangan bersumpah bagi menyokong versi mereka serta tuntutan balas seperti yang diplidkan. Defendan Ketiga menyatakan tiada keperluan untuk Defendan Ketiga memanggil saksi kerana Defendan Ketiga adalah penanggung Insurans bagi motorkar No. PGY 4006 dan Defendan Ketiga telah mengeluarkan satu polisi insurans No. JVD 2556851 kepada Defendan Pertama untuk motorkar No. PGY4006 SAKSI [12] Saksi-saksi yang telah beri keterangan di dalam kes ini adalah seperti berikut: Saksi Plaintif SP1 Dr. Mohan a/I Brabaharan dari Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun SP2 Dr. Khairul Isman bin Mohd All dari Hospital Tapah SP3 Dr. Ramnan Jeyasingam dari Columbia Asia Extended Care Hospital SP4 Inspektor Hafizi bin Said, Pegawai Penyiasat Trafik SP5 Mogan a/I Latchumanah, abang Plaintif SP6 Mariamah a/p Simon Sundram, ibu Plaintif SP7 Ravi A/L Latchumanah (Plaintif) SP8 P Kumaraguru A/L Periasamy (pakcik Plaintif) S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 6 Manakala pihak Defendan-Defendan pula tidak memanggil saksi untuk memberi keterangan. LIABILITI [13] Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua harus dipertanggungjawabkan 100% terhadap kemalangan ini. [14] Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan penglibatan motorkar no. PGY 4006 (‘kenderaan Defendan Pertama dan Kedua’) dengan motorsikal no. AGR 2563 dalam kemalangan tersebut. Justeru itu, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa tuntutan Plaintif terhadap pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua haruslah ditolak dengan kos. [15] Defendan Ketiga pula menghujahkan bahawa versi Plaintif berkenaaan kemalangan ini bahawa ia dilanggar dari arah belakang tidak disokong melalui contemporaneous document dan juga bukti senyap. [16] Defendan Ketiga juga menghujahkan bahawa Defendan Ketiga telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa di atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa: (i) Tiada perlanggaran antara motorsikal No. AGR 2563 dan motorkar No. PGY 4006. (ii) Tindakan Defendan Pertama membuat laporan polis mengaitkan beliau terlibat sama di dalam kemalangan adalah satu tindakan bersengkongkol (conspire) membuat tuntutan palsu ke atas Defendan Ketiga (iii) Kesemua laporan perubatan yang dikeluarkan adalah konsisten menunjukkan Plaintif adalah terbabas sendiri. Jika Plaintif terbabas sendiri, Plaintif telah memalsukan kemalangannya. (iv) Plaintif telah jatuh sendiri dan kemalangan dan kecederaan beliau alami tidak melibatkan motorkar No.PGY 4006. Oleh itu, Defendan Ketiga perlu mengambil langkah drastik dengan memohon satu deklarasi untuk melindungi dana awam yang dipegang secara amanah yang hanya boleh ditunaikan j ika ada kes yang tulen. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 7 KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH ATAS ISU LIABILITI [17] Setelah mendengar dan menilai keterangan kesemua saksi, dan setelah meneliti ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan dan setelah menimbang penghujahan kesemua pihak, Mahkamah memutuskan pihak Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Oleh itu, tuntutan Plaintif dibenarkan dengan kos mengikut skala dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga ditolak. Liabiliti diputuskan 100% di pihak Defendan- Defendan dan Plaintif tidak menyumbang cuai dalam kemalangan ini. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN [18] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang- undang yang mantap (‘trite law”) bahawa beban pembuktian di dalam kes sivil adalah terletak di bahu Plaintif untuk membuktikan tuntutannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Di dalam kes kemalangan beban pembuktian sentiasa terletak di bahu pihak Plaintif untuk membuktikan kecuaian pihak Defendan dan bukanlah menjadi tugas Defendan untuk membuktikan beliau tidak cuai. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada seksyen 101 hingga 103 Akta Keterangan 1950. [19] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes NEO CHAN ENG v KOH YONG HOE [1960] 1 MLJ 291 , di mana Neal OCJ telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “The onus of proving negligence on the part of the defendant was on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to discharge the onus either by her own evidence or by cross-examination of the defendant or by admissions made by the defendant. I am therefore forced with regret to dismiss her claim” [20] Di dalam kes MOHD YUSOF BIN MOHD RAKIM & ANOR VS SHANTA A/P PERIASAMY & ANOR [ 2006] 5 MLJ 251 at 257, VT Singham J telah memutuskan bahawa: “It is important to be reminded that there is no duty on the part of the first defendant in the instant appeal to prove that he is not negligent for the S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 8 accident until the plaintiffs have established negligence against the first defendant which the plaintiffs have failed” [21] Beban pembuktian adalah terletak di bahu Plaintif dan tidak pernah berpindah kepada Defendan. Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk membuktikan kesnya. Oleh itu, dalam dalam memutuskan isu liabiliti, Mahkamah perlu menentukan terlebih dahulu sama ada Defendan telah cuai dalam kemalangan ini dan hanya setelah kecuaian dibuktikan terhadap Defendan baharulah Mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada Plaintif telah menyumbang cuai. [22] Dalam pada itu, beban pembuktian Defendan Ketiga untuk membuktikan fraud juga adalah di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Standard pembuktian di dalam suatu kes sivil di mana terdapat dakwaan 'fraud' adalah atas dasar imbangan kebarangkalian. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes SINNAIYAH & SONS SDN. BHD. vs DAMAI SETIA SDN. BHD. [2015] 7 CLJ 584, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- (4) The correct principle to apply is as explained in In re B (Children) where it was stipulated that at law, there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. Therefore, it is up to the presiding judge, after hearing and considering the evidence adduced as being done in any other civil claim, to find whether the standard of proof has been attained. The criminal aspect of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation. (paras 49 & 50) DEFENDAN TIDAK HADIR MEMBERI KETERANGAN [23] Fakta bahawa tiada saksi Defendan - Defendan hadir memberi keterangan berkenaan versinya tidak bermakna bahawa Mahkamah seharusnya memberikan keputusan memihak kepada Plaintif. Pihak Plaintif masih terikat dengan beban pembuktian kesnya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 9 [24] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamad Ali [ 1971] 2 MLJ 175, memutuskan bahawa: "In a negligence action, the onus of proof rest wholly on the Plaintiff, whether or not the Defendant gives evidence. The Plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the Defendant’s negligence” [25] Di dalam keadaan di mana Defendan tidak hadir memberikan keterangan, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes KUNASEGARAN MANCKAM V. BAULA SINGH KIPA SINGH & ANOR. & ANOTHER CASE [ 1982] CLJ ( rep) 506 di mana Yang Arif Hakim Abdul Razak menyatakan : " The fact that the Defendants had not been called to rebut the Plaintiff’s case did not mean judgment must be entered in favour of the Plaintiff. The question of tilting the balance of probabilities in the Plaintiff’s favour would only arise where the Plaintiff has proved his case.” [26] Merujuk kepada kes-kes tersebut di atas, walaupun Defendan tidak hadir untuk menyangkal kes Plaintif , ini tidak bermaksud satu penghakiman harus dimasukkan memihak kepada Plaintif. Plaintif masih memikul beban untuk membuktikan kesnya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian walaupun tiada saksi Defendan hadir memberi keterangan. ISU PERMULAAN [27] Pihak Plaintif berhujah bahawa peguamcara Defendan Ketiga tidak pernah memfailkan "Penyata Pembelaan" dan/atau menyerahkan sesalinan kepada peguam Plaintif. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Plaintif berhujah bahawa tiada pembelaan yang boleh dibangkitkan oleh mereka. Justeru itu, mereka juga tidak boleh berhujah berkenaan tuntutan Plaintif dengan merujuk kepada "Penyata Pembelaan" yang tidak ada. [28] Berhubung isu permulaan ini, Mahkamah mendapati terdapat resit pembayaran bertarikh 14.4.2023 yang terkandung dalam fail Mahkamah bagi pemfailan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 10 dokumen tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati dokumen bertajuk ‘Penyata Pembelaan, Tolakan dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga Terhadap Plaintif’ terkandung di dalam fail Mahkamah yang mana telahpun ditandakan sebagai Lampiran 15A oleh kerani Mahkamah. Justeru, adalah dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa pihak Defendan Ketiga telahpun memfailkan Pembelaan, Tolakan dan Tuntutan Balas Pihak Defendan Ketiga pada 14.4.2023. [29] Berhubung isu sama ada Penyata Pembelaan, Tolakan dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga Terhadap Plaintif’bertarikh 14.4.2023 telah diserahkan kepada Peguamcara Plaintif, Pihak Defendan Ketiga telahpun melalui hujahan bertulis mereka mengemukakan e-mel 12 April, 2021 12:26 PM kepada Peguamcara Plaintif yang melampirkan sesalinan Pembelaan Defendan Ketiga. Tiada sebarang cabaran dibuat oleh Plaintif berhubung e-mel ini. Justeru, Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan Ketiga telah pun menyerahkan kepada Plaintif ‘Penyata Pembelaan, Tolakan dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan Ketiga. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan pihak Defendan Ketiga adalah berhak untuk bergantung kepada Pembelaan Tolakan dan Tuntutan Balas mereka dalam perbicaraan tindakan ini. ISU LIABILITI [30] Dalam memutuskan liabilti dalam kes ini, Mahkamah perlu menilai keterangan kesemua saksi dan juga keterangan dokumentari berhubung isu-isu berikut yang dibangkitkan oleh Pihak Defendan-Defendan. A. Defendan 1 dan 2 (a) Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan penglibatan motorkar no. PGY 4006 (‘kenderaan Defendan Pertama dan Kedua’) dengan motorsikal no. AGR 2563 dalam kemalangan tersebut. (b) Keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat kes kemalangan ini (I.O.) mengenai unsur- unsur syak-wasangka tentang penglibatan motorsikal no. AGR 2563 dan motorkar no. PGY 4006 dalam kemalangan sepertimana yang didakwa oleh Plaintif. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 11 (c) Plaintif telah menunggang motorsikal dalam keadaan mabuk dan khayal sehingga terbabas sendiri dan langsung tidak dilanggar oleh motorkar Defendan Pertama dan Kedua. (d) Laporan Hospital Tapah menyatakan “sepanjang berada di Emergency Department, pesakit berada dalam keadaan mabuk. Pesakit tidak menjawab soalan yang ditanyakan oleh Pegawai Perubatan dan Penolong Perubatan. Pesakit sukar hendak dikawal memandangkan dalam keadaan mabuk. (e) Terdapat percanggahan antara keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat kes kemalangan ini (I.O.) dengan keterangan Plaintif – (i) Di dalam statement Plaintif kepada Pegawai Penyiasat , Plaintif menyatakan beliau kenal dengan pemandu motorcar namun semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah , Plaintif menyatakan beliau pernah melihat pemandu motorkar tersebut tetapi beliau bukan kawannya. (ii) Di dalam keterangannya, Plaintiff menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu motokar PGY 4006 selepas pemandu motorkar membuat report sedangkan laporan Polis Plaintif dibuat pada 23.11.2016 manakala laporan Polis Defendan Pertama dibuat pada 12.7.2017 iaitu hampir 9 bulan selepas tarikh kemalangan. Kemudian apabila disoal balas lagi, Plaintif menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu mengenai nombor motorkar Defendan daripada pakcik beliau. (f) Terdapat percanggahan keterangan Plaintif dan SP8 (pakcik Plaintif) berhubung pembaikan motorsikal Plaintif. Menurut Plaintif, pakcik Plaintif yang menguruskan pembaikan motorsikal Plaintif. Namun pakcik Plaintif memberi keterangan bahawa beliau tiada tengok apa kerosakan motorsikal Plaintif. (g) Terdapat percanggahan keterangan Plaintif dan SP8 (pakcik Plaintif). Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama ada datang ke rumah beliau dan telah menawarkan duit sebanyak RM 200.00 untuk S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 12 penyelesaian kes kemalangan ini. Akan tetapi, En. Kumaraguru a/l Periasamy (SP-8) telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama memberi duit sebanyak RM 200.00 kepada SP-8 di Hospital Tapah. (h) Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak boleh digunapakai atas alasan kegagalan Defendan Pertama dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. beban pembuktian sentiasa terletak pada Plaintif untuk membuktikan kes Plaintif B. Defendan Ketiga (i) Tiada keterangan bukti senyap (“ silent evidence”) di rajah kasar dan gambar polis memihak kes Plaintif. (j) Keterangan SP4 (IO) tidak dapat membantu kes Plaintif. SP4 mengaku beliau tidak boleh mengesahkan sama ada terdapat perlanggaran di antara Plaintif dengan Defendan Pertama atau perlanggaran di antara m/ sikal No. AGR 2563 dan m/ kar No. PGY 4006 (k) Contemporaneous Document bercanggah dengan kes Plaintif tidak memihak Pihak Plaintif (l) Laporan polis yang dibuat oleh Plaintif setelah 1 bulan 8 hari adalah satu “after thought”. (m) Defendan Pertama lambat membuat Laporan Polis dalam tempoh yang wajar. Oleh yang demikian laporan polis tersebut tidak seharusnya diterima. Lagipun Defendan Pertama tidak hadir memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. (n) Kemalangan tersebut yang kononnya berlaku pada 17.10.2016 yang kononnya melibatkan Plaintif dan Defendan Kedua, pada hemat Defendan Ketiga tidak pernah berlaku. Defendan Pertama pada asalnya mungkin telah bersengkongkol (conspire) di dalam membantu Plaintif membuat tuntutan palsu terhadap Defendan Ketiga (o) Berdasarkan ruangan history di laporan perubatan, Plaintif sebenarnya telah jatuh sendiri dan terbabas akibat jalan licin sehingga menyebabkan kecederaan disebabkan berkemungkinan menunggang di bawah pengaruh alcohol berdasarkan : (i) Laporan Perubatan Hospital Tapah bertraikh 26.8.2020 telah menyatakan “Alleged motorbike skidded today” S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 13 (ii) Laporan Perubatan bertarikh 11.11.2016 dari Hospital Raja Pemaisuri bainun telah menyatakan di bahagian history bahawa “alleged motorbike skidded” (iii) Surat bertarikh 1.11.2016 daripada Hospital Raja Pemaisuri Bainun telah menyatakan bahawa 37 years Indian gentlemen with no known medical illness, recently involved in a road accident: skidded due to slippery road surface on 17.10.2016 Keterangan SP- 4 (Pegawai Penyiasat) [31] Keterangan SP4 boleh dirumuskan seperti berikut:- a) 2 buah kenderaan terlibat dalam kemalangan pada 17.10.2016 iaitu motorsikal AGR 2563 dan motorkar PGY 4006. Kedua-dua pihak yang terlibat dalam kemalangan telah membuat laporan Polis. b) Penunggang motorsikal tidak membuat laporan polis di Balai Polis. Pada 23.11.2016 waris kepada penunggang motorsikal datang ke Balai Polis memaklumkan saudaranya teribat dalam kemalangan dan berada di rumah. Bertindak atas maklumat tersebut SP4 telah ke rumah mangsa dan laporan polis POL 55 dibuat di rumah mangsa pada 23.11.2016. c) Pada 23.11.2016 apabila SP4 pergi ke rumah penunggang motorsikal dan mengambil statement POL55, SP4 mendapati penunggang motorsikal dalam keadaan terbaring di atas katil. Namun penunggang motorsikal telah memberikan kerjasama dan telah memaklumkan nombor motorkar Defendan kepada SP4 dan telah menuliskan sendiri nombor motokar Defendan. d) Pemandu motorkar tidak datang dengan sukarela untuk membuat laporan polis tetapi beliau hanya hadir setelah surat kedua bertarikh 16.5.2017 daripada pihak Polis diterima oleh beliau. Laporan polis pemandu motorkar dibuat pada 12.7.2017 iaitu lebih kurang 9 bulan selepas kemalangan. e) Tiada saksi bebas yang menyaksikan kemalangan ini f) SP4 telah pergi ke tempat kemalangan bersama jurugambar pada 23.11.2016 (pada tarikh laporan polis penunggang motorsikal dibuat) dan telah melakar rajah kasar dan kunci. Gambar kenderaan yang S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 14 terlibat dalam kemalangan ada diambil dan telah ditandakan sebagai Ekshibit P9A-C g) Percakapan beramaran Plaintif telah diambil pada 20.6.2017 manakala percakapan beramaran bagi pemandu motorkar diambil pada 12.7.2017. h) Saman telah dikeluarkan terhadap pemandu motorkar kerana lewat membuat laporan polis di bawah seksyen 52(2) APJ 1987 i) Menurut siasatan SP4, pemandu motorkar lewat membuat laporan polis kerana telah membayar RM500 kepada penunggang motorsikal tersebut dan penunggang motorsikal tersebut telah bersetuju untuk tidak membuat laporan polis. j) SP4 tidak dapat memastikan sama ada kenderaan – kenderaan tersebut terlibat dalam kemalangan ini. k) Status keputusan kes refer pada insurans sebab pihak polis tak boleh tentukan kesalahan mana-mana pihak l) SP4 menyatakan bahawa pada 20.6.2017 semasa rakaman percakapan penunggang motorsikal diambil, penunggang motorsikal ada memberitahu SP4 bahawa tujuan beliau membuat laporan polis sebab beliau tidak berpuashati dengan tawaran RM200.00 yang dibuat oleh pemandu motorkar sebagai penyelesaian. m) SP4 ada bertanyakan kepada penunggang motorsikal “adakah kamu tahu nombor pendaftaran kenderaan tersebut. jawapan dia pemandu itu ada beritahu saya, pemandu tersebut ada datang ke rumah untuk memberikan wang saguhati sebanyak RM200 tetapi saya tidak mahu dan saya mahu laporan polis dibuat”. n) SP4 mengesahkan Pemandu motorkar ada membuat pengakuan bahawa beliau pernah pergi ke rumah penunggang motorsikal. o) SP4 bersetuju bahawa penglibatan motorkar PGY4006 ini adalah disebabkan ada pengakuan daripada pemandu motorkar. Keterangan Plaintif (SP7) [32] Kemalangan berlaku ketika Plaintif sedang menunggang motorsikalnya dengan kelajuan 40 km/j di Jalan Bidor ke Tapah hendak pergi kerja. Ketika itu hujan renyai-renyai dan Plaintif sedang menunggang di tepi kiri jalan apabila beliau dilanggar oleh motorkar Defendan daripada belakang. Terdapat satu S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 15 tokong Cina di tepi sebelah kiri tempat kemalangan tersebut berlaku dan tempat itu diterangi oleh lampu dari tokong berkenaan. Plaintif jatuh ke dalam longkang dan dibantu oleh pemandu motorkar tersebut ke hospital. [33] Plaintif juga memberitahu bahawa dia nampak motokar yang melanggar dia semasa dia jatuh, dan pemandu motokar tersebut telah memberitahu bahawa dia yang melanggar Plaintif dan tiada kenderaan lain pada ketika itu. [34] Pegawai Penyiasat datang ke rumah Plaintif untuk mengambil laporan. Laporan polis Plaintif ditandakan Ekshibit P13. [35] Plaintif tidak mengenali pemandu motorkar sebelum kemalangan. [36] Kerosakan motorsikal di bahagian hadapan dan belakang. [37] Plaintif ada mengambil minuman keras pada malam sebelum kemalangan dan tidak mengambil alkohol pada pagi kemalangan tersebut. Plaintif tidak bersetuju bahawa beliau di bawah pengaruh alkohol ketika kemalangan berlaku. [38] Plaintif masih boleh mengawal motorsikalnya walaupun dalam keadaan pening/khayal. [39] Plaintif juga telah menafikan cadangan kedua-dua peguamcara Defendan bahawa kemalangan ini berlaku kerana Plaintif telah terbabas dengan sendiri akibat jalan yang licin, menafikan bahawa dia telah berkomplot dengan Defendan Pertama untuk membuat satu lapuran polis yang tidak benar dengan tujuan untuk membuat satu tuntutan palsu daripada Defendan Ketiga. Keterangan SP8 P Kumaraguru A/L Periasamy (Pakcik kepada Plaintif) [40] SP8 telah menerima panggilan daripada unit kecemasan Hospital Tapah jam lebih kurang 7.50 ke 8.00 pagi, menyatakan Plaintif telah terlibat dalam kemalangan dan boleh ‘discharge’ dan dibawa pulang ke rumah. SP8 telah pergi ke Hospital Tapah dan ada berjumpa dengan pemandu motorcar seorang S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 16 lelaki india (Defendan Pertama) dan pemandu motorkar itu ada memberikan wang RM200 sebagai penyelesaian untuk diberikan kepada Plaintif. SP8 tidak mengenali pemandu motorcar. Kemudian, SP8 telah membawa Plaintif balik ke rumah dengan bantuan seorang rakannya menaiki kereta. Keterangan SP2 Dr. Khairul Isman Bin Mohd Ali Pegawai Perubatan di Hospital Tapah [41] SP2 telah menyediakan laporan perubatan di ekshibit P2 di mana di bawah sejarah dinyataka “37 years old/Indian/male difficult to get history. Under alcohol influences. Alleged motorbike skidded today”. [42] SP2 menyatakan maklumat di bahagian sejarah itu bukan diperoleh daripada pesakit dan susah untuk mendapatkan history sebab pesakit under alcohol influence. Selanjutnya SP2 menyatakan tidak tahu siapa yang memberi maklumat berkenaan butiran di bahagian sejarah pesakit. [43] SP2 tidak mengambil ujian darah / air kencing untuk tentukan tahap alcohol. Sekiranya ujian darah / air kencing dibuat, tahap alcohol boleh dapat dipastikan. Keterangan Plaintif (SP1) Dr. Mohan a/l Brabaharan Pegawai Perubatan ortopedik Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainon [44] SP1 telah menyediakan laporan Perubatan hospital Ipoh (Ekshibit P1) di mana di ruangan Sejarah/History dinyatakan “Alleged motorbike skidded. The motorbike handle hit against his chest wall. Post trauma, he complained pain over chest wall and bilateral lower limb weakness”. [45] SP1 menyatakan ruangan Sejarah/History di ekshibit P1 telah diambil daripada kad kecemasan pesakit di mana pesakit itu datang ke kecemasan Hospital Ipoh dengan surat rujuk daripada Hospital Tapah, maka maklumat daripada surat rujuk tersebut diambil untuk menulis laporan perubatan hospital Ipoh (Ekshibit P1) S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 17 PENILAIAN KETERANGAN DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [46] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Karumalay Vaniyan & Anor v Ananthan Rethinam [2005] 2 CLJ 429, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: "A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness without undertaking a critical analysis of that witness' evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach of judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.” [47] Merujuk kepada kes di atas, prinsip undang-undang adalah suatu keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah perbicaraan tanpa “judicial appreciation of the evidence” boleh diketepikan atas rayuan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah perlu membuat penilaian keterangan kesemua saksi dan keterangan dokumentari sebelum membuat keputusan. [48] Setelah mendengar dan menilai kesemua keterangan di dalam kes ini, dan setelah menguji keterangan yang sedia ada terhadap kesemua kebarangkalian yang wujud, Mahkamah ini mendapati pihak plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya atas imbangan kebarangkalian atas alasan berikut: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 18 Keterangan SP4 (IO kes) yang tidak dapat memastikan sama ada kemalangan ini benar- benar berlaku [49] SP4 dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau tidak pasti sama ada kenderaan- kenderaan tersebut terlibat atau tidak dalam kemalangan ini oleh kerana laporan polis lewat dibuat iaitu sebulan selepas kemalangan, maka pada hari kejadian siasatan penuh tidak dapat dijalankan. [50] Mahkamah dalam memutuskan kecuaian dalam kemalangan ini, haruslah menimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah dan tidak harus bergantung kepada sebarang pendapat yang diberikan oleh pegawai penyiasat. Ianya bukanlah tugas pegawai penyiasat untuk memberi pandangan dan/atau keputusan samada kenderaan-kenderaan dalam kes ini tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan ini atau tidak, dan/atau untuk memberi keputusan berkenaan siapa yang cuai. [51] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Plaintif bahawa fakta samada terdapat satu kemalangan atau tidak dan siapakah yang cuai dalam kemalangan ini adalah bergantung kepada keterangan-keterangan dan bukti yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan ianya adalah merupakan budi bicara Mahkamah ini untuk memutuskannya dan keputusan tersebut tidak harus dibuat berdasarkan kepada pendapat pegawai penyiasat. [52] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes LIM JEH HAUR v NICHOLAS THOMAS PHILIP (2019) 1 LNS 1351 di mana Wong Kian Kheong J telah menyatakan seperti berikut: E. Should court attach any weight to IO's opinion? 22. The Defendant has relied on the opinion evidence of the 2 IO's that the Defendant was not at fault regarding the Incident because the 1st Plaintiff had came out from the left side of the Defendant and had crossed onto the Defendant's right of way. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 19 23. Firstly, a police officer investigating a road accident may give evidence regarding the result of his or her investigation, such as (which are not exhaustive) - (1) the nature and extent of the damage to the vehicles in question; (2) the results of an examination of the scene of accident, e.g.- (a) whether there were skid marks on the road; (b) whether the traffic lights and/or street lights were functioning at the material time; and (c) whether there were traffic signs at the scene of the accident; and (3) a sketch plan of the place of the accident. 24. The court should not attach any weight to the evidence of an IO that a particular party has been negligent or not (or words to that effect) because: (1) whether a party is liable for negligence or otherwise is to be decided by the court; (2) an IO has no personal knowledge regarding the accident. The IO's knowledge of the accident is derived solely from the results of the IO's investigation. In other words, the IO's evidence regarding who is negligent or not, constitutes hearsay evidence. I rely on the following judgment of Ong Hock Thye Ag CJ (Malaya) (sitting as a High Court Judge) in Public Prosecutor v. Siew Sung [1965] 1 LNS 140; [1966] 1 MLJ 145, at 145, as follows - "The inspector's evidence that his enquiries led him to believe that the accused was owner of the machine, was rightly struck out as hearsay, upon objection raised by defence counsel." S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 20 (emphasis added); and (3) an IO's evidence regarding who is negligent or otherwise, is purely his or her opinion. The court cannot accept opinion evidence unless there is a relevant issue before the court which is beyond the court's competence wherein the court may accept an expert opinion under s. 45(1) EA…” 25. As explained in the above paragraph 24, no weight should be attached to the opinion evidence of the 2 IO's that the Defendant was not at fault regarding the Incident.” [53] Berdasarkan kes tersebut di atas, Mahkamah ini berpendapat keterangan SP4 bahawa beliau tidak pasti sama ada kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut terlibat atau tidak dalam kemalangan ini bukanlah satu pendapat Pegawai Penyiasat. Keterangan SP4 bukanlah keterangan pendapat berkenaan siapakah yang cuai dalam kemalangan ini. Keterangan SP4 hanya mengesahkan bahawa beliau tidak dapat memastikan sama ada:- (i) Kenderaan – kenderaan terlibat atau (ii) Kenderaan – kenderaan tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan ini. [54] Ianya akan menjadi pendapat Pegawai Penyiasat sekiranya SP4 secara positif mengesahkan kenderaan-kenderaan ini tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan ini atau sekiranya SP4 mengesahkan kenderaan-kenderaan ini terlibat dalam kemalangan ini. [55] Memandangkan SP4 tidak pasti sama ada kenderaan – kenderaan terlibat dalam kemalangan ini ataupun tidak, ini tidak bermakna Mahkamah seharusnya menolak terus tuntutan Plaintif hanya kerana SP4 tidak dapat memastikan sama ada kemalangan ini berlaku atau tidak. Mahkamah hendaklah memberi pertimbangan kepada keseluruhan keterangan- keterangan secara totality dalam membuat keputusan berhubung isu liabiliti. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 21 Laporan perubatan Plaintif menyatakan bahawa motorsikal Plaintif terbabas (alleged motorbike skidded). [56] Berdasarkan ruangan history di laporan perubatan Plaintif, pihak Defendan – Defendan menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif sebenarnya telah jatuh sendiri dan terbabas akibat jalan licin sehingga menyebabkan kecederaan disebabkan berkemungkinan menunggang di bawah pengaruh alcohol. Hujahan Defendan- defendan ini adalah berdasarkan kepada: (i) Laporan Perubatan Hospital Tapah bertraikh 26.8.2020 telah menyatakan “Alleged motorbike skidded today” (ii) Laporan Perubatan bertarikh 11.11.2016 dari Hospital Raja Pemaisuri bainun telah menyatakan di bahagian history bahawa “alleged motorbike skidded” (iii) Surat bertarikh 1.11.2016 daripada Hospital Raja Pemaisuri Bainun telah menyatakan bahawa “37 years Indian gentlemen with no known medical illness, recently involved in a road accident: skidded due to slippery road surface on 17.10.2016” [57] Plaintif dalam kes ini telah mendapat rawatan sebanyak 2 kali di Hospital Tapah pada hari yang sama kemalangan pada 17.10.2016. Berdasarkan keterangan yang diberi oleh doktor yang merawat Plaintif di Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah, Dr. Khairul Ismail bin Mohd Ali (Saksi SP-2), Plaintif dalam kes ini telah dibawa ke Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah pada 17/10/2016 jam pukul 7.09 pagi, iaitu 39 minit selepas kemalangan yang dikatakan berlaku pada 17/10/2016 jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi. Pihak Defendan menghujahkan bahawa apabila Plaintif mendapatkan rawatan kali pertama di Hospital Tapah, beliau adalah di bawah pengaruh alkohol dan dikatakan bahawa beliau mengalami kecederaan akibat motorsikal tergelincir (‘motorbike skidded’), tanpa penglibatan kenderaan lain. [58] Pada hari yang sama, iaitu pada 17/10/2016 jam 8.38 malam, Plantif dalam kes ini dihantar ke Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah kali kedua oleh ambulans dan barulah pada masa itu, pihak hospital Tapah mendapat maklumat “alleged motor vehicle accident with motorcar” dan perkara ini dinyatakan dalam S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 22 laporan Perubatan Hospital Tapah bertarikh 21.10.2020 (Ekshibit P3). Ekshibit P4 iaitu kad rawatan pesakit menyatakan ‘Post MVA this morning’ [59] Dalam kes in, Mahkamah mendapati bagi rawatan kali pertama, sejarah tidak diambil daripada Plaintif dan tiada juga catatan siapa yang memberikan sejarah tersebut kepada doktor. Jadi berdasarkan catatan di bahagian sejarah tersebut, Mahkamah tidak boleh membuat keputusan secara konklusif bahawa kemalangan ini adalah akibat motorbike skidded. [60] Bagi menyokong dapatan Mahkamah ini, keterangan SP2 (Peguam Perubatan daripada Hospital Tapah) dirujuk : PEMERIKSAAN BALAS (SP2 - Dr. KHAIRUL ISMAN) Q : Rujuk WSSP2. soalan 5. saya rujuk kepada laporan . mukasurat 18 . di bawah sejarah 37 years old Indian male difficult to get history sebab alcohol, alleged motorbike skidded, itulah sejarah yang diperoleh A : Waktu mula-mula datang history tak dapat Q : Dr. yang tulis alleged motorbike skidded, Dr. tulis berdasarkan maklumat A : Ya maklumat itu bukan daripada pesakit Q : Susah nak dapat history sebab under alcohol influence? A : Ya … Q : Di bawah sejarah alleged mb skidded today. rujuk Ekshibit P3 mukasurat 21 tadi Dr. katakan ada orang maklum dia skidded, tentang motorkar , masa orang maklum siapa yang maklum pada kamu ? A : Saya tak pasti bahagian kecemasan Q : Dr. memang tak tahu A : Ya Q : Siapa yang in charge di bahagian kecemasan ? A : Saya tak pasti dia ambil ke tidak, verbal sahaja S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 23 Q : Betul atau tidak Dr. memang tiada pengetahuan ? A : Betul [61] Tambahan pula merujuk kepada lapuran perubatan Plaintif (Ekshibit P2) di mukasurat 18 Ikatan B perkara-perkara berikut telah dicatit dalam lapuran tersebut : "Sejarah (History) 37 years old / Indian / male, difficult to get history under alcohol influences” "Perkembangan keadaan pesakit sepanjang berada di bawah penjagaan doctor termasuk rawatan susulan" Sepanjang berada di Emergency Department, pesakit berada keadaan mabuk; Pesakit tidak menjawab soalan yang ditanya oleh pegawai perubatan dan penolong pegawai perubatan; Pesakit sukar hendak dikawal memandangkan dalam keadaan mabuk; Pesakit juga tidak mengikut arahan pegawai perubatan dan pegawai perubatan tidak dapat mengenal pasti sakit beliau.” [62] Sementara itu, ketika disoal balas Dr. Mohan A/L Brabaharan (SP1) memberitahu bahawa alleged motorcycle skidded" adalah berdasarkan kepada kad kecemasan pesakit dari Hospital Tapah. Keterangan SP1 seperti berikut dirujuk: Q : Rujuk mukasurat 12 di bawah bahagian sejarah , daripada mana maklumat berkenaan sejarah ini diperoleh A : Diperoleh daripada kad kecemasan pesakit tersebut Q : Bila ditanya oleh rakan bijaksana saya tentang maklumat di bawah sejarah tentang alleged motorbike skidded Doktor mengatakan dari kad kecemasan pesakit. Boleh terangkan apa itu kad kecemasan pesakit? A : Kes ini dirujuk dari Hospital tapah, sekarang pesakit itu datang ke kecemasan dengan surat rujuk daripada Hospital Tapah , kami S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 24 menggunakan maklumat daripada surat tersebut untuk tulis laporan Q : Ertinya pesakit ini adalah kes referral daripada Tapah Hospital ke Ipoh A : Betul [63] Berdasarkan keterangan SP2 dan SP1 seperti di atas Mahkamah tidak dapat memutuskan bahawa kemalangan ini adalah akibat motorbike skidded kerana tiada keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah untuk membuktikan bagaimana dan daripada siapakah sejarah tersebut diperoleh sedangkan Plaintif ketika itu dalam keadaan sukar hendak dikawal dan tidak menjawab soalan doktor malah tiada dokumentasi siapakah yang memberikan sejarah pesakit kepada doktor. [64] Maka kenyataan “Alleged motorbike skidded” dalam laporan perubatan itu tidak boleh dikatakan tidak menyokong atau bercanggah dengan versi Plaintif tentang bagaimana kemalangan ini berlaku. Justeru, Mahkamah tidak dapat memutuskan bahawa berdasarkan ini sahaja bahawa terdapat fraud di pihak Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dalam kes ini di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Keterangan Sokongan terhadap Versi Plaintif [65] Dalam kes ini Versi Plaintif adalah ketika Plaintif sedang menunggang motorsikalnya di Jalan Bidor ke Tapah hendak pergi kerja, motorkar Defendan No. PGY 4006 telah melanggarnya daripada belakang. Plaintif nampak motokar yang melanggarnya semasa dia jatuh ke dalam longkang dan pemandu motorkar tersebut yang membawa Plaintif ke hospital. [66] Keterangan Plaintif ini disokong oleh keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (SP4) di mana SP4 telah menyatakan bahawa Kedua-dua pihak yang terlibat dalam kemalangan telah membuat laporan Polis. Pada 23.11.2016 apabila SP4 pergi ke rumah Plaintif dan mengambil statement POL55, Plaintif telah memaklumkan nombor motorkar Defendan kepada SP4 dan telah menuliskan sendiri nombor motokar Defendan. [67] Fakta bahawa kemalangan melibatkan kedua-dua kenderaan terlibat dalam kes ini disokong dengan keterangan SP4 yang menyatakan menurut siasatannya, pemandu motorkar lewat membuat laporan polis kerana telah S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 25 membayar RM500 kepada Plaintif tersebut dan Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk tidak membuat laporan polis. Keterangan ini juga konsisten dengan keterangan SP4 bahawa pada 20.6.2017 semasa rakaman percakapan Plaintif diambil, Plaintif ada memberitahu SP4 bahawa tujuan beliau membuat laporan polis sebab beliau tidak berpuashati dengan tawaran RM200.00 yang dibuat oleh pemandu motorkar sebagai penyelesaian. [68] Selanjutnya SP4 menyatakan Plaintif ada memberitahunya bahawa pemandu motorkar ada memberitahu Plaintif nombor pendaftaran motorkarnya kepada Plaintif dan pemandu motorkar itu ada datang ke rumah Plaintif untuk menawarkan wang saguhati sebagai penyelesaian. SP4 juga mengesahkan Pemandu motorkar ada mengaku beliau pernah pergi ke rumah penunggang motorsikal. Ini jelas menunjukkan keterlibatan kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut dalam kemalangan ini. Tambahan pula terdapat keterangan sokongan daripada SP8 di mana SP8 telah menyatakan bahawa beliau ada berjumpa dengan pemandu motorkar di hospital, dan pemandu ingin membuat penyelesaian dengan menawarkan wang RM200.00. [69] Berdasarkan kesemua keterangan ini, Mahkamah ini membuat dapatan fakta bahawa kemalangan ini telah berlaku melibatkan kenderaan-kenderaan di dalam kes ini dan kecuaian adalah di pihak pemandu motorkar yang telah melanggar Plaintif dari arah belakang seperti mana versi Plaintif dan tiada versi Defendan di Mahkamah melainkan versi yang diplidkan dalam pembelaannya yang tidak disokong dengan keterangan bersumpah di Mahkamah. [70] Defendan Pertama seharusnya memandu dalam keadaan berhati-hati semasa memandu di belakang motorsikal Plaintif dan haruslah bersedia untuk menguruskan apa-apa kecemasan ketika memandu dari arah belakang. Tindakan Defendan Pertama melanggar Plaintif dari arah belakang jelas membuktikan kecuaian pihak Defendan Pertama dalam kemalangan ini. [71] Perlu diberi penekanan di sini bahawa Mahkamah tidak mengambil kira pengakuan yang dibuat oleh pemandu motorkar kepada Pegawai Penyiasat berhubung kecuaiannya melanggar Plaintif daripada belakang semasa rakaman percakapan beliau direkodkan oleh SP4. Begitu juga dengan laporan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 26 Polis Defendan Pertama, Mahkamah tidak membuat rujukan kepada laporan Polis tersebut memandangkan ianya tidak dikemukakan sebagai keterangan dan tidak ditandakan sebagai ekshibit di dalam kes ini. [72] Memandangkan Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah membuktikan kecuaian di pihak Defendan, maka beban berpindah kepada pihak Defendan untuk membuktikan sebaliknya dengan mengemukakan rebuttal evidence, namun dalam kes ini pihak Defendan – Defendan gagal memanggil sebarang saksi untuk melepaskan beban bukti mereka. [73] Memandangkan tiada sebarang keterangan lain yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan bahawa ada berlaku kemalangan lain di kawasan tersebut pada tarikh dan masa tersebut yang melibatkan kenderaan lain selain motorsikal Plaintif dan motorkar Defendan, maka dalam keadaan ini atas imbangan kebarangkalian Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa suatu kemalangan telah berlaku melibatkan motorsikal Plaintif dan motorkar Defendan di lokasi kejadian pada tarikh dan waktu seperti yang diplidkan oleh pihak Plaintif. Plaintif telah menunggang motorsikal dalam keadaan mabuk dan khayal sehingga terbabas sendiri dan langsung tidak dilanggar oleh motorkar Defendan Pertama dan Kedua. [74] Hujahan pihak Defendan bahawa Plaintif telah menunggang motorsikal dalam keadaan mabuk dan khayal sehingga terbabas sendiri adalah pada pandangan Mahkamah suatu perkara yang spekulatif tanpa disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan. [75] Mahkamah berpandangan sedemikian kerana dalam kes ini walaupun terdapat keterangan oleh doktor dari Hospital Tapah bahawa Plaintif berada dalam keadaan mabuk, akan tetapi, fakta ini dengan sendirinya tidak bermakna bahawa Plaintif telah hilang kawalan semasa menunggang motorsikalnya. Berdasarkan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah, Mahkamah telahpun membuat dapatan fakta bahawa kemalangan ini adalah satu perlanggaran daripada belakang oleh motorkar Defendan. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 27 [76] Tiada sebarang bukti secara perubatan (''medical evidence'') untuk menunjukkan bahawa tahap alcohol dan/atau kandungan alcohol dalam darah Plaintif telah menyebabkan dia tidak dapat menunggang motosikal dan/atau bahawa itu adalah punca kepada berlakunya kemalangan ini. Beban adalah pada pihak Defendan untuk membuktikan bahawa Plaintif berada dalam keadaan mabuk sehingga menjadikan beliau gagal mengawal motosikal beliau ketika kemalangan ini berlaku. Mahkamah memutuskan pihak Defendan telah gagal untuk membuktikan fakta ini. [77] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes SAIFUDEEN APANDI (SUING BY APANDI SALLEH, HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND) & ANOR v. LENGGANG AK NUING [2011] 5 LNS 2 di mana Mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut:- "[14] It is the second plaintiff (''PW15'') on admission that he had consumed alcohol before he rode his motorcycle and involved in the said accident. However, the decided cases submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs showed that blood alcohol level itself can never be conclusive to determine the degree of intoxication of the person whereby different people react differently to the same blood alcohol. [15] Justice Datuk Linton Albert in Kuching High Court Civil Appeal No. 12- 46-2009-1, Johnny Teh San Yew v. Dayang Mastura bt Abang Bolhassan held at pp 2 to 3: It is a basic truth which requires no authority or scientific support that the consumption of alcohol does not necessarily incapacitate a person to the extent that he is unable to ride his motorcycle sensibly. [16] In PP v. Ramasamy a/I Sebastian [1991] 1 MLJ 75 it was held at p 81: In any event, from the evidence of the experts, the blood alcohol level itself can never be conclusive to determine the degree of intoxication of the accused. Different people react differently to the same blood alcohol level. It makes a great difference whether the person is or is not an experienced drinker. [17] PW4, PW6 and PW7 testified that the alcohol content of the second S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 28 plaintiff as shown in exh P3 (ie, 137mg/100ml of blood) was not high was not based on any study or any analysis of the effect of alcohol on the second plaintiff. In fact, in the instant case there was no evidence whatsoever being adduced to show: (i) that the alcohol consumed by the second plaintiff had no effect of his riding skills; and/or (ii) that the alcohol consumed by the second plaintiff had not impaired his riding skills prior to the accident." [78] Dalam kes SUKHBEER SINGH GIAN SINGH & 1 LAGI v STEPHEN ANTHONY (2013) 1 LNS 188 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: "Peguamcara Defendan telah membangkitkan isu kemabukan Plaintif Pertama. Walau bagaimanapun tiada keterangan di hadapan mahkamah yang menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif tidak layak menunggang motosikal pada masa material. (rujuk kes Halijah v. Velaitham [1966] 1 MU 192, Foo Siang Him v. AG [1986] 2 MU 267)." [79] Mahkamah merujuk kepada keterangan SP2 Pegawai Perubatan dari Hospital Tapah seperti berikut: Q : Dalam kes ini bila pesakit telah dibawa masa itu Dr. berkhidmat di bahagian di Hospital Tapah , masa mula - mula masuk Dr. dah tahu dia difficult , sebab under alcohol kenapa tak ambil ujian darah untuk tentukan tahap alcohol? A : Tak dapat ambil ujian darah untuk tentukan Q : Sudah ada pemerhatian Dr. dah tahu under alcohol, tahap tidak dipastikan sebab ujian darah atau kencing tidak diambil A : Betul Q : Kalau ujian darah / kencing diambil Dr. boleh maklum Mahkamah tahap alcohol? A : Betul S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 29 [80] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati tahap alcohol Plaintif tidak dapat dipastikan kerana tiada ujian darah atau air kencing diambil. Ini bermakna tiada keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah yang membuktikan bahawa kemalangan ini berlaku disebabkan Plaintif menunggang dalam keadaan mabuk alcohol sehingga Plaintif telah menyebabkan kemalangan ini. [81] Lagipun Plaintif sendiri dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau dapat mengawal kenderaannya dan tidak bersetuju bahawa kemalangan ini berlaku disebabkan beliau mabuk. Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah tidak dapat membuat dapatan fakta bahawa Plaintif yang telah cuai sendiri dalam kemalangan ini. Justeru bagi menjawab isu ini, Mahkamah memutuskan tiada keterangan di hadapan mahkamah yang menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif tidak layak menunggang motosikal pada masa material. Kelewatan Defendan Pertama membuat laporan Polis. [82] Peguamcara Defendan Ketiga juga telah menghujahkan bahawa Defendan Pertama telah lewat membuat lapuran polis dan tiada alasan yang dinyatakan dalam lapuran polis tersebut mengapa lapuran tersebut lewat dibuat. [83] Dalam kes ini, pembuat lapuran polis tersebut, iaitu Defendan Pertama, tidak dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan dan lapuran polis tersebut juga tidak ditandakan sebagai exhibit. Lagipun Pegawai Penyiasat telah pun memberi keterangan bahawa Defendan Pertama telah hadir ke Balai Polis untuk membuat laporan secara tidak sukarela dan beliau hanya hadir setelah surat kedua dihantar oleh pihak Polis dan saman telah dikeluarkan terhadap Defendan Pertama kerana lewat membuat laporan polis di bawah seksyen 52(2) APJ 1987. Menurut siasatan SP4, pemandu motorkar lewat membuat laporan polis kerana telah membayar RM500 kepada penunggang motorsikal tersebut dan penunggang motorsikal tersebut telah bersetuju untuk tidak membuat laporan polis. [84] Mahkamah menolak hujahan pihak Defendan bahawa tiada alasan yang dinyatakan dalam lapuran polis tersebut mengapa laporan tersebut lewat dibuat. Mahkamah tidak boleh membuat sebarang rujukan kepada laporan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 30 polis Defendan Pertama kerana ianya tidak diterimamasuk sebagai keterangan dalam perbicaraan kes ini dan tidak ditandakan sebagai ekshibit. Mahkamah merujuk kepada prinsip dalam kes Siti Athirah Mohd Sapuan V. Razanatul Ain Hassan & Anor [2015] 6 CLJ 295 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: A court is only bound to consider evidence that has been properly tendered as evidence in the court. In the present case, the first defendant did not attend court to testify and her police report was never tendered as evidence before the Session Court. Therefore, both the SCJ and HCJ should have ignored the first defendant's police report completely when deliberating on the findings of liability. The HCJ erred in law in assuming that just because the first defendant's police report formed part of the plaintiff's documents, the police report was admissible evidence in court, and which evidence the SCJ could consider in arriving at her judgment. [85] Namun Mahkamah mendapati keterangan yang diberikan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat adalah memadai untuk menjelaskan sebab kelewatan Defendan Pertama membuat laporan polis. Lagipun, pihak Defendan langsung tidak mencabar dan/atau mengemukakan soalan kepada Plaintif semasa pemeriksaan balas mengenai samada terdapat perbincangan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan 1 dan wang saguhati untuk menyelesaikan kemalangan ini yang menyebabkan kelewatan membuat laporan polis di pihak Defendan pemandu mkar. Kegagalan untuk mencabar keterangan ini adalah merupakan satu penerimaan keterangan ‘acceptance’ oleh pihak Defendan. [86] Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah bergantung kepada prinsip yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Wong Swee Chin vs P.P. 1981 1 MLJ 212, di mana Mahkamah telah menyatakan kesan ketiadaan pencabaran keterangan saksi ( “the effect of non-challenging the case of a witness’):- "Mr. Jagjit Singh also raised as one of his main grounds of appeal that the trial judge erred in law when he held that the failure of the defence to cross-examine the two prosecution witnesses on the ammunition S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 31 actually found in the trouser pockets of the appellant at the time of his arrest (the subject-matter of the third charge) constituted a clear admission of the charge of possession by the appellant. We consider that statement of the law as a misdirection. A correct statement of the law is that failure of the defence to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the matter merely goes to the credibility of their testimony, to wit, the fact that they found the ammunition in the appellant's trouser pockets remains unshaken. On this point we need only say there is a general rule that failure to cross-examine a witness on a crucial part of the case will amount to an acceptance of the witness's testimony." [87] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Aik Meng (M) Sdn Bhd vs Chang Ching Chuan 1995 2 MLJ 794, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: "The content of the second rule may be stated thus. It is essential that a party's case be expressly put to his opponent's is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. In the same case, Lord Halsbury had this to say (at p. 76): My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to." S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 32 Laporan polis yang dibuat oleh Plaintif setelah 1 bulan 8 hari adalah satu ” after thought”. [88] Mahkamah menolak hujahan pihak Defendan bahawa Laporan polis yang dibuat oleh Plaintif setelah 1 bulan 8 hari adalah satu “after thought”. Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah, Plaintif telah memberikan penjelasan yang mencukupi mengapa beliau hanya membuat laporan polis pada 23.11.2016. Plaintif menyatakan beliau mendapat rawatan (rujukan dibuat kepada soalan dan jawapan No. 29 dalam Penyata Saksi Plaintif). Tambahan pula keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (SP4) menyatakan bahawa SP4 yang pergi ke rumah Plaintif untuk mengambil laporan polis POL55 dalam keadaan Plaintif terbaring di atas katil ketika itu tetapi beliau boleh memberikan maklumat. Q : Adakah penunggang motorsikal datang ke Balai Polis untuk buat laporan polis A : Tidak Q : Bagaimana laporan itu dibuat A : Pada 23.11.2016 waris kepada penunggang motorsikal datang ke Balai Polis memaklumkan saudaranya teribat dalam kemalangan dan berada di rumah. bertindak pada maklumat tersebut saya ke rumah mangsa dan membuat laporan polis POL 55 di rumah mangsa. … Q : 23.11.2016 bila Inspektor pergi ke rumah penunggang motorsikal motorsikal dan ambil statement POL55, ada sesiapa menolong dia buat laporan polis atau ravi sendiri buat dan maklum pada Inspektor A : Dia sendiri maklum pada saya, dia pun ada tulis sendiri no kenderaan. saya tulis tapi untuk kenderaan, saya suruh dia tulis sendiri Q : Semasa ravi beri semua maklumat ini stabil keadaan dia A : Terbaring atas katil tapi dia boleh beri [89] Tambahan pula, laporan Perubatan Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun bertarikh 1.11.2016 (Ekshibit P14) sendiri menyatakan Plaintif mengalami “T5/T6 vertebral fracture dislocation with paraplegia (lower limb paralysis)”. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 33 Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah mempercayai sebab kelewatan di pihak Plaintif untuk membuat laporan polis. [90] Kesemua keterangan ini menunjukkan bahawa laporan polis bukanlah suatu afterthought kerana terdapat penjelasan yang munasabah mengenai kelewatan Plaintif membuat laporan polisnya. Percanggahan keterangan [91] Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menghujahkan terdapat percanggahan antara keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat kes kemalangan ini (I.O.) dengan keterangan Plaintif – (i) Di dalam statement Plaintif kepada Pegawai Penyiasat, Plaintif menyatakan beliau kenal dengan pemandu motorkar namun semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah , Plaintif menyatakan beliau pernah melihat pemandu motorkar tersebut tetapi beliau bukan kawannya. (ii) Di dalam keterangannya, Plaintiff menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu motokar PGY 4006 selepas pemandu motorkar membuat report sedangkan laporan Polis Plaintif dibuat pada 23.11.2016 manakala laporan Polis Defendan Pertama dibuat pada 12.7.2017 iaitu hampir 9 bulan selepas tarikh kemalangan. Kemudian apabila disoal balas lagi, Plaintif menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu mengenai nombor motorkar Defendan daripada pakcik beliau. [92] Mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada terdapat percanggahan yang material dalam keterangan Plaintif yang memusnahkan kredibiliti Plaintif. [93] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes De Silva v. PP [1964] 1 LNS, di mana Gill J telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "Discrepancies and contradictions there will always be in any case. In considering them what the Court has to decide is whether they are of such a nature as to discredit the witness entirely and render the whole of his evidence worthless and untrustworthy." S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 34 [94] Seterusnya di dalam kes Pie Bin Chin v. PP [1985] 1 MLJ 234, Wan Yahya J menyatakan seperti berikut: "Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth-combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness's entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness's evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded. Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render otherparts of his story unworthy of belief. Various persons are endowed with varying powers of cognition, attentiveness and perception so that it is not uncommon for two witnesses to a common event describe it in slightly differing versions." [95] Dalam kes ini Plaintif telah menyatakan nombor pendaftaran motorkar Defendan dalam laporan polis Plaintif yang dibuat pada 23.11.2016. Namun semasa memberi keterangan Plaintif menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu motokar Defendan nombor PGY 4006 selepas pemandu motorkar membuat report pada 12.7.2017. Sememangnya terdapat percanggahan di sini. Namun persoalannya adalah adakah percanggahan tersebut adalah material sehingga menjejaskan kredibiliti Plaintif. Setelah diuji keterangan Plaintif ini dengan keterangan lain Mahkamah mendapati tiada percanggahan yang material di dalam keterangan Plaintif dalam kes ini. Pegawai Penyiasat juga dalam keterangannya telah menyatakan pada 23.11.2016 apabila beliau pergi ke rumah Plaintif dan ambil statement POL55, Plaintif sendiri maklumkan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat dan menuliskan sendiri nombor kenderaan Defendan. [96] Pada pandangan Mahkamah, apa yang jelas, pada masa laporan polis Plaintif dibuat, Plaintif telah pun menyatakan nombor motorkar Defendan. Percanggahan ini tidak material pada pandangan Mahkamah sehingga S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 35 keseluruhan keterangan Plaintif perlu ditolak. Mahkamah dalam memutuskan sedemikian telah mempertimbangkan jarak masa yang lama antara kemalangan 17.10.2016 dan tarikh Plaintif memberi keterangan di mahkamah pada 20.12.2022 (6 tahun). Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render otherparts of his story unworthy of belief (Pie Bin Chin v. PP [1985] 1 MLJ 234 dirujuk). [97] Begitu juga dengan percanggahan mengenai Plaintif mengenali Defendan Pertama. Menurut Pegawai Penyiasat Plaintif kenal Defendan Pertama yang ada datang ke rumah Plaintif. Tiada soalan lain ditujukan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat semasa pemeriksaan balas bagaimana Plaintif mengenali Defendan Pertama. Kemungkinan bahawa Plaintif kenal Defendan Pertama apabila Defendan Pertama datang ke rumahnya untuk menawarkan wang saguhati seperti mana yang diakui sendiri oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Pegawai Penyiasat tidak dapat diketepikan. Lagipun Plaintif telah pun dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau kenal Defendan Pertama bermaksud pernah lihat tetapi bukan kawannya. Selain itu, tiada juga keterangan rebuttal daripada Defendan yang menunjukkan Plaintif sememangnya adalah kenalan atau kenalan rapat Defendan Pertama. Pada hemat Mahkamah tiada apa-apa percanggahan yang material dalam keterangan Plaintif dan SP4 untuk Mahkamah ini menolak terus segala keterangan Plaintif. [98] Defendan berhujah bahawa terdapat percanggahan keterangan Plaintif dan SP8 (pakcik Plaintif) berhubung pembaikan motorsikal Plaintif. Menurut Plaintif, pakcik Plaintif yang menguruskan pembaikan motorsikal Plaintif. Namun pakcik Plaintif memberi keterangan bahawa beliau tiada tengok apa kerosakan motorsikal Plaintif. Mahkamah juga mendapati percanggahan ini bukanlah satu percanggahan yang material sehinggakan keterangan Plaintif dan pakciknya (SP8) ditolak in toto berkenaan kerosakan motorsikal. [99] Menurut rekod Mahkamah tiada satu pun soalan ditanya oleh pihak Defendan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat yang menyiasat kes ini mengenai apakah kerosakan kepada motorsikal hasil daripada siasatan pihak Polis. Pihak Defendan hanya merujuk gambar kenderaan (yang telah ditandakan sebagai S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 36 Ekshibit D11A-G) yang berada dalam simpanan mereka, kepada Pegawai Penyiasat yang mana gambar ini telah di ‘crop’. Gambar-gambar tersebut menurut Pegawai Penyiasat telah rosak dan tiada di dalam IP (Investigation Paper) Pegawai Penyiasat dan tiada juga di dalam system berkemungkinan pertukaran ke IPR kes baru, dan terdapat surat daripada ketua bahagian siasatan (ekshibit P10) yang mengatakan gambar telah rosak. [100] Pegawai Penyiasat dalam pemeriksaan balas, menyatakan Gambar C dan D gambar crop, nampak macam ada kesan calar manakala gambar D11A&B (gambar motorsikal) - berdasarkan gambar nombor plet motorsikal masih ada dan tiada kerosakan. Itu sahaja keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah berkenaan kerosakan motorsikal. Melalui penelitian Mahkamah, gambar motorsikal D11A&B adalah gambar ‘crop’ yang tidak menunjukkan keseluruhan bahagian motorsikal. Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak tahu mengapa gambar tersebut gambar crop dan inilah kali pertama Pegawai Penyiasat melihat gambar crop dan gambar crop ini bukan amalan biasa pihak Polis. Manakala gambar C & D adalah juga gambar crop yang tidak jelas menurut Pegawai Penyiasat dan Mahkamah juga tidak dapat memastikan apakah gambar C & D kerana gambar tersebut bukan gambar berwarna dan tidak jelas apakah sebenarnya gambar tersebut. Pegawai Penyiasat juga tidak pasti apakah tujuan gambar C&D diambil. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah tidak memberikan sebarang ‘weight’ kepada gambar – gambar ini. [101] Pihak Defendan hanya menyoal balas SP4 mengenai kerosakan pada nombor plet motorsikal. Mahkamah mendapati pihak Defendan telah gagal mencabar SP4 mengenai kerosakan di bahagian belakang motorsikal seperti yang dinyatakan dalam laporan polis Plaintif selain kerosakan pada nombor plet motorsikal Plaintif. Sama ada terdapat sebarang kerosakan lain di bahagian belakang motorsikal Plaintif seperti kerosakan kepada tayar dan rim belakang atau ekzoz, pemijak kaki belakang dan sebagainya tidak dicabar semasa pemeriksaan balas terhadap SP4 walaupun laporan Polis Plaintif menyatakan kerosakan di bahagian belakang motorsikal. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 37 Percanggahan keterangan Plaintif dan SP8 (pakcik Plaintif) mengenai tawaran wang RM200.00 oleh Defendan Pertama [102] Pihak Defendan menghujahkan terdapat percanggahan keterangan Plaintif dan SP8 (pakcik Plaintif) mengenai tawaran wang RM200.00 oleh Defendan Pertama. Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama ada datang ke rumah beliau dan telah menawarkan duit sebanyak RM 200.00 untuk penyelesaian kes kemalangan ini. Akan tetapi, En. Kumaraguru a/l Periasamy (SP-8) telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama memberi duit sebanyak RM 200.00 kepada SP-8 di Hospital Tapah. Pihak Defendan menghujahkan Keterangan yang berbeza ini haruslah ditolak sama sekali kerana fakta ini amat ketara menunjukkan motorkar Defendan Pertama dan Kedua (motorkar no. PGY 4006) tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan ini dengan motorsikal Plaintif (motorsikal no. AGR 2563). Justeru itu, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa tuntutan Plaintif terhadap pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua haruslah ditolak dengan kos. [103] Mahkamah mendapati pihak Defendan – Defendan langsung tiada menyoal balas Plaintif mengenai penerimaan wang RM200.00 ini. Semasa soal balas SP8, Peguam Defendan telah meletakkan kepada SP8 bahawa berkenaan wang RM200.00 hanya Plaintif boleh sahkan bahawa dia terima wang tersebut daripada SP8 dan SP8 bersetuju. Keterangan SP8 seperti berikut dirujuk:- Q : Berkenaan wang 200 ringgit hanya ravi boleh sahkan bahawa dia terima wang tersebut daripada kamu setuju / tidak? A : Setuju Q : Kalau diterima wang RM200 tersebut beliau akan menyatakan sama ada di dalam Mahkamah atau laporan polis dia ada terima duit itu daripada kamu , bukan daripada pemandu, setuju atau tidak A : (saksi mengangguk) S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 38 [104] Namun, pihak Defendan telah gagal menyoal balas Plaintiff bila dan bagaimana beliau memperoleh wang RM200 tersebut. Tambahan lagi, dalam keterangannya di Mahkamah, Plaintif tiada sekalipun menyatakan mengenai wang saguhati RM200.00 ini. Mengenai wang saguhati ini, hanya SP4 Pegawai Penyiasat yang memberi keterangan. Seterusnya, peguam Defendan Ketiga juga tidak pernah mencabar dan/atau mengemukakan soalan kepada Plaintif mengenai bayaran RM200.00 dan butirannya i.e cara bagaimana, di mana dan bila bayaran tersebut dibuat. Adalah tidak adil untuk Mahkamah menolak keterangan Plaintiff secara sekaligus atas alasan ini kerana Plaintif tidak diberikan peluang untuk memberikan penjelasan berhubung perkara ini semasa pemeriksaan balas (Aik Meng (M) Sdn Bhd vs Chang Ching Chuan 1995 2 MLJ 794 dirujuk). Justeru Mahkamah memutuskan tiada sebarang percanggahan keterangan antara SP8 dan Plaintif. [105] Jikapun terdapat percanggahan antara keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif, ianya tidak memusnahkan credibility mereka. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes PP V. DATUK HAJI HARUN BIN HAJI IDRIS [1977] 1 LNS 24; [1977] MLJ 15 di mana Hakim Raja Azlan Shah menyatakan: “In this case different witnesses have testified to different parts of what had happened or what had been said and also there are, in the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, some discrepancies, as would be expected of witnesses giving their recollections of a series of events that took place in 1971- 1973. In my opinion discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. It may be open to criticism, or it might be better if they took down a notebook and wrote down every single thing that happened and every single thing that was said. But they did not know that they are going to be witnesses at this trial. I shall be almost inclined to think that if there are no discrepancies, it might be suggested that they have concocted their accounts of what had happened or what had been said because their versions are too consistent. The question is whether the existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 39 of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize each evidence very carefully as this involves the question of weight to be given to certain evidence in particular circumstances.” [106] Di dalam kes DATO' SERI ANWAR BIN IBRAHIM V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2015] 2 MLJ 293, Arifin Zakaria Chief Justice (pada ketika itu), dalam menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membincangkan mengenai adakah PW1 di dalam kes itu adalah saksi yang kredible. [49] So, was PW1 credible? First the law. In Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 MLJ 193; [2002] 3 CLJ 457, Haidar Mohd Noor FCJ (as he then was), quoted the decision of the trial judge in that case with approval and reiterated the test for either accepting or rejecting the evidence of a witness, as follows: The Privy Council has stated that the real tests for either accepting or rejecting the evidence of a witness are how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination, and how far it fits in with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case (see Bhojraj v Sitaram AIR 1936 PC 60). It must, however, be observed that being unshaken in cross-examination is not per se an all- sufficient acid test of credibility. The inherent probability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration (see Muniandy & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 257). It has been held that if a witness demonstrably tells lies, his evidence must be looked upon with suspicion and treated with caution, but to say that it should be entirely rejected would be to go too far (see Khoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 MLJ 105b). It has also been held that discrepancies and contradictions there will always be in a case. In considering them, what the court has to decide is whether they are of such a nature as to discredit the witness entirely and render the whole S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 40 of his evidence worthless and untrustworthy (see De Silva v Public Prosecutor [1964] 1 MLJ 81). The Indian Supreme Court has pointed out that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments (see Ugar v State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277). It is useful to refer to Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15 where Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as His Highness then was) said at p 19: … In my opinion, the discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. The question is whether existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. In the absence of any contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent improbability, the evidence of any witness, whether a police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted (see Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Ali [1962] 1 MLJ 257) …” [107] Berdasarkan penilaian keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif secara keseluruhan, Mahkamah mendapati percanggahan jikapun ada, tidak material dan tidak menjejaskan atau memusnahkan kredibiliti Plaintif dalam kes ini dan tidak menjejaskan pembuktian kes Plaintif. [108] Dalam kes ini pihak Defendan telah gagal untuk memanggil saksi. Walaupun dalam kes ini versi Plaintif tidak disangkal melalui keterangan Defendan dan ‘presumed to be true on the basis that the Defendan elected not to adduce evidence’, ini tidak bermakna secara automatic Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa terdapat kecuaian di pihak Defendan dalam kes ini. Mahkamah masih perlu menilai keterangan/versi Plaintif dengan keterangan- keterangan lain untuk menentukan sama ada Plaintif telah berjaya S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 41 membuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa kecuaian Defendan telah menyebabkan kemalangan ini. [109] Walaupun pihak Defendan gagal memanggil saksi, Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif dan mendapati pihak Plaintif telah mengemukakan keterangan yang mencukupi untuk membuktikan kecuaian pihak Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Ketiga di dalam kemalangan ini di atas imbangan kebarangkalian yang mana perlanggaran ini adalah satu kes ‘langgar belakang’ dan tiada cuai sumbangan di pihak Plaintif. Berdasarkan kesemua alasan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati kemalangan ini adalah akibat kecuaian Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua bertanggungan secara vikarius. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes ORTUS EXPERT WHITE SDN BHD v. NOR YANNI ADOM & ANOR [2021] 1 LNS 2350 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: The Court of Appeal accepted the position of the law that once a defendant elects not to call for evidence, apart from being bound by such election, all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be true (Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan [2015] MLJU 70; [2015] 2 AMR 142). However, the fact that the defendant led no evidence or call any witness does not absolve the plaintiff from discharging its burden to prove its claim in law. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff must be sufficient to prove the claim (Mohamed Junus v Rahman Shah Alang Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81; [2008] 2 CLJ 369). [110] Justeru Mahkamah mendapati Defendan-Defendan bertanggungan 100% di dalam kemalangan ini dan Plaintif tidak menyumbang cuai. [111] Berdasarkan penilaian keterangan semua saksi Plaintif dan Defendan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mendapati di atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa Defendan Ketiga telah gagal membuktikan terdapat unsur penipuan/frod di dalam kes ini berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas. Dalam kes ini juga, tiada sebarang laporan pihak penyelaras dikemukakan di Mahkamah S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 42 yang mulia ini yang mana berkemungkinan boleh membantu Mahkamah untuk mencapai satu dapatan berhubung isu liability berhubung isu frod khususnya. [112] Malah untuk membuktikan kes berkenaan frod, Defendan Ketiga tiada mengemukakan sebarang saksi lain atau dokumen lain yang dapat mencabar keterangan Plaintif mengenai kemalangan ini. Justeru Mahkamah mendapati Keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif serta keterangan Dokumentari yang dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan kes ini menyokong versi Plaintif mengenai kemalangan ini dan tiada unsur-unsur frod yang berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak Defendan Ketiga berhubung perkara ini. [113] Mahkamah memutuskan kemalangan ini adalah akibat kecuaian Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua bertanggungan secara vikarius. Justeru Mahkamah mendapati Defendan-Defendan bertanggungan 100% di dalam kemalangan ini dan Plaintif tidak menyumbang cuai dan Mahkamah menolak tuntutan balas Defendan Ketiga. KUANTUM [114] Kuantum yang diawadkan adalah tertakhluk kepada dokumen-dokumen yang telah ditandakan sebagai ekshibit dan juga hujahan pihak-pihak. Gantirugi Am [115] Jumlah yang dihujahkan oleh pihak-pihak serta berpandu kepada Compendium of Personal Injury Awards Revised setakat 16 Oktober 2018 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Compendium) serta kes-kes yang diputuskan, Mahkamah ini berpendapat kuantum yang diberikan dalam kes ini adalah berpatutan dan mengikut trend semasa. [116] Mahkamah juga mengambil kira prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam kes Ku Jia Shiuen (an infant suing through her mother and next friend, Tay Pei Hoon) & Anor v Government of Malaysia & Ors [2013] 4 MLJ 108 di mana Mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 43 “It is settled law that damages in tort are not meant to be punitive; neither a reward. Damages are meant to be a form of compensation that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act so far as money can compensate. It is not meant to enrich the injured party. Therefore, the compensation must by fair, reasonable and adequate but not excessive (Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292) The aim is to put the injured party back as it were, as far as possible to his original position prior to the tortuous act which caused the damage (Shanmugam a/l Gopal v Zinal Abidin bin Nazim & Anor [2003] 3 MLJ 76; Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 (FC)). Kecederaan tidak berpunca daripada kemalangan yang sama [117] Pihak Defendan telah membangkitkan isu bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif tidak berpunca daripada kemalangan yang sama pada 17.10.2016. RAWATAN KALI PERTAMA (‘INITIAL TREATMENT’) [118] Berdasarkan keterangan yang diberi oleh doktor yang merawat Plaintif di Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah, Dr. Khairul Ismail bin Mohd Ali (Saksi SP2), Plaintif dalam kes ini telah dibawa ke Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah pada 17/10/2016 jam pukul 7.09 pagi, iaitu 39 minit selepas kemalangan yang dikatakan berlaku pada 17/10/2016 jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi. Pihak Defendan menhujahkan kesemua pemeriksaan fizikal dan X- ray di atas Plaintif tersebut adalah dijalankan pada hari kemalangan yang sama, iaitu pada 17/10/2016 dan sejurus selepas kemalangan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, setelah Plaintif dalam kes ini diperiksa dan dirawat oleh doktor di Hospital Tapah pada 17/10/2016 dan sejurus selepas kemalangan, beliau didiagnosis mengalami kecederaan “soft tissue injury” sahaja dan Plaintif juga telah discaj pada hari yang sama. RAWATAN KALI KEDUA [119] Pada hari yang sama, iaitu pada 17/10/2016 jam 8.38 malam, Plantif dalam kes ini dihantar ke Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah kali kedua oleh ambulans. Merujuk kepada keterangan saksi SP-2, doktor yang merawat Plaintif kali S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 44 kedua di Hospital Tapah adalah Dr. Muaz bin Shahriman dan beliau telah membuat pemeriksaan X-ray di bahagian “thoracolumbar sacral”, dan mendapati Plaintif mengalami kecederaan “T5 burst fracture”. [120] Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa kegagalan Plaintif memanggil saksi penting tersebut (Dr. Muaz bin Shariman) memberi keterangan di Mahkamah untuk membuktikan kes Plaintif ini membolehkan anggapan bertentangan (‘adverse inference’) di bawah Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini kerana pada pemeriksaan awal (rawatan kali pertama) kecederaan Plaintif yang didokumenkan adalah soft tissue injury sahaja tetapi pada rawatan kali kedua didapati kecederaan lain iaitu T5 burst fracture. [121] Mengenai aplikasi ‘adverse inference’ dalam kes ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes RAMES ARUMUGAM v Pegawai Penyiasat & ANOTHER APPEAL (2023) 1 LNS 870 di mana Mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut : [44] First and foremost, s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 reads: "Section 114. Court may presume existence of certain fact. The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume: ... (g) that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it." [45] Concerning the application of s. 114(g) of the EA 1950, we are primarily guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; [1987] 1 MLJ 492, where His Lordship Mohd Azmi SO (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the court held: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 45 "It is essential to appreciate the scope of s. 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case." [46] His Lordship Hasan Lah FCJ (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in Amri Ibrahim v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617 held as follows: "[56] The issue of the non-calling of Phee Chin Guan was argued before the Court of Appeal by the defence. The Court of Appeal held inter alia that Phee Chin Guan was not an essential or material witness to the prosecution in order to establish a prima facie case at the close of it is case or to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the defence case and the non-calling of Phee Chin Guan did not leave a gap in the prosecution's case. It was also held that on the facts of the case, the learned trial judge did not err in not invoking s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the prosecution. "[57] The power of the court to draw an adverse inference under s. 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 is discretionary. It depends on the circumstance of the case and particularly in cases where the material witnesses are not produced (see Lau Song Seng v. PP [1998] 1 SLR 663]. The scope of s. 114(g) has been explained by the Supreme Court In Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221 at p. 223; [1987] 1 MLJ 492 at p. 494: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 46 ... It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside Its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party In his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case." [122] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes CHUA KHENG VIK v WONG ZHEN YAIK (2022) 1 LNS 30 dimana Mahkamah telah membuat keputusan bahawa : "[39] D submits that P did not provide any justification for not calling the Initial IO and therefore an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 ought to be drawn against P. I disagree. P has explained that the Initial IO had retired and for that reason, SPl was subpoenaed to give evidence. Moreover, section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should only be invoked when there is withholding or suppression of material evidence, which is not the case here. [40] In Munusamy Vengadasalam v. Public Prosecutor [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221 at 223, the Federal Court said: "It is essential to appreciate the scope of s. 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adver:se infer:,ence under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case." [41] In the instant suit, SPl had given evidence based on the investigation papers prepared by the Initial IO. There is no withholding or suppression of evidence.” [123] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah , SP2 Dr. Khairul Isman yang mula-mula merawat Plaintif menyatakan beliau mendapat tahu bahawa Dr. Muaz Bin Syariman Teruna ada juga merawat Plaintif pada kali kedua Plaintif dibawa ke S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 47 kecemasan Hospital Tapah pada jam 8.38 malam pada 17.10.2016. SP2 dalam keterangannya menyatakan Dr. Muaz tidak lagi bertugas di Hospital Tapah, telah berpindah PKD dan tak pasti sama ada PDK Ulu Selangor atau Ulu Langat. [124] Mahkamah berpendapat Dr. Muaz Bin Syariman bukanlah saksi yang penting / material yang mana jika beliau dipanggil keterangannya akan memudaratkan kes Plaintif. Dr. Muaz tidak lagi bertugas di Hospital Tapah dan telah berpindah ke PKD lain. Tambahan pula, SP2 dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau telah menyediakan laporan Perubatan Klarifikasi di Ekshibit P3 (bertarikh 21.10.2020) berdasarkan kepada maklumat daripada Dr. Muaz Bin Syariman. Maka, Mahkamah berpandangan tiada isu bahawa saksi ini i.e. Dr. Muaz Bin Syariman tidak dipanggil dengan sengaja dan atau dihalang dari datang ke mahkamah dengan sengaja ("withholding or suppression of evidence). [125] Dalam kes ini SP2 telah memberi penjelasan mengapa laporan Perubatan beliau Ekshibit P2 (bertarikh 26.8.1010) menyatakan “X-ray No obvious fracture seen”. Merujuk kepada Penyata Saksi SP2 di soalan No.6, SP2 menyatakan x-ray yang dibuat pada mulanya tidak nampak patah disebabkan posisi badan pesakit tidak betul ketika ambil x-ray. Ketika kali kedua, pada waktu petang, dia sedar dan x-ray telah diambil kali kedua dan didapati ada kepatahan dan dia dihantar ke Hospital Ipoh. Mahkamah menerima keterangan SP2 dalam ketiadaan keterangan Perubatan lain yang menyangkal keterangan SP2. Selain itu, semasa Pemeriksaan Balas juga, SP2 juga ada menyatakan X-ray boleh nampak kepatahan, kadang-kadang ada nampak, kadang-kadang tak nampak kepatahan, lebih tepat jika buat MRI atau CT Scan. Justeru, Mahkamah mendapati tiada apa-apa keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah yang menunjukkan bahawa terdapat withholding or suppression of evidence. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah memutuskan anggapan bertentangan (‘adverse inference’) di bawah Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak terpakai di dalam kes ini. Lagipun pihak Defendan tidak dihalang untuk memanggil Dr. Muaz Bin Syariman untuk diperiksa mengenai T5 burst fracture tersebut. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 48 PEMUTUSAN RANTAIAN PENYEBAB (‘Break of Chain of Causation’) [126] Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif hanya mendapatkan rawatan bagi kecederaan tambahan lebih kurang 13 jam 30 minit selepas rawatan kali pertama. (Rawatan kali pertama: 7.09 pagi; Rawatan kali kedua: 8.38 malam) Tempoh masa 13 jam lebih tersebut bukanlah tempoh masa yang singkat. Selanjutnya, pihak Defendan menghujahkan tiada sebarang keterangan dan bukti yang kukuh telah dikemukakan bahawa kecederaan lain (selain daripada kecederaan “soft tissue injury”) adalah sememangnya turut diakibatkan oleh kemalangan yang dikatakan berlaku pada 17/10/2016 jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi. Justeru dihujahkan oleh Defendan- Defendan bahawa wujud pemutusan rantaian penyebab (‘break of chain of causation’) kepada kecederaan tambahan yang dialami Plaintif. [127] Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan keterangan Dr. Khairul Isman (SP2), Plaintif dimasukkan ke kecemasan Hospital Tapah pada jam 7.09 pagi pada 17.10.2016 dan discharge pada hari yang sama Pukul 12.00 tengahari lebih. Kemudian Plaintif dihantar ke Jabatan Kecemasan Hospital Tapah kali kedua oleh ambulans pada jam 8.38 malam sebagaimana yang direkodkan dalam Ekshibit P4. SP2 bersetuju terdapat ruang masa 8 jam antara kemasukkan Hospital kali pertama dan kemasukkan kali kedua. Justeru, persoalan di sini adalah sama ada dalam ruang masa 8 jam ini, adakah terdapat break of chain of causation dan adakah kecederaan-kecederaan lain selain soft tissue injury adalah diakibatkan oleh kemalangan yang sama. [128] SP2 dalam keterangannya tidak bersetuju bahawa dalam jarak masa 8 jam apa-apa boleh berlaku kepada pesakit kerana apabila pesakit i.e Plaintiff discharge pun dia tak boleh jalan 100%. SP2 menyatakan kalau Plaintif jatuh dari pokok yang tinggi ada kemungkinan boleh patah, kalau jatuh daripada katil tak patah. SP2 menyatakan untuk kecederaan T5, kebiasaannya kesan atau simptomnya boleh nampak dalam masa 24 jam seperti tidak boleh mengawal buang air besar dan kecil, lower limb tak boleh bergerak, dan loss of sensory. Dalam kes ini symptom pada Plaintif timbul dalam masa 24 jam. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 49 [129] Keterangan Plaintif di Mahkamah adalah dia dibawa ke Hospital Tapah dari tempat kemalangan sejurus selepas kemalangan ini berlaku. Setelah berada di Hospital Tapah, dia telah dihantar pulang pada hari yang sama dan menurut Plaintif dia telah dibawa ke rumah kakaknya. Setelah sampai di rumah kakaknya, Plaintif mengambil ubat sakit dan tidur. Apabila dia bangun dari tidur, Plaintif mendapati bahawa dia tidak dapat berdiri. Kemudian, dia telah dibawa semula ke Hospital Tapah dengan ambulan untuk mendapatkan rawatan. [130] Peguamcara Defendan – Defendan tidak mencabar Plaintif bahawa kecederaan "T5 burst fracture" bukanlah akibat dari kemalangan ini. Pada pandangan Mahkamah, berdasarkan kesemua keterangan ini dan penjelasan yang diberikan oleh SP2 Dr.Khairul Isman bin Mohd Ali yang mana adalah munasabah dan diterima oleh Mahkamah ini dalam keadaan ketiadaan rebuttal evidence, adalah mencukupi untuk menyokong versi Plaintif untuk Mahkamah ini membuat dapatan fakta bahawa Plaintif mengalami kecederaan "T5 burst fracture" akibat daripada kemalangan ini dan bukan kemalangan yang lain. Justeru Mahkamah memutuskan dalam jarak masa 8 jam, Plaintif tiada terlibat dengan apa-apa kemalangan yang lain, oleh itu tiada berlakunya ‘break of chain of causation’. [131] Menurut laporan perubatan Plaintif, Plaintif telah mengalami kecederaan seperti berikut: (a) Multiple rib fracture (6 ribs) (b) Bilateral lung contusion and hemathorax (c) Fracture sternum with retrosternal hematoma and pericardial effusione (d) Hospital Acquired Pneumonia (lung infections) (e) T5-T6 vertebral fracture dislocation with paraplegia (lower limbs paralysis) (f) Soft tissue injury (g) Scars [132] Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut bagi kuantum gantirugi am atas dasar 100% liabiliti: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 50 (a) Multiple rib fracture (6 ribs) [133] Dalam surat rujukan daripada Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun bertarikh 11/11/2016 (Ikatan B m/s 17), ia telah menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah mengalami kepatahan enam (06) tulang rusuk i.e. multiple ribs fracture (RIGHT 3,4 POSTERIOR ribs, left 2,3,4,5 posterior ribs). [134] Pihak Plaintif telah merujuk kepada Revised Compendium dan berhujah bahawa amaun sebanyak RM 30,000.00 diberikan kepada kecederaan Multiple rib fractures (6 ribs) with bilateral lung contusion. Manakala pihak Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menghujahkan awad sebanyak RM20,000.00 [RM4,000.00 per rib x 5 ribs] bagi kepatagan 5 tulang rusuk memandangkan Dalam laporan pakar Dr. Siva dinyatakan pemeriksaan X-ray yang dibuat pada 09/05/2019, menunjukkan hanya lima (05) tulang rusuk mempunyai kesan bercantum. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa hanya awad bagi kepatahan lima (05) tulang rusuk diberikan. [135] Compendium menyatakan awad bagi kecederaan ini Per rib – RM 4,000.00 hingga RM 5,000.00. [136] Mahkamah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM30,000.00 [ RM5,000.00 x 6 ribs) bagi kecederaan ini yang mana pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah munasabah mengambil kira inflasi dan nilai matawang sekarang. Mahkamah membenarkan awad bagi 6 kepatahan tulang rusuk (ribs) memandangkan ianya ada direkodkan dalam laporan Perubatan awal dari Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun bertarikh 11/11/2016. Manakala laporan Pakar Defendan bertarikh 22.5.2019 hanya menyatakan 5 kepatahan telah sembuh i.e.healed fracture of posterior aspect of of right 3rd & 4th ribs and left 4th – 6th ribs dan tiada mengemukakan x-ray untuk Mahkamah ini pertimbangkan kepatahan sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam laporan pakar Defendan itu. (b) Bilateral lung contusion and hemathorax [137] Bagi kecederaan bilateral lung contusion and hemathorax (rujuk Ekshibit P2) pihak Plaintif telah menghujahkan awad global bersekali dengan multiple rib S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 51 fracture. walau bagaimanapun pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua telah menghujahkan awad yang berasingan sebanyak RM10,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Mahkamah menerima pakai prinsip yang diputuskan oleh MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN dalam kes YANG SALBIAH & ANOR V JAMIL B HARUN [1981] 1 MLJ 292 bahawa ‘A global award has the distinct advantage of covering a multitude of sins. It does not show where or how the judge had erred on the side of over generosity or on the side of parsimony’, Mahkamah memutuskan adalah wajar awad berasingan diberikan mengambilkira prinsip dan tujuan gantirugi adalah untuk meletakkan pihak yang mengalami kerugian kepada keadaan yang sama sepertimana beliau berada jika kesalahan tort tersebut tidak terjadi atau pun berlaku. Ianya bukannya bertujuan untuk memperkayakan pihak yang mengalami kerugian. [138] Mahkamah memutuskan awad sebanyak RM15,000.00 adalah berpatutan dan munasabah bagi kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif di sini. Mahkamah berpendapat awad RM15,000.00 adalah wajar kerana Plaintif dalam kes ini mengalami bilateral lung contusion (kiri dan kanan) dan ditambah lagi dengan hemathorax. [139] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes In Teoh Weng You & Anor v Tan Hee Joo [2017] 9 MLJ 721 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengesahkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen yang membenarkan awad RM15,000.00 bagi bilateral lung contusion and haemothorax. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes tersebut juga telah memutuskan seperti berikut: [47] The learned sessions court judge made separate awards for fracture of three ribs and bilateral lung contusion and haemothorax. The defendants submitted that a global award of RM14,000 should be made instead of a separate award for each injury citing the case of Chong Sao Kuan v Danian Yeng bin Shaifullah [2014] 2 PIR 93. With respect, I am unable to agree with this. Upon review of the evidence, I am of the view that the injuries sustained are related to different parts of the body and affect different functions. There was no challenge advanced by the defendants to show that these injuries are connected and should be assessed together as a global award. As such, I am of S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 52 the view that the learned sessions court judge was right in exercising her discretion to make the separate awards. [140] Selain itu, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes-kes berikut sebagai panduan dalam memberikan awad bagi kecederaan ini: (a) Mohd Noorusallam bin Md Saad v Jamaluddin bin Desa [2016] 1 PIR [42], RM 15,000.00 diawadkan bagi bilateral lung contusion with right haemathorax (b) Nur Syafiq bin Shaharudin v Sheikh Mohd Farouk bin Abdul Khalid [2022] 1 PIR [32] di mana Mahkamah telah memberikan awad RM14,000.00 bagi bilateral pneumothorax with right haemothorax and left lung contusion. (c ) Mohd Farhan Azizan b Adnan v Teo Bee Leng [2020] 2 PIR [9], Bilateral lung contusion – awad sebanyak RM12,000.00 Fracture sternum with retrosternal hematoma and pericardial effusion [141] Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 menyatakan awad bagi kecederaan pada Sternum antara RM 9,500.00 (low) – RM 12,000.00 (high). [142] Pihak Plaintiff menghujahkan awad sebanyak RM12,000.00 adalah munasabah bagi kecederaan ini. Manakala pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa kedua-dua kondisi “retrosternal hematoma” dan “pericardial effusion” diakibatkan daripada kepatahan tulang sternum dan kedua-dua kondisi tersebut telah sembuh sepenuhnya. Oleh yang demikian, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua dengan rendah diri berhujah bahawa awad sebanyak RM 10,000.00 adalah adil dan munasabah bagi kecederaan ini. [143] Laporan Perubatan Hospital Ipoh (Ekshibit P1) menyatakan Plaintif mengalami kecederaan “Fracture of sternum with displacement fractured fragment posteriorly complicated with retrosternal hematoma and pericardinal effusion” S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 53 [144] Memandangkan dalam kes ini Plaintif bukan sahaja telah mengalami kepatahan sternum tetapi juga terdapat komplikasi retrosternal hematoma (clotted pool of blood behind the sternum ) dan juga pericardinal effusion iaitu ‘accumulation of too much fluid in the pericardium, a sac surrounding the heart’, maka Mahkamah berpendapat awad RM12,000.00 adalah wajar dan munasabah bagi kecederaan ini. [145] Awad RM12,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini adalah tidak keterlaluan dan masih berada dalam lingkungan awad seperti mana dalam Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018. Selain itu, Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Ahmad Sairan bin Yusak & 8 Ors v Khoo Hun Cheong & Anor [2014] 1 PIR [69] yang telah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM12,000.00 bagi Fracture body of the sternum sahaja. Hospital Acquired Pneumonia (lung infections) [146] Bagi Hospital Acquired Pneumonia, pihak Plaintif berhujah bahawa satu jumlah yang munasabah sebanyak RM10,000 dibenarkan. Manakala pihak Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menghujahkan awad sebanyak RM4,000.00 adalah adil dan munasabah bagi kecederaan ini dengan merujuk kepada kes Semawi Bin Mos (The Administrative Of The Estate Of Mohd Nasir Bin Semawi (Deceased)) V. Zulhamzah Bin Jobit & Anor [2016] 1 PIR [47]. [147] Mahkamah telah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM10,000.00 sebagaimana hujahan pihak Plaintif yang pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah munasabah dengan merujuk kepada kes Safarizuan bin Mustafa v Leizaini binti Abd Gani [2018] 2 PIR [52] yang telah membenarkan awad RM8,000.00 bagi Hospital acquired pneumonia [148] Mahkamah juga telah memberi pertimbangan kepada kenaikan kadar inflasi dalam membuat keputusan ini. Mahkamah mendapati kes Semawi Bin Mos (The Administrative Of The Estate Of Mohd Nasir Bin Semawi (Deceased)) V. Zulhamzah Bin Jobit & Anor (supra) yang dirujuk oleh Peguam Defendan tidak sesuai untuk dijadikan panduan dalam memberikan awad dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah pada masa ini. Ini adalah kerana Kes Semawi (supra) telah merujuk kepada kes Sendy a/l Kanaiyah v Lim Teck Seng & Anor S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 54 Sendy a/l Kanaiyah v Lim Teck Seng & Anor [2008] 1 PIR [57] yang membenarkan awad RM4000.00 bagi pneumonia. Mahkamah mendapati Kes Sendy a/l Kanaiyah (supra) adalah kes yang diputuskan pada tahun 2008 iaitu kira-kira 15 tahun yang lalu dan Mahkamah wajar mengambil kira factor inflasi, kejatuhan nila ringgit dan kenaikan kos sara hidup dalam memutuskan awad yang bersesuaian dalam kes ini. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Fitri Noor Bin Samdin v Siti Nooradawiyah binti Othman & Anor [2016] 2 PIR [49] di mana Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut memutuskan seperti berikut: “Pendapat mahkamah berkenaan isu inflasi dan kenaikan kos ini adalah selaras dengan prinsip undang-undang yang dinyatakan dalam kes Raji Transport Sdn Bhd & Anor v Idayu Zulkafli [2004] AMEJ 0087; [2004] 5 CLJ 479, HC di mana YA Low Hop Bing, hakim telah menyatakan bahawa: The considerations of inflation and enhanced cost of living over a period of more than two decades since the decision in Lau Ee Ee v Tan King Kwong [1986] 1 MLJ 308 should be given proper weight in the assessment of quantum of damages in personal injury litigation. Indeed, it is instructive to note that our courts have also moved ahead with the times in these areas. Chan Shick Chin, a very senior member of the Bar, in his concise and well-researched book on Personal Injury, Law, Practice and Precedents (Malaysia: Malayan Law Journal 2001), p 47 wrote: "The fall in the value of money must be taken into account in the use of comparables so that an award which is eventually given would be reflective of the current value of money: Abdul Ghani Hamid v Abdul Nasir Abdul Jabbar & Anor [1995] 4 CLJ 317.The judgment of Abdul Malik Ishak J in Abdul Ghani, supra, is in line with the trend in Singapore where Choor Singh J in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal also considered changes in the value of money, the decrease in the purchasing power of dollar there or the increase in the cost of living over the years, as relevant factors in the assessment of damages. A similar approach was adopted by Yusoff J in Wong Tin Vui v Patrick Midok & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 260." S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 55 T5-T6 vertebral fracture dislocation with paraplegia (lower limbs paralysis) [149] Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan awad RM400,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Pihak Defendan menghujahkan awad sebanyak RM220,000.00 merupakan satu awad yang munasabah untuk kecederaan ini memandangkan tulang belakang telah menyambung (‘united’). [150] Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 menyatakan awad bagi Fracture of the vertebra causing paraplegia – RM 220,000.00 to RM 300,000.00. [151] Akibat kemalangan ini Plaintif telah mengalami kelumpuhan secara kekal dan memerlukan penjagaan oleh orang lain secara sepenuh masa. Kelumpuhan secara kekal ini menyebabkan Plaintif tidak dapat lagi berjalan dan menjalani kehidupan normal seperti orang lain. Laporan Perubatan daripada Hospital Columbia Asia (Exhibit P5) menyatakan : • Spinal Cord Injury secondary to vertebral fractures – complete T4 paraplegia (ASIA impairment scale A) • Total sensory loss from T5 dermatomes and below bilaterally • neurological improvement is highly unlikely • unable to pass urine normally and requires CISC for drainage of urine • frequent episodes of urinary incontinence • risk of developing urinary tract infections and vesico-ureteric reflux is high • patient has developed kidnesy stones • patient’s Barthel index score is 30/100 • remains dependent on others • he is likely to remain dependent on caregivers for most activities of daily living • additionally he will remain dependent on caregivers for all household chores • Male patients with spinal cord injuries usually develop sexual dysfunction • patient continues to suffer from decubitus ulcers (bes sores) • risk of developing deep vein thrombosis of the lower veins S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 56 • depression • neuropathic pain • Osteoporosis and risk for pathological fractures [152] Mahkamah setelah menimbangkan kecederaan, keilatan/ketidakupayaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif serta umur Plaintif 37 tahun semasa kemalangan, serta awad-awad yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah bagi kecederaan seumpama ini dan setelah membandingkan dengan kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat awad sebanyak RM300,000.00 adalah munasabah dan adil dengan mengambil kira ‘injuries, treatment, disabilities and complication’ dan juga kejatuhan nilai matawang. [153] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes – kes berikut: (a) Syarizan Sudirmin & Ors v Abdul Rahman Bukit & Anor [2010] 3 CLJ 877 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM300,000 bagi kecederaan Fracture dislocation of the fifth and sixth thoracic vertebrae (Note: The plaintiff is paraplegic suffering from complete motor, sensory and neurological deficits of the lower limb, incontinence of urine and faeces and sexual dysfunction. The plaintiff also suffered fracture of the left and right femur, lung contusion and abrassions. The plaintiff had undergone a series of surgeries, developed pressure sores and developed kyphus deformity over the thoracic spine which causes chronic pain.) (b) Nur Syafiq bin Shaharudin v Sheikh Mohd Farouk bin Abdul Khalid [2022] 1 PIR [32] - Fracture dislocation T4-T5 with total spinal cord transaction neurology, paraplegia and erectile dysfunction – Awad RM300,000.00 (c) Syamsul Azli bin Nazari v Saiful bin Sapuan [2018] 2 PIR [19] - Awad RM300,000.00 bagi kecederaan Vertebral body fracture with paralysis. (d) Fitri Noor bin Samdin v Siti Nooradawiyah binti Othman & Anor [2016] 2 PIR [49] Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan awad RM350,000.00 bagi kecederaan - Burst fracture of the T6 vertebra with S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 57 paraplegia, fracture of the T1-T2 and T4-T8 vertebral spinous process, erectile dysfunction, muscle wasting in the lower limbs and osteoporosis (Note: The plaintiff as a result suffers from total neurological deficit distal to T6 vertebra, sensory impairment from T7 to T10 dermatomes bilaterally, sensory loss from T11 dermatomes and below bilaterally, reduced muscle power in the lower limb (0/5), bladder and bowel incontinence, multiple infected bedsores, impotency and inability to engage in sexual intercourse and to reproduce and is wheelchair bound for life) [154] Berdasarkan kes-kes di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan awad RM300,000.00 di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah adalah munasabah bagi kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini. [155] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Pelita Rasa Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors v Theeban Vengadesh a/l Govintarau [2015] 2 PIR [3] di mana YA Hakim Lim Chong Fong telah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM250,000.00 bagi kecederaan traumatic spinal cord injury resulting in permanent paralysis of the lower limbs. HMT yang bijaksana telah menyatakan seperti berikut dalam alasan penghakimannya: [4] The plaintiff suffered traumatic spinal cord injury resulting in permanent paralysis of the lower limbs. As such, the sum of RM250,000.00 as sought by the plaintiff for this injury based on the case of Mohamad Khairudin bin Zakaria v Pengarah Hospital Kuala Lumpur & 2 Ors Mohamad Khairudin bin Zakaria v Pengarah Hospital Kuala Lumpur & 2 Ors [2013] 2 PIR 14 is fair and reasonable. [38] As for the head of claim of general damages for vertebrae fracture, there was a burst fracture at the plaintiff’s L1 vertebrae with neurological deficit. In lay terms, he suffered traumatic spinal cord injury and that resulted in permanent paralysis of his lower limbs. The plaintiff principally relied on the case of Mohamad Khairudin bin Zakaria v Pengarah Hospital Kuala Lumpur & 2 Ors [2013] 2 PIR [14] where RM250,000.00 was awarded on similar injury that resulted in paralysis. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 58 In that case, the court arrived at that amount after reviewing the awards in the earlier like cases of Pua Lai Ong v Kassim bin Yunus & Anor[1993] 2 AMR 3208 of RM180,000.00 and Zulfari bin Ab Ghani & Anor v Shahril bin Idris[2002] 3 CLJ 187 of RM198,000.00. The court felt that RM250,000.00 was a reasonable sum in 2013. [156] Berdasarkan kes Pelita Rasa Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors v Theeban Vengadesh a/l Govintarau (supra), Mahkamah ini memutuskan awad RM300,000.00 di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah adalah munasabah mengambil kira RM250,000.00 adalah munasabah pada tahun 2013 manakala pada tahun 2023 RM300,000.00 adalah munasabah dan Plaintiff dalam kes ini mengalami T5/T6 fracture dislocation manakala dalam kes Pelita Rasa Sdn. Bhd. & 4 Ors v Theeban Vengadesh a/l Govintarau (supra), Plaintif mengalami L1 fracture sahaja. Tambahan pula, Plaintif dalam kes ini tiada peluang recovery akibat paraplegia yang merupakan keilatan kekal (permanent) di mana Ekshibit P5 jelas menyatakan ‘neurological improvement is highly unlikely’. [157] Lagipun, Mahkamah berpendapat Compendium of Personal Injury Awards hanyalah merupakan satu garis panduan dan Mahkamah ini tidak terikat secara ketat dengan amaun yang dinyatakan di situ. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Abdul Waffiy bin Wahubbi & Anor v A K Nazaruddin bin Ahmad [2017] MLJU 761 dirujuk di mana Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut: “I would also venture to say that it is the duty of counsel on both sides to guide the court to make an award which falls within the range as provided in the Compendium. Of course, even then there has to be medical evidence to support an award which leans towards either the higher or lower end of the range. Having said that, I do accept that the Compendium is not a statutory code but only a guideline which does not fetter the court’s discretion and that the court is, subject to exceptional factual circumstances, at liberty to depart from the Compendium. But, it would take compelling and extenuating facts (medical evidence) to persuade a court to depart from the Compendium. Otherwise, the Compendium will be rendered useless in so far achieving consistency in awards for damages for personal injuries.” S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 59 [158] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Law Kok Leong & Anor v Nor Hapiza binti Abu Hassan (wife to the deceased, Abdul Manap bin Hamid) [2017] 1 PIR [3] di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa: “The amount awarded by the SCJ for damages was not entirely excessive. The awards were given by referring to and being guided by recent cases” The defendants had proposed the sum of RM220,000.00 in the Sessions Court, and are maintaining the same figure in this appeal. It was submitted that the award of RM300,000.00 by the Sessions Court was excessive, particularly as the maximum award set out in the Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards is RM220,000.00. I am disinclined to disturb the award, as the learned SCJ had referred to the awards given in recent cases and was guided by them. He also correctly pointed out that the Compendium is merely a guideline, and that he was not bound to adhere to the amount set out in it. Soft tissue injury [159] Laporan Perubatan Hospital Tapah (Ekshibit P2) merekodkan kecederaan soft tissue injury. [160] Bagi kecederaan Soft tissue injury pihak Defendan menghujahkan jumlah sebanyak RM 1,500.00 manakala pihak Plaintif tiada sebarang hujahan atas item ini. [161] Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 memperuntukkan awad RM3,000.00 (low) dan RM5,000.00 (high). Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah membenarkan awad RM4,000.00 yang pada pendapat Mahkamah adalah munasabah. Scars - Incision scar 18cm on the posterior aspect of the thoracic spine - Sacral sore 3cm x 2cm - Scar 17cm x 2cm on the sacral region S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 60 - Scar 8cm on the posterior aspect of the left leg - Scar 3cm x 4cm on the lateral aspect of the left lower leg - Scar 3cm x 2cm on the lateral aspect of the right ankle [162] pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua dengan rendah diri berhujah bahawa awad sebanyak RM 8,000.00 adalah adil dan munasabah bagi kecederaan ini, manakala pihak Plaintif tiada hujahan atas item ini. [163] Mahkamah memutuskan awad sebanyak RM15,000.00 adalah wajar dan munasabah dalam kes ini mengambil kira bilangan dan ukuran scars dan parut tersebut adalah kekal. Mahkamah berpandukan kepada kes-kes berikut dalam memberikan awad:- (a) Sanjiswaran a/l Thamppiraja v Abdul Ghafar bin Abdul Ghani & Anor [2016] 2 - Mahkamah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM15,000.00 bagi Scars (2 cm laceration scar over the right ulna wrist, 5 cm laceration scar over the right wrist, 17 cm x 1 cm laceration scar over the right upper forearm, 19 cm x 2 cm keloid scar over the dorsum aspect of the right forearm, two 0.5 cm hyperpigmented ulcers over the right wrist and two 2 cm hypertrophic scars over the right arm). Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ukuran dan bilangan scars adalah lebih kurang sama dengan kes Sanjiswaran (supra). Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat awad sebanyak RM15,000.00 adalah munasabah. (b) Nadarajah a/l Seenivasam v Premnat a/l Ponchanu & Anor [2016] 2 PIR [23] – awad RM15,000.00 dibenarkan bagi scars (7.5 cm x 0.5 cm hypertrophic scar over the left wrist, 2 cm scar over the right chest, 4 cm scar over the left chest, 12 cm scar over the left forearm and 18 cm scar over the back thoracic lumber spine), abrasions and lacerations. Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ukuran scars adalah lebih kurang sama dan bilangan scars adalah lebih banyak berbanding kes Nadarajah. Mengambil kira nilai matawang masa kini dan peningkatan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 61 kos sara hidup, Mahkamah berpendapat awad RM15,000.00 bagi scars adalah munasabah dan tidak keterlaluan dalam kes ini. (c) Dalam kes Muhammad Khairul Nachzemie bin Abdullah v Norpaiza bin Abdullah & Anor [2015] 1 PIR [57] di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM15,000 bagi Scars: 5 cm x 2 cm and 6 cm x 2 cm raised pigmented scars over the left forearm, 1 cm x 1 cm and 3 cm x 1 cm raised pigmented scars over the left wrist and 25 cm x 2 cm raised pigmented scar over the right thigh). (d) Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Chandragupta a/l Meialagan v. Tan Lay Yin [2008] 1 PIR [41] RM15,000.00 telah diawadkan bagi scars (0.75 cm x 0.5 cm scar over the anteromedial aspect of the upper part of the left leg, 1 cm x 0.75 cm scar over the anteromedial aspect of the upper part of the left leg and 17.5 cm x 0.5 cm operative scar over the posterolateral aspect of the left hip region) [164] Sebagai rumusan, dalam memberikan awad bagi kecederaan-kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini, Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada pemerhatian/oberservation yang dibuat oleh Yang Arif Choo Kah Sing JC dalam kes Kovalan a/l Rajoo v Hanif bin Muhamad Pauzi [2016] 2 PIR [36], seperti berikut: “The mere fact that one judge′s award is different from another judge′s award does not form as a basis for an appellate court to disturb the award of damages by the lower court. The award of damages in every case stands by itself – it depends on the age, sex and degree of injury and the chances and degree of recovery as well. Occasionally, it also depends on the available options for medical treatments. A compendium is merely a compilation of information on court awards of damages. The information in the compendium may indicate the trend of the award of damages for similar injuries. Having said that, an award of damages outside the range found in S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 62 the compendium is not necessarily a reason for the appellate court to disturb the award of damages. The appellate court will only disturb the trial judge′s award of damages if and only if the trial judge′s award of damages is so very wrong or seriously wrong that no reasonable judge would have awarded the amount for the same set of facts. An award of damages leaning to one end of the scale found in a compendium does not tantamount to an award that is very wrong or seriously wrong; it is merely the exercise of the trial judge′s discretion. This does not form a basis for an appellate court to interfere with the discretion of the trial judge. The compendium′s scale should not be used as a basis for an appeal against the exercise of the judge′s discretion in deciding the award for damages.” [165] Mahkamah setelah menimbangkan mengambil kira ‘injuries, treatment, disabilities and complication yang dialami oleh Plaintif serta umur Plaintif 37 tahun semasa kemalangan, serta awad-awad yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah bagi kecederaan dan setelah membandingkan dengan kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat awad-awad yang diberikan bagi kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif adalah munasabah dan adil serta tidaklah berlebihan malah berdasarkan kepada trend semasa dan patut dikekalkan dan tidak wajar dikurangkan atas alasan terdapat pertindihan/overlapping memandangkan kecederaan tersebut pada tulang – tulang yang berlainan i.e. rib, sternum serta bilateral lung contusion dan komplikasi yang timbul selepas kecederaan tersebut hemathorax, pericardinal effuisione, pneumonia. Lagipun bagi semua kecederaan tersebut , awad-awad yang diberikan tidaklah terlalu tinggi untuk mewajarkan penolakan 10% bagi pertindihan (overlapping) kerana Mahkamah telah mengambil kira pertindihan semasa memberikan awad bagi kecederaan-kecederaan tersebut. Kehilangan Pendapatan [166] Dalam kes ini pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa ia adalah jelas bahawa tuntutan tersebut adalah di bawah kategori gantirugi khas dimana ia adalah suatu prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa gantirugi S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 63 khas (‘special damages’) hendaklah diplidkan secara spesifik dan dibuktikan dengan ketat. [167] Telah diputuskan bahawa ‘loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity’ jatuh di bawah gantirugi am dan bukan gantirugi khas. Kes Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 294 dirujuk di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan: Future loss of earnings or loss of prospective earnings are awarded for real assessable loss i.e., loss that is capable of assessment at the date of the trial. It must be proved by evidence and not by mere speculation. There must be evidence of a real and substantial loss which must not be remote and speculative: In the absence of such evidence to prove loss of future earnings, if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earnings capacity, he will be awarded a sum as part of the general damages for his disability suffered as a result of the injuries sustained, instead of compensation for loss of future earnings [168] Oleh yang demikian walaupun, ‘loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity’ tidak diplidkan secara spesifik di dalam pliding, mahkamah boleh membenarkan ‘loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity’ di bawah gantirugi am. Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, Plaintif telah memplidkan “Kehilangan pendapatan masa hadapan” di dalam Pernyataan tuntutannya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menolak hujahan Defendan bahawa kehilangan pendapatan adalah gantirugi khas (‘special damages’) yang perlu diplidkan secara spesifik dan dibuktikan dengan ketat. [169] Beban pembuktian adalah terletak pada Plaintif untuk membuktikan pekerjaan dan pendapatan untuk membolehkan Plaintif berjaya dalam tuntutannya bagi kehilangan pendapatan. Dalam kes ini Majikan plaintif tidak hadir untuk memberi keterangan mengenai pekerjaan dan pendapatan Plaintif. [170] Plaintif telah memberi keterangan bahawa beliau sedang dalam perjalanan untuk pergi kerja semasa kemalangan ini berlaku. Plaintif juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa beliau bekerja sebagai seorang kelindan lori dengan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 64 seorang yang bernama Manju dan bahawa beliau telah dibayar wang sebanyak RM45.00 sehari untuk kerja yang dilakukan. Plaintif juga telah memberi tahu bahawa dia tidak mempunyai apa-apa dokumen untuk mengesahkan dan/atau menyokong keterangannya. Walau bagaimanapun terdapat keterangan daripada Plaintif bahawa Plaintif menerima bantuan daripada SOCSO untuk pampers, urine bag, katil dan kerusi roda. Plaintif juga telah dimasukkan ke SOCSO rehab centre Melaka. Laporan Pakar Dr. Ramnan (Ekshibit P5) juga ada menyatakan “Ravi was admitted to SOCSO Rehabilitation Centre, Melaka on 30.4.2018 for spinal rehabilitation. He was discharged after about 5 months”. [171] Fakta bahawa Plaintif merupakan seorang pencarum dengan SOCSO dan bukti bahawa dia sedang menerima bantuan dari SOCSO adalah fakta jelas bahawa Plaintif sememangnya mempunyai pekerjaan dan menerima gaji ketika kemalangan ini berlaku. Hanya pencarum kepada skim PERKESO sahaja yang layak mendapat faedah di bawah Akta tersebut untuk "employment injury" (kecederaan pekerjaan - "an injury that was sustained whilst working and it includes traveling to work and returning from work''). Bagi membolehkan seseorang itu menikmati faedah skim PERKESO, seseorang tersebut mestilah sedang bekerja, mesti menjadi seorang pencarum kepada SOCSO, dan mesti mengalami kecederaan pekerjaan (''employment injury''). [172] Selain itu, Defendan Pertama dan Kedua telah berhujah agar Mahkamah perlu mengambil maklum akan fakta bahawa Plaintif sedang menerima bantuan dari SOCSO untuk kos pembelian pampers dan sebagainya, oleh itu tuntutan Plaintif untuk item-item ini harus ditolak. Berdasarkan hujahan ini, pihak Defendan tidak pada sebarang masa mencabar bahawa Plaintif sememangnya menerima bantuan daripada pihak SOCSO. [173] Di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah memutuskan pihak Plaintif berjaya membuktikan bahawa Plaintif ‘was gainfully employed’ pada masa kemalangan. Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif bagi kehilangan pendapatan walaupun tiada bukti dokumentari dikemukakan oleh Plaintif seperti slip gaji, caruman kwsp dan sebagainya bagi menyokong tuntutannya. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 65 [174] Dalam memutuskan sedemikian Mahkamah berpandukan kepada kes BALAKRISHNAN KUNJAMBOO NAIR v. SAVASTINE ANTHONY FRANCIS [1991] 2 CLJ Rep 327 di mana Mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut : "[4] (a) In relation to the claim for loss of monthly income no documentary evidence was produced either in the form of income tax returns or employers' records as the relevant company had ceased operations. (b) In the absence of any documentary evidence, judicial notice could be taken of the average earnings of marble grinding contract workers to be in the region of about RM700". [175] Mahkamah juga merujuk kes Renhome Bricks Factory Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Watah Umpin [2009] 9 CLJ 494 di mana YA Hamid Sultan Abu Backer PK [pada ketika itu] menzahirkan pandangannya seperti berikut: "(3) The appellants' contention that there was no evidence to support the respondent's claim for loss of earnings was misconceived. Proof of earnings in accident claims does not necessarily require formal documents. If the appellants wanted a lesser sum to be awarded, they had to adduce the relevant evidence for the court to assess a reasonable amount. Mere challenge or putting the respondent to strict proof was of no value. (paras 8, 9 & 10)" [176] Dalam kes Sheela Christina Nair v Regency Specialist Hospital Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [2016] 2 PIR [26] YA Mohd Nazlan Mohd Ghazali JC (ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: [39] It is not the law that a claim for loss of earnings will never succeed in the absence of supporting documents to show the earnings. Although this point is not submitted by the parties, it should be noted that there are a number of case law authorities where such claims were nevertheless allowed. In Fatimah Derakmak v Wan Jusoh Wan Kolok [1994] 4 CLJ 537 the High Court accepted the evidence of the plaintiff, a fruit seller that her monthly income was RM600.00 in the absence of any document. In Lim Ah Chi v Tan Ah Mui & Anor[1969] 1 MLJ 216 the Federal Court took judicial notice S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 66 of the income of a "pow" seller. In Saripah Mahmud v Govindaraju Venkatachalam[2011] 1 LNS 828 the High Court took judicial notice that the income of a small scale fish and vegetable seller to be RM1,000.00 monthly without documentary support. Again, in Balakrishnan Kunjamboo Nair v Savastine Anthony Francis[1991] 1 CLJ 503 the High Court took judicial notice on the average earnings of marble grinding contract workers to be in the region of about RM700.00 per month. In the case of Chan Peng Fook v Kan Pak Lee[1974] 2 MLJ 197 the earnings of an average carpenter was assessed to be RM150.00 per month in the absence of any document and even when the employer of the plaintiff was not called to give evidence as witness. [177] Dengan merujuk kepada kes-kes tersebut di atas, Mahkamah dalam kes ini memutuskan pendapatan Plaintif sebanyak RM1,000.00 sebulan pada masa material adalah munasabah dan jumlah ini adalah tidak terlalu tinggi dan tidak terlalu rendah mengambil kira pekerjaan Simati sebagai kelindan motorlori. [178] Mahkamah ini mengikuti pendekatan yang diputuskan dalam nas-nas duluan yang membenarkan jumlah yang kurang dalam keadaan kekurangan bukti/keterangan berkenaan jumlah spesifik gaji yang diterima oleh Simati. Mahkamah mengambil gaji minima RM1,000.00 (ketika itu) iaitu berdasarkan Perintah Gaji Minimum 2016 yang dikuatkuasa pada 01/07/2016sebagai kayu ukur dalam menentukan pendapatan Simati ketika kemalangan sebagai amaun yang munasabah. [179] Dalam kes Ganison Krishnasamy V. Kong Sii Cheng & Anor [2014] 7 CLJ 88 Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan seperti berikut: Learned counsel for the plaintiff has conceded that the plaintiff is still able to find some sort of simple job at a pay of RM800 per month which is the minimum wage requirement of the Labour Department. In the face of the evidence of PW11 that the plaintiff, if he were healthy and normal, could earn RM4,000 a month in the private sector after retirement, the loss in earning capacity is RM3,200 (RM4,000 - RM800). S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 67 [180] Plaintif berusia 37 tahun ketika kemalangan ini berlaku. Maka, "multiplier" adalah 9 tahun (55 - 37 ÷ 2 = 9). Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan awad bagi kehilangan pendapatan bagi Plaintif sebanyak RM1,000.00 x 12 x 9 = RM108,000.00. [181] Mahkamah ini juga tidak ketinggalan untuk mengambil maklum mengenai prinsip-prinsip yang perlu diambil kira semasa memberikan pampasan. Mahkamah merujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (a child suing through her father and next friend, Mohd Helmi Abd Aziz) v Kerajaan Malaysia & 2 Ors [2016] 1 PIR 16 Yang Amat Arif, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan Abdul Hamid Embong FCJ menyatakan:- “It is trite that damages served as compensation, not a reward, less still a punishment. In assessing damages, the courts should not be motivated by sumpathy and award fair compensation based on cogent evidence. The court could not descend into a domain of speculation. The evaluation of evidence which form the basis of any risk of future damage, must still be undertaken. The trial judge could only evaluate such evidence based on the recognized balance of probability standard, but with a lower degree of certainty as to the occurrence of such loss or damage in the future. Such a lower degree to be attached is best termed by the word “possibility”, “chance”, “risk”, “danger” or “likelihood”, but regardless of the words used and their semantics, they must also essentially be a substantial one and not speculative.” Tiada tolakan 1/3 living expenses [182] Mahkamah membenarkan awad bagi kehilangan pendapatan tanpa membuat tolakan bagi living expenses. Berkenaan dengan living expenses, tiada sebarang keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah yang mana menunjukkan ‘living expenses’ dibuktikan atau diakui sebagaimana menurut seksyen 28A(2)(c)(iii) Civil Law Act 1956. [183] Dalam kes Marappan & Anor V Siti Rahmah Bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99, Supreme Court telah memutuskan bahawa: S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 68 “The final ground of appeal was that the learned judge had misdirected himself when he failed to take into account or deduct the living expenses of the respondent as required under the above-quoted s 28A(2)(c)(iii) of the Act. On this ground we also agreed with the learned judge that the court should not make any deduction for living expenses under that subsection of s 28A of the Act as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured”. [184] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Sumarni v Yow Bing Kwong & Anor [2008] 1 MLJ 608, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa: “I have perused the Federal Court judgment of Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim and found no such principle set. All that was said in the last paragraph of the judgment of that case is 'that the court should not make any deduction for living expenses under that subsection of s 28 A of the Act as there was no proof or admission in this case as to what the actual living expenses of the plaintiff were at the time when she was injured'. There, the Federal Court was dealing with the contention of the defendant that deduction should be made according to the plaintiffs living expenses. But it was ruled that since there was no proof or admission of actual living expenses of the plaintiff at the time when she was injured, the trial Judge was correct in concluding that no deduction as claimed by the defendant should be made for living expenses under s 28A(2)(c)(iii) of the Act.” [185] Berpandukan kepada kes Marappan & Anor V Siti Rahmah Bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 dan kes Sumarni v Yow Bing Kwong & Anor [2008] 1 MLJ 608 di atas, Mahkamah tidak membuat sebarang penolakan bagi ‘living expenses’ kerana berdasarkan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah, S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 69 tiada bukti atau pengakuan (proof or admission) mengenai living expenses Plaintif semasa kemalangan. Gantirugi Khas [186] Gantirugi khas atas dasar liabiliti 100% dibenarkan seperti berikut: Kos penjagaan (pre-trial) daripada tarikh kemalangan 17.10.2016 hingga tarikh keputusan pada 28.6.2023 = 80 bulan [187] Plaintif dalam keterangannya telah menyatakan bahawa beliau memerlukan bantuan dari emak dan abangnya untuk menjalani aktiviti kehldupan harian (''activities of daily living''). Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak boleh berjalan lagi, lumpuh daripada bahagian dada ke bawah, tidak boleh ke tandas tanpa bantuan orang lain untuk buang air besar dan buang air kecil, memerlukan bantuan daripada ibu dan abangnya untuk mandikan beliau, menyediakan makanan, perlu membeli dan memakaikan bag air kencing dan colostomy bag dan untuk dapatkan rawatan dan sebagainya. Keterangan Plaintif ini disokong dengan keterangan abang dan ibu Plaintif. [188] SP3 Dr. Ramnan Jeyasingham daripada Columbia Asia Extended care Hospital telah memeriksa Plaintif 2 tahun selepas kemalangan tersebut dan telah mengemukakan laporan Perubatannya (Ekshibit P5). Dr. Ramnan dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa Plaintif “continued to be dependent on others for some activities of daily living as described at pages 29 – 30 of exhibit P5.” Dr. Ramnan berpendapat “such dependent will be permanent”. Feeding • Meals are prepared and served by the patient’s mother • he is able to eat on his own, independently Bathing • The patient is given daily bed baths by the patient’s mother S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 70 • He is transferred onto a commode chair and showered on alternate days, during showers he is able to manage upper half of body on his own • he is dependent on his mother for lower half of body and back areas Dressing • for lower hals of body and diaper change, he is dependent on his mother Bowel • The patient passes motion via colostomy • he is dependent on his mother for colostomy care • colostomy bag and base is being changed on a daily basis Bladder • The patient has urninary retention, due to neurogenic bladder • He is dependent on his mother for disposal of collected urine Toilet use • The patient is unable to use the toilet for urination or defecation Transfers • The patient requires significant help from 2 caregivers (brother and mother) for transfer for bed to wheelchair/commode chair and vice versa Mobility • The patient is unable to stand and walk • he is able to use wheelchair independently, on level surfaces [189] Pihak Plaintif berhujah bahawa Plaintif harus diberi pampasan dengan satu award untuk penjagaan yang telah diberi oleh emak dan abang Plaintif, walaupun penjagaan telah diberi tanpa apa-apa bayaran. [190] Kos untuk Nursing care telah diplidkan di dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif di perenggan 6 di bawah tajuk butir-butir gantirugi khas seperti berikut : (i) kos nursing care (butir-butir akan dikemukakan) S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 71 [191] Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa tiada bukti yang dikemukakan bahawa Plaintif telah menerima "perkhidmatan penjagaan kejururawatan". Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif hanya memplidkan kos nursing care dalam pliding mereka dan tidak memplidkan kos penjagaan pra-bicara (‘Pre-trial cost of care’) yang mana adalah di bawah kategori gantirugi khas di mana ia adalah suatu prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa gantirugi khas (‘special damages’) hendaklah diplidkan secara spesifik dan dibuktikan dengan ketat. [192] Oleh yang demikian, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua pohon agar tuntutan kos penjagaan pra-bicara tidak harus diawadkan memandangkan kegagalan Plaintif memplidkan tuntutan tersebut dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan serta tiada sebarang keterangan atau bukti dikemukakan bagi menyokong tuntutan tersebut. Secara alternative, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa satu awad sebanyak RM 600.00 sebulan adalah amat munasabah dibayar kepada ahli keluarga Plaintif sebagai kos penjagaan Plaintif di rumahnya. [193] Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa "nursing care" tidak bermaksud penjagaan oleh seorang jururawat yang bertauliah tetapi penjagaan sedernikian juga boleh diberikan oleh ahli keluarga dan/alau orang lain. Plaintif berhujah bahawa satu jumlah yang munasabah sebagai pampasan kepada penjagaan yang telah diberi oleh emak dan abang Plaintif ialah sebanyak RM1,500.00 sebulan kerana berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang diberikan adalah sukar untuk memberi bantuan kepada Plaintif yang berbadan besar serta perlu tukar pampers dan banyak lagi tugasan yang perlu dilakukan. [194] Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi Plaintif dan juga keterangan perubatan Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif sememangnya memerlukan penjagaan kerana beliau ‘dependent on others for some of the acivities of daily living” akibat paraplegia. [195] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes TAN CHEONG POH & ANOR v TEOW AH KEOW (1996} 3 CLJ 665 di mana Mahkamah telah membuat keputusan seperti berikut : S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 72 "[6] On nursing care, the courts have always compensated plaintiffs for the true value of the services that they need even though the services are provided by a parent or relative. The award for care and nursing should not be less even if the plaintiff is looked after at home, and compensation can be given in money for services rendered by parents. In the instant case, the evidence on the respondent's condition, as supported by objective medical opinion, suggested that she would not be adequately compensated unless a reasonable sum to engage a full­time domestic maid was provided." [196] Dalam kes Lau Ping Siong & Anor v Nador Ak Tawi [2012] MLJU 1486, walaupun nursing care tidak diplidkan, namun Mahkamah Tinggi masih membenarkan awad yang munasabah bagi nursing care memandangkan “the very nature of the injury suffered by a plaintiff makes the necessity of care and nursing an irresistible inference, then it must follow as justifiable the corresponding claim for the cost thereof.” Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan seperti berikut: [26] The Appellants complain that the claim for costs of nursing was not pleaded. The Respondent's counsel points out the Appellants' failure to object to the testimony of the relevant witness (PW2) during the trial. The Respondent maintains the Appellants were not taken by surprise by PW2's testimony. The Respondent's counsel says the Appellants "has (sic) waived their rights to object to the award of nursing care...(and)...ought to be maintained." [27] In addition to the non-pleading point, the Appellants' counsel also contends the relevant testimony of the Plaintiffs witness (PVV2) "was not corroborated with requisite documentary proof." In this connection, counsel says, "...the Appellants need not object to testimony of witnesses so long as the claims therein, if not previously pleaded, are S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 73 not awarded. As such, the Appellant has in no way, waived its right to object to the award." [30] In the said passage quoted from Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah (supra) the Federal Court appears to be enunciating the general principle, that special damages have to be specifically pleaded. In contradistinction, Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah Bt Ibrahim (supra) seems specific in its reference to the justifiability issue. This seems to have prompted the Respondent's counsel to submit, "...the Plaintiff's claim for cost of nursing care is justified by reason of the injury suffered by him." In other words, if the very nature of the injury suffered by a plaintiff makes the necessity of care and nursing an irresistible inference, then it must follow as justifiable the corresponding claim for the cost thereof. [31] In the instant case, the Respondent's non-compliance with the necessity to specifically plead his claim for cost of care and nursing did not appear to have prompted the Appellants / Defendants to raise the relevant objection. In fact, the Defendants / Appellants proceeded to cross-examine the relevant witness (PW2) on her testimony of her having taken care of her father (the Plaintiff) presumably while he was bed ridden. In the circumstances, on balance of probability, it would appear justified to conclude that the Defendants / Appellants have waived their rights to object to the award of care and nursing. Anyway, based on the testimony of PW2, the claim for the cost thereof also appears to have been justified. In the circumstances of this case, the amount awarded for cost of care and nursing is therefore to be maintained. [197] Mahkamah seharusnya membuat keputusan berdasarkan keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah dan keputusan itu seharusnya berlandaskan prinsip-prinsip keadilan dan bukannya semata-mata menitik beratkan ‘technical irregularities’. Mahkamah berpendapat tidak wajar menolak awad untuk kos penjagaan memandangkan terdapat keterangan bahawa Plaintif memerlukan penjagaan oleh ‘by a parent or relative’ atau ‘domestic helper’ S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 74 akibat kecederaan yang dialaminya. Lagipun, pihak Defendan ‘is not taken by surprise’ memandangkan mereka telah memeriksa balas saksi-saksi Plaintif atas isu nursing care ini dan tiada sebarang bantahan dibangkitkan atas hal perkara ini semasa perbicaraan kes. [198] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes LIM ENG KAY v. JAAFAR MOHAMED SAID [1982] CLJ Rep 190 di mana Mahkamah menyatakan seperti berikut: Counsel for the appellant attacked this assessment as being erroneous in law, because the special damages were already agreed to as at RM2,300 at the beginning of the trial and also because the pre-trial loss of earnings so assessed was "not pleaded, particularised and proved," He submitted that no such assessment could be made without an amendment of the respondent's statement of claim. The point taken by the Counsel is purely a technical point on pleading... From these two paragraphs of the statement of claim it is obvious that the respondent's solicitors treated the claim for loss of earnings as falling into two categories - (a) pre-trial loss, which they described it as 'loss of earnings" and (b) future loss of earnings, which they referred to as " prospective loss of earnings." But instead of pleading the pre-trial loss of earnings or "loss of earnings" as they described it as an item under special damages, they erroneously pleaded it as an item under general damages. This is purely a technical mistake, which in our view did not in any way affect the substance or prejudice the appellant - see O. 2 (Effect of Non-Compliance) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. We cannot see how the respondent should be deprived of his right by a purely technical error on the part of his solicitors, who were not up-to-date with this aspect of legal technicalities. In any case prayer (e) in para. (7), "Any other relief which this Honourable Court deem fit to grant" must not be treated as a mere ornament to pleadings devoid of any meaning. We think that this prayer and the prayer for "loss of earning" in para. 5(a) should entitle the Court to make such an assessment. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 75 [199] Jikapun Mahkamah menerima hujahan pihak Defendan bahawa kedua-dua cost of care and nursing care adalah berbeza, namun kesilapan ini pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah kesilapan teknikal di pihak peguamcara Plaintif yang mana tidak akan menjejaskan asas tuntutan Plaintif atau memprejudiskan pihak Defendan oleh kerana “the very nature of the injury suffered by a plaintiff makes the necessity of care” [Lau Ping Siong & Anor v Nador Ak Tawi [2012] MLJU 1486] [200] Mahkamah ini juga membuat rujukan kepada kes MARAPPAN & ANOR v. SITI RAHMAH BTE IBRAHIM [1990] 1 MLJ 99, di mana Yang Arif Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ telah memutuskan seperti berikut: - “As for the cost of care, the learned judge found that as PW3 did not actually engage anyone to look after the plaintiff, her estimate of the cost of caring at $800 pm was most speculative. He also considered that there was no necessity to consider the cost of sending the plaintiff to a nursing home as all along she had been looked after by PW3. The learned judge, however, referred to Taylor v Bristol Omnibus Co [1975] 2 All ER 1107 in which the English Court of Appeal has held that the item for care and nursing was justifiable and should not be any less if the plaintiff was looked after at home instead of in an institution, as it is now settled that compensation can be given in money for services rendered by parents. As the local cases cited to him had given awards ranging from $150 to $350 pm for this item and in the light of inflation the learned judge considered that an award of $350 pm to be fair and adequate for the cost of caring for the plaintiff at home. Before us, counsel submitted that $250 pm should be sufficient but we agreed with the learned judged that in the circumstances of this case the award for this item should be $350pm as the plaintiff was paralysed and needed care and nursing all the time.” [201] Berpandukan kepada kes-kes di atas, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif untuk kos penjagaan pre-trial oleh keluarga Plaintif untuk tempoh 80 bulan i.e. daripada tarikh kemalangan 17.10.2016 hingga tarikh keputusan pada 28.6.2023. Mahkamah berpandangan awad sebanyak RM1,000.00 S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 76 sebulan adalah munasabah mengambil kira keadaan ekonomi semasa dan kesulitan yang dialami oleh ahli keluarga dalam menjaga Plaintif yang paraplegia di mana penjagaan sangat diperlukan oleh Plaintif, terutamanya apabila perlu melakukan repositioning setiap 2 jam, memindahkan Plaintif daripada katil ke atas kerusi roda dan seterusnya membawanya ke tandas, menukarkan bag coclostomy dan sebagainya, dengan berat badan Plaintif yang berlebihan, ditambah lagi dengan merawat luka bed sore yang dialaminya. Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan RM80,000.00 (RM1,000.00 x 80 bulan) yang pada fikiran Mahkamah adalah suatu awad yang munasabah. Pada pandangan Mahkamah awad RM1,000.00 sebulan adalah wajar bagi kes-kes yang melibatkan paralysis khususnya. Kos penjagaan di rumah (masa hadapan - dibenarkan tanpa faedah) [202] Plaintif menghujahkan agar Plalntlf dijaga di sebuah "nursing home" dari tarikh keputusan sehinggan jangka hayat Plaintif yang dianggarkan manakala Pihak Defendan pula menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif sebenarnya tidak ada keperluan untuk mendapatkan penjagaan di nursing home dan/atau perkhidmatan penjagaan khas oleh jururawat di nursing care / home nursing care tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah. Seterusnya, pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa Plaintif boleh dijaga oleh seorang pembantu yang biasa berdasarkan keadaan terkini Plaintif. Pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berhujah bahawa hanya kos penjagaan oleh ahli keluarga sahaja yang wajar dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah memandangkan walaupun Plaintif sudah dijaga di rumah selama enam (6) tahun lebih oleh ahli keluarganya, keadaan beliau adalah tidak merosot. [203] Dalam kes ini abang Plaintif telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia tidak mempunyai masa lapang untuk diri dia sendiri, tidak boleh keluar secara sesuka hati, menghadapi masalah untuk mandikan Plaintif yang berbadan besar, malah tiada tempat yang sesuai untuk mandikan Plaintif. Emak Plaintif juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia perlu sediakan makanan untuk Plaintif, beri ubat, sapu ubat untuk Iuka, bersihkan colostomy beg, tukar beg air kencing setiap 4 jam dan bantu Plaintif sekiranya dia hendak baring. Emak Plaintif sudah menjangkau usia 69 tahun, merupakan seorang yang mempunyai penyakit kencing manis, asthma dan darah tinggi. Malah dia juga S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 77 telah memberitahu bahawa dia tidak berupaya untuk mengangkat Plaintif yang berbadan besar. Pihak Plaintif berhujah bahawa jika sekiranya Plaintif ditempatkan di satu "nursing home" semestinya Plaintif akan menerima penjagaan yang sempurna dan teratur. [204] Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan saksi – saksi Plaintif dalam kes ini mengenai home care dan institutionalized care dan keterangan mereka dirumuskan seperti berikut: Keterangan Dr. Ramnan (i) home care is better on phsycological perspective, institutional care may become inevitable in the future, this is the hypotetichal part. (ii) In this case the patient himself who is conscious and his current caregivers, they should decide what type of care do they wish for, there is home care or institutionalized care. (iii) any form of help in his part time will be useful and maybe cheaper (iv) In my opinion opinion, for this patient, part time maid not sufficient, it should be full time, maid can manage everything at home, to buy food, pay bill, he would need help from family members to continue living. Keterangan ibu Plaintif (i) Dalam keadaan sekarang saya tidak tahu berapa lama saya boleh menjaga Ravi (ii) Saya memerlukan seorang pembantu untuk menjaga beliau di rumah dan saya tidak sanggup untuk hantar ravi ke rumah home rumah penjagaan (iii) Dalam ketiadaan saya, abang ravi boleh ambil alih Keterangan Plaintif Dalam Penyataan Saksi Plaintif (Ekshibit WS-SP7), Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa:- S : Bolehkah kamu terus dijaga di rumah? J : Kalau ada orang. Kalau tak ada orang perlu cari tempat lain. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 78 [205] Berdasarkan ibu Plaintif, beliau memerlukan seorang pembantu untuk menjaga Plaintif di rumah disebabkan beliau tidak sanggup hantar Plaintif ke rumah penjagaan. Doktor pakar Plaintif juga memberi keterangan bahawa Plaintif boleh dijaga oleh seorang pembantu rumah. Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa beliau boleh dijaga di rumah jika ada orang yang boleh menjaganya di rumah. Pada masa kini, Plaintif sedang dijaga oleh emak dan abang dia sejak berlakunya kemalangan ini tanpa sebarang pembayaran. Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang telah diberikan oleh abang dan emak Plaintif, Plaintif harus tunggu untuk abang dia balik dari kerja untuk membolehkan dia mandi. [206] Mahkamah juga telah mempertimbangkan fakta bahawa ibu Plaintif sudah tua dan keadaan kesihatan beliau tidak mengizinkan dan adalah mustahil untuk menjaga Plaintif selama jangka hayat Plaintif. Berdasarkan kesemua keterangan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar satu awad diberikan bagi penjagaan oleh seorang domestic helper. Mahkamah berpendapat penjagaan oleh ahli keluarga untuk masa hadapan sehingga jangka hayat Plaintif adalah tidak praktikal memandangkan ibu Plaintif sudah lanjut usia dan abang Plaintif pula terpaksa bekerja untuk menyara diri. Selanjutnya Mahkamah mendapati tiada keperluan untuk mendapatkan perkhidmatan penjagaan khas oleh jururawat di rumah mahupun institutionalized care. Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan awad bagi kos penjagaan masa hadapan bagi seorang pembantu rumah (domestic helper). KUANTUM KOS PENJAGAAN MASA HADAPAN [207] Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menghujahkan bahawa satu awad sebanyak RM 600.00 sebulan adalah amat munasabah dibayar kepada ahli keluarga Plaintif sebagai kos penjagaan Plaintif di rumah. Oleh itu, pihak Defendan menghujahkan jumlah sebanyak RM 600.00 sebulan x 12 bulan x 16.87 tahun = RM 121,464.00 [Tanpa faedah]. Secara alternatif, sekiranya Mahkamah ingin mengawadkan kos penjagaan di rumah dengan seorang pembantu rumah, pihak Defendan merujuk kepada laporan pakar Dr. Ramnan yang menyatakan bahawa kos untuk mendapatkan khidmat seorang pembantu rumah adalah RM 1,704.00 sebulan. Justeru pihak Defendan secara alternative menghujahkan kiraan kos untuk mendapatkan khidmat seorang pembantu S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 79 rumah sebagai tuntutan kos penjagaa masa hadapan di rumah adalah RM 1,704.00 sebulan x 12 bulan x 16.87 tahun = RM 344,957.76 [Tanpa faedah] [208] Plaintif pula menghujahkan kos rawatan di sebuah nursing home adalah dijangka sebanyak RM1,680.60 sebulan x 289 bulan = RM485,693.40. Secara alternatif, Plaintif menghujahkan kos penjagaan jika dijaga di rumah oleh "domestic helper' adalah dijangka sebanyak RM2,303.80 sebulan x 289 bulan = RM665,798.20. [209] Dalam kes ini Dr. Ramnan dalam laporannya menyatakan In summary,: “Based on the patient's current condition, the following expenses are antlcipated if he is continued to be cared for within the environment of his home: 1. …The cost of engaging a domestic helper Is expected to be RM 1.704.00 per month. 2. Light weight wheelchair costing approximately RM 1,800.00 with a lifespan of about 4 years (RM 37.50 per month), 3. Wheelchair seat cushion (eg, ROHO Mosaic) costing RM 590.00 with a life expectancy of 1 year (RM 49.20 per month), 4, Commode chair costing RM 530.00 with a life expectancy of about 2 years (approximately RM 22.00 per month). 5. Electric Hospital bed costing RM 5,500.00 with a life expectancy of about 8 years (approximately RM 57.30 per month). 6. Hospital grade mattress costing RM 480.00 with a life expectancy of about 8 years (approximately RM 5.00 per month). 7. Reasonably good quality pressure relieving mattress to prevent bed sores, costing RM980.00 with a fife span of about 5 years (RM 16.30 per month). 8. Diapers costing approximately RM 150.00 per month. 9. Incontinence sheets costing approximately RM 22.50 per month. 10. Ancillaries for Clean Intermittent Self Catheterizatlon (CISC) costing approximately RM40.00 per month. 11. Colostomy sets costing approximately RM 200.00 per month. Hence, if Ravi A/L Latchumanah is cared for at home in his current physical state, the cost of care is expected to be approximately RM2,303.80 per month.” S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 80 [210] Berdasarkan laporan Dr. Ramnan Kos penjagaan bagi Plaintif di rumah adalah dalam anggaran RM2,303.80 sebulan. Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan awad sebanyak RM2,303.80 sebulan. Mahkamah berpandapat awad ini adalah wajar kerana Mahkamah tiada memberikan awad berasingan untuk kos pampers, incontinence sheet, colostomy bag, ancillaries for clean intermittent self catheterization (CISC), wheelchair, hospital bed, mattress dan sebagainya. yang mana kos-kos bagi peralatan ini telah diambil kira dalam awad kos penjagaan di rumah. [211] Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan kos penjagaan Plaintif di rumah masa hadapan oleh "domestic helper' sebanyak RM2,303.80 sebulan x 289 bulan = RM665,798.20 (tanpa faedah) LIFE EXPECTANCY [212] Menurut laporan pakar Dr. Ramnan menyatakan : “Based on the 2016 Spinal Cord Injury Data Sheet (Natronal SCI statistical Centre, Birmingham, Alabama, USA), a person who sustains Spinal Cord Injury (Paraplegia) at the age of 20 years and has already survived for more than 1 year post-lnjury, is expected to live for a further 28.1 years. [213] Berdasarkan kepada lapuran yang telah disediakan oleh Dr.Ramnan Jeyasingam, Plaintif dijangka akan hidup untuk selama 28.1 tahun lagi Plaintif berumur 40 tahun ketika laporan ini disediakan oleh Dr. Ramnan pada tahun 2019 dan semasa perbicaraan Plaintif berusia 44 tahun, maka setelah menolak 4 tahun, maka Mahkamah mendapati Plaintf dijanga akan hidup selama 24.1.tahun (289 bulan) lagi. Mahkamah tidak membuat sebarang tolakan untuk kontigensi sepertimana hujahan pihak Defendan. Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan awad seperti berikut untuk kos penjagaan masa hadapan tanpa faedah : RM2,303.80 x 289 bulan = RM665,798.20 [214] Pihak Defendan telah merujuk kepada kes ROHGETANA A/P MAYATHEVAN (AN INFANT SUING THROUGH HIS FATHER AND LITIGATION S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 81 REPRESENTATIVE, MAYATHEVAN A/L MAYANDI) V. DR NAVIN KUMAR & ORS AND OTHER APPEALS [2017] 4 MLJ 102, di mana Mahkamah telah menerima keterangan pakar berkenaan dengan jangka hayat hidup plaintif dalam kes itu dengan berdasarkan “Strauss Table”. Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak 30% “life contingency” selepas rujukan dibuat berdasarkan “Strauss Table. [215] Mahkamah tidak dapat bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Defendan berkenaan pemakaian Strauss Data/Table mengenai pengiraan multiplier dalam kes ini atas alasan seperti berikut: (i) Pakar Plaintif tidak disoal balas mengenai penolakan untuk contingency (ii) Straus Data/Table tidak pada bila-bila masa dirujuk semasa prosiding perbicaraan kes ini (iii) Pakar Plaintif juga tidak merujuk kepada Straus Data/Table ini semasa memberikan pendapat berkenaan life expectancy di dalam laporan pakarnya. (iv) Fakta mengenai Straus Data/Table hanya dibangkitkan oleh pihak Defendan di peringkat hujahan bertulis Defendan. Oleh itu, sekiranya Mahkamah menerimapakai Straus Data/Table pada peringkat ini, akan menyebabkan ketidakadilan kepada pihak Plaintif kerana Plaintif tiada diberikan peluang untuk memeriksa balas atas kesesuaian pemakaian dan pengiraan life expectancy Plaintif Kedua dalam kes ini berdasarkan Straus Data/Table. (v) Jika diteliti, dalam kes Rohgetana a/p Mayathevan (seorang bayi yang mendakwa melalui bapa dan sahabat wakilnya, Mayathevan a/l Mayandi) v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and another appeal (supra), Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “Although some other reference work was recommended by the witness for the Plaintiff, all the aforesaid expert witnesses were nevertheless agreed that the Strauss Data/Table that was available was an acceptable premise for the court to draw some assistance to work out the anticipated life expectancy of the Plaintiff; this was because there were no comparable Malaysian studies or statistics available on the subject. The learned Judge placed reliance on the Strauss Data/Table since the English court in James Robshaw v United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] Med. LR 229, involving a S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 82 similarly circumstanced cerebral palsy child, had also referred and analysed the findings set out in that Strauss Data/Table where the authors of the same had noted: “Survival prognosis for persons with CP should take into account age and severity of disability”. Adalah jelas daripada kes tersebut di atas bahawa kesemua pakar telah bersetuju dengan Strauss Data/Table dan boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah untuk membuat pengiraan jangka hayat / life expectancy Plaintif. Berbeza dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah, pakar Plaintif tiada langsung merujuk kepada Strauss Data/Table di dalam laporan pakarnya dan tiada juga keterangan lisan sedemikian oleh pakar Plaintif di Mahkamah. Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak sesuai dan tidak selamat untuk merujuk kepada Strauss Data/Table dalam membuat pengiraan ‘life expectancy Plaintif. (vi) Lagipun, Strauss Data Table kebiasaannya akan dirujuk dalam kes-kes yang melibatkan CP (cerebral palsy). Bahkan kes Rohgetana a/p Mayathevan (seorang bayi yang mendakwa melalui bapa dan sahabat wakilnya, Mayathevan a/l Mayandi) v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and another appeal (supra) yang menggunapakai Strauss Data Table ini juga merupakan kes kanak-kanak yang mengalami CP. Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, Plaintif tidak mengalami CP bahkan beliau juga bukanlah quadriplegic. Maka, sejauh mana pemakaian Strauss Data Table ke atas Plaintif dalam kes ini yang bukan seorang pesakit CP, semestinya bergantung kepada keterangan perubatan yang dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan kes ini. Oleh kerana tiada keterangan perubatan yang sedemikian berkenaan pemakaian Strauss Data Table dalam kes ini, maka Mahkamah menolak hujahan Defendan atas isu ini. (vii) Pihak Defendan juga tidak mengemukakan sebarang otoriti lain untuk menyokong hujahan mereka bahawa Strauss Data Table ini adalah terpakai juga kepada kes-kes yang bukan melibatkan pesakit CP seperti dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 83 [216] Dalam kes Bujang Bin Mat & Anor V Lai Tzen Hai & Anor [2004] 6 MLJ 376, Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada 5 pendekatan yang digunakan dalam menentukan multiplicand bagi nursing care seperti berikut: “Mr Frank Tang of counsel for the defendants has very helpfully in his submissions set out a survey of Malaysian cases on awards made in respect of cost of nursing care which show that our courts have adopted at least five different approaches in determining the multiplier in assessment of cost of nursing care in cases where a person is prognosed to require nursing care for the rest of his life. The five approaches are: (i) applying a direct multiplier of 16 years, following Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd). Other cases which have applied this approach are Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor v Mohamad Salam bin Sidik [2002] 5 MLJ 104; Mohd Yusof bin Abdul Ghani v Tee Song Kee & Anor [1995] MLJU 344 (refd); Muhammad Milshaddiq bin Juri v Rahmat bin Jamil [1993] MLJU 418 (refd);Swee Boon King v Thong Tin Sing & Anor [1994] MD 1224 (refd) and Chandran v Mohammad Razali bin Jaafar [1992] MD 911; (ii) applying a direct multiplier not limited to 16 years. Some cases that have adopted this approach are Zamri Md Som & Anor v Nurul Fitriyaton Idawiyah Nahrawi [2002] 1 CLJ 309 (refd); Wong Li Fan William (an infant) v Haidawati bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497 (refd); (iii) by taking the life expectancy minus age at the time of accident and using a direct multiplier. The cases that have adopted this approach are Tan Ah Kan v The Government of Malaysia [1997] 2 AMR 1382;Ng Chun Loi v Hadzir & Ors [1993] 1 CLJ 323 (refd); (iv) by taking the life expectancy minus age at time of the accident less one- third for contingencies and using direct multiplier. The cases that have adopted this approach are Chandra Sekaran a/l Krishnan Nair & Anor v Ayub bin Mohamed & Anor [1994] MLJU 82; Zainab bte Ahmad lwn Keretapi Tanah Melayu Bhd [2000] 5 MLJ 620 (refd); Nazori bin Teh & Anor v Teh Lye Seng & Anor [1996] 1 AMR 706 (refd); (v) by taking life expectancy minus age at the time of accident and using annuity tables with no deduction for contingencies. Cases that have S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 84 adopted this approach are Yu Mea Lian & Anor v Government of Terengganu & Ors [1997] MLJU 252 (refd); Inderjeet Singh v Mazlan bin Jasman [1995] 2 MLJ 646 (refd). [217] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, tiada tolakan dibuat terhadap multiplicand 28.1 tahun. Ini adalah kerana : (a) Tiada keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah yang mengasaskan suatu tolakan wajar dibuat (b) Keterangan Dr. Ramnan bahawa “I need to make some correction, refer page 41 Ikatan Betul from diagram can see someone age 40 years old at the time of injury , they will survive 28.1 years. This patient is only 37 years 8 months at the time of the alleged accident. So has life expectancy will be slightly more than 28.1 years.” (c) Tiada keterangan perubatan di hadapan Mahkamah bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif akan mengurangkan atau memberi kesan kepada jangka hayat Plaintif 28.1 tahun (d) Kos penjagaan termasuk penggajian pembantu rumah akan meningkat dalam tahun-tahun yang mendatang dan kejatuhan nilai matawang serta kadar inflasi yang sentiasa meningkat (e) Mahkamah mempunyai budi bicara untuk memilih mana-mana pendekatan seperti mana yang dinyatakan dalam kes Bujang Bin Mat & Anor (supra) dan dalam kes ini Mahkamah memilih pendekatan using annuity tables with no deduction for contingencies. [218] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes PANTAI MEDICAL CENTRE SON BHD v FAREED REEZAL ARUND & ANOTHER APPEAL (2022) 2 CLJ 173 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan bahawa :- [35] We considered too that damages are assessed on a once and for all basis. As stated in Nurul Husna Muhammad Hafiz & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2015] 1 CU 825, 850: ... The award of future damages or cost of future care in Malaysia is done on once-and­ for-all assessment basis, unlike in England where damages may be assessed periodically, following judgment on liability. Thus in Malaysia the victim cannot return to Court in the future to claim S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 85 more damages because his or her injuries have worsened, or if unexpectedly the victim has more needs and the original award had proved inadequate. [36] To now make a one-third deduction would be a further deduction when the contingencies in arriving at the life expectancy by reference to Graf had already been factored. We find the HC was plainly wrong to have made the 15% deduction. [219] Dalam kes SOTON BILI & ANOR v. KHAJIJAH LED & ORS [2008] 9 CLJ 303 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa: “In respect of the cost of prosthesis of RM108,730, it was alleged that the sessions court judge had erred in not reducing the amount of RM108,730 by 1/4 deduction for contingencies, vicissitudes of life and/or taking into account the accelerated payment. Whether or not a 1/4 deduction should be given is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the circumstance of each individual case. The sessions court judge's decision in not making the deduction could not be faulted as she had exercised her discretion judiciously. Hence, the appeal in respect of the costs of prosthesis was dismissed” [220] Berpandukan kepada keputusan dalam kes-kes di atas, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Plaintif bahawa kos penjagaan masa hadapan harus dikira berdasarkan multiplier 28.1 tahun dan hujah peguam Defendan Pertama dan Kedua berkenaan penolakan bagi contingency ditolak oleh Mahkamah ini. Kos pampers, incontinence sheet, colostomy bag, ancillaries for clean intermittent self catheterization (CISC) [221] Mahkamah menolak awad bagi item ini kerana telah diambil kira dalam awad kos penjagaan di rumah masa hadapan (tanpa faedah) S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 86 Kos Perubatan [222] Abang Plaintif telah memberi keterangan bahawa dia membelanjakan wang sebanyak RM250.00 sebulan untuk membeli beberapa item yang tidak diberi oleh hospital dan tidak ditanggung oleh SOCSO. Pihak Plaintif menghujahkan walaupun tiada dokumen untuk menyokong tuntutan ini, pihak Plaintif menghujahkan jumlah sebanyak RM250.00 adalah satu jumlah yang amat munasabah dan mohon sebanyak RM250/sebulan x 367 bulan = RM91,750.00 [223] Mahkamah mendapati pihak Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa amaun sebanyak RM 250.00 sebulan telah dibelanjakan sebagai kos perubatan Plaintif. Tiada keterangan sokongan dokumentari dikemukakan seperti bil, resit atau surat daripada pihak hospital sebagai bukti kukuh bagi perbelanjaan kos Perubatan. Justeru Mahkamah menolak tuntutan Plaintif bagi item ini. Kerosakan pakaian [224] Plaintif telah memplidkan RM250.00 bagi kerosakan pakaian. Manakala Defendan menghujahkan Plaintif gagal membuktikan tuntutan ini dan harus ditolak. [225] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes JACKSON ONG WEI HANG (m) & ANOR v CHEW ZHIA HAN & ANOR [2015] 1 PIR [6], di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan sejumlah amaun untuk kerosakan pakaian dan barangan peribadi di mana Mahkamah perlu mengambil kaedah “judicial notice” dan membenarkan awad ini memandangkan Plaintif terlibat dalam kemalangan dan semestinya kemusnahan pakaian terlibat juga. [226] Justeru Mahkamah membenarkan RM250.00 sebagai awad yang munasabah bagi kerosakan pakaian kerana sudah tentu akibat kemalangan ini Plaintif sebagai penunggang motorsikal mengalami kerosakan pakaian apabila motorsikalnya dilanggar dari belakang dan beliau jatuh masuk ke dalam longkang dan mengalami kecederaan. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 87 Pembayaran jumlah penghakiman ke dalam Amanah Raya Berhad [227] Peguamcara Defendan Pertama dan Kedua telah berhujah agar jumlah award yang akan diberikan dimasukkan ke dalam Akaun Amanah Raya Berhad untuk membolehkan jumlah penghakiman ditadbir dengan baik, dan bahawa Amanah Raya Berhad adalah pihak yang paling sesuai untuk menguruskan jumlah award yang akan diberikan. [228] Dalam kes ini, Plaintif membawa tindakan ini atas kapasiti personal beliau di mana beliau masih waras dalam keadaan paraplegia dan kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif sebenarnya bukanlah sangat serius sehingga boleh dikategorikan sebagai orang yang tidak berkeupayaan (person under disability) yang dirujuk sebagai ‘mentally disturbed person’ di bawah Mental Health Act 2001 hingga memerlukan orang lain meneruskan tindakan sebagai sahabat wakil seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam Aturan 76 Kaedah 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Justeru, Mahkamah tiada sebab untuk memasukkan jumlah penghakiman ke dalam Amanah Raya Berhad kerana Plaintif boleh menguruskan perbelanjaannya. [229] Mahkamah ini telah mempertimbangkan hujahan kedua-dua pihak dan memutuskan permohonan peguam Defendan agar wang penghakiman dibayar kepada Amana Raya” adalah ditolak. Ini kerana Mahkamah ini mendapati Mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memberikan perintah yang sedemikian. Bidang kuasa untuk memberikan perintah sedemikian terletak pada Mahkamah Tinggi dan bukannya Mahkamah Sesyen. Sekiranya perintah pembayaran wang penghakiman kepada Amanah Raya Berhad diberikan oleh Mahkamah ini, bermakna Mahkamah ini akan melangkaui bidang kuasanya dari segi undang-undang. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Jegathees Nagulan & Ors v Suresh Balakrishnan & Anor [2016] 6 CLJ 253 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut: [45] Therefore, it is very clear that the Sessions Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in allowing the money to be deposited in the name of the plaintiff to be administered by the Amanah Raya S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 88 Berhad. For courts to deal with such matters, it must have jurisdiction to do so. The courts have no general inherent jurisdiction to grant the order it did beyond jurisdiction given by particular statute. [46] Section 11 of the Act has only given the High Court the power and as such the Sessions Court lacks such power or jurisdiction therefore its order must be set aside. [48] It is noted that O. 76 r. 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 defines "Person under disability" as a person who is a minor or a patient. It is not disputed that the second plaintiff is a minor suing the defendants by his litigation representative ie, his mother, the third plaintiff in this case. On the face of r. 12, the Sessions Court has the discretion to give the directions as to the manner the money to be applied or dealt with by the court. [49] However, O. 12 r. 2 qualifies that the directions given under this rule may provide that the money shall, as to the whole or any part thereof, be paid into court and invested or otherwise dealt with. It is not disputed the money can be paid into court. In this instant case the direction of the Sessions Court Judge is for the money to be deposited in the name of the second plaintiff to be administered by the Amanah Raya Berhad. If the direction falls under the second limb 'or otherwise dealt with' then, in my considered opinion, for Sessions Court to deal with such matters, ie, directing Amanah Raya Berhad to administer the money, it must have jurisdiction to do so. By such direction, the Sessions Court in my opinion, has indirectly appointing Amanah Raya Berhad as trustee, executor, administrator of the second plaintiff's money to which only the High Court Judge has the power to make such appointment under s. 11 of the Public Trust Corporation Act 1995. [50] Therefore, the Sessions Judge has no general inherent jurisdiction to grant the order it did beyond jurisdiction given by a particular statute. S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 89 [51] I am mindful that the lower courts have been making such order but the fact that such orders are being made do not convert an illegal judicial order into a legal judicial order. [52] The order of the Sessions Judge given on 2 April 2015 and the amended order dated 6 October 2015 is set aside with costs of RM3,000. [230] Tambahan pula tiada saksi yang hadir daripada Amanah Raya Berhad untuk memberi keterangan bahawa mereka bersetuju dan sanggup untuk menerima pembayaran tersebut dan melaksanakan obligasi di bawahnya. Justeru, Mahkamah ini berpendapat tidak wajar untuk perintah pembayaran wang penghakiman ke dalam Amanah Raya Berhad dibeirkan. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Jegathees Nagulan & Ors (supra) yang memutuskan :- "[37] The defendants clearly failed to furnish any evidence that Amanah Raya Berhad has consented to take on the task as suggested in prayer 3 of encl. 76A, therefore, I am of the considered view that the learned Session Court Judge had absolutely no right in law to direct the monies to be paid to Amanah Raya Berhad. It cannot make an order against or for a party not a party to the suit unless that party has consented to be bound by the direction of the court. In view of this it is my considered opinion that the learned Session Judge's decision in granting the order in prayer 3 of encl. 76A is unlawful, and must be set aside on the law." [231] Berdasakarkan alasan-alasan di atas Mahkamah menolak permohonan pihak Defendan untuk wang penghakiman sebahagian dan/atau apa-apa peratusan daripada jumlah penghakiman dibayar kepada Amana Raya atau mana-mana akaun amanah. Kos Dokumen [232] Kos dokumen dibenarkan dan diletakkan di bawah kos tindakan S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 90 [233] Item-item lain yang diplidkan dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan adalah ditolak kerana tidak dibuktikan. [234] Faedah dibenarkan seperti berikut: 5% setahun ke atas gantirugi am dari tarikh penyampaian saman sehingga ke tarikh penghakiman. 2.5% setahun ke atas gantirugi khas dari tarikh kemalangan sehingga ke tarikh penghakiman. 5% setahun ke atas keseluruhan jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga pembayaran penuh. [235] Kos dibenarkan sebagaimana skala kos di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. (RAJESWARI KANNAKIAH) HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN TELUK INTAN, PERAK Tarikh: 21 Disember 2023 Peguamcara Bagi pihak Plaintif : Encik S.Ganesh Tetuan Abdul Rahim & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Defendan : Encik Selvanayagam Kailasam bersama Amelia Yee Zi Xin S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page | 91 Pertama & Kedua Tetuan Tetuan Kenneth William & Assoc., Peguambela & Peguamcara Ipoh, Perak Bagi pihak Defendan Ketiga: Encik Mohd Apandi Bin Mohd Yatim Gan, Ho & Razlan Hadri Company Peguambela & Peguamcara Kuala Lumpur S/N 4/1RU5PizkKZzXix2AUgA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-565-08/2023

PLAINTIF CHAN CHEE CHIN @ CHUN CHOO CHIN DEFENDAN 1. ) LEE YOON HUAT 2. ) YOH SHEUE SHYUAN 3. ) CHIN YIK KEIN 4. ) SINTARI SDN BHD

Company – striking out under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 – whether the claim is plainly or obviously unsustainable against the 4th Defendant - Whether the suit against the 4th Defendant should be Struck Out – Whether the 4th Defendant presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon - No Cause of Action or any remedy pleaded against the 4th Defendant

04/01/2024

YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a8a36bce-1ce1-43f5-aa0d-381b202384ef&Inline=true

GOJ SINTARI SB 018 (grounds striking out 4th Defendant).pdf 04/01/2024 17:00:30 WA-22NCC-565-08/2023 Kand. 43 S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N zmujqOEc9UOqDTgbICOE7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCC—565—DB/2023 Kand. 43 24,01,201; 1, \N THE HVGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCXAL DIVISION) WRIT OF summons No.: wA-22m:c.5s5-omnza BETWEEN CHAN CHEE CHIN @ CHUN CH00 CHIN (NRIC Na..49D12D—71—5305) . PLAINWFF AND 1 LEE vooN HLIAT (NRIC No.: 78620-05-5273) 2 VOH SHEUE SHYUAN (NRIC Na.. 751005-10-5302) 3 CHIN wk KE\N (NRIC Na..590507»10-6033) A swum SDN arm (company No zuaaomozass) .DEFENDANTS 2 5w zmuNOEcnuDuDY§I:\I:oE7w mm Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 5% Grounds ouudg m lnImdIu:t' n The AW Defendanl above named have applied |u slnke am the Plammrs claun under Order 15 rule 19 olthe Rules of com 2012 The argument pul «arm by the 4* De¢end.ann has on the lad that were was no cause ai men or even any remedies claimed by me Plaunhll m us c\a|m against me 4*" Defendant Alter reviewing the Statement 0! cwaxm, Hind that the Al" Delendant has suooessiully shown to mus Cnurl (ha| the clam agamst it should be struck out mm that «ms \s a p\am and obvluus case where the pawerlu strike out should be exercwsed Law on smkmg out smking om a dawn \s a draocman power pmwued «u «ms Cuufl under Order we nne 19 n snmm unly be exemseu when «ms Cmm finds me: the clam: is mam and obvmusxy unsustainame mm m becomes nmpossmle (or the case to succeed. I re(er to me decwsxon ollhe Supreme Coun In Bandar Eulldur Sdn Blvd .1 ms v United Mllnyan Ennklnq Corporation Bhd mm] 4 CLJ 7 where Mohamed Dzawddln FCJ held — sw zmumozcnuonbtqmcozvw -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm "The prrncrples upon wmch lhe Courl acls rri exercrsing its power urraar any oi ma ieur lrrnbs am is r. 191 Rules oi the Hlgh flare well semen ll IS anly In plaln arm ocyraus cases lhal recourse sncula be had la lhe summary process under lhls rule (per cley M R in Hubbuck v Wl/klnson [1399] 1 as as, p all, and llus summary procedure can nrily be adopted when ri can be clearly seen ihal a clalm or answer IS on me lace of ll “obviously unsustainable“ iAllonrey- General er Duchy or Lancaster v. L. 8. rvw Ry. Co [1592] 3 Ch 274, CA) ll cannot be exercised by a rnrnure examlnellan urine documenls and iacls alme case, In order lu see wlreiher the party has a cause uf aclrcn er a delence iwenlock v Malaneymss 1WLR123E,[1965]2 AH ER 371, CA) The auihovllles mrlher show «ha: rl ihere a poinl oi law requires serious discussion‘ an objeclron should be |aken on (he pleamngs and lhe pornl sei down ior argument lmdero 33 r. giwhrch rs lnpara rnalsrra wrln cure as r. 2 Rules cl lhe Hlgh E (Hubbuc)< y. wrlkrrrsan) (supra) The ccun must be sallslled lhal ihere is na reasonable cause cl amlon ar that me claims are irwclous or vexaliuus urihal me defences lalsed are HUI arguable" 5 There are lwn ways in whlch a claim may be plainly or obviously urrsusrarnanlc as explained by lha srrrgapora calm oi Appeal in The Bung: Melltli (201214 sue 545, where v K Rarah JA slated - ‘39 In curvrew, lhrs analylrcal, iacl—law crslrnnran can srrnrlarly be apphed lo 0 18 r l9i1)(b) arlhe ROC orthe lnherenliurlsdlnlon or me courllo strike oui Imsusialnable aclions, such a d clion helps lo more clearly elucidaie whai a own means when l! holds (Hal an ecllon ls "pIalrl\y or abvlously" unsustainable Applylng ms 3 IN zmulwzcvuonbtgblcozvw wane s.rr.r M... will re used m yaw re mrrrmr-r sun; nnmmnrrl vn muha wrul conceptual pnsm. a “plalnly or Obviously“ unsustainable actton would be one whtcn is either (5) Legallyunsustatnable lf‘l|may|:leclearasamaIIeruHawa| the outset that even it a party were to succeed in brdtrtng all the «acts that he divers to prove he will nul be entttled to the remedy that he seeks“, or to) Factually unsustatnable tilt is “passlble to saywtth conndence beldre trial ma| the tactual basts tor the claim is lancttul because it is enttrely without substance, [tcr example‘ ti tt ts] clear heyund questton that the statement ol tans contradtcted by at the documents or other rnatertal on whtch tt ts based“.' 7 The above was adopted by the Federal court tn Tel wet Many A on v Malaysia Allllnas Him 5 other Appeals [2fl1K]9 cu 425 8 ll ts true that tithe pleadings disclose a reasonable cause ol acttun and tr it could be shown that there are “issues of law that need to be elaborated and argued tn great detail and for mature consideration“, then this court should not strike out the sutt. 9. lsnould also constder «there are relevant lactual issues that redutre deliberation at the «acts through witnesses llthere are such tssues, thts Courl should not utilize its powers to slrlke out the claim was! order 18 ntIe19 Rules ol court 2012. to. At the same time, I am aware olmy duty to constder the clatnt and the amdavtt evidenee tn tutaltty to determine whether there extsts a N zntul|1OEcDuDnDY§blI:DE7w use Slim M... will be used M mm me nllfllnnllw Mtms mam. vn AFVLING wet 5% 11 reasonable cause 0! acllorl lhal oughl lo be relerrea to at lrlal. For lhrs purpuse, I reproduce lha umgmahl or Molld Azml sc.l In Bank lveqm Mahysla v Molld lsmall (19921 1 cu Rep 14, where hrs Lurdshlp quoted the Judgmenl allhe Prlvy Cuuncll VI Eng Mee Yong v Lelcnumarran 119791 1 LNS 1a, which is repmduced heveln — ‘Although m the normal way ll ls hm appropnale lor a Judge lo aI|emp| lo resolve cohlllcls ol evldenoe an amdavlh lhrs does no: mean lhal he ls bound to anneal uncrlhcally. as ralslng a mspule ol lacl whlch calls «or lunher lnvesllgallcln, every slalernehr an an affldavit however equlllucal, Vacklng In preclslon‘ lnDl:nsIs|erl( wrlh uhalspuled contemporary documenls or other slalemehls by me same deporlerll, or rnherenlly lrnprobable ln ltse may be.“ l also note lhal lhe Delehaams also argue lhal lhe alarm ls abuslve and relles on Order 92 rule 4 ollhe Rules ol Coun For lhls purpose. l have laken Inlo aocounl the exnlarreuon glven by (he caun cl Appeal as whal ls lahlarnaunl lo abuslve behavlour In ZalnaIAbldIn bin mmlu @ s luanlam VKeIa]nn Malaysla [ma] 5 ML! x53.- “[16]The ealegones er abuse uf prunes: are never closed and MH cerlalnly prnlrlerale pursuanl lo lhe myriad of clrcumslances avallable from lhe lactual rhalrlx lourld V7 each parucular case“ l also reler |o lhe declslorl alrhe coun ai Appeal In Hmpah Permal Sdn Bhd V Siblh Fares! Industries Sdn Blvd [21711] 1 CLI Z35 sw zmlAN0EcDuDnDY§blI:oE7w -use s.n.r M... wlll be used m mm me uumlh mm; nnmmnnl vn muhe wrul 5% 12. c. Gwen lne above, lor lne Delendanls lo suooesslully smke out me clam they musl snow mal me olalm as pleaded oy lne Plalntllls IS so obvlausly or plalnly unsuslamable wnemer lh s should he Slluck On! No Cause of Action or any remudy ploadud agaansl (ha 4'" Dehndaut. 13. 14 15 15 11 l nave perused me slalamenl ol Clalm and nnd lnal lna Plalnllll nas not pleaded any cause ol acnon agalnsl lne 4"‘ Defendanl The claim revolves around me shares held by me 1*‘ lo we 3"‘ uelendanls thal allegedly were held on trust on me Plalnlilrs behalf or belong to me F-lalnnlv, There ls no claim lnal was pameularized by me Plalrlllff agalrlsl me 4*" Delendanl. l also nole mal me remedies clalmed by me Plaintlll are solely agalnst me 1“ to 3”‘ Defendants. No vemedles are slaled in the sald stalernenl ol Clalm agalnsl me 4'" Delendanl. Aoourdlng no me Plalnllll, me only reasun why he added Ihe 4'" Delendam is because ne wanled tn ensure mat, if he ls successful, me 4*" Defendant wlH cause me shares claimed agalns| me 1“ lo 3'“ Delendanl to be Iranslerved lo mm In olner words. he says mal the 4* Defendanl should be relalrled as a nonnnal Delendanl Alter curlsldenng the last: and me pleaded case befure me l llnd lnal lne Dunflnued presence onne 41" uelendan IS not necessary Desplle 1ne lam lnal me dlspule concerns we lhls pmceedlng 5 sn zrnul|1OEclluDnDY§blI:oE7w -use s.n.1 Ilumhll wlll 1. used m mm 1.. annnnn Mvns nnmmnnl vn mune wrul 5% ta. ta. 20. 2t. 22. shares held by the 1“ to 3"’ Detendant tn the 4“ Deterldanlt the presence at the 4'" Delendant ts not necessary The tssuee that are pleaded that need to be dectded by thts court are only ecncerntng the telattanshtp and the aclluns solely between the Platnttrt and the other Delendants The pleaded case does not make any allegattons or tnvolve any acts ol the 4"‘ Defendant. l note that the Platnttll relers to the dectstan at the Htgh court tn Syarikar Fain Sdn Bhd y Faiz sdn Bhd (2011) J CLJ J46 but I do not belteve that the satd case asstst the Plaintitv The taets cl thts case, as pleaded. shows that its presence ts not necessary to ensure that all matters in dtspute may be ettectually and completely determtned and adtudtcated upon The dtspute enly concerns the Platntth and the other Delendants They do dencern shares tn the 4*" Delendant bul that does not mean that the 4'" l:-elendant should be made a pany tn this suil More so when aauneel tor the 4“ Delendant has glven nts unflertaklrlg that hts attent wtll ccmply wtth any orders of court tlthts Cuun was to hnu that the shares tn the 4"’ Delendant should be ttansterred tc the Plainlifiltum the 1" ta am Delenuants l have also corlsldeled the Platnttvrs rettance on Ambusa Maya v IJM Flanmlon Barhnd [2021] 1 LNS 1606 and Wong Klen Ylp v Eyud splnl MIII sdn End [2022] 5 CLJ 259 The facts and the pleaded case tn Wong Kien vtp y Eyavd spiral Mill sun aha tsupra) are suastanttally dttlerent to the pleaded case belcre me In that case. the clatm ccnoetns an appllcahmt under 7 sth zrnlAl‘}0EcDuDnDY§blI:DE7w ‘Nab! s.tt.t mmhlv wt“ be used M mm me nlWlruH|Y Mvtls nnmmnhl vn AFVLING wrtll 23. 24 secllon 345 a! me Companies Ac| that dawns «he aways 0! me company were urmenaken appresswely agamsl a member of me company. In muse types oi cases, we company has in be made a party to me sum as lhe rehefs dawned mu have an Impact on me decisions made prewously m we company and any unlawvul vesmunon ol dvenors may have m be changed. Vn «ms case, no such relnels are dawmed. The only mnnechon wwlh the 4"‘ Delendant VS Ihe dawn hr the shares In the sand company regwstered under me name onne other nerenaams, lo be tvansferred to the Flalnlifl. ms does not requive me 4*" Devenuam as that order may be emorceaoue against me other Delendants and as s|aled by me 4* Delendanfs ommsew, ms clwenl win commy with an omers or the Court relating to the Sam shares or any others made to Conn. To be dear, on the issue or lashes / Iimmanon , I do nol make any ruhng on «ms as «ms Is a mailer to be deemed belween me Fm-«in and me amer Debndanls. The omy reason 1 aHow mis smkmg out appncanan Is due to me (sol |ha( me meamngs do no: smm any reasaname cause oi acuon or even any remedy agamst me 4“ Delendam. 0 Order: M Ihis Court 25 Forlhe afcresawd reasons, I slnke omlhe Plammvrs claim mm casts Dated 22nd December 2023 alu‘ lndera Muhd Anef Emran bin Anfln Judge Hugh com o! Malaya at Kuala Lumpur N00 5 Sm: Shyr Jinn (ogemer wnn Kelsey Kuek «or Plalnufl Messrs Van 5. Sum Advucales & Sullcllms V H Yet; for 151, 2nd and 4m Delendam Messrs Shul Tax Advoca|es 8. soluenors Chm Yuk Kenn am Delenclanl (Llnrepresenledj

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22NCC-479-10/2020

PLAINTIF MANGKUBUMI SDN BHD DEFENDAN Kosi Enginering Sdn Bhd

Contract: Construction subcontractor claims - Interest charges for advance payments by contractor to subcontractor - Claim for bank charges - Unlicensed money lending - Whether subcontractor should bear excess amounts under contractor’s insurance policy - Cost allocation and reimbursement - Limitations in insurance coverage - Interpretation of indemnity clauses imposed on subcontractor in letter of Award - Scope of clause – Contractual obligations Companies: Corporate personality - Execution of documents - Whether undertaking executed by company or individual directors personally - Separate legal personality - Authority of directors Civil procedure: Requirements for set-off - Whether set-off defence satisfied - Whether set-off extinguishes claims

04/01/2024

YA Tuan Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=345a6f66-c159-4be9-8f12-67a9eae09fd9&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA SUIT NO. WA-22NCC-479-10/2020 BETWEEN MANGKUBUMI SDN BHD [Company No: 200101010800 (546556-H)] ... PLAINTIFF AND KOSI ENGINEERING SDN BHD [COMPANY NO: 199001011520 (203090-K)] ...DEFENDANT (In the original action) BETWEEN KOSI ENGINEERING SDN BHD [COMPANY NO: 199001011520 (203090-K)] ...PLAINTIFF AND MANGKUBUMI SDN BHD [Company No: 200101010800 (546556-H)] ... DEFENDANT (In the counterclaim) JUDGMENT [1] In this trial, the court is tasked with resolving a dispute between a main contractor and a subcontractor, centered 04/01/2024 16:17:45 WA-22NCC-479-10/2020 Kand. 123 S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 around a construction project. The core of the dispute involves the interpretation and enforcement of a contract, as well as the financial dealings connected to a banking facility provided for the project's financing. Critical to the court's examination is the subcontractor's failure to meet its financial obligations under this facility, leading to consequential legal actions against both the subcontractor and the main contractor. The court will look at issues such as assignment of proceeds, payments made and received, and the contractual implications of various agreements and undertakings. Central to this case are claims relating to outstanding payments for completed work, repair obligations, and legal costs incurred. Background facts [2] Pursuant to a Letter of Award dated 28.4.2016 (“Letter of Award”), the Defendant in the Counterclaim, Mangkubumi Sdn Bhd (“Mangkubumi”), awarded a works contract known as the “Sub Package: Relocation of Telekom Malaysia Berhad Cable” to the Plaintiff in the Counterclaim, Kosi Engineering Sdn Bhd (“Kosi”) in relation to a project called “Projek: Kerja-Kerja Menaiktaraf Jalan Persekutuan 5 (FR5) dari Tanjong Karang ke Sabak Bernam, Selangor” (“the Project”). Mangkubumi appointed Kosi as a sub- contractor for the Project. [3] On 28.9.2016, AmBank (M) Berhad (“AmBank”) granted Kosi a Domestic Recourse Factoring Facility and Trust S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Receipt Facility up to RM9,500,000 (“the Facility”) to finance Kosi's work related to the sub-contract from Mangkubumi. Also pursuant to a Notice of Assignment of Proceeds, all outstanding debts owed by Kosi to AmBank were assigned absolutely to AmBank and AmBank is entitled to receive all sums owing under the Facility directly from Mangkubumi as Kosi's assignor. [4] Kosi failed to make payments to Ambank on the Facility and AmBank filed an action against Kosi under Suit no. WA- B52NCC-909-19/2019 (“Suit 909”) in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court. [5] On 19.2.2020 AmBank demanded a sum of RM4,560,183.26 from Mangkubumi on the basis that Kosi failed to repay amounts owing under the Facility, and pursuant to the Notice of Assignment of Proceeds, Mangkubumi was liable to pay AmBank all outstanding sums owed by Kosi under the Facility as Kosi's assignor. [6] There were subsequent meetings and discussions between Mangkubumi and Kosi regarding Mangkubumi’s debt to Ambank. Kosi provided a letter dated 27.2.2020 (“Akujanji”) by which Mangkubumi contends that Kosi provided an undertaking to be fully responsible for payments to AmBank, including indemnifying Mangkubumi. Notwithstanding, Ambank filed Suit No. WA-22NCC-187- 05/2020 (“Suit 187”) against Mangkubumi on 18.5.2020 for S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Kosi's outstanding Facility payments, claiming a sum of RM4,560,183.26. [7] On 17.6.2020 Ambank obtained a judgment against Kosi for the sum of RM594,121.15 as at 30.11.2019 in Suit 909. [8] On 1.10.2020, Mangkubumi filed its action in these proceedings against Kosi seeking indemnity and reimbursement against liability and litigation costs it faced from AmBank's action in Suit 187 to recover outstanding debts relating to the Facility obtained by Kosi. On 9.11.2020 Kosi filed its Defence and Counterclaim. In the Counterclaim, Kosi claimed outstanding payments of RM159,535.90 for Certified Progress Claims, over RM1.4 million for Uncertified Progress Claims and Retention Sums owed, direct payment to AmBank to settle judgment debt, 5% interest, costs and other reliefs. [9] On 16.3.2021, Mangkubumi served documents to Kosi showing payment of RM1,163,211.93 that Mangkubumi made to AmBank on behalf of Kosi, as well as a Final Certificate of Contract stating the updated contract value and amounts paid. [10] On 11.5.2021 Ambank obtained a judgment against Mangkubumi for the sum of RM4,560,183.26 as at 31.10.2019 in Suit 187. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [11] On 23.12.2021, Mangkubumi discontinued its claim against Kosi but Kosi’s Counterclaim against Mangkubumi was maintained. Kosi then amended its Counterclaim and on 8.4.2022 the Defence and Amended Counterclaim was filed. Based on the Amended Counterclaim, Kosi claims from Mangkubumi a total payment amount of RM328,695.95 comprising RM137,213.16 still owing after deductions for payments to Kosi's suppliers, and RM191,482.34 still owing for repair works after accounting for advance payments. Kosi’s claim in the Counterclaim [12] Kosi's claim against Mangkubumi in the Counterclaim is for a total payment amount of RM328,695.95. [13] Specifically, Kosi claims Mangkubumi owes it: a) RM137,213.16: This is from an adjusted outstanding balance of RM665,426.02 that Kosi contends Mangkubumi still owes, less payments of RM528,212.41 that Kosi agrees should be deducted for amounts paid directly to Kosi's suppliers. b) RM191,482.34: This is for repair works Kosi states it performed at Mangkubumi's request, with a total billed value of RM521,482.34. After deducting RM330,000 in acknowledged advance payments S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 from Mangkubumi for this work, Kosi claims the remaining RM191,482.34 balance. Kosi’s case [14] Kosi's case is that after properly accounting for all payments and contractual adjustments between Kosi and Mangkubumi, Mangkubumi still owes Kosi RM328,695.95. Specifically: a) After adjusting the contract amount and accounting for payments made, there is RM665,426.02 still owed by Mangkubumi. b) The direct payments of RM528,212.41 made by Mangkubumi to Kosi's suppliers should be deducted from the outstanding balance. This leaves RM137,213.16 still owed by Mangkubumi. c) Regarding the repair works, Kosi performed work at Mangkubumi's request valued at RM521,482.34. After accounting for RM330,000 in advance payments from Mangkubumi for this work, Kosi claims the balance of RM191,482.34 is still owed. d) Combining the RM137,213.16 and the RM191,482.34, Kosi argues Mangkubumi owes a total outstanding payment balance of RM328,695.95. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [15] Kosi also disputes Mangkubumi's position that Kosi should bear sole responsibility and financial liability for the third- party damage that necessitated these repairs. [16] On Mangkubumi's defence of set-off, Kosi contends that it should not be responsible for indemnifying Mangkubumi for the legal costs incurred in Suit 187, as these costs are not covered under the indemnification provision of Clause 17 of the Letter of Award. Kosi argues that Suit 187 pertained to a failure to make payments to AmBank, a matter unrelated to the sub-package works specified in the Letter of Award, and thus falls outside the scope of Kosi's indemnification obligations. As for the Akujanji, the obligation to indemnify Mangkubumi fell on the directors personally, not Kosi. Mangkubumi's case [17] Mangkubumi does not accept that it owes Kosi any part of the RM328,695.95 claimed in the Counterclaim after properly accounting for payments already made by Mangkubumi. Specifically: a) The claimed outstanding balance of RM665,426.02 failed to account for all advance payments and payments to suppliers that should be deducted. b) Regarding the repair works claim of RM521,482.34, Mangkubumi's position is that a significant portion of this was paid or should be paid through insurance S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 payments rather than payments from Mangkubumi directly. c) Portions of the repair works were necessitated by damage caused by third parties not related to Mangkubumi. As such, Mangkubumi disputes liability to pay for repairing damage caused by others. [18] Mangkubumi also relies on the defence of set-off, contending that under the Letter of Award and the Akujanji dated 27.2.2020, it can offset the legal cost of RM510,730.00 incurred in Suit 187 against Kosi’s counterclaim, effectively nullifying Kosi’s claim. Witnesses [19] Kosi called two witnesses whose witness statements are marked “WS-PW1” and “WS-PW2” as follows: a) PW1 is Song Kok Chien, the business manager for Kosi. His evidence is regarding the payment amounts Kosi claims are still owed by Mangkubumi for contract and repair works. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-PW1.” b) PW2 is Roseli Bin Hussein, the Managing Director for Kosi. His evidence is regarding his limited knowledge of the case facts and details, indicating Song Kok Chien knows more as the business S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 manager. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS- PW2.” [20] Mangkubumi called only one witness, Mohamed Najib bin Mohamed Daud (DW1), a Company Director for Mangkubumi. His evidence is regarding the payment amounts that Mangkubumi claims Kosi still owes for contract and repair works. His Witness Statement is marked as “WS-DW1.” Issues [21] After considering the facts of the case and the defences relied on by Mangkubumi, the court frames the following issues for deliberation which this court considers pivotal to the resolution of this case: a) Whether Mangkubumi is entitled to deduct the payments made to Kosi's suppliers from the total claim amount owed to Kosi, and whether the interest charge of 8.85% per annum imposed by Mangkubumi on these payments is justified and legally enforceable. b) Whether Mangkubumi is liable to pay Kosi for the repairworks performed at Mangkubumi's request, and if so, what is the correct amount to be paid, taking into account the issues of insurance claims, S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 advance payments, and the quality and impact of the repairworks on the project. c) Whether Mangkubumi is entitled to set off its claim for legal costs incurred in Suit 187 against Kosi’s counterclaim for outstanding payment for repairworks, based on the indemnification provisions in the Letter of Award and the Akujanji dated 27.2.2020. [22] In the ensuing part of this judgment, this court will structure its deliberations around the issues above. Analysis and findings of the court Amount paid by Mangkubumi to Kosi’s suppliers [23] Kosi’s position is that the total balance outstanding from Mangkubumi to Kosi in this action is calculated by deducting the amount paid by Mangkubumi to Kosi’s suppliers as advance payments from the total claim of RM12,531,957.55 from Mangkubumi, less partial payment received from Mangkubumi of RM10,703,319.60 and payment to Ambank by Mangkubumi on behalf of Kosi of RM1,163.211.93 and further adding the amount owing by Mangkubumi to Kosi for repairworks. Kosi contends that for the purpose of this calculation the amount paid by Mangkubumi to Kosi’s suppliers as advance payments is RM528,212.41. In this regard, Kosi contends and submits as follows: S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 a) Mangkubumi has made payments of RM137,012.41, RM140,000.00, and RM251,200.00 to Kosi’s suppliers totalling RM528,212.41. b) Kosi does not have to indemnify Mangkubumi for these sums as these payments are not loans but rather advance payments to suppliers of Kosi, as the subcontractor of Mangkubumi for the Project works under the Letter of Award and these sums are deducted by Mangkubumi as the main contractor from the certificate of payment. c) Mangkubumi had the obligation to pay Kosi’s supplier as Mangkubumi's intention was always for these sums to be advance payments or direct payments, as indicated in the letters dated 6.9.2019 and 13.9.2019 addressed to Kosi. Mangkubumi is aware that these payments were meant to be advance payments or direct payments to Kosi’s supplier. d) Mangkubumi’s witness DW1 admitted during cross- examination that it did not suffer any losses from these payments as it received the benefits of the materials supplied. [24] Mangkubumi’s position is different from Kosi’s in the sense that it claims that the actual total advance payment to Kosi’s supplier made by Mangkubumi for Kosi is actually S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 RM858,212.41 and not RM528,212.41 with interest charge of 8.85% per annum on the requested amounts amounting to RM100,570.43 and deducting a total amount of RM374,836.96 paid by Mangkubumi to Kosi. Mangkubumi argues that it is Kosi that owes Mangkubumi a sum of RM583,945.88 as of 2.8.2021. In this regard, Mangkubumi contends and submits as follows: a) The actual total advance payment made by Mangkubumi for Kosi is actually RM858,212.41, with RM374,836.96 already deducted, leaving a balance of RM483,375.45, and with interest at 8.85% per annum, Kosi owes Mangkubumi RM583,945.88 as of 2.8.2021. b) Out of the sum of RM858,212.41, the sums of RM180,000.00 (shown in Payment Voucher dated 23.1.2019 as “Advance Payment - TG Karang Project”) and RM150,000.00 (shown in Payment Voucher dated 15.4.2019 as “Advance Payment for Tg Karang”) were released as advance payment for Kosi. c) Kosi requested additional advance payments of RM140,000.00 and RM521,200.00 to be paid directly to a supplier, GV Bumisinar Sdn Bhd, and agreed to be charged interest on those amounts as well. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [25] On the issue of interest charged by Mangkubumi to Kosi, which is disputed by Kosi, Mangkubumi argues the following: a) Kosi agreed and accepted the interest charge of 8.85% per annum on the requested amounts, as evidenced by the letters exchanged between Mangkubumi and Kosi, and the advance payment is to be repaid with the agreed interest rate, resulting in a total accumulated interest of RM100,570.43 as of 2.8.2021. b) Mangkubumi countered Kosi’s contention that Mangkubumi never provided documentation from Ambank to support the 8.85% interest charge by arguing that Kosi had never requested such documentation. Furthermore, Kosi did not respond to Mangkubumi’s letter from 6.8.2018, which clearly stated Mangkubumi’s intention to impose an interest rate of 8.85% per annum on advance payment requests. Kosi later requested additional advance payment and agreed to be charged interest, as specified under Clause 25 (h) of the Letter of Award, which holds Kosi responsible for any interest charged by Ambank when providing financial assistance. c) Mangkubumi lacks a licence to charge interest for advance payment, but it asserts that this issue was S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 only raised for the first time during trial and was not pleaded by Kosi, which goes against the fundamental principle of civil litigation. This was objected to by Mangkubumi during this trial. d) Advance payment should not be considered as money lending, as it involves releasing Mangkubumi’s own future funds ahead of schedule to expedite the project. Mangkubumi is not engaged in the business of moneylending and is not required to obtain a licence. Kosi, having agreed to the interest charge and being duly informed, is therefore obliged to repay the advance payments with interest. [26] I will first address the issue of whether Mangkubumi is entitled to the amount of RM100,570.43 charged by Mangkubumi towards Kosi based on the rate of 8.85% interest. The court is of the view that Mangkubumi is not entitled to the said interest charges. [27] The amounts of RM137,012.41, RM140,000.00, and RM251,200.00 were payments made by Mangkubumi to Kosi’s supplier for the works done under the Project. It is customary for the main contractor to make such payments, and the sub-contractor typically reimburses the main contractor through deductions from the certificate of payment. Mangkubumi’s purpose for charging 8.85% interest on Kosi’s advance payment was to ensure timely completion of the project and avoid delays, as expressed in S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Mangkubumi’s letter dated 6.8.2018. Mangkubumi stated in the letter: “Dengan segala hormatnya kami merujuk kepada perkara di atas. 2. Adalah dengan ini dimaklumkan bahawa pihak pengurusan telah menilai serta memutuskan untuk mengenakan kadar faedah sebanyak 8.85% setahun berkuatkuasa serta-merta kepada pihak subkontraktor yang ingin memohon Bayaran Pendahuluan. Kadar faedah yang dikenakan ini adalah bersesuaian dengan caj yang dikenakan kepada kami diatas kemudahan pinjaman yang disediakan oleh pihak bank. 3. Oleh yang demikian, pihak tuan dikehendaki mempertingkatkan kelancaran kemajuan kerja fizikal di tapak bagi mengurangkan tempoh masa pinjaman serta memastikan projek dapat disiapkan dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan. Kerjasama dan perhatian dari pihak tuan mengenai perkara di atas amatlah dihargai dan diucapkan ribuan terima kasih.” [28] Mangkubumi, through the evidence of DWI, admitted to not suffering any losses and Kosi did not cause any delays in the project. His evidence during cross-examination was: “LKH: Selain daripada itu, anda juga- Plaintif juga memberi bayaran kepada pihak Ketiga iaitu RM137,000.00, RM140,00.00 dan RM251,000.00 setuju? DW1: Setuju. LKH: Apabila anda membuat bayaran ini bagi pihak ketiga ini, setuju dengan cadangan saya, pihak Plaintif menerima manfaat iaitu mendapat bahan-bahan yang dibekalkan, setuju? DW1: Setuju. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 LKH: Oleh itu, saya cadangkan apabila bayaran ini dibuat, Plaintif tidak mengalami kerugian kerana menerima manfaat, setuju? DW1: Plaintif? LKH: Menerima manfaat daripada pembayaran kepada pihak ketiga ini. Oleh itu, Plaintif tidak mengalami kerugian, setuju? DW1: Setuju.” [29] Therefore, Mangkubumi has no legal right to charge the 8.85% interest on these amounts. Therefore, any accumulation of interest on these payments is unjustified. [30] Kosi was only agreeable to the 8.85% interest rate only if Mangkubumi provides substantive documented proof that it corresponds to the interest charged by Ambank and that the advance payment is intended for Kosi’s suppliers to carry out the works under the project. Evidence is required to support the rate of 8.85% interest as the agreement between Mangkubumi and Kosi is based on the understanding that Mangkubumi supports the procurement of materials necessary for the project. Mangkubumi has failed to provide documentary evidence to support its claim that the rate of 8.85% interest is based on what was charged by Ambank. Thus, the burden of proof on Mangkubumi according to Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 is not discharged. In contrast, Kosi has presented documentary evidence to substantiate its claim, fulfilling the requirements of the Evidence Act. Mangkubumi’s failure to provide evidence renders the source of the accumulated S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 amount of RM100,570.43 as interest charges to be unsubstantiated. [31] Kosi’s offer of an 8.85% interest rate was intended to be a bilateral contract, not a unilateral one, and Kosi’s silence does not constitute acceptance. Kosi’s silence in response to Mangkubumi’s letter dated 6.8.2018 and the obligation under clause 25(h) of the Letter of Award does not constitute acceptance of the 8.85% interest rate. [32] Silence does not amount to acceptance. In Seloga Sdn Bhd v UEM Gynisys Sdn Bhd [2007] 7 MLJ 385 (Court of Appeal) it was stated: “[62] Even if the respondent had not responded to the appellant’s letters dated 17 November 1999 and 11 December 2000, silence on their part would not constitute acceptance. In relation to this, we would refer to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed) Vol 9 at p 123 which reads: 250. Mode of acceptance: (2) by silence. Where the offeree is silent following the offer of a bilateral contract, a distinction must be drawn between the act of acceptance and communication of acceptance. It is not always necessary that acceptance be communicated before it becomes effective, but there must be an act of acceptance. The general rule is that if the only facts are that there has been an offer followed by silence on the part of the offeree, there is no acceptance of that offer, though there might be liability to pay a reasonable sum for any benefit received. Thus, the offeror cannot bind S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 the offeree against the latter’s will by expressly stipulating that, if the offeree does nothing, he will be bound to a contract, or to a variation of an existing contract.” [33] The case of Agromate (M) Sdn Bhd v Felcra Niaga Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 1655 (Court of Appeal) demonstrates that it is only when there is a pre-existing business relationship and long-standing course of dealing between parties that silence or failure to object to contractual terms will amount to acceptance of terms offered. Here, the parties had been doing business together for years under invoices and delivery orders containing late payment interest term. The defendant never objected and continued accepting delivery of goods pursuant to those terms. This conduct was held to indicate assent and acceptance of the interest term. [34] Mangkubumi and Kosi did not have the type of relationship where there were invoices with interest charges indicated not objected to over a long period as present in Agromate. Further, Kosi has expressly accepted the interest rate for certain amounts (the sums of RM140,000.00 and RM251,200.00.13) but has not accepted it for other amounts (RM180,000.00, RM137,012.41 and RM150,000.00). Kosi’s silence on those specific amounts cannot be interpreted as acceptance or agreement to the 8.85% interest rate. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [35] Clause 25(h) of the Letter of Award states that the sub- contractor (Kosi) is responsible for bearing and paying the interest charge if it is related to financial assistance from a bank. Clause 25(h) of the Letter of Award reads: “(h) The Sub-Contractor shall aware if there any lawyer / legal fees and financial assistance from the bank and there is interest charged, it shall be borne and paid in full by the Sub-Contractor.” [36] As Mangkubumi is not a bank, as admitted by DW1, Mangkubumi’s witness during cross-examination, Mangkubumi cannot impose the responsibility of interest payment on Kosi based on Clause 25(h) Letter of Award. [37] It is noted that Mangkubumi denies being a lender or financial institution but relies on Clause 25(h) Letter of Award which obliges Kosi to pay the 8.85% interest for financial assistance from a bank to place the burden of paying the 8.85% interest onto Kosi. Mangkubumi is thus approbating and reprobating which is not allowed as held in Cheah Theam Kheng v City Centre Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) and Other Appeals [2012] 1 MLJ 761. Mangkubumi’s charging of interest is in violation of Section 5(1) Moneylenders Act 1951, as it does not have the right to engage in money lending without a licence. Section 5(1) Moneylenders Act 1951 provides: “5(1) No person shall conduct business as a moneylender unless he is licensed under this Act.” S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [38] Mangkubumi argues that its lack of a licence to charge interest for advance payment was not pleaded by Kosi. However, the court views this argument as only a tactical move by Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi is aware that it does not have a licence to charge interest since it is not a financial institution or bank. The ability of Mangkubumi to charge interest is integral to the issue of whether the remaining balance that still needs to be paid by the Mangkubumi to Kosi is RM137,213.16. The court therefore rejects Mangkubumi’s submissions on the unpleaded issue of Mangkubumi’s lack of licence to charge interest for advance payment. [39] In relation to the amounts of RM180,000.00 and RM150,000.00, which Mangkubumi claims to be part of the RM858,212.41 it contends to be the total advance payments to Kosi’s suppliers, the court finds that these were payments made by Mangkubumi for “Insurance Advance Payment” related to repairworks that were not part of the Project which Kosi completed as per Mangkubumi’s request. During DW1’s cross-examination, his evidence was equivocal as after initially agreeing the payments were part of interim payments under the contract, he then conceded upon further questioning that the vouchers described the payments as “Advanced Payment”, confirming Mangkubumi’s contention that these amounts were meant for insurance advance payments, not project interim payments. The relevant part of DW1’s cross-examination from the Notes of Proceedings is as follows: S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 “LKH: Kini saya merujuk anda kepada muka surat 105, bundle B1. Ok. Daripada penyata ini yang dikeluarkan oleh pihak Defendan, terdapat 2 bayaran dibuat RM150,000.00 dan RM180,000.00, setuju? DW1: Setuju. LKH: Jumlah ini, adakah termasuk dalam jumlah yang dinyatakan oleh pihak anda tadi, iaitu interim bayaran di bawah kontrak- dibawah LA tersebut? DW1: Ya, setuju. Maksud bayaran kepada pre-financing. LKH: Merujuk kepada muka 98 di bahagian B perenggan B, kurungan A kurungan, satu bayaran interim ini. RM10,703,319.60. Ini jumlah yang telah dibayar oleh pihak Plaintif kepada Defendan. Betul? DW1: Ya. LKH: Jumlah ini boleh meliputi jumlah yang tadi dirujuk iaitu RM150,000.00 dan RM180,000.00 ini, betul? Faham soalan saya? DW1: Tak Faham. LKH: Ok, saya merujuk anda tadi di m/s 105 untuk jumlah RM180,000.00 dan RM150,000.00. Ok, nampak 2 jumlah itu? RM150,000.00 RM180,000.00, betul? DW1: Betul. LKH: RM150,000.00 dan RM180,000.00 ini, jumlah ini adalah termasuk dalam jumlah interim bayaran di 98. Betul? DW1: Betul. Ya, betul. LKH: Betul. Dan jumlah detail untuk bayaran RM180,000.00 ini dapat dilihat di m/s 55 - 56, betul? DW1: Betul. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 LKH: Dan detail untuk bayaran RM150,000.00 di m/s 65 - 66? DW1: Betul. LKH: Betul. Kalau kita rujuk kepada m/s 55, wujud perkataan Advanced Payment. Ya, jika dibandingkan dengan seperti yang anda nyatakan tadi di m/s 105. Ok. Nampak tak di situ insurans payment 15 - Untuk RM180,000.00 itu, bayaran dibuat pada 23 Januari 2019. DW1: Betul. LKH: Dan bayaran untuk RM180,000.00 ini dibuat pada 15 April 2019. Betul? DW1: Betul. LKH: Ini bererti pada masa bayaran ini dibayar, Kalau anda tengok voucher di m/s 55, adalah lebih awal daripada tarikh insurans membuat bayaran. Betul? DW1: Awal daripada? LKH: Tarikh insurans membuat bayaran, betul? DW1: Betul. LKH: So, itu adalah ertinya Advanced Payment, betul? DW1: Betul.” [40] As shown in the foregoing section on Kosi’s claims for repairworks, after deducting these amounts from the total requested payment of RM521,482.34, Mangkubumi still owes Kosi RM191,482.34. Mangkubumi has no legal right to charge the 8.85% interest on these amounts, and any accumulation of interest on the sums RM180,000.00 and RM150,000.00 is unjustified. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [41] Considering all the above, the court finds that there is only an amount outstanding from Mangkubumi to Kosi of RM528,212.41 (“the Advance Payment Amount”) in relation to the amount paid by Mangkubumi to Kosi’s suppliers as advance payments. This leaves a balance of RM137,213.16 after the Advance Payment Amount is deducted from the balance total claim amount of RM665,426.02. Outstanding payment for repairworks [42] Kosi adduced a summary dated 3.5.2021 in table form (“the Repairworks Table”) showing repairworks it performed on Mangkubumi’s request. This is produced below: [43] Mangkubumi’s position is that out of the five repairworks contained in Kosi’s Repairworks Table, only Items 1, 2, and 4 Repairworks are in dispute as Mangkubumi’s witness acknowledged that Items 3 and 5 Repairworks would be S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 charged back to the subcontractor. Mangkubumi contends that the total amount that should be paid to Kosi for these repairworks is RM265,224.98, but Mangkubumi received payments from the insurance company for Items 1 and 2 Repairworks, which were not paid to Kosi. Instead, these payments were used to offset the outstanding advance payments owed by Mangkubumi to Kosi. Therefore, the remaining unpaid amount for the repairworks is RM49,924.00 (RM5,540 for Item 3 Repairworks and RM44,384 for Item 5 Repairworks). [44] Mangkubumi maintains that it does not owe any outstanding amount to Kosi for Item 1 Repairworks and contends and submits as follows: a) Mangkubumi has already paid Kosi for Item 1 Repairworks. Kosi alleges that it is owed RM150,000.00 for Item 1 Repairworks, but Mangkubumi explains that this amount was actually an advance payment to Kosi’s suppliers which had already been paid, as evidenced by Mangkubumi’s letter to Kosi dated 15.4.2019 and Mangkubumi’s Payment Voucher dated 15.4.2019. b) The payment for Item 1 Repairworks was made through the evaluation and payment by the insurer, MSIG, as agreed upon in discussions with Kosi. Mangkubumi received payment for Item 1 Repairworks from MSIG for a sum of RM111,829.58 S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 as evidenced by the Maphilindo International Sdn Bhd letter dated 15.6.2020. c) Despite Kosi’s denial, Kosi had been informed, knew, and agreed that payment for Item 1 Repairworks would be made by the insurer, supported by evidence such as submissions for Item 1 Repairworks dated 1.11.2018 carbon copied to the Maphilindo International Sdn Bhd and Kosi’s participation in the repairworks. There is no evidence to support of Kosi’s disagreement to this payment method. [45] Mangkubumi maintains that it does not owe any outstanding amount to Kosi for Item 2 and contends and submits as follows: a) The payment of RM180,000.00 alleged by Kosi for Item 2 Repairworks was actually an advance payment and not specifically for Item 2 Repairworks, supported by evidence such as Mangkubumi’s letter to Kosi dated 15.4.2019 and payment voucher 23.1.2019 and acceptance by Kosi’s personnel. b) Item 2 Repairworks was paid through the insurer, with evidence of Kosi’s submission for Item 2 Repairworks dated 28.12.2018 which was carbon copied to Maphilindo International Sdn Bhd and payment into Kosi’s account. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [46] Mangkubumi refused to pay for Item 4 Repairworks as the repair work for Item 4 Repairworks conducted by Kosi not only failed to solve the problem but also caused delays in the project. Mangkubumi contends and submits as follows: a) Damage to Telekom Malaysia's cable was not repaired and Kosi failed to comply with instructions. b) Kosi’s incident report, although disputed as to its authorship, acknowledges the concrete blockage and deviation of the cable routing. This proves that Kosi’s work was not safe and did not meet Mangkubumi’s instructions. c) Mangkubumi is entitled to compensation under Section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 for the non- performance and delays caused by Kosi. In this case, Mangkubumi seeks compensation by not paying for Item 4, as Kosi failed to rectify the cable damage. [47] Kosi’s position is that Mangkubumi owes it RM191,482.34 for the repairworks performed at Mangkubumi's request. The repairworks were not part of the original contract but were requested by Mangkubumi as variation orders. Kosi completed the works and submitted bills totaling RM521,482.34. This consists of Kosi’s claims for Item 1 Repairworks amounting to RM202,150.34, Item 2 Repairworks amounting to RM213,404.00, Item 3 S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Repairworks amounting to RM5,540.00, Item 4 Repairworks amounting to RM56,004.00, and Item 5 Repairworks amounting to RM44,384.00, all of which were requested and completed by Kosi at Mangkubumi's request. [48] Mangkubumi has made partial payments of RM330,000.00 as an advance payment. After deducting the advance payment, the remaining amount owed by Mangkubumi is RM191,482.34. [49] Kosi relies on the precedent set in Era Kemuncak Jaya (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Switchgear Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1855, for the proposition that when repairworks are requested by Mangkubumi and completed by Kosi, Mangkubumi is obligated to reimburse Kosi for the cost of those works. [50] Mangkubumi has admitted to repairworks for Item 3 Repairworks i.e. RM5,540.00 and Item 5 Repairworks i.e. RM44,384.00. Thus, the following are Kosi’s submissions relating to Item 1 Repairworks, Item 2 Repairwoks and Item 4 Repairwoks: a) Kosi submitted the insurance claim for Item 1 Repairworks, which was handled by Mangkubumi's insurance company. The insurance claim amount was adjusted to RM186,829.58, but Mangkubumi only received RM111,829.58 after deducting the excess amount of RM75,000. Mangkubumi should pay the full repairworks claim amount of S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 RM202,150.34 or at least the adjusted value of RM186,829.58, as Kosi is not responsible for the excess amount under the insurance policy. Kosi, not being a party to the insurance claim, cannot be held liable for the excess amount. b) Kosi submitted an insurance claim for Item 2 Repairworks, which was to be paid by Mangkubumi's insurer. The insurance claim amount was adjusted to RM153,471.40, but Mangkubumi only received RM103,471.40 after deducting the less excess amount of RM50,000. Mangkubumi should pay the full repairworks claim amount of RM213,404.00 or at least the adjusted value of RM153,471.40, as Mangkubumi, being the insured party, is responsible for the less excess amount under the insurance policy. Mangkubumi cannot impose the less excess amount on Kosi, as it is the insured's responsibility to pay for it. c) Mangkubumi admitted that the cables damaged in Item 4 Repairworks were not caused by Kosi, but by a third party, YCH Sdn. Bhd. Mangkubumi requested Kosi to repair the cables. Since the damage was caused by YCH and not by Kosi, Kosi is not liable to indemnify Mangkubumi under Clause 17 of the Letter of Award. Mangkubumi admitted to Clause 17, which states that the subcontractor (Kosi) shall only indemnify the contractor (Mangkubumi) for breaches S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 caused by the subcontractor. As the damage was not caused by the subcontractor, Kosi argues that it is not obligated to indemnify Mangkubumi. Therefore, Mangkubumi should honour the claim of RM56,004.00 in full for Item 4 Repairworks. [51] The court rejects Mangkubumi’s contentions that the amounts of RM150,000.00 and RM180,000.00 were not meant as an advance payment for the Item 1 Repairworks and Item 2 Repairworks respectively. [52] From an examination of the Repairworks Table, it is clear that the amounts of RM150,000.00 and RM180,000.00 were not intended to be deducted from Item 1 Repairworks and Item 2 Repairworks individually, but rather the total amount of RM330,000.00 (RM150,000.00 + RM180,000.00) should be deducted from the overall sum of RM521,482.34, which includes the costs of all 5 repairworks in totality. [53] Mangkubumi’s payment vouchers dated 15.4.2019 and 23.1.2019 show that both the RM150,000.00 and RM180,000.00 were labeled as “ADVANCE PAYMENT - TG KARANG PROJECT.” This indicates that the payments were intended as insurance advance payments for all five repairworks in Tanjong Karang. [54] During the re-examination, PW1 confirmed that the payment vouchers specified “ADVANCE PAYMENT” and that there was no mention of repairworks. The documents therefore S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 clearly indicate the nature of the payments and that Mangkubumi’s arguments cannot be sustained. [55] With regards the payment for Item 1 Repairworks and Item 2 Repairworks, the court finds that Kosi's arguments are more compelling. Although there was payment for Item 1 Repairworks and Item 2 Repairworks that was made through the insurer which Kosi agreed to, there is no justification for deducting the excess amounts of RM75,000.00 and RM50,000.00 respectively from the claimed amounts. The inclusion of the excess clause in an insurance policy is a risk allocation measure typically aimed at limiting the insurer's liability, which is agreed to by the insured party contractually. However, it should not unfairly shift the burden onto Kosi, who reasonably expected to be reimbursed for the full amount of the works performed. Kosi should not bear the consequences of an insurance arrangement, which it is not a party to, that does not adequately cover its expenses. From an equitable standpoint, it is fair and just that Kosi receives the full amount for the works performed. Kosi fulfilled its obligations under the contract and should not be penalised for limitations or deficiencies in Mangkubumi’s insurance coverage. However, given that an adjustment by the insurer is made for the repairworks bills, this should be taken into account as it could reasonably be expected by Kosi that it will be subjected to the adjustment when it agreed to be paid by the insurer. Therefore, Kosi should be paid the S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 adjusted value of RM186,829.58 for Item 1 Repairworks and RM153,471.40 for Item 2 Repairworks. [56] I now turn to Item 4 Repairworks. The court does not accept Kosi’s argument that based on Clause 17 of the Letter of Award, Kosi is not responsible for damages caused by a third party during the Item 4 Repairworks, Mangkubumi should pay the full amount claimed for Item 4 Repairworks, which is RM56,004.00. Kosi’s reference to Clause 17 of the Letter of Award is irrelevant, as the real issue for Item 4 Repairworks is not who damaged the cable but rather whether Kosi performed the repair work to Mangkubumi’s satisfaction, a matter not addressed in Kosi’s submission. [57] The evidence before the court establishes that Kosi failed to conduct the repairworks properly and in accordance with Mangkubumi’s instructions. Damage to Telekom Malaysia's Fibre Optic Cable was reported at multiple locations, attributed to Kosi’s cable routing, as stated in Mangkubumi’s letter dated 18.6.2020. In the letter addressed to Kosi, Mangkubumi stated: “Perkara di atas adalah dirujuk serta laporan kerosakan yang diterima daripada pihak Telekom Malaysia (TM) melalui aplikasi whatsapp group 'Utiliti Tg Karang Sabak':- 1) 02hb Jun 2020 - Laporan Kerosakan Kabel TM Berhampiran Kawasan Pembinaan Jejantas Sungai Besar Berhadapan Klinik Kesihatan Sungai Besar (LHS) S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 2) 05hb Jun 2020 - Laporan Kerosakan Kabel TM Berhampiran Persimpangan Simpang 3 Loji (LHS) 3) 09hb Jun 2020 Laporan Kerosakan Kabel TM Berhampiran Persimpangan Kampung Sungai Limau (LHS) 2. Adalah dengan ini, pihak tuan perlu membuktikan bahawa laluan kabel yang dijalankan sebelum ini berada dalam keadaan yang selamat (bermaksud terhindar daripada gangguan kawasan pembinaar, yang sedang dijalankan seperti kerja- kerja piling, pengorekan, dan tidak berdekatan dengan laluan paip air dan lain-lain. 3. Pihak kami tidak teragak-agak akan mengenakan 'backcharged' kepada pihak tuan sekiranya laluan kabel yang dijalankan oleh pihak tuan tidak mengikut laluan yang sebenar (seperti lukisan pembinaan dan pengesahan kerja oleh pihak Mangkubumi dan Perunding ZAQ atau pihak JKR sebelum ini. 4. Maklumbalas segera terhadap perkara ini amatlah kami hargai terutamanya tanggungan sepenuhnya terhadap kos pembaikan sementara oleh pihak Telekom (jika ada) dan kos pembaikan sepenuhnya untuk kos pembaikan kekal (permanent cable).” [58] Despite Mangkubumi’s request for proof of safe routing, Kosi neglected to respond, demonstrating its failure in addressing the issue. Mangkubumi explicitly stated its right to “backcharge” Kosi if the cable routing failed to meet the required standards. Moreover, Mangkubumi informed Kosi in its letter dated 29.7.2020 to Kosi that piling works had to be halted due to damage to Telekom Malaysia's cable on 2.6.2020 causing delay in the piling works which resulted in a setback to the completion of the entire project. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [59] Based on an incident report in Kosi’s letter to Mangkubumi dated 4.8.2020, it is evident from the report that Kosi’s cable routing was not safe as requested or instructed by Mangkubumi. The report confirms that the cable routing had deviated to the main road due to concrete blockage, rather than following the intended route. [60] The court recogniwes Mangkubumi's right to withhold payment to Kosi for Item 4 Repairworks, justifying it under Section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950. Section 74 provides that when a contract is breached, the party harmed by the breach can seek compensation from the party responsible for the breach. This compensation includes any loss or damage that naturally resulted from the breach or was anticipated by both parties at the time of contract formation. However, it excludes any loss or damage that is indirect or not a foreseeable result of the breach. Therefore, Mangkubumi is entitled to compensation for the losses incurred due to Kosi's non-performance, which led to delays in the project. [61] In conclusion, the total amount chargeable by Kosi to Mangkubumi for Items 1, 2, 3 and 5 Repairworks is RM390,224.98. This is broken down as follows: a) Item 1 Repairworks: RM186,829.58; b) Item 2 Repairworks: RM153,471.40; S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 c) Item 3 Repairworks: RM5,540.00; and d) Item 5 Repairworks: RM44,384.00. [62] After deducting the advance payment of RM330,000.00 from the total amount of RM390,224.98, the remaining balance that Mangkubumi is liable to Kosi for the Repairworks is RM60,224.98. Mangkubumi’s defence of set-off [63] Mangkubumi’s position is that Kosi is entitled to be indemnified and recover its legal cost of RM510,730.00 incurred in Suit 187 pursuant to the Letter of Award and the Akujanji dated 27.2.2020. This is the basis of Mangkubumi’s defence of set-off, claiming that when this legal cost of RM510,730.00 is deducted from Kosi’s counterclaim amount, Kosi’s claim is extinguished. [64] In respect of the Letter of Award, Mangkubumi contends and submits as follows: a) Mangkubumi is entitled to be indemnified by Kosi for the payment of RM1,163,211.93 made to Ambank as part of an amicable settlement in Suit 187 between Ambank and Mangkubumi. b) The Facility provided by Ambank was intended to finance approved progress claims, issue letters of S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 credit, and provide general working capital related to the Letter of Award. c) Kosi and Ambank reached a settlement during the appeal proceeding, resulting in Mangkubumi making the payment to Ambank, fully discharging both parties' liabilities towards Ambank. d) While Kosi agrees to deduct the payment from its total claim, it disputes the obligation to indemnify Mangkubumi for the legal costs incurred in defending the legal action initiated by Ambank. e) The indemnity charges demanded for the payment made to Ambank and the legal costs incurred are justified by the provisions of the Letter of Award and Akujanji. f) Under Clause 17 of the Letter of Award, Kosi is required to indemnify Mangkubumi for all liability, charges, and expenses incurred as a result of any breach, undertakings, obligations, or omissions by Kosi in carrying out the Works. g) Additionally, Clause 21 of the Letter of Award grants Mangkubumi the right to set-off any expenses suffered or incurred against any monies due to Kosi. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 h) Mangkubumi emphasises that Kosi obtained the Facility from Ambank to support its financial needs for the Works, further supporting its argument for indemnification. [65] In respect of the Akujanji, Mangkubumi contends and submits as follows: a) The Akujanji was issued during negotiations or discussions between the parties to prevent Ambank from taking legal action. Kosi, through its directors and shareholders, confirmed its responsibility for all payments related to the Facility and agreed to indemnify Kosi against any claims, costs, and expenses arising from it. The Facility, as outlined in Ambank’s Letter to Kosi dated 28.9.2016 (“the Letter of Offer”), was intended to assist Kosi financially in carrying out the Works, including general working capital related to the Letter of Award. If the Facility was not related to the Works, Ambank would not have granted it. b) The Letter of Offer is covered under the Letter of Award and Kosi is liable for Kosi's legal costs. Kosi has paid all the legal costs incurred to the respective solicitors, as evidenced in the documents. There is no requirement under the Letter of Award or Akujanji for Kosi to consult or discuss legal fees with Kosi. The appointment of a solicitor is discretionary and S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 that each party is free to appoint its preferred legal representation. c) The Akujanji was issued by Kosi, not by its directors and shareholders in its personal capacity. The wording, context, and sentences of the Akujanji clearly indicate that it is from Kosi and not from the individual directors/shareholders. The Akujanji was executed by the signatories as shareholders and directors of Kosi, and it pertains to the Facility involving Kosi, Mangkubumi, and Ambank. d) Despite the absence of a round rubber stamp on the Akujanji, it was officially issued by Kosi. Another rubber stamp of Kosi, containing its full name, registration number, address, and telephone number, is present on the Akujanji, similar to other official documents such as the Letter of Award. e) Even if the Akujanji was considered to be from the directors/shareholders in its personal capacity, it would not negate Kosi's primary liability, and the directors/shareholders could not be named as defendants personally. [66] To understand Mangkubumi’s position regarding the Akujanji, the full text of the document is produced below: S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 “Kami, Roseli bin Hussein no. kad pengenalan 571026-04-5063, Zarinah Binti Dolah no. kad pengenalan 661206-10-5106 dan Mohammad Hairi Bin Rahim no. kad pengenalan 840118-14-5291 sebagai pengarah-pengarah dan pemegang saham KOSI ENGINEERING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 203090-K) dengan ini mengesahkan bahawa kemudahan kewangan “Domestic Recourse Factoring Facility” berjumlah RM 8,500,000.00 yang diluluskan oleh AmBank (M) Berhad hanya melibatkan pihak KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K) dengan Ambank (M) Berhad sahaja. Kami juga (KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K)) mengesahkan bahawa Mangkubumi Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 546556-H) tiada kaitan langsung berhubung perkara di atas dan Mangkubumi Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 546556- H) tidak bertanggungjawab untuk membuat pembayaran apa-apa jumlah tertunggak kepada AmBank (M) Berhad. Kami juga (KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K)) akan bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya terhadap pembayaran kepada AmBank (M) Berhad serta akan mematuhi terma- terma perjanjian di antara pihak KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K) dengan Ambank (M) Berhad tersebut. Sekiranya kami ingkar di dalam pembayaran kemudahan pembiayaan di atas kepada AmBank (M) Berhad, kami mengesahkan dan berakujanji bahawa KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K) akan bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya terhadap jumlah tertunggak tersebut. Selanjutnya, kami mengesahkan dan berakujanji akan menggantirugi Mangkubumi Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 546556-H) terhadap apa-apa tuntutan, kos, perbelanjaan dan tindakan yang akan di ambil atau telah di ambil oleh AmBank (M) Berhad berhubung dengan kemudahan kewangan “Domestic Recourse Factoring Facility” yang disebutkan di atas. Kami juga akan menanggung segala kerugian dari segala tuntutan kos dan perbelanjaan yang ditimpa atau ditanggung atau membebankan Mangkubumi Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 546556-H) hasil dari kegagalan KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K) menyelesaikan kemudahan kewangan “Domestic S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Recourse Factoring Facility” kepada AmBank (M) Berhad. [67] The relevant signing portion of the Akujanji is produced below: [68] Kosi’s position is that it should not be held responsible for indemnifying Mangkubumi in relation to the legal costs incurred in Suit 187 as the indemnification provision of Clause 17 does not apply to Suit 187. In this regard, Kosi contends and submits as follows: a) Suit 187 involved a failure to make payments to AmBank and was not connected to Mangkubumi's contractual obligations under the Letter of Award. During cross-examination, Mangkubumi's witness confirmed that Suit 187 was unrelated to Mangkubumi's failure to perform the sub-package works mentioned in the Letter of Award. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 b) According to Clause 17 of the Letter of Award, the Sub-Contractor (Kosi) is required to indemnify the Contractor (Mangkubumi) for any breaches caused by the Sub-Contractor or its representatives in carrying out the Works. However, as Suit 187 falls outside the scope of the Project works specified in the Letter of Award, Kosi is not obligated to indemnify Mangkubumi for Suit 187. [69] Clause 17 is produced below for reference: “(a) The Sub-Contractor shall save harmless and indemnify the Contractor from and against all claims, proceedings, liabilities, damages, costs, losses, charges and expenses of any nature whatsoever suffered or incurred by the Contractor arising out of or in connection with any breach caused by the Sub-Contractor or any of its agents, servants or other authorised person of the Sub- Contractor's undertakings and obligations herein and in respect of any act or omission by the Sub- Contractor in carrying out the Works.” [70] The court finds that Mangkubumi is entitled to be indemnified for legal fees amounting to RM503,020.00 and RM7,710.00 (a total of RM510,730.00) paid by Mangkubumi to its lawyers in the defence of Suit 187, including proceedings up to the Court of Appeal. This is established through the bills from Messrs Azlan Shah Sukdev & Co and Messrs Mahadi Redzuan & Co adduced as evidence, along with payment proof that corroborates with the figures testified to by Mohamed Najib in his witness statement S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 detailing the legal costs incurred in Suit 187 across both law firms that acted for Mangkubumi. [71] Mangkubumi’s evidence in this regard as provided by DW1 (Mohamad Najib Mohamed Daud, Mangkubumi’s director) was that Kosi obtained financing via the Facility from AmBank but failed to repay it, resulting in legal action against Kosi and Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi did not acknowledge AmBank's claim and insists that Kosi bears full responsibility for the loan. A series of meetings occurred, leading to Kosi executing the Akujanji to cover AmBank's claim and all associated costs. Mangkubumi paid the legal fees and under the terms of the Akujanji, Kosi is obligated to reimburse Mangkubumi for these expenses. [72] Mangkubumi's reliance on Clause 17 of the Letter of Award to assert its right to claim and hold Kosi responsible for indemnification and the payment of expenses and costs incurred as a result of AmBank's claim is problematic because there is insufficient evidence to establish a direct link between Kosi's alleged negligence or failure to perform its Project obligations and Suit 187. There is no evidence that clearly demonstrates that Suit 187 is a consequence of Kosi's actions or omissions related to the Project. Furthermore, during cross-examination, it was acknowledged by DW1 that Suit 187 does not involve any failure by Mangkubumi to carry out the sub-package works specified in the Letter of Award. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [73] However, there is no such problem in relation to the reliance of Mangkubumi on the Akujanji to claim indemnity for the legal fees for Suit 187. The last paragraph of the Akujanji clearly states that Kosi confirms and pledges to indemnify Mangkubumi against any claims, costs, expenses, and actions that AmBank may take or has taken in relation to the mentioned 'Domestic Recourse Factoring Facility'. In other words, Kosi agreed to cover all losses resulting from its failure to fulfill the obligations of the Ambank Facility and protect Mangkubumi from any financial consequences arising from it. It is not disputed that the Akujanji was executed in relation to Suit 187. [74] The only issue raised by Kosi in respect of the Akujanji was that the Akujanji was entered into by the individuals Roseli Bin Hussein, Zarinah Binti Dolah, and Mohammad Hairi Bin Rahim in their personal capacity, not on behalf of Kosi. I cannot find this to be true. From a careful examination of the Akujanji, it is clear that the Akujanji was given by Kosi, and not the individuals who signed it. The only potential argument in favour of Kosi is that the Akujanji begins with the words “Kami, Roseli bin Hussein no. kad pengenalan 571026-04-5063, Zarinah Binti Dolah no. kad pengenalan 661206-10-5106 dan Mohammad Hairi Bin Rahim no. kad pengenalan 840118-14-5291 sebagai pengarah-pengarah dan pemegang saham KOSI ENGINEERING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 203090-K)” which Kosi argues to mean that it is an indemnity given by the individuals stated. However, from the overall reading of the Akujanji it is clear that the S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 words mean that Roseli bin Hussein, Zarinah Binti Dolah, and Mohammad Hairi Bin Rahim as directors and/or shareholders of Kosi are making the statements that follow. There was no indemnity given by the individuals in the paragraph. [75] The rest of the text in the Akujanji which follows from “Kami juga (KOSI Engineering Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 203090-K)) akan bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya …” indicates that the indemnity is given by Kosi and not the individuals. Critically, for the purpose of the indemnity for the legal fees, it is the last paragraph that firmly establishes Kosi’s obligation to reimburse Mangkubumi for the legal fees. [76] The Akujanji document was issued by Kosi, despite the lack of Kosi’s round rubber stamp. This is supported by the presence of Kosi's other rubber stamp on the Akujanji, which includes crucial details such as the company's full name, registration number, address, and telephone number. The presence of this rubber stamp on the Akujanji aligns with the practice of using rubber stamps on official documents, as seen in other authoritative documents like the Letter of Award. [77] Given the above, the court finds that Mangkubumi is successful in proving its defence of set-off against Kosi’s counterclaim. S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 [78] The court found above that Kosi’s counterclaim against Mangkubumi was successful for a sum of RM197,438.14. This is set-off by the legal fees incurred by Mangkubumi by way of indemnity. Deducting the Plaintiff's legal cost of RM510,730.00 from Kosi’s successful claim amount of RM197,438.14 will extinguish the whole of Kosi’s claim against Mangkubumi. There is no outstanding amount for Mangkubumi to pay to Kosi. [79] I pause here to note that the set-off as claimed by Mangkubumi satisfies the requirements of set-off as decided in Permodalan Plantations Sdn. Bhd v Rachuta Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 CLJ 62 where Salleh Abas LP observed: “The characteristics of set-off as contained in O. 18 r. 17 are that (1) it is a cross-claim for a sum of money, ascertained or otherwise; (2) it is relied as a defence to meet the whole or part of plaintiff's claim, and (3) that it is immaterial whether it is added or not as a counterclaim as long as it is included in the defence.” [80] This defence was specifically raised by Mangkubumi in paragraph 7A (g) of the Amended Defence to Counterclaim, indicating its intention to offset any amounts owed to it against Kosi’s claim. “(g) sekiranya ditolak jumlah tuntutan balas Defendan tersebut, maka ia akan meninggalkan jumlah -RM182.034.05. Demikain itu, Plaintif tiada liabiliti dan Defendan langsung tidak berhak kepada apa jua bayarandaripada Plaintif.” S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 [81] The defence of set-off has proven successful, as the Mangkubumi’s claim surpasses Kosi’s, resulting in a net amount owed by Kosi to Mangkubumi. Mangkubumi is therefore not liable for any part of Kosi’s claim in this action. Conclusion [82] In the premise, based on the findings of the court above, the claim of the Plaintiff in the Counterclaim is dismissed as the Defendant in the Counterclaim is successful in its defence of set-off which extinguishes the whole of the counterclaim. [83] The court orders that costs of RM15,000 is to be paid by Kosi to Mangkubumi. 4 January 2024 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 Counsel: For the Plaintiff in Counterclaim: Lim Kien Huat with Felicia Paula Mojikon (PDK) (Messrs Lee & Lim) For the Defendant in the Counterclaim: Syafiq Amani (Messrs. Mahadi Redzuan & Co) S/N Zm9aNFnB6UuPEmep6uCf2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCvC-3653-08/2023

PEMOHON LOW KIM HONG RESPONDEN TETUAN CHIENG & LUM ASSOCIATESPIHAK KETIGA1. ) LOW SU KIAN 2. ) Low Seow Kian

The backstory of this case is rather delicate as it involves a family dispute over some shares transferred from a father to his son, challenged by his other children. In general, the basis of Enclosure 1, is pertaining to the transfer of 648,450 unit of shares (Shares) owned by the Plaintiff in Sritama Sdn. Bhd. (Company) to his son, Low Shee Kian (1st Son). The Defendant issued a letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary to cancel the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. The Company Secretary replied through a letter dated 18.7.2023 where the Company Secretary requested a copy of the appointment letter of the Defendant's firm as the Plaintiff's solicitor. The Defendant through a letter dated 18.7.2023 to the Company Secretary, informed them that the Plaintiff’s daughter was authorised by the Plaintiff to appoint the Defendant. The two letters issued by the Defendant dated 17.7.2023 and 18.7.2023 (Letters) were disputed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed this suit to declare that he has not appointed the Defendant to represent him, of which the Defendant adamantly stated otherwise. In this context, for lack of authority or no authority to act, it warrants the act of solicitors as a nullity (see Syawal Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dayadiri Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLRH 244; [1990] 3 MLJ 239; [1990] 3 CLJ 165, William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. Chemquip (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 1 MLRA 264; [1991] 2 MLJ 555; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 492 and Ranhill Holdings Bhd v. Mohd Fakrunizam Ibrahim, [2021] MLJU 2205; [2021] MLRHU 1715).

03/01/2024

YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d1574f17-09ae-4902-bf0e-66fa9c248dfd&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) SAMAN PEMULA NO: WA-24NCVC-3653-08/2023 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Tetuan Chieng & Lum Associates dan surat bertarikh 17.07.2023 dan 18.7.2023 kepada Tetuan T & L Consultants Sdn. Bhd., Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Seksyen 41, 50, 51, 52 dan 53 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 29 Kaedah 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 5 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Aturan 15 Kaedah 16 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 03/01/2024 12:31:11 WA-24NCvC-3653-08/2023 Kand. 68 S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA LOW KIM HONG (NO. K/P : 420807-10-5139) …PLAINTIF DAN TETUAN CHIENG & LUM ASSOCIATES (Disaman sebagai sebuah firma) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The orders sought by the Plaintiff in this Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) are primarily for: (a) a declaration that Messrs Chieng & Lum Associates (Defendant) are not solicitors for the Plaintiff and not entitled to represent the Plaintiff in any matters or proceedings; (b) that the Defendant withdraw their letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 issued to Messrs T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd.; and S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (c) an interim injunction first and thereafter a permanent injunction to be issued to the effect that the Defendant refrains from holding out that they are the Plaintiff’s solicitors in any matters or proceedings. [2] The grounds in support as stated in Enclosure 1 are as reproduced- “1. Plaintif merupakan bapa kepada Low Shee Kian (L1), Low Su Kian (L2) iaitu anak-anak lelaki Plaintif dan Low Seow Kian (L3) iaitu anak Perempuan Plaintif. 2. Plaintif adalah pengarah dan pemegang saham sebanyak 648,450 unit (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “saham tersebut”) dalam syarikat Sritama Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 197701004436 [35491-P]) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “syarikat tersebut”). Pengarah-pengarah lain adalah anak-anak Plaintif iaitu L1 dan L2. Pemegang-pemegang saham lain adalah L1 sebanyak 123,250 saham dan L2 sebanyak 64,800 saham. 3. Pada 11.07.2023, Plaintif telah mengarahkan Tetuan T&L Consultants Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “T&L”) iaitu setiausaha syarikat kepada syarikat tersebut supaya menyediakan dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan untuk melaksanakan pemindahan milik saham tersebut kepada L1 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “pemindahan tersebut”). 4. Namun, pada 17.07.2023 T&L telah menerima surat daripada Defendan yang kononnya bertindak bagi Plaintif untuk, antara lain, membatalkan pemindahan tersebut dan memintakan dokumen-dokumen tersebut dikembalikan kepada Defendan. 5. Apabila ditanya oleh T&L melalui surat T&L bertarikh 18.07.2023 kepada Defendan, Defendan melalui suratnya bertarikh 18.07.2023 memaklumkan bahawa Defendan adalah dilantik oleh anak perempuan Plaintif, iaitu L3 selepas diberi kuasa oleh Plaintif. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 6. Plaintif selepas itu telah melantik Tetuan Raja Eleena Siew Ang & Associates (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tetuan RESA”) dan mengarahkan Tetuan RESA supaya menulis kepada Defendan untuk mempertikaikan pelantikan mereka sebagai peguamcara Plaintif dan mengarahkan Defendan untuk menarik balik surat mereka bertarikh 17.07.2023 kepada T&L dan juga memohon maaf kepada Plaintif terhadap perbuatan mereka. 7. Selepas itu, Plaintif telah pada 25.07.2023 melantik Tetuan Goik, Ramesh & Loo (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tetuan GRL”) sebagai peguamcara baru Plaintif untuk menggantikan Tetuan RESA. Plaintif telah mengarahkan Tetuan GRL untuk menulis kepada T&L untuk memaklumkan kepada mereka supaya melaksanakan pindah milik tersebut. 8. Akibat dari insiden-insiden di atas terutamanya surat Defendan bertarikh 17.07.2023 (ekshibit LKH-4) dan 18.07.2023 (ekshibit LKH-5) kepada T&L dimana Defendan masih bertegas bahawa mereka adalah masih peguamcara Plaintif dan mempunyai kuasa untuk bertindak bagi pihak Plaintif, T&L telah pada 27.07.2023 memfailkan satu Saman Pemula Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur No.: WA-24NCC-405-07/2023 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “tindakan tersebut”) untuk arahan daripada Mahkamah. 9. Tindakan Defendan di atas adalah amat angkuh dan tidak mempedulikan hak Plaintif. Perbuatan Defendan amat tidak professional dan keterlaluan. Walaupun peguamcara Plaintif telah dalam surat mereka bertarikh 03.08.2023 di atas telah menawarkan kepada Defendan untuk Defendan sendiri datang ke pejabat Tetuan GRL untuk melihat surat Pelantikan Peguamcara yang telah ditandatangani oleh Plaintif, Defendan enggan berbuat demikian dan masih mahu peguamcara Plaintif memberikan kepada mereka sesalinan surat Pelantikan Peguamcara tersebut. Sudah tentu Tetuan GRL tidak akan memberikan satu salinan surat Pelantikan Peguamcara tersebut kerana ianya adalah satu surat “private & confidential” di antara Plaintif dan peguamcara Plaintif. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 10. Plaintif berhak untuk memfailkan tindakan ini demi untuk menjaga kepentingan dan hak Plaintif. T&L boleh memfailkan tindakan mereka di atas ke Mahkamah untuk menjaga kepentingan mereka dan tindakan tersebut tidak kena mengena dengan tindakan ini dan tidak boleh memudaratkan hak Plaintif untuk memfailkan tindakan ini. Tindakan ini juga tidak berniat untuk menjejaskan prosiding tersebut. 11. Tindakan salah Defendan dengan mewakili Plaintif tanpa apa-apa perlantikan yang sah, benar dan/atau betul daripada Plaintif dan tindakan Defendan dengan bertindak tanpa arahan Plaintif telah menjejaskan dan memprejudiskan teruk terhadap hak-hak Plaintif; 12. Kemudaratan Plaintif tidak boleh dipampas dengan kos kerana Defendan telah menjejaskan hak Plaintif dimana sebarang kerugian yang akan dialami oleh Plaintif tidak dapat didapat dikompensasikan dengan wang; 13. Plaintif mempunyai kes yang baik (“good case”) terhadap Defendan; 14. Imbangan keadilan dan kesenangan (“balance of justice and convenience”) memihak (“favour”) kepada injunksi ini diberikan.”. BRIEF FACTS [3] The backstory of this case is rather delicate as it involves a family dispute over some shares transferred from a father to his son, challenged by his other children. In general, the basis of Enclosure 1, is pertaining to the transfer of 648,450 unit of shares (Shares) owned by the Plaintiff in Sritama Sdn. Bhd. (Company) to his son, Low Shee Kian (1st Son). S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [4] On 11.07.2023, the Plaintiff went to the Company Secretary namely T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd. (Company Secretary), together with the 1st Son where the Plaintiff executed the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. [5] It was contended by the Defendant that the Plaintiff then informed his daughter, Low Seow Kian, that he did not wish to proceed with the transfer of Shares and gave his daughter the authority to find a solicitor to stop the said transfer of Shares and maintain the status quo. [6] The Defendant then issued a letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary to cancel the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. The Company Secretary replied through a letter dated 18.7.2023 where the Company Secretary requested a copy of the appointment letter of the Defendant's firm as the Plaintiff's solicitor. [7] The Defendant through a letter dated 18.7.2023 to the Company Secretary, informed them that the Plaintiff’s daughter was authorised by the Plaintiff to appoint the Defendant. The two letters issued by the Defendant dated 17.7.2023 and 18.7.2023 (Letters) were disputed by the Plaintiff. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [8] Subsequently, Messrs. Raja Eleena Siew Ang & Associates (RESA) issued a letter dated 21.07.2023 to the Defendant informing that they represented the Plaintiff and demanded the Defendant to withdraw its letter dated 17.07.2023 to the Company Secretary. [9] Thereafter, Messrs Goik Ramesh & Loo (GRL) replaced RESA and issued the Defendant a letter dated 25.7.2023 informing that GRL has replaced RESA as the Plaintiff's solicitor and demanded that the Defendant withdraw the letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary. Both letters dated 21.07.2023 and 25.7.2023 clearly indicated to the Defendant, that they are the solicitors representing the Plaintiff at all times. [10] The letter of appointment of Messrs GRL in Enclosure 2 at Exhibit “LKH-8” is reproduced- S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 THE ISSUE [11] The issue at hand is simply- Whether the Plaintiff has appointed the Defendant to represent him or otherwise? If the answer is in the negative, therefore, the Defendant must retract its’ letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 to T&L Consultants Sdn Bhd, the Company Secretary, as the Defendant has no authority to do so. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [12] The Plaintiff filed this suit to declare that he has not appointed the Defendant to represent him, of which the Defendant adamantly stated otherwise. [13] In Malaysia, the right to representation is enshrined in Article 5 of our Federal Constitution particularly for an accused person (see Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution and also in the Criminal Procedure Code at section 255). Eventhough the law is silent for civil litigant, it is indisputable that access to judicial process is also granted in civil matters as a matter of human rights for the right to choose or appoint a solicitor is one’s choice. [14] The crux of the Plaintiff's case is that, in fact, the Defendant had not been appointed to represent the Plaintiff thus has no authority to act for the Plaintiff. [15] In terms of proving one’s case, when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that person. This Court finds that since the Defendant contended that it was appointed by the Plaintiff, therefore, the burden is on the Defendant to prove that it was duly S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 appointed by the Plaintiff and was instructed by the Plaintiff to issue the Letters (see sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950). [16] In Ranbaxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Ei Du Pont Nemours And Company [2012] 4 MLJ 34; [2012] 9 CLJ 79; [2012] 4 MLRA 370 (CA), on the application of sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950, it was held that- “[68] The present case is a civil case, where the court decides based on the evidence adduced during trial on the balance of probabilities. Under s 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 the person who asserts the existence of any fact must prove the fact exists. s 102 of the same act stipulates that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. What the respondent needs to do (as the defendant to the present claim) is to enter appearance within time and to be represented by counsel to handle the proceeding on its behalf; to file the necessary statement of defence and counterclaim as well as other follow-up documents to get the matter ready for trial...". [17] The Defendant contended that it was appointed and instructed by the Plaintiff’s daughter. In this regard, the burden is on the Defendant to prove and produce the authorization letter signed by the Plaintiff appointing the daughter as such, if any, but none. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [18] The Defendant had also provided two (2) statutory declarations from the Plaintiff’s daughters; namely Low Seow Kian and Low Tong Chan stating that the Plaintiff has mandated, authorised and entrusted Low Seow Kian to stop the transfer of the Shares in the Company to the 1st Son and that thereafter, Low Seow Kian had appointed the Defendant to stop the transfer of the Shares and to return all share documents to the Defendant for safe keeping. [19] However, this Court finds that nowhere from the evidence, could be found that the Plaintiff had confirmed this authorisation allegedly given to his daughter. [20] In this context, for lack of authority or no authority to act, it warrants the act of solicitors as a nullity (see Syawal Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dayadiri Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLRH 244; [1990] 3 MLJ 239; [1990] 3 CLJ 165, William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. Chemquip (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 1 MLRA 264; [1991] 2 MLJ 555; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 492 and Ranhill Holdings Bhd v. Mohd Fakrunizam Ibrahim, [2021] MLJU 2205; [2021] MLRHU 1715). [21] Further, in Ranhill Holdings Bhd (supra), it was held- S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 “[33] I should first state that the defendant's reliance on the decisions in Syawal Enterprise (supra) and William Jacks & Co (supra) merely confirms that the lack of mandate of the lawyers may result in a nullity of the proceedings that may be set aside and that a challenge for that purpose may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. But these cases also made it clear that the allegation that the action has been brought or defended by solicitors who were not so authorised must, like any other allegation, be proved by sufficient evidence.”. [22] The Defendant had also contended that the Plaintiff has a very weak mental capacity and was manipulated by the 1st Son and that the Plaintiff is illiterate. However, there was no evidence produced by the Defendant in support of this contention. [23] Based on the facts, the form for the transfer of Shares was signed at the Company Secretary’s office. The Company Secretary had also dutifully, repeatedly interviewed the Plaintiff to ensure that the Plaintiff had the necessary and required mental capacity to transfer the Shares to the 1st Son before agreeing to be the witness to the Plaintiff’s signature. [24] In any event, this Court finds that only the Directors via a company resolution, can refuse such registration of a transfer of shares and not the Company Secretary (See section 106 (2) of the Companies Act 2016). S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [25] Therefore, based on the facts of the case from the affidavits filed by both parties, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has never appointed the Defendant to represent him. Rightfully, the appointment of solicitors is the choice of the Plaintiff. [26] As such, the Defendant has no authority to instruct the Company Secretary to stop the transfer of Shares from the Plaintiff to the 1st Son. CONCLUSION [27] Thus, Enclosure 1 is allowed for the following Orders- (a) That Messrs Chieng & Lum Associates are not solicitors for the Plaintiff and are not entitled to represent the Plaintiff in any matters or proceedings unless appointed by the Plaintiff in writing; (b) That the Defendant to withdraw the letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 issued by the Defendant to Messrs T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd.; (c) A permanent injunction to the effect that the Defendant is refrained from holding out that they are the Plaintiff’s solicitors S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 in any matters or proceedings unless appointed by the Plaintiff in writing; and (d) Cost. (YA DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCVC1 Kuala Lumpur Court. Date: 2 January 2024 COUNSELS PLAINTIFF Tetuan Goik, Ramesh & Loo Suite N-3-1, 2nd Floor Block N, Plaza Damas 60, Jalan Sri Hartamas 1, Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur. DEFENDANT S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Tetuan Law Chambers of Dahlia Lee & Co. C-06=09. Plaza Mont Kiara, No. 2, Jalan Kiara, Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-63-02/2023

PLAINTIF RHB BANK BERHAD DEFENDAN 1. ) MILLENNIUM SKILL TRAINING ACADEMY SDN BHD 2. ) SIVAMURTHY A/L MUNIANDY 3. ) SHANGKARI A/P SIVAMURTHY 4. ) MOHAMAD FARID BIN ISMAIL

BANKING: Deed of Assignment - Whether absolute assignment or charge - Rights of assignee – Auction - Locus standi of assignee - Whether assignment of property interests amounts to an absolute transfer of rights - Whether legal action premature - Ongoing negotiations

03/01/2024

YA Tuan Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=04af596e-2cd5-4be2-b0fd-2572bf72bae6&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO.: WA-22NCC-63-02/2023 BETWEEN RHB BANK BERHAD [196501000373 (6171-M)] ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MILLENNIUM SKILL TRAINING ACADEMY SDN BHD 200801040111 (841460-A) 2. SIVAMURTHY A/L MUNIANDY [IC No.: 541224-07-5565] 3. SHANGKARI A/P SIVAMURTHY [IC No.: 881023-43-5510] 4. MOHAMAD FARID BIN ISMAIL [IC No.: 731104-14-5159] ... DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT [1] COVID-19 upended markets and crushed businesses, leaving countless loan agreements in shambles. So the borrower fell into arrears, and long negotiations with the bank proved fruitless, prompting the present debt recovery action. The borrower and guarantors now cry foul, alleging settlement talks were still ongoing when the legal claim unexpectedly surfaced. [2] Yet beyond assertions of prematurity, the defendants dispute the very nature of the loan security - an assignment 03/01/2024 16:23:54 WA-22NCC-63-02/2023 Kand. 42 S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 of property interests - which the bank contends allows it to liquidate the security. The pivotal issue thus emerges: does this assignment amount to an absolute transfer of rights empowering the plaintiff to unilaterally sell the assets? Or is it a mere charge granting limited rights subject to court sanction? The loan may have soured, but legal rights and remedies turn on whether assignment was total or partial. For between absolute transfer and restrictive charge lies a gulf of consequence should negotiations break down. On which side the agreement truly lies will determine if this action jumps the gun. Background facts [3] The First Defendant, Millennium Skill Training Academy Sdn Bhd, obtained three term loans (Term Loan 1, Term Loan 2 and Term Loan 3) from the Plaintiff, RHB Bank Berhad, between August 2016 to September 2016, amounting to RM3,680,000. The loans were secured by personal guarantees from the Second to Fourth Defendants. The loans were documented by the Facilities Agreement dated 15.11.2016 and the Facility Agreement dated 17.3.2017 (“the Facility Agreements”). The personal guarantees were documented by a Personal Guarantee dated 15.11.2016 (“the Personal Guarantee”) executed by the Second Defendant, Third Defendant and Fourth Defendant. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] The First Defendant also executed 3 Deeds of Assignment dated 15.11.2016 and 17.3.2017 (“Deeds of Assignment”) in favour of the Plaintiff, assigning the First Defendant's rights, title, interest and benefits in 3 properties, Lot 19, 20 and 21 held under title GM 3547, Lot 1475, in Mukim Serendah, District of Hulu Selangor, to the Plaintiff as security for the repayment of the three term loans granted. [5] The term loans had monthly installment amounts due from the First Defendant to the Plaintiff. The First Defendant paid the monthly installments from 2016 until 21.8.2019, but was allegedly in default of RM46,773.03 as of 21.8.2019. [6] When movement restrictions were imposed in Malaysia due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the First Defendant's business suffered severely, making it harder for them to continue paying the monthly installments. The First Defendant is a company that has been providing vocational trainings to underprivileged students since 2009, including through the Malaysian Skills Malaysia programme. The First Defendant was also appointed in June 2021 as a training provider under a government programme. [7] Despite the COVID-19 impact, the First Defendant endeavoured to make monthly installment payments, although at lower amounts that were at times agreed to by the Plaintiff. This included monthly amounts of RM3,000 that the First Defendant had continued to pay. However, the First Defendant was eventually unable to electronically S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 deposit these RM3,000 monthly sums into the loan accounts. [8] On 14.2.2023, the Plaintiff filed the present legal action claiming RM3,895,975.12 plus interest of 9.95%. Concurrently, the Plaintiff attempted to auction off the 3 properties belonging to the First Defendant that were pledged as security for the loans, through auctions on 7.4.2023 and 31.5.2023. The Plaintiff’s claim [9] In this action the Plaintiff is claiming: a) RM1,403,826.01 due under Term Loan 1 as of 7.2.2023; b) RM1,412,609.24 due under Term Loan 2 as of 7.2.2023; c) RM1,079,539.87 due under Term Loan 3 as of 7.2.2023; and d) Interest on Term Loans 1, 2 and 3 at the rate of 3.50% per annum above the Plaintiff's Base Lending Rate (which was 6.45% per annum as of 7.2.2023) on daily rests from 8.2.2023 until full settlement. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] The total amount claimed is RM3,895,975.12 plus interest at 9.95% per annum. The Plaintiff’s application [11] The Plaintiff's application in Enclosure 13 is under Order 14 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) for summary judgment against the Defendants. [12] The Plaintiff seeks summary judgment for: a) RM1,403,826.01 under Term Loan 1; b) RM1,412,609.24 under Term Loan 2; c) RM1,079,539.87 under Term Loan 3; and d) Interest on daily rests from 8.2.2023 until full settlement and costs. Law on Summary Judgment (Order 14) [13] It is trite that once an application under Order 14 of the ROC 2012 is shown to have been correctly and properly filed, the burden shifts and thus rests on the defendant who desires to resist the application to raise a defence which shows a “bona fide triable issue”, in the sense of an issue which justifies and warrants the matter to be considered at the trial proper. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [14] Order 14 rule 3 of the ROC 2012 provides that unless the defendant satisfies the court with respect to the claim, or the part of a claim, to which the application relates that:- (a) there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or (b) there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed. [15] It is useful to refer once again to the often quoted decision of the former Supreme Court in National Company For Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300 which ruled as follows: “We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under Order 14 the first considerations are (1) whether the case comes within the Order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under Order 14. For the purposes of an application under Order 14 the preliminary requirements are: (i) the defendant must have entered an appearance; S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (ii) the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; and (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of Rule 2 of the Order 14. ... If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he becomes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why judgment should not be given against him.” [16] The Plaintiff has satisfied these preliminary requirements, and this is not disputed by the Defendants. Thus, the burden is now firmly on the Defendants to show that there is a triable issue that does not justify summary judgment to be entered against them. If the Defendants can demonstrate even one triable issue, this court will not grant summary judgment. But it has to be a genuinely triable issue as would require a trial in order to determine it (see Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241). Issues to be tried [17] There are a number of triable issues put forward by the Defendant in this matter listed as follows: a) The Deeds of Assignment only assign the properties by way of charge and not absolute assignment, so the Plaintiff cannot sell the properties, as this would amount to unjust enrichment if the Plaintiff is allowed to execute judgment for full sum; S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 b) The Certificate of Indebtedness provides inadequate information for the Defendants to challenge it or show any errors; c) The interest rate sought of 9.95% exceeds the 5% rate in Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 and is therefore exorbitant; and d) The Plaintiff's action is premature as the First Defendant had written proposals to pay the monthly instalments which were not responded to by the Plaintiff before filing this action. Analysis and findings of the court Unjust Enrichment [18] The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff does not have the right to auction off the First Defendant's properties under the Deeds of Assignment, as these assignments are by way of charge and not absolute assignments according to section 4(3) of the Civil Law Act 1956. They reference the case of Yap Chee Keong Holdings Sdn Bhd v Cosmopolitan Avenue Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 CLJ 764 (High Court) to support their stance. Furthermore, the Defendants contend that even if the Plaintiff attempted to auction the properties before obtaining judgment, the proceeds from such sales should offset any sums due to the Plaintiff, and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the sum claimed S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 prior to the sales. They assert that allowing the Plaintiff to obtain judgment before the sales would lead to unjust enrichment, especially since the First Defendant was not properly informed of the auction proceedings, potentially allowing the Plaintiff to execute judgment even after the properties have been sold, which they consider an abuse of the court process. [19] I do not agree with the Defendants’ contentions. [20] The Yap Chee Keong case is not applicable here. This case concerns whether loan agreements cum assignments amounted to absolute assignments that removed the plaintiff's locus standi to file a suit against the property developer. In the instant case, the Plaintiff is a bank pursuing its rights to enforce its security interests by way of auction pursuant to the Deeds of Assignment which expressly provides for its right to auction of the property as provided in Section 3.01 of the Deed of Assignment dated 15.11.2016. Section 3.01 reads: “Section 3.01 ASSIGNMENT In consideration of the Bank having at the request of the Assignor granted or made available or agreed to grant or make available or to continue to grant and make available the Facilities and for better securing the payment or repayment of the Indebtedness, the Assignor as beneficial owner hereby assigns absolutely to the Bank all the Assignor's rights, title and interest whatsoever in and to the Assigned Property and under the Sale Agreement together with the Assignor's right of enforcement thereof PROVIDED ALWAYS that S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 notwithstanding this Assignment, the Assignor shall and hereby undertakes to continue to observe and be bound by all whatsoever conditions, covenants and stipulations therein on the part of the Assignor expressed and contained in the Sale Agreement and the Bank shall have no obligation or liability under the Sale Agreement by reason of or arising out of this Assignment, nor shall the Bank be required or obligated in any manner to observe or perform any of the conditions or obligations of the Assignor under or pursuant to the Sale Agreement or to present or file any claim, or to take any other action to enforce the terms of the Sale Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, it is the intention of the parties hereto that the assignment created pursuant to this Section 3.01 shall be an absolute and unconditional assignment and not an assignment by way of charge. In the event any of the provisions of this Assignment is inconsistent with such express intention of the parties as aforesaid, such inconsistent provisions shall be rejected as repugnant and the intention of the parties as expressed above shall prevail.” (emphasis added) [21] Therefore, the issue in Yap Chee Keong of whether assignments were by way of charge or absolute assignments, affecting the plaintiff's locus standi, does not arise. [22] Further, the Defendants’ interpretation that the Deed of Assignment dated 15.11.2016 should be considered as “by way of charge only,” thus barring the Plaintiff from selling the property while also claiming the full outstanding amount is not supported by the text of the Deed of Assignment, specifically Section 3.01, which explicitly mentions that the S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 assignment is “an absolute and unconditional assignment and not an assignment by way of charge.” [23] The Plaintiff's action cannot be considered unjust enrichment, as it is executed within the legal bounds of the Deeds of Assignment together with the Facility Agreements. The Defendants are in default under the Term Loans, and they have not contested this fact. As a result, the Plaintiff is well within its rights to enforce its security interests under Section 7.01 of the Deed of Assignment as well as under Section 12.23 of the Facility Agreements. Section 12.23 reads: “Section 12.23 CUMULATIVE REMEDIES The rights remedies powers and privileges provided herein are cumulative and are not exclusive of any rights remedies powers and privileges provided by law. Upon default or breach by the Borrower of any term, covenant, stipulation and/or undertaking herein provided and on the part of the Borrower to be observed and performed, the Bank shall thereafter have the right to exercise all or any of the remedies available whether by the Letters of Offer, this Agreement or Security Documents or by statute or otherwise and shall be entitled to exercise such remedies concurrently, including pursuing all remedies of sale or possession and civil suit to recover all moneys due and owing to the Bank.” [24] The case of Pancaran Nilam (M) Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Berhad [2000] 4 CLJ 793 (Court of Appeal) further solidifies the Plaintiff's position, affirming that an absolute assignment allows the assignee to take any action with the property once notice of default has been given to the assignor. This case concerns the rights of an assignee bank S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 to sell properties that were assigned to it under loan agreements cum assignments, where the borrowers defaulted. The Court of Appeal held that an absolute assignment ranks higher than a charge, and the property is transferred absolutely to the assignee bank if the borrower defaults. As such, the assignee bank can do anything with the property once notice of default is given to the borrower. [25] This aligns seamlessly with the Plaintiff's claims, substantiating its entitlement to proceed with the auctioning of the properties and to claim the outstanding amounts. [26] The Plaintiff has thus met the legal prerequisites to enforce its rights under the Deed of Assignment and the Facility Agreements. The contention of the Defendants that this constitutes unjust enrichment is unfounded and legally unsustainable. The Plaintiff is thus entitled to both auction the First Defendant's properties and to claim the full outstanding amount owed. Certificate of Indebtedness [27] The next issue revolves around the Plaintiff's Certificate of Indebtedness and its status as conclusive evidence of the Defendants' indebtedness. The Defendants, in their challenge, argue that they are left in the dark regarding the figures in the certificate, claiming it unconscionable to rely solely on the Plaintiff-prepared agreements and urging that S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 the Plaintiff should be subject to the same burden of proof as dictated by the Evidence Act 1950. [28] The contractual provisions in question have clearly outlined the legal parameters under which the Certificate of Indebtedness is to be considered. Specifically, Section 12.12 of the Facility Agreements and Clause 20 of the Personal Guarantee expressly confer upon a certificate or a statement of account, duly certified by an authorised officer, the status of binding and conclusive evidence of the indebtedness. [29] Section 12.12 of the Facility Agreements reads: “It is hereby agreed that any admission or acknowledgment in writing by the Borrower, or any Security Party, or by any person authorised on their behalves or a judgment (by default or otherwise obtained against any of them) or a certificate or a statement of account in writing showing the Indebtedness of the Borrower, or any Security Party, which is duly certified by an authorised officer of the Bank shall be binding and conclusive evidence against the Borrower for whatever purpose including as being conclusive evidence of the Indebtedness in a court of law.” [30] Clause 20 of the Personal Guarantee reads: “A certificate signed by your officer as to the monies for the time being due or owing to you from the Customer as aforesaid or as to the liabilities of the Customer or any account settled or stated by or between you and the Customer or admitted by the Customer or on its behalf shall be accepted by me/us as conclusive evidence that the amount S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 appearing thereon is due or owing to you from the Customer.” [31] These stipulations are not uncommon in commercial contracts and have the laudable aim of providing a straightforward method for resolving issues related to proof of debt, thereby avoiding protracted litigation. [32] It is pertinent to refer to the authority of Citibank NA v Ooi Boon Leong & Ors [1980] 1 LNS 168 (Federal Court) and Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Yin (Berniaga Atas Nama K.H. Trading) Kor Toong Khoon [2006] 3 CLJ 544 (Federal Court) both of which have laid down that a certificate of indebtedness serves as conclusive evidence of the debt due and shifts the burden of disproving the same onto the defendant. The principle applied is the inherent acceptance that the parties, through their contractual freedom, have agreed to a specific mechanism for establishing indebtedness. The court should not lightly set aside such provisions, especially when they have the effect of streamlining the proof and are not inherently unjust or unconscionable. [33] The Defendants' claim of a lack of detail in the certificate does not, on its face, amount to a “manifest error” as required to overcome the conclusive nature of the document. The term “manifest error” carries with it a burden of proving an evident, clear, and obvious mistake, which is conspicuously absent in the Defendants' argument. It is not the absence of detail that renders a certificate erroneous S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 but the presence of a glaring inaccuracy, which the Defendants have failed to demonstrate. [34] Moreover, the Defendants' reliance on the principle that “no man is above the law,” as elucidated in Re M (A.P.) [1993] 3 CLJ 567 (House of Lords) appears misconceived. The Plaintiff is not claiming to be above the law but is invoking a legal provision that both parties had previously agreed upon. Contractual provisions setting out mechanisms for proof do not violate the rule of law but rather foster its application by defining legal relations and the evidentiary standards applicable thereto. [35] In light of the foregoing, this court concludes that the Certificate of Indebtedness dated 7.2.2023, duly executed and presented by the Plaintiff, serves as conclusive evidence of the Defendants' indebtedness in the sums stated therein. The Defendants have failed to demonstrate any manifest error or to provide any substantive evidence that could lead to a contrary finding. Interest [36] Another issue raised by the Defendants concerns the Plaintiff's entitlement to charge an interest rate of 3.50% per annum over and above the Base Lending Rate (BLR) of 6.45% per annum from 8.2.2023, until the complete settlement of the debt. The Defendants contest this claim on two principal grounds: firstly, that it contravenes Practice S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Direction No. 1 of 2012 which allegedly caps the judgment interest at 5%; and secondly, that it violates Section 11(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67). [37] Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 issued by the Chief Justice states: “Bagi menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diberikan kepada saya di bawah Aturan 30, kaedah 6(2); Aturan 42, kaedah 12; Aturan 44, kaedah 18(1)(b) & (2); dan Aturan 44, kaedah 19, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, saya dengan ini mengarahkan kadar bunga di bawah peruntukan-peruntukan di atas ditentukan pada kadar 5 % setahun. 2. Arahan Amalan ini berkuatkuasa mulai 1 Ogos 2012.” [38] Section 11(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 reads: “11 Power of Courts to award interest on debts and damages (1) In any proceedings tried in any Court for the recovery of any debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment: Provided that nothing in this section - (a) shall authorise the giving of interest upon interest;” S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [39] Upon thorough examination of the presented facts, legal documentation, and the cited case law, this court finds in favour of the Plaintiff for several compelling reasons. To begin with, the contentions advanced by the Defendants concerning the applicability of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 are misplaced. It is abundantly clear that the said Practice Direction does not govern the present case. The contractual agreement between the parties, particularly Clause 6 of the Letter of Offer dated 29.8.2016, explicitly states the terms under which interest can be levied upon default. Clause 6 reads: “In addition and without prejudice to the rights and remedies of the Bank, if you shall default in the payment of any sums on their respective due dates you shall pay interest on such overdue sums at the rate of 3.5% per annum above the Bank's Base Lending Rate or such other rate or rates as the Bank may, at its sole absolute discretion, at any time and from time to time, impose without notice to you, and such rate or rates of interest (''the Default Rate”) shall be payable by you, as well after as before judgment or demand, from the due date up to the date of actual repayment.” [40] The Plaintiff, therefore, reserves the right to enforce the contractually agreed-upon rate of 3.5% per annum over the BLR. [41] Turning to the argument that the Plaintiff's claim contravenes Section 11(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67), this contention is equally unmeritorious. The provision does not extend to the instant case, especially when the parties have expressly negotiated and agreed upon the S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 terms relating to the default interest rate. The contract, therefore, stands as a separate and self-contained legal instrument, obviating any statutory constraints that might otherwise apply in the absence of such an agreement. [42] In support of this position, this court finds the judgment in RHB Bank Berhad v Plastech Precision Coating Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 73 to be highly instructive. This case concerns a bank's claim against company directors who guaranteed a loan facility taken by their company, where the company defaulted on repayment. The High Court found that the defendants were bound by the express terms in the facility agreement relating to interest rates, including the higher default interest rates. It held that the bank had strictly adhered to the terms and conditions stated in the facility documentation with regard to the prevailing interest rate and the default interest rate. The defendants failed to show any omission by the bank in adhering to those terms. Quay Chew Soon J stated: “[40] A condition of the usage of the Banking Facilities is that the borrower has to settle the outstanding bills upon maturity of the Bankers Acceptance / Promissory Notes Financing. Owing to FIRST DEFENDANT's failure to pay the outstanding bills for the Bankers Acceptance and the Promissory Notes Financing upon maturity, an event of default had occurred which triggered P's rights under clause 11 of the Letter of Offer. Wherein the interest is automatically imposed at 3.5% per annum above the Bank's Base Lending Rate. [41] The Defendants are fully aware of this term stated in the Letter of Offer. P has strictly adhered S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 to the terms and conditions stated in the Letter of Offer with regard to the prevailing interest rate and the default interest rate. The Defendants had failed to show any omission by P in adhering to the terms and conditions of the Letter of Offer. [42] The terms of the Banking Facilities documentation are clear and the Defendants are bound by it. The court ought to uphold the same. In this regard, the observation of the Federal Court in CIMB Bank Bhd v Maybank Trustees Bhd & Other Appeals [2014] 3 CLJ 1 at 44 is instructive: [101] ... We are of the view that the Court of Appeal had erred in allowing pre-judgment interest, which the High Court had correctly refused, on the premise that the parties had agreed that no interest will be payable. It is our view that in deciding the question of interest, the court must consider the express agreement of the bondholders in the trust deed. In this case, the trust deed as specified under cl. 39 clearly provides that no interest shall be payable. The trust deed is a contract and “the court has a duty to defend, protect and uphold the sanctity of the contract entered between the parties”.” [43] There, the High Court unequivocally held that the agreed- upon terms concerning default interest rates are binding and enforceable, provided that they are clearly stated in the facility documentation and no omission or violation occurs from the creditor's side in adhering to those terms. In the matter at hand, the Defendants have similarly failed to demonstrate any such omission or breach by the Plaintiff. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [44] In conclusion, this court finds that the Plaintiff is fully entitled to claim the interest rate of 3.5% per annum over and above the BLR of 6.45% per annum, in accordance with the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract. The Defendants' contentions relating to Practice Direction No. 1 of 2012 and Section 11(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67) are found to be inapplicable in the current circumstances and are thus dismissed. The Plaintiff's claim for judgment interest stands vindicated. Premature action [45] The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff's action is premature, pointing out that the First Defendant had repeatedly proposed a monthly instalment payment plan, which the plaintiff did not respond to. They maintain that this situation mirrors the Court of Appeal decision in Malayan Banking Bhd v Sparrows & Arrows Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 481 where the action was deemed premature as negotiations were still in progress. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's failure to engage with these proposals has unfairly cornered the first defendant into accepting terms favorable only to the Plaintiff. They argue that pursuing a summary judgment under these circumstances undermines public policy encouraging out-of-court dispute resolution. Lastly, they emphasise that the ongoing negotiations and lack of response to the first defendant's letters, despite being marked “without prejudice”, indicate that legal action is inappropriate at this stage. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [46] I find that the Defendants' argument that the action is premature lacks merit and is distinguishable from the facts at hand, particularly when considered in the context of the cited cases of Malayan Banking Bhd v Sparrows & Arrows Sdn Bhd [supra] and RHB Bank Berhad v Boston Metro Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 1 LNS 2529 (High Court) which distinguished the Sparrows & Arrows case. These two cases concern the issue of whether a bank's legal action to recover debts is premature when settlement negotiations are still ongoing between the parties. [47] In the Malayan Banking Bhd v Sparrows & Arrows Sdn Bhd case, the Court of Appeal found the bank's action was premature. This was because the bank had not yet responded to the plaintiff's settlement proposal before filing the legal action. Hence, there was a pending settlement agreement at that time. However, in the RHB Bank Bhd v Boston Metro Sdn Bhd case, the High Court distinguished Sparrows & Arrows. It held there was no pending settlement agreement in RHB Bank's case. The bank had rejected the defendant's proposals. Its subsequent requests for documents did not amount to accepting a settlement offer. Hence, the bank was not prohibited from commencing legal action despite ongoing talks. [48] Here, any communications between the parties did not culminate in a binding settlement agreement, as evidenced by the Plaintiff's written communications dated 10.2.2023 and 7.3.2023, which unambiguously conveyed that the S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Plaintiff could not entertain the payment proposal made by the First Defendant. [49] In the 10.2.2023 letter, the Plaintiff rejected the First Defendant’s repayment proposal as the amount was too low, requested an upward revised proposal for consideration, failing which the Plaintiff would continue legal action to recover the entire debt. [50] In the 7.3.2023 letter, the Plaintiff again rejected the First Defendant’s revised repayment proposal as the amount remained too low, stated that it had been accommodative in the past and legal action would continue unless a mutually acceptable repayment programme is reached. [51] The contention that the Plaintiff's action is unconscionable because negotiations were ongoing is equally without foundation. Negotiations, per se, do not preclude a party from seeking legal redress, especially where, as here, there has been no acceptance of any of the offers or proposals made by the Defendants. The Plaintiff, by law, retains the right to initiate legal proceedings for the recovery of outstanding sums, particularly when there is no evidence to suggest that the Plaintiff ever indicated it would refrain from doing so. The Defendants' reference to “public policy objective” of encouraging out-of-court settlements is not sufficient to fetter this right, particularly when the Defendants themselves failed to substantiate their financial S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 viability in making the repayments, despite being granted reasonable time to do so. [52] Moreover, the Plaintiff's silence in response to the First Defendant's proposals cannot be deemed as leading the Defendants into an unascertainable position. The Plaintiff is under no legal obligation to accept the terms proposed by the First Defendant or to engage in an endless cycle of negotiations, particularly when the Defendants have not demonstrated a capacity to fulfill their obligations. Conclusion [53] Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence, it was quite clear to me that the Plaintiff had clearly met the preliminary requirements in an Order 14 application in accordance with the principles established by National Company For Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [supra] and further, applying the leading Supreme Court case of Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ 627. [54] Accordingly, I held that the contentions of the Defendants do not amount to triable issues or constitute any reasonable defence. S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [55] Enclosure 13 is allowed with costs of RM3,000 for the Plaintiff. 3 January 2024 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Muhamad Mizan bin Omar (Messrs Kington Tan Dzul) For the Defendant: Dalveena Korotana (Messrs. Arnold Andrew & Co) S/N blmvBNUs4kuw/SVyv3K65g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCC-1032-11/2022

PEMOHON LIM TITT HUAT RESPONDEN 1. ) TAN SAY KENG 2. ) WHAI CHENG AUTO PARTS SDN BHD

COMPANY LAW: Derivative action – Leave – Plaintiff seeking leave to defend company in action filed against it – Whether the plaintiff is acting in good faith – Whether history of litigation and plaintiff’s conviction negate good faith – Whether in best interest of company for application for leave to be granted - Companies Act 2016, s. 347, s. 348

03/01/2024

YA Puan Adlin Binti Abdul Majid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=73cd048e-c73a-42b9-8c7e-c5bf5e296345&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24NCC-1032-11/2022 Dalam perkara Whai Cheng Auto Parts Sdn. Bhd. [No. Syarikat: 198701004173 (162843-H)] Dan Dalam perkara tindakan guaman (guaman no. BA- 22NCC-83-06/2022) yang dimulakan oleh Roda Berlian (M) Sdn. Bhd. terhadap Whai Cheng Auto Parts Sdn. Bhd. di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 345, 347, 348 dan 350 Akta Syarikat 2016 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 5, Aturan 7 Kaedah 2, Aturan 28, Aturan 03/01/2024 10:39:18 WA-24NCC-1032-11/2022 Kand. 48 S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 88 Kaedah 2 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA LIM TITT HUAT [No. K/P: 611115-07-5161] (atas kapasiti sebagai Pemegang Saham bagi Whai Cheng Auto Parts Sdn. Bhd.) ... PLAINTIF DAN 1. TAN SAY KENG [No. K/P: 710505-10-5315] 2. WHAI CHENG AUTO PARTS SDN. BHD. [No. Syarikat: 198701004173 (162843-H)] ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT A. Introduction [1] The plaintiff filed an originating summons, seeking leave of court to defend a suit filed by Roda Berlian (M) Sdn Bhd (“Roda Berlian”) against the 2nd defendant, at Shah Alam High Court Suit No. BA-22NCC-83- 06/2022 (“Suit 83”). S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [2] I allowed the originating summons, and provided brief grounds for my decisions. The full grounds of my decision are as set out below. B. Background Facts The parties [3] Roda Berlian and the 2nd defendant were set up by two families, the “Lim Family” and the “Tan Family”. [4] The Lim Family holds 40% of the shareholding in Roda Berlian, while the Tan Family holds 60% of the shareholding. The original directors of Roda Berlian are the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and Lim Wooi Boo. [5] The Lim Family and the Tan Family hold 50% shareholding each in the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are the directors of the 2nd defendant. Hostilities between the parties [6] By July 2014, The Lim Family and the Tan Family were hostile towards each other. Several discussions took place, with proposals on the sale of shares. However, no resolution was reached. [7] In 2020, Roda Berlian and the Tan Family instituted Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22NCC-393-08/2020 (“Suit 393”) against the 2nd defendant and the Lim Family. The suit is a claim for breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, conspiracy to defraud and injure, breach of trust, negligence and breach of contract. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [8] By April 2021, representatives of the Lim Family in Road Berlian were terminated from the board of Road Berlian. Suit 83 [9] Suit 83 was filed thereafter. It involves a claim for the amount of RM1,131,711.15 alleged to be due and owing by the 2nd defendant to Roda Berlian, for loans and advances provided by Roda Berlian to the 2nd defendant. [10] As the directors of the 2nd defendant are the plaintiff (from the Lim Family) and the 1st defendant (from the Tan Family), this has led to an impasse at the board, with directors of the 2nd defendant not being able to reach a consensus to defend Suit 83. [11] The plaintiff thus filed this action to seek leave for the plaintiff to defend Suit 83 on behalf of the 2nd defendant. C. Assessment and Findings Derivative proceedings [12] The originating summons is filed under sections 347 and 348 of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA”). Section 347 grants the right to a complainant to initiate, intervene in or defend proceedings on behalf of a company, with leave of court. Section 348 sets out the process to obtain leave. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [13] The relevant provisions are as follows: “347 Derivative proceedings (1) A complainant may, with the leave of the Court initiate, intervene in or defend a proceeding on behalf of the company ... (2) Proceedings brought under this section shall be brought in the company's name. (3) The right of any person to bring, intervene in, defend or discontinue any proceedings on behalf of a company at common law is abrogated. 348 Leave of Court (1) An application for leave of the Court under section 347 shall be made to the Court without the need for an appearance to be entered. (2) The complainant shall give thirty days' notice in writing to the directors of his intention to apply for the leave of Court under section 347. (3) Where leave has been granted for an application under section 347, the complainant shall initiate proceedings in Court within thirty days from the grant of leave. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (4) In deciding whether or not the leave shall be granted, the Court shall take into account whether – (a) the complainant is acting in good faith; and (b) it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of the company that the application for leave be granted. (5) Any proceedings brought, intervened in or defended under this section shall not be discontinued, compromised or settled except with the leave of the Court.” (emphasis added) [14] For leave to be granted, the requirements in sections 347 and 348 of the CA must be met. [15] First, the applicant must be a “complainant” who has the right to initiate, intervene in or defend proceedings on behalf of a company pursuant to section 347(1) of the CA. [16] Next, the complainant must give 30 days’ notice in writing to the directors of the company, of his intention to apply for leave. This is set out in section 348(2) of the CA. [17] Finally, section 348(4) of the CA provides that in deciding whether or not leave should be granted, the court must be satisfied that: S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 a. The complainant is acting in good faith; and b. It appears prima facie in the best interest of the company that the application for leave is granted. Is the plaintiff a “complainant” under section 347(1) of the CA? [18] The definition of “complainant” in section 345 of the CA includes a member and director of a company. [19] It is undisputed that the plaintiff is a member and a director of the 2nd defendant, and is thus a “complainant” as defined under section 345 of the CA. The plaintiff therefore has the locus standi to file this action. Has the plaintiff given the requisite notice to directors of the 2nd defendant? [20] Under section 348(2) of the CA, the complainant is required to give 30 days’ notice in writing to directors of the 2nd defendant, of his intention to apply for leave pursuant to section 347(1). [21] It is not in dispute that this requirement has been complied with. The plaintiff served a notice dated 7 September 2022 on the 1st defendant, who is the only other director of the 2nd defendant, to inform the 1st defendant of the plaintiff’s intention to obtain leave to defend the 2nd defendant in Suit 83. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Is the plaintiff acting in good faith? [22] Section 348(4)(a) of the CA provides that in deciding whether or not leave should be granted, the court must be satisfied that the complainant is acting in good faith. [23] The test to determine whether an applicant is acting in good faith is set out in Swansson v RA Pratt Properties Pty Ltd & Anor [2002] NSWSC 583. Swansson (supra) was referred to in Celcom (Malaysia) Bhd v Mohd Shuaib Ishak [2011] 3 MLJ 636, where the Court of Appeal held that the onus of proof to show good faith is on the applicant, on a balance of probabilities. [24] The Court of Appeal went on to state that this requirement will depend on the factual circumstance before the court. The following passage of the judgment of Palmer J in Swansson (supra) was cited: “Nevertheless, in my opinion, there are at least two interrelated factors to which the courts will always have regard in determining whether the good faith requirement of s 237(2)(b) is satisfied. The first is whether the applicant honestly believes that a good cause of action exists and has a reasonable prospect of success. Clearly, whether the applicant honestly holds this belief would not simply be a matter of bald assertion: the applicant may be disbelieved if no reasonable person in the circumstances could hold that belief. The second factor is whether the applicant is seeking to bring the derivative suit for such a collateral purpose as would amount to an abuse of process.” S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (emphasis added) [25] Based on the above, two elements must be met to satisfy the requirement of good faith: a. The first is that the applicant must honestly believe that a good cause of action exists, and has a reasonable prospect of success. This belief cannot be based on a bald assertion. b. The second is that the applicant cannot be seeking to bring the derivative action for a collateral purpose, as would amount to an abuse of process. [26] In this case, I am satisfied that the requirement of good faith has been met. [27] The application for leave is made to defend the 2nd defendant in Suit 83. Suit 83 is a claim for RM1,131,711.15 alleged to be due and owing by the 2nd defendant to Roda Berlian, for loans and advances said to have been provided by Roda Berlian to the 2nd defendant. The 1st defendant’s case is that the amount outstanding is set out in the audited accounts of the 2nd defendant, and as such, the 2nd defendant does not have a defence to the claim. [28] A closer look at the accounts however shows that the claim is not as simple as made out by the 1st defendant. The amount allegedly due has not been conclusively proven in existing documents. The amounts referred to by the 1st defendant are reflected in the accounts of Roda Berlian as S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 amounts due by “other debtors” and “other payables” due. There are no further particulars of the amounts due, and the amounts are not reflected as owing by the 2nd defendant. [29] In Ng Hoy Keong v Chua Choon Yang & Ors [2010] 9 MLJ 145, leave was granted to the plaintiff to defend a suit on behalf of the 3rd defendant. The court held the plaintiff had shown sufficient evidence that he was acting in good faith. There were many disputed facts disclosed in affidavits filed by the plaintiff and the defendants, and as such, the court found that the issues could only be determined at full trial. [30] Similarly in this case, the documents before the court show that the claim against the 2nd defendant is inconclusive and in dispute. As such, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff would have the honest belief that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the 2nd defendant’s defence against the claim. In this regard, the first element of good faith has been met by the plaintiff. [31] In relation to the second element to meet the requirement of good faith, namely that the applicant cannot be seeking to bring the derivative action for a collateral purpose, the 1st defendant has mounted two arguments. [32] The first is related to the filing of Suit 393 by Roda Berlian and the Tan Family against the 2nd defendant and the Lim Family. Suit 393 was filed prior to the filing of Suit 83. Part of Roda Berlian’s claim against the plaintiff was allowed by the court. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [33] The second is the plaintiff’s prior convictions at the Magistrate’s Court for fraud and dishonestly using forged documents. The 1st defendant further claimed the plaintiff has been disqualified from being a director. [34] The 1st defendant argued that the history of hostility and litigation between the parties, coupled with the plaintiff’s questionable character, are indications of the absence of good faith on the part of the plaintiff in this action. [35] On this issue, I am guided by Tai May Chean v United Eastern Resources Sdn Bhd & Anor [2022] 4 MLJ 779, where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[71] With respect we do not think that just because there is a history of pending litigation between the plaintiff daughter and the defendant mother, there must then be some oblique or collateral purpose that the plaintiff is here pursuing. [72] Hostility between the parties does not equate to a lack of good faith and neither does it raise any presumption of a collateral purpose on the part of the applicant unless it is a case where the venomous vendetta of the parties has led to vile vilification, clouding all reasonable and rational decision and producing a perverted pursuit for personal gains (see the case of Pang Yong Hock and Another v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] SGCA 18 at paras 20 and 22). [73] Whilst we share the concern of the learned JC in that the court ‘cannot but be alive to the possibility that the plaintiff’s (TMC) S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 conducts by the plaintiff cannot in themselves equate to a lack of good faith by the plaintiff, or lead to a conclusion that the proposed defence of sought to be obtained for the 2nd defendant in its defence of Suit 83 must be considered objectively and dispassionately, and balanced with any the 2nd defendant in Suit 83 is to protect and safeguard the interest of the 2nd defendant. This is clear from the prayers in the originating summons, which relate directly to this purpose. The plaintiff sought leave to defend the 2nd defendant in Suit 83, to file all necessary applications and to control the proceedings. The prayers do not reflect any collateral benefit on behalf of the plaintiff, that would arise from the 2nd defendant defending itself in Suit 83. On the other hand, failure by the plaintiff to take action to defend present action is part of her strategy in furthering her own personal interests in the legal proceedings against the parties therein rather than the interest of the first defendant (UER)’, the court must nevertheless assess her subjective satisfaction of having acted in ‘good faith’ and ‘in the best interest of the company’ by evaluating dispassionately the benefits that she seeks to obtain for the company through the proposed litigation.” (emphasis added) [36] Thus, hostility between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, and past the 2nd defendant in Suit 83 is being brought for a collateral purpose. [37] Following Tai May Chean (supra), an evaluation of the benefits benefit that the plaintiff may have intended to obtain for himself. [38] I find the primary purpose of the plaintiff seeking leave to defend S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Suit 83 on behalf of the 2nd defendant would tantamount to a breach of the plaintiff’s duties as a director of the 2nd defendant. [39] From the considerations and findings above, I find the plaintiff has shown that the 2nd defendant’s defence of Suit 83 is not intended to be brought for a collateral purpose, so as to amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Is it in the best interest of the 2nd defendant that the application for leave is granted? [40] The next requirement that the court must be satisfied with is that it is prima facie in the best interest of the 2nd defendant for this application for leave to be granted. [41] In Celcom (Malaysia) Bhd (supra), the Court of Appeal cited with approval the test of the best interest of a company, as expounded in the following passage in Pang Yong Hock and Another v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] 3 SLR 1: “[21] Having established that an applicant is acting in good faith and that a claim appears genuine, the court must nevertheless weigh all the circumstances and decide whether the claim ought to be pursued. Whether the company stands "to gain substantially in money or in money's worth" (per Choo JC in Agus Irawan) relates more to the issue of whether it is in the interests of the company to pursue the claim rather than whether the claim is meritorious or not. A $100 claim may be meritorious but it may not be expedient to commence an action for S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 it. The company may have genuine commercial considerations for not wanting to pursue certain claims. Perhaps it does not want to damage a good, long-term, profitable relationship. It could also be that it does not wish to generate bad publicity for itself because of some important negotiations which are underway.” (emphasis added) [42] The Court of Appeal went on to hold that the application for leave in that case was intended to unwind a corporate exercise undertaken by the parties, which would be a laborious, costly and complicated process. It would also have a disastrous effect on the appellant's credibility and market reputation. As such, it was held that leave should not have been granted by the High Court. [43] In the present case, weighing all circumstances, I find it to be in the best interest of the 2nd defendant that the application for leave is granted. The fact that a claim is filed against the 2nd defendant gives rise to a genuine concern. I had earlier held that the claim against the 2nd defendant is inconclusive and disputed. It is therefore in the best interest of the 2nd defendant to be allowed to defend itself. [44] The court also recognises that the right to defend itself in proceedings filed against it, is a basic right of the 2nd defendant. This is notwithstanding the 1st defendant’s contention that the claim is straightforward and there is evidence to prove the amount owing. The 2nd defendant must still be allowed to defend itself. S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [45] It should also be highlighted that the 1st defendant is a director of both Roda Berlian and the 2nd defendant. Yet, the 1st defendant has chosen to object to the 2nd defendant defending itself in Suit 83. The 1st defendant’s actions are in wilful dereliction of his duties as a director of the 2nd defendant, and are against the best interest of the 2nd defendant. [46] Taking these considerations into account, I am satisfied that it is prima facie in the best interest of the 2nd defendant for this application for leave to be granted. D. Decision [47] Having found that the plaintiff is acting in good faith in seeking leave to defend the 2nd defendant in Suit 83, and that it would be prima facie in the best interest of the 2nd defendant for leave to be granted, I allowed the originating summons, with costs. Dated 22 December 2023 - sgd - ADLIN ABDUL MAJID Judge High Court of Malaya Commercial Division (NCC6) Kuala Lumpur S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Counsel: Plaintiff : Isaac Hong Chun Hao of Messrs. Chim & Co 1st defendant : YH Yeo of Messrs. Shui Tai S/N jgTNczrHuUKMfsW/XiljRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

DA-21NCvC-1-01/2019

PLAINTIF SHALIHAH BINTI MAHAMAD DEFENDAN 1. ) WAN ROSEZYDA BINTI WAN ZAIN 2. ) TETUAN HASIF AZHAM RIZAL & CO 3. ) Pentadbir Tanah, Pejabat Tanah Dan Jajahan Kota Bharu 4. ) Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan 5. ) JABATAN KETUA PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN PERSEKUTUAN 6. ) Penilai Daerah Kota Bharu Jabatan Penilaian Dan Perkhidmatan Harta 7. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

TUNTUTAN SIVIL: Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Jual Beli adalah tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio - sama ada PJB untuk membeli Hartanah Tersebut batal secara void ab initio apabila Hartanah Tersebut terlibat dengan pengambilan oleh kerajaan seluas 5147 kaki persegi dari keluasan keseluruhan 5522 kaki persegi - sama ada ujudnya elemen penipuan dan/atau salah nyataan oleh Defendan 1 sebagai pemilik berdaftar dalam urusan pembelian Hartanah Tersebut - sama ada Defendan 2 telah gagal menjalankan kewajipan berhati-hati dan skil professionalnya sebagai pengamal undang-undang dalam memberi nasihat guaman kepada anak guamnya dalam menyediakan PJB dan menguruskan pinjaman Plaintif dengan LPPSA - sama ada Defendan 3 telah gagal dalam menjalankan kewajipan statutorinya sebagai Pentadbir Tanah dalam memastikan status sebenar Hartanah Tersebut dan mematuhi prosedur piawaan yang ditetapkan dalam pengeluaran geran ganti dan mendaftarkan gadaian serta pindah milik Hartanah Tersebut kepada Plaintif apabila terdapatnya hal pengambilan tanah dalam Hartanah Tersebut - sama ada Defendan 4 selaku majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 3 adalah bertanggungan secara vikarius terhadap Plaintif - sama ada Defendan 6 telah gagal untuk menyedari dan meneliti dengan berhati-hati bahawa Hartanah Tersebut terlibat dengan pengambilan dan seterusnya telah gagal membuat penilaian yang sebenar bagi Hartanah Tersebut yang menyebabkan pinjaman diluluskan - sama Defendan 7 selaku majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 6 adalah bertanggungan secara vikarius terhadap Plaintif - sama ada Plaintif berhak mendapatkan semua bayaran harga jual beli RM195,000 dan bayaran-bayaran yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif berserta gantirugi-gantirugi am dan teladan kesan dari kegagalan transaksi pembelian Hartanah Tersebut akibat kecuaian Defendan-Defendan.

03/01/2024

YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5e4c8fb0-153f-4341-8de8-1aecad5d360b&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - DA-21NCVC-1-01-2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: DA-21NCVC-1-01/2019 ANTARA SHALIHAH BINTI MAHAMAD … PLAINTIF DAN 1) WAN ROSEZYDA BINTI WAN ZAIN 2) TETUAN HASIF AZHAM RIZAL & CO 3) PENTADBIR TANAH PEJABAT TANAH DAN JAJAHAN KOTA BHARU 4) KERAJAAN NEGERI KELANTAN 5) PENGARAH JABATAN KETUA PENGARAH TANAH & GALIAN 6) PENILAI DAERAH KOTA BHARU JABATAN PENILAIAN & PERKHIDMATAN HARTA 7) KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … DEFENDAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Plaintif menuntut dari Defendan-Defendan antara lainnya suatu deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Jual Beli (selepas ini dipanggil “PJB”) bertarikh 17.11.2015 antara Plaintif dengan Defendan 1 bagi satu hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Lot 1038, GM 1009, Mukim Tanjung Chat, Jajahan Kota Bharu, Kelantan (selepas ini dipanggil “Hartanah Tersebut”) adalah tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio. [2] Plaintif adalah seorang warga negara Malaysia beralamat di PT 595, Jalan Tanjung 11, Taman Tanjung Chat, 15300 Kota Bharu, Kelantan dan merupakan pembeli Hartanah Tersebut [3] Defendan 1 adalah warga negara Malaysia beralamat di nombor 4958F, Jalan Pengkalan Chepa, 15400 Kota Bharu, Kelantan dan merupakan pemilik berdaftar Hartanah Tersebut sebelum menjualkannya kepada Plaintif. [4] Defendan 2 adalah sebuah firma guaman yang berdaftar dengan Majlis Peguam Malaysia dan beralamat di Lot 718, Jalan Sri 03/01/2024 07:56:53 DA-21NCvC-1-01/2019 Kand. 120 S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Cemerlang 14/27 off Jalan Pengkalan Chepa, 15300 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [5] Defendan 3 adalah sebuah badan di bawah kuasa Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan yang antara lainnya mentadbir hartanah di Jajahan Kota Bharu dan beralamat di Jalan Hospital, Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [6] Defendan 4 pula adalah majikan Defendan 3 yang bertanggungan terhadap apa-apa tindakan, peninggalan atau kegagalan Defendan 3 dan beralamat penyampaiannya di Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Tingkat 1, Blok 6, Kompleks Kota Darulnaim, 15503 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [7] Defendan 5 adalah sebuah badan di bawah kuasa Kerajaan Malaysia yang beralamat di Bandar Baru Tunjung, Lebuhraya Kota Bharu – Pasir Mas, 15100 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [8] Defendan 6 juga adalah sebuah badan di bawah kuasa Kerajaan Malaysia dan beralamat di Aras 4, Wisma Persekutuan, Jalan Bayam, 15592 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. [9] Defendan 7 adalah majikan Defendan 5 dan Defendan 6 yang bertanggungan ke atas apa-apa tindakan, peninggalan atau kegagalan Defendan 5 dan Defendan 6 dan alamat penyampaiannya di Jabatan Peguam Negara, Bahagian Guaman, No. 45, Persiaran Perdana, Presint 4, 62100 Putrajaya. Fakta [10] Plaintif dan Defendan 1 telah memasuki PJB di mana Defendan 1 bersetuju menjual Hartanah Tersebut dengan harga RM195,000 dan Plaintif setuju untuk membelinya. Plaintif kemudiannya telah melantik Defendan 2 sebagai peguamcaranya dan juga sebagai stakeholder. [11] Setelah Hartanah Tersebut berpindah milik kepada Plaintif dan pinjaman pembiayaan diluluskan oleh Lembaga Pembiayaan Perumahan Sektor Awam (selepas ini dipanggil “LPPSA”) sebanyak RM155,000, Plaintif menyatakan dia mendapati keluasan fizikal Hartanah Tersebut adalah tidak sama dengan keluasan yang telah dipersetujuinya semasa memasuki PJB. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Kes terhadap Defendan 5 [12] Defendan 5 bersama dengan Defendan 6 dan Defendan 7 telah memfailkan permohonan di bawah Aturan 18, Kaedah 19(1)(a), (b) dan (d), Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (selepas ini dipanggil “KKM 2012”) untuk membatalkan writ saman dan mengenepikan pernyataan tuntutan terpinda Plaintif seperti di Lampiran 48. Permohonan Defendan 5 telah dibenarkan manakala permohonan Defendan 6 dan Defendan 7 ditolak. Tiada rayuan dibuat oleh Plaintif atau lain-lain pihak terhadap keputusan berkenaan. Isu [13] Isu-isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah dalam perbicaraan ini (Lampiran 62) adalah: (i) sama ada PJB untuk membeli Hartanah Tersebut batal secara void ab initio apabila Hartanah Tersebut terlibat dengan pengambilan oleh kerajaan seluas 5147 kaki persegi dari keluasan keseluruhan 5522 kaki persegi. (ii) sama ada ujudnya elemen penipuan dan/atau salah nyataan oleh Defendan 1 sebagai pemilik berdaftar dalam urusan pembelian Hartanah Tersebut. (iii) sama ada Defendan 2 telah gagal menjalankan kewajipan berhati-hati dan skil professionalnya sebagai pengamal undang-undang dalam memberi nasihat guaman kepada anak guamnya dalam menyediakan PJB dan menguruskan pinjaman Plaintif dengan LPPSA. (iv) sama ada Defendan 3 telah gagal dalam menjalankan kewajipan statutorinya sebagai Pentadbir Tanah dalam memastikan status sebenar Hartanah Tersebut dan mematuhi prosedur piawaan yang ditetapkan dalam pengeluaran geran ganti dan mendaftarkan gadaian serta pindah milik Hartanah Tersebut kepada Plaintif apabila terdapatnya hal pengambilan tanah dalam Hartanah Tersebut. (v) sama ada Defendan 4 selaku majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 3 adalah bertanggungan secara vikarius terhadap Plaintif. (vi) sama ada Defendan 6 telah gagal untuk menyedari dan meneliti dengan berhati-hati bahawa Hartanah Tersebut terlibat dengan pengambilan dan seterusnya telah gagal membuat penilaian yang sebenar bagi Hartanah Tersebut yang menyebabkan pinjaman diluluskan. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (vii) sama Defendan 7 selaku majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 6 adalah bertanggungan secara vikarius terhadap Plaintif. (viii) sama ada Plaintif berhak mendapatkan semua bayaran harga jual beli RM195,000 dan bayaran-bayaran yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif berserta gantirugi-gantirugi am dan teladan kesan dari kegagalan transaksi pembelian Hartanah Tersebut akibat kecuaian Defendan-Defendan. Isu tambahan dari Defendan 1 (ix) adakah PJB tersebut sah, batal atau boleh batal. (x) adakah perjanjian kontrak yang lengkap dan telah disempurnakan (telah dimuktamadkan) di mana balasan telah berpindah kepada pihak ketiga (secara benefisil) boleh dibatalkan. (xi) adakah harga jual beli sebanyak RM195,000 dalam PJB berkenaan merupakan suatu balasan yang sah untuk penjualan Hartanah Tersebut. (xii) dalam keadaan PJB berkenaan sah dan berkuatkuasa, adakah Plaintif mengalami kerugian dan transaksi jual beli melalui PJB kontrak tersebut. Jika jawapannya “Ya”, perlu diputuskan selanjutnya iaitu: a) berapakah jumlah kerugian Plaintif. b) siapakah yang melakukan kecuaian dan perlu bertanggungjawab dalam kerugian Plaintif tersebut. Tambahan isu oleh Defendan 2 (xiii) sama ada Defendan 2 dibebankan dengan tanggungjawab untuk mempertikaikan rekod hakmilik yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan 3 ketika mana menyediakan PJB. Penelitian dan penemuan mahkamah Kes Plaintif [14] Plaintif adalah pembeli Hartanah Tersebut dan Defendan 1 adalah pemilik berdaftarnya. Pada sekitar bulan Julai 2005, ayah Plaintif (SP2) telah dimaklumkan oleh seorang broker tanah (SD1) bahawa terdapat sebidang tanah berdekatan rumah SP2 untuk dijual. SD1 S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 kemudiannya memperkenalkan SP2 kepada suami Defendan 1 (SD2). [15] Setelah rundingan diadakan, Plaintif dan SP2 telah dibawa oleh SD2 untuk melihat Hartanah Tersebut. SD2 membuat representasi bahawa keluasannya adalah 513 meter persegi dan menunjukkan had sempadannya dengan tangan. Plaintif dan SP1 juga ditunjukkan pelan ukur Hartnah Tersebut dan keluasannya adalah 513 meter persegi atau 5522 kaki persegi. SD2 memberitahu mereka bahawa geran Hartanah Tersebut telah hilang dan jika mereka bersetuju untuk membelinya, Defendan 1 (SD3) akan memohon geran ganti. [16] Defendan 1 menetapkan harga Hartanah Tersebut sebanyak RM195,000 dan dipersetujui Plaintif. Plaintif kemudiannya melantik firma Defendan 2 sebagai peguamnya bagi menguruskan PJB. [17] Pada 15.6.2015, Defendan 1 telah membuat cabutan dari Pejabat Tanah dan Jajahan Kota Bharu (Defendan 3) berkaitan Hartanah Tersebut bertujuan memohon geran baharu. Geran ganti (eksibit D27) telah diperolehi pada 17.11.2015 dan Defendan 1 menyerahkannya kepada Defendan 2. Defendan 2 selanjutnya menyediakan PJB bertarikh 17.11.2015 (eksibit D22) dan ditandatangani oleh Plaintif dan Defendan 1. Defendan 2 juga telah menguruskan permohonan pinjaman Plaintif dengan LPPSA. [18] Pinjaman Plaintif diluluskan sebanyak RM155,000 berdasarkan nilaian bertarikh 10.1.2016 yang dibuat oleh Defendan 6 (melalui pegawainya iaitu SD6). Baki harga belian sebanyak RM40,000 telah dibayar oleh Plaintif secara tunai. Pada 5.10.2016 Hartanah Tersebut didaftarkan atas nama Plaintif dan satu gadaian kepada LPPSA telah dimasukkan oleh Defendan 3. Selepas itu LPPSA telah membuat potongan bulanan gaji Plaintif bagi membayar balik pinjaman tersebut. [19] Pada sekitar bulan November 2016 semasa pembersihan Hartanah Tersebut, Plaintif tidak menjumpai batu penanda sempadan Hartanah Tersebut. Plaintif kemudiannya membuat carian terhadap lot Hartanah Tersebut dari Defendan 3 dan mendapati keluasan tanah yang dicatatkan adalah 513 meter persegi serta juga rekod pengambilan seluas 5157 kaki persegi. Rekod ini menyebabkan Plaintif terkejut dan keliru kerana Defendan 1 tidak pernah memaklumkan berhubung dengan pengambilan ini dan PJB yang S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 disediakan Defendan 2 menyatakan keluasan Hartanah Tersebut sebagai 513 meter persegi (muka surat 9 PJB, Bahagian 4, Jadual 1). [20] Plaintif telah merujuk berhubung dengan perkara ini kepada Defendan 3, Jabatan Ukur dan Pemetaan Negeri Kelantan (selepas ini dipanggil “JUPEM”) dan Defendan 5. Defendan 3 memberi maklum balas bahawa status tanah berkenaan adalah seperti salinan hakmilik yang dikepilkan i.e. keluasan 513 meter persegi dan semakan akan dibuat berhubung dengan pengambilan. Defendan 5 juga memberi maklum balas bahawa seluas 5147 kaki persegi Hartanah Tersebut telah dibuat pengambilan dan Borang K telah dikeluarkan pada 3.12.1978. Geran baharu akan dikeluarkan setelah JUPEM membuat pengukuran. Manakala JUPEM memberikan maklum balas bahawa lot Hartanah Tersebut tidak lagi ujud dalam rekod mereka dan tiada lagi baki tanah. [21] Plaintif berasa tertipu dengan keluasan sebenar Hartanah Tersebut dan membuat laporan polis pada 31.7.2018. Permohonan kepada LPPSA untuk menghentikan potongan bulanan gaji bagi pembayaran pinjaman juga telah ditolak. Akibat dari salahnyata frod dan kecuaian berlapis-lapis (multiple levels of negligence), Plaintif telah mengalami kesusahan, kerugian dan masalah kesihatan yang teruk. [22] Plaintif menghujahkan kausa tindakan (cause of action) terhadap Defendan-Defendan adalah seperti berikut: (i) Defendan 1 atas salahnyataan frod (fraudulent misrepresentation). (ii) Defendan 2 atas kecuaian dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati-hati dan tanggungjawab fidusiari (breach of duty of care and fudiciary duty). (iii) Defendan 3 atas kecuaian dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab statutori (breach of statutory duty). (iv) Defendan 4 atas liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 3 (vicarious liability to the 3rd Defendant). (v) Defendan 6 atas kecuaian dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati-hati dan menggunakan skil (breach of duty of care and reasonable skill). (vi) Defendan 7 atas liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 6 (vicarious liability to the 6th Defendant). S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [23] Butir-butir kerugian yang dialami Plaintif (seperti dalam pernyataan tuntutan terpinda) adalah: (i) bayaran balik pembiayaan kepada LPPSA sebanyak RM163,495 (pinjaman sebanyak RM155,000 dan insuran takaful RM8,495). (ii) bayaran bulanan RM791.54 selama 360 bulan (30 tahun) bermula Ogos 2016 hingga Julai 2046 berjumlah RM391,585.07 (setakat Disember 2018, Plaintif telah membuat bayaran secara potongan gaji sebanyak RM18,996.96). (iii) bayaran tunai RM40,000 kepada Defendan 1. (iv) bayaran kos peguam (Defendan 2) RM5,500. (v) lain-lain kerugian dan kesusahan yang akan dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan. ISU LIABILITI PIHAK-PIHAK Kes Defendan 1 [24] Defendan 1 menghujahkan dia tidak pernah membuat sebarang penipuan atau salahnyata fakta kepada Plaintif berhubung dengan pengambilan balik yang dibuat oleh kerajaan pada tahun 1978. Defendan 1 tidak pernah membuat tawaran atau mengiklankan untuk menjual Hartanah Tersebut kepada Plaintif atau orang lain. [25] Ini adalah kerana Plaintif dan ayahnya (SP2) telah mempunyai pengetahuan berhubung dengan pengambilan balik Hartanah Tersebut sejak dari perjumpaan pertama di pejabat Defendan 2 pada 18.6.2015. Plaintif sendiri telah mempunyai pengetahuan berhubung dengan pengambilan balik Hartanah Tersebut ketika menandatangani PJB pada 17.11.2015, semasa merujuk kepada geran hakmilik dalam permohonan pinjaman kepada LPPSA dan ketika hadir di Pejabat Tanah bagi menandatangani Borang Pindah Milik (Borang 14A). Malah Peguamcara Plaintif (SD4 dari firma Defendan 2) mengakui mengetahui berhubung dengan fakta bahawa terdapatnya pengambilan balik tersebut. [26] Selain dari itu disebabkan Plaintif telah meneliti geran hakmilik serta dokumen-dokumen berkaitan dan menandatangani PJB, maka Plaintif adalah terikat dengan doktrin non-est factum dan perlu bertanggungjawab kepada PJB yang ditandatanganinya. PJB berkenaan telah lengkap, sempurna dan mengikat kedua-dua pihak S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 kerana hakmilik telah berpindah kepada Plaintif dan bayaran penuh pun telah dibuat. Kegagalan Plaintif mengambil tindakan munasabah bagi menyemak status Hartanah Tersebut dihujahkan menyebabkan tuntutan Plaintif gagal di bawah maxim caveat emptor. [27] Meneliti kepada kes Defendan 1 ini, saya berpendapat Plaintif dan SP2 adalah layman dan bukannya mahir dalam bidang jual beli hartanah. Sebab itulah mereka melantik Defendan 2 sebagai peguam mereka. Cabutan geran hakmilik Hartanah Tersebut yang ditunjukkan serta digunakan dalam perbincangan, dalam PJB, semasa menandatangani Borang 14A dan semasa menandatangani dokumen-dokumen pembiayaan (eksibit D25B dan eksibit D25C), dengan jelas mencatitkan di bahagian hadapan bahawa keluasan Hartanah Tersebut adalah 513 meter persegi. Manakala di muka surat dua di bahagian “rekod urusan” terdapat catitan pendaftaran pengambilan sebahagian tanah seluas lebih kurang 5147 kaki persegi bertarikh 3.12.1978. [28] Saya berpendapat sebagai layman, Plaintif atau SP2 atau sesiapa sahaja, jika tidak dimaklumi berhubung dengan pengambilan tersebut, tidak akan mengetahui bahawa baki tanah bukan lagi seluas 513 meter persegi. Ini adalah kerana pengambilan tersebut adalah pada tahun 1978 dan minat Plaintif untuk membeli Hartanah Tersebut dan memasuki PJB adalah pada tahun 2015 iaitu suatu tempoh 37 tahun. Mereka-mereka yang dikategorikan sebagai layman ini akan beranggapan cacatan 513 meter persegi adalah baki tanah selepas pengambilan atau keluasan terkini. Itulah pengetahuan yang ada pada Plaintif dan SP2 berhubung dengan keluasan Hartanah Tersebut. [29] Saya percaya Plaintif yang sedang mencari tanah untuk membina rumahnya sendiri tidak akan membeli Hartanah Tersebut dan tidak akan membayar dengan harga RM195,000 (tunai dan pembiayaan) jika dia mengetahui bahawa keluasannya hanyalah 375 kaki persegi. [30] Plaintif telah bertindak secara munasabah sebelum membeli Hartanah Tersebut dengan melantik seorang profesional dari Defendan 2 bagi menguruskan dokumentasi pembelian, pembiayaan, gadaian dan sebagainya. Sehubungan itu saya berpendapat maxim caveat emptor adalah tidak terpakai terhadap Plaintif. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [31] Defendan 1 mendapat hakmilik Hartanah Tersebut dari bapanya pada 11.5.1999. Saya percaya sebelum pindah milik itu dibuat (sebagai suatu kelaziman), Defendan 1 telah dimaklumkan oleh ayahnya berhubung butir-butir penuh Hartanah Tersebut iaitu pengambilan oleh kerajaan pada tahun 1978, keluasan yang diambil, pampasan yang dibayar dan baki tanah yang masih tinggal. Ini bermaksud Defendan 1 mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa keluasan Hartanah Tersebut bukan lagi 513 meter persegi selepas pengambilan dibuat. [32] Dengan tindakan menggunakan broker (SD1) dan suaminya (SD2) yang membawa Plaintif serta SP2 ke Hartanah Tersebut dan menunjukkan sempadannya, jelas membuktikan bahawa terdapatnya fraudulent misrepresentation berhubung dengan keluasan Hartanah Tersebut. Ini ditambah lagi semasa Defendan 1 bertemu Plaintif pada masa menandatangani PJB dan menandatangani Borang 14A, dimana Defendan 1 tidak memaklumkan keluasan sebenar Hartanah Tersebut. Dengan pemfailan writ saman ini terhadapnya pun dan setelah mengetahui keluasan Hartanah Tersebut bukannya 513 meter persegi, Defendan 1 masih enggan bertindak positif untuk membetulkan keadaan atau memulangkan wang jualan kepada Plaintif. [33] Seksyen 17, Akta Kontrak 1950 memperuntukan fraud sebagai: Section 17. "Fraud" "Fraud" includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [34] Juga prinsip dalam kes Kheng Chwee Lian v Wong Tak Thong [1983] 1 MLRA 66 FC: “[10] In the case of Pertab Chunder Ghose v. Mohendra Purkait [1888-89] 16 IA 233, Sir Richard Couch in giving the judgment of the Privy Council said at p 237: Where one party induces the other to contract on the faith of representations made to him, anyone of which is untrue, the whole contract is, in a Court of Equity, considered as having been obtained fraudulently.” [35] Jelas disini bahawa tindakan Defendan 1 adalah merupakan suatu salahnyataan frod (elemen-elemen seperti dalam kes Artistic Biofuels Sdn Bhd v Port Kelang Authority & Ors [2022] 1 MLRH 468) iaitu: (i) membuat salahnyataan kepada Plaintif bahawa keluasan Hartanah Tersebut adalah 513 meter persegi/5522 kaki persegi. (ii) membuat salahnyataan fakta tersebut dengan niat supaya Plaintif bertindak berdasarkannya. (iii) membuat salahnyataan fakta tersebut dengan pengetahuan bahawa ianya tidak benar kerana mengetahui adanya pengambilan balik pada tahun 1978 dan meninggalkan baki 375 kaki persegi. (iv) Plaintif telah percaya dan bergantung kepada salahnyataan fakta tersebut dalam menandatangani PJB. (v) akibatnya Plaintif mengalami kerugian dari segi monetari, penat lelah, tekanan mental dan kesihatan. [36] Atas alasan tersebutlah saya berpendapat Plaintif tidak terikat kepada PJB berkenaan kerana ujudnya salahnyataan frod. Ini selaras dengan keputusan kes Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v Hillary Ang & 4 Ors (Collectively Known as The Search) & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 127: “A party who signs a written contract is bound by the terms of the contract, except in the limited cases where fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation may be established.” S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [37] Sehubungan itu saya mendapati Defendan 1 telah melakukan salahnyataan frod terhadap Plaintif dan menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami kerugian. Kes Defendan 2 [38] Defendan 2 menghujahkan bahawa pliding Plaintif adalah terhadap salahnyataan frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan 1 sedangkan Defendan 2 tidak terlibat dengan kausa tindakan tersebut. Defendan 2 menghujahkan Plaintif adalah terikat kepada plidingnya dan dengan demikian tiada kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan 2. [39] Saya meneliti kepada pliding yang difailkan oleh Plaintif dan mendapati kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan 2 iaitu cuai/gagal dalam memberikan nasihat guaman yang munasabah apabila gagal dalam kewajipan berhati-hati (kecuaian prosesional) terhadap Plaintif telah diplidkan dengan jelas di perenggan 27 pernyataan tuntutan terpinda. [40] Selanjutnya Defendan 2 menghujahkan dia telah dapat membuktikan bahawa telah melakukan all possible standard attempt and practice dalam memastikan semua maklumat adalah tepat dalam menyediakan PJB dan seterusnya memperolehi pinjaman dari LPPSA. Setiap dokumen yang dikemukakan dan diperolehinya iaitu dokumen pinjaman, pelan tanah, cabutan hakmilik dan geran hakmilik ganti (eksibit D27) jelas menunjukkan catitan keluasan Hartanah Tersebut sebagai 513 meter persegi dan bukannya 375 kaki persegi. Selain dari itu Plaintif melantik Defendan 2 hanyalah bertujuan untuk memproses pinjaman dengan LPPSA sahaja dan bukannya diperingkat awalan semasa rundingan pembelian. [41] Keterangan Defendan 2 juga menyatakan dia berpendapat disebabkan pengambilan balik oleh kerajaan dibuat pada tahun 1978 dan transaksi jual beli Hartanah Tersebut bermula pada tahun 2015 iaitu suatu tempoh 37 tahun dan tempoh yang lama, maka catitan keluasan pada cabutan hakmilik dan geran hakmilik ganti semestinya telah dikemaskinikan. Oleh yang demikian dihujahkan Defendan 2 telah menjalankan segala tindakan profesionalnya dengan kewajipan yang berhati-hati. Plaintif sendiri gagal mengemukakan seorang pakar atau profesional lain bagi menunjukkan sebaliknya. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [42] Berhubung dengan pembelaan Defendan 2 ini, saya berpendapat tanggungjawabnya untuk bertindak secara profesional dan kewajipan berhati-hati dalam mewakili Plaintif bermula sebaik sahaja lantikan dibuat dan meliputi pelbagai aspek. Kedudukan ini telah diputuskan dalam kes Mulpha Kluang Maritime Carriers Sdn Bhd v Philip Koh Tong Ngee & Ors [2015] 8 CLJ 555: “(ii) the court finds that it is the duty of a solicitor, in particular, a conveyancing solicitor to ensure that all the documents pertaining to the transaction of land must be properly prepared, to carry out a thorough inquiry and to ensure that all the details which is stated in the transaction document is correct. .......... Therefore, as a solicitor, the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care to exercise professional skill, care and diligence demanded by law in advising all legal aspect with regard to the transactions in handling the S&P of the two lots.” [43] Adalah menjadi amalan asas conveyancing bagi peguam, di mana SD4 (peguam Defendan 2 yang mempunyai pengalaman dalam bidang ini selama lebih kurang 20 tahun bahawa dalam transaksi sebegini, peguam berkenaan perlu membuat carian atau inkuiri yang lengkap berhubung dengan Hartanah Tersebut terutamanya berhubung dengan pengambilan balik pada tahun 1978. [44] Saya berpendapat dengan pengalaman SD4 selama lebih kurang 20 tahun (seperti keterangannya sendiri), beliau perlu menyelidiki efek catatan pengambilan berkenaan iaitu sama ada keluasan sebenar dan terkini telah dibuat dalam geran atau cabutan hakmilik Hartanah Tersebut. Saya berpendapat SD4 perlu menggunakan pengalamannya dalam conveyancing untuk mendapatkan pengesahan tepat dan terkini berhubung dengan baki keluasan Hartanah Tersebut selepas pengambilan. Pengesahan tepat dan terkini bermaksud adakah tindakan oleh pihak-pihak berkaitan telah dibuat bagi mencatatkan keluasan sebenar. Soalan munasabah yang sepatutnya secara otomatik timbul kepada seorang professional dalam bidang ini adalah, adakah keluasan Hartanah Tersebut yang tercatat pada geran hakmilik itu telah mengambilkira keluasan pengambilan yang dibuat oleh kerajaan pada tahun 1978. [45] Keterangan menunjukkan SD4 sedar ujudnya pengambilan pada tahun 1978 dan mengambil tindakan dengan menyemak maklumat S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 tanah, meneliti geran hakmilik ganti, rekod cabutan hakmilik dan pelan lakar. Dari penelitian itu, SD4 memutuskan rekod-rekod terkini berhubung dengan keluasan terkini Hartanah Tersebut adalah betul serta tidak mengesyaki apa-apa kerana pengambilan telah lama dibuat iaitu 37 tahun yang lalu iaitu pada tahun 1978. [46] Saya berpendapat SD4 telah gagal melaksanakan kewajipan berhati-hatinya dan kewajipan profesional berhubung dengan pengesahan keluasan yang tepat bagi Hartanah Tersebut. Ini selaras dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tetuan Theselim Mohd Sahal & Co & Ors v Tan Boon Huat & Anor [2017] 4 MLRA 702: “[30] Thus, whether the first defendant, and in particular the second defendant, who was the solicitor handling the transaction, were negligent may be determined by a consideration of the following questions: i. whether the standard of care practiced by the second defendant was the same standard of reasonably competent solicitors in conveyancing practice; and ii. whether the second defendant had acted with diligence in exercising the reasonable care and skill expected to assist the completion of the SPA." [47] Selanjutnya saya juga tidak dapat menerima pembelaan Defendan 2 bahawa Plaintif sebagai seorang yang berpendidikan tinggi (penjawat awam yang mempunyai ijazah), sepatutnya dapat membaca atau meneliti geran hakmilik/cabutan dengan tepat iaitu sama ada terdapatnya pengambilan pada Hartanah Tersebut dan bertanyakan pada Defendan 1. Saya berpendapat walau pun Plaintif seorang yang berpendidikan tinggi tetapi dalam bidang conveyancing beliau adalah seorang layman. Atas sebab itulah Plaintif melantik firma Defendan 2 untuk urusan transaksi jual beli dan pinjaman Hartanah Tersebut. Sehubungan itu kewajipan berhati-hati Defendan 2 kepada anakguam mereka (Plaintif) masih berterusan walau apa pun status pendidikannya. [48] Akhir sekali saya menyentuh tentang pembelaan Defendan 2 bahawa perlakuan Plaintif menunjukan dia seorang yang tidak jujur apabila mendakwa PJB yang disediakan SD4 hanya mengepilkan muka surat 1 salinan geran ganti atau tidak dikepilkan langsung geran berkenaan dan berlaku perbezaan keterangan dalam S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 mahkamah. Saya berpendapat ini bukanlah isu material kerana pada pengetahuan Plaintif seperti yang dimaklumkan oleh Defendan 1, SD1 dan SD2, keluasan Hartanah Tersebut adalah 513 meter persegi dan itulah yang membuatnya memasuki PJB. [49] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan tersebut saya mendapati Defendan 2 telah bertindak dengan cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati-hati dan tanggungjawab fidusiari (breach of duty of care and fudiciary duty) dan selanjutnya menyebabkan kerugian kepada Plaintif. Kes Defendan 3 dan Defendan 4 [50] Defendan 3 dan Defendan 4 dalam keterangan mereka melalui saksi SD5 (Penolong Ketua Jajahan, Pejabat Tanah & Jajahan Kota Bharu) menyatakan mereka telah menjalankan kewajipan statutori sebagai Pentadbir Tanah tanpa gagal dan menjalankan tugas yang sempurna dalam memastikan status Hartanah Tersebut. Mereka juga telah mematuhi prosedur piawaian yang ditetapkan dalam pengeluaran geran ganti Hartanah Tersebut, memindah milik kepada Plaintif dan mendaftarkan gadaian. [51] Bagi menyokong keterangan tersebut, Defendan 3 menghujahkan tindakan telah dibuat untuk mencatitkan status sebenar Hartanah Tersebut pada geran hakmilik iaitu membuat catatan (endorsan) rekod pengambilan dengan “Perserahan No. 457/1978 Jil. 151 Fol. 78, Pengambilan Sebahagian Tanah – Borang K”. Endorsan yang sama juga dibuat dalam geran ganti yang dipohon oleh Defendan 1. [52] Selanjutnya Defendan 3 menyatakan pelan asal Hartanah Tersebut terpaksa dikekalkan dan dilampirkan dengan geran ganti dengan catitan keluasan asal sebelum pengambilan sebagai 513 meter persegi. Defendan 3 memberi alasan bahawa masih belum menerima dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan iaitu Pelan Akui (PA) dan B1-TIFF yang mencatitkan keluasan sebenar Hartanah Tersebut selepas pengambilan dari JUPEM. [53] Saya tidak dapat menerima alasan yang diberikan oleh Defendan 3 ini iaitu belum mendapat dokumen-dokumen berkenaan dari JUPEM. Perlu diingat pengambilan balik dibuat pada tahun 1978 dan endorsan dalam geran hakmilik didaftarkan pada 3.12.1978. Namun sehingga tarikh permohonan Defendan 1 untuk S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 mendapatkan geran ganti Hartanah Tersebut pada 16.6.2015 dan dikeluarkan oleh Defendan 3 pada 28.9.2015, iaitu suatu tempoh selama 37 tahun, keluasan yang tertera dalam rekod Defendan 3 dan dalam geran hakmilik masih lagi 513 meter persegi sedangkan seluas 5147 kaki persegi telah dibuat pengambilan dari keluasan asal 5522 kaki persegi. [54] Defendan 3 sebagai sebuah jabatan kerajaan negeri yang mentadbir dan menguruskan urusan hartanah dalam Jajahan Kota Bharu, Kelantan sepatutnya dengan kewajipan statutori, memastikan rekod ke atas Hartanah Tersebut adalah tepat bagi memastikan keluasan terkini. Defendan 3 merupakan sebuah jabatan yang banyak berurusan dengan orang ramai dan orang ramai ini akan bergantung seratus peratus kepada rekod Defendan 3 dalam urusan hartanah dalam Jajahan Kota Bharu. [55] Saya mendapati telah berlaku keingkaran tugas statutori kerana elemen-elemennya telah dibuktikan seperti yang dibentangkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2016] MLJU 15: “[27] The elements to satisfy the tort of breach of duty are as follows: a) The injury suffered by the plaintiff is within the ambit of the statute, b) The statutory duty imposes a liability to civil action, c) The statutory duty is not fulfilled, and d) The breach of the statutory duty has caused his injury.” [56] Tiada keterangan dikemukakan kepada mahkamah untuk menunjukkan usaha berterusan oleh Defendan 3 bagi mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan dari JUPEM bagi mengemaskinikan status Hartanah Tersebut walau pun mempunyai pengetahuan penuh bahawa telah terdapat pengambilan. Sehubungan itu saya berpendapat Defendan 3 telah gagal melaksanakan kewajipan statutorinya dan gagal mematuhi piawaan dalam mengeluarkan geran ganti yang tepat dan terkini. Ini selaras dengan keputusan kes Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 3 CLJ 271: S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 “[2] Penyelenggaraan pejabat tanah yang efisyen dan butiran yang berterusan tepat adalah kewajipan yang perlu dilaksanakan oleh defendan pertama kepada setiap orang awam yang membuat dan bergantung pada carian yang dibuat di pejabat tanah yang diselenggarakan oleh defendan pertama. Kebergantungan am ini bermaksud bahawa defendan pertama mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga kepada defendan-defendan bagi memastikan bahawa apabila carian-carian tersebut dibuat di pejabat tanah, mereka bertindak atas maklumat tepat dan yang diselenggarakan sewajarnya dan berdasarkan buku hakmilik yang tepat.” [57] Berdasarkan kepada status Defendan 4 sebagai majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 3, maka Defendan 4 bertanggungan kepada liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 3 (vicarious liability to the 3rd Defendant) di bawah Seksyen 5 dan Seksyen 6, Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956. Perlanggaran kewajipan statutori oleh Defendan 3 telah menyebabkan transaksi jual beli Hartanah Tersebut tidak mempunyai maklumat yang tepat dan terkini walau pun mereka bukan sepihak kepada PJB. Keadaan ini telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami kerugian yang membolehkan dia menuntut gantirugi terhadap Defendan 3 serta Defendan 4. Kes Defendan 6 dan Defendan 7 [58] Defendan 6 dan Defendan 7 memberikan keterangan melalui SD6 (Penolong Pegawai Penilaian). SD6 menyatakan dia telah menggunakan standard of care yang diperlukan sebagai seorang Penolong Pegawai Penilaian dalam membuat penilaian Hartanah Tersebut sebanyak RM155,000 dengan keluasan 513 meter persegi melalui laporan penilaian bertarikh 10.1.2016 (eksibit P11). Keterangan SD6 menyatakan dia bergantung penuh kepada dokumen permohonan pembiayaan Hartanah Tersebut kepada LPPSA yang disediakan Defendan 2. SD6 juga mengakui tiada keperluan untuk merujuk kepada geran hakmilik kerana dokumen dari Defendan 2 sudah lengkap. Dia juga menyatakan lawatan tapak telah dibuat ke atas Hartanah Tersebut. [59] Saya berpendapat adalah menjadi kewajipan berhati-hati (duty of care) kepada SD6 untuk meneliti pada geran hakmilik Hartanah Tersebut dan merujuk kepada endorsan pengambilan tahun 1978. Dengan itu adalah juga menjadi kewajipannya untuk membuat inkuiri berhubung dengan keluasan sebenar masakini. SD6 tidak S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 boleh bergantung dengan dokumen Defendan 2 sahaja. Tambahan pula SD6 ada pergi melawat tapak. Saya berpendapat hanya setelah beliau berpuas hati kepada isu itu, baharulah dia boleh membuat penilaian yang tepat. [60] Namun SD6 telah cuai dan melanggar kewajipan berhati-hati tersebut. Penilaian kali kedua ke atas Hartanah Tersebut yang dibuat oleh SD6 pada 5.10.2018 (selepas berlakunya pertikaian antara pihak-pihak) telah mendapati keluasannya hanyalah 375 kaki persegi dan dinilaikan RM12,000. Kecuaian ini telah menyebabkan LPPSA meluluskan pinjaman kepada Plaintif sebanyak RM155,000 (untuk keluasan 513 meter persegi) dan mendaftarkan gadaian Hartanah Tersebut. Seterusnya gaji Plaintif dipotong secara bulanan selama 360 bulan bagi pembayaran balik pinjaman. [61] Defendan 6 adalah sebuah jabatan kerajaan Persekutuan yang mentadbir dan menguruskan urusan penilaian hartanah dalam Jajahan Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Ia mempunyai kewajipan berhati-hati dalam memastikan penilaian ke atas Hartanah Tersebut adalah tepat selaras dengan harga pasaran dengan berdasarkan keluasan terkini. Defendan 6 merupakan sebuah jabatan yang banyak berurusan dengan orang ramai dan orang ramai ini akan bergantung seratus peratus kepada rekod Defendan 6 dalam urusan penilaian hartanah dalam Jajahan Kota Bharu. [62] Ini selaras dengan keputusan kes Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd v Hodder Rook & Associates Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1043: “It now seems clear that a valuer may in certain circumstances owe a duty of care to the recipient of a valuation containing negligent misstatements causing economic loss, even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the valuer and the recipient of the valuation. A duty of care is recognised to exist where the valuer actually knows or ought to have known that the person in question would rely upon the valuation so prepared. In respect of the objective limb of that formulation, it is noted that subjective knowledge of the particular recipient or purpose to which the valuation would be put is not relevant. In addition, there is the further requirement that a finding of a duty of care be reasonable in all the circumstances. Accordingly, the subjective knowledge, actual or potential, of the valuer is a relevant consideration in determining reasonableness.” S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [63] Berdasarkan kepada status Defendan 7 sebagai majikan/prinsipal kepada Defendan 6, maka Defendan 7 bertanggungan kepada liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 6 (vicarious liability to the 6th Defendant) seperti yang diperuntukan di bawah Seksyen 5 dan Seksyen 6, Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956. Perlanggaran kewajipan statutori oleh Defendan 6 telah menyebabkan transaksi pembiayaan pinjaman Hartanah Tersebut tidak mempunyai maklumat yang tepat dan terkini walau pun mereka bukan sepihak kepada PJB. Keadaan ini telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami kerugian yang membolehkan dia menuntut gantirugi terhadap Defendan 6 berserta Defendan 7. Keputusan liabilti [64] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan tersebut dan atas imbangan kebarangkalian, saya memutuskan: (i) Defendan 1 telah melakukan suatu salahnyataan frod (fraudulent misrepresentation) terhadap Plaintif. (ii) Defendan 2 telah cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati-hati dan tanggungjawab fidusiari (breach of duty of care and fudiciary duty) terhadap Plaintif. (iii) Defendan 3 cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab statutori (breach of statutory duty). (iv) Defendan 4 mempunyai liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 3 (vicarious liability to the 3rd Defendant). (v) Defendan 6 cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati- hati dan menggunakan skil (breach of duty of care and reasonable skill). (vi) Defendan 7 mempunyai liabiliti vikarius terhadap kecuaian Defendan 6 (vicarious liability to the 6th Defendant). ISU RELIF/GANTIRUGI (i) suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa PJB bertarikh 17.11.2015 antara Plaintif dengan Defendan 1 bagi Hartanah Tersebut adalah tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio [65] Keterangan dan penemuan seperti yang saya ulaskan dalam kes Defendan 1 telah menunjukkan Defendan 1 tahu bahawa pengambilan pada tahun 1978 telah menyebabkan baki tanah bukan lagi seluas 513 meter persegi. Namun Defendan 1, SD1 dan S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 SD2 telah berjaya membuat Plaintif yang sememangnya mencari tanah untuk membina rumah dengan suatu salahnyataan frod bahawa keluasan Hartanah Tersebut adalah 513 meter persegi bersetuju membelinya dengan harga RM195,000 dan memasuki PJB. Selanjutnya Hartanah Tersebut dipindah milik kepada Plaintif dan permohonan Plaintif untuk pinjaman diluluskan oleh LPPSA. [66] Jelas keterangan menunjukkan Plaintif memasuki PJB dengan persetujuan atau keizinan bahawa keluasan Hartanah Tersebut adalah 513 meter persegi. Dengan itu apabila keluasan sebenar (375 kaki persegi) timbul dan diketahui, maka butir-butir dan terma- terma dalam PJB berkenaan terutamanya keluasan sebenar adalah tidak tepat dan bercanggah dan tidak mungkin PJB akan dimasuki oleh Plaintif dari awal lagi. Oleh yang demikian PJB berkenaan adalah tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio. (ii) suatu perintah mengkehendaki Defendan 1 memulangkan semula bayaran RM195,000 bagi harga jual beli kepada Plaintif bagi menyelesaikan baki pinjaman LPPSA. [67] Memandangkan PJB tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio, maka Defendan 1 dengan itu adalah bertanggungan untuk memulangkan semula wang jualan Hartanah Tersebut sebanyak RM195,000 kepada Plaintif. Ini adalah tuntutan gantirugi khas dan dibuktikan melalui resit pembayaran RM40,000 (Ikatan Dokumen “A”, Bahagian A, muka surat 1 dan 10) dan dokumen pembiayaan LPPSA sebanyak RM155,000 (Ikatan Dokumen “A”, Bahagian A, muka surat 7-9). (iii) suatu perintah mengkehendaki Defendan-Defendan membayar gantirugi khas sebanyak RM8,495 dan jumlah potongan gaji Plaintif RM18,996.96 setakat 31.12.2018 dan potongan seterusnya. [68] Defendan 1 juga bertanggungan bersama-sama Defendan- Defendan lain untuk membayar gantirugi khas untuk insurans takaful sebanyak RM8,495 (Ikatan Dokumen “A”, Bahagian A, muka surat 7-9) dan bayaran ansuran yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif setakat 31.12.2018 sebanyak RM18,996.96 (penyata potongan di eksibit P15, P16 dan P17). Ini adalah kerana kesemua Defendan- Defendan (seperti penemuan saya) adalah bertanggungan kepada bayaran-bayaran ini yang berlainan dari wang tunai dan pinjaman untuk harga jualan. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [69] Saya berpendapat tidak berlakunya pertindihan tuntutan kerana sejumlah RM195,000 (tunai RM40,000 dan pinjaman RM155,000) adalah wang yang sebenarnya dibayar oleh Plaintif secara tunai dan pinjaman untuk harga Hartanah Tersebut seperti yang dipersetujui dalam PJB. Manakala bayaran insurans timbul berdasarkan kepada jumlah pinjaman yang diluluskan dan menjadi tambahan kepada jumlah pinjaman. Bayaran ansuran pula adalah termasuk faedah selama 360 bulan yang perlu dibuat melalui potongan gaji Plaintif dan juga menjadi tambahan kepada pinjaman. (iv) Defendan 2 memulangkan kos guaman RM5,500 kepada Plaintif [70] Penemuan saya juga mendapati Defendan 2 telah cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab berhati-hati dan tanggungjawab fidusiari (breach of duty of care and fudiciary duty) terhadap Plaintif. Kecuaian inilah yang menyebabkan PJB disediakan oleh Defendan 2 setelah dilantik oleh Plaintif sebagai peguamnya. Berdasarkan kepada penemuan saya bahawa PJB tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio, maka Defendan 2 adalah bertanggungan untuk memulangkan yuran guaman sebanyak RM5,500 yang dibayar oleh Plaintif (resit bayaran dalam Ikatan Dokumen “A”, Bahagian A, muka surat 11). [71] Saya berpendapat tidak timbul isu dalam tuntutan ini bahawa Defendan 2 mengenakan fi guaman kurang dari yang telah ditetapkan oleh Majlis Peguam kerana ianya tidak melibatkan Plaintif. (v) suatu perintah pembatalan pindah milik atas nama Plaintif bagi Hartanah Tersebut oleh Defendan 3 [72] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan bahawa PJB tidak sah dan terbatal ab initio, pendaftaran pindah milik dari Defendan 1 kepada Plaintif dibuat berdasarkan kepada PJB ini dan Plaintif mendapat penghakiman pemulangan harga belian, maka pendaftaran pindah milik atas nama Plaintif 1 dibatalkan setelah Plaintif menyelesaikan pinjaman kepada LPPSA dan membuat penebusan gadaian. (vi) suatu perintah mengkehendaki Defendan-Defendan membayar gantirugi am [73] Saya berpendapat Plaintif berhak mendapat gantirugi dari Defendan-Defendan seperti perpatah maxim “ubi jus ibi remedium” (where there is a wrong, there is a remedy). Prinsip asas kepada S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 pemberian gantirugi ini adalah untuk memampaskan Plaintif terhadap kerosakan, kerugian dan kecederaan yang dialaminya akibat perbuatan Defendan-Defendan. Prinsip-prinsip ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes-kes: Sambaga Valli KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Anor Appeal [2018] 3 MLRA 488 CA: “[14] It is trite that a person injured by another's wrong is entitled to general damages for non-pecuniary such as his pain and suffering, hardship, discomfort, mental distress and loss of amenities of life. There is no standard rule to measure the damage in such cases. The courts usually determine the amount based on a fair and reasonable standards, free from sentimental or fanciful standards, and based upon evidence adduced. The court should also consider the age, health and condition of the injured party pre-injury as compared with his condition after the injury. The court also consider the need for medical, psychological or physical symptoms, and the impact on the plaintiff's conduct and lifestyle before apportioning the amount of damages.” [74] Tindakan Defendan-Defendan berdasarkan kepada keterangan- keterangan yang telah dikemukakan, saya mendapati Plaintif telah mengalami kerugian dalam bentuk monetari dan mengalami kesan kepada emosi serta kesihatan. Saya mengambil judicial notice bahawa mana-mana insan pun akan mengalami kesan emosi ini berdasarkan kepada fakta kes ini iaitu terbeli hartanah yang tidak sesuai dibuat rumah kediaman, wang tunai telah dibayar, pinjaman telah dikeluarkan, potongan gaji telah dibuat dan sebagainya. Tiada keperluan untuk memanggil seorang pakar kesihatan untuk menunjukkan keadaan emosi, tekanan dan kesakitan Plaintif ini. [75] Selain dari itu Plaintif juga terpaksa mengeluarkan kos, melibatkan masa dan tenaga untuk berurusan ke jabatan-jabatan kerajaan berkenaan untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu yang timbul. [76] Dalam menentukan jumlah gantirugi am ini, saya menggunakan kes-kes berikut sebagai panduan: S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Sambaga Valli KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Anor Appeal [supra]: “All the courts should do are to award sums which are reasonable, moderate and conventional.” [77] Selain dari itu saya juga merujuk award-award yang diberikan dalam beberapa kes lain sebagai panduan: Eu Sim Chuan @ Eu Sam Yan & Anor v Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd [2006] MLRH 201: Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v Ding Siew Ching & Ors [2022] 4 MLRH 316: [78] Gantirugi am ini adalah berdasarkan kepada perlakuan dan keupayaan Defendan-Defendan serta jumlah tuntutan Plaintif. Dengan itu saya memerintahkan Defendan-Defendan membayar gantirugi am kepada Plaintif seperti berikut: (i) Defendan 1 RM200,000 (ii) Defendan 2 RM200,000 (iii) Defendan 3 dan Defendan 4 RM300,000 (iv) Defendan 6 dan Defendan 7 RM50,000 (v) suatu perintah mengkehendaki Defendan-Defendan membayar gantirugi teladan [79] Suatu jumlah gantirugi perlu diberikan kepada Plaintif sebagai suatu bentuk “hukuman dan peringatan” kepada Defendan-Defendan terutama yang memberikan perkhidmatan kepada orang awam supaya lebih berhati-hati dimasa hadapan. Saya merujuk kepada kes-kes sebagai panduan: Sambaga Valli KR Ponnusamy v Datuk bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Anor Appeal [supra] “[33] The exemplary damages or punitive damages - the two terms now regarded as interchangeable - are additional damages awarded with reference to the S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 conduct of the defendant, to signify disapproval, condemnation or denunciation of the defendant's tortious act, and to punish the defendant. Exemplary damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted with vindictiveness or malice, or where he has acted with a "contumelious disregard" for the right to the plaintiff. The primary purpose of an award of exemplary damages may be deterrent, or punitive and retributory, and the award may also have an important function in vindicating the rights of the plaintiff. [36] The remaining issue to be determined is the amount of damages. In Rookes v. Barnard (supra), Lord Devlin set out three basic principles of the assessment of quantum in exemplary damages cases. His Lordship held that in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must have been the victim of the punishable behaviour involved. This stipulation was necessary since "the anomaly inherent in exemplary damages would become an absurdity if a plaintiff totally unaffected by some oppressive conduct which the jury wish to punish obtained a windfall in consequence". Secondly, Lord Devlin specified that exemplary damages should be assessed with restraint and, thirdly, that the means of the parties should be taken into consideration. In addition to these rules, Lord Devlin also stipulated that exemplary damages should be awarded "if but only if" the sum of compensatory (including aggravated) damages to be awarded had an insufficient punitive or deterrent effect. [37] The principle of moderation was again stressed in John v. MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586, where the court stated that the quantum of an exemplary damages award should be the minimum "necessary to meet the public purpose" of the damages.” Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v Mejar Mustafa bin Omar & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 337: “An award for exemplary damages was aimed at punishing the defendants, and displaying the court's indignant attitude towards the acts committed. However, such damages must be restricted to oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government or where the defendant's conduct had been calculated to make a profit. As these assaults were outside these two categories, exemplary damages would not be awarded (see p 348B-E); Rookes v Barnard & Ors [1964] AC 1129 followed.” S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd v Top-A Plastic Sdn Bhd [2008] 5 MLJ 34: “The Court of Appeal in the above case had pointed out two main principles in awarding exemplary damages: i. There must be intent; ii. The action of the Defendants was oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional and whether the Defendants gained any benefit from his action against the Plaintiff.” [80] Tindakan atau perlakuan Defendan-Defendan seperti yang diulaskan sebelum ini adalah bersifat menindas, melampaui batas dan tidak berperlembagaan. Plaintif menjadi mangsa yang tertindas dalam transaksi jual beli Hartanah Tersebut. Tindakan dan perlakuan Defendan-Defendan juga adalah melampau serta tidak berperlembagaan seperti gagal berhati-hati dalam tugas, gagal menggunakan kepakaran, gagal bertindak dalam suatu masa yang munasabah, tidak menyesal, tidak mengakui kebenaran dan tidak membantu. Sehubungan itu saya berpendapat Plaintif berhak mendapat gantirugi teladan. [81] Dalam menentukan jumlah gantirugi teladan bagi setiap Defendan, saya berpandukan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sambaga Valli KR Ponnusamy v Datuk bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Anor Appeal [supra]: “In addition to these rules, Lord Devlin also stipulated that exemplary damages should be awarded “if but only if” the sum of compensatory (including aggravated) damages to be awarded had an insufficient punitive or deterrent effect. [37] The principal of moderation was again stressed in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586, where the court stated that the quantum of an exemplary damages award should be the minimum “necessary to meet the public purpose” of the damages.” [82] Selain dari itu saya juga merujuk award-award yang diberikan dalam beberapa kes lain sebagai panduan: Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v Ding Siew Ching & Ors [2022] 4 MLRH 316: RM1,000,000 S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Taz Logistics Sdn Bhd v Taz Metals Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] 5 CLJ 426: RM900,000 Kris Angsana Sdn Bhd v Eu Sim Chuan & Anor [2007] 4 CLJ 293: RM500,000 [83] Berdasarkan kepada panduan-panduan ini, saya memberikan award gantirugi teladan sebanyak RM500,000. Pembahagian antara Defendan-Defendan adalah seperti berikut; (i) Defendan 1 – 20% (ii) Defendan 2 – 20% (iii) Defendan 3 dan Defendan 4 – 50% (iv) Defendan 6 dan 7 – 10% (vi) kos tindakan ini [84] Berdasarkan kepada jumlah saksi, jumlah Defendan-Defendan dan jumlah hari perbicaraan, saya memberikan kos kepada Plaintif sebanyak RM30,000 (dikongsi oleh Defendan 1, 2, 3 & 4 dan 6 & 7) dan tertakluk pada 4% alokatur. (v) Faedah [85] 2.5% setahun dari tarikh pemfailan writ saman hingga tarikh keputusan untuk gantirugi am, gantirugi khas dan gantirugi teladan. [86] 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh bayaran penuh untuk gantirugi am, gantirugi khas dan gantirugi teladan. (vi) Lain-lain perintah [87] Bagi relif di perenggan 38 (b) (pemulangan RM195,000) dan perenggan 38 (c) pernyataan tuntutan terpinda (bayaran insurans RM8,495 dan potongan gaji RM18,996.96), dibayar kepada peguamcara Plaintif dahulu bagi menyelesaikan pinjaman serta gadaian Hartanah Tersebut dengan LPPSA. Baki akan dipulangkan kepada Plaintif setelah tindakan-tindakan tersebut dibuat. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Bertarikh: 30 November 2023. (ROSLAN BIN ABU BAKAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Plaintif: En. Ahmad Najib bin Deris, Tetuan Wan Haron Sukri & Nordin, PT 1180-1183, Tingkat 2, Jalan Kebun Sultan, 15350 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi pihak Defendan 1: En. Wan Mohd Zuhdi bin Wan Abdullah, Tetuan Rithauddeen & Aziz, Tingkat 6, Bangunan PKINK, Jalan Tengku Maharani, 15000 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi pihak Defendan 2: En. Norazham bin Yahaya, Tetuan Hasif Azham Rizal & Co, Lot 718, Jalan Sri Cemerlang 14/27, Off Jalan Pengkalan Chepa, 15300 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi pihak Defendan 3-4: Tuan Adam bin Mohamed @ Mamat, Penolong Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan, Tingkat Bawah, Blok 5, Kota Darulnaim, 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Bagi pihak Defendan 5-7: Tuan Ahmad Armi Najamuddin bin Azmi, Pengarah Guaman, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan, Tingkat Bawah, Blok 5, Kota Darulnaim, 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. S/N sI9MXj8VQUON6BrsrV02Cw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-45-19-06/2019

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH Vijaya Letchumy A/p Sannasi

penculikan-identiti tertuduh sama ada dibuktikan-duit tebusan sama ada dicamkan-seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan sama ada dipenuhi- pembelaan tertuduh jika konsisten- kegagalan menyediakan suspek dan OKT lain jika fatal.

03/01/2024

YA Puan Nurulhuda Nur'aini Binti Mohamad Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=892d3743-1e92-4db1-ab53-cbc7fb48a00c&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45C-4-09/2018 PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45C-5-09/2018 PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45-19-06/2019 PENDAKWA RAYA …PENDAKWAAN lawan 1) JEVAN A/L S RAMAMURTHY NO. K/P: 750726-14-6045 2) SURENDRAN A/L SIVASAMY NO. K/P: 820907-14-6221 3) MUNIANDY A/L ACHAIYAH KANNIAH NO. K/P 571123-10-5443 4) VIJAYA LETCHUMI A/P SANNASI NO. K/P 820326-04-5254 …TERTUDUH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Latar belakang. [1] Kesemua OKT1 hingga OKT3 di atas (mereka adalah OKT1, OKT2 dan OKT5 dalam pertuduhan asal BA-45C-4-09/2018) telah dituduh bersama dengan 5 OKT lain (mereka adalah OKT3, OKT4, OKT6 dan OKT7 dalam pertuduhan asal BA-45C-4-09/2018 dan OKT8 dalam BA- 45C-5-09/2018) dengan niat bersama untuk menculik seorang bernama Pratap a/l Pandien (SP12) di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Culik 1961, manakala OKT4 di atas Vijaya Letchumi pula telah dituduh di BA-45-19-06/2019 03/01/2024 11:10:42 BA-45-19-06/2019 Kand. 31 S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 dengan pertuduhan seksyen 5 Akta yang sama kerana telah ada dalam milikan wang tunai iaitu hasil tebusan yang terlibat di dalam kes penculikan ini. [2] 5 tertuduh yang lain itu (OKT3, OKT4, OKT6, OKT7 dan OKT8 dalam pertuduhan asal masing-masing) kemudian telah ditawarkan pertuduhan pilihan di bawah seksyen 365 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun yang sama. Kelima-lima OKT ini telah mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan pilihan ini dan dijatuhkan hukuman 5 tahun penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap. [3] Bagi tertuduh-tertuduh lain, kes diteruskan untuk bicara atas pertuduhan asal dan mereka kini dirujuk sebagai OKT1, OKT2, OKT 3 bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 3 dan OKT4 di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Culik. [4] Pertuduhan yang diteruskan dengan perbicaraan ke atas OKT1 hingga OKT3 adalah seperti berikut: BA-45C-4-09/2018 “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 12 Disember 2017, jam lebih kurang 9.10 malam, di Jalan 1B/8, Bandar Baru Sungai Buloh, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu, telah melarikan secara salah seorang lelaki bernama Pratap a/l Pandien (No. K/P:830819-14- 6239) bagi maksud mendapatkan wang tebusan. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan dan boleh dihukum di S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 bawah Seskyen 3(1) Akta Culik 1961 yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan”. [5] Pertuduhan bagi OKT4 pula adalah seperti berikut: BA-45-19-06/2019 “Bahawa kamu pada 23 Januari 2018 jam lebih kurang 1.30 pagi bertempat di rumah No. 27 Jalan Ambar 2, Batu 34, Taman Ambar, Dengkil di dalam daerah Sepang Negeri Selangor telah didapati menerima dan ada dalam milikan kamu wang tebusan sebanyak RM27,900.00 hasil jenayah culik bersabit Sg. Buloh 12038/17 dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Penculikan 1961 (Akta 365)”. Kes pendakwaan. [6] Kejadian bermula pada 12.12.2017 lebih kurang 8.30 malam ketika SP1 keluar menaiki motorsikalnya untuk merokok tidak jauh dari bengkel, apabila dia telah mendengar bunyi jeritan dalam Tamil dan nampak sekumpulan 3 individu yang bertopeng sedang memaksa seorang lelaki berbangsa Tamil (kemudian mangsa dicamkan sebagai Pratap SP12) masuk ke kereta MyVi 6365 yang enjinnya sedang hidup kerana SP1 nampak lampu belakang kereta dalam keadaan menyala. [7] Pada ketika itu, terdapat 2 kereta yang dilihat SP1 iaitu MyVi kuning tersebut dan Pajero putih 1207 yang berada di belakang bengkel di kawasan perumahan berkenaan. Menurut SP1, tempat kejadian dan tempat dia memberhentikan motorsikalnya dalam jarak 30-40 meter. Dia S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 kenal mangsa kerana tinggal dalam satu kawasan perumahan sama dan terdapat pencahayaan berhampiran tempat kejadian membolehkan dia melihat kejadian. [8] Oleh kerana takut, SP1 berpatah balik ke bengkel dan beritahu sahabatnya Jeevan Raj SP2 apa yang telah diperhatikan oleh SP1. SP2 kenal mangsa kerana mereka dari tempat tinggal yang sama iaitu Bandar Baru Sg Buloh dan ada ketika lepak bersama. SP2 menaiki motorsikalnya menuju ke tempat kejadian dan hanya menemui kereta Mitsubushi pajero milik Pratap manakala kereta MyVi tidak kelihatan. SP2 kemudiannya telah menelefon Saravanan Airoli SP3 memaklumkan kejadian kerana Pratap dan Saravanan bersaudara dan SP2 minta SP3 menelefon mangsa Pratap. [9] Dalam cubaan SP3 mengesan Pratap melalui telefon oleh SP3 tetapi gagal, SP3 telah menelefon bapa Pratap iaitu Panndien a/l Govindasamy menceritakan apa yang berlaku dan meminta Panddien cuba menghubungi Pratap tetapi juga gagal. SP3 ketika tiba di lokasi kejadian telah melihat kereta Pajero putih WTW 1207 milik Pratap. Ia disusuli dengan usaha mengesan kereta MyVi kuning dengan nombor yang dikatakan di sekitar Sg Buloh oleh SP2 dan SP3 juga gagal. SP3 kemudian meneruskan usaha mengesan Pratap di sekitar Selayang hingga ke Rawang, berseorangan selama sejam tetapi tidak menemui kereta MyVi tersebut. [10] SP4 pula ialah isteri kepada mangsa Pratap dan telah mengecam kereta Mitsubushi Pajero putih nombor 1207 milik Pratap. Kali akhir S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 melihat Pratap ialah ketika dia balik pada 12.12.2017 pada jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang sebelum dia (Pratap) balik semula ke tempat kerja untuk meneruskan tugasnya. Menurut SP4, kebiasaannya Pratap akan balik pada jam 10.00pm tetapi pada hari tersebut dia masih belum pulang pada jam 12.00am. [11] SP4 cuba menghubunginya tetapi gagal. Ini mengakibatkan SP4 menelefon bapa mertuanya dan telah diberitahu oleh bapa mertuanya Panndien Govindasamy (SP10), bahawa suaminya Pratap telah diculik. SP4 hanya bertemu dengan suaminya 21 hari kemudian pada 3.1.2018 di rumah bapa mertuanya Bukit Rahman Putra dalam keadaan tidak terurus dan kurus. [12] En. Panndien SP10 pada jam lebih kurang 8.45 malam 12.12.2017 berada bersama anaknya Pratap di Pejabat mereka. SP10 dan anaknya Pratap (SP12) kemudian telah balik ke rumah masing-masing. Semasa SP10 sedang mengadap makan malamnya jam lebih kurang 9 .00 malam, telah menerima satu panggilan telefon dari orang yang tidak dikenalinya menyatakan SP12 berada dalam tangan mereka. SP10 tidak percaya dan terus meletakkan telefon. [13] SP10 kemudian menerima panggilan daripada anak saudaranya bernama Saravanan SP3 menceritakan cubaan SP3 memanggil Pratap melalui telefon setelah dimaklumkan oleh SP1 melihat Pratap ditarik masuk ke dalam kereta MyVi kuning tetapi tidak berjaya dihubungi SP3. SP10 kemudian cuba menghubungi anaknya beberapa kali tapi masih S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 gagal sehinggalah SP10 menerima panggilan dari suspek penculik yang meminta wang tebusan RM10 juta jika gagal, anak SP10 akan dibunuh. [14] SP10 telah membuat laporan polis pada 13.12.2018 jam 3.45 pagi. Walau bagaimanapun, SP10 juga telah menceritakan kejadian ini kepada Supt. Somu SP13 yang telah memberi arahan kepada anggotanya Insp. Praba SP17 untuk mengetuai unit tindakan. Pada ketika ini, SP10 sebelum membuat laporan polis, telahpun lebih awal diarahkan oleh Insp. Praba (SP17) untuk berada di lokasi bilik Hotel Damansara untuk memantau panggilan berikutnya. SP10 menerima panggilan seterusnya jam 12.40 mengulangi permintaan wang tebusan RM10juta. SP10 telah menawarkan RM50,000.00 tetapi pemanggil enggan menerima jumlah ini dan mematikan panggilan. SP10 dapat mengecam suara pemanggil yang berbeza daripada panggilan awal. [15] Panggilan seterusnya pada jam 4.00pagi meminta jumlah yang lebih tinggi RM20 juta tetapi SP10 hanya bersetuju menawarkan RM50 ribu. Beberapa panggilan telah berlangsung di antara suspek dan SP10 di mana akhirnya pada 23.12.2017 SP10 telah bersetuju pada jumlah RM300,000.00. SP10 telah menyediakan wang sejumlah ini melalui wang bayaran gaji pekerja RM100,000 yang telah sedia ada dikeluarkan pada 4.12.2017 dan wang RM200,000 yang dikeluarkan kemudian pada 28.12.2017 melalui Hong Leong Bank. Insp Praba telah mengambil gambar wang yang terlibat yang diikat dalam 60 ikatan mengandungi RM5000.00 setiap satu ikatan dikemukakan sebagai ID151. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [16] Beberapa siri panggilan kemudian berlaku untuk tujuan membuat serahan wang tebusan ini bermula dengan R&R Port Dickson ke tol Ayer Keroh. Apabila tiada arahan diterima ketika SP10 di tol Ayer Keroh, SP10 telah balik. Keesokannya SP10 diarahkan oleh penculik untuk ke tol Bukit Raja kemudian ke tol Ipoh dan ketika ini SP10 mendapati dia diekori dari jauh oleh beberapa buah kereta. Di tol Ipoh juga tiada panggilan seterusnya yang datang mengakibatkan SP10 balik semula ke rumahnya. [17] Di rumah SP10, Insp Praba telah bertemu dengan SP10 dan memaklumkan penemuan Insp Praba bahawa kereta Pajero milik Pratap telah ditemui dibakar. SP10 turut menerima panggilan daripada penculik menyatakan kejadian kereta Pajero yang telah dibakar oleh mereka dan ingatan mereka kepada SP10 untuk tidak melibatkan pihak polis jika tidak anak SP10 akan dibunuh. [18] SP10 menerima panggilan berikutnya untuk ke Batu Caves bersama wang tebusan tersebut tetapi apabila tiba di lokasi, tiada arahan lanjut diberi yang mengakibatkan SP10 balik semula ke rumah. Pada 1.1.2018 jam lebih kurang 2.30 pagi SP10 menerima panggilan akhir dari penculik yang mengarahkan SP10 untuk ke Batu Caves semula dan diarahkan menuju ke satu jambatan sebelum Petronas dan akhirnya diarahkan menjatuhkan bag berisi duit tersebut dari jambatan tersebut. [19] Pada 3.1.2018, SP10 menerima panggilan telefon dari penculik menyatakan Pratap (SP12) berada di hentian Bemban. SP10 kemudian turut menerima panggilan dari anaknya yang menggunakan handphone salah seorang peniaga di R&R tersebut untuk membuat panggilan, S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menyatakan dia berada di Bemban. SP10 terus menuju ke hentian Bemban dan bertemu dengan Pratap di situ lalu dibawa ke hospital untuk pemeriksaan, atas arahan IO. [20] SP12 menyatakan pada 12.12.2017 lebih kurang jam 8.45pm ketika hendak balik ke rumahnya, SP12 yang berada dalam kereta Pajeronya sedang menelefon salah seorang pelanggannya dalam kereta yang dihentikan di belakang deretan kedai, apabila cermin tingkap belah pemandu yang dalam kedaan bertutup, diketuk 2 kali oleh seorang lelaki India yang memperkenalkan diri sebagai ‘polis’ sambil menunjukkan kad pengenalan diri, kad ini tidak jelas dilihat oleh SP12. [21] SP12 telah menurunkan cerminnya dan lelaki tersebut kemudian telah memasukkan tangannya melalui tingkap dan membuka pintu kereta tersebut. SP12 keluar dan lelaki tersebut terus memegang dan menekan tengkuk SP12 ke bawah. Tangan SP12 kemudiannya digarikan ke belakang oleh lelaki ini. Lelaki ini dilihat SP12 berkulit cerah dan agak tinggi. Ketika itu juga datang 3 lagi lelaki bertopeng dari arah belakang lalu menolak SP12 ke bawah. Lelaki yang menggarikan tangan SP12 dicamkan oleh SP12 sebagai OKT8 (OKT8 telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan pilihan seksyen 365 KK). [22] Kemudian 3 lelaki-lelaki ini telah menarik SP12 masuk ke kereta My Vi kuning dan ketika ini SP12 dapat melihat mereka merupakan bangsa India. Di dalam kereta, telefon bimbit SP12 telah diambil dan panggilan telefon dibuat kepada SP10 iaitu bapa Pratap memberitahu anaknya iaitu SP12 telah diculik dan meminta wang tebusan dibayar. Mereka kemudian S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 memakaikan sarung muka ke atas SP12 dan meletakkan selotape pada mata. [23] Setelah lebih kurang 35 minit, SP12 dapat mendengar gate dibuka dan dia dikeluarkan daripada kereta dan didudukkan dalam sebuah rumah dengan kipas terpasang. SP12 tahu dia tidak bersendirian kerana boleh mendengar seseorang bernafas di sebelahnya. Setelah beberapa jam, SP12 dibangunkan dan masuk ke dalam kereta dan bergerak ke sebuah rumah lain kerana perjalanan yang diambil lama dan dia (SP12) telah dibawa naik tangga ke atas ke sebuah bilik. [24] Meskipun sepanjang masa SP12 berada dalam keadaan mata bertutup dan tangan bergari, tetapi SP12 pasti terdapat 2 orang mengawalnya kerana SP12 telah bertanya kenapa dia diculik dan kedua- dua suspek ini telah menyatakan mereka ingin dapatkan wang tebusan RM500,000 atau RM1,000,000.00. [25] SP12 kemudian telah dibawa ke satu tempat lain kerana SP12 terpaksa tunduk untuk memasuki rumah ini. SP12 dibawa masuk ke sebuah bilik yang mempunyai katil dan disuruh baring. Selang masa, SP12 kemudian dibawa ke satu rumah lain kerana dia dapat mendengar bunyi ‘shutters’ ditarik untuk buka dan kemudian, ditutup. SP12 turut mendengar bunyi tong gas disusun. Ini didengar berulang kali. SP12 turut mendengar bunyi skru dibuka dengan ‘screw gun’ untuk menanggalkan tayar. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [26] Di premis ini, SP12 dalam keadaan dipakai topeng dan mata berlilit serta bergari, juga telah ditendang di belakang oleh seseorang dan bila ditanya kenapa, dia menyatakan ‘bapa kamu masih belum bayar lagi”. Dia juga mengugut menyatakan ‘kalau bapa kamu tidak bayar, tahulah kamu”. SP12 juga tahu kedatangan 2 lelaki berikut yang kemudiannya mereka telah menelefon SP10 (Panndien) dan menyuruh SP12 bercakap dengan bapanya. SP12 semasa bercakap dengan bapanya menyatakan dia dalam ketakutan. [27] SP12 menyatakan dia juga dipukul dengan apa yang dirasakan sebagai kayu, dari pemerhatiannya mendengar bunyi objek ini diketuk di lantai dan apabila ia diletak di bahu SP12 dengan diugut jika mahu dipukul dengan objek ini. SP12 diberi makan sekali sehari dan ada masanya ketika mereka beramai-ramai barulah SP12 diberi makan tengahari. [28] SP12 hanya diberitahu akan dilepaskan apabila dia diminta bersiap, mandi tetapi dibatalkan untuk dia dilepaskan kerana dikatakan ada hal dilakukan ayahnya Panndien. Keesokannya kali kedua mereka beritahu SP12 akan dilepaskan, SP12 diberi pakaian untuk bersiap meskipun dalam keadaan tangan bergari dan mata bertutup. Di dalam kereta tersebut, SP12 telah dibaringkan dan SP12 dapat merasa dia ditutup dengan jaket. Di dalam perjalanan tersebut, SP12 mendengar perbualan telefon suspek dengan ayahnya kerana terdengar nama ayahnya disebut dan diberitahu tempat anaknya akan dilepaskan akan dinyatakan nanti. [29] Setelah menjalani perjalanan melalui tol untuk beberapa ketika termasuk berhenti untuk mengisi minyak yang mana kesemuanya S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 diperhatikan SP12 melalui pendengaran bunyi menggunakan Touch&Go, bunyi tank minyak dibuka kerana SP12 masih dalam keadaan bertopeng, akhirnya kereta berhenti di satu tempat. Ketika masih dalam kereta, SP12 telah diberi amaran untuk tunduk dan jangan melihat kerana suspek bersenjatakan pisau dan akan menikam SP12 jika berlaku cubaan. Topeng dan gari SP12 dibuka tetapi mata dililit selotape sebelum SP12 dikeluarkan dari kereta oleh 2 lelaki dan didudukkan di satu tempat. [30] Setelah SP12 didudukkan, SP12 telah membuka selotape pada matanya tetapi mendapati kereta tersebut telah meninggalkan lokasi. SP12 dapati dia berada di lokasi highway di bawah jambatan dan apabila menyedari terdapat pencahayaan yang terang dari seberang jalan, telah bertindak melintas laluan highway tersebut ke arah cahaya lampu tersebut dan meminta bantuan penjual di situ dengan meminjam telefon untuk menghubungi ayahnya SP10. [31] SP10 tiba kemudian dan SP10 membawa SP12 ke hospital atas arahan IO. Hasil pemeriksaan oleh pegawai perubatan SP15 menemui kesan lecet pada muka dan belakang telinga serta cedera ringan sahaja yang dikatakan melalui ‘history taking’ akibat dibalut muka dengan selotape dan dipakaikan topeng. SP15 juga mendapati kesan kecederaan yang juga bukan akibat semulajadi dan boleh diakibatkan bersentuh dengan sesuatu seperti jatuh, terhentak, dipukul. Penemuan wang tebusan: pengecaman wang yang disediakan oleh SP10 dan wang yang dirampas dari saksi atau suspek jika wang yang sama dan pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [32] Wang tebusan berjumlah RM300,000.00 yang telah disediakan oleh SP10 telah diambil gambar oleh SP17 sebelum serahan dibuat di jambatan dan set gambar ini ditandakan sebagai ID151. Gambar diambil menggunakan handphone SP17 dan dimajukan kepada IO SP27 melalui applikasi WhatsApp. Atas dapatan Mahkamah, gambar ini hanya ditandakan sebagai ID151 melainkan ada keterangan lain yang timbul atas alasan tiada apa-apa soalan diajukan kepada SP17 berhubung pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 bersabit imej ini dikemukakan dalam bentuk CD dan dihasilkan sebagai gambar ID151. [33] Meskipun begitu, terdapat wang tebusan yang dirampas daripada OKT9 dan Sarasbathy SP25, sebagaimana senarai bongkar P200 beserta senarai nombor siri yang dilampirkan (untuk jumlah 706 keping RM50.00=$35,300.00) dan P202 (untuk 196 keping RM50.00=$9800.00) jumlah keseluruhan $45,100.00, 558 keping sebagaimana senarai bongkar P198 (jumlah RM27,900.00). Sejumlah wang 340 keping RM50.00 (berjumlah $17,000.00) dalam bag sandang ‘Levi’ turut dikemukakan melalui IO SP27 dan ditandakan sebagai P163A(1-340) yang dirampas dari rumah Surendran OKT2 oleh SP21. [34] Keterangan SP25 Sarasbathy menunjukkan pada awal Januari 2018, OKT9 bersama Vasantha telah datang ke rumah SP25 menyerahkan sejumlah wang nota RM50.00 berjumlah RM60,000.00 yang berada dalam ikatan getah dalam sebuah beg. SP25 telah menyimpan wang yang berada dalam beg tersebut dalam bean bagnya. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [35] Sejumlah RM50,000.00 kemudian diserah kepada Balan SP24 atas saranan Sarasbathy dan Vijaya untuk duit digunakan sebagai pinjaman Ah Long. Baki RM10,000.00 masih disimpan oleh SP25. Baki duit RM10,000.00 ini dan RM50,000.00 kemudian dirampas masing-masing dari rumah SP25 dan rumah Balan SP24. [36] SP19 Murukiah juga telah diserahkan 3 bungkusan plastic hitam berisi wang oleh Muniandy (OKT5) untuk disimpan sehinggalah diberitahu. Bungkusan ini telah disimpan oleh SP19 dalam reban ayam kosong. Atas arahan Muniandy kemudiannya, 2 bungkusan ini telah diserah kepada seorang wanita India di satu pertemuan R&R manakala satu bungkusan lagi yang tinggal telah diminta oleh Muniandy untuk ditanam sehingga arahan lanjut diberi. [37] Di dalam proses untuk menyerahkan satu bungkusan ini kepada Muniandy setelah diminta diserahkan di Tesco Senawang, SP19 mendapati plastic hitam koyak dan melihat kepingan RM50.00 di dalamnya. SP19 menggantikan bungkusan dengan bungkusan beras jenama ‘Rambutan’ sebelum ditanam semula kerana setelah menunggu hampir 2 jam, Muniandy tidak muncul di Tesco pada tarikh tersebut. [38] Daripada keterangan SP21 dan SP27, wang rampasan daripada saksi ataupun OKT diringkaskan seperti berikut: a) P197 daripada Lalitha (SP23) berjumlah RM28,600.00 b) P198 daripada OKT4 (SD3) berjumlah RM27,900.00 c) P200 daripada Balan (SP24) berjumlah RM35,000.00 S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 d) P202 daripada Sarasbathy (SP25) berjumlah RM 9800.00 e) P166 daripada Surendran OKT2 (dalam beg ‘Levi’ berjumlah RM17,000.00. [39] SP27 telah memberi keterangan membuat pengecaman sebahagian no siri wang rampasan ini dengan membandingkan no siri lampiran pada senarai bongkar dan dibandingkan dengan ID151. Mahkamah telah membenarkan ini dilakukan oleh SP27 sebagai pegawai penyiasat kes kerana kedua-dua keterangan SP17 Insp. Praba dan IO SP27 menyatakan arahan diberi dan diterima untuk merakam gambar wang tebusan yang disediakan oleh SP10 dan SP17 telah serahkan rakaman gambar ini kepada SP27. SP17 juga menyatakan handphone yang digunakannya untuk tujuan ini digunakan dalam keadaan berfungsi dengan baik. Malahan ini disokong oleh keterangan SP10 sendiri gambar wang diambil oleh SP17 menggunakan handphone SP17 pada lebih kurang 28.12.2017. [40] Meskipun dari segi pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950, ia masih belum dipatuhi sepenuhnya kerana tiada dinyatakan handphone ini digunakan dalam keadaan biasa dalam menjalankan tugasnya dan tiada keterangan dari SP17 bagaimana imej gambar berubah menjadi printout dalam bentuk ID151, namun SP17 dalam keterangannya jelas menyatakan dia telah menyusun kepingan wang RM50.00 ini sebelum gambar diambil dan telah mengecam gambar wang kertas ini dari segi susunan yang telah dibuatnya. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [41] SP27 juga mengesahkan telah memberi arahan kepada SP17 untuk mengambil gambar dan telah menerima gambar wang tebusan yang disediakan untuk serahan dari SP17 melalui WhatsApp dan CD namun tanpa perakuan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan. Atas bantahan pihak pembelaan untuk ID151 diterima sebagai P151, Mahkamah telah mengarahkan pihak-pihak untuk berhujah lanjut berhubung isu ini. Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah telah menerima ID151 sebagai P151. [42] Alasan Mahkamah dalam menerima ID151 sebagai P151 ialah: a) SP17 dan SP27 konsisten berhubung terdapat penyediaan wang tebusan oleh SP10 yang turut diakui oleh SP10; b) kedua-dua SP17 dan SP27 konsisten terdapat arahan untuk gambar diambil menyedari kes ini melibatkan satu kes penculikan dengan wang tebusan; c) SP17 telah menyatakan handphonenya dalam keadaan baik apabila gambar ID151 diambil; d) SP10 sendiri mengesahkan dia menyerahkan wang tebusan tersebut kepada SP17 untuk diambil gambar dan gambar telah diambil oleh SP17; e) wang rampasan dengan lampiran nombor siri beserta senarai bongkar yang dicatit oleh SP27 di P198 (meskipun sebahagian) adalah konsisten dengan nombor siri wang yang disediakan sebelum serahan oleh SP10 seperti berikut: LY 4248085 JL1826708 GE 1940306 JJ1188399 HV 1964730 GQ9515385 S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 f) jika kewujudan wang RM50.00 ini dengan nombor siri yang selari adalah diada-adakan oleh pihak polis, ini bermakna mereka berpakat mewujudkan ID151 serta senarai bongkar dan lampiran lain P200, P201 yang pada pendapat Mahkamah bukan menjadi pembelaan kesemua OKT dalam mencabar ID151. [43] Ini ditambah dengan keterangan SP1 bersabit awal kejadian SP1 melihat SP12 ditarik masuk ke dalam kereta MyVi pada 12.12.2017. SP27 yang menunjukkan gambar ID1151 tertera tarikh diambil sebagai 26.12.2017 pada jam 8.40pm selari dengan catatan pada sampul CD P210 tercatit 13.12.2017 dan 26.12.2017. Ini selari dengan keterangan SP10 yang menyatakan wang RM100,000.00 untuk gaji pekerja telah dikeluarkan pada 4.12.2017 manakala RM200,000.00 dikeluarkan dari Hong Leong Bank lebih kurang pada 28.12.2017 dan gambar turut diambil pada lebih kurang 28 haribulan. [44] Pada dapatan Mahkamah, tarikh 28.12.2017 adalah tarikh berdasarkan ingatan SP10 kerana dia telah menggunakan perkataan ‘lebih kurang’ untuk menggambarkan situasi ini. Namun, Mahkamah harus sentiasa beringat bahawa sesuatu perbicaraan bukanlah bersandarkan dengan sendirinya kepada kuatnya ingatan seseorang saksi kepada sesuatu fakta ‘it is not a trial by memory’. Akta Keterangan 1950 itu sendiri membenarkan apa-apa keterangan kontemporari ‘contemporaneous’ digunakan untuk menunjukkan apa-apa keterangan saksi sebagai benar, kredibel dan konsisten (‘true, credible and consistent’). S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [45] Dalam kes ini, SP10 mempunyai resit pengeluaran RM200,000.00 tersebut dan bersedia untuk mengemukakan resit pengeluaran tersebut. Meskipun terdapat ketinggalan di pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakannya, namun dari segi CD P210 tersebut menunjukkan keterangan bila gambar-gambar tersebut diambil. Bersandarkan kepada keseluruhan keterangan ini, Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa ID151 adalah satu dokumen yang kontemporari, kandungannya benar dan konsisten dengan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan keterangan dokumentar yang lain. [46] Berhubung dengan pematuhan kepada seksyen 90A pula, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Abdul Rahman Mohd v PP [2021] 1 LNS 804, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan bergantung kepada dicta oleh Augustine Paul J dalam kes PP v. Ramli Shafie [2002] 8 CLJ 846 yang berhadapan dengan isu sama ada gambar boleh dikemukakan tanpa memanggil saksi jurugambar. Augustine Paul J menerima masuk gambar tanpa perlu memanggil jurugambar atau mengemukakan filem negative kerana gambar ini telah dicamkan oleh saksi lain dan tanpa gambar-gambar ini dicabar kesahihannya. [47] Memetik penghakiman Augustine Paul J di dalam kes tersebut yang menyatakan kebolehterimaan gambar tanpa keperluan memanggil jurugambar kerana wujud saksi untuk mengesahkan apa yang dikemukakan melalui gambar ini adalah satu pernyataan fakta yang benar menjadi sandaran mahkamah ini seperti berikut: “In further elaboration, I refer to a passage from Evidence: Proof and Practice by Graham Roberts at p 545: S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 A question that arises where photographs are to be tendered is whether it is necessary to call the photographer. Generally speaking, there is no need to call the photographer provided that a witness is available who can testify that what is shown on the photograph is a fair and accurate representation of the scene at the relevant time. Calling the photographer will generally only be necessary when no such witness is available or in special cases when technical details of the photographer's art are likely to be in question. In other words, what is required, in the usual case, of a witness through whom a photograph is to be tendered is first-hand knowledge of what is shown in the photograph rather than first-hand knowledge of the taking of the photograph (see JW McElhaney, Trial Notebook (2nd Ed, Litigation Section of the American Bar Association, 1987) pp 202-203)”. [48] Di dalam kes Abdul Rahman (supra), apa yang dapat dirumuskan oleh Mahkamah ini ialah Mahkamah Rayuan dengan lebih lanjut menyatakan kesahihan sesuatu gambar adalah isu utama yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah meskipun pematuhan kepada seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan tidak dipatuhi sepenuhnya. Sebagai contoh, gambar kejadian bunuh semestinya akan diterima masuk sebagai sahih dan benar kerana tidak akan ada pihak-pihak yang akan mewujudkan senario seumpamanya yang menjadikan isu kesahihan gambar tersebut (no parties would recreate or re-enact the scene to suggest challenge to the authenticity of the photographs). [49] Mahkamah ini bersetuju bahawa isu pokok yang perlu diputuskan meskipun dengan kewujudan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan ialah jika gambar-gambar ID151 ini memberi cerita yang benar dan bukan diada- S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 adakan. Untuk ini juga, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pendakwaan yang merujuk kepada kes PP v Lin Lian Chen [1990] 2CLJ 1020 dan memutuskan ID151 boleh dikemukakan melalui IO SP27 apabila Mohtar Abdullah J menyatakan seperti berikut: “Mohd. Noor bin Jantan must be viewed in the light of the observation stated by Suffian LP himself: ... in our judgment it is immaterial whether or not the statement is a public document - for the principle is that a witness who has any document which is within his possession or power which is required by the defence and which is material to the defence, is bound to produce it; and this rule applies whether or not the document is public or private - save that in the case of a document within the possession or power of Government, Crown privilege may in certain circumstances be claimed. It is not suggested that the cautioned statement here is protected by Crown privilege. In the present case, the investigating officer had the cautioned statement " within his possession or power” ... Following Suffian LP's observation, for the purpose of the present case, the principle can be restated as follows: the principle is that any witness (including an investigating officer) who has any document (including a cautioned statement of an accused person) which is within his possession or power which is required by the defence and which is material to the defence, is bound to produce it...” (emphasis mine) [50] Dengan mengambil kira cabaran oleh pihak pembelaan berhubung wang ini melalui soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi-saksi pendakwaan iaitu ia sebagai satu perangkap yang diaturkan oleh Insp Praba SP17 dan SP12 mangsa Pratap sendiri (yang dinafikan oleh kedua- S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 duanya), wang ini adalah wang yang diberikan polis sebagai perangkap (yang turut dinafikan), wang yang ditemui dalam bakul di bilik Lalitha SP23 ini yang diletakkan oleh anak lelaki atau anak perempuan SP23 (dinafikan saksi), maka adalah jelas pembelaan sebenarnya tidak mencabar kewujudan sejumlah wang dalam bentuk nota RM50.00 ini. Berdasarkan keseluruhan prinsip dalam kes yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan semasa pembelaan dipanggil, untuk ID151 diterima masuk sebagai P151. Pembuktian kes di bawah seksyen 3 dan seksyen 5 Akta Culik [51] Bagi pertuduhan ke atas OKT1-3, iaitu melarikan secara salah ‘abduction’, maksud ‘abduction’ di bawah Akta Culik ialah sebagaimana takrifan di dalam Kanun Keseksaan apabila seksyen 2 Akta memperuntukkan: “wrongful restraint”, “wrongful confinement” and “abduction” shall have the meanings assigned to them in sections 339, 340 and 362 respectively of the Penal Code [Act 574]. [52] Seksyen 3 Akta yang sama memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Section 3. Abduction, wrongful restraint or wrongful confinement for ransom. (1) Whoever, with intent to hold any person for ransom, abducts or wrongfully confines or wrongfully restrains such person shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punished on conviction with imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years but not exceeding forty years and with whipping. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Section 362. Abduction. Whoever by force compels or by any deceitful means induces any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person. [53] Seksyen 5 pertuduhan OKT4 pula memperuntukkan: Section 5. Knowingly receiving ransom. (1) Whoever receives, has possession of or disposes of any money or property or any proceeds thereof, which has at any time been delivered as ransom in connection with any offence punishable under section 6, knowing that such money or other property has at any time been delivered as such ransom, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punished on conviction with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and shall also be liable to whipping. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person found to be in possession of any money or property or any proceeds thereof which has at any time been delivered as ransom shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have knowledge that such money or other property was delivered as such ransom. Seksyen 2 Akta pula mentakrifkan: “ransom” means any money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the release of a person abducted or wrongfully confined or wrongfully restrained. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [54] Mahkamah melalui penilaian maksima ke atas kredibiliti keterangan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan khususnya SP12 dan berpuas hati bahawa SP12 adalah seorang saksi yang kredibel. Keterangan SP1 dan SP12 menunjukkan berlakunya kejadian SP12 dilarikan secara salah. Versi SP12 pada dapatan Mahkamah adalah saksi yang kredibel kerana mengambil kira keterangan SP12 mengenai pengamatannya yang meskipun dalam keadaan mata bertutup, peka pada bunyi-bunyi seperti shutters ditarik dan ditutup, bunyi tong gas digerakkan yang konsisten dengan penemuan tempat SP12 dikurung sepertimana di gambar P137. [55] Keterangan SP10, SP12 dan SP17 selanjutnya juga membuktikan berlakunya kejadian menahan SP12 secara salah untuk mendapatkan wang tebusan apabila komunikasi telefon dibuat di antara suspek dengan SP10 yang turut didengari oleh SP17. Keterangan SP10 adalah material kerana SP10 adalah saksi yang merundingkan untuk jumlah tebusan dikurangkan dari jumlah asal yang diperas oleh suspek. [56] Keterangan SP12 juga memainkan peranan penting kerana telah dapat mengecam OKT8 Pooganeswaran seorang polis bantuan yang pada awalnya telah mendekati SP12 dan memperkenalkan diri sebagai polis yang telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan alternative seksyen 365 KK. Hasil soal siasat atas OKT8 inilah yang membawa kepada lain-lain suspek yang membawa kepada penemuan wang tebusan yang ditemui dalam keadaan tersorok. Penemuan gari dan ski mask juga menyokong versi kejadian oleh SP12. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [57] Identiti OKT-OKT pula ditentukan melalui pengecaman melalui penemuan DNA mangsa beserta DNA OKT1 (Jevan), OKT4 (Pirankash), OKT8 (Poonganeswaran) dan suspek Rovin Jothy. Fakta penemuan DNA OKT-OKT lain adalah relevan kerana menunjukkan berlakunya penculikan dengan melarikan secara salah SP12. Di samping itu, perbuatan OKT1 (Jevan) dan isterinya OKT4 (Vijaya), OKT2 (Surendran) dan OKT5 (Muniandy) membawa polis kepada penemuan sebahagian wang tebusan dalam keadaan jumlah yang besar dan tersorok dengan nombor siri selari dengan nombor siri wang dalam P151 (lihat bermula para 32 penghakiman ini) membuktikan kesemua memainkan peranan melarikan dan menahan dengan salah, mangsa SP12 kerana mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai wang tebusan ini yang ditemui dalam keadaan tersorok. [58] Untuk tujuan ini, anggapan seksyen 5(2) juga terpakai terhadap OKT4 (lihat para 78 penghakiman dan kes Krishna Rao yang disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di [2009] 2CLJ 603, Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor [1947] 74 IA 65 dan Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy v Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 367 berhubung kenyataan yang boleh diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah ini berhubung seksyen 27 Akta Keterangan dan seksyen 8 Akta yang sama sebagaimana diputuskan dalam ‘ruling’ Mahkamah semasa prosiding bicara berlangsung). [59] Meskipun jumlah wang yang dipadankan dengan nombor siri bukan berjumlah RM300,000.00 namun sebahagian besarnya telah diteliti dan dibuat perbandingan oleh SP27 dan disahkan semasa SP27 memberi keterangan. Tindakan OKT-OKT dalam kes ini memecahkan jumlah wang tebusan dengan membuat ‘layering’ melibatkan pengagihan kepada isteri S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 atau ahli keluarga serta sahabat melibatkan motif bertujuan untuk mengelakkan wang rampasan ini daripada mudah dikesan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini berpuashati bahawa satu kes di bawah seksyen 3 dan seksyen 5 dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan memanggil OKT-OKT untuk membela diri (lihat: Ting Khai Sin & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 MLJ 417). Kes pembelaan [60] Kesemua tertuduh membuat permohonan untuk OKT-OKT yang mengaku salah serta Rovin Jothy dikemukakan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan akan mengemukakan kenyataan 112 mereka kepada pihak pembelaan memandangkan OKT-OKT ini serta Rovin Jothy pada tarikh ditawarkan kepada pembelaan, tidak dibawa ke Mahkamah (lihat tentang keperluan mengemukakan saksi-saksi ini semasa ditawarkan: Ti Chuee Hiang v PP 1995 2MLJ 433 (SC), PP v Asnawi Yusuf [2012] 3CLJ 41 (COA)). [61] Apa yang dapat disimpulkan oleh Mahkamah ini ialah OKT-OKT awal yang lain ini telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan pilihan seksyen 365KK dan fakta kes yang dikemukakan menunjukkan mangsa yang terlibat ialah Pratap SP12. Oleh itu, versi SP12 bahawa dia dilarikan dan dikurung adalah kredibel. Malahan soal balas atas OKT2 juga bersetuju bahawa terdapat wang yang dirampas dari bilik sembahyang rumahnya, OKT4 (Pirakhas) melalui fakta yang dikemukakan juga menyatakan terdapat permintaan untuk wang tebusan dibuat dan fakta kes OKT8 (Pooganeswaran) menunjukkan wang habuan RM33,000.00 yang dirampas daripadanya yang disahkan sebagai wang tebusan melalui nombor siri oleh SP27. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [62] Semasa kes pembelaan, OKT5 Muniandy (dalam pertuduhan asal atau OKT3 dalam pertuduhan terkini) telah meninggal dunia sebelum sempat memberi keterangan. Atas permintaan Peguambela dan TPR untuk perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada pembebasan direkodkan, Mahkamah memerintahkan OKT3 dilepas tanpa dibebaskan (DNAA). [63] OKT4 (dirujuk sebagai SD3) pula menyatakan menerima sejumlah wang RM100,000.00 sebagaimana pertuduhan daripada ‘Jack’ atau Rovin Jothy untuk tujuan membayar duit peguam bagi Jevan dan Sundramurti. Namun, OKT4 menyatakan tidak mengenali ‘Jack’. Pada masa yang sama, sejumlah RM30,000.00 diserah pada Lalita (SP23) kerana rumah Lalita terletak dalam perjalanan ke Pejabat peguam Dato’ Baljit. [64] Dari baki RM70,000.00, sejumlah RM15,000.00 pula, menurut SD3 (OKT4) telah dibayar pada Dato’ Baljit, sejumlah RM5,000.00 dengan pecahan RM1,000.00 OKT4 (SD3) telah simpan dalam kereta manakala RM4,000.00 lagi dibelanjakan. Baki RM50,000.00 diagihkan pada ahli keluarganya termasuk makciknya Vasantha dan ini termasuk RM10,000.00 yang diserahkan oleh Vasantha kepada Sarasbathy (SP25). [65] Apabila disoal balas oleh TPR, SD3 menyatakan tidak membayar seluruh wang yang diserahkan oleh Jack kepada Dato’ Baljit kerana S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 arahan Dato’ Baljit ialah untuk membuat bayaran secara ansuran berdasarkan permintaan yang akan dibuat oleh Dato’ Baljit. Tiada bantahan oleh mana-mana pihak berhubung kenyataan SD3 ini. Walau bagaimanapun, di akhir kes pembelaan, Mahkamah terpaksa menolak keterangan SD3 ini kerana ‘hearsay’ atau dengar cakap kerana Dato’ Baljit tidak dipanggil (see: PP v Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim (No.3) (1999) 2MLJ 1) [66] Keterangan SD3 dibandingkan dengan soalbalas peguam OKT terhadap SP25 tidak membawa kepada cabaran bahawa jumlah RM10,000.00 telah diserahkan kepada SP25 oleh SD3. Sebagai tambahan, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah sesuatu yang tidak munasabah untuk ‘Jack’ atau Rovin Jothy menyerah sejumlah besar wang RM100,000.00 kepada SD3 atas alasan untuk mendapatkan perkhidmatan peguam bagi Jevan (OKT1) dan Sundramurti (adik Rovin) meskipun OKT1 ialah suami SD3 sedangkan SD3 sendiri menyatakan tidak mengenali Jack ‘Rovin Jothy’ dan Jack sendiri adalah salah seorang tangkapan dalam kes ini. [67] Malahan, SD1 OKT1 sendiri turut menyatakan tidak mengenali Rovin Jothy maka adalah sesuatu di luar norma untuk Rovin Jothy memberi jumlah besar ini untuk membantu orang yang tiada hubungan dengannya. SD3 juga bersetuju Rovin Jothy tidak perlu menyerahkan sejumlah wang kepada SD3 kerana Rovin Jothy sendiri boleh melantik peguam untuk adiknya Sundramurti. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [68] Keterangan SD3 juga menyatakan telah memberikan baki RM50,000.00 kepada Vasantha dan Vasantha telah berikan RM10,000.00 kepada Sarasbathy SP25. Keterangan SP25 ini tidak dicabar dalam solabalas pembelaan dari segi perbuatan SD3 yang apabila ditanya oleh SP25 duit apa, SD3 hanya diam tersenyum dan keadaan SD3 di dalam van polis pada hari rampasan di rumah SP25 yang bergari dan menangis sambil memohon maaf kepada SP25. Oleh itu, penafian SD3 semasa kes pembelaan apabila disoalbalas oleh TPR yang mencadangkan SD3 tahu ia wang hasil penculikan SP12 tidak disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan. [69] Keterangan OKT1 SD1 pula menyatakan dia sering keluar dengan Muniandy untuk minum dan kereta dipandu oleh Muniandy. Namun tiada apa-apa keterangan yang ditawarkan untuk menjelaskan bagaimana rambut dengan kesan DNA mangsa boleh ditemui dalam kereta Wira milik Muniandy meskipun terdapat cadangan kepada SP27 IO bahawa rambut OKT1 telah diletakkan dalam kereta tersebut (it was planted), yang tidak dipersetujui oleh SP27. [70] Di dalam PSD1 (kenyataan saksi OKT1) menyatakan darah dan rambutnya telah diambil oleh pihak polis tanpa dimaklumkan apa tujuannya. Perlu diingat bahawa OKT1 menyatakan sering menaiki kereta ini. Atas jawapan OKT1 yang bertentangan dengan cadangan bahawa rambutnya (dan bukan rambut mangsa SP12) diletakkan dalam kereta Wira ini oleh pihak polis, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa OKT1 mengubah cerita pada saat akhir ketika kes pembelaan menjadikan pembelaannya tidak konsisten dengan versinya sendiri. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [71] Oleh itu, dengan dapatan Mahkamah berhubung isu ini sebagai pemikiran terkemudian, maka Mahkamah menerima versi pendakwaan berhubung penemuan rambut milik SP12 mangsa dan OKT1 di tempat duduk belakang sebagai munasabah. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat rumusan terdapat bukti menunjukkan mangsa SP12 berada bersama OKT1 dalam kereta Wira milik Muniandy. [72] SD1 iaitu OKT1 juga menyatakan telah meminta adik Rovin Jothy (Sundramurti) untuk membantunya mendapatkan khidmat peguam dan SD1 menyatakan SD3 telah memberitahunya Jack iaitu Rovin Jothy telah memberikan wang RM100,000.00 untuk lantik peguam. SD3 mengulanginya dalam pembelaan SD3 namun semasa soalbalas, SD3 menyatakan tidak tahu wang ini untuk tujuan lantik peguam. [73] Meskipun pembelaan SD3 menyatakan Sundramurti telah menelefonnya dan beritahu abangnya Jack akan beri RM100,000.00 kepada OKT3 untuk dibayar kepada peguam untuk Jevan (OKT1) dan Sundramurti, yang mana berdasarkan senarai bongkar D218, menunjukkan 3 resit bayaran kepada Shukor, Baljit & Partners masing- masing bertarikh 8.1.18, 12.1.18 dan 15.1.18 untuk jumlah RM5,000.00, RM7,000.00 dan RM3,000.00, namun tiada mana-mana wakil dari firma ini yang dipanggil untuk mengesahkan arahan bayaran berkala ini (lihat para 65 penghakiman ini). S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [74] Pembelaan SD3 ini tidak pernah dicadangkan kepada SP23 kerana SD3 menyatakan kerana dia (SD3) takut menyimpan jumlah yang besar dan oleh kerana rumah SP23 berada dalam laluan ke Pejabat peguam menyebabkan SD3 meminta SP23 menyimpannya. Namun, versi SP23 ialah SD3 hanya datang ke rumahnya pada 14.1.18 untuk mandi dan tiada keterangan kedatangan SD3 pada tarikh-tarikh lain sebagaimana yang tercatit di resit 8.1.18, 12.1.18 dan 15.1.18. [75] SP23 percaya wang tersebut ialah wang SD3 kerana nampak SD3 menunjukkan ke arah almari tersebut kepada polis SP27. Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan versi SD3 bahawa SP23 tahu mengenai wang tersebut kerana telah diserahkan kepada SP23 dan dia tahu untuk tujuan bayaran peguam tidak dibuktikan dan tidak berjaya menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. Sebaliknya, ia menunjukkan pengetahuan di pihak OKT4. [76] Pembelaan OKT2 pula ialah meskipun mengenali Jevan iaitu OKT1, namun menafikan terlibat dengan penculikan ini. Walau bagaimanapun, OKT2 semasa soal balas bersetuju terdapat rampasan sejumlah wang dari bilik sembahyang rumahnya. Namun, telah menafikan dia yang meletakkan sejumlah wang dalam bag pouch dan plastik oren tersorok dalam bilik sembahyang tersebut. Namun, pembelaan OKT2 ini tidak pula mencadangkan bagaimana wang ini boleh ditemui berada dalam keadaan tersorok dalam rumahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa wang ini telah disorokkan oleh OKT2 sendiri. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [77] Kedua-dua OKT1 dan OKT2 memberi keterangan bahawa mereka telah dipukul dengan teruk oleh pihak polis untuk membuat pengakuan. OKT1 menyatakan telah mengadu kepada Majistret semasa tahanan reman berlangsung melibatkan reman OKT1, OKT2 dan Sundramurti. OKT2 pula menyatakan dia juga telah dipukul tetapi tidak berani mengadu kepada Majistret kerana bimbang akan membawa kepada kes kematian semasa dalam tahanan. [78] Mahkamah berpendapat alasan OKT2 ini tidak munasabah kerana jika tahanan reman dibuat serentak ke atas OKT1, OKT2 dan Sundramurti maka OKT2 sepatutnya menggunakan peluang yang sama bersama OKT1 untuk memajukan aduannya dipukul kepada Majistret tetapi ini tidak berlaku. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa alasan OKT2 dia juga telah dipukul untuk membuat pengakuan tidak menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah lebih-lebih lagi semasa IO SP27 memberi keterangan berhubung pandu arah, isu mengenai ‘inducement, not on his own volition’ hanya timbul selepas beberapa siri soalan dibangkitkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan Mahkamah bertujuan untuk mengetahui asas atau sebab bantahan yang dibangkitkan oleh pembelaan. [79] Atas bantahan OKT1 pula yang dia dipukul, tiada laporan polis yang dikatakan dibuat pada tahun 2018 yang dikemukakan atas alasan tercicir di penjara manakala surat yang dikatakan disediakan oleh peguam D216 untuk tujuan mendapatkan salinan pula hanya bertarikh 27.3.2023 selepas pembelaan OKT dipanggil. Keterangan OKT1 dengan merujuk kepada gambar P135(5&6) bahawa dia mengalami kecederaan lebam S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 pada muka, di mata, pipi dan punggung terkoyak ‘ligament tear’ dan kecederaan tangan hanya boleh diterima masuk setakat ia dapat dilihat pada P135 manakala kecederaan ‘ligament tear’ pada punggung bukan suatu yang jelas nyata tanpa laporan perubatan. [80] Oleh itu, dengan mengetepikan kecederaan ‘ligament tear’ pada punggung kerana tidak disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan, kecederaan pada OKT1 menurut kes PP v Krishna Rao Gurumurthi & Ors [2000]1CLJ 446 di mana Kang Hwee Gee J membuat dapatan hanyalah satu kecederaan yang tidak serius berbangkit daripada keperluan polis yang bertindak dalam menjalankan tugas mendapatkan maklumat sebagaimana yang diputuskan seperti berikut: “Far from being of trifling weight, the two sets of information provided by the respective accused in the instant case were of enormous value to the prosecution whose case may stand or fall by them. Their probative value certainly outweighs their prejudicial effect. There is in my judgement therefore no valid ground to reject them on the basis that they may not have been given voluntarily by the respective accused. In any case, I could not find any evidence of any form of oppression beyond that which was reasonably expected and required by the police to obtain information to find the killers of the four persons…" [81] Mahkamah bersetuju kecederaan yang ada pada OKT1 hanyalah satu kecederaan yang tidak mudarat dibandingkan dengan keperluan untuk polis bertindak mendapatkan maklumat dalam menjalankan S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 siasatannya. Oleh itu, apa-apa keterangan yang datang daripada OKT1 berbangkit daripada tindakan polis hingga mengakibatkan kecederaan ini adalah satu tindakan perlu untuk memastikan penjenayah dapat dikenalpasti dan dibawa ke muka pengadilan meskipun pihak polis telah ada suspek lain Rovin Jothy dan Sundramurti yang dapat membantu siasatan dari segi pengemukaan maklumat. Peranan Rovin Jothy [82] Mahkamah ini meskipun bersetuju dengan cadangan pihak pembelaan bahawa Rovin Jothy adalah saksi yang material, namun tanpa keterangan Rovin Jothy di Mahkamah tidak menjadikan terdapat kelompangan dalam kes pendakwaan kerana elemen di bawah seksyen 3 dan 5 telah dibuktikan dengan wang tebusan ini telah ditemui melalui pandu arah oleh saksi atau OKT sendiri. [83] Keseluruhan keterangan yang ada dan analisa Mahkamah ini, membawa kepada pendapat Mahkamah bahawa kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan Rovin Jothy (berada dalam tahanan menurut SP27) dan Sundramurti (tidak dapat dikesan melalui usaha yang dibuat secara carian iklan) untuk disoal-balas oleh pembelaan ataupun dipanggil sebagai saksi pembelaan tidak mengakibatkan ruang dan peluang pihak pembelaan untuk menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terjejas kerana pihak pendakwaan telahpun membuat tawaran untuk mengemukakan kenyataan 112 saksi (lihat: Siti Aisyah v PP [2019] 4MLJ 46). Pihak pembelaan tidak ada membuat permohonan lanjut untuk kenyataan ini. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh dipersalahkan atas kegagalan mengemukakan mereka. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [84] Kegagalan mengemukakan OKT-OKT lain yang telah mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan alternative seksyen 365KK juga tidak membangkitkan anggapan seksyen 114(g) kerana apa jua peranan mereka telahpun dinyatakan dalam fakta kes yang dikemukakan hasil daripada pengakuan salah mereka. Dengan ketiadaan anggapan seksyen 114(g) terpakai, maka tugas pendakwaan untuk menyediakan dan memanggil mereka sebagai saksi kepada pembelaan, selesai. [85] Soal balas pembelaan ke atas kesemua nama-nama suspek dan OKT-OKT seksyen 365KK jikapun wujud keperluan, hanyalah untuk menyokong pembelaan OKT1-OKT4. Pada tahap ini, setelah analisa keterangan OKT1-OKT4 itu sendiri dibuat, keterangan pembelaan mereka adalah tidak konsisten dengan ketidak bersalahan mereka. Oleh itu, jikapun berlaku kegagalan menyediakan suspek-suspek dan OKT- OKT seksyen 365KK oleh pihak pendakwaan, ia tidak membawa apa-apa kesan ke atas kebersalahan OKT1-OKT4 kerana keterangan utama yang gagal menimbulkan keraguan munsabah yang membawa Mahkamah ini memutuskan ketiadaan keterangan sokongan dari suspek-suspek dan OKT-OKT seksyen 365KK tidak memprejudiskan mereka. Memetik Augustine Paul J yang memutuskan “It must be noted that the question of corroboration does not arise unless the evidence of the witness requiring corroboration is itself credible” (lihat: Aziz Muhamad Din v PP [1997]1CLJ Supp 523). [86] Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pembelaan telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah berhubung keterangan S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 kes pendakwaan dan mensabitkan kesemua tertuduh. Setelah mendengar hujahan memberatkan dan mitigasi, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman 30 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap dan 3 sebatan rotan bagi OKT1 dan 2. Bagi OKT4, dijatuhkan hukuman penjara 5 tahun dari tarikh keputusan (kerana OKT4 berada dalam jaminan). Refreshing memory [87] Sebagai tambahan selain daripada analisa keterangan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mengambil kesempatan untuk membincangkan mengenai keperluan saksi memberi keterangan dengan mengambil ikrar bercakap benar tanpa perlu merasa bebanan untuk mengingati secara terperinci setiap fakta kerana bimbang dituduh tidak bercakap benar atau menyembunyikan fakta. Tidak dinafikan, atas lambakan kes yang berdaftar di Mahkamah menunggu untuk dibicarakan, telah timbul keperluan untuk saksi mengingatkan semula fakta apabila dipanggil sebagai saksi. Undang-undang telah mengiktiraf keperluan mengingat semula ini apabila memperuntukkan seksyen 159 Akta Keterangan 1950 seperti berikut: Section 159. Refreshing memory. (1) A witness may while under examination refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory. (2) The witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if, when he read it, he knew it to be correct. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 (3) Whenever the witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the court, refer to a copy of that document: Provided the court is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original. (4) An expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises. [88] Di dalam kes ini, telah timbul keperluan untuk saksi pendakwaan merujuk kepada dokumen rajah kasar apabila memberi keterangan. Rajah kasar ini tidak dikemukakan kepada pihak pembelaan di bawah seksyen 51A KTJ dan TPR, atas bantahan pihak pembelaan jelas menyatakan tidak bercadang untuk mengemukakannya. Oleh itu, saksi telah membuat permohonan untuk merujuk kepada rajah kasar tersebut dengan tujuan ‘refreshing memory’. [89] Di pihak Mahkamah pula dengan berdasarkan keterangan saksi yang telah diberi sehinggalah permohonan ‘refreshing memory’ dibuat, berpendapat dokumen lebih sesuai dikemukakan kerana jika tidak dikemukakan, Mahkamah akan berada dalam keadaan teragak-agak apa yang cuba digambarkan oleh saksi. Walau bagaimanapun, memandangkan pihak pendakwaan tidak bercadang untuk mengemukakannya sebaliknya membuat rujukan kepada permohonan saksi untuk ‘refresh his memory’, maka keperluan seksyen 159 Akta perlulah dipatuhi. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [90] ‘Refreshing memory’ bukan setakat membaca seksyen 159 secara kasar dan ‘literal’ iaitu dokumen dirujuk kepada saksi dan saksi melihat dokumen dan terus menyampaikan apa yang dihasratkan oleh saksi setelah melihat dokumen ini. Seksyen 159 itu sendiri memberi syarat untuk pembuktian dokumen ini sama ada dibuat oleh saksi ini sendiri atau tidak, bila dibuat dan yang lebih utama pihak pembelaan juga berhak untuk melihat dokumen yang dicadangkan untuk dirujuk oleh saksi (lihat seksyen 159, 160 dan 161 Akta). Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, apa yang berlaku ialah bacaan secara kasar seksyen 159 itu sendiri bahawa ia disediakan oleh saksi namun tiada perincian bila ia dibuat sama ada kontemporari atau tidak. [91] Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah tidak membenarkan rujukan kepada dokumen tersebut kerana tidak memenuhi syarat yang ditetapkan oleh seksyen 159 itu sendiri. Selain daripada itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat pihak pendakwaan tidak disekat daripada merujuk dan mengemukakan rajah kasar ini meskipun tidak diserahkan kepada pihak pembelaan kerana seksyen 51A KTJ bukan satu peruntukan bersabit kebolehterimaan dokumen sebagai eksibit ‘admissibilibity of documents as exhibits’ (lihat: PP v. Mohd Fazil Awaludin [2009] 2 CLJ 862. Ini adalah antara pemerhatian yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini dan dikemukakan untuk panduan. Bertarikh 28 Disember 2023 Hakim MTSJB S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 Bagi pihak pendakwaan; TPR Ho Kwong Chin, TPR Haikal Ismail & TPR Shahrul Ekhsan Hasim Pejabat Pendakwaan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan. Bagi pihak tertuduh 1 & 4: Dennis Mahen. R & Associates 05-06 5th Floor TKS Business Centre Wisma Tan Kim San No. 518A, 3rd Mile Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah 51200 Kuala Lumpur. Pagi pihak tertuduh 2: Tetuan Gabriel Susayan and Partners No. 61, 2nd Floor Bangunan Ban Guan Hin Jalan Dato’ Hamzah, 41000 Klang Selangor Darul Ehsan. S/N QzctiZIesU2rU8vH0igDA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-12BNCC-11-08/2022

PERAYU GAN KAH LOON RESPONDEN TAN WEI LEONG

Moneylenders – Friendly Loan – Lender and borrower total strangers – Meaning of friendly loan – Determination of true intentions of the lender and borrower.Appeal – Evaluation of evidence and testimonies of witnesses – Principles on appellate intervention – Plainly wrong, or where there had been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence.

03/01/2024

YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=612354b2-dbd8-47f3-aaf9-00ee58cf26e8&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO. BA-12BNCC-11-08/2022 ANTARA GAN KAH LOON (NO. K/P: 740607-14-5809 / A2855867) … PERAYU DAN TAN WEI LEONG (NO. K/P: 761212-13-5617 / K0502260) … RESPONDEN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This case concerns a matter where the Appellant/Plaintiff is alleged to have given a “friendly loan” to the Respondent/Defendant, a person the Appellant/Plaintiff had never met nor spoken to before. This led the learned Sessions Court Judge into remarking that such a friendly loan transaction caused her to “berasa hairan” as to why the Appellant/Plaintiff would agree to such a transaction. [2] The claim by the Appellant/Plaintiff against the Respondent/Defendant was for the return of RM380,000.00, being the balance of an alleged loan sum pursuant to an interest-free friendly loan 03/01/2024 12:10:34 BA-12BNCC-11-08/2022 Kand. 25 S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 of RM500,000.00. This claim was dismissed by the Sessions Court on 3 August, 2022, after a full trial. The Sessions Court also awarded costs of RM10,000.00 to the Respondent/Defendant. [3] The Appellant/Plaintiff has appealed against the decision of the Sessions Court to this Court. The Prevailing Issues [4] The overriding issue in this appeal is whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in law in evaluating the available evidence and testimonies of the witnesses before the Court. [5] Equally imperative is the issue of whether there existed a friendly loan transaction between the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Respondent/Defendant, as alleged by the former. The Parties’ Contentions [6] According to the Appellant/Plaintiff, the repayment terms of the supposed friendly loan are straightforward in that: (i) the Respondent/Defendant was to repay this friendly loan by way of thirteen (13) monthly instalments of RM40,000.00 per month; and (ii) the repayment instalments were to commence in March 2016 and ending March 2017 with the last instalment payment in the sum of RM20,000.00. S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [7] The Appellant/Plaintiff acknowledged that the Respondent/Defendant did repay the Appellant/Plaintiff the first 3 monthly instalments of RM40,000.00 each totalling RM120,000.00. Thereafter, the Respondent/Defendant then “failed, refused and neglected to repay the remaining eleven (11) monthly instalment amounting to RM380,000.00”. [8] The Appellant/Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge are as follows: (a) that the learned Sessions Court Judge failed to appreciate that there is undisputed evidence that the Respondent/Defendant has received RM500,000.00 and had repaid from his own account RM120,000.00 to the Appellant/Plaintiff; (b) that the learned Sessions Court Judge failed to appreciate that the Respondent/Defendant is obliged to return the monies that he has retained in the absence of evidence that it is a gift or that it need not be repaid; (c) that the learned Sessions Court Judge attached undue weight and/or consideration to the absence of a written loan agreement and failed to appreciate that a legally enforceable agreement need not necessarily be in writing; (d) that the learned Sessions Court Judge’s finding that the Appellant/Plaintiff’s cheques were issued to one Chong Bih Sing (“Bih Sing”) was contrary to both the Respondent/Defendant’s admission that he has received RM500,000.00 in his account and the documentary evidence S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 admitted in the trial that took the form of cheques drawn in favour of the Respondent/Defendant; (e) that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in accepting that the transactions made were between the Appellant/Plaintiff and Bih Sing as opposed to the Respondent/Defendant when such proposition was never put to the Appellant/Plaintiff at trial; (f) that the learned Sessions Court Judge attached undue weight to and/or was unduly concerned with the Appellant/Plaintiff not calling Bih Sing as his witness even though Bih Sing did testify at trial; (g) that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in finding and giving undue weight that there was no basis for a friendly loan on account of the lack of relationship between the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Respondent/Defendant when such propositions were never put to the Appellant/Plaintiff at trial. [9] On the Respondent/Defendant’s admission of his failure to respond to the Appellant/Plaintiff’s letter of demand, the latter relied on David Wong Hon Leong v Noorazman Adnan [1996] 1 AMR 7; [1995] 4 CLJ 155; [1995] 3 MLJ 283; [1995] 1 MLRA 708 for the proposition that if there were no such friendly loan agreement, the latter ought to have responded to the letter of demand by denying the existence of such an agreement. [10] More importantly, the Appellant/Plaintiff drew this Court’s attention to a decision of the Court of Appeal in Tan Aik Teck v Tang Soon Chye [2007] 5 AMR 416; [2007] 5 CLJ 441; [2007] 6 MLJ 97; [2007] 2 MLRA 58 S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (“Tan Aik Teck”), the facts of which, the Appellant/Plaintiff submitted, are on all fours with the ones in our present case. [11] The Appellant/Plaintiff highlighted that in Tan Aik Teck (i) there was also an absence formal loan agreement between parties; (ii) the plaintiff had also issued 2 cheques to the defendant; (iii) the defendant admitted that the 2 cheques were credited into his account; (iv) the plaintiff issued a letter of demand for the return of the loan through his solicitors; (v) the defendant claimed that he did not have any reason whatsoever to borrow money nor was he in need of any financial assistance at the material time; (vi) the defendant contended that he hardly knew the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff could not be his friend and granted him the alleged friendly loan; and (vii) both the plaintiff and the defendant have a common friend and the defendant’s request for the loan was made through this common friend. S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] The Court of Appeal in Tan Aik Teck held that the plaintiff had proven his claim on a balance of probabilities. On the plaintiff’s burden of proving the loan, the Court of Appeal opined as follows: [7] Since the defendant had admitted that he had received the two cheques and had credited them into his account, I am of the view that the plaintiff had discharged his burden that the money was a loan unless proven otherwise by the defendant. As such, the burden is on the defendant that the money given to him by the plaintiff was not a friendly loan. … [11] In my view, it does not matter whether the defendant was a millionaire and the plaintiff was a pauper, the undisputed facts remain that the plaintiff did issue two cheques amounting to the amount claimed to be the loan and the defendant admitted receiving those cheques and banked them into his account. As I have stated earlier, it is for the defendant to explain to the court what was the money for if it was not a friendly loan. [13] On the defendant’s submission in Tan Aik Teck’s case that the parties hardly knew each other and thus the plaintiff could not have granted the defendant a friendly loan, the clarification by the Court of Appeal on the meaning of the term “friendly loan” is most instructive. The Court of Appeal explained as follows: [12] It is clear to me that the defendant, in particular his counsel, was under the misconception what is meant by a friendly loan. A friendly loan is opposed to the normal borrowing from a moneylender or financial S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 institution. A friendly loan is a loan between two persons based on trust. There may be an agreement such as an I.O.U. or security pledged to repayment but most important there will be no interest imposed. … I am of the view that the defendant was under the misconception that in order to qualify for a friendly loan, the amount advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant must be amongst friends. [14] Finally, the Appellant/Plaintiff underscored to this Court in this appeal regarding the test for intervention by an Appellate Court of a decision of a lower court, which the Appellant/Plaintiff argued, and this Court agrees, is settled law. This Court was referred to cases such as Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 AMR 357; [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 MLJ 9; [2003] 1 MLRA 95 and Gan Yook Chin (P) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng [2004] 6 AMR 781; [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 2 MLRA 1. [15] Based on the settled principle that an appellate court will not intervene unless it was shown that the trial court was plainly wrong, or where there had been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence, the Appellant/Plaintiff submitted that the learned Sessions Court Judge was “plainly wrong” in her findings and committed errors of law and misappreciation of facts. [16] On the other hand, the Respondent/Defendant averred, inter alia, that: • the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Respondent/Defendant are total strangers to one another; S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 • there is no documentary proof of the purportedly friendly loan; • the cheque for the sum of RM500,000.00 was issued in favour of the Respondent/Defendant at the behest of Bih Sing, a personal friend of the Appellant/Plaintiff, without any reference to the Respondent/Defendant and/or verification; • the Appellant/Plaintiff has confirmed that he has had a personal relationship with Bih Sing for many years prior to this transaction and together they have been involved in the money lending business; • the Respondent/Defendant is from Sabah but instead of handing over the cheque to the Respondent/Defendant, the Appellant/Plaintiff directly banked the payment into the Respondent/Defendant’s account in Maybank, which branch was in Medan Tunku, Kuala Lumpur, controlled by Bih Sing; and • both the Appellant/Plaintiff and Bih Sing have confirmed that the Maybank account was completely controlled by Bih Sing and this had not been challenged and/or disputed by the Appellant/Plaintiff. [17] Crucially, the Respondent/Defendant maintained that the monies were meant for a pyramid scheme, in a company known as GM Friday Services Sdn Bhd and handled by Bih Sing. Most importantly, the Respondent/Defendant submitted that it was a transaction between the Appellant /Plaintiff and Bih Sing. S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Decision of this Court [18] This Court has examined the cause papers and grounds raised by the parties and is guided by the principles of law relating to appellate intervention. [19] Based on the authority of the Court of Appeal decision in Tan Aik Teck, the fact that a lender and a borrower may not be friends does not negate the fact that a friendly loan may still have been given by the former to the latter. As explained by the Court of Appeal, a friendly loan is one that can be distinguished from those of normal borrowings from a licensed moneylender or a financial institution. The distinguishing feature is that no interest is imposed. However, the Court of Appeal in Tan Aik Teck did also say that a friendly loan is a loan between two persons “based on trust” and “there may be an agreement such as an I.O.U. or security pledged to repayment”. [20] The “mystery” surrounding the circumstances as to why a person of the knowledge and standing such as the Appellant/Plaintiff would trust the Respondent/Defendant and make payments via two cheques amounting to a total of RM500,000.00 into the latter’s account will be unraveled when one considers the role played by a gentleman whose name has been repeatedly mentioned by the parties, that is, Bih Sing. Despite having been alleged by the parties as having played a significant role in this entire transaction, Bih Sing had remained quiet – at least until he testified on behalf of the Respondent/Defendant. S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [21] To be fair to Bih Sing, he had remained silent because he was neither added as a defendant nor as a third party by the Appellant/Plaintiff and the Respondent/Defendant respectively. [22] The involvement of Bih Sing in this entire episode of events leading to the filing of the present Suit in the Session Court by the Appellant/Plaintiff against the Respondent/Defendant, and the further appeal to this Court, is crucial in assisting us to determine the true intentions of the parties and nature of this transaction. As acknowledged by the Appellant/Respondent, Bih Sing is the Appellant/Plaintiff’s childhood friend and the Respondent/Defendant’s business partner. [23] The findings by the learned Sessions Court Judge that the main protagonists are actually the Appellant/Plaintiff and Bih Sing are valid. [24] The arguments by the Appellant/Plaintiff that the facts in Tan Aik Teck are similar to those in our present case and yet the Court of Appeal had ruled that the there was a valid friendly agreement warrants consideration. [25] It is indeed true that the facts in these two cases are comparable. However, one crucial distinctive feature that separates Tan Aik Teck from our present case, once again, can be traced to the involvement of a third- party common friend. Unlike in Tan Aik Teck, the history of past dealings between the Appellant/Plaintiff and this third-party common friend, namely, Bih Sing, is vital to the outcome reached in this case. [26] This Court is satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge has considered all the evidence, the testimonies of the witnesses, the grounds S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 advanced by the parties and had correctly reached her decision on a balance of probabilities. [27] This Court is not satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge had been “plainly wrong” in her findings or had committed errors of law and misappreciation of facts. [28] The decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge is hereby affirmed. [29] This appeal is dismissed with costs. [30] The Appellant/Plaintiff to pay costs of RM30,000 to the Respondent/Defendant, subject to allocator. Dated: 3 January, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Counsel: Sia Siew Mun with Kevin Wong and Tristan Ng for the Appellant (Messrs. Kevin Wong & Partners) Vincent Lawrence with Thrichelvam Rasiah for the Respondent (Messrs. Lawrence Hisham & Co.) S/N slQjYdjb80eqQDuWM8m6A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-407-09/2021

PLAINTIF SPK-SENTOSA CORPORATION BERHAD (DALAM PENGGULUNGAN) DEFENDAN 1. ) SEP CAPITAL (M) SDN BHD 2. ) PEMBINAAN SPK SDN BHD 3. ) TRW BOULEVARD SQUARE SDN BHD

Civil procedure: Judgment - Consent judgment - Pronouncement of rights - Non-executory consent judgment - Rights under arbitration award declared without requiring execution of deed of assignment - Whether the declaratory consent judgment can be enforced - Whether consequential orders amounts to unilateral variation of terms - Mutual consent for variation - Freedom of contract - Whether the non-assignment clause requiring consent of counterparty invalidates assignment - Power of court to grant consequential orders facilitating enforcement of declaratory consent judgment - Costs personally against liquidator Abuse of process – Misconduct - Reasonable professional judgment

03/01/2024

YA Tuan Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=78562c4a-5087-4b21-868a-efd6b9ac9ded&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO.: WA-22NCC-407-09/2021 BETWEEN SPK-SENTOSA CORPORATION BERHAD (IN WINDING UP) (COMP. NO.: 196401000051 /5347-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. SEP CAPITAL (M) SDN. BHD (COMP. NO.: 201301011290/ 1041128-X) 2. PEMBINAAN SPK SDN. BHD (COMP. NO.: 198401010361/ 122900-W) 3. TRW BOULEVARD SQUARE SDN. BHD (COMP. NO.: 198401010361/ 122900-W) ... DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT [1] When parties enter into a consent judgment declaring rights and entitlements, there is an expectation that it would be complied with, in letter and spirit. Yet, the First and Second Defendants here resist putting ink to paper to uphold a pronouncement that grants the Plaintiff rights over an arbitration award involving a third party. 03/01/2024 16:23:40 WA-22NCC-407-09/2021 Kand. 36 S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] In examining whether to compel the First and Second Defendants' execution of an assignment, the pivotal issue lies in the tension between consent judgments as declaratory compromises versus executable orders. This turns on the nature of declaratory relief, the principles underlying consent judgments, the defences raised regarding unilateral variations, and ultimately, whether executing an additional document is necessitated to give effect to this declaratory bargain. Background facts [3] On 12.5.2017, the Plaintiff, SPK-Sentosa Corporation Berhad and the First Defendant, SEP Capital (M) Sdn Bhd entered into a Share Sale Agreement for the Plaintiff to sell 54,300,000 shares in the Second Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd and 3,500,000 shares in Semarak Korporat Sdn Bhd to the First Defendant for RM6 million and RM3.5 million respectively. The Share Sale Agreement contained certain conditions precedent and stipulated the payment schedule for the purchase price. Clause 6A of the Share Sale Agreement stated that the Plaintiff shall indemnify the Second Defendant for any costs or claims arising from an ongoing arbitration proceeding between the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant, TRW Boulevard Square Sdn Bhd, and that any proceeds from the arbitration shall accrue to the Plaintiff. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] At the time, there was an arbitration proceeding between the Second Defendant and Third Defendant concerning a construction contract dispute where the Second Defendant was seeking over RM2.7 million from the Third Defendant. On 16.7.2019, the arbitration tribunal issued a final award requiring the Third Defendant to pay over RM17 million to the Second Defendant (“Arbitration Award”). [5] There was a shortfall of RM1 million for the purchase consideration of the Second Defendant's shares under the Share Sale Agreement which the First Defendant failed to pay. On 30.7.2021, the Plaintiff filed a suit registered under WA-22NCC-339-07/2021 (“Suit 339”) against the First Defendant to recover this RM1 million. On 22.10.2021, the parties recorded a consent judgment in Suit 339 for the First Defendant to pay RM700,000 as full settlement (“Consent Judgment”). [6] Separately, on 10.9.2021, the Plaintiff filed this suit in these proceedings against the First, Second and Third Defendants primarily seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Arbitration Award proceeds and an order requiring assignment of rights under the Arbitration Award. During case management on 21.10.2021, the Plaintiff withdrew this suit against the Third Defendant. [7] On 22.10.2021, the Plaintiff, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant recorded a consent judgment (“the Consent Judgment”) in this suit declaring that the Plaintiff S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 has rights over the RM16.9 million Arbitration Award sum, with interest and costs. [8] Around 18 months later, the Plaintiff sent a draft deed of assignment dated 18.4.2023 seeking to assign rights over the Arbitration Award proceeds per the Consent Judgment. The First Defendant and Second Defendant refused to execute this draft deed of assignment, communicated by a letter dated 26.4.2023. [9] On 17.01.2022 the Plaintiff issued a statutory notice of demand under Section 466 of the Companies Act 2016 to the Third Defendant. On 24.3.2022, the Plaintiff had filed a winding up petition registered as Petition No. WA-28NCC- 237-03/2022 (“the Petition”) against the Third Defendant to wind up the Third Defendant and demanded payment of over RM20 million. The Petition was dismissed by the High Court on 27.03.2023 on the basis that the Consent Judgment is merely a declaration that declares the Plaintiff's rights over the Arbitration Award sums which does not contain any enforceable order and is not an assignment in writing. [10] On 2.6.2023, the Plaintiff filed an application in Enclosure10 for consequential orders in this suit seeking an order requiring the First and Second Defendants to execute the deed of assignment within 7 days. The First and Second Defendants opposed the application. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Plaintiff’s application [11] In Enclosure 10, the Plaintiff filed an application for consequential orders to give full effect to the Consent Judgment, due to the following (as stated in Enclosure 10): a) The First and Second Defendants' refusal to comply with and give effect to the declaratory Consent Judgment stating that the Plaintiff is entitled to all proceeds of the Arbitration Award. b) The winding up court's refusal in the Petition to give full effect to the declaratory Consent Judgment. [12] The Plaintiff seeks the following consequential orders: a) The First and Second Defendants shall execute a deed of assignment transferring all rights under the Arbitration Award to the Plaintiff within seven days. b) Alternatively, if the First and Second Defendants fail to sign the deed of assignment, the court to direct its officer to execute the deed of assignment on behalf of the First and Second Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff. [13] The grounds are that the First and Second Defendants have refused to comply with the declaratory Consent Judgment by refusing to sign the deed of assignment. The winding up S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 court also held that the Consent Judgment is merely a declaration and not an assignment capable of enforcement. Hence consequential orders are necessary to give effect to the Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment [14] The terms of the Consent Judgment in their entirety are laid out below: “1. Satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif mempunyai hak ke atas kesemua jumlah yang telah diawadkan di bawah Awad Timbangtara bertarikh 16.07.2019 di antara Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga sebanyak RM16,925,094.16 dengan faedah pada kadar 8% setahun ke atas RM16,925,094.16 sehingga penyelesaian penuh Awad Timbangtara tersebut dan kos prosiding Timbangtara tersebut sebanyak RM350, 000.00; dan 2. Tiada perintah terhadap kos.” [15] Essentially in the Consent Judgment, the Plaintiff, and the First and Second Defendants have agreed that the Plaintiff has rights over the entire sums of RM16.9 million plus interest and costs awarded to the Second Defendant under the arbitration between the Second Defendant and Third Defendant. It is a declaratory consent judgment recorded in the Plaintiff's favour regarding its entitlement to the Arbitration Award sums. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 The Plaintiff’s submissions [16] In summary the Plaintiff submits: a) The filing of the consequential order application seeking execution of the deed of assignment is necessary and well within the court's inherent jurisdiction to give effect to the Consent Judgment. It does not violate the principle of functus officio. b) A clear injustice would occur if the First and Second Defendants are allowed to go against the Consent Judgment by now claiming entitlement over the arbitration proceeds, after having earlier agreed that the Plaintiff has rights to the proceeds. This would offend fairness and allow the First and Second Defendants to benefit from their own breach. c) The court should not assist the First and Second Defendants' silence and inaction in allowing the Plaintiff to obtain the arbitration proceeds per the clear Consent Judgment. Their silence renders the Consent Judgment futile. d) No absolute prejudice is caused to the First and Second Defendants by the consequential order. e) The deed of assignment is essential to give effect to the Consent Judgment, failing which it is merely a S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 futile paper judgment. This necessitates the consequential order. f) The First and Second Defendants agreed to give the arbitration proceeds to the Plaintiff under the Consent Judgment and Share Sale Agreement Clause 6A. Their present refusal to sign the deed of assignment and reliance on the Third Defendant's non-assignment clause are afterthoughts made in bad faith, showing their disregard for the Consent Judgment. The First Defendant and Second Defendant’s submissions [17] In summary the First and Second Defendants submit: a) The Consent Judgment is a contract between parties with only a declaratory order and no positive executory obligations on the First and Second Defendants. As such, they have no obligation to execute any deed of assignment under the Consent Judgment. b) The court has no jurisdiction to grant the order sought in Enclosure 10 as it is an attempt to unilaterally alter/amend the Consent Judgment without the Third Defendant’s consent. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 c) The consequential orders sought are illegal, futile and have no legal effect as the non-assignment clause in the Second Defendant's contract requires the Third Defendant's consent for any assignment. d) Any power of attorney created under the deed of assignment would be invalid for non-compliance with the Powers of Attorney Act 1949. e) The real dispute is between the Plaintiff and Third Defendant. The Plaintiff should have continued its action against the Third Defendant instead of withdrawing it earlier. f) Enclosure 10 severely prejudices the First and Second Defendants by varying the Consent Judgment and imposing additional onerous obligations without their agreement. g) The Plaintiff had earlier abandoned its demand for the First and Second Defendants to execute an assignment. It is now estopped from reasserting this demand. h) Overall, the First and Second Defendants have not breached any order. Rather, the Plaintiff's liquidator failed to properly advise on the Consent Judgment's limited effect. Costs should be ordered personally against the liquidator. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Analysis and findings of the court Non-executory declaratory orders [18] In this matter, the court finds that the essence of the Consent Judgment, agreed upon by the parties, is declaratory rather than executory. This distinction is pivotal. A declaratory judgment, as elucidated in Lai Kee Peng (Messrs Lai Kee Peng & Assoc) v Tay Hup Liang [2016] 4 CLJ 1 is a formal statement by the court pronouncing upon the legal state of affairs or relationships, without containing any order enforceable against the defendant. This case concerns a dispute over a stakeholder's release of a retention sum to one party despite a pending appeal against the court order relied on. The appellant solicitor was a stakeholder holding RM500,000 deposited by the purchaser under a sale and purchase agreement for the respondent vendor's benefit. The purchaser obtained a court order in default requiring forfeiture of the retention sum. While the respondent's appeal against that order was pending, the appellant released the sum to the purchaser. The order was later set aside. In explaining that a declaratory judgment only pronounces on legal relationships without any enforceable order, the Federal Court held that the High Court order obtained by the purchaser and relied on by the appellant was merely declaratory in nature. As the appellant solicitor was not a party to the court case, that declaration could not be enforced against her. She should not have S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 released the retention sum pending the Respondent's appeal. The Federal Court held: “[30] A declaratory judgment is a formal statement by a court pronouncing upon the existence or non- existence of a legal state of affairs. It pronounces upon a legal relationship but does not contain any order which can be enforced against the defendant. This is different from an executory judgment where the courts determine the rights of the parties and then order the defendant to act in a certain way, for example by an order to pay damages. If it is disregarded, it can be enforced by official action, usually be levying execution against the defendant's property or imprisoning him for contempt of court: Lord Woolf and Jeremy Woolf, The Declaratory Judgement, (4th Ed) Sweet & Maxwell.” (emphasis added) [19] This nature of judgment, as expounded in Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor (No 3) [2010] 2 MLJ 141, signifies that it merely declares rights without directing specific performance, hence lacking the enforceability characteristic of an executory judgment. This case concerns an application to stay the execution of a declaratory judgment pending review. The Federal Court had previously declared the appellant to be the beneficiary of a constructive trust over certain property registered under the second respondent's name. The second respondent then sold the property and pocketed the sale proceeds. The Federal Court made a follow-up judgment directing specific relief against the second respondent. when dismissing the second respondent's stay application, the court observed that the principal declaratory judgment only declared the S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 existence of the constructive trust without making any enforceable order. Unlike an executory judgment, a declaration pronounces rights without directing specific performance from the defendant. It cannot be executed or enforced by committal/imprisonment for contempt or other processes. This case illustrates that a declaratory judgment lacks enforceability precisely because it does not direct the defendant to do or refrain from doing anything specific. It merely declares legal relationships, unlike an executable court order against the defendant. The Federal Court held: “[6] There is an added point in so far as staying the effect of the principal judgment is concerned. All that judgment does, inter alia, is to hold that the appellant is a beneficiary under a constructive trust of which the second respondent is a trustee. In short it declares the existence of a constructive trust. It makes no positive order, The weakness of the remedy of declaration lies in the want of its enforceability. A declaration cannot be enforced by execution. In Prakash Chand v. Grewal [1975] Cri LJ 679, the court held as follows: A declaratory decree cannot be executed as it only declares the rights of the decree-holder qua the judgement-debtor and does not, in terms, direct the judgement-debtor to do or to refrain from doing any particular act or things. Since there is no command issued to the judgement-debtor to obey, the civil process cannot be issued for the compliance of that mandate or command. In other words, there can be no committal or other execution process issued to enforce a declaration. Since a declaration cannot be enforced, no question of staying it may arise.’’ (emphasis added) S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [20] In reviewing the Consent Judgment, it is apparent that it only contains a single declaratory order, without imposing any positive obligations or executable orders on the first and second defendants. Specifically, there is no stipulation for the execution of a deed of assignment or for the assignment of the Arbitration Award proceeds by the First and Second Defendants. The application of the principle 'Nemo dat quod non habet' is relevant here, as the First and Second Defendants no longer possess any rights over the arbitration proceeds to assign to the Plaintiff. [21] Furthermore, the court notes that during the negotiation process leading to the Consent Judgment, there was no contemplation or agreement regarding the execution of a deed of assignment by the first and second defendants. The Plaintiff's acquiescence to the Consent Judgment, premised on paragraph 25(a) of the Statement of Claim without any order as to costs, reinforces this understanding. It was prayed: “25. Wherefore, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendants the following: - a) a declaration that Plaintiff is entitled to all the sums awarded under the Final Award dated 16.7.2019 between the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant;” [22] The absence of any express obligation in the Consent Judgment regarding the execution of a deed of assignment by the First and Second Defendants is indicative of the parties' intentions at the time of agreement. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [23] The court finds that the Plaintiff, having agreed to the terms of the Consent Judgment, cannot now assert an obligation on the part of the First and Second Defendants to sign a deed of assignment. Such a claim contradicts the agreed terms and is barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The subsequent allegation by the Plaintiff, arising significantly later post-judgment, that the First and Second Defendants are obligated to execute a ‘proposed finalised draft Deed of Assignment’, is an attempt to unilaterally amend the terms of the Consent Judgment. This approach is inconsistent with the principles established in Mega Palm Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hun Tee Siang (Menyaman Atas Kapasitinya Sebagai Pemegang Jawatan Di Persatuan Penduduk Country Heights Damansara, Kuala Lumpur) & Ors [2022] 4 CLJ 248, where it was emphasised that a consent judgment is akin to a contract and cannot be varied without mutual consent. The Court of Appeal held: “[31] Thus, a consent order is akin to a contract with the superadded judicial command as emphasised in Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2003] 3 CLJ 244. Once a consent judgment had been perfected, the parties are bound by it and the court is duty-bound to enforce the agreed terms of the same. The court is also not at liberty to vary any of the agreed terms unless with the mutual consent of the parties...” [24] To support the proposition that the court is empowered to grant consequential orders to consent judgments, the Plaintiff referred to the following cases: Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 237; Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon v Kilang Kelapa Sawit Morib Sdn S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Bhd & Ors [2022] MLJU 2572; Ho Kam Wah @ Ho Kim Wah v Began Land Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 291; Common Ground TTDI Sdn Bhd v Ken TTDI Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 962; Chew Hon Keong v Betterproducts Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 7 MLJ 196; and Perniagaan Habeeba Majeed & Ors v Fazilah Bt Majhardeen & Anor [2020] MLJU 2335 (paragraph 14 of Enclosure 27) [25] However, these case all concerned executory consequential orders. [26] Stone World Sdn Bhd v Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd concerns the defendant’s attempt to impeach a consequential order granted in an earlier concluded suit over which all appeal avenues were exhausted. The Federal Court held that the High Court retained jurisdiction under the 'liberty to apply' exception to grant the consequential order, which substituted the remedy but did not vary the substantive finding of liability made earlier. While upholding the court's power to grant consequential orders, this case is distinguishable from the Plaintiff's situation as it dealt with enforcing the executory remedy due to blatant non- compliance. [27] Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon v Kilang Kelapa Sawit Morib Sdn Bhd & Ors concerns an application by the executor of a deceased plaintiff's estate to substitute the plaintiff and enforce the Court of Appeal's earlier order for specific performance of agreements. The High Court S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 allowed the substitution to give effect to the Court of Appeal's order. While supporting courts' powers to grant consequential orders, this case dealt with enforcing an executory order for specific performance and is hence distinguishable from the Plaintiff's situation. [28] Ho Kam Wah @ Ho Kim Wah v Began Land Sdn Bhd concerns the plaintiff's application to stay execution of a consent order and consequential order directing specific performance, pending appeals. The High Court dismissed the stay application on grounds of res judicata and issue estoppel as a similar application was earlier dismissed. While affirming courts' powers to grant consequential orders, this case dealt with enforcing an executory order and is distinguishable from the Plaintiff's situation. [29] Common Ground TTDI Sdn Bhd v Ken TTDI Sdn Bhd concerns the defendant landlord's application for consequential orders requiring the plaintiff tenant to vacate the premises and pay double rental after its tenancy expired. The High Court held the defendant was justified in seeking such consequential orders to compel the plaintiff's compliance, since it had refused to vacate despite the dismissal of its claim for a renewed tenancy. While affirming the court's power to grant consequential relief, this case dealt with enforcing the executory remedy against a non- compliant plaintiff. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [30] Chew Hon Keong v Betterproducts Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors concerns the petitioner's application for appointment of an independent accountant to value shares per a consent order, which was resisted by the respondents who applied instead to rescind the consent order terms and wind up the company. The High Court allowed the petitioner's application to unlock the deadlock and give effect to the consent order, holding the court retains power to facilitate implementation of consent judgments under the 'liberty to apply' rule. While supporting courts' consequential powers, this case dealt with enforcing executory obligations rather than just declaratory relief. [31] Perniagaan Habeeba Majeed & Ors v Fazilah Bt Majhardeen & Anor concerns the plaintiffs seeking consequential orders to enforce a consent judgment requiring the defendants to transfer a foreign worker to the plaintiffs' company. The High Court allowed the application to give effect to the consent judgment, holding it has inherent powers to compel performance of consent judgment terms. While supporting courts' consequential powers, this case dealt with enforcing executory obligations rather than just declaratory relief. [32] The court also observes that the Plaintiff only asserted that the First and Second Defendants must execute a 'proposed finalised draft Deed of Assignment' after one and a half years after the Consent Judgment was recorded on 22.10.2021. The proposed deed of assignment was only S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 sent to the First and Second Defendants around 18.4.2023. This was around 1.5 years after the Consent Judgment was recorded. [33] In the interim period between recording the Consent Judgment and demanding the deed of assignment, the Plaintiff had filed the Petition against the Third Defendant relying on the Consent Judgment. The Petition filed by the Plaintiff indicates that the real dispute herein is between the Plaintiff and the Third Defendant. The Plaintiff used the Consent Judgment to support its position as a debtor entitled to proceeds under the Arbitration Award in order to wind up the Third Defendant. However, the Petition was dismissed. It was only following the dismissal of the Petition that the Plaintiff then asserted that the First and Second Defendants must execute a deed of assignment to assign rights under the Arbitration Award. [34] Therefore, this sequence of events demonstrates that the real purpose of entering into the Consent Judgment was in relation to the Plaintiff's dispute with the Third Defendant regarding the Arbitration Award sums. It did not envisage requiring the First and Second Defendants' involvement through any deed of assignment or stipulation to that effect. The demand for execution of the deed of assignment appears as an afterthought following the failure of the Petition against the Third Defendant. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [35] In conclusion, the court rules that the Consent Judgment, being declaratory in nature, does not impose any enforceable obligations on the first and second defendants to execute a deed of assignment. The Plaintiff's application, which seeks to enforce such obligations, is dismissed on this ground. The court must respect and uphold the terms of the Consent Judgment as mutually agreed upon by the parties, and any attempt to alter or impose new obligations unilaterally is not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Unilateral variation [36] The Plaintiff submits that the deed of assignment is crucial to formalise the assignment of rights under the Consent Judgment, enabling the enforcement of the Arbitration Award. The Plaintiff contends that the deed of assignment's role is to summarise events and formalise the assignment of rights, ensuring clarity in future enforcement. The Plaintiff argues that without the deed of assignment, the Consent Judgment becomes ineffective, rendering the Arbitration Award unenforceable. [37] Further, the Plaintiff submits that despite the clear stipulations in the Consent Judgment, the First and Second Defendants refused to sign the deed of assignment, an act the Plaintiff views as contradictory and disrespectful towards the judgment. The Plaintiff contends that this refusal creates a gap in addressing the proceeds from the Arbitration, thereby prejudicing the Plaintiff's rights. The S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Plaintiff argues that this refusal indicates bad faith on the part of the First and Second Defendants, constituting an abuse of court process. Hence, the Plaintiff maintains that it is necessary and just for the First and Second Defendants to sign and stamp the proposed deed of assignment to give full effect to the Consent Judgment. [38] The First and Second Defendants submit that Enclosure 10 represents an unauthorised alteration of the Consent Judgment, effectively imposing new, onerous obligations on them without their consent. It is maintained by the First and Second Defendants that the Consent Judgment, as a conclusive document regarding the rights of the parties concerning the proceeds from the arbitral award, does not necessitate an additional document like the proposed deed of assignment. The First and Second Defendants contend that this deed of assignment, which they are being compelled to sign, contains clauses that unilaterally impose additional responsibilities, such as transferring the Arbitration Award to the Plaintiff's name and assisting in the recovery of arbitration sums. [39] Furthermore, the First and Second Defendants argue that Enclosure 10 unilaterally varies the Consent Judgment by introducing obligations not originally agreed upon. They assert that the terms of the proposed deed of assignment were drafted solely by the Plaintiff, without consultation, and include clauses that significantly increase their liabilities. The First and Second Defendants contend that this S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 approach undermines their rights to freedom of contract and alters the original agreement, which did not envisage such obligations. Therefore, they maintain that Enclosure 10, if permitted, would unjustly impose additional burdens on them that are not supported by the original terms of the Consent Judgment. [40] Upon careful examination of the arguments and documentary evidence, this Court finds the submissions of the First and Second Defendants to be more compelling for several reasons. [41] The Consent Judgment, as recorded on 22.10.2021, constitutes a legally binding agreement reflecting the mutual consent and understanding of the parties at that time. Any subsequent alterations or additions to this judgment, including those proposed in the deed of assignment, represent a unilateral attempt by the Plaintiff to vary the terms of this agreement. Such variations, particularly in the absence of mutual consent, undermine the fundamental principle of contract law that binds parties to their original terms of agreement. [42] The proposed deed of assignment contains clauses that impose new and onerous obligations on the First and Second Defendants. For instance, Clause 2(b) of the Deed states that “the Second Defendant is now liable to procure the Award to be transferred to the name of the Plaintiff,” and Clause 2(c) requires the Second Defendant “to facilitate and S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 assist in the documentation for the Plaintiff to recover the sums of the Arbitration Proceedings.” These clauses introduce responsibilities that extend well beyond the scope of the original Consent Judgment, thereby unilaterally altering the nature of the First and Second Defendants' obligations. [43] Moreover, Clause 4 of the proposed deed of assignment, creating a power of attorney in favour of the Plaintiff, further extends these new obligations, allowing the Plaintiff to use the Second Defendant’s name to recover proceeds from the Arbitration Award. These provisions are not merely formalisations of the assignment of rights as envisaged in the Consent Judgment but constitute new, onerous obligations imposed unilaterally by the Plaintiff. [44] The original Consent Judgment and the Share Sale Agreement do not stipulate or imply the necessity of a subsequent deed of assignment. The introduction of this document, therefore, represents a significant deviation from the agreed terms. The Plaintiff's assertion that the deed of assignment is merely a formalisation of the assignment of rights does not find support in the original documents. Rather, it appears to be an attempt to introduce new terms and conditions which were neither contemplated nor agreed upon. [45] The court notes the principle established in the case of Mega Palm Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hun Tee Siang (Menyaman S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Atas Kapasitinya Sebagai Pemegang Jawatan Di Persatuan Penduduk Country Heights Damansara, Kuala Lumpur) & Ors [2022] 4 CLJ 248 (Court of Appeal), which underscores that a consent judgment cannot be varied without mutual consent of the parties. This case concerns the plaintiffs filing a fresh action to enforce and seek additional reliefs under a consent judgment recorded in an earlier suit, which the defendants contended ought to have been pursued in the original suit itself. [46] The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' contention, holding that while most consent judgment terms mirrored the original prayers, there were some terms that went beyond the scope of the initial suit. Hence, a fresh action was required to enforce those additional consent judgment terms under the principle in In Re Hearn [1913] 108 LT 452. Nonetheless, the court underscored that a consent judgment cannot be unilaterally varied without mutual consent. The court, Per S Nantha Balan JCA, stated: “In so far as any variation of a consent order is concerned, it is also trite that the only possible way in which a consent order could be altered/varied would be by the consent of all the parties. See: the Federal Court’s decision in Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors; Meenachi v. Lum Kum Chum [1981] 1 LNS 59; [1981] 2 MLJ 145 (FC) (at p. 146).” [47] This statement arose in the context of the court examining the broader principles governing consent judgments. The court was considering the defendants' argument that the S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 plaintiffs' fresh action to enforce the consent judgment effectively varied its terms without mutual agreement. While the court ultimately allowed the fresh action, it reiterated the established position that any actual variation of consent judgment terms requires consent of all parties. [48] Coming back to the instant case, the unilateral attempt by the Plaintiff to impose these new terms through the deed of assignment, without the Third Defendant’s consent, is a clear deviation from this principle. It undermines the sanctity of the original agreement and the contractual freedom of the parties. [49] In light of these considerations, the court concludes that the Plaintiff's application to compel the First and Second Defendants to sign the deed of assignment represents an impermissible unilateral variation of the Consent Judgment. This variation, without the First and Second Defendants’ consent, contravenes the foundational legal principles governing consent judgments and contractual agreements. [50] Therefore, the court finds no merit in the Plaintiff's application. The application is dismissed, upholding the First and Second Defendants' right to adhere to the terms as originally agreed upon in the Consent Judgment. The sanctity of the original agreement, as embodied in the Consent Judgment, shall remain inviolate and respected. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [51] The court lacks jurisdiction to vary the Consent Judgment without the First and Second Defendants' consent. The Consent Judgment did not require an additional document for the assignment of rights. The “proposed Finalised Deed of Assignment” adds obligations not in the original Consent Judgment, such as asssigning the award proceeds to the Plaintiff and aiding in documentation, which cannot be imposed on the First and Second Defendants without their consent. Prohibition against assignment [52] The First and Second Defendants submit that the Arbitration Award dated 16.07.2019, favouring the Second Defendant, cannot be assigned without the consent of the Third Defendant, as stipulated in Clause 1.7 of the Conditions of Contract between the Second and Third Defendants. It is maintained by the First and Second Defendants that the Learned High Court Judge held that the non-assignment clause in the agreement requires the consent of the other party before any debt assignment. The First and Second Defendants contend that any assignment of the arbitral award's proceeds is invalid without the Third Defendant's consent, which the Plaintiff has not obtained. Furthermore, the First and Second Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has abandoned their right to demand that the First and Second Defendants sign any deed of assignment. This contention is based on the Plaintiff's agreement to record the Consent Judgment solely on paragraph 25(a) of the Statement of S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Claim with no order as to costs, and their failure to consult the First and Second Defendants regarding the preparation of the deed of assignment. [53] It is maintained by the Plaintiff that the First and Second Defendants have conceded the validity of the Consent Judgment, as evidenced by their solicitors' letter dated 26.04.2023, which acknowledges the Plaintiff's entitlement to the entire proceeds of the arbitration. The Plaintiff contends that based on this admission, the First and Second Defendants are now estopped from asserting a contradictory position and are bound to comply with Clause 6A of the Share Sale Agreement which states: “The Vendor shall indemnify PSPK the cost, expenses and any claims arising from the arbitration between PSPK and TRW (more specifically set out in the Third Schedule) and any proceeds arising from this arbitration shall accrue to the Vendor” [54] Further, the Plaintiff argues that the First and Second Defendants, having acted in accordance with the terms of the Share Sale Agreement and benefited from it, are now obligated to ensure that the proceeds of the Arbitration Awards are given to the Plaintiff. This obligation, as per the Plaintiff, is clearly outlined in Clause 6A of the Share Sale Agreement. S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [55] After a detailed examination of the submissions and evidence provided by both parties, the court finds in favour of the First and Second Defendants. [56] The central issue revolves around the enforceability of the deed of assignment in the context of the Consent Judgment. The First and Second Defendants' primary contention is grounded in the non-assignment clause present in the Conditions of Contract between the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant. Specifically, Clause 1.7 of the Conditions of Contract stipulates that neither party shall assign any part of the Contract or any benefit or interest therein without the prior agreement of the other Party. It reads: “1.7 Assignment Neither Party shall assign the whole or any part of the Contract or any benefit or interest in or under the Contract. However, either Party: (a) may assign the whole or any part with the prior agreement of the other Party, at the sole discretion of such other Party, and (b) may, as security in favour of a bank or financial institution, assign its right to any moneys due or to become due, under the Contract.” [57] This clause is critical in determining the validity of any purported assignment arising from the Consent Judgment. The Learned High Court in deliberating the Petition, applied the precedent set in Merita Merchant Bank Singapore Ltd v Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka [2014] 9 CLJ 1064, reinforcing S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 the significance of the non-assignment clause. The winding- up court’s ruling that the consent of the other party is a prerequisite for any valid assignment underlines the necessity of the Third Defendant's consent in this matter. [58] The Merita Merchant Bank case concerned an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which allowed the second defendant's appeal against the decision of the High Court with costs. The plaintiff, Merita Merchant Bank Singapore Ltd, sued the second defendant, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, as an assignee of certain debts due and payable by the second defendant to the first defendant, Benatulin Timur Sdn Bhd, who had supplied printing papers to the second defendant. The main question was whether the consent of the debtor is a legal requirement for the assignment to be valid in law under Section 4(3) of the Civil Law Act 1956. The court held that the non-assignment clauses in the contracts were valid and binding on both parties, and the consent of the debtor was a prerequisite for a valid assignment. The court also found that the assignment was ineffective as it was made without the debtor's consent, and the plaintiff's claim as an assignee was dismissed. The Federal Court, per Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was) stated: “[41] We have subjected these documents to scrutiny. With respect we are unable to agree with Merita's contentions. Since it is our finding that the element of consent is an important prerequisite, the fact that there existed an assignment between Merita and Benatulin did S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 not strengthen Merita's case as the contract stipulated that consent by the debtor (DBP) was a prerequisite before a valid assignment could be made. Nowhere did Merita highlight to us that this has been adhered to. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we reiterate here that it is an implied term of the contract that there could be no assignment by Benatulin of its rights under the 1997 contract unless the prior written consent of DBP was obtained. An attempted assignment of contractual rights in breach of a contractual prohibition was ineffective to vest the contractual rights in Merita. [42] Further, it is significant to note that the purported assignment P2 which formed the basis of Merita's claim was dated and stamped on 22 April 1998 although notice of such an assignment was given to DBP as early as 23 August 1996. On this issue the Court of Appeal found that since the assignment at P2 was dated and stamped at a much later date supported the conclusion that the purported assignment in P2 was not served on DBP. [43] In our judgment, the point of critical importance was not whether notice of assignment was given to DBP but whether Benatulin had obtained DBP's consent before executing the assignment with Merita. As we have alluded to earlier since Benatulin had failed to secure DBP's consent, hence DBP was, therefore, not bound to honour Merita's request and had rightfully refused to recognise the instruction by Benatulin to make payment to Merita. The purported assignment which lacked the consent of DBP for the purchases made under the said letters were unenforceable against DBP. It follows that the purported assignment by Benatulin to Merita without the consent of DBP constituted a breach of cl. 23 of the 1997 contract. Merita's claim as an assignee must, therefore, fail. Further, this court cannot allow Merita's claim against DBP as the payment due under the purchases made pursuant to the said letters had already been paid by DBP to Benatulin and CFP. (emphasis added) S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [59] The evidence presented by the First and Second Defendants, particularly the absence of any averment or documentation in the Plaintiff's submissions indicating that the consent of the Third Defendant was obtained, critically undermines the Plaintiff's position. The lack of such consent renders any assignment stemming from the Consent Judgment not only ineffectual but also potentially illegal. This aligns with the findings of the Learned High Court Judge in the winding up proceedings in respect of the Petition, where it was explicitly stated that the purported assignment via the Consent Judgment was invalid due to the lack of consent from the Third Defendant. This Petition involves the petitioner, SPK-Sentosa Corporation Berhad (In Liquidation), the Plaintiff in this instant case, seeking to wind up the respondent, TRW Boulevard Square Sdn Bhd, the Third Defendant in this instant case for failing to pay debts under a statutory demand pursuant to Section 465(1)(e) and 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016. The Petition was opposed by Ambank Islamic Berhad, a creditor of the respondent, and supported by two other creditors. The main issues were whether there was a valid assignment of rights over the Arbitration Award granted in favour of Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd (the petitioner’s subsidiary) against the respondent, to the petitioner via a consent judgment, and whether the petitioner was consequently a creditor of the respondent for purposes of presenting the Petition. The High Court analysed the Consent Judgment and held that it merely declared the petitioner's rights over the Arbitration Award and did not S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 legally assign those rights. Hence, there was no valid assignment to the petitioner. The court also relied on Clause 1.7, the non-assignment clause requiring the respondent's consent for any assignment, which was not obtained. Therefore, the petitioner had no basis to claim as a creditor and present the Petition. The petition was accordingly dismissed. My learned brother, Nadzarin Wok Nordin J stated in his judgment: “76. I am thus bound to follow the ratio in Merita Merchant Bank Singapore Ltd (supra) and am not bound to follow the decision in the Australian case of Brali v Hyundai Corporation (1988) 84 ALLR176 (NSWSC) or, with respect, the earlier decision on equitable assignments as per the Supreme Court in Public Finance Bhd v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 369 cited by learned counsel for the Supporting Creditors, to which this Court holds that in the case before me, the said non assignment clause at clause 1.7 of the Agreement between the Respondent and PSPK had made the consent of the other party a pre condition before the debt could be assigned and thus the purported assignment vis a vis the Consent Judgment was not valid as no consent was obtained as the Respondent had not consented to the same.” [60] Moreover, the court notes the inconsistency in the Plaintiff's approach. Initially, the Plaintiff agreed to the Consent Judgment without any requirement for the execution of a deed of assignment. The subsequent introduction of this requirement, approximately one and a half years later, without prior consultation with the First and Second Defendants and unilaterally prepared by the Plaintiff, suggests a shift in the Plaintiff's stance. This shift, as argued by the First and Second Defendants, is indicative of S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 an approach of approbation and reprobation, as elucidated in Express Newspapers plc v News (UK) Ltd and others [1990] 3 All ER 376. The Plaintiff cannot be permitted to adopt two inconsistent positions – initially accepting the Consent Judgment without the requirement of a deed of assignment and later imposing such a requirement. [61] Consequently, the court rejects the Plaintiff's application for a consequential order to compel the First and Second Defendants to sign the deed of assignment. The First and Second Defendants are not legally bound to sign the deed of assignment, and the Plaintiff cannot enforce this requirement under the current circumstances. The Consent Judgment, as recorded, does not extend to or include an obligation on the First and Second Defendants to sign a deed of assignment, particularly in the absence of the requisite consents. Costs [62] The First and Second Defendants have proposed that any costs incurred in this process ought to be borne by the Plaintiff’s Liquidator personally. This position is grounded in the assertion that the Plaintiff, being a wound-up company, cannot effectively bear the costs, and therefore, any award against the Plaintiff would be ineffectual. The First and Second Defendants draw upon the case of Markcon Sdn. Bhd. (In Liquidation) v Resilient Construction Sdn. Bhd. And Labtec Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. (Opposing Creditors) [1994] 1 S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 CLJ 271 where it was held that costs could be awarded personally against a liquidator in instances of misconduct or unnecessary proceedings. [63] The First and Second Defendants argue that the Liquidator’s actions, particularly in relation to the filing of Enclosure 10, amount to an abuse of process and an attempt to unilaterally alter or vary the terms of the Consent Judgment. They contend that this act was unnecessary and vexatious, and that it imposed undue burdens on them, thus justifying a personal cost order against the Liquidator. [64] However, having thoroughly examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court finds that the Plaintiff’s application for consequential orders, while ultimately unsuccessful, does not warrant the imposition of costs on the Liquidator personally. The Liquidator’s decision to bring this action appears to have been motivated by a genuine belief that it was in the best interests of the company, particularly in seeking to enforce the terms of the Consent Judgment. There is a lack of substantial evidence to suggest misconduct or a frivolous approach in the Liquidator’s pursuit of this matter. [65] While the First and Second Defendants’ concerns regarding the potential alteration of the Consent Judgment are noted, the court does not find these concerns sufficient to categorise the Liquidator’s actions as constituting an abuse of process. The Liquidator’s conduct seems to have been S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 within the realm of his professional judgment and duties, especially in light of the complexities surrounding the enforcement of the Consent Judgment and the deed of assignment. [66] Nevertheless, in accordance with the principles of fairness and equity, and considering the outcome of the case, the court orders that the costs incurred in this matter shall be borne by the Plaintiff. This decision is made in the context of the unsuccessful application for consequential orders by the Plaintiff, and the absence of sufficient grounds to impose these costs personally on the Liquidator. The court thereby adjudges that the First and Second Defendants' proposal for personal liability of the Liquidator for costs is not upheld, but the Plaintiff is to bear the costs of the proceedings. Conclusion [67] In the premise, the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 10 is dismissed with costs of RM4,000 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the First and Second Defendants. 3 January 2024 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Syereen Tang (Messrs Kesavan) For the First and Second Defendants: Nicholas Poon (Messrs. Kit & Associates) S/N SixWeIdQIUuGiu/Wuayd7Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-83-2783-11/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH BALAMURUGAN A/L NADARASA

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kanun Keseksaan - Seksyen 323 - Kesalahan dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan - Tertuduh memukul bahagian muka mangsa/pengadu dan menyebabkan lebam di pipi dan bahagian mata mangsa/pengadu - Tertuduh mengaku salah atas pertuduhan dan dijatuhkan hukuman satu bulan penjara dari tarikh tangkap - Sama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan adil, wajar dan berpatutanPROSEDUR JENAYAH: Hukuman - Mitigasi - Tertuduh dituduh atas kesalahan dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan - Tertuduh memukul bahagian muka mangsa/pengadu dan menyebabkan lebam di pipi dan bahagian mata mangsa/pengadu - Tertuduh mengaku salah dan dijatuhkan hukuman satu bulan penjara dari tarikh tangkap - Faktor-faktor yang diambil kira dalam menjatuhkan hukuman - Sama ada hukuman berbentuk bon kelakuan baik atau denda dapat memberi pengajaran berkesan kepada tertuduh dan masyarakat - Sama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan adil, wajar dan berpatutan - Kanun Keseksaan, s. 323

03/01/2024

Puan Farah binti Rosnan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=319a0468-999c-41f7-9ad7-124f53fa8f8d&Inline=true

A 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO. BA-83-2783-11/2023 PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN BALAMURUGAN A/L NADARASA (NO. K/P: 820130-14-6379) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A) PENDAHULUAN [1] Ini merupakan alasan penghakiman bagi rayuan yang telah difailkan oleh pihak Tertuduh terhadap sabitan dan hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap Tertuduh setelah Tertuduh mengaku salah. [2] Hukuman yang dirayu oleh Tertuduh adalah hukuman terhadap kesalahan dibawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu 1 bulan penjara dari tarikh tangkap. 03/01/2024 15:30:44 BA-83-2783-11/2023 Kand. 7 S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 B) RINGKASAN KES [3] Tertuduh menghadapi Pertuduhan seperti berikut: Pertuduhan Bahawa kamu pada 22.11.2023 jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang, di tepi jalan SB Jaya Jalan Kusta Sg Buloh, 47000 Sg Buloh Selangor, dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah didapati dengan sengaja mendatangkan kecederaan terhadap penama: Ramesh Kumar Karrupiah Ahmad, No Passport: M3872688 dengan memukul kepada penama tersebut. Oleh yang demikian itu, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan. Jika sabit kesalahan, penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai 1 tahun atau dengan denda yang boleh sampai RM2000/- atau dengan kedua-duanya. [4] Pertuduhan telah dibacakan, diterangkan dan dijelaskan kepada Tertuduh di dalam Bahasa Melayu. Tertuduh telah menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh faham dengan pertuduhan S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 tersebut dan seterusnya mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan yang dikemukakan. Setelah Tertuduh mengaku salah, penalti seterusnya diterangkan kepada Tertuduh. Tertuduh telah menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh faham sifat dan akibat pengakuan salah yang dibuat olehnya dan masih mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan yang dikemukakan. [5] Fakta Kes telah dibacakan dan diterangkan kepada Tertuduh di dalam Bahasa Melayu. Tertuduh faham dan mengakui benar fakta kes tersebut. Fakta kes ditandakan sebagai P1. [6] Pihak pendakwaan seterusnya mengemukakan dokumen- dokumen dan telah mohon daripada mahkamah untuk dokumen- dokumen tersebut ditandakan sebagai eksibit. Terdapat 8 tandaaan eksibit ditandakan iaitu: NO EKSIBIT TANDAAN 1. Fakta Kes P1 2. Laporan Polis Pengadu (No. Repot: SG. BULOH/007972/23) P2 3. Laporan Polis Tangkapan (No. Repot: SG. BULOH/007983/23) P3 4. 4 Keping Gambar Pengadu (A-D) P4 5. Surat Permintaan Untuk Peperiksaan Doktor P5 S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Bagi Kes Orang Yang Terlibat Dalam Kes Polis [7] Setelah pihak Pendakwaan menandakan kesemua eksibit pihak Pendakwaan seterusnya memohon daripada mahkamah untuk eksibit P4 dan eksibit P5 dirujuk kepada Tertuduh bagi tujuan pengecaman. Tertuduh seterusnya mengecam dan mengakui eksibit P4 dan eksibit P5 tersebut. [8] Setelah Mahkamah berpuashati dan Mahkamah menerima pengakuan salah yang dibuat oleh Tertuduh, Tertuduh kemudiannya didapati bersalah dan disabitkan dengan pertuduhan dibawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen yang sama. C) Fakta Kes [9] Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengemukakan Fakta kes. Fakta Kes tersebut telah ditandakan sebagai eksibit P1. Fakta kes ini juga telah diakui oleh Tertuduh. [10] Bagi tujuan kemudahan rujukan, Fakta Kes yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit P1 adalah seperti berikut: S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 1. Pada 22/11/2023 jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang semasa pengadu berada di tepi jalan SB Jaya Jalan Kusta Sg Buloh telah didatangi 1 lelaki India yang dikenali Balamurugan menaiki sebuah kenderaan Toyota Hilux nombor pendaftaran tidak pasti. OKT telah turun dari kenderaan dan terus bertindak memukul pengadu sebelum beredar dari tempat kejadian. 2. Punca kejadian adalah OKT telah menuduh pengadu menjadi punca berlakunya kebakaran di sebuah kedai di SB Jaya dan pengadu mengatakan tidak terlibat dalam kes tersebut dan tidak mengaku melakukannya menyebabkan OKT tidak berpuas hati dan bertindak memukul pengadu di bahagian muka. 3. Butiran tertuduh adalah:- Nama: Balamurugan A/L Nadarasa No. K/P: 820130-14-6379 Umur: 41 Tahun Alamat: No. 50, Jalan BRP 7/1C, Bukit Rahman Putra, 47000 Sg. Buloh, Selangor S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 D) Rayuan Tertuduh [11] Semasa rayuan atau mitigasi ditanyakan kepada Tertuduh, Peguam Tertuduh menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh berumur 41, sudah berkahwin, mempunyai 2 orang anak dan merupakan penanggung tunggal keluarga, mempunyai pendapatan bulanan sebanyak RM1,500 sahaja. Peguam Tertuduh memaklum bahawa Tertuduh memohon satu hukuman berbentuk denda sahaja. Peguam Tertuduh memaklumkan juga bawa kesalahan ini bukanlah kesalahan yang serius merujuk kepada Seksyen 52A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Kesalahan Tertuduh ini juga merupakan kesalahan kali pertama dan Tertuduh telah berada dalam tahanan reman selama 2 hari. [12] Tertuduh mengakhiri rayuan atau mitigasi dengan memohon daripada mahkamah untuk menjatuhkan suatu hukuman yang seringan-ringannya kepada Tetuduh yang berbentuk denda sahaja. E) Hujahan Pihak Pendakwaan S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [13] Pihak Pendakwaan berhujah berkenaan bahawa pengadu di dalam kes ini merupakan seorang warga emas yang sudah berumur 56 tahun, Tertuduh telah memukul pengadu di bahagian muka tanpa sebarang alasan yang munasabah. Oleh itu, pihak Pendakwaan memohon suatu hukuman setimpal dikenakan kepada Tertuduh. Pihak Pendakwaan juga memohon suatu hukuman yang boleh dijadikan pengajaran kepada Tertuduh agar Tertuduh tidak mengulangi kesalahan ini dan mengambil kira kepentingan awam dan kekerapan kes. [14] Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengakhiri hujahan Faktor Pemberatan dengan berhujah bahawa suatu hukuman setimpal perlu diberikan memandangkan kes memukul di telah semakin kerap berlaku. F) Keputusan Mahkamah Terhadap Hukuman [15] Prinsip Undang-Undang berhubung hukuman telah jelas dan mantap (trite). Setiap kes mempunyai fakta kes yang berbeza di antara satu sama lain namun Prinsip Hukuman yang perlu dipertimbangkan di dalam setiap kes adalah sama bagi S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 setiap kes dan keadaan ini telah diperjelaskan dengan sangat terperinci didalam kes Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256: In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. No two cases can have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations. The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. [Penekanan telah diberikan] [16] Prinsip Hukuman yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah selain daripada faktor-faktor lain adalah faktor S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 kepentingan awam. Adalah penting untuk mahkamah mengambil maklum bahawa faktor kepentingan awam ini haruslah diimbangkan dengan faktor kepentingan Tertuduh. Prinsip ini telah sekali lagi diperjelaskan didalam kes Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256: One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J. in Rex v Kenneth John Ball 35 CrAppR 164 as follows:– "In deciding the appropriate sentence, a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe." [Penekanan telah diberikan] [17] Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum berkenaan kuasa menjatuhkan hukuman di mana kuasa ini terletak pada budibicara mahkamah. Walau bagaimanapun, budibicara ini perlu dilaksanakan selaras dengan prinsip undang-undang berhubung S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 hukuman dan prinsip ini dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan didalam kes Ganesan Nachiappan & Ors v. PP [2000] 3 CLJ 302: The power of sentencing given to a trial court is a discretionary one and in order for us, as the appellate court, to disturb the sentence imposed, we must be convinced that the trial judge had erred in applying the correct principles of sentencing or had embarked on some unauthorised or extraneous exercise of discretion (see PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102[1976] 2 MLJ 256 and Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. PP [1981] 1 LNS 139;[1982] 1 MLJ 83). [Penekanan telah diberikan] [18] Setelah Mahkamah mempertimbangkan prinsip undang- undang seperti tertera di atas, mahkamah seterusnya mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor mitigasi yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh dalam membuat keputusan berhubung hukuman terhadap Tertuduh. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [19] Faktor-Faktor mitigasi yang telah dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah adalah seperti berikut: i. Pengakuan Salah Tertuduh [20] Mahkamah telah mengambil maklum bahawa Tertuduh telah mengaku salah dan ini telah menjimatkan masa dan kos semua pihak. Oleh itu, Pengakuan Salah Tertuduh ini harus diberi satu diskaun yang sewajarnya. [21] Dalam mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi ini, mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Ravindran & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 45 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: (3) It is an accepted rule of practice that an accused should be given credit or discount for pleading guilty. This is because public time and money will be spared if an accused admits his guilt. The credit or discount to be given to an accused person is not on the maximum sentence imposed by law but rather on a sentence which would have been imposed on the accused if he had claimed trial and been found guilty. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [Penekanan telah diberikan] [22] Berbalik semula kepada kes Tertuduh, di dalam kes ini, Tertuduh telah mengaku salah dan ini sememangnya telah menjimatkan masa dan kos semua pihak. [23] Oleh itu, Mahkmah telah mengambil faktor Pengakuan Salah Tertuduh sebagai salah satu faktor mitigasi yang perlu dipertimbangkan dalam memutuskan hukuman yang wajar dijatuhkan terhadap Tertuduh. Mahkamah juga telah mengambil maklum berhubung suatu diskaun yang wajar diberi oleh Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan hukuman terhadap Tertuduh setelah Tertuduh mengaku salah. ii. Kesal Dan Insaf Terhadap Perbuatan [24] Mahkamah juga telah mengambil maklum bahawa pengakuan salah Tertuduh bukan sahaja dapat menjimatkan masa dan kos pihak-pihak tetapi dapat menunjukkan keinsafan dan kekesalan Tertuduh terhadap kesalahan yang dilakukan. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [25] Faktor kekesalan dan keinsafan Tertuduh merupakan salah satu faktor mitigasi yang penting yang telah diambil kira oleh mahkamah dalam memutuskan hukuman yang wajar dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh. iii. Faktor Kepentingan Awam [26] Mahkamah mengambil maklum bahawa pengadu di dalam kes ini adalah seorang yang lelaki tua yang sudah berumur 56 tahun. Kes pukul sering dan kerap berlaku yang telah menyebabkan kesejahteraan dan ketenteraman awam terganggu bukan sahaja terhadap pengadu sendiri, tetapi terhadap orang awam yang berada di tempat kejadian. [27] Oleh itu, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa, suatu hukuman berbentuk pencegahan (‘deterrent’) perlu diberikan oleh mahkamah bagi menjaga kepentingan awam. Namun, mahkamah juga perlu mengimbangkan faktor kepentingan awam tersebut dengan faktor kepentingan Tertuduh sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [28] Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa suatu hukuman yang tegas dan jelas perlu diberikan agar suatu pencegahan jenayah dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan dapat dicegah. [29] Berkenaan isu ini, Mahkamah telah menggunapakai budi bicaranya sebagaimana diperjelaskan di dalam kes R v. Ball [1951] 35 Cr App R 164 seperti berikut: "….our law does not therefore fix the sentence for a particular offence but it fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular, the court has the right and duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe…." [Penekanan telah diberikan] [30] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Sinnathurai Subramaniam v. PP [2011] 5 CLJ 56 at para. 35: “The sentences imposed by the sentencing judges have a signaling effect. If the judge imposes a light custodial S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 sentence, he is sending a message to the whole world at large, so to speak, that the offence is not that serious. And if the judge imposes a binding over under the Criminal Procedure Code, he is saying that the accused should not be charged in the first place at all. So, it can be deduced that when a judge imposes a sentence he is making a statement whether the offence is serious or trivial. It is in these contexts that sentencing judges must be very cautious and must weigh in a balance the gravity of the offence with the proposed sentence. The sentence imposed must always reflect public interest after taking into account the mitigation advanced by the accused.” [31] Mahkamah telah meneliti Fakta Kes (eksibit P1), 4 keping gambar kecederaan pengadu (eksibit P4 (A-D)) dan Surat Permintaan Untuk Peperiksaan Doktor Bagi Orang Yang Terlibat Dalam Kes Polis (eksibit P5) yang diakui oleh Tertuduh. [32] Tertuduh yang berumur 41 tahun sememangnya mengetahui perkara yang benar dan salah. Tiada sebarang bukti dikemukakan bahawa dia tiada pengetahuan berkenaan apa yang Tertuduh telah lakukan adalah ‘illegal’ dan tiada sebarang S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 bukti juga yang menunjukkan sebarang keadaan yang bersesuaian untuk meringankan hukuman terhadap Tertuduh. Perbuatan Tertuduh memukul muka pengadu tanpa alasan yang munasabah telah menyebabkan soft tissue injury (STI) atau bruises (lebam) terhadap muka pengadu di bahagian pipi dan mata pengadu sebelah kiri adalah merupakan tindakan yang salah di sisi undang-undang dan suatu hukuman tegas dan jelas perlu diberikan ke atas Tertuduh. Suatu hukuman yang berbentuk ‘lenient’ adalah tidak sesuai untuk menjaga kepentingan awam. iv. Latar Belakang Tertuduh [33] Di dalam rayuan Tertuduh, Tertuduh menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh berumur 41 tahun dan mempunyai 2 orang anak dengan mempunyai gaji bulanan sebanyak RM1,500 sebulan sahaja. [34] Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa umur 41 tahun merupakan suatu umur yang seharusnya dapat membezakan antara suatu perkara baik dan buruk. Tambahan lagi, Tertuduh telahpun bekerja dan merupakan penanggung tunggal keluarga S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 yang telah dikurniakan 2 orang cahaya mata. Latar belakang ini menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh seharusnya boleh membezakan kesan dan akibat daripada perbuatannya. [35] Tindakan Tertuduh yang menyebabkan kecederaan terhadap seseorang dengan sengaja dan tanpa alasan yang munasabah adalah amat tidak menghormati undang-undang Malaysia dan sistem pentadbiran keadilan Malaysia. Oleh itu, suatu hukuman yang tegas dan jelas perlu diberikan kepada Tertuduh agar suatu pengajaran dapat diberikan kepada Tertuduh. v. Tiada Rekod Kesalahan Jenayah Lampau [36] Pihak Pembelaan telah memaklumkan kepada mahkamah bahawa ini merupakan Kesalahan Pertama Tertuduh. [37] Berkenaan dengan isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Jafa Bin Daud [1981] 1 LNS 28 dimana Hakim Mohamed Azmi (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan seperti berikut: S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 A "sentence according to law" means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles. In assessing sentence, one of the main factors to be considered is whether the convicted person is a first offender. It is for this purpose that before passing sentence, a Magistrate is required to call for evidence or information regarding the background, antecedent and character of the accused. Where the convicted person has previous records and admits them as correct, the court must consider whether the offence or offences committed previously were of similar nature as the one with which he is presently charged. The court must then consider the sentences imposed in the previous convictions for similar offences to determine whether they have had any deterrent effect on him. Where he is found to be a persistent offender for a similar type of offences, then it is in the interest of justice that a deterrent sentence should be passed and, in such a case, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the quantity, nature or value S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 of the subject-matter of the offence with which he is currently charged can very rarely constitute a mitigating factor. [Penekanan telah diberikan] [38] Berbalik semula kepada kes Tertuduh, berdasarkan kes di atas, adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Mahkamah untuk mempertimbangkan hukuman yang lebih berat terhadap Tertuduh jika Tertuduh mempunyai Rekod Kesalahan Jenayah lampau. Walau bagaimanapun, di dalam kes ini Tertuduh tidak mempunyai Rekod Kesalahan Jenayah Lampau dan fakta ini juga telah disahkan oleh Pihak Pendakwaan. [39] Oleh itu, faktor mitigasi ini telah dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah dalam memutuskan hukuman yang wajar dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh. vi. Hukuman Setimpal dan berbentuk Pengajaran [40] Pihak Pendakwaan memohon daripada Mahkamah agar S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 suatu hukuman setimpal dikenakan kepada Tertuduh. Pihak Pendakwaan juga memohon suatu hukuman yang boleh dijadikan pengajaran kepada Tertuduh agar Tertuduh tidak mengulangi kesalahan ini. [41] Maksud hukuman setimpal telah di jelaskan secara terperinci didalam kes R v. lpeelee [2012] 1 SCR 433: "….proportionality …is not just a sanction. First, the principles ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence,…it promotes justice for the victims and ensures public confidence in the system of justice. Secondly, the principles of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriates, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender…." [Penekanan telah diberikan] [42] Berdasarkan kes di atas, dapat dijelaskan bahawa hukuman yang hendak dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh mestilah setimpal dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan, ‘seriousness’ S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 kesalahan dan tahap penglibatan Tertuduh itu sendiri. [43] Berbalik semula kepada kes Tertuduh, Tertuduh telah dituduh dibawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Kesaksaan di mana hukuman penjara ditetapkan yang boleh sampai 1 tahun atau denda yang boleh sampai RM2,000/- atau kedua-duanya sekali. [44] Oleh itu, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hukuman 1 bulan penjara dari tarikh tangkap adalah hukuman yang setimpal, wajar dan sesuai dikenakan ke atas Tertuduh. [45] Tindakan tertuduh ini telah menyebabkan kecederaan di bahagian muka kepada pengadu yang mana telah mendatangkan trauma kepada pengadu dan juga mengganggu ketenteraman pengadu dan ahli keluarganya. [46] Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa hukuman 1 bulan penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap ini bukanlah terlampau rendah atau terlampau tinggi (‘too excessively low or too excessively high’). Malah, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hukuman 1 bulan penjara ini merupakan hukuman yang dapat menjamin keadilan kepada pengadu dan memberi keyakinan kepada sistem pentadbiran keadilan Malaysia. S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [47] Mahkamah seterusnya meneliti semula semua eksibit yang telah dikemukakan, rayuan Tertuduh dan pihak pendakwaan, maka Mahkamah mendapati hukuman penjara 1 bulan dari tarikh tangkap dapat menjadi pengajaran kepada Tertuduh agar tidak mengulangi perbuatannya. vii. Faktor-faktor Lain Yang Dipertimbangkan Mahkamah [48] Mahkamah ini juga mengambil kira fakta bahawa pengadu yang merupakan mangsa di dalam kes ini adalah seorang lelaki warga tua yang sudah mencecah umur 56 tahun manakala tertuduh adalah seorang lelaki dewasa yang mempunyai kekuatan lebih daripada pengadu. Akibat daripada kejadian ini pengadu telah mengalami kecederaan iaitu soft tissue injury (STI) atau bruises (lebam) di bahagian muka pengadu iaitu pipi dan mata pengadu sebelah kiri. [49] Di dalam mitigasinya, peguam Tertuduh memaklumkan terdapat salah faham yang berlaku di antara Tertuduh dan pengadu. Namun tiada provokasi yang nyata daripada pengadu yang mewajarkan tindakan tertuduh ke atasnya. [50] Meskipun tertuduh mempunyai pelbagai tekanan dan S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 masalah dalam hidupnya, namun itu tidak memberi alasan untuk dia melampiaskan kemarahannya kepada orang yang tidak berkenaan. [51] Setiap manusia diuji dengan pelbagai tekanan dan masalah, namun sekiranya ia diterima sebagai alasan yang munasabah untuk mencederakan orang lain, maka manusia akan sewenang-wenangnya menyalahgunakan alasan tersebut untuk melanggar undang-undang. G) KESIMPULAN [52] Setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor yang dinyatakan di atas, dan mempertimbangkannya di antara satu sama lain, mahkamah ini berpendapat hukuman penjara satu (1) bulan yang dikira dari tarikh tangkap tertuduh adalah berpatutan dengan jenayah yang dilakukan, sebagai suatu hukuman yang wajar dan bersesuaian setelah faktor kepentingan awam dan faktor kepentingan Tertuduh diimbangi. [53] Mahkamah ini berpendapat hukuman berbentuk bon S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 kelakuan baik atau denda sahaja tidak akan dapat memberi pengajaran yang berkesan kepada tertuduh dan juga kepada masyarakat agar tidak melakukan jenayah seumpamanya. Bertarikh 3 Januari 2024 ………………………T.T..…..………………… (FARAH BINTI ROSNAN) MAJISTRET Mahkamah Majistret Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Pendakwaan – Puan Saidah Fasihah Binti Che Yussoff, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Bagi Pihak Tertuduh – Chambers Of Noor Fara S/N aASaMZyZ90Ga1xJPU/qPjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

B-05(M)-77-02/2022

PERAYU LIN SIEK HONG RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya

Rayuan Jenayah - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman Mahkamah Tinggi untuk kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan kerana menyebabkan kematian - Mahkamah Tinggi memerintahkan hukuman gantung sampai mati - Mahkamah Rayuan memerintahkan: (1) Rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan ditolak; (2) Mengenal hukuman, Mahkamah Rayuan menggunakan kuasa budibicara di bawah Akta Permansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 (Akta 846) dengan mengenepikan hukuman mati dan menggantikannya dengan hukuman penjara selama 35 tahun dari tarikh tangkap. Hukuman sebatan dikecualikan kerana perayu telah berumur 54 tahun - Mahkamah Rayuan mendapati: (1) Perayu telah menikam simati di bahagian jantung. Kecederaan ini sahaja sudah cukup untuk membuktikan bahawa perayu memang mempunyai niat untuk menyebabkan kematian kepada simati; (2) Tidak timbul isu pendakwaan gagal memanggil saksi yang material dan inferen bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak terpakai terhadap pendakwaan; (3) Perayu yang memulakan pergaduhan; (4) Tiada provokasi atau pergaduhan secara tiba-tiba; (5) Isu ubat penenang adalah tidak bermerit kerana tidak disokong oleh keterangan perubatan. Tiada pegawai perubatan dipanggil untuk mengesahkan keadaan mental perayu akan terganggu jika beliau tidak mengambil ubat penenang tersebut.

03/01/2024

YA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Datuk See Mee ChunYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=837d17b8-484d-4c88-89dc-dacd2bec3b97&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO.B-05(M)-77-02/2022 ANTARA LIN SIEK HONG - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Klang, Selangor Perbicaraan Jenayah No.BA-45B-28-06-2019 Antara Pendakwa Raya Dan Lin Siek Hong] KORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, HMR SEE MEE CHUN, HMR AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, HMR 03/01/2024 10:33:33 B-05(M)-77-02/2022 Kand. 43 S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Pada 17.2.2022, perayu, Lin Siek Hong telah disabitkan dan dikenakan hukuman gantung sampai mati oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Klang, Selangor kerana menyebabkan kematian kepada Yap Choon Mooi, suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. [2] Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. Pertuduhan [3] Pertuduhan terhadap perayu adalah seperti berikut: Bahawa kamu pada 11.12.2018 jam lebih kurang 6.45 pagi bertempat di Lorong Tengah, Kampung Sungai Terentang, Rawang di dalam Daerah Gombak di dalam Negeri Selangor dengan sengaja telah membunuh Yap Choon Mooi, No.KP 770525-08-6174. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Kes Pendakwaan [4] Pada 11.12.2018 jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi, Chong Yoke Wa (SP11) bersama isterinya Yap Choon Mooi (simati) telah pergi ke pasar di Pekan Rawang dengan menaiki motosikal untuk membeli barang. S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] Sampai di pasar, SP11 telah ke kedai menjual surat khabar. Simati pula pergi ke kedai lain untuk membeli kopi. [6] Tiba-tiba seorang perempuan cina datang memberitahu kepada SP11 bahawa simati telah ditikam. SP11 segera pergi mendapatkan simati. Setibanya SP11 di tempat kejadian, beliau melihat perayu menarik rambut simati dan menikam perut simati dengan pisau 5 hingga 6 kali. Apabila SP11 meluru ke arah perayu, perayu telah melepaskan simati dan kemudian perayu telah menikam SP11 dengan pisau di bahagian pinggang. [7] Selepas itu, perayu melarikan diri. SP11 kemudiannya pergi ke klinik berhampiran untuk mendapatkan rawatan bagi dirinya dan simati. Doktor di klinik berkenaan enggan memberikan rawatan. SP11 kemudiannya meminta bantuan rakannya, SP10 untuk membawa beliau dan simati ke hospital. Wong Pok San (SP10) membawa SP11 dan simati ke Hospital Selayang. [8] Di Hospital Selayang, SP11 dan simati di bawa ke Unit Kecemasan. Dr. Pak Jun Wee (SP1) yang merawat simati memaklumkan bahawa simati telah meninggal dunia. [9] Dr. Connie Gan Pei Wen (SP15) yang merawat SP11 mendapati terdapat luka tikaman 3 x 1 cm di bahagian kiri bawah dada dan luka di bahagian siku 4 x 3 cm. Luka adalah dalam dan berdarah. [10] Fong Kar Heng (SP9) yang berniaga chee cheong fun berhampiran tempat kejadian nampak satu lelaki cina sedang memukul seorang S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 wanita. SP9 mengecam lelaki itu adalah perayu. SP9 meninggalkan tempat itu apabila pelanggannya memberitahu perayu memegang pisau. [11] Perayu melarikan diri dari tempat kejadian dan menyerah diri di Balai Polis Rawang. Perayu telah berjumpa dengan Sarjan Shamie bin Yusop (SP4). SP4 nampak kesan darah pada baju perayu. [12] SP4 menangkap perayu dan merampas baju dan seluar yang dipakainya. Seterusnya, SP4 membuat laporan polis dan borang bongkar. [13] Baju dan seluar perayu telah dianalisa oleh ahli kimia, Yong Khursihah binti Kamarul Baharin (SP13). Hasil analisa, SP13 mengesahkan terdapat kesan darah simati pada baju perayu. [14] Seterusnya, perayu telah membawa Inspektor Zulhashim (SP5) ke tempat kejadian di pasar dan menunjukkan kepada SP5 sebilah pisau [P32H (1)] yang dibalut dengan surat khabar cina [P32H (2)] yang disorokkan disitu. [14] Dr. Ahmad Hafizam Hasmi (SP14) yang menjalankan bedah siasat ke atas simati mengesahkan punca kematian adalah akibat luka-luka tikaman pada jantung. Dengan merujuk kepada luka-luka tikaman yang dikenakan ke atas simati, SP14 menyatakan “Berdasarkan kecederaan, orang yang sebabkan kecederaan memang untuk menyebabkan mangsa mati.” S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [15] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman memutuskan bahawa pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie dan memanggil perayu membela diri. Kes Pembelaan [16] Perayu memberi keterangan bersumpah. Versi perayu ialah pada 11.12.2018, jam lebih kurang 6.30 pagi, beliau telah pergi ke gerai makan berhampiran tempat kejadian dengan motosikal. [17] Ketika sedang makan, perayu melihat simati lalu di hadapan kedai kopi tempat beliau makan dan mulut simati telah mengutuknya. Perayu terus menghampiri simati dan bertanya mengapa mengambil RM1000 dari ibunya. [18] Simati kemudian berkata dengan suara yang kuat “apa awak buat sini penagih dadah”. Pada masa itu, ramai orang telah melihat ke arah mereka. [19] Perayu merasa marah dan telah mengambil sebilah pisau dari gerai chee cheong fun milik SP9. Perayu memberitahu simati supaya berhenti dari terus memarahinya. Pada waktu itu, tangan perayu masih memegang pisau. Menurut perayu, simati telah menangkap tangannya yang sedang memegang pisau dan berlaku tarik menarik antara kedua-dua mereka. [20] Semasa tarik menarik itu, simati telah berkata kepada perayu bahawa beliau seorang penagih dadah dan tidak akan berani menikam beliau. Satu tangan simati telah memegang tangan perayu dan satu lagi S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 tangan menolak dada perayu. Perayu sangat marah dan tidak boleh fikir apa-apa. [21] Perayu tidak menafikan beliau telah menikam simati dan mencederakan suami simati (SP11). Beliau menafikan beliau ada niat untuk membunuh. Sebaliknya, beliau mendakwa telah menikam simati secara tidak sengaja akibat beliau terlalu marah dengan kata-kata simati. [22] Sebelum kejadian tikaman, perayu mendakwa beliau telah mengambil ubat PSY iaitu ubat penenang yang dibekalkan oleh hospital dan klinik di Rawang. [23] Di akhir kes pembelaan, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman mendapati pembelaan gagal membuktikan bahawa perbuatan beliau menikam simati terjumlah kepada perbuatan mempertahankan diri, provokasi atau dalam keadaan tidak sedar perbuatan beliau adalah menyalahi undang-undang. Sebaliknya, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman memutuskan pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan tanpa keraguan munasabah bahawa perayu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Alasan-Alasan Rayuan [24] Perayu menyenaraikan tiga alasan kenapa sabitan terhadapnya dikatakan tidak selamat iaitu: (i) Inferen bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap pendakwaan kerana gagal memanggil satu perempuan cina yang S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 memaklumkan kepada SP11 bahawa perayu telah menikam simati. (ii) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman gagal menimbangkan pembelaan perayu mengenai provokasi oleh simati terhadap perayu yang mengakibatkan pergaduhan secara tiba-tiba dan perayu hilang kawalan diri. (iii) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman gagal mengambilkira ubat yang diambil oleh perayu untuk menenangkan mentalnya. Isu Inferen Bertentangan [25] Dalam kes Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 M L J 492, Mahkamah Agong menyatakan: It is essential to appreciate the scope of s114 (g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non- production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case.” [26] Peguam perayu menghujahkan perempuan cina yang memberitahu SP11 isterinya ditikam harus dipanggil oleh pendakwaan sebagai saksi untuk memberi keterangan kenapa pergaduhan boleh berlaku di antara perayu dan simati hingga menyebabkan simati ditikam. Akibat kegagalan pendakwaan memanggil perempuan cina itu, peguam S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 perayu menghujahkan inferen bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap pendakwaan. [27] Semasa disoal balas, SP11 menjelaskan beliau tidak kenal siapa perempuan cina yang memberitahu beliau isterinya ditikam: S: Ada seorang wanita cina beritahu kamu tentang kejadian, ada beritahu nama wanita cina ini pada pegawai penyiasat? J: Tidak, saya tak tahu nama dia. S: Wanita cina ini jumpa kamu, dia kenal kamu dan isteri kamu? J: Saya tak kenal wanita itu, saya tak ingat. [28] Jawapan SP11 itu menunjukkan perempuan cina itu adalah orang asing kepada SP11. Oleh itu, pendakwaan tidak boleh dikatakan menyembunyikan maklumat mengenai perempuan cina itu kerana memang tidak ada maklumat. [29] Perempuan cina itu juga bukanlah saksi yang material kerana SP11 sendiri adalah saksi mata yang melihat perayu memegang simati dengan menarik rambut simati dan menikam perut simati. Atas fakta kes ini, kami mendapati tidak timbul isu pendakwaan gagal memanggil saksi yang material dan inferen bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak terpakai terhadap pendakwaan. Isu Provokasi [30] Fakta menunjukkan sebelum kejadian ini, perayu dan simati tinggal berjiran selama 7 - 8 tahun. Sepanjang tempoh masa tersebut, simati S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 memang tidak sukakan perayu kerana perayu adalah seorang penagih dadah. Simati dikatakan selalu mengutuk perayu. [31] Pembelaan perayu ialah pada hari kejadian, berlaku “grave and sudden provocation” oleh simati. Simati dikatakan telah memaki dan menghina perayu sebagai penagih dadah. Caci maki simati dikatakan menyebabkan perayu naik angin, tidak boleh mengawal diri, mengambil pisau dari gerai chee cheong fun dan meluru ke arah simati. [32] Setelah membaca nota keterangan di dalam Rekod Rayuan, kami mendapati perayu yang memulakan pergaduhan. Dalam keterangannya, perayu bersetuju apabila beliau nampak simati, beliau (perayu) yang meluru ke arah simati. Beliau juga setuju simati tidak menghampiri perayu. Ini bermakna, perayu yang sengaja mencari gaduh dengan simati. [33] Kami juga mendapati dari fakta kes, tiada provokasi atau pergaduhan secara tiba-tiba. Keterangan SP9 ialah beliau nampak perayu menyerang simati. SP9 kenal simati kerana simati adalah pelanggannya. Menurut SP9, beliau tidak dengar perkataan provokasi keluar dari mulut simati atau sama ada simati memarahi perayu. Beliau hanya mendengar simati menjerit kepada perayu. Keterangan SP9 ketika disoal balas adalah seperti berikut: S: Dalam masa 5 minit mereka bergaduh kamu tak berapa dengar sebab sedang gunting “chee cheong fun”? J: Ya S: Dalam masa itu, kamu ada dengar perempuan cina iaitu simati memaki OKT? J: Tiada S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 S: Ada kamu nampak atau dengar simati marah OKT? J: Tiada, dia cuma jerit. S: Setuju kamu tak dengar sebab kamu sedang bekerja? J: Betul S: Simati ada maki, marah OKT tapi kamu tak dengar sebab sedang buat kerja? J: Saya dengar mereka jerit sahaja. [34] Pembelaan “grave and sudden provocation” telah dibincangkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Che Omar bin Mohd Akhir v PP [2007] 4 ML J 309. Untuk berjaya dalam pembelaan grave and sudden provocation, fakta-fakta berikut mesti dibuktikan: (i) The offender must have done the act whilst deprived of the power of self control; (ii) He must have been so deprived by reason of the provocation; (iii) The provocation must have been grave and sudden; (iv) The provocation must not have been sought by the offender; (iv) It must not have been voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for doing the act; and (vi) The provocation must not have been by anything done: (a) either in obedience to the law; or (b) by a public servant in the lawful exercise of his powers as such; or (c) in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. [35] Dalam kes di hadapan kami ini, kami mendapati pembelaan gagal membuktikan fakta-fakta seperti mana yang dinyatakan dalam kes Che S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Omar bin Mohd Akhir v PP untuk melayakkan beliau bergantung kepada pembelaan grave and sudden provocation. Pergaduhan dan tikaman ini boleh dielakkan jika perayu tidak menghampiri simati. [36] Oleh itu, pembelaan provokasi adalah tidak bermerit dan ditolak. Isu Ubat Penenang [37] Peguam perayu menghujahkan bahawa Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman gagal mempertimbangkan pembelaan perayu bahawa beliau mengambil ubat PSY (Arthin dan Cyberjack) selama 5 - 6 tahun. Jika beliau tidak makan ubat tersebut, beliau akan dengar suara menyuruh beliau mengacau orang dan menyentuh orang perempuan. [38] Pembelaan ini ada dipertimbangkan oleh Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman di para [74] alasan penghakiman. Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman membuat keputusan yang betul apabila menolak pembelaan ini kerana tidak disokong oleh keterangan perubatan. Tiada pegawai perubatan dipanggil untuk mengesahkan keadaan mental perayu akan terganggu jika beliau tidak mengambil ubat PSY tersebut. [39] Maka, isu ubat penenang adalah tidak bermerit dan ditolak. Keputusan Kami [40] Ini adalah satu kes di mana perayu telah dibuktikan dengan sengaja telah membunuh simati. Perayu telah menikam simati di bahagian jantung. Kecederaan ini sahaja sudah cukup untuk membuktikan bahawa perayu memang mempunyai niat untuk menyebabkan kematian kepada S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 simati. Oleh itu, sabitan adalah selamat. Maka, rayuan perayu terhadap sabitan ditolak. [41] Mengenai hukuman, kami menggunakan kuasa budibicara di bawah Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 (Akta 846) dengan mengenepikan hukuman mati dan menggantikannya dengan hukuman penjara selama 35 tahun dari tarikh tangkap. Hukuman sebatan dikecualikan kerana perayu telah berumur 54 tahun. Bertarikh: 3 Januari 2024 - SGD - Hadhariah binti Syed Ismail Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Bagi Perayu : En Lee Teong Hooi; Tetuan Lee Tan & Associates. Bagi Responden : TPR Parvin Hameedah & TPR Sarulatha; Jabatan Peguam Negara. S/N uBd9g01IiEyJ3NrNKw7lw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-156-04/2021

PLAINTIF Central Sugar Refinery Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Holsten Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd

Sale of goods – sugar local supply contract – credit limit and credit term – written approval of credit limit by Chief Financial Officer – whether any oral agreement of Head of Sales Department to increase credit limit by more than 3 times – analysis and assessment of evidence – whether allegation of oral agreement consistent with contemporaneous documents – whether allegation of oral agreement consistent with conduct of parties – parallel stipulation of credit limit and credit term – effect – continued supply of sugar for short time after credit limit exceeded – whether evidence of oral agreement to increase credit limit – export contract – payment before delivery – whether waiver of payment term – whether any obligation to deliver when there is no payment made.

03/01/2024

YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d697c3d6-4090-465f-ab4a-117cedcd5cf0&Inline=true

1 THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: BA-22NCvC-156-04/2021 _________________________________________________________ BETWEEN CENTRAL SUGAR REFINERY SDN BHD (COMPANY NO. : 99042-W) … PLAINTIFF AND HOLSTEN MARKETING (M) SDN BHD (COMPANY NO. : 680066-W) … DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT (After Full Trial) Introduction 1. This is trial of the Defendant/Holsten’s counterclaims after this Court previously granted summary judgment on 4.1.2022 to the Plaintiff for the unpaid value of sugar sold in the amount of RM1,255,125.00. The execution of the entire judgment sum was stayed pending the trial of the Defendant’s counterclaims. There is no appeal against the summary judgment dated 4.1.2022. [see the Summary Judgement dated 4.1.2022 in Enclosure 37] 2. When granting the summary judgment with stay, this Court pursuant to O.34 of ROC 2012 also directed that the counterclaims be tried on the following main issues: 2 (a) Sama ada Encik Henry Ong Ewe Teow telah bersetuju untuk meningkat had kredit bagi Defendan ke jumlah RM2,500,000 dan jika ya, sama ada persetujuan beliau mengikat Plaintif di sisi undang-undang; (b) Sama ada Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk meningkat had kredit bagi Defendan ke jumlah RM2,500,000 secara yang mengikat Plaintif di sisi undang-undang; dan (c) Jika jawapan-jawapan kepada soalan-solan (a) dan (b) adalah ya, sama ada Defendan telah mengalami kerugian-kerugian akibat keengganan Plaintif untuk membekalkan kuantiti baki gula, dan jika ya, berapa jumlah kerugian-kerugian itu. 3. After a full trial of the Defendant’s counterclaim, this Court on 23 October 2023 answered both questions (a) and (b) in the negative, and thereupon dismissed the Defendant’s counterclaims with costs, and ordered that the Plaintiff is entitled to proceed with execution of the Plaintiff’s summary judgment. Defendant’s case and the Plaintiff’s defences in the counterclaim 4. In the Counterclaim, the Defendant/Holsten alleged that due to the Plaintiff/CSR’s purported failure to supply sugar ordered by Holsten, Holsten suffered losses because it was unable to sell the sugar to its customers. In this regard, Holsten alleged that it suffered: (a) loss of profit of RM1,280,000.00 for being unable to sell sugar to Chop Hong Lee; and 3 (b) loss of profit of USD60,000.00 for being unable to export sugar to its Indonesian customer PT Masindo Batam Indonesia. In mounting the Counterclaim, Holsten alleged, inter alia, that (i) that CSR had allegedly increased the credit limit provided to Holsten from RM700,000.00 to RM2,500,000.00 in respect of local sugar; (ii) that the real reason CSR suspended the supply of sugar to Holsten was because of sugar shortage issues faced by CSR; (iii) CSR was in breach of obligation to deliver the export sugar to Holsten. 5. In response, CSR has submitted that Holsten’s Counterclaim is not bona fide, frivolous and wholly without merits based on the following grounds: (a) The credit limit agreed between Holsten and CSR was always RM700,000.00, and not RM2,500,000.00 as alleged by Holsten. (b) CSR is entitled to cease supplying sugar to Holsten due to Holsten’s exceedance of credit limit; (c) Based on documentary evidence and past practices, shortage of sugar was never a reason for CSR to stop supplying sugar to Holsten; 4 (d) Holsten failed to call a key witness, Henry Ong, who was expected to have material evidence to give on a number of issues to testify on its behalf; (e) The Counterclaim was just an afterthought by Holsten to evade its own contractual liabilities to pay CSR for the sugar sold and delivered by CSR to Holsten. (f) Any alleged losses and damages suffered by Holsten from its commercial arrangements with its customers was entirely caused by Holsten’s own conduct. Background facts 6. CSR is a leading sugar products manufacturer in Malaysia that operates sugar refineries, and manufactures and supplies a wide range of sugar products. [paragraph 2 of the Statement of Agreed facts in Enclosure 45, marked as “SAF”] 7. Holsten carries on the business of general import, export, merchanting and trading of goods including sugar products, hire- purchase dealings, bunkering services, transit services, transportation and commission agents. [SAF, paragraph 4] 8. CSR and Holsten had been doing business in sale and purchase of sugar with each other for many years. 9. In their business transactions, there were types and grades of sugars manufactured and supplied by CSR to Holsten for local 5 supply contracts as well as for export contracts. As part of their reciprocal business relationship, there were also other types and grades of sugars supplied by Holsten to CSR. 10. On an overall basis, CSR supplied sugars to Holsten under the export contract on basis of cash before delivery and under the local supply contracts on basis of certain pre-agreed credit limit and credit term. 11. On the other hand, for the types and grades of sugar supplied or to be supplied by Holsten to CSR, their contractual arrangement was that CSR paid advance deposit money with Holsten, then obtained the sugar from Holsten who thereupon deducted the value of supplied sugar from the CSR’s advance credit. 12. The subject contracts of supply in dispute in this action are: (a) Contract for Sale of Refined Sugar: LO/125-18U1 (for Malaysian market) (“the said Local Contract”) [AB4/320 – 323] for CSR’s supply of sugar to Holsten for local market and (b) export supply contract No. EXP/OT/34-19 (“the said Export Contract”) [AB1/79 – 81] for CSR’s supply of sugar to Holsten for export market. Issues to be Decided 13. From the pleadings, evidence and submissions of the parties, the main issues to be decided are summarised as follows: Supply of Sugar under the said Local Contract: 6 1st main issue: whether the Plaintiff/CSR’s Director of Sales Henry Ong has agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000.00 in respect of sugar for Malaysian market and if so, whether his agreement is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR in the eyes of the law. 2nd main issue: whether the Plaintiff/CSR has agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000 in a way that is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR under the laws. 3rd main issue: if the answers to the 1st and 2nd main issues are in the affirmative, whether the Defendant/Holsten has suffered losses as a result of the Plaintiff/CSR’s refusal to supply the balance quantity of sugar, and if so, what is the amount of the damages. Under this 3rd main issue, there are also sub-issues including: (3a) whether independently of the question whether the credit limit has been exceeded, the Plaintiff/CSR was entitled to stop delivery of the balance sugar to the Defendant/Holsten; and (3b) whether there is a real difference between stoppage of delivery and suspension or closing of trade account in the circumstances of the present case. Supply of sugar under the said Export Contract: 4th main issue: whether in the circumstances the Plaintiff/CSR was under an obligation to supply the export sugar to the Defendant/Holsten, and if so, was the Plaintiff/CSR in breach of such obligation in the circumstances of the present case. 7 5th main issue: if the answers to the 4th main issue is in the affirmative, has the Defendant/Holsten proved that it has suffered losses and damages due to the Plaintiff/CSR’s refusal to supply the export sugar, and if so, the amount of such losses and damages. 14. Before the commencement of the full trial, it was also the agreed procedure that: (1) At the full trial, upon the witness' affirmation and confirmation of the contents of his/her Witness Statement as his/her evidence, the Witness Statement and its contents are deemed to be read and there is no necessity for the witness to read the contents of the Witness Statement into the CRT system. This procedure is without prejudice to the rule against hearsay, i.e. the principle of evidence which requires witnesses to testify as to facts and matters within their personal knowledge and not on hearsay evidence. Liberty is given to the counsel to ask supplementary or additional question in examination-in-chief to clarify or explain or highlight salient parts of the Witness Statement before the cross-examination begins. (2) In order to save time and costs at the full trial, the Part A and Part B documents referred to in the witnesses' statements and evidence are marked as per the marking of Agreed Bundles of Documents as “AA” and “AB” numbers respectively followed by the page numbers and there is no necessity to mark the relevant pages of the Part A and Part B documents with separate exhibit numbers again. However, this procedure 8 shall be without prejudice to the rule against hearsay. Part C document, when either upgraded into Part B document or its original have been tendered by the maker and verified as authentic, shall be marked with a separate exhibit number. 1st main issue: whether the Plaintiff/CSR’s Director of Sales Henry Ong has agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000.00 in respect of sugar for Malaysian market and if so, whether his agreement is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR in the eyes of the law. 2nd main issue: whether the Plaintiff/CSR has agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000 in a way that is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR under the laws 15. In paragraph 4 of the Defendant’s Amended Defence and Counterclaim, the Defendant/Holsten pleaded that: (i) the credit limit given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was fixed at RM2,500,000.00; (ii) Account No. 2BJ1245 was a running account and subject to the said credit limit; and (iii) if the invoice was not paid within the stipulated time, the Plaintiff had the right to impose interest at 1.5% per month on all overdue invoices. 16. In paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff’s Reply to Defence and Defence to Counterclaim, it was pleaded that save for paragraph 4(iii), 9 paragraphs 4(i) and 4(ii) of the Defence was denied. The Plaintiff further pleaded that pursuant to the Plaintiff’s email dated 15.7.2020 and the Defendant’s email dated 17.7.2020, it was agreed between both parties that, among other account facilities, the credit limit in relation to the supply of local sugar would be capped at RM700,000, and that the Defendant’s allegation was an afterthought. 17. In paragraph 4(i) of the Defendant’s Reply to Defence to Counterclaim, the Defendant for the first time alleged that the Defendant via letter dated 22.2.2019 to the Plaintiff and subsequently handed personally to Henry Ong Ewe Teow on 11.8.2020 made a written application for increase of credit limit to RM2,500,000.00. Plaintiff, among others, verbally agreed to the said request through Henry Ong who informed the Defendant’s Director Tey Poh Choon and through the Plaintiff’s subsequent steps in selling sugar to the Defendant in excess of the alleged credit limit of RM700,000.00. 18. At the outset, it was explained by Encik Azahar the CFO of CSR, that CSR provides credit in relation to the supply and delivery of sugar to all its customers. This would include both credit term and credit limit. However, there are no fixed credit terms and credit limits that CSR would impose on all its customers. The credit limit provided to each customer depends on a few factors including (a) the identity of the customer, (b) the payment history of the customer, (c) the credit worthiness of the customer and (d) the decision of the management based on the limit of authority framework which was decided by the Board of Directors of CSR. [see WS-PW1 Q&A 6 in 10 Enclosure 87]. This evidence remained unrebutted. 19. This Court accepts this evidence of Encik Azahar because it is business logic and common sense and is unrebutted at the trial. 20. On 15.7.2020, Azahar sent an email to TKL and TPC of Holsten stating that CSR would grant Holsten: (1) 30 days’ credit term; and (2) RM700,000.00 credit limit: AB1/151 [Enclosure 48]. TKL replied to Azahar’s email on 17.7.2020, saying that Holsten accepted both the 30 days’ credit term and the RM700,000.00 credit limit: AB1/152. This is also testified by PW1 Mohamad Azahar in Q&A 7 of WS-PW1. The Defendant/Holsten did not dispute the fact that such e-mails were in fact exchanged between the parties. 21. The parties’ mutual agreement in writing on the credit limit of RM700,000 and credit term of 30 days was the product of discussions and negotiations which included the settlement of an earlier court suit filed by CSR against Holsten for unpaid invoices totalling about RM1 million. There was a history of payment defaults by the Defendant/Holsten including dishonouring of cheques before July 2020, as shown in the summary of chronological sequence of events listed below and to which the witnesses have also testified: 06.01.2020: the 1st Settlement Agreement contained in CSR Finance Director Mohd Azahar’s letter re “Outstanding RM1,325,368.94 as at 6 January 2020” (AB1/162 – 163 in Enclosure 48) with the following contents countersigned, agreed and accepted by Holsten: “1. We refer to the above matter. 11 2. Pursuant to the Contractor for the Sale of Refined Sugar : LO/125-18U1 dated 22 March 2018 (“Contract No. LO/125- 18U”), you have agreed to purchase and we have agreed to supply refined sugar (“Products”) to you with a payment term of thirty (30) days from the date of our invoice. 3. As you are aware, as at the date of this letter, the total outstanding sum due and owing to us on accounts of the Products sold and delivered to you pursuant to the Contract No. LO/125-18U is RM1,325,368.94 (“Debt”) excluding the late payment interest accruing on the same. 4. However, on a strictly without prejudice basis and with an intention to amicably resolve this matter, you shall effect payment of the Debt to us in instalments and by way of post- dated cheque to us pursuant to the following payment method, as a full and final settlement of the matter:- a. Maybank Cheque No.: 314418, dated 28.02.2020 for the sum of RM325,368.94; b. Maybank Cheque No.: 314421, dated 28.03.2020 for the sum of RM500,000.00; c. Maybank Cheque No.: 314424, dated 28.04.2020 for the sum of RM500,000.00; (paragraphs 4(a) – (c) shall collectively be referred to as “Post-Dated Cheques”) d. We shall be entitled to bank in and or encash the Post- Dated Cheques on the respective date without further notice to you; and 12 e. The Post-Dated Cheques must be handed over to us at our office before the parties shall fulfil its obligations pursuant to the Contract No. HST/CSR/5205019. 5. In the event of your default, failure and / or neglect to comply with the payment as prescribed at paragraph 4 above and / or any Post-Dated Cheques payments being dishonoured for the Debt, the entire Debt shall become immediately due and owing to us and we shall not hesitate to commence legal proceedings against you for the same including any late payment interest and consequential damages. 6. For the avoidance of doubt, any extensions and / or waives granted by us on your payment obligations as stipulated in paragraph 4 above shall not be deemed to be a waiver of our rights as set out in paragraphs 5 above. 7. If you are agreeable to our proposals as set out herein, kindly acknowledge receipt by signing on this letter indicating your acceptance of the same. 8. In the meantime, all our rights are hereby reserved. Thank you. 10.4.2020: CSR solicitor Law Partnership’s letter of demand against Holsten for dishonoured cheque of RM500,000, the second instalment under the 1st Settlement Agreement dated 06.01.2020: AB1/164 – 165. [Enclosure 48] 13 11.6.2020: CSR filed Shah Alam High Court Suit No. BA- 22NCvC-169-06/2020 against Holsten for the balance amount of RM1,000,000.00: AB1/166 – 191. 03.07.2020: CSR Henry Ong’s email to Holsten’s Ken, copied to Mohd Azahar and other person, with the following contents: “Thank you for joining us for our meeting this afternoon. Below are recap of our alignment for our immediate actions: Supply of Sugar to CSR 1. Balance of Quantity from signed contract : 4,350Mt (Delivered 650Mt) 2. Holsten is to revert with schedule of delivery to CSR by 14/7 to fulfil above contractual quantity, in which CSR is to make the balance of 80% payment for each delivery within 7 working days. Supply of Sugar to Holsten 1. Holsten is to revert with payment schedule for current total outstanding of RM1mil to CSR by 14/7. 2. Upon Item 1 been fully paid, below 2 contracts with then be reactivated by CSR. 3. Contract : EXP/OT/34 will be extended for 2 months for Holsten to utilise the full 300Mt for Export, based on term of payment before delivery basis. 4. Contract: LO/125018U1 will also be extended for 3 months for Holsten to utilise the Balance of Quantity of 653Mt based on current credit days and limit. 14 Let’s act swiftly to resolve the above for us to move forward”: see AB3/265 [Enclosure 52]. Also found in AB6/9 (Plaintiff’s Additional Documents) in Enclosure 76. 14.7.2020: Holsten’s Harry Tey’s email to CSR’s Henry Ong (also c.c. to a number of other persons including CSR’s Mohd Azahar) (see AB6/8 in Enclosure 76) whereby Holsten replied to CSR’s email of 3.7.2020 and stated that: “A) Supply of Sugar to CSR 1. We are currently waiting for our suppliers’ reply on their sugar price and delivery schedule. We shall provide you with a delivery schedule for the balance 4,350 my by 21.07.2020”. B) Supply of Sugar to Holsten 1. The revised statement of account is attached with this e- mail for your attention. We shall arrange a one-off payment of RM804,214.00, being the outstanding amount due to CSR within 1 week from the date of both parties’ acceptance and confirmation of the correctness of the said revised statement of account. 2. We require a confirmation from CSR on Holsten’s current credit term and credit limit with CSR”. 15.7.2020, 8.23 a.m. (AB6/7 in Enclosure 76): e-mail from Mohd Azahar bin Mohd Salleh, CSR’s Finance Director, to 15 Harry/Ken of Holsten (copied to other persons including CSR’s Henry Ong) with the following content: “On the revised statement of account in relation to Supply Sugar to Holsten, please fin below our reply in BLUE: 1. Outstanding Amount (as at 07.07.2020) = RM1,000,000.00 ; [CSR Reply : Yes we agreed on this balance] 2. Amount Refundable on claims RM (31,786.00); [CSR Reply : We will revert to you on this amount. However, for the interest of time, you may hold this amount until we resolve any related issues/disputes on this claims] 3. Amount Payable to Holsten RM (164,000.00); [CSR Reply : yes, we agreed that this amounts which is related to the Supply Sugar to CSR is to be deducted from item 1. However, please take note that the balance of deposit for Supply Sugar to CSR will increase by the same amount. Hence, the revised balance shall be RM1,783,500.00. Attached is the revised statement of account in relation to the Sugar Supply from Holsten to CSR.] 4. Balance Outstanding Amount RM804,214.00 [CSR Reply : Yes, we agreed Holsten to arrange this payment provided the above comments/remarks/notes in items 2 and 3 are accepted. 16 15.7.2020, 22:20 time.: e-mail from Mohd Azahar bin Mohd Salleh, CSR’s Finance Director, to Harry/Ken of Holsten with the following content: “In addition to my email below and in relation to the Supply of Sugar to Holsten, we would like to confirm on a without prejudice basis that CSR will grant Holsten with the following: 1. 30 days’ credit term; and, 2. RM700,000 credit limit. The above is granted on the basis that, and subject to: (I) the balance outstanding amount due from Holsten to CSR, being a sum of RM804,214.00, is paid in full within 1 week from 14/7/2020; and (II) the acceptance by Holsten of the terms and conditions stated in my earlier email (see below), Failing which the credit term and/or the credit limit may be revoked. Notwithstanding that, CSR reserves the right to amend such credit term and/or credit limit, or impose further conditions as may become necessary from time to time.” (AB1/151 in Enclosure 48) The said email is also found in AB6/6 [Enclosure 76]. 17.7.2020: email from Holsten’s Harry Tey Kak Lok (DW2) to CSR’s Mohd Azahar, Henry Ong and circulated to several other persons: “We refer to your email dated 15.07.2020 and below are our replies on a without prejudice basis:- 17 Supply of Sugar to Holsten 1. We accept the account facilities provided by CSR, 30 day’s credit term and RM700,000.00 credit limit under the condition: Credit term and/or credit limit or imposition of further conditions may be imposed or varied by CSR subject to prior discussion and negotiation with Holsten. 2. We hereby confirm the Balance outstanding amount RM804,214.00. Kindly instruct your solicitors to withdraw the suit against Holsten without costs in the event you are agreeable to our proposal. (AB1/152 in Enclosure 48). Also in AB6/5 [Enclosure 76]. 20.7.2020: CSR Mohd Azahar’s email to Holsten’s Harry Tey [AB6/4 - 5] with the following contents: We refer to your email dated 17 July 2020 and our emails dated 15 July 2020 and 17 July 2020 below. On a without prejudice basis, we write to confirm that both CSR and Holsten have achieved a settlement and in gist, the settlement terms are as follows:- a. The total outstanding sum to be paid by Holsten is RM804,214,00 and the said sum shall be paid by 21 July 2020 in cash. Upon receipt of the same, we will instruct our solicitors to withdraw the legal proceedings BA-22NCvC- 169-06/2020 at the next case management on 28 July 2020; 18 b. In respect of the outstanding sum of RM31,786.00, CSR will conduct internal investigation on the same but this is should not be seen as waiver of our rights to demand for the same in the event upon our internal investigation, it reveals that Holten is in fact responsible to pay such an amount to CSR. c. In respect of the sum RM164,000, CSR is agreeable for this to be transferred to the Agreement for Supply of Sugar to CSR whereby the balance deposit shall now be RM1,783,500. We have been advised by our solicitors that a separate letter will be issued in relation to this arrangement for the Agreement for Supply of Sugar to CSR. We understand that our solicitors will also be issuing a letter to your solicitors setting out the settlement terms as agreed between us. We look forward to receiving the payment in paragraph a. form you no later that tomorrow (21 July 2020).” [AB6/4 in Enclosure 76] 20.7.2020: Plaintiff’s solicitor Law Partnership’s letter to the Defendant’s solicitor whereby the Plaintiff proposed to settle CSR’s claims for unpaid invoices at RM1,000,000: AB1/82 – 83 [Enclosure 48]. The contents of the solicitor’s letter dated 20.7.2020 are as follows: RE: SHAH ALAM HIGH COURT SUIT NO.: BA-22NCvC- 169-06/2020 19 CENTRAL SUGARS REFINERY SDN. BHD. … PLAINTIF HOLSTEN MARKETING (M) SDN. BHD. … DEFENDANT ________________________________________________ 1. We refer to the above matter wherein we act for the Plaintiff, Central Sugars Refinery Sdn Bhd (our Client”). 2. We have been instructed that your client and our Client had been engaged in without prejudice negotiations with the intention to achieve an amicable resolution with respect to the above captioned mater (“Settlement”). 3. Our Client further instructs us that the terms for the Settlement as agreed upon between your client and our Client are as follows. With respect to the outstanding sum of RM1,000,000 (“Total Outstanding Sum”), it shall be paid by your client to our Client in the following manner:- a. RM804,214.00 : Your client shall pay in cash, to our Client, a total sum of RM804,214.00, on or by 21 July 2020; b. RM31,786.00: Our Client instructs us that in view that your client has raised queries in relation to the goods sold and delivered to your client for the said amount, on a goodwill basis, our Client is agreeable to withhold demand for the same pending our Client’s Internal Investigation. However, this is without prejudice to our Client’s rights to demand payment for the said amount for 20 goods sold and delivered to your client in the event our Client’s internal investigation reveals that your client’s queries in relation to the same were baseless and without merits; c. RM164,000 : As you aware, your client and our Client had entered into the Contract No. HST/CSR/5205019 dated 15-10-2019 and the Addendum dated 6-1-2020 (“Agreement”) whereby your client had agreed to supply sugar to our Client pursuant to the terms and conditions of the same. We further refer to our Letters dated 09-04- 2020 and 02-06-2020. i. Among others and notwithstanding that our Client, in due compliance with its obligation under the Agreement, had made a total sum of RM1,435,000 and RM615,000 to your client as the total upfront payment (collectively referred to as “Total Upfront Payment”) for the total sugar to be supplied by your client to our Client, there was and still is an outstanding of 4,350 MT of sugar to be supplied to our Client by your client as a the date hereof; ii. In fact, on or around January 2020, in view that the remaining of the sugar to be supplied by your client to our Client pursuant to the Agreement was not forthcoming, our Client exercised its right to offset the payment of your invoice dated 23-01-2020 which was for 100MT of sugar delivered on 23-01-2020 from the Total Upfront Payment 21 to mitigate any further losses, whereby the remaining Total Upfront Payment was RM1,619,500; iii. Notwithstanding the same, our client is now agreeable to your client’s proposal for the RM164,000 in paragraph 3(c) to be “transferred” to the accounts for the Agreement, whereby the Total Upfront Payment that is currently deposited with your client by our Client for the sugar to be supplied to our Client is now increased from RM1,619,500 to RM1,783,500. For the avoidance of doubt, we enclose in Schedule 1 our Client’s Revised Statement of Balance of Deposit (excluding penalty / late interest charges) for your attention. d. Upon the compliance of paragraph 3a, our Client shall proceed to withdraw the above captioned suit against your client at the next case management on 28 July 2020 with liberty to file afresh and without order as to cost. e. For the avoidance of doubt, this Settlement shall not prejudice or affect our Client’s right in respect of the outstanding sum as set out in paragraphs 3b and 3c, as you would appreciate that these two matters are still pending resolution between your client and our Client. 4. Please indicate your client’s acknowledgment and confirmation of the abovementioned Settlement terms within one (1) day from the date of this letter, failing which, this 22 Settlement shall automatically lapse upon the expiry of the said prescribed timeline. 5. All our Client’s rights are hereby reserved.” 21.7.2020, 7.12 a.m. (AB6/3 – 4 in Enclosure 76): Holsten’s Harry Tey sent email to Mohd Azahar (copied to other persons including Henry Ong) with the following contents: “We refer to your email dated 20 July 2020. Below are our replies on a without prejudice basis:- i) The total outstanding sum of RM804,214.00 will be paid to CSR by 21 July 2020 and the terms and conditions in the 2 paragraphs relating to RM804,214.00 and RM31,786.00 of your said e-mail are agreed. ii) Supply of sugar to CSR will start from mid August 2020. iii) On the revised Summary Account for Holsten, kindly inform that the balance deposit amount is RM1,783,500.00 and there is no penalty or late interest charges on this particular account. We would like to thank you for taking your precious time to settle this matter.” This Holsten Harry Tey’s email dated 20.7.2020 also appeared in Whatsapp conversation between CSR’s Henry Ong and Holsten’s The KL: AB1/2 [Enclosure 48]. 23 21.7.2020, 15:46 [AB6/2 – 3 in Enclosure 76] : CSR Mohd Azahar’s email to Holsten’s Harry Tey with the following contents: We have been advised by our solicitors that we should separate the issues arising from the 2 separate Agreements: 1. Contract No. LO/125-18U1 (“Agreement for Supply of Sugar by CSR”) 2. Contract No. HST/CSR/5205019 (“Agreement for Supply of Sugar by Holsten”) In this regard and with respect to our settlement negotiation for the Agreement for Supply of Sugar by CSR, we wish to reiterate that we will only be agreeable to withdraw the proceedings against Holsten provided that:- a. Holsten pays to CSR RM804,214.00, in cash, by today; b. RM31,786.00, CSR will conduct internal investigation on the same but this is should not be seen as waiver of our rights to demand for the same in the event upon our internal investigation, it reveals that Holsten is in fact responsible to pay such an amount to CSR; c. RM164,000, CSR is agreeable for this to be transferred to the Agreement for Supply of Sugar to CSR whereby the balance deposit shall now be RM1,783,500.00. The above (a) – (c) are the final offer from us In respect of the Agreement for Supply of Sugar by Holsten, our solicitors have advised that we should have a separate arrangement for this given that this relates to sugar to supplied by Holsten. 24 For the penalty charges mentioned in your email below, we wish to clarify that these penalty charges were issued to Holsten based on the agreed terms and conditions of the Addendum dated 6.1.2020 due to the late delivery of sugar by Holsten to CSR, which had caused CSR to suffer losses. Therefore, at this point of time, CSR will not be waiving the penalty charges and we also wish to point out that this should not form part of the Settlement for the Agreement for Supply of Sugar by CSR above. Furthermore, we will need to further discuss and determine the actual delivery date for the remaining 4,350 MT of sugar which CSR believes is only fair and reasonable, given that there are currently a total of RM1,783,500 deposited in Holsten’s account which is meant for the sugar to be supplied. We hope the above is clear.” 22.7.2020, 2:07p.m. : Holsten’s Harry Tey sent email to CSR’s Mohd Azahar (copied to other persons including Henry Ong) with the following contents: “We attach herewith the settlement bank in slip amounting to RM804,214.00 which was banked in yesterday for your kind attention. Kindly return to us the 2 PD cheques below which we have issued to your company since the said outstanding sum of RM804,214.00 has been cleared, details of which are as follows: 1) …03/2020 – RM500,000.00 (MBB 314421); and 25 2) 28/4/2020 – RM500,000.00 (MBB 314424) Kindly instruct your solicitors to withdraw the suit against Holsten on 28.7.2020 without costs in view of the said settlement.” [AB6/1 – 2 in Enclosure 76] 22.7.2020, 3.52 p.m. [AB6/1 – 2 in Enclosure 76]: CSR’s Mohd Azahar’s email to Holsten’s Harry Tey (copied to other including Henry Ong) with the following contents: “Thank you for the payment. We appreciate it. We will return the cheques as requested soonest possible and we will instruct our solicitors to withdraw the suit as per our solicitor’s letter in para 3d (attached) to your solicitors dated 20 July 2020.”: AB6/1. 22. The abovementioned contemporaneous documentary evidence shows that: (1) Holsten had recent history of payment defaults in year 2020 for very substantial amounts of overdue payments in excess of RM1,000,000 in respect of sugar supplied by CSR to Holsten; (2) The was previously a first settlement in January 2020 whereby Holsten issued 3 post-dated cheques to pay CSR for the total outstanding amount of about RM1,300,000, but the first post- dated cheque of Holsten was dishonoured, leading to the filing of the previous court suit by CSR and negotiations for second 26 settlement in respect of the court suit; (3) It took many written discussions and exchanges of emails involving many persons of both parties to discuss, negotiate and finalise their terms of settlement in respect of the two payment defaults in mid-2020; (4) Both parties bargained and negotiated hard and extensively on the terms of settlement. Holsten, in spite of its clear breaches of payment obligations, bargained and negotiated hard for the terms of second settlement; (5) Throughout the negotiations and discussions, it has been the consistent practice among CSR’s representatives that only Mohd Azahar, the Chief Financial Officer / Head of Finance in CSR, negotiated and fixed the credit limit and credit term and that none of the other representatives of CSR talked about the figures or fix the credit limit or credit term; (6) Both parties were careful and tedious in negotiating in writing the credit limit and credit term; (7) The parties’ negotiations were done in writing, transparently and copied to various representatives of the respective companies; (8) The credit limit mutually agreed upon in writing by end July 2020, after a series of transparent negotiations in writing, was 27 RM700,000 and the credit term was 30 days; and (9) In respect of sugar to be supplied by Holsten to CSR under a separate contract, CSR had made upfront advance payment of about RM1,500,000 to Holsten and such upfront advance payment was still kept by Holsten at the material times. 23. At the trial in February 2023, the Defendant/Holsten’s version of evidence is that on 13 August 2020 the Defendant’s Tey Kak Lok alone, pursuant to the Defendant’s Director Tey Poh Choon’s arrangement, met with CSR’s Head of Sales Dept Henry Ong alone at a restaurant at Taipan 2 Damansara where Tey KL handed a copy of the Defendant’s letter dated 22.02.2019 (AB1/1 on request to increase credit limit to RM2,500,000.00 and credit term to 45 days) to Henry Ong, discussed with him and thereupon Henry Ong verbally agreed to increase the credit limit and credit term as per the request. 24. The Defendant placed its reliance on the WhatsApp message in AB1/2 [Enclosure 48], which was supplemented at the trial on 21.02.2023 by loose exhibit “D2” with additional words “ “Issue settled” by Henry Ong and “Okay tq Yana just gave me DO number” by Tey KL. 25. Both AB1/2 and Exhibit “D2” show there were 2 audio messages in the conversations, but none of these audio conversations was produced by the Defendant in court. 28 26. AB1/2 also differs from Exhibit “D2” in that there is a 13 August 2020 message with an attachment immediately below 11.20 am audio message of 11 August 2020 but in Exhibit “D2” the message with attachment was immediately after the additional words “Issue settled” by Henry Ong and “Okay tq Yana just gave me DO number” by Tey KL. 27. On the other hand, the Plaintiff/CSR’s version is that the credit limit remained at RM700,000 as agreed and confirmed in writing in the e-mails of July 2020. 28. In the totality of the circumstances, this Court found that the Defendant/Holsten’s version is highly improbable and was therefore rejected by this Court. The reasons for this finding are: (1) By reason of the manner and features of the parties’ recent negotiations and agreement as summarised in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9) above, it is highly improbable that CSR would have authorised any of its managers to drastically increase the credit limit to RM2,500,000 for Holsten within about 3 weeks after having negotiated and agreed in writing on terms of settlement including the credit limit of RM700,000 and credit term of 30 days; (2) By reason of the manner and features of the parties’ recent negotiations and agreement as summarised in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9) above, it is highly unlikely that the parties would have opted for a surreptitious one-to-one meeting outside the office to negotiate and discuss on important issue relating to 29 credit limit and credit term like this; (3) By reason of the manner and features of the parties’ recent negotiations and agreement as summarised in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9) above, it is highly unlikely that any Head of Department of CSR would have the audacity of attending a surreptitious one-to-one meeting outside the office to purporting commit the company to such drastic increase in credit limit; (4) By reason of the manner and features of the parties’ recent negotiations and agreement as summarised in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9) above, it is reasonably known to Holsten that Mohd Azahar, the Chief Financial Officer of CSR, was the proper and authorised officer to commit on behalf of CSR any increase in credit limit; (5) The contents of both AB1/2 and Exhibit “D2” are incomplete as the audio messages were not produced or transcribed; (6) There are differences between the contents of AB1/2 and Exhibit “D2” and the Defendant’s witnesses have not satisfactorily explained the differences; (7) On the face of Exhibit “D2”, the words “Issue settled” by Henry Ong and “Okay tq Yana just gave me DO number” by Tey KL immediately following that would suggest the two persons were talking about a particular batch of sugar for delivery, which culminated in Henry Ong saying “Issue settled” and Tey 30 KL’s immediate thanks and confirmation that he received the DO number (Delivery Order) from CSR’s Yana; and (8) That the words “Issued settled” referred to resumption of supply of sugar in mid-August 2020 is also corroborated by Holsten Harry Tey’s own e-mail dated 21.7.2020 [AB6/3 - 4] during the email negotiation for settlement which specifically stated Holsten’s reciprocal commitment that Holsten’s supply of sugar to CSR under a separate contract would resume in mid-August 2020. A snapshot of the relevant part of Holsten’s said e-mail is also found in the WhatsApp message relied upon by Holsten here: see AB1/2 top. In both DW2 Tey KL’s evidence and DW3 Tey Poh Choon’s evidence, they confirmed that CSR’s physical supply of local sugar to Holsten resumed on 14.8.2020, i.e. 3 days after the 11.8.2020 meeting and the day immediately after Henry Ong’s WhatsApp dated 13.8.2020 “Issue settled” and DW2 Tey KL’s reply “Okay tq Yana just gave me DO number “. It can reasonably be concluded from the surrounding circumstances including the settlement negotiations that Holsten was expecting a reciprocal resumption of CSR’s supply of sugar to Holsten to be carried out at about the same time in mid-August 2020.In the circumstances, it is more probable that Henry Ong’s words “Issue settled” and DW2 Tey KL’s reply “Okay tq Yana just gave me DO number“ referred to resumption of CSR’s supply of local sugar to Holsten following the settlement of the previously outstanding payment. 31 29. Apart from being inherently improbable and being contradictory to the contemporaneous documentary evidence, the Defendant/Holsten’s oral evidence on the alleged increase in credit limit also suffers from inconsistencies between the oral evidence. The inconsistencies include: (1) In Q&A 7 of DW3 Tey Poh Choon’s Witness Statement [Enclosure 66], he alleged that Henry Ong told him the credit limit was increased to RM2,500,000; (2) In his oral evidence under cross-examination, DW3 Tey Poh Choon gave contradictory versions of (a) whether he had meeting or telephone conversation with Henty Ong on the matter; (b) in what form or manner the discussion with Henry Ong allegedly occurred: see NOE Tab C pp. 67 – 70; (3) In Q&A 6 of DW2 Tey KL’s Witness Statement, he said as follows in answer to a question: regarding DW2’s meeting with Henry Ong at the Oasis, Ara Damansara: “6. Q: What happened during the meeting between you and Mr. Henry Ong Ewe Teow on 11.8.2020? A: I passed the letter dated 22.2.2019 to Mr. Henry Ong Ewe Teow and he informed me that he had settled the RM2,500,000.00 issue with Mr. Tey Poh Choon.” (4) In DW2 Tey KL’s oral evidence, he said under cross- examination that he was instructed by his father DW3 Tey PC, the Managing Director of Holsten, to meet up with Henry Ong 32 and passed him a letter; he arranged to meet with Henry Ong; at the meeting, he “talked about the letter that Mr Tey Poh Choon instructed [him] to pass over to [Henry Ong]. The [Henry Ong say, “No problem, the issue will be settled. After that [they] shake hand snd [Tey KL] left. That’s what happened during that day”. [NOE Tab B p. 38 – 39]. DW2 Tey KL’s written evidence alleged that when he met Henry Ong that day, Henry Ong told him “the issue had been settled with Mr Tey Poh Choon”, but in DW2’s oral evidence under cross- examination, he said Henry Ong on that day told him that “the issue will be settled”. (5) In the course of cross-examination, DW3 Tey PC was evasive several times in answering the questions. (6) After DW3 Tey PC’s evasiveness in answering cross- examination questions, counsel put a simple question to him, i.e. “Mr Tey, my question is simple. I am suggesting there was no such conversation with Henry to increase the credit limit to RM2.5 million. Is it a yes or no. That’s it?” To this question, DW3 Tey PC answered, “Yes, but my transaction was not blocked” [NOE Tab C p. 75; 22.02.2023]. After the lunch break, when the same question was repeated, DW3 Tey PC answered, “No.” (7) In an earlier part of cross-examination, DW3 Tey PC said he had a meeting with Henry Ong on 10.8.2020 regarding the alleged increase in credit limit. When DW3 Tey PC later said it was a telephone conversation, the Plaintiff’s counsel then 33 pressed DW3 Tey PC for confirmation whether it was a meeting or a telephone conversation with Henry Ong on the matter, to which DW3 Tey PC said it was a telephone conversation [see NOE Tab C pp 67 line 29 – p. 69 line 23; evidence on 22.2.2023]. (8) After Defendant/Holsten changed solicitor and counsel on 23.2.2023 and the trial continued on 29.5.2023, DW2 in re- examination said that he went to meet with Henry Ong regarding the credit limit, or in DW3 Tey PC’s own words, “Kami, Defendan telah menerima emel yang menyata bahawa credit limit Defendan adalah RM700,000.00. Selepas itu, saya pergi jumpa dengan En Henry….”.. Henry minta saya hantar surat muka surat 1 ini sekali lagi kepada beliau dan beliau akan berbincang dengan Plaintif. Selepas dua hari, Henry memberitahu kami bahawa ok dan pada hari ketiga, kami mula menempah barang” [NOE Tab D p.21lines 25 – 30; p. 22 line 10; p. 23 line 17]. DW3 Tey PC also said in his re- examination evidence on 29.5.2023 that “Selepas dua hari kami menghantar surat kepada Henry, Henry menelefon kami dan memberitahu semua telah diselesaikan. Pada hari ketiga, kami mula menempah barang. Kami terus menempah barang daripada Plaintif”. [NOE p. 24 lines 10 – 12]. This version that the date when Henry Ong told him of the alleged agreement to increase credit limit was 2 days after the handing of a copy of 2019 letter to Henry Ong (i.e. at the meeting Oasis Ara Damansara meeting between DW2 Tey KL and Henry Ong) is contradictory to DW2 Tey KL’s version that Henry Ong said at 34 the Oasis Ara Damansara meeting that the issues had been settled with DW3 Tey PC. The credit limit and credit term are two very important commercial terms relating to the parties’ transactions under the Local Contract. It is highly unlikely that for such very important commercial terms, Holsten’s witnesses could have forgotten or mixed up on the date and form of any oral agreement to increase the credit limit by more than three times its pre-existing limit mutually agreed in writing, if there was such oral agreement as alleged. The contradictions between the different versions of the Defendant/Holsten’s witnesses at different occasions of the trial renders the Defendant/Holsten’s version highly improbable. 30. Moreover, the Defendant’s version of story of what transpired on 13 August 2020 seems to suggest that CSR’s Henry Ong has agreed to the Defendant’s request as per the Defendant’s letter dated 22.02.2019 (AB1/1) which included a credit term of 45 days. However, this alleged credit term of 45 days is contradictory to the Defendant’s own documents subsequent to 13 August 2020. Such documents of the Defendant subsequent to 13 August 2020 which show the contradiction with alleged credit term of 45 days include those summarised in the following paragraphs. 31. In all the Defendant’s Purchase Orders for local sugar subsequent to 13 August 2020, the Defendant stated the credit term as 30 days (which is the same as what Mohd Azahar agreed in July 2020 on 35 behalf of CSR) and not 45 days (which the Defendant alleged as part of its letter dated 22.02.2019 2019 purportedly agreed to by Henry Ong: see the Defendant’s Purchase Orders in AB1/89 - 105. 32. In our present case there was no letter, email or WhatsApp record whatsoever in year 2020 or early 2021 to state or allege that Henry Ong had purportedly agreed to increase the credit limit from RM700,000 to RM2,500,000. 33. By reason of the manner and features of the parties’ recent negotiations and agreement as summarised in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9) above, it is high improbable that Holsten would have neglected to make such a written confirmation if there was such agreement by Henry Ong as alleged. Being a defaulting party who had the courage and audacity to negotiate hard and extensively for terms of the second settlement, Holsten would most probably have the courage and conviction to promptly confirm in writing in August 2020 or shortly thereafter Henry Ong’s alleged agreement on increase of credit limit if there was such agreement by Henry Ong as alleged by Holsten. 34. Further or alternatively, when CSR stopped delivery of balance quantity of sugar under the said Local Contract in November 2020, Holsten would most probably have written to CSR and Henry Ong in November 2020 or December 2020 to confront them regarding Henry Ong’s alleged agreement on increase of credit limit if there was such agreement by Henry Ong as alleged by Holsten. 36 35. At the full trial, none of the Defendant’s witnesses has explained or attempted to explain what major and favourable circumstances had allegedly happened to the Defendant’s creditworthiness (if any) or its credit standing subsequent to July 2020 which could possibly warrant or justify an honest and diligent officer of CSR to consider or agree to a drastic increase of Holsten’s credit limit from RM700,000 to RM2,500,000 – a tremendous increase of more than threefold – within a very short period of about 3 weeks after the July 2020 agreement in the emails. 36. Further or alternatively, even if Henry Ong purportedly agreed to the Defendant’s request in the Defendant’s letter dated 22.02.2019 as alleged by the Defendant, such purported agreement is not binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR. 37. The reasons for this conclusion of non-binding are as follows: (1) This Court accepts the Plaintiff’s evidence that the person duly authorised by CSR to fix or vary the credit limit and credit term at all material times in 2020 has been CSR’s Head of Finance Department, Mohd Azahar and that Henry Ong as Head of Sales Department had no authority to vary or increase the credit limit or vary the credit term; (2) The contemporaneous documents including those summarised in paragraphs 19 to 22 above show that the Defendant/Holsten knew or ought to have known that CSR’s Chief Financial Officer, Mohd Azahar was the person authorised by CSR to impose, vary or increase the credit limit 37 and credit term; (3) The contemporaneous documents including those summarised in paragraphs 19 to 22 above show that the Defendant/Holsten knew or ought to have known that Henry Ong had no authority to increase or vary the credit limit or credit term; (4) The Defendant has not pleaded a case or particulars of ostensible authority of Henry Ong in respect of increase of credit limit and credit term; (5) Even if the Defendant pleaded a defence or particulars of ostensible authority of Henry Ong in respect of increase of credit limit and credit term, the Defendant still cannot succeed on such defence because contemporaneous documents including those summarised in paragraphs 19 to 229() above show that there was at the material times no basis for the Defendant to reasonably believe that Henry Ong had such authority; (6) Moreover, in the business sense of check-and-balance between various departments, a sales personnel of a company does not ordinarily have the authority to give credit limit and credit term to the customers of the company; and (7) In light of the surrounding circumstances summarised above [including those in paragraphs 22(1) to 22(9)] and in view of the surreptitious circumstances of the one-to-one meeting at 38 a restaurant outside CSR’s office, even if a sales manager of CSR were to purportedly agree with Holsten to drastically increase the credit limit as alleged by Holsten, he/she would be acting deceitfully and/or in collusion with Holsten such that his/her purported agreement would not be legally binding upon CSR. 38. In conclusion on the 1st and 2nd main issues, this Court finds and holds as follows: Findings on 1st main issue: This Court finds that the Plaintiff/CSR’s Director of Sales Henry Ong has not agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000.00 in respect of sugar for Malaysian market. Even if Henry Ong had purported to do so, his purported agreement is not binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR in the eyes of the law. Finding on 2nd main issue: This Court finds that the Plaintiff/CSR has not agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000 in a way that is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR under the laws. Sub-issue: change in the identity reference numbers in respect of Holsten in CSR’s records and system 39. In this regard, this Court finds that there is no valid basis for Holsten to try to make an issue of the change in the identity reference numbers in respect of Holsten in CSR’s records and system. This Court accepts Mohd Azahar’s evidence that under the old system of 39 CSR, Holsten was described as “Account No. 2BJ1245” and in early 2020, CSR upgraded its financial accounting software system and all customers were described with new numbers in the new software, with Holsten described as “100803”. 40. It is the finding of this Court that whether a document used the description of “2BJ1245” or “100803”, it referred to Holsten and that neither CSR nor Holsten was under any mistake or misunderstanding as to the true identity of Holsten as “2BJ1245” or “100803”. 41. The customer identity reference of “100803” was used in many of the Delivery Orders, Invoices, Statements of Account and other documents issued by CSR to Holsten, and Holsten acted on such documents to take deliveries and make payments in respect of some invoices. See, for example, the Customer ID and Customer Name stated in Enclosure 52 bundle AB3/271 - 275 (DO and Picking Lists dated 10.9.2020), AB3/276 - 279 (DO and Picking Lists dated 29.9.2020), AB3/280 - 283 (DO and Picking Lists dated 15.9.2020), AB1/133 – 150, AB4/324 - 359. See also the cross- examination of DW1 Tey CS on this point on 20.2.2023 [NOP Tab A p. 36 lines 10 – 35; p. 37 lines 1 – 4. 42. Holsten did not at any time object to or question CSR regarding CSR’s use of Account No. or ID No. 100803 to refer to Holsten in the Delivery Orders, Invoices, and other documents in connection with the transactions with Holsten: see the cross-examination of DW1 Tey CS on this point on 20.2.2023; NOP Tab A p. 48 lines 17 40 – 21. 43. It is also important to note that the CSR’s bank account number to which Holsten made payments always remained the same. Even if Holsten made payments by referring to its old Account No. 2BJ1245, the payments would be captured by CSR’s accounting software and mapped to Holsten’s account. In DW1 Tey CS’s evidence, he admitted that Account No. 245 and 803 (i.e. 100803) were just accounts to identify Holsten as a customer: NOP Tab A p. 76 lines 24 – 37; p. 77 lines 1, 28 – 36; p. 78 lines 16 - 23. 44. In the circumstances, this Court finds that there was no premature closure of Holsten’s account in respect of the local supply contract as alleged by Holsten or at all. 45. Whatever change of Customer ID Number or Account Number in CSR’s internal software system when CSR changed its accounting software is purely CSR’s internal process and does not affect the terms of the commercial relationship between CSR and Holsten or any other customer in any manner. Sub-issue: Continued delivery of local sugar after the credit limit had exceeded RM700,000 46. Holsten’s argument that the continued delivery of local sugar after the credit limit had exceeded RM700,000 showed the credit limit was increased to RM2,500,000 and/or led Holsten to act on basis that the credit limit had been increased is also an invalid and 41 incorrect argument which is rejected by this Court. 47. The reasons for rejecting such argument of Holsten are as follows: (1) On 31.03.2021, Statement of Account was issued by CSR to Holsten showing that as at 06.11.2020 the total outstanding amount was RM769,007.50 and as at 30.11.2020 the total outstanding reached RM1,256,175.00: AB1/160 [Enclosure 48]. This shows that according to CSR’s Finance Dept and Accounts Dept the credit limit of RM700,000 was breached shortly before 06.11.2020 when the total outstanding amount which became due and payable exceeded RM700,000. By this Statement of Account, CSR was using the overdue payments as criterion for computing whether or not the credit limit had been breached. (2) The problem, as shown in the summary table in paragraph 5 of the Defence on batches and quantities of sugar taken and the instalment payment made, was that: (a) in the months of August and September 2020, Holsten took deliveries of many batches of local sugar but paid very few instalments totalling amount of about RM360,000, much less than the total value of sugar taken (about RM1,000,000); (b) in the months of October 2020 Holsten collected delivery of 10 batches of sugar in big quantities and values 42 totalling about RM700,000 but only paid 5 instalments totalling RM500,000; (c) when the October 2020 deliveries also became due and payable in November 2020, Holsten continued to collect many batches of sugar in sizable quantities totalling about RM650,000 but only paid 4 instalments totalling RM450,000. This caused the total outstanding unpaid amount to balloon quickly to more than RM1,100,000 in November 2020, thereby causing a major alarm to CSR’s management. This problem of quick ballooning of the total outstanding amount in excess of the credit limit of RM700,000 was the result of Holsten’s disproportionate acts within a rather short period of time when Holsten increased its collections of sugar substantially but decreased its instalment payments substantially. Being the author of such problem, Holsten cannot benefit form the situation it created out of its breaches of payment obligations. (3) CSR had more than 200 customers and a major alarm concerning this one customer Holsten was only brought to the attention of the senior management of CSR in November 2020. Then, acting promptly, CSR stopped delivery of further quantity of sugar pursuant to clause 10 of the said Local Contract. In the circumstances, CSR should not be blamed for not acting earlier than it did. 43 (4) This Court accepts the evidence of CSR’s witnesses that the continued deliveries of some batches of sugar to Holsten in the months of October and November 2020 after the total outstanding amount had breached RM700,000 was due to oversight or carelessness of the relevant staff in CSR’s organisation in handling the accounts of more than 200 customers at the material times, and such oversight or carelessness did not constitute an agreement by CSR to increase the credit limit. In the circumstances, this Court does not find any estoppel has arisen against CSR in suspending the deliveries until Holsten remedies its payment defaults. (5) It is also the finding of this Court that in the circumstances Holsten knew about the breach of the credit limit in October and November 2020 and took advantage of the oversight or carelessness of CSR’s staff by continuing to order substantial quantities of sugar but without matching its purchases with the instalment payments. This conduct on the part of Holsten was a repetition of its past breaches of credit limit which led to the first settlement negotiations and the second settlement negotiations. Sub-issue: Whether shortage of sugar was the reason which led CSR to stop supplying sugar to Holsten 48. In this Counterclaim, Holsten pleaded that CSR had wrongfully, without reason and in breach of the agreement, prevented Holsten from collecting sugar pursuant to Purchase Order No. PO-000227 44 dated 19.11.2020 (“PO 227”) issued by Holsten to CSR. 49. During trial, Holsten sought to establish that the reason behind the suspension of sugar supply is due to shortage of sugar on the part of CSR. In support of such contention, Holsten sought to introduce evidence to the effect that Holsten frequently faced issues of CSR’s stock shortage while collecting sugar from CSR. 50. As established during trial, despite having high demands and therefore longer queue time for the collection sugar, CSR always strived to fulfil and had in fact fulfilled every purchase order prior to PO 227. The Defendant’s witness DW1 Tey CS confirmed to the same effect: see NOP Tab A p. 90 lines 7 – 24; NOP Tab C p. 86 lines 10 – 15. 51. PW2 Victor Ng, ex-manager of the Plaintiff/CSR who at the trial was the Transformation Director of Yeo Hiap Seng Group of Companies, testified that the dates stated “OWN COLLECTION” on the purchase orders were the dates on which Holsten intended to collect the sugar from CSR’s warehouse; these dates were never fixed as the actual delivery dates as they would always be subject to, amongst others, the availability of sugar; and representatives from CSR and Holsten would engage in discussions after the purchase orders were issued and Holsten would be notified when the sugar would be available for Holsten’s collection: Q&A 6 of WS-PW2. 52. In his oral evidence PW2 Victor Ng also testified that the same arrangement is also applicable for all other customers of CSR at all material times. CSR at the material times had more than 200 45 customers, and the manufacturing capacity of the sugar refinery is fixed. At times when the various customers sent in purchase orders with intended collection/delivery dates which exceeded the available stock of sugar and beyond the refinery’s manufacturing capacity, CSR would discuss with the various customers to re-schedule parts of the sugar collection/delivery dates. Such re-scheduling were for short duration of time – sometimes several hours and sometimes a handful of days. Despite the need to re-schedule occasionally, CSR supplied and delivered sugar pursuant to purchase orders issued by Holsten and in accordance with the contracts. In Q&A 7, PW2 Victor Ng gave examples of documentary evidence to illustrate this point. 53. This Court finds PW2 Victor Ng to be a credible witness and that his testimony, which is also consistent with the documentary evidence, is accepted by this Court. 54. It was also established during trial that despite the slight delays and the need for re-scheduling of collections and deliveries at various occasions as stated above, Holsten did not stop ordering sugar from CSR and chose to continue to purchase sugar from CSR: see NOP Tab A p. 90 lines 26 – 31. 55. From the foregoing, it is clear that shortage of sugar had never been a reason for CSR to refuse or stop Holsten from collecting sugar from its warehouse. At most, CSR would only request Holsten to reschedule the collection time. On occasion there is an insufficient stock of sugar, a situation not exclusive to Holsten, the sugar is typically delivered within a few days. See the evidence of PW2 Victor 46 Ng’s evidence; WS-PW2 Q&A 7. 56. This Court accepts the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witness PW2 Victor Ng that the slight delays and the re-scheduling of dates and times for collection of sugar deliveries also happened to all other customers of CSR and is a common feature in the sugar refinery business. [see oral evidence of PW2 Victor Ng on 16.6.2023]. 57. This Court finds that in connection with Holsten, the reason of CSR’s suspension or stoppage of delivery of sugar to Holsten was because the credit limit of RM700,000 had been exceeded, and that such suspension or stoppage of delivery of sugar to Holsten was no due to shortage of sugar. The reasons for this finding include: (a) this Court accepts PW2 Victor Ng’s evidence including WS- PW2 Q&A 12; (b) the documentary evidence shows that as at November 2020 the outstanding sum due and payable by Holsten for the sugar sold and delivered by CSR was RM1,255,125.00; (c) despite being notified of the outstanding amount in excess of RM700,000 the Defendant/Holsten did not pay up and also did not put in writing any allegation or argument about any increase in the credit limit; (d) there was also no contemporaneous document to suggest that at the material times in November 2020 and December 2020, 47 there was any major shortage of sugar at CSR’s refinery or warehouse; and (e) there was no documentary evidence to suggest that CSR’s refinery had a major breakdown which could trigger any major permanent shortage of sugar. 58. Holsten’s argument on shortage of sugar supply as the reason for CSR’s stoppage of delivery is baseless and unsustainable. 59. This Court accepts the evidence of CSR’s witnesses (including PW2 Victor Ng on 16.6.2023 in NOE Tab H p. 103 lines 2 - 11) that with more than 200 customers who might at times put in many Purchase Orders which would well exceed the production capacity of CSR’s sugar refineries, there have always been the need to discuss the schedules and re-scheduling of deliveries of sugars with various customers in the past (including Holsten). 60. This Court accepts PW2 Victor Ng’s evidence that the situation of demand exceeding supply frequently occurred in the past years and it has been part and parcel of sugar business of this nature. When such situation occurred, CSR and customers (including Holsten) discussed and resolved the schedules of deliveries and the sugars were supplied according to the mutually adjusted schedules. Slight re-scheduling of batches of sugar for collection or delivery has often happened to the various customers of CSR, and it has never been any real issue or problem between CSR and its various customers. [see PW2’s evidence on 31.5.2023, Q&A 7 of WS-PW2-]. 48 61. There is no valid or sufficient for Holsten to try to make an issue out of minor or trivial incidents which occur in the normal course of business operations in the sugar trade. Temporary shortages in the past have never resulted in CSR’s stoppage of delivery or suspension of trade account with any of their customers. 62. In the circumstances, this Court finds that CSR’s stoppage of delivery of balance local sugar to Holsten was because of Holsten’s defaults in payment of very substantial amount and not because of any temporary shortage of sugar. 63. In any event, this Court holds that even if a product manufacturer were to face a major breakdown in its own factory which triggers a long-term shortage of supply of its products to its customers, there is nothing objectionable under the laws if the manufacturer, in pursuance of the terms of its supply contracts with various customers, issue notices of suspension of supply to those customers whose payments are overdue and remaining unpaid. The manufacturer’s contractual obligation to supply each such customer would then resume only upon the defaulting customer’s remedying of the payment default. 64. In our present case, it is clearly established that Holsten did not remedy its payment defaults, and also did not attempt to remedy the defaults to any extent, despite having been notified of the stoppage or suspension of supply arising from the payment defaults. As such, the Plaintiff/CSR was entitled to continue to stop supply and, after after the prolonged payment defaults by the Defendant/Holsten, to 49 take the Defendant/Holsten’s repudiation as having put an end to the supply contract. 3rd main issue: if the answers to the 1st and 2nd main issues are in the affirmative, whether the Defendant/Holsten has suffered losses as a result of the Plaintiff/CSR’s refusal to supply the balance quantity of sugar, and if so, what is the amount of the damages. 65. As this Court has answered the 1st and 2nd main issues in the negative, it is not strictly necessary to answer the 3rd main issue on alleged losses and quantum thereof. 66. For completeness, this Court will proceed in the alternative to make findings on the damages and quantum of damages. 67. In the said Local Contract, the agreed price of CSR’s supply of local sugar to Holsten was RM2,100 per metric tonne: AB4/320 [Enclosure 49]. It is in evidence that the parties’ practice in respect of local sugar was that Holsten would send its transporters to CSR’s factory to collect the sugar and transport the same to Holsten’s place of business or to its customers. 68. Holsten has produced invoices it issued to its customer Chop Hong Lee which show that the agreed price with Chop Hong Lee for local sugar in October and was RM2,240 per metric tonne: see AB3/196 – 252 [Enclosure 52]. In light of these invoice records, this Court finds that Holsten re-sold the sugar to Chop Hong Lee at a price of 50 RM2,240. 69. Although there is a gross margin of RM2,240 – RM2,100 = RM140 per metric tonne, Holsten has to incur the transportation costs of collecting sugar from CSR’s factory and transporting the same to its customer’s factory. Holsten’s witnesses have not given evidence on these costs of transportation. 70. The profit per metric tonne which Holsten would make from the re- sale of local sugar to Chop Hong Lee was RM140 – t where t is the transportation cost per metric tonne. 71. In Henry Ong’s email dated 3.7.2020 during the settlement negotiation, it was stated that the balance quantity of local sugar under the said Local Contract as 635 metric tonnes as at July 2020: see AB3/265 [Enclosure 52]. There is no contemporaneous document which disputes or contradicts Henry Ong’s statement of fact that the balance quantity of local sugar under the said Local Contract was 635 metric tonnes as at July 2020. At the trial, none of the Defendant’s witnesses has challenged or questioned the correctness of such a statement. In the circumstances, this Court finds on a balance of probabilities that the balance quantity of local sugar under the said Local Contract was 635 metric tonnes as at July 2020. 72. If the gross margin of RM140 per metric were to be used to compute Holsten’s loss of profit from the balance quantity of 635 metric tonnes of local sugar, Holsten’s loss of profit would be RM150 per 51 metric tonne x 635 metric tonnes = RM88,900.00. 73. If one were to take into account the transportation costs which Holsten has to incur in collection sugar from CSR’s factory and in sending the same to Chop Hong Lee’s factory, the loss of profit would be less than RM88,900.00 in respect of the balance 645 metric tonnes of sugar under the said Local Contract. 74. In the circumstances, this Court finds that the total amount of loss which the Defendant suffered as a result of non-supply of balance 645 metric tonnes of sugar was not more than RM88,900.00. 75. Holsten has not produced specific evidence of any other head of loss or damages in respect of the non-supply of the balance quantity of local sugar. In the circumstances, Holsten has not proved any other head of loss or damages on a balance of probabilities. Sub-issues (3a) whether independently of the question whether the credit limit has been exceeded, the Plaintiff/CSR was entitled to stop delivery of the balance sugar to the Defendant/Holsten; and (3b) whether there is a real difference between stoppage of delivery and suspension or closing of trade account in the circumstances of the present case 76. Section 32 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 provides that “32. Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions, that is to say, the seller shall be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the price, and the buyer shall be ready and willing to pay the price 52 in exchange for possession of the goods”. 77. In the absence of any sale without any credit term (giving a period of time for payment), the buyer has to pay the full amount for the goods upon taking delivery of goods. When a credit term (period of time for payment) is agreed between the seller and the buyer, then the buyer has to pay within the period of time stated in the agreed credit term. 78. In the absence of credit limit, there is no limit to the amount of goods a buyer can order from the seller. When a credit limit (i.e. limit of the amount which can be ordered) is agreed between the seller and the buyer, then the buyer cannot purchase on credit more than the limit stated in the agreed credit limit. This credit limit is the businessmen’s common practice of controlling and limiting the credit risk exposures vis-à-vis various customers, and the amount of credit limit for each customers depends on the seller’s assessment of the particular customer’s creditworthiness. 79. Clause 7 of the said Local Contract provides, among others, that “PAYMENT: 30 days from invoice date”. Clause 10 of the said Local Contract provides, among others, that “Failure to adhere to the payment terms, Seller has the right to stop delivery” [see AB4/320 & 321 in Enclosure 49]. 80. Under clauses 7 and 10 of the said Local Contract, in the event of any failure by Holsten to adhere to the payment term of 30 days from the invoice date, CSR has the contractual right to stop delivery of sugar to Holsten. The contractual right under clause 10 to stop 53 delivery in the event of any failure by Holsten to adhere to the payment term is independently of question whether or not the credit limit has been exceeded. 81. Even in CSR’s written approval of the credit limit of RM700,000 and credit term of 30 days which was agreed in writing by Holsten in July 2020, the credit system has two limbs which operate in parallel co- existence, namely the credit limit (in terms of amount) and the credit term (in terms of time period). 82. Where credit limit and credit term are imposed side-by-side, the credit limit (in terms of amount) cannot be interpreted to the extent of erasing or obliterating the credit term (time period for payment). 83. A buyer under the combination of credit limit and credit term mechanism cannot refuse to pay the invoices on the excuse that the total amount owing is less than the credit limit amount and thereby try to postpone the payment obligation indefinitely although the invoices have exceeded the credit term in terms of time period. This is what PW2 Victor Ng testified on 31.5.2023 [NOE Tab G-- p. 101 line 4 – p. 102 line 2. This Court accepts this evidence of PW2 Victor Ng. 84. Interpreted properly in the context, the combination of credit limit and credit term mechanism requires the buyer (a) not to exceed the credit limit by having total unpaid invoices at any point of time in excess of the credit limit; and (b) not to default in paying any invoice within the time period stated in the credit term (i.e. overdue and 54 unpaid). 85. In the context of our present case, it is undisputed fact that as at CSR’s stoppage or sugar supply in November 2020 a number of CSR’s invoices issued to Holsten in respect of the local sugar had been overdue and in excess of 30 days (and even in excess of 45 days) from the dates of the respective invoices. 86. In the circumstances, independently of the question whether the credit limit has been exceeded, the Plaintiff/CSR was entitled to stop delivery of the balance sugar to the Defendant/Holsten as from November 2020 onwards on the ground of Holsten’s failure to adhere to payment term. It then became the obligation of the Defendant/Holsten to quickly remedy the payment breach before the Plaintiff/CSR could have any obligation to resume the delivery of balance sugar to the Defendant/Holsten. 87. As Holsten still continued to default in payment up to the date of the trial, CSR was, and still is, entitled to continue its stoppage of delivery of balance sugar to Holsten under the said Local Contract. 88. Bearing in mind that the contractual credit term is 30 days, the default in payment from October 2020 until the date of trial (mid- 2023) is a continuous default for a very prolonged period in the context of the said Local Contract. 89. In the circumstances, the Defendant/Holsten’s prolonged and continued breach of payment obligation is repudiatory breach and/or breach of a fundamental term, thereby entitling the Plaintiff/CSR to 55 terminate the supply contract and thereafter permanently ceased the supply of sugar under the said contract. 90. There is no real difference between stoppage of delivery and suspension or closing of the trade account in the circumstances of our present case because: (1) As Holsten continues its default in payment of the overdue invoices in respect of the local sugar, Holsten is not entitled to receive any further delivery of balance sugar from CSR whether it is stoppage of delivery or suspension / closure of trade account; and (2) As Holsten has continued to default in payment of overdue invoices for a very prolonged period, CSR is entitled to close the trade account with Holsten in respect of the said Local Contract. 91. This Court rejects Holsten’s argument that CSR was in any way bound to deliver the sugar in respect of which Delivery Orders were issued. 92. Firstly, there is no such contractual term to that effect. 93. Secondly, clause 10 of the said Local Contract talks about failure to adhere to payment terms, and such clear and specific clause cannot be superseded by extraneous event such as issuance of Delivery Orders. 56 94. Thirdly, there is no evidence of trade usage or custom to justify implying such term to negate or vary clause 10 of the said Local Contract. 95. Fourthly, there is no evidence of any promise by CSR that clause 10 contractual right is waived or varied by issuance of Delivery order. 4th main issue: whether in the circumstances the Plaintiff/CSR was under an obligation to supply the export sugar to the Defendant/Holsten, and if so, was the Plaintiff/CSR in breach of such obligation in the circumstances of the present case 96. A copy of the Contract for Sale of Refined Sugar Exp/OT/34-19 dated 9.5.2019 (“the said Export Contract”) can be found in AB1/79 – 81 [Enclosure 48]. 97. Clause 7 of the said Export Contract [AB1/79] clearly and specifically provides as follows: “PAYMENT: Full payment before delivery. Payment by TT into our account at RHB Bank, Kuala Lumpur Account No. 61412900000407 in favour of Central Sugars Refinery Sdn Bhd Swift Code: RHBBBMYKL ” 98. In the Amended Amended Defence and Counterclaim (Enclosure 40), the Defendant/Holsten’s pleaded case on the said Export Contract is only in 3 paragraphs of the counterclaim, namely: 57 (1) the last sentence of paragraph 6 which alleged that the Plaintiff/CSR also stopped the said Export Contract dated 9.5.2029 which was signed with the Defendant for 300MT of export sugar; (2) paragraph 7 which alleged that as a result of the Plaintiff’s stoppage of sale of sugar to the Defendant, the Plaintiff committed breaches of the contracts and the Defendant has incurred losses and damages; and (3) paragraph 14 which alleged that as a result of the aforesaid breach of contract by the Plaintiff, the Defendant could not sell the export sugar to its customers and thereby suffered loss of profit of USD60,000. 99. In the Plaintiff/CSR’s Amended Reply to Defence and Defence to Counterclaim (Enclosure 42, Bundle of Pleadings), CSR denied Holsten’s allegations of breach and pleaded that: (i) at all material times, Holsten did not issue any Purchase Order or shipment notice to CSR: paragraph 7(b); (ii) whatever loss or damage (if any, which is denied) was caused by Holsten’s own act or conduct: paragraph 8; and (iii) Holsten was not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for: paragraph 17. 58 100. The main commercial terms of the said Export Contract are contained in clauses 1 to 8 at AB1/79 which include (i) clause 7 “PAYMENT: Full payment before delivery. Bank by TT into our account at RHB”, with the account number and Swift Code stated; (ii) the buyer to send timely shipment instruction together with documentary requirements and Pre-Shipment Notice at least 20 days in advance: clause 8. 101. From the express terms of the said Export Contract, it is clear that before any delivery of sugar for export is made, full payment for the export sugar ordered must be paid first (clause 7) and the buyer must send timely shipment instruction together with documentary requirements and Pre-Shipment Notice at least 20 days in advance (clause 8). 102. In our present case, there was no payment whatsoever which had been made by the Defendant/Holsten to the Plaintiff/CSR in respect of any export sugar under the said Export Contract. There was also no Pre-Shipment Notice or documentary shipment instruction given by the Defendant/Holsten to the Plaintiff/CSR in respect of any export sugar under the said Export Contract. 103. This Court rejects Holsten’s contention that CSR’s representative had allegedly told Holsten’s representative to withhold the issuance of Purchase Orders for the export sugar due to shortage of sugar supply. 104. The reasons for this finding of fact include: 59 (a) this is a material allegation on the counterclaim for export sugar but it was not pleaded in the counterclaim; (b) there is no e-mail or WhatsApp or documented communication to substantiate this allegation; (c) there were a number of comparatively minor issues such as lorry waiting to collect sugar, re-scheduling of sugar delivery or collection by several days and similar operational issues which Holsten saw fit to record in writing including WhatsApp messages; as such, it is highly improbable that a major issue such as instruction (if any) to withhold issuance of Purchase Orders for export sugar would have been overlooked or inadvertently omitted by Holsten in its e-mail and WhatsApp communications with CSR’s representatives. 105. Holsten’s contention that CSR must issue the Invoice for export sugar first before Holsten had an obligation to pay for the export sugar is also rejected by this Court. 106. Firstly, there is nothing in the terms of the Export Contract to stipulate to that effect. 107. Secondly, clause 7 of the Export Contract is very clear and specific on the payment term, i.e. full payment before delivery. 108. Thirdly, Holsten knew of the agreed price and it was up to Holsten at what point of time and for what quantity of export sugar it wanted to pay for and obtain delivery. The bank account number and details 60 of CSR for receiving payment for export sugar is expressly stipulated in the Export Contract. If Holsten really had the money and wanted the export sugar, it could have easily paid the agreed price for the quantity it wanted at a certain point of time, notify CSR of the payment and demand for delivery of the export sugar. Without the full payment for export sugar as expressly stipulated in clause 7, CSR had no obligation to deliver the export sugar to Holsten. 109. Fourthly, after making the full payment for the purchased batch of export sugar, Holsten as the buyer also had to send timely shipment instruction together with documentary requirements with pre- shipment notice of at least 20 days: clause 8. 110. Fifthly, in the past transactions under the contract, the actual practice between the parties was that Holsten paid the full payment of the relevant batch of sugar first before the tax Invoice was issued at least several days thereafter: see Tax Invoices at AB5/6 – 32 [Enclosure 58] as compared with bank statements at AB5/33 - 65 on the corresponding items and amounts. 111. In our present case, it is undisputed fact that until the date of trial, Holsten did not pay the agreed price for the export sugar under the Export Contract. The Defendant/Holsten also did not issue any Purchase Order or Pre-Shipment Notice. 112. In the premises, the Plaintiff/CSR was under no obligation whatsoever to supply the export sugar to the Defendant/Holsten at all material times. 61 113. This Court finds that CSR was not in breach of any obligation to deliver the export sugar to Holsten in the circumstances of the present case. 114. This Court rejects the Defendant’s argument that CSSR’s officer’s application and procurement of AP permit at Holsten’s request constituted a promise to deliver the export sugar. The reasons for rejecting such argument are as follows: (1) As testified by the Plaintiff’s witnesses [PW2 Victor Ng and PW3 Shamsul Shah], AP permit is only a permit issued by the relevant authority which approves the intended export of sugar at some future time during the permit validity period; (2) It has been the practice in the export business that AP permits are obtained first before the supply contracts are implemented, and that the implementation of the supply contract depends on the terms of the contracts themselves; (3) It was also the past practice between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the Ap permit would be applied for and processed well in advance of the Defendant’s schedule of taking delivery, and that the Defendant had to make full payment to the Plaintiff first before the export sugar was delivered to the Defendant; (4) The express term of the said Export Contract clearly stipulated that there must be full payment before delivery; and 62 (5) The express terms of the said Export Contract cannot be varied or superseded by the application for or issuance of the AP permit, an export approval which was required by law. 5th main issue: if the answers to the 4th main issue is in the affirmative, has the Defendant/Holsten proved that it has suffered losses and damages due to the Plaintiff/CSR’s refusal to supply the export sugar, and if so, the amount of such losses and damages 115. As regards the quantum of the Defendant/Holsten’s counterclaim in respect of export sugar, Holsten has not produced the complete contract terms which it had with PT Masindo, the foreign company which is said to have contracted with Holsten on the export sugar. There is also no disclosure as to whether PT Masindo or Holsten would bear the shipping charges, insurance costs etc in sending the sugar to Indonesia. 116. Although the Defendant’s documents in AB3/266 shows that the Defendant would make a gross profit from the sale of export sugar to PT Masindo, the Defendant has not taken into consideration the costs and expenses it has to incur in implementing the sale and export of sugar to PT Masindo. The contract between Holsten and PT Masindo has not been produced in court to prove the quantum of alleged loss. 117. In the circumstances, Holsten has not specifically proved its counterclaim for special damages in respect of the export sugar. 63 Miscellaneous issues and/or arguments arising Whether adverse inference should be drawn for not calling Henry Ong to testify 118. In the submissions, the Plaintiff/CSR argued that Holsten’s failure to call Henry Ong as a witness, after having listed Henry Ong as a witness for Holsten, should result in an adverse inference to be drawn against Holsten under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. The Defendant/Holsten disagreed with the Plaintiff’s said argument, and counter-argued that if adverse inference is to be drawn, it should be drawn against the Plaintiff/CSR. 119. The undisputed evidence shows that Henry Ong had left the Plaintiff/CSR’s employment before the date of the trial. Both parties here listed Henry Ong as a witness but eventually, neither party called Henry Ong to testify in Court. 120. There is no evidence that either party has done any act to withhold or prevent the other party from calling Henry Ong as a witness. As such, there is no evidence of intentional withholding of material evidence insofar as omission to call Henry Ong as a witness is concerned. 121. In the circumstances, this Court finds that no adverse inference under s. 114(g) should be drawn against either party here. 122. Further or alternatively, this Court finds that the evidence and factual findings without Henry Ong’s presence at the trial are abundantly clear to the effect that there was no oral agreement to increase 64 Holsten’s credit limit which could legally bind CSR in the circumstances of the present case. Defendant/Holsten’s manner of contesting the application for summary judgment 123. It seems that the Defendant, by putting up a very grossly exaggerated counterclaim amount of RM1,280,000.00 in its Amended Defence and Counterclaim [see paragraphs 13 and 15(i) thereof], has managed to get a stay of execution of the entire amount, instead of merely part, of summary judgment sum of RM1,255,125.00 at the hearing of the application for summary judgment. 124. In paragraph 13 of its Amended Defence and Counterclaim, the Defendant/Holsten tabulated the alleged quantities of local sugar to be supplied under the said Local Contract as 800 metric tonnes per month from December 2020 to July 2021 (i.e. a total alleged quantity of 6,400 metric tonnes). From the indisputable contemporaneous evidence adduced at the trial, this Court has found that there was only a balance quantity of 635 metric tonnes of sugar to be supplied under the Local Contract [see paragraph 70 above]. 125. By its pleadings and its affidavit, the Defendant/Holsten has misled this Court into thinking at the time of granting the summary judgment that there was a total quantity of 800 metric tonnes x 8 months = 6,400 metric tonnes of balance sugar which was to be supplied under the Local Contract, and this resulted in this Court granting the unconditional stay of the entire summary judgment amount pending 65 the trial of the counterclaim. If the Defendant/Holsten were to be truthful in the presentation of pleadings and the affidavit evidence at the summary judgment stage, this Court would not have granted a stay of execution of the entirety of the summary judgment sum, and the maximum amount of stay of execution in such event which this Court would have granted would be RM88,900.00 in respect of local sugar and USD60,000 in respect of the export sugar. 126. Having conducted the full trial on the counterclaim, having heard the evidence of witnesses including documentary evidence, and having examined the evidence adduced at the trial, this Court finds that the Defendant/Holsten has put up a counterclaim amount which lacks credibility. Defendant’s counsel’s manner and extent of asking questions 127. In the course of re-examination of DW3 Tey PC, the Defendant’s counsel has put forward quite a number of re-examination questions which were (i) not covered by the cross-examination questions and answers; (ii) not covered by pleadings; and/or (iii) new matters. This led to a number of objections by the Plaintiff’s counsel and exchange of arguments and explanation on such re-examination question. 128. Similar situations also occurred when the Defendant’s counsel asked questions not covered by pleadings and/or which are irrelevant or should not be re-opened (e.g. the underlying basis of the parties arriving at a previous settlement sum for past transactions) or which are repetitious questions. 66 129. The abovementioned situations resulted in unnecessary protraction of the full trial which could have been significantly shorter. Summing-up and Conclusion 130. In summing-up, this Court found and held as follows: Liability issues in respect of the said Local Contract: (1) This Court finds that the Plaintiff/CSR’s Director of Sales Henry Ong has not agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000.00 in respect of sugar for Malaysian market. (2) Even if Henry Ong had purported to do so, his purported agreement is not binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR in the eyes of the law. (3) This Court finds that the Plaintiff/CSR has not agreed to increase the Defendant/Holsten’s credit limit to RM2,500,000 in a way that is binding upon the Plaintiff/CSR under the laws. (4) Further or alternatively, independently of the question whether the credit limit has been exceeded, the Plaintiff/CSR was entitled to stop delivery of the balance sugar to the Defendant/Holsten in the circumstances of the present case as the Defendant/Holsten had failed to adhere to the payment term of 30 days. 67 (5) There is no real difference between stoppage of delivery and suspension or closing of trade account in the circumstances of the present case. Quantum issue in respect of the said Local Contract: (6) If the gross margin of RM140 per metric were to be used to compute Holsten’s loss of profit from the balance quantity of 635 metric tonnes of local sugar, Holsten’s loss of profit would be RM150 per metric tonne x 635 metric tonnes = RM88,900.00. (7) If one were to take into account the transportation costs which Holsten has to incur in collection sugar from CSR’s factory and in sending the same to Chop Hong Lee’s factory, the loss of profit would be less than RM88,900.00 in respect of the balance 645 metric tonnes of sugar under the said Local Contract. (8) Holsten has not produced specific evidence of any other head of loss or damages. In the circumstances, Holsten has not proved any other head of loss or damages on a balance of probabilities. Issues under the said Export Contract: (9) In the circumstances the Plaintiff/CSR was under no obligation to supply the export sugar to the Defendant/Holsten as the Defendant/Holsten had not made the full payment for the 68 export sugar. (10) The Plaintiff/CSR was not in breach of any supply obligation in the circumstances of the present case. (11) In the circumstances, Holsten has not specifically proved its counterclaim for special damages in respect of the export sugar. 131. In conclusion, this Court dismisses the Defendant/Holsten’s counterclaims with costs. 132. After hearing the further submissions of the parties’ respective counsel on quantum of cots, costs of the counterclaim action are assessed at RM80,000, subject to allocator, and shall be payable by the Defendant/Holsten to the Plaintiff/CSR. Dated this : 3rd January 2024 Signed ….…................................................................ TEE GEOK HOCK JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM (NCVC 10) 69 To the parties’ solicitors: 1. For the Plaintiff : Suaran Singh & Chow Xing Hui Messrs Law Partnership (Kuala Lumpur) 2. For the Defendant : Sivashankar Messrs R Kengadharan & Co. (Petaling Jaya)

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCvC-3653-08/2023

PEMOHON LOW KIM HONG RESPONDEN TETUAN CHIENG & LUM ASSOCIATESPIHAK KETIGA1. ) LOW SU KIAN 2. ) Low Seow Kian

The backstory of this case is rather delicate as it involves a family dispute over some shares transferred from a father to his son, challenged by his other children. In general, the basis of Enclosure 1, is pertaining to the transfer of 648,450 unit of shares (Shares) owned by the Plaintiff in Sritama Sdn. Bhd. (Company) to his son, Low Shee Kian (1st Son). The Defendant issued a letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary to cancel the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. The Company Secretary replied through a letter dated 18.7.2023 where the Company Secretary requested a copy of the appointment letter of the Defendant's firm as the Plaintiff's solicitor. The Defendant through a letter dated 18.7.2023 to the Company Secretary, informed them that the Plaintiff’s daughter was authorised by the Plaintiff to appoint the Defendant. The two letters issued by the Defendant dated 17.7.2023 and 18.7.2023 (Letters) were disputed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed this suit to declare that he has not appointed the Defendant to represent him, of which the Defendant adamantly stated otherwise. In this context, for lack of authority or no authority to act, it warrants the act of solicitors as a nullity (see Syawal Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dayadiri Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLRH 244; [1990] 3 MLJ 239; [1990] 3 CLJ 165, William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. Chemquip (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 1 MLRA 264; [1991] 2 MLJ 555; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 492 and Ranhill Holdings Bhd v. Mohd Fakrunizam Ibrahim, [2021] MLJU 2205; [2021] MLRHU 1715).

03/01/2024

YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d1574f17-09ae-4902-bf0e-66fa9c248dfd&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) SAMAN PEMULA NO: WA-24NCVC-3653-08/2023 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Tetuan Chieng & Lum Associates dan surat bertarikh 17.07.2023 dan 18.7.2023 kepada Tetuan T & L Consultants Sdn. Bhd., Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Seksyen 41, 50, 51, 52 dan 53 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 29 Kaedah 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 5 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Aturan 15 Kaedah 16 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 03/01/2024 12:31:11 WA-24NCvC-3653-08/2023 Kand. 68 S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA LOW KIM HONG (NO. K/P : 420807-10-5139) …PLAINTIF DAN TETUAN CHIENG & LUM ASSOCIATES (Disaman sebagai sebuah firma) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The orders sought by the Plaintiff in this Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) are primarily for: (a) a declaration that Messrs Chieng & Lum Associates (Defendant) are not solicitors for the Plaintiff and not entitled to represent the Plaintiff in any matters or proceedings; (b) that the Defendant withdraw their letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 issued to Messrs T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd.; and S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (c) an interim injunction first and thereafter a permanent injunction to be issued to the effect that the Defendant refrains from holding out that they are the Plaintiff’s solicitors in any matters or proceedings. [2] The grounds in support as stated in Enclosure 1 are as reproduced- “1. Plaintif merupakan bapa kepada Low Shee Kian (L1), Low Su Kian (L2) iaitu anak-anak lelaki Plaintif dan Low Seow Kian (L3) iaitu anak Perempuan Plaintif. 2. Plaintif adalah pengarah dan pemegang saham sebanyak 648,450 unit (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “saham tersebut”) dalam syarikat Sritama Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 197701004436 [35491-P]) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “syarikat tersebut”). Pengarah-pengarah lain adalah anak-anak Plaintif iaitu L1 dan L2. Pemegang-pemegang saham lain adalah L1 sebanyak 123,250 saham dan L2 sebanyak 64,800 saham. 3. Pada 11.07.2023, Plaintif telah mengarahkan Tetuan T&L Consultants Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “T&L”) iaitu setiausaha syarikat kepada syarikat tersebut supaya menyediakan dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan untuk melaksanakan pemindahan milik saham tersebut kepada L1 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “pemindahan tersebut”). 4. Namun, pada 17.07.2023 T&L telah menerima surat daripada Defendan yang kononnya bertindak bagi Plaintif untuk, antara lain, membatalkan pemindahan tersebut dan memintakan dokumen-dokumen tersebut dikembalikan kepada Defendan. 5. Apabila ditanya oleh T&L melalui surat T&L bertarikh 18.07.2023 kepada Defendan, Defendan melalui suratnya bertarikh 18.07.2023 memaklumkan bahawa Defendan adalah dilantik oleh anak perempuan Plaintif, iaitu L3 selepas diberi kuasa oleh Plaintif. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 6. Plaintif selepas itu telah melantik Tetuan Raja Eleena Siew Ang & Associates (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tetuan RESA”) dan mengarahkan Tetuan RESA supaya menulis kepada Defendan untuk mempertikaikan pelantikan mereka sebagai peguamcara Plaintif dan mengarahkan Defendan untuk menarik balik surat mereka bertarikh 17.07.2023 kepada T&L dan juga memohon maaf kepada Plaintif terhadap perbuatan mereka. 7. Selepas itu, Plaintif telah pada 25.07.2023 melantik Tetuan Goik, Ramesh & Loo (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Tetuan GRL”) sebagai peguamcara baru Plaintif untuk menggantikan Tetuan RESA. Plaintif telah mengarahkan Tetuan GRL untuk menulis kepada T&L untuk memaklumkan kepada mereka supaya melaksanakan pindah milik tersebut. 8. Akibat dari insiden-insiden di atas terutamanya surat Defendan bertarikh 17.07.2023 (ekshibit LKH-4) dan 18.07.2023 (ekshibit LKH-5) kepada T&L dimana Defendan masih bertegas bahawa mereka adalah masih peguamcara Plaintif dan mempunyai kuasa untuk bertindak bagi pihak Plaintif, T&L telah pada 27.07.2023 memfailkan satu Saman Pemula Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur No.: WA-24NCC-405-07/2023 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “tindakan tersebut”) untuk arahan daripada Mahkamah. 9. Tindakan Defendan di atas adalah amat angkuh dan tidak mempedulikan hak Plaintif. Perbuatan Defendan amat tidak professional dan keterlaluan. Walaupun peguamcara Plaintif telah dalam surat mereka bertarikh 03.08.2023 di atas telah menawarkan kepada Defendan untuk Defendan sendiri datang ke pejabat Tetuan GRL untuk melihat surat Pelantikan Peguamcara yang telah ditandatangani oleh Plaintif, Defendan enggan berbuat demikian dan masih mahu peguamcara Plaintif memberikan kepada mereka sesalinan surat Pelantikan Peguamcara tersebut. Sudah tentu Tetuan GRL tidak akan memberikan satu salinan surat Pelantikan Peguamcara tersebut kerana ianya adalah satu surat “private & confidential” di antara Plaintif dan peguamcara Plaintif. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 10. Plaintif berhak untuk memfailkan tindakan ini demi untuk menjaga kepentingan dan hak Plaintif. T&L boleh memfailkan tindakan mereka di atas ke Mahkamah untuk menjaga kepentingan mereka dan tindakan tersebut tidak kena mengena dengan tindakan ini dan tidak boleh memudaratkan hak Plaintif untuk memfailkan tindakan ini. Tindakan ini juga tidak berniat untuk menjejaskan prosiding tersebut. 11. Tindakan salah Defendan dengan mewakili Plaintif tanpa apa-apa perlantikan yang sah, benar dan/atau betul daripada Plaintif dan tindakan Defendan dengan bertindak tanpa arahan Plaintif telah menjejaskan dan memprejudiskan teruk terhadap hak-hak Plaintif; 12. Kemudaratan Plaintif tidak boleh dipampas dengan kos kerana Defendan telah menjejaskan hak Plaintif dimana sebarang kerugian yang akan dialami oleh Plaintif tidak dapat didapat dikompensasikan dengan wang; 13. Plaintif mempunyai kes yang baik (“good case”) terhadap Defendan; 14. Imbangan keadilan dan kesenangan (“balance of justice and convenience”) memihak (“favour”) kepada injunksi ini diberikan.”. BRIEF FACTS [3] The backstory of this case is rather delicate as it involves a family dispute over some shares transferred from a father to his son, challenged by his other children. In general, the basis of Enclosure 1, is pertaining to the transfer of 648,450 unit of shares (Shares) owned by the Plaintiff in Sritama Sdn. Bhd. (Company) to his son, Low Shee Kian (1st Son). S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [4] On 11.07.2023, the Plaintiff went to the Company Secretary namely T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd. (Company Secretary), together with the 1st Son where the Plaintiff executed the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. [5] It was contended by the Defendant that the Plaintiff then informed his daughter, Low Seow Kian, that he did not wish to proceed with the transfer of Shares and gave his daughter the authority to find a solicitor to stop the said transfer of Shares and maintain the status quo. [6] The Defendant then issued a letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary to cancel the transfer of Shares to the 1st Son. The Company Secretary replied through a letter dated 18.7.2023 where the Company Secretary requested a copy of the appointment letter of the Defendant's firm as the Plaintiff's solicitor. [7] The Defendant through a letter dated 18.7.2023 to the Company Secretary, informed them that the Plaintiff’s daughter was authorised by the Plaintiff to appoint the Defendant. The two letters issued by the Defendant dated 17.7.2023 and 18.7.2023 (Letters) were disputed by the Plaintiff. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [8] Subsequently, Messrs. Raja Eleena Siew Ang & Associates (RESA) issued a letter dated 21.07.2023 to the Defendant informing that they represented the Plaintiff and demanded the Defendant to withdraw its letter dated 17.07.2023 to the Company Secretary. [9] Thereafter, Messrs Goik Ramesh & Loo (GRL) replaced RESA and issued the Defendant a letter dated 25.7.2023 informing that GRL has replaced RESA as the Plaintiff's solicitor and demanded that the Defendant withdraw the letter dated 17.7.2023 to the Company Secretary. Both letters dated 21.07.2023 and 25.7.2023 clearly indicated to the Defendant, that they are the solicitors representing the Plaintiff at all times. [10] The letter of appointment of Messrs GRL in Enclosure 2 at Exhibit “LKH-8” is reproduced- S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 THE ISSUE [11] The issue at hand is simply- Whether the Plaintiff has appointed the Defendant to represent him or otherwise? If the answer is in the negative, therefore, the Defendant must retract its’ letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 to T&L Consultants Sdn Bhd, the Company Secretary, as the Defendant has no authority to do so. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [12] The Plaintiff filed this suit to declare that he has not appointed the Defendant to represent him, of which the Defendant adamantly stated otherwise. [13] In Malaysia, the right to representation is enshrined in Article 5 of our Federal Constitution particularly for an accused person (see Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution and also in the Criminal Procedure Code at section 255). Eventhough the law is silent for civil litigant, it is indisputable that access to judicial process is also granted in civil matters as a matter of human rights for the right to choose or appoint a solicitor is one’s choice. [14] The crux of the Plaintiff's case is that, in fact, the Defendant had not been appointed to represent the Plaintiff thus has no authority to act for the Plaintiff. [15] In terms of proving one’s case, when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that person. This Court finds that since the Defendant contended that it was appointed by the Plaintiff, therefore, the burden is on the Defendant to prove that it was duly S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 appointed by the Plaintiff and was instructed by the Plaintiff to issue the Letters (see sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950). [16] In Ranbaxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Ei Du Pont Nemours And Company [2012] 4 MLJ 34; [2012] 9 CLJ 79; [2012] 4 MLRA 370 (CA), on the application of sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950, it was held that- “[68] The present case is a civil case, where the court decides based on the evidence adduced during trial on the balance of probabilities. Under s 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 the person who asserts the existence of any fact must prove the fact exists. s 102 of the same act stipulates that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. What the respondent needs to do (as the defendant to the present claim) is to enter appearance within time and to be represented by counsel to handle the proceeding on its behalf; to file the necessary statement of defence and counterclaim as well as other follow-up documents to get the matter ready for trial...". [17] The Defendant contended that it was appointed and instructed by the Plaintiff’s daughter. In this regard, the burden is on the Defendant to prove and produce the authorization letter signed by the Plaintiff appointing the daughter as such, if any, but none. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [18] The Defendant had also provided two (2) statutory declarations from the Plaintiff’s daughters; namely Low Seow Kian and Low Tong Chan stating that the Plaintiff has mandated, authorised and entrusted Low Seow Kian to stop the transfer of the Shares in the Company to the 1st Son and that thereafter, Low Seow Kian had appointed the Defendant to stop the transfer of the Shares and to return all share documents to the Defendant for safe keeping. [19] However, this Court finds that nowhere from the evidence, could be found that the Plaintiff had confirmed this authorisation allegedly given to his daughter. [20] In this context, for lack of authority or no authority to act, it warrants the act of solicitors as a nullity (see Syawal Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dayadiri Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLRH 244; [1990] 3 MLJ 239; [1990] 3 CLJ 165, William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. Chemquip (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 1 MLRA 264; [1991] 2 MLJ 555; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 492 and Ranhill Holdings Bhd v. Mohd Fakrunizam Ibrahim, [2021] MLJU 2205; [2021] MLRHU 1715). [21] Further, in Ranhill Holdings Bhd (supra), it was held- S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 “[33] I should first state that the defendant's reliance on the decisions in Syawal Enterprise (supra) and William Jacks & Co (supra) merely confirms that the lack of mandate of the lawyers may result in a nullity of the proceedings that may be set aside and that a challenge for that purpose may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. But these cases also made it clear that the allegation that the action has been brought or defended by solicitors who were not so authorised must, like any other allegation, be proved by sufficient evidence.”. [22] The Defendant had also contended that the Plaintiff has a very weak mental capacity and was manipulated by the 1st Son and that the Plaintiff is illiterate. However, there was no evidence produced by the Defendant in support of this contention. [23] Based on the facts, the form for the transfer of Shares was signed at the Company Secretary’s office. The Company Secretary had also dutifully, repeatedly interviewed the Plaintiff to ensure that the Plaintiff had the necessary and required mental capacity to transfer the Shares to the 1st Son before agreeing to be the witness to the Plaintiff’s signature. [24] In any event, this Court finds that only the Directors via a company resolution, can refuse such registration of a transfer of shares and not the Company Secretary (See section 106 (2) of the Companies Act 2016). S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [25] Therefore, based on the facts of the case from the affidavits filed by both parties, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has never appointed the Defendant to represent him. Rightfully, the appointment of solicitors is the choice of the Plaintiff. [26] As such, the Defendant has no authority to instruct the Company Secretary to stop the transfer of Shares from the Plaintiff to the 1st Son. CONCLUSION [27] Thus, Enclosure 1 is allowed for the following Orders- (a) That Messrs Chieng & Lum Associates are not solicitors for the Plaintiff and are not entitled to represent the Plaintiff in any matters or proceedings unless appointed by the Plaintiff in writing; (b) That the Defendant to withdraw the letters dated 17.07.2023 and 18.07.2023 issued by the Defendant to Messrs T&L Consultants Sdn. Bhd.; (c) A permanent injunction to the effect that the Defendant is refrained from holding out that they are the Plaintiff’s solicitors S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 in any matters or proceedings unless appointed by the Plaintiff in writing; and (d) Cost. (YA DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCVC1 Kuala Lumpur Court. Date: 2 January 2024 COUNSELS PLAINTIFF Tetuan Goik, Ramesh & Loo Suite N-3-1, 2nd Floor Block N, Plaza Damas 60, Jalan Sri Hartamas 1, Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur. DEFENDANT S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Tetuan Law Chambers of Dahlia Lee & Co. C-06=09. Plaza Mont Kiara, No. 2, Jalan Kiara, Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur. S/N F09X0a4JAkm/Dmb6nCSN/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-45C-4-09/2018

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) JEVAN A/L S RAMAMURTHY 2. ) SURENDRAN A/L SIVASAMY 3. ) Mohan A/l Selorajoo (Pg) 4. ) Pirakhas A/l Subramaniam (Pg) 5. ) Muniandy A/l Achaiyah Kanniah (Dnaa) 6. ) Uthaya Kumar A/l Ponnusamy (Pg) 7. ) Barique (Pg)

penculikan-identiti tertuduh sama ada dibuktikan-duit tebusan sama ada dicamkan-seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan sama ada dipenuhi- pembelaan tertuduh jika konsisten- kegagalan menyediakan suspek dan OKT lain jika fatal

03/01/2024

YA Puan Nurulhuda Nur'aini Binti Mohamad Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3e242e7a-b804-48c1-b294-156be2d9e038&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45C-4-09/2018 PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45C-5-09/2018 PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45-19-06/2019 PENDAKWA RAYA …PENDAKWAAN lawan 1) JEVAN A/L S RAMAMURTHY NO. K/P: 750726-14-6045 2) SURENDRAN A/L SIVASAMY NO. K/P: 820907-14-6221 3) MUNIANDY A/L ACHAIYAH KANNIAH NO. K/P 571123-10-5443 4) VIJAYA LETCHUMI A/P SANNASI NO. K/P 820326-04-5254 …TERTUDUH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Latar belakang. [1] Kesemua OKT1 hingga OKT3 di atas (mereka adalah OKT1, OKT2 dan OKT5 dalam pertuduhan asal BA-45C-4-09/2018) telah dituduh bersama dengan 5 OKT lain (mereka adalah OKT3, OKT4, OKT6 dan OKT7 dalam pertuduhan asal BA-45C-4-09/2018 dan OKT8 dalam BA- 45C-5-09/2018) dengan niat bersama untuk menculik seorang bernama Pratap a/l Pandien (SP12) di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Culik 1961, manakala OKT4 di atas Vijaya Letchumi pula telah dituduh di BA-45-19-06/2019 03/01/2024 11:08:31 BA-45C-4-09/2018 Kand. 732 S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 dengan pertuduhan seksyen 5 Akta yang sama kerana telah ada dalam milikan wang tunai iaitu hasil tebusan yang terlibat di dalam kes penculikan ini. [2] 5 tertuduh yang lain itu (OKT3, OKT4, OKT6, OKT7 dan OKT8 dalam pertuduhan asal masing-masing) kemudian telah ditawarkan pertuduhan pilihan di bawah seksyen 365 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun yang sama. Kelima-lima OKT ini telah mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan pilihan ini dan dijatuhkan hukuman 5 tahun penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap. [3] Bagi tertuduh-tertuduh lain, kes diteruskan untuk bicara atas pertuduhan asal dan mereka kini dirujuk sebagai OKT1, OKT2, OKT 3 bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 3 dan OKT4 di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Culik. [4] Pertuduhan yang diteruskan dengan perbicaraan ke atas OKT1 hingga OKT3 adalah seperti berikut: BA-45C-4-09/2018 “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 12 Disember 2017, jam lebih kurang 9.10 malam, di Jalan 1B/8, Bandar Baru Sungai Buloh, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu, telah melarikan secara salah seorang lelaki bernama Pratap a/l Pandien (No. K/P:830819-14- 6239) bagi maksud mendapatkan wang tebusan. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan dan boleh dihukum di S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 bawah Seskyen 3(1) Akta Culik 1961 yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan”. [5] Pertuduhan bagi OKT4 pula adalah seperti berikut: BA-45-19-06/2019 “Bahawa kamu pada 23 Januari 2018 jam lebih kurang 1.30 pagi bertempat di rumah No. 27 Jalan Ambar 2, Batu 34, Taman Ambar, Dengkil di dalam daerah Sepang Negeri Selangor telah didapati menerima dan ada dalam milikan kamu wang tebusan sebanyak RM27,900.00 hasil jenayah culik bersabit Sg. Buloh 12038/17 dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Penculikan 1961 (Akta 365)”. Kes pendakwaan. [6] Kejadian bermula pada 12.12.2017 lebih kurang 8.30 malam ketika SP1 keluar menaiki motorsikalnya untuk merokok tidak jauh dari bengkel, apabila dia telah mendengar bunyi jeritan dalam Tamil dan nampak sekumpulan 3 individu yang bertopeng sedang memaksa seorang lelaki berbangsa Tamil (kemudian mangsa dicamkan sebagai Pratap SP12) masuk ke kereta MyVi 6365 yang enjinnya sedang hidup kerana SP1 nampak lampu belakang kereta dalam keadaan menyala. [7] Pada ketika itu, terdapat 2 kereta yang dilihat SP1 iaitu MyVi kuning tersebut dan Pajero putih 1207 yang berada di belakang bengkel di kawasan perumahan berkenaan. Menurut SP1, tempat kejadian dan tempat dia memberhentikan motorsikalnya dalam jarak 30-40 meter. Dia S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 kenal mangsa kerana tinggal dalam satu kawasan perumahan sama dan terdapat pencahayaan berhampiran tempat kejadian membolehkan dia melihat kejadian. [8] Oleh kerana takut, SP1 berpatah balik ke bengkel dan beritahu sahabatnya Jeevan Raj SP2 apa yang telah diperhatikan oleh SP1. SP2 kenal mangsa kerana mereka dari tempat tinggal yang sama iaitu Bandar Baru Sg Buloh dan ada ketika lepak bersama. SP2 menaiki motorsikalnya menuju ke tempat kejadian dan hanya menemui kereta Mitsubushi pajero milik Pratap manakala kereta MyVi tidak kelihatan. SP2 kemudiannya telah menelefon Saravanan Airoli SP3 memaklumkan kejadian kerana Pratap dan Saravanan bersaudara dan SP2 minta SP3 menelefon mangsa Pratap. [9] Dalam cubaan SP3 mengesan Pratap melalui telefon oleh SP3 tetapi gagal, SP3 telah menelefon bapa Pratap iaitu Panndien a/l Govindasamy menceritakan apa yang berlaku dan meminta Panddien cuba menghubungi Pratap tetapi juga gagal. SP3 ketika tiba di lokasi kejadian telah melihat kereta Pajero putih WTW 1207 milik Pratap. Ia disusuli dengan usaha mengesan kereta MyVi kuning dengan nombor yang dikatakan di sekitar Sg Buloh oleh SP2 dan SP3 juga gagal. SP3 kemudian meneruskan usaha mengesan Pratap di sekitar Selayang hingga ke Rawang, berseorangan selama sejam tetapi tidak menemui kereta MyVi tersebut. [10] SP4 pula ialah isteri kepada mangsa Pratap dan telah mengecam kereta Mitsubushi Pajero putih nombor 1207 milik Pratap. Kali akhir S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 melihat Pratap ialah ketika dia balik pada 12.12.2017 pada jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang sebelum dia (Pratap) balik semula ke tempat kerja untuk meneruskan tugasnya. Menurut SP4, kebiasaannya Pratap akan balik pada jam 10.00pm tetapi pada hari tersebut dia masih belum pulang pada jam 12.00am. [11] SP4 cuba menghubunginya tetapi gagal. Ini mengakibatkan SP4 menelefon bapa mertuanya dan telah diberitahu oleh bapa mertuanya Panndien Govindasamy (SP10), bahawa suaminya Pratap telah diculik. SP4 hanya bertemu dengan suaminya 21 hari kemudian pada 3.1.2018 di rumah bapa mertuanya Bukit Rahman Putra dalam keadaan tidak terurus dan kurus. [12] En. Panndien SP10 pada jam lebih kurang 8.45 malam 12.12.2017 berada bersama anaknya Pratap di Pejabat mereka. SP10 dan anaknya Pratap (SP12) kemudian telah balik ke rumah masing-masing. Semasa SP10 sedang mengadap makan malamnya jam lebih kurang 9 .00 malam, telah menerima satu panggilan telefon dari orang yang tidak dikenalinya menyatakan SP12 berada dalam tangan mereka. SP10 tidak percaya dan terus meletakkan telefon. [13] SP10 kemudian menerima panggilan daripada anak saudaranya bernama Saravanan SP3 menceritakan cubaan SP3 memanggil Pratap melalui telefon setelah dimaklumkan oleh SP1 melihat Pratap ditarik masuk ke dalam kereta MyVi kuning tetapi tidak berjaya dihubungi SP3. SP10 kemudian cuba menghubungi anaknya beberapa kali tapi masih S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 gagal sehinggalah SP10 menerima panggilan dari suspek penculik yang meminta wang tebusan RM10 juta jika gagal, anak SP10 akan dibunuh. [14] SP10 telah membuat laporan polis pada 13.12.2018 jam 3.45 pagi. Walau bagaimanapun, SP10 juga telah menceritakan kejadian ini kepada Supt. Somu SP13 yang telah memberi arahan kepada anggotanya Insp. Praba SP17 untuk mengetuai unit tindakan. Pada ketika ini, SP10 sebelum membuat laporan polis, telahpun lebih awal diarahkan oleh Insp. Praba (SP17) untuk berada di lokasi bilik Hotel Damansara untuk memantau panggilan berikutnya. SP10 menerima panggilan seterusnya jam 12.40 mengulangi permintaan wang tebusan RM10juta. SP10 telah menawarkan RM50,000.00 tetapi pemanggil enggan menerima jumlah ini dan mematikan panggilan. SP10 dapat mengecam suara pemanggil yang berbeza daripada panggilan awal. [15] Panggilan seterusnya pada jam 4.00pagi meminta jumlah yang lebih tinggi RM20 juta tetapi SP10 hanya bersetuju menawarkan RM50 ribu. Beberapa panggilan telah berlangsung di antara suspek dan SP10 di mana akhirnya pada 23.12.2017 SP10 telah bersetuju pada jumlah RM300,000.00. SP10 telah menyediakan wang sejumlah ini melalui wang bayaran gaji pekerja RM100,000 yang telah sedia ada dikeluarkan pada 4.12.2017 dan wang RM200,000 yang dikeluarkan kemudian pada 28.12.2017 melalui Hong Leong Bank. Insp Praba telah mengambil gambar wang yang terlibat yang diikat dalam 60 ikatan mengandungi RM5000.00 setiap satu ikatan dikemukakan sebagai ID151. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [16] Beberapa siri panggilan kemudian berlaku untuk tujuan membuat serahan wang tebusan ini bermula dengan R&R Port Dickson ke tol Ayer Keroh. Apabila tiada arahan diterima ketika SP10 di tol Ayer Keroh, SP10 telah balik. Keesokannya SP10 diarahkan oleh penculik untuk ke tol Bukit Raja kemudian ke tol Ipoh dan ketika ini SP10 mendapati dia diekori dari jauh oleh beberapa buah kereta. Di tol Ipoh juga tiada panggilan seterusnya yang datang mengakibatkan SP10 balik semula ke rumahnya. [17] Di rumah SP10, Insp Praba telah bertemu dengan SP10 dan memaklumkan penemuan Insp Praba bahawa kereta Pajero milik Pratap telah ditemui dibakar. SP10 turut menerima panggilan daripada penculik menyatakan kejadian kereta Pajero yang telah dibakar oleh mereka dan ingatan mereka kepada SP10 untuk tidak melibatkan pihak polis jika tidak anak SP10 akan dibunuh. [18] SP10 menerima panggilan berikutnya untuk ke Batu Caves bersama wang tebusan tersebut tetapi apabila tiba di lokasi, tiada arahan lanjut diberi yang mengakibatkan SP10 balik semula ke rumah. Pada 1.1.2018 jam lebih kurang 2.30 pagi SP10 menerima panggilan akhir dari penculik yang mengarahkan SP10 untuk ke Batu Caves semula dan diarahkan menuju ke satu jambatan sebelum Petronas dan akhirnya diarahkan menjatuhkan bag berisi duit tersebut dari jambatan tersebut. [19] Pada 3.1.2018, SP10 menerima panggilan telefon dari penculik menyatakan Pratap (SP12) berada di hentian Bemban. SP10 kemudian turut menerima panggilan dari anaknya yang menggunakan handphone salah seorang peniaga di R&R tersebut untuk membuat panggilan, S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 menyatakan dia berada di Bemban. SP10 terus menuju ke hentian Bemban dan bertemu dengan Pratap di situ lalu dibawa ke hospital untuk pemeriksaan, atas arahan IO. [20] SP12 menyatakan pada 12.12.2017 lebih kurang jam 8.45pm ketika hendak balik ke rumahnya, SP12 yang berada dalam kereta Pajeronya sedang menelefon salah seorang pelanggannya dalam kereta yang dihentikan di belakang deretan kedai, apabila cermin tingkap belah pemandu yang dalam kedaan bertutup, diketuk 2 kali oleh seorang lelaki India yang memperkenalkan diri sebagai ‘polis’ sambil menunjukkan kad pengenalan diri, kad ini tidak jelas dilihat oleh SP12. [21] SP12 telah menurunkan cerminnya dan lelaki tersebut kemudian telah memasukkan tangannya melalui tingkap dan membuka pintu kereta tersebut. SP12 keluar dan lelaki tersebut terus memegang dan menekan tengkuk SP12 ke bawah. Tangan SP12 kemudiannya digarikan ke belakang oleh lelaki ini. Lelaki ini dilihat SP12 berkulit cerah dan agak tinggi. Ketika itu juga datang 3 lagi lelaki bertopeng dari arah belakang lalu menolak SP12 ke bawah. Lelaki yang menggarikan tangan SP12 dicamkan oleh SP12 sebagai OKT8 (OKT8 telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan pilihan seksyen 365 KK). [22] Kemudian 3 lelaki-lelaki ini telah menarik SP12 masuk ke kereta My Vi kuning dan ketika ini SP12 dapat melihat mereka merupakan bangsa India. Di dalam kereta, telefon bimbit SP12 telah diambil dan panggilan telefon dibuat kepada SP10 iaitu bapa Pratap memberitahu anaknya iaitu SP12 telah diculik dan meminta wang tebusan dibayar. Mereka kemudian S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 memakaikan sarung muka ke atas SP12 dan meletakkan selotape pada mata. [23] Setelah lebih kurang 35 minit, SP12 dapat mendengar gate dibuka dan dia dikeluarkan daripada kereta dan didudukkan dalam sebuah rumah dengan kipas terpasang. SP12 tahu dia tidak bersendirian kerana boleh mendengar seseorang bernafas di sebelahnya. Setelah beberapa jam, SP12 dibangunkan dan masuk ke dalam kereta dan bergerak ke sebuah rumah lain kerana perjalanan yang diambil lama dan dia (SP12) telah dibawa naik tangga ke atas ke sebuah bilik. [24] Meskipun sepanjang masa SP12 berada dalam keadaan mata bertutup dan tangan bergari, tetapi SP12 pasti terdapat 2 orang mengawalnya kerana SP12 telah bertanya kenapa dia diculik dan kedua- dua suspek ini telah menyatakan mereka ingin dapatkan wang tebusan RM500,000 atau RM1,000,000.00. [25] SP12 kemudian telah dibawa ke satu tempat lain kerana SP12 terpaksa tunduk untuk memasuki rumah ini. SP12 dibawa masuk ke sebuah bilik yang mempunyai katil dan disuruh baring. Selang masa, SP12 kemudian dibawa ke satu rumah lain kerana dia dapat mendengar bunyi ‘shutters’ ditarik untuk buka dan kemudian, ditutup. SP12 turut mendengar bunyi tong gas disusun. Ini didengar berulang kali. SP12 turut mendengar bunyi skru dibuka dengan ‘screw gun’ untuk menanggalkan tayar. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [26] Di premis ini, SP12 dalam keadaan dipakai topeng dan mata berlilit serta bergari, juga telah ditendang di belakang oleh seseorang dan bila ditanya kenapa, dia menyatakan ‘bapa kamu masih belum bayar lagi”. Dia juga mengugut menyatakan ‘kalau bapa kamu tidak bayar, tahulah kamu”. SP12 juga tahu kedatangan 2 lelaki berikut yang kemudiannya mereka telah menelefon SP10 (Panndien) dan menyuruh SP12 bercakap dengan bapanya. SP12 semasa bercakap dengan bapanya menyatakan dia dalam ketakutan. [27] SP12 menyatakan dia juga dipukul dengan apa yang dirasakan sebagai kayu, dari pemerhatiannya mendengar bunyi objek ini diketuk di lantai dan apabila ia diletak di bahu SP12 dengan diugut jika mahu dipukul dengan objek ini. SP12 diberi makan sekali sehari dan ada masanya ketika mereka beramai-ramai barulah SP12 diberi makan tengahari. [28] SP12 hanya diberitahu akan dilepaskan apabila dia diminta bersiap, mandi tetapi dibatalkan untuk dia dilepaskan kerana dikatakan ada hal dilakukan ayahnya Panndien. Keesokannya kali kedua mereka beritahu SP12 akan dilepaskan, SP12 diberi pakaian untuk bersiap meskipun dalam keadaan tangan bergari dan mata bertutup. Di dalam kereta tersebut, SP12 telah dibaringkan dan SP12 dapat merasa dia ditutup dengan jaket. Di dalam perjalanan tersebut, SP12 mendengar perbualan telefon suspek dengan ayahnya kerana terdengar nama ayahnya disebut dan diberitahu tempat anaknya akan dilepaskan akan dinyatakan nanti. [29] Setelah menjalani perjalanan melalui tol untuk beberapa ketika termasuk berhenti untuk mengisi minyak yang mana kesemuanya S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 diperhatikan SP12 melalui pendengaran bunyi menggunakan Touch&Go, bunyi tank minyak dibuka kerana SP12 masih dalam keadaan bertopeng, akhirnya kereta berhenti di satu tempat. Ketika masih dalam kereta, SP12 telah diberi amaran untuk tunduk dan jangan melihat kerana suspek bersenjatakan pisau dan akan menikam SP12 jika berlaku cubaan. Topeng dan gari SP12 dibuka tetapi mata dililit selotape sebelum SP12 dikeluarkan dari kereta oleh 2 lelaki dan didudukkan di satu tempat. [30] Setelah SP12 didudukkan, SP12 telah membuka selotape pada matanya tetapi mendapati kereta tersebut telah meninggalkan lokasi. SP12 dapati dia berada di lokasi highway di bawah jambatan dan apabila menyedari terdapat pencahayaan yang terang dari seberang jalan, telah bertindak melintas laluan highway tersebut ke arah cahaya lampu tersebut dan meminta bantuan penjual di situ dengan meminjam telefon untuk menghubungi ayahnya SP10. [31] SP10 tiba kemudian dan SP10 membawa SP12 ke hospital atas arahan IO. Hasil pemeriksaan oleh pegawai perubatan SP15 menemui kesan lecet pada muka dan belakang telinga serta cedera ringan sahaja yang dikatakan melalui ‘history taking’ akibat dibalut muka dengan selotape dan dipakaikan topeng. SP15 juga mendapati kesan kecederaan yang juga bukan akibat semulajadi dan boleh diakibatkan bersentuh dengan sesuatu seperti jatuh, terhentak, dipukul. Penemuan wang tebusan: pengecaman wang yang disediakan oleh SP10 dan wang yang dirampas dari saksi atau suspek jika wang yang sama dan pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [32] Wang tebusan berjumlah RM300,000.00 yang telah disediakan oleh SP10 telah diambil gambar oleh SP17 sebelum serahan dibuat di jambatan dan set gambar ini ditandakan sebagai ID151. Gambar diambil menggunakan handphone SP17 dan dimajukan kepada IO SP27 melalui applikasi WhatsApp. Atas dapatan Mahkamah, gambar ini hanya ditandakan sebagai ID151 melainkan ada keterangan lain yang timbul atas alasan tiada apa-apa soalan diajukan kepada SP17 berhubung pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 bersabit imej ini dikemukakan dalam bentuk CD dan dihasilkan sebagai gambar ID151. [33] Meskipun begitu, terdapat wang tebusan yang dirampas daripada OKT9 dan Sarasbathy SP25, sebagaimana senarai bongkar P200 beserta senarai nombor siri yang dilampirkan (untuk jumlah 706 keping RM50.00=$35,300.00) dan P202 (untuk 196 keping RM50.00=$9800.00) jumlah keseluruhan $45,100.00, 558 keping sebagaimana senarai bongkar P198 (jumlah RM27,900.00). Sejumlah wang 340 keping RM50.00 (berjumlah $17,000.00) dalam bag sandang ‘Levi’ turut dikemukakan melalui IO SP27 dan ditandakan sebagai P163A(1-340) yang dirampas dari rumah Surendran OKT2 oleh SP21. [34] Keterangan SP25 Sarasbathy menunjukkan pada awal Januari 2018, OKT9 bersama Vasantha telah datang ke rumah SP25 menyerahkan sejumlah wang nota RM50.00 berjumlah RM60,000.00 yang berada dalam ikatan getah dalam sebuah beg. SP25 telah menyimpan wang yang berada dalam beg tersebut dalam bean bagnya. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [35] Sejumlah RM50,000.00 kemudian diserah kepada Balan SP24 atas saranan Sarasbathy dan Vijaya untuk duit digunakan sebagai pinjaman Ah Long. Baki RM10,000.00 masih disimpan oleh SP25. Baki duit RM10,000.00 ini dan RM50,000.00 kemudian dirampas masing-masing dari rumah SP25 dan rumah Balan SP24. [36] SP19 Murukiah juga telah diserahkan 3 bungkusan plastic hitam berisi wang oleh Muniandy (OKT5) untuk disimpan sehinggalah diberitahu. Bungkusan ini telah disimpan oleh SP19 dalam reban ayam kosong. Atas arahan Muniandy kemudiannya, 2 bungkusan ini telah diserah kepada seorang wanita India di satu pertemuan R&R manakala satu bungkusan lagi yang tinggal telah diminta oleh Muniandy untuk ditanam sehingga arahan lanjut diberi. [37] Di dalam proses untuk menyerahkan satu bungkusan ini kepada Muniandy setelah diminta diserahkan di Tesco Senawang, SP19 mendapati plastic hitam koyak dan melihat kepingan RM50.00 di dalamnya. SP19 menggantikan bungkusan dengan bungkusan beras jenama ‘Rambutan’ sebelum ditanam semula kerana setelah menunggu hampir 2 jam, Muniandy tidak muncul di Tesco pada tarikh tersebut. [38] Daripada keterangan SP21 dan SP27, wang rampasan daripada saksi ataupun OKT diringkaskan seperti berikut: a) P197 daripada Lalitha (SP23) berjumlah RM28,600.00 b) P198 daripada OKT4 (SD3) berjumlah RM27,900.00 c) P200 daripada Balan (SP24) berjumlah RM35,000.00 S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 d) P202 daripada Sarasbathy (SP25) berjumlah RM 9800.00 e) P166 daripada Surendran OKT2 (dalam beg ‘Levi’ berjumlah RM17,000.00. [39] SP27 telah memberi keterangan membuat pengecaman sebahagian no siri wang rampasan ini dengan membandingkan no siri lampiran pada senarai bongkar dan dibandingkan dengan ID151. Mahkamah telah membenarkan ini dilakukan oleh SP27 sebagai pegawai penyiasat kes kerana kedua-dua keterangan SP17 Insp. Praba dan IO SP27 menyatakan arahan diberi dan diterima untuk merakam gambar wang tebusan yang disediakan oleh SP10 dan SP17 telah serahkan rakaman gambar ini kepada SP27. SP17 juga menyatakan handphone yang digunakannya untuk tujuan ini digunakan dalam keadaan berfungsi dengan baik. Malahan ini disokong oleh keterangan SP10 sendiri gambar wang diambil oleh SP17 menggunakan handphone SP17 pada lebih kurang 28.12.2017. [40] Meskipun dari segi pematuhan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950, ia masih belum dipatuhi sepenuhnya kerana tiada dinyatakan handphone ini digunakan dalam keadaan biasa dalam menjalankan tugasnya dan tiada keterangan dari SP17 bagaimana imej gambar berubah menjadi printout dalam bentuk ID151, namun SP17 dalam keterangannya jelas menyatakan dia telah menyusun kepingan wang RM50.00 ini sebelum gambar diambil dan telah mengecam gambar wang kertas ini dari segi susunan yang telah dibuatnya. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [41] SP27 juga mengesahkan telah memberi arahan kepada SP17 untuk mengambil gambar dan telah menerima gambar wang tebusan yang disediakan untuk serahan dari SP17 melalui WhatsApp dan CD namun tanpa perakuan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan. Atas bantahan pihak pembelaan untuk ID151 diterima sebagai P151, Mahkamah telah mengarahkan pihak-pihak untuk berhujah lanjut berhubung isu ini. Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah telah menerima ID151 sebagai P151. [42] Alasan Mahkamah dalam menerima ID151 sebagai P151 ialah: a) SP17 dan SP27 konsisten berhubung terdapat penyediaan wang tebusan oleh SP10 yang turut diakui oleh SP10; b) kedua-dua SP17 dan SP27 konsisten terdapat arahan untuk gambar diambil menyedari kes ini melibatkan satu kes penculikan dengan wang tebusan; c) SP17 telah menyatakan handphonenya dalam keadaan baik apabila gambar ID151 diambil; d) SP10 sendiri mengesahkan dia menyerahkan wang tebusan tersebut kepada SP17 untuk diambil gambar dan gambar telah diambil oleh SP17; e) wang rampasan dengan lampiran nombor siri beserta senarai bongkar yang dicatit oleh SP27 di P198 (meskipun sebahagian) adalah konsisten dengan nombor siri wang yang disediakan sebelum serahan oleh SP10 seperti berikut: LY 4248085 JL1826708 GE 1940306 JJ1188399 HV 1964730 GQ9515385 S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 f) jika kewujudan wang RM50.00 ini dengan nombor siri yang selari adalah diada-adakan oleh pihak polis, ini bermakna mereka berpakat mewujudkan ID151 serta senarai bongkar dan lampiran lain P200, P201 yang pada pendapat Mahkamah bukan menjadi pembelaan kesemua OKT dalam mencabar ID151. [43] Ini ditambah dengan keterangan SP1 bersabit awal kejadian SP1 melihat SP12 ditarik masuk ke dalam kereta MyVi pada 12.12.2017. SP27 yang menunjukkan gambar ID1151 tertera tarikh diambil sebagai 26.12.2017 pada jam 8.40pm selari dengan catatan pada sampul CD P210 tercatit 13.12.2017 dan 26.12.2017. Ini selari dengan keterangan SP10 yang menyatakan wang RM100,000.00 untuk gaji pekerja telah dikeluarkan pada 4.12.2017 manakala RM200,000.00 dikeluarkan dari Hong Leong Bank lebih kurang pada 28.12.2017 dan gambar turut diambil pada lebih kurang 28 haribulan. [44] Pada dapatan Mahkamah, tarikh 28.12.2017 adalah tarikh berdasarkan ingatan SP10 kerana dia telah menggunakan perkataan ‘lebih kurang’ untuk menggambarkan situasi ini. Namun, Mahkamah harus sentiasa beringat bahawa sesuatu perbicaraan bukanlah bersandarkan dengan sendirinya kepada kuatnya ingatan seseorang saksi kepada sesuatu fakta ‘it is not a trial by memory’. Akta Keterangan 1950 itu sendiri membenarkan apa-apa keterangan kontemporari ‘contemporaneous’ digunakan untuk menunjukkan apa-apa keterangan saksi sebagai benar, kredibel dan konsisten (‘true, credible and consistent’). S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [45] Dalam kes ini, SP10 mempunyai resit pengeluaran RM200,000.00 tersebut dan bersedia untuk mengemukakan resit pengeluaran tersebut. Meskipun terdapat ketinggalan di pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakannya, namun dari segi CD P210 tersebut menunjukkan keterangan bila gambar-gambar tersebut diambil. Bersandarkan kepada keseluruhan keterangan ini, Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa ID151 adalah satu dokumen yang kontemporari, kandungannya benar dan konsisten dengan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan keterangan dokumentar yang lain. [46] Berhubung dengan pematuhan kepada seksyen 90A pula, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Abdul Rahman Mohd v PP [2021] 1 LNS 804, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan bergantung kepada dicta oleh Augustine Paul J dalam kes PP v. Ramli Shafie [2002] 8 CLJ 846 yang berhadapan dengan isu sama ada gambar boleh dikemukakan tanpa memanggil saksi jurugambar. Augustine Paul J menerima masuk gambar tanpa perlu memanggil jurugambar atau mengemukakan filem negative kerana gambar ini telah dicamkan oleh saksi lain dan tanpa gambar-gambar ini dicabar kesahihannya. [47] Memetik penghakiman Augustine Paul J di dalam kes tersebut yang menyatakan kebolehterimaan gambar tanpa keperluan memanggil jurugambar kerana wujud saksi untuk mengesahkan apa yang dikemukakan melalui gambar ini adalah satu pernyataan fakta yang benar menjadi sandaran mahkamah ini seperti berikut: “In further elaboration, I refer to a passage from Evidence: Proof and Practice by Graham Roberts at p 545: S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 A question that arises where photographs are to be tendered is whether it is necessary to call the photographer. Generally speaking, there is no need to call the photographer provided that a witness is available who can testify that what is shown on the photograph is a fair and accurate representation of the scene at the relevant time. Calling the photographer will generally only be necessary when no such witness is available or in special cases when technical details of the photographer's art are likely to be in question. In other words, what is required, in the usual case, of a witness through whom a photograph is to be tendered is first-hand knowledge of what is shown in the photograph rather than first-hand knowledge of the taking of the photograph (see JW McElhaney, Trial Notebook (2nd Ed, Litigation Section of the American Bar Association, 1987) pp 202-203)”. [48] Di dalam kes Abdul Rahman (supra), apa yang dapat dirumuskan oleh Mahkamah ini ialah Mahkamah Rayuan dengan lebih lanjut menyatakan kesahihan sesuatu gambar adalah isu utama yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah meskipun pematuhan kepada seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan tidak dipatuhi sepenuhnya. Sebagai contoh, gambar kejadian bunuh semestinya akan diterima masuk sebagai sahih dan benar kerana tidak akan ada pihak-pihak yang akan mewujudkan senario seumpamanya yang menjadikan isu kesahihan gambar tersebut (no parties would recreate or re-enact the scene to suggest challenge to the authenticity of the photographs). [49] Mahkamah ini bersetuju bahawa isu pokok yang perlu diputuskan meskipun dengan kewujudan seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan ialah jika gambar-gambar ID151 ini memberi cerita yang benar dan bukan diada- S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 adakan. Untuk ini juga, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pendakwaan yang merujuk kepada kes PP v Lin Lian Chen [1990] 2CLJ 1020 dan memutuskan ID151 boleh dikemukakan melalui IO SP27 apabila Mohtar Abdullah J menyatakan seperti berikut: “Mohd. Noor bin Jantan must be viewed in the light of the observation stated by Suffian LP himself: ... in our judgment it is immaterial whether or not the statement is a public document - for the principle is that a witness who has any document which is within his possession or power which is required by the defence and which is material to the defence, is bound to produce it; and this rule applies whether or not the document is public or private - save that in the case of a document within the possession or power of Government, Crown privilege may in certain circumstances be claimed. It is not suggested that the cautioned statement here is protected by Crown privilege. In the present case, the investigating officer had the cautioned statement " within his possession or power” ... Following Suffian LP's observation, for the purpose of the present case, the principle can be restated as follows: the principle is that any witness (including an investigating officer) who has any document (including a cautioned statement of an accused person) which is within his possession or power which is required by the defence and which is material to the defence, is bound to produce it...” (emphasis mine) [50] Dengan mengambil kira cabaran oleh pihak pembelaan berhubung wang ini melalui soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi-saksi pendakwaan iaitu ia sebagai satu perangkap yang diaturkan oleh Insp Praba SP17 dan SP12 mangsa Pratap sendiri (yang dinafikan oleh kedua- S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 duanya), wang ini adalah wang yang diberikan polis sebagai perangkap (yang turut dinafikan), wang yang ditemui dalam bakul di bilik Lalitha SP23 ini yang diletakkan oleh anak lelaki atau anak perempuan SP23 (dinafikan saksi), maka adalah jelas pembelaan sebenarnya tidak mencabar kewujudan sejumlah wang dalam bentuk nota RM50.00 ini. Berdasarkan keseluruhan prinsip dalam kes yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan semasa pembelaan dipanggil, untuk ID151 diterima masuk sebagai P151. Pembuktian kes di bawah seksyen 3 dan seksyen 5 Akta Culik [51] Bagi pertuduhan ke atas OKT1-3, iaitu melarikan secara salah ‘abduction’, maksud ‘abduction’ di bawah Akta Culik ialah sebagaimana takrifan di dalam Kanun Keseksaan apabila seksyen 2 Akta memperuntukkan: “wrongful restraint”, “wrongful confinement” and “abduction” shall have the meanings assigned to them in sections 339, 340 and 362 respectively of the Penal Code [Act 574]. [52] Seksyen 3 Akta yang sama memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Section 3. Abduction, wrongful restraint or wrongful confinement for ransom. (1) Whoever, with intent to hold any person for ransom, abducts or wrongfully confines or wrongfully restrains such person shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punished on conviction with imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years but not exceeding forty years and with whipping. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Section 362. Abduction. Whoever by force compels or by any deceitful means induces any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person. [53] Seksyen 5 pertuduhan OKT4 pula memperuntukkan: Section 5. Knowingly receiving ransom. (1) Whoever receives, has possession of or disposes of any money or property or any proceeds thereof, which has at any time been delivered as ransom in connection with any offence punishable under section 6, knowing that such money or other property has at any time been delivered as such ransom, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punished on conviction with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and shall also be liable to whipping. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person found to be in possession of any money or property or any proceeds thereof which has at any time been delivered as ransom shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have knowledge that such money or other property was delivered as such ransom. Seksyen 2 Akta pula mentakrifkan: “ransom” means any money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the release of a person abducted or wrongfully confined or wrongfully restrained. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [54] Mahkamah melalui penilaian maksima ke atas kredibiliti keterangan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan khususnya SP12 dan berpuas hati bahawa SP12 adalah seorang saksi yang kredibel. Keterangan SP1 dan SP12 menunjukkan berlakunya kejadian SP12 dilarikan secara salah. Versi SP12 pada dapatan Mahkamah adalah saksi yang kredibel kerana mengambil kira keterangan SP12 mengenai pengamatannya yang meskipun dalam keadaan mata bertutup, peka pada bunyi-bunyi seperti shutters ditarik dan ditutup, bunyi tong gas digerakkan yang konsisten dengan penemuan tempat SP12 dikurung sepertimana di gambar P137. [55] Keterangan SP10, SP12 dan SP17 selanjutnya juga membuktikan berlakunya kejadian menahan SP12 secara salah untuk mendapatkan wang tebusan apabila komunikasi telefon dibuat di antara suspek dengan SP10 yang turut didengari oleh SP17. Keterangan SP10 adalah material kerana SP10 adalah saksi yang merundingkan untuk jumlah tebusan dikurangkan dari jumlah asal yang diperas oleh suspek. [56] Keterangan SP12 juga memainkan peranan penting kerana telah dapat mengecam OKT8 Pooganeswaran seorang polis bantuan yang pada awalnya telah mendekati SP12 dan memperkenalkan diri sebagai polis yang telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan alternative seksyen 365 KK. Hasil soal siasat atas OKT8 inilah yang membawa kepada lain-lain suspek yang membawa kepada penemuan wang tebusan yang ditemui dalam keadaan tersorok. Penemuan gari dan ski mask juga menyokong versi kejadian oleh SP12. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [57] Identiti OKT-OKT pula ditentukan melalui pengecaman melalui penemuan DNA mangsa beserta DNA OKT1 (Jevan), OKT4 (Pirankash), OKT8 (Poonganeswaran) dan suspek Rovin Jothy. Fakta penemuan DNA OKT-OKT lain adalah relevan kerana menunjukkan berlakunya penculikan dengan melarikan secara salah SP12. Di samping itu, perbuatan OKT1 (Jevan) dan isterinya OKT4 (Vijaya), OKT2 (Surendran) dan OKT5 (Muniandy) membawa polis kepada penemuan sebahagian wang tebusan dalam keadaan jumlah yang besar dan tersorok dengan nombor siri selari dengan nombor siri wang dalam P151 (lihat bermula para 32 penghakiman ini) membuktikan kesemua memainkan peranan melarikan dan menahan dengan salah, mangsa SP12 kerana mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai wang tebusan ini yang ditemui dalam keadaan tersorok. [58] Untuk tujuan ini, anggapan seksyen 5(2) juga terpakai terhadap OKT4 (lihat para 78 penghakiman dan kes Krishna Rao yang disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di [2009] 2CLJ 603, Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor [1947] 74 IA 65 dan Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy v Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 367 berhubung kenyataan yang boleh diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah ini berhubung seksyen 27 Akta Keterangan dan seksyen 8 Akta yang sama sebagaimana diputuskan dalam ‘ruling’ Mahkamah semasa prosiding bicara berlangsung). [59] Meskipun jumlah wang yang dipadankan dengan nombor siri bukan berjumlah RM300,000.00 namun sebahagian besarnya telah diteliti dan dibuat perbandingan oleh SP27 dan disahkan semasa SP27 memberi keterangan. Tindakan OKT-OKT dalam kes ini memecahkan jumlah wang tebusan dengan membuat ‘layering’ melibatkan pengagihan kepada isteri S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 atau ahli keluarga serta sahabat melibatkan motif bertujuan untuk mengelakkan wang rampasan ini daripada mudah dikesan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini berpuashati bahawa satu kes di bawah seksyen 3 dan seksyen 5 dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan memanggil OKT-OKT untuk membela diri (lihat: Ting Khai Sin & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 MLJ 417). Kes pembelaan [60] Kesemua tertuduh membuat permohonan untuk OKT-OKT yang mengaku salah serta Rovin Jothy dikemukakan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan akan mengemukakan kenyataan 112 mereka kepada pihak pembelaan memandangkan OKT-OKT ini serta Rovin Jothy pada tarikh ditawarkan kepada pembelaan, tidak dibawa ke Mahkamah (lihat tentang keperluan mengemukakan saksi-saksi ini semasa ditawarkan: Ti Chuee Hiang v PP 1995 2MLJ 433 (SC), PP v Asnawi Yusuf [2012] 3CLJ 41 (COA)). [61] Apa yang dapat disimpulkan oleh Mahkamah ini ialah OKT-OKT awal yang lain ini telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan pilihan seksyen 365KK dan fakta kes yang dikemukakan menunjukkan mangsa yang terlibat ialah Pratap SP12. Oleh itu, versi SP12 bahawa dia dilarikan dan dikurung adalah kredibel. Malahan soal balas atas OKT2 juga bersetuju bahawa terdapat wang yang dirampas dari bilik sembahyang rumahnya, OKT4 (Pirakhas) melalui fakta yang dikemukakan juga menyatakan terdapat permintaan untuk wang tebusan dibuat dan fakta kes OKT8 (Pooganeswaran) menunjukkan wang habuan RM33,000.00 yang dirampas daripadanya yang disahkan sebagai wang tebusan melalui nombor siri oleh SP27. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [62] Semasa kes pembelaan, OKT5 Muniandy (dalam pertuduhan asal atau OKT3 dalam pertuduhan terkini) telah meninggal dunia sebelum sempat memberi keterangan. Atas permintaan Peguambela dan TPR untuk perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada pembebasan direkodkan, Mahkamah memerintahkan OKT3 dilepas tanpa dibebaskan (DNAA). [63] OKT4 (dirujuk sebagai SD3) pula menyatakan menerima sejumlah wang RM100,000.00 sebagaimana pertuduhan daripada ‘Jack’ atau Rovin Jothy untuk tujuan membayar duit peguam bagi Jevan dan Sundramurti. Namun, OKT4 menyatakan tidak mengenali ‘Jack’. Pada masa yang sama, sejumlah RM30,000.00 diserah pada Lalita (SP23) kerana rumah Lalita terletak dalam perjalanan ke Pejabat peguam Dato’ Baljit. [64] Dari baki RM70,000.00, sejumlah RM15,000.00 pula, menurut SD3 (OKT4) telah dibayar pada Dato’ Baljit, sejumlah RM5,000.00 dengan pecahan RM1,000.00 OKT4 (SD3) telah simpan dalam kereta manakala RM4,000.00 lagi dibelanjakan. Baki RM50,000.00 diagihkan pada ahli keluarganya termasuk makciknya Vasantha dan ini termasuk RM10,000.00 yang diserahkan oleh Vasantha kepada Sarasbathy (SP25). [65] Apabila disoal balas oleh TPR, SD3 menyatakan tidak membayar seluruh wang yang diserahkan oleh Jack kepada Dato’ Baljit kerana S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 arahan Dato’ Baljit ialah untuk membuat bayaran secara ansuran berdasarkan permintaan yang akan dibuat oleh Dato’ Baljit. Tiada bantahan oleh mana-mana pihak berhubung kenyataan SD3 ini. Walau bagaimanapun, di akhir kes pembelaan, Mahkamah terpaksa menolak keterangan SD3 ini kerana ‘hearsay’ atau dengar cakap kerana Dato’ Baljit tidak dipanggil (see: PP v Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim (No.3) (1999) 2MLJ 1) [66] Keterangan SD3 dibandingkan dengan soalbalas peguam OKT terhadap SP25 tidak membawa kepada cabaran bahawa jumlah RM10,000.00 telah diserahkan kepada SP25 oleh SD3. Sebagai tambahan, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah sesuatu yang tidak munasabah untuk ‘Jack’ atau Rovin Jothy menyerah sejumlah besar wang RM100,000.00 kepada SD3 atas alasan untuk mendapatkan perkhidmatan peguam bagi Jevan (OKT1) dan Sundramurti (adik Rovin) meskipun OKT1 ialah suami SD3 sedangkan SD3 sendiri menyatakan tidak mengenali Jack ‘Rovin Jothy’ dan Jack sendiri adalah salah seorang tangkapan dalam kes ini. [67] Malahan, SD1 OKT1 sendiri turut menyatakan tidak mengenali Rovin Jothy maka adalah sesuatu di luar norma untuk Rovin Jothy memberi jumlah besar ini untuk membantu orang yang tiada hubungan dengannya. SD3 juga bersetuju Rovin Jothy tidak perlu menyerahkan sejumlah wang kepada SD3 kerana Rovin Jothy sendiri boleh melantik peguam untuk adiknya Sundramurti. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [68] Keterangan SD3 juga menyatakan telah memberikan baki RM50,000.00 kepada Vasantha dan Vasantha telah berikan RM10,000.00 kepada Sarasbathy SP25. Keterangan SP25 ini tidak dicabar dalam solabalas pembelaan dari segi perbuatan SD3 yang apabila ditanya oleh SP25 duit apa, SD3 hanya diam tersenyum dan keadaan SD3 di dalam van polis pada hari rampasan di rumah SP25 yang bergari dan menangis sambil memohon maaf kepada SP25. Oleh itu, penafian SD3 semasa kes pembelaan apabila disoalbalas oleh TPR yang mencadangkan SD3 tahu ia wang hasil penculikan SP12 tidak disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan. [69] Keterangan OKT1 SD1 pula menyatakan dia sering keluar dengan Muniandy untuk minum dan kereta dipandu oleh Muniandy. Namun tiada apa-apa keterangan yang ditawarkan untuk menjelaskan bagaimana rambut dengan kesan DNA mangsa boleh ditemui dalam kereta Wira milik Muniandy meskipun terdapat cadangan kepada SP27 IO bahawa rambut OKT1 telah diletakkan dalam kereta tersebut (it was planted), yang tidak dipersetujui oleh SP27. [70] Di dalam PSD1 (kenyataan saksi OKT1) menyatakan darah dan rambutnya telah diambil oleh pihak polis tanpa dimaklumkan apa tujuannya. Perlu diingat bahawa OKT1 menyatakan sering menaiki kereta ini. Atas jawapan OKT1 yang bertentangan dengan cadangan bahawa rambutnya (dan bukan rambut mangsa SP12) diletakkan dalam kereta Wira ini oleh pihak polis, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa OKT1 mengubah cerita pada saat akhir ketika kes pembelaan menjadikan pembelaannya tidak konsisten dengan versinya sendiri. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [71] Oleh itu, dengan dapatan Mahkamah berhubung isu ini sebagai pemikiran terkemudian, maka Mahkamah menerima versi pendakwaan berhubung penemuan rambut milik SP12 mangsa dan OKT1 di tempat duduk belakang sebagai munasabah. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat rumusan terdapat bukti menunjukkan mangsa SP12 berada bersama OKT1 dalam kereta Wira milik Muniandy. [72] SD1 iaitu OKT1 juga menyatakan telah meminta adik Rovin Jothy (Sundramurti) untuk membantunya mendapatkan khidmat peguam dan SD1 menyatakan SD3 telah memberitahunya Jack iaitu Rovin Jothy telah memberikan wang RM100,000.00 untuk lantik peguam. SD3 mengulanginya dalam pembelaan SD3 namun semasa soalbalas, SD3 menyatakan tidak tahu wang ini untuk tujuan lantik peguam. [73] Meskipun pembelaan SD3 menyatakan Sundramurti telah menelefonnya dan beritahu abangnya Jack akan beri RM100,000.00 kepada OKT3 untuk dibayar kepada peguam untuk Jevan (OKT1) dan Sundramurti, yang mana berdasarkan senarai bongkar D218, menunjukkan 3 resit bayaran kepada Shukor, Baljit & Partners masing- masing bertarikh 8.1.18, 12.1.18 dan 15.1.18 untuk jumlah RM5,000.00, RM7,000.00 dan RM3,000.00, namun tiada mana-mana wakil dari firma ini yang dipanggil untuk mengesahkan arahan bayaran berkala ini (lihat para 65 penghakiman ini). S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [74] Pembelaan SD3 ini tidak pernah dicadangkan kepada SP23 kerana SD3 menyatakan kerana dia (SD3) takut menyimpan jumlah yang besar dan oleh kerana rumah SP23 berada dalam laluan ke Pejabat peguam menyebabkan SD3 meminta SP23 menyimpannya. Namun, versi SP23 ialah SD3 hanya datang ke rumahnya pada 14.1.18 untuk mandi dan tiada keterangan kedatangan SD3 pada tarikh-tarikh lain sebagaimana yang tercatit di resit 8.1.18, 12.1.18 dan 15.1.18. [75] SP23 percaya wang tersebut ialah wang SD3 kerana nampak SD3 menunjukkan ke arah almari tersebut kepada polis SP27. Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan versi SD3 bahawa SP23 tahu mengenai wang tersebut kerana telah diserahkan kepada SP23 dan dia tahu untuk tujuan bayaran peguam tidak dibuktikan dan tidak berjaya menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. Sebaliknya, ia menunjukkan pengetahuan di pihak OKT4. [76] Pembelaan OKT2 pula ialah meskipun mengenali Jevan iaitu OKT1, namun menafikan terlibat dengan penculikan ini. Walau bagaimanapun, OKT2 semasa soal balas bersetuju terdapat rampasan sejumlah wang dari bilik sembahyang rumahnya. Namun, telah menafikan dia yang meletakkan sejumlah wang dalam bag pouch dan plastik oren tersorok dalam bilik sembahyang tersebut. Namun, pembelaan OKT2 ini tidak pula mencadangkan bagaimana wang ini boleh ditemui berada dalam keadaan tersorok dalam rumahnya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa wang ini telah disorokkan oleh OKT2 sendiri. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [77] Kedua-dua OKT1 dan OKT2 memberi keterangan bahawa mereka telah dipukul dengan teruk oleh pihak polis untuk membuat pengakuan. OKT1 menyatakan telah mengadu kepada Majistret semasa tahanan reman berlangsung melibatkan reman OKT1, OKT2 dan Sundramurti. OKT2 pula menyatakan dia juga telah dipukul tetapi tidak berani mengadu kepada Majistret kerana bimbang akan membawa kepada kes kematian semasa dalam tahanan. [78] Mahkamah berpendapat alasan OKT2 ini tidak munasabah kerana jika tahanan reman dibuat serentak ke atas OKT1, OKT2 dan Sundramurti maka OKT2 sepatutnya menggunakan peluang yang sama bersama OKT1 untuk memajukan aduannya dipukul kepada Majistret tetapi ini tidak berlaku. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa alasan OKT2 dia juga telah dipukul untuk membuat pengakuan tidak menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah lebih-lebih lagi semasa IO SP27 memberi keterangan berhubung pandu arah, isu mengenai ‘inducement, not on his own volition’ hanya timbul selepas beberapa siri soalan dibangkitkan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan Mahkamah bertujuan untuk mengetahui asas atau sebab bantahan yang dibangkitkan oleh pembelaan. [79] Atas bantahan OKT1 pula yang dia dipukul, tiada laporan polis yang dikatakan dibuat pada tahun 2018 yang dikemukakan atas alasan tercicir di penjara manakala surat yang dikatakan disediakan oleh peguam D216 untuk tujuan mendapatkan salinan pula hanya bertarikh 27.3.2023 selepas pembelaan OKT dipanggil. Keterangan OKT1 dengan merujuk kepada gambar P135(5&6) bahawa dia mengalami kecederaan lebam S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 pada muka, di mata, pipi dan punggung terkoyak ‘ligament tear’ dan kecederaan tangan hanya boleh diterima masuk setakat ia dapat dilihat pada P135 manakala kecederaan ‘ligament tear’ pada punggung bukan suatu yang jelas nyata tanpa laporan perubatan. [80] Oleh itu, dengan mengetepikan kecederaan ‘ligament tear’ pada punggung kerana tidak disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan, kecederaan pada OKT1 menurut kes PP v Krishna Rao Gurumurthi & Ors [2000]1CLJ 446 di mana Kang Hwee Gee J membuat dapatan hanyalah satu kecederaan yang tidak serius berbangkit daripada keperluan polis yang bertindak dalam menjalankan tugas mendapatkan maklumat sebagaimana yang diputuskan seperti berikut: “Far from being of trifling weight, the two sets of information provided by the respective accused in the instant case were of enormous value to the prosecution whose case may stand or fall by them. Their probative value certainly outweighs their prejudicial effect. There is in my judgement therefore no valid ground to reject them on the basis that they may not have been given voluntarily by the respective accused. In any case, I could not find any evidence of any form of oppression beyond that which was reasonably expected and required by the police to obtain information to find the killers of the four persons…" [81] Mahkamah bersetuju kecederaan yang ada pada OKT1 hanyalah satu kecederaan yang tidak mudarat dibandingkan dengan keperluan untuk polis bertindak mendapatkan maklumat dalam menjalankan S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 siasatannya. Oleh itu, apa-apa keterangan yang datang daripada OKT1 berbangkit daripada tindakan polis hingga mengakibatkan kecederaan ini adalah satu tindakan perlu untuk memastikan penjenayah dapat dikenalpasti dan dibawa ke muka pengadilan meskipun pihak polis telah ada suspek lain Rovin Jothy dan Sundramurti yang dapat membantu siasatan dari segi pengemukaan maklumat. Peranan Rovin Jothy [82] Mahkamah ini meskipun bersetuju dengan cadangan pihak pembelaan bahawa Rovin Jothy adalah saksi yang material, namun tanpa keterangan Rovin Jothy di Mahkamah tidak menjadikan terdapat kelompangan dalam kes pendakwaan kerana elemen di bawah seksyen 3 dan 5 telah dibuktikan dengan wang tebusan ini telah ditemui melalui pandu arah oleh saksi atau OKT sendiri. [83] Keseluruhan keterangan yang ada dan analisa Mahkamah ini, membawa kepada pendapat Mahkamah bahawa kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan Rovin Jothy (berada dalam tahanan menurut SP27) dan Sundramurti (tidak dapat dikesan melalui usaha yang dibuat secara carian iklan) untuk disoal-balas oleh pembelaan ataupun dipanggil sebagai saksi pembelaan tidak mengakibatkan ruang dan peluang pihak pembelaan untuk menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terjejas kerana pihak pendakwaan telahpun membuat tawaran untuk mengemukakan kenyataan 112 saksi (lihat: Siti Aisyah v PP [2019] 4MLJ 46). Pihak pembelaan tidak ada membuat permohonan lanjut untuk kenyataan ini. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh dipersalahkan atas kegagalan mengemukakan mereka. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [84] Kegagalan mengemukakan OKT-OKT lain yang telah mengaku salah di atas pertuduhan alternative seksyen 365KK juga tidak membangkitkan anggapan seksyen 114(g) kerana apa jua peranan mereka telahpun dinyatakan dalam fakta kes yang dikemukakan hasil daripada pengakuan salah mereka. Dengan ketiadaan anggapan seksyen 114(g) terpakai, maka tugas pendakwaan untuk menyediakan dan memanggil mereka sebagai saksi kepada pembelaan, selesai. [85] Soal balas pembelaan ke atas kesemua nama-nama suspek dan OKT-OKT seksyen 365KK jikapun wujud keperluan, hanyalah untuk menyokong pembelaan OKT1-OKT4. Pada tahap ini, setelah analisa keterangan OKT1-OKT4 itu sendiri dibuat, keterangan pembelaan mereka adalah tidak konsisten dengan ketidak bersalahan mereka. Oleh itu, jikapun berlaku kegagalan menyediakan suspek-suspek dan OKT- OKT seksyen 365KK oleh pihak pendakwaan, ia tidak membawa apa-apa kesan ke atas kebersalahan OKT1-OKT4 kerana keterangan utama yang gagal menimbulkan keraguan munsabah yang membawa Mahkamah ini memutuskan ketiadaan keterangan sokongan dari suspek-suspek dan OKT-OKT seksyen 365KK tidak memprejudiskan mereka. Memetik Augustine Paul J yang memutuskan “It must be noted that the question of corroboration does not arise unless the evidence of the witness requiring corroboration is itself credible” (lihat: Aziz Muhamad Din v PP [1997]1CLJ Supp 523). [86] Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan pihak pembelaan telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah berhubung keterangan S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 kes pendakwaan dan mensabitkan kesemua tertuduh. Setelah mendengar hujahan memberatkan dan mitigasi, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman 30 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap dan 3 sebatan rotan bagi OKT1 dan 2. Bagi OKT4, dijatuhkan hukuman penjara 5 tahun dari tarikh keputusan (kerana OKT4 berada dalam jaminan). Refreshing memory [87] Sebagai tambahan selain daripada analisa keterangan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mengambil kesempatan untuk membincangkan mengenai keperluan saksi memberi keterangan dengan mengambil ikrar bercakap benar tanpa perlu merasa bebanan untuk mengingati secara terperinci setiap fakta kerana bimbang dituduh tidak bercakap benar atau menyembunyikan fakta. Tidak dinafikan, atas lambakan kes yang berdaftar di Mahkamah menunggu untuk dibicarakan, telah timbul keperluan untuk saksi mengingatkan semula fakta apabila dipanggil sebagai saksi. Undang-undang telah mengiktiraf keperluan mengingat semula ini apabila memperuntukkan seksyen 159 Akta Keterangan 1950 seperti berikut: Section 159. Refreshing memory. (1) A witness may while under examination refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory. (2) The witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if, when he read it, he knew it to be correct. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 (3) Whenever the witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the court, refer to a copy of that document: Provided the court is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original. (4) An expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises. [88] Di dalam kes ini, telah timbul keperluan untuk saksi pendakwaan merujuk kepada dokumen rajah kasar apabila memberi keterangan. Rajah kasar ini tidak dikemukakan kepada pihak pembelaan di bawah seksyen 51A KTJ dan TPR, atas bantahan pihak pembelaan jelas menyatakan tidak bercadang untuk mengemukakannya. Oleh itu, saksi telah membuat permohonan untuk merujuk kepada rajah kasar tersebut dengan tujuan ‘refreshing memory’. [89] Di pihak Mahkamah pula dengan berdasarkan keterangan saksi yang telah diberi sehinggalah permohonan ‘refreshing memory’ dibuat, berpendapat dokumen lebih sesuai dikemukakan kerana jika tidak dikemukakan, Mahkamah akan berada dalam keadaan teragak-agak apa yang cuba digambarkan oleh saksi. Walau bagaimanapun, memandangkan pihak pendakwaan tidak bercadang untuk mengemukakannya sebaliknya membuat rujukan kepada permohonan saksi untuk ‘refresh his memory’, maka keperluan seksyen 159 Akta perlulah dipatuhi. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [90] ‘Refreshing memory’ bukan setakat membaca seksyen 159 secara kasar dan ‘literal’ iaitu dokumen dirujuk kepada saksi dan saksi melihat dokumen dan terus menyampaikan apa yang dihasratkan oleh saksi setelah melihat dokumen ini. Seksyen 159 itu sendiri memberi syarat untuk pembuktian dokumen ini sama ada dibuat oleh saksi ini sendiri atau tidak, bila dibuat dan yang lebih utama pihak pembelaan juga berhak untuk melihat dokumen yang dicadangkan untuk dirujuk oleh saksi (lihat seksyen 159, 160 dan 161 Akta). Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, apa yang berlaku ialah bacaan secara kasar seksyen 159 itu sendiri bahawa ia disediakan oleh saksi namun tiada perincian bila ia dibuat sama ada kontemporari atau tidak. [91] Atas alasan ini, Mahkamah tidak membenarkan rujukan kepada dokumen tersebut kerana tidak memenuhi syarat yang ditetapkan oleh seksyen 159 itu sendiri. Selain daripada itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat pihak pendakwaan tidak disekat daripada merujuk dan mengemukakan rajah kasar ini meskipun tidak diserahkan kepada pihak pembelaan kerana seksyen 51A KTJ bukan satu peruntukan bersabit kebolehterimaan dokumen sebagai eksibit ‘admissibilibity of documents as exhibits’ (lihat: PP v. Mohd Fazil Awaludin [2009] 2 CLJ 862. Ini adalah antara pemerhatian yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini dan dikemukakan untuk panduan. Bertarikh 28 Disember 2023 Hakim MTSJB S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 Bagi pihak pendakwaan; TPR Ho Kwong Chin, TPR Haikal Ismail & TPR Shahrul Ekhsan Hasim Pejabat Pendakwaan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan. Bagi pihak tertuduh 1 & 4: Dennis Mahen. R & Associates 05-06 5th Floor TKS Business Centre Wisma Tan Kim San No. 518A, 3rd Mile Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah 51200 Kuala Lumpur. Pagi pihak tertuduh 2: Tetuan Gabriel Susayan and Partners No. 61, 2nd Floor Bangunan Ban Guan Hin Jalan Dato’ Hamzah, 41000 Klang Selangor Darul Ehsan. S/N ei4kPgS4wUiylBVr4tngOA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-12ANCvC-38-08/2023

PERAYU Chu Boon Tiong RESPONDEN Tetuan Bahari & Bahari (Menuntut sebagai sebuah firma)

TATACARA SIVIL: Rayuan dari Mahkamah Rendah ke Mahkamah Tinggi – Penghakiman terus di bawah A. 14 k. 1 Kaedah-Kaeedah Mahkamah 2012 − Isu baki yuran guaman yang tertunggak bukanlah seperti perkhidmatan perubatan di mana seseorang pesakit hanya boleh selesai berurusan dengan doktor apabila memperoleh “ubat” selepas “bercakap”/konsultansi dengan doktor. Profesyen peguam adalah lebih daripada itu di mana “ubat” hanya boleh diperoleh daripada Mahkamah. Sebagai “perantara” antara Mahkamah dan anakguam, peguam ialah orang penting yang menyediakan segala dokumen untuk penelitian Mahkamah.

03/01/2024

YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f0a89d25-273f-4db8-9c5e-dd061e007e54&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-12ANCvC-38-08/2023 ANTARA CHU BOON TIONG (No. K/P: 710527-04-5149) − PERAYU DAN TETUAN BAHARI & BAHARI (Menuntut sebagai sebuah firma) − RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Petaling Jaya Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Guaman Sivil No: BB-A52NCVC-17-01/2023 Antara TETUAN BAHARI & BAHARI (Menuntut sebagai sebuah firma) − Plaintif Dan CHU BOON TIONG (No. K/P: 710527-04-5149) − Defendan) [Yang diputuskan oleh Sazlina binti Syafie, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen Petaling Jaya pada 20-7-2023] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 03/01/2024 15:36:19 BA-12ANCvC-38-08/2023 Kand. 16 S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Pengenalan [1] En. Chu Boon Tiong ialah Defendan dalam kes di Mahkamah Sesyen Petaling Jaya di mana beliau telah dituntut oleh Tetuan Bahari & Bahari, sebuah firma guaman (Plaintif). [2] Tuntutan Tetuan Bahari & Bahari terhadap En. Chu Boon Tiong ialah untuk baki bayaran guaman berjumlah RM244,180.00. [3] Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan interlokutori untuk memperoleh penghakiman terus terhadap Defendan dan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan permohonan Plaintif. [4] Defendan tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen memfailkan rayuannya ke Mahkamah Tinggi ini. [5] Pada 15-11-2023, saya memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan oleh Perayu (Defendan) dan keputusan Puan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana (Pn HMS) dikekalkan. Kos rayuan sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur dibayar oleh Perayu (Defendan) kepada Responden (Plaintif). Fakta Kes [6] Pada atau lebih kurang bulan Ogos 2018, Defendan dan 7 yang lain telah disaman di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur di bawah Saman WA- 22NCC-355-08/2018 mengenai melibatkan tuntutan jumlah pelaburan sebanyak RM43,136,069.00 yang di antara lainnya telah dibayar kepada Defendan. Plaintif-plaintif tersebut telah memohon, antara lainnya, suatu S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 injunksi, deklarasi, akaun keuntungan atas kemungkiran tugas fidusiari, perintah pembekuan akaun CDS, perintah halangan dari penjualan, penyembunyian, penyerah hak milik, pelupusan saham atau dana yang berkaitan, saham, aset atau kepentingan lain, pemberian penyata kewangan yang lengkap, pendedahan oleh broker saham berkaitan dengan pegangan saham Defendan yang berkenaan semuanya sepertimana dalam Saman tersebut dan juga permohonan interlokutori. [7] Defendan telah meminta khidmat guaman T/N Bahari & Bahari (Plaintif) untuk mewakilinya dan adiknya Chu Boon Siong dalam Saman tersebut dan telah bersetuju membuat bayaran khidmat guaman Plaintif. [8] Defendan telah membuat sebahagian bayaran invois-invois tersebut dan Defendan terus meminta khidmat nasihat guaman dari Plaintif untuk kes-kes lain Defendan. [9] Defendan telah berkali-kali berjanji untuk membayar Invois tersebut termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada janji untuk membuat bayaran, tetapi gagal, abai dan/atau cuai menunaikan janji tersebut. [10] Oleh itu, Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan seperti yang berikut: (a) Jumlah Baki Bayaran sebanyak RM 244,180.00; (b) Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun terhadap jumlah sebanyak RM244,180.00 tersebut dari tarikh akhir matang Invois-invois tersebut pada 7-2-2019 sehingga tarikh penghakiman; S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (c) Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun terhadap jumlah sebanyak RM244,180.00 dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; (d) Kos. Penghakiman terus: [11] Pada 28-4-2023, Plaintif memfailkan permohonan untuk memperoleh penghakiman terus di bawah Aturan 14 kaedah 1 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [12] Alasan-alasan permohonan antara lain seperti berikut: (a) Jumlah keseluruhan yang dituntut masih perlu dijelaskan dan terhutang daripada Defendan kepada Plaintif; (b) Defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan yang bona fide malah fikir semula serta diestop melalui tindakan-tindakannya sendiri; (c) Defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan; dan (d) Tidak ada apa-apa isu yang perlu dibicarakan dalam tindakan ini. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan: [13] Dalam afidavit jawapan untuk menentang permohonan penghakiman terus, Defendan menyatakan perkara yang berikut: (a) anggaran bayaran berkenaan dengan kuantum yang perlu dibayar sebagai yuran guaman yang dibincangkan oleh Defendan dengan Plaintif masih belum dipersetujui. (b) waran lantikan Plaintif tidak membutirkan jumlah yuran guaman yang Defendan perlu bayar untuk khidmat guaman Plaintif. (c) Plaintif gagal membawa nilai anggaran tersebut kepada perhatian Mahkamah. (d) yuran guaman adalah berlebihan dan tidak munasabah kerana bukan semua dakwaan dalam Guaman MTKL tersebut terhadap Defendan. (e) Plaintif sering mengeluarkan invois bagi yuran guamannya terutamanya pada tarikh yang berkaitan dengan Guaman MTKL hingga menyebabkan Defendan risau dengan Guaman MTKL akan terjejas. (f) atas dasar niat baik, Defendan membayar suatu jumlah sementara perbincangan dan perundingan berkaitan dengan yuran guaman dimuktamadkan. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (g) yuran guaman dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif secara unilateral. (h) Defendan ada membangkitkan perasaan tidak puas hati terhadap nasihat dan/atau kelakuan Plaintif dalam Guaman MTKL dan juga Guaman Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam. Oleh itu, pihak-pihak belum mencapai kata sepakat berkenaan dengan jumlah bayaran yuran guaman yang perlu dibayar. [14] Berdasarkan perkara yang dinyatakan, Defendan menyatakan bahawa terdapat isu untuk dibicarakan sebelum liabiliti disabitkan terhadap Defendan iaitu – (a) adakah memang benar bahawa jumlah yuran guaman yang dituntut dalam tindakan ini adalah jumlah yang dipersetujui oleh Defendan? (b) adakah terdapatnya perbincangan dan/atau pengaturan di antara pihak-pihak berkenaan dengan jumlah yang dituntut (yang mana disangkalkan) dan adakah jumlah tersebut telah matang? (c) apakah pengaturan sebenar di antara pihak-pihak terhadap yuran guaman pihak Plaintif? S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Sama ada terdapat kekhilafan dalam keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana? [15] Alasan penghakiman Pn HMS yang bijaksana memperkatakan mengenai dapatan fakta dan undang-undang mengenai keputusan membenarkan penghakiman terus. [16] Pn HMS yang bijaksana memutuskan bahawa dalam tuntutan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan di sini, ia adalah satu kes yang jelas dan terang dan tidak ada isu untuk dibicarakan atau keperluan memanggil saksi memberi keterangan. Mahkamah telah teliti kesemua kertas kausa, eksibit, hujahan serta otoriti kedua-dua pihak dan Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa kes ini adalah sesuai untuk direkodkan satu Penghakiman Terus. [17] Mahkamah Sesyen telah menganalisa fakta dan mendapati bahawa – • serahan writ saman telah sempurna diserahkan kepada Defendan dan pembelaan bagi tuntutan Plaintif di sini telah difailkan. • afidavit sokongan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif juga telah mengeksibitkan semua dokumen dan keterangan yang menyokong tuntutan mereka tersebut. • Plaintif telah dengan jelas menyatakan dalam afidavit mereka yang menyokong permohonan penghakiman terus ini bahawa Defendan telah gagal mengemukakan isu yang layak untuk S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 dibicarakan dan Plaintif percaya Defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan bermerit. • seterusnya, setelah beban beralih kepada pihak Defendan, Defendan telah gagal menunjukkan satu isu yang layak untuk dibicarakan. • Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pembelaan yang difailkan oleh Defendan tidak membawa apa-apa merit atau isu yang perlu dibicarakan. • isu yang dibangkitkan dalam affidavit Defendan telah dijawab oleh Plaintif dan disertakan dengan eksibit yang menyokong tuntutan Plaintif. • Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Defendan tidak pernah mempertikaikan invois-invois yang dikemukakan walaupun selepas setahun. Invois-invois tersebut juga telah dikira matang dan Defendan sendiri ada membuat bayaran. • fakta Defendan mendakwa beliau membuat bayaran adalah atas dasar niat baik (good will) dan masih dalam proses memuktamadkan jumlah yuran sepatutnya tidak dapat diterima. Ini kerana, atas dasar khidmat professional dan dari latar belakang yang ditunjukkan, Defendan bukanlah pertama kali menerima khidmat guaman secara professional terutama dengan Plaintif di sini. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [18] Pn HMS yang bijaksana telah merujuk peruntukan Akta dan nas undang-undang kes mengenai penghakiman terus dan khidmat profesional yang diberikan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan iaitu – • Aturan 14 kaedah 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. • kes Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ Rep 186. • kes Cempaka Finance Bhd v. Ho Lai Ying & Anor Federal Court, Putrajaya [2006] 3 CLJ 544. • seksyen 124 Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 (Akta 166). • kes Kris Heavy Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Lewis & Co [2017] 1 LNS 964, di mana YA Mohd Nazlan Mohd Ghazali memutuskan – “[46] Thus, the Plaintiff submitted that the sum reflected in the estimated bill did not immediately crystallize and become a debt due to the Defendant merely upon the expiry of the one year period after the delivery. And further, the Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to grant an order to compel the Defendant to prepare a detailed bill of costs even if more than one year had lapsed since the delivery of the bill to the Plaintiff. This was also the position taken in Mindvalley Labs Sdn Bhd v. Messrs Rao & Kamal (a legal firm in S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 partnership) [2016] 1 LNS 1303; [2017] 1 AMR 159. [47] There is in my view no argument that the debt stated in the bills would not necessarily or automatically crystallize upon the expiry of the one-year period stated in Section 128(2) of the LPA. The more pertinent issue in the instant case however is that the part-payments and the absence of dispute (prior to the disposal of the Appeal) evidenced the absence of a bona fide dispute as the debt. Equally of significance is the fact that the Plaintiff had not taken any steps to have the bills taxed, either before or after the expiry of the one-year period. Thus Tan Tek Sin does not fully advance the case of the Plaintiff. [50] Even more recently in Tetuan Kang & Kang v. Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 431 the High Court found as follows: “[33] … An invoice delivered by a solicitor to his client becomes a bona fide bill by virtue of the rebuttable presumption encapsulated in s. 124(2) of the LPA. The presumption is triggered in the absence of any objection or challenge to the solicitors’ bill. The bill is valid for purposes of s. 124. The client has one year from the date of delivery of the bill to tax the bill if he disputes the amount claimed. If the client does not avail himself of this procedure, his remedy under the LPA to S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 challenge the bill is extinguished by s. 128(2) of the LPA. This provision provides that the power to order an assessment shall not be exercisable on an application made by the client after the expiration of twelve months from the delivery of the bill. No taxation outside this period is permissible. [34] Turning to the facts in this instant case. The defendant did not seek taxation of the invoice at any point in time and the period mentioned in s. 128(2) of the LPA has expired. By operation of the statutory prohibition in s. 128(2), the amount claimed in the invoice has become final and payable. It cannot be disputed or challenged.”. [19] Selanjutnya, Pn HMS yang bijaksana menyatakan – “Dalam masa yang sama, invois tersebut telah diserahkan lebih daripada satu tahun dan tindakan guaman di MTKL juga telah selesai. Defendan mendakwa sehingga kini, kos yuran guaman masih belum dimuktamadkan antara kedua-dua pihak. Jika demikian, bagaimana yuran guaman ini boleh dikatakan muktamad atau bilakah tempoh sepatutnya ia dikatakan muktamad? Apa yang nyata adalah bahawa dari tindak tanduk (conduct) kedua-dua pihak, jumlah invois dan kuantum yuran guaman telah dimuktamadkan tetapi apa yang masih dibincangkan S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 adalah cara bayaran, bilakah bayaran dan tempoh masa yang masih diperlukan untuk Defendan membayar jumlah yang dinyatakan dalam invois. Peruntukan tentang seksyen seksyen 124 dan seksyen 128 Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 (Akta 166) dan bil antara peguam cara dan anakguam ini juga telah dijelaskan dalam kes Kris Heavy Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd (supra). Dari segi undang-undang, tuntutan Plaintif telah mencapai tempoh matang dan walaupun lebih setahun, Defendan gagal mengambil apa-apa tindakan Mahkamah melalui petisyen bagi mentaksirkan bil guaman yang dikenakan jika merasakan jumlah yang dikenakan adalah tidak munasabah, tidak berpatutan atau berlebihan (excessive). Apakah yang dimaksudkan jumlah tersebut belum dimuktamadkan? Dan jika benar, bagaimanakah Defendan menjangkakan jumlah ini akan dimuktamadkan? Ini bukanlah satu isu untuk dibicarakan sebagaimana cadangan Defendan untuk memanggil saksi-saksi memberi keterangan di Mahkamah berhubung apa perkara yang dibincangkan atau apa maksud perbualan Whatssap/email dan sebagainya yang mana berkemungkinan ia adalah dibuat tanpa prejudis antara pihak- pihak? S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Adalah tidak wajar pada peringkat ini untuk Defendan mendakwa beliau tertekan kerana tuntutan dibuat disaat-saat genting, Defendan tidak berpuas hati dengan perkhidmatan Plaintif dan sebagainya sedangkan masih ada perhubungan secara professional antara Plaintif dan Defendan atas permintaan Plaintif untuk masih menggunakan khidmat Plaintif selepas tamat tindakan di MTKL tersebut. [20] Pn HMS telah memetik keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Pendaftar Hakmilik Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Selangor & Anor v. Lau Yong Ying, 2020] 5 CLJ 164, di mana Y.A Kamardin Hashim JCA; Kamaludin Md Said JCA; Lee Swee Seng JCA memutuskan – “(5) As for payment for legal fees, this court affirmed the award given by the trial judge because the amount of RM1,172,791.26 had been agreed between the respondent and her lawyer to do the legal work for her. The lawyers’ invoices clearly showed that the invoices were addressed to her which meant she had to pay or had paid the amount stated in the invoices. (para 33). (viii) Payment for legal fees - RM1,172,791.26. We affirmed the award by the learned judge because the amount had been agreed between the respondent and her lawyer to do the legal work for her. The lawyers’ invoices at pp. 206 to 214 clearly show that the invoices were addressed to her which means she has to pay or had paid the amount stated in the invoices (exhs. P6, P7, P8, P9). We did not agree with the appellants' suggestion that the overall fees were only RM321,142. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Based on the invoices at pp. 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208 and 209 of the rekod rayuan bahagian C. As alluded to earlier, the amount stated in the invoices at those pages must be awarded as cost incurred by the respondent. The amount RM321,142.18 suggested by the appellants fell short of the amount RM925,000 which was agreed as legal fees and getting up amount for the lawyer in Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. 21 NCVC-25- 06- 2015, Shah Alam High Court Originating Summons No: 24-916- 07-2012 and Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No: B-02 (A)-900-06- 2015. The agreement is at pp. 210-214 of the rekod rayuan bahagian C (exh. P10).”. [21] Berkenaan dengan pernyataan Defendan dalam affidavit dan hujahan mereka bahawa terdapat isu untuk dibicarakan antaranya, adakah jumlah yang dituntut dipersetujui oleh Defendan, adakah terdapatnya perbincangan atau pengaturan antara pihak-pihak berkenaan jumlah yang dituntut dan adakah jumlah tersebut telah matang dan apakah aturan sebenar antara pihak-pihak terhadap yuran guaman Plaintif dan saksi perlu dipanggil memberi keterangan, Pn HMS yang bijaksana memutuskan – “[23] Mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan yang dinyatakan. Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa berdasarkan kes Pendaftar Hakmilik Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Selangor di atas, apabila satu invois dikeluarkan dan dipersetujui/tidak dipertikaikan, ia adalah satu dokumen sah untuk menuntut bayaran sebagaimana dinyatakan. Tiada keperluan untuk saksi hadir memberi keterangan atau merit untuk dibicarakan. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [24] Pendekatan yang dirujuk Defendan terpakai hanya bila bil kos/yuran guaman dipertikaikan dan kes difailkan melalui Taksiran Kos/Bill Kos. Mahkamah ingin mengulas isu bil yang dipertikaikan (walaupun dalam kes ini ia bukanlah isu untuk ditentukan) kerana melalui kes Seri Cemerlang Mills Management Sdn Bhd Lwn. Dato' Zainal Haji Ismail & 10 Yang Lain [2009] 1 LNS 1426 hal-hal ini telah diterangkan dengan teliti oleh YAH Dato’ V. T Singham seperti berikut: “Dalam prosiding penaksiran bil kos tidak ada peruntukan, sama ada dalam A. 59, ataupun di bawah k. 13 untuk sepina dikeluarkan kepada seseorang di atas permohonan pihak yang memohon untuk menaksirkan kos di antara peguamcara dan anakguam. Tugas Pendaftar dalam prosiding penaksiran bil kos adalah untuk menentukan atau taksirkan apakah amaun kos yang patut dan munasabah bagi perayu dan berpandukan kepada garis panduan yang ditetapkan di Appendix 1 Part x A. 59. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa perayu tidak boleh cuba menukar prosiding Bil Kos di kamar Pendaftar kepada satu perbicaraan penuh. Seterusnya, Pendaftar tidak semestinya terima keterangan lisan melainkan pendaftar sendiri berpendapat perlu keterangan untuk sebarang penjelasan. Pendaftar sahaja boleh memutuskan sama ada perlu untuk memeriksa mana- mana pihak sekiranya keterangan adalah relevan di mana Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa keterangan daripada En. Hanafi Bin Kasbi seperti dicatit di Writ Sepina tersebut S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 adalah tidak relevan untuk taksiran bil kos. Sekiranya satu pihak tidak berpuas hati dengan taksiran bil kos oleh Pendaftar dan sekiranya Pendaftar tidak membenarkan mana-mana item dalam Bil Kos atau tidak membenarkan amaun yang dipohon atau membenarkan amaun yang terlampau tinggi atau rendah pihak yang tidak berpuas hati berhak untuk mengkaji semula oleh Pendaftar. Seterusnya, sekiranya keputusan Pendaftar dalam prosiding mengkaji semula masih tidak memuaskan hati mana-mana pihak, pihak itu mempunyai peluang dan terdapat peruntukan untuk pihak yang tidak berpuas hati memohon untuk kajian semula oleh Hakim Dalam Kamar. (rujuk A. 59 k. 34 dan k. 36 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980) dan bukan cuba menukar prosiding taksiran bil kos kepada perbicaraan penuh.”. [25] Apa yang Mahkamah ini ingin simpulkan adalah bahawa, dalam tuntutan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan di sini, ia adalah satu kes yang jelas dan terang dan tidak ada isu untuk dibicarakan atau keperluan memanggil saksi memberi keterangan. Defendan perlu membezakan tuntutan di sini dengan apa yang dinyatakan dalam keadaan kos guaman/yuran guaman dipertikaikan (sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Seri Cemerlang Mills Management Sdn Bhd di atas).”. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Analisa dan Dapatan Mahkamah Tinggi [22] Mahkamah telah meneliti rayuan ini dan hujahan bertulis pihak- pihak. [23] Untuk mengekalkan atau mengakaskan keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana bagi penghakiman terus, Mahkamah ini perlu memastikan sama ada Pn HMS telah melakukan kekhilafan ketara dalam memahami fakta di hadapannya dan sama ada suatu analisa analitikal telah dicapai oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana itu. [24] Isu tuntutan Plaintif iaitu suatu firma guaman yang telah memberikan khidmat profesional kepada anakguamnya iaitu Defendan bagi kes di MTKL ialah untuk baki yuran guaman yang berjumlah sebanyak RM244,180.00. [25] Menurut peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) dalam hujahan rayuannya di hadapan saya, menyatakan – “The Appellant humbly submits that a summary judgment, in this case, may inadvertently deny the Appellant the opportunity to fully present their case. The complexities and nuances of the issues raised necessitate a more comprehensive judicial process.”. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [26] Seterusnya, menurut peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) terdapat perkara yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam mendengar semula kes ini di peringkat rayuan iaitu – “CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS HONOURABLE COURT 22. Re-evaluation of Bona Fide Defense: This Honourable Court is respectfully urged to reconsider the bona fide defense presented by the Appellant in accordance with Section 29 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which mandates that all civil appeals from a subordinate court be by way of rehearing. The detailed counter-arguments and discrepancies highlighted in the foregoing submissions highlights the existence of genuine issues that warrant a full trial. 23. Existence of Triable Issues: The Appellant has consistently emphasized the presence of triable issues, particularly concerning the agreement on the ‘estimated fees’. The ambiguity surrounding the Warrant to Act, the unilateral determination of the Invoices, the lack of explicit acceptance in the e-mails, and the vague references in the WhatsApp conversations all point towards unresolved matters that require judicial scrutiny. The Appellant submits that the totality of the facts herein has left many questions unanswered. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 24. Precedents Highlighting the Need for Trial: This Honourable Court is urged to take into account the precedent set in Southeast Asia Insurance Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia, which clearly establishes the necessity of a full trial when even a singular triable issue is present. The Appellant's submissions have demonstrated multiple such issues, making the case for a full trial even more compelling. 25. Evaluation of Evidence and Affidavits: The Respondent’s reliance on various documents and communications as evidence of the Appellant’s agreement to the legal fees requires a more thorough examination. The Honourable Court is requested to critically assess the evidence, especially in light of the conflicting interpretations presented by both parties. 26. Potential Implications: The Honourable Court is also urged to consider the broader implications of granting a summary judgment in cases where genuine disputes exist. Such a precedent may inadvertently discourage parties from raising legitimate concerns and defenses, fearing summary judgments without a full hearing.”. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [27] Secara jelasnya, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pertimbangan yang dinyatakan oleh Perayu (Defendan) ialah untuk “membetulkan kekhilafan” Pn HMS yang bijaksana. [28] Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah ini, saya mendapati Responden (Plaintif) bukan sahaja berunding, berbincang dan bercakap lisan semata- mata dengan anakguamnya iaitu Perayu (Defendan) berkenaan dengan yuran guaman yang dikenakan kepada Perayu (Defendan). Terdapat invois yang telah dikeluarkan dan dihantar kepada Perayu (Defendan). Invois yang dihantar tidak dibantah mahupun dipertikaikan oleh Perayu (Defendan). [29] Tindakan undang-undang diambil berpunca daripada Perayu (Defendan) sendiri. Peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) menyatakan bahawa – “The Appellant has failed, neglected and/or omitted to make payment as per the invoices, instead, sought several extensions of time for the payment.”. [30] Penegasan Perayu (Defendan) bahawa kes ini bukan “a plain and obvious case” untuk melayakkan Responden (Plaintif) memperoleh penghakiman terus. Isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu (Defendan) perlu diputuskan melalui perbicaraan. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [31] Peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan) menghujahkan bahawa keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana dikatakan khilaf apabila Pn HMS secara khilaf memakai peruntukan untdang-undang kepada fakta yang bercanggah. Pn HMS itu dikatakan gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa Defendan mempunyai pembelaan yang bona fide. [32] Sungguhpun, Perayu (Defendan) telah secara teliti menyenaraikan percanggahan yang terkandung dalam tuntutan Responden (Plaintif) di mana dalam pliding sendiri, Responden (Plaintif) mengakui bahawa persetujuan kepada anggaran fi berdasarkan dokumen. Perayu (Defendan) telah memeriksa secara kritikal kekaburan kepada persetujuan mengenai hal perkara yuran guaman, iaitu − • the Warrant to Act failed to present a clear, quantifiable sum, particularly the alleged “estimated sum”. • the Invoices seemed to be unilaterally determined by the Respondent without clear justification or evidence of the Appellant’s agreement. • the emails merely showcased the repetitive sending of these Invoices without any explicit acceptance from the Appellant. • the referenced WhatsApp conversations did not directly address the Invoices or the payable amount, making it unjust to assume that terms like “wang” and “cash” pertained to the said Invoices or an agreed payment. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 • a representative of the Respondent, had admitted that there were several meetings that took place between him and the Appellant. • with no supporting evidence, the Respondent narrated a different story to say that the Appellant had agreed to the Invoices. • it is the Appellant’s case that the Appellant had in fact raised his disagreement to the fees and payable and that the parties have agreed for the final sum payable to be negotiated. • the representative of the Respondent, Mohd Rizal Bahari Bin Mohd Noor, had accepted the purported payment of legal fees of RM10,000.00 in his personal account. The Appellant submits that the sum of RM10,000.00 was an interim payment, pending the agreement between the parties regarding the finalized sum to be paid to the Respondent. • the substratum of the Respondent’s claim is that the Appellant had agreed to the Invoices; however, it must be noted that the Respondent has not successfully demonstrated through affidavit evidence an indisputable agreement on the part of the Appellant. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 • the Respondent’s failure to establish an unequivocal agreement raises doubts regarding the validity of their claim. • there exists a glaring conflict of facts between the parties at present. • keputusan terkini Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam cara terpelajar Perayu (Defendan), Kenneth Choong Yew Phing v. Lion Tin Sdn Bhd (2021) 1 LNS 2575, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan – “[26] As a beginning it is noted that the parties have given contrasting and highly disputed versions of how the claim arose. [27] The Plaintiff and the Defendant are relying on their own documents to prove that the governing contract binds the other. This would certainly be seen as a triable issue as it has to be determined which of the conflicting documents govern the relationship between the parties. [28] Yet there is acknowledgement and acceptance of the PO Appendixes with the Plaintiff’s signature and it is noted that its business registration stamp was affixed to it. In contrast to that it cannot be ignored that the contract relied on by the Plaintiff does not have any acknowledgement or signature from the Defendant accepting its terms. This to me constitutes as a triable issue. The conflicting facts and S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 contrasting evidence adduced can only be resolved at a trial.”. [33] Penghakiman terus yang dibenarkan oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah berdasarkan keterangan afidavit yang disokong dengan dokumen yang diekshibitkan oleh Responden (Plaintif). Mahkamah Sesyen telah ditunjukkan dengan prima facie evidence whereby no necessity arises to evaluate the reasonableness of the amount. Petikan keputusan dalam kes Tetuan Kang & Kang v. Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 431 para 36 & 37 sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) iaitu – Any issue and/or dispute shall only be made by way of petition within a year after the delivery of the invoices. The Defendant failed to do so. [34] Dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Responden (Plaintif) sebagaimana di Ekshibit MRB-2 - Warrant to Act menunjukkan bahawa Perayu (Defendan) menyatakan “I, undertake to pay all cost, expenses and legal charges incurred thereof”; Ekshibit MRB-3 Invoices bertarikh 8- 11-2018 dan 7-2-2019; Ekshibit MRB-5 Emails bertarikh 8-11-2018 dan 8-2-2019 yang melampirkan invois; Ekshibit MRB-6 Excuses diberikan oleh Perayu (Defendan) yang memohon lanjutan masa untuk membuat bayaran due to purportedly waiting his money from Taiwan, adalah memadai untuk Pn HMS yang bijaksana mencapai dapatan fakta hanya dengan melihat afidavit dan dokumen yang dirujuk. Tiada keperluan untuk memanggil saksi khususnya En Chu Boon Tiong dan peguam dari Tetuan Bahari & Bahari. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [35] Peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) memetik keputusan dalam kes Sagujuta (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v Trane Malaysia Sales & Services Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 MLJ 535 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan – “Under an O 14 application, the duty of a judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit; where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable in itself, then the judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the same issue not triable.”. [36] Isu baki yuran guaman yang tertunggak bukanlah seperti perkhidmatan perubatan di mana seseorang pesakit hanya boleh selesai berurusan dengan doktor apabila memperoleh “ubat” selepas “bercakap”/konsultansi dengan doktor. Profesyen peguam adalah lebih daripada itu di mana “ubat” hanya boleh diperoleh daripada Mahkamah. Sebagai “perantara” antara Mahkamah dan anakguam, peguam ialah orang penting yang menyediakan segala dokumen untuk penelitian Mahkamah. [37] Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) yang menghujahkan bahawa “The Appellant is estopped from disputing the legal fees whereby his conducts accepted the same – Ekshibit MRB-4: On 1-2-2019, the Appellant pays RM30,000.00 and on 4-3-2019 the Appellant pays another RM30,000.00. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Ekshibit MRB-5 Respondent’s email dated 8-2-2019 indicates the invoice was issued after a discussion with the Appellant. Respondent’s email dated 13-3-2019 shows the Appellant will be paying the invoices by way of cash. Ekshibit MRB-6 Whatsapp conversations showing the Appellant was seeking for extensions of time to pay. Ekshibit MRB-7 & MRB-8 Letter of demand dated 26.4.2021 followed by payment of RM10,000.00 by the Appellant on 10.5.2021.”. [38] Dokumen yang diekshibitkan inilah yang diteliti oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana dan beliau mencapai dapatan fakta bahawa tiada percanggahan yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dalam menuntut baki yuran guamannya itu. [39] Hal perkara mengenai ketidakpuasan hati Perayu (Defendan) ke atas perkhidmatan guaman yang diberikan oleh Responden (Plaintif) kepadanya, Mahkamah ini memetik hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Responden (Plaintif) seperti yang berikut: Whether the Respondent entitled to the legal fees when the Appellant is dissatisfied with the services? 33. The purported dissatisfaction is contradicting Appellant’s own expression when he texted the Respondent after parties managed to enter into Consent Judgment during the trial. The Appellant texted “clap, clap, clap, handshake, cheers”, “u are top lawyer” and “very-very puas hati” on/or about 14.2.2019. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 In rebutting the above, the Appellant said the expressions were made as the Respondent managed to file all cause papers. What cause papers he was talking about? The matter was in trial and the update was given regarding the Consent Judgment. 35. On the other hand, the Appellant attempted to use Shah Alam Session Court Suit No. BA-A52NCvC-296- 06/2018 (“Suit 296”) to show his dissatisfaction. 36. Though the Respondent has provided its explanation in the Affidavit in Reply, we must say that Suit 296 has nothing to do with the invoices and it revolves different entities altogether. The Appellant has even admitted to this. Perenggan 19 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan (Kand. 9) The Appellant also attempted to show that the invoices are excessive as the most of the applications in Suit 355 were premised on the other Defendants. We invite the Court to refer to the invoices, no charge was made for any application except for the Appellant only.”. Prinsip Campur tangan dan Gangguan Mahkamah pada peringkat rayuan [40] Nas undang-undang kes Jade Homes Sdn Bhd v Sivananthan a/l Krishnan [2021] 5 MLJ 349 di mana adalah undang-undang nyata bahawa keputusan mahkamah perbicaraan hanya boleh diubah (overturned) oleh mahkamah rayuan (appellate court) sekiranya keputusan mahkamah perbicaraan adalah “nyata salah” (plainly wrong). S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam memutuskan bahawa − “It is trite law that an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge, save and except where the decision of the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’ where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that, with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge…”. Dan juga keputusan dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa ujian “nyata salah” bukanlah bertujuan untuk digunakan oleh mahkamah rayuan sebagai cara untuk mengganti keputusannya sendiri terhadap dapatan fakta mahkamah perbicaraan – “[76] What is pertinent is that, the ‘plainly wrong’ test is not intended to be used by an appellate court as a mean to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts.”. [41] Ciri utama bagi sesuatu “appellate intervention” adalah jelas dan mantap dalam semua peringkat rayuan. Tugas Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan ialah untuk memastikan sama ada Mahkamah yang membicarakan itu mencapai keputusannya berdasarkan keputusan atau dapatan secara betul mengenai keterangan dan berasaskan kepada undang-undang. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [42] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 memutuskan – “[14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ merely related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test.”. [43] Begitu juga dalam kes Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa “an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence”. S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [44] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 memutuskan “the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle”. [45] Prinsip undang-undang mengenai appellate intervention only justified that on the available evidence, that the SCj is erred (Kes Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 146). [46] Dua ujian yang dikenal pasti perlu dipenuhi bagi tujuan appellate intervention adalah “plainly wrong test” and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence test” (the case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 98-99). [47] Dalam kes Ong Leong Ciou & Anor v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Another Appeal [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at 329, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa – “[125] We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to the findings of facts made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demeanour and credibility of the witness before him or her. Generally, such finding ought not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 appellate interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.”. [48] Dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa – “... an appellate Court should not interfere with factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial Judge was plainly wrong or one that no reasonable Judge could have reached. If it is not, the fact that the appellate Court may have reached a different conclusion on the facts, is irrelevant.”. [49] Mahkamah Tinggi ini pada peringkat rayuan tidak boleh mengubah dapatan Pn HMS yang bijaksana yang mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah mengemukakan keterangan dokumentari yang konkrit yang boleh membuktikan tuntutannya bahawa Plaintif telah memberikan perkhidmatan professional sebagaiman “pesanan” Defendan. [50] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dapatan fakta yang betul oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana tidak memerlukan Mahkamah Tinggi mengusik dapatan fakta tersebut. Plaintif (Responden) berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan (Perayu). S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 Kesimpulan [51] Berdasarkan alasan yang saya nyatakan di atas, penghakiman saya memutuskan bahawa rayuan Perayu (Defendan) adalah ditolak dan keputusan Pn HMS yang bijaksana adalah dikekalkan. [52] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa factual findings of the learned SCj was correct. [53] Pada peringkat rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, saya telah menjalankan appellate role. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini tidak perlu mengusik dapatan fakta yang dicapai dan pemakaian peruntukan undang-undang yang betul oleh Pn HMS yang bijaksana. Bertarikh: 3 Januari 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam NCvC12 S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Peguam cara: Bagi Pihak Perayu (Defendan): Daniel Tan Shen Yang Tetuan Chai & Company, Kuala Lumpur. Bagi Pihak Responden (Plaintif): Muhammad Danish bin Abdullah Manoharan Tetuan Manoharan Chambers, Kuala Lumpur S/N JZ2o8D8nuE2cXt0GHgBVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-02(A)-1875-10/2021

PERAYU REVENTHAREN A/L SUPPIAH RESPONDEN MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA

Professional discipline – Application for Reinstatement and Restoration to Roll of Advocates and Solicitors (“Roll”) - Petitioner breached fundamental foundation of relationship between lawyer and client- Whether being struck off from Roll for certain length of time sole criteria in considering restoration to Roll – Whether the petitioner has met the requirements of change of character, penitence and restitution-Whether it is fair and reasonable to reinstate and restore the petitioner to Roll- Whether requirements of s. 107 of Legal Profession Act 1976 fulfilled.

03/01/2024

YA Dato' Lim Chong FongKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Dato' Lim Chong Fong

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2c90da63-20ea-4766-824e-3031f64fa1a2&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - FINAL (REVENTHAREN) 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA IN PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF PUTRAJAYA CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(A)-1875-10/2021 BETWEEN REVENTHAREN A/L SUPPIAH … APPELLANT (NRIC NO.: 551210715831) AND BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA ... RESPONDENT In the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Originating Summons No.: WA-17D-36-11/2019 Between Reventharen a/l Suppiah …Petitioner (NRIC No.: 551210715831) And Bar Council Malaysia …Respondent CORAM: LEE SWEE SENG, JCA. HASHIM BIN HAMZAH, JCA. LIM CHONG FONG, JCA. 03/01/2024 14:49:49 W-02(A)-1875-10/2021 Kand. 45 S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal on reinstatement of an advocate and solicitor who had been struck off from the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors (“Roll”). [2] The Appellant is the advocate and solicitor concerned. [3] The Respondent is the Bar Council Malaysia constituted under the Legal Profession Act 1976 (“LPA”). [4] We heard the appeal on 18th September 2023 and thereafter unanimously ordered the Appellant be reinstated back to the Roll. The High Court order is set aside with no order as to costs. [5] We now provide below the grounds of our decision. BACKGROUND FACTS [6] The Appellant was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya on 9th February 1995 and practised as a sole proprietor under the firm name Messrs. Reventharen & Associates since 23rd February 1995. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [7] By a sale and purchase agreement dated 10th July 2012 (“Agreement”), a V. Santhadevi a/p S. Velusamy (“Complainant”) who is the Appellant’s client purchased a property from a Syed Abdullah bin Syed Noh (“Vendor”). [8] On 8th October 2013, the Complainant lodged a complaint against the Appellant to the Disciplinary Board constituted under the LPA (“DB”) for his failure to transfer the balance sum of RM247,500.00 due under the Agreement to the Vendor’s solicitors (“Complaint”). [9] Consequently, the DB on 24th December 2013 forwarded a copy of the Complaint to the Appellant and requested for an explanation in accordance with s. 100(1)(b) LPA. The aforesaid DB’s letter is reproduced below: [This space is intentionally left blank] S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] There was no explanation given by the appellant to DB on the complaint lodged against him. As a result, the DB proceeded to consider the complaint lodged against the Appellant during the meeting on 25th April 2014 and prima facie found that there was merit in the Complaint. The DB further proposed to hear the Complaint on 22nd August 2014 without the need for further investigation by a Disciplinary Committee. As such, a letter dated 9th February 2014 was issued to the Appellant and the aforesaid letter is reproduced below: [This space is intentionally left blank] S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [11] The Appellant on 19th August 2014 wrote to the DB admitting to his wrongdoing and informing that he had already paid the sum of RM247,500.00 to the Vendor’s solicitor and completed the transfer of the Property to the Complainant. The Appellant’s letter is reproduced below: [This space is intentionally left blank] S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [12] As the result, the DB summarily determined and informed the Appellant on 28th August 2014 of their decision to strike the Appellant off the Roll with effect from 12th September 2014. [13] On 15th August 2017, the Appellant informed the Respondent and DB that he intends to apply to be reinstated as an advocate and solicitor and enquired whether that was any claim made against him from the bar Council compensation fund. [14] Since there was no claim made under the Bar Council compensation fund against him, the Appellant on 28th November 2017 applied to the High Court to restore and reinstate his name to the Roll (“First Reinstatement Application”). [15] However, the High Court on 12th April 2018 dismissed the First Reinstatement Application. [16] The Appellant on 7th May 2018 appealed to the Court of Appeal against the aforesaid decision of the High Court but he subsequently withdrew the appeal. [17] On 11th November 2019, the Appellant again applied to the High Court to restore and reinstate his name to the Roll (“Second Reinstatement Application”). S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 AT THE HIGH COURT [18] The Appellant principally contended as follows as summarised by the learned High Court judge: (i) he has all the while admitted to his misconduct and did not appeal against the DB's decision; (ii) he took all the necessary measures to ensure the complainant's matter was settled and no loss was suffered by the complainant; (iii) after being unemployed and unable to secure any gainful employment due to his age and having to rely on savings and support from his family members, from August 2016 to July 2017, he assisted his friend in establishing and running a college named Kolej IEWM and was appointed as the Chief Operating Officer which was a temporary position where he left the college after it became fully operational; (iv) he had obtained and provided testimonials and certificates of good conduct from senior members of the Bar and public persons known to him to confirm his past misconduct, regret and their support of his reinstatement to the Roll; (v) he is truly penitent and regretful of his misconduct; S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (vi) he should be allowed to see out of his remaining years of his life as a person who had acknowledged his wrong doing and punished for it and be given a second chance for the remainder of his life. [19] However, the Respondent counter-contended that the Appellant’s application is not fair and reasonable pursuant to s. 107(1) LPA following Teoh Hooi Leng v. Bar Council [1991] 2 MLJ 190 (SC) wherein Hashim Yeop Sani (CJ (Malaya)) held as follows: “The word "fair" must necessarily mean that the decision must be fair firstly to the members of the public with whom the applicant will be renewing professional relations once readmitted because the law seeks to protect not only the profession but also the public from errant lawyers. … The word "fair" also requires that the decision must be fair to the Court itself because when readmitted the appellant will be an officer of the Court. Last but not least the decision must be fair to the appellant… … The duty of the Court in a case like this is to exercise its discretion having regard to the materials available before it and the particular facts of the case. The question should be seen as an exercise of discretion according to particular facts of the case. It should never be regarded as a principle laid down as a rule of law that an advocate and solicitor who has been struck off the Roll for dishonesty can never be reinstated. Section 107 of the Act requires that the decision should also be a reasonable decision. A reasonable decision is a decision which is based on reasonable grounds. A reasonable decision must first of all be supported by cogent evidence and not one based on conjecture or speculation.” S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [20] The learned High Court judge, after due consideration, dismissed the Second Reinstatement Application and stated, inter alia, as follows in the grounds of decision reported in [2022] 9 CLJ 538 (“Decision’’): “[15] In the instant matter, in expressing that he is ashamed for the misconduct that he has committed and that he has repented, the petitioner in his supporting affidavit avers that "despite minor issues of misconduct I have always been proper and tried hard to maintain and adhere to the high standard of integrity and trustworthiness expected of a lawyer." This court finds that at the very core of the matter, ie, the petitioner's breach of his client's trust where trust is the principle of which the legal profession is founded upon, such averment does not reflect remorse on the part of the petitioner. By making such averment, it is of the considered view that the petitioner is attempting to justify and trivialise a serious misconduct. The undertaking given by the petitioner to the court cannot be equated with the act of penitence or repentance when compared with such averment. It cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner is clearly remorseful and his undertaking that he will not repeat the same mistake and will do his utmost best to preserve the integrity of the legal profession is therefore doubted. [16] The respondent has divulged and this court takes cognisance of the fact that apart from the striking off, there are six complaints lodged against the petitioner involving gross disregard of client's interest, unbefitting conduct and monetary dishonesty. These complaints are either kept in abeyance, reprimand, fine or withdrawn. According to the report by the respondent's Secretary, in the event of the petitioner's restoration to the Roll, one of the complaints (Complaint Reference DB14 9542) will re-activate. It is of the considered view that the pending disciplinary complaint against the petitioner is relevant. There is therefore a pre-existing and/or fresh complaint after the striking off that has been held in abeyance against the petitioner. The complaints demonstrate the unbefitting conduct of the petitioner as an advocate and solicitor. It remains a question and grave concern whether the petitioner would not repeat the misconduct. [17] Although it is true that the petitioner's disbarment period has been more than five years, there is nothing in law to state that the length of time that has lapsed is the sole criteria in considering restoration to the Roll… S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [18] In the instant matter, the petitioner had breached the fundamental foundation of relationship between a lawyer and his client which is founded upon trust. Relating to the complaint herein, it took the petitioner four months and eight days and some 17 months later from the date the balance purchase price was first paid into the petitioner's clients' account before he made restitution to the complainant. Clearly, the restitution was an afterthought. The petitioner's misconduct was grave and having to scrutinise strictly such misconduct, this court cannot consider to restore the petitioner to the Roll solely on the amount of years that had lapsed or only on the weight of testimonials provided. The focus has to be on whether the petitioner has demonstrated remorse, repentance and rehabilitation. … [24] In finding that the petitioner has failed to show that he is remorseful, penitent and rehabilitated, the life expectancy of the petitioner is irrelevant where administration of justice, public interest and the interest of the legal profession are concerned. It must be borne in mind that reinstatement is an exception rather than a rule. The petitioner has been disbarred for more than eight years now. Due to the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner and his stand that what he had committed was 'minor issue of misconduct', it follows that he is not fully rehabilitated and will continue to pose a threat to society and will cast a pall of doubt over the integrity and reputation of the legal profession (see Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v. Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR 1018). The fact that the petitioner is 66 years old is not a paramount consideration but his worthiness and reliability for the future are supreme more so in the profession where the attribute of trustworthiness must be upheld in all circumstances. [25] In regard to the right to livelihood/restraint of trade, it must be emphasised of the well-entrenched principle that the ability to practice as an advocate and solicitor is not a right but a privilege afforded by the legislation specifically the LPA… … [27] Premised on the above, this court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to satisfy that he is a fit and proper person to be restored to the Roll. The misconduct of this nature is too prevalent and a strong message should be sent out to discourage potential offenders…” S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [21] The Appellant is dissatisfied with the Decision and had on 22nd September 2021 appealed to the Court of Appeal. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [22] Before us, the Appellant focussed on four points wherein the learned High Court judge erred in fact and law in coming to the decision to dismiss the Second Reinstatement Application, viz: (i) failure to appreciate that the Appellant did not in his supporting affidavit aver that his misconduct was a minor issue; (ii) failure to consider the Appellant’s penitence and rehabilitation throughout six years after his name was struck off from the Roll; (iii) failure to appreciate that the previous disciplinary complaints made against the Appellant should have no bearing or little weight in the reinstatement proceedings; and (iv) failure to appreciate that the certificates of good character and testimonials produced by the Appellant showed the Appellant’s penitence after his name was struck out. [23] In opposition, the Respondent counter-contended that the learned High Court judge rightly dismissed the Second Reinstatement Application in accordance with s. 107 LPA and trite case law. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [24] The primary statutory provision is s. 107(1) LPA which reads: 107. High Court may restore an advocate and solicitor (1) The High Court may, if it thinks fair and reasonable, at any time order the Registrar to restore to the Roll the name of an advocate and solicitor which has been removed from, or struck off, the Roll. [25] In Chan Chow Wang v. Malaysian Bar [1986] 2 MLJ 159, Harun J (later SCJ) held as follows in interpreting s. 107(1) LPA: “In re-admitting applicants to the Bar, the Court has a duty to litigants and to the legal profession to ensure that such persons are of the highest integrity and honour. The Court must also be satisfied, in the public interest, that the Applicant is not likely to repeat these offences if he is re-admitted. The onus is therefore on the Applicant to show that: (a) there has been such a change in his character as to make him a fit and proper person to resume practice at the Bar; (b) he is truly penitent; and (c) he has made restitution.” [26] Since this reinstatement application involves the exercise of discretion as provided in s. 107(1) LPA, our duty here as an appellate court has been well explained by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) in Paya Terubong Estates Sdn Bhd v. Pusaka Warisan Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 909 (CA) as follows: “Although the decision whether a caveat ought to remain on the register is a matter within the discretion of the judge, it is like all other discretionary matters one that is required to be exercised judicially. One can, of course, quite well appreciate an appellate court's reluctance to disturb the primary exercise of discretion. This is because a court of appeal in a matter such as the present does not possess an original discretion, its initial function being one of review S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 only. However, where, as in the present instance, it is amply demonstrated that the judge in whom the primary discretion is vested has failed to take into account relevant considerations it is the duty of this court to say so and to intervene and set matters right by an exercise of its own discretion.” [27] We started off reminding ourselves that every reinstatement case is unique and must be decided based on its particular and peculiar facts without preconception. [28] Thus, in respect of the first point raised by the Appellant, we find on review that the learned High Court judge has in paragraph (15) of the grounds of Decision seriously erred in mistakenly finding that the Appellant stated in his affidavit in support of the Second Reinstatement Application that “his wrongdoings are minor issues of misconduct”; hence did not reflect remorse on the part of the Appellant. This phrase was in fact stated only in the Appellant’s earlier letter dated 19th August 2014 addressed to the DB. In the Appellant’s affidavit in support, he actually stated as follows: “12. Saya sedar bahawa apa yang saya telah lakukan adalah salah. Saya sesungguhnya menyesal dan meminta maaf keatas semua kesalahan saya. Saya menyesal kesukaran yang saya menyebabkan kepada pengadu sejauh mana beliau telah hilang kepercayaan kepada saya sambil melaporkan perkara ini kepada Majlis Peguam dan Majlis Peguam mengambil tindakan terhadap saya. Saya menyesal kesilapan saya yang telah menyebabkan banyak kebimbangan dan kesusahan kepada pengadu. Ini adalah salah laku saya sendiri dan tanggung jawab saya.” [29] Next as to the Appellant’s second point on his penitence and rehabilitation since he was struck off from the Roll, we see in paragraphs (17) and (18) of the grounds of Decision that the learned High Court judge has downplayed the consideration of length of period of disbarment by S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 merely stating that the length of time of 5 years is not the sole criteria. We however noted that the Appellant has now been disbarred for some 8 years and we objectively find that this length of time of disbarment is adequate in light of the misconduct committed considering that the Appellant wholly paid the sum of RM247,500.00 to the Vendor’s solicitor and completed the transfer of the Property to the Complainant fairly soon after the complaint was lodged. That notwithstanding, the Appellant has also unreservedly tendered his penitence in his affidavit in support of the Second Reinstatement Application. [30] We are mindful of the Respondent’s contention that there is insufficient lapse of time between the dismissal of the Appellant’s First Reinstatement Application and the Second Reinstatement Application relying on the Singapore cases of Re Ram Kishan [1992] 1 SLR (R) 260 and Re Nirmal Singh s/o Fauja Singh [2001] 2 SLR (R) 494 but its our view that the LPA did not prescribe a mandatory requisite lapse of time as well as the facts of the Singapore cases are dissimilar. The provision in s. 94(2)(b) LPA relied by the Respondent is inapplicable to a reinstatement application after the advocate and solicitor has been struck off the roll pursuant to s. 94(2)(a) LPA. [31] Moreover, we find there were no criminal charges preferred against the Appellant; hence there was neither conviction nor sentence meted on the Appellant. This is unlike in the other cases where the disbarred advocate and solicitor also served jail sentence where that person absconded with client’s money and later caught and charged for criminal breach of trust as seen in the Singapore case Chiong Chin May Selena v. Attorney General and another [2021] SGHC 167 relied by the Respondent. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [32] We also took into consideration that the Appellant is presently unemployed. He is 68 years old and may not have many more years left to practice. This has seemingly not been appreciated by the learned High Court judge in paragraph (24) of the grounds of Decision. [33] Moving on to the Appellant’s third point, we find that the learned High Court judge had in paragraphs (16) And (24) of the grounds of Decision given unduly excessive weight on the previous complaints made against the Appellant which have been suspended and kept in abeyance because of the Appellant having already been struck off from the Roll. We appreciated the learned High Court Judge was concerned that the Appellant would repeat his misconduct. Before us, the Appellant has unequivocally given his undertaking to this Court that should he be restored and reinstated to the Rolls, he undertakes not to be a signatory of any client’s account of the legal firm in which he will be practising. It is, in other words, plain to us that the Appellant cannot be a sole-proprietor but must work as a legal associate/assistant or otherwise as a partner without authority or power to sign any client’s account or office account of a legal firm. In the premises, we find the learned High Court judge’s concern as well as the Respondent’s public duty to maintain zero tolerance towards any risk of client’s money being wrongly used or unaccounted have been adequately addressed and safeguarded through his undertaking given to this Court. We heeded the Respondent’s caution that there must be no risk of repetition of the misconduct by the Appellant when he resumes law practice following Re Chin Swee Onn [1964] 30 MLJ 124. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [34] We are also of the view that disciplinary charges based on complaints should not be preferred in instalments one after the other, especially to defer and then prefer another charge on a prior complaint after the reinstatement of the advocate and solicitor back to the Roll. We are aware of the Respondent’s contention that the Appellant suppressed in his Second Reinstatement Application the fact that the Complainant also made a complaint that she was “locked up” in the Appellant’s office in her pursuit to resolve the non-payment of the RM247,500.00 to the Vendor’s solicitors but we are of the view that this is interconnected with the principal complaint that resulted in him being struck off from the Roll. Thus, we find that the absence of disclosure of this fact is not fatal contrary to that in the Singapore case of Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v. Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR 1018 relied by the Respondent. [35] Finally, with regard to the Appellant’s fourth point that the certificates of good character and testimonials tendered demonstrated his penitence, we find that the testimonials from the senior members of the Malaysian Bar are sufficient in the circumstances of the case where they have stated that they are convinced as to his penitence and commitment to uphold and maintain the high standards of the Malaysian Bar. We noted that there is no mandatory format for the certificate of good character/testimonial prescribed in the LPA or rules made thereunder for purposes of reinstatement; thus, the Appellant cannot be faulted in adducing them as so presented to the Court. We are also mindful of the findings of this Court in Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Ahmad Rushdi Omar [2017] 9 CLJ 413 but we find the case facts and circumstances there that disclosed numerous serious misconducts are starkly different and distinguishable. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 CONCLUSION [36] For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that this is a fit and proper case for appellate intervention to restore and reinstate of the Appellant back to the Roll. Put simply, we are satisfied that the Appellant has met the requirements of change of character, penitence and restitution set out in Chan Chow Wang (supra) and accordingly it is fair and reasonable to reinstate him in the circumstances of this case subject always to his undertaking and conditional upon him not to be a signatory of any client’s or office account of the legal firm in which he is practicing. [37] The appeal is therefore allowed as so ordered. Dated this 4th December, 2023 -Sgd- LIM CHONG FONG JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 LIST OF COUNSELS: Counsels for Appellant 1. Ranjit Singh 2. Prisilla Chong Solicitors for Appellant MESSRS. RANJIT SINGH & YEOH Advocates & Solicitors, D3-U5-12, Solaris Dutamas, No.1 Jalan Dutamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur. Counsels for Respondent 1. Farez Jinnah 2. Nadhirah Rahman Solicitors for Respondent MESSRS. FAREZ JINNAH Advocates & Solicitors, A-11-05, Plaza Taragon Kelana, No. 3, Jalan SS 6/6, 47301 Kelana Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan, STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: Section 107(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 CASES REFERRED TO: Teoh Hooi Leng v. Bar Council [1991] 2 MLJ 190; Chan Chow Wang v. Malaysian Bar [1986] 2 MLJ 159; S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Paya Terubong Estates Sdn Bhd v. Pusaka Warisan Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 909; Re Ram Kishan [1992] 1 SLR (R) 260; Re Nirmal Singh s/o Fauja Singh [2001] 2 SLR (R) 494; Chiong Chin May Selena v. Attorney General and another [2021] SGHC 167; Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v. Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR 1018; and Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Ahmad Rushdi Omar [2017] 9 CLJ 413. S/N Y9qQLOogZkeCTjAx9khog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-25-65-09/2022

PEMOHON HARREE VEESHNU VARMA RESPONDEN 1. ) MIMMI SURIATI BINTI KHALID (BAHAGIAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA DAN PERTUBUHAN) 2. ) KETUA PENGARAH, JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA 3. ) KETUA SETIAUSAHA, KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA 4. ) kementerian dalam negeri, malaysia

An application by the applicant seeking leave from this court to commence judicial review proceedings against the respondents pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012. The applicant seeks, amongst others, an order for certiorari to quash the decision of the Bahagian Pendaftaran Negara dan Pertubuhan, Kementerian Dalam Negeri - Federal Constitution

03/01/2024

YA Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=81382d1f-26a4-48dc-8e17-bbb067971951&Inline=true

1 BA-25-65-09/2022 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO.: BA-25-65-09/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai suatu permohonan untuk kebenaran/perintah certiorari berkenaan keseluruhan Keputusan Kementerian Dalam Negeri Malaysia bertarikh 27.04.2018; Dalam perkara mengenai Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964; Dan Dalam perkara Perkara 14 dan 15A Perlembagaan Persekutuan; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA HARREE VEESHNU VARMA (No. Passport: AV24686) …PEMOHON DAN 1. MIMMI SURIATI BINTI KHALID BAHAGIAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA DAN PERTUBUHAN) 2. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA 3. KETUA SETIAUSAHA 03/01/2024 15:18:15 BA-25-65-09/2022 Kand. 19 S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BA-25-65-09/2022 KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA 4. KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI, MALAYSIA …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN JUDGMENT [1] This is an application by the applicant, Harree Veeshnu Varma, seeking leave from this court to commence judicial review proceedings against the respondents pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012. The applicant seeks, amongst others, an order for certiorari to quash the decision of the Bahagian Pendaftaran Negara dan Pertubuhan, Kementerian Dalam Negeri dated 27.4.2018. [2] The Honourable Attorney General objected to this application seeking leave to commence judicial review. Factual Background [3] The facts of this application are as follows. The applicant was born out of wedlock on 27.1.2001 to a Malaysian father and a Filipino mother. On 14.2.2002, the applicant’s parents were married in the Philippines and registered their marriage at the Embassy of Malaysia in Manila on 18.3.2002. There was a DNA paternity test conducted on 25.12.2021 which confirmed the biological father of the applicant as Mr. Neelauthaman a/l Ratnam, a Malaysian. [4] The applicant through his father, had on three (3) occasions applied for a Malaysian citizenship. The first application was dated S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BA-25-65-09/2022 30.1.2013 was rejected vide a letter dated 24.4.2014. The second application was on 22.7.2014 was rejected by the Federal Government via a letter dated 27.4.2018. The third application was made on10.12.2019 and is still pending the decision. Objection by The Attorney General [5] This application for leave was objected to by the Honourable Attorney General. Senior Federal Counsel on behalf of the Honourable Attorney General submitted that the application for leave should be dismissed on the grounds that the intended judicial review is bound to fail as: (i) the impugned decision is non-reviewable and not appealable to court; (ii) it is settled law that an illegitimate child is not entitled to Malaysian citizenship; and (iii) there is a pending third attempt of Article 15A of the Federal Constitution application where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision. Legal Principles at Leave Stage [6] To consider this application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings against the respondents, this court alluded to case law for the principles governing a leave application for judicial review. In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BA-25-65-09/2022 478 the Federal Court at page 488 held that the test for leave to commence judicial review are as follows: “[12] …Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.” [Emphasis added] [7] In Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Lembaga Lebuhraya & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224 His Lordship Visu Sinnadurai J at page 225 held as follows: “... The court, in exercising its discretion that an application for leave be granted must be convinced by the applicants that prima facie the application is genuine and that there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application. The test’s threshold is very low; a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion, an arguable case must be shown, not a prima facie case. Additionally, an application must fail if it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors, groundless, where there are more appropriate alternative remedies, and where the application for judicial remedies is inappropriate.” [Emphasis added] S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 BA-25-65-09/2022 Analysis [8] In this application for judicial review, the applicant seeks to quash the Federal Government’s rejection of the applicant’s second application for citizenship under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution which was communicated to the applicant vide letter dated 27.4.2018. [9] Apart from that quashing order, the applicant also seeks a declaration that he is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Section 1(a) Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. [10] Learned Senior Federal Counsel for the Honourable Attorney General objected to this application seeking leave to commence judicial review. Tuan Liew Horng Bin submitted that the impugned decision is non-reviewable and not appealable to court as Section 2 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution provides that a decision of the Federal Government under Part III of the Federal Constitution shall not be subject to appeal or review in any court. [11] Tuan Liew Horng Bin further argued that the impugned decision made under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution falls under Part III of the Federal Constitution. [See: Yu Sheng Meng & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2015] MLJU 637] [12] Reference was made to the case of Madhuvita Janjara Augustin v. Augustin a/l Lourdsamy & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 307 which had upheld the validity of Section 2 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution and came to the conclusion that a decision of S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 BA-25-65-09/2022 the Federal Government under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution is not open to appeal or review in any court. [13] Senior Federal Counsel also stated that it is settled law that an illegitimate child is not entitled to Malaysian citizenship by operation of law under Section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution read together with Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. [See: CTEB & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236] [14] Moreover, it was submitted by Tuan Liew Horng Bin that there is still a pending third application of the Article 15A of the Federal Constitution application where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision. It is trite law that a court of law would be slow to interfere when a constitutional remedy has not been exhausted by the Plaintiff. [See: Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian Malaysia v. Pang Wee See & Anor [2017] 3 MLJ 308 (CA)] [15] The applicant argued that to obtain leave the applicant is required to show that his application is not frivolous or vexatious. The applicant stated that at the leave stage, the court does not need to delve into the merits of the case. [16] The applicant further submitted that sections 3 and 4 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 gives the applicant the merits to challenge the decision of the respondents. To support this contention, the applicant cited the case of Lew Yee Hong @ Liew Yee Hong & Anor v. Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Ors [2020] 8 MLJ 62 and the case of Madhuvita Janiara Auqustin (suing through next S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 BA-25-65-09/2022 friend Margaret Louisa Tan) v. Auqustin a/l Lourdsamy & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 307. [17] Pertaining to the objection raised by learned Senior Federal Counsel that there is still a pending third application of the Article 15A of the Federal Constitution where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision, this court had on 12.9.2022 allowed the applicant’s application for extension of time to file an application seeking leave for judicial review. This extension of time granted by this court is in relation to the decision of the respondents dated 27.4.2018. Hence, this application for leave is against the decision of the respondent dated 27.4.2018. [18] In the case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chief Judge of Malaya & Ors [2016] 8 MLJ 357, Asmabi J (as Her Ladyship then was) stated the following: “It is settled law, the function of the court in exercising its power to grant leave for judicial review is to sieve through the application before it by examining the facts and the law and decide if the case is one which is frivolous and or one which merits further argument on the substantive motion. In exercising this function the court is guided by the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in England in R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex p Rushkanda Begum [1990] COD 107; [1990] Crown Office Digest 109, Dip as follows: (a) if it is clear to the judge that there is a point for further investigation on a full inter parte basis with all evidence as is reasonably necessary on the facts and all such arguments on the law then leave ought to be granted; S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 BA-25-65-09/2022 (b) if the judge hearing the leave application is satisfied that there is no arguable case the judge should dismiss the application for leave to move for leave for judicial review; (c) if the judge is not really sure whether there is or is not an arguable case, the judge may invite the putative respondent to attend and submit as to whether or not leave ought to be granted; and (d) in exercising the powers in an inter parte leave application the test applicable by the court must be the same approach as that as the test adopted in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal against the arbitrator s award. The court has to consider the facts and law before it and ask itself whether the court is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration or otherwise.” [19] What this entails is this court is required at the leave stage to make a perusal of the material to determine that the application is not frivolous or vexatious. At this stage, a court is not expected to look into the merits of the case. [20] This application seeking leave before this court relates to the citizenship application of the applicant. At present the applicant is stateless even though the applicant had lived in Malaysia all his life. [21] The threshold for a leave application in a judicial review is low. Respectfully, this court is of the view that this court ought to hear this matter out at the substantive stage of the judicial review proceedings and not dismiss the case summarily. S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 BA-25-65-09/2022 Conclusion [22] For the aforesaid reasons, this court is satisfied that this application for leave to commence judicial review is not frivolous or vexatious. This application seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings is hereby granted. Date: 13 December 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 BA-25-65-09/2022 Counsel: For The Applicant: Hisyam bin Yusof Tetuan W.A Wan Adnan & Associates Advocates & Solicitors No. 16-3 Jalan Tasik Raja Lumu L U4/L Taman Subang Delima, 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor hisyamyusof@yahoo.com.my +6 03 7831 0147 For the Respondent: SFC Liew Horng Bin Jabatan Peguam Negara, Bahagian Guaman, Aras 6, No. 4, Persiaran Perdana, 62100 Putrajaya +6 03 8872 2000 S/N Hy04gaQm3EiOF7uwZ5cZUQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-551-11/2020

PLAINTIF ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG DEFENDAN CHONG THIAM THAI

CONTRACT: Settlement agreement - Evidential burden when there is acknowledgement of debt - Binding nature of signed contract - Avoidance of later evidentiary burdens - Burden shifting to admitting party to disprove - Repayment terms - Payment timing - Interpretation of terms - Consideration of the entire context rather than reading terms in isolation - Conditions precedent – Restitution - Ceasing repayments as intention to end agreementCIVIL PROCEDURE: Consequential orders - Courts' inherent powers - Prevent injustice - Give full effect to substantive orders - Restore parties to original position

03/01/2024

YA Tuan Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f3c7dd2c-c124-4468-9fe7-b244dbfb6ca2&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22NCC-551 -11/2020 BETWEEN ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG (NRIC No: 490308-05-5169) ... PLAINTIFF AND CHONG THIAM THAI (NRIC No: 740310-14-5058) ... DEFENDANT JUDGMENT [1] The Plaintiff lent RM2.8 million to the Defendant whom he has never met before, allegedly introduced through her friend as a person facing financial difficulties. When the debt could not be repaid, a settlement was signed where she acknowledged owing the full amount and proposed instalments tied to certain conditions. Later when sued for repayment, the Defendant argued the agreement lacked specifics on exact timing, to escape obligations not yet due. Yet timing matters less than defined prerequisites contingent on her actions which she failed to fulfill. Now the Defendant must confront the consequences of plain admission, which bind parties to the intention evident when 03/01/2024 08:29:58 WA-22NCC-551-11/2020 Kand. 96 S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 inking signatures and securing debts, regardless of subjective comprehension. As this case illustrates, a signed obligation anchored in admission rather than nuance carries the day when debts come due. Background facts [2] On 24.1.2017, the Plaintiff, Ong Koh Hou, and the Defendant, Chong Thiam Thai, entered into a Settlement Agreement (“the Settlement Agreement”) in respect of the settlement of a RM2.8 million loan given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. This was documented by way of a proposal letter issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff which was signed in agreement by the Plaintiff. The agreement was on the basis, as asserted by the Plaintiff, that: a) The Plaintiff lent the Defendant a sum of RM2.8 million (“Loan”) from January to April 2016, with RM1.818 million in cash and RM982,000 via UOB cheque no. 056208 for RM982,000; b) On 26.4.2016, the Plaintiff disbursed the final tranche of the Loan of RM982,000 to the Defendant; and c) In May 2016, the Defendant was unable to repay the Loan. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] The key terms stated in the Settlement Agreement to be in relation to the RM2.8 million due from the Defendant to the Plaintiff include: a) RM1,000,000 was to be settled by way of set-off with the amount payable by the Plaintiff to one Tan Sri Guok Nguong Peng (“Tan Sri Guok”) for the purchase of shares in Platinum Wholesales City Sdn Bhd (“Platinum Wholesales City”); b) RM1,700,000 was to be settled by the Defendant by transferring all 10 shares she held in 333 Resources Sdn Bhd (“333 Resources”) to the Plaintiff which represented 100% of the issued shares; c) The Defendant acknowledged that RM100,000 was due and owing to the Plaintiff [stated in clause (i) of the Settlement Agreement]; d) In respect of the land held by 333 Resources that was charged to Public Bank Bhd (“PBB”) for a loan of approximately RM600,000, the Defendant undertook to pay all instalments for this loan duly and punctually; and e) The transfer of 30,250 shares representing 1% interest in Platinum Wholesales City from the Plaintiff to the Defendant was subject to two conditions precedent: (a) the RM100,000 would be repaid to the S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Plaintiff free of interest, and (b) the outstanding amount to PBB would be fully settled. [4] Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant transferred her 333 Resources shares to the Plaintiff and executed a Deed of Assignment on 11.3.2017 to assign a RM734,410 debt owed by 333 Resources to the Defendant to the Plaintiff. The Defendant also serviced the PBB loan instalments from January 2017 to March 2020. [5] On 1.11.2019, the Plaintiff demanded RM100,000 owing under the Settlement Agreement clause (i) from the Defendant. On 21.11.2019, the Defendant disputed this demand. On 8.9.2020, the Defendant stated she would cease servicing the PBB loan instalments. [6] The Plaintiff commenced the present action on 10.11.2020 against the Defendant to claim for the Loan pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. The Plaintiff’s claims [7] In this action, the Plaintiff seeks the following: a) RM2.8 million being the loan he gave to the Defendant from January to April 2016; b) Interest of 8% per annum on the RM2.8 million from 25.4.2016 until the date of full settlement; S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 c) An order that the Defendant returns to the Plaintiff 30,250 shares in Platinum Wholesales City or the market value of those shares; d) Costs of the action; e) Further reliefs that the court deems fit and proper. [8] The Plaintiff in his Written Submissions and pursuant to prayer (e) and the inherent powers of the court under Order 92 rule 4 Rules of Court 2012, in order to materialise and complete the objective of the prayer in paragraph (c) prays for the following Consequential Orders: a) The Plaintiff shall revoke the Deed of Assignment dated 11.3.2017 after the Defendant has repaid and/or returned to the Plaintiff the sum of RM2.8 million together with all of the interest accrued according to the prayer in paragraph 14(b) of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim dated 10.11.2020; and b) Parties are at liberty to apply. The Defendant’s Counterclaim [9] The Defendant, via a counterclaim in her Defence and Counterclaim contends: S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 a) That the Plaintiff has breached the key terms of the Settlement Agreement despite the Defendant complying with the same. Hence, the Settlement Agreement has been terminated due to the Plaintiff's breach. b) As the Plaintiff has breached and terminated the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant contends that the agreement should be rescinded. The parties should be restored to their original positions before the Settlement Agreement as follows: i) The Plaintiff to return the 333 Resources Sdn Bhd shares and transfer back the RM734,410 debt to the Defendant; and ii) The Defendant to refund RM982,000 she received from the Plaintiff. c) The Defendant also claims she has suffered losses as she was entitled to receive 30,250 shares in Platinum Wholesales City under the Settlement Agreement. This benefit has been denied due to the Plaintiff's breach. [10] The Defendant therefore in her Counterclaim prays for: a) A declaration that the Settlement Agreement has been breached by the Plaintiff; S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 b) An order that the Plaintiff transfers all shares in 333 Resources to the Defendant within 7 days; c) An order that the Plaintiff assigns back the RM734,410 debt owed by 333 Resources to the Defendant within 7 days. d) After 7 days from judgment, the Deputy/Senior Assistant Registrar is authorised to sign share transfer forms and other documents on behalf of the Plaintiff to effect the share transfer and debt assignment; e) The Defendant shall pay RM982,000 to the Plaintiff after the Plaintiff has transferred the 333 Resources shares and assigned the RM734,410 debt back to the Defendant. f) General, exemplary and aggravated damages to be assessed by the Senior Assistant Registrar and paid by Plaintiff within 7 days; and g) Costs of the action. The Plaintiff’s case [11] In summary, the Plaintiff's case is that: S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 a) He lent RM2.8 million (the Loan) to the Defendant from January to April 2016, with the Defendant admitting to this debt in a Settlement Agreement signed on 24.1.2017. b) The Defendant has breached the Settlement Agreement by: i) Failing to pay the Plaintiff RM100,000 owing under Clause 3(i); ii) Ceasing repayment instalments for a RM600,000 loan charged against 333 Resources' property after transferring 333 Resources to the Plaintiff under the Settlement Agreement; and iii) Not settling RM1 million owed to Tan Sri Guok for purchase of the Plaintiff's Platinum Wholesales City shares. c) Due to these breaches by the Defendant, the Plaintiff asserts that the Settlement Agreement has been terminated. Thus, according to legal principles of restitution, the Defendant is now liable to fully repay the Loan amount of RM2.8 million to the Plaintiff. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 The Defendant’s case [12] In summary, the Defendant's case is that: a) The Plaintiff has failed to prove that he lent the full RM2.8 million to the Defendant, as he admitted to only disbursing RM1.818 million in cash to a third party and not the Defendant. b) The Defendant has complied with the Settlement Agreement terms by: i) Facilitating the set-off of RM1 million owed by the Plaintiff to Tan Sri Guok; ii) Transferring her 333 Resources shares to the Plaintiff and assigning a RM734,410 debt to the Plaintiff; and iii) Servicing the PBB loan instalments from January 2017 to March 2020. c) It is the Plaintiff who breached the Settlement Agreement by demanding: i) Premature repayment of the RM100,000 under Clause 3(i) before the due date; and S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 ii) Full repayment of the alleged RM2.8 million Loan, despite the Defendant discharging her obligations under the Settlement Agreement. d) Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims should fail and the Settlement Agreement be rescinded, with the parties restored to status quo ante. This includes the Plaintiff returning the 333 Resources shares and assigning back the RM734,410 debt upon the Defendant refunding the RM982,000 she received. [13] In essence, the Defendant denies liability to repay the full RM2.8 million Loan and instead asserts that it is the Plaintiff who has breached and should now rescind the Settlement Agreement. Witnesses [14] Only one witness gave evidence for the Plaintiff, which was the Plaintiff, Ong Koh Hou @ Won Kok Fong, himself (PWI). His evidence was on the background and events regarding a loan of RM2.8 million he gave to the Defendant and the subsequent Settlement Agreement and breaches of it by the Defendant. He states that the Defendant is DW2’s long-term mistress. His witness statement is marked as “WS-PW1.” [15] The Defendant called two witnesses: S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 a) DW1 is Chong Thiam Thai, the Defendant. Her evidence was on the denial of receiving the total amount of RM2.8 million claimed by the Plaintiff and detailing her limited involvement and understanding of the financial and legal arrangements made with the Plaintiff, as influenced by a third party, Wong Tong Chun, who is also known as Jackson Wong (DW2). She does not personally know the Plaintiff and only became aware of the Plaintiff's existence through Jackson Wong. She did not explain her exact nature of her relationship with Jackson Wong but she conducted various actions, such as signing documents, based on Jackson Wong's requests or instructions. Her witness statement is marked as “WS-DW1.” b) DW2 is Wong Tong Chun, also known as Jackson Wong who is a businessman in the field of wholesale clothing. His evidence was on the Settlement Agreement signed by the Defendant, whether she received the RM2.8 million loan from Plaintiff, and the surrounding circumstances regarding the loan transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant. He has known the Plaintiff since year 2000 through their common friend and states that the Defendant is his friend. His witness statement is marked as “WS- DW2.” S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Issues [16] After considering the facts of the case, the court frames the following issues for deliberation which this court considers pivotal to the resolution of this case: a) Whether the Plaintiff has successfully discharged his burden of proof to establish that the full loan sum of RM2.8 million was given to the Defendant, when the Defendant contends that evidence only shows RM982,000 was received while the balance was given to a third party. b) Whether the RM100,000 payment under Clause 3(i) of the Settlement Agreement is due to the Plaintiff upon signing of the agreement or only after all terms are fulfilled as contended by the Defendant. c) Whether the assignment of RM1 million from the sale proceeds of the Plaintiff's shares to Hoe Aun Nee, as shown in the Assignment Letter and related documents, satisfies the Defendant's obligation under Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement to pay RM1 million to Tan Sri Guok. d) Whether the issue of illegal moneylending in relation to the Plaintiff's giving of the Loan to the Defendant has been properly raised by the Defendant as an issue to be tried before the court. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 e) Whether the Defendant is entitled to the counterclaim reliefs sought, including the return of 333 Resources shares and assigned debt by the Plaintiff, given the Defendant's argument that she has complied with the Settlement Agreement while the Plaintiff has breached it. [17] In the ensuing part of this judgment, this court will structure its deliberations around the issues above. Analysis and findings of the court Full Loan sum disbursed to the Defendant [18] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence substantiating the alleged loan of RM2.8 million, other than RM982,000.00. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's claim for repayment of the Loan sum of RM2.8 million is only based on the Settlement Agreement and not supported by any documentary evidence. The evidence only shows that only a sum of RM982,000.00 was received by the Defendant. The Plaintiff also admitted that the balance sum of RM1.818 million was given to Jackson Wong (DW2) and not the Defendant. [19] It is maintained by the Defendant that the burden of proof, as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, squarely lies on the Plaintiff to establish his case. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's reliance on mere allegations, S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 without concrete evidence, is insufficient to meet this burden. Furthermore, it is argued by the Defendant that even the Plaintiff could not provide specific details or documentation to prove the transfer of the claimed loan amount and has given evasive answers when asked about it. [20] Finally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claim is inherently unbelievable and unsupported by documentary evidence, and thus, the Defendant is not obliged to provide any contrary evidence unless the Plaintiff satisfactorily discharges his burden of proof. [21] The Plaintiff submits that the loan of RM2.8 million has been duly acknowledged and admitted by the Defendant, as evidenced by the signed Settlement Agreement and the Defendant's admission during cross-examination. It is maintained by the Plaintiff that this agreement is legally binding, regardless of the Defendant's understanding of its terms, supported by legal precedents that affirm the binding nature of signed contracts. The Plaintiff contends that the Settlement Agreement, along with partial disbursement evidence, sufficiently proves the loan's existence and the Defendant's receipt of the same. Additionally, the Plaintiff argues that his testimony, despite any perceived evasiveness, is credible and supported by authoritative legal positions, asserting that forgetfulness does not undermine credibility. Lastly, the Plaintiff emphasises that all relevant documentary evidence supporting his claim has S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 been presented, contrasting the Defendant's failure to provide any substantive evidence to disprove the loan's existence. [22] I do not accept the Defendant’s contentions and find that the Plaintiff has successfully discharged his burden of proof against the Defendant to show that the Loan sum was given to the Defendant. The Settlement Agreement documented in a letter dated 24.1.2017 from the Defendant to the Plaintiff, signed by both parties proves that the Loan sum was disbursed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. In the second paragraph of the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant clearly states: “In relation to the sum of RM 2,800,000.00 due from myself to you, I hereby propose to settle as follows:..” [23] During cross-examination, the Defendant has admitted to this fact: “ALFRED: So, but you do confirm that this Settlement Agreement has been signed by you and Mr. Ong Koh Hou? CHONG: Yes.” [24] The Settlement Agreement which was signed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant is binding on the parties who signed it. Although the subject heading of the letter dated 24.1.2017 is “Settlement Proposal”, this letter was issued by the S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Defendant and signed in acceptance of the terms by the Plaintiff. [25] The disbursement of part of the Loan by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in the sum of RM982,000.00 is proven via the UOB Bank Cheque dated 26.4.2016 issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. Although there is no other evidence that the rest of the RM1.818 million was disbursed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the Defendant admitted unequivocally in the Settlement Agreement to the whole Loan being owed by her to the Plaintiff. From a reading of the Settlement Agreement, it is clear that the Defendant acknowledges her debt of RM2.8 million. The content of the Settlement Agreement is reproduced below: “Re: Settlement Proposal I refer to the above matter. In relation to the sum of RM 2,800,000.00 due from myself to you, I hereby propose to settle as follows: 1) RM 1,000,000.00 shall be settled by way of set-off with the sum of RM 1,000,000.00 payable by you to Tan Sri Guok Nguong Peng in respect of the purchase price for the shares in Platinum Wholesales City Sdn. Bhd. 2) RM 1,700,000.00 by way of transfer to you of 10 shares in 333 Resources Sdn. Bhd. ['the company') being 100% of the issued and paid up shares of the company. 3) I further acknowledge and undertake as follows: i. The sum of RM 100,000.00 is due and owing from myself to you. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 ii. The land held under PN1592 Lot 35936 Mukim Kuala Lumpur, Daerah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan registered in the Company's name is charged to Public Bank Berhad with current outstanding sum of approximately RM 600,000.00 ('the Loan'). iii. I shall pay all instalments duly and punctually to Public Bank Berhad in respect of the Loan. iv. The transfer to myself of the 1% Interest over your shares (30,250 shares) in Platinum Wholesales City Sdn. Bhd. shall be subject to the condition precedent that the abovementioned RM 100,000.00 shall be repaid to you free of interest and the outstanding amount due to Public Bank Berhad shall be fully settled. Your understanding and assistance is very much appreciated.” [26] A plain reading of the letter shows it is a settlement proposal from the Defendant to the Plaintiff addressing her total debt of RM2.8 million. The proposal outlines a set-off arrangement for RM1,000,000.00 against a debt owed to Tan Sri Guok and proposes transferring company shares in Platinum Wholesales City to settle the remaining RM1,700,000.00. Additionally, it acknowledges a payment of RM100,000.00 by the Defendant to be paid and includes commitments related to a land charge and share transfer conditions. The proposal became a binding agreement when the Plaintiff indicated his acceptance to the terms by signing under the words “I agree and confirm the above terms and conditions.” S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [27] Even if there is a dispute with regards whether the Plaintiff has satisfied his obligations under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant plainly states in the Settlement Agreement that the sum of RM2.8 million is due from her to the Plaintiff. Given the admission, it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to produce other evidence of the disbursement of the other parts of the Loan other than the sum of RM982,000.00, particularly the disbursement of the Loan in cash in multiple tranches from January to April 2016 amounting to RM1.818 million, as contended by the Plaintiff. [28] In coming to this conclusion, I referred to the case of Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v The Search & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 127. This case concerns a recording contract entered into between the plaintiff, a recording company, and the defendants, a music group. The defendants later signed with another company, allegedly breaching their contract, leading the plaintiff to sue the group for breach of contract. The defendants argued that they were not bound by the terms of the first 1984 contract that they had signed with the plaintiff as they did not "agree to the terms" of the first contract and hence were not bound by it. The court summarily dismissed this argument, stating that a signed written contract is binding, except in limited cases like fraud, undue influence etc. which the defendants had not established. The court held: “There is no principle of law which states that where a party does not fully understand certain terms of a contract, the contract may be vitiated. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 The general principle of law, of course, is that a party who signs a written contract is bound by the terms of the contract, except in the limited cases where fraud, undue influence, or misrepresentation may be established. This rule is so strict that even if a party to a contract has not read the contents of a contract, he is held to be bound by its terms. In the leading case of L'Estrange v F Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394, Scrutton LJ pronounced (at p 403): When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not.” [29] However, the claim was dismissed as the court found that neither the first 1984 contract nor the second 1985 contract were still in effect when the defendants began recording with another music company, as the first contract had been substituted and the second had expired by effluxion of time. [30] I am also guided by Rainbow Bay Sdn Bhd v MLGH (Sabah) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 10 MLJ 846. This case concerns a joint venture agreement between a developer (the plaintiff) and a Sabah state government linked company (the first defendant) to carry out a mixed development project in Kota Kinabalu. The court held that the first defendant had breached the joint venture agreement by failing to procure the land title for the project within reasonable time and that the second defendant, the Sabah State Government, had unlawfully interfered resulting in the first defendant's breach. The plaintiff succeeded in its claim for damages against the defendants S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 for breach of contract and inducing breach of contract. In starting the court’s analysis, Mairin Idang J stated: “[10] The general rule is this: “You are bound by the terms of the agreement you signed, regardless of whether you have read or understood it or otherwise" (see Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v The Search & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 127 and s. 10(1) of the Contracts Act 1950).” [31] It is clear from the authorities above that a signed agreement is binding on the parties, and that the court will give effect to the plain language of the agreement. Parties cannot claim they did not understand or consent to certain terms to avoid legal obligations under a duly signed contract. [32] The Settlement Agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant clearly sets out the acknowledgement and admission by the Defendant of the Loan. The Defendant has not provided any evidence to establish fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation in relation to the Settlement Agreement. [33] From the evidence, the Defendant has not provided any evidence to disprove the existence of the Loan other than mere protests. The court does not accept the Defendant's argument that she has no duty to disprove the disbursement of the Plaintiff's case when she has clearly admitted to debt. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [34] I am also satisfied that the Plaintiff was not an evasive witness during cross-examination. The Plaintiff, being in his 70s, has answered all of the questions of the Defendant’s Counsel to the best of his ability and knowledge. The Plaintiff’s contention is that he gave the Defendant a loan that was partially disbursed in cash in several instalments from January to April 2016. As the trial took place in November 2022, it has been approximately 6.5 years since the disbursements took place. Given the Plaintiff's age of 70 years old, I accept that it is reasonable for him not to be able to remember every detail of the cash disbursements made 6.5 years ago. [35] The observations in Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal [2004] 3 MLJ 405 and Pie Bin Chin v Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 MLJ 234 support the proposition that every witness giving evidence in court is entitled to credence and must be believed unless there are good and cogent reasons not to believe him. [36] In the Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim case, the Federal Court observed: “215 Furthermore it is trite that every witness is entitled to credence and must be believed and his testimony accepted unless there are good and cogent reasons not to believe him. In Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Ali [1962] MLJ 257, (at p 258) Thomson CJ said this: When a police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 evidence must in the first instance be accepted. 216 And in Balasingham v Public Prosecutor [1959] MLJ 193 (at p 194) Ismail Khan J (as he then was) stated: After all there is no legal presumption that an interested witness should not be believed. He is entitled to credence until cogent reasons for disbelief can be advanced in the light of evidence to the contrary and the surrounding circumstances. 217 So what happens when there are discrepancies or contradictions in a witness' testimony? Would that make him less than credible and lead to an outright rejection of his entire testimony? In Chean Siong Guat v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 63 (at pp 63 and 64) Abdul Hamid J (as he then was) had this to say: Discrepancies may, in my view, be found in any case for the simple reason that no two persons can describe the same thing in exactly the same way. Sometimes what may appear to be discrepancies are in reality different ways of describing the same thing, or it may happen that the witnesses who are describing the same thing might have seen it in different ways and at different times and that is how discrepancies are likely to arise. These discrepancies may either be minor or serious discrepancies. Absolute truth is I think beyond human perception and conflicting versions of an incident, even by honest and disinterested witnesses, is a common experience. In weighing the testimony of witnesses, human fallibility in observation, retention and recollection are often recognized by the court. Being a question of fact, what a magistrate need do is to consider the discrepancies and say whether they are minor or serious discrepancies. If, S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 after conthem. On the other hand, if a magistrate finds that the discrepancies do not detract from the value of the testimony of the witness or witnesses, it would then be proper for him to regard the discrepancies as trivial and ignore them. On the other hand, if a magistrate finds that the discrepancies relate to a material point which would seriously affect the value of the testimony of the witness or witnesses, then it would be his duty to weigh the evidence carefully in arriving at the truth. 218 And in Pie bin Chin v Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 MLJ 234 (at pp 235 and 236), Wan Yahya J (as he then was) said: Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth- combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness's entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness's evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded. Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render other parts of his story unworthy of belief. Various persons are endowed with varying powers of cognition, attentiveness and perception, so that it is not uncommon for two witnesses to a common event to describe it in slightly differing versions.” S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [37] In this case, the Defendant has not provided any good and cogent reasons to doubt the credibility of the Plaintiff's testimony. [38] The Plaintiff has also produced the critical and relevant documents in the Plaintiff’s possession to support the Plaintiff’s case in this suit, which is in contrast to the case of Bekalan Sains P & C Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 329 cited by the Defendant where the witness had failed to produce documentary evidence in support of his case that he claimed to be in his possession. [39] I also accept that the purpose of a document such as the Settlement Agreement is to put on record in the form of an acknowledgment by the Defendant of certain facts to avoid the necessity of proving this later through documentary evidence. In this case, once the Defendant’s debt of RM2,800,00.00 to the Plaintiff is recorded in the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiff is not required to give the exact details of the disbursement of the Loan sum in cash in multiple tranches from January to April 2016 amounting to RM1.818 million. [40] The issue of the Defendant never having received the RM1.818 million as part of the Loan has never been raised before by the Defendant. This is clear from the letters dated 21.11.2019 and 8.9.2020 from Messrs Hisham Chong & Co, the Defendant’s solicitors when responding to the Plaintiff’s letter of demand dated 1.11.2019. Learned counsel for the S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Defendant argued that this was not raised before because it was not an issue. However, the fact that this issue was only raised at the trial smacks of an afterthought. The Defendant had never disputed her debt of RM2.8 million and raising this now goes against the position that the Loan is due and owing from the Defendant to the Plaintiff as agreed in the Settlement Agreement. [41] As for the evidence by the Plaintiff in cross examination that the sum of RM1.818 million was given to Jackson Wong and not the Defendant, nothing turns on this. It is not the Defendant’s case that the sum of RM1.818 million was received by Jackson Wong and enjoyed by him instead of the Defendant. In fact, Jackson Wong did not give evidence that the money was paid to him and for what purpose the sum of RM1.818 million was given to him. Given Jackson’s Wong proximity with the Defendant and his dealings with the Plaintiff on behalf of the Defendant, it would be equally conceivable that Jackson Wong received the RM1.818 million on behalf of the Defendant. The Settlement Agreement cuts through all the uncertainties about why Jackson received the sum of RM1.818 million from the Plaintiff as there is an express admission of the Defendant’s debt to the Plaintiff to the sum of RM2,800,00.00. Therefore, the court does not make any finding that because Jackson Wong received the money, no loan to the sum of RM1.818 million was given to the Defendant. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Whether non-payment of RM100,000.00 is a breach [42] The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant is required to pay RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiff based on the terms of the Settlement Agreement, particularly Clause 3(i). However, the Defendant argues that the Settlement Agreement only states that the RM100,000.00 is due and owing from the Defendant to the Plaintiff, but does not specify when the payment should be made. The Defendant submits that the ambiguous language in the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted in favour of the Defendant. [43] Additionally, the Defendant has never denied owing the RM100,000.00, but instead argues that the payment is not due until all the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fulfilled. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has wrongfully demanded payment of the RM100,000.00 before the due date and that the Plaintiff has breached the Settlement Agreement by demanding payment of the alleged Loan. [44] The Plaintiff takes the position that the RM100,000.00 is due to the Plaintiff from the Defendant upon the signing of the Settlement Agreement. After this was not received from the Defendant, the Plaintiff issued a letter of demand through his solicitor, Messrs Alfred Lai & Partners on 1.11.2019 for the payment of the RM100,000.00. The position taken by the Defendant that the payment is not due until all the terms of the Settlement Agreement is stated in S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Messrs Hisham Chong’s letter dated 21.11.2019. This refers to Clause 3(iv) of the Settlement Agreement which requires the Plaintiff to transfer 30,250 shares in Platinum Wholesales City to the Defendant. [45] However, reading Clauses 3(i) to (iv) together as a whole and not in isolation of each other, the Plaintiff’s obligation in Clause 3(iv) would only be activated upon the Defendant satisfying the Conditions Precedent in Clauses 3(i) to (iii). Clause 3(iv) reads: “The transfer to myself of the 1% interest over your shares (30,250 shares) in Platinum Wholesales City Sdn Bhd shall be subject to the condition precedent that the abovementioned RM100,000.00 shall be repaid to you free of interest and the outstanding amount due to Public Bank shall be fully settled.” [46] Clause 3(iv) of the Settlement Agreement states that the Defendant must fulfill two conditions precedent before the Plaintiff is required to transfer 30,250 of his shares in Platinum Wholesale City to the Defendant. The first condition precedent is for the Defendant to repay the RM100,000.00 that is owed to the Plaintiff, and the second is for the Defendant to settle the PBB loan. However, the Defendant has not fulfilled either of these conditions precedent, and has admitted to the same during cross- examination. As a result, the Defendant is not entitled to enjoy any benefits related to the shares of Platinum Wholesales City. The Defendant's refusal to pay the RM100,000.00 in accordance with Clause 3(i) of the S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Settlement Agreement is therefore significant because it is one of the conditions precedent that must be satisfied before the Defendant can receive any shares of Platinum Wholesales City. [47] As the Defendant’s reason for not paying the RM100,000.00 cannot be upheld, the Plaintiff’s position that the RM100,000.00 is due to the Plaintiff from the Defendant upon the signing of the Settlement Agreement is correct. There is no ambiguity in Clause 3(iv) and it is clear that the Defendant has an obligation to pay the RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiff upon the signing of the Settlement Agreement. By taking the erroneous position that the payment is not due until all the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fulfilled, the Defendant evinces an intention not to pay the RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiff which is a breach of the Settlement Agreement, entitling the Plaintiff to recover the Loan. Payments to Hoe Aun Nee [48] The Defendant contends that she has not breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to pay Tan Sri Guok RM1,000,000.00 in accordance with Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement. There was a sum of RM1,000,000.00 assigned by Tan Sri Guok to Hoe Aun Nee which is used to set-off part of the purchase price of shares in Platinum Wholesale City payable to Tan Sri Guok and the Plaintiff reached an agreement through a letter from Tan Sri S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Guok dated 30.11.2016, in which Tan Sri Guok surrendered an amount of RM1,000,000.00 as part of the purchase price of shares in Platinum Wholesale City to Hoe Aun Nee, and Hoe Aun Nee made a set-off of the amount of RM1,000,000.00. In other words, Hoe Aun Nee had paid the sum on the Defendant’s behalf. However, the Plaintiff denies that the transaction was related to this suit and the Plaintiff only began to dispute the set-off after this suit was filed. To support her contention that the Plaintiff's denial is unfounded, the Defendant has produced documents, including an Assignment Letter dated 30.11.2016, which indicate that the sum of RM1,000,000 was assigned to Hoe Aun Nee and set off against the Plaintiff's purchase price for shares in Platinum Wholesales City. [49] The Defendant also contends that although the sum of RM1,000,000 has been set off, the Plaintiff commenced a legal action against one Hoe Aun Nee in a separate suit in the Sessions Court (“the Hoe Aun Nee Suit”) in respect of a loan of RM1,771,200.00 given by the Plaintiff to Hoe Aun Nee, a portion of which is related to the present case. The Defendant contends that the amounts totalling RM1,771,200.00 which the Plaintiff pleaded as loaned to Hoe Aun Nee matches the amount that the Defendant had pleaded in her Defence in this current suit to be the amount that Hoe Aun Nee received from the Plaintiff. The Defendant contends that she has not received any of this amount as the loan from the Plaintiff. The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's double-claiming of the same S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 amount from both the Defendant and Hoe Aun Nee shows his intention to unjustly enrich himself and therefore the Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. The Defendant cites the case of Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 6 CLJ 285 to support her argument that the Plaintiff's admission in the Hoe Aun Nee Suit should be considered a judicial admission and cannot be denied. [50] Documents, including the Assignment Letter, the UOB cheque and the letter from Tan Sri Guok confirming receipt of payment, were produced by the Defendant to support her contention that the transaction was between Tan Sri Guok, Hoe Aun Nee and the Plaintiff had a connection to her. [51] The contents of the Assignment Letter dated 30.12.206, issued by Tan Sri Guok to the Plaintiff are produced below: “Dear Sir, RE: Absolute Assignment of the sum of RM1,000,000.00 out of the sale proceeds payable to myself in connection with my sale of 3,025,000 shares in Platinum Wholesale City Sdn Bhd to you. I refer to the above matter. I hereby confirm that I have assigned absolutely the sum of RM1,000,000.00 out of the abovementioned sales proceeds to HOE AUN NEE (NRIC NO. 710107-07-5536). Payment by your good self to the abovementioned assignee is valid and good discharge in respect of the sum of RM1,000,000.00 payable to me being part of the abovementioned sale proceeds.” S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [52] The cheque dated 29.12.2016 is produced below: [53] The letter from Tan Sri Guok dated 30.12.2016 confirming receipt of payment states: “ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Reference is made to the Share Sale Agreement between us dated 10 of November 2016. I hereby confirm that I have received from you Ringgit Malaysia Two million Nine Hundred Seven Thousand Six Hundred Ninety Two (RM 2,907,692.00) only being part payment for the purchase of 3,025,000 ordinary share in Platinum Wholesales City Sdn Bhd.” [54] The court rejects the Defendant’s contentions and finds the documents produced clearly show that the transaction was between Tan Sri Guok, Hoe Aun Nee and the Plaintiff and had nothing to do with the Defendant. The documents produced, including the Assignment Letter, the UOB cheque and the letter from Tan Sri Guok confirming receipt of payment, do not indicate that Hoe Aun Nee used the S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 assigned sum of RM1,000,000.00 in any manner related to the Defendant. [55] Moreover, the fact that Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement persisted in the Settlement Agreement despite the Assigned Sum being already available for set-off indicates that the Assigned Sum and the Settlement Agreement are unrelated. In fact, the Assignment Letter dated 30.11.2016 was issued before the Settlement Agreement dated 24.1.2017. During cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that she had not paid the sum to Tan Sri Guok, as required by Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement. [56] Based on the above, I find that the Assigned Sum is an independent and distinct issue from the Settlement Agreement, and the Defendant has failed to pay the sum of RM1,000,000.00 to Tan Sri Guok, as required by Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement. [57] As for the Defendant’s contention that there is a judicial admission by the Plaintiff that the loan in the sum of RM1,771,000.00 claimed by the Plaintiff in the Hoe Aun Nee Suit represents part of the Loan in this suit, I accept that the Hoe Aun Nee Suit has no relationship whatsoever to this suit. The Defendant has been clear in her cross examination in stating that the transactions which took place among Tan Sri Guok, Hoe Aun Nee and the Plaintiff has nothing to do with the Defendant: S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 “ALFRED: Would you agree with me that the transactions took place between Mr. Ong, Ms Hoe Aun Nee and Tan Sri Guok Nguong Peng has nothing to do with you? CHONG: Yes I agree.” [58] Further, the filing of the Hoe Aun Nee Suit was not a matter which was raised at the trial. The Hoe Aun Nee Suit was filed on 21.10.2022 while the trial proceeded on 21 and 22 November 2022. Learned Counsel for the Defendant explained in oral submissions that the filing of the Hoe Aun Nee Suit was not discovered until after the trial in this suit concluded, therefore it did not come up in evidence. However, as this issue was never put to the Plaintiff, it will be unsafe for the court to give any weight to the Hoe Aun Nee Suit as the Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to explain the Hoe Aun Nee Suit at trial and there is no evidence on the matters pleaded in the Hoe Aun Nee Suit for the court to make any firm finding of fact. All that is before the court is the pleading by the Plaintiff in the Hoe Aun Nee Suit (para 7) that the Plaintiff gave Hoe Aun Nee a friendly loan of RM1,771,200.00 and that in the Defendant’s Defence and Counterclaim in this suit at para 7(a) it is pleaded that Hoe Aun Nee received from the Plaintiff the same sum of RM1,771,200.00. This does not equate to no loan being given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and there is no evidence that this is so. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Illegal moneylending [59] Whether the giving of the Loan by the Plaintiff to the Defendant is illegal moneylending is not an issue for the court to consider. This was not raised by the Defendant’s witnesses and in the pleadings. This was not even submitted by the Defendant in the main Written Submissions. The Plaintiff only submitted on this issue in anticipation of the issue of illegal moneylending being raised by the Defendant. [60] The fact that the Defendant in paragraph (b)(iv) of her solicitors’ letter dated 25.11.2020 requesting further and better particulars specifically asked whether the Plaintiff was a licensed lender does not amount to the issue being raised by the Defendant in the pleadings. In any event, there is no right, liability or disability asserted or denied by the Defendant for the allegation of illegal moneylending. The court cannot make any determination on whether the giving of the Loan by the Plaintiff to the Defendant is illegal moneylending when the issue has not been put forward clearly by the Defendant. Defendant’s Counterclaim reliefs [61] The Defendant, in her Counterclaim, prays inter alia for a declaration that the Settlement Agreement was breached by the Plaintiff, the transfer of all shares in 333 Resources to the Defendant free from any encumbrances, the resignation S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 of all directors of 333 Resources, the return of the sum of RM734,410.00 owed by 333 Resources. to the Plaintiff, and the payment of RM982,000.00 by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. Additionally, the Defendant claims for general damages, including exemplary and aggravated damages, to be assessed by the court. [62] The Defendant argues that she is entitled to the Counterclaim reliefs as she has complied with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. She has settled the amount of RM1,000,000.00 owed by the Plaintiff to Tan Sri Guok, transferred ownership of the shares in 333 Resources to the Plaintiff, and paid the bank instalments for the property since January 2017 until March 2020. Instead, the Plaintiff breached the Settlement Agreement by demanding payment of the alleged Loan in this suit. [63] The Defendant relies on the case of Tuan Mat Tuan Ismail v Tan Ah Hin & Ors [2019] 9 CLJ 104 to argue that, due to the Plaintiff's breach, the Settlement Agreement is nullified, and the parties must be restored to their original position. Therefore, the Defendant prays that the Plaintiff returns the shares in 333 Resources and delivers the transfer documents and the sum of RM734,410.00 to the Defendant, who will pay the Plaintiff RM982,000.00 that the Defendant received from the Plaintiff. The Defendant also points out that the Plaintiff in paragraph 14(c) of his Statement of Claim prays for an order that the Plaintiff is required to return and/or cause the return of all shares in 333 S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 Resources after the Defendant has paid and/or returned to the Plaintiff the sum of RM2.8 million together with all accrued interest. [64] I find that the Defendant's counterclaims are without merit. The Settlement Agreement has been terminated on the ground that the Defendant has committed three breaches of the Settlement Agreement i.e. the Defendant’s refusal to pay the RM100,000.00 due and owing by the Defendant to the Plaintiff according to clause 3(i) of the Settlement Agreement, the cessation of instalment payments for the PBB loan as evinced in Messrs Hisham Cong & Co.’s letter dated 8.9.2020 and the Defendant’s failure to pay the sum of RM1,000,000.00 to Tan Sri Guok in accordance with Clause 1 of the Settlement Agreement. The Defendant's actions show a clear intention to bring the Settlement Agreement to an end. [65] I also find that the Plaintiff’s prayer in paragraph 14(c) of the Statement of Claim has no bearing on the Defendant’s Counterclaim. The prayer for the Plaintiff to return shares in 333 Resources after the Defendant has paid the sum of RM2.8 million ensures complete justice is achieved in this suit. The prayer in paragraph 14(c) together with the Consequential Orders prayed for by the Defendant in paragraph 63(i) and (ii) of Enclosure 63 are all prayers that will restore the Plaintiff and the Defendant back to their respective original positions before the Settlement Agreement. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 Consequential orders [66] The Plaintiff prays for Consequential Orders in paragraph 63 of the Plaintiff’s Written Submissions arguing these are needed to give full effect to the Plaintiff's prayers, ensure that complete justice is served in this suit, and restore the Plaintiff and Defendant to their original positions prior to the Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to paragraph 14(e) and the court’s inherent powers under Order 92 rule 4 Rules of Court 2012, the Plaintiff additionally prays that after the Defendant repays the outstanding Loan sum of RM2.8 million and interest under paragraph 14(b), the Plaintiff be permitted to revoke the Deed of Assignment dated 11.3.2017 executed between parties under the Settlement Agreement. [67] This Assignment facilitated the transfer of all shares in 333 Resources to the Plaintiff under the Settlement Agreement. Now that the court has found the Settlement Agreement to be terminated due to the Defendant's breaches and the Defendant liable to repay the outstanding debt, permitting the Plaintiff to revoke this Assignment would unwind the effect of the transfer of shares to the Plaintiff and restore the parties to the status quo before the Settlement Agreement. [68] Pursuant to Order 92 rule 4, the court has wide powers to make any order necessary to prevent injustice, abuse of process, or to give full effect to the court's judgment. Revoking this Assignment would achieve such objectives. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [69] The Consequential Order of “Parties are at liberty to apply” also reserves parties' right to return to court for any other reliefs or issues that arise to give complete effect to the court's judgment. This is commonly ordered by courts to enable implementation of the substantive orders granted. [70] Therefore, in line with Order 92 rule 4 Rules of Court 2012, to give full effect to the court's decision making the Defendant liable to repay RM2.8 million, the court makes the Consequential Orders sought by the Plaintiff alongside the main prayers allowed. Granting such consequential reliefs is within the court's wide powers and discretion. Conclusion [71] The Plaintiff has satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof regarding the disbursement of the full Loan by the Defendant. The court finds that the Defendant has committed breaches of the Settlement Agreement by failing to pay the RM100,000 under Clause 3(i), ceasing instalment payments for the PBB loan, and not settling the RM1 million owed to Tan Sri Guok. Her conduct shows an intention to no longer be bound by the Settlement Agreement, leading to the Plaintiff justifiably terminating it and claiming repayment of the acknowledged RM2.8 million debt. S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [72] The Plaintiff has therefore proven his claim on a balance of probabilities. The Plaintiff’s claim is allowed and the Defendant’s Counterclaim is dismissed. [73] The court orders as follows: a) The Defendant shall repay and/or returned to the Plaintiff the sum of RM2.8 million; b) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum is imposed on the sum of RM2.8 million from the date of Judgment until the date of full settlement; c) An order that the Plaintiff is required to return and/or cause the return of all shares in 333 Resources after the Defendant has repaid and/or returned to the Plaintiff the sum of RM2.8 million along with all accrued interest according to paragraph (b) above; d) The Plaintiff shall revoke the Deed of Assignment dated 11.3.2017 after the Defendant has repaid and/or returned to the Plaintiff the sum of RM2.8 million together with all of the interest accrued according to the prayer in paragraph (b) above; e) Parties have the liberty to apply; f) The Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed; and S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 g) Costs of this action of RM25,000.00 shall to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff subject to the allocator. 29 December 2023 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Lai Choong Wui with Kelly Yap Jia (Messrs Alfred Lai & Partners) For the Defendant: Lee Hong Yap with Alan Tan Fu Seng (Messrs. Joseph Ting & Co) S/N LN3H8yTBaESf57JE2/tsog **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-A72NCvC-4759-11/2022

PLAINTIF BANGSAR HILL MANAGEMENT SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) LIM KOK SENG 2. ) TAN CHOW HEE

tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan- tunggakan caj penyelenggaraan- perjanjian MMA telah tamat- tempoh 10 tahun dari dari serahan milikan kosong- perjanjian diperbaharui dan dilanjutkan melalui perbuatan- diputuskan perjanjian telah tamat dan tidak mengikat pihak-pihak.

03/01/2024

Tuan Muhammad Najib Bin Ismail

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b18e517f-a536-4ee5-ab2e-a91de787b195&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO. WA-A72NCvC-4759-11/2022 ANTARA BANGSAR HILL MANAGEMENT SDN BHD PLAINTIF DAN LIM KOK SENG & TAN CHOW HEE DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. PENGENALAN [1] Di dalam tindakan ini, Plaintif ialah sebuah Syarikat yang diperbadankan di bawah Akta Syarikat 1965 yang mempunyai alamat berdaftar di B-11-05 & B- 11-3A, Corporate Suites, Gateway Kiaramas, No. 1, Jalan Desa Kiara, Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur. [2] Defendan-Defendan pula adalah pemilik berdaftar bagi unit kediaman di alamat Lot No. 11, Bangsar Hill, 26 Jalan Medang Serai, Bukit Bandaraya, Bangsar, 59100 Kuala Lumpur dan juga merupakan pemilik saham bagi Plaintif di atas. [3] Plaintif adalah bertanggungjawab untuk memastikan dan membekalkan perkhidmatan pengurusan dan penyelenggaraan (management and maintenance) kawasan kediaman yang dikenali sebagai “Bangsar Hill” dimana Defendan-Defendan merupakan salah seorang pemilik kediaman di kawasan tersebut. 03/01/2024 16:19:59 WA-A72NCvC-4759-11/2022 Kand. 54 S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [4] Untuk rekod, Defendan-Defendan merupakan pemilik berdaftar yang ketiga bagi premis kediaman Lot 11 tersebut yang dibeli oleh mereka pada tahun 2011 daripada pemilik berdaftar kedua iaitu Dato’ Teo dan Datin Chai. Pemilik berdaftar yang pertama pula bernama Mr. Tee dan Ms Yang. Kawasan kediaman “Bangsar Hill” ini mula dimajukan dan dibangunkan oleh pemaju iaitu Bandar Raya Developments Berhad (BRDB) pada sekitar tahun 2000. B. FAKTA RINGKAS [5] Di dalam tindakan ini, Plaintif mendakwa Defendan-Defendan (selepas ini akan dikenali sebagai Defendan Sahaja) telah gagal untuk membayar caj penyelenggaraan (maintenance charges) bagi tempoh mulai 15 Jun 2020 sehingga 1 Oktober 2022. Plaintif juga menyatakan Defendan, pada tahun 2019, ada membuat tiga kali bayaran caj penyelenggaran iaitu pada tarikh 11 Jun 2019, 10 Julai 2019 dan 28 November 2019. [6] Defendan pula menyatakan tiada kontrak sah yang mengikat pihak Defendan dan Plaintif bagi tempoh masa yang dikatakan tertunggak tersebut. Ini kerana perjanjian “Management & Maintenance Agreement (MMA) yang ditandatangani oleh Plaintif dan Pemilik Berdaftar Pertama Lot 11 tersebut yang bertarikh 29 April 2005 yang memberikan hak kepada Plaintif untuk mengenakan caj bayaran penyelenggaraan kepada pemilik berdaftar di kawasan kediaman “Bangsar Hill” tersebut telah tamat tempoh keesahannya. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [7] Klausa 2.1 (a) MMA tersebut menyatakan tempoh masa keesahan perjanjian MMA tersebut adalah untuk tempoh 10 tahun dari tarikh serahan milikan kosong pembangunan (development vacant possession date) tersebut. Klausa 2.1 tersebut menyatakan: “DURATION OF THIS AGREEMENT 2.1 This Agreement between the Management Company and the Purchaser shall commence on the property VP Date and shall continue until: a. the expiry of ten (10) years from the Development VP Date; OR b. the termination of this Agreement pursuant to clause 2.2 below; whichever happens earlier.” [8] Walaubagaimana pun, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa kontrak perjanjian masih wujud dan mengikat pihak-pihak kerana perjanjian tersebut telah dihidupkan/dilanjutkan (reinstated/extended) melalui tindakan pihak-pihak yang boleh dilihat melalui invois Plaintfi yang tidak dinafikan oleh Defendan, bayaran sebanyak 3 kali bayaran caj penyelenggaraan yang dibuat oleh Defendan pada tahun 2019 dan tahun-tahun sebelumnya serta juga melalui tindakan Defendan yang masih menggunakan perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh pihak Plaintif. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [9] Bagi menyokong versi Plaintif, seorang saksi iaitu Puan Ng Hui Mei iaitu Operations Manager, Chartwell Asset Management Sdn Bhd telah dipanggil oleh pihak Plaintif dalam tindakan ini. Manakala pihak Defendan pula telah memanggil seorang saksi iaitu Defendan Pertama sendiri bagi menyokong versi Defendan. C. ISU-ISU UNTUK DIBICARAKAN [10] Di dalam Tindakan ini, terdapat tiga (3) isu-isu utama yang perlu diperhalusi dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini bersandarkan kepada prinsip bebanan undang-undang di atas imbangan kebarangkalian iaitu: a) adakah wujud kontrak yang mengikat pihak Plaintif dan Defendan di dalam tindakan ini; b) sekiranya ada, adakah terdapat perlanggaran kepada terma kontrak oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif dan juga oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan (tuntutan balas); c) apakah gantirugi yang bersesuaian. D. UNDANG-UNDANG YANG TERPAKAI [11] Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukan: S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 i) 101 Burden of proof (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. [12] Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 pula menyatakan: “102 On whom burden of proof lies The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. [13] Mahkamah merujuk kepada otoriti di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu “DR. SHANMUGANATHAN v. PERIASAMY S/O SITHAMBARAM PILLAI [1997] 2 CLJ 153” yang menyatakan: “Under s. 101, it is provided that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Under s. 102 the burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.” S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [14] Di dalam kes “RODA BERLIAN (M) SDN BHD & ORS v. LIM TITT HUAT & ORS [2023] 1 LNS 264”, Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan: “[28] The Plaintiffs bear the legal and evidential burden to prove on a balance of probabilities of establishing a case against the Defendants throughout the trial before the onus shift to the Defendants to establish their Defence.” [15] Setelah meneliti keterangan saksi, keterangan dokumentari serta hujahan bertulis yang telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak, ringkasan dapatan- dapatan dan penemuan dibawah telah dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini. E. ISU PERTAMA: SAMA ADA TERDAPAT KONTRAK YANG MENGIKAT PIHAK-PIHAK DI DALAM TINDAKAN INI [16] Secara ringkas, terdapat 4 perjanjian utama yang perlu dirujuk dan dijadikan asas sandaran di dalam memperhalusi isu di atas iaitu: i. Road Management and Maintenance Agreement (“RMMA”) bertarikh 19 November 2001 di antara pihak Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL) dan pemaju perumahan “Bangsar Hill” iaitu Bandar Raya Developments Berhad (BRDB); S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 ii. “Novation Agreement (NA)” di antara DBKL, BRDB dan Plaintif bertarikh 8 Januari 2002; iii. Perjanjian “Management and Maintenance Agreement (MMA)” bertarikh 29 April 2005 di antara Plaintif dan pemilik berdaftar Lot 11 yang pertama; dan iv. Perjanjian “Assignment and Novation Agreement (ANA)” di antara Plaintif, Defendan dan pihak Ketiga (iaitu pembeli kedua) bertarikh 16 Julai 2012. [17] Perjanjian MMA tersebut menyatakan antara lain bahawa Plaintif berhak mengenakan dan mengutip Caj Penyelenggaraan (termasuk kawalan keselamatan dan kebersihan kawasan) ke atas pemilik rumah di dalam kawasan perumahan tersebut. [18] Tempoh perjanjian MMA tersebut pula adalah untuk satu tempoh 10 tahun dari Tarikh milikan kosong diserahkan kepada pembeli pertama. Namun, tempoh perjanjian dan terma-terma MMA tersebut boleh diperbaharui atau dilanjutkan tertakluk kepada persetujuan bersama semua pemilik dan juga pihak Plaintif. [19] Setelah meneliti keterangan pihak-pihak, didapati tiada keterangan yang diberikan oleh pihak-pihak bilakah Tarikh milikan kosong tersebut telah diserahkan kepada pembeli pertama. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [20] Namun, Pihak Defendan mendakwa bahawa tempoh 10 tahun keesahan perjanjian MMA tersebut telah tamat. Dakwaan ini juga tidak disangkal oleh Plaintif, namun Plaintif mendakwa walaupun wujudnya kemungkinan tempoh keesahan telah tamat, namun kontrak dan terma MMA tersebut telah diperbaharui atau dipersetujui untuk dilanjutkan melalui perbuatan (conduct) Defendan yang tidak pernah membantah atau menolak invois uang diserahkan, terdapat bayaran dibuat oleh Defendan pada tahun 2019 dan terdapat permintaan dan perbuatan Defendan yang menggunakan khidmat pekerja Plaintif bagi nmembantu pembersihan kawasan hadapan rumah Defendan. Sub-Isu Pertama: Adakah perbuatan Defendan yang tidak pernah membantah invois yang diserahkan kepadanya oleh Plaintif adalah merupakan persetujuan tersirat bahawa Defendan adalah terikat secara kontrak dan terhutang dengan Plaintif; [21] Secara asasnya, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan prinsip yang diutarakan oleh Plaintif berkaitan kedudukan invois sekiranya tidak dibantah oleh Defendan, maka akan menjadi satu factor pemberat untuk menunjukkan bahawa wujudnya kausa tuntutan dan keberhutangan yang sah oleh Defendan. Plaintif juga telah merujuk Mahkamah ini kepada beberapa otoriti undang- undang bagi menyokong kedudukan Plaintif bahawa perbuatan Defendan yang tidak pernah membantah invois yang diserahkan kepadanya oleh Plaintif adalah merupakan persetujuan tersirat bahawa Defendan adalah terikat secara kontrak dan terhutang dengan Plaintif; S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [22] Namun demikian, perbezaan utama yang memisahkan dan menjarakkan prinsip-prinsip berkaitan kedudukan invois sepertimana di gariskan di dalam kes-kes tersebut jika dibandingkan dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini ialah tiada pertikaian berkaitan kewujudan dan keabsahan kontrak di antara pihak-pihak di dalam kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh Plaintif tersebut. Invois-invois tersebut dikeluarkan bersandarkan kepada kontrak yang sah dan tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak-pihak. [23] Di dalam kes dihadapan Mahkamah ini, asas utama pertikaian pihak- pihak ialah berkaitan kewujudan kontrak di antara pihak-pihak dimana pihak Defendan mendakwa bahawa tempoh 10 tahun keesahan (validity) perjanjian MMA tersebut telah tamat. Plaintif pula mendakwa walaupun wujudnya kemungkinan tempoh keesahan telah tamat, namun kontrak dan terma MMA tersebut telah diperbaharui atau dipersetujui untuk dilanjutkan melalui perbuatan (conduct) Defendan. [24] Justeru, pada hemat Mahkamah, perbuatan Defendan yang tidak membantah atau menafikan invois yang diserahkan kepadanya oleh Plaintif bukanlah suatu yang boleh disandarkan sebagai sandaran utama kepada tuntutan Plaintif memandangkan asas utama iaitu perjanjian MMA yang membolehkan invois tersebut dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif dipertikaikan oleh Defendan. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [25] Plaintif haruslah membuktikan terlebih dahulu bahawa wujudnya kontrak yang sah dan mengikat di antara pihak-pihak bagi menbolehkan invois-invois yang dikeluarkan dan diserahkan kepada Defendan tersebut boleh dijadikan sandaran utama bagi menunjukkan wujudnya keberhutangan dan tunggakan oleh Defendan. Sub-Isu Kedua: Adakah perbuatan Defendan pada sekitar tahun 2019 yang membuat bayaran sebanyak RM 38,596.33 sebagai bayaran caj penyelenggaraan yang tertunggak merupakan persetujuan tersirat bahawa Defendan telah memperakui perlanjutan kontrak dengan menyelesaikan tunggakan; [26] Plaintif mendakwa Tindakan Defendan yang membuat bayaran tunggakan sebanyak RM 38,596.33 bagi caj penyelenggaraan yang tertunggak merupakan persetujuan tersirat bahawa Defendan telah memperakui perlanjutan kontrak dengan menyelesaikan tunggakan. [27] Defendan pula menyatakan bahawa bayaran tersebut bukanlah satu pengakuan Defendan terhadap keberhutangan, tetapi merupakan sebahagian bayaran secara sukarela dan suci hati (rujuk perenggan 7 Pernyataan Pembelaan) oleh pihak Defendan kepada Plaintif tanpa mengakui atau bersetuju dengan kewajipan mana-mana kontrak. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [28] Pada hemat Mahkamah, bayaran yang dilakukan oleh Defendan tersebut adalah merupakan bayaran caj penyelenggaraan yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan secara terma “good faith” kepada Plaintif setelah diminta untuk membuat bayaran oleh Plaintif. [29] Defendan semasa disoal balas oleh Plaintif menyatakan: Q- I put it to you that this was a Freudian slip. You know what is a Freudian slip? It was a slip on your part, you gave away the fact that the management has the right to collect its fees, isn’t it? A- Well, I never denied that the Bangsar Hill has the right to collect fees because it is stated in MMA. Q- And you have also accepted that the MMA has been extended, isn’t it? A- No, I never said that it has been extended. I cannot find any proof that was given to me that it has been extended. Q- If it wasn’t, why did you tell them that they cannot collect management fees on other issues? Why did you not say the MMA is not extended? A- Yes, because they were sending me invoices to ask me to pay. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [30] Pada hemat Mahkamah, Plaintif sendiri juga gagal untuk meyakinkan Mahkamah bahawa Defendan sememangnya sedar dan mengakui bahawa MMA tersebut telah dilanjutkan dan oleh kerana itu, Defendan membuat bayaran tersebut kepada Plaintif. [31] Mahkamah ini juga berkecendurungan untuk membuat dapatan bahawa ada kebarangkalian yang tinggi bahawa Plaintif juga tidak sedar dan “aware” bahawa perjanjian MMA tersebut sebenarnya telah tamat tempoh dan perlu diperbaharui oleh pihak-pihak. Sub-Isu Ketiga: Adakah perbuatan Defendan yang masih mendapatkan khidmat pekerja Plaintif termasuk untuk kegunaan sendiri di dalam laman rumah Defendan merupakan perbuatan tersirat pengakuan wujudnya kontrak dan seksyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950 terpakai di dalam situasi ini [32] Secara ringkas, perlu ditekankan sekali lagi bahawa terdapat 2 perjanjian berbeza yang terpakai di dalam Tindakan ini, iiatu: i) RMMA dan NA diantara DBKL, BRDB dan Plaintif. -perjanjian-perjanjian ini antara lain telah memberikan hak ekslusif dan tanggung jawab kepada Plaintif untuk menyelenggara kawasan “Reserve Road” yang dikenali sebagai Linear Park di dalam kawasan perumahan Bangsar Hill tersebut. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 ii) MMA dan ANA di antara Plaintif dan Pemilik/Defendan -perjanjian ini membolehkan Plaintif mengenakan caj penyelenggaraan ke atas setiap pemilik termasuk Defendan bagi menampung kos penyelenggaraan Bangsar Hill tersebut. [33] Justeru, dalam apa jua keadaan termasuklah sekiranya Defendan atau mana-mana pemilik lain gagal untuk membuat bayaran caj penyelenggaraan kepada Plaintif, tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk menyelenggara reserve road dan kawasan sekitar di dalam perumahan Bangsar Hill tersebut masih tetap perlu dijalankan dan diselenggara oleh Plaintif. [34] Pekerja-pekerja Chartwell iaitu agensi pelaksana kerja-kerja penyelenggaraan bagi pihak Plaintif masih bekerja seperti biasa dibawah seliaan Plaintif dan tidak tertakluk kepada MMA di antara Plaintif dan pemilik- pemilik lain termasuk Defendan. Bayaran bagi kerja-kerja kontrak pembersihan dan penyelenggraan oleh Chartwell masih dibuat dengan baik oleh Plaintif. Justeru, seksyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950 di dalam situasi ini adalah tidak relevan. [35] Pada hemat Mahkamah juga, Tindakan Defendan yang menggunakan khidmat pekerja Chartwell bagi membantu membersihkan kawasan hadapan porch rumahnya yang dipenuhi dengan daun-daun dari pokok-pokok yang terdapat di kawasan Linear Park adalah sesuatu yang tidak boleh dianggap sebagai pengakuan tersirat wujudnya kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [36] Ini adalah kerana pekerja-pekerja Chartwell tersebut tidak mempunyai kuasa atau diwakilkan oleh Plaintif untuk memasuki atau memperbaharui kontrak bersama Defendan. Pada hemat Mahkamah, permintaan Defendan dan Tindakan bantuan oleh pekerja Chartwell tersebut tidak terjumlah kepada pembaharuan kontrak, bahkan lebih kepada pertolongan atas pertimbangan pihak Chartwell yang diberikan kepada Defendan. [37] Pihak Chartwell tahu dan sedar bahawa mereka tiada keperluan untuk membersihkan halaman rumah Defendan,,namun masih melakukannya setelah diminta bantuan oleh Defendan. Perkara ini pada hemat Mahkamah dilakukan tanpa memikirkan obligasi dan niat untuk memperbahrui kontrak, tetapi lebih kepada bantuan diberikan kepada Defendan. Sub-Isu Keempat: Adakah perbuatan (conduct) Defendan secara peribadi di sepertimana dinyatakan di atas boleh menjadi asas kepada pembaharuan dan perlanjutan kontrak MMA [38] Persoalan yang paling penting untuk diteliti oleh Mahkamah ialah adakah perbuatan (conduct) Defendan secara peribadi di dalam Tindakan ini boleh menjadi asas kepada pembaharuan dan perlanjutan kontrak MMA dan juga boleh dikatakan menjadi asas persetujuan untuk mewakili pemilik-pemilik lain untuk melanjutkan kontrak MMA ini. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [39] Pra-syarat utama yang ditetapkan di dalam MMA tersebut berkaitan klausa pembaharuan atau perlanjutan tempoh kontrak serta terma-termanya iaitu perkara tersebut adalah tertakluk kepada persetujuan bersama semua pemilik dan juga pihak Plaintif di dalam perjanjian tersebut. [40] Klausa 2.3 menyatakan bahawa: “Subject always to the DBKL Road Agreement (as novated in favour of the Management Company pursuant to the DBKL Novation Agreement) continuing to subsist, this Agreement may, upon the expiry of the period stipulated under Clause 2.1(a) above, be renewed or extended for such period or periods of time and subject to such terms and conditions as the Management Company and the purchasers of all the Bungalow Lots of the Development may mutually agree upon.” [41] Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, secara ringkas dapatan dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini bahawa tiada sebarang keterangan secara oral ataupun dokumen yang menunjukkan bahawa terdapat persetujuan ataupun perbincangan (sama ada secara kontrak bertulis, resolusi mesyuarat bersama Plaintif dan semua penduduk atau apa jua dokumen sokongan lain) untuk melanjutkan tempoh keesahan perjanjian MMA tersebut yang dipersetujui oleh semua penduduk dan juga pihak Plaintif. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [42] Plaintif hanya mengemukakan satu minit mesyuarat Syarikat Plaintif (Minutes of the General Meeting of the Company) bertarikh 2 November 2017 bagi menyokong keterangan Plaintif. Rujukan kepada minit mesyuarat tersebut mendapati tiada sebarang perbincangan atau persetujuan berkaitan cadangan melanjutkan atau memperbaharui tempoh keesahan MMA tersebut. Perbincangan mesyuarat tersebut hanya antara lain bersetuju untuk menaikkan kadar caj penyelenggaraan yang telah dipersetujui oleh ahli mesyuarat tersebut tanpa melibatkan perbincangan berkaitan perlanjutan atau pembaharuan tempoh keesahan MMA tersebut. [43] Walaupun dinyatakan bahawa korum mesyuarat adalah mencukupi, namun klausa 2.3 di atas jelas menyatakan sekiranya tempoh keesahan MMA hendak dilanjutkan, ianya memerlukan persetujuan bersama semua pemilik lot kediaman dan juga pihak Plaintif. [44] Justeru, pada hemat Mahkamah, perbuatan (conduct) Defendan secara peribadi sepertimana dinyatakan di atas tidak boleh menjadi asas kepada pembaharuan dan perlanjutan kontrak MMA memandangkan pembaharuan atau perlanjutan kontrak MMA tersebut mestilah mendapat persetujuan semua pemilik dan bukannya perbuatan Defendan seorang sahaja. [45] Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan di dalam situasi ini, kontrak secara perbuatan (conduct) Defendan adalah tidak sesuai untuk dijadikan sandaran berkaitan pembaharuan atau perlanjutan kontrak MMA tersebut. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [46] Sesuatu kontrak yang mengikat perlu diketahui syarat-syarat nyata dan penting kepada sesuatu kontrak tersebut. Sekiranya benar perbuatan Defendan telah mewujudkan kontrak pembaharuan, isu-isu lain yang timbul pula, inter alia, ialah: i) apakah tempoh baharu perjanjian MMA tersebut; ii) apakah terma-terma lain yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak; iii) addakah pemilik lain juga dianggap bersetuju dan terikat dengan pembaharuan kontrak MMA tersebut. [47] Justeru, tanpa penjelasan dan keterangan lanjut berkaitan perkara di atas, adalah sesuatu yang sukar dipertahankan bagi menyatakan bahawa kontrak perjanjian MMA tersebut telah dilanjutkan atau diperbaharui oleh pihak- pihak di dalam tindakan ini. Sub-Isu Kelima: Tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bilakah Tarikh MMA ini mula berkuat kuasa dan tempoh akhir MMA tersebut [48] Pihak Plaintif juga gagal menyatakan secara jelas bilakah tarikh milikan kosong telah diserahkan kepada pemilik pertama. Ini kerana, perjanjian MMA menyatakan tempoh MMA hanya untuk tempoh 10 tahun dari tarikh serahan milikan kosong kepada pemilik pertama. Ketiadaan maklumat atau keterangan berkaitan tarikh serahan milikan kosong oleh pihak pemaju kepada pemilik pertama adalah sangat memprejudiskan Defendan di dalam tindakan ini. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [49] Ini kerana sebarang persetujuan pembaharuan atau perlanjutan mestilah bermula selepas tamatnya tempoh 10 tahun keesahan MMA tersebut. Ketiadaan keterangan berkaitan tarikh mula MMA tersebut pastinya menyukarkan Mahkamah untuk membuat dapatan bilakah tarikh masa pembaharuan atau perlanjutan kontrak tersebut bermula, khususnya untuk menilai dan membuat dapatan sama ada perbuatan (conduct) Defendan tersebut berlaku di dalam tempoh masa keesahan kontrak MMA atau selepas kontrak tersebut telah tamat tempoh (lapsed). [50] Ini kerana sekiranya MMA tersebut bermula dari tarikh MMA ditandatangani iaitu pada 29 April 2005, maka tempoh akhir keesahan perjanjian MMA ini akan berakhir pada 28 April 2015. Tiada sebarang keterangan menunjukkan terdapat sebarang perbincangan atau persetujuan oleh semua pemilik kediaman di Bangsar Hill tersebut untuk memperbaharui atau melanjutkan tempoh MMA pada tahun 2015 tersebut. [51] Pada hemat Mahkamah, maklumat berkaitan tarikh serahan milikan kosong ini sepatutnya ada di dalam pengetahuan dan rekod simpanan pihak Plaintif. Kegagalan Plaintif untuk memanggil saksi daripada pihak Plaintif (bukannya saksi daripada Chartwell sahaja) dan juga kegagalan mengemukakan keterangan berkaitan tarikh serahan milikan kosong bagi menentusahkan tarikh permulaan MMA ini adalah satu “adverse inference” di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap Plaintif di dalam Tindakan ini. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [52] Ini kerana keterangan SP1 sendiri mengesahkan bahawa beliau tiada pengetahuan secara langsung berkaitan terma-terma MMA tersebut. SP1 semasa disoal balas menyatakan: Q- I now refer you to the MMA maintenance management agreement and assignment notice which has been marked in regards to Question 5, 6 and 7 marked as P1 and P2. Again, can you confirm that you have no personal knowledge of this agreement? You're neither a signatory? A- No. Q- Is the original copy kept with Chartwell? A- The MMA? Q- MMA. A- No. Q- No. And until this case has come up you did not know of its existence. Am I right? A- Of the MMA or Lot 11 or the MMA in general? MMA in general I am more or less aware of it. I heard my ex-colleague my predecessor talked about it and mentioned that there's a maintenance road and maintenance agreement. Yes. Q- You’ve heard they have told you so. A- Yes, he have informed me. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Q- But until the case has come up to Court you’ve never heard of its existence. A- I've not seen its existence. I'm not privy to that document. [53] SP1 juga hanyalah merupakan pekerja di dalam Chartwell yang merupakan agen dan pelaksana kontrak berasingan di antara Plaintif dan Chartwell. Pada hemat Mahkamah, ketiadaan keterangan daripada pihak majikan yang juga merupakan pihak di dalam perjanjian MMA (iaitu Plaintif) telah menyebabkan kelompangan serius dan ketiadaan keterangan dapat diberikan berkaitan tarikh milikan kosong dan perkara-perkara berbangkit lain berkaitan MMA ini. Sub-Isu Keenam: Adakah perjanjian RMMA dan NA tersebut bertentangan dengan undang-undang (illegal) [54] Pihak Defendan di dalam Tindakan ini menghujahkan bahawa perjanjian RMMA dan NA di antara DBKL, BDRB dan Plaintif adalah perjanjian yang tidak sah dan terbatal kerana bertentangan dengan undang-undang (illegal). [55] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa Mahkamah ini tiada bidang kuasa untuk membuat pengisytiharan berkaitan keabsahan sesuatu kontrak dan kelayakan undang-undang sesuatu pihak untuk memasuki mana-mana perjanjian. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa Mahkamah Majistret tidak diperuntukkan langsung dengan satu bidang kuasa untuk membuat satu perintah deklarasi atau perisytiharan. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [56] Hal ini berbeza dengan bidang kuasa yang secara spesifik diperuntukkan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga Mahkamah Sesyen. Di dalam kes “BADAN PENGURUSAN BERSAMA MESAHILL v. GALA INTERAKTIF SDN BHD [2022] 6 CLJ 706”, Mahkamah telah menyatakan: “[19] The Magistrate's Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. Its jurisdiction is merely to decide all actions and suits where the amount in dispute or value of the subject matter does not exceed RM100,000. It is only a Sessions Judge who is empowered to grant declaratory relief. This is clear from s. 65 read with s. 90 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948. A High court decision arriving at this same proposition is Wong Loy Fatt & Anor v. Lim Tok Yew [2015] 5 CLJ 602”. [57] Tambahan pula, pihak yang dipertikaikan tersebut iaitu pihak DBKL bukanlah pihak yang dijadikan sebagai pihak di dalam tindakan ini dan tidak mempunyai peluang untuk memberikan pembelaan ataupun untuk membawa tindakan ini untuk didengar di hadapan korum Mahkamah yang bersesuaian. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH BAGI ISU PERTAMA [58] Berdasarkan kepada dapatan-dapatan di atas ini, Mahkamah ini membuat kesimpulan bahawa perjanjian MMA bertarikh 29 April 2005 tersebut telah luput keesahannya dan tiada kontrak baharu atau lanjutan yang mengikat di antara pihak Plaintif serta Defendan di dalam Tindakan ini. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 ISU KEDUA DAN KETIGA: PERLANGGARAN TERMA KONTRAK DAN GANTIRUGI BERSESUAIAN [59] Berdasarkan kepada dapatan di atas berkaitan isu pertama yang mana Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan bahawa perjanjian MMA bertarikh 29 April 2005 tersebut telah luput keesahannya dan tiada kontrak baharu atau lanjutan yang mengikat di antara pihak, maka Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tiada keperluan untuk Mahkamah ini meneliti dan menjawab dua (2) isu berbaki iaitu berkaitan perlanggaran kepada terma kontrak oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif dan juga oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan (tuntutan balas) serta berkaitan gantirugi yang sesuai kepada pihak-pihak. KESIMPULAN [60] Mahkamah ini setelah meneliti keseluruhan pliding, keterangan saksi- saksi dan dokumen sokongan yang dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah termasuk hujahan-hujahan bertulis oleh kedua-dua peguamcara yang bijaksana, maka Mahkamah ini di atas bebanan imbangan kebarangkalian, memutuskan bahawa: i) Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dengan tiada perintah terhadap kos. S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 ii) Defendan juga telah gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutan balas Defendan terhadap Plaintif. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan balas Defendan juga ditolak dengan tiada perintah terhadap kos. [61] Mahkamah juga merekodkan penghargaan dan terima kasih kepada peguam-peguam terpelajar dan bijaksana atas kerjasama baik yang diberikan, serta usaha dan ilmu pengetahuan yang dikongsi bersama sepanjang perbicaraan berlangsung dan di dalam hujahan bertulis yang telah difailkan. Bertarikh 3 Januari 2024 MUHAMMAD NAJIB BIN ISMAIL Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Sivil (9) Kuala Lumpur Peguam Plaintif : Harjinder Singh Sandhu dan Izzah Shakirah Mohd Sukor [Tetuan Akberdin & Co.] Peguam Defendan : Goh Boon Yee dan Nur Farah Ain Binti Faizul [Tetuan B K Goh & Goh] S/N f1GOsTal5U6rLqkd54exlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCvC-486-09/2022

PLAINTIF 1. ) NADARAJAH LINGAM A/L SINNADURAI 2. ) THANASELAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 3. ) KISHOKUMAR A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 4. ) LOGESHWARAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 5. ) LANESWARAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM DEFENDAN 1. ) DATO SRI DR. SURESH RAJ LACHMANAN 2. ) DR. SARASPATHEY NACHIMUTHU 3. ) DR ASSUNTA DAVADASS 4. ) DR. KUPPUSAMY IYAWOO 5. ) DR. RAIHANAH ABDUL KHALID 6. ) WONG PIK LIN 7. ) ASSUNTA HOSPITAL (M) SDN BHD

This is an application by the Plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim (Enclosure 20) pursuant to Order 20 Rule 5 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC). The first application to amend the Statement of Claim (SOC) was filed on 28.11.2022 (Enclosure 5) which Order was granted on 12.01.2023. It is an established principle that the courts have a wide discretion whether to allow an amendment or not (See Ismail bin Ibrahim v Sum Poh Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 348). Accordingly, Order 20 Rule 5 of ROC stipulates for the amendment of writ or pleadings with leave of the Court. It provides a discretion for the Court to allow leave to amend pleadings which must be exercised judicially (see Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. v. Yamaha (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [1982] 1 MLRA 417; [1983] 1 MLJ 213). Such amendments should not cause injustice to the other party.

03/01/2024

YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=385dc57b-332d-405e-8cb8-3541a9ce5c93&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR CIVIL SUIT NO. : WA-22NCVC-486-09/2022 BETWEEN 1. NADARAJAH LINGAM A/L SINNADURAI 2. THANASELAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 3. KISHOKUMAR A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 4. LOGESHWARAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM 5. LANESWARAN A/L NADARAJAH LINGAM … PLAINTIFFS AND 1. DATO SRI DR. SURESH RAJ LACHMANAN 2. DR. SARASPATHEY NACHIMUTHU 3. DR. ASSUNTA DAVADASS 4. DR. KUPPUSAMY IYAWOO 5. DR. RAIHANAH ABDUL KHALID 6. WONG PIK LIN 7. ASSUNTA HOSPITAL (M) SDN BHD (17026-H) … DEFENDANTS 03/01/2024 08:36:47 WA-22NCvC-486-09/2022 Kand. 84 S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an application by the Plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim (Enclosure 20) pursuant to Order 20 Rule 5 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC). The first application to amend the Statement of Claim (SOC) was filed on 28.11.2022 (Enclosure 5) which Order was granted on 12.01.2023. BRIEF FACTS [2] The Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Defendants for tort of negligence arising from the demise of Madam Shanti A/P Ponnudurai (Deceased) on 28.8.2016. The Deceased was under the treatment and care of the Defendants from 12.8.2016 to 28.8.2016. [3] The Deceased was the wife of the 1st Plaintiff and mother of the 2nd to the 5th Plaintiffs. The basis of Enclosure 20 is for amendment of the SOC on dependency claim under section 7 of Civil Law Act 1956 (CLA) and administrator of the Deceased’s estates under section 8 of CLA. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] The Plaintiffs had initially filed the Writ of Summons (Enclosure 1) and SOC (Enclosure 2) on 27.8.2022 where the Plaintiffs instituted this action against the Defendants in their personal capacity allegedly suffering from psychiatric injuries due to the demise of the Deceased and not as dependents under section 7 or on behalf of the estate under section 8 of CLA. [5] Subsequently, on 28.11.2022, the Plaintiffs filed an application to amend the Statement of Claim (Enclosure 5), which was granted by this Court on 12.01.2023 (Enclosure 11), wherein the Plaintiffs included additional facts to the claim which were also in their personal capacity [6] Thereafter, on 9.3.2023, the Plaintiffs have again filed an application to amend the SOC which is Enclosure 20 by attaching the Proposed Amended Statement of Claim. The proposed amendments may be summarized as follows- a) The addition of the 1st Plaintiff in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of the Deceased; b) The addition of a cause of action on behalf of the estate of the Deceased; and c) The insertion of new reliefs on behalf of the estate of the Deceased. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (Proposed Amendments) [7] The chronology of the case can be summarized in the following table- Subject Date Deceased’s date of demise 28.8.2016 Grant of Letters of Administration 11.5.2017 Writ of Summons and original Statement of Claim filed 27.8.2022 Application to Amend the Statement of Claim (The First Amendment) (Encl. 5) filed 28.11.2022 Order for Enclosure 5 (Encl. 11) 12.01.2023 Application to Amend the Statement of Claim (The Second Amendment) (Encl. 20) filed 9.3.2023 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [8] An application for amendment of a writ or pleadings is not a matter of a right of a party but is left to the judicial discretion of the Court depending on the circumstances of each case (See Raphael Pura v. Insas Bhd & Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513). S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] It is an established principle that the courts have a wide discretion whether to allow an amendment or not (See Ismail bin Ibrahim v Sum Poh Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 348). [10] Litigants should not come to Court and thereafter amend their pleadings as many times at their mercy. For the purpose of good governance, the Courts need to dispose cases justly, expeditiously and economically. As such, it is important for the Plaintiffs to provide a sufficient explanation as to why they have to amend the SOC for the second time after the period of approximately four (4) months. [11] Accordingly, Order 20 Rule 5 of ROC stipulates for the amendment of writ or pleadings with leave of the Court. It provides a discretion for the Court to allow leave to amend pleadings which must be exercised judicially (see Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. v. Yamaha (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [1982] 1 MLRA 417; [1983] 1 MLJ 213). Such amendments should not cause injustice to the other party. The three (3) basic questions to ask are- (a) whether the application was bona fide; (b) whether the prejudice caused to the other party could be compensated by costs; and S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (c) whether the amendments would not in effect turn the suit from one character into another and inconsistent character. [12] In Government of Malaysia v. Mohamed Amin Hassan [1984] 1 MLRA 793 (FC) it was held- “(1) What the respondent was trying to do was to add himself as a plaintiff and pursuing a claim peculiar to himself. That claim was distinct from the claim he instituted as administrator of the deceased's estate. This was not a case of altering a party suing in his representative capacity into his personal capacity. It was a case of adding a new party to the original suit. This was not permissible under any provision of the O 15 r 1 of the SCR, particularly when the period of limitation affecting the proposed plaintiff had expired. The court had no power to resuscitate an action which must fail in limine upon a plea of limitation. The court should not try to extend O 15 r 1 of the SCR beyond their natural and proper limit in order to supply omissions or defects nor strain them to the justice of an individual case.”. [13] Based on the case of Government of Malaysia v. Mohamed Amin Hassan (supra), this Court finds that Enclosure 20 seeks to add a new party from a dependency claim under Section 7 CLA into an estate claim under Section 8 CLA which is an entirely new cause of action which would turn this suit from one character (a claim made in personal S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 capacity) into a suit of another (an Estate Claim) and is an inconsistent character. [14] It is also pertinent to note that the 1st Plaintiff had been granted the letters of administration on behalf of the Deceased’s estate on 11.5.2017, more than 5 years prior to the commencement of the Plaintiffs’ original action against the Defendants. The 1st Plaintiff’s reason for the delay is that he had “overlooked” the letters of administration and had only recently received the same from the “solicitors who handled the application for the letters of administration”. It is thus, inconceivable that the 1st Plaintiff elected not to retrieve the letters of administration for almost 5 years. [15] Relatively, there was no valid justification from the Plaintiffs to explain the delay despite the fact that the Letter of Administration of the Estates was granted over 5 years ago. It was also not explained as to why it was not even filed during the first amendment of the SOC. Further, Enclosure 20 was only filed after the limitation period has set in, of which the Plaintiff has failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [16] Accordingly, as the Deceased passed away on 28.8.2016, it is clear that the dependency claim is time barred as it must be brought within 3 years from the date of death as provided under section 7 of CLA. Section 7(5) CLA provides- “(5) Not more than one action shall be brought for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint, and every such action shall be brought within three years after the death of the person deceased.”. [17] In this regard, the Supreme Court in Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 held- “An application to add or substitute a new party to an action after the expiry of the limitation period should not be allowed and this is based on good and sound principles. The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly to have definite end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by courts.” [18] It is trite law that, outside of the legal ambit provided by Order 20 Rule 5 ROC, amendments to pleadings which seek to add a new party to proceedings after the expiry of the limitation period are not allowed (see Government of Malaysia v Mohamed Amin Bin Hassan (supra). S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [19] As such, the Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim on behalf of the Deceased’s estate by way of the proposed amendments pursuant to Order 20 Rule 5 ROC after the expiry of the limitation period. [20] In addition, the Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages, loss of expectation of life and loss of earnings are prohibited by law. Section 8(2) of CLA provides that- “(2) Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of that person- (a) shall not include any exemplary damages, any damages for bereavement made under subsection 7(3A), any damages for loss of expectation of life and any damages for loss of earnings in respect of any period after that person’s death “ (Emphasis Added) [21] It is clear from the statutory provision in section 8(2) CLA, that exemplary damages are not recoverable in an estate claim (See Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Leong Yew Chin [1986] 1 MLRA 225) and in Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors v. Selvi Narayan & Anor [2021] 3 MLRA 424, the Federal Court had expressly held that Section 8(2) CLA 1956 acts as a complete bar to a claim for exemplary damages by a deceased’s estate. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [22] Further, in the case of Datuk Seri Khalid Abu Bakar & Ors v. N Indra P Nallathamby (the administrator of the estate and dependent of Kugan a/l Ananthan, deceased) & Another Appeal [2014] 6 MLRA 489; [2015] 1 MLJ 353 it was held- “[28] The rationale behind the existence of ss 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Act is clearly set out by Salleh Abbas FJ (as he then was) in Sambu Pernas Construction & Anor v. Pitchakkaran Krishnan [1982] 1 MLRA 143; [1982] 1 MLJ 269; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 299 as follows: "At common law the death of a person gives rise to two principles. The first is that the death of any person is not a civil wrong. Therefore no action can be founded on it although death may result in pecuniary losses or damages to the deceased's spouse and children. Lord Ellenborough CJ in Baker v. Bolton [1808] 1 Camp 493 ruled that "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." The second principle was that when a person died any cause of action which was vested either in his favour or against him at the time of death was buried with him. In other words the cause of action did not survive the death: "actio personalis moritur cum persona". The first principle which regarded death as not giving rise to any cause of action was rectified by s 1 of the Fatal Accidents Acts 1846 to 1959, popularly known as Lord Campbell's Act whilst the second principle which dealt with the non-survival of the cause of action was rectified by the Law Reform S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. The provisions of these two UK statutes are now incorporated in ss 7 and 8 of our Civil Law Act 1956. Had it not been for ss 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Act it is clear that the plaintiff could not have the right to bring the suit, and having acted under these sections and in particular s 7, his case must stand and fall on the basis of these sections. [29] Sections 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Act thus give rise to two respective causes of action. Section 7 relates to what is known as "the dependency claim" where the statutorily recognised dependants of the deceased can launch a claim for the loss of pecuniary benefits which would have been provided by the deceased for the support of his dependants had he not died. Section 8 relates to what is known as "the estate claim" where all causes of action, save and except what are prohibited therein, vested in the deceased prior to his death shall be survived by his personal representatives of the estate. Whatever is claimed will be for the benefit of the estate.”. [23] It was also observed that an award for mental pain and suffering for the dependants are not allowed under section 7 CLA. In Ketua Polis Negara & Ors v Nurasmira Maulat bt Jaafar & Ors (minors bringing the action through their legal mother and next friend Abra bt Sahul Hamid) and other appeals [2018] 3 MLJ 184 (FC) it was held- “[96] As s 7 of the CLA is a provision enabling the specified dependants of a deceased person who came by his death due to S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 the wrongful act, neglect or default of another to claim for damages in their own right to compensate them for loss of support due to such death, a claim for the pain and suffering of the specified dependants (or even of the deceased person himself) is certainly beyond the purview of the section. [100] The proviso to subsection 7(3) of the CLA does not allow damages to be awarded to a parent for being deprived of the services of a child or to a husband for having been deprived of the services or society of his wife. [101] For loss other than pecuniary loss, the only damages that s 7 of the CLA allows to be claimed are damages for bereavement. However, such damages can only be awarded to the spouse of a deceased person or, if he was a minor and never married, his parents. The sum that can be awarded as damages for bereavement is RM10,000.00, subject to the power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to vary such sum.”. [24] Enclosure 20 should not be a ‘tactical manoeuvre’ (see Hong Leong Finance Bhd v. Low Thiam Hoe & Another Appeal [2016] 3 MLRA 81; [2016] 1 MLJ 301; [2015] 8 CLJ 1). This Court finds that Enclosure 20 is not made bona fide and is a tactical manoeuvre to defeat the period of limitation and the Plaintiffs are attempting to insert a new party into the proceedings outside of the limitation period. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 CONCLUSION [25] For the foregoing reasons, Enclosure 20 is dismissed with costs subject to allocatur’s fee. (YA DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCVC 1 Kuala Lumpur. Date: 31 December 2023 COUNSELS For the Plaintiffs Messrs Goban & Co. L12-12, Menara Sentral Vista 150 Jalan Sultan Abdul Samad 50470 Kuala Lumpur. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 For the 1st, 3rd and 4th Defendants Messrs Shean Delamore & Co. Tingkat 7, Wisma Hamzah-kwong Hing No. 1, Lorong Ampang 50100 Kuala Lumpur. For the 2nd Defendant Messrs Jayadeep Hari & Jamil Suite 2.03, 2nd Floor, Block A No. 45, Jalan Medan Setia Satu Plaza Damansara, Bukit Damansara 50490 Kuala Lumpur For the 5th Defendant Messrs. Asbir Hira Singh & Co. Unit 25-15, Block A Menara UOA Bangsar No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1 59000 Kuala Lumpur. For the 6th and 7th Defendants Messrs. Azim Tunku Farik & Wong Unit 5.03 Tingkat 5 Wisma Badan Peguam Malaysia No. 2, Lebuh Pasar 50050 Kuala Lumpur. S/N e8VdOC0zXkCMuDVBqc5ckw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

MA-24NCvC-60-03/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) DEVARAJ A/L D LECHIMINAN 2. ) RENNUDEVI A/P JOSEPH RAJATHURAI RESPONDEN PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

Constitutional Law: citizenship – by operation of law – child adopted by citizens of Malaysia – Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – whether ‘parents’ only biological or include persons who adopted the child – Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(e) and subsection 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – ‘not born a citizen of any country’ – section 19B Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – whether child found exposed.Held: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required under the law - parents only refer to biological parents - principle of jus sangunis not satisfied - child not found exposed - petition dismissed

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

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02/01/2024 14:40:23 MA-24NCvC-60-03/2022 Kand. 47 S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—2mcvc—su—o3/2022 Kand. 47 32,01/2:24 41-4.’! 2: DALAM MAHKAMAH T|NGG| MALAVA DI MELAKA DAM AVIA 2 In lhu Mum: oi Rink: 7, 73 Ind 76 Rules of Court 2oI1 And In one Mam: al Section 25 :2! me courts of Judicature AcI19s4 and spacific RaliulAct1950 And In Ina Mutter of suction 9 dun 25A ol Ine Auopuon Act 1952 and Article Hand Second Schedub oi tha Fadorll constinnion Buween 1. DDL 2. RJRY (Applying In thelr awn capacity and n lliignllon ropmoniazivn of a minor child, Ruvesa aip Dovarai) PLAINTIFF And PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMMIAN. MALAYSIA DEFENDANT JUDGMENT Introduction [11 ms is me ground: of daemon o1 (hm com m vespecl M an apphcmlon filed by me 1-" ma 2"“ P\ammls mmg on men behaw and as lmgatlon representanvu 0! a mum emu named RAPD (name mdzcteo lo mamcam ananyrnilyj (‘cmIa') for . pnn::Ipa\ order under paragraph 1 0! Enclosure 37 mm me cm 09 declared a onixen af Malaysia pursuanm: me upemnon omude mum rend mgmev wmu sermon 1:) 12) under Pan n and semon 195 under Part m av me Fedem consmuuon CFC‘) ov anemanwexy, pursuant to me wevauon olAme1e «mm; read lugmhet mm section (I7 (9) ans 2(3) under Far! I: av ma Second scneame at me FC (ApplIca|1Dn‘) Vn addmon to that pnnc|pa\ ovum, lhe Plamnms further seek raumm onnsuuentnal orders as set mm m paragraphs 2, 3,4 and 5 lhavam Bzckgmund mu [2] The Child was horn on 14 3 2019 ta a woman known as DMPK nhe Bmlogical Mother‘) at Hospnal Sultanah Nora wsmau, Ealu m ,wmn.umv.mm..»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [131 In approaching «ms >ssue, Ihis Caun memo the decwslon ov me Cuurl av Appeal -n P-«mm am: Kalull/rln dun Kamnu Mnlnysil v. Pang Wee Sn 5 AnoI[1017] 7 cu :3. That decrsxon Is Impcrtarvl because -1 dealt man we same Dnnclpul Issues bwwhl up by Counsel (of me Plaumms Tc sum u bnefly me coun MAppaaI mm: that (at the law an cnizensrup Is confamsd. both Dlvcedurally Ind subslannvely m he so Illa", me cansmullonallly or me FC Is wnstdeved lmm me perspectwe or the Consmunon and :2 Is not to be mcerprec/ed by refevenoe to other statutes, even :1 may were passed by Panllment‘ (bl thewuvd ‘parent’ only means bvokzgxcal parenl and does nu! extend to include adaptive parent, and .1 Ihe parem vi to mcmu Adaplwa patent, the FC womd have expressly pmvmea so, (e) il .5 a flawed argument to say Ihatlhe pmvxsxons 0! me Adopuan An 1952 Drevlded me missing link In 11 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm nnerpnaxing ms word ‘parenf in semen ma), Pan II‘ Secund Schedule‘ (a) the scheme of me Dmvlslons under me Adovnon /an 1952 does mt extend me the realm mm: F0 lfl maflsn a! cmxenshlvn (e) that m detemwung me cmzensnip of a person bum me pnnmplan 01/us sun Irlfl /u: sangwm: mus! has moved‘ and m .n resvlct to ma pnnoinla afjus sanguws, m runs upnn me appucanx to prom: that aim: lime av mun, vane or ms parancs was euner a Malaysian citizen or a permanem mswdenl m Mawayaua [M]; The ilPF‘>Camnn mbmn pnncmles onus solrsnd /us ssngufms at me llma av mm :n he detemwlalwon ol cmzansnnp as amboruled by ms mas».-p Abang Vskandar JCA (as he then wasnn pm, Swn s. (supvajwas Mermdtu mm awnwaw by me Fedevefl Coun m OBET(supra) u m mmw.umv«umM mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [15] Mom xmpunanny, the menu cm In CBET(supra) dud not approve (he Cmm of Appeafs bread WOVDVMBIIDH In Mnd!luvlll1supra)onme meamng cV’pzrenl‘ Io mu-me non- bwulogvcal parents such as adomwe parems and that decxsnon must be taken to have been avervmed (sse Pegulm mg». umym I Anor v. Go Fu Song a om-4202212 cu m /[2022] MLIU 1m; [15] On lhat basws, this court |s bound by slam decvsrs to lnHaw the declsxons m P-ng Swat 5-. (supra) and CBET(suprI) anmnevevme cannot be pevsuadedw agree mmme F\a|nufl: that a beneficern reamng cf semen Na) Pan ll Second Schedme tugsmev wim me pmvlsmns cl me Adophon An 1952, In pcmcular union 25A, is permissible hcwevar dssvaue wl may D: m (be cw; Inlevesl [111 Cummg bauk to me has In ms Apphclhon and apwymg Ping Swu Soc (supra), me mg in be delavrmnad .. wnemer me Plzurmus have sausned both pans cl sectmn 1 cl Fan II‘ Second Schedule, man Is, (hit me chm . 1; m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! (I) was burn In Malaysia, and (H) mam leasl one elma Child‘: paranls one la at me time ol um enner 2 cmxen at pennananlly raeldem In Malaysla The (um lequlremenl IS satisfied by me ha manna cnlln was horn ln aalu Pans!‘ Juhom The second vaquuemenl bears to be Woven [13] New 35 declded by me Fadaral calm ln CTEE lsupm) Iha lunaamanlal rule In lnlerprellng ma FC at any wnllan law n to give media we IIIIBMIDH M me flamers The oouncannal insert or lnlsrpret new words mlo me FC The cowl may only call Yn ald of lunar mam. a1 oorlalmcnm where the pmvlsmns are lnlpraaae, pmtean evacamva ur can reasonably hear more than me meanlng [ls] secllen 1(3) of Pan II Second Schedule makes velerenae only la me llrna atom and n01 at me llma ma appllcaxlon la made Thu! vaqulvumenl ls clear and unamblguous Thus, ln dacernunlnglna smus allhe cnllds peranl, ll is lne aldlaglcal Momera amus mat must be delermlned and rum zne adapuve m vMxAlwauvvvLvo4M7nuHuA ma a.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. LAIQ4 a mm he nflmnnflly am. glam. y.. .nune v-mxl navems, elm Malaysian cmzens, svnce there vs no adom-we parent at me time 01 mm Ta suggesl mat am. we cf the Child‘: bnlh‘ the Flamnfls ware already his paranu wmfld be dealiv nmpossmle and cunlradlclory to ma plain meaning of Ihe phIase“a1ma me of man“. (2:11 It Is claar «am ma evidence (hi! [hi Biological Momers cmxensmp and pisspon wue Idenlmed In the Flrsl ac The fact that the cmzensrup ann passport mmxser were stated In that dncurnem must mean that the pnsspm was mmun me Bwolagml Mather‘: possssmn or Known to me Plamhlls smoe the First as was wssued anerme Plamlmslook slepslo sdopllhs cmxa Thers can be no umerexplanalmn where Ihal Inlovmalion came lvarn On ma: nonsldamuon, mvs Cowl finds on me bahmeafproblbihuesmalshewaim111:1 - cmzen of Sn Lanka and no! u Malaysian [211 nus Court does not find me Plamllffs Aaamonaw Amaavn In Endnluru an mm; the Flalrmffs smug mm was nu xnquury made to me sn Lankan embassy an Inn cmunsmp status av the Biological Malhu based on me passpen number 15 m mmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [22] There I! also no evldarloe mal me alologlcal Mamerwas a pemlanenl rendenl cl M-laysla Allnaugn EH9 was ln Malaysla ax me unle of glvlng mm to me cmla them IS no evldsrloe mm she had entered Malaysla legally or mal he! presence ln Malaysla was as apemlarlenllesldenl Theve was rla lnquiry made wnn ma Malayslan lmmlgranon nepannlanl on me alalogleal Melners enlry mm Malaysla or her s1alus [23] Based on one above I find that lne Plalmlfls have iilled la alaonarga the burden cl pmvlng Ihal lne lalologlcal Mother was anther a cnlzen ol Malaysln or a pemlarlenl reslderll Far all the reasons dlscusud above, lnla calm finds na men: In grarnlrlg lne order all Cltlzenshlp under me Flm Ground second Ground [24] The plamtlffs‘ contend firally lnal. given me feel than me New BC was Issued Ihls com snould -ccenl lnal lrle cnllds parents are Malayslins and lhal lha cmla his not eaqulrea ma elllzerlshlp ml any alhev eaunlry ll was zvgued mat yactlan 15 m vMxAIi7uuWvlVqlM7huHuA ‘Nair s.n.l mmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 M mm .. nflglnnllly mm: glam. VII arlum puns! He) X5 concerned men only wheve tne cnna was bow and VvfieIhe( the chud ts stateless [251 s-nee mus Court is bound by the aecismna -n Ping swu su (supva) mat tne pmvmons onne Adoptton Ad 1952 hive no matenamy an the delermtnalmn at cluzenshlp under the so, the status ottne Wawnuffs as me adapuve parents cannot be taken mm account as of rtgh1 The Maunms sun cany the burden wfpmvmg tnat the Child was not born a cmzen at my cute: country [251 on finding that the BIoIog>ca\ Meme! Isa Sn Lankan. It cannot be sam mat the cm was not born a omxen of any atner country As held by the Com 0! Appeal VI nun Siew Hang 5 Anal V4 Kntun Pongnnlt Jntmnn Fcndnflnrln Noun: 5 0512-117) 5 MLJ 552 /1291713 cu 1», wt Iell upon me appncant to pmve ms Imaags under me pnneple or us sangwns In tnnoase, both me lvphcanrs mntagmx plranls were unknmm and no evidence was offered to prove the lineage at the bwokzglcal parents Smne the uneage cwld not be pmven me appucant Vafled In sahsfy semen I(e) at Fan 17 m vMxAIi7uuwvLVqlM7huHuA ‘Nair smnw n-nhnrwm n. LAIQ4 m my n. nnnmun mm: dun-mm VII .nune pm in, Second Scheduie despite spending his me wiimn me Federahun - [:5] A pram reading alplragmpli 1 my ‘ms nofbom . cmun ofmy courmy min: to IM rsllllonsmp nlmc 2""lupdl-ant la rue bmlogiu! m min: plums .: Ml mm of in: mm rm aw lvullbh dvcurmnrlry «mam. m. aw app-mi. mun nemficntu (Emu T88- 51 carlnmod nu mlomulmv pofllmwla 10 me woo-c-in-nuts nu ma mkv-nlpnmcullrs mu llldollid mm 'Mnklumnt mm Dqpamhtw {:4} sim ma mnnty mm mm lawful ma nmrogmaip-mi; uu unknown, niumpassion tn duomunclhl maps on». 2-: uvallml mu wuwd on-era mu 2» -ppaiimi in be canlomsd Einlbnshlp by Illlfidgllsfin sangmms {:71 mus M awvmw, ma 2"" aupsnamnu I-utllufilladlht Nlumsmovit to be - cmzvrv nyou-mm mm wflhln the mummy ovpmvman 11.; air»: /I of in. semi: si.-mm al in Fndsruv cumiimmn (Risk! to cm. Knot rm V Pnmulrar Bent Kahli/rm an xmmn Malaysia pmnuu m; [:01 We mrmal amen! me oanlermm or me spool/ant: mar ma av1deocelIna!1Ir92"‘appaUan(wasDominIheFnduIabnnandImd Iesrdsdm lma Flaenlion III": we, as mi as me nnsence alpemcular: m-mam Ippdlanls mm mrmmte All nauecmrmsimagecanoe I5 sm nMxAI97uuuwLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. s.n.i ...m.mui .. HIGH In vuny .. nflmnluly mm: dnuamnl VI mum puns! cmslruod as smficvont wool ma! ma 7" avpenam was not bum a when 0! any nuuntvy As was mm oaniev. mm .s mqum .a ewdunw am-e 2w -waeuunrs lvnenge, mm. owdemz .a mm: [21] The dauuon m man Sltw Bony (supra) was veferred to m Ihe reoem Htgh Coun decision m rmn mm sum v. K-ma Pnnualah Jabatan Pemtanann Megan Malayxlx A 0:: mm] 1 LNS us 1 {mm} ML./U 99:, where like -n ma pmaanc aaaa ma wdennly M lhelamer Is unknown and the mologucal momer gave mm to the appncam m Malaysia The >ssuo ma Mose them was vmelhev she was a cmzen 0! Malaysia The mgr. Cuurl laund Ihat there was cnnfusmn aa to me actual omzansmp sums of ma btobgxcal mutt-an whelher mavacx max aha had a red menmy card maanz max she was a permanenl resndem or welhershe was a crush av Singapore On mac bags, me mgr. Caun new that me bwologwcw mother was stateless and granted ma anphoatmn for umzenshnp [23] In contrast. thelacts nu ma prasam case show no cunmsmn as to ma uype ov uacumem waned in \n FIrsIBC The m vMxAIwauwvLvq4M7nuHuA ma saw n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII murm v-vrm Bmlng-cal Mmhev wls‘ at me me arms cmId's mm, s Sn Llnkan cmzsn It must also be said than mere Is no evidence that me Plammls made any mqulry on ma hackgraund and cmzensmp of the blokugwcal father when they were In Ihe pwcess cl reaching an agreemunl mm the Bmkngwcal Mulhar on me adnpman II is quxte meonoswsnle ms: nu Inquvry was made on that mailer to asoenam me ngm of the mother to umlalevully sunanderlhe cm «or adnclion Thus‘ W5 Cuun finds that mere was msulficxenl eflcn. pemans even a warm neg\ec1, by me Plalrmlfs In asoenam mac fact Therefare, «ms Cmm finds mac ms vans m Fnnh Nnni Sukar (supra) distinguishable smce lhelalher us unknown‘ the cmm must be taken to laHow the Bvmoglcal Mumers Unzenshlp The burden \s on me Pwsmxins to snow why she \s not anlmed lo sn unm cmxansrw‘ wtuch may «am In no [231 In Azimih Ha-man V4 Katya Penqlrlh mm» Pundcklun Mag"! 5 Anor 120231 J cu /mm] 2 ML! 227 the Caun M Appeal new (ha! 7 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm.‘ Pahm in me state of Johare some a months later on or mm 24 H 2019, ham PVIWMS were mlormed M the Biological Mmners aesne In gwe up we cnuu my auopuon An agraemam was struck on the same day between menu when me amlogncax Mather agreed tn surreodet all he! parental and guardianship nghts to ball! PIIVNINS who would Idofl the Chfld as their own Both Plaxnllifs are husband -nu wwe am ave Mmayslan cmlens [3] Slncelhe bwrlh uithe cnua was not nagmavea mm me mm a late regusuauon ev me man was done by me Flamurls an 24112019 and a mu cemfimte dated 21 7 2021: was Issued by Jnbatan Pendaflaran Negara In that camiicale‘ me Biolagwcal Mother was wdemmed as a Sn Lankan cauzen bearing paaspon Ne Nszzuss M the «me of gwmg bmn sne was 37 years 01d The tmloslcallatheroflhe child is nalknwn The oemficale was marked as ‘Bukan Warganegava mm sc‘; [4] Bclh Fmnllffs men filed comm appnn-amna m amp: xne cnna and me relevant orders were gramau by me Maaaka Susswans Cowl an 25 10 zozc Follawmg max alder. a new mm oerlmcale was wssued dated 12 4 2021 wneram ma 1“ Pmnmv ws reguerea m mmw.umvammm me am ...m.mn e. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm 1247] vim: ovmd rm wpnrsmago can 00 aseunimld as in mm case‘ Ihmmvappelklntsnabonsfiw llhwrnma dram can beaelermmed by Mvrwca vu m. manmy av nu parents my lwwsgu Ind ma cnvzanlmp law: gavsmmg nolplvarvlt nltvunalvty wound be mwam Ia ddtsvuuna wflvlhtlov mm» sppllllnl mm: m nqmmm mu m ‘wls no! Dam . Milan av My mum/y vn mu: ovsnt, 1». Ipvslllnl Many: ham m Mnlaysvan smv would b1 5 porsovv ham . cmun of andmorootmtvy, :9 Cambodvl, by wluo 5/me pmvcwle nun: mam»: Hvvreu. mu wmm ml :2 slatafieu at the Inn av hov mm“ [30] Movvng an, cinlhe Child besad Io have hear: found exposed wnhm me me: ing 01 section IQB av Fan II sacdnd Schedule7 Sewer! 193 presumes that when a chm Is vound exposed‘ the maths vs presumed to be a parrnanent uesndent and the Vmdmg man lha cvuld was axpmed shlu be the due 0! um: [31] Revfuranol was made to me Fedem Court demvon vn con a Anor v. Ponduluvr am: Blgl Kmnvnn Dan Kumlan. Mnlnyaia [2022] 1 cu 1 /(21:21) uuu 2.121 where ma meamng av me lam: ‘uxposetf under semen ms was dvsoussed. m nwmnv.umv«umM mm. Snv1|\nmhnrwHH>e HIGH m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumvvl VI mum pom! [as] rm mam mm: m s 155 an ‘my new Dam amid Immd axpmam mypluf Tm purposuofllvvx sscmil, when new contuxv musmm numnmmmanuarsnwnamunmammveua m . plus mmu: my Inn mm» woaogm/punms yampmu. mud) V1/alaknvdmll mas aims um» Iulnbn aflflo mm mduaoa m hum cluldlemell Inlrldnnvdnnrdumpsnaa‘ baby A-lchm: public olsmool Iouols place: M worsma and so an A mm: molnmq nl -.nm..a‘ suggasu .9 new bum cm/d «me an dtscavarod‘sxpn.1od at any oi mess Icualmns [sq A: sum, nu. Dmndsaf posstme mlerplelzmwv of me word found expasud‘ rs Ia mean! 4 . meamng m mdude a cum: -be-named at me pncemmnnymenmmmmwmssmnwvsunmm The opemnve word ’exposeL1'm 5195 mustllverelnle moompasx mephglvl or abanoomd now mm amam, omelwtse the mmmng man! of plivumng smmesavvess wumd be amama or raudarud tummy [32] In hght at max defimmn‘ can the Child be sad to have been ablndonud or axnosed7 The Respondent: contend Ihal me has at abandonment were not proven lay me Ptamtms {:33} The (acts here shvw that afler me cm was born, the crmd vemamed mm the Biological Mather up unm me P\ammls met 2: sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrw\HI>e HIGH m M, .. mn.u.y mm: dnumml VI mum pom! her same 3 months afler she had funded me Child m them Thus‘ unhke m ccu (supra). me mama remained war. the cm unm she was gwen up Mr adoption Vn ms cows vvew, muse lads do not show any abandonment amounmng en Velvmg me cnue axposed wllhaul any mm ov me bxolowcal parent [34] Smoe ems Court does nm find that me cnua was iaund exposed, bvlh presurnpuons Imdev semen 1915 Pan II‘ Second Schedule, that s — (3; me emu Is born to a mother who is pennanemry ressdem at me place where lhe fmdmg was made (them: sangmms preaumpnan) am (on me date ov me imam Is taken as the dale 01 me mm cannot be mgaerau m vaveur er ma mamurvs it \s a prlnnlpie ol haw max «or a presumplmn to apply‘ the lacl or eonaman (nggenng me presumpuen must first be proved As was swear: by Thomson 0.) m My Kim mm v. PF[1!61)1 ms 71,-[1961] 1 MLJ ms velerred to m vMxAIwuuwvLvqIM7nuHuA ‘Nair am n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my a. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm mm aDprova\ m Dam’ sn' Mohd Nuiib :0 Mad Rank v.PF(2a22)1 cu m /(202211 ML] 131 » n u wmy llenluntlfy In oburw mm mm. . anstulun/Dvuunvptvan wm u mm mu apom. m Nlcu or mum and so levels: the anus a( wool an any pm (/10 bar: pctennn! eustenm omen apvesumpban cannot ahmellnsoenxe mm pmotnl any fact we exmenns av wmm rs a wndvlmlv pr-mam 0/ ma pr-«umnuon lnxmq Ta sly atnurwuv would a. m «y m mu mm a/ Mime mm mom: [:5] On me Isiua man mus cam show: adopt In imarvrammn 01 me law mm mm be In my mteresl ov me cum, mus com cannat msagree that me numgrammg of cmzensmp to the Child will pose chauenges to me Plamuws as parents‘ me cmla as an mdmdual and mm me wamum and the cm: In a vamny unn However n would be neaessary to quote what was said by Rehana vusui PCA in aenvanna the Federal Conn‘: declsian m CTEB (sum) ~ 1221 Lumnd Cnansol lur ma Appaflanls Dr Cyms Du mlpnssld wan us an bur m mmd Mo mm plmclphs m eonslrumv the mem: nnnsmmnunnl pmvmons am 1.: am: an .m«m:.:.m onamung me m nwmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! avnrfmq am He submmsd that m ma prwes: ul wvlarnlebng colvsmmorw pmvtsowls to ma cmm, tshwfidbe done In ways so as m unable avamvlg ngm be grven mm m neny ov denuae Msm,r:1Iwg In support me Supmme Com or mam m Paslfiraduzle lnstmlts ul MednmIEducamn and Rueamn V KL Namsmllv-irvI!597] AIR aw (SCI 12:) ms mumpnmoom Mnramnvo/vuslhe weifnm of: mud, any nmy mam 0! m. /my mm mu be vefievanl He then mm mm Vwbsrlome m Mumatu olflame Allan: ./ F1:herIV980lAC .’l1Fwm¢Vv smphascsed on raw may and mmaepamuun afa mad /mm me (am:/y R5) ms pom! In a. norm rs nus n man an whom mu/ermenl an» rvms Dffinzwns-mp wu mud: to the dvddlen mmry to em» no rsmny back up No cwmlry m M: wandwvll wurvfzvltzlnsmu llurvyana mm: Hltahng mu ma-ma mm: nmflumviy mum my be . mmaar-non am not Mu lunar! or cumin -mop:-a Thus, wm: AIM mm mam mar one was nnlylu alhw mum to my.» Ealmuaa Irllmsyrsam flyous old [25] Nobody can drsawss ma! Iarmiy should not as lsparulsd Nowem me Issue berm us :5 wlluthornvmdmglnmnfyseparubmn 1; sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m M, .. mm., mm: dnumml VI mum pom! necessan/yammod me cum: m mt: can to I -.-mnn¢'II'I W°D"l15°" allaw /smnham added) run not mm mt M mm: In a man pursuant loAntd-3 15 7n. rlmrssfiarahon pnnape may be rs/etran! Val Me authonnes ta mnmsun me exemse ms dusuefron pursuant to Amc)e15 ma: rs wmrs me rwllrrsmam ofmcmwnwwwruts M Hmca. nnnommma r:.l.IcofmuchMll7 raamanea tnepnv-=-area: law an ramny seam-anon m In. nunlnxt ullhrs -pp-at [$1 on tns same tone. this cum cams met me mtesmei ai grammg stttzansntp In tns cnna so as to pmtect tne weware ol the Child Is uunamonal upon the sausvaamn at me mtena for cmzenantp In accordance with the Iiw cmzensnip ts not granted merely to serve the Child's wallave The cnnu 5 now blesed wnhtne presenee oflha Ftrst and Second Ptatmw as parents who wtu nurture and tatae tne cnua wttn lava and em and ma Coun ts cerlaln tnat may wtu do tnen utmost bes| tn lhe meanttme to pfomde me cnua wttn me best envtnanment until an awllulmn ts made under Amcte 15 of the recent Consluulmn 15 am I1MxAID7uumvlVo4M7huHuA «mm. a.n.t nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 m my t... nrmnnflly mm: dnuumnl wa artum vmm Conclusion and decision [37] Eased upnn an the above. the Court finds mat the cnleni for cmzensmp by awauan M waw undarlhe FC have no! tween met The Awllcallon :5 hereby msrmssea wllh no order as m cos1s Dalsd thus 2"“ M January 2024 /¢~u\~4.;Q MOHD RADZI BIN ABDUL HAMID JUDGE HIGH coum. MELAKA Pamas Al The Hearing For the P1; .11 11; Enclk Framed Nambxar Advocates 8 Salwcdcrs Tainan Fvancm Perewra & Shirl s-me an, Wnsma TCT 56-1, 3" Mb Man lpch 51200 Kufla Lumvuv 11 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm u src Puan Zavnm bvnll Tuglvan Federal Cuunse\ Pqabm Penlsmal Undang-Unuang New: Melaki Aras 1, Blok Laksamana Sen Negen, Ayer Keroh Hang Tuah Jay: 75450 Malaka 13 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [5] as ma father and me 2"“ Plamm as me mother However‘ me New so was marked :5 ‘fiukanwalganegari ( New ac‘) Thus‘ the reason hr the Appllcamun m this judgment. yetevences to “Amcles and “Second Schedule“aremthata1me FC The law on ciuzensmp [6] II has been deeded m a smug of cases and renamed m me Com at Apvem dwsuon m Pemmm 5-ur Kallnlrnn an Kemalian, Mal-ysia v. Pang woo Sn 3. Anor[2l711] 7 cu 13 /(201713 MLJ J08 and me recent Federal cuundeosmns m crss 5 Anur v. Km. Pcnglrih Pundlluran mg n, Mnlnysla A Dr: (202114 MLJ 23: /12021) a cL./ 411 and CCH 5 /mar v. Pwndalhr sosar Blgi K-Ianinn Dan Kumuliln, Malawi; 1 20221 1 cu 1 /I202!) MLJU 2.111 that the law on cmzenshlp ave excluswely prov-sea In me Fc In delwanng me uamsmn of me Court m ccn (supra). Her Ladysmp me cmer Justice Yengku Mavmun set cm a remmder on ma such pmwsmns are m be mlzvpreled — [ta] Cmzsrwup no mum mm :2, Put in am. so but M: nbo . mm: sa mnlnclh/y :..u...m me mm :0 Ms mdplluanal may cw-nun-d m m 511; A: sum my pmmm on mm; A: mmnm .: Mary .4 pawl»: [47] Navmv ma mar. m an eonwlcfefi mmafm of mu Iwowm wlnww by Abdoolcwsrl (I: H: mm m; m Madeira umvemy Bedvsfl v Gcvammsm plMalay::a[19M[2 ML] :55, Hip sar- rmm Pub/»'cFm.-ur:umrvDaInhHsmnbmH.;vh1n:& OI: mm 2 MLJ us mu Ma Conxmutlcn rs no! la be mnstmad m Any ,..m». a mm sens: {James V commmm oi Msmba nsasmc am but ms doe: noumn ma: a war! As anmanm mecnarpevvenumunguamlme camnm... m me mlemm olany »sg.rman.mumna« meaty, Never: mowma. for ma pumou ul mpplymq nnu.umn.r nrnl mmw suppand mars Iimphans posted) [421 me want my my: Dad la do battle wrm mew Mu L‘onfl»'c1In37pImL1ple.r On live (via mud, n rs and mm m ./udacmry mm: pmpon Io usurp we ml: olthe Legislature On In: me: hand n IS sax! Illa! me Juaxuary mun be flmacnw ta Pmtsct mmamemaz rvmls. No mm» me Irglmvant we are Lvn.I1anW Iammflvd nl mm Inn Indie! mm Dy mm sadeslskmglhear 5 sm nMxAI97uuvwLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! rupschve pm-mans m consmulmnnlcnses Whore do wa draw me me bslweuv mess two lxlrumu’ [491 w. behave mat the ans-war 4» ma quuimn ho: hum anscussod m mvwmerubh mnnun! of rams: mm me man recwvl osmgcrss ms mnw mm: 1: m. unaavsllvdlflv mu m...1.mm.n.gm lmipllmsvurvs muxtbu wnslruod ls broadly u poxarbh um Dmmmlu mm.-n Hm mass mu mm M uoflllruadu n-mmy anponobto rmnw mat-ml wscuaom mm play a loser par! when umshulng wmmnnu Prowsmns One cnnmal afluni m be pedanbv: or clmg neelesny In mnulamd Iegaasm [501 Men constrmny a ward or mm: m the FL‘ pmmm Mar war-nt-ems) - nmauwwvlal nah: me court snommve lbw wrdu! msmn mtlmrrw wrmaut mummy ur vanwv m. n...‘ munnmg And when uonmwng Antsmlabd Pmvrmnl‘ Ive uoufi mould ma than M a whale navmg ngard m ma burnout and mnm onlmu pvuwsms -nu mrmomso mu wlknrrva mummy rullm mm M mm at mm mm another [71 On me subject of rules of mzemramion allhe pnwissans u« me FC, me Federal Cnun In Data‘ Sari Ir. pa Mohammad Nlnr Jamaluddln v. Dam’ Sui Dr bmbry Abdul mm, 5 sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Allomcy sum-I (lntuwnn) (20121 2 cu m;[2o1a1 2 ML] 255 halt- One umcr mwun-nr gm. m mmmmn .1 cm4.mm .5 mt, “me Canslmmon mm! o. conndomd n 5 man, And m I: xa vm man .5 /.1 .5 possmle‘ m an M: mvmn; u rs an amnnansa cnnan m mnahluimnal oonstrudmn ms! no one Dmvtsmn aims Conmlulmv r: m be sepalalzd /mm a)! me omen‘ and Lvrvsrdersd alone, ma ma: an my pmwwns mm-g upon . p.m.m..m,.n m m be mm: mm m Md to be so mam-ma u to slrscrulle the gum p-mu or am mstmmcnl An clamcnlaly M): almrusmmum .5‘ ms! flpombb enact mm be gt»/an m evalypan amt every ward or: Corlslrmuorv and ma! unless Mere rt Jam: clear mason m me wnrmy. no pomun of me Ilmdamenlul law sham be trusted as supemunus (See Danahada Urus San End v Koknmny $411 5I~1(Eu Council Mal-ysrl me-mu-1 (20011 2 MLJ 2511 Dellberauons and decision ol min cum [3] u .5 me Flalnlilfs case that me cm \s a mule" o1 Ma\ays4a by operation 0! law an 2 anemauve grounds - ti) FIrs(\y1‘F\rslGvound‘), pursuamlothe pmvlslcns ofthe Adoption Act 1952 me crma havmg bewme 3 cm ai 7 sm nwmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Malsyuan cmzens, acquives cmzensmp under secuon 1(3), Pan n Mme F0: or an Ssoonmy (Samnd around), me am nannq been abandoned by me Euologmul Molnar mud not nawng acqu-red cnuensnip <31 any country wmnn 12 months from the dale ol umn. acquues uuzenshlp pursuam Io semen 1(e) and semen 2(3) af Fan n Second Schedule read laaethev mm sermon 195 el Part In. Second Schedule Qa.UzLEA§z_QL'.zuad [91 It was contended by counsen for me Flawrmffslhanhe cm cum to be accorded clllzensmp purmnc lo Amcve um Kb) read wan yachon 1(a)o1 Pan n on the mm man we ward ‘parent’ m paragraph (a) therem augm m be mnslmsd broadly to mdude aduplws parens Ifwasfunher argued that me pravvsnans ov me Adoption AC1 1952 am Is, section em Ind 25A wmcn conferlufl legal nghu on adoptwe puenli‘ are conclusive pm: at me menmy M the cmm. psvenl ‘for all m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! purposes‘ M ws me Planrmrrs comerman that me phrase ‘for all purposes’ means and muuaes me purposas av Icqumng omxensrvp ume: semen 1(3) of Pan II no] To advance the Plammrs cause, Counsel rvferved to me aecusmn at ma Cowl av Appeal m Madnuvln Jan/In Augusun v. Augustin Loouninmy a Dr: pm) 1 ML! 3:71 / [ms] 4 cu 15¢ where «he word ‘parent’ was mlerpmted nmaary Io includo Idamlve gums and not vesmaed to mologscau palenls [111 M was mans: arvuad mat ems com srmuxd adopt a beneficem umerpmuuon at m maanlng cl ‘parenf, sua- max parem can also mean Vawfw parents sum as adovllve parents and not ]us1 biological pavems s-nee a leg:\ adomlon awards the adocllva Dlrems menu: at parems, ma law, m pamcular secuon 1(3) should no: amcnmmaxe between blolngxcal and aaamwe parems A beneficent mterprecanon, n‘ adopted by Ihls coun, womd pvevent me cmld fmm bema rundored flawless and «no family um! would be aflmled ca grow peIceluHy unburdened by all the m ,wmw.umv.mm..»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm W] sacral and legal sngma and crrauerrgee that me cmlu would mherwxsaa race grawrng up as a stamens perwrr Redererroe was mane \o me declsmns rrr Minister or Home Affairs v. canine Macdonald HsIm[19s0]Ac 319, Eastern Heamr Board v, An Ford Uchhla {mu} 1 IR M7 and Indira Gandhi 147 Mumo v. Pcrramrh Jabaun Annma Isllm PorIk[201l]1 MLJ 545, rrr response, courrser for me Reeporxsems argues that In any aerermrnarrun nl clhzansmp undev me FC‘ hm prrnerples or [us son and /us sangwms of me brclngncal parent and not me adoptive parent mus: be pvaven by me applrcanl Reference was made to the Court at Appea\ eecrsrone In Llm Jen Hsiln L Anor v. Km. Plngnrih uoaurr Pendaklvan Neann A Dr: 12017) 5 cu M2 and mm slew Bony 4'. Anal v. Kama Ponyaralr Jabawl Pendaltaran Megm 1. Ors [2017] 5 MLI 862. It was avgued man lhe Plarrmfis In one Appllcalrun raneu to discharge the human 01 prevmg jus salrgumis srnce me Broragrcal Momerwas 3 sn Lankan

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24-73-12/2022

PEMOHON Sunrise Home Goods (M) Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN 1. ) KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN KASTAM DIRAJA MALAYSIA 2. ) Tribunal Rayuan Kastam

Originating Summons -Countervailing and Anti- Dumping Duties Act 1993- Appeal against the decision of the Customs Appeal Tribunal dated 7.11.2022 which dismissed the Appellant's appeal against the decision of the DG of Customs in the form of a bill of demand dated 4.5.2021 in relation of the Anti-Dumping duties allegedly underpaid by the Appellant.

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f398b918-2e09-4fa0-8600-d0d34fcd1bdc&Inline=true

02/01/2024 11:32:45 WA-24-73-12/2022 Kand. 34 S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N GLmY8wkuoEGANDTT80b3A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—24—73—12/2022 Kand. 34 D2/D1/2n2L 11:32-as mum IAHKAMAH mace: nun nu xmu LUIAFUR mum wluvm vsnsaxuwm xuun LUIIPUR, muwsu (ammnm KLIASA-KUASA mus) smgu gamuu no wA.2ua.1zgu Dnlam pemzra saw pevmuhnnan a. bawnh Sukiyan mw ma KasIam1967 Dem Damn psrlura mangenav sum MI Iumuun bcnankiv A 5 2021 yang dwkehmlkan m hawah Seksysn I7(I)Ak\a Kasla/n1967. Dan Dalam parkirz malvuanan dulhanu Vambakan m bawah Seksyen 25 Akla nun Tnmbcl aanu flan Anll-Lamhnkln mu an Seksyen Mm ma Kas|am1967 Dan Dalam perkam m-nun MDF TRK 7OU«i21/H202 Tnbunm Rayuan Kanam pads 7 NavemberZD22. Dan Daham penm. Ahnan 55A Kasaah 1. Kaedah-Kasdah Mahkamah 2012 Mun Slum . Hume Good: (Ml sun arm Fumyu mm P... 1 cl 2; ‘ sm Gunvawmnssanwrranhaa «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 1 Knlu lzengmn Kuhn 2. Trlbunll my-t-n Knnm Rnvundun—Run0noIn Judumunl hmoduction 1 The Appellant IS appealing agalnsl me tieclslon 111 me 2"“ Respondenl (me cuslpms Appeal Tnbunal) (Tllbunal) ln respect bl Appeal No. MOF TRK 700-6/1/8 (2021) daled 1112u22 whlch dlsmlssed the Avnellenls appeal against the declslorl ol me 1“ Respondenl (Customs) ln me lenn cl a mu or demand dated 4.5 2o2l In ralmlan lb me enudumplng dunes allegedly ttnderpeld by the Appetlenl 2 The Appellanl filed en Orlglnallng Summons (os) dazed 2.12 2u22 (Enclmurc 1) pnmanly seeklng the iotlbwlng rellefs — 2 1 That mus appeal be allowed, whereas lne Declslon ol me 2"“ Respondent (Tribunal) regardlng Appeal Np. MOF TRK mo. an/s (2021) dated 761.2022 (Tribunal Dlclslnrl) be set eslde. 2.2 ‘rnaune decismn plme 1“ Respondenllcustonls) In Ihe form at a lull at demand deled 45.2021 In relalmn lb lne arm- dumplng dunes allegedly underpaid by me Appellant be set aslde. 2 :1 That all payments made by lhe Appellenl for the Sflld bl“ of demand daled A 52021 be lully relunded by1ne customs lb lne Appellant; 2 4 Costs. and 2 5 Any other and lunner rellettnat «ms Honourable co-tn deems fit and proper. 3. After me heanng. I allowed the Appellarlfb 0S|Er1c|ost.tre 1) Here are me grounds for my declslon. V... 1 D! u 1 SIN GunVawktmEGIlNDTYInh:M “Nair s.n.l ...n.mn .. tn... m my 1... bflnlnnflly mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .mte Wm! customs cannot sinona ino Expmss suspension /Emnption giiion by Legislation through istms 25. The coiin is of iris view that customs is tmnno tiy all wnthen laws I( cannol arbitrarily rewrite trie iaw by its Letters and disallnw iris Appellant frvm the SVIU-dumping dmies exemp‘ ri Mam wriicri it has been exempted by the MOF in the exam e M ii: staiiiioiy aisoruioii 27. The ciisioins allempt to remove aiiimiinioing oiitis from customs oiiiiss suspension / exempllori entiiiea by LW and LMW is in cisai bveach of Parliamenrs inteni as sei DUI in the express iangiiage 0! Section 2(1) oi iris ciisionis Act 25 It must be noted Dual Parhamenl does not iegisia|s Yfl Vim Every woiu appearing in an Act niiisi bear some meaning. 29 Via Federal Coufl In Klishllldill A/|. Achuun Nzil A Ors V. uinniysin AIL SarIIykano[1996] 2 mum m; [1997] 1 cu 6:45; [IDI7] I AMR 997:[I997]1 ML] 95 held that “Tim! eiinuion oi s Collfl mien Imllsllu ng In An cl 9. sinsin is In lrmmnl nio Illllfll in mdur In . Iflll i-gimim Inl n onin rily by msisnes to In: wards sopssnng in in Ifllnllal e eunsni. riinis ll -. mi, wold Ipp unity in .n Ac! mull b If uni. ml ning. ForPIIl|ImInl um um luglslatl iii vain ny tn. us. Mm: ningius won: an onissss. Aiiigicisi iiiieipreieiis insisiais iioioiniiieaio aisisggiu inoiosiissg in nxvalme ur siigsigiaiy isgisiniioii or [0 iisai "IBM as siiosiiiiioiis oi iiisigiiiviunr (eniprissis added) so. in Kllul Pongaisti Hasil Dalam Megan v. F gas (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1013] MLRHU I78; [2014] I ML! 701: [2014] 3 CL! 943: [2n14]1 AMR176,Zale7Ia ninti viisou (as she then was) neid iriai: ii ii wiiri nu. Inspect I cannnlngnze wiiti initiiiis DI IUDVWSSVOFV The wings ‘ExIs1Ing tiiisiiiess‘ rsiiiio tisioi. I71! words -in respect oi manlflflcllmflg Of nmceasmg at a piixxiici mllil he mix zogsuioi as s wnolu. so trisi ma axpmswn 'BXi5WVfl oiisiiioss in mom oi iiiisniiisstiin-is oi expressnn or s oioaiici is iris mare probable eiipissson miicn ls <€|r\5i)lBH| Mm 016 i lfllmll 0! (he Laqislalum in oiinciiiig DEVI am oi saieoiiie 7A Reierio Melacap noveiooniein v Kema Peogsvah Hisil niiism Negan iiiigicisi Rzview Aooiiuiian Na n2—25—aaMoo9) n Parlialmnl had intmi-.1 ninmnnsni allowlmw to M iosiiimo me 11 si 11 sm Gunvawkisossmwwwou “None s.ii.i nuvihnrwm be ii... m min i... nflmnnflly MIMI dnuuvilnl n. AFVLING Wm! only In "produnlon Inn“, III-II Panlamnnl would nnm sunly spammed nnna enaany In Schudnle u n agm wllh an. meoneanc [hat by n.nea ne ma comillnnn ef"pmdu:1ion am" In ma munlnnz M “minuhclunnq me appolllnt nae eneanny stud ulm mes. lllngully Ind wimoul nnnrneenennan e wen wu mm mm Innnllovn an FM mint. rm aeeennam cannm nu enema lo usum lhe nene af me n by cnlnlrng nu mm eeonnnnon nl ~nn.nune-manna" me emnnne in own new. (emphasis added) an Fnmrner, In Palm on RI net. and Duvulopvnonl scam M Iysla A Arno! v. Pro in vequaablu one Sdn and [anal] 2 CLJ 255; [2004] 1 MLRA 131; [2004] 4 AMR 202; [2005] 3 MLJ 97, me Feaeran com held — [as] re my nuagnnenn s nu nes na nnneeen upon me wennesnaennsnee gmdahnas aeennee by wuns nenn nnne Immamunll whun nnnanuennng a (axnng snanune Sednorn nu and nnase gennennnes ursxm nannonnousny my my onenane nn enmeny flnmrenn spheres when aranng a noun .n ma exemnse en Ils mlervrannvu numdnclnon rm eenm aeemen. na nu aeeenea by: court when lnlevpnling a Ilxlng mmne ns mansen mu m nna afivlcl on me Pnvy caenenn dehvamd by Lord uoneyan nn Mungnrn y nnnana Revenue Cummns5noneV[1§71]AC 139 Fnlsln ma words are to be givnn munr ordinary nneannne. Yhey in nod no es glvln mm. em. mnnlng xlmply hluuu Iiulroblln I5 ne lrunnhu nagmnnane ux avoidanu duviolt As Tnmnsv J sad nln hns neneenn unssernnnrngy nuegnnenn nn Marx y. nnnano Revenue Ccmmnssnmver {mun NZLR nsz an ms mman prevents as non nppnnmblu no me nnnemvenannen nf revenue slanulzs semnanys en. mean» look nnareny alrmat is tinny 3 .171": vs III: mum no: any lnundmtni. 1-nme Is an -e-my abuul a nu. men ‘ no pmmnennen salon ux Nennnna n: In bi me .ne es. to be nnnpnae. one an only look 1 an um Ianeum -Md (Per Rawnmn n nu ceee Brandy synamane y nnn.ne Ravlnua Commnxsnonnrs nnsznn 1 K5 nu an M approved by Vnsmum Snmons no nn canaenen Eagle on Ca ue y R-glnm [1545] 2 Aln an 49% nnsoam: nne Thlrdnyn me ahjacl om. eonmnensen of: sulnm blinfi u. axcaruin nu. wnnn an». naensnanune, nn mly bu pulumufl man nannnu lnjusnce nov absurdity wu nmene In mu-non a llllral lnlnmnulion would prnducr such a nesunn, Ind me naneuaee aennnns of an memannen which would Junk! It. In lush In Inl-mrullllon may be adopmd e... :1 an 21 em Gunvawknanssanwrrunnaa “Nana sanan 1.-nnarwnnn e. LAIQ4 m my n... nflmnaflly mnnnn dnuuvnnnl y.. mune v-man FuuRYv'Y tn: htilorvof In Inanmunl and Kit uasnns which lad in tts mtna haunt! my bu Mud as In nu Ion: wnnrunton. Iamnhasts added) 32. Furtnerr t| V5 cteer trorn the Henserd tnet Partiament mtended to suspend I attempt customs «tunes on an goods Impcnsd min LW and LMW so as to serve as an tnoentive to: the grewtn or export— onented indttslnes 33 lam 09 the VI8Wl'Faf|Iamefl|7'IRd\l1|€rIdSd m exclude anltdumplrtg duttos (mm We exemplten, tl woutd have amended the defintlton 0! ‘cttslnms duif under Secltan 2(1) Dflhe CLISCOMSAIII to raflect such mention given mat Sectton 2(1) of the Customs ADI was tn fact amended tn the year 2003 by Customs (Amendment) Act 200510 tndude sateguard dunes 34 Basad on the above‘ I find that the Tnbunal had made an error tn holdmg that sectton 211) at tne customs Am ts tnetevant W aseenatntng rt the staintesssteet plales are suspended I exempt tram anlt-dumping dimes gtven met - (at Secttan 2(1) ot tne customs Act ctearty defines ‘custom duty“ to Include 'an|I-damptng du|y trnposed by or under the Anh- Dumptng Duties Act“: and to) customs‘ purported oondmen tn tts Leltars IS tnoortstslenl with Pamemenrs tntsntmn ta eslablish an LMW tectttty to tnoenltvlse and enoourage exporl—orterI|ed tnflusmes. 35 Theremre‘ it IS eteertnat I the Minister s pt-amgaltve to dectde tne scope ot the customs dunes exernptton gwen to LW and LMW ltcensess under the Customs Dunes Exemphon Order, and not met ofcusloms :45. Evtdentty, the Customs Dultes Exemptton Order ts enacted hy me Mtntster in true exsrctse of tts power oontened by Famament under sectton 14(1) cl me Cuswms Act and the customs Duties Exemntton order dnty domes min enact an 31 mm :57, me Federal Conn HI Posmvo viston Labuan Ltd v. Km- Pnnglrlh Hull Dllam Hogan [2011] 2 MLRA 995;[zt1I7] 2 ML! Dzlellcnl ‘ sru Gunvswktsnssmwwwou «mu. s.n.t mmhnrwm .. med u may r... nflmruflly -mm: m.n.n Vfl mutta vtmxt 421 held that admimslrahve policy camml ovemde Vegisbhon when It said as follows - [122] As has been held nyxne F|davi\Cour1mme:aseaVPa\m on Rzselrch end Develapmam Board Malaysm «new; n \s e wen samed pnnepue men a nrovmon .n a smule mnmnng nuwev on a member at me Execuuve m enan subswmary \eg\s\am:n par1.Icular1yans\haY\mpu:es e nnanem lavy at ch-rgas upon any sqclmn av me DIAMIC mum be construed slncfly menu cm 1.9:: lmpmhnbnly of .1 sulmdiary n gmeuen mm mm Inn! n! In pannl Au, munch en uuunmnem dnmnndn that an Idmlmstriflvl nolicy mly um above I wwdmy lenlslalm «rm mememeal -dmmnem lh-ubn mull m nhwunrdud {Knrapan Mahysla V Wong Pox New 5. Anar uses] 2 MLRA 433 new} 1 MLJ m. [1991] 2 cm was man n mm 850) Pm Swen cn.n Fun at p 437 m the mm me me uuzsmn |a sme . “Any subslcf ry In an ‘on I: m flhcl a n-ensm of vovmr mm. Pnnlamunl to some olher Iulllnrily. o.g. Iron: um Admmluvallon why. me me -ulllonly at Mlllyslu vested In an ce nut. down to any local eumomy In em In pwucnh mummy, dignity nu Iandlna MP|mnmonl Ind an me same :1 e, on mln u. m n safeguard lnr such luhulflury lvuiuallovu and mm .In em e1 such snflflunrdn" (emphasvs added) as Based on me above. u \s eneeny (he M-mslar who Is empowered underthe Cuslnms Act to demdecne uypeuvcuscdmsdunes quarmed {or exemphon and (‘here ws no ewdence met me Mamsxer has de\ega(ed such puwer in custom: under me De\egaI.1on of Powers Act 1956 39. The rnndnan eneany commuted an em at law 47: holdmg me: me cuswms coma, by way uf me Cusmms Circular. unpose . Iega\ uondmon that ovemdes me scennory exempndn gwen Io LW and LMW hoensses «mm anu-dumpmg dunes. Customs Circular and Lmu lo rum are male Inumal Gulannnu A0 I! Is 0: be noled me Customs Curcmar merely states mat because me man duly exempuen given In eampemes wnn LMW slams ws based on a cus1om Dunes Omen which was -n effect (hem me me u of 21 ‘ em GLmVawkunEGANDTYInh:M “Nana s.n.‘ nmhnrwm e. d... m my me nrW\ruH|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa v-ms! 41. 42 43. 44. 45. dunes Imposed under me Antr—Dumpmg Dunes Act are‘ lhereforee not exempted The BOD was Issued to lhe Appeuaru on 27 1 2021 based on me Cushms Clrcular. cleany, me Customs crrcular mere\y oanlams Cusmrns‘ own |arpre!a|Ian or me relevant pmvrsrons. u does not purport to Impose a “regar cnrmiuun“ on all LMW carnparues: the worn syaral or condmon appears nowhere m «ms letter The Tribunal erred rn law by huldmg than the Cus|oms Crrcula a valid Vegal wrvdmon Imposed by Customs on me Appellarrl which rasmcts them (ram emoymg an|\-durnpmg suspensran /exempnan Funher‘ Ifind that the Lelterr whrch the Customs relied on IO rmpase We DUFDGHBG oarrdmurr 15 not Issued pursuant In any express provision 0! me Customs Ac! rne Customs runner contends man nus purponea oondrlmrl had been cornrnumca|ed (a me Appellan|U1mughlr1e Leller to FMM rm more mew that me Lane: to FMM Is mere |nlema\ gmdance to me Cusmrns and Ir1I.ema\ ruling has no rarce or law In Mum Purposa Holdings aemad v. Kelu: Pengarar: Hasil D: m N: on [zoos] 1 MLRA An; [zoos] zuu 49:; [zone] 1 CL! 1121 the Court 0fAnpea| held as lollvws — [<31 Adopflna the anvmam Ihal commervis mu. 1 In Mupnruon men In reqwemenl av men we pro»/1547 speaks refvrs «u a reumremeru rrnposed by raw so :1 .5 mcumbsrrlorr revenue Ia pmnnn 2. wrmen raw whrcrw rvquues an agreemem such as me one m we n-mun rnnarice «a rave me approval cl Government or an auvmrrly uroormullee appemuee by Ina Gavarrwntrrl caenur rm mvurmu lvlvvldy and wremy nnnosdod ma mere rs no such hw mere was 1 sun man by munitl lunuvcnnu mm nc Gul llml Iwll-am m . at am. In my lumld hro1herAnfir-Zz|un:.lGA p 'nm em mpor.-.,m nc Gnldtllnu m not In. see. He Kuk Chsong Sfln am 5. Anar V um Kay mug A. Gus mm; 1 MLRA 1 19191 2 MLJ 224. wrwuv Wan Hamzah J gm --rm guidelines wan ruued nut puvsuanuu any pmrgmn by liw rm Iruny oplnlan. my new nu com ollnw. ~. (emphasis audea) run is M u srN sunvewreessmmmeu «mm. smnr nmhnrwm be H... e may r... mm-r -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum wrur 45. Further‘ on the same Issue, I have deemed In Yuniootun Dn g sdn Bhd v. Kama Pengaran Hasil Dnlam Negut [1922] MLRHU zoos, [20:21 I LNS 24:3; [2022] MLJU 2541, as touows. - m} In In: tnsunt case. r tma lhz| ahnaugh me Accnmpany mom and Rnmlnflur to Form c tor YA: mu Ind nu mm-d uxpayun to flln tn lax rnlums tussd on audited mo-mu. il wu mmty a MI! pncllcn or -no whlcll ma nnl bun mm mnndlmry by the mt mm m.IumK hm . [As] Funhannore n mull tn nmunuu uuldlllnu ind Inlnmal on ma mu-ryacts as a guideline and is not loqilly hmdlnn. ow (See Kznu Pcnwvlll Hun Dalam Negnn V. Sucv:-is Ellctmmcl a. Yvunllomnrs Mlnuhclunr son and um] MSTC Joan . .1 mm. Pumosn Holdinfix Blmld V mm Ponuarzh Hasil Dnlnm mom most 1 mum M1, zzmzs] 2 mu us, [me] 1 cu «mm (emphasis added! 47 Gwen |ha| the Letters are mere in|ema\ gmdeltnes and have rm force or tow, t am at the vtew that the Customs may not rely on me Customs‘ Letters to Impase me purpurled condmcn on We Appeflanl The Lattm cannot In-pan Lnual Condlllonx on the Apptlllnl 43 tt Is to be noted mat the Bob was Issued by the Cuuoms on the basis that the Agpeuant had commuted an ottence under secnon \33(1)(a) at me Cuslnms Act. 49 Thus Court vtew that Customs cannot by way or a Customs cm:-not / a Letter to FMM create a legal oandtttan, the bleach at whtch allracls a cnmtnal ssnchan under Secltnn 133(1){a) Mme Customs Act Any findtng |c lhe contrary would creale a dangerous tmpltcattan that the Customs are empowered [0 play me to‘: of a legvslaturs and create Cnrldlhonlq that woutd resml in pens! sanctton, so. tn Transocoan Drllllnq (supra) I have dectded mat me Inland Revenue Board cannot crea|e a cnmlnal ullance undar section 112(1) M the lTA1or nan! ng or a tax return through the use of Acwmpanytng Notes and Renundenn lhe tax relum — up 15 at 1. sm Gt.mvawkunEsItND'rrant::M “Nair s.n.t nmhnrwm o. o... m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm om m] n ‘smom a Dena! saluln shomd be s1nc1Iywns|mod m favnuvalms subject Themlam. smce sechun 112(3) dune rm bemg prevmsed upon me eommissmn Ma uvImAn:\ ollunca un¢wrsec1ionH2{1)allhe|TA And Much moses penames. u shnuld be many mupmea. pa] Hrmever. 5| pnmgmph: w a 4014 aims cese sxeued In: Sour new we: oemgrepn 2(B)U1lhe Awompanymg Notes (Nola lnngan) and me ‘fiammdsr wenngeuen) m me Fmm :2, men rermnds xexpaye: to compute (axes eesed an mu-a aeeoum, hat mused 2 I293! ream-emem [341 m imnllcln n of IN: Iullng ls um um Rnspondarll Donn! by It! mun Icl e um. Mal: lrlngln and “PIIlnnAun", cream 1 cvlmlnll alfenci undav Iacliovl 1l2(I]o1 an IVA. [351 u an M me mew that me scw evrod m hmdmg that me enacuuenl er seclmn mu. at me me wes mended emym sme dsafly‘ me we— emuna mu vaunvanlem be we lax relums eased on eedued lGCmm| (emphasws added) 51. Funhen I noted that nenher me Cuslnms Circular nov me Lener to FMM were addressed ursenl lolhe AppeHanI In ten. me Tneuners findm ' inocnslslenl wum aral evidence given by Customs own wwness, who teslified belore me Tnbunal that she is not sure meme: me purported wndmon had ever been commumcaled (0 me Aapeuam u — Adakah puun sehqu mew. ublmm emu yang mhuax men pmak nuan pada Iahun 2n2a ke em Periyu. rural Kz5|am henankh a 11 2ms den 9 :2 we WI Indak pamah dmanlarsemm uem kepad: pmak puaym A — Tuiak pasu (See: Encl. 1, page 2, 298 @ 2, 324: AIS of Mcv, Exh. Mcv-2:; Nous ul Pro-cudlngs It ‘Tribunal daud 19.5.12} nu Purnomd common In nm In my License: 52 season 65(2) of me Customs Ac| for LW Licence pmvvdez.‘ (2; Any such Momma sneu be Val mm plnod end Inmecl In such nomltlnvu u on Dlncbuv Gomnl In nah nu may Ipuclfyln Inn mmm. (empnams addadj me 11 at u em eunvewkeesemmmeu “Nana Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e me. e may e. nrW\n|U|y em. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 53. 54. 55. 56 57 58. Seollorl e5At2t Cusloms Act lor LMW Licence provldes (2; Any susn lluancu snsll be (or such plvlod and mules: lo such comiluann as me Dimunv Gunny-1| In each us. mly spuclfyln ms llcence. (emphasls added) Based an Inn above SECHOVIL \ am 09 We vlew Ina! me Customs ls raqulved |o specny the condrlluns appllcabla W the Incense issued |u meAppeIlanlam1 not In a separate document whemerlhe Customs Clrcular or Leller to FMM Inna suppentar my vlew by relemng tome case olscruntum laalu (supra) whet! tne Conn pl Appeal consldered Sectlon 555(2) at me Cuslnms Acl wnlcn 15 pan malerla Io Sacllon 55(2) and 65A(2) In present appeal The Calm ol Appeal held that lhe pnmse “speclry In lna llcanee“ means “to menllorl expllcltly. dennltely and cerlalrlly V1 tne llcenoe“ wnen lhe llcence ls lssued when ll neld as lollows — 127; Ey reamng sueclfy W tne lloerlce‘ based an us natural meavllfla ll would rmlurllly mean "In mcnllon Ixpilully. esllnluuy sna enmlnly In ms liaanu". ln am: wms, nu Emldlllofll can In imvnstd 1!!-rlhu ‘cuncl had been lssmd I: (III: 9015 sgslnst um pmlclplu M stanlng ll upllcmy. dflinilnly Ind clflzlnly. (351 ms prmclplns snaa ln mu Ibava aulnorllnes snowad lnsl ml... . n e mssly pmlnss mt condlllons snall be spscmsa . m Ibcnnoi, n m nu ms: nu conanlons nlnul Bo gllnbvd vmnn um llcsm was use-lea. No comiilmns can no uramd llllvlhal». (emphasis addsdl Applylng saruntum mlu (supra) to me present appeal lam pl me view (hat the aurvonad oorldfllon ougnt to he “merlllnrled expllcllly, deflrlltely and cenalnly tn the lloenoe and not tnmugn the customs Clrcular. l find that the present appeal is even worse than semnlum Maju (supra) as the pwporled cnndlllun was not sent to me Appellant bu| was adurassad and clrculated lo a long llsl olcustems Depanments Wlthlrl customs ln lacl, the Appellant only became aware or the Cusloms Clrcularlctv the nrsl tlme when I! renewed customs nelme v... u M u ‘ sm Gunvawklsnssmwwwpu “Nair Smnl nuvlhnrwm s. med w my me snnnnln mm: dnuuvlml Vfl menu ml ol assessment dated 27.12021 wntoh attached the customs ctrcular. 59. Therefore. based on the above, I new that it was wrong tor the Trlbtmat to halo that the purported condllmn In these Letters had been valldty lmposed on the Appellant‘ when the Appellant was never tntorrneo of such nurporled conuttion at the tune that the nces were Issued and coutd not Dcsstbly have any pnor knowledge at tt. so The Customs on the other hand relreo on generlc statements tn the Explanatory Note at the Appellant‘: LMW and LW Lteent-es and Larnpiran c, whteh ls tound on Customs‘ webstte, to contend that the Letters, whtch oontatn the purported eonatttons, are rssueo pursuant to secltons 65(2) and t3sAt2) and have been incorporated rnw the Ltcenees 61 Hawevevt t find |ha( Lampllan C can only be (cum on Customs’ webslte, It is not lssued or gtvsn to the Appeltant Nuthlng lrl the Lamplran C or the Exptarlatory Note of the LMW Illknce states that LMW Llcensaas dn not entoy amt-dumpmg oultes suspenslan I exemnltnrl tsee Appellant's Affidavlt tn support. exlrl I“MCV-11") 52 Based on the pnnctptes that taxing legislation: must be canstmed slrlctty and against the Revenue tn the com :11 Avbeat case at Exxon Cltnmlul (M) Sdn Elm V. Kama Plngarlh Hull Dlllrn Nogori [2005] Z MLRA 335; [2fl|'l5] I CL] 810‘ only condltlorts that are spectfied tn the Lteertces shall be applicabte and the Appettartt shall not he sutztect to any other eanutltons that are not spectfiea tn the Llcences and be treated as eommlttlng a cnrnlnet offence for not oomptylng wI|h Hie purported condlllarts. 53 Gwen that Customs cannot be attawed to create tegat condtttorts that wttl result In cnrnrnat sanctlans and corlslderlrlg that the purpnned legal eonatlton ts not carttalned ‘H'I' the Ltcenses. lt ts clear that Customs‘ disalluwarto: 01 the ADDe||an|'s entitlement to suspenslorl I exlempllorl pl antl-ounrprng dunes ts unreasonable, arbtlrary and uttra vtres. n... 1! av u ‘ SIN GunvawktmEsutl:l'l'rant2:M «mu. s.n.t mmhnrwttt be u... a may r... nrtmruttly mtmn dnuuvtnrtt vn .rtutte mat conciu 34 Premised on me ainresam reasons, I am oi me view chat the Tribunal‘: aecision I5 tainted wnn errur oi iaw, Irra|ionaH|y and/or unraasonableness Iha| warrant me Inlervenlmi Mme coun as. The iegisiauve mm at Parliament to suspend I exempt ami- dumpmg dunes lcr LW and LMW Licensees is deafly expressed in me legislafiuris and ma Hansard as. The cumms. as an executive arm of me Government, and ms Tribunal. as a quasi-judiusi body, have a duty to uphold and give 9119:: to me imsnuon ui Pamamsni. Any devialion iiom this duty undermines |he integrity of me legislaliva pmcass 67, As such. I allowed me Appauanrs os qenciosuie I) WI|h costs 0! RM1,000 no wiihaui me anocacar lee Dated: 01 January2024 Ahmad Kama: mu Md. Shahid Judge High Oaurl Kuala Lumpur Inc In M n ‘ sm Gu..vswkmEsmu'rrann:M «mm. s.n.i ...is.mm .. U... a may i... nflniruflly -mm: mm. VI mum Wm! Background Facts 4 The background teats gathered him the cause papers. Athttavtt In support and submisslnns or the parttes are largely undlsplfled and can be suntrnanzeo as totluws - 4 1 The Appellants pnnctpal lzuslness ts In manutacture kltcherl SII1KS(PfDd|lO‘1)SO\B|y'0feXpOFl tnalnly tn the Urllled states To rnanutacture the Pvoducts, the Appellant uses‘ amangs| others, tntported stalnless-steel plates tront Jlangmen XHHL statnlass steel Marlulaclunrlg Co. Lta (Jhngman XNHL), a company luca|sd tn euangoong, Chlna These statnless- steels plates were Imported under the tantt code or hammnlsed system (HS) was or 7219 33 D00 A 2 The Appellant has a licensed (te bonded) warehouse tLw) under sectton as or the Cuslams Act and a ltoensea tte. oondeat ruanutacturing warehouse tuaw) under sectton 55A ot the Cltsmms Act. 4 3 As an LMW ttcehsee, the Appellant ts suloma|it:a|ly alsu a ltoehsea warehouse tLwt unaer Secltan G511) customs Ac| tLw Ltoenseet Yhe Appellant ts enlllled to susperlslon I exempliarl cuswms dulles tor the trnpnrted raw matenals upon deposl g the ntatenals tnto tls llcensed (ie bonded) warehouse. 4.4 Under the dertnitton at the wolds ’|lt:en$ed warehouse‘. “duuable goods‘ and ‘utsmrrls duly" under Sechon ztt t of me customs Act. this suspenston I exetnptton trom customs dultes enpyed by the Aypellam expressly tncluaes suspertsron / uempllun from arllldumpln outtes. Accordingly. the Appellant all: not pay any Intldurvtplng dullas on the lmpofled stalrtless-slael plalest 4 5 Under an tnternal urcular I letter dated 3 11.2016 (custom: circular), the customs lmposed a legal condttron on all LMW Lleensees (lnptudtng the Appellarttt that an LMW Lloertatea does not entoy suspenston I exemption for anliedumplrlg dunes: v... s at u ‘ srn Gunvswktsossmwwwhu “Nair s.n.t nuvlhnrwm s. med In may t... mtn.t-y mt. m.t.n. Vfl nrlutta vtmxl Cuunsols For Ihe Appeuam For the Respondents ‘ sm smvmmsmmmnu Dalo Nllm Nadkaml (cm Ivy Lmg Yveng Pmg and En. Jay Fong Jia Sheng with mm! Teluan Lee Hxshammuddm men & Gleumu Peguambexa dan Feguamcara Law 6. Menara1 Dmamas‘ Solans Dulamas‘ No 1, Ja\an Dulamas 1, 50450 Kuala Lumpur Puan Nor Jamuan Smmadsh mm. Tone! Serum Federal Counsel Jabalan Kastam nwma Malaysia, Bahagwan Perundangan. A135 4 Sdalarl. No. 3, Persxaran Ferdana, Kommem Kemenlenan Kewangan‘ Pvesml 2. 52595 Pmrauaya me 11 M21 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 4.5 The purported eanttltlon had been communicated to me Appellant tnmugn tne Customs‘ letter lo tne Federation oi Malayslen Manutactuters [FMM) dated 9.1.2016 (Laltov to FMM): 4 7 ll lsa tact not alspulea lnat - (a) The customs circular does not purport lo lmpose any oorldlllorls on LMW Licensees, bu| rather sets out Cuslnms‘ lnterpielation or |he lawl (B) Trle Customs Circular was not wntten to me Appellam. put in olher customs Deparlmemsi and lorwarded to tne Presldent or FMM bytne Lellerln FMM issued some two yeeis helore the issuance pl tne LMW license in me Appellant, and (5) The LMW llcsnoe Issued to me Appellant nallnsr aorllatns lnls rmrarly sinlllar ponaltlpn, rlardces lt reler to the customs Clrcularl Letter to FMM as on 2.12 2020 and 5 I ZOZL the state customs at Penis conducted an audll on the Appellant and leund out that me Appellant nee underpaid anti-dumnlng outlet. at me tale at 23.95% tor the lmpprtatlon of tile slainless~sI=el plates tram chine lor 2018 until December 2020 under the Anti—l)umplng Dulles Act and St‘-fledule pl customs (AnIi—Dumplrlg Dulles) Order zulal 4.9 On 4 5202!, a BIII 0' Demand (BOD) was issued [0 the Appellant clalrnlng trle antldumplng duties imwnltng to RML 173,015 53: 4 10 The Appellam (hen filed in appeal to Ma Trlbunal number MOF TRK70U6/1lB(2D2l|. on 7 it 2022, the appeal has been dlsmlssed by the Trlbunall A11 Aqgrleved by tne tteclslon attne Trlburtal. the Apvellarllfilad true 05 to challenge tne same. 5, The grounds In suppart at this appllcatlen are as lelltms (a) Tne Tnbunal cnmmllled ermrs at law by’ Page 4 ol 2: “Nair Snnll luvlhnrwlll be UIQG In mm l... nnfllrullly ml. dnuavlnnt VI nFluNfl ml ttt Falling to apply the court of Appears declslcn tn semntutn Meju Sdn Bhd v. Fengarah Kashm Negeri Punk tznznt Muuu 195; [znzot 5 MLJ AM wntch held that the phrase speclfy tn the licence‘ means ‘to rrtentton exollcltlyt definitely and certainly In the ltoenee‘. Cortdtttans must he urtamblguuusly pamculartxed and ldermfied tn the llcertce when the lteenee is granted or lssued tn the Appellant and no oondtttdns can pe lmposed attet that. tn) Maintetntng Cttsmms‘ ptll d1 demand dated 4. 2021 whtch was nteued based en a purported condlttan n-nposed en the Appellant vta Customs mternal letter dated 3 tt 2016 and Customs‘ letter to FMM dated w.t2.2ntd that lteensed mendtaaunng warehouses do npt enjoy exemptten tor anhduntptng dulles. and (mt Fatltng to lmerprel secttdn 2(1), septton d5 and seeuen 65A or the Customs Act 1957 (custonts Act) eeneetly and wrongly deemed that the Appettant must pay the anllvdumplng dunes at the Appellant dtd nt:| optatn an exemptten tor antrduntprng dultes rntposed under the ceuntervatltng and Anll—Dumping nuttes Act 1993 (Antl- nuntnlng nuttn Act) to) The Trtbunal tatled In glve any ccnsideratton or to grve sutnctent due eanstderattpn that (l) As a Itoertsed warehouse and a lteensed ntendtaetunng warehouse under Secltons 65 and 55A 0! the Customs ACL lhe Appellant ls unwed (D eniuy suspension 0! all customs dunes tmposed The defmlllorl D7 customs dunes Includes arm-dumplng dunes lmpnsed under the AnIl»DumDlng Duties Act. ttt) customs ts not empowered under the customs Act or the Antr-Dtmtptng Dulles Act to restnct I ltmtt the defihrttan or custams duttes: trim The purported eondtttdn lmpcsed by customs has never been speclfied tn the relevant licenees lsslled to the Appttcant under Sechon as and sectton 55A ol the Customs Act In true regard, the purpdned condthon up 5 an: ‘ srn Gunvswktsdssmwwwhu “Nair amt ntmhnrwlll be tn... e may t... nflnlrullly mm. dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna vtmxl does not iuIi‘ii the iegai requirumenl ‘In mention exphcfllyi definilely and eerrainiy in the iioence‘. (iv) The son was Issued soieiy based on the custom s awn inierpreiaiion anoipr iniernai poiicy sta|ed in me Leners Tne Leflers have no roree oi law and camradicl wiin Ihe express provisions in me cuscorns Act and me A Dumping Duiies Act: and (V) The purponed condnion slated in me Leliers has never been seni by cusronis is the Appeliani 1:) me Tribunal railed \o decide iiiei me Appeiiani rras a iegiiirnaie expenaiion iriai rne coun o1 Appea\‘s decision in sorunrurri Malu (supra) and ine omer express plvvlsmns would be adhered io and applied oy cusiorns nip RIspondInll' submission 5 In gis(,U1B Respondenis submfl as ioiiows - 6 1 Ami-dumping duties are nn| suspended /exenrpied under me cuiiionrs Ad The prevailing iaw reiaiing to anrrdurnping dunes is me AMi—DumpIng Dulis Act. wriien does not provide for me suspension I exernpiion oi aniidurnping ouries ior LW and LMW in inis regard Sedian as and secrion GSA or lhe Customs Aei are irreieirari . 52 There is no order under me An|i~Dum Duties Aci lhal suspendslexempls ine animurnping du1ieslnrLWarid LMW. Any ierrniriarion, exemption, or suspension oi anii-durnping dunes imposed lies wnri ihe Miriisier oi iriiemaiionai Trade and Industry (Him) and Minister o1 Finenoe (MOF): 6.3 Relying on Salmon 30(5) of the An|i~DumpIng Duties AM, he definition ei “customs dutyflmder Section 2(1)oHhe Customs Act snouid oe read resinciiveiy, only ior the purposes oi suiriorisirig cusronis Io wlleci anti-dumping dunes: 6.4 According ro paragraph 7 or me condition aneeiied ro me Lioenoes, wnicn siaies mar me Appeueni is norexernpied rrerrr r... e n! 2: ‘ sru Gunvswkirossmwwmou “Nair s.n.i luvihnrwm rs. UIQG e may i... oflninnflly mi. dnuaviml VI nFiuNfl pmui "Its obirgaliaris under other W//Han law related ID 115 busines-SW |he Appsiiam is siioiea lo the Animiiiiipiiig uiiiies Act and noi exempted iroiii iria anu-oiiniping duties on me imponed siainiesssieei aims, and 6.5 It is a siandard practise oeiween cusioms and FMM inai irie Lener |o FMM is sufficieni rionoe, and ii is me issponsioiiiiy of FMM in ciieuiaie me said letter to ils members. The decision ouiie ceun Appaiiaiii oiiieys llflplnlinrl I nxlmplion main Dlyllllrll of smi- duiripirig diii s This court is of me View that me Tnnunai had aired in iioiding uiai as sin LMW Licensee‘ irie Appeusni does no| eiiioy siispeiisioni exemptian «oi am!-dumping diiiies. 5 An LMW Lioensee (who also possesses an LW hcenoe) enioys misionis dimes suspension iexeniniion ioi gnods deposited into ils bonded warehouse under Customs Act, and under Seclicn 3A(1|oV iris AMi—DLlmpIn§ Duties Aei wiiicn dearly provides inai ine Cusloms Act and Anii-Duniuing Dunes Act snaii be corisirued as one 9 The Hansard oi Dewan Rakyal 3*’ Pain nieiirs soeond session on 512,197: cleariy reiieeis me Paiiiairiems intention io iaciiiiaie an LMW iioensee |o cany out manMaC||Arlng aoiiviiies on iniponed goods (raw iriscenan iriai are rioi subject in custom dimes in ins LW. 10. Tne Ihen Finance Mlnlillr had siaied as (allows - iii oiiisuii. seeioii as M iiie Cuilnml Au siiesoy pmvndsi V0? waienoiisiiio ieeiiim All goods imported inio such iioemso warehouses aie l\0l siinieci ia Ousmms diiiies unlil may aie released iioin mm me pnspossi nuw IE no snow Vllifllflltluflllg lclivfllai io be union on will To mi. exuiii. cnmml iaciiiiies In be made available in siicii ware uses NIH bemmpaflblew moss ooisinseie iii 3 I159 In . zone The pispme eiisionis iaeiiiiy wiii ml Duly pm-iie a viinnei incentive to (M giomi in axpon nr1enIa|ed indiisinss. ii mu Also eviomrlgl (M dispeisai oi inddsiiies Iwuy iioiii IM iiiaioi iiman areas Pu: y oln SIN GLniYswkuiiGAl1DTYmh:M “Nair s.ii.i navihnrwm be UIQG In may i... nflflinlflly mi. dnuaviml VI AFVUNQ Wm! 11 12 13. M 15. 16 17 15 lhersiry om-gm empmymenl appcrlumhas to our peophl m one some: «ms am ms luvs! men: Therelore, .1 Is clear me Pamamenrs «mention m creatmg LMW hcences Is no anoourage and moenluvvse export-onenlsd Industries u musl be noted lhatau LMW Licensees now automalically possss a LW licence as smled VII Sechon 55A(1A) 01 the Customs AC1 The Appsllam In Ihe prasenl anpaal possessed both LMW Lsoence and LW Lmsncs «or years 2019 and 2020. Sacuon 17A lnterplelauon Acts «M» and 1967 (cnnsohdalad and Remsed 1939) orowdes that regard musl be gwen to the pumose unoonyung the An: mum to be had in ms puvpou oucu 17A m ms mlerp/~e|amn ova ommm 471 an Act a oonstruchun mm would promote Ilse Duvpuse or anpecl unaenyma me Am twhelhev mm purpose av amen ‘s ewes-xy mm m me am or run) my he prelerved In a mnllmchan Iha| mum nut promote max nurpmae or uhpscl Tnerelore, u Is my resoecmn mew that me mlerpretaoun 01 me rmevanl nmwsmns under me Customs Am musl oonvonu Mm Fariismznfs Wermon (0 mcenhvvse and encourage axpnn acuvmes Hsvmg read the oevmmon oi LW under Sac1mn(2}(1)n1|I1e Customs Act logelher with ma meanmg oi ‘durame goods‘, it \s dear Iha| |he Appeflant as a Lw Lwoensee us aHnrwed to warehouse duuable goods wuhcul paying |he cuslams duty msn Semen 211) a! me Customs Act defines LW as louows » huensad waumule‘ mennl a winhaum av nmlv pm. no.....n luv ms vmrehousmg uldmmble gooas umersemn es ’Dulvab\e goods is furlher defined under Section 2 of me cusmms Act as. ‘dulwama qooas means all good: suhncl to ma paymen|olcus1oms my 3115 an men suchdmy ha: not ye| been pam “Cuslums duly“ us defined under senior: 2(1) of me Customs A421 to Include ‘Inli-dumping duly wnposed by or under the Ann-Dumpmg Dunes Act . »..,um sm Gunvswksoossmwwmhu «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrw\HI>e U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! “cunoms duly" means any moon my. xpon my runzx sumharqe or cess Whosed by m Imdev| Ad any Duunlowalllnn duty 91 mil-dumping duty lmpmnd by or undur 0.. Counkwllllm ma Ami-Dunn nu nuuu AM am [An any, any eavegum duly Impused by at under the Saieguands Act 2005 |Ac|657]and mch.-Ans .ny ruynny uuysmu n 0.0 Min cxpcn du|y umnr any wnllun law ov a mnlram. lease or agreemunt In men ms Federal Government or me Guvvammsm or any sm. u n my a. In wmm such Gavemmem has oonsenlsd (cmphasus added) 19 Further, Regulalwn so onne repealed Customs Regulamons 1977 wmch Is apphcable VD! me year 2019 and Regwalmn (NW) 07 the Customs Regulahons 2019 which is appneame can the year 2020 prowde my a cusmms was had been pa . me Taxpayer .5 no Vonger allowed in more "as slamless-SIB!‘ plates V! VI! LW 20. Regurannns 310:) and so onhe Customs Regmauons 2015 read as Mlows. - Dunn nfllmnuu undcrlectlon as M an Am 31 Any nelson wna has been granted lwoense Io apevale .5 warehnuse under unson ea o: In: Asl- (37 Shaun eruurs nm In goods deposwed are rermveo hum me wiremuw wwtmn the penod speafied .n me name. an snau no| slam any ma; Much cullomi duty rm been me, ur -nu rswrve new mlo me wanenause any duluma wads wnacn mu wav>uu|\y been ramovod. vmemnr laraxoun m omnrvnn. ynmm obmmmg mu appvo‘a\ m wmmg «mm me proper omner M cuxmms Regmaliun .'S1(b) 0! Customs Regulations 2019, wilh effecl from I 1 2020 (appncanle ror year 2020) The hcensee mu mi- (a) slate on me lmerwsd premises goods upon Much me duly has mu ham, or my Receive luck mm me Imensed prervuses any auuame gnuds men haw pmwovsly been mmnvnd. mum lo! upon or mhenmse. Wllhoul flrsl nmamma me nennixnen m wmmg uHhe pmperulfloer an s at 1: sm Gunvswkm£sMu'rranh3A «mm. smuw nmhnrwm be 0.... 0 my me nflmnuflly mum: flnuamnl y. mum Wm! 2t 22. 23 24 25 Regutattpn so or customs Regulahons 1977 tappltcapte tor 2019) I find that the customs dutrea suspenston IS mnststent wt|h and reflected tn the vollowrng — (i) The cuetpnrs webslleon Ltcensed warehouse states lhatthe payment at duly (dult) and taxes lcukat) tor dutiable goods warenousep In LW VS deterreo untu me goods are reteased tor home consumption or re-exparled. and (See Enetmur. I3 page up (it) The Mm's wetzstte on LMW wmon atates that raw materiats ano components warehouse tn the LW, used dtreclly tn me manutactunng ul appmved goods are exempt tram ‘cuslams duty. (Set Enclosuu 1: pp e an Ftmher. as an LMW Ltoensee, the Appeuant arse eruoys customs dultzs exemplton under para 2(1) and Item 85 of the Schedute lo the customs Dulves lExempImns) Order 2017 Reedtng paragraph 2(1)andt|em asto the schedule or the Customs Duttes Exemntton Order‘ tt is ctear that LW and LMW Ltcensees are exempted from the payment or customs duty. Basso on (haforeguing, lhe tegtstattons, rnotuotng tne customs An, Ann-Dumpmg Dultes Act custom Dunes Exemp n order, custom Regutauons 1977, am Customs Regutaupns 2019, cteany pmvtde mat the Ltoenees are enlflled to suspension I exernotton trom oustprns dunes. wrucn extend to anti-pumptng putts. Tnerevore, rt I3 evvdenl that the Appellant as an LMW Ltoensae entoys suspenston from customs dunes under the customs Acl and exempttpn «mm customs duttee unoer the customs Dunes Exemntinn order r... m at 11 ‘ am Gunvswkteossmwwmpu «mu. s.n.t Iuvthnrwm .. mad a may t... unmu-y mm: dnunvtml VI murta mat

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22M-886-12/2022

PLAINTIF SA Puncak Management Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN 1. ) Nakiwa M&S Sdn. Bhd. 2. ) Iylia Najlaa Fathi Binti Dato' Nabil 3. ) Idzham Haiqal Bin Dato' Nabil

Civil procedure – Summary judgment – Default in repayment of Islamic Pre-Factoring facility granted by a factoring company – Whether plaintiff was entitled to terminate and recall facility – Whether plaintiff failed to plead particulars - Whether there was admission of amount due entitling final judgment to a reduced claim – Whether Islamic Pre-Factoring Agreement covers purchase orders issued before agreement was executed - Whether the failure to issue certificate of indebtedness renders the case triable - Doubt as to bona fides of defence – Conditional leave to defend - Whether defendant ought to be given conditional leave to defend – Rules of Court 2012, Order 14 rr 1, 3, 4 - Evidence Act 1950, s17(1) - Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, s2 & 3

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Yusrin Faidz bin Yusoff

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=dc25b710-9f92-454c-bd0d-11f6d91478dc&Inline=true

02/01/2024 13:58:14 WA-22M-886-12/2022 Kand. 68 S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—22)(—E85—12/2022 Kand. as n2/ouzou 13:52-14 IN IN: HIGH com" or MALAVA AT KUALA LUMPUR [COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT No. WA-22M-IE6-1212012 In the mine! 0! an Islamic Pre- Flctolinv Aqmmom daled 1:37.202: And In me manor of an Islamic Flclarlnq Agnimnnl flllld 11.01.2021 And In ma mam: ad 1 Guaranm d.uu1:I.a7.znu And In III: mane! of one: 7 and Order 23 of the Rules of coun 2012 BETWEEN SA Punuk Maniglmnnl Sdn Bhd (company No. : Zu01I11n15BsI (618238-H)) PLAINTIFF AND IN Emzmrrzwmnnzzwman -um Sum! n-vwhnrwm be flied M mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm I NAKIWA M55 sou. sun. [Company No. 200501045910 (653973-A)! 2. IYLIA NAJLAA FATHI smn DAN)‘ NAEIL [NRIC No. 331203-ss-$550] 1. Inzm HAIOAL BIN DAIO' NABIL INRIC No. : 94051:-m-5531] DEFENDANTS GROUNDS or gyfimfim INTRODUCTION m In em: me me Plavrmll had applied (ov a summary pmgmenx m and 20 to be entered agams| the Defendants Vanna sum owmg under an Vsramxc PreFaclorIng Agreement pursuant to 014 allhe Rules oi Court 2012 me Rams’) [2] Mler conswdenng the arguments presemed by man pames, 1 had on 25 10 2023 dlsmnued the Plzmmrs appncanon Inseeaa I granted me Devenaams Veaveln delend on me eundmon manna sum ol RM1 421.955 10 be pam mm Court within 30 days 1 also snpulaled max N the candmon ws met, lhe case mu proceed to man, and me costs zssacualed wmn encl 20 will be treated as costs m me cause Conversew‘ 4 me Delenflanls tau xo runm me m Emzxxrrzwmknzzwman mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Iumtt v Bank Slmganan Nulonnl 2021} MLJU 2552 South E:slAs1: Insurance Eerhld V K: In Malagig (19951 1 cm 1045. and N no Comgnx for Fggign mg, 1 Km. Rap Sdn and [1954] 2 MLJ 300 ta argue that In any event, 1| Vs well seltled that \f a delendam succeeds In ratsmg even a smgle tname Issue, ll wm nut be a fit case and praper case to under summary judgrnent It VS veltememly avguad by me Detenuante mat the 0 14 junsdtcfion VS any to be exerctsed VI very dam cases wherem me Inlenlmn was nut la shut out Delenuams 1mm thetr day m court [1 51 Vn response. mmntm reamea caunul argues that tneaeuy by mum VI making paymemdoes not atvect me ngm ol me Flamml In tnswst on Ms ubhganan In pay upnn expvrallon cf the t:redt1|erms for each rewivabie On the Vssue at repayment at Rmmnoa no on at as 2022, Ills contenaea mat the same was Bald by D1 mmuut any duress Dr undue mnuenee wheretn V! uIlrmale\y reduces the outstanamg amoum (mm RM1.71o,a9a as to RMI 140,595 219 In essence the Ptamtwt posit: tnettnere rm been a breach tmaer me agreement between names emtlhng [hem Ia temunate me said tact es 1) m ztemnzwmwzmu mm. am.‘ ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm Wm! my on Illa wssue of aorreclnoss onne amcum claimed the Plamml argues that D1 had mu knowledge Mlhe sum due, and ma: at all mansriamrnes [nave Is nu complaint or cammanls made on me slalement o1 acwunls wssued (0 them FINDINGS AND DECISION [21] Summary judgmeni pvocaaure am m provide a wdgmenl m we ImlIa\ phase Ma case llwould be granled when n \s deemed appropnaxe, wnn me mum Ilm In save time an axpense: Imked wan : fuH1na\ The zulhumy :1! me coun m gram summary mdgrrtenl ws specmeu m o 14 y 1 and 3 Mme Rule [211 o 14 r 1 at me Rures read as loI|aws- m wnm In in when to wmch an. ml: Iwlru . xuhlmnl ul unnn has been served on a delendant and man delennam nas enlevsd an appealanoe m In: lchun (M pmnun may on mu wanna mu ammnu nu nu attuned to a damn mcluded .n ma wn| Dr In a pamular pan evsusn a dam nr has no dnlunx to hack 3 sum er pan excnnl In m In: amount ul my dimngu d:vmed..Ipp1yIn\hu own lor|udwnenlag:mslmal selendanl uy Sumac! lo Dlviwiph 13) um. Me lpphn m wary ncmn hugun by M1! mnev man on: much mdudas _ my : clam by me ulamml fur um uanasn mahuwi pwsecuhon mu Imp! nnmlru uduanun a: breach of prumne cl mamlqe oi sm Em11><rrEwsDRHz2RR4:A «mu. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e med u may he mn.uu -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! mm : cram by me pmmm um an .n lulgahnn mm 1:) nm ovuer mu na| app\y m in l:1mn In wmu: o m apphas [23] Whereas 0.14 r! or me Runes read as Valium: - m Umesi on me new; M an inphmimn «mm ml: 1 ewlhev the cm cum me Applznlmn M the aulonaanl -am: he cm with mom tn me exam av me pan or 3 am. in Much me app\Ica|\on remes um mere .. in wisue or quexnon m awn. Much wanna be med on manner: ought om some ulnev reason u. be ; mm M on: dalm ov rain me can may awe sucruuagmem Var me .u.-mu against ma| ueierudamon Ihal am at purl u may be um having ream! m 0.. mm nllhc nmady »« remcuum 42) rag cowl miy Cy onilr am Iubpxl to wow cunflmans Winy as may mus: svaym: exaculmn manymgnmu given mm a delendxnlunder mu NW9 um!!! sum the mm M my cwnmum made a: nausea by me dMendan| m we admn [24] The law guvevmng summary wdgment ws «me and had been succlncfly shied by Humm Vuop Sum SCJ us he then will m In .1... lnlugngg :4 sun mm v Am Mum Sdn anu[19s112 MLJ I83 ax p 133 -m The urldnrlylng pmnawprvy m me Order 1: nmvmnn u m p-mm a omnlnl clsmy enmled to me mm, lmm mm darayd nu wdynanlwum mere ‘a na limy amuabie menu |o me am The umwman am:-nu only he lnnllad «a cam where mm .5 no mmmm. mm mu (ha p\Imm1 u enlmzd In In: mdulmm 0142114 5 nrxmlendsd m mu nuuhn .m.m.m we wnsdnwun mum only beexucuscd m very clearcalel“ [25] In Eank Negari mg gysll v Ilnhd Imu (199211 ML] 400. me Courl new mat when in amman. «max at mspuxe Is equwocik ar lacking pvecxswon or \s mconmem wnh unmspmea aonlempurary dncumams or other statements bylhe same aeponenv. or us mheuenuy mlpmbable m usew. u sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! men such asserlmn at denial wm he veleaed, mmny renaenng me Issue not lnable In other words. leave to devena wm not be gramed based upon "mere assemons" by defandant: msnead, me count wm look an the whme snuauon umcauy to exnmme whether the deianoe Is or-mun: us] In me Privy cauncu case 0! Eng Moo Yang 5 95 v gm]; mum [1979] 2 MLJ 212‘ a! 217‘ Lord Dlplack explimed I| is mus Wmuugh m me rmmm my n u not auplopnile my a judge to illemm xa ruolva wnmui «emu»: an iMdlvI| ms due: no! mean max he ‘s bound |o acaenl mummy u mswg a dlspme 54 Ian wm calls var mm invnllnlhon wary rlalsmunl an In mmn hmmvll Iquwocul. Vackmg m prauslon moumsum MIII umlspnned conlzmpurarydocumems at mm nmemmlx By III nma dspanv x. 04 mhcmnliy mmum. m mun ma be In makmg ma. omev on me appmznm :5 he my mum ‘us!’ me may ; vubad Mm: Gnu:/elm: men n. muunuIu1nud\aaI\y V1 V510: mm in an-mm. m the nu: msunee whelhev xllllm-ms unmanned m llfldlvns ma: we um upon as rmsmg . mum av awdsnua upon : mennl lanl um .umu.n: puma lane pmmny In nnvvl mm Invesnganm .5 (0 mew Hum“ [21] Vn the event max me Cowl Imus Ihal Iheve are Issues In be med. n has me auvmnty |o granl weave in defend as wnferred by 0 14 v 4(3p av me Rules wmm anpul-«es as vouuws - Lelvelunn new :4 1 o) 4 m 12> (3) m cam may give a deiendanl anamst whom mm in apphcahun 5 made lent in mm Ira xenon mm rnpncl nu ma dawn or ma pin :71 . dmm m vmlch the apphcannn Mates ermer unmndmunafly or on such new n In gmng ucumy or um av mode at mm at omemme an n mm m 14 sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 447 [25] In [his use. the Defendants ms. concerns about me Flammh dacmnn to uueary appvcach TUDM lav payment concerning the vecewables to be assxgned by 01 la TUDM They argue that TUDM Is net privy to the comraclual relaliansmp between Ihe Flaimifl and 91 under the (names Concemlng me mes anhe pames mvulved, n \s wonhwmle Ia naive mm the lundamenlal oonoep| oflhe factormg arrangement Faclnnng, a prawoe wrlh anclenl racks, days back co Babylnman limes Tu; gyg gf uammunbx campnsed m Mesopolamu during 17551750 ac -aamm specmc um practices veraled to merchants‘ agems who pnwmea assurances for nae credits markmg me eamesl documented mscance of laclonny Balms me zom oenlury‘ a ‘iactaf served 21 a business aganl mm mpanumun-as we» as slnnng and seumg consigned goods, pmwmng cnems wnn an aocoum M ::oHec(ed funds‘ ensuring customers‘ emu. am oocasmany ulfenng cash advances Io cnarus prim lo me Iflual sale :1! goods Facxars pllyed - crucial and acme role‘ ewecnafly m luvelgn lrada‘ and gamed 5IgmN:anoe dulmg me era of wlamar expbrilxan and development Vn modern muss, me unaanymq principle ov vacmnng umam oemerea amund the financial vuncnon at pmwamg funds In sellers engagsd in transactions wnn credllwcrlny orgamzanons The neoessny oi pnysucauy pcssesmng me mm .5 m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! goods Is no lnngev marldaled. lnsleea. legal mecnenlsms and converlllorls lacllllile me lransler ol awllershlp lnruugh lnlemallonal lraae lnslmmems ll VI however ohservld lnel me aclvva mle L11 a «mm ln me ccllecxlon pl reeelvaples (rum me eulgnee endured me last pl me (291 Durlrlg me recesslcn or me early 19305‘ a global phenomenan was noled where man and mealumcale enlerprlsu. aclwely engaged ll’! dehvenng goods and serwces la larger pmpprallons, laced ponsmevanle challenges anslng from delayed 0!. al nlnes camplele non-remvery ol piymems awed by men cuslcmers ms nnuanon had a pmlnuna lmp:c|. lesultlrlg In a cons|vlr.1lan pl men cepael llow thereby llmlllng me lends aocessiule lo: men day-In-day cperalmns and Impeding Ihelr pulemlal lor grcwln and suelelnalnlny To enhance me nemplly ol sucn blmnenes me iarmallxallan olme concept ulladurlng |L:oI< place mlougll me UNIDROIT Cunvenfion on lnlnrnalianal Faemrlng. winch was adopted ln onawa an 25 051933 (“the Converlllan') Anlcle 1 at me Convermnn pmvlded a definihnrl luv a ‘fadorlng wnlrucl‘ 35 lauows 'Amcle I 1 2 For me pulposu no one Cmwerllwn -raaenng epnnaer mun! a eenlraa wnuudad belwnn uni p-ny an. -upplml Ind anolhnr pany lme laenm 9‘"Sul!I| lp men 4.; lbs nuppueu may E! van asslan lo me fuck)! llualvlblsa nnnng Hum mnlrlcls cl sale afgoods -nape between me maybe! mm M! cunmvlu: 16 em Emzlxrrzwsunuzzfiman «me s.n.l nuvlhnrwm be H... e may he MEVHIUIY -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna vtmxl mummy alnav man Inns: nu ma aaxa cl quad) mugm pmnanly in: than aamnax fanmy ov nnunhold use my ma mm m w pancnu :1 naasx Iwn nHheleHw4mg4unI1mn: —flnan::e «cm. auppw mdudmn Vein: and amanc. pay-mu —m.mmen:nce co accaums Uadgennuj Iehalmg Ia me recerumu. —cn!Incuon of not um. vpmlaclvun agamamavauu In naymem by demms m nwoe cl ma alsvgnmenl M In: run:-wlmls sun bogwen «a «blur: “ [an] \n our cannuxn even Ihough Mmaysla xi us! a member M ma Vnlevnananal Inamma larthe unmcancn cl Pnvale Law qunumom ana nas nnlgwen effeclto mesawd ccnvenncn me (arm "\s\amic Fauonng Eusiness" Is defined In nation: 2 A 3 um. In 9 F uggg ; 5-mylgg Ag 20:: as “(he nusmua or scqumng debts m other financm ab/rgatrons due to any person ansmg Imm any transact/on wmcn rs m acccmanca wvfh snanan‘ [M] spacmc xc ma use ma pamac have entered Inlo an Vslimuc Pre- Faclnnng Agreement wrucn became ma basxs M ma enwc clann of RMIJAQBSB 59 Unlike nurmal faclanng wmcn vs “invoice-based" Pra- Fictonng represents a muncnal |nnnI:nun am a ammcx vacmy where a Factonng company pm»/ides advance finsncmg lo a contractor or vendun vaamaung me nnancmg cuunme puma prmecis Auac known as ‘purchase cmar «nancmg: N pravldls financxal rename «or ccnnaaxan |o pruduce anc delwcrgacas or samcea to (new customers an aaamzwmaazzmaa «ma. am.‘ nmhnrwm be met! a may he nflmnaflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max [:21 Fmm me cuntrad documems, mere are mm pzmes mvnwed They are — 2) b7 5) at the Intended asswgnnr ‘ e . the pnnclpal borvvwev mu; (he mlendad asslgnee ‘ e , Inc (now (PlamIM)‘ the approved deblnv i e 1 me purchaser or me goods or same; rrunm and me gummms [D2 5. D3) [:31 In essenoe, mere were three ounlracwal Iemionshlns that were created 37 Qomracl bemoan m and T QM, Here DI agnes |n sell none pmpneaary avcrafi spare pans to mom on whom mvoices ave reused YUDM wouva svgn or be served names of assignment at am: oonfmmng «run they would maka payments to me Flamufl Pnor to me Issuance oilnvmoes by DI. me Vslamlc Pzeraaonng Agreemem aflows mamas up to ma sum of RM2‘Z7E,SI7 as |:) be duhuvsed |o D1 saw: an me emaonoe. disbursements wera made oy me Plalnml In :71 upon mom wssumg ow wan men pumnase orders Tm; womd ensue D1 to source and pay vov me goods ordered by TUDM 1; m Emzxxrrzwsumzzfiruan «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrwH\I>e p... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! n7 Canlract belween m and Fmnufl Here me Wamufl waum men-use up to sum 0! RM2.27B‘SV7.B9 pnur lo D1's mvmce lo TUDM wnn an agreed pmfil raxe at 5% per mom and me pnymenx charges at 1 5% per momh The man penoa var me Vshrmc Fre-Fauonng Agreement was var so days‘ whevein me recourse period wanna be an uaye upon expvry of the cream pence n has been Igleed um lhe payment |uw:lds me pre- Ianonng “shall be done by way 0/ ansemng me vutsta/vdmg balance against paymenrs from the Factoring !nvarr:e{s) / commcr‘ wnemn .1 D1 «ans In vaennr and zsslgn the mvcu:a(s) upon me exp-ry oi G0-day cvedul pemzd on has to pay rm me balance advanced sum undev me Islamic Prermonng Agreement no lalanhan 30 days upon expiry ovme Eflday cvedrt aenae, and c) n tween Pllwnlrfl and me u Vin n D Contract av pemonal guayancee by D2 & D3 xo me P\amM In! pre-payments made In D1 12 m Emyxrrzwsunuzzfiman «mm. s.nn ...n.mn .. U... m my n. nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max [:4] In ngm ol rne given aennmcn an a .:are4u| examrnanan at me Is\am|c Pre-Facmnng Agreemenr rn qnssuon. rt rs evmenr Dial a comprehensive lmanual structure has been mencunausxy ellabllshed lhmugh mu|ual egreemem nemeen the Plamllfland m we srnrcrurea lramewnrk preersexy omhnes essenI\a\ components and rmncacre nerem In me prehzttctnng agreement. mcludmg the advmee nmn, any applicable pmfil elemem or chavges. me auranon Mme are-faclonng arrangemenr, and me mechanisms gavemmg me cnHecuan and vemmance oi lands rnrougnour me process 0! ple»far.1ormg as well as iactonng proper Hence I nelreve man rne Flainnfls slim: to socuva eennnnanon on me issue nl paymlnt «om mom‘ whether undertaken more 01 avrer me comrneneernenc at regax proceedings cmsmute an essermal aspen 0! ms responsrmlnres as auurned In one ls\amic Ple-Factoring Agveemunl, wnren rs in be cunsvdeved m ccruunctlan wrrn me Ismrmc Factoring Agreement. TN: preaciwe sranee aligns wrnr me agreea- upen terms and reflects me P\amlifl's oamrmtment in mmurng us resporrsrhrlmes wrxnrn me eecaursned nnancrax structure [35] Upon revrewrng me amdavn evmenoe, rs Is my new that me Plalnml ha: successfully derllorlsfriled the axvslenoe Ma breach Based on the Venev dated 02 as zuza (exh M94 01 encl 35)‘ D1 hat taxes In raise an Arwmca rs sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzmuan “Nana s.n.r nmhnrwm .. med e may r... nrwhuflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa war wndmcn, me Plauntm has me nghl In enlev nnar Judgment‘ mm scan. or Rmsmo on to the Plalnlfll [3] ma Defendants Ned men nohee M appeal on 0111 2023 Upvn cunsldenng ma Deaenaanty lnrmal applrcanon rn encs 52, I nave granted a stay oflhelmpcsed commons and anymnnar pmcee Ings unm me drspasal cl their appeal BACKGROUND FACTS [4] To aaarasa rra rmnramare casn needs, the Flrsl Delendanl ("D1 yr hmdmg a 3—year contract valued at RM2‘949‘5€‘/15 m supmy nL:n— pmpnarary awcrafl spars pans ro me Royar Maraysian An Fovce (ITUDMHX has aplea lo! Yaclunng Cansequenuy or has agrees (0 32!! ns accnunla racarvaaxa ro ma Plamnff at a drscwnvred rate‘ elucmalmg me nature cl ma flnancm Iacrmy mvolved [5] Eased on a Lenar av oner lar manna PreFaclunng Facrmy defied 13 a7 2021 (“Lamar oi Offer 1'; ind a Tawarruq Pre—Fac|onng Agreement dated 13 07 2021 (“Iaramrc Pm-Famonng Agreement‘) as wan as a Lens: m ELa1MrrEwmRMz2RR4:A “Nana saw ...n.mn .. a... w my r... mrmu-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war agamsl an puvchase omen issued by mom tron. Decamber 2a2o NI June 2021 wherem tne “scruff payment meonantent under me tstam-c Pve- Faclonng Agreement could ncl be Implemented nu nu Iherefcrelavled to nbnou» tne repayment terms upon expiry M the 60-day cvedt penoo As to tne excuses gnen Ie oetay and/cl nonpayment by TUDM aue to ’Arahan Perbendaharaan so tnvssr, me obntraet IS clear m that we advance: sum has k: be repaid baeeo an the credn tevms dsspws non-payment by mom. and eesbne D1 5 came to rane and taaov tne Invmoas upon eontptymg wtlh tne butenaee under: [:5] In any event tne ‘Arman Petbendzharaan 5s (APSBV Is, tb me, a non- issue as TUDM wnmd only pay based upon presentment at an mvmce As D1 tenet: to generate Irwolces tor the an purchase orders‘ K becomes pvaoedurzlly tmpesstbla torruom lo rennt any mrect paymenlla me PIIVIHW The absence bt documentary evidence ham D1‘demonstratinglhexrvehance on tnts AP5a tssue, mgnngnte a crucial gap In their argument and unuerscores the need In! dear avidenu to subusnlme tnen posmen [371 Based an the event or de-faun descnbeo VI tne agreement. I find that me Fmrvtm‘ VS enwed to tenmnete me Facnmes by Vssumg a tuner 01 n m ztemnzwmnnzznam we saw ...n.mn be H... a may t... nrW\ruH|y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mutta v-mat aevmmmon men 15 as 2022 qexn SA-J av and 21) and merezner Ne ms suit agamst me Devennams «or me overdue sum The relevant name 0! (ermmauon was Issued to m m compu-nee or Clause 1 (Nance) nllhe Lener money 1‘ and Claus: 19 M m l5I:rmc Pre—Fa:(onng Agmemerfl Lellers al demand to D2 5 D3 mm dated 20.5 2022 (exh SA-6 at encl 21) were conecny wssued based on me terms ollhe Guarantee da1edI3.D7 2021 (exh sn-5 alancl 21) [:3] On me Issue ov me ifleged lack av panmmars, me Deienaams‘ have rsnea on me case or Mlliyin Banking v we Sun Tang (supm) m supnon at man wmenuon that me deb! must be specmcaw punlculanasd Havmg exammed one case however, I am a! me consmereu mew that nus case can he dislmgulshed as -n me case relied on there was a umerence between me amcum claimed :1 mended m the Stalement of cum and me AW-dlwl m suppan Furlhev, m the sad case meve was a dispute m regard Io me vanaliun at mleresl rate as weH me plammfs acnva Muss! to wpmy me pamculars olme zmuum due despne me aecenaanrs requesls In our case u \s clear hum me smemem olaccoum produced by bum pames (P\:mm¢ m exh SM!) olencl 9 and Detenaams In em IHDV1 MenclA7)|I1alIhe waves: :2 m Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! uutslanalng ammml stood at RMt.74o.s9a as lt ls the same amount as statea tn the Plarmnrs alaadlnga and nails: ulappllcallon [35] As to the alleged rneanalstency In tne amount clalmed. I am at tne vlsw tnattne Plaintm has lully explalrled tnat tne same ts based on me tnnelrne and subsequent admlsslnn of tne Delendants lnnially an at 20 us M2 the ourstanurng amaunt stood at RMZ035 050 32 Due to payment: made. n became Rm 770,593 as subsequent payment of Rmzluooo on by D1 reduced the aucstanulng sum to RM1 741189889 by 15 092022 on the nsue M tna allagea exaggelzled amnun| wnlalrled V! we Plnirlmfs letter In mom. rt prlmarlly oompnses purchase ovders tnat nave yet m be convened lntn lnvcloes It Is also clear tnat based on the lauonng anarlyamarll. tne nnanaea amount ls stgnmcantly lower tnan lne actual contract amount [40] Be that as rt may. tne slrerlglh altne Plalntnrs case for 0 IA nangs on me rssue oltna cemneata el rndealeaness wmetr. ll produce would Imounl ta conclusrve evluence at me averaue sum. Regretlully, tne l=lamrill larlea ta pmvlde sum eertmcate. Almaugh based on clause 5.3 of tne lslamlc Pre- Faclnnng Agreemenl a statement 01 aecaunt can be argue: to be lmpltealy concllmve pml nlamotml aue by at, me Guararllee agreement llgned by 23 m Emzlxrrzwmnnzzfikun «war. a.n.l nmlhnrwm .. u... w my r... aflnlnallly mm. dnuuvlnnt Vfl arlum war D2 5. D: requlres Ihe proaucnpn 01 In actual penmcace M lndebledness The relevant clause 24 pl me Guaranlee smes as «allows. 1: A eemficale by my cl yum cufficavi at ca me men-es ana llabdhuu: rur me llme beuvg nu: cl rnmnra It; you by the Chem stun he nlndlng and umduslve on and mlrul us w my am or ur av perinnal r-pmanramr [411 Allnaugrr not addressed py the learned counsels, anulhar aspecl requmng viva race axlmlnalrnn pertains (0 our Issue cl whelher lna 40 puvchase pnlers menllaned ln me Plarnlrfrs leller In TUDM were wrlnrn me smpa allne lslarnrc Pre-Faclonng Agreement rms cnnsldemlon ames uua la ma lapl lnal lnera purcnna mders ware lulled belween December 2020 anu June zozl, predatlng me execullon cl lne Vslalmc Pr&Factonng Agreement on 1307 2021 The quesucn anses does lne pre-laclenng zgvaamenl apply rulrosperarraryv 7hz| could poasrnly ha (ha case as D1‘: comracl ralerence wlln TUDM was aalaa '2o1e'. on me ulnar hand, ll Is also ppssmle manna reason my TUDM relusesla pay Isduelo me famnal mesa lransaclvuns were numle me scope or me lamonng agreements‘ wherein paymanl could anry be made In me suppllar l e D1 Nonetheless, I behave marl resolullon ailhezre rssues ls cpnlrngenl Ilpun oral avldence la he presanlsd dunng full lnal In sm Emzlxrrzwsunuzzfiman “Nair s.r.r mmhnrwm .. med m my r... nflnlnnflly mm. dnulfllnl Vfl .nuNa war my Exarnrrung me evraenoa oulhned In me amaavns and ma praaemea arguments rt appears Ihal grannrrg summary gudgmem may not be appropriate m (hrs rnsxanae nespne cm; I mamlim same reservamns regammg the delensa‘ espemully cancenvng ma crearbmcy ol the allegallan nns skepuclsm arIses!rem(he1actlhatD1 had me e-man dated 11 no 2022 texh sA—9 ofencl 9)‘ convrrrnea manrrerrversron annecoxal outstanding sum plus prom and crranm um an RM1.421‘9B8 10, wharem m made an nller |u some men veraron Mme pnncrpxe sum at RM773‘720 no by 3 msIaHmenls perm aemrng the pmfil and omer charges Could rl he pnssrme Ihal TUDM hzd aheidy ssmed payrnem wrm m In! me 40 puvchase orders am on rn mm, surrapmrausxy used Ihese same purchase orders to wsmy financing irurn me Plarnmv There vs a\su me rssua onhe aannaarpn In Paragraph 9 5 and 911 cf man Amdavil In Reply dated 30112022 (end 11) Much was nlad m oppose he marrrmra Onglrulmg Summans In nnase paragraphs, ma nevennanva efiecwely admmed |I1a\ me sum ol RM77Z-1.092 as Is due and payama lame wamm Contrary to me Delendants‘ submrssron, n rs my wew that ma cam of um Nyuk sang @ Fudy Llm I. On v Azlm Nnlr vac Gum Hock (supra) and on Clluo & Sam Chan 5 Sons Sdn. Bhd. VWovIg Nyuk 1Iin(suprs)can be msmrrgmsnea ms Is because me lacks In me present can vwmve a corwersmn of me Orvgmatmg Summons prucauure 25 r~ Emzxxrrzwsukuzzrtman «mm. Snr1|\nmhnrwHH>e U... w my r... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl aF\uNa war Inm : wIII Whelem I2 nas been omered mat anIaavIIs Ned be aeemea as meadmg wrule Insufflmenl to peIsIIaae «ms Cnurl to enter nnax pmgmem on a can at me claim exh SA-9 III encl 2 and me relevant pumqrapm In end 11 are nevennexass pmbalwe In deciding an me Issue ol Ine uevennenu‘ lam! accemanoe av uauI\IIy ana men eenmauun ol me sum due {as} conIIaereIIon Is aha gmn Ia DI‘: Condufl In men Ianure |a Issu- Invoices based on me 40 purcnase emers Issued ny TUDM Accordmg to me pwvlsrons wIInIn me Fslarmc Fre-Factoring Agreement me paymem (award: me sum advanced unuer me Pre-Ficiuvlng wumd be sewn upon me payment by mom based an me Issuance at Invmce As no Inuame was Issued faclored and assigned one cannot ewed TUDM Ia make dvreci paymem to me I=IaInII« As sucn D1‘; suspmus man In wIInrIaIuIng me Issuance evInvoIceuaI me said 40 purchaae orderscannm be deemed Dona me and are cast In an unlavorame ngm 1441 In my penpecwe, me mentioned snaumseanses aflev sImIcIenI NSNVCJUOIV coy me In set mndmons upon we grant cf weave to I1e¢ena As deemed III me case 0! Jncabs v 3935; my [[1 co [1901] as LT 62 balove aonamanal leave |a deland can In granm me coun mus! be Is sm ausIxnzwmnumIu:aI “Nun: s.n.I nmhnrwm be UIQG u may I... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum MI sausfled that mere we no res! substarmal duesnon in be mad or men xhsve Is no mspule as to (acts or law whwch Iawses a reawnabve doubl Ihal the plawnffls ave enwed to wdgmenl In me case M arm-n and Commonwullh neldnngn and v Oundrol HoldlnnIlnc[1EBE] as 542, [1559] 3 All ER 492. [me] 3 WLR 723 :1 was hem max wnere me deaenee can be described as lackmg H1 Dona We and perhaps shadowy wt nas been me pucnoe at eevns in we eendmonex weave m delend The Federa\CL:uI1 .n me case clone cmn n-my Lee 300 Neck [1970] 1 MLJ 112 telerved In the Englrsh case at Figlgmnk Lw v Stein [1951] 3 AM in sea‘ wherein n wax hem Ihatwhen (hire n eduneunng suspmious m (ha flofunflanfl mode at presermng his use ar wnere me court e wen wnn a reel deem about me defendant‘: gdod «men even though n cannm be send var cenam thanhere Vs ndc a «new: vssue n \s ennued (a make in order that the defendant do pay me amount claimed or any lesser sum Into mun dr lumxsh seeumy var that emdum as a sandman lar weave m delend [45] I behave men cne evenum mu men wows msny mus on me vssue M quantum namely la: the Plammflo produce the cerlmcale of mdebledness secondly, names would need to explain whether me Isxanue Pre—Fzc1unng Agreement ‘S to Dave! the we 40 purchne amen wmch pvedzles the 17 m aemnzwmnnzzmen we s.nn mmhnrwm .. med m my me nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n Vfl .neve we Fzmlmes Aa per me case (:1 cam Para Mining co. v. Fnsmeago aow R 830 412152; wrrere me prammv suea lnr caHs and rehed on me evruenee of a clerk mac he had posted me Iener er aflotmenl. and me derenee was nan’ recerm er me lanai, luv: waa grven m aevena an paymenl ol ammml claunsd mm Court. to ename delendaru in crass-examine as In posurrg cl Vener [u] Aeeerurrugry, me Derenaams are gwen leave to aerend on cundmon that mey aeposrc me sum 0! RM1421 95510 ma Conn wllhm a sway crruerrame following me arder In the even! me Darermznus var: Io make me deposrl me Flamml wanna be enmlefl In rural gudgmenl rnr me mu sum erarmea wrm me agreed prom charges eampensauon charges (T:‘w\dh)‘ and Audgmern rnneresn The sand sum represents ma versmn of me aulslandlng amcunl, piymenl ul which was olfered by way av rnsxaumema Gwen me Derenaam acknuwledgrusm and willingness to sema Ihe mermened amount‘ we condition appears reasonable undev me crrcurnsxar-cee m r~ Emzxxrrzwsurwzzfiruan «ma sarm ...m.rwur be H... w my r... mmruuly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war nsclslou [47] Aflerconsmennglhe Ficlsand curcumsxanoes presented m we amavix evndenoa, the Plamuffa apphcalnon rm summary wdgmem m and 20 V5 dlsmwssed Vn na sxeaa me Defendants are accorded canmuanal weave |o defend. wnllngent upun me payment av RMM21 ‘ass to be pm! we Courl wllmn 30 says If we Dundmnn Is salufiad, me use wm pmcaad m «nan ana the costs assocvaled mm end 20 wxll be Krea|ed as cuss m me cause Carwer3e\y «me Deienaama ran lofum one condition, we F\a|n|rflwuu|d be ax hbeny (0 enter Ma! mdgmenl of me pleaded mm mge|I1=vwI|h prom anu mmpensahon churges and mdgmenl unnarean Is weH as ws|s nl RM5.oao no payame by me Devenaams to me wanna: L4—~ (vusnm mnz am vusom Judlcm Commissioner Hugh Coun o1Ma¥aya Kuala Lumpur name 29» Deoemher2023 m Emzxxrrzwsunuzzfinuan «mm. Snr1|\nunhnrw\HI>e met! a may n. nrwhuflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max For the Flaumfl Dmesh Nandrayng Messrs Nandrajuq. Aavacaces 3. samnms, 3-as Tower 3‘ UOA Busmess Park‘ No 1 Jalan Pangalumara m/51A semen U1. 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Fm me Delenuams Mnhd Hafiz Em Gnavam [Mend Fm Fahmy Em Abdw Rink wrlh mm) Messrs Fa1ru\ Fahmy 5. co ‘ 1—o+o:s, Subang suna. Jslan Blmang‘ us/:3. Seksyen us, 40150 sn-n Nam, Sehngar Dam! Ensan CASE REFERENCE: Bank Nu .-ra Malayan: V Muhd lsmixl A On 1199211 MLJ mo 2 Cempaka Finance BM v Ho Ln. Ymg (tmdmg as KH Traamgy 3 Anor [2005] 3 cu 544 3 HSEC Bank Malaysia Berhad v LH Tvmber Pmuucus Sdn Ehd as Ors (200513 cu zoa o Mahamad Faun Che Rus v JR Jami Resources Hcldmgs sun am [2016] 5 cu 256 5 Pehnlar Agresxf (M) sun Ehd v Prqek Lebuhraya Usanasama Bemad Lemhaga Lebuhriyi Malaysia (Fmak Kelngz) [2014] 1 LN5 79 5 Perwnra Afin Bank Bevhad v onson Sun and a Olhers [2003] MLJU 676 m Emzxxrrzwsunnzzmuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! or oner lav Iswamrc Flctonng dated 13 a7 2021 (‘Laney al OM21 2“y and an Islamic Facronng Agreement dated ram 2021 ('\sl:rmc Faclonng Agveemenflr the Walnm granrea D1 wrm Islarmz: Pre-Factonng and Facwnng !acIIvly mm me purchase pm 01 RM2,27a,5w as and RM2 :59 733 73 respemvely. and me sale pnoe nl RM2r540,65B 95 and RM5ro14r434 17 respectwew (’FacvhIies'j The sea Fauhnes are based on me Tawarvuq pvinuple sxructurlu m a norwevolvmg form under me Shlnah prrncrpre cl Munsbahah [51 Purluanl to a Guaranree and Inaemmry Agraement dated 13 07 2021 (‘Guaran|ee') me Secanu Delendanl (‘D2’) and mm Dzfenflam (-D3“) have rmmry and severauy agreed to guarantee all oursvanarng paymenrs er me Facmnes [7] A demand was wssuefl on 20 (15 2022 lexll SAG 0lenc\21). seekmg (0 recover a \‘o|aV sum of RM2 035050 32 compnsmg RM1 317.319 51 under the |s\amIc PM-Fanonng Agreemsnl and RMII7,730 B1 unaer the Ismmc Factoring Agreemem The amount unaer me Iskanuc Facronng Agreemem was rarer semed, leavmg me Fre—FacIoring laulilvss skill uursrenamg As at 30 as 2022 me everdue sum was Induced to RML77ors9a 59 A Vurlhav m Emzxxrrzwsunuzzfiman “Nana smm ...m.mur .. U... w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max 7 10 11 12 1: 14 15 15 17 13 19 20 21 Malayan Bankmg and v Veo Sun Yor1g[1999]B ML.) 317 L1m Nyuk Sang @ may L1m 5 Or: 11 man Naslr van Guan Hock (202012 MLJU 1104 cu once a Sena Chan 3. sans sun sna vwong Nyuk Ts|n[2D1G] 9 MLJ 17s concmca Engmaanng Product arm 14 Greengvoup Eng San ans [zmn MLJU 1915 Noam! Hilda ac Isman y Eank Smlpinan Naslonal 120211 Muu 2652 scum Eas|As1:lr1suranca Eerhad y Kerzjzan Ma1ays-a [was] 1 cm 1045 National Company lor Foreign Trade 14 Kayu Raya sun arm [1950] 2 MLJ zoo Ma1ayan lnsurince (M) sun and v A51: Mace: Sdn anu[19e712 MLJ 153 Bank Negara Ma1ays1a y Muhd Iarnau [1992]1 MLJ 400 Eng Mee Yong a. 01:. y Le|churr1anan[1979]2 ML! 212 Jacobs y Eanms nssnuery Co [1901] as LT 52 Brmsh and Commonweaflh Hnldmgs prov Quadrsx Hoidlngs me [1929] ca 542 Cho Chin Huatv Lee am Huck [1970] 1 MLJ 112 Flemrank Lld ys1e1n [1961] 3 All ER 683 cana Pan: Muung Ca V Fas1r1edge3OW R am (1352) m Em11><rrEwsDRHz2RR4:A «ma a.n.1 nuv1hnrw\H a. 1.... a my 1... nrW\ruH|Y -mm: dnuumnl y. ar1uNa M1 LEGISLATION REFERENCE: Order 14 r1 A :13, a as uhhe Rmes nvcoun 2012 sflmonne E~4u1enr:eAcI 1950 52 a. sa Mme Islamxc Fxnancwm Semces An 2013 An 1, \JNlDRO1TCunvenuun on Imemauunal Facmung Olvawa — 23 05 1988 :....~_. BOOK! ARTICLE REFERENCE: 1 The Code av Hammuvabl (Translated by L w King, 1910) m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! sum oV RM3D.000 so was new by D1 en 0! as 2022 wnerem me am was lmlhev reduced to RMI,74D,55B as Despne afiempls and meeungs amen al an armcable resohmon erme Issue‘ u did nol come In lrumon [31 As in was m ccnlmuous breach M ‘Ls amgauons, me Facumes were lerrmnaled waea Name 0! Demand daled15 us 2022 (“Terrmnallon Notice") lexh sue nl anal 2:7 As ex 15 as 2022. me sum nl RML740 ass as wai oulslandlng and payable by me Defendants as me sole av pnnmpal ashlar. which was In be semen wnmn 7 days rmm me Termlnanon Nance The said sum cnmprises al RMLDQZDOS 55 being prInr:\pi\ due. and mean 395 34 nemg numenamg pvufil vale [9] Due in me Delendanls‘ demure xe seme me epeemea amount‘ me F\a|n|m mmanea lega\ mm by (mug an Ongmamng Summnns at me Kua\a Lumpuv Hugh Court under Sun No WA—24M-I3-10/2022 an 02 m2u22 Fnllawmg 2 com Drdav issued on 02112022 (encl 12), me ongmamng Summon: wan convened mo . wnx cansequenuy, all ammo: filed m cunnsanon Mm u were deswgnaled as meadlngs, and ham pames were granted me liberty In Incorporate aaanianer preaumgs as needed m Emzmwzwsunuzzfiruan we sew ...m.mm .. U... m my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [I0] By way cl Ihls zppllcallnrl ln erlcl zu, me Plalnlm sougm lmm |he Defendants as follows. a) the prlnclpal sum al RMl 140.392 as as at 15 as 2022, :2) pram charges an a me 0! 5% per month an the amaunl a! RMLDEZDUB 55 item 1509 2022 unlll lull reallzallon cl ludgmanl sum :7 lale payment chalges at a me an 5-/. par monlh on me xmounl of Rmaszloos 55 mm l5o92u22 unlll lull reallzallwl cl iudgmerlk sum a) costs. and e) lnlalesl at 5% per annum an me cosl awarded [11] Funher In ma abuvel me lullwing Y5 prayed nu ma allarnallve la) rue luagmenl lor part at me Plalnlms clllm In me amount of RM713,o92 33. wllh lnleresl at me rate 0! 5% per annum on me ludgmerll sum fmm the dale ov lndgmenl umll mu reallzallnn la) The cuss at |he appllcaxlan ma lncmnul ms|s are In be borne by Ihe Defendants. m Emzlxrrzwsulwzzfiruan «mm. ml ...m.mm .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNa Wm! (c) Interest at me rate 0! 5-2.. per annum on the ordered costs (tom the dale 0' Judgment Im|I| the lull and (lnal sememem cf the judgment‘ and (:1) Th: Plamhlfs renuxmng clam aga\rIs| Ihe Delendanls are in be delevmmed by way of a fun Ina! couussus CONTENTIONS [m Plawrmffs Veamed cnunsex, Dmesh Nandramg draws upun 4ega\ pvecedanls m Bunk Ngln M Iulg v Mohd lxrmll A on [1992] 1 MLJ 400, Comgak: Flnlnce Eng 14 Ho LII Vlng trading as KH Tramng & Anor [was] 3 cu 544 and nsac Bank M I ‘ mad v. LH Timber Pgjggg syn and 5. on [nos] 5 cm 249 n \s manually conlended mat the F\amlIll has esiahhshed a pmna lame use var the sum ol RM1‘74D‘B98 B9 wheveln me buraen mereaare shms In me Defendants In samy the com why nmgmenu should not have been gwen Igamsl them [13] To vurmer strengthen men suhmlsswonsn me Plavrmflargues lha(D1 mu nol dispute |heIr Iiabmy under me Facmcres and had vlde e-mam dated 11 10 2022 (exh sA-9 olend 9;. mlormed the Plaunmllhal Ms version av m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman mm. smnw ...n.mn .. med w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! me total omsnanmng sum plus prom me man at RM1 mass 10 In (he same e-ma: D1 made an olfer to sellle that version av me prmcvple sum av awn 120 on by 3 installments belore selfllng the pum ind olhev charges AI |hal pom! m lwme‘ based on an email. ms Pmnun awsagreed mm me war as me lmal uu|s\andmg sum stood ax RM1,74o 398 as m] In the Inemalive |he Plamlnfl arguss that ms netsnasms have m paragraphs 9 5 and 9 H at (new Amdavll m Reply dated so 11 2022 (encl My admitted to me sum at RM773 092 as wherem me same Is sapame M being Idjudged :1 due and omng, am hence final wdgment be enlevad up In me and sum Rehanoe is placed upon -1711 M me Evldence An! 1950, Man In Fauxi cm Ru: v JR Joint R Holdin 5 Sdn Bud [2016] 6 Cu 256‘ and Pelamzr Agggiljfl 51,; am y Era gk Lnbuhrlp [2014] I ms 19 [15] caunssw luv the Delendanls, Mohd Ham Em Ghalam‘ contends man me amount assensa by me F\aIn\m Vacks comp\e|e subsxarmanon and us unuerlain It \s assened that the Plammv fafled lo quanmy the pnnupal due and mud to exp¥aIn now me element al pmfil 015% per mamh as weH as m Emzmrrzwinnnzzfiman mm. smsw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w mm s. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! penarry sum M 1 5% per mpnrrr rs denved at The case at Ferwln Aflln Bank aemad v Qrison Sdn and 5. Omar: [zuua] MLJU 576 rs cried to vmerem Anaur Milrk lshak 4 refuted to me ]udgmsn| ol Augrrsrrrre Paul J In lhecase oVMnI.Iy|n aarrkrrrg Bhdv Yoo sun 1orrg[r9s91e ML! :77 which new mar me pemrrcare er Indebtedness produced does not cure the detecr wnhm me meadmgs yrs-a-yrs me regurremerrr «pr me Prarnrm In fully cnndescend on ma pamcullrl or amoum due espacrarry an me suraracr pr rmeresr charged and repaymanrs made my Aagrrrprrauy, ma Derenaam comand mar ma vrarrmrv prerrrarrrrary ended me iicrlmes wrren. m reaury rr was TUDM mar caused uerays In the payment process It rs a\so suhmllted mar an ayerrr crasemea as 'Aranan Pevhendaharaan as (AP5E)“ ma occurreg M May 2:122 wheram mom had In ohlam speerar permrssran «mm are Accountant General emraraysra no pay (or charges Incurred In me prevrpus year (2021) Hence the delay rs sara ro be beyenn D1 5 cpnrrpr In support M rms claim me Defendams presented ma Pumrnvs Veater daled oz as 202: ram IHDJ ol errcr 35), wherein me F\a|nIM snrrgm cranrrcarrprr lrom TUDM regardmg me payment srarus rprme pursranmng 40 am or 55 purchase orders mar have yer lo be convened rmo rrwprcas They argues max rm arrraunr 0| Rmarsssass so chimed by ma m Emzrxrrzwmnnzzfiman “Nana s.n.r ...nr.mrr .. med m my r... mmnauly mm: dnuumrrl y. arrurm v-mar Flalnlllllrom TUDM VI exh lHD»I ls exoesswe, and lnal ln any evam II shows Ihallhe lacllmsa have not been termlrIa|ed as ll was lssued anerlne sullwas fllzd ‘me Delenaanls also ralse omeclinns In ma Plammvs declslon cu dll:c|ly approacn TUDM lo pursue payment lor lns lecslvables «om D1 They argue that TUDM IS not pnvy la me connacrual lelallonshlp belween lh: Plalnllvl and D1 under me established laclllnes [11] on me Issue at me anernallve sum ol RM771092 33‘ me Defendants‘ counsel anjussmatme same was nol pleaded and naslcally an allennnugnl Thu calm of Llm Nyuk Sung Q Fvudy Llm A on um-n I4: r we Gu-n Hock [mm] 2 MLJU 1104 an on Chm 5 sons Chan 5 sons Sdn. Bhd. v flggg Nyuk Tiln [mm] 9 ML.) 176 were Vellad upnrl wnereln me nelenaanls argue mac m a summary ludgmenl appllcallon ma Plalnlm ll Danna by me SIa|emenl cl Clalm ana came! by affldavns ralse mallels nol pleaded [II] The Derenaanzs learned nourlsel mind me case .71 Control: Enginlenng Product Bhd v Grsengmug Eng Sdn EM [2017] MLJU 1913 and argues lhal lne Plalnlm lallad lo set uul : pnma racla case var 0 14 runner, me ualenaanlx learned calmsel clled (M cues of Noorul HAM: an W m Emzlxrrzwmnnzzfiman “Nair s.n.l nunhnrwm .. u... M may he nflnlnallly mm: dnuuvlnnl VII mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-21NCvC-92-10/2020

PLAINTIF SME ORDNANCE SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN MALAYSIA 2. ) KERAJAAN MALAYSIA

Isu yang berbangkit di dalam tindakan ini adalah berkaitan dengan perolehan peluru berpandu yang dikenali sebagai ‘Misil Bakhtar Shikan Model 8C’ (misil) bagi maksud memperkasakan kelengkapan persenjataan Tentera Darat Malaysia iaitu salah satu cabang di bawah Angkatan Tentera Malaysia yang berada di bawah kawal selia kementerian defendan pertama. Melalui tindakan ini, plaintif kini membangkitkan isu kegagalan di pihak defendan-defendan untuk membayar mereka baki jumlah penjualan misil tersebut yang dikatakan telah sempurna dibekalkan kepada defendan-defendan. Defendan-defendan pula mendakwa bahawa terdapat kelewatan di dalam pembekalan misil tersebut oleh plaintif yang menyebabkan mereka berhak untuk mengenakan jumlah gantirugi yang telah ditentukan secara kontrak atau ‘Liquidated Ascertained Damages’ (‘gantirugi’) terhadap plaintif. Mengenai isu ini, mahkamah mendapati bahawa masa adalah tidak sesekali menjadi bebas di dalam kontrak ini. Defendan-defendan telah menyatakan dengan jelas berhubung tarikh akhir bagi penghantaran misil yang telah terdahulu sebelum itu dilanjutkan sehingga 30.3.2019 di samping berpegang kepada hak mereka untuk mengenakan gantirugi akibat kelewatan.Mahkamah seterusnya mendapati bahawa gantirugi yang dikenakan iaitu sejumlah RM10,312,812.00 adalah melebihi 24.5% daripada jumlah nilai kontrak keseluruhan iaitu hampir satu perempat daripada jumlah RM41,922,000.00 yang mana ini adalah ternyata merupakan satu jumlah yang keterlaluan apatah lagi ditambah pula dengan fakta bahawa tidak wujud sama-sekali sebarang kerugian kewangan di pihak defendan-defendan. Atas dasar itu, mahkamah telah memerintahkan sepertimana berikut:(a) Satu perisytiharan bahawa pengenaan gantirugi yang berjumlah RM10,312,812.00 oleh defendan-defendan terhadap plaintif adalah salah, tidak patut dan/atau melanggar nas undang-undang; (b) Satu perintah untuk defendan-defendan membayar, secara bersama dan berasingan jumlah RM10,312,812.00 kepada plaintif; dan(c) Faedah ke atas jumlah penghakiman sebanyak 5% setahun bermula dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian sepenuhnya.

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Raja Ahmad Mohzanuddin Shah bin Raja Mohzan

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02/01/2024 14:52:58 WA-21NCvC-92-10/2020 Kand. 47 S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bDUxNSkNrEWjae93BjgFjQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—21NCVbCa93nl0/2020 Kand. 47 n2/m/2024 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH T|NGG| MALAVA m KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAVAH PERSEKIHUAN MALAYSIA GUAMAII SIVIL No: WA-21N(.\tC»B1~1aI2g2g ANTARA SME ORDNANCE SDN EHD (No.SyarikaI: 504541) ...PLAINT|F DAN 1. KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN MALAYSIA 2. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Prawaunl [1] Isu yang nemangkm an da\am unaaxan ml adalah herkanan dengan pemenan pelum berpandu yang dnkenah sebagaw Ms» Bakhlav Smkan Model ac‘ Lmnsnl) bag: maksud memperkasakan kelengkapan persenjalaan Tamera Dara! Malaysxa mm sa\ah sam cahang an hawan Angkalan Tamera Mmaysxa yang berada dl bawah kawal seha kementenan deasndan perlama syn x:DuxNskNrEwp=suBmFu) um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmny mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm p... um [21 Damn hll peralehan mu, p\imliV Ie\ah bcrparinin smaku Igen Iunggll Kapada Globe! xnuuurias a necanoe Solutions (GIDS) vallu yabuah syankalyang dllmhlu man Ksrapan Pamcan [31 Sabelum penglmenan plamm, lelnh wuyud hubungin sacara Vangsung 4: mm ems flan defender: kedua ax man: permehan mm! puda Kama I|u auakukan secara (em: a. anlara kedua-dua pnhak Iersebm Waliubagamlanapun. bermula paaa znu, ems udnk lagl bamrusan dengan delendan kedu: kevan: Ielnh molanllk pnamm smku Igen lunggal meraku di Malaysi- [4] Meialm unaakan pmax defendan-delendan unmx membayav merelu um ynmlan pemuamn mlsll xersanm yang dwk an «em: eempuma amaxaxxan kapada uavanaan-amnaan Defendan-defandan pula mendakw: hahuwa waapan kelewman :1. dmam pembekalan man Iersebul nloh pramm yang menyebabkan meraka berhak unluk , p\amM km: mamnangmkan Isu xegagalan :1. mengenakan wmlah glnulugn yang terah dnzntukan secara konlrik alau ‘Lwquvdlied Asoenained Damages‘ (‘g:n(\rugI') temudan pVamM [5] Bertmk Ialak uanpaui perkara nu‘ plumlfl hum memohun penunlman-penunlulan. yang an anlava Iamnyay sepem benkut ternidap defandurmelendan — (at Sam perliytmaran Bahama pengenaan girmrugl yang beryumlah RM10312‘812D0 c\eh uelanuan-aefandan m nuuxNskNrEW|=emsnFp0 «mm. am.‘ ...m.mn .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl aF\uNa Wm! me u orav levsebul uan mamuluskan bahawl cengen-an ganumg. sebanyak RM10,3I2,8I2-00 (ersebm Idalah dvkelmkan Planrmi lalah sekall lag: mamhunt berblgav rayuan bag: pengecuuhan Iersebu! namun dafandan panama masm menalak rayuan-rayunn plllnllltersebut Inn-llu umuk dlblclnkln [29] Bag: maksuu permcar-an hndlkan m benkul adulah merupakan sswnu umuk mbucmkan yang felah dlperselujul oleh pIhaK-pIhak- (ap Same Ida pengnam-ran mm! dllamutkan ke «am. penghanlarin kenmn (30 3 2019)’ (I2) sama aau mm masnh ug. merupakin mnpln kmuaw my Sama ada mesa untuk pengnamavan misll adalah bebas (urns rs at large)? m) Sama ada ueienuan-cmenaan mempunyaw Iugas—Iugas fiduswan dx bawah konu'ak7 (e) Sama ads wendan kadu: bemak mengenakan ganwugrl m sama ad: aeaennan kedua bercanggungjawab bagi (unnnan pVaInm'7 [so] Mahkamah mendapan bahawa Iswsu Ievsebut men dlrangkumkan kepada hanya due (2) wsu mama Iallu m huuxNskNrEW|=emBnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! p... u an :7 (a) same aaa miss umuk penghantaran rmsll aflalah nebav my Sama ada dafendan kedu: bemak mengenlkan gannmgw Sam: mu muse unmx pengnanraran rmsrl adalsh bsbas7 [:1] Menurul hujahan plznnm aaaxan merupakan undangdmdang yang manlap bahawa nxwanya sesuatu kunlrak ilu mbenarkan unluk dlllksanakan ma\ampau\ Iankh pelaksanaan yang aw. maka mass adallh menjadl bebas sebagen permulain kepada Isu um p\amM lelah memwk kepada kepulusan Mahkamah Fersekuluan an dalam Ken suns Hok Sd/1 Elhd v. Sah Foh Shsng [2013] 2 MLRA ass yang xelah memperunlukkan sepemmana benkm melalul penghaknman Jeflrey Tan HMP m rnz. 545 mu sekuanya plhak yang mink hersalah nuax msmhatllkan konlrak levapw sebaliknya membenarkan pmak yang mungbdr unluk mewaxsanakan konlrak on may lempoh rnasa anal yang telah mpersemnn sebemm nu‘ make masa bukan wagx rnanpm umpalu kanlrak can aleh nu mas: (elah mevuadl benas maka pmak yang mungkvr dlbenarkan unluk mallksanakan langgungjawab konlraknya ax dalam lempah masa yang munasabah [14]The long and shun M n as held and observed n. Hock Hual /Inn Foundry. n man were 3 party nu! -n delaull does not rescind a contract undev s 56(1) M me Cnmracls A01 1950 run alluws me pany -n deliull m eompme me work beyand me oompnenon dale‘ than lime .5 no ‘anger al me essence of me oomvact. and man when lame Is ix Verge. me promlsov must perfnfm me pmnnse m nuuxNskNrEWp=emsnFp0 «mm. s.nn ...m.mn .. U... n may he nflmnnflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! n... 13 HY §1 wnnln a reasonable me an pmylaea unosl s 47 ollno Act, and ll lnsl. .s unlensonnslo oolay lno may no. ln delaun mly olue a mnloe rlxlna : reasonable lllne lur oenomlsnoe aller lna expuancn ol wnlcn lne parry nol ln oolsull would ml lne ccmricl as all in end (revhrased ivvm Law or Cormam ln Malaysla oy A Mnhaimln Ayus al p 20. Agaln ll was no. nelo. only me: lllne by me coun al Appeal lnal 2 nmice llxlng a reasonable time lol pelvonnanoe ls .eounea before breach ula oralnlse ln ‘M1lCh me lo: penonnsnce ls nm speclneo mull: clyslalllse lnaeeal we were no. sllawn any aulnonly max ruleo ms. such nouoe ls essenllal oelole meson could occur Ralher, In me oonnaly, Ihere ls e oeclslon ol mls coun namely Damansara Really am y Elmgsal Hlll Haldlrlgs son Blvd 5 Ana! [2011] l MLRA lss. um I l s MLJ Aaol ln-l could ncl nu. only pelrll lnal breach occurs anal me expluuon ulveaaonable llnle lo. pel1armnrloe' (:2) Flalnll lug: luml meruluk kepsoa Seklysn 56 Ana Kunlrak 195:: dan lugs kes Hock Hus! nor. Foundry y Nags Tsmbaga Sun and [1998] 2 MLRA ass on mans NH cnen HMR lolarl menyalakan seperllmarla berlkul a. me 360 penghaklman behau 'I2l1 slnce lne oetennsn: ulu nnl Vlscllld me mrllyacr under s 5E11)Mlerl|he plalnllmalleo to colnplele on 31 lenusly I981 bu. lnsleaa had allvwed me colnplellon date In pass ano had even allawed me plalnml Io lelneoy nls aslaull lay cerlnllllng nnn lo cormnue ll. work on the pralem unlll n was wholly oonlpleloal time was no longer lo be regarded as olme essence on me oonlracl Ann wnen lune ls no longel at llle essence at me oonum s 55(1) sm ouuxNskNrEW|=emBmFp0 “Nana s.n.l nuvlhnrwm .. UIQG n may l... .n.ln.ll.y ml. dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNa Wm! Pa;e1Aova1 (which u only zppucame be can: wnm the plmel m the centric! have mlanflad Ihimme vi essanhil) M Iangev apnhes [2z1wn.n mm us no Vongev ol ma essence mm: wnlrnn am no um: fur peflamunu Vs specwfned‘ ma ptomme must be paflamlad mmn a rmonnma um: Sechan 41 man.» 47 Where, hwy ma contract. a premium :5 m pennnn ms promise mlhom zppllcahm by me pnmusee, and no lame fur perfmmanca .a spec-fled. me engagement man be peflovmsd wnmn a reasanahle am 123] M to what Is a reaaoname mm: «n have the IxmIrac1 peflanned n, m each panrcmav case, 2 quesmn at Vac! am vmare one pany has been guilty 5! unnecessary delay ma mhev may give mm . nouns mung a reasoruble um: at me exnwalmn cl much he wull vest me wnuacx as an an and rm remedy an IIW (:7! one party «a call of! mo comracl umnamauy M mu wly n he finds me other guiny ol unnecessary delay has survmd umcamsd m the yresenl any bscauiu equw womd not «ml the navy wha had been many av Impmpriely (see Jamshed Knoauam ham V Bunuri Dh\m]Ibha\ [1915] 32 rm 155‘ 157;’ [33] Bag: menyokong human plamm, merska Ielah bevgantung kapada Iakva-ram benkut (3) Man :33! yang uueupkan unluk pekaksanaun pengnamaran mlsll adillh pad: an 11 2016 (I2) Wflaubagalmlnlpun lerdapll sekuvang-kuringnya uua pananmnn man yang Ielah dlbenkan c!eh amnaan sm nuuxNskNrEMa~sasmfi0 «mm. sanuw ...n.mn .. U... a may he anmnamy -mm: dnuamnl VI arwum Wm! me 15 .1. av panama a. mans yang penamanya tempuh pelaksanaan man dlplndu kn 31012017 ma\a\u| Knnlrik Tambahan Panama den susman nu mpunua lag: ke (ankh so 04 2013 main. Konlrak Tzmhahan Kedua lc) waxaupun wujufl Isu mengenaw perlaruulan mesa bag! kah kelngz. namun pVaInII1 mendakw: bahawa menann mesyuarat yang Ie\ah dradakan pada 2 a zuta, p|hak—pIhak fehih mkalakan bersemu umuk membenkan Iaruulan masa benknmya semngga 3032019 Vnl Iefah dwsckong melamx surat-sunk defendan perlama yang rnasmg-mas-ng benankh 1a72o1a. 3102015 dan 124 2019 meskmun llada kontrak Iambahan yang lasmi (:1) Eegnu juga fakla menumukkan banawa paaa rnasa sebemm kontrak mama dxmasukw pad: 862015‘ DIBIHIW Isiah memaklumkan kepada defender: melaluu suralnya yang berlankh 1352015 bahawa «nan akan hanya boleh dmamar kepada Tentera Dara! Ma\ays\a pada bulan November 2017 sepemmana sum GIDS benankh 2842015 IN terbukll bahawi apabula Kanllak mama Iersebm dlmasuku plhak-pinak masm mengekalkan tankh penghanlaran pads anozms mesklpun mamtfl lelah memaklumkan bahawa musxl aka?! hanya dapak dlhaflliv pads November 2017 Menurul plamlfl lagl, perkara ml (elah dlsahkan uleh nww semasa seal-ba\as dw mana dnkatakan bahawa apamra pmaboplnak memasuun kantrak utama (ersebul. mereka sehenamya lama bahawa (ankh m x:uuxNskNrEWp=anBmVyu mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! val: 16u~a1 penyarahan misn ssmemangnyl aka" mpmua samuulnya dan VH1 adalah «am-mm dengan kswujudan Kormzk Tambahln Pamma nan Kanlrak Tambahan Kedui [34] Maka, berdasarkan segala lakva yang lelah dmyalakan dw afasa pwamm hemwan hahawa Ianya telah menjadxkan masa unluk pekaksanaan konllak meruadv bebas dan um sememangnya mkeflahul sendm uleh defendan-deiendan Da\am keadaan nu. adalah dmujahkan se\an]u(nya hanawa mawnm‘ bemak untuk melaksanakan unggungawah Knntraknya asaflcan wanya dllakukan dalam tampon masa yang munasabah sepemmana pemnlukan sexsyen 47 Akla Kuntrak 1550 [351 Mahkamah sehnmnya man menelm kes Damansarza Realty Bhd v Bungser Hr” Horamgs Sdn BM 5 Anor [2011] 9 cu 251 yang dwsandarkan oleh p\a|nh1d\ mana Rwhird Maluwm HB (Sibah E. Sarlwlk) (Yang Am: Am pada keuka nu) semis: menvyampilkan penghaknman Mahkamah Fevsekuluan (elah berpandangan sepem bewkutdw ms 275 “ml Accordingly. II Is uur considered mew man em :1 me was at Verge. mere was am a duly an ma pblmwfl In commence work wumn a reasonable ume By iamng In take me necessary steps to mmmanee development Vov lmneen and a haw years. me plammr has mdeed brched me PDA mu: yusufled me muanoe of me Iennlnalmn nelwe ‘ m huuxNskNrEW|=suBnFp0 «ma saw mmhnrwm a. U... w my a. nrW\n|H|:I mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max van :7 cl :1 [351 Juslelu mn plamm lelah berpandungan bahawa mamzndangkan xampon 55:! umuk mereki melzksanakan konlvak adllih salami 22 man aanpada Oankh kontrak mama, maka lampoh mesa yang munislbah unmk p\aInM berbum aemman aaalan se\ama 22 man lagv danpadl 30 4 2013 mm semngga Fehruan zozz Tankh 3042015 uumm aaalan marupakan iankh yang dlbenarkan an nawan Kontrak Tlmbahan Kedua Maka‘ dakwa p1a1nn¢ Iagn memandingkan mereka Ielahpun rmlaksanakan obhgasu kamraknyz pida 1752019, adalah yeuaa banawa 1anya telah mlaksanakan an dalam (empch mesa yung munasabah [37] Berdasarkan yang aeaemman p\aIn|I1 berhujah bahawl man man rneruadv babes dan aavenaan kaduu max wag: berhak unluk mengsnaxan gm(vug1 sepemmzrm yang calan mareka Ilkukan man karanl nu plamm berpundangan bahawa segali nnaakan defendln kedun adalah temyava xmaalanan an «oak sah .11 mm unaang-unaang [as] Bemubung Isu um, se|elah mankaman menemx 1ana4akca yang mkemukakan semasa perbucaraan sena nuyananmyahan yang dlbuat cleh pmak»pxhak mahkamah mendapan uanawa kcnnak ulama (elah pads asalnya menetapkan tankh penghanlsvan mis» adalah pada alau sebelum 30112016 sepemmana yang telah sedna dmyalakan di klausa 9 Faaa «anap 1m mahkamah mendapall bahawa klausa 9 ada\ah temyala perlu dlbaca bersama-same dsngan Hausa 35 yang telah seem nyaca flan m nuuxNskNrEW|=mnBmFp0 “Nana Snr1|\nuv1hnrw\HI>e U... w my 1... annn.11-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mane M1 Pan um 37 mang memperunlukkan bahawa mm Idalah marupakan Inlipah kenlrak Samanlira nu‘ Hausa :9 pm: mampamnmkkan bahawa ssbarang plndian kepada kunuak udak akan maruadx berkuslkuan malalnkan seknunya wa dlparselujm oleh kedua-dua man plhak dan dlbual sacara benuns den annecem mewm mu parjarulan xambanan [391 Perkara W adalah lerbuklv apawa wujudnya Kanuak Tamhahan Panama dan Kcmrak Tambahan Ksdua yang memhenkan masa Iamhahan sepemmana yang teiah dmyatakan til alas Kedua-dua Kcnlvak Tambanan Penama aan Konwak Tambahan Kedua Im rnasm mengekalkan lama yang khusus bemubung dengan Isu masa an mana Ia admah masm merupakan «nvp-am kanlvak Inn 16135 rnenuruukkan banawa pada hak:k.amya,1erma yang u|ama ml mak peman a.n.an<an umuk mgugurkan sama sekah men pxhak-plhak [40] Mahkamah lumt mendapah bahawa siksw plamhf waitu PW1 man bersemu semasa dvsoal baxas bahaw: apabila kanlrak annenena: dengan pmak kera;aan mu defendan ksdua ax dalam kes unn maka plhaibplhak adiflah Karma! aengan terrna-term: panannan tersebul Fermi! yang aama mm dlpemelujm oleh plimhl yang msllbatkan term »tevma yang sama an dilam Kenlrak Tambahan Panama dan Knnlrak Tambahan Kedul [M] Se\anjulnya memanaangkan p\aInII1 Udak berupaya unmk mewaksanakan pengnantaran mlsll pida 3042013 yang merupakan lempoh mesa lawman dv bawan Kontrak Tanmanan m huuxNskNrEWp=snBmFp0 «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. U... w my me nrW\n|U|:I mm: dnuumnl y. mum v-ma! Van u .r :1 Kedua din susulan danpad: mssyuarul-mysyuaril yang an-aaxan an anlara pmak-pmak pida 2 32013 dan 21 122015 bagx msmbmcangkan Isuw ' unluk membenkan plalrml «ankn yang akhxr mg. penghunliran maka aolenann-wenaan man bersaluju mm: lersebul yang man. xanya Ie\ah dflanwlkan semngga so 3 2019 Wa\iubIAga\manapun‘ adaluh pmu mtekankan hahawa defendln-deflendln man was berpendlnin oanawe n ndalah map tenakluk kepada nak dmnaan kedua unmk mengenakan gznllrugw Mahkamlh menaapan bahaw: my ml rnmpakny: ndak sesakuh pemih dlabaxkan men delandandefendan munarnanya aerenaan kedua Susulan nu, ganurugl man kamuduannya aikanmn oven aetenuzn kedua berrumi aanpaaa 3au42o<a Parker: nu admah dlperkukuhkan Iagl apibvll . ya turut dnpersemgm clan FW1 semasa pemenksaan balasnyi [421 Maka nu, nkapun semasa pIhak—pII1aK memasukl konlrak mama pmak-pmak nampaknya sedar bahawa mesa akan mpunda sepenimana yang ouba dmujahkan oleh p\aInM, mahkamah m. menaapan bahawa a max sesekalx berswa: menghaxang defendan kedua danpada mengenskan ganurugn lm adatah kevana pmak p\am\If maslh lagi cenm dengan Kesemua konlrak yang dlmasuki m antara pihak-pmak lelsebut Ievmasuklah yang lerakhirnya melalui Knnlrak Tambahan Kedua yang ‘alas mempemmukkan mesa penghamaran hanya duarnmkan setakal 304 2018 Begnu juga. perkam-perkma yang benaku selepas nu an mana wujudnya pevsemuan penamman masa ulen aevenuan kedua Ielah menangkxs Nqahan mamtxl mengena: peckara W m nuuxNskNrEW|=ansnFp0 «mm. am.‘ ...n.mn .. U... w my me nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! u... my 31 [431 Eerduarkan nu‘ mika masa nunum max sesekah meruadn babas m dil-m konhak ml Dafendan-defendan man manyalakan dangan ‘alas bemubung lankh aknu bagv penghanhran misil yang man (erdanulu sebemm ||u dflanwtkan sahmggi so 3 2019 dx sampmg berpegang kukuh kapud: hak mevekl umuk mangenakzn garmrugx yang um dibenkan nm kepada plalnui samn ads as/endsn fimdua bamnk mungenakan gantm/gr’ [44] Memandangkan masa pewaxsanaan adalah mink menjadw bebas an aalam knnuak mu maka susulan danpada nu dan secara umumnya, sesualu pm-x yang hers.-nan aklbat kelzwalan adalah perm mkenuxan ganmug. Dalam keadaan In: walnm lalah yuga menghujihkln, secara sum nerganu, bahaw: berdasarkan seksyen 5612) ms Konlrak 1950, yang mans Ia memperunlukkan suam Keadlan an mana plhak-plhak bemsunu bahlwa mass adalah bukan mempakan -nupau pewaxsanaan Kuntrak, make an dmam Keadaan ml pmak yang udak barman hanya boleh mengenakan pampasan alas sebarang kenuangan yang dnalami olehnya sahafi nklbal dlnpads kelewalan fevsebul [45] Dmam menyokang .54; ml, plalrml berpegang kukuh kepada seksyen 5612) Am Konlrak 195:) lelsebul Eagl maksud kemudahan ruyukan Keselumhan seksyen 56 Ana Kontrak 1950 adalah km: mxemukaxan yang secara knususnya mempevunlnkkan sepen: benkul. m nuuxNskNrEWp=~sasnFP «mm. snnnw ...n.mm .. U... n may he mmu-y -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa Wm! v... a ..r av tavhadzp plamm ada\ah salnn, max pulul dln/Itlu malanggul nus unuang-unaang, my sum penmlh unmk deiendamdefendan membayar. secara bersuma dam berasmgan, jumlah RM10,312‘E12 no kepada plalnlfl (c) Ganllmgl am, gannrugw teladan dan/ahu uarmmgx Ieruk yang akan dnakslrkan oleh mahkamih: den (:1) Faednh ks alas ;um\a7I penghakwman sebanyak 5% selahun bsrmuva darn «am. pengenaan ganlllugl sehlnqga ke larikh panghlkuman flan dxsusull we?! jumlah laedah yang same din IIIIKH penghaknman sehmggi penyelasslan sapenuhnya um balaknng panlkalan dlamara plhak-pllllk [6] Lamman danpada sa|u mesyuarat mndlngan kontrak an amara p\aInlIV dan defendan-uedendan pads anusznm m kementenan delendan panama satu Surat $etu]u Tenma benankh 1712 2:114 levah dnkeluarkan oxen delendan perlama yang mana dedendan» uevenaan Ielah belseluju menenma lawaran p\amnf bag! nun.-m ’Me-mbekal Dan Menghanlar Mrs]! Bakmar Smkan Untuk Kegunaan Tamera Darat Malaysia“ (‘Surat Serum Tammi") [7] sum Semu Tenma xemebux, yang Iuml manggap meruadx sebihagxan dmpadl Karma-Ievma konlvak mangandungx symm- m r:uuxNskNrEW;=susnVyu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! vnezloul 5s Eflicl av tenure to perform at ma mna, In mn(mcI in man mne rs essential (1) When a pany ha a eonlracl pronnaas m do a oenam Ihlrvg at or bnfmn a -pacmea nme, or cerum mlnqi ax av oerone speemeo tunes and vans in do any such mung an or Delete [he seemed lune, me oonuaci, or so much a: n as has no! been peflormedy becomes valuable I! me when at me promnee me vruemion at me pames was lhal hme mum be onne essence oflhe mnlracl Eflecl orlmrure when nms rs rmressenhal (2; II n war nul me m|enImn at me pamel Ina! xnne enema be of me essence of me oonvacn. me comm um um become vmdable by me vamne to oo me (lung at or belnre me specmeu time, on me orennaeo In annuea to ccmpennlmn hum me prormsor «or any ma occaiiuned In him by me vanme Elise! or nccepramts nl pevfonvvance .3! me nine! man me: agreed UPDII 13; v, m use of a contract vuidzme an account o4 me promlsors ramna to peflovm nu pvamlse an we nme Igveed me pmnme accepts penonnance at me premise at any name omer man man agreed. me pmrmsee cannot clam: compensahon for any lass uncanoned oy me nan~p:rInmuno9 of me pmnnaa at the urn: amen. was: at me me of me accimznoe. ne gwes name to me pmlmsur 0| ma xntennon to :10 so [46] Maka, dangan beriandarkan kepada seksyen 56(2) Akua Konuak 1950 pllmhf serammnya berhwah oahawa apabua anelm fakta» fakta yang menyelubungx lindakln IN. adalah was Iemyala bahawa sememangnya mans sabarang kemglan yang berlaku dw pinak dmendan-de¢endan sm ouuxNskNrEMa~msnfi0 «mm. sanuw nmhnrwm .. met! a mm o. nrW\n|H|Y -mm: dnuamnl VI ar\uNa Wm‘ van 2: of 37 [47] Earhubung dengan xsu W, deiendun-defendan pula lehh menghujahkin nanawa kes plamm aebagannana yang dlphdkan adalah nanawa plamm nanya menunlul unluk pengecuahan ganlvmgu. maka wan memka menunlul pemullngan ganlvugl yepemmnya Plamlfl dxkaukan bukannya mamplldkan blhawa Mnlan ganumgl yang dnkenaken adalah ketevlaluany udak munaslbah aan «max beraaaa Jusleru. plalrmi adalah sehnmsnya lenkil dengan phdlng mereka sendln mkapun dlkalakan bihawa delendanrdefenuan gagax membamah semasa pvzmdlng pemenksaun seal bales lamadap saksv plamlvly namun lakra map menunjukkin bahawa kedudukan kes yang km: cuba amawa sacara sum berganu oxen glam Idalah jauh lersasar danpada kes mama plilmfllersabut rm adahah kerana kes plalnlllsebagalmana yang mpnaxan aaaxan baruwa devendznnefendan Imak bzmak unmk mengenlkan garmrugu kevana masa lldak lag: memadl nrmpall kepsda komrak [45] Delendan-de4endan se\an;u|nya turul berhujah bahawa defendan kedua adahah bemak unmk mengenakan gamlvugl terssbul memandangkan plamm calan gaga\ umuk menyerankan nnsn lersebut sepenlmana yang Islah diperaequym meh pmak—pmak melaxm Konlrak Tambahan Kenna Julmah kuamum yang dwkenskan aleh deaenuan kedua juga dlhujahkan celan gagal dlsanggah men plamnf secara benuhs ssbagaimana yang dlpelsetmul oleh PW1 Huyan delendan-delendan nag, segala lommla yang mkenaxan nagx mengura ganllrugx adalah Jelas m nuuxNsxNrEW;=ansnFp0 «mm. a.nn nmhnrwm .. U... a may he nrwhuflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa v-ma! »..,.mm menurul pelumukan knnlvak khususny: sapcmmana an klausa 15 1 3 Knnllak Ulami [49] Kedudukan defiendan-defendan Juga adalah dskatskan kuxuh kerana Ielah dnambah puwa dengan Kevwujudan persetujuan oleh PW1 bahawa defendan-de¢endan (Idak pemah mengecuallkan gannmgx seklranya mlsll levsebut dlhamar selepas so 4 201a Iauu tankh akmr yang dnelapkin me\alm Kantmk Tambahan Kedua Malahan, p\aInM (e\ah dlmaklumkan me\aIui perhxncangarv perbmcangan yang dwadakan pads 252013 dan 21122018 bahawa garmrugw akan (etap dukenakan bermula danpada Iankh so news {so} Eerhubung dangan mu ml‘ rnahkamah mannapam bahzwa delendan-flafendan lelah beqaya memhukukan bahzw: penamlnya. (e\ah wuum ksmungkuran knnlrnk m plhzk p\amN flan kaauanya, konmx yang berkenaan adulah Iarnyala mempenmlukkan «emu yang membankan hak kepada wenaan kedua unluk mengenikan ginlwgl Jlka w bennya amuxukan, mlka secara prmslpnya defendan Kedui aaaxan uharuanya hemak umuk mengenakan ganwugu, mak kurahh sama nda keruglan sebanlr man mbukum ataupun «um [51] Walaubagawmanapun‘ parkara ml lldaklah bermaksud bahawa penganafisaan bemubung Isu ml hanya temena dw swm sanqa mu adalah xerana mawmvf masm bmeh unmk menwuukkan bihawa m nuuxNskNrEW|=ansnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Dan gt :1 $1 ganumgn yang (Blah dltelapkan oleh delendan kedua adalan kalavrlaman din lldlk munanbah [52] Rumusan bemubung dengan perkara dx acas adalah jelas diperunlukkan menaxm seksyen 75 Ana Knntrak 1950 yang memperunlukkan sebagalmana benkul 75 Ccmpervsallan «or breach oi mntram where penalty slrpularsdlnr Whan : oomrict has been braken w a mm vs nlmed m we contract as me ammm| «a be paid .n case at such breach nr Nlhe cnnlvsm oonlams any alhev supmanan by way of penany, me pany complaining M the breach a mum, vmalhar Ur nm acmax damage or lass us waved to have been caused thereby. to recent: «nun ma pany who nas hmken me conltact reasonable campensmlcn not mesa-ng ma Imnurn in namad M as me case may be‘ me penany snpuxaneu far [53] Memyuk Kepada seksyen 75 Ana Korvlrak 1950 a yewas menumukkan baharwa sekwanya sesualu knrmak nu mempunyal klausa berhubung dengan Isu ganumgl acau pampasan maka plhak yang ndak bersa\ah ada\ah dlbenarkan unluk memhuat «umuean garmmgl tetapw yurnwannya mesulah munasabah aena max me\eb1hI gumlah yang Ielah dnetapkan dw dalam Kontrak Jlka mnnuk kepada nuyanan Dlalnlil bernubung dengan Isu W. rneveka berpendman bahawa adalah merupakan undang-unding manlap m mana garmrugx yang dlkenakan mesillah lenakluk kepada auam jumlah yang munasabah Maka hujahan yang mbuac oven mamw selamulnya adalah bahawa memandangkan sacuaauunya saksl d1 m nuuxNskNrEW;=mnsnFp0 «mm. saw nmhnrwm .. U... w my me mn.u-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-ma! Bag: 2; W31 pmak aevenaangamnaan man berseluju sena menyacakan bahawz wmlzh ganumgi yang dukanakan oleh keraylan aualan kalerizluan, maka suflah [emu wanya idalah mevupakan sum wmlah yang hdak munasabah yang mxanakan aleh aevenaan kedua [54] Eerhubung vsu W. secanan mshkamah menelm huyahan pmak— pmax, manxarnan menaapam bahawa walaupun devendan penarna Isiah mengenakan gan|Irug< seymnlan RM10y312yB1200 yang mana perkara : odak sesekall duagm c\eh mahkamah nanawa Ianya adalah berpandukan kepada konlrak yang dlmasukx nleh pmakpmaky namun mahkamah max boleh merunup mala Ierhadan salu Iakva yang permng dx mana ow: semjm telah dengan yakvmw mengakul banawa aaawan sememangnya max wwud sebarang xarug4an Kewangan dw pmak uerendanasetendan wzflaupun wujudnya kegagaxan dw puhak plamur umuk mengemukakan rmsn tersehut a. dalam Iempch masa yang mpersemyuu Bemuhung dengan perkara : , Kala nwu wagx, ans yang wujmi adalah hanya kerugian yang mehbalkan nsu perancangan uperasx (emeva nu sana;a' Namun, mankaman Udak mempunyax apa-apa dokumen yang berkanlan dengan perkara W unluk aumyux bagl menumukkan nagannana operasl lentera telan memadl tergemiala Maka. daVam wsu mu mahkamah beusemyu dengan hujahan p\aInM bahawa detsndarmelanaan Ie\ah gagax melepaskan beban penmukuannya bag! menunyukxan kewuyuuan keruglan lersebut m x:uuxNskNrEWp=euBmFp0 «mm. saw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mxnmny mm: mmn VII mum Wm! Dale 2: 5737 [551 selanwmya, plamm blrhman Inhawa gumlnh ganurugu yang dxkenakan sebanyak RMH1312 :12 no adzlah kemvlnluan man; \a udalah sabanyik Isbm kurang 24°/. dnnpada .-man mlai karmak [55] Eagl miksud Iru mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Tekun Nasmnal v. P)s/muds Dnve (M) Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2121] 10 cm 205 m mana Hasnah Mnnammea Hasmm HMF keuka behau menyamparkan penghakvnan Mahkamah Fersekuluan dw ms 231. 235 5 235 telah dengan nyaca flan je\asnya berpendman bahawa [54] Vvhen mev ' - clause on damages me mun mus| mmaxe me rusonameness n! ma amuse m quesuan Whax Vs “reasan:h|e" mm naturally he oaeea on me avavvable emence Arum Am J m Wume smmeu mu Ltd v Jackson [1536] 1 ms z1a‘mse}2 MLJ 155 nhservefl The dlsnnmmn between lrqmaaled uamages ana penalty has ceased In be cl great lags} -mponance because me nesun m e-mar me Is man the noun mu51 aenermme ueasmame campensafinn [55] sucnon 75 CA prov-as: when a cnnlracl has been amen, w . sum u numsd m me wnnacx u we amount «a be yam m an :1! such hreanh, av .4 me wnlrad canlamt any om: supulanon by way av venillv‘ me any oomulalning ov me bvaach .s enmlod. whelhev ur nu| aclual damage or loss Is proved to have been cause thereby to Iecewe (mm the party who has m huuxNskNrEW|=emBnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! me n .1. 31 bmknn ln. oonlmcl raawrlihla oumvanszllurl nnl exceeding the -nwum Io rlamud or, n (he can mly he! lne nenany u-nulalea our [561 The Federal Cmlfl In sell; Kumar (supra) sgls out me gmdlllg prmclplc Ill wnurulng me lppllcalion cl 1 75 CA The mun mus! evlluzla the aims: agallm lne avallahle evldenca lo iscoruln whether one Imoum calculalnn band on me chute Ii prupomunila la me luglllmala lmaresl M lne lnnwenl party In the penonnam 04‘ me Drlmary ubllqallun Wm: amount sllplllzlea ln the clause ls exlzrbnarll, men the clause mus1 be regarded as an unreasonable “penalty clause” and merefole vuid [ea] sum lna Hugh com. Plennud: ma nm mm any evlderlce lnal sum sllpulilud In cl H2 r. In lccurile reoresununon cl ln Inn of prom so zi la allow me mun la dellrmlne wnelner ar nol lnelr pmfit pwjectmn IS nlgnly speculahve cl grossly excesslva lo avold unlusl ennchmenl on me [acts am evldennel Plenlnlae falled In Wave Ihe sum nlalrnea based on me lmnula An award V0 uarnages must be pmpomonale In lne loss suflered Flenllude la-lea m ptove I|s losses H1 alder In recelve lne mnemallne a ll 2 and musl also neoesszmy lall to wave W5 losses ln lls clalm Iur general aalnages [70] ll me sum sllpulalea ln ma agreement I! extravagant and unaansclonalale ln ammml in wmnallscn mm me lass wmlch mlu wnnewanly be prwea |o nave lnlluweu lrom me omen lnen I| must b: regarded as a penalty (See Clydebank Erlglneerlng Company v Vlqulerdo y Castaneda (Dan June RamosJ[15U5lAC al A qenulne Dreanlmale ol damages an In: other hand wnula be anllclpalefl damages ulnlllalea rellecuve of srn nl:luxNskNrEWl=~s<lslnFP “Nair s.n.l luvlhnrwm .. UIQG n may r... nflmnnflly -mm: mm. VI .nuna Wm! me 2: N 31 the me man a rainy In an agvaemenl may sum: as a cunsequanca at me emacn Dlmlges mum ma excessive or dwipronomonala am not a genume pveeshmale M ‘as: and may be new by me count to be a penny and‘ memdore. unemxceanle Lord Dlmock m scanumamn namng ranxev Co AB v Fleca Pelmlera Ecuanmiana (The 'Scap(rIde') [1933] 2 AC 594 at p 702 We classic form cl many dime Is one which nmvldn mat upon breach av a pnmary abhgahon under me cenoram a secondary oengamon shall am on me pan eune pany m breach «a pay to me mher parly 2 sum of money which does not represent a genume we-esnmale 01 any less ||ke\y to be susxamea ny mm as me vesull of me meaen ev pnmary oohgauon bulls substantially m excess of max sum Yhe classic lnrm av renew agamsl such a penalty dense has been In reluse (0 gwe emu I» u, bu| to awzvd me mmmm. law measure ov damages in! me breach al primary anhgzunn mean [711 we agree mm ma Conn 01 Appeal that cl 11 2 appears In be a penauy uauae under s 75 ca M \s semen Vaw (ha! :1 a sum ws name m a eamraa us exnrhllanl and umezsoname var n In be we m case ov mam n mus! be neacea as a penauy and mereme me under 3 75 CA 1571 Berhubung wsu Im mahkamah semuulnya mandapah bahawa pkapun konlrak mama lelih mensyaratkan banawa defendan kedua berhak unmk mengenakan gumlah ganllrugl yang paannya tum! lelah dlvevsemul Nah p\aInM kelxka memasu omrak mama em huuxNskNrEW|=emBnFp0 «me am nmhnrwm a. U... a may e. mm-y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa Wm! vue as M37 larsebul, namun wnyl bubcanlah setualu yang Imleh enenma secara huh!-bmat olsh mlnkamah Vnl ndalah kerunl sepammlni yang lelah dlzamrkan a. dalam kes Takun Nusiunal v Plsmtude Dnvs (M) sun arm A Another Appeal [2021] 10 cu zus lepem yang man mmyuk an ans‘ maka dawn keadaan yang sedermklan, Mausa bevhubung dangln -an ganmugn tamebul adalah mahngnya max aapaz dlkualkunakan Elgx rnaksud um, mankaman man mampemmbangkan :11 mana jumlah kontrak yang lerllbal agauan sebmyik RM41.a22,aoo no manakala yumhh ganmugn yang dukenlkln pula adalah sebanyak RM1u.312,a1z no Beldasarkan mi‘ mank-man manuapan bahuwa nunlan ganumgl yang dukenakan idulah rnalemm 24 5% danpudn gumlah mlzl kunlvak kesammnan -anu nampn salu perampat danpada 1-man RMA«922,oao 00 ying man: vm adalah tamyal: merupakln sam ]um\ah yang kaxen-vu-n apallh Iagx dnambah gma dengln «ma nanawn naak wunm s:ma»sekaI> seburang kerugnun kewangan an pmak delendan-defandnn sepemmana yang mam aanmn man DW1 [53] Eerdasavkan mu lrlly naak Kelenaman Ma muhkamah herpanflingan bahlwl plhak yang sebe1u!-bommya yang mengaxam. ksrugxan adzlah seharusnya piamm xenna bukan sanqa defendan penam: telah mempamlem ADD bulw Mwsxl Bakmar Smkan uarsem unluk kagunaan Temevz Dara: Malaysia‘ mauanan dadendandeiendun meneuma keunlungan pula apabwa mengenikan aennnxan nmmysvzaczoa ssbagax g-nurug. sedlngkan naaa saebavang keruglan rangaung danpadl seg. m nuuxNskNrEMa~sasmfi0 «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrwH\I>e U... a may he nrW\n|U|y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-ma! v... 1:: gr :1 kewlngln yang maranu o\eh delendan-aelendan Mala‘ nxapun defandan kaduz dlavahkan umuk mangemhahkan ;um\ah wang RMIO,312,812flO cusauux, Ianya same man max memgrkan aevanu-n-amnuan keranu delendan keflua hanya membayar ]um\ah penuh haw: mm lersehul yang marnaamya manpun mpmlem men ddendan-de4endan sepenuhnya danplda plamul Im aaalan }e|as meruaul kaslmpmin kenap: mahkamah berpanflangan nanawa pm-Ian ganumg. yang dnkenakan lersehut adalah kenenaluan dan udak munasabah [591 Mengenax wsu yang mbangknkan oleh defendan-deéendan dw mans perkara mengenaw ]um\ah gamlrugn yang keteflaluan den max munasabah yang c-ma mhangkmxan a\eh p\aInM adalah mak aypuukan, mahkamah mendapah bahawi jikapun wanya udak dlplldkan secar-a cerpenncu, namun perkara W adalah masm temp Ierangkum m bawah Aswsu ganlimgw yang le\ah dlpohon pengecuahannya o\eh p\amlIV sens Imdakan pengenaannya yang mkatakan mak munasahah darn ndak ssh dw sis: undang—undang Haklkalnyan xesexurunan lakta yang relevan den ma(ena\ telahpun mp:-axan dengan jelas can Vengkap dx dalam pemyalaan tunmlan oxen p\amM [60] B391 menylmpmkan perkzva w sanannnnya, muhkamah (elah mengamnu panduan uanp-as mu Mas/ays Tradmg Sdn and V Ksduh Cement sun Eng [2004] 1 MLRA 732 44 man: Gapal sn Rum (kamumannya HMF) man memuluskan sedemlklin on man- penghaklmln Mahkamlh Rayuln (1! ms nu m nuuxNskNrEW|=ansnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mn .. U... w my me nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! wax: u 91 37 syaril sepenl bsrikul yang, G1 mam mnnya, memperunmkkan hahaw: - (a) Nflaw komrak yang mperseau;-n adalah sebanyak RM41‘922.0D0 no (la) Jumlan keserumnan mrsll idalah sebanyak 405 bum pada narga RM1U4.505 on sebmir 1c) Ternpon komrak adaiah selama Ilga 13) «shun m Sehmgga penanpan konlmk yang formal uuaksanakan, Ma: knnlrak berserla Sum semu Tenma Iersehnt akan menjadl kontrak yang san unluk menglkal manna den defendan- uerenuan (e) Plalrml perlu mendeposnkan swam ban perlaksanaan dalam henluk ;.am.nan bank sehanyak RMZGSGAOO co ylng merupakan 5% daripada nnal penghanlavan panama dalam lempuh 14 nan aanpaaa Hnkh Surat setup: Tennua Iersehul m Plaunw perm manlndllanganl sum Akuan Pammda Benaya my Tankn penghantaran nusn telsebul meswan dflakukan pada alau sebekml 31 10 2016 (“Iankh pengnannaran panama’) [5] Surat setup: Tenma (ersebul lelah makm lenma uleh plamm pads 15 12 2014 m x:uuxNskNrEW;=suBmFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! v... u .r 31 Mr mar Iubmm lner we nughl not re pelmll lne nialnml le sueeeee on lne kmllng of uloppcl beciun n was nor pleaded Vt ls We llm lne nlernnlrs pleaee: use anes nel axuvsssly relee erlloppel Hnwevver all me mlevanl laols on wlncn In eflapnel may anse were pleeaerl That rs smcrenl An express plea IS not neeessery aeusreea Tridlng (1955; sun arm v Alab . Malayslan Memnanl Bank Ehd. Lever Ems Lm v sell [1931] 1 KB 557‘ pet Smman L.) el up 532 - 533 ll was lnerelore open lo lne leamee judge to find la me plalnw on me basis of eseeppel He did ml we must [61] sagnu lug: Mahkamah Pelsekuman dl dalarn kes supennlendenl oILem1s And surveys 4th Dlvlslorl a. Anar v HamIrMall/slll & Ols [1994] l MLRA 300 melalur pengnakirnan Pen swee Chm HMA al me am lelan menyalakan barlawa [121 A legs: mull er eeneluslen 01 law an has proved belove a com I! generally nul pleaaee am only malensl facts which would lead |o such a result or eonunsron wnen lr eornes |c e aelenaenr eg ll re not ler mm m say lner he rs nnl lrenle eg lor a sum clalmefl ne mnsl also plead when avellame, eg lnal me goods were never aelwerea, or lnel ne nes been mlslaken lnr enemer huyev wiln a slmllav name are 10 say merely mar ne rs rm llenle lor me sum clalmafl rs a legal resulr wmen sneula mrl, smaly speaklng nave been pleeaea am only slaled ln me players lo me dsianeer ln me Voml mar elerm be urernlssee, mauuh ll Is e nermelly ameprhhle ene nennless harbmger or some rnelerlar Ila: lo lellw ny way ol dnenoe SIN huuxNskNrEW|=emBnFp0 “Nana e.n.l nuvlhnrwm re med e may r... nflmnellly -mm: dnuuvlml vn .nenn vmul r... 32 av 31 [621 Mahkamlh wgz cum: msngimbnlklra smuasx :11 man pkapun mxsxmn bzhawa perkara leraebul masm perm dwphdkan, namun kagagalan unluk mamphdkan Isu pengenaan ganllmgl yang keiarlamin den max munasabah nu aaaxan temyall nu-x maruadv eslopel G1 puhak plamm unluk membangkllknrmya Keuka perbucaraan Vru ada\ah keranl Inrdaurkan kepada kes superrmermen: or Lands And Surveys, 4m omsran 5 Anar v Hamlr Marusln L ors 11994} 1 MLRA am an mana man mputuskan baharwn eekrrenya sesualu perkara yang amangmx-n eernasa pembenan keletangan gags‘ dtbantah oleh prnak lawan maka kelenngan nu akan masih dllanma olah mahkamah mas scbab kegagman unluk dxbanxah plda me. an ksm yang amal penhng mu Pen Swee cnm HMA man memmuskan sepemrnana benkut flu ms 302 a 30: pangrukmun beluau [<4] The underlying wewxnawn ranonale var veqwing such material facts Io be weaned rs, av cmnse to prevenl Ihe uppuslng my item bemg laken by surprise oy evmenbe wmch depans (mm weaned malenm vans, mt sucn evidence it aHaw2d, mu pIe1udnce and embarrass or mislead the nppusmg pany [151 If: parry rs man by suvpnse‘ us must amecl Ihen and there an me pain! or nrne when sum evidence emerges, M such evidence to be dxsregardeu by me Own and me Cmm mu men uphnfld sud! lxmely ubpecllun Yhe coun wm gensrauy however grant an adguummenl w requested‘ on smlame |elms as an oasis etc {at me meadmg m be amended by me pany seeking m auauee such evmence one mus! bear m mmd me need lar an ru nuuxNskNrEWp=snsmFp0 «mu. smm nmhnrwm .. med u may r... mum-y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum WM run as .r :1 urdeviy adversary synem M . Caurl mu. not a man: runnnue rrr 2 market was us} A pany II nol ram by surpnse when me errmmsranoes ar1u:\Iymdu:a(z an eg when xuch Mdenoe us me very emaenee swgm re be renea on by mm [mm me mum or wnan nu van: lo angel: In such ewe-nee min and more 15 It": Cuurl nnw sucks to emprmrze [us] we next deal wnrr me veer Inn men evnienoe was ner omecxnd ro hmeoully is bemg Inadrmsslhle an accuunl of us being It ymrree wrm pleading [19] Generally In em: uses omy mm names rzrr vahdale any mode or sdduung emerree by mnsenl, express ar lmerredr even when such meae rs wegmnr, «or any Irregulinly rr deemed re he warns by such cmreenr mrrrrear runes er emflenc: can be In a hmllad axlanlr even arspmea wllh by a Court wvlhoul wch consenr mo, plus» an seenerrr y Chanarad Marunme Bank [rays] crr D Asa, simnafly wrm technical Mn o1 pruondura Therefnve when such Ivndenoe reprerenrs a depzrlure rrum pleadmg, II should be objecled k: as when arre where rr Is adduced‘ and rr will be we me man re anly obreasu Io mar rm. as In me rrrral sunmrssron at me dose ml evrnerree as rn me Inslam anneal In these erreumsrarrees me pany vacmg such evidence ar varranee mm meadlng. by vamrrg la nqect cannot be said m be taken by surprise, preruarcea. mrsnea nr embarvassed omerwrse. me omer me at me com wumd be. In me evenl on such omezmon raised ar the stage M final submusmn bemg arzeplefl by are com, um me peny euaucrng such evidence muy me me 51:21 risk a! being aeruea leave ro amand ms welding m queslmn ar mar stage sm nuuxNskNrEW|=~sasnFP “Nana sew nmhnrwm .. U... m may r... nflmruflly mm: dnuamnl VI mum p-ms! W 34.1437 [20] Such evmcnu whan gwen wuhem any omecnon ny me uppoung pany wm Vunher have me nllecl ol curing ma absence av such plan m me rnlevanl pbadvnn, m nthev mm, me man at overwmmg um. dalecl m wch pleading As was mm: by Fu.1eva\Coumn Ana Kwn Km: 4. Anur v Lau Pxlng Ngong mm} 1 MLRA 452‘ [1934] 2 Mu 277. uses] cu (Rep) 24. re an p 275 Evwdence gwen u the max can lherelme m ipplapnile wcumsunces uvemnme devecks m me pleadmgs wheve Ihe net law“ 57 web ewaence Vs |a prevent me other me from bemg um by Iurpnse [211 There ws however, at was: one Important exnepnon m such curing of delect at meaamg by ewdence flepamng lrum such meaning wumoul ubgechnn men and mere to such Mdenoe [531 D1 dalam kes a. hadapan mahkamah ml‘ adalah lemyala bahawa Isu mengenaw pengenaan qarmrugx yang Kevteflaman dan Ildak munasabah mu man gagal uvbamah men pmak devendan-nevenuan semasa pemenksaan mama saksl p\am|I1 sens saksl mereka sendln Iawtu nww kanka mseal balas oleh pmak plamm Dalam keadaan nu ssbarang banwahan yang hanys mnangxmxan semasa ax penngkal hujahan selepas perhlcaraan ada\ah Iemyata tedampau lewat unluk dnbangkwkan Mahkamah max berpandangan bahawa aeaenaarmevendan mengam Ierperamat mengenav isu um Justem keterangan (ersehul amen mtenma Men mahkamah m hDL1xNskNrEW|=si1BnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! p... :5 n! 11 [541 Bardasivkan segala anahsa darn dapalan rnankamnn sepcmmana yang telah dlnyaukan lerduhulu Im. mankaman rnenuapan bahawz klnusi mengenal ganllrugl larsebut Idaloh hdak bnleh unxuk dtkullkuasskin [65] Mahkamah mm: mendapan bahawa berdasarkan kepada segala perkara yang telah dwungkaxkan an aces, maka seksyen 47 Akta Konlrak 1950 an seksyen 55(1) Akla Komrak 1950 admin lldak levpakax an dakam pemkaxan um sepemmana yang Cuba dlhujahkan men p\amt\l Defendan kedua udak pemah me\epas|can haknys unluk menggugwkan pengenaan ganllrugl sepemmana yang mpenmnnkkan an da\am konlvak Seksyen 47 Akls Kanuax 1950 memperlmlnkkan sepem benkul 47 Tune larperfunnarwe ofprumrse wnere no apprncanon Is to by mania and no me rs spam/rad Where by mu conuau. a prnmlsur Is In peflovm ms ummvse wnnoun awllcanan by Ina promises. and no om: Iar peflonnance Is apecmean me engagement mull he pemmned Mmm a reasonable Mme Exwanztiorn V Tnn uueslmn ‘what ws 3 reuoruhh m \s m eacn pammlzrcase. a quesuan ollad [66] Bag» maksud kebngkapsn mahkaman turut mendapac bahawa ndak lImI:u\ Isu Konarmya defendamielendan rnempunyai (anggungawab fiduslan bagn memasukan planmw dapat menyempumakan lugas pembekzflan mlsvl |ersebu( Sebarang hubungan yang wuwd an ancara plhalopwhak adalan semaIa—maLa m huuxNskNrEWp=snBmFp0 «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm n. med w my n. DNWVVIWY mm: m.n.n Vfl mum vmm 7:1: mm rnelnbalkan hubungan kontvlklufl. Ana ying pm. pm: pandangin mahkamah adalah p\aInM senmn ying lelah \ewz| membekawkan musll Aslsebux berdasarkan permanmun meraka sendln [67] Begnu Jugs semen mahkamah menexm fakla»1akla dl da\am kes ml lermamanya bemubung dengan wsu kelewatan dv pmak plamm mahkamah mendapall hshawa udak ada sebarang asas unluk mempemmbangkan lunlutan pVaIrI|l1 bag: ganllvugl am‘ garmmgl (emuan alau garIL17|g\ Ieruk sepemmana yang dfllmlul tersebut Kuimpulan [55] Jusleru an den bersesuanan dengan nasu penemuan an alas‘ mahkamah dengan In: membenarkan hanyi penunMan- panunlulan ax persnggawperenggan as up, an flan (V) Pemyalnn Tunlutan sepammana benkul - (5) Sim pensyllhavan bahawa pengenaan garvtlrugl yang bequmlih nmoaumoo oleh deiendan-deiendan (erhauip Malmlf adalah sahh lrdak palm dan/Iliu makanugar nas undangmndilnfi‘ (D) Sfllu pennfah unmk defendan-delendan membayar‘ secara barsama dan berzsmgan ‘umlah RMIO‘312‘a12D0 kepada plalrmf m huuxNskNrEW|=emBnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [69] Feguam F\amuf . Peguam Delendan . » Defendan run 37 m :7 (c) Faeduh ks ates jumlah pmghakwman seblnylk 5% aetahun bermula uan cankn penghakuman sehnngga penyelesanan sepanuhnya Mengenax wsu kos, mahkamah max membenkan apa—apa permlah mengenax kas kerana aevenaavmerendan pad: dasimya adalah saapztutnya berhak umuk menuenakan yam-rug-, cumanya, mmlah yang mxenakan adalah hdak munasahah D1 dsllm mass yang sama. mahkamah (Idak boleh menntup mat: lerhadap fakla bahawa WI-|||Jd kelewatan HI puhak pfimhf Jusleru flu llada kus yang mkenakan temadap defendarvdelendarv 2_4—. .5! 2 |RA.|A AHMAD MDHZAMUDDIN SHAH] Pesurumaya Kehaklman Mamman Tmggx Kuula Lumpur bertankh vs" Oklobar 2023 Tainan Vuslanz:\ Azlx & zam Mom: Munzeer hm Zamul Abldln bersama Syed Ahmed Khablr bun Abnm Rahman Jabltan Peguam Nagara‘ Mahayana Fenuam Kanan Persekuluan Tuan Nwk Mohd Nam hm Nxr Kar bevsama Peguam Kanan Persekuluan Puan Rahalza mmi Hamzah m nuuxNskNrEW|=snsnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! »...s.,. :1 [91 Maralm satu sural Pmdaan Perlama Kepada sum Setup; Yenma xemebul yzng benankh 1702 zms, unkh pengrunlaran mvsn lelah duundmg semma Gan anuxar kaplda 30112015 (‘|ankh penghlmarln keduI'i [10] Pads 06 062015 kontrak No KP/PERO1C/RT15fl/MIOE-O4 |'Kentrak Ulama”) telah dmandacangan: a\eh plamm Gan defendan kedua [111 D1 antari kandungln parmng Karma-Carma Kcmuk Ulzma Ievsehu! adalah seP€I1Ibenku( - ta) mausa s memperunlukkan bahawi tanpa mengambxl kva tankh knntmk ml drlandalangam. konlrak uni hendabdah berkualkuasa selama Ivy: (3) Iahun bermula danpad: lankh Surat semu Tenma pida1B12 2014 sehingga 17 12 21117 Aua—apa perlirwlan (empoh kualkuasa konlrak Im hanya bo\eh dlbual dangan perseluwan helsama p1hak—pIIIak secava berluhs se\aras dengan klausa 40 Tanpa mengambfl knra lempoh kurflrak ml‘ konfmk Im akan KENS berkuatkuasa sehmgga semua hak din obligasl konlrak dlpenum melamkan yvka kanlrak inl dwamalkam my Klausa 11 memperunmxkan, an aneavs 1am, bihawa nefendan kedua hendaklah membual bayaran mangm m\a1 penghanlavan mm: ia1tu bayaran pendahuluan sebarlyak RM1o,ooo,oocua (“bayaran perlama’) dan m x:uuxNskNrEW|=suBnFp0 «mm. s.n.1...m.m111... .1... w my 1... WW1-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum M1 »...s.m bayeran penghanlarun mm 2016 sammbah RMa1.922,am on (‘bayaran axm ) aan newsman amuac dalim Iempoh empll was my hln um tankh dokumen- dokuman sepen-mam yung mpamnnumn an da\am Hausa nmanuc mkemukakan oleh p\a\mW‘ (c) Klausa 12 memperunlukkan bahawa sebelum penghamaran mrsnl telsebut‘ defender» kadua bemak mewaxsanakan wan dan pemenksaan awal tprafielwery mspecmn alau “PDl”) lerhadap man lersehut (d) Klausa 35 mempemnlukkan bahawa masa hendakkah meruadv mnpau kontmx [12] Apa yang benaku berlkulrvya Idillh Guns man memaklumkan bahzwa musk: liflak dlpil mengeluav din mambakawkan musu lersebul manaukm xanxn Denghanlaran kedui kevan: dlkalakan cerdapm keperluan mandesak an plhak ketenlaraan Pakusxan untuk mempsmehx mun (emebut [131 Oleh kerana Ku. pmanpmak man kemudlannya bersemu unluk mslnnjulksn lankh penghanmran mvsu dan susulan nu Kcmrak Tambanan Panama Kepada No Kunlrak. KP/PERO1C/RTI50/I4/OE-04 telah dllandatanganx pads 25.04 2017 (“Kontrak Tamhahan PerIarna“] yang mana an anlara lerma yang mpmaa adalah bahawa cankn penghanlarsn Ielah muhah kepada 31 «:7 2017 (‘lankh peagnamaran keuga") m x:uuxNskNrEW|=suBnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Due 7 0737 [14] max (emerm dw snu, Konlrik Tarnbanan Kaaua kepada Knnhzk No KP/Penowcnznsomroz-04 berllnkh 12 12 21717 (“Kunlvak Tumbahan KafluI“) man pm: selamulnya ananuaxangam man pmak-plhak yang man: dw unliru Karma yang mpmda -cman aanawa lankh penghinhran man dmbah Kepana auoazma (“tankh penghinlaran kaenwal”! [15] Pada seknav bman Mac 2015‘ suns te\ah memben nous banawa kesemua 400 mm misu akan sedla umuk penghanlaran se\ewa(- levvalnya pads 154 zma, namun ems Ie\ah menunlul unluk bayaran pan harga waxan map.-.\ saber-un sebarang pemerlksaan dan pengupan ke atas mxsll tersebut dapal auaxukan [15] Plawnllflsmmanliran nu mambualperrnohunun kupad: dalsndan panama pada zauume unluk dafendan penamn membuat bayaran secara lerus kepedi suns pagx squmlah RM2‘/‘1E&,BB7 no unluk memlmlnhk-n nnan «anaapuc dnbawa masuk ks dalzm negava. sememara asbihigxan Ilgw bakmya sewmlah RM4,733,033 00 dnbaylr kepada plamllf sawapas selasai penpnannaran mu Ieraehul xapau. pmak Tenlera Dam Maliysna. [17] Namun. aavanaan panama leluh menmak permuhunan plalnm pad: 15 05 2016 seman suatu mesyuaval yang Iurul dlhadm clan wakn pmnm am dasar bnhawa hayaran kepada GIDS secara sadarmknan aaaxan benanlangan dengin paramnn kewangln Defendan»deVend:n hevpendman buhawa sepsmmana term: aaal m nuuxNskNrEW|=anBnFp0 «ma am.‘ nmhnrwm a. p... w my a. nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-NM ma - av Iv kamrak‘ buyaran akan hanyz amuax selalah m-an larsebut dlserahkan sen: unanma oleh Tamera Dam Malayma [151 F\amM le\ah pada 28 052013 membual perrnohonan Kepada dedendamdefendan bag! kaedah pembaysran allernam dulakukan lermaswdah mencadangkan agar Komrak |eIsebu| msarannak alau dmovaslkan kepada ems supaya kesannya akan menunjukkan nanawa plhak yang berkcmrak adalsh a. amara GIDS flan delendan kedua In: adalah dlkatakan hag! memudahkan proses pembayavan secara Vangsung danpada defendan kedua kepada suns dl mana >3 hukan lag! mellbalkan p\am|Iff Na-nun, sekah lag! permmtaan p\aInl\l lelah mm! jugs dltolak o\eh delendan-delendan [19] Da\am paaa nu, pla-nu! lelah melauasl had mas: Iankh penghantimn kaempal -anu pads 30 D4 2:213 [20] secemsnya memandangkan wuyudnya vsu-Isu (ersebut yang masm «erganmng, maka p\aInli1 lekah melamulkan Iempoh kesahan mu pelaksanaan semngga ke waoszme D. da\am mesa yang same‘ p\aIrml akan bemsaha mendapmkan binluan kewangin danpafla sumber—sumber yang law In: ‘alas menuruukkan an sml bahaw: plaimw menga\am| Kekangan kewangan an plhak meveks m x:uuxNskNrEWp=snBmVyu «ma am.‘ nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnU|:I mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! »=...g.m [21] Pad: 2711 201:, plamm «emu mengemukakin rancangin unluk pemenkiaan mam penghamavan 1‘Pre-Dehmery Vnspectlonj ax Karuchn Paknsnn Kabenlvln dwkatakan man drbenkan Kepada plalrml pad: 25 01 2019 unluk mewaxm delandan mu: a. damn menwankan prom pemenksaan sebelum pengnannamn [22] susulan mu. pemenksaan sebelum penghancaran yang benempat m Pakistan den 23 ex 2019 sehlngga n2 u2.2o1e mkaxaxan lelah berjaya aualankan dan Vaporan kepulusan pemenksaan sebemm penghanlaran man auumskan uleh amenaan panama pads 18 02 2019 [23] Am dasar nu, penghanlavan rmsu lersabul [elm dvancang unluk mbuat pad: 0903 2019. namun begnu padi us as my GIDS Ie\ah menwahmw kasulnan ax dulem penghanllran mm! Iersebut dan Ielah mamnhon penghlmarin amuan pad: 24 o: 2019 [24] Akhlmya‘ sebuah kapal bernama MV Pamnera J yang mengangkul mlsll (ersebul lelah nenepas danpada pelabuhan Kavacm. Pakvstan pads 01042019 dan telah one dv Pewabur-an Klang pads 04 as 2019 MM telsebut 1e\ah kemumannya amanm unluk msumpan an Depoh Peluru Pusal ul salu lakes: ax Semenanjung Ma\aysIa m hDL1xNskNrEW|=si1BnFp0 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! ..m.:m [251 Hasnlnyn, um Ia\ah membawa kapadi pengemaran sun Femanksaan dun Pansnmaan Akmv yang dvbenkln man deiendan panama pada 17 05 2019. [251 Benkulan mu, plamm |e\ah mangamukaxan dakumen bag: Muan pembayaran bayaran akmr pada 2a 052019 bag: sewm\ah RM31322 can 00 Penn ]uga mambll klra bahawa p\amlN te\ah sebelum nu menenma Jumxan bayavan pendihuluan sebsnyak RM1o,ooo can 00 [271 Namun aemman. penyelesalan haul bayavan am: lelah hanya dlbuat nada ca 97 2019 an man: pida mas! yang sama juga pxmlah ganhrugw sebanyak R»/I1o,3<2,a<2 on yang a-km nan tanxh penghanlaran keempax Innu 3004201: lalah dlkenakln oreh delendan kedua lerhidap wamm an anaa sebab kmewalan yang berlaku an dalam penghanlaran mm! caraamn dan yurmah glnhrugx Inn Man dltolak darlpada JIJIIIVSVI bayaran axmr yang dnenma oxen p\aInIiV Jusleru‘ praunm hanya menenma sewmlah RM21.60§,I8B oa snap sebagau bayaran akmrlersebut [231 Plamm lelah membual permmnnan umuk pengecuahan pengenaan ganurugx yang mkenaz-an ke alasnya. namun man dlmlak oleh detendan kedua pada 12 04.2019 Plimlll teLah membual beberapa rayuan susulan mangenaw perkala mu pads 29 04 2019. 26 06 2019 den as 01 zuzo Namun begwm‘ defendan panama lelah menunax rayuamayuan plamllf unluk pengecuahan m huuxNskNrEWp=anBnFp0 «mm. saw nmhnrwm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-28PW-402-08/2022

PEMOHON LAMAN REALITI SDN BHD RESPONDEN RIMAU INDAH SDN BHD

Application for leave to commence a civil action against the Respondent under section 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965. Whether the Applicant has satisfied the test laid down in Mesuntung Property Sdn Bhd v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd.Whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case against the Respondent.

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5e5cef4c-627c-4c1e-943f-4bb8942df02d&Inline=true

ja-12b-28-07/2019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) POST COMPANIES’ WINDING-UP NO.: WA-28PW-402-08/2022 BETWEEN LAMAN REALITI SDN BHD … APPLICANT AND RIMAU INDAH SDN BHD (IN LIQUIDATION) … RESPONDENT 02/01/2024 16:12:00 WA-28PW-402-08/2022 Kand. 26 S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The Applicant filed Enclosure 1 for leave to commence a suit/civil action against the Respondent under the provisions of section 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965. [2] The Respondent was wound up under the provisions of the Companies Act 1965 (“CA 1965”). Thus, the applicable provision is section 226(3), which states: “When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except: (a) By leave of the court; and (b) In accordance with such forms as the Court imposes. A similar provision is found in section 471(1) of the CA 2016. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] Bukit Rimau Development Sdn Bhd (“BRDSB”) was the original registered proprietor of the undivided land held under the Master Title Geran 36409 Lot 3783 situated at Mukim and District of Klang, Selangor (“the Master Title”). The Master Title was subsequently S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 subdivided into four (4) individual separate titles, which includes HS (D) 89073, No PT 99589 (“the said Land”). [4] By a Sales and Purchase Agreement dated 17.09.1999 (“the Respondent’s SPA”) entered into between the Respondent and BRDSB, the Respondent (formerly known as Seraya Selera Sdn Bhd) purchased the Master Title for the purposes of developing low to medium costs apartments known as Pangsapuri Rimau Indah (“the said Project”). [5] The said Land measuring 18,021 square metres/4.45 acres is the subject matter of the Applicant’s intended suit. [6] A winding-up petition, No. D10-28-196-2009, was filed against the Respondent on 25.03.2009. The Respondent was wound-up on 23.07.2009 (“the First Winding-Up Order”) and private liquidators were appointed (“previous Liquidators”). [7] However, the court allowed a stay of the winding-up order and consequently, the previous Liquidators were relieved of their appointment on or around July 2014. [8] On 26.02.2015, another winding-up petition vide Kuala Lumpur High Court (Winding-Up) No. 28NCC-136-02/2015 was filed against the Respondent. [9] The Respondent was ordered to be wound-up by the Kuala Lumpur High Court on 09.04.2015 (“the Second Winding-Up Order”) and Mr. S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Andrew Heng and Dato Heng Ji Keng were appointed as the joint liquidators of the Respondent (“the New Liquidators”). [10] The New Liquidators, upon taking over the management of the Respondent, discovered that the said Land had been fraudulently transferred to a company known as Jiwa Rakyat Sdn Bhd (“Jiwa Rakyat”). [11] The fraudulent transfer was carried out in the following manner: (a) Loh Kok Cheng and Te Chong @ Tee Kang Teng (“the Fraudsters”) had entered into a fictitious Sales and Purchase Agreement on 18.10.2004 without authorisation from the directors of the Respondent, for the sale of the whole Master Title with Chin Nyuk Pin (“Chin”) and Chow Cho Tai (“Madam Chow”) for a consideration of RM5,000,000.00. (b) Thereafter, on 11.05.2005, Chin and Madam Chow purportedly entered into a Sales and Purchase Agreement in respect of the said Land with Jiwa Rakyat (“the purported Jiwa Rakyat SPA”) for a consideration of RM3,500,000.00. (c) To facilitate the transfer of the said Land, Chin and Madam Chow had purportedly executed a fictitious declaration of trust of the said Land in favour of Jiwa Rakyat on 24.06.2009. (d) On 24.11.2009, about four (4) months after the First Winding-Up Order, Chin and Madam Chow purportedly executed a memorandum of transfer of the said Land in favour of Jiwa S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Rakyat. Thereafter, the said Land was registered in the name of Jiwa Rakyat. [12] Upon discovering the fraudulent transfer, the new Liquidators together with the Petitioners of the Winding-Up, initiated 22NCVC-709-12/2015 (“Suit 709”) on 29.12.2015 to recover the said Land. [13] Suit 709 was initiated against the following parties: a. First Defendant – Jiwa Rakyat; b. Second Defendant – Bukit Rimau; c. Madam Chow; and d. Chin. [14] On or around the year 2016, Madam Chow had affirmed a statutory declaration and obtained a judgment vide WA-24NCC-80-03/2016 (“OS 80”), inter alia, for a declaration, that: a. Madam Chow never at any material time hold a position as the director of the Respondent; and b. Madam Chow did not at any material time execute the SPA and the declaration of trust in favour of Jiwa Rakyat. JUDGMENT & ORDER IN SUIT 709 [15] Following the judgment in Suit 80, the Respondent had on 14.11.2017, obtained a judgment from the Kuala Lumpur High Court in Suit 709 for S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 a declaration, among others, that the ownership and registration of the said Land to Jiwa Rakyat is void ab initio, invalid and should be set aside. [16] Pursuant to the decision in Suit 709, the Respondent had on 23.01.2018 obtained an order to transfer and register the said Land in the name of the Respondent. [17] Pursuant to both the judgment dated 14.11.2017 and order dated 23.01.2018 (“the Judgment and Order”), the Respondent was registered as the proprietor of the said Land on 20.03.2018. Until today, the Judgment and Order have not been appealed against nor set aside by any party, thus it remains valid and binding. SALES AND PURCHASE (SPA) OF THE APPLICANT [18] On 13.06.2011, the Applicant entered into two (2) Sales and Purchase Agreements with Jiwa Rakyat for certain portions of the said Land, namely: a. The First portion measuring 1.1 acres for the consideration sum of RM3,354,120.00 and defined as Parcel C [Refer to page 4 of Applicant’s affidavit in support]. b. The Second portion measuring 1.1 acres for the consideration sum of RM3,354,120.00 and defined as parcel B [ Refer to page 5 of Applicant’s affidavit in support]. S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [19] It is pertinent to note that: a. The said Land measures 4.45 acres in its entirety; b. The Applicant purported SPA’s claim is only limited to 2.2 acres; and c. In brief, the Applicant is claiming on the undivided share of the said Land. [20] The Applicant had on 13.01.2020 (nine years after the applicant’s SPA) initiated a suit vide suit number 22NCVC-30-10/2020 (“Suit 30”) and sought, inter alia, for an order for the said Land to be registered under the Applicant’s name as well as damages against the Respondent and others. However, Suit 30 was struck out by the High Court due to the Applicant’s non-compliance with case management directions. The Applicant had also lodged Private Caveats on the said Land. [21] The Respondent filed a suit vide number WA-24NCC-1657-09/2021 (“OS 1657”) to remove the Private Caveats lodged by the Applicant. [22] On 16.08.2022, the Court in OS 1657 ordered the Applicant’s Private Caveats to be removed. The Learned High Court Judge in removing the Applicant’s Private Caveats held, inter-alia, that: a. Pursuant to Orders in Suit 709 dated 14.11.2017 and 23.11.2018, the said Land was to be transferred to the Respondent; S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 b. there is no appeal or application to set aside such Orders by any party; c. The record of the registry shows that the Respondent is the current registered proprietor of the said Land; and d. The Applicant has no caveatable interest in the said Land. THE APPLICANT’S PRESENT APPLICATION [23] The Applicant now seeks leave of this Court to file an action as per the draft Statement of Claim (“Draft SOC”), for, inter alia, the following reliefs: a. A declaration that the decision of the High Court in Suit 709 is invalid/void and/or is in breach of natural justice; b. A declaration that the Applicant is the bona fide purchaser of the Purported Parcels and should be registered as the registered proprietor pursuant to section 340 of the National Land Code; and c. Other consequential orders. [24] In brief, the Applicant is seeking to be registered as the legal owner of the undivided share in the said Land or alternatively, damages in lieu of the same. S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [25] It must be noted that to date the said Land has not been subdivided nor partitioned. TEST FOR GRANTING LEAVE [26] It is trite law that in order to obtain leave, the Applicant must show that: (a) the Applicant’s claim cannot be dealt with by the Winding-Up Court; and (b) The Applicant has a prima facie claim against the Respondent. [27] In Boardroom Advisory Sdn Bhd v Byard Spiral Mill Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 1447, the High Court when applying the above test in the case before it held: “…the cases establish that two criteria need to be fulfilled by an applicant before the court exercises its discretion to grant or not to grant leave. The first is that the applicant’s claim cannot be dealt with by the Winding-Up Court and the second is that the applicant has a prima facie case against the company (see Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v Stella D’Cruz (1985) 1 LNS 47, and Mesuntung Property Sdn Bhd v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (2014) 1 CLJ 202).” [28] While it is self evident that the remedies sought by the Applicant cannot be adequately dealt with by the Winding-Up Court, the pivotal S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 issue is whether the Applicant has shown that it has a prima facie case against the Respondent. [29] Having read the Affidavits and submission by the parties, this Court finds that the Applicant has failed to establish that it has a prima facie case against the Respondent for the following reasons: (a) The Judgment and Order have not been set aside and/or appealed against; (b) It is pertinent to note that in Suit 30, the Applicant did not seek to set aside the Judgment and Order. In fact, the Applicant in Suit 30 had at the material time agreed that Jiwa Rakyat was a fraudster. In the Applicant’s affidavit in support, in Suit 30, the Applicant avers that: (c) Memandangkan perkara di atas, Defendan Pertama tidak pernah menjadi pemilik sah tanah tersebut dan oleh itu Defendan Pertama tidak layak dana tidak berhak di sisis undang-undang dan/atau fakta untuk menjual tanah tersebut kepada Plaintiff. Hakmilik tanah yang telah didaftarkan atas nama Defendan Pertama bukanlah hakmilik yang bersih dan tidak boleh disangkal seperti yang diputuskan oleh Yang Arif hakim Mahkmah Tinggi yang bijaksana. (Defendan Pertama above refers to Jiwa Rakyat) (c) This Court is in agreement with the Respondent’s submission at paragraph 73, where it submits: “(73) It is only now the applicant is seeking for the first time to set aside the Judgment and Order in the intended suit. Clearly, these S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 are not based on facts which were found only recently. This is clearly and afterthought by the Applicant.” (d) The Applicant is bound by the Judgment and Order in Suit 709, (see: Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 (ca) [page 75 of TAB-6], the Court held: “We cannot over-emphasise the proposition that once a judge makes a ruling, substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory, it must be adhered to and may not be reopened willy-nilly.” (See: Gulf Business Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Israq Holding Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 34 (ca) [page 83 of TAB-7]). (e) Furthermore, it is trite law that once the issues in a suit have been determined in finality, the same issues are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings. (See: Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC) [page 99 of TAB- 9]). [30] The Applicant submits that it was not a party to suit 709. Thus, it is not bound by the court judgment and order. I find this submission to be misconceived because it is settled law so long as the Judgment and Order arise from the same facts, the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel can be invoked. See: Dato’ Sivananthan A/L Shanmugam Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 122 (CA) where the Cou r t o f Appea l he ld ; S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 “[25] In the present appeal, since the present action would undoubtedly involve going over precisely the same facts as in the previous HTF suit, and accepting the broader approach and the wider sense of res judicata as the preferred and correct legal position, the fact that the parties to this suit are different from the HTF suit does not disentitle the appellant to invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel to bar the respondent from relitigating a specific issue that had been decided in the prior separate action. The doctrine also applies to a non-party. It is therefore not necessary for parties to be the same in both actions. What the doctrine seeks to prevent is an abuse of the process of the court by attempting to make a double claim as well as allowing the plaintiff to relitigate its cause for the same relief and based on the same subject matter for which judgment had successfully been obtained in the HTF suit and to produce the same set of facts, the same witnesses and the same documents (see Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Badan Perhubungan UMNO Pahang Darul Makmur).” [31] I also accept the Respondent’s submission at para 79 and 81 in which it contends as follows: “(79) Further, the Applicant was aware of the Respondent’s interest on the said Land back in the year of 2012, whereby the Applicant’s solicitors for the Applicant’s Purported SPAs had duly informed the solicitors of Jiwa Rakyat that the Respondent is challenging the interest of the said Land. (81) Suit 709 was only determined in 2018. The Applicant could have and should have intervened in Suit 709 to protect their purported interest.” S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 SECTION 340(3) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE APPLICANT [32] In the Draft SOC, the Applicant sought a declaration that it is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the said Land because it was a bona fide purchaser. [33] The Applicant cannot rely on section 340 (3) of NLC and claim to be the bona fide purchaser. This is wholly misconceived in both in law and fact. The Applicant does not come under the category of bona fide purchasers pursuant to s ection 340 of the NLC. In other words, indefeasibility is a protection for the registered proprietor of a land. Only a registered proprietor would be conferred with the protection of indefeasibility under the NLC. [34] Therefore, for the above reasons I find that the Applicant has failed to satisfy this Court that it has a prima facie case against the Respondent, and I dismiss this application with costs of RM7,000.00. Dated 2nd January 2024 …………t.t……….. Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: EUGENE KHOO YEAN SHERN SOLICITORS FOR THE APPLICANT: TETUAN GANAESWAREN & LATIB COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: VENKA ARUN WITH JOAN MARIE JACOB SOLICITORS FOR THE RESPONDENT: TETUAN VEN & ASSOCIATES Cases Referred to: ➢ Boardroom Advisory Sdn Bhd v Byard Spiral Mill Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 1447 ➢ Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v Stella D’Cruz (1985) 1 LNS 47 ➢ Mesuntung Property Sdn Bhd v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (2014) 1 CLJ 202). ➢ Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 (ca) [page 75 of TAB-6]. ➢ Gulf Business Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Israq Holding Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 34 (CA) [page 83 of TAB-7] ➢ Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (SC) [page 99 of TAB-9] ➢ Dato’ Sivananthan A/L Shanmugam Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 122 (CA) [page 181 of TAB- 13]: Legislation Referred to: ➢ Section 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965 ➢ Section 471(1) of the Companies Act 1965 ➢ Section 340 of the National Land Code Decision Date : 21.02.2023 S/N TO9cXnxiHkyUP0u4lC3wLQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

MA-24NCvC-60-03/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) DEVARAJ A/L D LECHIMINAN 2. ) RENNUDEVI A/P JOSEPH RAJATHURAI RESPONDEN PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA

Constitutional Law: citizenship – by operation of law – child adopted by citizens of Malaysia – Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – whether ‘parents’ only biological or include persons who adopted the child – Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(e) and subsection 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – ‘not born a citizen of any country’ – section 19B Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution – whether child found exposed.Held: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required under the law - parents only refer to biological parents - principle of jus sangunis not satisfied - child not found exposed - petition dismissed

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d7c0c580-dede-4543-8b56-ae0cedbb87b8&Inline=true

02/01/2024 14:40:23 MA-24NCvC-60-03/2022 Kand. 47 S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N gMXA197eQ0WLVq4M7buHuA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—2mcvc—su—o3/2022 Kand. 47 32,01/2:24 41-4.’! 2: DALAM MAHKAMAH T|NGG| MALAVA DI MELAKA DAM AVIA 2 In lhu Mum: oi Rink: 7, 73 Ind 76 Rules of Court 2oI1 And In one Mam: al Section 25 :2! me courts of Judicature AcI19s4 and spacific RaliulAct1950 And In Ina Mutter of suction 9 dun 25A ol Ine Auopuon Act 1952 and Article Hand Second Schedub oi tha Fadorll constinnion Buween 1. DDL 2. RJRY (Applying In thelr awn capacity and n lliignllon ropmoniazivn of a minor child, Ruvesa aip Dovarai) PLAINTIFF And PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMMIAN. MALAYSIA DEFENDANT JUDGMENT Introduction [11 ms is me ground: of daemon o1 (hm com m vespecl M an apphcmlon filed by me 1-" ma 2"“ P\ammls mmg on men behaw and as lmgatlon representanvu 0! a mum emu named RAPD (name mdzcteo lo mamcam ananyrnilyj (‘cmIa') for . pnn::Ipa\ order under paragraph 1 0! Enclosure 37 mm me cm 09 declared a onixen af Malaysia pursuanm: me upemnon omude mum rend mgmev wmu sermon 1:) 12) under Pan n and semon 195 under Part m av me Fedem consmuuon CFC‘) ov anemanwexy, pursuant to me wevauon olAme1e «mm; read lugmhet mm section (I7 (9) ans 2(3) under Far! I: av ma Second scneame at me FC (ApplIca|1Dn‘) Vn addmon to that pnnc|pa\ ovum, lhe Plamnms further seek raumm onnsuuentnal orders as set mm m paragraphs 2, 3,4 and 5 lhavam Bzckgmund mu [2] The Child was horn on 14 3 2019 ta a woman known as DMPK nhe Bmlogical Mother‘) at Hospnal Sultanah Nora wsmau, Ealu m ,wmn.umv.mm..»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [131 In approaching «ms >ssue, Ihis Caun memo the decwslon ov me Cuurl av Appeal -n P-«mm am: Kalull/rln dun Kamnu Mnlnysil v. Pang Wee Sn 5 AnoI[1017] 7 cu :3. That decrsxon Is Impcrtarvl because -1 dealt man we same Dnnclpul Issues bwwhl up by Counsel (of me Plaumms Tc sum u bnefly me coun MAppaaI mm: that (at the law an cnizensrup Is confamsd. both Dlvcedurally Ind subslannvely m he so Illa", me cansmullonallly or me FC Is wnstdeved lmm me perspectwe or the Consmunon and :2 Is not to be mcerprec/ed by refevenoe to other statutes, even :1 may were passed by Panllment‘ (bl thewuvd ‘parent’ only means bvokzgxcal parenl and does nu! extend to include adaptive parent, and .1 Ihe parem vi to mcmu Adaplwa patent, the FC womd have expressly pmvmea so, (e) il .5 a flawed argument to say Ihatlhe pmvxsxons 0! me Adopuan An 1952 Drevlded me missing link In 11 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm nnerpnaxing ms word ‘parenf in semen ma), Pan II‘ Secund Schedule‘ (a) the scheme of me Dmvlslons under me Adovnon /an 1952 does mt extend me the realm mm: F0 lfl maflsn a! cmxenshlvn (e) that m detemwung me cmzensnip of a person bum me pnnmplan 01/us sun Irlfl /u: sangwm: mus! has moved‘ and m .n resvlct to ma pnnoinla afjus sanguws, m runs upnn me appucanx to prom: that aim: lime av mun, vane or ms parancs was euner a Malaysian citizen or a permanem mswdenl m Mawayaua [M]; The ilPF‘>Camnn mbmn pnncmles onus solrsnd /us ssngufms at me llma av mm :n he detemwlalwon ol cmzansnnp as amboruled by ms mas».-p Abang Vskandar JCA (as he then wasnn pm, Swn s. (supvajwas Mermdtu mm awnwaw by me Fedevefl Coun m OBET(supra) u m mmw.umv«umM mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [15] Mom xmpunanny, the menu cm In CBET(supra) dud not approve (he Cmm of Appeafs bread WOVDVMBIIDH In Mnd!luvlll1supra)onme meamng cV’pzrenl‘ Io mu-me non- bwulogvcal parents such as adomwe parems and that decxsnon must be taken to have been avervmed (sse Pegulm mg». umym I Anor v. Go Fu Song a om-4202212 cu m /[2022] MLIU 1m; [15] On lhat basws, this court |s bound by slam decvsrs to lnHaw the declsxons m P-ng Swat 5-. (supra) and CBET(suprI) anmnevevme cannot be pevsuadedw agree mmme F\a|nufl: that a beneficern reamng cf semen Na) Pan ll Second Schedme tugsmev wim me pmvlsmns cl me Adophon An 1952, In pcmcular union 25A, is permissible hcwevar dssvaue wl may D: m (be cw; Inlevesl [111 Cummg bauk to me has In ms Apphclhon and apwymg Ping Swu Soc (supra), me mg in be delavrmnad .. wnemer me Plzurmus have sausned both pans cl sectmn 1 cl Fan II‘ Second Schedule, man Is, (hit me chm . 1; m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! (I) was burn In Malaysia, and (H) mam leasl one elma Child‘: paranls one la at me time ol um enner 2 cmxen at pennananlly raeldem In Malaysla The (um lequlremenl IS satisfied by me ha manna cnlln was horn ln aalu Pans!‘ Juhom The second vaquuemenl bears to be Woven [13] New 35 declded by me Fadaral calm ln CTEE lsupm) Iha lunaamanlal rule In lnlerprellng ma FC at any wnllan law n to give media we IIIIBMIDH M me flamers The oouncannal insert or lnlsrpret new words mlo me FC The cowl may only call Yn ald of lunar mam. a1 oorlalmcnm where the pmvlsmns are lnlpraaae, pmtean evacamva ur can reasonably hear more than me meanlng [ls] secllen 1(3) of Pan II Second Schedule makes velerenae only la me llrna atom and n01 at me llma ma appllcaxlon la made Thu! vaqulvumenl ls clear and unamblguous Thus, ln dacernunlnglna smus allhe cnllds peranl, ll is lne aldlaglcal Momera amus mat must be delermlned and rum zne adapuve m vMxAlwauvvvLvo4M7nuHuA ma a.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. LAIQ4 a mm he nflmnnflly am. glam. y.. .nune v-mxl navems, elm Malaysian cmzens, svnce there vs no adom-we parent at me time 01 mm Ta suggesl mat am. we cf the Child‘: bnlh‘ the Flamnfls ware already his paranu wmfld be dealiv nmpossmle and cunlradlclory to ma plain meaning of Ihe phIase“a1ma me of man“. (2:11 It Is claar «am ma evidence (hi! [hi Biological Momers cmxensmp and pisspon wue Idenlmed In the Flrsl ac The fact that the cmzensrup ann passport mmxser were stated In that dncurnem must mean that the pnsspm was mmun me Bwolagml Mather‘: possssmn or Known to me Plamhlls smoe the First as was wssued anerme Plamlmslook slepslo sdopllhs cmxa Thers can be no umerexplanalmn where Ihal Inlovmalion came lvarn On ma: nonsldamuon, mvs Cowl finds on me bahmeafproblbihuesmalshewaim111:1 - cmzen of Sn Lanka and no! u Malaysian [211 nus Court does not find me Plamllffs Aaamonaw Amaavn In Endnluru an mm; the Flalrmffs smug mm was nu xnquury made to me sn Lankan embassy an Inn cmunsmp status av the Biological Malhu based on me passpen number 15 m mmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [22] There I! also no evldarloe mal me alologlcal Mamerwas a pemlanenl rendenl cl M-laysla Allnaugn EH9 was ln Malaysla ax me unle of glvlng mm to me cmla them IS no evldsrloe mm she had entered Malaysla legally or mal he! presence ln Malaysla was as apemlarlenllesldenl Theve was rla lnquiry made wnn ma Malayslan lmmlgranon nepannlanl on me alalogleal Melners enlry mm Malaysla or her s1alus [23] Based on one above I find that lne Plalmlfls have iilled la alaonarga the burden cl pmvlng Ihal lne lalologlcal Mother was anther a cnlzen ol Malaysln or a pemlarlenl reslderll Far all the reasons dlscusud above, lnla calm finds na men: In grarnlrlg lne order all Cltlzenshlp under me Flm Ground second Ground [24] The plamtlffs‘ contend firally lnal. given me feel than me New BC was Issued Ihls com snould -ccenl lnal lrle cnllds parents are Malayslins and lhal lha cmla his not eaqulrea ma elllzerlshlp ml any alhev eaunlry ll was zvgued mat yactlan 15 m vMxAIi7uuWvlVqlM7huHuA ‘Nair s.n.l mmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 M mm .. nflglnnllly mm: glam. VII arlum puns! He) X5 concerned men only wheve tne cnna was bow and VvfieIhe( the chud ts stateless [251 s-nee mus Court is bound by the aecismna -n Ping swu su (supva) mat tne pmvmons onne Adoptton Ad 1952 hive no matenamy an the delermtnalmn at cluzenshlp under the so, the status ottne Wawnuffs as me adapuve parents cannot be taken mm account as of rtgh1 The Maunms sun cany the burden wfpmvmg tnat the Child was not born a cmzen at my cute: country [251 on finding that the BIoIog>ca\ Meme! Isa Sn Lankan. It cannot be sam mat the cm was not born a omxen of any atner country As held by the Com 0! Appeal VI nun Siew Hang 5 Anal V4 Kntun Pongnnlt Jntmnn Fcndnflnrln Noun: 5 0512-117) 5 MLJ 552 /1291713 cu 1», wt Iell upon me appncant to pmve ms Imaags under me pnneple or us sangwns In tnnoase, both me lvphcanrs mntagmx plranls were unknmm and no evidence was offered to prove the lineage at the bwokzglcal parents Smne the uneage cwld not be pmven me appucant Vafled In sahsfy semen I(e) at Fan 17 m vMxAIi7uuwvLVqlM7huHuA ‘Nair smnw n-nhnrwm n. LAIQ4 m my n. nnnmun mm: dun-mm VII .nune pm in, Second Scheduie despite spending his me wiimn me Federahun - [:5] A pram reading alplragmpli 1 my ‘ms nofbom . cmun ofmy courmy min: to IM rsllllonsmp nlmc 2""lupdl-ant la rue bmlogiu! m min: plums .: Ml mm of in: mm rm aw lvullbh dvcurmnrlry «mam. m. aw app-mi. mun nemficntu (Emu T88- 51 carlnmod nu mlomulmv pofllmwla 10 me woo-c-in-nuts nu ma mkv-nlpnmcullrs mu llldollid mm 'Mnklumnt mm Dqpamhtw {:4} sim ma mnnty mm mm lawful ma nmrogmaip-mi; uu unknown, niumpassion tn duomunclhl maps on». 2-: uvallml mu wuwd on-era mu 2» -ppaiimi in be canlomsd Einlbnshlp by Illlfidgllsfin sangmms {:71 mus M awvmw, ma 2"" aupsnamnu I-utllufilladlht Nlumsmovit to be - cmzvrv nyou-mm mm wflhln the mummy ovpmvman 11.; air»: /I of in. semi: si.-mm al in Fndsruv cumiimmn (Risk! to cm. Knot rm V Pnmulrar Bent Kahli/rm an xmmn Malaysia pmnuu m; [:01 We mrmal amen! me oanlermm or me spool/ant: mar ma av1deocelIna!1Ir92"‘appaUan(wasDominIheFnduIabnnandImd Iesrdsdm lma Flaenlion III": we, as mi as me nnsence alpemcular: m-mam Ippdlanls mm mrmmte All nauecmrmsimagecanoe I5 sm nMxAI97uuuwLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. s.n.i ...m.mui .. HIGH In vuny .. nflmnluly mm: dnuamnl VI mum puns! cmslruod as smficvont wool ma! ma 7" avpenam was not bum a when 0! any nuuntvy As was mm oaniev. mm .s mqum .a ewdunw am-e 2w -waeuunrs lvnenge, mm. owdemz .a mm: [21] The dauuon m man Sltw Bony (supra) was veferred to m Ihe reoem Htgh Coun decision m rmn mm sum v. K-ma Pnnualah Jabatan Pemtanann Megan Malayxlx A 0:: mm] 1 LNS us 1 {mm} ML./U 99:, where like -n ma pmaanc aaaa ma wdennly M lhelamer Is unknown and the mologucal momer gave mm to the appncam m Malaysia The >ssuo ma Mose them was vmelhev she was a cmzen 0! Malaysia The mgr. Cuurl laund Ihat there was cnnfusmn aa to me actual omzansmp sums of ma btobgxcal mutt-an whelher mavacx max aha had a red menmy card maanz max she was a permanenl resndem or welhershe was a crush av Singapore On mac bags, me mgr. Caun new that me bwologwcw mother was stateless and granted ma anphoatmn for umzenshnp [23] In contrast. thelacts nu ma prasam case show no cunmsmn as to ma uype ov uacumem waned in \n FIrsIBC The m vMxAIwauwvLvq4M7nuHuA ma saw n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII murm v-vrm Bmlng-cal Mmhev wls‘ at me me arms cmId's mm, s Sn Llnkan cmzsn It must also be said than mere Is no evidence that me Plammls made any mqulry on ma hackgraund and cmzensmp of the blokugwcal father when they were In Ihe pwcess cl reaching an agreemunl mm the Bmkngwcal Mulhar on me adnpman II is quxte meonoswsnle ms: nu Inquvry was made on that mailer to asoenam me ngm of the mother to umlalevully sunanderlhe cm «or adnclion Thus‘ W5 Cuun finds that mere was msulficxenl eflcn. pemans even a warm neg\ec1, by me Plalrmlfs In asoenam mac fact Therefare, «ms Cmm finds mac ms vans m Fnnh Nnni Sukar (supra) distinguishable smce lhelalher us unknown‘ the cmm must be taken to laHow the Bvmoglcal Mumers Unzenshlp The burden \s on me Pwsmxins to snow why she \s not anlmed lo sn unm cmxansrw‘ wtuch may «am In no [231 In Azimih Ha-man V4 Katya Penqlrlh mm» Pundcklun Mag"! 5 Anor 120231 J cu /mm] 2 ML! 227 the Caun M Appeal new (ha! 7 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm.‘ Pahm in me state of Johare some a months later on or mm 24 H 2019, ham PVIWMS were mlormed M the Biological Mmners aesne In gwe up we cnuu my auopuon An agraemam was struck on the same day between menu when me amlogncax Mather agreed tn surreodet all he! parental and guardianship nghts to ball! PIIVNINS who would Idofl the Chfld as their own Both Plaxnllifs are husband -nu wwe am ave Mmayslan cmlens [3] Slncelhe bwrlh uithe cnua was not nagmavea mm me mm a late regusuauon ev me man was done by me Flamurls an 24112019 and a mu cemfimte dated 21 7 2021: was Issued by Jnbatan Pendaflaran Negara In that camiicale‘ me Biolagwcal Mother was wdemmed as a Sn Lankan cauzen bearing paaspon Ne Nszzuss M the «me of gwmg bmn sne was 37 years 01d The tmloslcallatheroflhe child is nalknwn The oemficale was marked as ‘Bukan Warganegava mm sc‘; [4] Bclh Fmnllffs men filed comm appnn-amna m amp: xne cnna and me relevant orders were gramau by me Maaaka Susswans Cowl an 25 10 zozc Follawmg max alder. a new mm oerlmcale was wssued dated 12 4 2021 wneram ma 1“ Pmnmv ws reguerea m mmw.umvammm me am ...m.mn e. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm 1247] vim: ovmd rm wpnrsmago can 00 aseunimld as in mm case‘ Ihmmvappelklntsnabonsfiw llhwrnma dram can beaelermmed by Mvrwca vu m. manmy av nu parents my lwwsgu Ind ma cnvzanlmp law: gavsmmg nolplvarvlt nltvunalvty wound be mwam Ia ddtsvuuna wflvlhtlov mm» sppllllnl mm: m nqmmm mu m ‘wls no! Dam . Milan av My mum/y vn mu: ovsnt, 1». Ipvslllnl Many: ham m Mnlaysvan smv would b1 5 porsovv ham . cmun of andmorootmtvy, :9 Cambodvl, by wluo 5/me pmvcwle nun: mam»: Hvvreu. mu wmm ml :2 slatafieu at the Inn av hov mm“ [30] Movvng an, cinlhe Child besad Io have hear: found exposed wnhm me me: ing 01 section IQB av Fan II sacdnd Schedule7 Sewer! 193 presumes that when a chm Is vound exposed‘ the maths vs presumed to be a parrnanent uesndent and the Vmdmg man lha cvuld was axpmed shlu be the due 0! um: [31] Revfuranol was made to me Fedem Court demvon vn con a Anor v. Ponduluvr am: Blgl Kmnvnn Dan Kumlan. Mnlnyaia [2022] 1 cu 1 /(21:21) uuu 2.121 where ma meamng av me lam: ‘uxposetf under semen ms was dvsoussed. m nwmnv.umv«umM mm. Snv1|\nmhnrwHH>e HIGH m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumvvl VI mum pom! [as] rm mam mm: m s 155 an ‘my new Dam amid Immd axpmam mypluf Tm purposuofllvvx sscmil, when new contuxv musmm numnmmmanuarsnwnamunmammveua m . plus mmu: my Inn mm» woaogm/punms yampmu. mud) V1/alaknvdmll mas aims um» Iulnbn aflflo mm mduaoa m hum cluldlemell Inlrldnnvdnnrdumpsnaa‘ baby A-lchm: public olsmool Iouols place: M worsma and so an A mm: molnmq nl -.nm..a‘ suggasu .9 new bum cm/d «me an dtscavarod‘sxpn.1od at any oi mess Icualmns [sq A: sum, nu. Dmndsaf posstme mlerplelzmwv of me word found expasud‘ rs Ia mean! 4 . meamng m mdude a cum: -be-named at me pncemmnnymenmmmmwmssmnwvsunmm The opemnve word ’exposeL1'm 5195 mustllverelnle moompasx mephglvl or abanoomd now mm amam, omelwtse the mmmng man! of plivumng smmesavvess wumd be amama or raudarud tummy [32] In hght at max defimmn‘ can the Child be sad to have been ablndonud or axnosed7 The Respondent: contend Ihal me has at abandonment were not proven lay me Ptamtms {:33} The (acts here shvw that afler me cm was born, the crmd vemamed mm the Biological Mather up unm me P\ammls met 2: sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrw\HI>e HIGH m M, .. mn.u.y mm: dnumml VI mum pom! her same 3 months afler she had funded me Child m them Thus‘ unhke m ccu (supra). me mama remained war. the cm unm she was gwen up Mr adoption Vn ms cows vvew, muse lads do not show any abandonment amounmng en Velvmg me cnue axposed wllhaul any mm ov me bxolowcal parent [34] Smoe ems Court does nm find that me cnua was iaund exposed, bvlh presurnpuons Imdev semen 1915 Pan II‘ Second Schedule, that s — (3; me emu Is born to a mother who is pennanemry ressdem at me place where lhe fmdmg was made (them: sangmms preaumpnan) am (on me date ov me imam Is taken as the dale 01 me mm cannot be mgaerau m vaveur er ma mamurvs it \s a prlnnlpie ol haw max «or a presumplmn to apply‘ the lacl or eonaman (nggenng me presumpuen must first be proved As was swear: by Thomson 0.) m My Kim mm v. PF[1!61)1 ms 71,-[1961] 1 MLJ ms velerred to m vMxAIwuuwvLvqIM7nuHuA ‘Nair am n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my a. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mm mm aDprova\ m Dam’ sn' Mohd Nuiib :0 Mad Rank v.PF(2a22)1 cu m /(202211 ML] 131 » n u wmy llenluntlfy In oburw mm mm. . anstulun/Dvuunvptvan wm u mm mu apom. m Nlcu or mum and so levels: the anus a( wool an any pm (/10 bar: pctennn! eustenm omen apvesumpban cannot ahmellnsoenxe mm pmotnl any fact we exmenns av wmm rs a wndvlmlv pr-mam 0/ ma pr-«umnuon lnxmq Ta sly atnurwuv would a. m «y m mu mm a/ Mime mm mom: [:5] On me Isiua man mus cam show: adopt In imarvrammn 01 me law mm mm be In my mteresl ov me cum, mus com cannat msagree that me numgrammg of cmzensmp to the Child will pose chauenges to me Plamuws as parents‘ me cmla as an mdmdual and mm me wamum and the cm: In a vamny unn However n would be neaessary to quote what was said by Rehana vusui PCA in aenvanna the Federal Conn‘: declsian m CTEB (sum) ~ 1221 Lumnd Cnansol lur ma Appaflanls Dr Cyms Du mlpnssld wan us an bur m mmd Mo mm plmclphs m eonslrumv the mem: nnnsmmnunnl pmvmons am 1.: am: an .m«m:.:.m onamung me m nwmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! avnrfmq am He submmsd that m ma prwes: ul wvlarnlebng colvsmmorw pmvtsowls to ma cmm, tshwfidbe done In ways so as m unable avamvlg ngm be grven mm m neny ov denuae Msm,r:1Iwg In support me Supmme Com or mam m Paslfiraduzle lnstmlts ul MednmIEducamn and Rueamn V KL Namsmllv-irvI!597] AIR aw (SCI 12:) ms mumpnmoom Mnramnvo/vuslhe weifnm of: mud, any nmy mam 0! m. /my mm mu be vefievanl He then mm mm Vwbsrlome m Mumatu olflame Allan: ./ F1:herIV980lAC .’l1Fwm¢Vv smphascsed on raw may and mmaepamuun afa mad /mm me (am:/y R5) ms pom! In a. norm rs nus n man an whom mu/ermenl an» rvms Dffinzwns-mp wu mud: to the dvddlen mmry to em» no rsmny back up No cwmlry m M: wandwvll wurvfzvltzlnsmu llurvyana mm: Hltahng mu ma-ma mm: nmflumviy mum my be . mmaar-non am not Mu lunar! or cumin -mop:-a Thus, wm: AIM mm mam mar one was nnlylu alhw mum to my.» Ealmuaa Irllmsyrsam flyous old [25] Nobody can drsawss ma! Iarmiy should not as lsparulsd Nowem me Issue berm us :5 wlluthornvmdmglnmnfyseparubmn 1; sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. HIGH m M, .. mm., mm: dnumml VI mum pom! necessan/yammod me cum: m mt: can to I -.-mnn¢'II'I W°D"l15°" allaw /smnham added) run not mm mt M mm: In a man pursuant loAntd-3 15 7n. rlmrssfiarahon pnnape may be rs/etran! Val Me authonnes ta mnmsun me exemse ms dusuefron pursuant to Amc)e15 ma: rs wmrs me rwllrrsmam ofmcmwnwwwruts M Hmca. nnnommma r:.l.IcofmuchMll7 raamanea tnepnv-=-area: law an ramny seam-anon m In. nunlnxt ullhrs -pp-at [$1 on tns same tone. this cum cams met me mtesmei ai grammg stttzansntp In tns cnna so as to pmtect tne weware ol the Child Is uunamonal upon the sausvaamn at me mtena for cmzenantp In accordance with the Iiw cmzensnip ts not granted merely to serve the Child's wallave The cnnu 5 now blesed wnhtne presenee oflha Ftrst and Second Ptatmw as parents who wtu nurture and tatae tne cnua wttn lava and em and ma Coun ts cerlaln tnat may wtu do tnen utmost bes| tn lhe meanttme to pfomde me cnua wttn me best envtnanment until an awllulmn ts made under Amcte 15 of the recent Consluulmn 15 am I1MxAID7uumvlVo4M7huHuA «mm. a.n.t nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 m my t... nrmnnflly mm: dnuumnl wa artum vmm Conclusion and decision [37] Eased upnn an the above. the Court finds mat the cnleni for cmzensmp by awauan M waw undarlhe FC have no! tween met The Awllcallon :5 hereby msrmssea wllh no order as m cos1s Dalsd thus 2"“ M January 2024 /¢~u\~4.;Q MOHD RADZI BIN ABDUL HAMID JUDGE HIGH coum. MELAKA Pamas Al The Hearing For the P1; .11 11; Enclk Framed Nambxar Advocates 8 Salwcdcrs Tainan Fvancm Perewra & Shirl s-me an, Wnsma TCT 56-1, 3" Mb Man lpch 51200 Kufla Lumvuv 11 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm u src Puan Zavnm bvnll Tuglvan Federal Cuunse\ Pqabm Penlsmal Undang-Unuang New: Melaki Aras 1, Blok Laksamana Sen Negen, Ayer Keroh Hang Tuah Jay: 75450 Malaka 13 m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [5] as ma father and me 2"“ Plamm as me mother However‘ me New so was marked :5 ‘fiukanwalganegari ( New ac‘) Thus‘ the reason hr the Appllcamun m this judgment. yetevences to “Amcles and “Second Schedule“aremthata1me FC The law on ciuzensmp [6] II has been deeded m a smug of cases and renamed m me Com at Apvem dwsuon m Pemmm 5-ur Kallnlrnn an Kemalian, Mal-ysia v. Pang woo Sn 3. Anor[2l711] 7 cu 13 /(201713 MLJ J08 and me recent Federal cuundeosmns m crss 5 Anur v. Km. Pcnglrih Pundlluran mg n, Mnlnysla A Dr: (202114 MLJ 23: /12021) a cL./ 411 and CCH 5 /mar v. Pwndalhr sosar Blgi K-Ianinn Dan Kumuliln, Malawi; 1 20221 1 cu 1 /I202!) MLJU 2.111 that the law on cmzenshlp ave excluswely prov-sea In me Fc In delwanng me uamsmn of me Court m ccn (supra). Her Ladysmp me cmer Justice Yengku Mavmun set cm a remmder on ma such pmwsmns are m be mlzvpreled — [ta] Cmzsrwup no mum mm :2, Put in am. so but M: nbo . mm: sa mnlnclh/y :..u...m me mm :0 Ms mdplluanal may cw-nun-d m m 511; A: sum my pmmm on mm; A: mmnm .: Mary .4 pawl»: [47] Navmv ma mar. m an eonwlcfefi mmafm of mu Iwowm wlnww by Abdoolcwsrl (I: H: mm m; m Madeira umvemy Bedvsfl v Gcvammsm plMalay::a[19M[2 ML] :55, Hip sar- rmm Pub/»'cFm.-ur:umrvDaInhHsmnbmH.;vh1n:& OI: mm 2 MLJ us mu Ma Conxmutlcn rs no! la be mnstmad m Any ,..m». a mm sens: {James V commmm oi Msmba nsasmc am but ms doe: noumn ma: a war! As anmanm mecnarpevvenumunguamlme camnm... m me mlemm olany »sg.rman.mumna« meaty, Never: mowma. for ma pumou ul mpplymq nnu.umn.r nrnl mmw suppand mars Iimphans posted) [421 me want my my: Dad la do battle wrm mew Mu L‘onfl»'c1In37pImL1ple.r On live (via mud, n rs and mm m ./udacmry mm: pmpon Io usurp we ml: olthe Legislature On In: me: hand n IS sax! Illa! me Juaxuary mun be flmacnw ta Pmtsct mmamemaz rvmls. No mm» me Irglmvant we are Lvn.I1anW Iammflvd nl mm Inn Indie! mm Dy mm sadeslskmglhear 5 sm nMxAI97uuvwLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! rupschve pm-mans m consmulmnnlcnses Whore do wa draw me me bslweuv mess two lxlrumu’ [491 w. behave mat the ans-war 4» ma quuimn ho: hum anscussod m mvwmerubh mnnun! of rams: mm me man recwvl osmgcrss ms mnw mm: 1: m. unaavsllvdlflv mu m...1.mm.n.gm lmipllmsvurvs muxtbu wnslruod ls broadly u poxarbh um Dmmmlu mm.-n Hm mass mu mm M uoflllruadu n-mmy anponobto rmnw mat-ml wscuaom mm play a loser par! when umshulng wmmnnu Prowsmns One cnnmal afluni m be pedanbv: or clmg neelesny In mnulamd Iegaasm [501 Men constrmny a ward or mm: m the FL‘ pmmm Mar war-nt-ems) - nmauwwvlal nah: me court snommve lbw wrdu! msmn mtlmrrw wrmaut mummy ur vanwv m. n...‘ munnmg And when uonmwng Antsmlabd Pmvrmnl‘ Ive uoufi mould ma than M a whale navmg ngard m ma burnout and mnm onlmu pvuwsms -nu mrmomso mu wlknrrva mummy rullm mm M mm at mm mm another [71 On me subject of rules of mzemramion allhe pnwissans u« me FC, me Federal Cnun In Data‘ Sari Ir. pa Mohammad Nlnr Jamaluddln v. Dam’ Sui Dr bmbry Abdul mm, 5 sm nMxAI97uuvvvLvo4M7nuHuA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Allomcy sum-I (lntuwnn) (20121 2 cu m;[2o1a1 2 ML] 255 halt- One umcr mwun-nr gm. m mmmmn .1 cm4.mm .5 mt, “me Canslmmon mm! o. conndomd n 5 man, And m I: xa vm man .5 /.1 .5 possmle‘ m an M: mvmn; u rs an amnnansa cnnan m mnahluimnal oonstrudmn ms! no one Dmvtsmn aims Conmlulmv r: m be sepalalzd /mm a)! me omen‘ and Lvrvsrdersd alone, ma ma: an my pmwwns mm-g upon . p.m.m..m,.n m m be mm: mm m Md to be so mam-ma u to slrscrulle the gum p-mu or am mstmmcnl An clamcnlaly M): almrusmmum .5‘ ms! flpombb enact mm be gt»/an m evalypan amt every ward or: Corlslrmuorv and ma! unless Mere rt Jam: clear mason m me wnrmy. no pomun of me Ilmdamenlul law sham be trusted as supemunus (See Danahada Urus San End v Koknmny $411 5I~1(Eu Council Mal-ysrl me-mu-1 (20011 2 MLJ 2511 Dellberauons and decision ol min cum [3] u .5 me Flalnlilfs case that me cm \s a mule" o1 Ma\ays4a by operation 0! law an 2 anemauve grounds - ti) FIrs(\y1‘F\rslGvound‘), pursuamlothe pmvlslcns ofthe Adoption Act 1952 me crma havmg bewme 3 cm ai 7 sm nwmw.umv«umM mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Malsyuan cmzens, acquives cmzensmp under secuon 1(3), Pan n Mme F0: or an Ssoonmy (Samnd around), me am nannq been abandoned by me Euologmul Molnar mud not nawng acqu-red cnuensnip <31 any country wmnn 12 months from the dale ol umn. acquues uuzenshlp pursuam Io semen 1(e) and semen 2(3) af Fan n Second Schedule read laaethev mm sermon 195 el Part In. Second Schedule Qa.UzLEA§z_QL'.zuad [91 It was contended by counsen for me Flawrmffslhanhe cm cum to be accorded clllzensmp purmnc lo Amcve um Kb) read wan yachon 1(a)o1 Pan n on the mm man we ward ‘parent’ m paragraph (a) therem augm m be mnslmsd broadly to mdude aduplws parens Ifwasfunher argued that me pravvsnans ov me Adoption AC1 1952 am Is, section em Ind 25A wmcn conferlufl legal nghu on adoptwe puenli‘ are conclusive pm: at me menmy M the cmm. psvenl ‘for all m mmw.umvqmm»m mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! purposes‘ M ws me Planrmrrs comerman that me phrase ‘for all purposes’ means and muuaes me purposas av Icqumng omxensrvp ume: semen 1(3) of Pan II no] To advance the Plammrs cause, Counsel rvferved to me aecusmn at ma Cowl av Appeal m Madnuvln Jan/In Augusun v. Augustin Loouninmy a Dr: pm) 1 ML! 3:71 / [ms] 4 cu 15¢ where «he word ‘parent’ was mlerpmted nmaary Io includo Idamlve gums and not vesmaed to mologscau palenls [111 M was mans: arvuad mat ems com srmuxd adopt a beneficem umerpmuuon at m maanlng cl ‘parenf, sua- max parem can also mean Vawfw parents sum as adovllve parents and not ]us1 biological pavems s-nee a leg:\ adomlon awards the adocllva Dlrems menu: at parems, ma law, m pamcular secuon 1(3) should no: amcnmmaxe between blolngxcal and aaamwe parems A beneficent mterprecanon, n‘ adopted by Ihls coun, womd pvevent me cmld fmm bema rundored flawless and «no family um! would be aflmled ca grow peIceluHy unburdened by all the m ,wmw.umv.mm..»m mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm W] sacral and legal sngma and crrauerrgee that me cmlu would mherwxsaa race grawrng up as a stamens perwrr Redererroe was mane \o me declsmns rrr Minister or Home Affairs v. canine Macdonald HsIm[19s0]Ac 319, Eastern Heamr Board v, An Ford Uchhla {mu} 1 IR M7 and Indira Gandhi 147 Mumo v. Pcrramrh Jabaun Annma Isllm PorIk[201l]1 MLJ 545, rrr response, courrser for me Reeporxsems argues that In any aerermrnarrun nl clhzansmp undev me FC‘ hm prrnerples or [us son and /us sangwms of me brclngncal parent and not me adoptive parent mus: be pvaven by me applrcanl Reference was made to the Court at Appea\ eecrsrone In Llm Jen Hsiln L Anor v. Km. Plngnrih uoaurr Pendaklvan Neann A Dr: 12017) 5 cu M2 and mm slew Bony 4'. Anal v. Kama Ponyaralr Jabawl Pendaltaran Megm 1. Ors [2017] 5 MLI 862. It was avgued man lhe Plarrmfis In one Appllcalrun raneu to discharge the human 01 prevmg jus salrgumis srnce me Broragrcal Momerwas 3 sn Lankan

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

MA-24NCvC-292-10/2022

PEMOHON MUHANIZA BINTI MD HANIF RESPONDEN Orang-orang yang menduduki bangunan dan struktur lain yang didirikan atas sebahagian tanah yang dipegang di bawah hakmilik GMM 1442, Lot No. 2487, Mukim Serkam, Daerah Jasin, Negeri Melaka.

"Kaedah 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 - permohonan untuk perintah milikan kosong - prinsip terpakai - terdapat isu penghunian tanah dengan izin pemilik berdaftar - terdapat sejarah izin penghunian tanah oleh 2 pemilik berdaftar sebelum tanah dibeli oleh Pemohon - Permohonan di bawah Kaedah 89 KKM tidak sesuai - terdapat isu untuk di bicarakan - Permohonan ditolak"

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=eb30ce5d-7d0e-411c-bef4-26c6bf21304d&Inline=true

02/01/2024 10:45:37 MA-24NCvC-292-10/2022 Kand. 36 S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Xc4w6w59HEG9CbGvyEwTQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—2mcvc—292—1n/2u22 Kand. 36 32,01/2224 ,2-45 aw DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DIMELAKA SAMAN PEMULA N0: MA-IANCVC-291-10/2022 Dnlam norm. manuenli haruruh-hananah yam] flpcgnng ax lnwah em 4444:, Lo! No 2437‘ Muklm Serltam, Daerall Jilin, Negeri Malakai nan Dalam park : Aluran as Kudah-Kaedah Mahklmah 2012 AMTARA IAUNANIZA B|NTl MD HANIF PLAINTIF DAN Dramrcrang yang mondudu ' blnaunan dill slruklur Dun Ilruktur Ialn yang as knn alas seballagiln tanah Vang an pognng um». hakmllllx cum m2. Lo! Mo 24:11, Mukim Serlum. Dzerall Jnin, Negeri Melalta, Iaitu: 1. PUA H00 PENG 2. MG HOOK 3. MAH LIAM WAN 4. MA CHAT CHUAN DEFENDAN 1 sw xumwéwzehcncvyzwvn mm Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm LATAR BELAKANG [I] In: adalah kepulusnn Mahkaman temadzp sam permohnnan aleh Plamuff mataxm Lampxran 1 untuk mandapalkan penmah mlllkan kosong harlanah mkenun sebagal GMM 1442, Lo: No 2457, Muklm Serkam‘ Duran Juan, Nsgen Melaka m bawah Ammn as Kaedzh Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 VKKM‘) [2] Alasan permohonan P\aIrmfIen<andung damn Limpnran 2 Secara nngkasnya Plalnufadalah pemllwk bemafiarTanah (ersebul Tanah nu telah amen pada 2013 darn Abd Gham am Ramll Kztevangan dokumenlar rnengsnai pembeluan den kemudlannyi pendlflaran naxmmx auflah sepenl an mam mum MH-1‘ MH-2 aan MH»3 Plamm mengatakan belnau le\ah mmaklumkan oxen pemmk asal hahawa Tanah nu amauku tanpa kebenaran dan dncembohl aleh |>e¢enaan—De«am:sn Lapovln Fahs Ielah dlbuat dan kemudlan nndakan mangnmngkan Tanan nu dlamhvl [3] Masmg-masmg Dedendan Ferlama serungga Keempal telah memiankan Amdavll Jawapan mempenlkau tmdakzn Pkamllf m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Di da\am kss Lee sang L-i A On v. Tetuan Tokoyaki Fmperty sdn. BM. [1001] J CLJ 365, Mahkamah Rayuan le\ah memumskan - “The learned judge lblmd M8! on the Al77dASflJAll9d /8615‘ [ha p/alnrfirs Ms rsgtslersd owner OYMS sard/and and the dofondlnls am not have any proof um they had bun gil/an lhe permission w lfclncc by the phintilf or an previous uwnor ollhe /and as the Slate) pnunu ma p/amrm occupation aims sum ;7fDP9"y and that :1 was propel and lppmprilte for mu mgn Cnun to make In» am: under 0. an 0! mo RHCm evm we dellndants us than WIN no ilrfaus issues We srlhraly agrva Will! the VIEW OI me Hugh Cowl " (penekamsn <1/tambah) [151 Walaupun pnnswp undang-undang mengalakan pembayaran cum Ianah Gan namapamya bekalan elektnk um dengan sanmrmya memhukllkan hak penduflukan alau rmllkan umac Canny: ldenl (M) Sdn Bhd v. Onnq«DI.Ing Vang Mungenlll Dlri Sn-bayai 'Pvnyl‘ A On [ma] 1 cu 257)‘ namun Iamapax cam sqarih penduduksn lanah mu oxen keluarga Delendzn-Deisndan unluk 11 IN x:AmwswEGncnGvyEwm -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm (empnh yang sangn lama yang ndak wen amsxepuxan nleh Mahkamah ml Mahkamah udak berpuas nan bahawn mengukut kepulusan an dalam Fullrise Resources Sdn Bhd v. Mg Ah Tang 5 Ann! [2004] 5 CLJ; Salim lumall 5 Dr: V. Lohbvy Sdn. End. (Ma. 2; mm 1 cu wz; mum: nin mu 5 Dr: v. Pungarnn nmah sauan Sdangor[1.W1) 1 MLJ 343,- nan Lee Loy .5 or: v. ran Kan: Sam] 5 Anal [2010] 3 MLJ 2441 Defendan-Defendan holeh dlanagip sebagan pencmuboh haw maksud satu pennononan an hawah Kaeaah 59 [16] Di dalam kes Tekad Urus sun. and. v. Fenduduk Dcsa Puwin (200411 MLJ J05 Mahkamah Rayuan Ie\aI1 memuluskan » ' so me prupriery at ms app//calran underO 59 aim we was sgam ms subject maflsrul an appeal 17! me Federal Com m (I19 case of snaneen bts Abu Baksr v Perbadanan Kama/uan Megan Selangor[1998] 4 MLJ 233 There me court held that me summary procsdum under 0 as at the RHC rs gavemed by me same pnncrp/as as moss undsro 14 uf me RHC The deisndant need an/y show me: there was . (nab/9 Issue al/aw lo rssrsl the ;7lLwmI's app/Hiatlan IN xa4mwswEGncnGvyEwm mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 31 Rsvsmng lo the facts antte present apyeal we rtotatnntmete an tttttbte tssttes on me absence b/ettnst ltcencs or consent as ettegea by ttte respat-cent. tn olll vtew, me nttegeu continued conswvr or the aupelllntis ptsaecessors-t'n—u'nIe is one 0! line setiuus Issues to bu vied. The prnsence of me abpenants Isprsssrllutlvvs at me nteaztng presided by the Mtntstet bmerence (ses DPS; cannot be avsfloakad 32 From the judgment In sanans case tr ts obvtous to us ms! 5 mm neanng an apbttcaban Llndfir 0 as cbnstaets only emastttt swdenca The persnns agatnst wnbnt the prucsedmgs IS /tted need only snow they have an arguable case tnat tney nccupted the land tmasr /tcenoe tn Uur bpttttart the prtnctbtes/stt1 dawn tn aottans case apply to ttte presemcsse From the allrdawt evidence‘ we find mat tnts ts not 5 case In be dealt wrfh summanly tlrldal o as There are mab/s tssues whtcn snattm be aeretmmed at me me " (penekanan atcatttbsn) [171 Sepem atsettutn awal taut, xatattputt Kepermngan men men swt Koh ke abas lanah McL boleh atpentkat keabsahannya. namun sepem yang dlpuluskan juga dalam kes Tlkld um, pendudukan tttt boten IN Xc4wflwSBHEGDcbGvyEwYG ‘Nair s.n.t mmhnrwm be tn... M my t... brW\nnU|Y mm: dnuumnl wa mum vmm tecap memam sah herdasarkan salu Izm mu kerelian slau acqmascsnce oleh Kusu Em Musa‘ dnkuu om: Rimln nan kemudlannyn oseh Am Gham ~33 We would observe Mal mu i! In: Iaspandunfs inifial ontry an an zub/ocl and was unlawful .. Illcgld by the .pp.uam.s. ncquluccnco mm such enIryI.lw1uI{sss Se/rm‘: case) 34 me respondents had been In occuualion 0/ ma sumac: /and smce 1983 This Ian! was well wtlhm Ihs knowledge a! me Federal Land conummnner and live State Go»/smmgnr wlmse aepamnenzs and agencres had pmwdsd pubbc amenmes to men. wnn the svailabillry nl such ewdence, an Issue arises as 1.: whether the conduct of me government agencns courd be mlsrpratsd as aonssnt olma Stars Aumamy We now that my; rs a Inable Issue" (penekanan dwlambah) [1 E] Mahkamah Rayuan an dalam kes Lu Wu cnoong A Anor v. rerv ching van 5 Anor[2018] 1 LNS 19I7Ie|ah memuluskan - u m xa4mwswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm "[121 ms pnncrp/as at play in IaspacIofOI!1er 59 or the Rules 0/ coun 2012 are Inls. /n ma dsclsmn olaonan mn ram .; Dr: V Pengaran Tsnah Gallan SeIangoI[1991) 1 cu Rey 48 [1991] 1 ML./ 342, Mnhamed Azmr .50.] In dellvermg the mdgmonl ol ms Federal caun, accepled ms suzrmrssrorrs ol counsel [or me appeIlam!ha!On1sr 8915 me reproduction at me Englrsn 0 113‘ um may me pmcodura rs . summary srmpla and speed] is /1 IS mlanded to operale wrlhout a plenary Mal rnvnlvmg the ans! examination 11/ witnesses and mm the mlrumum afde/By, expense and techmca/Ky Where none or me wrongrul omrprers can rsasonab/y bardsnnfiodms pmcsedmgs lake an the charxcler or an acuon ur lam, smce me acuon would re/are IO MG recovery o/the IES wvmou! mere being any ollvaruarry but the p/amfflf On the other hand, M9 the dalaull and summary procedures under 0 13 and o 14, (his Order would normal/y apply only m vrrrua//y uncanlsstad cases arm clear cases Wham (hers rs no ISIIG OI queslron IO lry, is where mars rs no uatonnblo mum as m tho claim or me pIalIm'II to ncover possession om. Iandorns to wmnvlul nccupntian onmlund wirnou: Ilcanco or cousin! and without ury right, rm. or Interest merelo “ 15 ru xa4mxwswEGncuGvyEwm mu. sum nmhnrwm .. u... m my r... paw-y mm: dnuumnl vu mum Wm! [13] Tnrs pnnclple has been lollowscl In .9 long line of cases rncluarng Molld Raw: hm Veacoo v Federal Land Dave/apmenl Aullromy [1991] 1 MLJ 123, and S!/Ill‘! hm lsrnell 5 Lam-Lam V Lsbbsy Sdn Blvd (N0 2) [1997] 1 CL! 102, /199712 MLJ A /14] in Bonerrscase, me Federal counlaurmme lssus nfwhemw mere was lloenoe or consenl to me appsllanrs occupation or me land lor falmlllg purposes was rrselr a maple rssue, lrenoe the summary procedure und9rO as was nal suitable, Tris Federal Ccull added Ina! 'ln our aprrmn lor me purpose olme summery procedure a mlrncuon should be made berween Jqalmrl slnlnlicll-I wno nnve no ngnu wnlslsoevan and occupiers with licence or collsenl, and as well as tenants and licensees holdrng over /I may be impossible In emnllsn the existence ol lny (liable Issue in me use al new squmers, bul me poaifian al Icnllvrs and lleelme. nnrdlng over. or pmone occupying w/0| implied or expressed connmol me owmr may be dlfluunt.‘ (penekanan mtambeh) I6 rn xa4vAxwswEGvcnGvyEwm me. an.‘ lunhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mmnnuly em. dun-mm VII eF\uNG vtmxi KEPUTUSAN [I9] D1 atas penlmbangin semua pevkara fadl. Mahkamah memuluskln bahawa kesemua Derenaanoeoenaan benaya membangkn tau unluk mmcarakan dan dengan yang aemman, men! perlnahonan Plaunmudak sesuai unluk mpumskan secars (ems an bawah /uuran as KKM 2012 Permuhonan In: mmax dengan kn: seblnynk RM3,a0o )‘;1\~<.._...)r, uéub nunzn am ABDUL nmln HAKIDI MAH KAMAH 11NGGl MELAKA Tank - 2 Januan 2024 am Flhak Plgmlfl Teluan Azam ldxharn Azman .1. Farmers paguamnewa a Peguamcala No 251, Jalan Sehawangsa 5, Tlman Senawangsa 54200, Kuala Lumpur aggx Hhak Ddlenggn Tainan Muhd Lamp A Assaaates Faguambela 5 Peguamcara N0 3 5 3-1. Jalan EU 5‘ Taman Bachlng mama 15350 Melaka sm xa4mxwswEGncnGvyEwm m. smm ...m.mm .. .4... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm secam asasnya De1em1an—De1endan mangalakan canan Ierkan yang pad: asalnyu dnkenall sebugal EMR L01 529, Mukum Sarkam, Dserah Jasm ( Tanah Asal‘) (elem dlpemlem Kepentlngan cleh Man an Koh dalam (ahun I94D—an Sebuah rumah «em mamkan oleh Mah sw. Kan dan ma bersama kaluirgsnya telah unggal m rumah nu Sebuah rumah wag. kemumannya dlbma dw alas lanan yang sama oleh daluk kapaaa suamu Deiendan Kedua [:1 Ole?! kevana Tanah Asa! nu benara! Malay Customary Land 1‘MCL'L maka (anah nu dipegang dx ails nama semang Me\ayu bemama Kusu Bm Muss sebsgsx panama wam aau nammee kepada Mah Sww Koh Sam gaaaan wan dlbuat anlam Mah sw. Koh dan Kusu Em Mun yang mammak knpnda Man SM Koh bagl meruuga kepenungannya Kusu Em Muse kemumannya mendapalkan seorang bemama Ramll Bun H] Fahl |‘Ram||') unluk rnenggarmnya Tanah nu kamudlarmya (man dlserahkan kepaai Pqabat Tanah aleh wstm Mik SM K07! unluk muan pembmlan rumln wbadnl Cnna Harm kemumannya memmdah mmk |anah yang [man dwpecah hahagwan Ianu L01 2457 (‘Lot 24:17‘; yang mm dxpemkaxkan nu kepada anaknyu‘ Abd Ghlnl Bm Rzmll (‘Abd Gharu‘) Mengvkut Detandzn, llrldakarl Pllmfll d‘ bswah Nuvan 99 KKM Z012 adalah m xa4vAswswEGvcnGvyEwm ma Snr1n\nuuhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! udak Iepal flan mask bersesuman keranaxemapat wsudsulalda yang msnumukkan mereki bukan panceraboh (e|apI talah menauaum Tinah nu am. am kenasama yang nenaku anma keluavga mereka dangan pemmk asal Isu BEREANGKIT [5] Vsu yang barbangkn r1z\am Ilndakan Ini dawn samzda lmdakan unluk mendapaxxan pannllh mmkan kosung an biwah Kiedah as KKM max-n mum bevdasurkin ram bahuwa Defendan Ielah mendudukw Hananah nu flengin kepercayazn mareka menaudukv lanah alas satu kapentmgan avian sekurang-kuvangnyu bevdasarkan um pemhk berdaflav yang asax aeyak lanun 194Gan PRINSIP UMDANGMNDANG [5] senemm menyeruuh mengenax mam Dermchanan Inn Mnhkamih nl hams lerlebm uanum menyenluh pfmslp undangdmdang yang Ie\ah Iermaktub sepenl mputuskan an aalam kes Echari Taih 4 Or: .1. Pongarnh Tmh & Gallan SIIIngcr[1991] 1 cu 547,- Chlu Wing w. 5 on v. Onq amg Clleng [1994] 1 cu :1: dan m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm smlmn Ahu Bah! v. Pubadauun Kemqiuan Noqui so/nnpor [1999] 1 cu 74 mengen salu permohonan dn bawah Kaeaah as KKM Fnrlslp yang mpmusxan dapal dvumuskln — (at um permuhonin penqosongan lanah Irdak sexual umuk keadian dl man: Dsfandln mandudukx Ilnah Ilu berlkmirl satu sewzan alau pendudukan yang sah bawah undang— undallg‘ (b) pavmahanan an hawah kaedah 89 adalah sepem pevmahonan an bawnh Kaedah 14 KKM dw mana beban Dalandan nanya unmk memmbulkan nsu yang perlu dlmcarakan, flan (c) dalam mencabav salu permolmnan dx bawah Kaedah B9, Delendan hanya peflu menumukkan , u) pendudukan awa\ Ianah nu adalah menglkul undang— undang din (up Ierdlpat mn atau laser: yang nyata acau cersivat din pmak pemlllk kapad: Delendan Ap-bu: Delendan beuuya membanglulkan mm mm nu maka permohonan p\amM harus dmflak m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm PENILAIAN DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [7] Denim mamlst permnhonan ml‘ Mahkamsh mengamhul ma vana- fakla benkul » (a) lemapal selarah penghuman Tansh Asa! yang mkenan oleh Mah sw. Koh pada1940-an flan selemsnya aleh kemayganya, {b) hubungan Man swu Koh dengsn Kusu Bun Muss dan kemudlarmya dengan Ramll‘ (c) kenyalaan De¢enaan Keuga yang mengenah Ramll can anaknya Abd Gharu secara penned», (:1) max ads xeterangan dan Ramh yang menenma mmkan Ianah dan Kusu Em Musa mencabar semua kenyacaan De«endan— Defiendan; dsn (2) penyerahan Tanah Asa! uleh Eng Swse Neo men kepada menmang Mah Sww Kan unxuxmuan pemhlnaan mmah made! Cma pad: lahun 1973 an xemumannya lanah nu dnpeuhkan kepada 2 bndang lanah wawtu L01 2200 an mans mmah madam IN xa4mwswEGncnGvyEwm mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm nu mum: flan Lot 2457 yang didanarxan acas name Ramn Bun H. Fam {5} Plalmfl menqhujahkany knlaupun Mah Swv Ken lalah mempemlehx kepenllngan aw alas Tanan Mal nu, kepenhngun Ilu udak berkuatkuasa uncuk mengxkat manamana pmak kevana status man mu sebagal salu MCI. menghalang Mah Swi Koh dan mermllk nak nmada ucara berdnflar alau benefislal ke um. |anah mu Dengan yang aemman apa yua Iransaksx dengan Kusu am Muss flan kemudlannya Ramfi adalah juga «max ssh Make. sebagaw pemlhk bevdaltav, kamn mempunyaw hzk yang 537! mm. pemlhk unluk beruvusan dengan tanah nu Dengan yang demlkxan, Mahkamah Am hams mengukmav hak Plalrml sebagal pelmhk bardaflar yang mar. membeh Lat 2457 secaru sun dan AM Gham flan mempunyan hak “mdeleas4bIe' [9] Planrmv lelah merwuk kepada nemrvtukan Seksyen 340 Kanun Tanan Negara den kepntusan m dahm Ton 5-0 V. K MarI4thomul!m(1D77]1 MLM 110 an In 11 Tlawsluw & Or: v. Fund-II-r Gorln-Gcnm hnah Nugurlsal-ngnrnnzj 1 MLJ Ja uebagal menyekong hujahan mu m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [10] Ava yang .eIas pada Muhkamah -m‘ kavaupun lerdapil wsu samnda Mal! SW! Koh teiah mempenflerll flak yang sah ke alas (anm asal yang mxategonkan sebagal tanah MCL me\alm pegangan oleh Kusu am Musa_ namun Mah Swi Kan dan kemavgunya Ialah sakurang»kuIIngnya mendudukl (anah mu dengan kmzman dun Kusu Bm Muse Mahkamah Inga memapm Izm nu le\ah belsambung se\epas lanah nu mdaflu alas nama Ramlw Seklvanya Rimll lelah msnganggap semua De1em1an~De1endan sabag: penoeromh, suaan pasn behau lelah mengamnn nndakan unluk mengusxr meraka lehnh awa\ lag-, leap! wax adaundakan sebegnu auamhn. Bahkan behzu mak mengamnu up:-apa hndakan semngpn Dehau memnndah rmlwk tanah LM 2487 IIU kepada anaknya Abd Gham pada 14 10 1931 Ann Gham mgandak mengamhu apa-apa nndakan menguslr Defendemnelendun Bankan. Abd Ghanl merqual Ianah nu Kepada Flamm dzngan pengetahuan ada penghunl dan mmah an ataslanah im kepada Plamm Kellhalannys Ramh Ielah mengual |anih flu kepuda Plamhl din memblarkan Plalnm yang bemadapan dengan semua De1endzn~Delendan [11] Mahkamah jugs mendapan vakta mengenaw penyerahan Tanah Asa! bagmuuan mmah Ibadal semasa pemmkan uleh Ramn flan m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm kemumannya AM Gham mengundanq pennnyaan yang panting din ha! Im hdak ada pwnpannyl damn pmadlng dw hadapnn Mahkamsh Fenanyaan mu adalah‘ jvka Man sw: Koh dan kemudlannya Eng Swee Neo mak mempunyal kepentlngan dx scas tanah nu‘ nagznnana penysrahan flu boleh dmuax men Ng Swee Nan den kenapa Ramll max menghalang den mamhamah penyerahan lanah nu pada mmanya den seiepas Tanah Asal nu dipecah kepada 2 bahaylin dan Lot 2437 dldaflsr ms naunanya, mengapa bellau alau AM cnam nu-x langsung bemndak unmk mengusw DaVendan»Defendan7 [I21 Apa yang Aelaz. pad: Mahkamah Im Idahh‘ Ielah ada mu darn Ramln untuk samua Defendan-Delendan Isms menghunl Tlnah Asal dan kemudlannya LOIZ487 bersekall dengan rumah rumah yang te\ah dlbma sehingga behau manundahnya kepada Abd. Gham dan izln nu benerusan sehmggl Abd Sham metuualnyn kepada P\amlIfl Maka‘ pengefahuan Ramh serla Abd Sham flan pevanan masmg- musing lerkact ranan Asal dan Let my mu adalah situ perxara yang hams dlkemukakan an sam pamvcauan m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [131 Walaupun Mahkamah akuv dengan pflnsxp undangmndang sepam yang celah dlblncang m da\am kes wu Kang Whye A Anor v. Ln Woon rung [1977] 1 MLRHU :u yang menyalakan pemnluk namana: hananah berhak unluk mennmalkan szsuatu grsmmous lacansee kepada penghum dengan memben nuns nan selelah nabs dlbenkau pmak yang menauaum hananah nu enggan Iralunv can harlanah mu dan pada kenka nu pmak nu mevuafll panceroboh namun lakta dw dslam Kes : bukan salu Keadaaan m mana Defsndan-Dafendan adalah penghum ax-s dasnr gnalmralls ncensee den Ptannm {:41 Walaupun secara pnma lads Pm-nnr berhak membawi Imdakan W bemasavkan hak mlllkan beniamar dan pemakalan Sakayen 354 Kanun Tanah Negara (lmat kepuwsan Mankaman Rayuan da\am Ahmnd Snnilly Ismail Bukli v. Nlk salma zaidan Hi, Wan Mona zzldnnuj 5 cu am namun sepsm dmyahkan awn! I-ax bag: luwan pmsldmg an bawan Aiuran as Detemen-aeienaan hanya perm menuruukkan lemapalnya lakta yang mpenu unluk mmcauakan Pads pendapat Mahkamah. terdapal sekuvang- kurlngnya pemmhangnn menganan mu pendudukan Tanah Asa! nan Lol24B7 yang dapal dmhal flan cmuakan Ramh Gan Ana Sham m m xa4mswswEGncnGvyEwm mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

MA-42JSKH-5-10/2022

PERAYU ABU BAKAR BIN JAMAL RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya

" Seksyen 376, 377B dan 377CA Kanun Keseksaan & Seksyen 14A Akta Kesalahan-kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 - Rayuan terhadap Hukuman - Samada hukuman penjara 46 tahun dan 240 tahun sebatan melampau - pertimbangan faktor umur Perayu 56 tahun semasa hukuman dijatuhkan dan peluang tertuduh menikmati kebebasan - jumlah sebatan tertakluk kepada had di bawah seksyen 288 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah - pemakaian pendekatan dalam kes Tuan Mat Tuan Lonik v. PP dan Muhamad Mizan Sahari v PP - Rayuan dibenarkan - hukuman penjara dikurangkan kepada 37 tahun dan sebatan di kurangkan kepada 24 sebatan".

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9f710bcb-94be-4738-bb6b-195f3b7895ec&Inline=true

02/01/2024 10:25:41 MA-42JSKH-5-10/2022 Kand. 35 S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ywtxn76UOEe7axlfO3iV7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal uA—¢2JsKH—5—1u/2022 Kand. 35 mm/2224 ,2-AS an DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA nu MELAKA RAVUAN JENAVAH NO: MA-42J5KH-(5-157-WI2022 ANTARA Aau BAKAR BIN JAMAL PERAVU DAN PENDAKWA RAVA RESPONDEN [balam Mahkamall Szsyen di Ayn Keroh. Puluu Malaka Petbicaraan J-my-n No: MA-GZJSK-6141912022] Amara Pandakwa Ray: Abu Bakar bln Jamal sw mmuuzemuuawu mm Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm LATAR EELAKANG [1] Tenuduh (‘Param telah dlsabxlkan oleh Mahkamah Sosyen rmswm Aye! Keroh, Mslaka dengln 21 kosalahan ax buwm Sekayen 373(2) Kanun Kgseksaan mm. 5 kesamwan m hawah Seksyen 317cA KK nan 1 kesalahan m bawah Seksyen 3775 xx an 1 kesahhan dl hawah Seksyen 14»: dmaca Seksyen 16 Am Keialanan-kesalahan sexual Temadlp KanakrKanak 2017 sumcan mu henkut penyakuan sa\ah Pelayu xemaa-p semua penuduhan [2] Rayuan ml aaaxah lerhadap hukuman pemara 46 «um dan 240 sebatln yang telah duzluhkan men Hakim MS Ruyuan .m herklsar mas 3 Isu mama Aallu ~ 1:) samada Hakim MS man gagal rnemalum perunlukin seksyan can Kznun Pvnudur Jenayih (KFJ) damn mannnpaaw kapntusan mengena: hukuman. m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:w7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [13] Rumusan yang Mahkamah ml aapat Dual aan kepumsan-keputusan nu adman - (a) kesalahan seksual (erhadav kanak-kanzx apanah lag: uleh pemangsa yang rnempunyax hubungln kekalnargaan nendaklah m anggap sangal senus oleh Mahkamah. (:1) dalam memaluhkan hukuman Manxaman hams memmjukkan pendman \egas flan bencl {abharrenn lemaflap kesalzhan sebegnu sebagal hukuman berswax meneegan, (:2) mmlah hukuman pemeruaraan ke am kesamtan yang Danyak din bemlang handakllh rnunu uh an mamunglunkan penxah bevpemang dlbebaskan semasa hayalnya. am (:1) mvaupun Seksyen zea KPJ menalapkan bahawa hukuman Iebil lldik hmeh melebml 24 sebatzn Iinyl Ibdak menghalang Mahkamah menjiluhklll hukuman makllnu wmaupun dalim keadaan umuv pesalah melsbuhx had umul 50 hhun dl hzwah Seksyen289 (C) KPJ sebagal uyarm pendlflln lsgas Mahkimun nemadap kes-wanan nu m yw1xn7nuUEs7axuu:mI7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! pa] Menganm pemlaxan lelhadap hukuman pnruara‘ mam mamlm hukurnan yang dI]:|uhkan oleh Hakim Ms, Mxhkamih berpenflapal Mak ad: kaknnaran m dnlim pendekalan yang (elah mamnn an aanam meruatuhkan hukuman Hukuman dljaluhkan menunn tahun kesalanan mengambll kva pengulangan kesarahan yang sama pada tahun lahun berlkm sememlk kesamhan panama pad: umm 2015 sernngga nanun 2a22 bagl kssahhan an blwah Seksyen :75 4:) an mm kesamhan an bawah smyen :77cA paaa |ahun 2021 Han 2022 [15] Mengenal samad: (empoh pemara 45 lsmm adahh mehmpau apabnla daambfl kn umuv Peruyu 56 lahun semai: rmkunun duzluhkan Mahkamah .n. mengambll panduln can kapulusan Mahkamah nayuan m dalam kes Abd Rahlm And Ranaman dan nun Mu Secarz perhandlngan kes Abd Ramm meluhaxkan 22 penuuunan m hawah Seksysn 3775 KK manaka kes ruan Mal mellbatkan 5 pemduhan m bawah ssksyen 3755 KK Hukuman penjara an dahm kas Abd Ramm aaalan so tahun manakala dl dalam Kari Tum Mn ad: n 75 (Ihun Dw mam ks: Abd namm pesaxan mak mempunym nubungan kekeluargaan dengnn mangsa manaka\a an da\am kes m yw1xn7nLmEs7axuu:w7A mm. saw ...n.mn .. .7... w my 7... mm-y mm: dun-mm wa mum v-vrm Tllln Ml! mangi: Idflah anak lirl nssalih DI dawn Ken And Rlhlm umur pesahh lidak amangxmn Iebagau mu yang dlpemmbingkan din Mahkamm Rayuan IAVZH mangelihkin hukumun ED |IhIm‘ manakah fl\da\am kes Tull! Ml! umur pesalah (e\ah Eflalllbll bun d1 mans Ienun pendengaran rayuan pesallh berumur 45 lanun [151 an alas tau umur‘ kapuluian m datam AM Rlhim handaklan an bezakun dun ks: ‘man an dan kes Yuan Mal hurus Ienm maven kepzdz Iayuan dw hadapan Mahkamah um keuna Mahkamah Rayuan an dahm nun rm man mamban penimhingan Ke alas kemunasabahan lsmpoh pemara :1. man: levluuuh akan mancapal new 123 (amm sekuanya tenuduh rnerualanl hukuman peruala bag: mupun yang penuh sen: peluang nenudun unluk memkmnll kebebasan . 7241 An appellate cowl wm not he L7ver1y ready to mum wan any sentence rmpassd by me ma! coun un/ass there are verygood reasons rv do so For Bumosss ol Mrs case‘ suffce rf we memy peruse the sentences meted uawn, subsequenrlyla be zmlmsd by me Hrgh Court, from me new 0/ mew or /ogre 1: .5 srallstrca//y accemea ma: the average Ms spun at a Ma/aysmn man A: 712 year: wlw/slrllatula 1; m yw1xn7nuUEs7axuu:mI7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Ma/sysran woman 75 yam In Irma (Ive average life span wm /ncrsase That being 50. win: me apps//ant now 43 years am, an average ne has 22 years afgood his Mi TD Impose a sentence that will lake him unlfl we age or 123 years old, and Krmwmg Iu/Iy wel/ rnarne nevev wm serve me lull Isrm, not Only Is Insane DUI strains ms /nls/lrgsnoe DI the cam! Any magma: sentence may amacl unnecessary scnmny and nsgam nnmmanrs from Ms pub//c on how we awkwardly can-incl ourselves /251 mm the Santana: 0! me am and second charges to run mnseculrvely, lhus Factual/y reducing [Its length L7! hms of mcarceralron lo 30 years, and WM ueaucnons mmwn m for good behawar, by me nme ne I5 rs/eased he mu be about 70 years 0/ age :e the avsragellfe alaMa!ays:an man Even IMS nvss lo smell freedom .9! that age We ltkelmood OI him Desemng and causing trauma to anyone rs 5/»m Our ardels not only nas taken guano interest we accuunl but also made M9 sentsncs ssnsxbls and law " [:71 Marlquk pm: kepada kes Munamad Minn sun»: .1. dalam kes nu Mahkamih Tlnggl man mangmngm Inmpoh pemeruaraan I050 xarmn mass 42 canun alas 105 parluduhan mengumbnl kw: umur petullh 34 uhun Mu bursm semnyn pelaizh a. damn kes nu meru:\am pamamarnn unluk lempuh yang penuh umumyl akm mencapm 75 lahun apnblla umenaakan. sesuan dengan fingkaan u m yw1xn7nuuEa7axuu:u\nA mm. snm ...n.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he m1mn.HIy mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! hayal seorang le\ak1 pada pandangan Mahkamah Rayuan an dalam kes Tuan Mar. [I8] Make, adalan wuar unmk Mahkamah ml mengammlpenneman sauna vapem kes ‘run In umuk mempemmbang hkla hahawa umur Perayu Ikln menjnngkau 102 tahun pk: bahlu mam m lempnh pemerualaan yang pemm [I9] Seksyen 455 Am: Femava zoom dan Jadual Emu: Ana ynng sama mampenmlukknn pasalah m bawah Seksyen 37¢, :17: dan anc KK max belkelayakan un|uk dz paml Maka Perayu Ildak Iayak nnluk para! bagx kesalahln kesalahan m bahwah seksyen 375 nan 3715 Manakala‘ pengremilan hukumln an bzwah Seksyen 44 Akta Feruar: moo dun Pemuran 43 Ferllurzn Pevalwan Paws zoom adalnh henakluk kepadl kuasa Kormslonev Jendem nan perlakuan hak pesalm Sekallpun Pevayu layik rnenenma 1/3 renman hukuman. In: beram hukuman penjavanya adalzh urlluk (empoh 31 unun din paaa hanks um Pmyu belumur a7 Iahun Bemmrxan keadnn Parzyu uemua namr m haflapln Manklmah um Mahkamah memangkakln m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:mnA mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm menjangkakan Ferayu mungkln akan mengaxann kedallan fiznkal pads umur nu seknanya behau hldup selama (empoh nu [2u1 Dalam menflax isu mn Mlhkamah jug: mennuk kepadi lempoh nukunmn penmn aeumuv mdup mg. jennyah wan Meraml pemntukan Akva 345 mengznat Pemns-man Hukuman Man Mandaton 2023‘ Nlahkamah telah -14 benkan budimcara unluk merualuhkan nukwnan permrulvaan «man so umngga 40 nannn nu: hukurnan man um fllmuhkan unluk kesmahan yang dahmunya mswamkan hukuman mall dr nawan Ana Kanun Keseksaan. Am Senlila Am dan Akla Cullk. Manakaxa dw bawah Akia Dadah Eerbihtya 2952. (empnh pemenjariln seumur mung mun 30lahun lm berm: hukumzn penjara yang me\ebIrH 40 lahun am merupakan salu Iernpoh yang melemm hukuman nenpra maksnma yang dlpemnlukkan bawah undang-Imdang yang boleh amukum mall walaupun tiny: saw jumlah akumulaul am hukumln-hukumin yang heqzlan secaya nemrulan 15 m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:mI7A wn. snnnw nmhnrwm .. n... m mm n. nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n wa mum v-max [21] Maka berblllk kepada Raynan rm, seqelan memambnl knra mm usla an Keudnn flzlklvkaslhltan Pavayu sekarlng dun tampon pemeruaraan as eanun, Mahkamah xmpenaapan «amen nu mm. leflam salu tampon yang mdampau Mahkamah menygunapakal pemmbangan an dalam kes rum Mam mane lenuduh hams dlheli pemang unmk rnemkmau kebebasan paaa mu mdupnya din mawa pad: umur yang Ilrwl nngal mu kemungkvan mrluduh mangadl anuman xepaoa masyarakat KEPUTUSAN [221 D. a|as pemmhangan vakuomakcov (ad: Mahkamah ml mangervenvkan hukuman penyivl mam. 45 limm ymg dqlluhknn uleh Ham MS din dlglnu dengan hukuman peruarz kepada 37 Iahun Mengambn knra pemzng pengrenman hukuman, Peuyu nerpemang memalankan Iempeh pemeruaraan selarna hanya 25 tamm nan hellau berpemang merasa kebehasan paaa mm" 81 |ahun Mahkamah berpenflapal pad: umur nu rlsnko bahawa Pariyu haleh mengancam Inik-Inakrvy: yang um» dewlsa din wga masyaraxan secara amnya aaal-n rendah 17 m yw1xn7nuUEs7axuu:mI7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [23] Temper: peniara 31 lahun m knra sepem benkulx H) K83 MA-EZJSK-51-09/2022 Im|uk 1 penuduhan dl hawah Seksyen 375(3) xx bag! kesalahan m tahun zms mnuxum dengan co (amm peruava (ta) Kes MA-62JSK—S2—09/2022 unxux 2 venuauhan ax hawah Saksyen 3754:) KK mg‘ kasmanan an |ahun zma masmg maslng a. hukum dengan no lahun peeuava, (5) Kedua dua hukuman Imluk (shun 2015 dan 2015 beqalan saremak. (6) K35 MA—62JSK-G3-D9/2u2Z aan MA-GZJSK-54»D9QD22 untuk 5 perluduhan an bamh Seksyen 37613) KK nagx kesmahan an (ahun 2011 maslng mismg dihukum dengan :2 lahun pemara, (:7 Kes MA—62JSK—65-09/2022 din MAJSZJSK-66-0912022 umuk 5 oenuaur-an an bawah Sekxyen 37613) KK hug! kenhhan an (ahun 2:115 masmg masmg dmukum flengan 12 Iahun peruar-. m m yw1xn7nLmEs7axuu:w7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm U) xes MA52J5K—67-09/2022 untuk 1 penuum-an dx bawah semen 375 KK mg: kenlahan m nhun 2019 dmukum 1: lahun pevuara, (g) Kesemua hukuman untuk lahun 2011, 2015 dan 2019 berman seremak telapr uenumcan selepas hukuman 2015 5 2016, 0») K25 MA62J5K—68-0912022 unluk 2 pertuauhan an bamh Seksyen :75 KK bag: kesalahan dnahun 2021 dmukum mamm Pewara. (uh Kes MA-62JSK—69-090022. MA-GZJSK-70-05/2022‘ MA- 52JSK»71-09/Z022 din MA-susx-12-o9I2u22 umuk H penuduhin m hamh Seksyen 375(3)‘ 3713. men mg. kesalahan an (Ihun 2022 masmg masmg dmuknm dangan 14 vahun pemara, u; Kes MA—62J5K-71—09/2022 unvuk 1 penuduhan an bawah Seksyen um a-hm bernama smyen 15 Akla Kesalihan» kesalzhan seksuax Temadap Kanak Kanak 2m7 hag: kesalahzn an (arm: 2022 amukum dengan o lahun psmnva‘ an 19 m yw1xn7nLmEs7axum:u\I7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (k) Kesemua hukuman unluk (ahun 2u2I din 2022 beualan mar-max mam henumlin nlepu hukuman Iahun 20172013 den 2019 [741 E39: hukuman sebalan pun: Mahkamah menyermm x-neom dahum hukumun mm kasalahnn :1. Dawn Fenuflulun Kenna umuk keszlahan Seksyen 3775 an bawah kes MA62 JSK—71—09fZD2Z‘ mmana Mahkamah mandivall kssmahan dw bawlh perunlukan nu ma! lerunam amxam pengeoualuan Seksyen 2:9 (:2) KW m man: hukuman seha| Imleh dlkenakan alas pesalah umuk kesa\ahan an hawuh seksyan 376, am: 37‘/CA alau me walaunun umumya menemm so mum man keranl Perayu bemmur ss lahun semasa hukurnan m jaluhkan maka hukuman sebat udak boleh dlkenakan unluk kssalahan nu Dengan Mu hukumln 2 sebalan an bawah penudunan seksyen 3773 mkaupman [75] Mengen ' umlah basal lelslsa sabunylk 238 sabalin‘ semen ass 45) KPJ 1-Ins mempevuncumn bahawa ‘um-n makwm Ieballn n k omen meramm 24 sebalan 4. am: mam dewasa Dw alas pemmhangan m m yw1xn7nLmEs7axum:u\I7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (bl samada mllulman yang dlkenakan aflallh melampau dan man xeumpal dengan umur Pauyu pm kellka hukuman adulah 56 lahun, dan (C) Ierdapal ISIA kesmatan Pelayu yang memmgasl mllulman yang balah ul lanmkan HIDANG KUASA MAHKAMAM DALAM MENDENGAR RAVUAN TERHADAP HuKuIlIAN [3] Mahkarnah Persekuluan «ll dalam kes om’ son Anwnl bin lmnlm V4 Punllc Pm-cum mm] : ML} 15: dangan ‘alas din tepahyn memuluskan bahzwa Mahkamah Rayuan lmmnya hams berwlspada aalam mengubah sesualu mmlman kecuall al lnana Mahkamah yang menoengar vayuan berpuas ml bahawa hukuman yang lalan dljamhkan oleh Mankamlh Rendah adalah lenampm rlngan flan mlampnu bent Ihu tldzk sah alau Muhkamah talah nlah dalam memakal pnnslp penllalan aan peuganggarln hukumzn - “V! ls 0/ ms llpmosl lmparlance lo stress here that the appellale wart wlll not normally alter me sentence lm/ess ll ls sallsnea that me senlence passed by was lower court IS mamlsslly lnaaeqllale or m yw1xn7lLlDEs7ax\Iu:ll\I7A ‘Nair Sum! ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII .mm mm nu hukuman sabal yzng dljaluhkan ol-h Hakim MS mkelapwkan din mgmn sebl Ib:nKul- (a) unmx semua penuaumn nagu xasmmn pads unun ms 5. 2016 dmukurn 5 sebalan Lb) Untuk slmua Dirruduhan bayl kesalahan pad: urmn 2017 amukum 7 xan sabatun, (5) Sehalan unluk lahun 2015‘ 2015 a. 2:117 dualan aetemak, ta) Unluk semua pemmuhan uagx kesmanan pads lamm 2018 dmukum a my sabaun‘ (e) unmx aemua penuu-man bag: xeuuman paaa mun 2015 dmukum 3 kah sehalarh (0 umuk semua penumman bag: kesalahan nada tahun 2021 amuxums kall sebalan 19) Seblun umuk Inmm mm‘ 2019 aanzozt duman menuk, am 11 m yw1xn7nLmEs7axum:u\I7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (M Unluk semua penuduhan bag: kesmahan pada 2022 d\ hukum 9 kah sebatan [26] Wahupun umur nan kadar Kesmztan Periyu m hujung pemeluaraan mungkm Ivdak mu membmehkan hukumln ubilin dualnnkun bemasarxan Seksysn 290 KPJ «erpam Mahkamah mengamml pendekalan sepem dw dalam kes ‘nun Mnt bahawa Mankamah mempunyai lugs: uumk menuruukkan kepada masyarikzl bnhawa kei nun sapsnl yzng dlhkukan olen Pefayu max bnleh dlplndlng nngan am: kepumngan awlm [27] Samuel xeump-nan Mzhkzmah memhenavkan Iayuan Ferayu Izrmadap hukuman Hukuman penjiri den mm yang duanmkzn man Ham Ms mxenepukan dnn dlganlnkan sepem dlpennclkan flu alas uéni: iubzl am As|5uL puma HAKIM IAAHKAIAAH TINGGI MELAKA TarI<h— 2 Jenna" 2024 m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:w7A mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm §a_mELh_ak_E:ay.u Teluan Fanaawau 5 Assomales 3571‘ KM1U Fengkalan Mmyak Ayer Mmek‘ 75460 Melaka JLfli fimnalan Pandakwa Rays Pejibal Parusmal unaangunaang Negen Mehk: Wlsmi Persekmuan Um! Pendakwaan was 2 man Business Guy, Bandar Mm: Melaka 75450 Ayerxeroh. Mmaka exceswve or lllsgal orolherwlxe nol a pmpel sanlencs navlng naganl la all ma racrs dlsclosed annal me calm has dean, erred m applying coneczpnnclples m II-vs assessment olsenrence, soe PP 1/ L00 cnoon Fart (197512 MLJ 255 In snandulnnanaa ./aystllake v PP meal 1 ML] 53 line appellant plesdld gul/ly to gmng /'nI:a maanca on a murder lnnl, an alvanca llnaers 194 ollna Penal Code wlncn named a maxlmlnn sanlence of 20 years and a fine ms rnnlnlage Imposed a senlellcv ollan years‘ nnpnsonmenl Hrs appeal agalns! ma senltnca was dlsmlssed ny me Fedalxl com Rule Aunn Shah LP (as ms Royal Nlghnuss men was) slalaalalp B41 - /5 (he senlencs harsh and mamas:/y excsssn/5" We would panapnrasa n m llus way As ml: is an appeal agamsl‘ ma exercise by me /eamedludge ora dlsmalmn vealed m mm, 15 me sontenos so far uulslda me non-nal dlscrellonary limits as to enable lhls court lo say lnal us lmposnlon must have lnvorveu an arm: of law oi some flescrlpllorfl l have had nccaslon ro say elsawnera, lnal me my mncepl olluolclaldlscletlon VWOA/GS a ngnl lo moose berweell more man one possible course ol actlon upon whlcn mam ls mom la: reasonable people (0 hold mrlanng Izplnlnns as In wnlcn ls lone pnslenaa null is game lnevnalue Human nalura being whaflllsl IN yw1xn7nLluEa7ax\lu:u\l7A ma. s.nn nmhnrwm .. U... w my me annmu-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNG Wm! drflsrenl nmgss applying me same pnncms it um um hme :n ma same country 1:: srrm/ar lens may samefrmes reach wrmn: cane/::s:u::s (see Jamrsson v Jamreson [11952] AC 5251) rr rs an ma: reason that some very conscrsnlmus wages have mougn: 1 man duly to vrsn pamcular mines wvlh exemplary sentences whflsl others, equally consc:enr:'o::s, have mougm :2 men duly ru wew ms xame crmlss wnn /amency There/we sentences do vary m apparent/ysrmrial mcumsrances wrlh ms nam: almmd L7I!IIenarlrcu!ar;m1ga :1 :s Iortllat mason almthallms commas sardllagsm andagam rrwrl/norrrormafly mlerfere mm sentence: and thepossrmlrry are:/en lhs probabrmy, ma: anolhar mun would have imposed a drflsmn! sentence rs nu! sumcrsnt per :9 m warvanl ms mun‘: Inteflsmnca we are :n Iun agraemanl wrth the statement orpnnaple en::::c:aved above " [A] D: dalam kes Pub/lc Proucunnr v Lao cnoon F-«[1575] 2 ML! 255 Ham: Hasmm Yenp san: (pads kellka mu: lelah memuluskan yepem benku| - ‘The pnncn:/as to be app/red m nnposmg sentence howevar 2:: me same u: every case The Hvgh Cour! slmngm sxermss alrls Iswstormry powers nu: ma! nomlally after the ssmsncu unless :1 :s saluflld that me sentence av ma mwer saw! :5 arthar man:/es:/y msdequals ar grossly nxcsasn/a or Wegal :2: olherwnsq not :: proper servlence nawng nagnm m ,n.:xnnuuzsm::u:::n:: mm. s.:.: nmhnrwm .. .:... :4 my :... ::::n.::: mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! m a/rzne facts disclosed on me rscordartn a//me facts much the court aughl lo (ake;un1rcral name 01, mar rs to say, thzrrhelowercm/I1 claafly has erred In applying the correct pnnmple: m me assessmenl of the sentence It rs a nnnly esmmsnsu pmcnce [hat (I12 court mu Iwl after a senlnncs merely because n zmgm have passed a dlllarenl sentence PEMLAIAN MAHKAMAH aIKa a alan M9ma1umP n k n n 1 Ks n Mara Jsnagn [51 Peguambeh Ferayu menghlqahkan Hakvm MS lehh samhavah apannu menenma xeaerang-n laporan barluhs \fi:l|m lmpan Statement‘ (‘vs’) a. bawah Seksyen 183A KPJ lanpa lsrlelslh dahulu manavima pennohonin am mangla -Itau kaluarw minus: unmk memben muangan secaru nun Pm pendapat Perayu kelerangun hpuvan vxs nanya men a: lenma nka mangsa atau keluarga mangsa wax naun umuk member! keievangan onen karma mungsa min kalunrga nungsa um memahm unluk memhen Keberangan an max ada sebah an kemukakan kenap: nungsa atau kemarga mangsa ndak aapn mu, mus VIS mum aksmn P10 din we udak upiminya an benma oleh Hakim MS m yw1xn7nuuEs7axum:n\I7A mm. smm nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [6] Seksyen 183A KPJ oersebut memperun1ukkan.- -(11 same me coun passes slntence acoovdlng In law under mum I83, «nu coun sn-II. upon me mqunsl om» vnmm nuns uflence or me v|cl|m‘s lamuy‘ call upon me mum or a member 0! me vIctIm‘s family |o make a nanamem on me Impact or xne uflenoo on ma wctlm or his vannly. (2) Where me victim at a membev ov me vImm‘s vamily is an any lesion unable ca attend the pracaedmgs zflerbemgcalled by me coun unuu sunucnun(1>.ma Cowl m-y an as auscnmon amnn . wnnen slaramenl ov me mum at 1 membev of me vmlml lanuIy' m Pad: nandanaan Mahkamihn Dembicaan Sekiyan wsaa m nu menuruukkan pembenan Kelnrlngln VIS ldlllh sllu mnnvnx am nun yang umenxan men undangundang kepaua mangsa uan bnkan salu kev-‘Ewan atau praayam sebelum sesusalu nukuman boleh di muhknn mun: em ma lam many: VIS nu man menghalang Mlhkamlh umuk merunluhkan hukuman m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:mnA mu. smm nmhnrwm .. u... w may he nnnmuu mm: dnuumnl VII munc Wm! [B] sevem yang umuxuskan dalam ken PP v. snnnmr Azuwnn Adlnln mm) 2 cu uu mu) a mu m. nnuan vxs mnyaxan nmuk memnanm Illahkamah memanann kesan dan aklbat kesalahan Ienuduh ke alas hlflup rnangsa mu kamarganya Maka‘ VIS akin membanlu Mahkamnh mencapm ealu perspekm yang am: Gan saksama mengenm keszflahan. pengalarnan mangsa alau kemarganya aan hukuman yang bakal duaiuhkan sellmpal dengan kesflahln din keszn ke am mangsa alau keluavganya [91 walaupun kedua-dun mangsa dalam xas Im alau keluarganya max mennnm unluk memben kelsmngnn mm nun dan ndzk ada mm menyehul mengapa laporan helluhs dw ulamakan Gan kelerangan usan Mankaman barpendapnt max susah unluk memahamu sebahr Iebabnyz Pencabman mus lubuh mangsa kanawkanak oleh ayah mnmng adalzh salu xeanaan ynng sangu hesav unluk manun-na mangsa dan kemarga max susah Imwk membayangkan cabaran seurang anak ymg mawl mm memben gambaran secara lvsan dndalam Mahkamzh mengen up: yang befiau lahh Valw Kesllihan yang auaxukan oleh Periyu aua\ah benflang-uling xan dun wanya jugs m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:w7A mm. snnnw n-nhnrwm n. med w my n. nnnmun mm: m.n.n wa mum v-max mehbatkan am yang dvmasukkan ke vonqqa mnun mangsa Dalam kaadnn nu. Mamnun -nu nanny: kahadvzn dm mangsz umuk mamban kahlangzn nsan am sangax nmnoeuanxan mlngsa ntau keluavganyl din sag: mental am emon [I0] D! a|as pemrnbangan nu. Mahkamah im manaapam nu-k nu: Dmjums malubalknn kc am Perayu :13: man VIS nu dikamukakzn nacava bermlus dan bukan secara nszn Mahkamah max menaupam huk Pemyu unluk al jaluhkan hukuman mengnkul unaangunaang telall dvpvejudts dan ndak ada rnana mana banagnan Alasan Fenghakmun yang menunmkkan Hakim MS lelah dw pengamm Imp: kuwuarzn munannan men VIS nu damn memaluhkan hukuman M narF mm m) Pihak Pevayu mengmuankan Perayu menghlfllp sakll kencmg mama yang knhkal‘ aaun unggv pnlung um penyukn mm Mengerm rsu kamhzlnn‘ Mnhkumah menquk kepada kepulusan urdalam kes FF v. Olumnl cnong You MM [2019] 1 ms 1792/12919} MLJLI mu m m yw1xn7nuuEs7axuu:mnA mm. smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! mana Isu laklnr kesmalan dalam mmgail nukmnan cem- ncang secav: paruang labar Pad: DSl1dIDIIMahkZfY\iVIH’I\‘ laklnr panenlu aaalan samaoa .en.s penyakll yang dlalaml oxen Perayu adahn penyakm yang riwilannya lrdak dapal dx seduzkzn oleh pmak Pemava amawan Axes Pemarz 1995 dan Perilman Penwi 1995 mupmaa uhun znnop Mahkamah um marvdapm ma kelelangan yang menuruukkan kemudanan kesnhalan an Penjara «max dapal merawal Perayu a|au lerdapat halangan kspada Perayu unluk mengakses rawaun Iewinrnyl melilul mslam Penjan Ans dasar nu Mahklmnh naak mendapau zda mam a|as Isu Im Men ens! same 7 m H kuman Pen ara Dan SsbaIAdsIah Im Atau Melamgau [12] Dalam rmnllal xsu Inl Manxaman telan menelm kepumsun Mahkarnzh Rayuln an (mam kes Tum Mn nun Lanik v‘ PPIZOWJ I cu nu 1200914 MLJM dun Abd Rlnlm Abd Rnnlmnn v. PF[201B] 5 cu 515/11121111 MLJ 25 sen: kepuxusan Mankamnh Tmggl an damn xes Munnmnd Minn Sallafl Mn PP[1027] 1 ms us:/[1022] MLJLI 590. m m yw1xn7nLmEs1axum:w7A mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-164-03/2022

PEMOHON Elvine Anak Aseng RESPONDEN 1. ) Majlis Angkatan Tentera 2. ) Jeneral Tan Sri Dato' Seri Zamrose bin Mohd Zain, Panglima Tentera Darat 3. ) Brigedier Jeneral Khairul Anuar bin Abd Aziz, Panglima Briged Keenam Infantri Malaysia 4. ) Leftenan Kolonel Mohd Haizar bin Arshad, Pegawai Memerintah Batalion Keempat Rejimen Renjer Diraja 5. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

Judicial Review - Certiorari to review the decision and/or recommendation dated 31.1.2022 by Majlis Angkatan Tentera to maintain the termination of the Applicant's service.

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bf9e68a7-c912-4c29-8633-d0073f135d62&Inline=true

02/01/2024 11:47:41 WA-25-164-03/2022 Kand. 45 S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N p2ievxLJKUyGM9AHPxNdYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—1s4—o3/2022 Kand. 45 uz/m,2n2L 11 :L7-:1) mun: uamuum muss: MALAVA m KUALA LUHPUR mum muvm rsnsexwum KHALA LUMPUR tammnm KuAs»KuAsA mus) vs onomw |lNl'|lK s KAN xzmuumu WA—25-1Sl—DJ/2022 mm perkarz mengm. kagutuuvv ulannkzm Mums Anqkstin Tamera Iemadnu ELVINE ANAKASENG ma K/P. 330317-13.5459)‘ um Damn psmaia mengenal Amkel 511; Penemmg. nFuseIulu:rI‘ Dan Dahm nemars mengerul Arms! «:1 m Panenoagun Penukulum Din Dalam perkara salu Pzvmohonzn unmk . u kebanarnn a. Izlwlh Marin 53‘ Kman 312» Kaedzah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan mum yeneva szh: Permahonin umuk sam Cevumnnm bawah Alursn 53 Kaedm 212) K:-dah~Kaedah Mahkamih zmz Dan Dalam Demnva um Fammhnnan unluk Ganu Rug! a. haven Aluran 53‘ mam 5¢mcaeaam<.aeaan Mahiramah zmz: u... 1 ar 11 sm pzmxuxuyfimnnwxwvv «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Dan nmm psnula mangenax Seksyen 25 Am Kahaiuman 1964 din perknrn munglnaw Peremgsn 1, Jam: kapada ma Dan Da\am peruva manganll seksyen 5110 am Snksyen av Akll Angkilln Tsnml wm ANTARA ELVINE ANAK ASENG pmouou um « wuus ANGKAYAN mnrsmx 2 JENERAL TAN SR: one saw zmnos: aw MOHD um wweuma vzrrraru own 3 ERIGEDIER JENERAL KNAVRUL mum aw ABD Am wmeumn amen: KEENAM INFANTRY muxvsm o xsrrzww KDLONEL MOHD HAVZAR am ARSHAD ream» MEMERINTAH amxuon KEEMPAT REJIMEN azmzn mun s xzauww muvsu RESFONDEN-RESFONDEN Darzoul sm pzmumymmpmvn «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ndak rneieporkan“ I find inai ine cnarges imposed nave noi speemcaiiy stale: me Appircanis invdivenieni wiin me 3 rnoiordycies that are so esseniiai to me criarge wriion is me main suoiecx M me oiienee. I am of me view lhal since mere were no moimcycies and/or pnoiograpns produced beiore ine commanding omoer and mere was no evidenoe by any wiineiis regarding ine panrcuiars dune motorcycles in question, the proseouiion‘s case rs doomed to tail. Slcond Elomnnt in me Sucond charge. 27 Having perused me evidence produced neiore the COWL I (ind met me 4'" Rsspandenl tailed io prove mat ine Applicant nas coniniined a oonducl that is preiudiuai in the good order and servioe discipline (keiakuan yang rnernudaraikan keadaan balk dan iavaienib perkhldmatanj 23. -Kenius Dewan Edlsl Keempal, 2007' deiine “ke\akuari' as ‘raoiac yang oiasa diiakuken, perangai, parirdaian“ irind inai inere was no evidence before irie 4'" Respondeni In prove iiiai the Appiioancs conduct was preiudiaei co ins good order and service disoipiine. Third cmrge. Kelakuari yang memudaralkan keadaan bank dan iaiaienm nerkhidmalani yang bsrlantangan dengan Saksyen av Akla Angkuvan Teniera 1972 iiiilu ia, di Pos Ealu 34, op Benleng zen Ulara sekioraraye KTJ s agd sin 2/2021, Kuaia Nemrig. Kedah pada 22 52D2I yarn Iebin kurang ieao. ieian memherikan peririlah yang (idak sah kepada anggaia oawarian iaim rneniuai Iiga bush mnlaslkal rarnpasan kepada orang amrn yang msmpakan sua|u kelskuan yang memudaralkan kaadaan balk den Iaralerlib perxnidrnaoarr 29 True eienienia oi ine chmge to be proven by me Respondenis are as ioiiows — a wrieiner me Appicant riad given a vvrongrui order io his subordinate to sen inree oonfiscaied molarcydes to the Civilian‘ and vane 11 .i 1! [Same ads Pemnhon te\ah mambenkan perintah yang udak sah kepada anggma bawahen rarnu men]ua\ luga buah molorslkm rimpasan kepada orerrg ewern), dan b. Whether we oanoucx rs prejumoe olgcod ovderand service arscipnrre. (Same ada keseflahan flu merupakan sua|u ke\akuan yang memudaralkan keadaan balk den Vatalertib pevkmdmalan) Frru Elnmonl of mu mm charge. 30. eased an my finding In paragraph 26 above men me 4‘" Respurrdem Iarled to prove the mree 13) motorcycles In quesnrarr. V rronoeo that me clvlhan (orang awamj who was mennonsd In me charge was not eaued to cesciry more lhe 4'” Respondent as euraerrce man me motorcycle had been so\d lo mm :1 runner, 1 mm man nu reeerpr was proauoeo In prove Lha| mere was a sale and purchase crarrsacnorr as stated in the charge “meruual uga nuarr rnauarsrkax kepada orarrg swam second Elurmm nl Ihe Third Charge. 32 Tms Issue has been mscussed m paragraphs 27 and 28 above 33 Based on the above. lhis Own vs 09 the oonswdered oplmon that a proper procedure mus| be adhered to In such a proceeding m order hr (ivmese [0 be uphe\d and no such suhslarlhal uuushae Is occurred upon the accused :4 I find suppon for my view by reaerrmg In me case 0! Mejar Fudxll Arshud v. Mlllis Anukalnn ‘rurmn, Malaysia 5. Mo! [2010] 3 MLRH 10; [21111] 4 CLJ 930 where Merramau Zawawr SaHeh. J (as be men was) rrem as1uI\ows:- my Mahxaruan telah memelaskzm banawa dalzm snuasr (enema Stmnkln Kuhnklmln ummap knpuluun yang mcllhlllun hnl-MI kemmmr. mm. ceruuuk lxtpldl Slmakan Kehaklmin, r... .2 on 1. mlsalnvyl, “where the Iclions by anm comes mu m vmauve of lmlr own ugullllunl oi hlyond an Ir man In within an much am. Cami." Mihkzmah juga menglkwal nanawa Dada xaznnnya ‘ms am: Own :19 not me Aganuss wmm mm delumma ma precue bilanov to be swck -n (N: admrlmenl belwun mm 0! man‘ and me aemam aidwscxphne and duly at imlafl lorces mmwbers“ Dmam mesa ynng am. manuman menyllnkzn huh-wa 4 nm mtlnkunukln budlhlcaranyl, punnuan ke muun dalam A-hal knlunluruin n-naamn nn-nga-nnunun. unun lktnr ylnu M. In an munaunu pmsoduv yang betul din an (emphasws audadt canon-man 35 Prenusad on the aiuresaxd reasons, nms com Vs ol the mew max me decxsxon of Respnndenls IS (armed wwlh me error at waw and/ar mauonamy and/Dr unreasanabrenss |hal wanams me mlervenlmn ohms Conn 36. smae my declsxan ws based on me above wssues/gmunds‘ rwm not addrass we remavnmg wssuej/grounds raised by me Applvcanl 37. As such, the Appncanrs applvcahan for a wdl al review (Endosure 7) VS auwwed with coals of RM5.000 DD wllhnul the allocalor lee. Dated 01 Januaryzau Ahmad Kamal bun Md sham Judge Hxgh cmm Kuala Lumpuv u... 1: ul 1: am pzmxuKuy13MnAHPxMavv «ma s.nn nmhnrwm a. U... w my n. nrW\ruH|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nrwum v-max counsel For me Apyhcam Encxk Zamurin hm Mnhd Dom |Enc4k Fauzu Noor u Anas and Enux Yusman um Che Amen wilh mm) Temsn Fadzfl Near a. Assocxates Peguambeia 5 Peguamcara No 25. Ja\an Sen Puma SIE‘ Bandar San Puha. 43000 Kzyang‘ Selangar Dam Ehsan For the Respondents‘ Puan Nur lrrnawane blDaut1 Senmr Federal Counsel Jabalan Peguam Negam‘ Bahagwan Guaman. No 45, Persuarsn Ferdanfi‘ Fvesim 4‘ 52:00 Pulrajaya v... .4 .v .4 Judgmenl Introduction 1. The Applicant filed an apphcamn lav yudmal renew (snclosuna 7) under Order 53 av the Rules or coun 2012 (ROC) 2 The Avnllcanl was gramed tesve to apply for pudwcxal review agamsx me Respondents to seek the ¢o\kw./mg reners - 21 Eahawa Pemohon amen kebenaran di bawah Nuran 53 Kaedah 3 (2; Kaedah—Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 unluk mamuhnn saw Semakan Kehakwman (emadap kapmusan Responden Perlama ianu Maflxs Angkatan Tenlera yang menclak permohonan ulangkap nenanxn 22112022 yang bersangkulan dengan kepulusan bersalah dan hukuman “Drlurunkan ke pangkalRen]sr|PrebeU'yang|e!ah mkenakan ks a|as Pemahun pada 26.6.2021 sena dibemenukan danpada verkhldrnalan ATM berkual kuasa pada 17 3 2021: 2.2 Banawa Pemuhun when kebenaran umuk memohon salu Pannllh cemaran un|uk mamhamlkan Kepuxusan Respanden Panama lersebuh 23 aanawa Femnhon dnben Kebenaran un|uk memonan salu Deldarasi bahawa Kepulusan Responden Panama lersehut adalah sa\ah u undangmndang, ba|a| uan max san; 24 Bahawa Pemahon when kebenalan unluk memahon salu Perinlah bag: Responden-Respondan membayar semula gap dan Imbuhan-unbuhan yang sewsgamya ananma o\eh Pemohon nannma dan (ankh Pemohon diberharmkan danpada perkmumacan iavlu pada 11.5.2021 sehlnggs ke Lankh lama! perkmumalan behau pada 2|.|2.2024. 2.5. aanawa Pemonan amen kebenaran unluk memohon salu Pennlah bagu Rasponaenaesponden memhayar kepada Pemohon apa-an: vaadah, pencen pevkhidmalan dan gamaran perkhxdrratan yang Pemohon sehamsnya Vayak pervlehv sena suar manlaal aihefikan kepada Femahnn up : av u semngga ke larlkrr carnal perkrnarnalan Pemohorl lanpa kehllarlgan kskanarlan pangkal dan kelslimevlraan, 2.6. Kas‘ flan 2 7 Rahhellflaln darl selenlulnya yang Mahkamah yang Mulla ml anggap palul dlpennlahkan 3 ln essence, lna Applleanl filed me lualalal Ievlew ler . cenlprarl Order lo reylew me declslorl and/or remmmendallon dated 31 01.2022 bylhe Mallis Angkalan Terllsra(IlA1')11"Respunden() The Appllpenl eppllas (11 ms Honourable Court to quash lne sald declslnn made by me 1" Respondent lo rnalnceln lne lenrnnallen of lne Appllpanrs service and mat mere were no lrregulanly analpr lmpmprlely In me procedures 0! me 4-“ Respondent as me Oommanding omeer dumlg |he lnyeslrgallon of charges and summary hearlng (‘Perblcaraan Terus‘) that was held agalnst lhe Appllcanl. wnlen me Appllcaru alleged had caused sllpslanllal VIN ' wmenppllcanl 4 ms lud al rel/my apphcallun Ne. WA-25»164—U3l2D22 (JR 134) IS fixed lo be heard logetherwlkh ludrcral revlaw appllcallofl Na wA« 25-163-D3/2022 (JR 153) and ludlolal revlew appllcallorl No: WA- 25-I65-U3/2022 [JR 155) 5 Afler the rlearlng, I allowed me Appllcanrs appllcaflun in JR 164 lngelner wlln JR 163 and JR les. 5 Dissatisfied mm the dficlslorlsl the Respondents ln JR 1&3, JR 164, and JR 165 filed an appeal. rms luagmerll mnlalns me lull reasons lpr rny JR1S4 aeclslon The grounds or ludgrnenl lerJR ls: arm JR 165 wlll be prepared sepa.-alely lvom lrlls judgment. Erie! Facts 7. The anal racls galhered from me cause papers are largely urIdlspu|ed and can be summarlzed as lallows:- 1.1. The Appllcanl ls a lonner Omar Rank (LLP) member cl me Army ln me Royal Ranger Reglmenl corps wlln me rank oi Shff sargeanl who commenced service an 22.12 2003 and r... . 9! u was to be cnmple|ed on 21.6.2024 laelore being dlscharged (mm sen/lee, ms Appllcanl held a poslllon as me ‘Penolorlg Kelua Plarun Rapal“ 72. on 25 5.2021, me Anpllcanl was charged wllll lluee (03) allenees and was subsequently deal| wlln dlrecfly by me 4"‘ Respondent. He was later lound guilty on all cnarges and serl|erlced |o -reaucllon lo we rank cl Ranger (Ren]ev|“. He was further dlmhalgad lrorn servlce by me 2*“ Respondent (Chlelaf me Army) wllrl ellecl lram 17 B 2021 The Law 3 Judlclal Review Is generally concerned wlln lhe aeclslan making process where me lmpugned declsion ls flawed on me ground al procedural lmproprlely 9. However, the law has now developed la allow a declslorl lo be challenged on graunds ol lllegallly and lrrsllonallly, wrucn then perrnils me calms lo scrulinlzelhe aeclslan nel anlylor lhe process. but also for subslanoe 10 II ls sellled law met me Hlglr Court wlll nnl lnlerlere wllrl a dBCISl0I’l or me Rsponaenls unless II can be eslanllslleu lllalllle declslon ls lnlaned wllh arms or law ll The mearllrlg el ermr uf law has also been explained by the Caufl 0! Appeal m we case cl Syarlknt Kand-run Molayu KI nun Ehd v. rranspon warms Union [1995] 1 MLRA 1:3; [1 W5] 2 cu ua; 1195512 AMR 130141995] 2 ML! 317 In me lollawlng words at In lllher lea ‘bk rluv dvslnble In llllmpt n mun-«ye dellnhlon <2! mm unounu In In mar M law‘ «or ma c-|agmIs.I cl SUCH an crrol are ml dosed. Eul ll may In said mm In enor el llw woula hr alselessa ll cm llnn-nllkuv am nlmnlllho wrung qlusllon or Mku lma ucwunl lmnl consldcralinns or omns In uko um -mun: r-lmnl eensmmlona (wnal may be ounverllzrlllylsmlad an Anlsm c ervarlor ll »- mlsconnlvuu mu lmnn of my r-lmnl Ilatuln. or min-pal Hr rnimales a mincipln mm guveral law ~ (errlphasls added) v... s n! u 12 Similarly, m we case amrspacu Man-gnmom Scrvices Sdn and v. Cal (5) Harbans singn Chlngar Sliigh [znoo] I MLRA :54; man] 4 cu 11, me Courl M Appeil held out an erroneous -rvrevenoe cl iaas ls also an eriur of law winch would warram an niderolcemoiari » “On me mhsrhand. we sum alcwvse. main ls enively mmpeiem far we Nlgh Cami ln cerimarl pmuedmgs m dlsngve: wnli ms indurirlal Cami on me mndusms m imuewes drawn by me latter «mm me pruved or admiiied evvdsnoe on me gmund mu no wasoriahle mhuml sirmlafly clwurvisiamaud would have unwed at such a conclusion or drawn such In rmnisnce An Irmiuuiis Iiifeunu mm. piovld nr aammea «am is an Inc! at law: not .n Imar 01 um. [emphasis added) 13 Based an the fciegomg passages, ii ls my viewlhal to succeed m an applicaiion lurjudlclill review, lhe Apphcani mus! shw met me Respondenls had. among uihers' - a. Asked nsell iha wmng QLASUDVIS2 h Consldered inelevanl mailers, C Furled Ia Danslder relevani mailers‘ d Failed io apply lhe proper prlnoiple|s)o1law,and/or e Reached a aemsvon ihat was so perverse man no reasonable mbunal under similar oircumsianoes would have reached ll. rm Appiieanrs ground: an inn judicial nvlvw 14 In grsl, Illa Applicants applicailon harem is based on the lollowing grounds . I4 1 That the mvesiigaiion cl charges by the 4"‘ Respondent ls prncsdurllly flawed, biased and has iesullad in a lailure Ol iusiioe (1) Fallurs In Conduct a Pmpar invesiuganon of Charges u... : nl u sm pZxemxLiKL/yEMflAHPxNdVI “Nana sew nuvihnrwlll e. U... m my me mmuny mm: dnuumni Vfl mum v-ms! 142 That his Abstract oi Evidenoe‘ was detective and not in accordance wI\h this rule. (1) The ‘Aiasir-act at Evidence‘ was conducted without tne Applicants knowtarsge 12; The 4'" Respondenl is me person who issued me will sranmng Order and is me same person who investigated tna charges and aunductaa the summary mai against the Appltmnl (3) The churges lramed against ins Applicanl were delectwe. undearartd unoanain as may let! to spemfy the aeiaris ol the aiieged aflencas Tm doclslnn of are Caun That the investigation M nhargus by tho 4" Rupond-ni is procedunlly flawed, blnsad and ms resulted in a failure of injustice. Failure to conduct a Prapsr Invssiiuaiinn of chsrgos. 15 ms Issue nas been In paragraphs 15 in 31 ussed at tengm in me irragmsnt of JR 163 ‘max ins ‘Abstract 01 Evidence‘ was def-cllvo and not in accordance with em rulu. ma ‘Abstract oi Evldunce' was conducud wiinaut ms Applicant‘: Itnuwlodnu. 16 This Issue nas been discussed ai iengtn M1718 judgrnantpun 163 In paragraphs 32 to 36. v... r at ll ‘Nana s.r.r Inmhnrwm r. i... w my r... nflninnflly mm: dnuuvtnni VII mum v-mat The 4"‘ Rzspovldonl lune person who issuud em unll Standing Order and II. um same person who lnvnllgaled me lzhurgu and conauchd (III summary Irlnl lg ' II "II Anpllcunl. 17. ms Issue nas been discussed at length WV me judgmenIo(JR 163 m paragmphs 43 lo 45. Thu chamns turned against mo Aapncanl were defective, unclnar and ununaln us may Iallad lo specify mu dolllls oi me alleged affnnnu. la The Appllcanl was chavgad mm mu (:3) cnargx as follows: a; First change. max memaluhl perlrllah lelap. yang benenlangan derlgan Seksyerl 51 Ana Angkalan renlera 1972 lam: V5. .1. Pas sam 34, semasa malaksanakan Operasl Berlleng Zen Ulars Kawasan Tanggurlgyawab s Brlged dan Operas? Fagar ll sun 2/2021 G1 anlara 26 42021 mngga 22.5 2021, man melanggar Perlnlih Upeusi Esrllang zan uuara Kewasan Tarlggunglawab 6 Eflgfid lol= KOTA BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA DAN PAGAR ll) Sm 2/2021 benankh an 3 2021 al pererlggan 3 -: 122), laml suam perlnlah yang dlkelahulnya alau dilangka dengnn munassbah ulkelanuinya, dengan lldak msnyerahkan llgi bush moloslkal rampasan kepada ulhak PDRM dengan kadar segera adalah salu kssalahan 19. The elements ol the charge lo be prm/en by the Respondents are as lollo a. Whether lne Appllcanl al Pas aalu 34,t1unng Benleng Operallcn ol Zon Ulara Kawasan Tarlggurlglawab 5 Enged between 26 April In 22 May 2021, had vlolaled Penman Operasl Banleng zen Ulara Kawasan Tanggunqliwab 5 Enged (op KOTA BRAVOICHARLIE/DELTA DAN op PASAR ll) Sm 2/2021 dated 30.3.2021 Dalagraph 3 c (22; when ne lanea m hand over Lhree conrlscalea mclarcyclas as soon as passlble la the PDRM p....am (Sama ada Pemohon m Pas Sam 34, semisa melaksanakan Opemsi Bemeng Zon Ulara Kawasan Tanggunmamb 5 angaa (OF KOTA BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA DAN OP FAGAR ll) Sin 212021 berlarikh 30.3 2021 paragraph 3:: 1221 dengan (Idak menyerahkan Hga buah motorslkal kepada plhak PDRM dengan kadar segaraj, dan 1). Whether we Orders known to him orwmch he nugm reawnamy be expecued to know [Same ada penntah cersebm aaalan sualu pewflah yang dikelahumya alau duangka dengan munasabah dwketahumya). Flrll Elomunl of tho rim Chargl 20. me 4'" Respondent has ram lu produce any evmenoa before him |o pmvs met me smnamg Orders is 1:. (ha charge as m Exhibrl MH- 4 1:1 me ’Afidavi1Jawapan 11) Responden(' dated 22.7 2022 Is me and scanmng omen 21 On «ms Issue, I have mscussed an length m mewdgmenc o1JR 153 In paragraphs 53 In as Second Element mm First Chargn. 22 The 3"’ Respondem had faned Io prove mm me Slandmg Order is an order man 01: Applicant already knew or reasanamy expeclad 1:; know 23. ms Issue nas been dnscussed m the Judgment 0! JR 153 .n paragraphs 7211: 13 Second charge. Kelakuan yang memudamtkan keadaan hank den 1avazemn perkhmmalan, yang nenamangan dengan Seksyen s7 Ak|a Angkalan Tenure 1912 1ai|u 13, P05 Batu 34, samasa memksanakan Op Eenleng Zon mam Seklov Bravo KTJ 6 59¢ siri 2120211 Kuara Nerang, Kedah <11 anlara 2542021 hingga 22.5.2021, lelah lidak mewaponcan v...m .4 keosda puhak a|asan berkenaan nga huah malcsxkal rampssan yang mempakan sualu kelakuan yang memudaralkan keadaan den lalalemb perkmdmalan. 24 The elements at the charge |u be preven by the Respondems are as roHows.- 5) Whelher the A,pp|\can| at P05 Ban: 34, durmg Op Berneng Zen Ulara Seldol Bravo KTJ 6 Bgd Sm 212021. Kual: Nerarvg Kedah balween 23.4 2:121 la 22 5 2021. laded Ia repun to (he Ngher aulhonly regarding three wnfiscalsd motorcycles, and (Sam ada Pemohon dx Pos :4‘ semasa mewaksanakan op semsng zen Uizra Sekwr Bravn KTJ 5 Bgfl sm 2/2021, K-ma Nevang, Kedah d. anlara 26.4 2021 hmgg: 22 5 2021 lelah max melaporkan kepada pmak alasan berkenaan (vga buah molosxkal rampasan): den b) wnamer we conduct Is Dvegudlca of good wear and servme msciphne (Sama ada kesalahan flu merupakan sualu keiakuan yang memudaratkan keadaan hawk darl |aIa|emb perkhidrnatan). First Elnmom Mme Second charge. 25. 1 and mm me charge is me vague and no ewdence was ever \ende1ed eunar mmugh wunesses or aocuments to esvabhsh “who ya me sunenor that should be vapurlad la" The pamcurars of me offence only smed ‘came to vepon Ia supenors" but am not speuflcafly svaue who he was Therefore. 1 am of me view met me onus us on the pmsecmion to prove who the "supanow us and wha| me [arm of me dlreclwe ws, lamng which wiH affed me prcseeuuon case 26 The 4'" Respondent has a\so ened in Vaw and (sun when failed in prove and expkun me 3 mcmvcycles mat are recerrea to as ‘Ielah run 1:: 1:! u

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22M-886-12/2022

PLAINTIF SA Puncak Management Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN 1. ) Nakiwa M&S Sdn. Bhd. 2. ) Iylia Najlaa Fathi Binti Dato' Nabil 3. ) Idzham Haiqal Bin Dato' Nabil

Civil procedure – Summary judgment – Default in repayment of Islamic Pre-Factoring facility granted by a factoring company – Whether plaintiff was entitled to terminate and recall facility – Whether plaintiff failed to plead particulars - Whether there was admission of amount due entitling final judgment to a reduced claim – Whether Islamic Pre-Factoring Agreement covers purchase orders issued before agreement was executed - Whether the failure to issue certificate of indebtedness renders the case triable - Doubt as to bona fides of defence – Conditional leave to defend - Whether defendant ought to be given conditional leave to defend – Rules of Court 2012, Order 14 rr 1, 3, 4 - Evidence Act 1950, s17(1) - Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, s2 & 3

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Yusrin Faidz bin Yusoff

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02/01/2024 13:58:14 WA-22M-886-12/2022 Kand. 68 S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ELcl3JKfTEW9DRH22RR43A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA—22)(—E85—12/2022 Kand. as n2/ouzou 13:52-14 IN IN: HIGH com" or MALAVA AT KUALA LUMPUR [COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT No. WA-22M-IE6-1212012 In the mine! 0! an Islamic Pre- Flctolinv Aqmmom daled 1:37.202: And In me manor of an Islamic Flclarlnq Agnimnnl flllld 11.01.2021 And In ma mam: ad 1 Guaranm d.uu1:I.a7.znu And In III: mane! of one: 7 and Order 23 of the Rules of coun 2012 BETWEEN SA Punuk Maniglmnnl Sdn Bhd (company No. : Zu01I11n15BsI (618238-H)) PLAINTIFF AND IN Emzmrrzwmnnzzwman -um Sum! n-vwhnrwm be flied M mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm I NAKIWA M55 sou. sun. [Company No. 200501045910 (653973-A)! 2. IYLIA NAJLAA FATHI smn DAN)‘ NAEIL [NRIC No. 331203-ss-$550] 1. Inzm HAIOAL BIN DAIO' NABIL INRIC No. : 94051:-m-5531] DEFENDANTS GROUNDS or gyfimfim INTRODUCTION m In em: me me Plavrmll had applied (ov a summary pmgmenx m and 20 to be entered agams| the Defendants Vanna sum owmg under an Vsramxc PreFaclorIng Agreement pursuant to 014 allhe Rules oi Court 2012 me Rams’) [2] Mler conswdenng the arguments presemed by man pames, 1 had on 25 10 2023 dlsmnued the Plzmmrs appncanon Inseeaa I granted me Devenaams Veaveln delend on me eundmon manna sum ol RM1 421.955 10 be pam mm Court within 30 days 1 also snpulaled max N the candmon ws met, lhe case mu proceed to man, and me costs zssacualed wmn encl 20 will be treated as costs m me cause Conversew‘ 4 me Delenflanls tau xo runm me m Emzxxrrzwmknzzwman mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Iumtt v Bank Slmganan Nulonnl 2021} MLJU 2552 South E:slAs1: Insurance Eerhld V K: In Malagig (19951 1 cm 1045. and N no Comgnx for Fggign mg, 1 Km. Rap Sdn and [1954] 2 MLJ 300 ta argue that In any event, 1| Vs well seltled that \f a delendam succeeds In ratsmg even a smgle tname Issue, ll wm nut be a fit case and praper case to under summary judgrnent It VS veltememly avguad by me Detenuante mat the 0 14 junsdtcfion VS any to be exerctsed VI very dam cases wherem me Inlenlmn was nut la shut out Delenuams 1mm thetr day m court [1 51 Vn response. mmntm reamea caunul argues that tneaeuy by mum VI making paymemdoes not atvect me ngm ol me Flamml In tnswst on Ms ubhganan In pay upnn expvrallon cf the t:redt1|erms for each rewivabie On the Vssue at repayment at Rmmnoa no on at as 2022, Ills contenaea mat the same was Bald by D1 mmuut any duress Dr undue mnuenee wheretn V! uIlrmale\y reduces the outstanamg amoum (mm RM1.71o,a9a as to RMI 140,595 219 In essence the Ptamtwt posit: tnettnere rm been a breach tmaer me agreement between names emtlhng [hem Ia temunate me said tact es 1) m ztemnzwmwzmu mm. am.‘ ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm Wm! my on Illa wssue of aorreclnoss onne amcum claimed the Plamml argues that D1 had mu knowledge Mlhe sum due, and ma: at all mansriamrnes [nave Is nu complaint or cammanls made on me slalement o1 acwunls wssued (0 them FINDINGS AND DECISION [21] Summary judgmeni pvocaaure am m provide a wdgmenl m we ImlIa\ phase Ma case llwould be granled when n \s deemed appropnaxe, wnn me mum Ilm In save time an axpense: Imked wan : fuH1na\ The zulhumy :1! me coun m gram summary mdgrrtenl ws specmeu m o 14 y 1 and 3 Mme Rule [211 o 14 r 1 at me Rures read as loI|aws- m wnm In in when to wmch an. ml: Iwlru . xuhlmnl ul unnn has been served on a delendant and man delennam nas enlevsd an appealanoe m In: lchun (M pmnun may on mu wanna mu ammnu nu nu attuned to a damn mcluded .n ma wn| Dr In a pamular pan evsusn a dam nr has no dnlunx to hack 3 sum er pan excnnl In m In: amount ul my dimngu d:vmed..Ipp1yIn\hu own lor|udwnenlag:mslmal selendanl uy Sumac! lo Dlviwiph 13) um. Me lpphn m wary ncmn hugun by M1! mnev man on: much mdudas _ my : clam by me ulamml fur um uanasn mahuwi pwsecuhon mu Imp! nnmlru uduanun a: breach of prumne cl mamlqe oi sm Em11><rrEwsDRHz2RR4:A «mu. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e med u may he mn.uu -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! mm : cram by me pmmm um an .n lulgahnn mm 1:) nm ovuer mu na| app\y m in l:1mn In wmu: o m apphas [23] Whereas 0.14 r! or me Runes read as Valium: - m Umesi on me new; M an inphmimn «mm ml: 1 ewlhev the cm cum me Applznlmn M the aulonaanl -am: he cm with mom tn me exam av me pan or 3 am. in Much me app\Ica|\on remes um mere .. in wisue or quexnon m awn. Much wanna be med on manner: ought om some ulnev reason u. be ; mm M on: dalm ov rain me can may awe sucruuagmem Var me .u.-mu against ma| ueierudamon Ihal am at purl u may be um having ream! m 0.. mm nllhc nmady »« remcuum 42) rag cowl miy Cy onilr am Iubpxl to wow cunflmans Winy as may mus: svaym: exaculmn manymgnmu given mm a delendxnlunder mu NW9 um!!! sum the mm M my cwnmum made a: nausea by me dMendan| m we admn [24] The law guvevmng summary wdgment ws «me and had been succlncfly shied by Humm Vuop Sum SCJ us he then will m In .1... lnlugngg :4 sun mm v Am Mum Sdn anu[19s112 MLJ I83 ax p 133 -m The urldnrlylng pmnawprvy m me Order 1: nmvmnn u m p-mm a omnlnl clsmy enmled to me mm, lmm mm darayd nu wdynanlwum mere ‘a na limy amuabie menu |o me am The umwman am:-nu only he lnnllad «a cam where mm .5 no mmmm. mm mu (ha p\Imm1 u enlmzd In In: mdulmm 0142114 5 nrxmlendsd m mu nuuhn .m.m.m we wnsdnwun mum only beexucuscd m very clearcalel“ [25] In Eank Negari mg gysll v Ilnhd Imu (199211 ML] 400. me Courl new mat when in amman. «max at mspuxe Is equwocik ar lacking pvecxswon or \s mconmem wnh unmspmea aonlempurary dncumams or other statements bylhe same aeponenv. or us mheuenuy mlpmbable m usew. u sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! men such asserlmn at denial wm he veleaed, mmny renaenng me Issue not lnable In other words. leave to devena wm not be gramed based upon "mere assemons" by defandant: msnead, me count wm look an the whme snuauon umcauy to exnmme whether the deianoe Is or-mun: us] In me Privy cauncu case 0! Eng Moo Yang 5 95 v gm]; mum [1979] 2 MLJ 212‘ a! 217‘ Lord Dlplack explimed I| is mus Wmuugh m me rmmm my n u not auplopnile my a judge to illemm xa ruolva wnmui «emu»: an iMdlvI| ms due: no! mean max he ‘s bound |o acaenl mummy u mswg a dlspme 54 Ian wm calls var mm invnllnlhon wary rlalsmunl an In mmn hmmvll Iquwocul. Vackmg m prauslon moumsum MIII umlspnned conlzmpurarydocumems at mm nmemmlx By III nma dspanv x. 04 mhcmnliy mmum. m mun ma be In makmg ma. omev on me appmznm :5 he my mum ‘us!’ me may ; vubad Mm: Gnu:/elm: men n. muunuIu1nud\aaI\y V1 V510: mm in an-mm. m the nu: msunee whelhev xllllm-ms unmanned m llfldlvns ma: we um upon as rmsmg . mum av awdsnua upon : mennl lanl um .umu.n: puma lane pmmny In nnvvl mm Invesnganm .5 (0 mew Hum“ [21] Vn the event max me Cowl Imus Ihal Iheve are Issues In be med. n has me auvmnty |o granl weave in defend as wnferred by 0 14 v 4(3p av me Rules wmm anpul-«es as vouuws - Lelvelunn new :4 1 o) 4 m 12> (3) m cam may give a deiendanl anamst whom mm in apphcahun 5 made lent in mm Ira xenon mm rnpncl nu ma dawn or ma pin :71 . dmm m vmlch the apphcannn Mates ermer unmndmunafly or on such new n In gmng ucumy or um av mode at mm at omemme an n mm m 14 sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 447 [25] In [his use. the Defendants ms. concerns about me Flammh dacmnn to uueary appvcach TUDM lav payment concerning the vecewables to be assxgned by 01 la TUDM They argue that TUDM Is net privy to the comraclual relaliansmp between Ihe Flaimifl and 91 under the (names Concemlng me mes anhe pames mvulved, n \s wonhwmle Ia naive mm the lundamenlal oonoep| oflhe factormg arrangement Faclnnng, a prawoe wrlh anclenl racks, days back co Babylnman limes Tu; gyg gf uammunbx campnsed m Mesopolamu during 17551750 ac -aamm specmc um practices veraled to merchants‘ agems who pnwmea assurances for nae credits markmg me eamesl documented mscance of laclonny Balms me zom oenlury‘ a ‘iactaf served 21 a business aganl mm mpanumun-as we» as slnnng and seumg consigned goods, pmwmng cnems wnn an aocoum M ::oHec(ed funds‘ ensuring customers‘ emu. am oocasmany ulfenng cash advances Io cnarus prim lo me Iflual sale :1! goods Facxars pllyed - crucial and acme role‘ ewecnafly m luvelgn lrada‘ and gamed 5IgmN:anoe dulmg me era of wlamar expbrilxan and development Vn modern muss, me unaanymq principle ov vacmnng umam oemerea amund the financial vuncnon at pmwamg funds In sellers engagsd in transactions wnn credllwcrlny orgamzanons The neoessny oi pnysucauy pcssesmng me mm .5 m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! goods Is no lnngev marldaled. lnsleea. legal mecnenlsms and converlllorls lacllllile me lransler ol awllershlp lnruugh lnlemallonal lraae lnslmmems ll VI however ohservld lnel me aclvva mle L11 a «mm ln me ccllecxlon pl reeelvaples (rum me eulgnee endured me last pl me (291 Durlrlg me recesslcn or me early 19305‘ a global phenomenan was noled where man and mealumcale enlerprlsu. aclwely engaged ll’! dehvenng goods and serwces la larger pmpprallons, laced ponsmevanle challenges anslng from delayed 0!. al nlnes camplele non-remvery ol piymems awed by men cuslcmers ms nnuanon had a pmlnuna lmp:c|. lesultlrlg In a cons|vlr.1lan pl men cepael llow thereby llmlllng me lends aocessiule lo: men day-In-day cperalmns and Impeding Ihelr pulemlal lor grcwln and suelelnalnlny To enhance me nemplly ol sucn blmnenes me iarmallxallan olme concept ulladurlng |L:oI< place mlougll me UNIDROIT Cunvenfion on lnlnrnalianal Faemrlng. winch was adopted ln onawa an 25 051933 (“the Converlllan') Anlcle 1 at me Convermnn pmvlded a definihnrl luv a ‘fadorlng wnlrucl‘ 35 lauows 'Amcle I 1 2 For me pulposu no one Cmwerllwn -raaenng epnnaer mun! a eenlraa wnuudad belwnn uni p-ny an. -upplml Ind anolhnr pany lme laenm 9‘"Sul!I| lp men 4.; lbs nuppueu may E! van asslan lo me fuck)! llualvlblsa nnnng Hum mnlrlcls cl sale afgoods -nape between me maybe! mm M! cunmvlu: 16 em Emzlxrrzwsunuzzfiman «me s.n.l nuvlhnrwm be H... e may he MEVHIUIY -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna vtmxl mummy alnav man Inns: nu ma aaxa cl quad) mugm pmnanly in: than aamnax fanmy ov nnunhold use my ma mm m w pancnu :1 naasx Iwn nHheleHw4mg4unI1mn: —flnan::e «cm. auppw mdudmn Vein: and amanc. pay-mu —m.mmen:nce co accaums Uadgennuj Iehalmg Ia me recerumu. —cn!Incuon of not um. vpmlaclvun agamamavauu In naymem by demms m nwoe cl ma alsvgnmenl M In: run:-wlmls sun bogwen «a «blur: “ [an] \n our cannuxn even Ihough Mmaysla xi us! a member M ma Vnlevnananal Inamma larthe unmcancn cl Pnvale Law qunumom ana nas nnlgwen effeclto mesawd ccnvenncn me (arm "\s\amic Fauonng Eusiness" Is defined In nation: 2 A 3 um. In 9 F uggg ; 5-mylgg Ag 20:: as “(he nusmua or scqumng debts m other financm ab/rgatrons due to any person ansmg Imm any transact/on wmcn rs m acccmanca wvfh snanan‘ [M] spacmc xc ma use ma pamac have entered Inlo an Vslimuc Pre- Faclnnng Agreement wrucn became ma basxs M ma enwc clann of RMIJAQBSB 59 Unlike nurmal faclanng wmcn vs “invoice-based" Pra- Fictonng represents a muncnal |nnnI:nun am a ammcx vacmy where a Factonng company pm»/ides advance finsncmg lo a contractor or vendun vaamaung me nnancmg cuunme puma prmecis Auac known as ‘purchase cmar «nancmg: N pravldls financxal rename «or ccnnaaxan |o pruduce anc delwcrgacas or samcea to (new customers an aaamzwmaazzmaa «ma. am.‘ nmhnrwm be met! a may he nflmnaflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max [:21 Fmm me cuntrad documems, mere are mm pzmes mvnwed They are — 2) b7 5) at the Intended asswgnnr ‘ e . the pnnclpal borvvwev mu; (he mlendad asslgnee ‘ e , Inc (now (PlamIM)‘ the approved deblnv i e 1 me purchaser or me goods or same; rrunm and me gummms [D2 5. D3) [:31 In essenoe, mere were three ounlracwal Iemionshlns that were created 37 Qomracl bemoan m and T QM, Here DI agnes |n sell none pmpneaary avcrafi spare pans to mom on whom mvoices ave reused YUDM wouva svgn or be served names of assignment at am: oonfmmng «run they would maka payments to me Flamufl Pnor to me Issuance oilnvmoes by DI. me Vslamlc Pzeraaonng Agreemem aflows mamas up to ma sum of RM2‘Z7E,SI7 as |:) be duhuvsed |o D1 saw: an me emaonoe. disbursements wera made oy me Plalnml In :71 upon mom wssumg ow wan men pumnase orders Tm; womd ensue D1 to source and pay vov me goods ordered by TUDM 1; m Emzxxrrzwsumzzfiruan «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrwH\I>e p... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! n7 Canlract belween m and Fmnufl Here me Wamufl waum men-use up to sum 0! RM2.27B‘SV7.B9 pnur lo D1's mvmce lo TUDM wnn an agreed pmfil raxe at 5% per mom and me pnymenx charges at 1 5% per momh The man penoa var me Vshrmc Fre-Fauonng Agreement was var so days‘ whevein me recourse period wanna be an uaye upon expvry of the cream pence n has been Igleed um lhe payment |uw:lds me pre- Ianonng “shall be done by way 0/ ansemng me vutsta/vdmg balance against paymenrs from the Factoring !nvarr:e{s) / commcr‘ wnemn .1 D1 «ans In vaennr and zsslgn the mvcu:a(s) upon me exp-ry oi G0-day cvedul pemzd on has to pay rm me balance advanced sum undev me Islamic Prermonng Agreement no lalanhan 30 days upon expiry ovme Eflday cvedrt aenae, and c) n tween Pllwnlrfl and me u Vin n D Contract av pemonal guayancee by D2 & D3 xo me P\amM In! pre-payments made In D1 12 m Emyxrrzwsunuzzfiman «mm. s.nn ...n.mn .. U... m my n. nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max [:4] In ngm ol rne given aennmcn an a .:are4u| examrnanan at me Is\am|c Pre-Facmnng Agreemenr rn qnssuon. rt rs evmenr Dial a comprehensive lmanual structure has been mencunausxy ellabllshed lhmugh mu|ual egreemem nemeen the Plamllfland m we srnrcrurea lramewnrk preersexy omhnes essenI\a\ components and rmncacre nerem In me prehzttctnng agreement. mcludmg the advmee nmn, any applicable pmfil elemem or chavges. me auranon Mme are-faclonng arrangemenr, and me mechanisms gavemmg me cnHecuan and vemmance oi lands rnrougnour me process 0! ple»far.1ormg as well as iactonng proper Hence I nelreve man rne Flainnfls slim: to socuva eennnnanon on me issue nl paymlnt «om mom‘ whether undertaken more 01 avrer me comrneneernenc at regax proceedings cmsmute an essermal aspen 0! ms responsrmlnres as auurned In one ls\amic Ple-Factoring Agveemunl, wnren rs in be cunsvdeved m ccruunctlan wrrn me Ismrmc Factoring Agreement. TN: preaciwe sranee aligns wrnr me agreea- upen terms and reflects me P\amlifl's oamrmtment in mmurng us resporrsrhrlmes wrxnrn me eecaursned nnancrax structure [35] Upon revrewrng me amdavn evmenoe, rs Is my new that me Plalnml ha: successfully derllorlsfriled the axvslenoe Ma breach Based on the Venev dated 02 as zuza (exh M94 01 encl 35)‘ D1 hat taxes In raise an Arwmca rs sm Emzxxrrzwsunnzzmuan “Nana s.n.r nmhnrwm .. med e may r... nrwhuflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa war wndmcn, me Plauntm has me nghl In enlev nnar Judgment‘ mm scan. or Rmsmo on to the Plalnlfll [3] ma Defendants Ned men nohee M appeal on 0111 2023 Upvn cunsldenng ma Deaenaanty lnrmal applrcanon rn encs 52, I nave granted a stay oflhelmpcsed commons and anymnnar pmcee Ings unm me drspasal cl their appeal BACKGROUND FACTS [4] To aaarasa rra rmnramare casn needs, the Flrsl Delendanl ("D1 yr hmdmg a 3—year contract valued at RM2‘949‘5€‘/15 m supmy nL:n— pmpnarary awcrafl spars pans ro me Royar Maraysian An Fovce (ITUDMHX has aplea lo! Yaclunng Cansequenuy or has agrees (0 32!! ns accnunla racarvaaxa ro ma Plamnff at a drscwnvred rate‘ elucmalmg me nature cl ma flnancm Iacrmy mvolved [5] Eased on a Lenar av oner lar manna PreFaclunng Facrmy defied 13 a7 2021 (“Lamar oi Offer 1'; ind a Tawarruq Pre—Fac|onng Agreement dated 13 07 2021 (“Iaramrc Pm-Famonng Agreement‘) as wan as a Lens: m ELa1MrrEwmRMz2RR4:A “Nana saw ...n.mn .. a... w my r... mrmu-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war agamsl an puvchase omen issued by mom tron. Decamber 2a2o NI June 2021 wherem tne “scruff payment meonantent under me tstam-c Pve- Faclonng Agreement could ncl be Implemented nu nu Iherefcrelavled to nbnou» tne repayment terms upon expiry M the 60-day cvedt penoo As to tne excuses gnen Ie oetay and/cl nonpayment by TUDM aue to ’Arahan Perbendaharaan so tnvssr, me obntraet IS clear m that we advance: sum has k: be repaid baeeo an the credn tevms dsspws non-payment by mom. and eesbne D1 5 came to rane and taaov tne Invmoas upon eontptymg wtlh tne butenaee under: [:5] In any event tne ‘Arman Petbendzharaan 5s (APSBV Is, tb me, a non- issue as TUDM wnmd only pay based upon presentment at an mvmce As D1 tenet: to generate Irwolces tor the an purchase orders‘ K becomes pvaoedurzlly tmpesstbla torruom lo rennt any mrect paymenlla me PIIVIHW The absence bt documentary evidence ham D1‘demonstratinglhexrvehance on tnts AP5a tssue, mgnngnte a crucial gap In their argument and unuerscores the need In! dear avidenu to subusnlme tnen posmen [371 Based an the event or de-faun descnbeo VI tne agreement. I find that me Fmrvtm‘ VS enwed to tenmnete me Facnmes by Vssumg a tuner 01 n m ztemnzwmnnzznam we saw ...n.mn be H... a may t... nrW\ruH|y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mutta v-mat aevmmmon men 15 as 2022 qexn SA-J av and 21) and merezner Ne ms suit agamst me Devennams «or me overdue sum The relevant name 0! (ermmauon was Issued to m m compu-nee or Clause 1 (Nance) nllhe Lener money 1‘ and Claus: 19 M m l5I:rmc Pre—Fa:(onng Agmemerfl Lellers al demand to D2 5 D3 mm dated 20.5 2022 (exh SA-6 at encl 21) were conecny wssued based on me terms ollhe Guarantee da1edI3.D7 2021 (exh sn-5 alancl 21) [:3] On me Issue ov me ifleged lack av panmmars, me Deienaams‘ have rsnea on me case or Mlliyin Banking v we Sun Tang (supm) m supnon at man wmenuon that me deb! must be specmcaw punlculanasd Havmg exammed one case however, I am a! me consmereu mew that nus case can he dislmgulshed as -n me case relied on there was a umerence between me amcum claimed :1 mended m the Stalement of cum and me AW-dlwl m suppan Furlhev, m the sad case meve was a dispute m regard Io me vanaliun at mleresl rate as weH me plammfs acnva Muss! to wpmy me pamculars olme zmuum due despne me aecenaanrs requesls In our case u \s clear hum me smemem olaccoum produced by bum pames (P\:mm¢ m exh SM!) olencl 9 and Detenaams In em IHDV1 MenclA7)|I1alIhe waves: :2 m Emzxxrrzwsunnzzfinuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! uutslanalng ammml stood at RMt.74o.s9a as lt ls the same amount as statea tn the Plarmnrs alaadlnga and nails: ulappllcallon [35] As to the alleged rneanalstency In tne amount clalmed. I am at tne vlsw tnattne Plaintm has lully explalrled tnat tne same ts based on me tnnelrne and subsequent admlsslnn of tne Delendants lnnially an at 20 us M2 the ourstanurng amaunt stood at RMZ035 050 32 Due to payment: made. n became Rm 770,593 as subsequent payment of Rmzluooo on by D1 reduced the aucstanulng sum to RM1 741189889 by 15 092022 on the nsue M tna allagea exaggelzled amnun| wnlalrled V! we Plnirlmfs letter In mom. rt prlmarlly oompnses purchase ovders tnat nave yet m be convened lntn lnvcloes It Is also clear tnat based on the lauonng anarlyamarll. tne nnanaea amount ls stgnmcantly lower tnan lne actual contract amount [40] Be that as rt may. tne slrerlglh altne Plalntnrs case for 0 IA nangs on me rssue oltna cemneata el rndealeaness wmetr. ll produce would Imounl ta conclusrve evluence at me averaue sum. Regretlully, tne l=lamrill larlea ta pmvlde sum eertmcate. Almaugh based on clause 5.3 of tne lslamlc Pre- Faclnnng Agreemenl a statement 01 aecaunt can be argue: to be lmpltealy concllmve pml nlamotml aue by at, me Guararllee agreement llgned by 23 m Emzlxrrzwmnnzzfikun «war. a.n.l nmlhnrwm .. u... w my r... aflnlnallly mm. dnuuvlnnt Vfl arlum war D2 5. D: requlres Ihe proaucnpn 01 In actual penmcace M lndebledness The relevant clause 24 pl me Guaranlee smes as «allows. 1: A eemficale by my cl yum cufficavi at ca me men-es ana llabdhuu: rur me llme beuvg nu: cl rnmnra It; you by the Chem stun he nlndlng and umduslve on and mlrul us w my am or ur av perinnal r-pmanramr [411 Allnaugrr not addressed py the learned counsels, anulhar aspecl requmng viva race axlmlnalrnn pertains (0 our Issue cl whelher lna 40 puvchase pnlers menllaned ln me Plarnlrfrs leller In TUDM were wrlnrn me smpa allne lslarnrc Pre-Faclonng Agreement rms cnnsldemlon ames uua la ma lapl lnal lnera purcnna mders ware lulled belween December 2020 anu June zozl, predatlng me execullon cl lne Vslalmc Pr&Factonng Agreement on 1307 2021 The quesucn anses does lne pre-laclenng zgvaamenl apply rulrosperarraryv 7hz| could poasrnly ha (ha case as D1‘: comracl ralerence wlln TUDM was aalaa '2o1e'. on me ulnar hand, ll Is also ppssmle manna reason my TUDM relusesla pay Isduelo me famnal mesa lransaclvuns were numle me scope or me lamonng agreements‘ wherein paymanl could anry be made In me suppllar l e D1 Nonetheless, I behave marl resolullon ailhezre rssues ls cpnlrngenl Ilpun oral avldence la he presanlsd dunng full lnal In sm Emzlxrrzwsunuzzfiman “Nair s.r.r mmhnrwm .. med m my r... nflnlnnflly mm. dnulfllnl Vfl .nuNa war my Exarnrrung me evraenoa oulhned In me amaavns and ma praaemea arguments rt appears Ihal grannrrg summary gudgmem may not be appropriate m (hrs rnsxanae nespne cm; I mamlim same reservamns regammg the delensa‘ espemully cancenvng ma crearbmcy ol the allegallan nns skepuclsm arIses!rem(he1actlhatD1 had me e-man dated 11 no 2022 texh sA—9 ofencl 9)‘ convrrrnea manrrerrversron annecoxal outstanding sum plus prom and crranm um an RM1.421‘9B8 10, wharem m made an nller |u some men veraron Mme pnncrpxe sum at RM773‘720 no by 3 msIaHmenls perm aemrng the pmfil and omer charges Could rl he pnssrme Ihal TUDM hzd aheidy ssmed payrnem wrm m In! me 40 puvchase orders am on rn mm, surrapmrausxy used Ihese same purchase orders to wsmy financing irurn me Plarnmv There vs a\su me rssua onhe aannaarpn In Paragraph 9 5 and 911 cf man Amdavil In Reply dated 30112022 (end 11) Much was nlad m oppose he marrrmra Onglrulmg Summans In nnase paragraphs, ma nevennanva efiecwely admmed |I1a\ me sum ol RM77Z-1.092 as Is due and payama lame wamm Contrary to me Delendants‘ submrssron, n rs my wew that ma cam of um Nyuk sang @ Fudy Llm I. On v Azlm Nnlr vac Gum Hock (supra) and on Clluo & Sam Chan 5 Sons Sdn. Bhd. VWovIg Nyuk 1Iin(suprs)can be msmrrgmsnea ms Is because me lacks In me present can vwmve a corwersmn of me Orvgmatmg Summons prucauure 25 r~ Emzxxrrzwsukuzzrtman «mm. Snr1|\nmhnrwHH>e U... w my r... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl aF\uNa war Inm : wIII Whelem I2 nas been omered mat anIaavIIs Ned be aeemea as meadmg wrule Insufflmenl to peIsIIaae «ms Cnurl to enter nnax pmgmem on a can at me claim exh SA-9 III encl 2 and me relevant pumqrapm In end 11 are nevennexass pmbalwe In deciding an me Issue ol Ine uevennenu‘ lam! accemanoe av uauI\IIy ana men eenmauun ol me sum due {as} conIIaereIIon Is aha gmn Ia DI‘: Condufl In men Ianure |a Issu- Invoices based on me 40 purcnase emers Issued ny TUDM Accordmg to me pwvlsrons wIInIn me Fslarmc Fre-Factoring Agreement me paymem (award: me sum advanced unuer me Pre-Ficiuvlng wumd be sewn upon me payment by mom based an me Issuance at Invmce As no Inuame was Issued faclored and assigned one cannot ewed TUDM Ia make dvreci paymem to me I=IaInII« As sucn D1‘; suspmus man In wIInrIaIuIng me Issuance evInvoIceuaI me said 40 purchaae orderscannm be deemed Dona me and are cast In an unlavorame ngm 1441 In my penpecwe, me mentioned snaumseanses aflev sImIcIenI NSNVCJUOIV coy me In set mndmons upon we grant cf weave to I1e¢ena As deemed III me case 0! Jncabs v 3935; my [[1 co [1901] as LT 62 balove aonamanal leave |a deland can In granm me coun mus! be Is sm ausIxnzwmnumIu:aI “Nun: s.n.I nmhnrwm be UIQG u may I... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum MI sausfled that mere we no res! substarmal duesnon in be mad or men xhsve Is no mspule as to (acts or law whwch Iawses a reawnabve doubl Ihal the plawnffls ave enwed to wdgmenl In me case M arm-n and Commonwullh neldnngn and v Oundrol HoldlnnIlnc[1EBE] as 542, [1559] 3 All ER 492. [me] 3 WLR 723 :1 was hem max wnere me deaenee can be described as lackmg H1 Dona We and perhaps shadowy wt nas been me pucnoe at eevns in we eendmonex weave m delend The Federa\CL:uI1 .n me case clone cmn n-my Lee 300 Neck [1970] 1 MLJ 112 telerved In the Englrsh case at Figlgmnk Lw v Stein [1951] 3 AM in sea‘ wherein n wax hem Ihatwhen (hire n eduneunng suspmious m (ha flofunflanfl mode at presermng his use ar wnere me court e wen wnn a reel deem about me defendant‘: gdod «men even though n cannm be send var cenam thanhere Vs ndc a «new: vssue n \s ennued (a make in order that the defendant do pay me amount claimed or any lesser sum Into mun dr lumxsh seeumy var that emdum as a sandman lar weave m delend [45] I behave men cne evenum mu men wows msny mus on me vssue M quantum namely la: the Plammflo produce the cerlmcale of mdebledness secondly, names would need to explain whether me Isxanue Pre—Fzc1unng Agreement ‘S to Dave! the we 40 purchne amen wmch pvedzles the 17 m aemnzwmnnzzmen we s.nn mmhnrwm .. med m my me nflmnnflly mm: m.n.n Vfl .neve we Fzmlmes Aa per me case (:1 cam Para Mining co. v. Fnsmeago aow R 830 412152; wrrere me prammv suea lnr caHs and rehed on me evruenee of a clerk mac he had posted me Iener er aflotmenl. and me derenee was nan’ recerm er me lanai, luv: waa grven m aevena an paymenl ol ammml claunsd mm Court. to ename delendaru in crass-examine as In posurrg cl Vener [u] Aeeerurrugry, me Derenaams are gwen leave to aerend on cundmon that mey aeposrc me sum 0! RM1421 95510 ma Conn wllhm a sway crruerrame following me arder In the even! me Darermznus var: Io make me deposrl me Flamml wanna be enmlefl In rural gudgmenl rnr me mu sum erarmea wrm me agreed prom charges eampensauon charges (T:‘w\dh)‘ and Audgmern rnneresn The sand sum represents ma versmn of me aulslandlng amcunl, piymenl ul which was olfered by way av rnsxaumema Gwen me Derenaam acknuwledgrusm and willingness to sema Ihe mermened amount‘ we condition appears reasonable undev me crrcurnsxar-cee m r~ Emzxxrrzwsurwzzfiruan «ma sarm ...m.rwur be H... w my r... mmruuly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war nsclslou [47] Aflerconsmennglhe Ficlsand curcumsxanoes presented m we amavix evndenoa, the Plamuffa apphcalnon rm summary wdgmem m and 20 V5 dlsmwssed Vn na sxeaa me Defendants are accorded canmuanal weave |o defend. wnllngent upun me payment av RMM21 ‘ass to be pm! we Courl wllmn 30 says If we Dundmnn Is salufiad, me use wm pmcaad m «nan ana the costs assocvaled mm end 20 wxll be Krea|ed as cuss m me cause Carwer3e\y «me Deienaama ran lofum one condition, we F\a|n|rflwuu|d be ax hbeny (0 enter Ma! mdgmenl of me pleaded mm mge|I1=vwI|h prom anu mmpensahon churges and mdgmenl unnarean Is weH as ws|s nl RM5.oao no payame by me Devenaams to me wanna: L4—~ (vusnm mnz am vusom Judlcm Commissioner Hugh Coun o1Ma¥aya Kuala Lumpur name 29» Deoemher2023 m Emzxxrrzwsunuzzfinuan «mm. Snr1|\nunhnrw\HI>e met! a may n. nrwhuflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max For the Flaumfl Dmesh Nandrayng Messrs Nandrajuq. Aavacaces 3. samnms, 3-as Tower 3‘ UOA Busmess Park‘ No 1 Jalan Pangalumara m/51A semen U1. 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Fm me Delenuams Mnhd Hafiz Em Gnavam [Mend Fm Fahmy Em Abdw Rink wrlh mm) Messrs Fa1ru\ Fahmy 5. co ‘ 1—o+o:s, Subang suna. Jslan Blmang‘ us/:3. Seksyen us, 40150 sn-n Nam, Sehngar Dam! Ensan CASE REFERENCE: Bank Nu .-ra Malayan: V Muhd lsmixl A On 1199211 MLJ mo 2 Cempaka Finance BM v Ho Ln. Ymg (tmdmg as KH Traamgy 3 Anor [2005] 3 cu 544 3 HSEC Bank Malaysia Berhad v LH Tvmber Pmuucus Sdn Ehd as Ors (200513 cu zoa o Mahamad Faun Che Rus v JR Jami Resources Hcldmgs sun am [2016] 5 cu 256 5 Pehnlar Agresxf (M) sun Ehd v Prqek Lebuhraya Usanasama Bemad Lemhaga Lebuhriyi Malaysia (Fmak Kelngz) [2014] 1 LN5 79 5 Perwnra Afin Bank Bevhad v onson Sun and a Olhers [2003] MLJU 676 m Emzxxrrzwsunnzzmuan «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! or oner lav Iswamrc Flctonng dated 13 a7 2021 (‘Laney al OM21 2“y and an Islamic Facronng Agreement dated ram 2021 ('\sl:rmc Faclonng Agveemenflr the Walnm granrea D1 wrm Islarmz: Pre-Factonng and Facwnng !acIIvly mm me purchase pm 01 RM2,27a,5w as and RM2 :59 733 73 respemvely. and me sale pnoe nl RM2r540,65B 95 and RM5ro14r434 17 respectwew (’FacvhIies'j The sea Fauhnes are based on me Tawarvuq pvinuple sxructurlu m a norwevolvmg form under me Shlnah prrncrpre cl Munsbahah [51 Purluanl to a Guaranree and Inaemmry Agraement dated 13 07 2021 (‘Guaran|ee') me Secanu Delendanl (‘D2’) and mm Dzfenflam (-D3“) have rmmry and severauy agreed to guarantee all oursvanarng paymenrs er me Facmnes [7] A demand was wssuefl on 20 (15 2022 lexll SAG 0lenc\21). seekmg (0 recover a \‘o|aV sum of RM2 035050 32 compnsmg RM1 317.319 51 under the |s\amIc PM-Fanonng Agreemsnl and RMII7,730 B1 unaer the Ismmc Factoring Agreemem The amount unaer me Iskanuc Facronng Agreemem was rarer semed, leavmg me Fre—FacIoring laulilvss skill uursrenamg As at 30 as 2022 me everdue sum was Induced to RML77ors9a 59 A Vurlhav m Emzxxrrzwsunuzzfiman “Nana smm ...m.mur .. U... w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max 7 10 11 12 1: 14 15 15 17 13 19 20 21 Malayan Bankmg and v Veo Sun Yor1g[1999]B ML.) 317 L1m Nyuk Sang @ may L1m 5 Or: 11 man Naslr van Guan Hock (202012 MLJU 1104 cu once a Sena Chan 3. sans sun sna vwong Nyuk Ts|n[2D1G] 9 MLJ 17s concmca Engmaanng Product arm 14 Greengvoup Eng San ans [zmn MLJU 1915 Noam! Hilda ac Isman y Eank Smlpinan Naslonal 120211 Muu 2652 scum Eas|As1:lr1suranca Eerhad y Kerzjzan Ma1ays-a [was] 1 cm 1045 National Company lor Foreign Trade 14 Kayu Raya sun arm [1950] 2 MLJ zoo Ma1ayan lnsurince (M) sun and v A51: Mace: Sdn anu[19e712 MLJ 153 Bank Negara Ma1ays1a y Muhd Iarnau [1992]1 MLJ 400 Eng Mee Yong a. 01:. y Le|churr1anan[1979]2 ML! 212 Jacobs y Eanms nssnuery Co [1901] as LT 52 Brmsh and Commonweaflh Hnldmgs prov Quadrsx Hoidlngs me [1929] ca 542 Cho Chin Huatv Lee am Huck [1970] 1 MLJ 112 Flemrank Lld ys1e1n [1961] 3 All ER 683 cana Pan: Muung Ca V Fas1r1edge3OW R am (1352) m Em11><rrEwsDRHz2RR4:A «ma a.n.1 nuv1hnrw\H a. 1.... a my 1... nrW\ruH|Y -mm: dnuumnl y. ar1uNa M1 LEGISLATION REFERENCE: Order 14 r1 A :13, a as uhhe Rmes nvcoun 2012 sflmonne E~4u1enr:eAcI 1950 52 a. sa Mme Islamxc Fxnancwm Semces An 2013 An 1, \JNlDRO1TCunvenuun on Imemauunal Facmung Olvawa — 23 05 1988 :....~_. BOOK! ARTICLE REFERENCE: 1 The Code av Hammuvabl (Translated by L w King, 1910) m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! sum oV RM3D.000 so was new by D1 en 0! as 2022 wnerem me am was lmlhev reduced to RMI,74D,55B as Despne afiempls and meeungs amen al an armcable resohmon erme Issue‘ u did nol come In lrumon [31 As in was m ccnlmuous breach M ‘Ls amgauons, me Facumes were lerrmnaled waea Name 0! Demand daled15 us 2022 (“Terrmnallon Notice") lexh sue nl anal 2:7 As ex 15 as 2022. me sum nl RML740 ass as wai oulslandlng and payable by me Defendants as me sole av pnnmpal ashlar. which was In be semen wnmn 7 days rmm me Termlnanon Nance The said sum cnmprises al RMLDQZDOS 55 being prInr:\pi\ due. and mean 395 34 nemg numenamg pvufil vale [9] Due in me Delendanls‘ demure xe seme me epeemea amount‘ me F\a|n|m mmanea lega\ mm by (mug an Ongmamng Summnns at me Kua\a Lumpuv Hugh Court under Sun No WA—24M-I3-10/2022 an 02 m2u22 Fnllawmg 2 com Drdav issued on 02112022 (encl 12), me ongmamng Summon: wan convened mo . wnx cansequenuy, all ammo: filed m cunnsanon Mm u were deswgnaled as meadlngs, and ham pames were granted me liberty In Incorporate aaanianer preaumgs as needed m Emzmwzwsunuzzfiruan we sew ...m.mm .. U... m my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [I0] By way cl Ihls zppllcallnrl ln erlcl zu, me Plalnlm sougm lmm |he Defendants as follows. a) the prlnclpal sum al RMl 140.392 as as at 15 as 2022, :2) pram charges an a me 0! 5% per month an the amaunl a! RMLDEZDUB 55 item 1509 2022 unlll lull reallzallon cl ludgmanl sum :7 lale payment chalges at a me an 5-/. par monlh on me xmounl of Rmaszloos 55 mm l5o92u22 unlll lull reallzallwl cl iudgmerlk sum a) costs. and e) lnlalesl at 5% per annum an me cosl awarded [11] Funher In ma abuvel me lullwing Y5 prayed nu ma allarnallve la) rue luagmenl lor part at me Plalnlms clllm In me amount of RM713,o92 33. wllh lnleresl at me rate 0! 5% per annum on me ludgmerll sum fmm the dale ov lndgmenl umll mu reallzallnn la) The cuss at |he appllcaxlan ma lncmnul ms|s are In be borne by Ihe Defendants. m Emzlxrrzwsulwzzfiruan «mm. ml ...m.mm .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNa Wm! (c) Interest at me rate 0! 5-2.. per annum on the ordered costs (tom the dale 0' Judgment Im|I| the lull and (lnal sememem cf the judgment‘ and (:1) Th: Plamhlfs renuxmng clam aga\rIs| Ihe Delendanls are in be delevmmed by way of a fun Ina! couussus CONTENTIONS [m Plawrmffs Veamed cnunsex, Dmesh Nandramg draws upun 4ega\ pvecedanls m Bunk Ngln M Iulg v Mohd lxrmll A on [1992] 1 MLJ 400, Comgak: Flnlnce Eng 14 Ho LII Vlng trading as KH Tramng & Anor [was] 3 cu 544 and nsac Bank M I ‘ mad v. LH Timber Pgjggg syn and 5. on [nos] 5 cm 249 n \s manually conlended mat the F\amlIll has esiahhshed a pmna lame use var the sum ol RM1‘74D‘B98 B9 wheveln me buraen mereaare shms In me Defendants In samy the com why nmgmenu should not have been gwen Igamsl them [13] To vurmer strengthen men suhmlsswonsn me Plavrmflargues lha(D1 mu nol dispute |heIr Iiabmy under me Facmcres and had vlde e-mam dated 11 10 2022 (exh sA-9 olend 9;. mlormed the Plaunmllhal Ms version av m Emzmrrzwmknzzfiman mm. smnw ...n.mn .. med w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! me total omsnanmng sum plus prom me man at RM1 mass 10 In (he same e-ma: D1 made an olfer to sellle that version av me prmcvple sum av awn 120 on by 3 installments belore selfllng the pum ind olhev charges AI |hal pom! m lwme‘ based on an email. ms Pmnun awsagreed mm me war as me lmal uu|s\andmg sum stood ax RM1,74o 398 as m] In the Inemalive |he Plamlnfl arguss that ms netsnasms have m paragraphs 9 5 and 9 H at (new Amdavll m Reply dated so 11 2022 (encl My admitted to me sum at RM773 092 as wherem me same Is sapame M being Idjudged :1 due and omng, am hence final wdgment be enlevad up In me and sum Rehanoe is placed upon -1711 M me Evldence An! 1950, Man In Fauxi cm Ru: v JR Joint R Holdin 5 Sdn Bud [2016] 6 Cu 256‘ and Pelamzr Agggiljfl 51,; am y Era gk Lnbuhrlp [2014] I ms 19 [15] caunssw luv the Delendanls, Mohd Ham Em Ghalam‘ contends man me amount assensa by me F\aIn\m Vacks comp\e|e subsxarmanon and us unuerlain It \s assened that the Plammv fafled lo quanmy the pnnupal due and mud to exp¥aIn now me element al pmfil 015% per mamh as weH as m Emzmrrzwinnnzzfiman mm. smsw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w mm s. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! penarry sum M 1 5% per mpnrrr rs denved at The case at Ferwln Aflln Bank aemad v Qrison Sdn and 5. Omar: [zuua] MLJU 576 rs cried to vmerem Anaur Milrk lshak 4 refuted to me ]udgmsn| ol Augrrsrrrre Paul J In lhecase oVMnI.Iy|n aarrkrrrg Bhdv Yoo sun 1orrg[r9s91e ML! :77 which new mar me pemrrcare er Indebtedness produced does not cure the detecr wnhm me meadmgs yrs-a-yrs me regurremerrr «pr me Prarnrm In fully cnndescend on ma pamcullrl or amoum due espacrarry an me suraracr pr rmeresr charged and repaymanrs made my Aagrrrprrauy, ma Derenaam comand mar ma vrarrmrv prerrrarrrrary ended me iicrlmes wrren. m reaury rr was TUDM mar caused uerays In the payment process It rs a\so suhmllted mar an ayerrr crasemea as 'Aranan Pevhendaharaan as (AP5E)“ ma occurreg M May 2:122 wheram mom had In ohlam speerar permrssran «mm are Accountant General emraraysra no pay (or charges Incurred In me prevrpus year (2021) Hence the delay rs sara ro be beyenn D1 5 cpnrrpr In support M rms claim me Defendams presented ma Pumrnvs Veater daled oz as 202: ram IHDJ ol errcr 35), wherein me F\a|nIM snrrgm cranrrcarrprr lrom TUDM regardmg me payment srarus rprme pursranmng 40 am or 55 purchase orders mar have yer lo be convened rmo rrwprcas They argues max rm arrraunr 0| Rmarsssass so chimed by ma m Emzrxrrzwmnnzzfiman “Nana s.n.r ...nr.mrr .. med m my r... mmnauly mm: dnuumrrl y. arrurm v-mar Flalnlllllrom TUDM VI exh lHD»I ls exoesswe, and lnal ln any evam II shows Ihallhe lacllmsa have not been termlrIa|ed as ll was lssued anerlne sullwas fllzd ‘me Delenaanls also ralse omeclinns In ma Plammvs declslon cu dll:c|ly approacn TUDM lo pursue payment lor lns lecslvables «om D1 They argue that TUDM IS not pnvy la me connacrual lelallonshlp belween lh: Plalnllvl and D1 under me established laclllnes [11] on me Issue at me anernallve sum ol RM771092 33‘ me Defendants‘ counsel anjussmatme same was nol pleaded and naslcally an allennnugnl Thu calm of Llm Nyuk Sung Q Fvudy Llm A on um-n I4: r we Gu-n Hock [mm] 2 MLJU 1104 an on Chm 5 sons Chan 5 sons Sdn. 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Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22NCvC-249-05/2022

PLAINTIF Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Public Bank Berhad

The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendant is for special damages amounting to RM5,170,000.00, general damages, interest and cost for the negligence, failure and/or refusal of the Defendant as a bank in carrying out its duty for its customer, the Plaintiff.The matter in dispute is regarding 13 cheques of the Plaintiff’s (Disputed Cheques) that were cleared by the Defendant between March 2015 and January 2016 which the Plaintiff contended were forged signatures of PW1 and PW2 by Jeffrey who was one of the Authorised Signatories from Group A. PW1 and PW2 had denied signing any of those Disputed Cheques. There is an underlying contractual relationship between a bank and its customer. The bank owes its customer a duty to take reasonable care and skill in acting in accordance with the customer's mandate (see Abdul Rahim Abdul Hamid & Others v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 MLRA 629; [2006] 5 MLJ 1; [2006] 3 CLJ 1, Development & Commercial Bank Bhd v. Liew Weng Hang & Ors [2007] 2 MLRA 291; [2001] MLJU 681; [2007] 6 CLJ 260, Moonev & Ors v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1966] 1 MLRH 23; [1967] 1 MLJ 87, Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1985] 2 All ER 947, Redmand v. Allied Irish Bank Plc [1987] FLR 307 Bank of Montreal v. Dominion Gresham Guarantee and Casualty Co Ltd [1930] AC 659).

02/01/2024

YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f3db5293-108d-46cf-b29e-02ce4ff0aca8&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCVC-249-05/2022 ANTARA BUKIT BARU VILLAS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 800308-D) … PLAINTIF DAN PUBLIC BANK BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 6463-H) … DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendant is for special damages amounting to RM5,170,000.00, general damages, interest and cost for the 02/01/2024 13:19:25 WA-22NCvC-249-05/2022 Kand. 59 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 negligence, failure and/or refusal of the Defendant as a bank in carrying out its duty for its customer, the Plaintiff. [2] The case went for full trial and the following witnesses were called- Plaintiffs’ Witnesses (i) PW1 - Muck Ho Wan, Director of the Plaintiff (ii) PW2 - Wee Soon Teck, Director of the Plaintiff (iii) PW3 - Iskandar bin Azaman, expert and document examiner from Jabatan Kimia Malaysia Defendants’ Witnesses (i) DW1 - Kharzul Rafi bin Md Yazid, Customer Service Ambassador, Seri Gombak Branch of the Defendant (previously an executive at the Defendant’s PJ Old Town Branch) (ii) DW2 - Roslee bin Abd Karim, Assistant Manager of the Current Account Department, Jalan Kelang Lama Branch of the Defendant (previously a Senior Executive at the Defendant’s PJ Old Town Branch) (iii) DW3 - Ku Kim Soon, Manager of Central Monitoring Department, Banking Operations Division, Head Office of the Defendant (previously Banking Services Manager at Defendant’s PJ Old Town Branch) (iv) DW4 - Lim Sok Mui, Banking Services Manager of Defendant’s PJ Old Town Branch BRIEF FACTS S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] The Plaintiff opened a current account bearing account number 3144285022 (Account) with the Defendant’s PJ Old Town Branch on 29.1.2008 and the authorised signatories to operate the Account were- (i) Loh Kim Fee; (ii) Lau Jenn Wee (Lau); and (iii) Yeoh Teen Eam (Jeffrey). [4] Accordingly, as mandated by the Plaintiff’s Directors’ Circular Resolution dated 11.1.2008, the authority to operate the Account (including the issuance of cheques) by the Plaintiff was on the condition that it contained any 2 signatures of the aforesaid authorised signatories (Authorised Signatories). [5] Further, on 2.11.2009, the Plaintiff updated the list of Authorised Signatories of the Account to include PW1 and PW2 while Loh Kim Fee was removed. [6] The specimen signatures of PW1 and PW2 were accordingly furnished to the Defendant through a Supplementary Account Opening Form dated 2.11.2009. It was mandated pursuant to the Plaintiff’s Director’s Circular Resolution dated 2.11.2009, of the change in the Authorised Signatories that any one signature from Group A (Lau and S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Jeffrey) and any one signature from Group B (PW1 and PW2) would be required to operate the Account including for the issuance of cheques (2009 Mandate). [7] The matter in dispute is regarding 13 cheques of the Plaintiff’s (Disputed Cheques) that were cleared by the Defendant between March 2015 and January 2016 which the Plaintiff contended were forged signatures of PW1 and PW2 by Jeffrey who was one of the Authorised Signatories from Group A. PW1 and PW2 had denied signing any of those Disputed Cheques. [8] The Disputed Cheques with forged signature of PW1 are- CHEQUE DATE / DATE PAID OUT CHEQUE NO. AMOUNT (RM) 6.3.2015 / 6.3.2015 494176 570,000.00 6.3.2015 / 9.3.2015 494170 730,000.00 11.3.2015 / 11.3.2015 494183 300,000.00 18.3.2015 / 18.3.2015 494167 450,000.00 27.4.2015 / 29.4.2015 494173 40,000.00 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494195 300,000.00 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494199 190,000.00 15.1.2016 / 15.1.2016 221004 610,000.00 TOTAL 3,190,000.00 (Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1) S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] The Disputed Cheques with forged signature of PW2 are- CHEQUE DATE / DATE PAID OUT CHEQUE NO. AMOUNT (RM) 6.5.2016 / 6.5.2016 221020 150,000.00 6.5.2016 / 6.5.2016 221021 1,000,000.00 6.5.2016 / 6.5.2016 221024 300,000.00 6.5.2016 / 6.5.2016 285700 370,000.00 11.5.2016 / 11.5.2016 221026 160,000.00 TOTAL 1,980,000.00 (Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW2) [10] Among the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and PW2 are cash cheques No. 494199 amounting to RM190,000.00 and No. 221024 amounting to RM300,000 (Cash Cheques). [11] Thus, the Plaintiff claims for RM5,170,000.00 being the sums of the Disputed Cheques that were alleged to be paid out by the Defendant without mandate. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION [12] The Plaintiff contended that the signatures on the Disputed Cheques which were all allegedly signed by PW1 and PW2 were forged. S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 As such the Defendant as a bank, has no mandate to honour the Disputed Cheques and debit the Plaintiff's current account. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant was negligence and breach of its fiduciary duty when the Defendant paid out the Disputed Cheques which signature was forged by Jeffrey. [13] The Plaintiff also contended that the Defendant had acted in breach of the 2009 Mandate as the Disputed Cheques were paid out without proper inspection on the signatures, thus, the Defendant has failed to take sufficient measures to verify the Disputed Cheques’ transactions. [14] The Plaintiff further contended that it had deposited around RM2,000,000.00 in the Account as payment of redemption sum to MBSB Bank (Redemption sum) for 2 pieces of land (Land) owned by the Plaintiff and in September 2016, PW1 discovered that: (a) Jeffrey had forged documents of the Plaintiff to sell the Land without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, approval and/or authority; (b) Jeffrey had forged the signature of the Authorised Signatories from Group B of the Account on the Disputed Cheques; S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (c) The redemption sum had also been embezzled by Jeffrey through a few cheques where: (i) Jeffrey forged the signatures of the Authorised Signatories from Group B of the Account; and (ii) the Disputed Cheques were cleared by the Defendant; (iii) Part of the proceeds of the sale of the Lands were paid to MBSB Bank to redeem the loan and the balance of the proceeds were deposited into the Account and were later withdrawn by Jeffrey by way of multiple cheques with forged signatures of the Authorised Signatories from Group B of the Account; (iv) The proceeds cleared by the Defendant were embezzled by Jeffrey personally and/or his representatives and/or his other companies. [15] It was the Plaintiff’s contention that the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signature of PW2 (which include the Cash Cheques), were cleared and the withdrawals were allowed by the Defendant which acted in breach of S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 its fiduciary duties, negligently and/or without exercising proper care and diligence towards the Plaintiff as a customer of the Defendant. [16] In this regard, PW1 had also lodged a police report on behalf of the Plaintiff against Jeffrey on the 19.9.2016. DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION [17] The Defendant contented as its defence- a) Estoppel and the statutory protection afforded under Section 24 Bills of Exchange Act 1949 (BEA); b) The statutory protection afforded under Section 73A of BEA; c) The Plaintiff’s own negligence had attributed to their alleged losses and the Plaintiff was in breach of its contractual duties owed to the Bank; and d) The Plaintiff’s claim in respect of the fo l lowing e igh t (8 ) cheques (Eight Cheques) is barred by Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953- NO CHEQUE DATE / DATE PAID OUT CHEQUE NO. AMOUNT (RM) 1. 6.3.2015 / 6.3.2015 494176 570,000.00 2. 6.3.2015 / 9.3.2015 494170 730,000.00 3. 11.3.2015 / 11.3.2015 494183 300,000.00 4. 18.3.2015 / 18.3.2015 494167 450,000.00 5. 27.4.2015 / 29.4.2015 494173 40,000.00 6. 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494195 300,000.00 7. 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494199 190,000.00 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [18] The Defendant also contended that the Disputed Cheques were not forged and it had paid out on the Disputed Cheques after having made verification with Jeffrey who was one of the Plaintiff’s Authorised Signatories. As such, section 24 of BEA raised an estoppel against the Plaintiff as a customer from relying on the alleged forgery. Additionally the bank also relies on section 73A of BEA which provides a statutory defence for a bank where a customer negligently contributed to the forgery. [19] The Defendant also contended that it carried out the transactions in good faith and the examination conducted by the Defendant in carrying out those transactions were following the required procedures in the ordinary course of a bank's business. [20] Further, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff did not abide by the terms governing current accounts enforced from time to time and therefore was in breach of the same, including the failure to inform the Defendant of irregularities in its statement of accounts. 8. 15.1.2016 / 15.1.2016 221004 610,000.00 TOTAL 3,190,000.00 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 ISSUES [21] Generally, the main issues are- (a) Whether the signatures of PW1 and PW2 on the Disputed Cheques were forged? (b) If the Disputed Cheques were forged, does the second limb of section 24 of BEA operative, such that the Plaintiff is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority? (c) If the Disputed Cheques were forged, does section 73A of BEA operate to afford a defence to the Defendant that the Plaintiff, knowingly or negligently contributed to the forgery or the unauthorised signature such that it operates and is deemed to be the signature of the person it purports to be in favour of the Defendant who in good faith pays the Disputed Cheques? (d) Whether the Plaintiff’s claim in respect of the Eight Cheques is barred by limitation pursuant to the Limitation Act 1953? ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Relationship between Bank and Customer [22] There is an underlying contractual relationship between a bank and its customer. The bank owes its customer a duty to take reasonable care S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 and skill in acting in accordance with the customer's mandate (see Abdul Rahim Abdul Hamid & Others v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 MLRA 629; [2006] 5 MLJ 1; [2006] 3 CLJ 1, Development & Commercial Bank Bhd v. Liew Weng Hang & Ors [2007] 2 MLRA 291; [2001] MLJU 681; [2007] 6 CLJ 260, Moonev & Ors v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1966] 1 MLRH 23; [1967] 1 MLJ 87, Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1985] 2 All ER 947, Redmand v. Allied Irish Bank Plc [1987] FLR 307 Bank of Montreal v. Dominion Gresham Guarantee and Casualty Co Ltd [1930] AC 659). [23] The Federal Court in the case of Abdul Rahim Abdul Hamid & Ors v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 1 adopted the principle laid down in Barclays Bank PLC v. Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363 where the Court recognised the duty of a bank to observe reasonable skill and care in executing a customer’s instructions- “[28] To our minds, if a bank executes an order knowing it to be dishonestly given, or shuts its eyes to an obvious fact of dishonestly, or acted recklessly in failing to disclose material facts, the bank will plainly be liable. In our judgment, it is an implied term of the contract between the bank and the customer that the bank will observe reasonable skill and care in and about executing customer’s orders (see Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363).”. S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [24] The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is of a banker and customer relationship (see: Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd & Ors v Shencourt Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 619). In Kian Lup Constructions v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283, the Court held - “In the present case, the defendant is a banker and the plaintiff is a customer. The plaintiff maintained a current account no 365-125731-001 with the defendant's Raub Branch. By operating a current account with a banker, the customer is depositing his money with the banker and the banker is liable to pay the money deposited when demanded or instructed by the customer by way of issuing a cheque. The characteristics of the banker and customer relationship were first highlighted by the House of Lords in Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. It was decided by their Lordships that the relationship between a banker and his customer was essentially one of a debtor and creditor and not one of trusteeship. This decision was affirmed on the ground that there was no fiduciary relationship between a banker and his customer to warrant a suit in equity.” [25] In Public Bank v Exporaya Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 507, the Court of Appeal set out the relationship between a bank and its customer and reaffirmed the fiduciary duties owed by the bank to its customers to exercise reasonable care and skill in drawing and payment of customer’s cheques. “[22] It is well-settled that primarily the relationship between a bank and its customer (account holder) is that of debtor and creditor, but quad the S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 drawing and payment of the customer’s cheques as against the money of the customer’s in the banker’s hand the relationship is that of principal and agent; and as an agent the bank owed fiduciary duties to the customer and prima facie was also bound to exercise reasonable care and skill in carrying out the transactions of its principal. The above proposition was accepted and adopted by the Queen Bench Division (Commercial Court) of England in the case of Barclays Bank plc v. Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363; and the House of Lords in Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926) 43 TLR 124).”. [26] In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Exporaya (supra) further elaborated the objective standard of care of the bank as one of a reasonable prudent banker, as follows: “[32] The correct test, in our opinion, must be whether a reasonably prudent banker, faced with the same circumstances, would regard the course of action taken on the facts justifiable. In each fact situation, common sense must prevail. In every case, we must determine the bank’s obligations against the background of day to day commercial activity …”. [27] Further, the Federal Court in Abdul Rahim (supra) held that the bank will plainly be liable if it executes an order, when there are grounds for believing that there was a misuse of authority for the purpose of committing fraud. “[32] … A bank is not obliged to question any transaction which is in accordance with the customer’s mandate, unless there are grounds for believing that there was a misuse of authority for the S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 purpose of committing a fraud. See Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale Ltd & Anor [1992] 4 All ER 409 …”. (a)Whether the signatures of PW1 and PW2 on the Disputed Cheques were forged? [28] This is a question of fact to be determined by the Court based on the evidence adduced. The burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the signatures on all the Disputed Cheques were forged or unauthorised. The standard is that of a balance of probabilities (See Astana International Sdn Bhd & Ors v RHB Bank Bhd & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 758, United Asian Bank Bhd v Tai Soon Heng Construction Sdn. Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 182). [29] The Plaintiff had called PW1 and PW2 who testified that they did not sign the Disputed Cheques. An expert witness was also called from Jabatan Kimia Malaysia (PW3) to testify. Expert Evidence [30] Section 45 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides for opinions of experts- S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (1) When the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law or of science or art, or as to identity or genuineness of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in that foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity or genuineness of handwriting or finger impressions, are relevant facts. (2) Such persons are called experts. [31] PW3 testified pertaining to the Forged Signatures of PW1 and PW2 on the Disputed Cheques. On the method of examination, PW3 said that- “we use visual examination to compare the handwriting characteristics in the disputed signatures compared to the handwriting characteristics in the specimen signatures of Muck Ho Wan and Wee Soon Teck where’s characteristics such as a line quality, terminal stroke, the fluency as well as formation of the strokes were look at to compare.”. [32] Further, the report of PW3 (Exhibit P1), stated the following conclusions- (i) The Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 “were probably not written by the writer of the specimens (“Muck Ho Wan”)” (ii) The signatures of PW2 in the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW2 ‘were not written by the writer of the specimens (“Wee Soon Teck”)” [33] PW3 testified that the signatures on the Disputed Cheques were not S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 signed by PW2. [34] PW3 further explained that the remark ‘probably not written’ for the signatures of PW1 on the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1, is still a conclusive opinion that the signatures of PW1 in the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 were not written by PW1 and he further testified that “which means I do not believe Muck Ho Wan wrote these disputed signatures.”. [35] The Court of Appeal in Public Bank Bhd v Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) [2016] MLJU 1719; [2016] 3 CLJ 548 held that the trial Court in deciding whether a signature of an account holder is forged, ought to decide based on the totality of the evidence. [36] All the Disputed Cheques were purportedly signed by PW1 and PW2 and both testified that they did not sign the Disputed Cheques and that their signatures had been forged. [37] As such, based on the testimony of PW1, PW2 and also PW3 as the handwriting expert, the Plaintiff had on balance of probabilities, succeeded in proving that the signatures on the Disputed Cheques were indeed forged. S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [38] Since it has been proved that the Disputed Cheques were forged, the Defendant is thus liable to compensate the Plaintiff for the loss unless there is a clear representation by the Plaintiff that the Disputed Cheques were effective and good for payment. Further, when the Plaintiff is able to establish that the Defendant paid out the Disputed Cheques without mandate, the liability of the Defendant is absolute unless it falls under section 24 and section 73A of BEA. (b) If the Disputed Cheques were forged, is the second limb of section 24 of BEA operative, such that the Plaintiff is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority? [39] In Malaysia Plastics Sdn Bhd Malaysia Plastics Sdn Bhd v. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Suit [2012] 9 MLJ 336; [2012] 2 MLRH 659, it was held that the burden of proving estoppel lies with the bank- “[63] Who bears the onus of establishing that such an estoppel is operative in this case? It is the bank that bears the onus of establishing such an estoppel precluding the customer from making claim for the monies paid out under the disputed cheques. This is because it is the bank that contends that the customer has acted in a manner that warrants an inference that the customer S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 represented to the bank that the cheques were good for payment and were to be honoured.”. Defendant’s Cheque Verification Process [40] DW2 in his evidence, testified that the staffs of the Defendant had undergone training for cheque verification process. In conducting such verification, the Defendant will verify the signatures in the cheques received, via a naked eye inspection, and compare with the specimen scanned into the Defendant’s database. In this regard, DW1 and DW2 both confirmed that the specimen available in the Defendant’s database is taken from the client’s opening account form. [41] According to DW2, the standard and requirement for such inspection is that the signature must tally and the same or similar with the specimen. After the inspection, if the cheque value is RM5,000.00 and above, the Defendant will normally be required to contact any one of the Authorised Signatories or any person authorised by the Plaintiff at the telephone number provided to the Defendant to obtain his/her confirmation on the issuance of the cheque. [42] Thereafter, the joint authorizing officer, in this case, DW3, would perform all the necessary checks again to ensure the verifications were S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 in order. If the verifications were in order, DW3 would similarly authorise the payment on the cheque(s). Further, upon conducting the necessary checks, if there are sufficient funds in the Said Account to cover the payment of the cheque(s); and if the cheque(s) are issued in accordance with the mandate of the Plaintiff, the Defendant will proceed to process and honour the payment of such cheques Admissions of DW1 and DW2 [43] DW1 and DW2 both had verified and authorised the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signature of PW2 and admitted that the signatures appeared in the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW2 look different from the specimen signatures. However, DW2 still verified the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW2 and passed it over to DW3 who testified that he had verified the Disputed Cheques, as joint authorising officer, and his verification came after the initial round of verification conducted by DW1 and/or DW2. [44] In all reasonable situation, the Defendant should have been alarmed and exercised prudent measures to check the Disputed S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Cheques as the amount involved were huge but this the Defendant had failed to do so. All the Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW1 and Disputed Cheques with Forged Signatures of PW2 are huge cheques exceeding RM5,000.00. Further, Cash Cheques were presented by Jeffrey to be made payable to Jeffrey himself. This being so, the Defendant should have acted as a reasonable prudent banker by exercising its option to call and verify with other Authorised Signatories of those in Group B, either PW1 or PW2 as the Cash Cheques of RM490,000.00 were payable to Jeffrey himself. However, verification was only conducted with Jeffrey despite the fact that the Disputed Cheques were payable to Jeffrey. [45] Further, there was also a letter (ID2) informing the Defendant about the change of correspondence address of the Plaintiff which was passed by Jeffrey to DW2. DW2 had testified that ID2 was passed by Jeffrey to DW2 in the Defendant’s PJ Branch which DW2 duly accepted. PW1 had denied signing ID2. The Plaintiff was unaware about this and as such unaware of the Disputed Cheques transactions as all correspondences were sent to another address as per ID2. Defendant’s Breach of Duty – Payment not mandated. [46] The law on cheques with unauthorised or forged signature is S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 governed under section 24 of BEA and it is trite that the entire signature is wholly inoperative and thus, the Defendant does not have any mandate to make payment of the Cheques. [47] Section 24 primarily renders a forged or unauthorised signature on a bill as wholly inoperative and gives no right to the Defendant to enforce payment on the bill as the Defendant had no mandate to pay on the Cheques. The law does not accord protection if the party against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. [48] In ML Breadworks Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ, it was held- “[38] The general position in law regarding to forgery of cheques has been comprehensively set out by learned counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Gregory Ling and I adopt his submissions here. He relies on an excerpt from a well-recognised author on banking law namely Poh Chu Chai, Banking Law (2nd edn) at p. 721: When a bank makes payment on a customer’s cheque, it does so on the customer’s mandate. The mandate is signified by the customer’s signature on the cheque. When a customer’s signature on a cheque is forged, the instrument is inoperative and a bank has no authority to make payment based on the forged signature. A customer has a prima facie claim against a bank if the bank makes payment on a forged instrument. [39] Following from this therefore it is incumbent upon a bank to S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 compensate or reimburse its customer if it makes payment on a forged instrument. …… [46] It is clear therefore that prima facie upon proof of a cheque having been forged, the liability of the bank arises without question as an absolute liability, unless the customer relatively narrow duties of failing to exercise due care in the drawing of a cheque or failing to alert the bank of known forgery were to be proved, in which event the bank might avoid liability.”. [49] It was evident that Jeffrey was the one who presented the Disputed Cheques for payment and the Defendants had also confirmed that verification of the Disputed Cheques was made with Jeffrey. However, as the amount involved is huge and considering that the Disputed Cheques especially the Cash Cheques were for Jeffrey’s gain, it should have alerted the Defendant and raised a reasonable suspicion of the representation made by Jeffrey, which the Defendant had failed to do so. [50] This duty is even more prevalent when Jeffrey went to the Defendant’s PJ branch to withdraw huge sum of money amount to RM490,000.00 from the Cash Cheques payable to Jeffrey himself. Any reasonable prudent banker in the Defendant’s situation will not just make oral confirmation with Jeffrey himself when Jeffrey was the one who tendered the Cash Cheques. S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [51] Therefore, the defence of estoppel by the Defendant cannot stand, thus, the Defendant is liable for paying out the Disputed Cheques. (c) If the Disputed Cheques were forged, does section 73A of BEA operate to afford a defence to the Defendant that the Plaintiff, knowingly or negligently contributed to the forgery or the unauthorised signature such that it operates and is deemed to be the signature of the person it purports to be in favour of the Defendant who in good faith pays the Disputed Cheques? [52] The onus to prove whether the Plaintiff had knowingly or negligently contributed towards a forged signature lies with the Defendant (Malaysia Plastics Sdn Bhd (supra)), [53] Section 73A of BEA provides- “Notwithstanding section 24, where a signature on a cheque is forged or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, and that person whose signature it purports to be knowingly or negligently contributes to the forgery or the making of the unauthorized signature, the signature shall operate and shall be deemed to be the signature of the person it purports to be in favour of any S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 person who in good faith pays the cheque or takes the cheque for value.” [54] Accordingly, any such 'verification' made by Jeffrey could not amount to a valid or effective confirmation as there was non-compliance of the 2009 Mandate that any one signature from Group A (Lau and Jeffrey) and any one signature from Group B (PW1 and PW2) would be required to operate the Account including for the issuance of cheques, which in this case the signatures on the Disputed Cheques were forged by Jeffrey. [55] The Defendant has a responsibility as a bank towards its customer and as such owes a duty to the Plaintiff as provided under all other provisions of BEA. This was as deliberated in the case of Shorubber (M) Sdn Bhd v. CIMB Bank Berhad [2015] MLJU 2073; [2015] MLRHU 788, where the Court held- “[49] It is also pertinent to bear in mind that the introduction of s 73A into the BEA was not intended to absolve a bank of its primary responsibilities and obligations to its customer that was provided for in the other provisions of the BEA. This was evident from the debate and ministerial statement in Parliament on this amendment, a relevant extract of which is set out below: "Sememangnya diakui akta ibu menekankan kepentingan pengguna. Walau bagaimanapun, pindaan yang telah dicadangkan tidaklah bermaksud untuk mengalihkan risiko pemalsuan tandatangan ke S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 atas pengguna. Bank tetap mempunyai kewajipan dan tanggungjawab yang sepenuhnya untuk memastikan ketulenan tandatangan tuan punya akaun. Dalam hal sesuatu pemalsuan, tandatangan tuan punya akaun adalah menjadi tanggungjawab bank untuk menunjukkan bahawa tuan punya akaun yang secara sengaja atau telah cuai hingga menyebabkan tandatangannya dipalsukan. Dengan perkataan beban pembuktian masih terletak kepada pihak bank. ..... Pihak bank hendaklah mengukuhkan sistem dan prosedur keselamatan dalam penerimaan dan penunaian cek. Pihak pelanggan pula, hendaklah mengambil peranan yang agak berhati-hati agar tidak cuai atau secara sengaja membiarkan tandatangan dipalsukan." [56] The question is, whether in tandem with section 24 and by virtue of section 73A, did the Plaintiff contributed negligently or facilitated the act of forgery as contended by the Defendant? Section 73A allows any person who pays the cheque to seek the protection under the said section. Did the Defendant comply with all the established banking procedures, examined the signatures on the Disputed Cheques against the specimen signatures in its system and generally taken all precautionary measures? [57] Based on the facts of the case, PW1 and PW2 had no knowledge of the forged signatures. In fact, Jeffrey was the one who had issued ID2 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 informing the Defendant about the change of correspondence address of the Plaintiff which PW1 had also denied signing resulting that all correspondence are directed to an address unknown to the Plaintiff. [58] Applying section 73A of BEA to the instant case, it would seem clear that the Defendant needs to prove that the Plaintiff had knowingly or negligently contributed to the forgery in the sense of making it easier for the forgery to be committed and that the Defendant had acted in good faith when it paid the cheques. [59] Based on the facts, this Court finds that the Plaintiff does not knowingly or negligently contributed to the forgery. There was no evidence to hold that the Plaintiff or PW1 and PW2 had personally knowingly or negligently contributed to the forgeries. [60] As such, this Court finds that the Defendant failed to establish the element of knowledge or negligence on the part of the Plaintiff. [61] The next question is whether the Defendant has acted in good faith? [62] ‘Good faith’ as provided under section 73A is defined in section 95 of BEA, as follows- S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 “A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, within the meaning of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not.” [63] If the forgery or the incorporation of the unauthorised signature of the mandatory signatories was caused by the negligence of the Authorized Signatories, then, the Defendant is protected provided the payment of the Disputed Cheques were paid "in good faith". In this case, it was one of the Authorised Signatories who forged the Disputed Cheques. [64] In Shorubber (M) Sdn Bhd (supra), the Court deliberated on the word ‘honestly’ and held that- “[61] 'Honestly' was, in my holding, therefore no longer limited to absence of direct impropriety, fraud or complicit conduct but in some situations like here, in the particular context of a banker-customer relationship, acting in reckless or complete disregard of the rights or interest of an account holder or customer to whom a duty was owed by the bank, could fall within the wider meaning of acts not carried out 'bona fides' or honestly.”. [65] In this context, based on the facts, the Defendant had failed to verify the Disputed Cheques despite the large amount of money involved as well as that payment were made out to Jeffrey. The Defendant should have S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 been alarmed and acted in a prudent manner, but failed to act in good faith and thus was negligence as defined under section 95 of BEA. [66] Thus, the Defendant has breached its duty of care in carrying out the customer's mandate. In such circumstances, the Defendant is negligent in paying out the Cheques. [67] In this regard, the Defendant had failed to satisfy the requirement that the Defendant had to, in any event, to act in good faith in making payment on the Disputed Cheques. Accordingly the Defendant was not entitled to the statutory defence available under section 73A BEA. (d) Whether the Plaintiff’s claim in respect of the Eight Cheques is barred by limitation pursuant to the Limitation Act 1953? [68] Out of the 13 Disputed Cheques, the following Eight Cheques were paid out more than 6 years- NO CHEQUE DATE / DATE PAID OUT CHEQUE NO. AMOUNT (RM) 1. 6.3.2015 / 6.3.2015 494176 570,000.00 2. 6.3.2015 / 9.3.2015 494170 730,000.00 3. 11.3.2015 / 11.3.2015 494183 300,000.00 4. 18.3.2015 / 18.3.2015 494167 450,000.00 5. 27.4.2015 / 29.4.2015 494173 40,000.00 6. 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494195 300,000.00 7. 31.12.2015 / 31.12.2015 494199 190,000.00 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 8. 15.1.2016 / 15.1.2016 221004 610,000.00 TOTAL 3,190,000.00 [69] Thus, this Court finds that limitation sets in for the Eight Cheques under section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953. The Plaintiff cannot rely on section 29 of the Limitation Act as section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 is only applicable when there existed the issue of fraud by the Defendant which was not, in this case. Instead, fraud was not pleaded at all against the Defendant. CONCLUSION [70] The Plaintiff’s claim is allowed for RM 1,980,000.00 only, interest and cost accordingly. (Y.A. DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commisioner Civil High Court NCVC 1 Kuala Lumpur. Dated: 29 December 2023 S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 COUNSELS For the Plaintiff MESSRS RICHARD WEE CHAMBERS Advocates and Solicitors No. 9, Jalan 22/38 46300 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan For the Defendant MESSRS SHOOK LIN & BOK (KUALA LUMPUR) Advocates and Solicitors 20th Floor, AmBank Group Building 55 Jalan Raja Chulan 50200 Kuala Lumpur S/N k1Lb840Qz0ayngLOT/CsqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

MA-37G-6-05/2022

PLAINTIF KOPERASI CO-OPBANK PERTAMA MALAYSIA BERHAD DEFENDAN KOPERASI PEKERJA-PEKERJA MELAYU MELAKA BERHAD

"Kaedah 49 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 - Rayuan terhadap keputusan Penolong Kanan Pendaftar yang telah memberi perintah garnisi muktamad - isu: samada aset digarnis adalah aset Koperasi - Perayu menghujahkan aset berbentuk wang dalam simpanan bank adalah milik ahli-ahli Koperasi dan bukan aset Koperasi - Tidak ada keterangan menunjukkan aset di garnis adalah jumlah yang di asingkan dari aset koperasi - Perayu gagal mengemukakan Penyata Akauan atau Lapuran Audit atau Akauntan yang dapat menunjukkan pengasingan aset - Rayuan ditolak"

02/01/2024

YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=90700e63-05d3-4a40-bb6b-9e9c20f5333a&Inline=true

02/01/2024 10:33:56 MA-37G-6-05/2022 Kand. 41 S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Yw5wkNMFQEq7a56cIPUzOg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—37G—s—u5/2u22 Kand. 41 32,01/2224 ,2-42 55 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI MELAKA No. PERLAKSANAAN: MA-376-6-05/2022 ANTARA KOPERASI CO-OPEANK PERTAMA MALAYSIA BERHAD PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN DAN KOFERASI FEKERJA-PEKERJA MELAVU MELAKA EERHAD PENGHUTANG PEMGHAKIMAN 1. MALAVAN EANKIMG BERHAD 2. MAVEANK ISLAMIC BERHAD 3. CIMB BANK BERNAD 4. cmls Isuum: BANK BERHAD 5 BANK MUAMALAY MALAYSIA EERHAD 5. AL RAJHI BANKING L INVESYMENT CORPORATION (MALAYSIA) END GARNISHSARNISI 1 sw vw5m.MMruEq7a5r:c\Pu;ov mm Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm A|.A§.AN.EEN.G.HAlSJMAM PERKARA DI HADAPAN MAHKAMAH [1] Im IN ada¥ah keoulusan mengenal vayuln Pangnmang Panghakxmln sehagzl peayu (‘Fer|yu‘) lemadap kapulusan Penulong Kanln Penaanar 1‘FKP‘| berlankh 512 2022 yang (elah menmak permohonan Perayu an dalam Lamplran 3 unluk mengecuahkan sejumllh wang RM497,e2o 77 darn mganusn nleh plhak Pemvutang Panghlbomnn mesponden‘) LATAR EELAKANG [2] Mengwkut Parayu‘ wa ada\ah salu badan koverasl yang dnuhuhkan .1. bawah Akla Koperasl 1993 Selakax Ogcs 2022, Perayu mampunyaw 227 anggcza bervaflar yang msrnbuax biyaran yuran mu caruman secava pemolongen gap mela\uI snstam am: lahan lerus Angxamn Kuperasx Kebangsann Mam/513 mm (ANGKASA) [31 Perayu menegaskan melalux amdavu an Lzmplran 7 din 1D banawa wang yang dlpohon umuk mkecualukan dan (mdakan garnlsl adalah wang caruman ahlw dan bukan asel Pemyu Jwka pennlah germs: m vw5o.ra.MMruEq7a5uc\Pu;av mm. s.n.\ ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm 7.. mum pm bahawu caruman mareka bensiko am rmang memu. tindukan garnlsx um dun sekvnnya benav, Bahama mereka palm memiallkan satu mntman an bavah Axuran 49 Kaedah 6(1)sebagaI plhak keuga yang mungkln mempunyax hzk ke alas Aumhh nu Kaedah nu memperunmkkan - (1; u m gnmrshu pmceedmqs u u Drought (9 mo nolrce CA! the Cowl um some omer person mm Illa judgment neblm .5 nrcfauns to u ervmted to me as»: sought in be .u..«.=a orllas are/ems to have . nllarge or her! upon n, Me com: may amer mat patson 1» mm baron: Me com and glam m. ,..:.... at m. um wvm pulmulms mm (2; Alierhunvvg any person we attend: Dllarl ms Cowl m sommm mm an me: under parsglapn (1; me Court may summanly denmnme ms qmmm 5: mm namm an alumni: 0! make such mm mm! as :1 mm mm mcluamg m mdur ma: any quuirarv or us... rvlmsuly re: dstalmmmg me vamuy Mme am. of such umerperson 3: rs menhwlurl m pniagmph m on mod m such manner as u mzrmarled m rule 5 [15] Man, sebagav kesumpman, Mihkamah mampan Perayu «emu gigal unluk mtmbuknkan nanawa mug ynnq dxpemkaxkan adalah bukan wang mmknya yang wa udak berkuasa unluk herurusan dengarmya atau wang yang dlpegang sebagax amanah bagl pmak shll-ahhnya (hhal Malaysian lnlom-lvonul Trldlrly carpomion Sin. and. v. Rn» Elnk Somnd pm] 2 cu 717.-[201l]ML./U m u m vw5m.MMruEq7a5uc\Pu;av mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! KEPUTUSAN [17] Dengan yang dermkuan Rayuan H11 dnmak dengan kas RM1,5D0 ac Fennuh garms» muktamad sepem dnpenmahkan olen PKP d\keka\kan. /all-5...?-, MOND Iikbzn a Aianun. HAMID HAKIM IMHKAMAH TINGGI MELAKA Bemrikh — 2 Januan 2024 unmk Pengh g gagggn an Encxk Amnr Nfendn hm Mohd Kham Taluan Muhd Mahfar :5 Cu Psguam Bela a. Paguam Car: No um ma Ja\an PNDD1 Pwsat Mega Durlan Daun 75400 Mama Unmk Perm gng Pgngngkuman on Munivah bum Am Rahman Tami" Gal’! Rafidah Tnn Peguam sews s Peguam Cara La! 7 27‘ Tmgkat 7‘ Wwsma Genus! Jian Amneng soasu Kuala Lumpuv :2 sw vw5o.m4MruEq7a5uc\Pu;av um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm muidamad ks alas gumlah Mu sepem dlpuluskan oxen FKP dwkekalkan‘ mnka xi akan mungaklbalkan karugwan den kelndakadnlan kepaaa arm ahh Ferayu [41 Bag menyokong permananannya, Pevayu «am: melamplrkan mam ahli‘ penyaia bank dun bukn pemolnngan gin arm can panyana akaun Pemyu yang dukatakan sebahagxannya mengandungx Jumllh yang aupemkaxkan [51 Parayu menyatakan wan; caruman am: man dinmgkan dan wung BIBI knperasn dl Maybank No 5U4D2|2BI94E dan dulahurkan d1 aalam akaun svmpanan xetap an N Ram: Bank (elsvbn ‘HBA-1') Maka, wang yang Ingln dlgarnls an akaun Al Ram adallh sebenarnya rmhk pencamm am bukan asel Perlyu HLIJAHAN PIHAK-PIHAK [s| Pmak Perayu menghujahkan pengecuanan wang yang dvpedlkaxkan adallh perm b-gu mengelzk um xeuaakaauan kc nus pcncavurn» pancarum yang man membual sumbangan aan gap mereka Rujukan lelah amuax kepada Kasdah 92 Murin 4 »<asdan—Kaeuan m vw5m.MMFuEq7a5uc\Fu;av mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Mahiwnah 2012 flan keputusin dx da\am kes Hong Kong and Shlngllll aanking corponuon Gah su LII! (Macon-munlcauon Authority of slngapon, GamI.Inn;[19l£] 2 MLJ an ax mans (elah mpmuskan — my A9 rule am pmvldas my me umur Io show cause mu:-1 at less! scvdrv day: name my mm appomlsd memny «or m. iurmer consideration al {M mum. be served not only on ma gamrshee mu mm on m. jugmem mm unless the cm almrwvn mrucls H mm In um um mass; 2 ML] as at Bfludgmenl mm am mm Defers the Cam! In ml: ms oo;ec1ron m Ihe gvmsflss omenus: being made alzsome m ms case me Gmsnu omw Ta Snow cm. wns not served on the/augment deblvr In any case me Cowl can hear Me judgmervl Humor: apamnm under :1: mlvsrsntpowers mm mm any omal as may be necessary to prsvevvt rrvusnoa or Ioprvvsnl an abuse afllva plazas: ulme cum (Order 92 Ru): 47 [7| Selerusnya dmwahkau bahawa Perzyu uuax perlu unmk membuknxan nnsam pemlndahan wang dan akaun semasa Perayu flan Maybank kepada bank A! Ram: Katina likta mengenaw senaraw ahl cammin dan pemouungan gin la\ah pun dvbuktlkan melahu eKs4b4I “HBA-I‘ wash cukup menyokong (akla bahawa Perayu adalah sebuah kaperasc yang memaxankan aknvm slmpanin o\eh Ingvala selam puruaman me\a\uI cara‘ amara Vamnyi‘ mengumpu! syer yulan dan ueposn a sm vw5m.MMruEq7a5uc\Fu;av mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [a| Dmmankan aaalerusnya bahawa ekslhll ‘NBA-1“ .eIas menunjukkan wmhh wang syev darn yurin ahh-ahh nenumlan RMA97,65O 77‘ rnakl jumlah nu bukan merupakan asst Pevayu mum admah wsng yang an sumhang oleh ann—ann [9| Pxhak Resmnen berpendman bahlwa Responder! telah membuknkan pada penngkal pennohnnln lmdaknn garnm bahawa semua akaun dan wang adalan an alas nama Perayu dan demlkzan adalah muik Femyu aan adalah menjadv beban pembuknan Perayu pm: penngkal ml selalah Penman Tunpuk Saba!) dlkeluivknn untuk membukhkan nanawa wang yang mpemkawkan bukan mmk Perayu Rujukan an huat Kepada has Bank Kwiasanu Rakyar (M) v. Kapuul scroaguna Iman Malaysia: Md. (20211 7 cu an m man: aupumsxan — -m) Hawlvar am nghl 0? ms mdqmsnl mam, m gnmfsn moms: n ma juvgrrlem mom am accounts vs not unfettered and m cowl mly rtluu m nurrlu .5 dtundan 2.. nuko ... mm mum. nnry pr 1 yamlnnee nr . ;..4g,.....: mm 1. -are no mm mm m. mm mm .. lccrumg .1». to ma [ndgrmnx damn! it also W1 01 ncomlng 4». to snmnn ./n Mme IS . shlumw pluvrsanlv Much expvassly prumbrts attachment av mnmn deal :9 as guvlnshcnt am am has been equuwbly nssagrwd to 2: mm party and la gunk me, .am.,;. wuufid a. urvrmr In the garmsnss my other cmm winch may muss ummu WI/tuned nmoflgthecromluu alun msoivunfmmnsny ‘ (p-“man anznmam m vw5o.mIMruEq7a5uc\Pu;av mm. smm ...n.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm PENILAIAN MAHKMAAH no] Adalah Mai menglkul kes Tuco srom (M) Sdn. Blvd. v. An-min Kumnl yr Krishnan (20171 5 cu :15,-mm] a nu 251 Mahkamah mempunyal bum mcara dan ndak perm memuluskan an alas unbangan kebavangkaliin sesuam kes gamxsh Iugu. Mahkamah adalah unluk membual salu kepulusan yang am: - Wu: .5 ugmficarvl 070 Am Ms! :1 gwcs a my nflscrelmn :0 me man to oetenmne summamy at by way al heating ltracmng less svvnvficance In (In Evidence Ad 195175!/LMIV!5l9ID¢O(1H7E wag: me marl rs rlqmnd 10 make u my... WWICH u mm is my man .. in say. 0 as r mm no] Impose me wmsm or gamtsnee In anabluh m. case an the mm. a/moaoms o 49, 1grvesmecaufl1Ired:.IcI!bonIvdscodsL'IemzPte( o 4g.mm/mxam-g Ia drscrelmnary puwuraI!nemun' [11] Selelah mennm kelerangan yang an kemukakan ubh plhak Perayu dw an-m Lampaan 7 dan I0 Mankamah mendapah lerdapal kegagman a» pmax Pemyu unluk mengemukakan kelerangan yang Iebm Ierperina uan hrfokus dawn membukukan pengasmgan ‘umlah cnruman sepem yang mdakwa max ma dlkemukakan Lapcmn Audn alau Lapman Penyata Kewangan Perayu yang rnenunjukkan wmlah akaun an bzwah nimanya mahupun m bank min: dan pengkalaganan akaun nu Pads pend:palMahkamah‘ sam Lapomn m vw5m.MMFuEq7a5uc\Fu;av mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! man man Penyata Laporan Kewnngan Perayu sudah pasll akan mp-n menumukkan kepada Mahkimah ml pangasmgin wang czruman dan asfl Kapnrasw [12] Mahkamah ndak mendapati selam dan penylta akaun Al Raihl yang mkaukan penyava aklun mmpanan telap‘ Ieldapal penyaca kmngan Lam yang memmjukkan pememlan wang caruman ahh-ahlv dan akaun Maybank Pevayu dan pengkrudnan ks akaun Al Rajhl yang memhawa Kepldl wmlah yang dlpemkalkan Paoa peodapat Mahkamah adalah ndak sukar. pxa benar wsng dlpenikavkan adlkah wang ahh. unluk Perayu mengammu Imdakzn rnembukllkan dengan .e|.u semua Iransaksl kewingan dengan a. sakong sum pengesahan akauntin akin Jumaudwl Ulhal seksyen 102 5 10: Ana Ketevangan 1950 mengenax beban pembukuun ka alas (SKI: eleh pthak yang Irlgln Mahkamlh mempercaya: lakla Ilu seas Kes memauonal fimos & on v. Lgong Ha Yuen[1980] 2 Mu Ed) DI damn kes Bank Kefinama Rakyat v. Kapurnl Sublguna Inlln Mlllysll 5hI1I1D21] 7 CLJ EM‘ Mahkamah meneupkan - [131 Howsvsr, me right a( the ptdgmanl crsmtar m gamrsn mamas m Ills /udgmsnt demufx bank accounts 5 Hal unlstlersd and Ine mm may refuse to sxsravse rm dtscvetrorv to man an order absolute anlylfn garmslvss an m vw5o.ra.MMruEq7a5uc\Pu;av mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm jndqrwntdubtor rs Ibh 2» plan that M: am duo arlcaumg due in the judgment debtor is also duo m accmmg due to someone else, mm »s a statutory Dmwsvon wh/an anptuufy pruhrbrk amcnmenl 9/ Lvvlam dam 1.» m ganvrmad lho am Ms mu .q.m.my nssogned m . mm parry Md (0 gm: on1sv amme wuum be mm In an. gumlmee and amev creators may may Ems: unduo prslersmzu among the cmdvmr: ulmtnxomm nomazrvy" (penekanan nnamnany (13) Yerkml pemmbangan mu, Munkamah juga memuuk kepada kapmum an da\am kes mm Nlnq Runwwuoa Sdn. Ehd. Ilwun xapmsl Peselti pea-nu Rancnngnn Felcra Pulau Eslantik, Slk Bnrhld, Elnk Islam Malaysia Bhd(G:mi5i)[2I71l] 1 LMS 1473, d\ man: Mahkamah mendapau pmak penghmang penghiklman gaull membuklnkan ballawa wang yang dx aenma darn Kerajaan Malaysia melalui Suvuhamaya Kaperas: Mmaysla adalah sebenamya hakl pmaman unluk mewaksanakan sam konlrak kebersvhan bangunan flan kawlsan sekoluh dan uengan aamman wing yang dwparllkar boleh m gamua aleh plhak penghulsng pengnamman - ma: Mahkamah my berpendsaat wang ,;...,.m... RM5oa am: no tetaflpmv mdeoosrtkan me dalam nkmm JD pada 1.9 72014 Fania mm Penntah Gums! Isnebul mks/uarkan plda 22 52015 mm nnmcw 9 [Man kamudrannya wung yang mgamrs rauu RMJ57 mu Muhkamslv MI nslpendnpnr m 9.17.: mlngcmukakan xeharang peuynts ptubulamaan yang tslan awnaxan bag: Kenn-lmvja pamoursmsn sekulzh m om.» Balmg summmmwn Vbulan sm vw5m.MMFuEq7a5uc\FL1zav mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! mama Mahknmah mr monuuk ./ADA/AL xsnsa, mm /KRAR mm. Pvmlmlan mam Nana ada menyazaxanw '/n; menmhlumlrnn pad: Pambiaya Isxw mus makmmal senagaomnns ysvg airehendalu men Pambusya belkenurl nangan ksgunaan Kemudshan reuebul om mm.-aw 1... yang manynnlnh parmugnln Knpcrlsl dun opomw am kodudukan Kawnnoun Kapuu-I flan mulnma msmbvrrkln mm. Psmhraya penyara lcrrtany semua wang yang lemutang mun Kantian Dalim mm sobsgmmma ammonamu um Fbmbaya clan mam x. somnsr [21] u.»m..n I'm ammm: danpada Waad mu m 215: JD sahamsnya nampvl menaemukaksn penyara lrewangin bugamlarva wily mnda! RM5I)I7.470I7 no yang xwsmlem darla-ada sxu dtgrmakan dnlam lempofi 9 man. Mankamsh ml :.m.:.4u durvyln Ivllflhan peguam ./C yang mags,” mm ds/am Iampon mug ammmn Ira datum Jkum m pm 1» 7 am aomnggn PI;-mm Gnmm rsmbm pafln 22 5 2015 sujumtall mam kumng we we no auguna pallet men JD unluk man moan! mm." ./D /arlgwng lrdak nzngemuknkan penyata kswangan bagamlans pemelsryasn dcksmankm bagr keg/aierya pembersman seknlah lwsnbul JD ma gagal merugsmakskan suturing dokumm my menu-mas" wnng ;wsaa,ao-7 on mwuyuan /221 Mahknmnh rm mun msrluuk swat sm keuada F-mmng Augean, sm Negsn Kedah mum Sokborlankn 25 72014 dmerenggm 3 ads menyataknrv -3 ma mam dmlmli nntuk manysmukakin Laaoran Penggunaan Wang nag. pmaman Am - 12:1 Sekuunyu bumrvnny yang mgama bukznrvyi mm JD smmy. mg modal Rusaa nan oo JD sehannvvyn nlengcmulrlkan mum mu kslsrarvgavv btgmmnna wavy RM5mz we on mgurvzkan datum tampon 9 hulan smtum wing RMl57,lB7 u dlgumu clan JC 9 sm vw5m.MMruEq7a5nc\Fu;av «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! nu Mahhamm rm buptmtlpot nklunyn nu... vrlny Rnu.s7,a7u mimpakln mm Mk! mm pinjirrl-n dwi Sm, m noun munvumuknhn ponym lkaun hm flan hnun mu nhinggl um wing digamls. Kegagaran JD mnuk mm": mm.» nmmnfukknn wing yang nflynmu ohm JC muupmn mg JD xandm dun hunnnyz mg mm: muaqoman ubagarnurll y-ng mm. om. ./D.‘ (penekanzn dnambil) [14] Rujukan 1uga mbuat knpada kepulusan an dalam Pemas Trading Sdn. Ehd. v. ssnali Consmtctlan works Sdn Bird 4 Anar[1991] 2 CLJ1587 ‘Gamshee pruoeedlngs ire anachmem prmxadmgs aha‘ lnaugh rwl m msvecx olchnnels. |:u|aVdsm1 In. order my nuhhn -2 show unit that w.- omalmd, mom and. :1 pm. was name on home puma Incl: Ivhhnoo. By mm, In pmneeamg: av Imchmml M chlllem m . mam al who M: In artduoe evndenm flrsl me gimxshoa .. hke a aamrn/enema: In me mmns anached ma this .s Ham :5 remiomefl by me nature an name .71 me under msl. cm \s_ the order In! g.mm to mm cause ‘rm bmdin 1: xhlfbd to a gummm In mowing gm. :. pmvl mu m nllayu. that n. ".4 no n-my at n. time uftm amino .1 tin man to lhow cm The mm nr IV1: ummmenu ufhawvg to begun um ws dependent on mum parlyww\¢1aIHl no evsdanoe mu waeglven by mmavswde Please see 5 m2 cl Ewdence Au “ [penekanan dwamhah) [15] D\ sampmg nu. Mahkamah in: Iuga mendapatx mdak ada kelerangan yang menumukkan Perayu telah memsbdumkan semua ahhnya m sw vw5o.m4MruEq7a5uc\Pu;av «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-42R(A)-1-01/2023

PERAYU Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN MOHD FAIZZAN BIN SANI

Rayuan terhadap pelepasan dan pembebasan– 25 (1) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah 2009 – elemen-elemen untuk dibuktikan – kegagalan memenuhi kehendak-kehendak di bawah s. 61 – 65 Akta Keterangan 1950 - isu-isu yang sama telah dibangkitkan di akhir kes pendakwaan - hakim bicara telah menimbang semula dapatan-dapatan (“revisit earlier findings”) - kegagalan pegawai penyiasat dalam menjalankan siasatan yang baik terjumlah kepada ketidakadilan kepada responden - mahkamah di peringkat rayuan tidak akan campurtangan untuk mengubah keputusan hakim bicara berhubung dapatan-dapatan fakta yang berpandukan undang-undang yang relevan

02/01/2024

YA Dr Wendy Ooi Su Ghee

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2038bd66-94bc-4f51-9e26-1f2c849b9def&Inline=true

02/01/2024 14:30:54 BA-42R(A)-1-01/2023 Kand. 36 S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Zr04ILyUUUeJh8shJud7w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA—l2R(A) —1—u1/2u23 Kand. 35 32/01/IOAL ,ma 54 DALANI MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI sum-1 Aura DALAM NEGERI SELAMGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAN NO BA-42R 5 -ouzuza ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA PERAYU DAN MOHD FAIZZAN am sun rzzspouosu (N0. K/P:u11214a.sa11) Plngnnalln m Ini adalah rayuan aanpaaa Tvnbalan Pandakwaruyi lelhadzp kepumsan ham mcara pada as.m.2u2a yang te\aI1 melapas dan membebaskan Respunden dw akhw kas psmba\aan bagi Iiga A3) parluduhan an bawah 525 Akla Suruhaniaya Ramh Malaysia zoos (SPRM 2009). [2] Penuduhan-uenuduhan lsmadav raspundan adalah barbunyw sspam mana ber1ku| - Fefluduhan Pmdaan Ferlamz “Bamswa ksmu mm mm Nnvember 2919‘ mm; 1, sanasran Kawalan don Kasalamalirv. PI/IIDII Vmlwaserv, Laulngan Taming Anlnmbnngsu mu. LurvIuur1KL!A 2;, dalsm Danish seam, mam Never! Sarsrvyon sw zmawlyuuu-Jnasmuavw -ms Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm yang bnrlugnsxsbignv max." Pulmlang Panglrlfllrrugvvavn Gm1KP2B av Pulabal Opway lmmm KL/A 2, Man mbedksn wing -man Dudumhh RM wow secnns turw mm Mulvnmnlnd Fans srmn am an Ram ma KP. c1m51—12—527B}. P-meamu rmlwm Gm KPV9 yaw e-«mm svblgltolsng 2-Wm Mal mslwllun w ssbamnv Imdekan mevwvkm Alum /nuvman 1950/:1 my man: Aamu «um mnlnnggflplfllnluknn srk-17'" Zrnz Aha s.mm-rum Pinzqgnhln Rama): ma (M15 :94; umuk merwvmahksn mugvm am mmnnauna/-w-can pomanm s-klor mm mu Ir-mu we-I me/spam-n kualshan Pnnyovnk-n mad. sum-rv-ya Pencevlhen Raxuan waym dun dwuun W, kamu tllnlv muflrlgvlv paunmm ssksyfll 25 111 AM: smm-aim P-moan-n mm zaov dun bulelv ammm mama slksynn 2.54214». ynng um!’ Fenuduhan Plndaan Kedua mm mm pad: may mum zaza, :1/Alas 2, 5-nmn Knwa/In van »<-mm.-r-n, P-;-on Inmm, Laulmgan Taming Anmublnvsa Km. Lun-our 1KL!A 2;. mm aamn seam. 4.1.». New-:1 sum-gar. yang mm: Wbegar mom” Fulalong Pwglrihlnuvvvsen em: Kim 41 mam: Dverau Vrmmsn KUA 2, ma aroma» w-rw mom bequmm rm zaaoa mm. mm noun Mummmad Afa Mlunnm am Azzorm'(Na KP 9oa7m$o.15295}. Pumbamu muwuu. Gmn1KP!9.VaII7 mrmm subagm ourrg mum Dag! meleunkan g am suhnmfla Ifndskan mangtm ma /mtavmn 195%: yaw mans mm Ivlen mm-you Domnluhn uksyull 21:: Am swam-rveya Pvmvvlhan mm 2009 (Am. .594; mm mmmvaum. mrawu am. ksbmanwwlgjlwsbnn pm-mm soktur mm um klmll we-I rnelunavknn lunalavran punyoqnkan Kflnbds smunsnlsyu Psnceganan Rasuah Malaysra van dangan rm, mm mm mu-new puummn sahsyzn 25 (1; Alma Surunaniaya Psncognhan Reagan mm mm. bale): dtimkum 4, Dawn?! may-n 2542) Aka my lama” sm zmmlyuuu nammavw _ mm. smm IIIVVDIVWW be LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm (V!) (W7 samemangnya berlaku parlamuan dv amam sva dan vesponden pada waklu tersebm Respondan lmak hahmmenahu mangenax kewuludan pemumn “set1mw'kaun|er an KLVA 2 sepam yang dinwlakan dleh sw, SP6 dan SP8 aeh\ngga\an reapandan mxanan umuk swasatan ollh sumnarqaya Psnaeganan Rasuan Malaysia (SPRM) pads 15,1 1.2n2n dl mana rusponden xalan dlhenlahu nemauannya men samang pegawax SPRM SP7, svs nan spa max dapal mammnmkan benaknnya pemuacan malapaskan warga asmg yang nnggaw Vehm maaa an kaunhzr paflepasan KLIA 2 kerana mereka max dapal msnyatzkan Lanxn, mass dan bulvan warga aaing yang mlepaskan Ierssbm Dlpalan nakim biura pm. akhlr k-aalumnan kn [12] Pada aklw kaasmmnan xea. nalnm blcera tehah mslapas flan membebaskan responaan bagi keligakelxga psrluduhan pmdaan |arsebul berdasarkan alasan-masan bsrikm (si\a Imal mukisural 45 ma 1 Rlkod Rayuanj I‘) ("I my kata-angan spa, SP7 dan sws (slab dmabar kenowanpamayaannya, SP6‘ sw den swa mempunyaw kapenlingan saxalah respnnaen membeti kaneuangan belaamwa den hakim blcara aapenaapax dengan nunanan yang dlkamukakzn Men pequambela ax penngkat pambalaan aw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -ma saw n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. mnnn mm: dun-mm VIZ nF\uNG puns! my new pun darmkian, Mada panjulasan lamul yang dmw|akan da\am flasan verlghaldman linking bagslmlna kutarangan swc‘ sw den sva |e|ah mcanar kabolshpemawannya. alau bagawmanakah spa, SP7 den spa mampnnyal kapurmngan sauna»: rasponden member! keleranunn bmaannya. Rlyuln my Teuman dsngan kspulusan hakim mom, pmak perayu telah memvamun Nah: Rayuan pads 06.01 2023. [15] Dalam Pefisysn Rayuan, pmak perayu Isiah msruyu lamadap ps\aDasan flan pambebasan responden beydasarkan a\asan—a\asen nerckun, Iallu mum hicara lelah lerkhilsf din segl ma dan mang- undang spatula — fa) mamuluskarv max Dsndskwssn mar membuldrkan kas me/zmnam keraquan yang murrasanah lsmsdep Responder: flan melsbasksn dsn msmbebeskan Raaponasn‘ /:7; memumaksn banawa dokuman-dnkumen yang dunndaksn sebagal mm mm, IDDB, mom, «mm, mm: dun clan/DD16 la/sh mmnum kih-ndik-koharvdak qr Diwsh s. s1 » as Ala: Knhrawin 1950 (AK mm: (cl Irdak msmaemnmaman katsrarrgan Rusponasrv yang bsrsslum Rasoondsn mm memnakarv Dsnyafls new mm. a pm bulan November 2019‘ rd) hdak msmpsmmbslwlun Astumvgan flasuonflen balvawa sr-6, spz dan spa ads/ah msrupakarv Wnawar umgmm m unwell Dflsuksn D: (cl mm rrwmosmmbarvykan katsranaan banawa Ruspannen rnamuurlyav Ivubungarv Dafk dsngsn sr-5, sr-7 dun SP5,- u N zmulyuuu nammavw um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Iv; III! (AI 1/! (nu (n7 um msmp-mmnangm mslsrangsn spa behave rams mun morupsksn nnnraf psgawal hsksdn am mman (WFN) unmk pusuhzn A big! man: 9 5191120217/om 2300 hrs — ma hrs w.ama/ beniassrlmn ms, SP8 omugu an/am puukan n,- rmk rmmpenlmbangkan kamangan spa nanswu bsltuu mm aria msmbual pamonksain Illlkal pm m112o2a bag! msmmxan mmnsam SP5 ks pcj-oar, mm rnurnpammbangkan keleranqun spa Dshuwa mam: Man :1! mm spa rupa mm mumh pm bag! memkodksn kamzmran dulsm um Tum Amndsuoo. mm momuurfimbangkan kagagalan Responder! ssbs/um psrrrmli-vv psltiaruirl max manyslsnkan pemsytasn pen-Ibe/Ian yang mmysls/(an mam am pemhelasn Rsgmnasn; Ifdak msrvummmbongkan ma banaws mmon D15 man mm: mxemuman senate pomenksnan semula s;-5 den spa m Dsdflflkslflfimba/aan. um msmpurtmlbarlgkan kagagahsn Rasoomien msnysrankarv Iwyada max pendnkwaan ms (fan room ssbaqm ssbahsgvarv darrpada kslwsngarv plmbelaan Ruponaen aebe/um pemlulasn pom/caraan, lrdak msngambd kin baimwa pcmbs/sen Rsspunaen aria/an rakaan semsnmsra. miak msngembll Aura nmwa psmhslaan nesoamn many: Derevfatpnnafisn aamua-mam: lrdakmengnmbnflurab-nnwa mmngan Respondun mran mm Konslstsn darn rnirsgukon sw zmulyuuu nammam «ms smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! us] Elamun |erdapa( banyzk aVasan-a\asan dauam Pafisym Rayuzn naraenum namun pmak Dem/u nanya menyemun namang man (4) nu uhmu m dmam psnghlqahannya lawn — In Same Eda dokumen-dokumen yang tfllandakan aebaum iailu ‘ IDD2, Inna, mow, VDD12‘ roma aan flan \DD|6 «evan mamenum kehendakvkehendak di human 5 51 —a5 AK195D (u) Kegagalim hakim Mcam mampemmbangkan kalsrangan responder: aana kelarangan4<eIsrannan sps dzn spa apabfla mareka mpanggn semula di kss psmbelaan. nu) Ksgagalan reaponuan manyarlakan perm/a|aan pambalaan, D15 darn IDD15 sebemm parmuxaan pemcaaan. (M sama aaa kenarangan mspcmasn adeflah (idak konsman darn mewguxan [171 Iswsu tersebm at alas Ie\ah dlhulahkan oxen pemyu damn: Hullhan ‘ Fenayu benarIkh1fl11.2D23 bersama Vkalan mam: Pemyu I1 :1 Sebwknya‘ bemasarkun Hulahan Respanaen bernarixh 19 09 ms bevsama Vkalan omen Respwnden, k raspunden Iekih msnghujahksn dapztan namm bvcarz adaxan 1ana| den mamuhan agavrayuan lak dan kavmusa/I mkakankan mum-u Mnhklmlh Ia [131 masan Penghakiman haklm maaya sena kapulusan ham Dada akmrkaaalumhan kas. kesemuanya adalah bsrdasarkan penemuan iakta o\eh hakim bncara bsmandukan unuanwnuang yang Ma»/an aan mahkaman um eman campunangan flan manganagu aaparan larsabui meuamxan meveka 18735 sz\ah. aw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -ma saw n-nhnrwm be used a mm a. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm [201 Pnnsip am Vrf jelas dlnyalakan dzlam banyak nas undangmndang dan anlara lain ada\aI1 sabagaimana yanfi tflbuluskan uleh Mankaman Psrsakuluan dalam Amrl bln Ibnmm a. Anor v Puhlln Pmsncumr Ind nnothor maul [20171 1 ML.l1— 7511 VHS we law Malina mm mm: mauuage as m ms asdim/fly on mm must be men proper wmgm am: oonsoauravon An ippvfista cowl snoulrl be slow m ulsmm/ng sum ammq at fast alvfwd at by m. mauuaga, who ma the advantage orassmg and many me wtmess‘ umm male was aubsrnnlral and mmaauzng reasons rm msayrwslngf ku pmama: Kuhlndik-klhnndak -1| bawuh :. n1 — 55 AK 1950 [M1 Pmak pemyu Celah mangmqankan bahawa ham biczra man |an<mIa¢ apabila mammuskan bahawa dakumendokumen yang ndakan sehagai wailu IDD2. |DD8. Iumu, IDD12, IDD|3 dan nan lDD1fl man memeuum kshendak-kehandak an bnwah 5 ac — 65 AK 1950 m] Namun, m da\am pengllujahannya. pmak perayu nar-ya menyemuh (anlang VDDZ‘ mm, mm: den dan \DD16('Impa|dokumsnlarsebut“) dan msmohnn agar ampal dokumen Iersebul mat sebagai um Olen yang dervuklan, rayuan an naaapan mahkamah Am akan dipuluskan berkawan empat dokuman Isrsebul. [231 unmk kemudshan pamanamnn. bunnnunrempacuukumemarsamn admah sepem henkul V m um: mempakun Kanyalaun Madwa pabalan lmiqresan Malayaua berurikh us as 2n2a, Pas Lawatan sum ms) Tumm Tempoh Sepanjang FKP yang dikamukakan man pemaaxaan semasa pemaflksasn balsa SP1. aw zmulyuuu-Jnasmuavw 'Nn|2 Sum ...m.. M“ be used a van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! fl‘) (nu) (vi) Barman \DDZ1nHmda kelerangan yang dlbeflkan alert 5»: tenlang pakah yang mangsmarkan uaknman |arsebu| alau Dun Va an bawan mmkan den kawenan swam. mos adalah Mama Dalaman aanagsan Kavmlan Psjabal Vmlgresan KLVAZ, Sspang Sslangm burtarikh o9ne,2o2u yang auanaanangan: clan TPPK vusrazw Din Wan vusw Namun, TPPK Yusrazfl hm wan vusgr sabagai permbuat dokuman terwebul max dwanfllll blarpun man auamaman sebagm saks1 oleh plhak pandakwnan man man aukamukakan oleh psmbslaan semasa pemeliksaan ba¥ai spa mm: adalah mun: Tngas Hanan Jabalan Vrrflgresen KLIA Tahun mo yang dikamukakan man panmaxaan samasa vemenksaan was swa Narnnn, man zda apaapa kelarangan yang dlkemukakan lentanq napaxan yang Man msnyatflakan, menge\uan<in dan men9BwallDD13, name pula auaran aenam pegswax (WFHJ 09- 10.112020/2300 - U700 nu (Team A) yang dlkamukakan auen Iespondsn ssmasa marnhen ke|srz-mgan bsvsumpah. Dokumen Iersebm mamvurlyai nanaanangan Mohd Khaimfldm bln Muxllmun Dawn! cop nama dnn lawalan bsllsu Namuvv nude ape-—epa perkannan 'saVinzn diakui' yang mnyawakan sakah. IS an zmulyuuuunasmnavw Nuns s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m yaw n. annmun mm: dun-mm wa munc pm m1 Dz\am paua nu, mahkamuh mi berssluw aengan nmak pemyu bahawa flokumen-dakumen my dllandakan sabagai\DD2,VDD8,¥DD13 flan name (“smpal mums" Iersebuf) gagal mamsnuhi Kahsm1ak- ksherndak di bawall s 5145 AK1950.0\eM|n.emDamckumen nemmn fidak boleh dnsflma masuk oxen mahkamah blcari aaoagau kacerangan [:51 Eerlandaskan kes Public Pmlucular V cm H-1: Nurun Hqli Inn. [1911] 1 ML] tan yang dmlluk oxen perlyu. mamlndsngkan dckumen-dakuman oembm masm Idalah mo den nuxaru-N D. make spa-spa kelaranaan yang dlbenkan yang berkaman aangannya juga (idak ikan auenma masuk sebagal ketarangan ulsh mahkamah, ianu, sabagawmana yang diputuskan oleh AbdocIcadarHMR di mukasursl 153 - ‘A: than (we mums haw notboen prwectana pmpefly ndmvllad as sum msymusl rn mu ummlll an.-«ysa bu discount-dsnd I am scmnirngry dlsnguvrsfsmmzes to them andalso all 0:91 raszrmony as war: nuanced m mlulran murals - (mnsksnan drlamban} :25] Dalam paaa Nu, habdm Mcara man Kalkhllal apamna mendnpad amps! dokumen (arsobm lemh Iflsahkan kemlenan nleh pembua| dan arang yang mempunyai mifikan he alasnya dan kshendak-kshandak av bawah 52k. 51 hinuqa as AK195D IHVBII mpenum. Ham hlcara mm: Ialkhilaf anabila menanma smval dakumen bersebm sebigal kelemngan Dsmbalaan. In. Kenya: pmymnan pcrllyitlan ptmholllll, ms dun mum nbllum p.-mun-n norm:-mu. [:11 Memmn 5.52 Akla Surunhaya Psncagahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 (Akta SPRM zoos), saaaavang lsrluduh hendabdah. subemm pumulaan pemicavaan, msrvysrahkan Kepada plhak pendikwaan pmnyaman 17 sw zmawlyuuu-Jnasmuavw -um Sum ...m.. mu be used m mm a. nvwhufllli mm; flan-mm VI] muNG pm pemnexaan sena sahnan manamana dokuman yang akan mkamuxakan sebagav mahaman daflpsda keterunaan Dam pamoelaan my Namun, harlandaskan PF 11. ran sax Mnhd In Abdul Snmad [2021] 1 LNS «st Lian DnIo' sn Mohd NI]|b am Abdul R-uk v. PP [mm 5 cu 9:, mm: Klnun Taiacara Jana)/an 1KT.li uan 5.62 Akla sww 2009 nanya mempakan perunlukan-pemnlukan herunsur prvsedur sahma (Nah nu, kegaga\an mamalum s.51A KY.) atau 5.52 Akta spam zone hdak akan memvunyal an:-apa kssan /aklbal temadap Vsu nsnsmnaan maauk k-naranaan [29] Data!!! Dada nu‘ penghwahen perayu menqenax mu im adalan fidak bsrmem Isu mu. K-gagalan mam biclru mnmyertimlungkzn klurlngln Respundnn um I: urangan-knhrlngan spa din spa dalam kos nombolun In. kocmpn: Sumn ad: kal mum. mponuon naaum lldnk kovulu-n dun mu-agukm [av] Keduadua isu kadua dan kaampal akan d ncangkan sscava barsama msmandangkan Va adalah barkanan keleranqan-Kataranian van: dlkemukakan semasa Res Dembeman [311 Amara alnsn-diasan nagx pelevélsan darl pernbebasan responuan an akhlr Ksselunman kes analah dlsehabkan haklm hmara sependapal uangan nuklhan yang diksmukakan man paguarnhsla av panngkal pembelaan sw zmulyuuu-Jnasmuavw -ma Sum IHIVVDIY Mu be used m mm ua nvwhuflly mm; flan-mm VII mum pm [121 Pambacaan hugahan paguambexa an penngkal pambexaan msnuvwkkan Va ada\ah bemsxun Vsu-Wsu yang |e|ah dibanakhkin alsh plhak pamhe\aan an akhir kes pendakwaan wailu ¢anIang- m Emmsn pemberlan suapan kapaaa respanden udak dapat dlbukhkan an Kegagavan perayu mnnangnll Zul Ams sehagai saksl (my Kegagavan pereyu mambukflkan munay nu melalul skaun bank spa, SP7 uan akaun isieri spa (xv) Kllumpangnn dmam navalfl Kan paruyu [as] \su—isu im man pun mpemmnangkan nlah hakim mean: pans akmv kes pendakwaan yang vnana haktm blcara mendspan perayu wan bsrjayi memuuman kas prima lamb Ierhadip responder: Narnun, :1: am pemlaaraan, hakim mcara pula beusapenuapac dengan pengnuyanan pembelaan di akhlr Kes pemnemn sedangkan isu-isu yang sama ls\ah dibangmxan an ikmr kes pendakwaan [:5] Dengnn berbua| damnkian. Hakim aura lalah manimbang semula dapalan-dapalan mym: came! findings‘) beliau “miss an am has pendakwaan yang mans hnklm bicara man mendapan plhuk pelayu seflaku pendakwaan lemh berjaya nmnnuknxan kes prime Iacis Iamadap raspmden, olsh nu parnmaan (aw: dlpanggfl Nenum, uada akmr ksselunmnn kas, haklm Bic:/a lalah menukalkan uapavan I:eHau hnsrvuvv undn kelararvgzn-keterangan bum yang dibangkltkan olsh respondsn yang mush menhnbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ks atas kas pendakwaan 1; syn zmulyuuu-masmuavw y ‘Nata snnnx IIIVVDIVWW be used M van; .. nflmruuly mm: dun-mm VIZ mum pm [351 Bsrkenaan wsu mammbang ssmma dapalandapatan (‘revisit same! /Tm.1/H93") wm, miukan sda\ah «um: kapadi sunny. Valle v Fubllc Pmucumr [2022] I ML! m d\ manzl Mahkarnah Pemkuxuan lelah memumskan- ml Ivan] mm on pvawslon mandutos rs ra IN cum Ia bu um-a won me aunts -macs, the case agnlnstme mum has um pmvad bayumi masanubl: mum mu 1:! muru 1». doing to rm mm mun an m.-mm not in nvisil in urlior Iiniirlnu .2 m. cm. 91 m. Pmllcuflw m. um... ullltli rw an nccuud to am! on N: «lance. The aumaaw an mm is Duh Akim L On v mm Fmncumr mu; 1 Mu 4:; pan] 2 cu m mu Rrchvd Ma/arwm c1 (Sabsh ma Sarawak} (War :1; as/mma maludamsnml rm mm m1 sum as 1351 W: 71040 IM! wlv-n uutsmy mu daftmv ms iumad mllmc sufnvfsxnxflymvtsnad hv: uadfsr Imdfnpx upon men n. called 9.: rm dcfance such laymen rs qwtv aunt!-ary lo M: pflnclph ol mmnmum avaluaban av the 9|/Marlee addnnd .4 m. dun gr m. Woucuflorv 5 cm mauum his/udgnunr Ma law-ad muuagc made it mm Max Iva my nouducnrl . maximum mmuan arm. evvclamx-I adduced by M 9'0:-cutron Deter: cam for me delznca rm) Tm: doe: rm! mean Ilowavur mm m. Ma/juaga carmm mfg! m lam arm-sy esnblrmvfl m cm was arm pmsecullan an rum: pwvoca amnsvymn htnuu/I wnumw mg musm mtplnnnimn has succnddd m rubulllny any or 1». smurorv Druunw/mu on my batance ar Dmbamlmus Mm any mm Pmsunuzirwvs Wnhexl nr bu succeeded /n cailw a Masonic/s mu In his mm! at 4.: (rum 9! ma pwmmn use Iwlvzre rm .mr:I| pvzsunualmn .pym; wmt m mm :15 I: la charm: mrmm: nnamvs on than am (prrwhasrs mud) sw zmulyuuu nammavw «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm Egg g hgn Pmduan Kama 'BiIvuwIk5muDm1n 1a ummmzaza, mhns 2, aenamn Kawalan den Kesefiamalan‘ PO1abaIM|r'9Ivnn‘ up-ng-n moans Amvnbeflgsn mm Lwvww mu: 2;, mm Dunn S-pnnm :1-hm N-van Saw-nan yang mum mam fimbslan Fenolow Pangnmv Vmgmsevv Gnu xm at P:/abut op»-u Vmlgvuon xuA 2, mm. .1.n.um wnrrg xuauurv mum» am 50090 seen"! me. me): Mnhd Rlnuodm am Abdultah We xp. 75u4Ja»aa—5271y,Pmuonmu1mIgnmn GreflKP1HynngD:nlndaksabags: Dung zmgm bflwlmuleflushsn mammq4m~=n mngam Akin //mgruul mswoa, mg mlna klmu man mnlunqqur Danmmkan ulaylsn 215: Mm sumnaniaya mmam /em.» zaov mm :94; umuk menwuumn m-ya: din h-u-mnww-wnw-b-n pumnm slktnr nwam gm. kamu new melapnrkan koaa/man yinyogoksn Maid: Sumhaluaya Pemvqahuv Rlsvulv Maluym dun dcrrgan nu mu. man mamrrailr Dunmmkarl szkxyen :5 m Akin Sumhlnllyl P-mgmn Rowan zoao din own dmukum m Dlwnh Juksy-n 25 (2; Akin ylng um- Kn Fundnkwnn [:1 Secara lingkasnya marangan Dandakwaan manunjukkln berikul. Sarzmaw mmnan 19) orang saw tewan dhaanggn se'oagA\mann dvnyaukan an barwah Lni bsvsnma permn msveka mas.ng—mas.ng sw Mohamed Amt: hm Arum Kznm nmmm P-rvgannh Kawnlan Jibshn Inugmen Mamysla KUA s»>2 Noamamxan bum Mohd Aziman Pennlnng Pengnasa §FFM, sm ‘ Nu-wam Nadzinh b|Yusnp mp Penalonu Penguasa swam spa Mohd Amwavn hln Normn Penulonq Penguasa swam sm zmulyuuu nammam mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! my Jerasnya, apahfla hakwrn mcaru mendapin belvau bsvsapsndapal dsngan hujahan plmbelaan d1 aklw has pembehaan‘ haldm |>1r,ava(e\ah msnukardapa|an~dapalan beflau an akmr kas psndakwann yang sebemm km man menmama kapad: psmbslaan ' nggu Beflanflaskan nuns Aklm (sum), ham blcara lelah tarkhllsfapabula berbuat aannkian Fambdnn «aux suhlmmyt dlpanqqll [an Eiarpun begun, dariuida anahsa dan penllalnn novamca Katersngan manganai kasamruhan ks: pendakwaan, edmah uapacan mankuman ini bahawa parnbelaan max seharusnya dipanggll uleh mahkamuh brcani ekoran k5gaua\an plhak pavsyu unluk msrnbukfikan kas puma fume temadap vssponden (11 am kas pendnkwaan. [331 Arman pnnsm am undangmndang barmwa blban pambuklian kss auaxan dw mas banu pendakwaan sapameng permcarain dan hukannya iarluduh unluk memhukllkan kafidakbersalahannya nu Bsrpsgang kenada pnnsip undang-undzmg tersabul, pada penngksf kes pendakwaan. pmak uevayu perm membukhkan saw kas pnma lame |emadap uesponuen alas xssawanan-kesnlahan yang waakwa llu. [:91 olan yang aemman, namm Mcara Ielah «enmilarapawa mendapih pihak pendakwian 1e\ah barjaya memnuxmn ken pnma Isms Ierhadap lsrludlm samgswmans yang cflperunlukkan a. bawan 5173(1)“) Kamm Tatacarz Janayah [An] Masan-alssan bagi dapawan (ursebu! olah mahkamah mi adalah sspem benkm [41] Pmak nanayu Ialah havgannmg sspenunnya kapada kelerangan sakshsaksl nmu SP6, SP7, flan spa umuk membukhkan kesalahalv kesalahan respanaen dx bawah 5.25 ma swam may 2; syn zmulyuuu-./nasmuavw -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm [411 Kslarzngan spa. sw, dan svs idslah masmg-masrng barkawan dengan penuduhan plndaan panama, parmduhan pindaan kadua din penuduhan pmdaan kaliga. my Adalah fidak dmaflkan behawa ke|erungan—kshymngan spa, SP7, nan SP5 anew: lldak disukung ('r:onnboraIsd'| shah ke|arangan- kelerangan min Dalam am‘ kata Vain‘ kesalunman kea pemyu sdalsh bargamung sensnuhnya kebwa nennakuawenuakuan swa, sw‘ dun SP8 (anaa aDa~aD: bum Vain‘ samada secara lerus mu: m keadaan. lm naps: amns: dalam pemenksaan was spa as mukasuval 151 Rskcd Rayuan Jmd 21A). 5 Damn: wsa, semiu mm an mm. vlultln rm bamnomva flwlgan panmmsn suaam om on somuanyv buvnsnnzn mama" mpad-apmma mu Mann »m...aamn...umu.n, Mmmma FM: Shah 3... Ab and am mga Muhammad Aflq Muas1smEInAneml,yaa!au mm 4. Va. (punsklmn an-mam Plnylasllzn ymg mm: mcnyclurun dun mmk-p or-n sps [441 Menurul sw. befiau mmakukan akuvm 'semng' kaumsr an bawah seliaan hga mug p-egawal imlgrssen lanu Fl Zul Anls. PIT Rmuan dan PIK Danny Supfl Namun, s97 lelah flllangkaa olsh responuen sscara “red mmuw semasa melakukan “.sstf1rIf‘ di kaunler Ea\a\ Palevasan KUA2 yang mana mm. mamhawa keuada mndlngan danqan respenaan bagl Iujuan menutup kes tsmsbul [45] SP7 mangakui bahawa kadudukan baliau dangan kauntsr-kaunler uevseraelanan adaiah lidzk jzuh ma\ah Dnlsh alpanaena dan dlnampak. Juga, pm masa ilu (svdspst xekulang-kumngnw um man enam 11 sw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! pegswal lawn yang hekarja an kuumer-kaunlar pelenasan yang hsrsebelahnn sw pida muse ilu. [451 B!arD\m spa se\aku pogawal penyiasal herssluju Masatzin-sxasalan lersebul udalah Dermnu dan hams d\]a\ankan, namun, SP9 max membuat apmpa slasman ke alas penyena 1 pegawal-psuawsv Vam yang burwgaa hsrsama SP7 semasa mnarngan nu beflaku alaupun mkamin psrcakapan mamka diambwl spe jugs (ldak membuai apaapa siasatxn Ienlanq an manukah respanaan kzarlugas pada mass nu [47] naaa slasalan ‘uga dua\ank.an o\en swa berkanan jaduallugas SP7 can rssponden pada bulan 11/2019 avsupun rakaman pelcakapan marnnu aanpaaa Degamaw yang camban uanaan penyadlaan jadual Iugasan pegawax umgnasan an KLWAZ us] save iuga lalah gaga¥ mamhuat spa-ape sxasscan ke axas bulnrzn warganegam Chma «menu: yang dlkmakan dilapaskan oleh SP7 [49] Dalam amkata Vain, spa max menmankan ape-apa sizsalan Vain berkeulan kssavanan respnrvflan m bawzh parluduhan plndsan panama Mam: spa hdak memwnyal pengetahuan banawa mndmgan amara SP7 dan rusvandsn te\ah berlaku an kaunberdl Ara: 3 SP9 Ilanya mengambll Jalan mudah dengan hargamung sspammnya xepeaa pengakuan SP7. [so] Barkzilan dsngan kelaranaan sws W15‘ wzng suapan sebenyak RM5fl0~OD man mkacaxan dlbenlan kepadi responden pada 10.11 2029 @ 11 an lI\s\am dv Hzfldlng Lounge, Aras 1. aanagxan Kawaxan Dan Keselnmalan, Jabalan Imlgrasen Malysia, KLIA 2 [51] Pada masa nu, dx dalam Holding Lounge larssbul, Iardapa| seramal Mull man; pagawaipegawm imwgreseln Valn, anma lam, aaalan P! Hafiz dim PIK Fa\za| Wang suapan larsehlfl ada\ah berkanan setting kauntev syn zmawlyuuu-Jnasmuavw -ma Sum ...n.. M“ be used m mm ua nvwhufllli mm; flan-mm wa muNG pm keluzr unluk malapaskan sauumh mang w-arganegara Inaonesxa yang wan «ma! Iamn mail [m Namun, spa max membual spa-apa slasacan ks ems peqawa\- psgawefl vmlnrasen lam yaw waaa aw Haldmg Lounge tersebul semnsa keiafllln vemberran warm suapan Iersebul auuranmmmn semuun many wauganegara asmg Inaanaana yang dwkatakan ta\ah lmggal Vabih masa levsehm Juga ddak dlambfl o\ah SP9. [55] SP9 juga Mak rnenjaxannan apaipa s1asa|an Iawn berkailan keuzrangan spa yang marupakan aasarl basrs kesa\ahan mspondan ' bawah penuaunan Dindaan xeaua sepennnana nenaan kelerannin sw nan sPa, SP9 Juua menaanuml man rnunan aangan nanya oergannung sepenuhnya kepada pengukuan sps umpa mambual apa—apa swasalan Vanjut yang bokah mangnaaukan banyak xamngan Vam unluk dukamukaksn [54] Ekwmn dan penywasatan yang xidak menyalumh dan lengkap men 5129. kemangan-menngan spa. SP7 dan svs gagal menyamknn «anxn. mass aan wmn warameaararwafsanegara asmg yang mkaxakan nanan dilspaskan ulah msraka berikulan perbualan ‘satiny’ lsrsahul Raknman ccrv [551 sP1Juga bstseluju aengan pen-nexaun bahawa nmamgan levsebul lelah beflaku dmam npuxan rakaman ccrv. Namun, naaa rakaman ccrv dlkemukakan bag? manyokong kaharangan manganaw rundmgzn kussbul uloh 5:7. :55] Malah SP1 te\ah menuakul bahawa hshzu udak dapal Vngal aga- apa bulwan Iamang warganegam asmg bsrkenaan. Mamun, SP7 bavselum dsngan psmbelaan nanawa mam pemimauan ccw yang 2: an zmulyuuu-./nammavw Nuns s.nn ...n.. M“ be used m yaw na nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm wa munc pm mamas di silu bnlsh marakam warganagara cmna yang dlkatakan te\ah paskan ulsh bsliau. Akan lefipl. naaa ralcamsn cow dx kaunler pelepasan SP7 Ievssbut dlkemukakan. [511 Exarvun msnunn SP7, nembenan warm suavan szhanyak mana- an banaku d\ Are: 1. namun‘ SP9 uaax membua| apa-spa Vavman ke Cempal kelatflan Ierssbut alau pun rnsngavnbn apa~apa mkaman ccrv an Sam: (55) Juga, naaa rikamin cow dx Haldmg Lounge mkernnukan yang mana manuml SP8 sduhh Cempal pembefian Wang suapan kapada respundsn [591 Begnu Inga aengan keuadsan rakaman cow dikemukakan an llmpal yang vnann rnenumc SP6‘ wang suapan Is\ah mbsnkan kauada respundan. M1 Mme?! lmak dlnafiksn cow mamamkan per:-man yang pannng di aavam kas Wm mamandangkan manunn 5%‘ SP7 dan SP6, pelzpssan wamanegara-warganegara aging, rundmgan sens psmbenan suapen kesenmnnya heflaku di dzlam psiabal bangunun KUA2 yang di hawah Vipulan ccw. Sehdak-«daknya, rikaman ccrv akan msnunjukkan inlevaksi responds" dsngan sway svv arau spa suhagaimana yang dmyalakan an-an sva, sw darn swa hahawa rakamannakaman my Malangnya, nnaa rakaman ccrv Vangsung yang mkamukakan man pmsk pemyu sepanjang pemlcaraan yang mana |alah mambawa ksoaaa kebmpangan matana I ssdus dalam nanam ks: parayu/pundakvman [52] Kepammgan rakaman ccw eflah dnaxankan dz\am kes Fubllc Frouculnr v Ahnud lahld Namldi mm 9 cu 113 yang uinnuk dalam penghujahan pmak rasvonaen :5 syn zmulyuuu-./nasmuavw -nna s.nn In-nhnv M“ be used m van; me nnn.ny mums m.n.n wa mum puns! uomy mil [cal seluruun-ya, fukfl-b\mI pemoayamn wanu ausvan ks dalsm mun- akaun bunk spa, SF7 dean akmm Maybank 1slen spa mga udak dikemukakan bagi mambuklikan Wang suapan kepada raspnnden ada\ah danpada wangwang yang mmasukkan ks da\am akaun-akaun mum. Malah, SP9 Ildak Vangaunfl membuat spa-avi nenyemakan ke am akaumakalm bank spa, SP7 am nknun Maybank Islen sue hag: mamnukukzn “money Ira!/"lelsebul I64] s-memangnya -money wear ada\ah saw prom smsalsn yang pemmg dakam kes vasuah alau pengguballan wang haram kerana wa dapal manunjukkan psrgarakan warm dalam atau my bank bag? maflgslihuv bagmmana um um dwpsrolew dan dnupuskan [as] Da\am Dada ilu, penyizsztan yang hdak msnyammh dan Vsngkap uloh svw Ielah menafikan mspondan salu Derblclraan yang advl. Sebaaalmsna yang mpuxuskan aatam Ghlum Gnuruzldoluhlvblnnl Nauln 11 Public Pmucmnr mm] 5 IIILJ m. Iugas sesemang pauawaw penyiaxal hukan sahaia Imluk mangukuhkan kss pandakwaan mala- - As an mmuwmg man, pm hi: m animus msaanwawy lo -mmm ax/saw. .m.my. mm»; /serum ofms cs... mm. not MP/ftlmuvsmiflwsvamanbmnlsolhclnpfllum mauryonm -Mmm-ma mm 7! not meroiy to new up u pmascunan can mm ma Mdanco as may-flehlulhe zountomcadl corn/vrnun Dunn bang out me marunvambhsd mm (M mm. cnaudnsvy .1. Dr: V sum :1 My (1974) 9 supmm Cow! cm: 774). m appauam unno! be Devlsliszdfnr/ackulmaenuflytnlnvasfivstriznbyPWfi!19Drfvm17/umultvne Iimslronoumd borvuflrumouhllsoc pm cmmm vFubllc Pmaacmor mm; 1 ML] 137/ ' Is N mmuuu nasrmmw um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm (as) Salaruumya, tugas nan paramm pandakwaan (alah dIh\m:angkan men Mahkamah Fersakumun dmam Rusll bin vum v Public Fronculor [2021] 4 MLJ An m mana paranggan-pereman 29 dan so penghaklman Mum Zawawi Salleh HMP menyalakan sepam benkut V ‘[213] w. beam mm m dllcusslon on m. prupenuh ufllrepmsecutw rn-pmmmum a m‘ma‘ms( ml accuwsu a 3Dsc!a/ puma pm or Imroislsunl/kamewunselfuraparxymlmnlhrnlzrcmnspl/‘or mu acemvd um: my menu whn have mm»: m new/nq u onnvrchon at .511 mm, pmcvcutors an uhun nllad “rnininII of lunln" -nu tnnlnvh 1. topreaent me whom eon no mo cum Indy 1:: mmmn finding on! whom we mun Itu. Bu :9 me» xaaeralroh m UVmllI£l(1rIflV!,PVlIP'9!9DAlfW! are mndornvorll we}!-dsfined mm mmmg m duty oldlsdmun 1551 mm 51A am. We), {:9 -any m nll .n L‘:-dlbll -mi ruin-nl wlmnui, muou) my to conduct In: an Fairly an R v am: /mm] 2 KB am, R V SugaImsn[1D85]25 Cr Ayn R 109, Muhammad M Kndar my mums! V Pub/in Proucu1r.v[2I)11] 2 sm 1205; mu) m wamd mm to amvhausa mm, .: aw Mmea. pmsmnors :1! etpetlvd la pl-uunl m.» an I-my, Implnlllly and pm!-nlunllly mm mm no court In arming at mo mm. ay pmmrng an m. ml:-/Int!-5!: to m ma. Ofllzcr elm: Cwn"(Sa:R V sum. mm) 23 CrApp Ram“ (panskanan dlrambihl Kegugalan momanggil Pl 241! Ann [57] Koaagalan plhak perayu memanuwl Pl zm Anis ssoagax salur psnflakwaan baseru ksciadaan kmsmngan beflau man mewuyudkun kewmpangun malena / aenus dalum naram kes pervdakwaan Ke|erangzrH<a\erangan sws, SP7 aan SP3 ksssmuanya manysbul tentang P1 Zul Anis dun pernnan yang mmainkan zflahnyz dalam seflap psriuduhan mndaan Ierhadap vaspondsn 71 N mmuuu nasrmmw um Sum ...m.. WW be .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! [sa] Menuru| sps‘ P1 Zul Ams lelah mangarar-loan behau member! wzumo kepada responden belkanlan “ssm’IIq"kauntarks\uav hagi (ma (3) wsrasneoara Indonesia Namun‘ sws am ad: maklumat bulirin mlnginaw age: (at warganegara lndanesla nlarpun bellau lalah menlnme nmsoo darlpada Pl zm Anis. Malah, 5:9 lugs tidak psmah baqumpa F! Zul Anis untuk msrakam palcakapan beliau. [an] Menuml sw puVa,aklIv1(l‘seP(lnd kauncerr udaluh m bawah sellaan w Zul Ams dan dua orang pegawaw ilmgrsssn wam. nu] spa pula memben kecsrungan bahawa PI Zul Am: Ielah membuat pambayaran wang ssbanyak RM5‘flD0rDO ks dalam akaun Maybank \s1eIi spa smavaa salu anau due shifl pemuaoan ssmng kaunlertersebm [111 Semsmangnya pihak perayu mermpunyal mdangkuasa unuuk memanggfl saksx-saksi pendakwaan. Namun, jelas dan keterangzn spa‘ sm dan spa, M zux Anus merunaksn asorang sakm pandakwaan yang panung bag: Muan pembukhan kes (emadap rasponaen bag: kasalahin dw bawah xemga-mga pmudunan pmdzan harsabm rm Sebagalmana yang mpmuskan oleh Mahkamah Mung dalam n cm... Hlang v PP [1:95] 2 ML! «:9 . - wanna ssmnaz, II n In our vrswcleprlaw ms! mm mm pmsacutuan nus - rorvwhlt ducubon Is (U m» cnmca orwmsm lo be cam 51 me ma/1399, 9 7 Am Muhammad 9! Dabbah V M; of Pa(sstms!194l1AC us II pp 157499, M4412 An 5» 12w -1 pp 143—1u;, (ht mod um rmman uuonprnmuxam nmcmlrm m m pmmmm of: can rs max :1 Ilsa hls . duty :9 call .1: .1 lira nocnnlry wnnlnn nu uuhllth nmormmu me accused neyan-1.rnemn.m mm and :1, In the cxucln 4:! M‘ dllcnflon. :4 II": in mm: my: obllgattun - mm.-n II mnmv loss mm . murovy -my » M1 mum mm as manna (Denekanan mmmm) 2. N mmuuu nasrmmw um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm my aemasaman huraian-huralan di am, adalah dapatan mahkamsh ml bahawa buk(|—Dukfl Ienlang jadual ken , rakamamakaman cow‘ ke(erangnn—ke|emngan dan rakaman parcakapan venawal-DSQawa\ lam. lsrmasuk TPPK Vusrazfl, PK zm An1s,P!T Rmuan, PM Danny sunu, Pl Hafiz dan PVK Faizax, butivan akaun nanx sPu, SF? nan akaun Maybnnk wslari spa, bukli money hall. human wauganegam-warganagara axing yang tflkatakan dHepiskan, kesmuanya hams dlkamukakan ohah pmak perayu mam membukllkan kers prfnla fads |erhadap mspunden bag! Kesulahan—ks5a\ahan yang didakwa ru] sabanknya, bnban aembuknan ml (elah dipmdahkzn kn avas hahu raaponaan yang mana psngamukaan ampal dokumen usrsam |DD10. mom sen: D15 warm gamhar-gsmhar ax lapangan KUA2 amum kes pamnavaan adalah nauaamaan dnngan usnha plhak respnndan un|uk membukukan kafldakbelsalahannw [vs Memandzngkan pembelaan fldak sehalusnyn dlpanggll man hakim ’ ra, make panghujahan pmak perayu Ismang (i) au kadu: - kegngalan halum bmam mampanimbangkan keterangan lespcndan sana ke|avangan~ke1arangan SP5 flan spa npablla men-ska uipanggir samuva m xas nembelaan sans u.) an ksempal » kalarangan reuponuen idulah naak konslslan dan msragukan adiflah akademvk semata-male :9 am zmulyuuu-masmuavw -ma saw ...m.mn be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Kulmnulun [73] Berdasarkan nuralsnmuralan dun davaiandavaflan d! alas‘ Vayllin Ferayu adamh dengavv ml dmahak dan kepulusan namm blcara dlkekalkan‘ Esnarikh pada A D ambsr2D23 (VA. DR. WENDV I su GHEE) Fesummaya ehaklman ah Nam (Janayah 5) Mahkamah Tmggw Pmak-Pmax Psndakwaan . Pn Vma Juheza EM Maaras T\mkza\an Pandakwa Raya Sumhamaya Fanoegahan Rasuah Ma\ays\a Peguambels Teluan lshrakh Saad 5 Ca ‘ 5:3‘ Jalsn Bm 6110A Eandir Hum Mahkoh moo Kqang Sslzngor sw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [41 SP5 Mend Kmuaaan um Musuman renew man.» man Jabman mam Ms\ay$/In ma swa Muhammad Afia Muaazam am Psqawm Vmwgvesen KF1H Azumi V KLIA 2 ss-7 Muhammad Fans snan Em AhRas\d Peuawaw llmumsan KPH! _ ‘ _ Km 2 are Mom mzauumn BM Abdufllh Pagawax Imvgrulsn KF19 Km 2 SP9 Jlgalhis AIL Nngafingum Fegnvwai rem»: Fenolarlg Penguin spam Namun baa! membukukan oermdunan—pem.gunan panua-man pmaaan pemma‘ kadua dan keflga lerhadap .aapum1an, psrayu Ie\ah balgamung sepenuhnya Kepada keterangun-kelarangan SP7‘ SP3 dan SP8 masm-muszng [51 Bag alluduhan pmdaan panama, ksterangan swv adalah secava nngkaanya sepem herikm 51 sapanjang hsrlugas av KLIA 2, SP7 oemah |eflIba| aennan aknrvm “seIl1ng“ kaunler Mink nu:-mo Ianun 2019 xshsngaa sekarsnu Aknvm 'sem‘ng“ ksunler mi melvbalkan pengalumn pergevakan kelual dan masuk walga a u ma\aIui kaumar yang mana fiada ssbavanq flndakan mamw mennikm Akla lmwgresen 195:/53 wmauvun muapan xesawanan aan xegagalan mamenum syarat yam dnslavkan dw bawah Akin tersebm. aw zmulyuuu nasmumw «-ma am n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. nrW\nnH|:I mm: dun-mm VII .num Wm! 5.2 5.3 54 5.5 SP7 (alah msmhamu pagawaw-pagawai lam iai|u PI Zn! Ams, PIT Riduan dan PIK Danny Supll yang mempunynl kenalan dengan ejervejsn pekeqa asmg bag: memudahkan pram as kaunlerlmlgresen Kehiasaannya, SP7 akan mandapa| mesa; mangenm maklumat warga asmu ma\alui wha!saDP dari PI Zul Anis, P17 Rmuan dan PM Danny supn unluk akhvm -smug" kaumanemanot Selspas sshap urusan 'sal(mg" kaumer, ksmasaannyu aalapaa nan: wzklu xeua, SP7 akan me\aDo7kan xepaua Pl zuv Ams‘ PIT Riduan darn wk nanny Supll unluk mendapa| nayaran dari Fl Zn! Ams, PIT Rwduan dan FIK Danny SupH menglkul wmlah wavga asing yang heliau moses. Barman dangan bawran yang dilarima. sw akan mandspal RM50U- an mngga Rmssam bagw urusan 'samnr kaunler ksluardan RM20r1-DD ningga RMZSD-00 bag! umsnn 'xe2lmg" kaunlav masuk bagx sellap passpml yang behau uvuskan. Bayamn yang 597 Asnma ads\ah iecara mum flan ads juga melaluw pmdahsn wang ks akaun Maybznk No. 155220532552 mmk 5:7 Pada seldlar nuvan November 2019‘ semasa SP7 bekelia an N35 2‘ ksumer new pebpusan KLIA 2, SP7 nelan membual umsan “sefllnf kaunler keluar umuk searang warua asing cmna yang menduduki Malaysia mawanim tampon mass (averslayedj Raspondan Ia\a?I mendlpal lahu bahavwi Iemang umsan ‘selling’ kaunlzar oersenu: ssmasa ballau mem|1ua|mndaan ks senap kaunter. syn zmulyuuuunasmuavw -ma am.‘ ...n.mn be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 55 5.7 Msnuml sm, :1 man membedtahu mspcnasn hanawa beflau am membaw seam: suapan supaya lldak mangamnu Imdakan ks mas amnya dan [nus melindungi urusan ‘salami kauntar Msnurm sw‘ rs-Sounder: ta\ah uersamu dengzn tawaran su=7 flan mm melspmxan psmsra in? kenada Kama Kumvtflan D wallu TPPK vusrazw umux menaamml lmdakan ke alas sw. owan nu, sempa-E hebis waku kena, sm lalah berjumpa respunden ax Alas 1, pqahaz Eahaglan Kawalan am Kasshimalan KUA 2 dan msmben Wang Inna: benumlah Rmno-no keyada behau Amaun RMJDD-DO dwlanluksn uleh sw flan Danna warm mu aasxan naau asnpaaa umaan uaamg kaumar kemar nan Malayan: flan hukann‘/I wann SP7 sendm [6] Heat penuauhan Mnasan kedua pula, ketennaan SP6 Idalan sacara nngkasnm sepsm benku| 5.1 62 sepemmana SP7. SP6 Mia lambs! dakam aklwm -5911/n9’ kaunler namun spa hanya memnamu pegawal F> Zul Ams sahala an mans svs akan msndapal buhran warga asmg ma\a|ui caman karlas daripada P1 Zul Anus. Paua saknarbulan Janusn zuzn, samasa spa dw (amputlehal pegawaw Irmgresen (lacks!) dl Arms 2, pejabat Eahagwan Kawalan dan Kesstamatan KLIA2, F-'\ZulAnis1eIah Derjumpa dsngan SFE dan membsflkan wang nmal RM1.5uu-no kerana mambanlu membual umsan ‘setting’ ksunler keluar nan: ma (3) many Warga aslng Indonesia yang mendudukl Malaysia meleh smpnh masa (ovevslayedj. s sw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 5.3 5.4 1.1 PI Zul Anus Jugs memmla SP3 mambankan suapan sebanynk RM2OD—flD kapada responder: aupen (Idsk mengambil undakzn ks alas am SP6 can Juga mehndungl umsan ‘surfing’ kaunier Karena mpormen marvdnpm Cxhu bahawa SP6 Csish membum umsan “selling” kaunter larssbm PI Zul AM: uauk mambeliushu svs bagaimana responder! m:nd:pa| lahu urusan Ielsebul Dalam pm nu. pafla sekitav bman Januan zm, semasa spa berada di Holding Area, m N35 2, psjabal Eihagxan Kawalan dan Kussiamatan KLLA 2, sws lelah memberikan wang lunaw sebanyak RM2UD—GD kepada respanuen sebaqai suapan supaya «aux mengambu «ndakan ks alas SP6 den iuga meunaungu urusan “sstlinj kauntsr Manumt spa, vesponuen Ishah msnarima suapan cersanm, (Idak msngambn ssbamng Ixndakan ka alas swe am jugs: Iwdak mawapoman narkara my ksoada Kama Kumpuxan n IEVIU TPFK Yunazn‘ unmk msngimbu (mdakan ks alas baliau Amaun suapan RMZOU-U0 dxlanlukan Meh spa dan punca wang Im adalah his“ ampaua urusan “ssI1rnq’ kaumer hag: (Iga (3) umng walga aslnq muoneaxa ulnar nan Malaysia dan bukannya wang swa senam. 17] Bag‘ pemmunan pmdaan ksliga Ma, katerinaan spa adalah secara nngkasnya sapam berikul. Snpemmsna spa dan SP7‘ sue turut eenizm dslam aklwm “setflng"kaunler namun svs hanya membamu pegawal PI zm Anls sahaJa dan TPPK vusrazu. spa akan msndapm mesa; me\a\ui whatsapp nan F! Zul Ams yang juga merupakan 7 sw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 72 13 74 mm: Kepuda wax vuaraz-1 unluk ammo “setting” kaunler inn seweuaa seflap umaan 'seIt!rw' kaumer, keblasaannyfl aebpas hams wakw kaua. swa axan merapoman kepada P! zm Anna :11 mam Wang nasu umsan ‘setting’ kaunlar am dmenkan eleh P! zm Am: xepaaa spa secara lunai alau mmasukkun ke aavam akaun Maybank No. 1so1m7s24e mlllk man swa Menumt spa‘ naaa 1011 202a semasa spa bevada m Hohimu Area Ara: 2‘ Bahaman Kawalan uan Kaaemmalan. Jabalan lrrflglesen Malayswa, KLIA 2‘ spa Ie\ah member: saw suapzn bariumlah Rmsnmno tuna: kepada responder! supaya lidak mangambH lindakan ka atas dvinya dzn juga mshndung uman “soItmg’ kaumar. Im adalsh dlssbabkan responaen talah mengelahuv spa oambandeman ulusan‘ anmg' kauncer kaluar hagi sapuluh mo) mang wargz asmg Indonesia yang mandudukw Malaysia me\e nammn mesa (overstsysd) wailu salu kesmanan fli bswah Axes muigrasen 1959/63. Menumt spa‘ responder: Ia\aI1 manamua suapan mrsebm, uaak manqamniv aanarang unaakan ks stat behau nan mga naak mehlnolkan pemara ml xepaaa Kama Kumvuven D Iauu TPFK Yusrazll unluk msvvgambfl lmdakan ks alas swa. Amaun suapan Rmsoam Ielsebul di|enmkan Meh spa dan punca wang mi ada\aII hasil daripada umsan -sauw kaunler haul sepumh MD) urang wurga sslng lndmaswa kemar dan Ms\aYMa aan bukannya wane spa mam aw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -ma saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm In: nrW\ruH|:I mm: dun-mm a. mum Wm Daplun hlklm blur: man mu: kn plndlkwlln [3] D1 peflngkntakmrpandakwann. haklm bicara «man mendapan uihak psrayu oeqaya membukllkan sam kss pnma (awe ielhadap mponuen aenugamna yang mpscunmkkan m bawan 5173100) Kanun Taulcarz Jenuyah m Jusmru nu, nakxm bicara mam memanggil pambalain urwuk membala din K nomhnlnn my Dalam kss pembaluan, nsspundan man memilill umuk membafi katzerungan belsumnah ax sampmg memunugu semuvz dua (2) arang saw pendzkwaan Vallu SP5 Mona Khalmddm hm Musllman (Panolcng Pangarah Kanan J1M.KL|A)dan swa [11] Sacam ringkasnya, responder! menafikan psmah herlumpa can mbenknn suapan secara umai men SP7, sva dan spa an Bahagwan Kawalan dan Kesehmatan‘ mans: lrmglessn, KUA 2 pads hula-blla mm pada mun zme dan 2u2c Sebegaw panmexaan, respnndsn oalan menyatakan sepam be|1kuI- (u Fsiabst lmiglusn KUA 2 adalah lamps! lenwka dan ummpx o\eh sislsm kamefa ccw 24 Jam an mana semesflnya pemuacan Mu dapsl dlrakam flka um: berlaku Dalum pads mu. rssonnden lslah mengsmukakan gambar-gambar yang dilands sabagaw D14 m. (2) dan (A) yang msnunjukkan kewujudan kamera ocrv di kawasan Oarxahm. Kehldaen Iankh speslfik dalam penuduhuwpenuouhan pindaan panama dan ksdua man manyababkan responder: (‘I7 9 sw zmulyuuu-masmuavw -um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! uni (‘VI M Mdak bauan manyamak samma Jadual mgasan rsspanden paaa bu\an-bman tarsebut bag: mennfikan dakwaan SP7 din svs. Bsgi pemmunan omaaan kstiga yang msnuruukkan dikwaan suspsn berlaku pads 10.11.2020, rasponaen lllah mengemukakan Jaws! Twas Hanan JIM KLVA Tanun 2020 (Eksmbfl D13) yang Mas menuruukkan pads 1a 11.21720, kedua-dua sPa dan ruspondan hercun Make kscsmngan SP3 yang mendakwa ma dan raspanuan bekens aan penmenan suapan baflaku oads nankn |en.abu| ada\aI1 hdak benarsama sekali Dakwaan SP7 yang responder: halah menangkapnya secam ‘caught rad hsndmf flan ssnepns nu SP7 malakukan Wndlngan‘ dengan responder: unluk 'menulup' kss Mu dmeflkan sama sekah: memandangkan kefiadaan saksuaaksx lam‘ rnasalnnnya, pegawax Vmmresen yang berada kaunIar— kaunlav nelepasan yang bersebehahan flengsn SP7, pagiwai penyelna yang dflempatkan ba(u\—b21uIdIDe\akang SP7 max fllpanggll ke mahkamah unmk mambukhkan ksbenarun dakwaan swv mu Dukwaun swa hahawa vembsrian wan); mnai kspada responder: dilakukan daram amk Holding Lounge secara di haw-ah meja dmafiksn same sekalw; memandangkan tags (3) law psgawaw lmlgresen yang berida dv bunk yang sama vawtu Pl Hafiz, PIK Faizal den seomng Van! yang spa udak mgan ndak dmanggil un|uk mangesahkan serahan m an zmmyuuu-masmuavw -nan saw ...n.mn be used m mm .. anmmuuy mm: flan-mm wa muNG pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

J-05(SH)-253-06/2022

PERAYU LOO YONG HENG RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Rayuan Jenayah - Perayu telah didakwa dengan enam (6) kesalahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) iaitu satu pertuduhan mengedar dadah di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) dan lima perduduhan memiliki dadah di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta yang sama - Rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang mensabitkan perayu bersalah atas kesemua enam pertuduhan dan menjatuhkan hukuman gantung dileher hingga mati bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya dan penjara 2 tahun mulai dari tarikh sabitan bagi setiap satu pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2) dan hukuman penjara berjalan serentak - Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan 1: Sabıtan ke atas perayu bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan adalah selamat. Oleh itu, tayuan perayu terhadap sabitan bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan ditolak. Sabıtan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dikekalkan. 2. Mengenai rayuan terhadap hukuman, bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B ADB, Panel Mahkamah Rayuan menggunakan kuasa budibicara di bawah Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 (Akta 846) dengan mengenepikan hukuman gantung sampai mati dan menggantikannya dengan hukuman 30 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap (13.2.2018) dan 12 sebatan rotan. 3. Rayuan terhadap hukuman bagi lima kesalahan memiliki dadah di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB ditolak. Hukuman 2 tahun penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dikekalkan. Hukuman penjara berjalan serentak dari tarikh tangkap.

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin MazlanYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d346baa5-9278-4343-a3ca-d22a5ed297ec&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO.J-05(M)-257-06/2022 ANTARA LOO YONG HENG - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN DI DENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO.J-05(SH)-253-06/2022 ANTARA LOO YONG HENG - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN DI DENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO.J-05(SH)-254-06/2022 02/01/2024 09:00:43 J-05(SH)-253-06/2022 Kand. 46 S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA LOO YONG HENG - PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA - RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Perbicaraan Jenayah No:JB-45A-10-09/2018, No:JB-45-14-09/208, No:JB-45-13-09/2018 Di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Muar, Johor Antara Pendakwa Raya Dan Loo Yong Heng] KORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, HMR MOHAMED ZAINI BIN MAZLAN, HMR AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, HMR S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 PENGHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH Pengenalan [1] Perayu, Loo Yong Heng telah di dakwa dengan enam (6) kesalahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) iaitu satu pertuduhan mengedar dadah di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) dan lima pertuduhan memiliki dadah di bawah seksyen 12(2). Enam pertuduhan ini di bawa dalam tiga kes yang berlainan. Ketiga-tiga kes dibicarakan bersama di dalam satu perbicaraan. [2] Rayuan No.257 Melibatkan 2 pertuduhan iaitu satu pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B (1)(a) ADB dan satu pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB. [3] Rayuan No.253 Melibatkan 3 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB. [4] Rayuan No.254 Melibatkan 1 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB. [5] Di peringkat pendakwaan, kes didengar oleh Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman (PK) Awang Armadajaya (Hakim bicara pertama). Hakim bicara pertama memutuskan pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan dan perayu dipanggil membela diri. Hakim bicara pertama kemudiannya telah bersara. Kes pembelaan didengar oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Abu Bakar Katar (Hakim bicara kedua). S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] Di akhir kes pembelaan, hakim bicara kedua telah mensabitkan perayu bersalah atas kesemua enam pertuduhan dan menjatuhkan hukuman berikut: i) Gantung dileher hingga mati bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) ADB. ii) Penjara 2 tahun mulai dari tarikh sabitan bagi setiap satu pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2). Hukuman penjara berjalan serentak. [7] Ini adalah rayuan perayu terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi. Berat Dan Jenis Dadah Dalam Enam Pertuduhan [8] Bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) ADB, dadah yang terlibat ialah 183.14gram methamphetamine. [9] Bagi 5 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB, berat dan jenis dadah mengikut susunan pertuduhan adalah seperti berikut: (i) 0.07gram heroin dan monoacetylmorphines. (ii) 22.21gram ketamine. (iii) 3.91gram ketamine (iv) 0.79gram methylenedioxymethamphetamine [MDMA] (v) 0.04gram nimetazepam. [10] Kesemua dadah yang dipertuduhkan adalah dadah berbahaya yang disenaraikan di dalam Jadual Pertama ADB 1952. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Kes Pendakwaan [11] Fakta kes pendakwaan yang direkodkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi adalah seperti berikut. Bertindak atas maklumat, sepasukan polis yang diketuai oleh Inspektor Sharul Rizal bin Abd Kadir (SP9) telah membuat pemerhatian ke atas sebuah rumah yang bernombor 144, Jalan Bukit Kontang, Daerah Tangkak, Johor (rumah tersebut). [12] Semasa sampai di rumah tersebut, SP9 mendapati pintu pagar luar hadapan rumah tertutup. SP9 memanggil penghuni yang berada di hadapan rumah untuk membuka pintu pagar. Tetapi penghuni tersebut enggan dan masuk ke dalam rumah. Penghuni yang berada di hadapan rumah dicamkan sebagai perayu. [13] Oleh kerana perayu enggan untuk memberi kerjasama, anggota polis terpaksa memanjat pintu pagar. Perayu berjaya ditahan di bahagian ruang tamu rumah tersebut. [14] Turut ditahan ialah bapa perayu bernama Lu Choon Hee @ Loo Soon Hee (SP5) yang berada di bahagian dapur. SP9 dan anggotanya telah menjalankan pemeriksaan badan ke atas perayu dan SP5, tetapi tidak mempunyai apa-apa barang yang menyalahi undang-undang di tubuh badan mereka. [15] SP9 kemudiannya telah menanya perayu di manakah bilik tidurnya. Perayu telah membawa SP9 ke bilik yang terletak di sebelah kiri rumah. Pintu bilik dalam keadaan bertutup, tetapi tidak berkunci. SP9 telah mengarahkan perayu untuk membuka pintu bilik. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [16] Selepas masuk ke dalam bilik itu, SP9 dan anggotanya telah membuat pemeriksaan di hadapan perayu. Hasil pemeriksaan, SP9 menjumpai bahan-bahan yang disyaki dadah berbahaya di atas rak TV yang terdapat dalam bilik tersebut. Rak TV tidak berpintu dan tidak berlaci. Dadah-dadah tidak tersembunyi dan terletak di kawasan terbuka. Bahan yang yang disyaki dadah berbahaya yang dijumpai ialah: (i) 1 bungkusan teh mengandungi dadah jenis syabu; (ii) 1 peket plastik lutsinar mengandungi dadah jenis syabu; (iii) 1 bekas kotak tin berisi dadah jenis syabu, pil Eramin 5, serbuk Ecstacy dan Heroin (yang dibungkus dalam plastik-plastik); dan (iv) 1 peket plastik mengandungi dadah jenis serbuk Ecstacy. [17] Bahan-bahan yang disyaki sebagai dadah berbahaya tersebut telah dirampas oleh polis dan diserahkan kepada ahli kimia (SP6) untuk dianalisa. [18] Hasil analisis beliau, SP6 mengesahkan bahan-bahan yang disyaki dadah itu adalah dadah berbahaya mengikut jenis dan berat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kesemua enam pertuduhan. [19] Selain daripada dadah, barangan lain yang dijumpai di dalam bilik berkenaan ialah 1unit sealer, 1unit penimbang digital, 1unit gunting, 1 bungkusan plastik lutsinar mengandungi peket-peket plastik kosong dan wang tunai RM10,000.00 di dalam beg tangan wanita. [20] Pemeriksaan di bahagian dapur pula menemui 2 pucuk pistol beserta dengan peluru (tidak berkaitan dengan kes dadah). S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [21] Kes pendakwaan didengar oleh Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman (PK) Awang Armadajaya (hakim bicara pertama). Di akhir kes pendakwaan, hakim bicara pertama memutuskan suatu kes prima facie telah berjaya dibuktikan dan memanggil perayu membela diri bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan. Kes Pembelaan [22] Saksi-saksi yang memberi keterangan dalam kes pembelaan ialah perayu dan ibunya (SD2). Perayu memberi versi berikut. Sebelum beliau ditangkap, pada jam 7.00 pagi kawannya bernama Ah Pui telah datang ke rumah tersebut dan mereka berbual di dalam bilik perayu. Perayu tidak pasti sama ada Ah Pui pernah menggunakan tuala, seluar dan botol minuman yang dijumpai di dalam bilik perayu. Selepas Ah Pui beredar, perayu berada di bahagian luar rumah untuk menyapu daun pokok di atas lantai. [23] Selain daripada Ah Pui, perayu mengatakan kawan-kawan beliau yang lain yang pernah masuk ke dalam biliknya ialah San San dan Ah Seng. [24] Pada jam lebih kurang 10.00 pagi, pasukan polis sampai di rumah tersebut. Anggota polis berpakaian preman dan berada di luar pagar. Polis meminta perayu membuka pintu pagar. Perayu kemudiannya masuk ke dalam rumah kononnya untuk mengambil remote control untuk membuka autogate. Semasa perayu berjalan di ruang tamu, polis telah menangkap perayu. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [25] Polis kemudiannya membawa perayu ke ruang dapur. Di bahagian dapur, polis menangkap bapa perayu bernama Loo Soon Hee (SP5). Polis kemudiannya membawa SP5 ke ruang tamu dan perayu dibawa masuk ke dalam bilik pertama (bilik perayu di mana dadah dijumpai). [26] Semasa berada di dalam bilik pertama, polis telah nampak skrin monitor CCTV dan mencabut semua pendawaian CPU CCTV. Menurut perayu, CCTV dipasang di ruang tamu dan sesiapa yang masuk ke bilik perayu akan kelihatan. Perayu mempertikaikan kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan recorder CCTV. Perayu telah membuat laporan polis D75 dan D76 berkaitan kehilangan recorder CCTV. Perayu menafikan polis ada menunjukkan barang kes dadah yang dijumpai dalam bilik berkenaan. [27] Perayu mendakwa sealer (P20) yang dijumpai di dalam biliknya adalah kepunyaan bapanya yang digunakan untuk perniagaan. Manakala alat timbang digital (P24) yang dijumpai di dalam bilik yang sama adalah kepunyaan ibunya untuk menimbang tepung membuat kek. Manakala duit RM10,000.00 adalah wang simpanan untuk membuat ubahsuai rumah. Perayu mendakwa kononnya jumlah wang yang sebenarnya ialah RM30,000.00. Tetapi, beliau tidak membuat laporan polis mengenai kehilangan RM20,000.00 itu. Tanpa ada laporan polis, inferen yang munasabah ialah jumlah wang yang dijumpai ialah RM10,000.00 sahaja. [28] Emak perayu bernama Tan Ah Moi (SD2) pula telah memberi keterangan berikut. Pada hari kejadian, beliau berada di rumah anak ketiganya yang bernama Loo Yong Chai, di Sabah. Sebelum Tahun Baru Cina beliau dan anaknya pulang ke Semenanjung. Semasa berada di S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Kuala Lumpur, beliau dimaklumkan bahawa perayu dan suaminya (SP5) telah ditangkap oleh polis. [29] SD2 memberi keterangan bahawa recorder CCTV yang berada di dalam bilik perayu berfungsi dengan baik. Tetapi, recoder tersebut telah tiada. Saksi ini juga mengatakan bahawa alat timbang yang dijumpai di dalam bilik perayu adalah miliknya untuk menimbang tepung. Alasan-Alasan Rayuan [30] Peguam perayu menghujahkan sabitan terhadap perayu adalah tidak selamat atas alasan-alasan berikut: (i) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dari segi undang- undang dan fakta apabila gagal membuat dapatan afirmatif sama ada perayu mempunyai milikan sebenar (actual possession) atau milikan secara anggapan (presumed possession) sebelum menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(da) ADB. (ii) Perayu tidak mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan eksklusif ke atas bilik di mana dadah dijumpai. (iii) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf apabila mengambilkira dan menerima keterangan mengenai “kelakuan perayu”. (iv) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf apabila membenarkan pendakwaan menggunapakai seksyen 154 Akta Keterangan S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 1950 untuk menyoalbalas SP5 sedangkan tiada percanggahan material dalam keterangan. (v) Pembelaan perayu tidak dipertimbangkan. Isu Possession [31] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman (PK) Awang Armadajaya telah menyatakan: “…after making maximum evaluation, I found that the prosecution succeeded in proving a prima facie case on all charges against the accused. I call the accused to enterhis defence on all the charges. For ease of preparinghis defence, I am stating that I have in the course of making this decision, invok the presumption under s 37(da) DDA 1952.” [32] Seksyen 37(da) memperuntukkan: (da) any person who is found in possession of- … (xvi) 50grammes or more in weight of Methamphetamine; otherwise than in accordance with the authority of this Act or any written law, shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to be trafficking in the said drug. [33] Peguam perayu menghujahkan, sebelum PK boleh menggunapakai s.37(da), PK perlu terlebih dahulu membuat dapatan afirmatif mengenai possession iaitu sama ada perayu mempunyai pemilikan sebenar atau anggapan pemilikan. Dalam kes ini, PK tidak membuat dapatan afirmatif mengenai possession. Ketinggalan ini S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 terjumlah kepada satu kesilapan yang memerlukan campur tangan dari mahkamah ini. [34] Untuk menyokong hujahannya, peguam perayu merujukkan kami kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Jorge Crespo Gomez v PP [2020] 5 ML RA 492 yang menyatakan: “If one is to read paras 24-28 and 53-54 of the grounds of judgment of the learned JC, as we had reproduced in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, the learned JC made findings as follows: (i) Mens rea possession by direct evidence and presumption under s37 (da) of the DDA; or alternatively (ii) Presumption under s 37 (d) of the DDA for possession and knowledge and definition of “trafficking” under s.2. The aforesaid disclosed that His Lordship did not make an election as to which presumption he had relied on. He had adverted to both presumptions under ss37(d) and 37(da) of the DDA and also s2 without making a finding as to whether the appellant was found to be in actual possession or was presumed to be trafficking under s37(da) of the DDA or whether the appellant was presumed to be in possession of the drugs under s37(d) of the DDA and was found to be trafficking under s2 of the Act. In Seyedalireza Seyedhedayatollah Ehteshamiardestani v PP [2014] 5 MLRA 705; [2014] 6 ML J 408; [2014] 4 CL J 406 a decision by the Court of Appeal which was affirmed by this court held that if the learned judge had resorted to the presumption in calling the defence, the law requires that the learned JC applied the test of balance of probabilities in considering whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption. It is imperative that the learned JC made his election as to which presumption he was relying on, namely whether it was actual possession based on the evidence before him or presumed possession under s 37(d) S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 of the DDA and whether it was actual trafficking based on the evidence or presumed trafficking under s 37(da) of the DDA, as such finding had an impact on the burden placed on the defence. Hence, by invoking all the alternative presumptions available, it would have an effect that the appellant would have to rebut all the presumptions (alternative ones included) that had been invoked against him. That would be a heavy burden on the appellant as the standard of proof to rebut a presumption is on the balance of probabilities. If the court had acted on the available evidence in proof of the relevant ingredients without resorting to presumptions there is only an evidential burden on an accused person to raise a reasonable doubt. All these could have been avoided if only the learned judge made a definite finding on which presumption precisely that the appellant has to rebut. In this regard, the court also refer to the iew by Augustine Paul J in PP v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 1 MLRH 764; [2000] ML J 705; [2000] 4 CL J 649….” [35] Peguam perayu bergantung kepada kes Sureeya Wutthisat & Satu lagi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2012] 5 MLRA 483 di mana Ahmad Maarop HMR (YA pada ketika itu) memutuskan: “Selepas menghuraikan “fakta kes”, di bawah tajuk “Perbicaraan kes”, YA hakim bicara menyatakan bahawa mahkamah memutuskan satu kes prima facie telah berjaya dibuktikan terhadap Sureeya dan Asan dan mereka telah dipanggil untuk membela diri. Sehingga peringkat ini, YA hakim bicara tidak menjelaskan bagaimana beliau mencapai keputusan tersebut.Beliau juga tidak memberikan alasan-alasan kenapa beliau memutuskan bahawa kes prima facie telah terbukti. Sehubungan ini, di ms 29 Rekod Rayuan, YA hakim bicara menyatakan bahawa Sureeya dan Asan telah gagal mematahkan anggapan statutory di bawah s 37(da) ADB. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Ertinya, di akhir kes pendakwaan beliau semestinya telah berpuas hati bahawa mens rea possession telah terbukti terhadap Sureeya dan Asan. Malangnya tidak ada apa-apa dalam alasan penghakiman untuk menunjukkan bahawa beliau telah membuat dapatan afirmatif tentang possession. Ini adalah satu lagi kesilapan yang dilakukan oleh YA hakim bicara…” [36] Dalam kes Soorya Kumar Narayanan v PP [2009] 2 MLRA 420, Ahmad Maarop JCA menyatakan: “We come to a more serious misdirection. This occurred when the learned judge found that the defence had failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking under s 37 (da)(vi) of the Act. On the basis of the law as stated in Muhammed b Hassan v PP (supra), this finding presupposes that the learned judge was satisfied that the said presumption had arisen in the first place. The question is when was he so satisfied? We have said earlier that before the presumption under s.37 (da) of the Act can arise, there must be an affirmative finding of possession. As we have demonstrated, the learned judge did not make any affirmative finding of possession at the close of the prosecution’s case. So, his finding regarding the defence’s failure to rebut the presumption under s37 (da) of the Act is really bewildering…” [37] Kami tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam perayu. Fakta kes Sureeya Wutthisat dan Soorya Kumar yang dirujuk peguam perayu adalah berbeza dari kes di hadapan kami. Dalam kedua-dua kes tersebut hakim bicara telah tersilap kerana tidak menggunapakai anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da) di akhir kes pendakwaan, tetapi secara tiba-tiba, di akhir kes pembelaan mengatakan anggapan seksyen 37(da) gagal dipatahkan. Sedangkan, dalam kes di hadapan kami, hakim S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 bicara pertama telah memberi indikasi di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa beliau menggunakan anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da). Ini bermakna, hakim bicara berpuas hati bahawa perayu mempunyai possessi sebenar (actual possession atau mens rea possession) dan dia dianggap mengedar dadah kerana berat methamphetamine yang dijumpai ialah 183.14gram, melebihi berat statutori 50gram. Dengan indikasi tersebut, perayu memikul beban untuk mematahkan anggapan pengedaran atas tahap imbangan kebarangkalian. Manakala bagi pertuduhan pemilikan, perayu memikul beban membuktikan tanpa keraguan munasabah bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut bukan milikan beliau. [38] Dalam kes PP v Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan [2006] 2 C LJ 129, Arifin Zakaria FCJ (YA pada ketika itu) menyatakan: “It ought to be stated that the decision in Muhammad Hassan only prohibits the use of double presumptions under ss 37(d) and 37 (da). It is, therefore, open to the prosecution to rely on either of the presumptions. In other words, the prosecution may positively prove ossession without relying on the presumption under section 37(d) of the Act and go on to rely on the presumption of trafficking under s.37 (da) of the Act to support a charge under section 39B of the Act. See Tunde Apatira & Ors v Public Prosecutor (supra); Msimanga Lesaly v Public Prosecutor [2005]1 CL J 398 (a decision of the Court of Appeal confirmed by this court in Federal Court Criminal Appeal No.05- 27-2004 (K). Conversely, the prosecution may rely on the presumption under s.37(d) to prove possession and seek to prove by affirmative evidence (independent of the presumption under s.37 (da) that the accused was in fact trafficking in the dangerous drug.” S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [39] Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan kami. Dalam kes ini, dadah-dadah dijumpai di dalam bilik yang dihuni oleh perayu seorang sahaja. Dadah dijumpai di atas rak TV yang tidak berpintu dan tidak berlaci. Dadah terletak di kawasan terbuka, tidak tersembunyi dan berada di hadapan mata perayu. Adalah mustahil untuk perayu mengatakan beliau tidak tahu ada dadah di dalam biliknya sendiri. Adalah mustahil untuk orang asing boleh letak dadah, gunting, sealer, alat penimbang dan peket-peket plasik kosong di dalam bilik perayu tanpa pengetahuannya. Adalah juga mustahil polis tidak menunjukkan kepadanya dadah yang dirampas kerana pemeriksaan di dalam bilik dibuat dengan kehadiran perayu dan di hadapan perayu. Kesemua fakta-fakta ini menyokong dapatan hakim bicara pertama bahawa perayu mempunyai mens rea possession. [40] Pembelaan perayu bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut diletakkan di dalam bilik beliau oleh orang lain tanpa pengetahuan beliau tidak boleh dipercayai. Ini adalah kerana di dalam bilik tersebut juga turut dijumpai alat menghisap dadah, gunting, sealer, peket-peket plastik kosong, alat penimbang digital dan wang tunai berjumlah RM10,000.00. [41] Perayu mengatakan sealer adalah kepunyaan bapanya (SP5) yang digunakan dalam perniagaannya. Manakala, alat penimbang digital pula adalah kepunyaan ibunya (SD2) yang digunakan untuk menimbang tepong untuk membuat kek. Persoalannya, kenapa alat-alat ini mesti berada di dalam bilik perayu. Melihat kepada kuantiti dadah yang dijumpai dan keadaan fakta kes, inferen yang munasabah boleh dibuat iaitu sealer dan alat timbang ini digunakan untuk aktiviti pengedaran dadah. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [42] Dalam keadaan dadah-dadah, sealer dan alat penimbang dijumpai dalam bilik perayu, yang dihuni oleh perayu seorang sahaja dan dadah- dadah juga tidak tersembunyi, hakim bicara pertama membuat keputusan yang betul bila memutuskan perayu mempunyai possessi sebenar. Perayu mempunyai jagaan, kawalan dan pengetahuan mengenai dadah- dadah tersebut. Oleh itu, kami mendapati tidak ada apa-apa kekhilafan dilakukan oleh hakim bicara pertama bila beliau menggunapakai anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da). Oleh itu, kami mendapati isu possession yang dibangkitkan peguam perayu tidak ada merit dan ditolak. Isu Tiada Kawalan Dan Jagaan Eksklusif Bilik [43] Dalam keterangannya, perayu mengatakan bilik beliau bebas dimasuki oleh ahli keluarga dan kawan-kawannya yang bernama Ah Pui, San San dan Ah Seng. Tetapi perayu tidak tahu nama penuh kawan- kawannya; tidak tahu alamat tempat tinggal mereka dan tidak tahu nombor telefon mereka. Perayu bersetuju beliau tidak memberikan nombor telefon dan butiran kawan-kawannya kepada pegawai penyiasat, kononnya kerana beliau tidak ditanya. Keterangan perayu ini adalah tidak munasabah. Jika betul kawan-kawan beliau yang meletakkan dadah- dadah itu di dalam biliknya, perayu boleh memberikan butiran lengkap mengenai kawannya kepada polis supaya siasatan boleh dibuat. Tidak perlulah tunggu polis tanya kerana polis tidak tahu. Dalam keadaan perayu tidak ada apa-apa maklumat mengenai kawan-kawannya dan polis juga tidak diberitahu mengenainya, hakim bicara kedua telah membuat keputusan yang betul bila memutuskan Ah Pui, San San dan Ah Seng ini tidak wujud. Perayu hanya sekadar menamakan mereka S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 sahaja. Notis Alcontara tidak sempurna dan polis tidak boleh dipersalahkan jika tidak buat siasatan. [44] Mengenai isu tiada kawalan eksklusif ke atas bilik ini, hakim bicara kedua juga membuat keputusan yang betul bila memutuskan, walaupun bilik boleh diakses oleh orang lain, ini tidak bermakna perayu hilang kawalan ke atas bilik. Lebih-lebih lagi dalam kes ini, dalam bilik perayu ada wang tunai RM10,000.00. Adalah tidak munasabah perayu tidak ada kawalan dan jagaan ke atas biliknya; sila lihat kes Hemankumar Subramaniam v PP [2020] 3 CL J 844. [45] Maka, isu tiada kawalan eksklusif ke atas bilik ini juga adalah tidak bermerit dan ditolak. Isu kelakuan perayu [46] Dalam kes ini, kelakuan perayu yang dipertikaikan ialah perayu enggan membuka auto gate bila diminta oleh pegawai serbuan, SP9. Sebaliknya, perayu telah lari masuk ke dalam rumah. Akibatnya, pasukan serbuan terpaksa memanjat auto gate. Perayu menafikan beliau melarikan diri. Perayu mengatakan beliau masuk ke dalam rumah untuk mengambil remote control untuk membuka gate. Kami mendapati sukar untuk menerima penjelasan perayu. Adalah lebih munasabah untuk perayu menjawab permintaan SP9 dengan mengatakan beliau akan ambil remote control dan bukannya bertindak terus masuk ke dalam rumah. Di antara versi SP9 dan keterangan perayu, kami mendapati versi SP9 adalah lebih munasabah iaitu perayu enggan beri kerjasama. Kelakuan perayu ini adalah relevan di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 untuk menunjukkan perayu ada pengetahuan mengenai dadah di S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 dalam biliknya. Oleh itu, hakim bicara kedua tidak terkhilaf apabila mengambilkira kelakuan perayu. Maka, isu mengenai kelakuan perayu ini juga mesti gagal dan ditolak. Isu Pemakaian Seksyen 154 Akta Keterangan 1950 Terhadap SP5 [47] SP5 adalah bapa perayu. Keterangan SP5 di mahkamah yang memihak kepada pendakwaan adalah: (i) SP5 mengesahkan bilik di mana kesemua dadah dijumpai adalah bilik perayu. (ii) SP5 mengesahkan bilik perayu didiami oleh perayu sahaja. (iii) SP5 mengesahkan bahawa perayu akan memarahi orang yang masuk ke dalam biliknya. Tiada orang mahu masuk bilik dia. (iv) SP5 setuju barang kes yang dirampas berupa gambar- gambar perayu diambil daripada bilik perayu. (v) Beliau tidak ingat bila kali terakhir kawan-kawan perayu datang ke bilik perayu. (vi) Beliau tidak pernah melihat sealer. [48] Tiba-tiba semasa pemeriksaan balas, SP5 mengatakan pada pagi sebelum perayu ditangkap polis, ada kawan perayu datang berbual dengan perayu di dalam bilik perayu; sealer itu digunakan oleh SP5 untuk membungkus fish ball; perayu tidak halang ahli keluarga masuk ke bilik beliau dan pintu bilik perayu jarang dikunci. [49] Hakim bicara pertama bersetuju dengan TPR bahawa ada percanggahan material antara keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 utama dan keterangan semasa pemeriksaan balas. Dengan itu, hakim bicara membenarkan permohonan TPR untuk memeriksa balas SP5 di bawah seksyen 154 Akta Keterangan 1950. [50] Seksyen 154 Akta Keterangan memperuntukkan: “The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questionsto him which might be put in cross- examination by the adverse party.” [51] Bila disoalbalas oleh TPR, SP5 mengaku cerita ada orang datang ke bilik perayu pada pagi hari kejadian berlaku setelah SP5 bertemu dengan peguambela perayu di luar bilik bicara. Oleh itu, tidak hairanlah bila SP5 mengubah keterangan dan menyokong kes pembelaan. [52] Di hadapan kami, peguam perayu menghujahkan hakim bicara pertama telah terkhilaf apabila membenarkan TPR menggunapakai seksyen 154 Akta Keterangan apabila tidak ada percanggahan material dalam keterangan SP5. Kami tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam perayu. Adalah jelas kepada kami bahawa SP5 adalah saksi belot (hostile witness). [53] Walaupun SP5 adalah saksi belot, ini tidak bermakna semua keterangan SP5 harus ditolak. TPR berhujah bahawa keterangan SP5 yang disokong oleh keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan masih boleh diterima. TPR bergantung kepada kes PP v Ramli bin Shafie [2002] 6 MLJ 153, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan: S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “It must be observed that even in the case of a witness who has been declared hostile, as much of his evidence which is corroborated by other evidence can be accepted.” [54] Di dalam kes Desa Samudra Sdn Bhd v Bandar Teknik Sdn Bhd & Ors [2012] 1 ML J 729, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “In the law governing documentary evidence, as in oral evidence, three matters come to mind- relevancy, admissibility, and weight. They must be considered in that order. Only evidence which is relevant ought to be admissible. Irrelevant evidence should be rendered as inadmissible and the matter ends there. Now, relevant evidence which is rendered admissible is still subject to the element of weight. The court can either attach due weight to the evidence, or some weight, little weight, or no weight at all.” [55] Dalam kes ini, kami mendapati keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama bahawa beliau tidak ingat bila kali terakhir kawan perayu masuk ke bilik perayu; perayu akan memarahi sesiapa yang masuk ke biliknya; bahawa bilik perayu kadang-kadang dikunci dan kadang-kadang tidak dikunci serta SP5 tidak pernah melihat sealer adalah keterangan-keterangan yang relevan untuk menunjukkan bahawa bilik perayu dan barang-barang yang berada di dalam bilik perayu adalah di bawah kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan perayu sendiri sahaja. Oleh itu, keterangan-keterangan SP5 semasa pemeriksaan utama (yang belum diubah) diterima masuk sebagai keterangan pendakwaan dan diberikan pemberatan yang sewajarnya. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Isu Pembelaan Perayu Gagal Dipertimbangkan [56] Setelah membaca nota prosiding di dalam Rekod Rayuan, kami mendapati pembelaan perayu boleh diringkaskan seperti berikut: (i) Beliau tidak ada pengetahuan mengenai kewujudan dadah- dadah yang menjadi intipati kesemua pertuduhan di dalam bilik beliau. (ii) Bahawa dadah-dadah itu diletakkan di dalam bilik beliau oleh individu lain tanpa pengetahuan beliau. (iii) Bilik beliau boleh diakses oleh sesiapa sahaja. Fakta ini disokong oleh keterangan bapa perayu, SP5. (iv) Kawan-kawan perayu, kononnya bernama Ah Pui, San San dan Ah Seng ada masuk ke dalam bilik beliau. Tetapi polis tidak mendapatkan nombor telefon Ah Pui, San San dan Ah Seng. (v) Polis juga tidak menunjukkan dadah-dadah yang dijumpai kepada beliau. [57] Peguam perayu menghujahkan bahawa hakim bicara kedua telah gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa pembelaan perayu telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah kepada kes pendakwaan. [58] Kami mendapati hujahan peguam perayu adalah tidak benar. Pembelaan perayu adalah penafian semata-mata iaitu menafikan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pendakwaan. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [59] Bagi pertuduhan pemilikan dadah, Kami mendapati hakim bicara kedua telah pun mempertimbangkan pembelaan perayu apabila beliau memutuskan di para [33] penghakiman seperti berikut: “Saya berpendapat pembelaan sebegini terjumlah kepada penafian kosong. Pembelaan sebegini tidak boleh diterima oleh mahkamah dan ia tidak menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah berkaitan pemilikan dadah oleh tertuduh membabitkan semua pertuduhan. Saya merujuk kes Mr Losali v PP [2011] 4 ML J 694 yang memutuskan: “[54] The learned trial judge rightly held that the defence of the appellant was a bare denial. It is trite law that the defence of bare denial is no defence. What this amounts to is this. That the appellant did not offer any explanation to the two charges and merely denied the evidence advanced by the prosecution. That was indeed a perilous course to undertake.” [60] Mengenai pertuduhan pengedaran dadah methamphetamine seberat 183.14gram, di akhir kes pendakwaan, hakim bicara pertama telah menggunapakai anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da) (xvi) ADB. Beban bukti beraleh kepada perayu untuk mematahkan anggapan pengedaran atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Perayu harus memberikan penjelasan bahawa dadah tersebut adalah untuk kegunaan beliau sendiri atau untuk sebarang tujuan lain selain daripada pengedaran. Dalam kes ini, perayu gagal memberikan apa-apa penjelasan. Oleh itu, satu-satunya inferen yang munasabah yang boleh dibuat ialah dadah itu adalah untuk tujuan pengedaran; sila lihat Ogbugo Chioma Martha v PP [2019] 1 LNS 491. Maka, kami mendapati hakim bicara kedua telah membuat keputusan yang betul apabila memutuskan: S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 (i) bahawa perayu memiliki dadah untuk tujuan pengedaran kerana perayu gagal memberikan penjelasan apakah tujuan dadah tersebut; dan (ii) perayu gagal mematahkan anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37(da) (xvi) ADB. Keputusan Kami [61] Bersandarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, kami sebulat suara mendapati sabitan ke atas perayu bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan adalah selamat. Oleh itu, rayuan perayu terhadap sabitan bagi kesemua enam pertuduhan ditolak. Sabitan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dikekalkan. [62] Mengenai rayuan terhadap hukuman. Bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B ADB, kami menggunakan kuasa budibicara di bawah Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 (Akta 846) dengan mengenepikan hukuman gantung sampai mati dan menggantikannya dengan hukuman 30 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap (13.2.2018) dan 12 sebatan rotan. [63] Rayuan terhadap hukuman bagi lima kesalahan memiliki dadah di bawah seksyen 12(2) ADB ditolak. Hukuman 2 tahun penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dikekalkan. Hukuman penjara berjalan serentak dari tarikh tangkap. Bertarikh: 29 Disember 2023. - SGD - Hadhariah binti Syed Ismail Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Bagi Perayu : Encik C.S Lim & Cik SY Sia; Tetuan Lim Wong & Partners Bagi Responden : TPR Aznee Salmie binti Ahmad; Jabatan Peguam Negara. S/N pbpG03iSQ0OjytIqXtKX7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

J-02(NCvC)(W)-1948-10/2019

PERAYU TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD RESPONDEN BIG MAN MANAGEMENT SDN BHD

Damages for electricity disconnection - Defamation - Trespass - Infringement of Right - Claim for loss of revenue - Exemplary damages be allowed for a claim which is based on contract

02/01/2024

YA Datuk S. Nantha Balan A/L E.S. MoorthyKorumYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul JalilYA Datuk S. Nantha Balan A/L E.S. MoorthyYA Tuan Mohamed Zaini Bin Mazlan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9e1fc26a-a37b-4080-b29f-1c1f72a698f3&Inline=true

1 | P a g e DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: J-02(NCVC)(W)-1948-10/2019 ANTARA TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 200866-W) … PERAYU DAN BIG MAN MANAGEMENT SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 864287-P) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, Malaysia Guaman Sivil No.JA-22NCVC-138-07/2016 Antara Big Man Management Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat: 864287-P) … Plaintif Dan Tenaga Nasional Berhad (No. Syarikat: 200866-W) …Defendan] CORAM: ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, JCA, S. NANTHA BALAN, JCA MOHAMED ZAINI BIN MAZLAN, JCA 02/01/2024 07:59:59 J-02(NCvC)(W)-1948-10/2019 Kand. 97 S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 | P a g e Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................... 3 The Mayaria Principle .......................................................................................... 7 Background Facts .................................................................................................. 8 The High Court’s Decision ................................................................................. 11 Meter Tampering – Preliminary Objection ......................................................... 11 Illegal Disconnection of Electricity .................................................................... 13 Damages for Wrongful Disconnection ............................................................... 15 Exemplary Damages ........................................................................................... 16 Defamation .......................................................................................................... 17 Breach of Statutory Duty .................................................................................... 19 Tort of interfering with the Consumer’s business .............................................. 22 Trespass ............................................................................................................... 23 Order dated 30 September 2019 ......................................................................... 24 The Trial .............................................................................................................. 26 The Witnesses ..................................................................................................... 26 Our Decision ....................................................................................................... 31 Was there Meter Tampering? .............................................................................. 31 The Preliminary Objection .................................................................................. 32 The Mayaria issue – Repeated Meter Tampering .............................................. 47 Damages .............................................................................................................. 50 Can exemplary damages be allowed for a claim which is based on breach of contract? .............................................................................................................. 55 Breach of Statutory Duty - Whether the Defendant had infringed the Consumer’s rights as a registered electricity user by divulging the Consumer’s account details to a third party without the Consumer’s consent ................................................ 64 Defamation – Did DW19 utter the Impugned Words? ....................................... 66 The Outcome ....................................................................................................... 68 S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 | P a g e JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] This is an appeal by Tenaga Nasional Berhad (“TNB”) against the decision of the learned Judge of the High Court at Johor Bahru (“the learned Judge”) (after a full trial) delivered on 30 September 2019. By the said decision, the learned Judge allowed all but one of the reliefs sought by Big Man Management Sdn Bhd, the Plaintiff in Johor Bahru High Court Suit No. JA-22NCvC-138-07/2016, against TNB. The judgment of the High Court which has given rise to the present appeal is reported as Big Man Management Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2020] 11 MLJ 472, [2020] 8 CLJ 27 (HC). The suit was originally filed on 29 February 2016 in the Kuala Lumpur High Court and registered as Suit No. WA-22NCVC-116-02/2016 (“Suit 116”). By an Order dated 28 June 2016, Suit 116 was transferred to the Johore Bharu High Court and re-registered there as Suit No. JA-22NCvC-138- 07/2016 (“Suit 138”). [2] In this judgment we shall refer to the Appellant as “TNB” and the Respondent as “the Consumer”. The Consumer had two contracts with TNB for the supply of electricity to the premises at Lot 140216 (MSB1) and Lot 140216-1(MSB2), Jalan Berjaya 8/1, Perindustrian Taman Berjaya, 81200 Skudai, Johor (collectively, “the Premises”). S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 | P a g e [3] For purposes of the supply of electricity to the Premises, the Consumer is registered as TNB’s consumer under two separate TNB accounts i.e. account numbers 0340 0082532201 (“Meter A”) and 0340 0082532408 (“Meter B”). Unless otherwise stated to the contrary, the said Meter A and Meter B shall be referred to collectively, as “the TNB meters”. [4] A company which was closely connected to the Consumer, known as Ice Man Sdn Bhd (“Ice Man”) operated an ice-making factory at the Premises. Ice Man was the previous consumer for the supply of electricity to the Premises. The Consumer and Ice Man had a Management Contract dated 1 October 2013 pursuant to which the Consumer handled all matters relating to the supply of electricity to the Premises. The Consumer only provided management services and were not involved in the operations of the ice-making factory. Significantly, the Consumer did not operate the ice-making factory. Rather, it was Ice Man which operated the ice-making factory. [5] The issue which lies at the heart of the case is the alleged tampering of the TNB meters which were situated in the (locked) meter room and located within the compound of the Premises. It was alleged that only TNB had access to the meter room. The issue of no access to the meter room was a major part of the Consumer’s stand where they contended (per the pleadings and oral testimony of their key witnesses) that they had no access to the meter room and as such, disavowed any knowledge of, or responsibility for any alleged tampering of the TNB Meters. On the other hand, as far as TNB are concerned, upon inspection of the meter room on various dates, they discovered that the TNB meters had been tampered with. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 | P a g e [6] As such, TNB claimed that they were entitled to invoke their powers under s.38(1) of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 (“the Act”) and disconnect the supply of electricity to the Premises. Section 38(1) of the Act provides as follows: (1) Where any person employed by a licensee finds upon any premises evidence which in his opinion proves that an offence has been committed under subsection 37(1), (3) or (14), the licensee or any person duly authorized by the licensee may, upon giving not less than twenty-four hours' notice, in such form as may be prescribed, cause the supply of electricity to be disconnected from the said premises. [7] The disconnection under s.38(1) of the Act is predicated on an offence having been committed per s.37 (1), (3) or (14) of the Act. Here only Sections 37 (1) and (3) of the Act are relevant (if at all), and they read as follows: (1) Any person who tampers with or adjusts any installation or part thereof or manufactures or imports or sells any equipment so as to cause or to be likely to cause danger to human life or limb or injury to any equipment or other property shall be guilty of an offence and for each such offence shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. … (3) Any person who in any manner dishonestly- (a) abstracts electricity; (b) consumes electricity; (c) uses electricity; (d) alters the index of any meter or other instrument used on or in connection with any installation of any supply authority or any licensed installation for recording the output or consumption of electricity; or (e) prevents any such meter or instrument from duly recording the output or consumption of electricity, S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 | P a g e shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both. [8] For completeness, we should mention that s. 38 of the Act was amended via PU(B) 501/2015. The amendment took effect on 1 January 2016. However, the amendment is inconsequential as the impugned events here took place before the amendment came into force. [9] Turning to the issue of meter tampering, the Consumer’s unyielding stand is that the disconnections were wrongful. The Consumer initially filed 2 separate legal actions (see paragraph [21]) and eventually filed Suit 138 based on the following causes of action: • wrongful disconnection of electricity supply to the Premises on 2 July 2014 and 8 April 2015. • unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business. • breach of statutory duty by TNB. • defamation. • trespass. [10] In this regard, it is perhaps useful to reproduce part of the evidence of Mr. Goh Tack Lik (PW8), the Chief Executive Officer of the Consumer and a Director of Ice Man, who was asked (per his evidence in chief), “why did Big man initiate the current suit against TNB?” and his answer was, “Big Man suffered great losses after TNB unlawfully disconnected the electricity supply to the premise Secondly, TNB has breached its duty by revealing the private data of its consumer to a third party. Thirdly, TNB has been making false and untrue statements to defame Big Man. Fourthly, TNB has trespassed into the factory. Lastly, TNB had also interfered with the business.” S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 | P a g e [11] The dispute may be crystallized as follows - whether it had been proven that there was meter tampering in respect of the TNB meters on the several occasions when TNB’s technical officers had carried out inspections of the TNB meters, and whether TNB’s action in rectifying the tampered meters on each of these occasion when tampering was discovered, and later disconnecting the supply of electricity on 2 July 2014 and 8 April 2015 on account of meter tampering (after the TNB meters had been rectified), was lawful in all the circumstances. [12] In this regard, the pertinent legal question is whether the disconnection which was carried out based on a previously discovered tampered meter (and which was then rectified by TNB) was unlawful by reason of the application of the principle which was established per the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Mayaria Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 2 MLJ 801 (CA) (“Mayaria”) and upheld by the Federal Court in Civil Appeal No. 02(f)-28-03/2017(W), and subsequently endorsed/approved and reiterated by the Federal Court in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Chew Thai Kay & Anor [2022] 2 MLJ 25 (FC) (“Chew Thai Kay”). The Mayaria Principle [13] What is the Mayaria principle? It is this. Once TNB discovers meter tampering and the impugned (tampered) meter is then rectified and /or replaced, then the offence under s. 37 of the Act is deemed as no longer subsisting (no longer extant) and ceases to exist at the time when the notice of disconnection is issued by TNB to their customer and in those circumstances, TNB cannot invoke s. 38(1) of the Act to disconnect the supply of electricity to the consumer’s premises. Hence, the disconnection would be unlawful. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 | P a g e [14] In the present case it was argued on behalf of TNB that there are exceptions to the Mayaria principle and that the present case falls within the so-called exceptions. The question is – what if any, are the exceptions to the Mayaria principle? According to TNB, the Mayaria principle does not apply to a case of repeated meter tampering and/or where TNB has already carried out the disconnection. It was contended that the cases which have hitherto come up for consideration by the Courts, namely the case of Modernia Plastic Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2015] 3 CLJ 825 (HC), Xin Guan Premier Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2016] 1 AMR 603,[2016] 10 MLJ 788, [2016] 1 CLJ 318 (HC), Mayaria (supra) and Chew Thai Kay (supra) are all instances of a one-off act of meter tampering and where the disconnection has yet to take place. On that analysis, it was argued for TNB that the Mayaria principle only applied to a one-off occurrence or discovery of meter tampering, and/or when the supply of electricity has yet to be disconnected and where the consumer is seeking to restrain the disconnection which has yet to take place. These issues are dealt with elsewhere in the judgment. We turn now to the salient background facts. Background Facts [15] The events which gave rise to the filing of Suit 138 may be stated as follows. TNB initially carried out inspections on the TNB meters on 4 December 2013 and 6 May 2014. On 23 June 2014 and 25 June 2014, TNB issued 2 notices of disconnection of electricity supply in Form A schedule as a result of the inspection on 6 May 2014. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 | P a g e [16] The said disconnection of supply notices stated that the supply of the electricity would be disconnected on 24 June 2014 and 26 June 2014 respectively. However, the disconnection of the electricity supply did not occur on those specified dates. Subsequently, on 1 July 2014, TNB issued disconnection notices dated 1 July 2014 for MSB1 and MSB2 and disconnected the electricity supply to the Premises (“1st Disconnection”). TNB only resumed the electricity supply for both MSB1 and MSB2 on 1 October 2014. [17] On 27 July 2014, the Consumer received 4 letters of demand (“LODs”) dated 27 July 2014 from TNB claiming for the loss of revenue based on the allegations that the TNB meters had been tampered with and/or modified. [18] The details of the LODs are as follows: For Meter A • Loss of revenue amounting to RM 6,698.17 from 1 December 2013 until 4 December 2013 due to alleged tampering found against MSB1 during inspection 4 December 2013; • TNB claimed for the loss of revenue amounting to RM 365,137.79 pursuant to s.38(3), (4) and (5) of the Act for the period from 4 December 2013 until 10 May 2014. For Meter B • Loss of revenue amounting to RM 1,603.84 from 1 December 2013 until 4 December 2013 due to alleged tampering found against MSB2 during inspection on 4 December 2013; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 | P a g e • TNB claimed for the loss of revenue amounting to RM 425,091.18 pursuant to s.38(3), (4) and (5) of the Act for the period from 4 December 2013 until 6 May 2014. [19] TNB subsequently carried out inspections on 15 October 2014 (MSB1) and 7 January 2015 (MSB2). On 7 April 2015, the Consumer received notices to disconnect electricity supply to the Premises. On 8 April 2015, TNB disconnected the electricity supply to the Premises (“2nd Disconnection”). TNB only resumed the electricity supply for both MSB1 and MSB2 on 14 May 2015. [20] The 1st Disconnection and the 2nd Disconnection were carried out by TNB following its findings of meter tampering at the Premises for both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts on 6 May 2014, and 7 January 2015 respectively. [21] The Consumer attempted to challenge the disconnection notices dated 1 July 2014 via Originating Summons No. 23NCVC-340-06/2014. In this regard, the Consumer sought to restrain TNB from carrying out the disconnection or alternatively, sought an order that TNB reconnects the electricity supply to the Premises. The High Court refused the Consumer’s application. The Consumer had also filed an action to recover its purported losses as a result of the 1st Disconnection i.e. via Civil Suit No. 22NCVC-113-07/2014 (“Suit 113”). [22] At the same time, other events took place and, in this regard, sometime in April 2015, Ice Man executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with a third party, namely, Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd in respect of the proposed sale of Ice Man. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 | P a g e [23] Following the execution of this MOU, Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd engaged in negotiations with TNB to resolve all issues in respect of the electricity supply to the Premises under both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts. TNB participated in these negotiations as Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd had purportedly shown TNB its intention to take over Ice Man. Then a Surat Akujanji dated 21 May 2015 between TNB and Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd was executed as a result of these negotiations. As a result of the Surat Akujanji:- (a) the Consumer purportedly withdrew Suit 113; and (b) all loss of revenue due to the meter tampering discovered at the Premises for both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts were to be settled by Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd. [24] Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd did not fulfill its obligations to TNB under the Surat Akujanji. TNB had thereafter obtained judgment in default of the amounts due and owing by Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd under the said Surat Akujanji. The High Court’s Decision Meter Tampering – Preliminary Objection [25] The learned Judge’s approach to the issue of whether there was any tampering of the TNB meters at any time in the period between the year 2013 and 2015, may be summarized as follows. The learned Judge noted firstly that the Act gave TNB the right and power to disconnect electricity supply upon making a finding that the meters had been tampered with. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 | P a g e [26] The learned Judge noted that it was TNB’s case that upon inspections on 4 December 2013, 6 May 2014, 15 October 2014 and 7 January 2015, the TNB witnesses (DW1 to DW14) had discovered that the TNB meters had been tampered with. TNB submitted that it is not their duty to prove who had tampered with the TNB meters. TNB further submitted that there is no provision under s. 38(1) of the Act that TNB must first prove that it was the Consumer who had tampered with the TNB meters. On the question of meter tampering, what happened during the trial is that the Consumer’s counsel raised a preliminary objection against TNB for raising evidence on the alleged tampering on the ground that TNB did not put forth to the Consumer’s relevant witnesses, the photographs and documentary evidence purportedly showing the alleged tampering, or what the TNB witnesses saw during the inspection, and cross-examine the Consumer’s witnesses on the same. It was submitted on behalf of the Consumer that none of the crucial and specific facts of TNB’s case on the alleged tampering were put to the Consumer’s witnesses during cross-examination. Essentially, it was argued for the Consumer that TNB had breached the Rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). [27] The learned Judge reserved his decision at the end of the trial and eventually accepted the preliminary objection and went on to make a finding that TNB had adduced and led evidence on the alleged tampering for the first time when conducting its case for the defence, and that nothing was specifically put forward i.e., the material facts of its case on the alleged tampering, during the cross-examination of the Consumer’s witnesses. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 | P a g e [28] The learned Judge held that the relevant witnesses of the Consumer had, in their witness statements, stated that they did not have access to the TNB meters and also denied claims or knowledge of the alleged tampering. Illegal Disconnection of Electricity [29] The learned Judge concluded that there was no challenge to these testimonies and that it was totally unfair for TNB to raise evidence on the same without giving the opportunity to the Consumer's witnesses to challenge, explain or contradict the same. As far as the learned Judge was concerned, the veracity of TNB’s evidence on the alleged tampering was not tested and there was nothing on the record against which the proposed evidence by TNB could be weighed and evaluated by the court. Therefore, the failure of TNB to put forth those facts and cross-examine the Consumer's witnesses amounted to an abandonment by TNB of this part of the defence. [30] The next issue lies at the heart of the appeal, i.e., whether the disconnection of electricity supply was illegal? The learned Judge’s approach was as follows. First, the learned Judge noted that it was not disputed by both parties that the disconnection of supply was done at the Premises, in respect of MSB1 and MSB2 respectively on 2 July 2014 and 8 April 2015. This fact was testified by DW20. TNB submitted that the disconnections of electricity supply for the Consumer’s premises were legal and in accordance with s. 38 (1) of the Act. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 | P a g e [31] TNB submitted that in the case of repeated meter tampering, TNB does not lose the right to disconnect the electricity supply even if the tampering has been rectified and is no longer extant. TNB has the statutory right to do so upon discovery of tampering on the meter installation pursuant to s. 38 of the Act. The Consumer on the other hand submitted that the alleged tampering had been rectified and was no longer extant and as such the 1st Disconnection (2 July 2014 -1 October 2014) and the 2nd Disconnection (8 April 2015 -14 May 2015) were unnecessary, deliberately calculated to be punitive and used as a means to obtain payment from the Consumer. [32] It was also the submission of the Consumer that TNB cannot invoke s. 38(1) of the Act if the alleged tampering was halted and no longer extant and to recover the loss of revenue (per the Mayaria principle). The learned Judge agreed with the Consumer’s proposition and concluded that the disconnection of electricity supply at the Consumer’s premises on 2 July 2014 and 8 April 2015 were illegal, and that TNB had breached the electricity supply contract twice. Thus, the Consumer was entitled to claim damages for the wrongful disconnections. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 | P a g e Damages for Wrongful Disconnection [33] As for damages for the wrongful disconnection, the Consumer claimed special damages comprising of the cost of renting diesel generators, the purchase of diesel fuel and compensation which had to be paid to Ice Man. The learned Judge held that special damages (as claimed) had been proven and allowed the Consumers claim for special damages in the sum of RM 2,907,931.40 (1st Disconnection) and RM652,012.20 (2nd Disconnection). The learned Judge also ordered exemplary damages at 25% of the sum of special damages awarded for the wrongful disconnection of electricity to the Premises. [34] In respect of the special damages claim, the learned Judge opined (paragraphs [91] – [93] of the Grounds of Judgment) that due to the disconnection of the electricity supply, the Consumer had (i) to rent and later buy a generator to ensure the unhindered operation of the ice- making business; and (ii) to purchase diesel in powering the generator, the costs of which was twice the price of electricity supply by TNB. Thus, the learned Judge made a finding that special damages totaling RM2,907,931.40 and RM652,012.20 were incurred due to the 1st and 2nd Disconnections, respectively. According to the learned Judge, the damages were the direct result of the non-supply of electricity and one “which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it”. As the damages came within the second limb of s. 74 of the Contracts Act 1950, the Consumer was entitled to recover from TNB the compensation for the same. (paragraphs [91]-[93] of the Grounds of Judgment). S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 | P a g e Exemplary Damages [35] The learned Judge concluded that TNB had conducted itself in ways which called for exemplary damages as follows: (i) intentionally punishing the Consumer through the disconnection of electricity supply - the lifeblood of the business; (ii) intentionally prolonging the first disconnection for a maximum of three months without any acceptable basis even though, by their own admission, the maximum period was not applied to first-time disconnections; (iii) refusing to meet the Consumer's representative for possible reconciliation and showing insolence; (iv) mounting a baseless claim of tampering, particularly with respect to the period of the first disconnection as the purported basis for the second disconnection and yet took no legal proceedings to pursue the claims; and (v) effecting the second disconnection with impunity and without any regard for the pending case against the first disconnection and without waiting for judicial pronouncement on the rights of the Consumer under the Act. The learned Judge held that the purpose of awarding the exemplary damages was to punish TNB and to deter TNB from misbehaving in the future. The Consumer was accordingly awarded exemplary damages amounting to 25% of the special and general damages awarded. (see paragraphs [98], [99] & [108] of the Grounds of Judgment). S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 | P a g e Defamation [36] The next issue is whether TNB’s representative, En. Mohd Fauzi bin Husin (DW19) had made a defamatory statement against the Consumer. In this regard, the learned Judge made a finding that on 8 May 2015, the impugned representation was made by DW19, to Pn. Noor Azah Azizan (PW5) through a phone call. The impugned representation was subsequently reduced to writing and sent by PW5 to Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd via a letter dated 8 May 2015. The learned Judge held that TNB had per paragraphs [39] and [45] of its Defence admitted making the impugned representation through the phone call and was therefore not disputed. [37] The issue before the High Court was whether the Consumer had established the cause of action for defamation. In the present case, the learned Judge held that DW19 had made statements which were defamatory in nature and/or with malicious intent to PW5, to the effect that the Consumer had tampered and/or modified the meters. Based on the seriousness of the defamation, the Consumer’s reputation and standing and based on the effect of the statement to their dignity, the Consumer was awarded RM25,000.00 as general damages, and RM25,000.00 as aggravated damages. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 | P a g e [38] On the issue of defamation, the learned Judge held that DW19 had made statements to PW5 which were defamatory in nature and/or were malicious. In their natural and ordinary meaning, the words meant and were understood to mean that the Consumer had (i) tampered and/or altered the meter; (ii) stolen the electricity supply for the premises; (iii) done something illegal; (iv) had been charged and TNB had taken court action against the Consumer; (v) the Consumer had repeatedly committed the same wrongdoings; and (vi) had acted unreasonably as a consumer. The impugned representation was then reduced to writing and sent to Sunshine Merchants Sdn. Bhd. via a letter. The representation was defamatory as it tended to lower the Consumer in the estimation of any reasonable man. The Consumer had further proven that the words complained of had been published to a third party by TNB. (paragraphs [115], [122], [123] & [134] of the Grounds of Judgment) [39] The slanderous remarks were actionable per se at the Consumer's instance and there was no necessity for the Consumer to prove actual damage. Based on the extent of the publication of the defamatory statement, the seriousness of the defamation, the Consumer's reputation and standing and the effect of the statement to their dignity, an award of RM25,000.00 each for general and RM25,000.00 for aggravated damages would be fair and reasonable. (paragraphs [145] & [147] of the Grounds of Judgment) S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 | P a g e Breach of Statutory Duty [40] The next issue was whether TNB had breached the provisions of the Act and infringed the Consumer’s right (breach of statutory duty) as a registered electricity user by divulging the Consumer’s account details to a 3rd party (Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd) without the Consumer’s consent. The claim in this regard may be gleaned from the following paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim, namely: 104. Selanjutnya Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan telah menjejaskan hak Plaintif sebagai pengguna bekalan elektrik dengan mendedahkan butir-butir akaun Plaintif kepada pihak ketiga serta memasuki perjanjian dengan pihak ketiga tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran Plaintif. 105. Oleh itu Defendan telah melanggar kewajipan berkanun "breach of statutory duty" dengan bertindak di luar bidang kuasa yang diberikan di bawah Akta Bekalan Elektrik 1990 dan Peraturan- Peraturan Bekalan Pemegang Lesen 1990. [41] The following extracts from the High Court’s Grounds of Judgment are relevant to the purported cause of action of breach of statutory duty. Breach of statutory duty – disclosure of the consumer’s information to Third Parties Breach Of Statutory Duty [31] The defendant had acted beyond its jurisdiction, without permission and/or consent from the Consumer as a registered user as: (i) The defendant revealed the Consumer's account details to a third party by conducting a discussion with Puan Noor Azah Azizan ('Azah') on 8 May 2015 which involved the following items: (a) the settlement of the disputed sum by the Consumer; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 | P a g e (b) the settlement of the electricity bills in arrears for the Consumer's premises; (c) the withdrawal of the Consumer's court case against the defendant; (d) the preparation of a company resolution by Ice Man to facilitate a change of Ice Man's management to Sunshine Merchants; (e) the preparation of a letter of undertaking by Ice Man to sell stocks to the nominee of Sunshine Merchants; and (f) the backdating of documents in para. (d) and (e) to the date of the memorandum of undertaking. (ii) On 20 May 2015, the defendant had signed the instalment payment letters with Sunshine Merchants which stated: (a) the Consumer agrees to settle the disputed sum and the current bills in arrears in instalments; and (b) that the defendant has the right to disconnect electricity supply without serving a notice of disconnection. (iii) On 21 May 2015, the defendant had signed the Sunshine Merchants letter of undertaking which was prepared by the defendant with the following terms: (a) that Sunshine Merchants agreed that the Consumer had tampered and/or modified the meters and had to settle the disputed sum to the defendant; (b) that Sunshine Merchants will settle the disputed sum to the defendant in instalments; and (c) that Sunshine Merchants will ensure that the Consumer's court case against the defendant will be withdrawn. [32] The Consumer only became aware of the instalment payment letters and the letter of undertaking after the Consumer had met with the defendant's officer at the defendant's branch office due to receiving two copies of notices dated 22 June 2015 which claimed that two cheques for a total of RM50,000 could not be honoured. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 | P a g e [42] On the issue of breach of statutory duty, the learned Judge made a finding that based on the evidence of PW5, in the midst of the 2nd Disconnection, Sunshine Merchants Sdn. Bhd. entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 10 April 2015 with Ice Man with the intention to take over Ice Man. According to PW5 and DW18, various phone calls were held between Sunshine Merchants Sdn. Bhd. and TNB without the knowledge of the Consumer i.e. the electricity account holder. [43] As a result of the discussion, a Surat Akujanji was signed between TNB and Sunshine Merchants Sdn. Bhd., who purportedly acted on the Consumer’s behalf. According to the Surat Akujanji, the Consumer purportedly admitted to liability and quantum vis-à-vis meter tampering. The Consumer also purportedly agreed to withdraw Suit 113 filed against TNB for the wrongful disconnection in 2014. [44] The learned Judge was of the view TNB was liable for infringing the Consumer’s right as a registered electricity user by divulging the Consumer’s account’s detail to Sunshine Merchants Sdn. Bhd. without the Consumer’s consent. Thus, the learned Judge awarded the sum of RM 20,000.00 for general damages against TNB. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 | P a g e Tort of interfering with the Consumer’s business [45] The other issue is whether by their actions TNB had committed the tort of unlawfully interfering with the Consumer’s business. In this regard the learned Judge found that based on the evidence produced, the Consumer had failed to prove that TNB had unlawfully interfered with the Consumer’s business as required under the law. Thus, upon perusing the evidence presented, the High Court found that the Consumer had failed to fulfil the requirements set out in Megnaway Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Soon Lian Hock (Sole Proprietor of The Firm Performance Audio & Car Accessories Enterprise [2009] 3 MLJ 525 (HC) where Justice Low Hop Bing (later JCA) set out the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for the tort of unlawful interference with trade. At p.537- 538 of the judgment in Megnaway, Justice Low Hop Bing said, [48] The elements which constitute the tort of unlawful interference with trade or business are: (1) Interference with the plaintiff's trade or business; (2) Unlawful means; (3) Intention to injure the plaintiff; and (4) The plaintiff is injured thereby. (See Bullen & Leake & Jacob's Precedents of Pleadings [1990] p 464). [49] Although unlawful interference with trade is a developing tort and of uncertain ambit, its existence is beyond doubt and certain of its features are clearly defined. In H & R Johnson (Malaysia) Bhd v H & R Johnson Tiles Limited & Anor [1995] 2 CLJ 581 at p 593, Zakaria Yatim (later FCJ), citing authorities, said: …If one person deliberately interferes with the trade or business of another, and does so by unlawful means, that is, by an act which he is not at liberty to commit, then he is acting unlawfully, even though he does not procure or induce any actual breach of contract: Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins & Ors [1969] 2 Ch 106, 139 per Lord Denning MR. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 | P a g e [46] The Consumer did not appeal against the dismissal of the claim for unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business. Before us it was argued for the Consumer that this Court could still entertain the claim for unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business pursuant to s. 69 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. We do not think so. In our view, if the Consumer was aggrieved by the dismissal of the claim for unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business, then they ought to have lodged an appeal. Section 69 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 cannot be called in aid to entitle the Consumer to circumvent their failure to lodge an appeal (or cross-appeal) against the dismissal of that part of their claim relating to unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business. See: Douglas Ding Jangan & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 946 (FC) where the Federal Court stated that s. 69 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 “cannot be interpreted to mean that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal extends to the setting aside of the decision of the High Court that is not the subject of an appeal by the appellant.”. As such, we have no hesitation in rejecting the Consumer’s plea for the claim for unlawful interference with the Consumer’s business to be allowed. Trespass [47] The learned Judge also allowed a sum of RM50,000.00 as general damages for trespass in respect of an incident which occurred at the Premises on 19 August 2015 at 2.57 a.m. In so far as the claim for the trespass is concerned, it is not in dispute that in light of the Federal Court’s decision in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Evergrowth Aquaculture Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2021] 9 CLJ 179 (FC), the Consumer’s claim for damages for trespass is no longer sustainable or tenable. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 | P a g e [48] Thus, Counsel for the Consumer magnanimously conceded that the award of RM50,000.00 as damages for trespass ought to be set-aside. As such, we allow this part of TNB’s appeal and set aside the award of RM50,000.00 as damages for trespass. Order dated 30 September 2019 [49] The reliefs allowed by the High Court are set out in the sealed Order dated 30 September 2019 and they read as follows: (a) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan untuk gantirugi khas sebanyak RM2,907,931-40 untuk kos-kos tanggung kerugian akibat pemotongan bekalan elektrik kali pertama di premis Plaintif dibenarkan, (b) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan untuk gantirugi khas sebanyak RM652,012-20 untuk kos-kos tanggung kerugian akibat pemotongan bekalan elektrik kali kedua di premis Plaintif dibenarkan; (c) Tuntutan gantirugi am oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan dalam mengganggu perniagaan Plaintif secara salah di sisi undang- undang dan menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami kesukaran dan kerugian ditolak, (d) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi gantirugi am sebanyak RM20,000-00 kerana menjejaskan hak Plaintif sebagai pengguna bekalan elektrik yang berdaftar dengan mendedahkan butir-butir akaun Plaintif kepada pihak ketiga tanpa kebenaran Plaintif dibenarkan; (e) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi gantirugi am sebanyak RM25,000-00 dan gantirugi teruk sebanyak RM25,000-00 kerana mencemarkan dan memfitnahkan Plaintif dengan membuat kenyataan fitnah kepada pihak ketiga dibenarkan; (f) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi gantirugi am sebanyak RM50,000-00 akibat pencerobohan oleh Defendan dalam kawasan premis Plaintif pada 19/8/2015 dibenarkan; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 | P a g e (g) Suatu perintah injunksi untuk menghalang Defendan dan/atau pegawai-pegawai Defendan dari memasuki ke premis Plaintif dan/atau mengulangi perbuatan Defendan dan/atau memotong bekalan elektrik dan/atau memotong bekalan elektrik dan/atau mengganggu perniagaan Plaintif dalam apa jua cara ditolak: (h) Suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa Defendan mengeluarkan jumlah RM1,116,638-31 dari akaun meter-meter Plaintif iaitu 03400082532201 dan 03400082532408 ditolak. (i) Suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa Plaintif tidak pernah masuk ke bilik pepasangan meter elektrik dan mengusik dan/atau mengubahsuai meter-meter tersebut di premis Plaintif dibenarkan: (j) Suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa Plaintif tidak pernah berhutang apa-apa jumlah tuntutan terhadap Defendan berhubung hasil pemeriksaan-pemeriksaan oleh Defendan di premis Plaintif pada 4/12/2013, 6/5/2014, 10/5/2014, 15/10/2014 dan 7/1/2015 dibenarkan; (k) Suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa Defendan mengeluarkan jumlah RM151,016-15 dan RM167,469-77 daripada akaun meter-meter tersebut ditolak; (l) Suatu perintah deklarasi bahawa Surat Tuntutan TNB bertarikh 1/2/2016 tersebut adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dibenarkan; (m) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi gantirugi teladan sebanyak 25% atas gantirugi khas dibenarkan di perenggan (a) dan perenggan (b) dan gantirugi am yang dibenarkan di perenggan (d) iaitu masing-masing sebanyak RM726,982-85, RM163,003-05 dan RM5,000-00 dibenarkan; (n) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi faedah pre-judgment 3% setahun ke atas gantirugi khas RM2,907,931-40 yang bermula dari tarikh akhir pemotongan bekalan elektrik kali pertama pada 01/10/2014 sehingga tarikh penghakiman berjumlah RM436,189-70 dan faedah pre-judgment 3% setahun ke atas gantirugi khas RM652,012-20 bermula dari tarikh akhir pemotongan bekalan elektrik kedua pada 14/05/2015 sehingga tarikh penghakiman berjumlah RM85,744-09 dibenarkan; (o) Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi faedah post-judgment sebanyak 5% setahun atas jumlah RM4,574,929-50 dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian sepenuhnya dibenarkan; dan S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 | P a g e (p) Kos sebanyak RM40,000-00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. The Trial [50] Parties identified the following issues to be determined at the trial:- (2) Sama ada berlakunya usikan pada pepasangan meter-meter elektrik di premis Plaintif pada bila-bila masa di antara tahun 2013 dan 2015? (3) Sama ada Peruntukan Akta Bekalan Elektrik 1990 memerlukan Penyata Bertulis diserahkan kepada Plaintif? (4) Sama ada kedua-dua pemotongan bekalan elektrik di Premis Plaintif adalah sah? (5) Sama ada pekerja Defendan, En. Mohd Fauzi telah mengeluarkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang merupakan suatu fitnah dan/atau libel terhadap Plaintif? (6) Sama ada pegawai / pekerja Defendan telah mencerobohi ‘trespass’ premis Plaintif dengan memasuki ke premis Plaintif pada 19 Ogos 2015, jam 2.57 pagi? (7) Samada keseluruhan perbuatan Defendan merupakan suatu usikan dan gangguan secara tort terhadap Defendan dan perniagaan Defendan (tort of interference)? The Witnesses [51] The Consumer called 9 witnesses to testify. They were:- PW 1 Azlin Binti Mohd Kasran PW 2 Lim Yong Chiang PW 3 Wong Thim Hock PW 4 Leow Kah Pow PW 5 Noor Azah Azizan Bt Mohammed Ali Azizan PW 6 Mohd Zuki bin Ismail PW 7 Ser Boon Hwa PW 8 Goh Tack Lik PW 9 Ibrahim Haikal Bin Razak S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 | P a g e [52] PW 1 (Azlin Binti Mohd Kasran) - an employee of Ice Man who acknowledged and signed TNB’s meter inspection documents dated 4 December 2013. [53] PW2 – the director of Kuang Yi Machinery & Trading Sdn Bhd who purportedly “… menyewa dan menjual mesin-mesin janakuasa kepada Ice Man dan/atau Big Man.” He testified that he did not issue any receipts for payments that were purportedly made. (See: Q/A No. 17 of PW2’s witness statement). He said, “Tidak. Sebab Kuang Yi Machinery akan merujuk kepada penyata akaun untuk mengenal pasti samada bayaran telah di selesai.” [54] PW3 the Consumer’s Director. It is critical to note that SP-3’s evidence was that: “PD: Mr. Wong tu tak pejabat Bigman dimana? SP3: Mr. Wong tidak tahu kerana selama ini Mr. Wong selalu berada di Singapore. PD: Mr. Wong tau tak peranan Mr Wong sebagai Director Bigman? SP3: Mr. Wong tidak pasti, untuk, setahu Mr. Wong adalah untuk menguruskan kerja sahaja. Yang lain Mr. Wong tidak pasti. PD: Uruskan kerja apa? SP3: Mr. Wong tidak kerjakan apa-apa kerana kerja-kerja diuruskan oleh Alex. PD: Alex pengarah Bigman ataupun tidak? SP3: Alex adalah CEO Bigman. Semua kerja diuruskan Alex.” (emphasis ours) [55] PW4 – an employee of Ice Man who acknowledged and signed TNB’s meter inspection documents dated 6 May 2014. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 | P a g e [56] PW5 – a former lawyer of Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd. She, inter alia, gave evidence that she attended to discussions between Sunshine Merchants Sdn Bhd and TNB in the negotiations between them to settle all issues in respect of both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts. [57] PW6 – an external security guard who was on duty at the Premises during TNB’s inspection on 18 August 2015. It is pertinent to note that PW6 gave evidence that the ice factory at the Premises was operating “… selama 24 jam sehari”. [58] PW7 – the Consumer’s “pengurus” and the “pengurus am” of Ice Man Sdn Bhd. He however gave evidence that he is salaried by Ice Man. [59] PW8 – the Consumer’s CEO as well as a director and shareholder of Ice Man. [60] PW9 – a lawyer who advised PW8 on the business of the Consumer and Ice Man. [61] TNB called 20 witnesses to give evidence. DW 1 Mohd Hafizul Bin Sauti DW 2 Mohd Reduan Bin Dapor DW 3 Sharul Bin Bahar DW 4 Nik Mohd Azri Affandi Bin Nik Mahmood DW 5 Mohamad Syukri Bin Abdul Aziz DW 6 Wali Mohammad Gulam Sariff Bin Md Yusoff DW 7 Muhammad Ikhwan Bin Khairel Salleh DW 8 Muhammad Yusoff Bin Hasnan DW 9 Mohd Zulhelmi Bin Mohd Yusoff DW 10 Hasbullah Bin Sabran DW 11 Hizri Hilmi Bin Abdul Shukor DW 12 Mohd Firdaus Bin Abdul Wadi DW 13 Mohd Rahimi Bin Hashim S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 | P a g e DW 14 Wan Zulhilmi Bin Wan Mokhtar DW 15 Zahari Bin Md Zuki DW 16 Nazirah Binti Abdul Nasir DW 17 Mohamed Nasser Bin Ariffin DW 18 Mohd Azfar Bin Azhari DW 19 Mohd Fauzi Bin Husin DW 20 Arizal Bin Ashari [62] DW1, DW2 and DW3 – were part of the TNB inspection team that carried out the inspection of the meter for Account A at the Premises on 4 December 2013. TNB’s inspection team discovered that its meter had been tampered. [63] DW4, DW5 and DW14 – were part of the TNB inspection team that carried out the inspection of the meter for Account B at the Premises on 4 December 2013. TNB’s inspection team discovered that its meter had been tampered. [64] DW6, DW7 and DW8 – were part of the TNB inspection team that carried out the inspection of the meter for both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts at the Premises on 6 May 2014. TNB’s inspection team discovered that both its meters had been tampered. [65] DW1, DW9 and DW12 – were part of the TNB inspection team that carried out the inspection of the meter for Account A at the Premises on 15 October 2014. TNB’s inspection team discovered that its meter had been tampered. [66] DW10, DW11 and DW14 – were part of the TNB inspection team that carried out the inspection of the meter for Account B at the Premises on 7 January 2015. TNB’s inspection team discovered that its meter had been tampered. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 | P a g e [67] DW13 and DW17 – were the TNB employees who served TNB’s notices of disconnection dated 23 June 2014, 1 July 2014 and 7 April 2015 to the Consumer for both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts. In this regard, it is critical to note that the disconnection notices issued are in respect of TNB’s findings of meter tampering i.e. they were issued in accordance to Borang A of the Schedule to LSR 1990 (pursuant to Reg. 6A(1) LSR 1990). [68] DW15 – the police inspector who accompanied TNB’s inspection team during the inspection of TNB’s meters for both the Respondent’s TNB Accounts at the Premises on 19 August 2015. DW15 had adduced the warrants (dated 17 August 2015) obtained for purposes of his entry during the said inspection. [69] DW16 – the TNB employee who had issued the debit letter dated 20 July 2014 and the cancellation of the said debit letter vide letter dated 10 September 2014. [70] DW18 – TNB engineer who lodged the police report dated 5 July 2014. [71] DW 19 (Mohd Fauzi Bin Husin) - the TNB employee who is alleged to have slandered the Consumer. DW19 gave uncontroverted evidence that he did not utter the words alleged by PW5 in her letter of 8 May 2015. [72] DW 20 (Arizal Bin Ashari) - TNB Engineer who instructed the TNB inspection teams to carry out the inspections on TNB’s meter for both the Consumer’s TNB Accounts at the Premises. DW20 was also the Engineer who ordered the disconnection of the electricity supply to the Premises on 2 July 2014 and 14 May 2015. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 | P a g e Our Decision Was there Meter Tampering? [73] We shall start with the meter tampering issue. The question is, was there meter tampering? Indeed, this was the first issue to be tried. It is important to bear in mind that the question was/is not whether the Consumer was responsible for meter tampering. The distinction is important. [74] Indeed, we would go so far as to say that the identity of the person(s) responsible for meter tampering is irrelevant as TNB does not have to prove that it was the Consumer who tampered with the meters. The fact that the meters were tampered is enough. See: Court of Appeal’s decision in Thomas Thomas @ Mohan A/L K Thomas v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2017] 4 CLJ 340; [2018] 5 MLJ 831 (CA) where it was stated unequivocally that: “[11] TNB's right to commence civil proceedings against its registered consumers for losses due to the commission of offences under s. 37(1), (3) and (14) of the ESA is covered by s. 38(3)-(5) of the ESA. For purposes of a claim under s. 38(3)-(5), we take the view that it is not necessary for TNB to prove the identity of the person who damaged or tampered with the meter.” S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 | P a g e [75] It is axiomatic that the burden of proof is on TNB to prove that they had discovered that meter tampering had taken place on the occasions when inspections were carried out by the TNB inspection team. In Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Ichi-Ban Plastic (M) Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 557; [2018] MLJ 14 (FC), the Federal Court explained that the question as to whether there was meter tampering is to be based on a “subjective finding” by the TNB inspection team. At paragraph [27], the Federal Court explained as follows; [27] Another reason for the conflicting views of judicial opinion was the misreading of s. 38 itself. Sections 38(1) and s. 38(3) of the Act are interrelated. It is clear from s. 38(1) and s. 38(3) that the person who decides whether an offence has been committed under s. 37(1), (3) or (14) of the Act is the "person employed by a licensee". The licensee is TNB. The finding whether an offence has been committed or not is based purely on the subjective finding of the employee: (See WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd). If the person employed by the licensee decides that an offence under s. 37(1), (3) or (14) has, in his opinion been committed, he may then require the consumer to pay for the loss of revenue. For example, if there is in his opinion, evidence of meter tempering he may then require the consumer to pay for the loss of revenue. At that point of time, the matter had not been brought to the court. The Preliminary Objection [76] In the present case, it is clear that at the end of the trial, the learned Judge upheld the preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel for the Consumer when TNB’s witness was testifying on the meter tampering issue and concluded in his Grounds of Judgment that TNB had, violated the Rule in Browne v Dunn as the Consumer’s key witnesses were (allegedly) not confronted with the meter tampering issue and documentary evidence (inspection reports/photographs etc.) when they were on the witness stand and thereby abandoned that part of their defence vis-a-vis meter tampering. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 | P a g e [77] The preliminary objection was raised whilst evidence was being adduced during the defence stage of the trial. The relevant part of the transcript of the notes of proceedings reads as follows: PP: For good order, I just want to raise it. Third and final issues, probably a bit more serious. This is a point now as far as my client's case and evidence, particularly Goh Tack Lik and James, that they have not done any tampering or whatsoever. This whole claim by TNB are all interference etc etc. Now, first witness that came to say substantively about tampering is DW3 who do this nice diagram for us. YA: But subject to be cross kan? PP: Yes. My issue is this it occurred to me on the day itself because we don't know the continue with cross for the day I reserved it on the next day, I informed my colleagues by since he wasn't called back that day, so i take it up this occasion. Issue is this, he had given a specific evidence to say this is the means of tampering, mode of tampering. He is also given photos and YA: Yang cucuk tu? Tali tangsi tu kan? PP: And apparently that tali came through and tarik jatuh semua la. Now, this is very specific evidence about the type of tampering that allegedly occurred. The issue is this, the rule in Browne v Dunn says that if there is to be something that you want to put to this suit, that there was see that happened was done by the Plaintiff, you must put it to the Plaintiff witness, specifically to say we have found A B C D. They can say yes no or they can explain. They can even explain why this is improbable because of whatever circumstances that they may be aware of. In this case, one of things were specifically put, at least generally la YA: By you? PP: No, by defence counsel. During cross examination of the Plaintiff, relevant witnesses. This case will only be James and Alex. Nothing was put. So in my view, this cannot be brought up now. This is abandonment of their so called defense or particulars of the defense that they relied upon, Yang Arif if I can refer is in generally speaking the priniciple is stated in Sivalingan, Court of Appeal YA: Tu bukan kes accident ke? S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 | P a g e PP: Sivalingam, yes it was in detention camp. it was accident and so called raised of detention. But the principle is at page 400, last past Yang Arif. As cited at (e), further and more importantly it was never put to Plaintiff cross examination that such request had come from him. The trial judge taken this failure into account and came to disbursed the evidence. Now then they refer to principle in Aik Ming, I think Yang Arif also recalled. It had cited a few other points. I have Aik Ming here as well. But portion yang saya rujuk tu only this point, thats why I said alot of points yang dah decided YA: Ok so? PP: But the portion I merujuk itu is only to this point. That's why I said a lot of other points, company law as well. Yang Arif, we refer to Aik Ming at page 794, at para (1) that i have highlighted. Again, they have been about the essential the parties and the opponent of the material witnesses when they are under cross examination. But failure in this respect, it will be treated of the abandonment of the pleaded case and the parties of the absent of valid reason refrained from doing so, then it may be barred from raising it in argument. Further down, referring to the, because the principle comes from Browne v Dunn, Yang Arif will be aware, this is what the Lord Chancellor had to say. Now my Lord cannot held saying that it is need to do absolutely essential to proper conduct course, where it is intended to suggest that the witnesss is not speaking the truth on the particular point to direct his attention to the fact by some put in cross showing that that is implication is intended to be made, and not to take this evidence and pass it by at the matter unchallenged and then when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps it might be unable to. If it put to him, the circumstances which is suggested indicate that the story it tells or not, will argue that a witness is unworthy. I wont go on with that but further down, Lord Halsbury had to say my Lord the vidence in this case i cannot express my concurrence with Lord Channcelloer as the trial should be conducted. To my mind it would be more absolutely unjust and not cross examine witnesses upon evidence which then given. So as to give them notice and to give them popotuniryt of explanation, and the opportunity is to defend their own character and not having given them such opportunity to ask the jury of the worst is to believe what they have said. Then it goes on they also refer my Lord, Court of Appeal here refers to further down where Browne v Dunn has been applied in the Indian course. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 | P a g e Where Justice Mukharji where his stated lawyers clear of the subject and wherever the your opponent had declined to avail himself the opportunity or to put essential in cross, it must follow that he believe the testimony given to be disputed as well. YA: I think tak payah la. I think case ni pun Hip Tong, it is about affidavit evidence. PP: That case is a little bit different. YA: Yang ni more on trial, witnesses go by trial. Tapi sama je prinsip dia. Let say you swore something, you tak jawab tu amount to admission. PP: Yes. Indeed. So here what happened was we stated we here we did not do anything. All that was suggested to the Plaintiff witness was oh you did tamper. When what should have been, because we don't what are they case going to be. They should be specific reference to say now look at this photo, this is how you tampered. YA: Macam ni la En Mithran, saya taknak buang masa, kita pun dah panggil saksi dah banyak. You leave it on submission but all your objection, i akan record. I think we call next witness. I take not of what you said. Because it is their case, I cannot tell councel you do this you do that. That is amount i am taking side. So, you all lawyers, you do your job you know what you are doing, and you submit about me and I don't know whether En Amierul or Puan Izatunlina, they have also some other authority to say otherwise, I just listen both side and I made my decision. PP: I am obliged my Lord for recording that. Why I had to raised this was because I had involved in many cases where if this is not raised YA: Amount to? PP: Defense is actually being stopped. And barred from raising this evidence YA: Takpe this one. PP: Okay I take your Lordship point. I just wanted to record. Thank you my Lord. PD: We leave it for submission. [Emphasis & underlining added] S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 | P a g e [78] At his juncture, it is perhaps relevant to refer to the Federal Court’s decision in Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Evergrowth Aquaculture Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals [2021] 9 CLJ 179, [2021] 7 AMR 857, [2021] 5 MLJ 937 (FC), which touched on the Court’s duty to make inferences and logical conclusions on the basis of the evidence that is presented. In this regard, paragraphs [70] and [74] are relevant; [70] In our view, the question of irrebuttable or rebuttable presumptions does not arise insofar as sub-s. 38(1) of the ESA 1990 is concerned. This is simply an inference that can be logically drawn from established fact. There is a rational relationship between the discovery of metal clamp and the inference to make that the customer caused the diversion to prevent full registration, reading and/or recording of electricity consumption by the meter. The fixing of a metal clamp at the test terminal block of TNB's meter leads to one logical conclusion that the meter had been tampered with. The law of evidence recognises an abundance of inculpatory evidence and/or circumstances that leads to a single logical conclusion. It simply meant that the court is required to make logical inference and to attribute meaning to the evidence. … [74] We reiterate that a factual inference must be based upon relevant evidence, not conjecture and must be such that a rational mind can reasonably draw from it the conclusion that the fact exists. In this regard, it is open to the defence to challenge the inference's reasonableness. The respondent is at liberty to adduce direct or circumstantial evidence during the trial that would break the obvious connection between consumption of the electricity and the inference that the meter had been tampered with and caused the diversion and the inference could be reasonably and logically drawn. It is incumbent upon the court to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence from all angles and perspective and determine whether the inferences are reasonable based upon the combined effect and cumulative force of all the evidence adduced before the court. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 | P a g e [79] Essentially, the learned Judge concluded that meter tampering was only brought up during the defence stage. But, our reading of the evidence suggests otherwise. In this regard, we start by referring to the evidence of Ser Boon Hwa (PW7). PW7 was the Manager of the Consumer. He was also the General Manager of Ice Man since 2011. Undoubtedly, as the Manager of the Consumer, and General Manager of Ice Man, PW7 would be ideally placed to testify on the allegation of meter tampering. [80] On the issue of meter tampering PW7 said (per his Witness Statement) that the meter room was locked and that only TNB had access to the meter room. He disavowed any knowledge about meter tampering and said, “kami hanya melakukan perniagaan ais sahaja dan tidak mempunyai kepakaran mengubahsuai atau mengusik pemasangan meter”. Basically PW7’s evidence in chief on meter tampering was to establish that the Consumer had nothing to do with any meter tampering. During cross examination PW7 was asked, “Tahu kenapa bekalan elektrik diBig Man dipotong pada 2 Julai2014?”, and he answered, “Sebab pihak TNB mangatakan pihak kami ada kecurian electricity.” TNB’s counsel then said, “Mengusik pepasangan meter ke?”, and his response was “Dalam Bahasa Cina maksudnya kecurian”, and the learned Judge interjected to say, “Mengusik pepasangan meter”. [81] We also refer to the evidence of Goh Tack Lik (PW8), the Chief Executive Officer of the Consumer who was asked (per his Supplementary Witness Statement) in obvious reference to the meter tampering allegation, “what is your stand on the allegation made by TNB” and he said, “We did not tamper with the meters”. The following parts of PW8’s cross-examination are relevant to the issue at hand; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 | P a g e PD: So can I say when the first inspection carried out by TNB, the registered consumer for that premises is Big Man? SP8: Yes PD: Were you at the factory when they carried out the inspection? SP8: No PD: That time you already been appointed as CEO for Big Man? SP8: Yes PD: What about the other three inspection in 2014 and 2015? SP8: No PD: Do you know about the inspection? SP8: I aware after couple of days. PD: Informed by who? SP8: James PD: What did James tell you? SP8: He told me that there is an inspection PD: And the outcome, did he inform you? SP8: No PD: Did you ask James? SP8: I did not ask him. PD: So as a CEO of Big Man, did you go to TNB right after the inspection? Lets take the first date, 4th December 2013. Did you go to TNB after that? SP8: I have been there but I cannot recall much PD: Did James or Azlin showed you any form that they received from TNB? SP8: No. PD: For all the inspection? From 2013 to 2015? You did not see the form? S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 | P a g e SP8: I did not see. Because number one I don't know what the form about. I seldom there. PD: My question is did you see the form? SP8: No PD: And James and Azlin did not pass you any form? SP8: No PD: Did you know that the tampering was discovered at meter installation in Big Man premises? SP8: I don't know [Emphasis added] [82] In re-examination of PW8 he was asked several questions on meter tampering; PP: Then you were asked did you inform Dato Eshwar that the supply was disconnected because they found that the meter was tampered with. Do you inform Dato Eshwar about that. Your answer was I think James informed him. Do you know what James actually inform him or not. Do you know or do not know? What is that you know that James informed him? SP8: James informed him that because Dato told James that the supplied cut off because of the tampering. So Dato told James, and James let me know. PP: Now, you also had answered the question that James was dealing with Dato Eshwar on TNB matter and I was dealing with him only on Ice Man. Can you explain a bit further what do you mean? SP8: Ice Man because, dealing with him was because of the sales of ice Man. PP Shares la? SP8: Yes PP: That is what you were dealing with? SP8: Yes S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 | P a g e PP: Now, you were also asked did you asked there was a payment made to TNB about RM280,000. You were asked did you asked why it is fixed at RM280,000. Your answer was he showed James the figures I think everything he showed James. I think according to James, everything was there, all these figures was from TNB. Have you ever seen these figures before? SP8: Not at all PP: You were asked what are these figures for Is it for tampering, monthly billing or etc. You answered it is for tampering Now how did you know that this is for the tampering? SP8: Told by Eshwar PP: That's the only way you know is it? SP8: Yes PP: Then you were asked it was suggested to you that because of this figure, the supply was disconnected. Because of tampering. You said supplied was disconnected because of tampering but these figures are plucked from the air. Can you explain what do you mean by that? SP8: Yes. We have never see the figures at all. Never received any claim from TNB at all. So I said it was plucked from the air PP: It was suggested to you that you know the reconnection of the supply was done because of the agreement signed by Dato Eshwar with TNB. You said you didn't know. But what did you know at the time? SP8: I know the payment we made, tomorrow the supply immediately comes S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 | P a g e [83] The preliminary objection that was raised by learned Counsel for the Consumer was based on the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, 71 per Lord Herschell LC (p.71) which states that “it will not do to impeach the credibility of a witness upon a matter on which he has not had any opportunity of giving an explanation by reason of there having been no suggestion whatever in the course of the case that his story is not accepted”. [84] We think that it is necessary to state that the so-called rule is not cast in stone and it is a rule which allowed for a measure of flexibility depending on the particular circumstances. In this regard, it is relevant for us to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Liza bte Ismail v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR 454, where Yong Pung How CJ, at [67], [68] and [72] made the following observation; “[67] The rule in Browne v Dunn is not inflexible. This was noted in that case itself by Lord Morris in particular (at p 79), who emphasised the need for caution against ‘laying down any hard-and-fast rule as regards cross-examining a witness as a necessary preliminary to impeaching his credit’. Similar sentiments were expressed by Gleeson CJ in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677, a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. Having set out the observations of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn Gleeson CJ observed (at p 688): It is plain that their Lordships, whilst recognising and affirming a rule of practice in the terms in which they expressed themselves, also recognised the need for flexibility in its application. That need arises from the very nature of the subject matter which it concerns. The central purpose of the rule is to secure fairness in the conduct of adversary proceedings. That consideration provides the best guide, both to the practical requirements of the rule in a given case, and to the consequences which may properly flow from its non-observance, including the remedies that are available to deal with a problem so created. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 | P a g e [68] It is settled law then that the rule in Browne v Dunn is a flexible rule of practice, intended to ensure procedural fairness in litigation. The mere failure to cross-examine does not necessarily mean that adverse inferences must be drawn against the ‘defaulting’ party as there may be other explanations for this failure: R v Birks ; R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17. … [72] Although the general proposition is that testimony not subjected to contradiction in cross-examination may be treated as unchallenged and thus accepted by the opposing party, the court is still entitled to reject such testimony: Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 per Samuels JA at p 507; see also Hunt J’s observations at p 18 in Allied Pastoral Holdings. A careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence must still be undertaken to determine the cogency and weight of such testimony. In other words, it need not always follow that the whole of the appellant’s testimony would have to be accepted by the court, nor that the conviction in respect of DAC 9796/96 would ineluctably be considered flawed.” [emphasis and underlining added] [85] We have also taken the liberty of referring to the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Markem Corporation & Anor v Zipher Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 267, [2005] RPC 31 (CA) where the case of Browne v Dunn was forensically analysed and commented upon as follows; 57. Prior to the hearing before us we drew the attention of the parties to the decisions of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 and the Australian case of Allied Pastoral Holdings v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 44 ALR 607. One member of the court was aware that Australian practitioners were very alive to the rule in Browne v Dunn (so also, he has ascertained, are Canadian practitioners). The case reference and the Pastoral Holdings decision were supplied to him through the helpfulness of Justice Heerey of the Australian Federal Court. 58. Browne v Dunne is only reported in a very obscure set of reports. Probably for that reason it is not as well-known to practitioners here as it should be although it is cited in Halsbury for the following proposition: S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 | P a g e "Where the court is to be asked to disbelieve a witness, the witness should be cross-examined; and failure to cross- examine a witness on some material part of his evidence or at all, may be treated as an acceptance of the truth of that part or the whole of his evidence." 59. Because the decision is so difficult to lay hands on we take the opportunity here of citing all the material passages. We do so via the decision of Hunt J in Allied Pastoral because his judgment also contains his own valuable comments. He said (p.623): "It has in my experience always been a rule of professional practice that, unless notice has already clearly been given of the cross-examiner's intention to rely upon such matter, it is necessary to put to an opponent's witness in cross-examination the nature of the case upon which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence, particularly where that case relies upon inferences to be drawn from other evidence in the proceedings. Such a rule of practice is necessary both to give the witness the opportunity to deal with that other evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from it, and to allow the other party the opportunity to call evidence either to corroborate that explanation or to contradict the inference sought to be drawn. That rule of practice follows from what I have always believed to be rules of conduct which are essential to fair play at the trial and which are generally regarded as being established by the decision of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67. No doubt because that decision is to be found only in an obscure series of law reports (called simply "The Reports" and published briefly between 1893 and 1895), reliance upon the rules said to be enshrined in that decision seems often to be attended more with ignorance than with understanding. The appeal was from a defamation action brought against a solicitor and based upon a document which the defendant had drawn whereby he was to be retained by a number of local residents to have the plaintiff bound over to keep the peace because of a serious annoyance which it was alleged he had caused to those residents. Six of the nine signatories to the document gave evidence on behalf of the defendant that they had genuinely retained him as their solicitor and that the document was really intended to be what it appeared on its face to be. No suggestion was made to any of these witnesses in cross- examination that this was not the case and, so far as the conduct of the defendant's case was concerned, the genuineness of the document appeared to have been accepted. However, the defence of qualified privilege relied upon by the defendant depended in part upon whether the retainer was in truth genuine or whether it was a sham, drawn up without any honest or legitimate object but rather for the purpose of annoyance and injury to the plaintiff. This issue was left to the jury. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 | P a g e The plaintiff submitted to the jury that the retainer was not genuine and was successful in obtaining a verdict in his favour. In support of that submission, the plaintiff asked the jury to disbelieve the evidence of the six signatories who had said that the retainer was a genuine one. Lord Herschell LC said (at 70- 71): "Now my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a case, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intended to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses." His Lordship conceded that there was no obligation to raise such a matter in cross-examination in circumstances where it is "perfectly clear that (the witness) has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling". His speech continued (at 72): "All I am saying is that it will not do to impeach the credibility of a witness upon a matter on which he has not had any opportunity of giving an explanation by reason of there having been no suggestion whatever in the course of the case that his story is not accepted." Lord Halsbury said (at 76-77): "My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross- examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to." S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 | P a g e Lord Morris (at 77-79) said that he entirely concurred with the two speeches which preceded his, although he wished (at 79) to guard himself with respect to laying down any hard-and-fast rules as regards cross-examining a witness as a necessary preliminary to impeaching his credit. The fourth member of the House of Lords, Lord Bowen, is reported (at 79-80) to have said that, on the evidence of the six signatories, it was impossible to deny that there had been a real and genuine employment of the defendant. But his Lordship made no statement of general principle. These statements by the House of Lords led to the formulation of a number of so-called "rules". They have been stated in various ways in the cases and by text-book writers, and it is fair to say that there is some room for debate as to their correct formulation. For example, in Cross on Evidence (2nd Australian ed, 1979) the authors state (at para 10.50): "Any matter upon which it is proposed to contradict the evidence in chief given by the witness must normally be put to him so that he may have an opportunity of explaining the contradiction, and failure to do this may be held to imply acceptance of the evidence in chief." In Phipson (12th ed, 1976) the authors state the rule somewhat more discursively (at para 1593): "As a rule a party should put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness, or in which he had a share … If he asks no questions he will in England, though not perhaps in Ireland, generally be taken to accept the witness's account and he will not be allowed to attack it in his closing speech, nor will he be allowed in that speech to put forward explanations where he has failed to cross-examine relevant witnesses on the point … Where it is intended to suggest that the witness is not speaking the truth upon a particular point his attention must first be directed to the fact by cross-examination, so that he may have an opportunity of explanation; and this probably applies to all cases in which it is proposed to impeach the witness's credit… Failure to cross-examine, however, will not always amount to an acceptance of the witness's testimony, e.g. if the witness has had notice to the contrary beforehand, or the story is itself of an incredible or romancing character." 60. Hunt J concluded (p.634): "I remain of the opinion that, unless notice has already clearly been given of the cross-examiner's intention to rely upon such matters, it is necessary to put to an opponent's witness in cross- examination the nature of the case upon which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence, particularly where that case relies upon inferences to be drawn from other evidence in the proceedings." S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 | P a g e 61. We think all that applies here. It is not necessary to explore the limits of the rule in Browne v Dunn for this case falls squarely within it. Indeed the position is stronger here, for the Judge was not even asked to disbelieve the witnesses. Mr Watson was right not to support the Judge's findings – the only puzzle is why he did not take that position earlier. [Emphasis and underlining added] [86] In conclusion on meter tampering, it is our view that the preliminary objection was misguided and ought not to have been raised. Indeed, there was no attempt by TNB to discredit the Consumer’s witness on the issue of meter tampering. And from a plain reading of the Notes of Evidence, it is clear that the Consumer had fair notice of the fact that TNB had made discovery of meter tampering and all relevant documentary evidence in relation to the issue (placed in Part B no less) were given to the Consumer ahead of the trial. More importantly, there was no attempt and no ruling by the Court, to discredit or debunk the contemporaneous TNB documents (and police reports etc.) in relation to meter tampering. [87] It was therefore incumbent upon the learned Judge to have examined all the evidence that was adduced and to determine whether there was tampering. Had he done so, it would have been plain beyond peradventure that there was no dispute that there was meter tampering, except that the perpetrator was unknown. Indeed, TNB never claimed that the Consumer was responsible for meter tampering. And, significantly the Consumer also did not tender any evidence to debunk TNB’s subjective finding of meter tampering. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 | P a g e [88] At the end of the day, it was plain and obvious that there was copious documentary proof (where most of the relevant documents on meter tampering were in Part B) and supported by oral testimony of TNB’s technical inspection team that they found that the TNB meter had been tampered. Our reading of the evidence suggests quite unequivocally that TNB’s evidence on meter tampering is unimpeachable as it was contemporaneous, credible, cogent and convincing. [89] As a result, the learned Judge ought to have found that the evidence on meter tampering was not discredited or impugned in any way. The preliminary objection was premised on the basis that TNB was blaming the Consumer for the meter tampering which was not really the case that was presented at the trial. In the circumstances, the learned Judge was plainly wrong in his decision to uphold the preliminary objection and to hold that TNB had abandoned the issue of meter tampering. The Mayaria issue – Repeated Meter Tampering [90] Next, we deal with the Mayaria issue with specific reference to repeated meter tampering. Before we deal with Mayaria, it is necessary to highlight the rectification work which was carried out after discovery of meter tampering. The following table explains the rectification which had been carried out. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 | P a g e No. Date of Inspection Rectification taken based on TNB’s contemporaneous documents 1. 04.12.2013 (MSB 1) Pepasangan disil semula. 2. 04.12.2013 (MSB 2) Pepasangan disil semula. 3. 06.05.2014 (MSB 1) Tukar armoured cable. Tukar CT ketiga-tiga fasa kerana CT telah terbakar. Note: Inspection was conducted on 06.05.2014 but rectification was carried out on 10.05.2014. Note: This inspection was the basis of TNB’s First Disconnection from 02.07.2014 until 01.10.2014. 4. 06.05.2014 (MSB 2) Tukar armoured cable. Note: Inspection was conducted on 06.05.2014 but rectification was carried out on 10.05.2014. Note: This inspection was the basis of TNB’s First Disconnection from 02.07.2014 until 01.10.2014. 5. 15.10.2014 (MSB 1) Tukar meter main. Pendawaian diperbetulkan dan pepasangan disil semula. Note: This inspection was the basis of TNB’s Second Disconnection from 08.04.2015 until 14.05.2015. 6. 07.01.2015 (MSB 2) Tukar meter baru pada meter utama & meter semak. Pepasangan disil semula. Note: This inspection was the basis of TNB’s Second Disconnection from 08.04.2015 until 14.05.2015. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 | P a g e [91] TNB contends that they did not fall foul of the Mayaria principle as they fall within the “exceptions”. As far as we are concerned, there are no exceptions to the Mayaria principle. The answer to the issue of repeated meter tampering is in fact to be found in paragraph [37] of the Federal Court’s judgment, in Chew Thai Kay where the Federal Court reiterated the principle that the amendment to s. 38(1) of the Act had not altered the position of the law as decided by the Federal Court in Mayaria when it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in that case. The Federal Court held that the position of the law now, as then, was that once the impugned meter had been rectified and/or replaced with a new meter and TNB no longer suffered loss, TNB could not lawfully invoke the amended s 38(1) to disconnect electricity to the consumer’s premises. The Federal Court went on to state that it was clear and plain from a reading of s 38(1) that only on a finding of evidence of meter tampering was TNB empowered to disconnect supply. If there was no evidence of meter tampering, no offence was committed and there was no lawful power to disconnect. [92] According to the Federal Court, Parliament intended for the subsequent action (disconnection) to be taken presently, urgently, and expeditiously (ie, immediately upon discovery of tampering) and not in the future (ie, long after discovery of any tampering, much less after the tampered meter had been rectified and/or replaced). Only evidence of meter tampering justified disconnection. Once the impugned meter had been rectified there was no longer any issue of meter tampering and thus the offence under s 37(1) no longer existed. There had to be a continuing offence to invoke the power of disconnection. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 | P a g e [93] Thus, it is clear from the judgment of the Federal Court in Chew Thai Kay at [37] that “where there was a further discovery of meter tampering after the previous tampering had been rectified, TNB could immediately exercise the power of disconnection under s 38(1) provided that it took no step to all over again rectify the subsequent tampering”. This passage from the apex court is decisive on the issue of repeated meter tampering. In the upshot, it is not a question of exception to Mayaria. Rather, Mayaria still applies and each time the tampering is repeated, it becomes necessary for TNB to comply with s.38(1) of the Act and to then issue the requisite Notice of Disconnection. If TNB rectifies the tampered meter, then it falls into the ambit of the Mayaria principle and cannot thereafter invoke the statutory power of disconnection under s. 38(1) of the Act. As such, the disconnections were wrongful and TNB was liable for damages. The Consumer claimed special damages which had to be strictly proven. Damages [94] We turn now to damages. It is appropriate at the outset to set out the trite principles in relation to proof of damage. Here, it is important to note that the main focus of the present discussion is the hefty amount claimed as special damages, which must be specifically pleaded and strictly proven. In Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v. Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 19; [1993] 3 MLJ 352 (SC), Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ said at pp. 57 and 58 (CLJ); p. 416 (MLJ): Now, those being my findings of fact on the issue of liability, and they are findings in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of both trespass and nuisance, I must now address the question of the quantum of damages. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 | P a g e The general rule as to the measure of damages, a rule equally applicable to tort as to contract, was defined by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co 82, at p 39 in these terms: 'that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation'. In Munnelly v. Calco 83, Henchy J said, at p 399: ... the particular measure of damages allowed should be objectively chosen by the court as being that of the particular case, to put the plaintiff fairly and reasonably in the position in which he was before the damage occurred, so far as pecuniary awards can do so. Before I proceed to assess the quantum of damages, I would remind myself of certain other well-established principles which I should keep in the forefront of my mind in considering this part of the case. First, when a plaintiff claims damages from a defendant, he has to show that the loss in respect of which he claims damages was caused by the defendant's wrong and also that the damages are not too remote to be recoverable. Secondly, I would refer to what Lord Goddard said in Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 84, at p 178: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: 'This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.' They have to prove it. Thirdly, on the quality of evidence expected of a plaintiff, it is necessary to remember what Devlin J (as he then was) said in Biggin & Co v. Permanite 85, at p 438, namely, that where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it; where it is not, the court must do the best it can. Nevertheless, it remains true to say that that generally, difficulty of proof does not dispense with the necessity for proof. (See Aerial Advertising Co v. Batchelors Peas (Manchester) 86 at p 796 per Atkinson J) The case of Ashcroft v. Curtin 87 illustrates this point, for there the plaintiff, claiming for diminution of profits of his one-man business, failed in his claim despite the evidence pointing to a decrease in the company's profitability due to the injury, the records relied on being too rudimentary and the accounts too unreliable to quantify the loss. (emphasis added) S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 | P a g e [95] Before us, it was argued for TNB that the claim for special damages should fail on the following grounds. In summary, TNB’s complaint on special damages was as follows:- Exhibits P8 to P18, and P20 to P22 are simply payment vouchers and invoices in respect of the Consumer’s purported purchases of diesel for its generators. There is however no evidence that the Consumer had in fact made the payments stated therein as no receipts in respect of the purported payments were adduced. The Respondent’s purported dealers for the purchase of diesel also did not give evidence at trial. The High Court had also failed to give due consideration to the fact that the diesel purportedly purchased by the Consumer (per the adduced payment vouchers and invoices) were not only for the use of the generators but also for the use of the Consumer’s lorries. More importantly, the High Court failed to give due consideration to the fact that some of these documents are Ice Man Sdn Bhd documents and not the Consumer’s documents. Exhibits P1 to P3, and P2 are simply payment vouchers and invoices in respect of the Consumer’s rental and purchase of the generators from PW2. There is however no evidence that the Consumer had in fact made the payments stated therein as no receipts and Consumer’s account statements in respect of the purported payments were adduced. This was admitted by PW2. Again, the High Court also failed to give due consideration to the fact that Exhibits P1, P2 and P3 also consists of Ice Man Sdn Bhd documents. [96] The following cases illustrate the point as to the quality of evidence necessary to justify a claim for special damages. In particular the cases emphasize that there must be evidence of a credible paper trail to show that payment was made. Indeed, invoice/vouchers per se without receipts, will not suffice. The first case is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tan Ah Kow & Anor v Tan Chaui En [2017] 6 MLJ 297, [2018] 2 CLJ 610 (CA) where the following principles were enunciated; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 | P a g e [24] The learned JC erred by not considering the fact that the bank statements exhibited by the respondent are actually not the bank statements of the respondent personally, but of the respondent’s business enterprise, namely Lee Hin Motor Auto Parts Enterprise (RR Bhg C Jld 4/4 pp 357, 359-360, 370, 373 and 376-377). Therefore, the bank statements do not reflect the respondent’s personal bank transactions. Nowhere in the bank statements is it stated that the cheque payments by Lee Hin Motor Auto Parts Enterprise are paid to the first appellant for the respondent’s purchase of the 13 pieces of land. [25] The respondent exhibited some invoices to prove his payments to the first appellant (‘exhs P2(a)-P31’) for the purchase of the 13 pieces of land. The respondent contended that he had also paid the first appellant for the said purchase by way of contra with the sale of motorcycles by the respondent to the first appellant. However, the learned JC failed to consider that the invoices by themselves do not prove payment of the purchase price to the first appellant. In commercial transactions, invoices are billing documents, but they are not receipts and thus cannot be used as proof of payment. [26] The respondent did not produce any other contemporaneous documents to support his claim based on the invoices. There is no proof of any purchase order given by the first appellant to the respondent. The first appellant denied having received any motorcycles by way of contra from the respondent. The learned JC further failed to take note of the fact that there were no delivery orders produced by the respondent to show that the first appellant had taken delivery of the motorcycles from the respondent. Thus, it is clear that the respondent was unable to prove his payment to the first appellant by contra with the motorcycles as he had pleaded in the seven items stated as ‘invois’ in the above table in para 8 of the SOC. [27] There is therefore no proof at all by the respondent that from 27 February 2003-10 March 2004 he had paid RM200,000, and from 24 March 2005-5 July 2005 he had paid RM50,000 in the form of cheques, and RM170,000 in the form of contra with motorcycles supplied to the first appellant for the purchase price of the 13 pieces of land. [28] We agree with the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that the unilateral documents of the respondent purporting to show payments are of no probative value to prove actual payment by him of the purchase price. [Emphasis and underlining added] S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 | P a g e [97] In Sunlite Textile Sdn Bhd v Motilal Realty Sdn Bhd (PART 2) [2007] 5 MLJ 640 (HC), Abdul Malik Ishak J. rendered a comprehensive analysis on the law relation to proof of damages. At paragraph [26] he said; INVOICES WITHOUT RECEIPTS [26] The plaintiff's affidavit in support in encl 2 asserted at para 11 to the following effect: that 'the contractor's invoice and receipt for the sum of RM394,000 which are annexed hereto and marked as exh 'RKB- 3'.' The Malay language version of the same paragraph of the same affidavit was worded in this way: Sekarang dilampirkan dan ditunjukkan kepada saya adalah invois- invois dan resit-resit untuk jumlah RM394,000 yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit 'RKB-3'. A perusal of exh 'RKB-3'of encl 2 would indicate that only the invoices were exhibited. No receipts were exhibited at all. In fact, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had made any payment. It can therefore be concluded that the plaintiff's averments that payments were made based on the receipts were both misleading and deceptive. [98] Having examined the documents carefully and comprehensively, we are constrained to agree with the submissions that were made on behalf of TNB in that there is no evidence whatsoever of the purported damages that the Consumer had incurred from paying Ice Man per exhibit P19. In this regard, there is no evidence of the losses suffered by Ice Man which the Consumer was liable to compensate. And as rightly submitted on behalf of TNB, there is in fact no evidence that the Consumer had ever used generators (and diesel) for purposes of the ice production business at the Premises. As mentioned at the outset, the Consumer only provided management services and were not running an ice-factory. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 | P a g e [99] In this regard, there is also no evidence whatsoever of the Consumer’s business sales during the period of electricity disconnection to justify the purported rental and/or purchase of the generators. [100] No doubt, there appear to be various receipts issued by Ice Man for the compensation payments that were made by the Consumer. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the Consumer had proven at least the payment of RM1,536,225.00 to Ice Man. But the problem here is that PW8 was cross-examined extensively on this and he could not show proof of actual payment. All he could say was that he made the payment in Singapore through a “money-changer” and it was through the money changer that payment was made to Ice Man. It is important to keep in mind that Ice Man and the Consumer are closely connected. The answers given by PW8 just did not stand up to curial scrutiny and was questionable in our view. In the overall analysis it is quite clear that the Consumer was not able to show any evidence of actual payment to Ice man, or to Kuang Yi Machinery Trading (rental/purchase of generators) or to Lim Soon Kit (purchase of diesel), or to Teo Choo Peow (purchase of diesel). In the overall analysis, we find it quite remarkable that the Consumer could not even show any credible evidence of actual payments by them to Ice Man, or to the so-called suppliers of diesel and generator. Can exemplary damages be allowed for a claim which is based on breach of contract? [101] It was argued for TNB that exemplary damages ought not to have been granted as the Consumer did not plead specific facts to justify a claim for exemplary damages. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 | P a g e [102] Reference was made to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v Robert Doran & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 174 (CA). In the present case, we agree that exemplary damages ought not to have been granted but for a different reason. It is necessary to state here that the following aspect of exemplary damages was not raised by either side but being an issue of law, we consider it necessary and imperative that it be dealt with here. In our view, the claim for exemplary damages was untenable. [103] The issue as to whether exemplary damages can be allowed for a claim which is based on a breach of contract was comprehensively discussed in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in National Feedlot Corporation Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors v Public Bank Berhad [2023] 7 AMR 213, [2023] 10 CLJ 430 (CA) (“National Feedlot”). The following extracts from that judgment (reproduced below) explain why exemplary damages are not allowed in breach of contract claims. [119] And as for whether aggravated and exemplary damages are claimable in a breach of contract case, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of Lee Swee Seng Judicial Commissioner (as he then was - now JCA) in Ang Beng Choo v. RHB Insurance Berhad [2013] 1 LNS 382 where the learned judge said: Damages Whether aggravated and exemplary damages are claimable for breach of contract The basis for assessment of damages in a breach of contract is to put the plaintiff, the non-defaulting party, in the position as if the contract has not been wrongfully terminated. It is compensatory in nature. As such aggravated damages is generally not awarded for a breach of contract simpliciter. In this respect the House of Lords decision in Farley v. Skinner [2002] 2 A.C. 732 summarised succinctly the general principle in a breach of contract against an award for anxiety, distress, disappointment and loss of credibility, reputation and the like as follows in the speech of Lord Hitton at page 757-758: S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 | P a g e 47. It is clearly established as a general rule that where there has been a breach of contract damages cannot be awarded for the vexation or anxiety or aggravation or similar states of mind resulting from the breach. The principle was stated by Bingham LJ in Watts v. Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421, 1445: A contract-breaker is not in general liable for any distress, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation, tension or aggravation which his breach of contract may cause to the innocent party. This rule is not, I think, founded on the assumption that such reactions are not foreseeable, which they surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy. This general principle has recently been approved by this House in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. The principle has particular application to commercial cases and in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co Lord Cooke of Thorndon observed, at p 49, that: "Contract- breaking is treated as an incident of commercial life which players in the game are expected to meet with mental fortitude." But the principle is not applicable in every case and in Watts v. Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421 Bingham LJ went on to state that there was an exceptional category of cases which he described as follows: Where the very object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not provided or if the contrary result is procured instead. If the law did not cater for this exceptional category of case it would be defective. A contract to survey the condition of a house for a prospective purchaser does not, however, fall within this exceptional category. Bingham LJ then stated: In cases not falling within this exceptional category, damages are in my view recoverable for physical inconvenience and discomfort caused by the breach and mental suffering directly related to that inconvenience and discomfort. (emphasis added) The exceptions do not apply in this case for a breach of an Agency Agreement. Generally no exemplary damages shall be awarded in a contractual claim, and the weight of authorities is against granting such an award. The learned author of Guest on Contract (28th ed) is categorical on this ("vindictive" or "exemplary" damages have no place in the law of contract"; pg. 592), while Mcgregor on Damages (18th ed) has this to tell us at page 428: S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 | P a g e For contract, on the other hand, the position is less certain. Historically, the law has always set its face against awarding exemplary damages for breach of contract; outrageous conduct is the domain of tort rather than contract. Even when the Supreme Court of Canada in Royal Bank of Canada v. W. Got & Associates Electric Ltd Et al 178 D.L.R. (4th) 385, approved and awarded exemplary damages in a breach of contract claim it cautiously observed as follows at page 394-395 that such an award would be most exceptional and extraordinary: The trial judge and the Court of Appeal awarded exemplary damages for the egregious conduct of the bank and we would not disturb this finding. Punitive damages are available for breach of contract, although, as Mclntyre J. held in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1085..., the circumstances that would justify punitive damages for breach of contract in the absence of actions also constituting a tort are rare... We emphasize... that an award for exemplary damages in commercial disputes will remain an extraordinary remedy. The celebrated author Visu Sinnadurai in the Law of Contract (3rd ed) was of the same view too at page 731, para 13.38, Vol 1): It is only in extremely rare cases that the courts grant exemplary damages. This type of damages if granted, is usually to punish the Defendant. Under English law, the only category of contracts in which such damages had been granted were in actions for breach of promise of marriage. But since the abolition of such actions in 1970 by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, it would appear that exemplary damages will no longer be granted by the English courts for any action for breach of contract. Since the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard, even the award of such damages in tort is now restricted. Even in a breach of contract of employment generally no aggravated and exemplary damages are awarded. In Penang Port Commission v. Kanawangi s/o Seperumaniam [2002] 8 CLJ 503; [1996] 3 MLJ 427 at pages 434-435, His Lordship Mahadev Shankar JCA observed: There are other very disturbing features about this litigation. Addis v. Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 is well-entrenched in the common law, and damages cannot be awarded for the manner of the dismissal of his injured feelings or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that the dismissal of itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment. We are at a total loss to understand on what basis the deputy registrar thought fit to award a huge round sum of RM2m under this head. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 | P a g e The respondent refused to turn up for work on 1 March 1985 claiming that he had been constructively dismissed. It is far from clear whether the deputy registrar considered the respondent's duty to mitigate his damage. Furthermore, the respondent claimed that he was entitled to be confirmed as traffic supervisor because he thought he was qualified for the post. The undeniable fact is that he was never appointed to that post by the appointing authority. The basis on which the deputy registrar proceeded to calculate the alleged 'arrears' of emoluments due to the respondent from 1 March 1985 (as also the award of RM2m) would have been an unsolved mystery, at least until the deputy registrar's notes of evidence and grounds of judgment became available. Damages are not awarded simply because the plaintiff has thrown them at the head of the court. The loss must be shown to have actually occurred and also be recoverable in law before the award can be made. See also the helpful article "Exemplary Damages for Tort and Breach of Contract in Selected Common Law Jurisdictions" by Abdul Majid bin Nabi Baksh [2007] 3 MLJ xcvii. (emphasis added) [120] In PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v. Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd And Another Appeal [2017] SGCA 26; [2017] 2 SLR 129, the Singapore Court of Appeal (per Justice Andrew Phang) unequivocally enunciated that punitive damages are not claimable in breach of contract claims. The learned judge gave a number of reasons why punitive damages are not claimable in a breach of contract situation. They may be stated as follows: (f) In so far as the issue relating to the possible award of punitive damages in a purely contractual context was concerned (and considering, first, the arguments against the award of such damages), allowing the courts to punish a party who had breached a contract sat uneasily with the concept of a contract as an obligation arising from a voluntary and binding agreement. The courts ought to have but a minimal role in regulating the contracting parties' conduct without regard to their agreement. It would be anomalous or even inappropriate for the court to regulate the contracting parties' conduct by imposing an award of punitive damages on the party in breach by way of what is in effect an external standard. The standard was an external one because, with the award of such damages, the court went further to signify its own outrage at the contract-breaker's conduct, and to communicate its own view of what proper commercial behaviour should be. Such an external standard might be said to be antithetical to the very nature and function of the law of contract in general and its remedial structure in particular. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 | P a g e In contrast, the law of tort afforded far more latitude to the courts in regulating conduct between the parties; it imposed standards of normative behaviour between complete strangers: at [68], [71], [72] and [74]. (g) The argument based on a "remedial gap" - that it was necessary to have a residual discretion to award punitive damages in contract law because existing remedies were inadequate to punish and deter outrageous behaviour - was neutral at best. If the concepts of punishment and deterrence were inapposite in the context of the common law of contract, there would be no gap in the first place. Such a gap could, in any event, be filled by alternative remedial options, such as "Wrotham Park damages", an account of profits for breach of contract, or damages for mental distress. These arguably had punitive or deterrent effects even though they remained primarily compensatory in purpose in that they protected a plaintiff's interest in contractual performance: at [78] to [84]. (h) Another argument against recognising punitive damages for breach of contract was the absence of clear criteria by which to determine when punitive damages should be awarded, and the consequent uncertainty this would lead to. The concept of an "outrageous" breach was particularly elusive in the commercial context where self-serving behaviour was an accepted facet of contracting norms. It would be very difficult to identify specific (as well as workable) criteria for ascertaining when a contracting party's conduct had crossed the line from self or vested interest into the realm of the "outrageous": at [85], [86] and [89]. (i) The weight of case law authority was also against the recognition of punitive damages for breach of contract though this was not necessarily conclusive of the issue: at [101]. (j) Policy considerations also militated against the award of punitive damages in a purely contractual context. Awarding punitive damages in a purely contractual context might adversely affect the manner in which litigation would be conducted inasmuch as it might add to its length, complexity and costs and confer upon plaintiffs an undue advantage in forcing large (or larger) settlements. Further, punitive damages were most commonly awarded in circumstances where there was a heightened risk of recurrent reprehensible conduct, especially where the parties were of unequal bargaining power, such as in insurance, employment and consumer transactions. Such risk would be more appropriately managed by regulation rather than by judicial remedies such as an award of punitive damages: at [102], [104] and [106]. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 | P a g e (k) Turning to the arguments in favour of an award of punitive damages in a purely contractual context, first, the argument from uniformity - that it would be inconsistent to recognise punitive damages in tort but exclude punitive damages from contract claims - was unpersuasive because the law of tort was qualitatively different from the law of contract: at [110] and [111]. (l) The Canadian case of Whiten v Pilot Insurance Company (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 257 ("Whiten"), the key authority relied on by the judge, was not persuasive authority for the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract. Whiten held that punitive damages could be awarded where the conduct complained of constituted the breach of an independently actionable wrong - the breach of a contractual duty of good faith. But there was no reason in principle why a single breach of contract ought not also to justify an award of punitive damages; if it was the egregious nature of the conduct of the party in breach that was being punished, it ought not to matter whether that conduct was the result of a single breach or more than a single breach: at [112], [114], and [115]. (m) As the amicus curiae had also pointed out, Whiten has been subject to no small measure of criticism (significantly, from a number of eminent academic experts in the field of Canadian contract law, one of whom was of the view that Whiten may not be a true authority for the award of punitive damages in a purely contractual context as there were features of the case not common to ordinary commercial contracts, such as quasi - regulatory interests, and as it was also a case involving tortious defamatory conduct): at [117] and [118]. (n) The principles in Whiten were also not persuasive because the court assumed that there was no difference in principle between awarding punitive damages in tort and in a purely contractual context; the broader issue of principle - why punishment was a legitimate remedial response to a breach of contract - was not really dealt with. The principle of proportionality, which attempted to impose a rational limit on punitive damages awards, did not furnish sufficient guidance and had led in turn to uncertainty: at [121] to [123], and [126]. (o) Further, it was not clear whether Whiten recognised the availability of punitive damages for all contract breaches or only certain types of contracts where was a material power imbalance, or more generally contracts where there was a duty of good faith: at [127] and [128]. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 | P a g e (p) The existence of a duty of good faith would not, on its own, justify an award of punitive damages in the event of its breach, although it might help overcome one of the objections in principle to punitive damages for breach of contract: the undesirability of a court imposing on the parties its own normative standard of contractual performance. However, it did not necessarily follow that punitive damages ought to be awarded; the existence of an express or implied duty of good faith was a neutral factor: at [134]. (q) The arguments against the award of punitive damages far outweighed the arguments in favour of such an award. There ought to be a general rule that punitive damages could not be awarded for breach of contract: at [135]. (r) Given that PH had at most been grossly negligent, this was not a situation which merited an award of punitive damages. Even if fraud had been established, this was hardly an exceptional case warranting a departure from the general rule: at [138] and [139]. (s) Cl 25 excluded consequential and indirect losses suffered by the contracting parties as well as third parties arising out of the (defective) performance of the SPA in question, but not consequential or indirect losses arising from a refusal to perform the contract or to be bound by it. Airtrust's claims for loss of profit and the loss of opportunity for earning further profits were consequential and indirect losses and therefore excluded by Cl 25: at [151], [153], [155] and [156]. (t) Airtrust sought indemnity costs in respect of the entire trial. The specific instances of unreasonable conduct it had alleged, even if made out, only affected a few of the issues in dispute and a few witnesses. There was no reason to disturb the judge's decision not to order an award of indemnity costs against PH: at [158]. [Observation: Given that the instances in which a breach of contract can occur were manifold, the court would not rule out entirely the possibility that a case might one day come before the court, involving a particularly outrageous type of breach, which necessitated a departure from the general rule that punitive damages would not be awarded for breach of contract. That said, any argument for the award of such damages would need to surmount the many reasons of principle and policy set out in the judgment against doing so. It would therefore take a truly exceptional case to persuade the court that punitive damages should be awarded for breach of contract. Indeed, the court was not sure that it would award such damages even if it were faced with the facts of a case as extreme as Whiten. There were a number of other possible alternative remedies (including the award of damages for mental distress for breach of contract) that could also be invoked by the court to do practical justice while respecting the compensatory function of damages for breach of contract: at [136].] S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 | P a g e [104] Thus, it is clear that it is not permissible for exemplary damages to be granted for a breach of contract claim of this type. Quite apart from the lack of jurisprudential basis for awarding exemplary damages for a breach of contract claim, we also note that the learned Judge had awarded exemplary damages based on 25% of the special damages. This is quite unprecedented. Special damages are out of pocket expenses or claims which are quantifiable and which have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proven. Special damages are not assessed. They need to be proven in the usual way before the Judge. The claimant must produce the best evidence to support the claim for special damages. Traditionally, exemplary damages are awarded in addition to the general damages. [105] As stated earlier, we are satisfied that the Consumer had not proven their special damages claim. Even if we were to accept the suggestion that the Consumer had proven the amount claimed as special damages, we do not agree that exemplary damages can be granted as a percentage of special damages. There is no jurisprudential support for exemplary damages to be granted as a percentage of special damages. In any event, we are of the view that as a matter of law, exemplary damages are not claimable in a breach of contract claim. (See the views of this Court in the National Feedlot case – supra). S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 | P a g e Breach of Statutory Duty - Whether the Defendant had infringed the Consumer’s rights as a registered electricity user by divulging the Consumer’s account details to a third party without the Consumer’s consent [106] On the issue of breach of statutory duty, (per paragraphs [104] and [105] of the Amended Statement of Claim), it is clear that those paragraphs do not specify which sections of the Act have been breached. In Dr Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid & Anor v Jurusan Malaysia Consultants (Sued As A Firm) & Ors. [1997] 3 MLJ 546 (HC) p.566-567, the High Court (per Justice James Foong – later FCJ) said, Unlike the general principles of pleading where laws need not be pleaded, in an action based on a breach of statutory duty, it is absolutely necessary and essential for the plaintiffs to disclose the specific legislation affected; for it is the basis for the plaintiffs' claim. In fact, this is the approach recommended in the Atkin Court Forms, where all the precedents covering this aspect of the claim fully disclose the relevant provision of the statute or by-laws alleged to be breached. [107] Thus, the Consumer’s claim for alleged breach of statutory duties (wrongful disclosure of the Consumer’s information to third parties without their consent) was a complete non-starter and ought to have been dismissed. But, it seems that the claim has since morphed into a claim for damages for breach of confidential information, which was not at all pleaded. In China Road & Bridge Corporation &Anor v. DCX Technologies Sdn Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 644; [2014] 5 MLJ 1(CA), the Court of Appeal dealt with the importance of pleadings in a breach of confidence claim and stated as follow; S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 | P a g e [32] To trigger cl. 7 of the 'memorandum' it is essential to disclose by way of pleadings what 'information' which was disclosed was breached. We have perused the pleadings several times but we were not able to identify the precise 'information' which was said to be breached. The word 'information' has a specific meaning and jurisprudence. All statements or correspondence made by the plaintiff will not qualify as 'information'. Neither will a part of the proposal per se will qualify as information. In addition, 'information' per se will not be entitled to 'confidential' status in relation to the memorandum. The statement of claim should define with some precision the information or communication which is alleged to be confidential. (See Diamond Stylus Co Ltd v. Bauden Precision Diamonds Ltd [1972] FSR 177). The usual form of relief in an action for breach of confidential information includes a declaration as to the confidentiality. (See Industrial Furnaces v. Reaves [1970] RPC 605). In essence, the trial court must first identify the 'information' which has the characteristic of confidentiality and then proceed to consider whether the exception stated in cl. 7 will apply and then proceed to consider whether there was a breach. We have perused the judgment of the learned trial judge several times but we were not able to identify the finding on the 'information', whether it had the characteristic of confidentiality and whether it was breached. Failure to do so will necessarily compromise the integrity of the decision making process and the judgment will stand as perverse. All subsequent findings resulting from the failure will have no value to the decision making process itself. In Ocular Sciences Ltd v. Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289 the court had this to say: Breach of confidence (1) It was essential in a breach of confidence action that the plaintiff should give full and proper particulars of all the confidential information on which he intended to rely for two reasons: first, the plaintiff usually sought an injunction and, unless the confidential information was properly identified, an injunction would be of uncertain scope and might be difficult to enforce; secondly, the defendant must know what case he had to meet as he might wish to show that certain of the items relied on were matters of public knowledge. The absence of proper particulars could compromise a defendant's ability to defend himself if the plaintiff could rely on matters of which no proper warning was given. If the plaintiff failed to give proper particulars it was open to the court to infer that the purpose of the litigation was harassment rather than protection of the plaintiff's rights and the action could be struck out as an abuse of process. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 | P a g e [108] Hence, on the pleadings point alone, the claim for wrongful disclosure of the Consumer’s information to Third Parties (breach of statutory duty) or even breach of confidence, ought to have been dismissed. Defamation – Did DW19 utter the Impugned Words? [109] Next, we deal with the claim for defamation. Of course, the learned Judge was right that based on paragraphs [39] and [45] of the Defence, there was an admission that the impugned words were uttered by DW19. But the oral testimony was otherwise. Here, it is relevant to refer to PW5’s evidence and DW19’s evidence in response. In this regard, it is clear that the learned Judge completely ignored the evidence of DW19 that he never said the impugned words as conveyed by PW5. And, more pertinently, DW19’s evidence was unchallenged during cross- examination. PW5 admitted that the impugned statement in her letter of 8 May 2015, was her own words and not those uttered by DW19. Under cross-examination PW5 explained exactly what was said by DW19. “PD: … Dinyatakan di dalam pliding ini, En Fauzi ada buat representasi kepada Puan Azah. Kita baca line yang ke 4 lah. Dari atas. Merupakan satu kesalahan yang berat kerana mereka telah melakukan kesalahan yang berat kerana mereka telah berkali-kali mengubahsuai meter meter TNB. Soalan saya, apa yang En. Fauzi, adakaha ini yang En. Fauzi cakan pada Puan Azah atau ini dalam bentuk document? Boleh ceritakan tidak? SP5: Bukan dokumen. Masa mesyuarat kami telah dimaklumkan oleh En. Fauzi bahawa kilang ais tersebut di cakap ada kes dan ada dua meter dan kami dimaklumkan bahawa memang kedua-dua meter tersebut ada meter tampering yang berlaku. Banyak kali dia cakap. So dia cakap memang ada kes berkenaan dengan meter tampering. Sebab tu dia cakap problem untuk anakguam kami lah untuk membeli sebab meter tampering telah berlaku banyak kali. Sebab itu tunggakan yang ada pada akaun tinggi, the amount itu adalah tinggi. Itu yang diamklumkan.” (Emphasis ours) S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 | P a g e [110] We are thus constrained to hold that despite paragraphs [39] and [45] of TNB’s defence, it is of critical importance that the person to whom the impugned words (PW5) were alleged to have been said had clearly testified that the words she used were her words and not that of DW19. In light of PW5's evidence, the claim for slander cannot stand as it has not been proven that the impugned words per paragraph [56] of the Amended Statement of Claim were uttered by DW19. The claim for defamation ought to have been dismissed. In any event, even if defamation has been proven, it is necessary to keep in mind that the impugned words, if they were indeed uttered, were only said to one person. The extent of publication was de minimis at best and the Consumer would have been entitled to a meagre amount of damages not exceeding RM1,000.00. Further, there was no plea for aggravated damages. Thus, we do not see how the learned Judge could have granted aggravated damages when there was no claim for this head of damages. [111] The case that is relevant on limited publication and its effect on damages is the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors. [1999] 3 SLR 22 (SGCA) which reads as follows; [48] There was also a point of distinction which, with respect, we think that the learned judge did not take into account. In the three cases referred to as guiding precedents, the publication of the defamatory matter was in the press. The extent of publication was much greater than that of the present case. The circulation of The Hammer is limited by the fact that it is not sold on the newsstands. Out of the 20,000 copies which were printed, only 8,000 copies were sold in various parts of Singapore and only Tamil readers would have read it. Also, not all the Tamil readers of the article in August 1995 would at that time still be familiar with the persons who held responsibilities in the 1995 Tamil Language Week. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 | P a g e The actual extent of publication of the article was very limited and very much less than that of the three cases referred to by the learned judge. Admittedly, the gravity of defamation cannot always be ascertained by reference to the extent of the publication; nor can it be varied or adjusted by some direct proportion to the number of persons to whom the defamatory material is published. Nonetheless, the extent of publication remains an important factor which should be considered in the assessment of damages: see Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1998] 1 SLR 97 158. The Outcome [112] To sum up, we agree with TNB that the preliminary objection ought to have been dismissed. Further, the learned Judge ought to have examined all the evidence. And if that had been done, the learned Judge would have come to the inescapable conclusion that there was meter tampering on the dates when inspections were carried out by TNB’s technical team. However, we find TNB’s stand on the Mayaria issue, untenable. Thus, since the tampered meters were rectified, they could not lawfully disconnect the supply of electricity under s.38(1) of the Act. Thus, they are liable to pay damages for wrongful disconnection of electricity to the Premises. [113] However, the Consumer failed to prove their claim for special damages. The claim for trespass is no longer legally sustainable or tenable. There was no appeal by the Consumer arising out of the dismissal of their claim for the tort interference with their business. The claim for defamation is unmaintainable in light of PW5’s testimony, and DW19’s evidence that he did not utter the impugned words. Lastly, the claim for breach of statutory duty is untenable as the relevant statutory provisions alleged to have been breached and which purportedly gave rise to a private cause of action, was not specifically pleaded. S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 | P a g e [114] As for breach of confidence, the Consumer did not even plead the elements necessary for a claim for breach of confidence. TNB has failed on the Mayaria issue, but has succeeded on all other issues both on liability and quantum. The final outcome is that TNB’s appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The High Court’s Order/Judgment dated 30 September 2019 is hereby set aside. We allow costs of RM80,000.00 (subject to allocator) as costs here and below, to be paid by the Consumer (Respondent) to TNB (Appellant). S. NANTHA BALAN, Judge, Court of Appeal, Putrajaya, Malaysia. Date: 21 December 2023 Legal Representation For the Appellant: Steven Thiru Hadi Mukhlis Bin Khairulmaini Izatunlina Binti Jamaludin Messrs. Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership Unit A1-12-01, Arcoris Mont Kiara, Jalan Kiara, 50480 Mont Kiara, Kuala Lumpur. (Ref: HMK/ST/TNB/BMMSB/01 [21-729]) S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 | P a g e For the Respondent: Datuk Dr Gurdial Singh Njiar P. Mitran Abraham Au Tian Hui, Lim Yew Yi Kerk Boon Leng Messrs. Kerk & Partners 5-5, Oval Damansara, 60000 Kuala Lumpur. (Ref: BIG-1950016) Legislation: Section 37, 38 Electricity Supply Act 1990 Cases Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). Big Man Management Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2020] 11 MLJ 472, [2020] 8 CLJ 27 (HC) Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Mayaria Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 2 MLJ 801, [2022] 2 CLJ 333 (CA) Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Chew Thai Kay & Anor [2022] 2 MLJ 25 (FC) Megnaway Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Soon Lian Hock (Sole Proprietor of The Firm Performance Audio & Car Accessories Enterprise [2009] 3 MLJ 525 (HC) Douglas Ding Jangan & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 946 (FC) Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Evergrowth Aquaculture Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals [2021] 9 CLJ 179, [2021] 7 AMR 857, [2021] 5 MLJ 937 (FC) Thomas Thomas @ Mohan A/L K Thomas v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2017] 4 CLJ 340; [2018] 5 MLJ 831 (CA) Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Ichi-Ban Plastic (M) Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 557; [2018] MLJ 14 (FC) Liza bte Ismail v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR 454 SGCA S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 | P a g e Markem Corporation & Anor v Zipher Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 267, [2005] RPC 31 (CA) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v. Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 19; [1993] 3 MLJ 352 (SC) National Feedlot Corporation Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors v Public Bank Berhad [2023] 7 AMR 213, [2023] 10 CLJ 430 (CA) Sunlite Textile Sdn Bhd v Motilal Realty Sdn Bhd (PART 2) [2007] 5 MLJ 640 (HC) Tan Ah Kow & Anor v Tan Chaui En [2017] 6 MLJ 297, [2018] 2 CLJ 610 (CA) Dr Abdul Hamid Abdul Rashid & Anor v Jurusan Malaysia Consultants (Sued As A Firm) & Ors. [1997] 3 MLJ 546 (HC) A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors. [1999] 3 SLR 22 (SGCA) China Road & Bridge Corporation &Anor v. DCX Technologies Sdn Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 644; [2014] 5 MLJ 1(CA) Modernia Plastic Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2015] 3 CLJ 825 (HC) Xin Guan Premier Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2016] 1 AMR 603,[2016] 10 MLJ 788, [2016] 1 CLJ 318 (HC) Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v Robert Doran & Ors [2013] 2 MLJ 174 (CA). S/N asIfnnujgECynxwfcqaY8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-123-08/2023

PEMOHON MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD RESPONDEN BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD

There are merits in Bauer’s claims in the ongoing arbitral proceedings - Whether Meridian is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum if the arbitration proceedings concludes in Bauer’s favor

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Hajah Aliza binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=32f3aeff-eb98-4630-9e0b-368b27cb6a12&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-123-08/2023 BETWEEN MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD (Company No.: 530788-P) ... PLAINTIFF AND BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD (Company No.: 121194-X) ... DEFENDANT (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-134-08/2023 BETWEEN BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD (Company No.: 121194-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD (Company No.: 530788-P) ... DEFENDANT 02/01/2024 12:13:31 WA-24C-123-08/2023 Kand. 35 S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Unlike the majority of suits pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] (‘CIPAA’) which are heard together in this Court, these suits concern the applications by – (a) Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd (‘Meridian’) pursuant to s 28 CIPAA in Originating Summons No. WA-24C-123-08/2023 (‘O.S. No. 123’) to enforce the third Adjudication Decision dated 17.7.2023 (‘3rd AD’) by the third learned Adjudicator, Mr. Winston Ng Peng Cheang (‘3rd Adjudicator’) (‘Enforcement Application’); and (b) Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (‘Bauer’) pursuant to s 16 CIPAA in O.S. No. WA-24C-134-08/2023 (‘O.S. No. 134’) to stay the 3rd AD pending the final determination by way of arbitration (‘Stay Application’), without any application being made under s 15 CIPAA to set aside the 3rd AD. [2] On 15.11.2023, after giving due consideration of the affidavit evidence and the oral and written submissions of the parties, I had allowed the Enforcement Application and dismissed the Stay Application. [3] These are my full grounds of judgment for the decision. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 The Cause Papers [4] The cause papers in both suits are as follows: The Enforcement Application: (a) Meridian’s O.S. dated 3.8.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Meridian’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Senior Contract Manager, Ong Eng Theng on 3.8.2023 (encl. 2); (c) Bauer’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Managing Director Commercial, Julian Benedict Lord on 24.8.2023 (encls. 5 and 6); and (d) Meridian’s Notice of Intention to Use Affidavit in O.S. No. 134 dated 15.9.2023 (encl. 7). The Stay Application: (a) Bauer’s O.S. dated 25.8.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Bauer’s AIS affirmed by the same deponent on 24.8.2023 (encls. 2 and 3); (c) Meridian’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 14.9.2023 (encl. 4); and S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (d) Bauer’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 27.9.2023 (encl. 6). Brief Salient Facts [5] The background facts to these suits can be found in my grounds of judgment – (a) dated 4.5.2020 in Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd and another summon [2020] MLJU 1405; [2020] MLRHU 1138 where I had dismissed Bauer’s applications to set aside the Adjudication Decision by the learned Adjudicator, Mr. Rodney Colin Gomez (‘1st Adjudicator’) dated 31.10.2019 (‘1st AD’) pursuant to s 15 CIPAA and to stay the 1st AD pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties pursuant to s 16 CIPAA, and had allowed Meridian’s application to enforce the 1st AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA (Bauer’s appeal against my decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 3.1.2022 and Bauer’s motion for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court on 27.4.2022); and (b) dated 17.2.2023 in Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 1047; [2023] 1 LNS 917 where I had allowed Meridian’s application for the Adjudication Decision by the learned Adjudicator, Ir. Shanmugaraj s/o Chelliah S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Thamotherampillai (‘2nd Adjudicator’) dated 15.11.2021 (‘2nd AD’) to be set aside under s 15(d) CIPAA as the 2nd Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction by deciding on the set-off claim (Bauer’s appeal against my decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23.10.2023). [6] For the present suits, it is sufficient to recap that – (a) Meridian commenced the first adjudication proceedings (‘1st Adjudication’) against Bauer by way of the Notice of Adjudication dated 17.6.2019 for the sum of RM7,494,014.17 which was due and payable for works done since 2017 pursuant to the CIPAA. At that time, the 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35 was not contractually due to be released by Bauer to Meridian and was therefore not included in the 1st Adjudication. On 31.10.2019, the 1st Adjudicator delivered the 1st AD in favour of Meridian in the sum of RM5,311,360.51 together with interest and costs, after allowing Bauer’s set-off claims of RM142,238.60 out of the total set-off claims of RM 5,188,402.91. Bauer has since complied with the 1st AD; (b) On 13.12.2019, Bauer issued the notice to arbitrate to Meridian to refer the dispute between the parties to arbitration; and (c) Meridian submitted its Payment Claim to Bauer on 29.12.2020 claiming for the 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35. The Notice of Adjudication dated 1.4.2021 was subsequently S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 served on Bauer (‘2nd Adjudication’). On 15.11.2021, the 2nd AD was delivered whereby Bauer’s set-off for the damages/ liquidated ascertained damages (‘LAD’) in the sum of RM3,913,000.00 out of RM 5,188,402.91 was allowed and Meridian’s claim for the 2nd moiety of retention sum was dismissed following the said set-off. [7] As the 2nd AD was set aside by this Court and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Meridian then commenced another adjudication proceedings against Bauer to recover the same 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35 (‘3rd Adjudication’). [8] Meridian served the Payment Claim dated 7.3.2023 on Bauer. Bauer did not serve any Payment Response on Meridian. [9] On 12.5.2023, Meridian served its Adjudication Claim whilst Bauer served its Adjudication Response on 26.5.2023. Meridian served its Adjudication Reply on 2.6.2023. [10] Meanwhile, on 22.5.2023, Bauer filed an application seeking for a stay of execution of the Order of this Court made on 17.2.2023 to set aside the 2nd AD and for a stay of the 3rd Adjudication pending the disposal of Bauer’s appeal against the said Order. Bauer’s application was dismissed on 7.7.2023. [11] On 17.7.2023, the 3rd Adjudicator had determined in para 143 of the 3rd AD that: S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 “… a. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35 on or before 31-7-2023. b. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the total costs of the adjudication proceeding amounting to RM59,507.18 on or before 31-7- 2023. c. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant interest on the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35 at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on a daily basis commencing from 21-6-2020 until the date of this Adjudication Decision on or before 31-7-2023. d. If the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35, accrued interest pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) above and the total costs of the adjudication proceeding amounting to RM59,507.18 are not paid in full by the Respondent to the Claimant by 31-7-2023, the Respondent shall pay interest on all outstanding amounts at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on a daily basis commencing from 1-8-2023 until full and final settlement. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 e. All payments that are required to be made by the Respondent to the Claimant shall be made by way of a Banker's Cheque or Cashier's Order issued by a local financial institution.”. I. THE ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION [12] Section 28 CIPAA provides as follows: “Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment 28. (1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. (2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. (3) The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court.”. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Mr. CK Oon submitted for Meridian that it had complied with all statutory requirements for an application pursuant to s 28 CIPAA to enforce the 3rd AD and this was not disputed by Bauer. [14] Bauer affirmed that the Enforcement Application should be dismissed as the 3rd AD should be stayed in the circumstances as averred in the AIS. In short, Bauer’s main defence in resisting the Enforcement Application was that, if the Stay Application is allowed, then the Enforcement Application ought to be dismissed. [15] The effect of an adjudication decision is clearly provided in s 13 CIPAA which reads: “13. The adjudication decision is binding unless – (a) it is set aside by the High Court on any of the grounds referred to in section 15; (b) the subject matter of the decision is settled by a written agreement between the parties; or (c) the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court.”. [16] As mentioned at the outset, Bauer did not file an application pursuant to s 15 CIPAA to set aside the 3rd AD. In addition, the subject matter of the 3rd AD has not been settled by a written agreement between Bauer S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 and Meridian and the dispute has also not been finally decided by arbitration or the court. [17] Section 28 CIPAA confers a discretion on the High Court which must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA. This discretionary power does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15 CIPAA. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the court that – (a) there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favor; (b) there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; and (c) there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law [see Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) at paragraphs 24 - 26, pp 370 and 371]. [18] Based on the foregoing, I would agree with Meridian’s contention that the 3rd AD should be enforced as of right. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [19] As Bauer has taken a position which is dependent on the outcome of the Stay Application, I now turn to consider the Stay Application. II. THE STAY APPLICATION [20] Section 16 CIPAA reads as follows: “Stay of adjudication decision 16. (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. (2) The High Court may grant a stay of the adjudication decision or order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or make any other order as it thinks fit.”. [21] Bauer has indisputably fulfilled the requirements for a stay under paragraph 16(1)(b) CIPAA as the subject matter of the 3rd AD is S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 pending final determination by arbitration (see the decisions of this Court in Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 at paragraph 69, pp 286 - 287 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 8.8.2022) and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 at paragraph 8, which are to be contrasted with Classic Series Sdn Bhd v Ng Lung Yang (Trading under the name and style of ‘NLY Coating’) [2023] MLJU 2324 at paragraphs 35 and 36). [22] In his submission for Bauer, Mr. Sanjay Mohan has fittingly submitted that the court may stay an adjudication decision where there are clear errors, or to meet the justice of the individual case and that the correct approach under s 16 of the CIPAA would be to evaluate each case on its merits where the financial capacity of the unpaid party to repay the adjudicated sum could be a factor but not the only factor (see View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22). [23] The learned counsel further submitted that the justice of the present case demands that the 3rd AD be stayed (see too, paragraph 26 in the AIS). [24] In Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734, I said: “[64] Among the cases which have discussed how the tests of clear and unequivocal errors and justice of the case S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 are to be applied in the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant a stay or otherwise are EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1851, Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194 and; [2021] 1 LNS 367, Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852, Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 and CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305. [65] In CRCC Malaysia (supra), this Court said: “[56] … [57] As for the phrase “to meet the justice of the individual case”, this Court in Genbina Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 2 MLRH 101 at p 111 said that the determination as to what is right and fair must necessarily be dependent on the factual matrix and circumstances arising in each case whilst in EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594 at p 603, Lim Chong Fong J expressed the following view: S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[27] Furthermore in the View Esteem case, it is also stated that the financial status is not the sole factor in determining the grant of the stay. The stay may be allowed to meet the justice of the individual case aside from clear error. They seem to be disjunctive as explained in the Leap Modulation case. Justice of the case is of course even more subjectively objective. It involves the exercise of discretion. However in light of the caveat of caution mentioned in the View Esteem case, I am also only minded to grant the stay if my conscience is pricked in the special circumstances of the case. Beyond that, it is incapable of definition or illustration. [28] The bottom line is that considerations of both clear error as well as justice of the individual case to justify the stay of an adjudication decision have to be stringently applied as this would otherwise defeat the statutory intent of the CIPAA to ensure cash flow in the construction industry; see Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 801.” S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 …” (see too, RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247). [25] The grounds upon which Bauer claimed that the justice of the instant case warrants a stay of the 3rd AD are examined below. 1st Ground: There are merits in Bauer’s claims in the ongoing arbitral proceedings [26] In paragraphs 21 to 23 of the AIS, Bauer stated the respective contentions of the parties in the arbitration proceedings, namely – (a) Bauer’s claims against Meridian which include the sum of RM4,506,451.18 as loss and expense suffered by Bauer due to Meridian’s delay; RM681,951.73 as back charges; RM1,485,698.02 as loss and expense during the defects liability period; and RM432,767.67 being the sum which was overpaid to Meridian; and (b) Meridian’s counterclaim against Bauer for the sum of RM9,275,068.18 being the balance value of works done including the 2nd moiety of retention sum; and the entitlement to an extension of time (‘EoT’) until 25.11.2017 or alternatively, that S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 time for completion of the sub-contract works had been set at large, to emphasise that the arbitral tribunal will make a final determination on the issues relating to, among others, the value of works carried out by Meridian; whether Meridian is entitled to an EoT; whether Bauer is entitled to its loss and expense claim; whether Meridian failed to provide certain provisions as required under the sub-contract; whether Bauer is entitled to its back charges; and whether Meridian is entitled to the 2nd moiety of retention sum (the pleadings in the arbitration was shown in exhibit “A-11”). [27] Bauer further stated in paragraph 24 of the AIS that the arbitration proceedings have reached a mature stage wherein Bauer has closed its case on 21.7.2023 and the arbitration proceedings are fixed for continued hearing in the months of August 2023 and February and March 2024. [28] Bauer asserted that all disputes which were raised in the adjudication proceedings will be finally determined by the arbitral tribunal, including Meridian’s entitlement to the release of the 2nd moiety of the retention sum, and that based on Bauer’s position in respect of the total value of work carried out by Meridian and Bauer’s claims for loss and expenses and back charges, there is no sum due and payable to Meridian [29] As the Court of Appeal had dismissed Bauer’s appeal on 23.10.2023, when the Stay Application was heard on 9.11.2023, Bauer’s averment in the alternative in paragraph 29 of the AIS would apply, namely that S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 the Enforcement Application will naturally be allowed and once the 3rd AD is enforced, Bauer will be left with no recourse or remedy to set aside the 3rd AD. [30] Bauer firmly believes that it has merits in its claim for loss and expense in the arbitration, at least in the sum of RM3,913,000.00 because this Court had set aside the 2nd AD on the ground of excess of jurisdiction rather than on the merits. Hence, it cannot be said that the factual and evidentiary findings made by the 2nd Adjudicator in finding that there was delay by Meridian and in allowing Bauer’s loss and expense, are not reasoned or unsound. The claimed amount will extinguish Meridian’s claim for the 2nd moiety of retention sum. [31] I have considered Bauer’s 1st Ground to support the Stay Application and I was not persuaded that it is in the interest of justice for the Court to grant a stay of the 3rd AD. Sub-s 37(1) CIPAA provides that a dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. The fact that there is an ongoing arbitration is not, per se, a ground for granting a stay application under s 16 CIPAA (see Meridian Contracts (supra) at subparagraph 65(c)]. [32] Moreover, based on Bauer’s Statement of Claim, its claim against Meridian is for the total sum of RM7,106,866.60 as opposed to Meridian’s total counterclaim of RM9,275,068.18 against Bauer as shown in the Amended Statement of Defence and Statement of Counterclaim (see the AIS, encl. 3). S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [33] Contrary to Bauer’s assertion that the arbitration proceedings have reached a mature stage, the precise timeline for the final determination of the disputes between the parties remained uncertain. Whilst the hearing before the arbitrator has been set until March 2024 and assuming that the hearing will be completed in that month, the arbitrator has yet to give directions on the dates for written submissions, and possibly clarification hearings to be held. The exact date when the final award will be published is also unknown. [34] To allow a stay of the 3rd AD in the circumstances of this case would be to defeat the primary objective of the CIPAA to alleviate cash flow issues by providing an effective and economical mechanism [see Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 (FC) at paragraphs 46 - 55, pp 242 - 246 and Inai Kiara (supra, at paragraph 28, p 371)]. [35] For the avoidance of doubt, I did not give any consideration to Bauer’s submission that the 3rd AD contained clear error as this ground was not raised in Bauer’s affidavit evidence. Moreover, Bauer has chosen not to file an application to set aside the 3rd AD under s 15 of the CIPAA. 2nd Ground: Whether Meridian is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum if the arbitration proceedings concludes in Bauer’s favor [36] In paragraphs 31 to 33 of the AIS, Bauer affirmed that there is a risk that Meridian will not be able to repay the adjudicated amount in the S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 3rd AD should Meridian be required to do so after the disposal of the arbitration proceedings. Bauer relied on – (a) the Summary Of Financial Information in the Companies Commission of Malaysia (‘CCM’) search conducted on Meridian on 15.8.2023 which shows for the financial year end 31.12.2022, Meridian suffered a loss after tax in the sum of RM915,089.00; had a net dividend of negative RM915,800.00; had two open charges that remain unsatisfied; and had four charges in the total sum of RM3,200,000.00 that remain unsatisfied; and (b) the CTOS Report on Meridian which shows – (i) there is a significant decrease in Meridian’s retained earnings as follows: • Financial year end 31.12.2018: RM4,416,179.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2021: RM2,300,061.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2022: RM469,127.00 (ii) Meridian has no revenue for the financial year end 31.12.2021 and 31.12.2022; and (iii) there is a significant decrease in Meridian’s profit after tax: S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 • Financial year end 31.12.2018 in the sum of RM726,251.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2021 in the negative sum of RM6,319.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2022 in the negative sum of RM915,800.00 (see exhibit “A-12”, encl. 3). [37] Bauer’s counsel vehemently submitted that Meridian’s public financial information reveals that Meridian is in significant financial distress. For two consecutive years, Meridian had zero revenue and this signified severe strain in cash flow and a lack of ability to generate any revenue. This was worsened by the fact that Meridian’s suffered two straight years of negative growth and negative profit. As at 31.12.2022, Meridian suffered loss of profit (after tax) of RM915,089.00. [38] Further, based on Meridian’s balance sheet for the financial year end 31.12.2022, Meridian’s current net worth was only in the sum of RM2,879,172.00 and its net asset was after Bauer had complied with the 1st AD and paid the Adjudicated Sum with interests and costs of RM6,265,214.52. Meridian’s total assets include the non-current assets in the sum of RM1,804,884.00, which are not easily liquidated into cash. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [39] In addition, the unsatisfied charges are an indicator of high debt level and poor financial health. This exposes Meridian to the risks of losing its assets if the secured creditors decide to enforce the charges. With regards to the alleged cause of Meridian’s precarious state of finance, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, the fact remains that Meridian is currently in a precarious state of finance and might not be able to repay the Adjudicated Sum. [40] After having scrutinised the CCM search and CTOS Report and the parties’ averments and submissions, it is my considered view that Meridian’s financial health is not at such a perilous level that it would not be able to repay the adjudicated amount, if called to do so. This is because – (a) the adjudicated amount including costs, and excluding accruing interests, is only RM1,147,927.53; (b) as at financial year end 31.12.2022 – (i) Meridian’s current assets is RM2,330,408.00 and non- current assets is RM1,804,884.00 which gives a total of RM4,135,292.00. The total assets and the current assets exceed the adjudicated amount; and (ii) Meridian’s total liabilities is RM1,256,120.00 and its losses after tax is RM915,089.00. Even with these figures, and considering the total assets and the net worth of S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 RM2,879,172.00, Meridian would still be able to repay the adjudicated amount, if required to do so in future; (c) the six unsatisfied charges involve two open charges and four charges which were created between 5.11.2004 and 18.7.2007 for the total amount of RM3,200,000.00. As submitted by Meridian, unsatisfied charges are not markers for its financial health and could be seen as reflecting the banks’ confidence in Meridian as a going concern; and (d) in PNL Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v Loh Teck Wah & Ors [2022] 6 MLJ 304, the Court of Appeal said: “[88] The case of Datuk Mohd Sari bin Datuk Hj Nuar v Idris Hydraulic (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 5 MLJ 377 was also cited where it was held that in determining the issue of inability to pay debt, the High Court considered the assets and liabilities of the company. Kamalanathan Ratnam JC (as he then was) held as follows: Section 218(2)(c) is very clear. To ascertain if a company is unable to pay its debt the court shall take into account the contingent and prospective liabilities of the company. In order to ascertain its liabilities, it is proper that its assets are also ascertained because only upon ensuring that there is insufficient assets to meet the debts can there be ascertained liabilities. Therefore, the S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 current assets must be taken stock of to see if after considering the total liabilities both contingent and prospective there is a surplus deficit. (Emphasis added.) [89] We have no quarrel nor quibble with what is unquestionably the settled test with respect to whether a company is ‘unable to pay its debts’.”. Applying the settled test as above quoted to the present case, with current assets of RM2,330,408.00 and total liabilities of RM1,256,120.00, Meridian is still capable of repaying the Adjudicated Sum, if required to do so. [41] As to the issue of whether a conditional stay should be granted in favor of Bauer, it was argued that a stay under s 16 CIPAA, even if conditional upon Bauer depositing the Adjudicated Sum into a stakeholder account, would best protect the competing interests of parties as – (a) Meridian’s rights will be protected by the fact that the adjudicated sum in the stakeholder account will be released to Meridian if the arbitration proceedings conclude in Meridian’s favour; (b) Bauer’s rights will be protected as a stay will alleviate its anxiety that it cannot recover the adjudicated sum if the arbitration proceedings conclude in Bauer’s favour; and S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (c) both parties can focus on the arbitral proceedings without fear of further execution or winding-up proceedings arising from the 3rd AD. [42] Although I have, in cases such as Tecnicas Reunidas Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Petrovietnam Engineering Consultancy JSC (PVE) & Anor and other cases [2021] MLJU 2633 and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd (supra) allowed a conditional stay, I was not convinced that this would be an appropriate order to make in the instant case in order to strike a balance between securing the recoverability of the Adjudicated Sum and preserving the essence of an adjudication proceeding under the CIPAA. [43] The Adjudicated Sum has been owing to Meridian since year 2020 and Meridian has not been able to recover the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the 3rd Adjudication whereby it had paid both its and Bauer’s portions of the security deposit as Bauer had defaulted in making this payment. Conclusion [44] In view of the foregoing reasons, the Enforcement Application in O.S. No. 123 was allowed and the Stay Application in O.S. No. 134 was dismissed. S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Mr. Sanjay Mohan was agreeable to the costs as proposed by Mr. CK Oon and I concurred. Hence, costs of RM5,000.00 were ordered for the Enforcement Application and RM10,000.00 for the Stay Application, both subject to allocatur. Dated: 22 December 2023 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 123 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 134: Oon Chee Kheng (Goh Jing Han with him) Messrs. C K Oon & Co. Advocates & Solicitors L3A-3A, Wisma BU8 No. 11, Lebuh Bandar Utama Bandar Utama Damansara 47800 Petaling Jaya Selangor S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 134 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 123: Sanjay Mohan (Wong Li-Wei and Tan Jia Shen with him) Messrs. Sanjay Mohan Advocates & Solicitors Unit 5.01 Level 5 WORK @ Clearwater Jalan Changkat Semantan 50490 Kuala Lumpur Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: Ananda Kumar a/l Krishnan v Ng Chin Tai (t/a Lean Seh Fishery) & Anor (Tesco Stores (Malaysia) Sdb Bhd, intervener) [2016] MLJU 924 Classic Series Sdn Bhd v Ng Lung Yang (Trading under the name and style of ‘NLY Coating’) [2023] MLJU 2324 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 Mecomb Malaysia Sdn Bhd v VST M&E Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 380 Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 1047; [2023] 1 LNS 917 S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd and another summon [2020] MLJU 1405; [2020] MLRHU 1138 Niko Bioenergy Sdn Bhd v RH Balingian Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 1574 PNL Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v Loh Teck Wah & Ors [2022] 6 MLJ 304 Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247 Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2022] 6 MLJ 58 Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 Tecnicas Reunidas Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Petrovietnam Engineering Consultancy JSC (PVE) & Anor and other cases [2021] MLJU 2633 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 Legislation: Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, ss 13, 16, 28 & 31 Rules of Court 2012, O. 7, O. 28, O. 69A r. 4 & O. 92 r. 4 S/N /67zMpjrMEaeCzaLJ8tqEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-25-163-03/2022

PEMOHON Mohd Ridzuan bin Mohammad RESPONDEN 1. ) Majlis Angkatan Tentera 2. ) Jeneral Tan Sri Dato' Seri Zamrose bin Mohd Zain, Panglima Tentera Darat 3. ) Brigedier Jeneral Khairul Anuar bin Abd Aziz, Panglima Briged Keenam Infantri Malaysia 4. ) Leftenan Kolonel Mohd Haizar bin Arshad, Pegawai Memerintah Batalion Keempat Rejimen Renjer Diraja 5. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

Judicial Review - Certiorari to review the decision and/or recommendation dated 30.1.2022 by Majlis Angkatan Tentera to maintain the termination of the Applicant's service.

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=73f3a83c-83e4-4799-bd18-839142426c9b&Inline=true

02/01/2024 11:41:43 WA-25-163-03/2022 Kand. 61 S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PKjzcSDmUe9GIORQkJsmw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—1s3—o3/2022 Kand. 51 uz/m,2n2L 11:L1-:13 DALAM umxgunn mus: MALAVA nu «mu Luuvurx mum vnuvm pznssxurum xmu LUMPUR (nuusuu KuAsA.xuAsA mu) P monomm 5: AN KEIIAKIM wA.2s1s:.asr2a2 u. m pemara mengenm kepulusan ulanqlcau Mm Avvralan Tenteru Aemadap MOHD mnzum am MOHAMI/!AD4Nn KIF E70218-n3»51A5p Dan Damn psrkara mengenal Amkal sm man. u. Peuekululn Dan Da\am Derkara mengenax Nuke! mm Paflsmbiuaan Pumukmuxn Din mum Derksra satu Fermohonsn unluk uh kebennmn m Damn Alumn sa. Kzedah am Kaedah—Kasdah Mahkamah 2012 Dan mum pemara saw Pevmohonan unluk salu cemaunm bawah Alman 5:, ma.» 2m Kuda7>Kaedah Mahknmnh zmz Dan Dalam nemm um Pelmumnnn unluk Garm mm a. bawah Amman 53. Kaadah sm Kaedahrkaedah Mamcarnah 2m2 ». mu sm Ptqmsnmuumsmnaumvw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Dun Da\am perkzna mangensx Seksyan 25 ma Kuhakvrvan 1954 um. parkava mengenm Fursngqan 1‘ J-fins! kapad: Akla Mahkamah Kehzkhuan «as» Dan Dmam peflxiva mangmm sukysn sun din Saksyen s7 Akla Angkavan Tamera I972 Amuu MOHD RIDZUAM am MUHAMMAD ...wsuoHoN mm 1 uuuus mcxnm rzurzsu 2. JENERAL nu Sm Into’ SERI znmosz am noun zauu rmaum TENTERA nun 3. ERIGEDIER JENERAL KNAIRUL mum am AID am amouuu mean xssum mnumu rnuvsux 4 LEFTENAN KOLONEL mum muzuz am ARSNAD vauwu MEIIIEKINYAN snnuou KEEMPAY REJIMEN REMJER mmm 5 xanuum MALAYSIA ...x:sroun:» RESPONDEN flap x m :4 sm Pnmdnmuumsmnuusmw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm n paper concludes that were is a case agamst that 31 Based on the abcve, I am olthe mew man the 4'" Respondem has erred m law as he ianea lo aampry wum me pmvwswons under Sechon 95 oVAct 77. I find that ma mvesugamon ola charge has never been conducted and [here 15 a procedura\ new Ina! had oocasmnea a mxscamage av jusuce to me Appncam mat the ‘Abslran ad Evldoncr was uevecxive and not in accordance with ma ml-. u) The 'AbIlrncI av Evidencf was conauma wllhom Ihe Appluunrs Imawlodfioa 32 Based on my findmg above, that were vms no unveauganon of a marge was conducted. :1 has pvejudwced and occasioned a rmscamage of wanes when he was nn|m1urrv\ad(ha|in‘ADslrar:l o! Evwdence‘ would be taken agalnsl him. 33 Therefore, x am 01 me view mac ma appolnlmenl or Mapv Yud Azuma bm Jaalar(3011I25| bylhe 4'4“ Responuem as me amcenu lake an ‘Abslmcl of Emaence‘ wnnom the Appncan: bemg Informed us cleany egamsl me Vzw 34, Furlher‘ I find that :1 has vaulted m me Appucam lcsmg ma nghl undar rule JJ(2)(bJ ov the Puumsa and subsaquenfly unable la exemse n’ rigm to have a summary of ewaence taken The rule statesmal, “Pmvwdefl nu: summary av amence must belakzn w- an we maximum pumshment rm the eflenee mm wmvh ms accused w nhavgen ws dam. av my mu accnsld. :1 any lime man on clulul lgllnst mm as r-quiruninwrilinullukasnm myofn dnnubcukt or my the oommallmnw olfioen M me opmlen Ilval ma wmavesh av ‘M1195 vequwe mm : summary ac mama; be Iaken (emphasis added) Pusan mu m Pkg-csnmuumswunoumvw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmmuny am. dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 35. 36 (b) 37. as The above Rute 33i2)(b) dearly gives the Appitcant the rtghl to choose to have a summary oi evidence taken and without his right being used, the Ap ‘ nt has not hed the appammtly id cioes. examine the prosecution witnesses when the 4" Respondent applied tute as which does not require the Appticanrs ptesence when the evidence is taken and there was no oath been administered to ail the witnesses iheieieie. it it my view that the Applicant has been oreiudiced by the 4*“ Respmtdervfs actions ioriaiting to inioim the Appiicanl of his tights and this error had occasioned iniiistioe to the Applicant when he was not given the opportunity \n choose a summary Evidence taken against itiin. Failure to give a copy oi the ‘Abetnct oi Evidoncf and Mo cautioned statement being admtnistiend during the handing ovlr enhe ‘Ahnrlcl oi Evldoncl Even fllhe appointment oi Meier Vud Aziime I1 Jnaiai 1301 t 125) ie vaiid in law. I view that the 4”’ Respondent iaiied to advice Meier vud Azuma tot a copy oi ‘Abstract oi Evidence‘ to be handed over |o the Applicant in eomoiienoe with Rule 35(2) of the F'U(A|i6J to give him cautioned statement when he handed over a copy at the Abslracl oi Evidence‘ to the Appiicani Ruie 36(2) oi the PUiA)1a3 states as ioiiows » ‘Whnn nn nbclrntl oi Ivlflunu It: hurt inede in amaidence wnn paragraph (ti a cceyoittsmtt he handed bo (III ccmed Ind be lhlll then be uullnned in the ioilowiitg tam — 'J5f?7 i hit is a copy of the sonnet cl lvlfllrtce in your me. you are not abiiged to say anything Wilh tegaid to it unieee you wish to do w‘ but you mania and it end, when yeti have iead it, it you wish to say anything wml you say win be taken down in wining nnd may be gtvnn in evidence‘ (emphasis added) Fzlellanl IN Pxunsntttunmztoiitius-ttw «wit. s.ii.i nuvthhrwiii be it... M my in. nflninniily MIMI m.i.n y. hriutifl mi 39. The above mles cleany expIaIned |hal a ‘cautmned statement’ should be given Ia the Applmanl wtucn nas not been done Furthen I named mm In: amour takmg Ina ‘Azmracx of Evidence’ Ianed Io campIy wIlh me pnmsmns of ma Iaw under me Third scnedme of Rum 35(2) or me FU1A)163thaIa oertiflcate needs In be anached lo ma 'Abs|racI at Evmenoe‘ alter I| has been handed Ie the accused. The Tmrd Schedule svates that: .94 (III! I I-anwnan.-Iun-I av smear Irwmrvw It} an day «:4 19 nmnd In In. mu-a (number/link/namelu |uI umev dasutvhun at The accused} 3 (opy M In- zbslunt Mlvifllncl lilillllfl In hlm dated as Day E, «v ma duly undonnd hlm In ncmrdllwv mm mu nuns of Pmcadures um arm that {on me dly av w as aumea be nuke ma man the sl.alemen| wmm IS mama: and atudusd to Tm: oenmcate) the am not make a .m.m.nII mu acaaea submuloa mlunanu M Ivtfluncs my me deteme men are marked (respeuwem and altaavad In nus unmcsm (empnass addedh AD In View ov me suave me Apphcant has been nlwudxcsd when no copy at me ‘Abstract of Ewdence‘ was handed over In mm Tne Am Raspnnderlt aIso has an obhgatmn lo auwse MeJar we Azuma [0 hand over the statement onhe mnasses Ia me AnpIIcanI which me 4"‘ Respondent «awed to do so 41 Tneratora. I mew that Isms Io hand over (ha slalement oven the wunesses In the Applicant would cause Ingustlce to the Apyhcant and I behave lha| they are not Ina! any wunesses mu an Important and material witnesses II produced he unfavourabte to the pmsecunon Iaesponaenrsy use 42 Based on the reasons stated above, |hIs noun Is at the vIew that the failure ov me 4'" Respandent to appoint a competent otfioer and Io advlse the ntfioer |0 Inflow prune! rules and procedures has caused detects and gaps In the Invashgalion (:7 the charges made In accordance mm rule as of ms PU(AI 183 ms has resulted In the Apphcanl being prejudiced and has caused subslarmal Injustice In his nghls due ID the failure on the pan 0' |hB 4'” Respondent. has I3 ma m Pu:-:sDInun*1<3I0m:Iusnvvw «mm. Sum! nmhnrwm .. I... e may he nrtmruflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl nFIuNa mm rtie 4'- Respondent lstne person ttiat issund tlie unit standing order No. 51 and Perlntaili oporael aeniing zen utarn KTJ e Brlqud slrl 212021 (S-ktor OP KOTA BRAVUICMARLIEIDELTA DAN FAGAR 11) burlnflkh t1.3.2ll21 di peionggiin 3c (19) and istne same person wtio Invutlgnhd ttie charges against trio Applicant. 4: it is to be noted tnat standing Order No 57 and Penntan operasi aenleng zen ulare Km 5 Bnged sin Z/202i lselrtor OF KOTA BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA DAN PAGAR ii) herlarikh 17 3 2021 at paragrapn 3 c its) ere orders tnat have been inside and signed by tne mt Respcrldenl The esiienee at trie onarge is related to tne Iiwilraverilrig ofa standing order‘ in wnioli rt was issued by tne 4'” Respondent untertiinalely, tne 4'" Respondem was also directly involved in tne lnVeslIga|inrl oi a enarge against tne Applieani 44 in tnis particular case, tne 4"‘ Respondent nas decided tliat me Applicant be reterred to a nigtier eiitliontyto be dealt wiln soniiriarily by tlie Appropriate superior Aulhnnly tam Respondent) The queslion is wtielner tne decision made by tlie 4*" Respondent is lust and ieir sinoe tie nirnselt was tne makev oi me standing order No. 57 and at tne same time was tne person wno investigated tne ptiaige 45 Tnis court 45 ot tne view mat tne 4'-7 Respondent is a rriatenal witness as lie is the iriexer oi tliat partieiilardociirrients. l-te snould nave been present to give evidence as a witness and not a person who investigated tne charge espe ly it is in relation to the content bl tne orders tnat ne prddooed Tnis Dunn believes tnere has been preiudioial to tne Applicant and poeurred e subslanhal iniustiee to him and lt would be biased as tne person issuing tlieae standing orders, is also itie person investigating the oliarge. 46 Based on the Manual oi Armed Forpes Law 1972 tnat is ull ized and iiidieially known by tne Arrned Fonda as a guide on tne understanding and oonduei in be laken idr tne provisions under N2! 77 has stated trial in me event the pornirianding omoer of tne accused was involved in tne investigation prior to a cnarge and ottenee being eelablistied. ltien tne said commanding plrieei atiall not be a itidge in me seidcase. Tlitis. in siieti a soenanotne accused snail be made to be attacned to anptner unit and under enotiier oornrriariding pincer ot tne said o i inno would lnen cake tne responsibility to llwesllgala tne onarge »s.. H at IA IN PK42icSDniUfiGlDR0uslmw “Nair s.n.i mmhnrwlll be ii... a may i... bflnlnallly siiri. dnuuvinnt v.. .nuve Wml 47, The 4'" Respondent snbuld have apnhsd to transfer or attach the Apprrbent to another will for the management ol the erscrprinery case egamt mm se Iha\ ms charge/charges can be tnvasugmed by an rnaeperment Commanding otrreer, In tnrs event me process 01 rusbce can be ecnrevee wrtnout me rntervenbon 01 any parltes as Tnrs Courl rs oflhe vrew met the Applicanl has been prejudteed and mere has been a substenttve vuusltce by the acnons at the 4*- Responaant nrrrrseu as he who Issued lhe starrerng oreer No 57. was also rnvestrgeted the charges egernst the Applicant and subsequently deemed that the Apptrcent shomd be reterred to a mgrrer eutrrbrrty ter summary met me ulurg lumen - elnn mu Appnunt wm dollcllvu. uneleer and unuruin as they 1 d to spccify the d s of are zneged nflences. 49. The Applreertt was charged wttn (W0 (2) changes as lbHows:~ P‘ Charul. Ttdak memamht Permtah Tetap yang bertemanqan dengan seksyen 51 Akta Angkalan Tenlera, 1972, ’Iavlu Ia‘ di kem Sahara‘ Op Eameng Senor Eravo, Padang Tarap, Keflah d1 anvara 13 Apfll hmgga 24 Me! 2021‘ men ermanggar Perlnlih Opsrast Eenleng zbn Ulzra KTJ 5 Bnged Siri 2/2021 (senor or: KOTA BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA DAN PAGAR 11) beflankh 17.3.2021 Gt verenggan 3 4: us), tatlu sualu perintah yang dtkelahulnya Elan dqangka dengan munssabah dlkevahuvnya. dengan tttlak menyerahkarl enam buah mmoslkal rampasan kapada pihak PDRM dengan kadar segeta eeatarr meruadt salu kesatahan‘ 50 The erements :11 me charges |o be proven by the Respondent: are as loI|ows:- a whether me Applreent al sebara Camp‘ at senterrg Op Eravn Sector‘ Padang Terapr Kedah between 13A2D21 untrl 24.5.2021‘ had fafled to rrrrrnearetely surrender 6 seized momrcydes te PDRM. (Sama ada dl kem serrere, op Benleng Sekwr Brave, Padang Temp. Kadah at antere 13 Apnl rungga 24 Met 2021, pemohon mass: 1. IN Pkg-:sDmu-rzstonaumrw «we. smut ...n.rwrr r. b... m my r... bflmnnflly mm: m.r.n Vfl mum WM lelan lloak menyerankan enani buah malaslkal rainpasan kepada Dlhak PDRM dengan kadar segera) b whether me Applicant has eonlraveneo aenleng ops order Ncnh zone KTJ 5 Bnged Sm 2/zazl (senior OP KOTA BRAVO/CHARUE/DELTA DAN FAGAR :1) daled 17 3 2021 at pavagraph 3 e (19); ano (same eoe Pemenon lelan rnelangger Pennlen cpereai Benlerlg zen Ulaia Km 6 Brigeo sin 2/2021 (Seklor OP KOTA ERAVOICHARLIE/DELTA DAN FAGAR 11) benankh 17.3 2021 dl peranggan 3 ::119), man a wneiner ine order was known in mm or mlghl reasonanly be expecieo lo know by him lsarna aaa pennlah lersebul adalah sualu oennlan yang dlkelahulnya a|au duangkan dengln munasabah dlketahul olennyal rim Elernoni omia Firsl chemo. 51 l find met me 3'“ and 4"‘ Resoondenls have ened WI law and laci wnen «alien to prove and exp am one 6 motorcycles that are releneo no as “lulled lo be hlnded over in PDRM" The charges inrpoeeo have not specifically slaieo me Applicant‘: lnvolvsmenl wiln Iris 5 motorcycles 52, There was no dlrec| involvemenl oi me Applicant and no chain oi evioenoe lnai linked me Applicanl Wl|h lne mmamycles as charged. Further, I nno lnai lne vehicles in queslion were no: brought belore me 4'“ Resporlderll lor ioenlrncalion and as evidence of lhe aflenoe oornmllied. second Element 0! Ihe Firs! charge. 53. me 3" and 4' Respanoenls lailed ta produce any evidence balms mum to prove inel lne Standing Orders in me enarge as in Exh ».......ru rn Pxunsnmuwslonoumvw “Nair s.n.1...n.rvn... UIQG M my r... nrwlrullly mm: m.1.n Vfl .nuvo mi 55 57 58. MH-4 onrra “Afidavit Jawapan (1) Respcnden" dated 29.6.2022 rs rne vahd srandrng orders. Yhe 4* Respondent rn his “Afidavll Jawapan (3) Responden” daned 14.7 2022 paragrapn 7 Sam that it Is a vand order as there rs a deregacron ol power gwan by me crnev 07 Army re aH ma Commanding omeers mcmding mm m make and mi |he sranding order as slaled m Exnmn MH-6 -Andavn Jawapan (5) Responden»Raspundan'da(ad 13 1 2e23, However, dunng me rnvesugauan cl charges by me 4*" Respondent and summary proceeding oerora ma av Rospondanl. I rrnd born Respondents Vailed to produce and no ewdenoe hefnve men. scared mar mere was such delegauon at power. A! lha| malena! unre when are Apphcanl was need by me aw Rsrpondsrn, a| nu «me such Iellsr was produced as an evrdenue Further. mere was no wnness called In give a s|av.emen( rega g the leller on the olherhami, me 3"‘ Respondent m Pavagraph 6 oihls “Afidavll Jawapan (7) Raspondenmsponden" dated 191 2023 argued lhat mare Is no requrrsrnann undcr rne raw ragavdmg me de\egsI\on cl power by me cnreiomnny to make and pubhsh me Slandmg oresr need «o be produoed m ore neanng rarn at me vrew that 511109 the ‘vrowamon o1 srand-ng Order Is one at me Imponanl elements m the charge and semen 51(3)01Ac( 77 eleany shared than mere shall he a deregauon oi power. mererore, ll rs rnsurnhem on me 3” Respondent to prove that such ‘permtah camp‘ is a valid perimah sacnon 5113) MAC! 77 prcnndes (1131 r3) me nirvdlnu erd-rs or mmlne orders deseneed vn ermaearon :2) may he — (a7 made or and my puhllshld in wear manner As nny nu dolnnninlu ny, ms Svvlcn ohm «or Inch Slrvlcl or my nlllcu nulhorbld try him. (emphasis added) On uns rssue, I nave decndsd in Suhairi Ahu Kuslm v. Majlis Angk-un Tonuu umyn. a. Anor 1202:] 5 MLRH :49; [2023] AMEJ 0945; [2023] muu man: [2023] I LNS 912 as 1onows:- rue n M u rn Pxrz-csnrnumzsmnounvvw “Nana s.n.r nuvwhnrwm .. med w my r... nrW\n|U|:I mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war [471 “The sw prosecumn Minus, Kant Noor Farah emu Mend Saad w my em-nu duflng the Summary 7...: ma made a statement Ina! Ihe Svsndmg Omar had been my uubnme on the team‘: men men m. sand as mum . Vsm man flibevl kuu unuuk m-nanflalangnni Puimzh Bahaullu mum. mu m u m: zoza an wza yum mu-en rn-ngqnll Ilnnqan kgsalahan m-mun didah am mun, Yum. P-rinlzll ‘Imp nu al um. :11 plan: myuun puukln. Adam: memam langgungjawab sehan peqawm am anggma mink memhaca sens memamm Penman (menu! [as] Based m pamgmphs as and 47 abuve. n .5 uearlhal KIpXNoor man mun Mnhfl Sud only mnnflonld Pcvlnuh v-up um an m u an Pam K nralaan". the nu nun who we h me aumomy w publllh mu Sllndlnu om» mm pan Knnymzn‘? She never see that Penman Telap mi msmrkin m papal: kenyzwan sebngnvmin: marahkan dan/alau umenlukan oleh Kenna pemmmexerr or any umer Wu |o lhaleflun [491 am. mm. wurl were to map: um Ll Km mm mm. Nussm ms me semce cw em each Semce or any amcer aumonzed Dy her, In such mam. wu lflduufl buluvv lho Summlvy mu and/arlwlon nus mm to um. mat on Slandlnu om. wll Iulaliurwd In such : m.Innu(1n am: can an m. hum‘: -mm aura) as demrrnimd by Lt Kol Allllu hlml Nu {sm The fiasporvdems suhrvm mu Ihe Anpllnlnl w fllavnd m cm" Ixammlfl the pemcuum. wilnnss mum.“ um um um pm any qunilon or men mum nu em Ilnlnmnnt |51] Hwaver, Ihls mm: mm. vluwlhalme veq m-nzotumu-51 av m 71 - quuuen of Iiw. "union. on burdln Is an Ant Rulxwndulls co esueusn a pri . fame against the An m by . dunlng .u my nluvlnldach In mum. lngndllnll Mme chum umu semen 51 01 MI 11 luv: bun ulibllslud against me Appllclnl m m. Summlry nu: bclare nu Aypllclnl an bu Ionnd qnllly by me 2- R-lpondlnl” (emphasis added) 59 Based on Ihe above. u Is Impoffinl lorlhe am and 4” Respondents Io ensure max mere was such demgauon ml pawer gwen by me some Chiefto the Commandmg omoer empower them to make and pubhsh me sam Standing Order before mm dunng me mvesugahun of charges were summenzy aeanng mm me case can he proceeded mm and m is me 3” Reeponaem respunsibilfly of bum me u m u sm W42-csnmumzsmnoumvw «we. smm ...m.mm e. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ms! Respondents tn ensure this document to be tendered as an evtdenoe so. Theretere, I am ot the vtaw that ll was an aflenhottght ot the Respondent: when tl was onty attached by the 4' Respondent afler II was argued and -rose by the Appttcent tn Paragraph 15(a) of Enctosure 3 61 Added to that, t nouoed that there were he person who gavo a statement regardng the Startdmg orders and no eenmcete was produced purpo ng to be stgned by the A“ Respondent euthonsed any person to glue evtdenee regardtng the content at the sunorng order 62. Seclmn tstte) 54 Act 77 states as tottows.- “tsttat A aetItftca|e purpcrltttg In he srghed by . persons comrrtaltdtw etneer ur Iny emur etrtnens-d by mm in ntva the eertrheate, Ind nature the cements at pretany part at slartdtng orders ererher mulme man: are eonnnutnp nnhnu maul «or- (.1) any Vomtatttan or unit or body at hoops (b) any mmnwvfl rrroher eree. slatrnn. gamwrt orpraoe rer snyshtp at rater esreerrshrnerrt, or to! anytmrrtoratruafl smtt W prpmdrnp epetnsr the aim vlnnrt M menu M the matters stated tn Ihe cemfntatr 63 Having perused the evtdenoe produwd Debra the Court. I find that there was no Such oemficale produced durtng the rnvesttgatton ot the charges by the 4'" Respondent empowers any person to gtve evtdenoe before htrn wrth regards to the satd Slandtng orders. Third Et-mum omtn First charge 64. Thus court finds that the 3'“ and 4"‘ Respondents have vetted te pmve that these standtng Orders are orders that the Apptrcant etreedy knew or rensonepty expected to know. There was no evidence that the Appltcartl knew about the orders as there was no but I! M n rn Pxu-ssnmuntstontztumvw “Nair smut luvthhrwm e. t... e may r... mn.r-r enn. dnuavtml vn .nune p-mxt evtdenee produced beiore the 3"’ Respondent drtne 4'” Respondent that he has read rt and in these standing Orders ts wttnin nts hnowtedga. ss rttts court ts or the vtsw that there shall be evtdenee tzetore both Respondents to prove that the Apphcant knows adorn the standtng orders orreasonably sttdutd know such standtng orders Hawever, there was no evidence to corroborate the statement made by Ihe1" Respnndem (paragraph 5.6 Afidavtl Jawaoan (I) Responden- Responden dated 29.5.2022) tn wntat stated that Penyetta Rtstk aatahon Ket RRD had dettvered Pertmah Operas: 2 and Penntah No 57 to all me operafinnal post wtttt the ourme lo be displayed at the notree board 55 Furlhert t ttnd that rt ts not arudant that an oper ' at order wttt oa plaoed on the nollce board because tn theanned toroes, ooerattonal erder ts a classtrred as “SECRET documenl and ontytnose who are aulhortsed have access to the documents. It wodtd be awkward rt the documents could be dtsptayed en the nottce board. Tneretore, I am ottne vtew that the 32 and 4“ Respondents cdutd not make any assumphon by saying that the Aopttaant snadtd know tne standtng order wt|houl any evtdenee brought betore hunt. 2- charge. max rnernatunt Pennlah Tetap yang oenentangan dengan Seksyerl 5| Akta Angkelen Tenlers I972. “tatluy A3 at Kent Sahara, OD aenteng Sektor Bravo‘ Padangterap, Kedatt pada t7 Met 2u2t, tant leblh kuvang 1915 tetan melanggar Pertnlah recap No. 57 Keselamatan Operas! Markis Takltkal Batatinn Kaempal Reumen Renter Dtrija oenarikh 3 Aont 2021, tatm suatu pertntart yang dtketahutnya atau dttangxa dengan munasabah dtkeiahutnya. dengan msmbenarkan orang swam memasuki Kam Sahara adalah msnyadt salu kesalahani 67. The elements to be proven by trte Respondents are as loHows:— a whether the Appttcant at Kem sanara. op aenteng Seklor Bravo, Padang Terap, Kedah on 1752021, at 1915M, trad attowed the ctvtttan to enter sanara namp. (Sams ada dt Kern Saharat Op senteng sektor Erato Padang Terap, Kedah pada I7 5.2o2t, jatn teotn Kurang tats Femahon tetatt rnentoenarkan orang swam ntentaautn Kant snarat o... 10 al In rn Pxu-=SDmLlM1G\0R0unww “Nair s.tt.t mmhnrwm be t... a may t... mtn.tt-y mt. dnuumnl Vfl artuttfl v-mat Judqmunl Imroduciion 1 The Applmanl filed an application for ]udIc1a\ renew (Enclosun 7) undev Order 5: MIN: Runes of coun 2012 (R00). 2. Tne Appncanc was granted weave to apply (or ]ut1|cia\ review against the Respanflems to seek the following ranava — 2, sanawa Femahon diben kebenaran d1 bawah Amrin 53 Kaedah 3(2) Kaedan-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 un|uk memahon saw Semakan Kehaklman temaflap kepulusan Responden Panama lam: Mams Angkatan Tenlera yang msnolak permuhcnan ulangkaji bemrikh 25.1.2022 yang barsangkulan dangan kapmusan berssllh den hukuman ‘Amavan Keras" yang Ielah mxenaxan ke avas Pemuhun pnaa 1752021 sena man mberhenlikxn aanpaaa perkhldmatan dan seterusnya dlbatalkan lauhah berkual kuasa pada 1011,2021: 22 Eahawa Pemohan diben kebeniran unluk memchun sllu Pennuh Oemoran unluk membatalkan Kspuxusan R:-suonden Panama lersebut 23, Banawa Pemanon amen kebenavan unluk memohon sam Deklarasw banawa Kepunusan Responden Perlama Iersebul admah salah unaang-unaang. bans! flan ndak ssh, 2.4. Eahawa Pemohun diben kebenaran unluk memohon satu Fennlah hagw Respondsn-Responden membayir sennula gqi dan xmbuharwmbuhan yang smvapamya dnennna oleh Femohon bennula nan 1ankn Femnhan mbernemikan danpadi perklwimalan Aaflu pads 1011 2021 semngga ke tankh «amen perkrndmaxan Pemahon pada 17.2.2039. 25. Eahawa Famohun amen kehanaran unluk memonon aam Penmah bani Raspondeniespondsn membayav kepada Pemohnn apa-apa caeaan. pencen perkmdmalan den gamsran perkrudmalsn yang Pemonan aenamanya 1ayak pamxem sons suai manlaat dvbankan kepada Pemohcn »...mu m Pnznsnmumzmonaumvw «mm. Snr1|\nmhnrw\HI>e 0.... 1. my 1... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl y. muNa M1 b. whether the act of me Apolicani conlravene Pennlah ‘relap No 57 Keselamlln Opevasl Markas Takzikal ealalion Keeinpal Reiirnen Renier Dlraja daled 3 4.2021: and lsarne ada Pamchon lelan melanggar Pennlan Telap No 57 Keselamatarl operasi Marks: Tukllkal Bauillon Keempal Rejimen Rerijer Enraia benankh 8 4.2021), den i: wnelner lne order was known lo nini or rnlghl reasonably oe exoecled lo know by iiini (same side pennlan lemebut adeian slAa|u pennran yang dlkelahuinya alau duangka dengan munasabah dikelaliuinya i Fivsl Elomnnl of in. Second cnergo. on lain oi me view inai me 3"’ and 4'" Respondenls were erred in iacl and law when larled lo esiablisn any evidence slallng who me civilians rnenliened in me onarge nave been allowed by ine Anpllcant lo enler the sanara camp 69. I nnd th-3| me mle in me slariding order No 57. Keselarnauin uoerasi, ‘FENCEGAHANN ine olfence regarding ‘memhenarkari drang awam mernasukl Kem Sahara" IS under me sub-looic ol paragrepn 3 a “Ancaman Ks eiae Irldlvldu“ m I agree willi lne Appllcarlfs suhmiss n lnal lriis oionioilion only exls|s wnen lnere is a inreai lo an ivldual Tne queslion is wnelrier lnere rs a lrireai lo any individual lha| allows soon prdhioilion lo lake eNec|7 I find lnal mere was no evidence oeiore me 3'" and 4'" Respondents io prove lnai lnere was such a inreai Sncand Elnrmnl ul «no second Cllllgl. 71 Tnie issue has baeri dieeuesed in lnie iudgrneni in paragraphs 53 no as aoove »...u an rn Plqzicsnrnuemslonoumiw «wn. a.n.i nuvihnrwlll n. in... a may in. niriniirr MVMI dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNfl mi Third Elnmum 95 the second Chargl 72 The 3" and 4*" Respondents had tailed to prove that thte standtng order is an order that the Appttcartt atteady knew or rsasenaety expected to knew. There ts no evtdence that the Apphcam knew about this order because no evtdertce was produced before the 3" Respondent that he had read it and the Slandmg order ts wtthtn hts knowtedge 73. There shau be evtdence belore the 3“ Respondent to prove that me Aopttcant knows about the standtrtg Ovdar or reasonattty sndutd know such a stattdtng order. The 3'“ Respondent ooutd not make arty assttrnptton by sawtg that the Appltcanl should know the startdtng Order wtthdut any prod: before ttttn 74. Based on the above, thts Cnurl ts ot the considered optnton that a proper procedure must be adhered In tn such a preceadtrtg tn order tar tatrrtess to he upheld and no such sutastanttal tntusttce ts occurred upon the accused 75 I find suppan tn my mew by teterrtttq to the case at Molar Fadxll Annad V. Mallis Angkalan ventent, uataysta 3. Ann! [mo] 3 MLRH 1|'l: [21111] 4 CLJ 330 where Mohamad Zlwiwt SBHBII. J [is he then was) netd as icHows'- [44] utanttartnn mart tnetnetnkan bahiw: dllam stntast rarterttt. Sunlkxn K-ha In hmadip keatmtsan rang mellhalllan h:|—hi| truenmtun . h mt ktttk Iupldn SIIIII .n KIIIIKIIIIIII. tntsatnya, “whim IM nctiam by anttea lumu lII.II m VIOIIIIVI at tmtr own rugtttattens er bvyonfl Imlr peuers ate mtttttn the reach em. Court“ Mahkatttatt tug. trtenetkttrat eartawe aade teztrnrty. ‘ma ant ceun ate not one a artdes wtttch mus1 delelmlne the grease eetartee td be struck tn tn dttnttnant bclwnen ‘ngh|0I man‘ and the demand etdtsetptttte nrtd duty ul armed tetces rttetnoere natatn rttasa yang Sama Mahkarttan rttertyataurt blhnwa d-tent tn. kutnkan btmlhlcaranyu. pcmhull k-putuurt dauttt hal-HIII kmrmrun rt-ttdakutt tn-ngatttetndra sennta laklm ynnc vehvm den nllmlluhl eveudttr y-MI bflnl dun Id (smphasts added) u... u am am PK42-cSDmUflG\DR0unww “Nair s.r.t mmhnrwm be mad M my t... nflmhnflly MVMI dnuumrtl Vfl nF\uNG vtmxt Conclusion 76. Prenused on me atoresam reasons, mus Oourl is of ma mew that me deasmn or Respcndenvs Is (amted wan me ermr of law and/or Irvalionalfly and/or unreasunatfleness that wlrvams the mcarvarmon Mlhrs Oourl. 77 Since my de an 15 based on |he abova xssues/gmunds‘ Iwill not address the vemaimng wssues/gmunds raised by the Anplncanl 79 As such‘ we Appncanrs applieauon In: a judlclal review (Encrasure 7) Is allowed wmu cos|s ov RM5.000.00 wdnn-A lhe allccalof lee. Dated: 0? January 2024 /K/x/V\ Ahmad Kama} hm Md Shahrd Judge High court Kuals Lumpur nn 1; .m m Pxunsnmunvmonoumvw «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! counsels For the Appncam: Encxk Zamunn bun Mam Dam (Enctk Fadzwl Noor a Anas and Encik Vusman bun Che Aman mm mm) Te(uen Fem Moor A Associates Peguambela a Peguamcala No 25, Jalan Sen Pulra 3/E‘ Eandav Sen Pmra. 43000 Kauang‘ Selangor Dam Ehsan Far (he Respondents’ Puan NIH lrmarwatxe NDEIAC1 Semor Federal Counsel Jabalan Peguam Negara‘ Bahagwan Gunman‘ Na 45. Persnavan Perdana, Frasml 4‘ 62100 Pulrajaya. Duo 1. will m PK;z-csnmummwobiausmw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! semngga ke lankh carnan perknrdrnanan Pernonon lanpa kehflangan kekanunan pangkal dan kmslrmewaan. 2.6 Banawa Pemahon fllberi Kebenamn unluk rnerndndn saxu Penman agar Femnan menenma penganugerahan semula xaunan yang lalah naunkan dan dlbenaman menggunakan gelaran pangkaIMei - 2.7. Kos; dan 2 3 Rennem lam darn selarumnya yang Mahkamah yang Mulia mi Aangguu palm dwpennlahkan. 3 m essence, the Appncaru filed mis judicial Iewew var a Cemomri Order In mvlew xne deasion and/at rooommendahon dated 31 01.2022 by me Mania Angkatan Tenlera (mm (1“Responden(j and lo quasn the sand decisrpn made by me MAT to mamxarn the mrnmanon of me Applmanfs same and man mere ware no wegularny and/or impropriety In the nraosdurls of the as’ Respondent as me Appmpnale Supenar Aunnoruy dunng me summary heanng (‘Perbltalaan Terus‘) and me 4*" Respondent‘ as me Commanding Offioer durmg the invasligatmn at charges mat was new agamsl me Applicant, whmh the Appncam alleged supsxamial Jrqusime In rum. 4. This judxclal review appncandn No‘ WA«2§—163v03/2022 (JR163) is mad |u he heard xogsnner mm .u ' al mnew appncanm Na‘ WA- 25-154-os/2o22 (JR 154) and ,u ma: Ievxew appucaudn Np: WA- 25.1a5—o3/2c22) (JR ms). 5 After the heanng‘ 4 auawed me ApphcanIs' appncanon -n JR 163 mgemer wun JR 154 and JR 165. s Dissatisfied mm (he deal ans, the Respondancs 17‘ JR 1&3, JR 16A and JR 165 med an appeal. ms judgment enntalns me run reasons tar my JR 133 decisxon, The grounds -mudgnrann lav JR Isa and JR I65 wrll be planned separamy from Ims wdgrnenx vuudln m Pxgzuusnrnumzmonausmw «mm. s.nn nunhnrwm .. d... a may he RVWWMUIY -mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa WM Brie: Facts 7 The brlel lacls gathered mm the cause papers are largely unarsnulea and can be summanzed as follows - 7 1 The Anpllcanl IS a former Army Offioer ll'| me Royal Ranger Reglmerll Carps wilh We rank 01 Majar who commenced servloe on 6 52005. laelore being dlschalged (mm servlce, lne Applicant held a posl n as the Head ol Company A and was responsible ler aravo Sector MK Yak Kern Sahara 7 2 on 17.6.2021. lne Appllcanl was charged with lnree (03; ollerroes and was subsequenlly dealt wlln dlrectly by me 3"’ Rasparldenl He was |i|Br found guilly on (W0 (02) charges and sentenced lo a severe Reprlmarld (Amaran Karasl He was lunherdlschalged lrorn sennee under Rule 42(2)[g)am1 41(2) of the Rules of Avmed Forces (Terms of Service) 201 3 with efiectfmm 10.11 2021 Thu Law 5 Judlolal Review IS generally concerned wlln the declsion making process wnere me lmpugned declslorl ls llewsa on me gvound ol uvocedural lmpraprlaly. 9. Hawever, the law nas new developed to allow a aeuslcn In {as challengad on grmmds nl lllsgillly and lrrzllanallly. wnlen men pennlls me Courts to scrullnlze me decislon not only lorlne process, bul also lor suuslanoe. 10. ll ls settled law than me Hlgh Cuurl will not lnlerlere Mm a aeclslon olthe Respondents unless ll can be establlshed mal me aeclslon ls irlladad wllh errors or law 11 The meanlng olenuv of law has also been explalrled by me Cnurl nl Appeal ln me case cl Syulkat Kenduraan Muluyn Kelanlan Elld V. Trlmpon Wovklr: Union [1935] 1 MLRA 26!; [1995] 2 CLJ 14a; [ms] 2 um um; [1995] 2 MLJ :17 VI lne lnllowlng words. we s all! IN Pxlmsnmummlonaumrw «wn. Smnl nuvlhnrwlll be LAIQ4 m may he nflnlnnllly Mlhln dnuuvlnnl wa mulls ml n feasible nor duivlbll Io altumpl. In nxruunllwo dlllnlllan or maumx c. . rwr am new, my me camqnnes at such in urmv . not doses. am II mly n ald man an em no I». would ho manna um- uucmavwnlku nu hlmnll mu wrong qunllnn 91 «me lmn Icconnl lrnlwam can union: nv omits In ukn Inn: lccmml mmm can-aumuons (what may be mnvemermy |ermed an Amummc errm) L)! w M mimn-uuu um mm. 91 my rllnunl -unm. or mluppllcl nr mlsslnml pvlnup 0100: general In.” lemvhasls added] 12 Smulariy‘ m lhe v. Cal (5) Hurblnl slngn c ngar ugh [zonal 1 MLRA 664; [zonal I CLJ 17. Ihe com cl Appeal Held than an ermneous mverence av (acts V5 am an error al law wmcn womd warram an order of cemman — ~on the mm mm. wl Iccep(,5loaursn,Ihav1xns enuruly mmpelanl for In Hwgh Com m ceniman prucsedlngs m disagree wmh Ihe lnflusmal Count on he mnduslans ov mrmms drawn by me mm lvom Inn pmvad or summed mmoe on me ground max no mnsvnahh tribune! wmlafly czrcumslanced would have amved at such a wnc\us\an or drawn such an mfevence An ummoul inilunun mm prvwd or Idmlnnd men n Irmr M llw; nm In urmr nflan." (emphasus added) 13 Band on the foregoing passages, VI IS my vvsw |ha| to succeed m an appncaunn fol ;udic\a\ review, the Applicant musl Shaw that the Respondents had, among others. a Asked nselfthe wrong queslians. I) considered Welevam mauers, 2 Failed m ocnsmer relevant maners: :4 Failed to awry the proper pm.a'pAe1s) of law: andlor e Reached - daemon man was so perverse mat no reasonable mbunal under Ilarcircumslanoes womd have reached it. »...s..m sm Ptqmsnmuumsmnaumvw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! The Applicant‘; qi-minds Idrtha iud review 14 tn gist, the Applicant‘: application herein is based on the following grounds.- 14 1 That the investigatiptt at charges by the 4“ Respondent is ptocedurally vlawed, biased and has resulted in a tailure cl iuatioe (aj Failure to conduct a Proper Investigation at energies. 14 2 That the ‘Abstract :21 Evidence’ was defective and not in accordance wllh the rule. (a) ‘me Abstract at Evidence‘ was conducted witndut tne Applicants knowledge. (I2) Failure tn give a copy oflhe ‘Abstract or Evidence‘ and No cautioned statement been administered during tne nandina over of the ‘Abslracl of Evidence‘ 14.3. ‘ms 4'" Respondent is the person that issued tne unit standing order No. 57 and Perintan operas. Eertlang zcn utara KTJ 6 Bnged Siri 2/2021 tseldnr op KDTA BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA DAN PAGAR 11 ) benankh 17 :1 2021 di perenggan 3c (19) and is the same person who investigated the charges against lne Applicant. 14.4 The 3“ Respondent nad erred in suhmllllrlg cnly a copy at the cnarge Repofl instead cl the charge sheet 14 5 The charges trained against trie Applluanl were detective, unclear and uncertain as they tailed la specify the details ol tne alleged ottences me 7 cl ll ru PKpI=SDmLlfiGl0R0Ltnww “Nair s.r.i nurlhnrwm .. UIQG M my i... nflnlnnllly mi. m.i.n. Vfl nFluNfl mi Hts dcclslon omre court ‘nut the vastignion of chamos by tho 4"‘ Rlrspondunt Ii procouur-Ity flawod. bland and has multso In a vanure at lusllu. (a) Failure to conduct at Proper Investigation ol Charges. 15. Havvng perused the relevant cause papers, I find mat the 4"- Respondenl nas (arise to Gummy wrtn tne mandalury pfovvslon ot Sechon 95 of the Armed Forces Ac! 1972 (M)! 77) when he faflad to bnng the Apphcanl before mm to be inveslxgated [or the charges agatnsl mm as provided under Rule 33(1) 07 the RMES 01 Procedure or me Armed Forces 1MvIrIary Cmm) ms (PU(A)1S3). 15 sectron 95 arm 77 reads as (allows.- trmsrrg-norr at enaroes bycxxnminfllnu Olllcus “Beflnre an auaganorr agamsl a person subpecl |o servtue raw undlrlms An Utaremaller relerved tu as ‘the accused rrat It: has cnmmtfled an muss a::ms| my Dmvmnn M Ihxs Part VI hmrtlr vmceoded wrtn ma aflegahort srrsu be reported m are term 0! a change. In true accused s cammnndma omoar, and Inn mmrnlndmg mliur shun Vrwnshgnla ma marge In me nrescnbed manner 17 ’\n the prescnbed manrtet’ rs provroea urvdev rule 33(1) at the ‘PU(A)163'aslolIt1w3‘— 3: (1) Subject to paragranhs tar and an Mum a ourrrrnarrairra uficnr wwsstlgates a charge It: strau nrst read out ano, n nacsssaryr Pxmatn ms charul (0 ma lacuna Ind 1It:IHhan- (a) hunting avosrre. Mmselhn aecmaanoa wtln mm :4. or (0) cause Ine evwdalwe In be reduced In wnurrrr In accordance wI|h parsurlrm 121 and raaa and cutmdu rt 15. Based on tne above, the rule rnanoateo the 4“ Respondent we read out the charge and explarn trra charge to \he Aopncant. I find ms 4'" Respcndenl fafled Io rnionn me Appttcanl :71 me rnettrnd or mvestrgauon (ha! he wHI he mnducling. vuualn r~ Pxu-asnrnumzswonousmw “None sarm mmhnrwm .. U... a may r... oflmruflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl .mra war 19. 20. 2t 22. 23. 24. 25. Based prr the evmanca presented before the cum, I find lhal the invesugalton at the charges has nsvet been conducted wmcrt raqmras the Applicant to appear more the A“ Rasponaartt. ma Appttcant was only bmughl betara ma 4' Responnartt on 25.5.2021 but t find true 4“ Raspanaant WI paragraph 7 of ma ‘Afldavll Jawapan (5; Responden-Responden dated 13.1.2023 ctatmea mat N was tor the purpose at both the tnvesligallon at an attanca and the Invesfigaflon at a crurge On mis issue, I agree wrtn |he Appltranfs oontentton lha| what Iransptmd on ma ma|enal dale was that ma Appttunt was brought betora ma 4“ Respondent mm the purpose to detatn the Appncartt under close arrest tor lurther investigation by trta “Cawangan stasatan Jenayah" 5: sIa|sd rn Paragruph 3(c]. Fan (at, Charge Report dated 25.5.zo2t Exhtbrl ‘MRM»3' Enclosure 3 wmch states LhaL 3 Psmapat ta) Sldlluduh dtlahin/dlmtuk untuk Itlsalnn Vlnml Funhar, tn Par: 3.b.(2j '5\]t| Pembemahuan Dttalekkan DI Dalam Tangkapan RaptlLonggar D. Bawah Kaedah ts PU(A) 153- Exhtbtt MRM—4 pt Enclosure 3 dated t4.3.2n22 states 12; tmtuk msvtdapzlkan huktt-buktt tambahzn berkntlnn matanart den Dflmlfluhan ruastn unlam stasatan cs: kernna mluk mandapalkan kelerangan Varttm bemenazn kus“ Paragraph 4 ullhe sate ‘mm’ atsp stated by me 4* Respondent that: 4. ‘memznggtt dart memaklumkzn kepma anqwla yang nrrangtap sepgrlt dlkmandakt filth pumntukan Kama» V! xxn um mm mm PU(A7163 ' It is (0 be noted under |ha Armed Forces legal system. that the mvasugatton of an oflence and an mvesttgaltcn ova charge are two dlflemnl types at Invesligallon. A persnn who is alleged to have suspected or have cummtlled an oflenoe, an arrest may be made against mm under Sections 93 and 94 at Am 77 uamam r~ Pxunsnmuummonoumrw «mm. amt luvthnrwm .. U... a may r... mm-y mm: mm. VI mum v-mat 25 The procedure or arrest has been described under Rule 13 of me PU(A)163 wmcn appears to be when a person rs waned under arose arrest. 27 Rme rem) oi the FU1A)153 slates that — (27 rnrorrn (hp arraslrm person vmelmr na rs unde( chase or oven arresm my rnronn me ensued nelson Mme reason oorwncrr he rs uneer arreu. (c) nnnumamy defivev me lrvlflad psrwn In a plume er cuslady, and 4-1) anum In In person lnlo whnl cuncdy an. Ir-wllod mum in cnmmllted ar an Iimn or anus! or within Ivanty-lnur hours lhonnfur . copy or a mam Ieporl pwvldnd um I! no such chum: upon II nmenm, rm plnon irru wmu nuswfiy on nrr-mu pmnn II unnrnnrea will nporllhe tlmumxlxnuis Io me eonrnrannxng Mfiuv with will. of cnnllrluud mm flan nul lppolr lo bu Juullllnd. on: can release Mun urulhd vlvsm without prviudlce Do ms reamsr (empnasrs added) 29 In me m|(an| case, a charge repon under rule «am; an me PU(A)163 has been issued and me Avpficam has been bmugm before the cornrnenarrrg omeer. However, I find that the pnrpese (or me Applvcam berng nraugrrr oerore me 4'" Responaem rs la de|errmne wrremerme Aaplrearn will oonllnuela be aecarned under dose anus! as sIa|sd under rule 13 of me PU1A)163 wrncrr 45 me reason lor being lunherdariamed undarzflase arresr or released «mm me said arres| 29. The 4"‘ Respondent Chase Xhal the Applxcarw be Iurlher flelamed under close arrest wnn the purpose of furlher rrweanganan by me ‘Cawangan Siasatan Jenayah' as VI appears that the Invesmg cannot be completed wwmm 24 hours. Therefore, a ‘$1 I Pemheniahuan“ was Issued by lhe 4" Respondent according ro MB 13 of me PU(AjI$3 so As to ma mveshgaunn 0! a charge, rr aner me rnvss|Ig|I\on Man offence Is commuted, me nexr srep rs «or me cawangan srasaoan Jenayan Io repm in me Commanding omcer me result of me rnvesngamorr and me Oommandmg omcer as pmvldud under Sec1mn 95 av Act 77 under me we :71 “Summary D1spL)sa\ oi Charges’ snau he brought the accused belors rnrn lor further rnvesugara by way of mveslrgahm oi a charge N the finding :4 me uaxuoaru r~ Pxunsnmuummonoumrw «we. snrm mmhnrwm n. med m my r... mn.u-y mm: mmn Vfl mum war

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24C-134-08/2023

PEMOHON BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD RESPONDEN MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD

There are merits in Bauer’s claims in the ongoing arbitral proceedings - Whether Meridian is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum if the arbitration proceedings concludes in Bauer’s favor

02/01/2024

YA Dato' Hajah Aliza binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=228c0b75-c80c-4f0b-8f53-e196e2dea01b&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-123-08/2023 BETWEEN MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD (Company No.: 530788-P) ... PLAINTIFF AND BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD (Company No.: 121194-X) ... DEFENDANT (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-134-08/2023 BETWEEN BAUER (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD (Company No.: 121194-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND MERIDIAN CONTRACTS SDN BHD (Company No.: 530788-P) ... DEFENDANT 02/01/2024 12:14:56 WA-24C-134-08/2023 Kand. 23 S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Unlike the majority of suits pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] (‘CIPAA’) which are heard together in this Court, these suits concern the applications by – (a) Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd (‘Meridian’) pursuant to s 28 CIPAA in Originating Summons No. WA-24C-123-08/2023 (‘O.S. No. 123’) to enforce the third Adjudication Decision dated 17.7.2023 (‘3rd AD’) by the third learned Adjudicator, Mr. Winston Ng Peng Cheang (‘3rd Adjudicator’) (‘Enforcement Application’); and (b) Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (‘Bauer’) pursuant to s 16 CIPAA in O.S. No. WA-24C-134-08/2023 (‘O.S. No. 134’) to stay the 3rd AD pending the final determination by way of arbitration (‘Stay Application’), without any application being made under s 15 CIPAA to set aside the 3rd AD. [2] On 15.11.2023, after giving due consideration of the affidavit evidence and the oral and written submissions of the parties, I had allowed the Enforcement Application and dismissed the Stay Application. [3] These are my full grounds of judgment for the decision. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 The Cause Papers [4] The cause papers in both suits are as follows: The Enforcement Application: (a) Meridian’s O.S. dated 3.8.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Meridian’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Senior Contract Manager, Ong Eng Theng on 3.8.2023 (encl. 2); (c) Bauer’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Managing Director Commercial, Julian Benedict Lord on 24.8.2023 (encls. 5 and 6); and (d) Meridian’s Notice of Intention to Use Affidavit in O.S. No. 134 dated 15.9.2023 (encl. 7). The Stay Application: (a) Bauer’s O.S. dated 25.8.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Bauer’s AIS affirmed by the same deponent on 24.8.2023 (encls. 2 and 3); (c) Meridian’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 14.9.2023 (encl. 4); and S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (d) Bauer’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 27.9.2023 (encl. 6). Brief Salient Facts [5] The background facts to these suits can be found in my grounds of judgment – (a) dated 4.5.2020 in Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd and another summon [2020] MLJU 1405; [2020] MLRHU 1138 where I had dismissed Bauer’s applications to set aside the Adjudication Decision by the learned Adjudicator, Mr. Rodney Colin Gomez (‘1st Adjudicator’) dated 31.10.2019 (‘1st AD’) pursuant to s 15 CIPAA and to stay the 1st AD pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties pursuant to s 16 CIPAA, and had allowed Meridian’s application to enforce the 1st AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA (Bauer’s appeal against my decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 3.1.2022 and Bauer’s motion for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Federal Court on 27.4.2022); and (b) dated 17.2.2023 in Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 1047; [2023] 1 LNS 917 where I had allowed Meridian’s application for the Adjudication Decision by the learned Adjudicator, Ir. Shanmugaraj s/o Chelliah S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Thamotherampillai (‘2nd Adjudicator’) dated 15.11.2021 (‘2nd AD’) to be set aside under s 15(d) CIPAA as the 2nd Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction by deciding on the set-off claim (Bauer’s appeal against my decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 23.10.2023). [6] For the present suits, it is sufficient to recap that – (a) Meridian commenced the first adjudication proceedings (‘1st Adjudication’) against Bauer by way of the Notice of Adjudication dated 17.6.2019 for the sum of RM7,494,014.17 which was due and payable for works done since 2017 pursuant to the CIPAA. At that time, the 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35 was not contractually due to be released by Bauer to Meridian and was therefore not included in the 1st Adjudication. On 31.10.2019, the 1st Adjudicator delivered the 1st AD in favour of Meridian in the sum of RM5,311,360.51 together with interest and costs, after allowing Bauer’s set-off claims of RM142,238.60 out of the total set-off claims of RM 5,188,402.91. Bauer has since complied with the 1st AD; (b) On 13.12.2019, Bauer issued the notice to arbitrate to Meridian to refer the dispute between the parties to arbitration; and (c) Meridian submitted its Payment Claim to Bauer on 29.12.2020 claiming for the 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35. The Notice of Adjudication dated 1.4.2021 was subsequently S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 served on Bauer (‘2nd Adjudication’). On 15.11.2021, the 2nd AD was delivered whereby Bauer’s set-off for the damages/ liquidated ascertained damages (‘LAD’) in the sum of RM3,913,000.00 out of RM 5,188,402.91 was allowed and Meridian’s claim for the 2nd moiety of retention sum was dismissed following the said set-off. [7] As the 2nd AD was set aside by this Court and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Meridian then commenced another adjudication proceedings against Bauer to recover the same 2nd moiety of retention sum for RM1,088,420.35 (‘3rd Adjudication’). [8] Meridian served the Payment Claim dated 7.3.2023 on Bauer. Bauer did not serve any Payment Response on Meridian. [9] On 12.5.2023, Meridian served its Adjudication Claim whilst Bauer served its Adjudication Response on 26.5.2023. Meridian served its Adjudication Reply on 2.6.2023. [10] Meanwhile, on 22.5.2023, Bauer filed an application seeking for a stay of execution of the Order of this Court made on 17.2.2023 to set aside the 2nd AD and for a stay of the 3rd Adjudication pending the disposal of Bauer’s appeal against the said Order. Bauer’s application was dismissed on 7.7.2023. [11] On 17.7.2023, the 3rd Adjudicator had determined in para 143 of the 3rd AD that: S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 “… a. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35 on or before 31-7-2023. b. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the total costs of the adjudication proceeding amounting to RM59,507.18 on or before 31-7- 2023. c. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant interest on the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35 at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on a daily basis commencing from 21-6-2020 until the date of this Adjudication Decision on or before 31-7-2023. d. If the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,088,420.35, accrued interest pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) above and the total costs of the adjudication proceeding amounting to RM59,507.18 are not paid in full by the Respondent to the Claimant by 31-7-2023, the Respondent shall pay interest on all outstanding amounts at the rate of 5% per annum calculated on a daily basis commencing from 1-8-2023 until full and final settlement. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 e. All payments that are required to be made by the Respondent to the Claimant shall be made by way of a Banker's Cheque or Cashier's Order issued by a local financial institution.”. I. THE ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION [12] Section 28 CIPAA provides as follows: “Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment 28. (1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. (2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. (3) The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court.”. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Mr. CK Oon submitted for Meridian that it had complied with all statutory requirements for an application pursuant to s 28 CIPAA to enforce the 3rd AD and this was not disputed by Bauer. [14] Bauer affirmed that the Enforcement Application should be dismissed as the 3rd AD should be stayed in the circumstances as averred in the AIS. In short, Bauer’s main defence in resisting the Enforcement Application was that, if the Stay Application is allowed, then the Enforcement Application ought to be dismissed. [15] The effect of an adjudication decision is clearly provided in s 13 CIPAA which reads: “13. The adjudication decision is binding unless – (a) it is set aside by the High Court on any of the grounds referred to in section 15; (b) the subject matter of the decision is settled by a written agreement between the parties; or (c) the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court.”. [16] As mentioned at the outset, Bauer did not file an application pursuant to s 15 CIPAA to set aside the 3rd AD. In addition, the subject matter of the 3rd AD has not been settled by a written agreement between Bauer S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 and Meridian and the dispute has also not been finally decided by arbitration or the court. [17] Section 28 CIPAA confers a discretion on the High Court which must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA. This discretionary power does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15 CIPAA. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the court that – (a) there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favor; (b) there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; and (c) there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law [see Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) at paragraphs 24 - 26, pp 370 and 371]. [18] Based on the foregoing, I would agree with Meridian’s contention that the 3rd AD should be enforced as of right. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [19] As Bauer has taken a position which is dependent on the outcome of the Stay Application, I now turn to consider the Stay Application. II. THE STAY APPLICATION [20] Section 16 CIPAA reads as follows: “Stay of adjudication decision 16. (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. (2) The High Court may grant a stay of the adjudication decision or order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or make any other order as it thinks fit.”. [21] Bauer has indisputably fulfilled the requirements for a stay under paragraph 16(1)(b) CIPAA as the subject matter of the 3rd AD is S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 pending final determination by arbitration (see the decisions of this Court in Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 at paragraph 69, pp 286 - 287 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 8.8.2022) and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 at paragraph 8, which are to be contrasted with Classic Series Sdn Bhd v Ng Lung Yang (Trading under the name and style of ‘NLY Coating’) [2023] MLJU 2324 at paragraphs 35 and 36). [22] In his submission for Bauer, Mr. Sanjay Mohan has fittingly submitted that the court may stay an adjudication decision where there are clear errors, or to meet the justice of the individual case and that the correct approach under s 16 of the CIPAA would be to evaluate each case on its merits where the financial capacity of the unpaid party to repay the adjudicated sum could be a factor but not the only factor (see View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22). [23] The learned counsel further submitted that the justice of the present case demands that the 3rd AD be stayed (see too, paragraph 26 in the AIS). [24] In Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734, I said: “[64] Among the cases which have discussed how the tests of clear and unequivocal errors and justice of the case S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 are to be applied in the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant a stay or otherwise are EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1851, Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194 and; [2021] 1 LNS 367, Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852, Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 and CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305. [65] In CRCC Malaysia (supra), this Court said: “[56] … [57] As for the phrase “to meet the justice of the individual case”, this Court in Genbina Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 2 MLRH 101 at p 111 said that the determination as to what is right and fair must necessarily be dependent on the factual matrix and circumstances arising in each case whilst in EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594 at p 603, Lim Chong Fong J expressed the following view: S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[27] Furthermore in the View Esteem case, it is also stated that the financial status is not the sole factor in determining the grant of the stay. The stay may be allowed to meet the justice of the individual case aside from clear error. They seem to be disjunctive as explained in the Leap Modulation case. Justice of the case is of course even more subjectively objective. It involves the exercise of discretion. However in light of the caveat of caution mentioned in the View Esteem case, I am also only minded to grant the stay if my conscience is pricked in the special circumstances of the case. Beyond that, it is incapable of definition or illustration. [28] The bottom line is that considerations of both clear error as well as justice of the individual case to justify the stay of an adjudication decision have to be stringently applied as this would otherwise defeat the statutory intent of the CIPAA to ensure cash flow in the construction industry; see Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 801.” S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 …” (see too, RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247). [25] The grounds upon which Bauer claimed that the justice of the instant case warrants a stay of the 3rd AD are examined below. 1st Ground: There are merits in Bauer’s claims in the ongoing arbitral proceedings [26] In paragraphs 21 to 23 of the AIS, Bauer stated the respective contentions of the parties in the arbitration proceedings, namely – (a) Bauer’s claims against Meridian which include the sum of RM4,506,451.18 as loss and expense suffered by Bauer due to Meridian’s delay; RM681,951.73 as back charges; RM1,485,698.02 as loss and expense during the defects liability period; and RM432,767.67 being the sum which was overpaid to Meridian; and (b) Meridian’s counterclaim against Bauer for the sum of RM9,275,068.18 being the balance value of works done including the 2nd moiety of retention sum; and the entitlement to an extension of time (‘EoT’) until 25.11.2017 or alternatively, that S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 time for completion of the sub-contract works had been set at large, to emphasise that the arbitral tribunal will make a final determination on the issues relating to, among others, the value of works carried out by Meridian; whether Meridian is entitled to an EoT; whether Bauer is entitled to its loss and expense claim; whether Meridian failed to provide certain provisions as required under the sub-contract; whether Bauer is entitled to its back charges; and whether Meridian is entitled to the 2nd moiety of retention sum (the pleadings in the arbitration was shown in exhibit “A-11”). [27] Bauer further stated in paragraph 24 of the AIS that the arbitration proceedings have reached a mature stage wherein Bauer has closed its case on 21.7.2023 and the arbitration proceedings are fixed for continued hearing in the months of August 2023 and February and March 2024. [28] Bauer asserted that all disputes which were raised in the adjudication proceedings will be finally determined by the arbitral tribunal, including Meridian’s entitlement to the release of the 2nd moiety of the retention sum, and that based on Bauer’s position in respect of the total value of work carried out by Meridian and Bauer’s claims for loss and expenses and back charges, there is no sum due and payable to Meridian [29] As the Court of Appeal had dismissed Bauer’s appeal on 23.10.2023, when the Stay Application was heard on 9.11.2023, Bauer’s averment in the alternative in paragraph 29 of the AIS would apply, namely that S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 the Enforcement Application will naturally be allowed and once the 3rd AD is enforced, Bauer will be left with no recourse or remedy to set aside the 3rd AD. [30] Bauer firmly believes that it has merits in its claim for loss and expense in the arbitration, at least in the sum of RM3,913,000.00 because this Court had set aside the 2nd AD on the ground of excess of jurisdiction rather than on the merits. Hence, it cannot be said that the factual and evidentiary findings made by the 2nd Adjudicator in finding that there was delay by Meridian and in allowing Bauer’s loss and expense, are not reasoned or unsound. The claimed amount will extinguish Meridian’s claim for the 2nd moiety of retention sum. [31] I have considered Bauer’s 1st Ground to support the Stay Application and I was not persuaded that it is in the interest of justice for the Court to grant a stay of the 3rd AD. Sub-s 37(1) CIPAA provides that a dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. The fact that there is an ongoing arbitration is not, per se, a ground for granting a stay application under s 16 CIPAA (see Meridian Contracts (supra) at subparagraph 65(c)]. [32] Moreover, based on Bauer’s Statement of Claim, its claim against Meridian is for the total sum of RM7,106,866.60 as opposed to Meridian’s total counterclaim of RM9,275,068.18 against Bauer as shown in the Amended Statement of Defence and Statement of Counterclaim (see the AIS, encl. 3). S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [33] Contrary to Bauer’s assertion that the arbitration proceedings have reached a mature stage, the precise timeline for the final determination of the disputes between the parties remained uncertain. Whilst the hearing before the arbitrator has been set until March 2024 and assuming that the hearing will be completed in that month, the arbitrator has yet to give directions on the dates for written submissions, and possibly clarification hearings to be held. The exact date when the final award will be published is also unknown. [34] To allow a stay of the 3rd AD in the circumstances of this case would be to defeat the primary objective of the CIPAA to alleviate cash flow issues by providing an effective and economical mechanism [see Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 (FC) at paragraphs 46 - 55, pp 242 - 246 and Inai Kiara (supra, at paragraph 28, p 371)]. [35] For the avoidance of doubt, I did not give any consideration to Bauer’s submission that the 3rd AD contained clear error as this ground was not raised in Bauer’s affidavit evidence. Moreover, Bauer has chosen not to file an application to set aside the 3rd AD under s 15 of the CIPAA. 2nd Ground: Whether Meridian is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum if the arbitration proceedings concludes in Bauer’s favor [36] In paragraphs 31 to 33 of the AIS, Bauer affirmed that there is a risk that Meridian will not be able to repay the adjudicated amount in the S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 3rd AD should Meridian be required to do so after the disposal of the arbitration proceedings. Bauer relied on – (a) the Summary Of Financial Information in the Companies Commission of Malaysia (‘CCM’) search conducted on Meridian on 15.8.2023 which shows for the financial year end 31.12.2022, Meridian suffered a loss after tax in the sum of RM915,089.00; had a net dividend of negative RM915,800.00; had two open charges that remain unsatisfied; and had four charges in the total sum of RM3,200,000.00 that remain unsatisfied; and (b) the CTOS Report on Meridian which shows – (i) there is a significant decrease in Meridian’s retained earnings as follows: • Financial year end 31.12.2018: RM4,416,179.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2021: RM2,300,061.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2022: RM469,127.00 (ii) Meridian has no revenue for the financial year end 31.12.2021 and 31.12.2022; and (iii) there is a significant decrease in Meridian’s profit after tax: S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 • Financial year end 31.12.2018 in the sum of RM726,251.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2021 in the negative sum of RM6,319.00 • Financial year end 31.12.2022 in the negative sum of RM915,800.00 (see exhibit “A-12”, encl. 3). [37] Bauer’s counsel vehemently submitted that Meridian’s public financial information reveals that Meridian is in significant financial distress. For two consecutive years, Meridian had zero revenue and this signified severe strain in cash flow and a lack of ability to generate any revenue. This was worsened by the fact that Meridian’s suffered two straight years of negative growth and negative profit. As at 31.12.2022, Meridian suffered loss of profit (after tax) of RM915,089.00. [38] Further, based on Meridian’s balance sheet for the financial year end 31.12.2022, Meridian’s current net worth was only in the sum of RM2,879,172.00 and its net asset was after Bauer had complied with the 1st AD and paid the Adjudicated Sum with interests and costs of RM6,265,214.52. Meridian’s total assets include the non-current assets in the sum of RM1,804,884.00, which are not easily liquidated into cash. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [39] In addition, the unsatisfied charges are an indicator of high debt level and poor financial health. This exposes Meridian to the risks of losing its assets if the secured creditors decide to enforce the charges. With regards to the alleged cause of Meridian’s precarious state of finance, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, the fact remains that Meridian is currently in a precarious state of finance and might not be able to repay the Adjudicated Sum. [40] After having scrutinised the CCM search and CTOS Report and the parties’ averments and submissions, it is my considered view that Meridian’s financial health is not at such a perilous level that it would not be able to repay the adjudicated amount, if called to do so. This is because – (a) the adjudicated amount including costs, and excluding accruing interests, is only RM1,147,927.53; (b) as at financial year end 31.12.2022 – (i) Meridian’s current assets is RM2,330,408.00 and non- current assets is RM1,804,884.00 which gives a total of RM4,135,292.00. The total assets and the current assets exceed the adjudicated amount; and (ii) Meridian’s total liabilities is RM1,256,120.00 and its losses after tax is RM915,089.00. Even with these figures, and considering the total assets and the net worth of S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 RM2,879,172.00, Meridian would still be able to repay the adjudicated amount, if required to do so in future; (c) the six unsatisfied charges involve two open charges and four charges which were created between 5.11.2004 and 18.7.2007 for the total amount of RM3,200,000.00. As submitted by Meridian, unsatisfied charges are not markers for its financial health and could be seen as reflecting the banks’ confidence in Meridian as a going concern; and (d) in PNL Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v Loh Teck Wah & Ors [2022] 6 MLJ 304, the Court of Appeal said: “[88] The case of Datuk Mohd Sari bin Datuk Hj Nuar v Idris Hydraulic (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 5 MLJ 377 was also cited where it was held that in determining the issue of inability to pay debt, the High Court considered the assets and liabilities of the company. Kamalanathan Ratnam JC (as he then was) held as follows: Section 218(2)(c) is very clear. To ascertain if a company is unable to pay its debt the court shall take into account the contingent and prospective liabilities of the company. In order to ascertain its liabilities, it is proper that its assets are also ascertained because only upon ensuring that there is insufficient assets to meet the debts can there be ascertained liabilities. Therefore, the S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 current assets must be taken stock of to see if after considering the total liabilities both contingent and prospective there is a surplus deficit. (Emphasis added.) [89] We have no quarrel nor quibble with what is unquestionably the settled test with respect to whether a company is ‘unable to pay its debts’.”. Applying the settled test as above quoted to the present case, with current assets of RM2,330,408.00 and total liabilities of RM1,256,120.00, Meridian is still capable of repaying the Adjudicated Sum, if required to do so. [41] As to the issue of whether a conditional stay should be granted in favor of Bauer, it was argued that a stay under s 16 CIPAA, even if conditional upon Bauer depositing the Adjudicated Sum into a stakeholder account, would best protect the competing interests of parties as – (a) Meridian’s rights will be protected by the fact that the adjudicated sum in the stakeholder account will be released to Meridian if the arbitration proceedings conclude in Meridian’s favour; (b) Bauer’s rights will be protected as a stay will alleviate its anxiety that it cannot recover the adjudicated sum if the arbitration proceedings conclude in Bauer’s favour; and S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (c) both parties can focus on the arbitral proceedings without fear of further execution or winding-up proceedings arising from the 3rd AD. [42] Although I have, in cases such as Tecnicas Reunidas Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Petrovietnam Engineering Consultancy JSC (PVE) & Anor and other cases [2021] MLJU 2633 and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd (supra) allowed a conditional stay, I was not convinced that this would be an appropriate order to make in the instant case in order to strike a balance between securing the recoverability of the Adjudicated Sum and preserving the essence of an adjudication proceeding under the CIPAA. [43] The Adjudicated Sum has been owing to Meridian since year 2020 and Meridian has not been able to recover the out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the 3rd Adjudication whereby it had paid both its and Bauer’s portions of the security deposit as Bauer had defaulted in making this payment. Conclusion [44] In view of the foregoing reasons, the Enforcement Application in O.S. No. 123 was allowed and the Stay Application in O.S. No. 134 was dismissed. S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Mr. Sanjay Mohan was agreeable to the costs as proposed by Mr. CK Oon and I concurred. Hence, costs of RM5,000.00 were ordered for the Enforcement Application and RM10,000.00 for the Stay Application, both subject to allocatur. Dated: 22 December 2023 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 123 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 134: Oon Chee Kheng (Goh Jing Han with him) Messrs. C K Oon & Co. Advocates & Solicitors L3A-3A, Wisma BU8 No. 11, Lebuh Bandar Utama Bandar Utama Damansara 47800 Petaling Jaya Selangor S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 134 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 123: Sanjay Mohan (Wong Li-Wei and Tan Jia Shen with him) Messrs. Sanjay Mohan Advocates & Solicitors Unit 5.01 Level 5 WORK @ Clearwater Jalan Changkat Semantan 50490 Kuala Lumpur Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: Ananda Kumar a/l Krishnan v Ng Chin Tai (t/a Lean Seh Fishery) & Anor (Tesco Stores (Malaysia) Sdb Bhd, intervener) [2016] MLJU 924 Classic Series Sdn Bhd v Ng Lung Yang (Trading under the name and style of ‘NLY Coating’) [2023] MLJU 2324 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 Mecomb Malaysia Sdn Bhd v VST M&E Sdn Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 380 Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 1047; [2023] 1 LNS 917 S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Meridian Contracts Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd and another summon [2020] MLJU 1405; [2020] MLRHU 1138 Niko Bioenergy Sdn Bhd v RH Balingian Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 1574 PNL Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v Loh Teck Wah & Ors [2022] 6 MLJ 304 Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247 Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2022] 6 MLJ 58 Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 Tecnicas Reunidas Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Petrovietnam Engineering Consultancy JSC (PVE) & Anor and other cases [2021] MLJU 2633 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 Legislation: Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, ss 13, 16, 28 & 31 Rules of Court 2012, O. 7, O. 28, O. 69A r. 4 & O. 92 r. 4 S/N dQuMIgzIC0PUGW4t6gGw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

RA-82-8-12/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD WAFIUDDIN BIN MAZELAN

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02/01/2024

Puan Ana Rozana binti Mohd Nor

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02/01/2024 16:24:55 RA-82-8-12/2021 Kand. 86 S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N HUaykfYo0esJJ1Pn3xng **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—a2—a—12/2021 Kand. as 22/on/mu 15:2»:-53 mum MANKAIAAN umusmar KANGAR mun NEGERI mans KES JENAYAN mu: mun AMYARA PENDAKWA sun uwm uonn wmunnm am mzzuu ALASAN psueunxumu 1. PEMDAHULUAN Tenuduh ::x.mm...1.m.».x.m.n mum keulunan ummn. luyln an Kunun K: nu ma am. dnhukum .1. um-n llluyun :2: .4." um. um am Kanun Knuknun Pemodulun am." cemndnv Teflufluh mun nevem yilvg bsnkul am...“ -am». lumn pus: 1111:/znzl lam mm. knrann 10.15 Dani. bunnmpat an .:...m rumnh M. u, an... 1 . s, an Arnu, nmu Arlu. rum. allnm am». An 4. ml-m now. on.-:s.. an...» m.. ml-n .....y. .u... kuoodnraan x. m. lhu Iumu mm sm mum. mm: Abdullnh, No. Knd Pfllfiulalan: s1n4o2—11—5zs4 denaan menflllunlkan «mm. lens di mu.- mu digunnlun uhagll nniah bnluh rnonyulubkarl Imnatian flan dnnnan Ilu Iumn man melxkukan ....n. kualulun ynng hullh an hukum an bawlh . um :24 Klmm Knolu m am am... hunmn nklynn nu mu... Konknnn” 2. nun azuuuws KES 2 1 mm pnudakwlsn dulum m ml Iulnh mamunggfl serlmanempul hula: n rsrl mung um pnndlhw N »u=ym=u.;m mm mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm ra; Sm Fanmah mmmbdulhh «spa an Normal F15’ I mm Mazulan xspzy. /1:) Kansmbe\ Mahamad Sylhmn Mn Snnawn ¢sp3), M mspuruamuzm hm Ahmad (SP4). 1-) sum. Mam F-wwuv An-:1: am Azaml (spin 4/; Ma Axum am we AIMSPSL (qr Anil: s¢ um-u (spa nu mm" um: bmuvmuam (span, {:1 Rmmayann mm zmn aspen Lu Mom Basn mu Az\l(SPIfl). rx; ASP u.m.mm.a Bantam ms xspm III Mumuu zmmn mu Ro¢lI[SP12L rm; Kovhlal Muhd Swan hm mm tspm an m msoemurmmmaa Kham Em vans: (span 22 Bevdauvkln mm:-nan nxmaxu Defldahwaan 4. rudapan Muhkamnh lnku km iehn menunpukk-n kzlavungln bshlwu pa. n/:2/2w nmnu spa wanna Damn! flu dnlam nmnh munyn spa mm. berdunqlv bunyt {using nu ma! mmah, ss-9 Ielah umuxnumm oteh sunmmyl mg kelunr Ieflehlh amm mum levdapat om-g mmqvnuk flan msnlkzm munya‘ apabfla spa keluzv hebau melmal senmng pelenuuan sedang tzmnrmg nus plan ur bevdekman ubuan s-npanu nan kemudnnrlyz lelah menqhuhunm mm PoHsA:Iu 23 pm pm Iehm kumng 1027 pngw, semasa spa uedang bedugas or W Gemvan Ipn Nan‘ beuau Iehh menenma sumu panggflnn flnnpada omnfl imm yam mempflvkenalkan am mam. “Fun Vanlr memaklumkan buhlwl leldlvll mung mm mllyu Iain mmum dun mamllm nunyn malImIITl1I 2 up»: Arnu mm Ram Elluln 2 4 Selzlnh spa mmnma Llponn Izlxecul spa mu munaklumkin mm angauva Mpvym barium: mun nlenghnlnkzmmpnlkzydun am spa kamndunnyl mun menahubunm Imbulnnn dun umnmlnyl mcmhun Iavann pohi ubauaxmana Aviu Report 1307/24 qpuy sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv 9 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 5 mm xzssumumw EOLEN sun RuMusAN asnmsmuu susnm wsmaona ¢ sscam uzsmuum xzs wx oxslusn am sun m mwm szxsvzn :2: won xsszxwu xmouw asmxu nu mm-m um um um uuauamuu msmsu saaruna ANAK mu on vzux usuuuu uauuu ww uxau sswkus SELEPAS nmma nus aswuxu mum numu vznssaur muss vzunusuxuum mu nvsuum mm vznmux mu nunmu cum cams mm m srru muss; raw nwmmn KE um xzczmsm uoswm vumxu FAuz\Ar< uNmK numxm suwnm mum s wswsxma uvnnuw ssasnmz um umasa ram Msumxm mm m wsowwm mum» om vzmvw sow JELASKAN xsououxm M10495» 4 sERmsAR><m msu smsmw umau vER.JA‘nm mu vskmuuus nl vane»: nun s»<uA ssrsnusrm an vzuw uzuanmrunu amen um xzmun xsuu nauv mm muuru OLEK AWAI m szxzuums mwww rsnszaur um wwesn ram unmux xzmu rum nosmm uNvuK -asnmmmu mwmw uwur 4 is Selam dannaua xemngan srm yang menyataknn bellau Ielah nnrlkam pelcakapiu sm uan swz rmgenm Kqadlan a. damn vumah umwn an mung: um SP5 mevlklm gnmbll hndlpnn Mm lnmp|| mud n (Psmc) .1.» finmhnv dv amm mmm ..m-mu APBA»D! mu .u. mmnuan Vain yam: mkemumau unluk memexasxan navalfl VIII; beflaku pafln mu mama: as calm nmlah nmull Nu. M.Jihn up ; RPA Arau.P¢r1vI. 4 2a svn y-M mewlukzn Pagnw-I Tum: Fumrmk .1 m u.».....g...ny. M. mu mammhmlan sualu keungs n menpenm mm .1. mlnn kegidun mm spa dawn Ioeterzngannva memaklurnkan hahawa SP14 Ielah memaklumkan kaniaanya Imvlvat benakunw hkzmzn hetlaku d\ Mar nmun Na. 44, am. up s, an Ann, Fur . sear: knususnyu berlaku m Kxwlun daham gamnnr may kelevangan SP11 mum sepem ynm mm s sawumux swam c vs smmc MERUJUK xsmu Am J amw c uznumwa mam xmuum v wznzwum szazum sun sum» aammm sum ommmman cm msvznan mm rswn vsassaur uszumw wsmnr ssmxu xmnmu mm vznszauv sw HU=ykVVuflusH1Pn:lxlW “ «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm A 21 srm man men‘/ilakzn yank amarn Iumah Na 44, Jalan ma 5 RPA Amu. Fem: denaln kwaun yang dnmqukkan dalam gamblr P5(C) adalih dua vuluh metal 4 22 Mala», semis: drwal ale?! mink Dembelnn meflfienm Devwumnulan amp-w obh sun. svn tzelah memhenkan .1... ms. kederanqun mznnenau permllan um: ad: peugumvuhn nmper ana mum. m uanam rumah Na :4. Jalan ma... 5. an Ann, Penn an... L-.1-k 4 23 Semis: am... am Ylmblhn Pnndakwamya yang Drpela|IrSP11 man menynlakan mam behau s mm I MM IERSEBUY ADA ASP MIEMBUAI’ AFA-APA pausnnxs-Au soazusm mum szumn sznnuau 4 D1 man xsmmu A ADA psmxsa. nu xsxsuuus mm mun nuum vsnsssur um m:w< Mzmumw APA«APA smm sum nu mum: sum». Yanssam s Amman up MASUK mum kumm nmx ; 24 rm ..1. nenplaun dlnpida sP1v manganaw petvanggahan mi din semasa ducal halas oleh nlhzk Demhelnan ,..g.. helm. menyanakan nahnva 1...... «ms. mzsuk ks dalam rumah din nznya henna .1. luav mman flan kmmdmnnyn a-hm ptrmnkxnn summn nan... m...y.m... buhlwu mm mu... umpm a. Inmpn x.,....... mm mm: a...m...u..n ul-H swu om... ma... ..en.:... .1. mm mrmh an m. 20:49: ylnq am... .1. mum mmlh nan sPu sendln yang memm. spa mehkuun wuss (empm hepdmn .1. I... Nmah (snebnl 425 Mnhknmnn .1.m..m ltmlnya-buy: nrsrugerw dr mm iabanlmyi :.....u.... ylng r-I-h mlnynhlnkln koaudu n .m saw dsngln manguunulun saenhh ken: m. ber1|ku.sekwsnyn n......:.... mm... Izenav-buuv um... dvdalrn mmah Bersmlan yam: berbanaknu-1a\ah mengapl sm manbemahu kepadz sm kefldtan Im:ebu| beflaku dl Iuav mmah mm. In atzs jahn til sebagaamana yang mmrqukkan datum number 951:), .1... memben xmmn sunny: sm ».u.ym.n..m mm '2 «w... 5.... nmhnrwm .. ..... .. my .. ..nmn.u-y mm: ........ VII .n..m Wm! vengumpuhn samvel mum Men ssm m Iuav mmah Muk m dalam mman uhn vamnya lvefldwn heuabul bonanbsnar Lumaku m hxwuan P5112», msngipa sP14 mengamnkan 5P5 unmk melnknm aamhar-gwnhu am“ numh uhaialmana mmm FE1A~DD us sm flan SP2 bask mermetimn mm seoem keumau manuknla K:'mranuanSPH din srm mzsmymaswng bermnngan mengenzl mama» yang man I 27 Tulah muqam pump umiznmlndzvrn mluan, iawalu sabrun maman bewamm keoldl um yang kukuh dun bcrdullkan bukti yang man mkemukakan .1. mmmaman gapem yangmpunukan men. Mxhkamnh Penekuluan ualam Ker Sm Sonn Suln -/. Fnnss 1 Lu: 155-[ms v ML} 11: 'Navamu\I-LI ma man-Mmnnu .4 ulna pm: In . aummaw .-... alumni n. Max:-1 no bvvdve my "|aruena\ on: m n. prvsacwon mam V-vespaarveoi mum-v Ims com m alhuwnsa convnad m ns on mm} d ma gwl av mmuzruu Man aumud, rudnauun n...n.n...a N! m. wmuuz manned and nwmmu mu m. . ..m.1.¢- 4 2s Selanmlllva bemuhung dengan sums» Pegawav Penymul mengenaw nemvammana median benaku. mahkamahdalam Kulmlelah memlukkn vans: mun dmulusknn men Mahknmah my...“ Luau nnnmniutuammm 1/. pa mm 1 cu an a. mm Mnnkamah Rayuan Iedah memmuskan sepem yang be:-km " Thu awnlhnl cannm n- punauum [or lack nl In§1mlV|V- Mulluuncn or nudvuunn an m purl m In Imoullplwr dlpmlnfl Mm oi um um. no-mum! bovmfl of mm (on mmumm Vcu Run 26§.[19§2l1 MLI137) Du mxnmv n um PM: me mvilunnu rm maugmm an mmy xlnnes unnlvled and mnlevul gap: ex-A1 Enter! an Inn: umulmn, .n Imevevlne m we -up-Invrx Vxvuur mum lmereinve In hive Men mm by m. umld mun cm M19: .1 m. and .1 ma prwlacuuvn and ma mnmmv1 -m mm, V mm Emu: mg «C M, [Iwsn Mu may -‘ sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv *5 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 4 29 Mahkamah hsvplndlpat Bahama rzmn kualvnlvln (bunch of m. mam; yang ueroangxu dalam kes nendnkwaan neumaa. Iavmal Kemdwan ml wammnenuan mm Tenuduh darn pemhehasarflemnduh danpadz penuduhan m akhv ups noun-mun mun sawahl ya:-9 mm mm ummm. 4 so Dilam ks: ml juga, mamqman lalah mnalm kutuvanaan mu kaadun {czvounutsnasl Mame; yang rzlnh amanuxmn aleh mm pe«dI<wnan dengnn mengemukahan Ielernngm-kelzrargnn yang mxm (a; spa unlam keleangannyn menynmkln bah-we semua keudun Daren sednng menamsao mkak m mar mmah behau flan man mchhal Tamdm wading auuukm mar SP1m|uarIumah tusabul. spa mum sm mm ke am remmm. am mmwm ken: ylllg anpeglng clah Yeruaduh Tenuduh mm. meuyemhknn keus ma mu-3-nnrm mm swan unpn meman Kemudrm spa Perm Ire arah smu dun Temrfluh dun memmla Tamduh unmk muuk ka dihm smuah mlvlah husong spa menglkul hanya melmal Temmnm duduk m alas spa dalam mm» mm lelas memandllvgklu muaanww-nu nu adalsh mm as» mmung, (D) um um. kltldun lam: SP2 ndnru bevarm ax a. m mmlh my. sPv um lemengar bunyw mm av ‘um um», sw man dImak\umkr\ ubh iuzmmya yang kuluar ¢.n.:.m dahulu haham ladapal mama mengnmuk u... menlkam mm. anamla sm ketuav. cm. melmal seomng perempuan sedang (emarmg am mm m nemuwu mm mp:-s flan Ymuduh ..¢.ng um...‘ um. unluk muuk um mm mm Iunuh kolung. sw knmudwanflfl mun mlwhwurvnl Bum Pulii Am: sw nullsliku main danpadl mu\m:\SF1 .1. dahm kax ml yedaflfl becbanng .1. Mas mr, lapnmn yang dmeukan mm. 5P3 adalah apa yang numaklumkan men suaml beuau sahapa flan suanu sw mm m IN udak mun pea: mum; man dlplllflawl unmk .....,,.m... .4». mg mlmu oleh rm-u human: n u.,.a.... ms-hm sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv “ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (cy smo ......y...n..... huhlwa .1... n... 11......" helm: 1...... beam .1. .1........ ......z.. .1... Dad: .a... wear. mu... m :5 pam. sun will .......1....ga. kekaouhan .1. ......a.-.: .u...... belau .1... s... M... ...e....... ..1..1...;, s.=.n........ ....... .1... ....=...........1... .....1.. .....1.... ..... ......1..1... ..... ...... ..e..... ....u v......1..n ...1.n.. .1...1... .1. an .:.....y. .... sm .1... ............... 1...... 1...... SP“! .1... ............. memuwk r......1..n supaya ....=......e..m lam r.....1.... membeukan .1... nu ma... SP1n sebemm sum .1... ...z..—.n.. .......u.ux wvaya .a masuk ke ..a.a... piaar wbuah .......... ......, ........ ... v.....1.... ................. .......g ..... Irepndn swan... sm mm. .............. .1...» .......1.. .......g .1.....gg.. .1. ..... ...... ...m........... ......... .......1.... rm sr-1aa.1a..r. arugula rorndaoegah ....ay.r., behau |e\2h mendzpal .............. ......g..... ...,..1.... ........... .1... mu... ...... p...1. .. ......... .....1.... mcelum SP4. sm. .1... sm ...1. 5...... ......1y-....... .1. ....»........ .n.r.... ......u. a. ....1pan s.=..a.... mu... 1...... pew! xe am. sv. 4... mar. dmaklumkan uh?! sw .1........ sp. ml-h .1...:..... .14.... ....s. 5...... yang band: ......... ......a.. spa ma melryalakan semasa helm. menghampm r..1...1.... ........ ......1. 4...... ....1.... ........ .........1.... sm mbn ...............m.. ....p.. Iupnyn ...1... ............. ....~.¢.. wk... win .1... ............ .1... 1......1.... ..u.. ..........1.n.: an... ........r. (evsehul .1... masuk K3 .1...... mmah 1......“ ;.; SP4 ynng .......z..... ....gs..p... ...r...1... v......1.... ,..g. ......1 .........g.....,,. many ..... .1....... v......1.... ..1. .........1..... pm... .1... ...... .......a.n umnl u....1. .1. mmnh mmg ...m1..._ .1... m Pmak pemizkwazn wga Man mengemukakan boetevangan mangsnav p............. .p.......... cm ...... ...........z... .1..... ......x 57. .1...... .... .... .1... .a......1.. K. (van: ...... .1... lying 1...... .1... sp. .1... .......a.. K! am) .1... K7 (ma) ...... bah: . .1... s... ........v........ pm... '5 «w... 1.... .......w... .1. ....1 .1 mm .. ..1........ an... ........ .. .......c pm... wheiaw kam Delokal y-nu uuaxm nlen Temmuh dalamkesum m Mensienax ketaranyan mm mum ma dwkemukakan alert mnak pendakw rvuhkzmsn mandlplh um ads m.....mm um yang lstah malmnt mu m Tsfludun laluh Imnyehlbkan kaoedevnn dunaln nwnugunahn wemmm upw. 5P1 awn mmuh Na 44, Ja\an ma 5, an Amufems 4 :2 s ,.m.ny. m-Imm 5PlIem:vmad\aIu1IIan um: Iuarmmnh SP1‘ Indak aria sakn y-nu melrhal Tenuflnm (ahh menybfilhkan kamdarnn tevwbm Yam] dlalakan beflaku dalam vumah (flak Ada manafluanu sabssl [Ilia YUM! nvenflhkan nlehhal SP1 beflan ialumi Selvpis keladnn hkaman din mm. m alas mr saangmmann yang Isiah my-wk-n mew sm mm kalanngannya 4 as Mikhmlm yang dlbsnkan duh svs menganavmviivaloviflil rnewamuk flan memkam Ibunymuga Mnyi dlpemleh danpada Auxnu mu... yang kehur d.|n Iumsh Jebdum befliu uan mm. spa um Ildak pad: nmma man mpangun xe mnnknmnh 4 34 naumxa my vemakwnan hanya mehhal SP1 sudah xemnng Ma: Jihn an Tanuduh Man bevada dn atas badan sm saetan aensan Keleraniin sru mm... Yemmuh my. msndekan sm ch mar mmnh nannbm amp 4 :5 «mung.» alah sm yum menyatakan bnhan bshnu mun dvmakhlnkan aleh SP1 bnhnwn helnu Cedah dmkam men Inak bednau ynng mm. aawam rumah‘ lmak msahkan oxen 5»: Mann Dun sn=2 kelaangan menu: udak mumxmn wtapa sewn dallpada kanymaan Inrsebul ad: «um: um sm keond: sm pad: hm k-:1: Inn 4:: sm am 5:13 mg. rnevlymxkan mama Duh: bummink igvuull semis: henna mmam mmahkasang dennan vneagnmuk flan mha menendang mmu. map: spa‘ 5:: dan svm mervyatzkan Tenudun man membenkan sm HUaykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv ‘S «W. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! k-nuama up-nu: dlmmu unmk msnyerihkan ksrs am Tenuduh mm: dalam kzadaan mu melsnan A 37 Menpanm vemmunn man an-h mm 5»: pm Pu. m7 an m. krtsvanuinrkenevnwan um um memwmm hahlwn Tenudmlnh uni law: rvlsrwlbabkan buuosdevaan kenada sww dennan mevlmlunakzn kens\P121flalam um mu‘ Tevluduh (eh?! a-Imam bsrzda an arm badan SP1u|eh spa. spa din sum Gan pemuaLan Tenuduh 1... bmeh menyehlbkln kehnmrun anvah sm pm bqu man xam pom: yam: «ppm. nhehnya 4 as Menunrm kuberawan um mam my lawn diknmukaknn am. pm Pindiwnin‘ mamman man mernmk kgs ppm. Kang cg $121124 1 us 2111 yang menyiukin bamawu xeklranyl mhak pendakwaan belglnluvng kwada kecemngan wkm kendann, velah menpm pnnsxp undmg-undnng ynng mlnhp bchawa um yaw betul nah» um" hams mm; nan bahuw: x.«.y...g... muan ... n...1.xm. amr..mw. x...4umn.m., .3 tehuulnyu nmm... mm mm kommpullrluhlju mm kabunuhhan on 1...... kunguln ma munaszbah mm kes Sunny Aug V as [1955 1 ms 171 uses! 2 MLJ‘ Dggg‘ Mm gm Hggu V 55711953 cu Reg 101 [was] 2 MLJ 2:2, Amemevsflva/DPRsma:smy V PP[2au9] 2 ML! 197, Kym: V PP (1914: ms g 11975] I MLJ Ma, gum Km ;m V PP [157 1 LN; din km IIIwI 2 ML! 273) 4 29 Hakim dahm has W pugs Ielah menquk kg: chug Kln sly V. pp (151711 ms yang man memumskan sepem yang mm we arms on pmse-rwun Mme (he ewdemze ., .11. nmumslancel nalwu .5 . Very mvy one amlme ewdence mustpmru mm» 4.: ma Izznclusmn .1 mnguil arm» Ircusoa mm: in mm n. um. I: 1. nu-unulcm‘ un Semuulnya dawn kes Kanm - 1. V. nmuc ms 1 ss. Fmyu «am has W «exam mecayu ke mas sahnan alas kesnlnhm mombunnn max .4. uh: man yang melmfl bagawmana snmzn mserang, kes ymk pnmllkwlln bun-nlzung Iqpuwhnyl um. lmu-Igun um ma. 1 sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv '7 mm. 5.11.1 Illflhlfwm .. .1... M my 1... nrW\nnU|Y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! um“ um Had: we, Nalum Mahkrnah Fanekuluan. dalam penahakmianrvfi izlah menyalakan seoen. yang mxm ‘m . cut whim m pnasosvman mm on m.mu.m..« avrdlmx mm zvrdemv man be mwvunslunl mm my Dinar Hvlumasas (run um um mu pm olme secs/sod - 441 Salelnh mnhkumh rmnllm mgmmun nlhlk-pvhak, mnhkamih memapish kelaannan mm keadaan max memum: tepid: mu kasnmpulm mm kgbersavahan Tennduh Iznpa Vevaguan yang munasahnh‘ mahkamah Kali: menem wkarwa-um my benkul (.1 mm Ad: kmunngnn mm mm kaindmn lab: r.m.auh mm mmyebnbkun kuwdouin mad: sw. r ylnn mkmaun [bl Nak ad: ma-an-nan yang rrlenelimlkan Vneflaenal kqaman a. damn mmah Na 44, mm up 5, an Ann, Penn nemamuna Pfifluduharh tn; lvdikada ketzanngin danvifiz sw wanu mugs: aawam ks: man spz yflng dlkatakm saw um mengenm kegndmn seoenar ymg baflaku dahm mluah mam M mu ad: kmllinwn marvgenll swaua Lag. yum; bend: dalam mmnh mew sewn sv1,sn>2a.n Temoduh‘ 4-; mx nu. later-nnim mm: m. Yanuduh mm. onnq yllla Ialnh nunyevwmn keaedavan um: sw, 4a lvdak ads kawawan Lama Ida ms Iensbul man dlgunakzn unluk manyabubk-n kaudavun n-m-nap an dun (gl hdak id: kehelsnuan Mann bag! In: ms «smmn lshh agunaxan alen Tenmuh mm menyehahkan xeaasevun sm H\JiykVVuflusH1Pn3;-mi ‘“ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 442 mnuenm kaoadavian yang fllahmv o-an sm aanam kn ml pmak penflikwlln mun mengemukzkm kemecangan 5:» am sun 4 4: saw nuruplkan psgawm palvbalin yang Man mombuat pemallklun mm mm» 55-: Gun msmblvlkln riwlun -wt! klpadlnyl, mshlul p.m.m-... ylnu a...\.m.. am. 5:27, uhuu mllmauhkun n-nu: sw nungaliml lukankamln bululz 1 am 2 an a. umgm. mung man nmm. um Veham .1. schema am mu run kann march pm schema km din kanan Vener 4 u sP1|\-an dlhm k.enlrIngInnn(aI|l1 membenlahu mnhklmlh hahnwl senlala seoem P12 bcleh memnunnkln keceaeuan yam same sennuamua yang dIa\:mI olah sm Wabu hagamanlpun, 571 Ma: benmuw dlrvgan mdnngnn pegulm nuns-mam ahlxn mm yang memmyu hupma ynng «am an nmuns sepem wmm flan vlsau mm M: ma. manyebibkan mas. mm us Dalam «as .m sn mga ma memhum pemenkuan awn! uemaanp sun nan membenkan muatzn zwal kepfida am, hmau meflmszhkan sm mengulzmu wk: .1. hlnlgmn mnmg um. um m..u...ux... bend: um ynng bemkurln v u an x n 5 an spa mg: mnnynnkan n um um xamemn um. flsehlbkla um: Iuluklvl bend: mam dun P12 mu huleh menyeu-mun lull: seoem nu ma Hlsxl pemenknnn jug: menpenhun mdnpn kenn mean a. Iehav sw am kaun m. mar. mpumm am-as Pnrhullnn manceknkdln memaama mg». kun pm me: «7 wzlauwn sw nan spa man membenkan kmnranuin rnwflenar men. .n y--mnumum sm anlumku VII,lI1iD\lfllFKldIkHhIIH§ll\Yl"§ mkemuxmn betkanun mp: Whku y-nu manvmumn lraoedevnn Imubm 4 an 5:1 am SP5 man menylmkzn kepnd: mu mzm mum mam mm H: hahaman belaknng um» sebelah km spa, Indakafla mmngan yam mm mm nun mm. - keeederun m. mm mm Dun sm H\JiykVVuflusH1Pn3xtW ‘“ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 449 SP1dw $P2|\¢akmembenkan apnpa kslevangan rvtevmevlaikuadun my bedaku dw mam lumah rempat kepdnan yang mm rnenpednskln pasaalan mv manakah saksrsalm pendakwaan yang lam mm melmat Tennduh bevada .1. .u. mm sm, dun dawn kududukln Tenuduh sapem m. max mungkm nnmuh man mnnyebnnkun kaudavun a. blnlgwln bnllkung bldun ubu-h km sm 4 so r-mu vendakwnn ‘ugn mu mengemukakzn kmemngan henrennn dmgan ksan msmh a. wane: Dsnldl dun haganmarm spa wen mendnpm kneedlunrum 4 51 sva ad: mengambflsefiarah pesaknsebaqmmana yangzexan dlmtalkan dalam Lapel!!! Farmalzn P15‘ dalam selaran velakrl mu man msmwdkzn bnhnwa “rm patient .g . an yams am Ma/my lady wvlh undnnymg ayslvpodamm, Ivodannllvve-1 ..m« by mm mum o/anmsa was .:.n.>.a usmvlslu’ mac: (leak umy-Iakan ism: Id: “kncwn person“ I11 ntermuk keeadn mmam. um-m has wu 452 can my «em-man. mahkamall um mummnun um. -mum kudu: um. um: m pm mum, wlhm u... lmllpnl y.... dlulzulknn u. m pcnudulun. nmaun mg.» . ng . m.mm.gm mm. in m. mun-. mun ulna! Imtuk amuuuu... allh nlrulx Dnndnlmun. 4:, ...... .4. plan mum, .,.n.. .1... ......,.. ,.... .::..:....a.... mu... ..m.a..».... rmuuun .........m...... mu... ma. ,.... mu .n...n.u... ....m.-u ubmn...,...ux.mm.aa.... 4 5: Pmzk penaakvman man mengemukakan xemangan yang benkm umuk ntembukhkzn alemall venudumn my my: dahm kgs ml 4.; Kzlzrnngnn spa ynnglehh melmmhnuduh nednng dudukm mm sm :1! mm mmlll Iarsebul dun mum swm mllum Iva . n Tenuduh nan memm «am ‘llnfi -wanna clan Tecwmm sm »u=mv.n.;m mm 1" mm. smm ...m.Mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII murm pm.‘ 2 5 ram mnkh kzudun pm 1045 paw juga‘ um»: sou din pawkan sedanu membual mndaan m kamasan Amu. salnh searam inggmz ymg helslnu sm mm Psrrungku Saqan mam 157371 Munaman Snamm Zzmnhm lsmml Izlan mg.mpau...m pangg\IInInIa4u1I uunpldl urlng mm mallpmun hnhlwn um-pa: mm. kqnaun ovum mlnglmuk m knwnsnn an mu 25 5P4 dam anggma (elah pevgw Iv: Iempat lueisdun an Ivuhhal vamzl om amm mm .1. Inmpal xqamm helau mm a.u...,..m.. mg." searing mum mg mum helah mamamnk flan mundur mnndlr a. hadanan selman mm!» 27 spn Isiah nwmpemenzkan a. sebagaw pans kepada lelakn Melzyu Iersehm dengpn mermmukkzn kw kuau palm snemvwyl Vulakw Mshyu mean man menyer-n an an sm Lem: memmm mam... um Ieuk: Meluyu berubm um. um w.n..a¢m hm Mm.» ynnimn memvnkm Tamaun a. m mm 2 :4 sm kemumannya man memhaw: am reamm. ke sum.“ Susnun Jsnuylh wn Ann unluk (Ind-kun mum 29 Melnlm pemenksun yang dualznkzn uhh sm dan sws yang mempakan pegawal peruhalan Hasmlm Tuankn Fnuzuh‘ mu. yang «em m...,.:.m.. pnmmkuan mu flan mambenkan mwalan mm ksduawa SP7 dun spa m-ngnlhlun mm mnngu rsm mervglhml um (Iunun henna 1 mm 2 ml 4. mm 1': ulikzng mu. ubvhh km hbim m ubeuh Bias um dun kesan mevlh old: sebclah km an kanln Vuher 21:2 Tnmlduhkamuflmmyll -n dnuaun ¢.m.mm.n mm mahkukan mun.» an buwlh «man :24 Klnun Kueklun dvb-u mum. semen 325:. Kanun mmaan 3. xznunuxun unnmrsuunms 31 Seluyun um Kcmm mum um.» “V.l‘} man u (unu nuhkumlh .1. mm ken mm plndlkwl-n mambimmukkln wk... sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv 3 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Temmuh mm menyamhktn mg mg drpeqlnqnyn mm. smonnpa malawzn‘ rm Kelevangnn men 5943 yang menynmkzn hahmn mm. Lem am-m.mm ohh sw mum. sm mun amknm men nnlkbeluu v-nu mm dllam mm» to; Ken: Iersebm Ielah dnemkkan am. swa m alas sehuah mnnnm Wkuk ubemm sm memhual mnnmg nemaaap kens mrsabul mm m mam ken m. den mambungkul ken: mew: unluk maernnknn up:-1: :44. an (41) spa Ada mevekmlhn sq...» peulul yang menyatzkan hnhlwl sm mermakwz umxam dengan meqggunakan kens 4 54 mm baummlnapun‘ kallnngan mu svs dun sm max auaman oleh sun tan sv2 m nuhkamnh iplhwla u=a_.u...ny. ervpgin mambevlkzn keherafluan atau meroesahkan manarmana dokumerv 455 Sehlvmmn penudunan sehmh law pmak pendnkwann mm mangmmkakan kemnpm xmanan av: my berlaku dahm man No 44, Jalan ma 5. mm mu‘ Poms sebngmmnna penuduhsn dam saml mu kzlu unzy mu mgunmn Mbagaw setuata yang men menyehackan kemauan pm mm flan mesa hegafllan m dullm vmuh mum man I-1-k dlpllln mlhklm-h dlhm aiemnn kadui hlgi 4 56 can my uamxuan, mlhkama munllnuslun bahawi "mm: mg. um. um: .4. pm urilduwnkw din mmpllylng din-hulk-n dalln pumdumn I-mm-m man mmum... "mm. mm. ,.... mm dlgmuknn uh: mum. noun nnnyubuhkan Immaflln um. mm unmk mhunukan olan nihnh p-m.u»...... sm »u=ym.n.m mm 2‘ “Nair 5.4.4 n-nhnrwm .. HIGH .4 mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum W s KESIMPIJLAN 51 Bemasanan pe...u..a;. kaemngan seam mammum u=.m.a.p ksuamua saxmaxn pauaaxwun, Mahiamm bevuandavak bahawa pm nm.m.n mnmbulmkln uelwlv mlw vemuumun a. mm saluyan :2: mm. Knekuln dwbaca benama "men azsa Karlun xmuaan vane mm ptlak pendakwaan (ehh man umuk mcmbulmkan aleman ksdxa an mg. haw pa-waumn hemennn u-9-I unluk menwumum kahunuun yansl Iwkun unluk 52 Earuauman axasama-.n m ms, mahkamah IN mama»... whak Dlndlkwnn um um: unluk mnw-mm... sullu m pm. Isa: mm-o rarvuduh ab! Delludman yam: mmmm Iemadavnyi din daupldn kemedangln yang dnkemukikzn adahh mu lslamal mum mslII:lIpg\'\ Tulluduh memhela am alas penmun... Izvsebul flan mahkamah m. max husema unluk mensabmrzn Yamuuuh pka vembelaln dlpanggn darn Taluduh memmn mm bemmm am 53 Om! yam demwkwan‘ Termfluh aerial’: uh anew: flan mnemm dlnnadi pamumun m bawuh seksyw :2: Kanun Kuelsun muse: banana seksyen am Kanun Kseksaan ransom Ianpa peflu mpanggu unmk membeh am a.n...n. 2 1...“... 2:224 An: R u M. van Mahkamah M mm Kznaav Pam: Fwhak-pxluk 349» mhak pendakwaan Puan Nunn mm mm Ab. Rama am pm T-«um». mm mm bin Nam!-n 2 sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 1:: ma cm. ofplunuwnorr) Muhhanuh nevmnllah mevvunusun um: ea. mluk pevmakwun my. heavy: unluk nvengemukalcan iualu kas prim: fine temenep Temmuh mas pemnduhin hemsdnpnya mu Itdak Iabahml meme-m amine kapumlan nmuk memamu Yemaduh membelndm uaspemnduhxn Iemadnpnya -uu me\lDIIkIn an membooukln Tenuduh lanpl rmmlnflgfl Yenudun unluk rmmbwh am :4 2 mum.» Psrxekmuarl man has Puhhc Prouctnorv Mondknal gm figguzgmz v cg 457 mun menwanxkan Panduan wapada Mahkzmah bekanaan mgas mankamah a. akmv ka pasdahwnn .4» men. Gap!‘ Sn nun JCA (u n. men wn) mun mlnyaukan seoam Mug beak-n -a For me aufllnuu M In: cam: b=\aw. wn umnnniu .. 7nHova lm ms- Ihal ihuuld be um by - Inil man 1 me dale ov me Wu:E<:mun'x clue on In: don M an pvouemarru em, wbjoa mt mm. M By «- arnncuncn m momnmym 3 minimum EVIIIIIIWI cu-my Iuuwnru thn mdmhty av sad: eme wasecunou : Mmesses me mm mm.“ .u mumubk rrflmunas we: may be mwn mm ma ewaenee wme nvmonau mm M Iwo a man mmnau, V-an amw me mlomueo Inn mul imnurubla lo we Iwmd (up uk ynunaw m. qx—|mn m m cal! upon me wowed m mm M defence Ind :u.m.m.m..n mm am Vpvopavdle ::uw\r.1 mm an m. mm. new Mien mi’ w an nnwm lo um um I-en 1| wee: mu a pm: rm =59 ha: been «me out Ind m. dflanu: mama bu uflw Wme arrswa n We‘ mew apnma lame use ms nu! bea\ m-It au|:naxM aoousad mm be iequmed‘ my me mm. m cahd‘ IM nnculd em. In mm um mm mm my Illav dnlsmx .. am In: iccuud was 1: gm wduwm Dun .e Inmuah ». - 1:: m on m Mu V Pubic PmuwrorI1vE.'!I!LNS :2 new Mu 25: em Huiykwunuslfl menu ‘ «mm. smm ...m.mm be LAIQ4 m may he mm-y em. dnuumnl VII mum Wm! : 3 Pzvkmull pnml lam‘: max an-mmun m own KTJ Wa\au hagalmnnapun, Mnhkamah Pecsekmuan dnlnm ken Bnlncanlndnn V. pp must 1 cu H mm 1 AM}! :2 mm: 2 ML: J01 man mengrmman beokcmnn um puma mg ..p.mm. . ylng mnkm In mlItIMdeuohhvcuuVuvlhnnroucuI~oI\ww|d0¢valo«bu mm ndence swam la cmmn he accused w M em. m mam Mam? Wlhe aniwen nnmeamnnlmemevu - Vlmavwemse hasbeeu mlfle out ms mm. an ac naeosvly‘ mam - cmmoerwon 04 me exxsle-me .4 my VI-mnlbh mu m In cal: m (M pmhcmcn w um. my man mum mum an n. no Wm: 7:1): can a a ummn aw..." dalam kc: Lnol x... and mu. p.....m.. Amugaua man 2 Mu ss; (ms) 2 um 11 my. manlhuraman m....... uuln umuk rnenanmknn um: .4. pm. V109 um. um...“ ...u m .....m M. ».m.r “In nu! ruipeoaml new we oenen mu m be ippfied m u:«:mu\nmg mam . puma lam: can hu Iron mad: am under ; am (hi wand -paw lo . mu war 5 173 :2! m. cvcy u ml -. omummeu m mt Mlwmern of ><m.~. Veap Sam F1 (:5 us men -my -n om Mawzr hm Hash m a. Nlm mm [1ie3l2MLJ232m p 2712 ‘Tu Iumnunu, u wnulfl mmun apudav mm luvlng mgam m n. pnsnnwnn mam. mama u hr. . pnml has nun n rum ban nlahlmhed mm Notdm mm and Am Abdulhh we xm»v\d aocmed now me Mum mma mm umnu memnunnu mm wamnlmexrmnvwmen m um waves :1 may em |o mm am now mm. n me may as pevvemy mm m use wen mown may m bum ma undot m. Em-vumy x-uuunm-1 ma in-tum u an way u. onnvnbd vim: mm. mum m vnd mm semn 34 mm. P-n2! cagy»mm.rum.qu.nmn um um negmv we lie mrvflxem m m: mm: M hive |ul1 mum bean: V»: M mmw m lhe -mevndm . mg: am. enemy. um my». mum.» laannd 9-mm In mm. um .1 m. clan M an Wouumnn nu Fnmmr m was nwunn m m Vnquslanvn Imam-an M Pamamenl as axpmud m we Iznguzgn empmynd byntomvwmal mmnome be: dualenvcmlrya judge umvfim-nan mcuudqhr.1Iln:un:m mum uluwemam Pzvum V sm H\JiykVVuflusH1Pn:h-mi 5 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! I<9M 1 M1177 Inmmvwmu mm: u..mm m..m.mymmg m M: Ilnuulle m :2. rglxnfiyfnrmulllsd 5 vggm vnnumx - mu. mww mg was In M. . mmmum eyuumu um mm mm [M ma...» .-a. us mm: m -. mllu . maximum wilullmn m mam vnmhwv Io comma av ml at In: mm: mm pm-unm tx- u manor: Mews man than rs envy um vxuuu mm . mg. mm we may 5 mom IN cpc has to und-«aka am. due mm p-u-mum. and He man man we vvuuewon Wanna Ia mlxdmum .y.x..m m In ..x yummy. unlmm w v dyad: «a nu man In: men»: mm NI wm. no h: an: m mmlm mung .m n pvwnmn m wvmd mm on we may of we evnemz cmnxlmsd m me umlemlmn me: u II: anawev s \n me neqmm lat no hum: an an: nu men mbdu ul um me manned nculv ha -nmbd u m nwuulu ~ :5 Sarsyen 324 Kamm Keieksaan man mampemrmlkkan xepnm vanuhenxnn 'Vnl|mmlW musing mm aydarrsmwu wzsums nrmeans 224 VI/Mnwv, -nxnlm m.c.-«pm-u:..uun>y Mdrnn :34 yumnnvymm mm by menu .2 My mmmvmn my s-molmu mam at among, :1 my mllumemvmcfl, usedaanwsaoovvnlolloncv um-otymcmsaoam, army m...m.a wupavv u spamea wmrm m @ my mum aim or my mm lubwanco or ny rmans :4 my P114512" ar any wrroave smalanoe cl by mean: cl any expiomve mwam any means olany wflswme mm n y: aslsmmmt m the human bow to mama. to mm. one mm mm mo mend. any Mun: M my mm mm Wmarnd mm rmwvswvnarl fur: lurm mm. may enlcnd m ‘Ion my; Mwrlh my :1 win wmwma 9: mm My two a!:umD44rushmev1Ia' an Sn1.|muInyn llklyln am Knnun K.-eumn cam mlmperumukiun mkumin yang mm "Pums/lment Var caaxm mm m spasm. Vomersnwsey up 412 M/haw-I mm mm (1: ms spam: av iwmur wan", - mm m mmunmnlod mm oralhvrmmb-r HIM: flmilr and commux an Menus unougamzzafifimgwfimwp-pwwmm sm H\Jiyk7VunusH1Pn:h-IVE ‘ «mm. smm nmmwm .. U... w my me mmuny -mm: dnuamnl y. mum Wm! wmmsarvrnwl Var . mm mm may autumn in: mm! aims mamnmm lam! far mm he wuuldnavebeen/Aabve on mrmrrron for ma! Mleoceundenne mevan: mm ruawltndzrntng any Lmwmmm plov-otd for ma: ofltvlcv - 3 7 Bag: mengsnukakzn suam kes puma lame Ramadan Tennduh flalam kn an bzwah saskyen :24 Kanun Kssakuan yaw dlbau bersama senyen :23. Knnun Keseknln, pmak peudlkvaan nandaklilu nmluluukkzn bnnnw rmpllhmlpnln kenmnn ymg mum mu. aum.m mm (a) pad: mm, wakm din lemankyang msehmkm flalim penuamun mangsa adalah bu mam Tenuduh 10} nnuaun am-an pew-pl am-auungm. mm llu m-nyll‘ dun ya; mun-m menugunakan seouah kem yang ma mgunmn sebagaw aalulh halal: menyeoanm mmun 4. Isu UMDANG-UNDAMG 41 Bedaulkan Mu ynvg mkemukmn men pmax peudakwun, In H: nanapan Mahkamah aaahn sevem yang mm 4.; um. udl pm mum wlhm dun Irmpll ylng duebulkun fllhm pumuumn mawu mam. mu heard: muuuh, rm sama ads ma Iankh, wakm flan mm yang msehmkan dman nenuuunan, Tenuduh danaan sum: mandatanqkan cedar: K: .m m-ngu, .1... (cl hm; -1- wad. Ixnkh mm can my-1 v-nu dmcbmaln dallm pedmduhnn remmn mewlgqunikzll aabwllh kzvix yiw mu mgunaian sehagav secuain [mien menyenamn kematnan sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv ’ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! IaJ Sam: ans Dada hnkh. vnklu flan c-mun ma umxsuum. aan-m pnnufluhln mnngxx mhlah ihu mm Yofluduh 4 2 Baa: will naruma max paman paaa mnaaua mas: dwvemkawkan bahzwa rvungu uhu sm dlhm kn w «man mu kapadl Tevluduh 43 sm dzlam huvemwannw memakmmkan naruwa behau man ke nuhknmah mm memx bank kes lemadapz avuk man yang bemaml Mohd Wafindmn hm Mazelan u Kalanmuan sum luv Man dwwmwny Nah kelavarvsln swz yum memuldumkun mm be u M. hem ml unluk mannnk mu K51 ylng mam armri om: yang mmpaun manqla dlnnan ahanu behau yang M1: membakan Temoduh dalam kes VII! 45 suamu-ya mu svu yang Jug: mampam Faglwm wanymun |uql mlngls-Ink-n x...a.... yung mum kn om mnmblnkln u.r.....g... mu. beriaku memmm Ihu denunn mu kindung A6 ouh yang dermknan mihklmlh im mmummn mum inllplli nmam mm mu mum. man an annual y-no flluhulun mun Difluduhln m-nun mm. Ihu mm Y-mam: ul-n n-My: Imluk dlhukikan um plluk pondllliuln. as; sun. am pm mum, mm .1... Inmpn ynng nfisebunun mm pemuunan, Yemmuh dengan ungap rnendavangkan udeu k: ab: nungu 4 7 Bzmubunw denwan mmpilv xeaua, dalam my vm loeladxan mauamna dalam pemsduhin man muxan bevhku pad: mmma jam mm. Ituvinn 1a.1s mu, benempnldlxlnmnlmmnhflmu, ;.m.n1.s. RFAAuu. Perils. 4a sm mm Pegrw . Fanymul ma-a mm».-nu new main an a-mu bah: ole?! mun p-moan-an man marwilikan bahawa haul uaiatzn sw HU=yk7VuflusH1Pn:lxlW 5 «ma smm ...m.mm be used .a mm ma mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG v-vrm beivau «=1-am. semmmm dmam Denuduhan mkmkan Iemh mm flalam Iumah Na 44, man up 5‘ an mu. azwo Am, Pems. Mahkanuh memauk mevangan spa mm. membeukan kelzmngan dnlam pememaan mm men Bmak pernbelaan sepem yang mm. s saoxmas sun RUJUK vazzusem a mum ws5TuAN su muux MUKA suan xsnm sun um Awux KEPADA I-mus xsswn xaunuw D<xArAxAu ssmxu m Auluur no 44 mm rm 5 an Amu um mm mm EERI xemwcm Ksmnml aamxu D1 mm; Rumm J ssmu 4 9 Dalam kas wu nka anew katminuan salunaksl pendakwaan bemwh dlnpadi sw ImggnM104lemklmSFI4,l\dlxndnkst2mngan dlxemukakm nigh max swam... memanm nu yam: mm mm. son an. Iamm w/12/2921 mu rem mm: «o 15 mm «mm mmnh bu-llnul No. 44 an n rm 5. EPA Am. Ann. Poms 4 cu mum xemangan sru helsau menyalakan dauvaua nasu susatzn umu, Tsnuduh mm M: am am an m up mm-gm. m. dlpll damn mm: mm mun... n=.m.m. Ray: «mm mp-xx. m...n.;... Duh-u xlm mg benkm s sEYE:usMvA nu vanznscsm Ia psnmum snxsl. xmu ummw Msn smsmm mam wwcsn mm urnxm man Amwm BERDASARKAN smsama Kmu, men Kmu NVAYAKAN aaeamm xmu amen mm wmvm mu» J aenuasuwu msu smsanu sum Mmssa mLw=An vmu nmxm om on ozuam mznecaumuu szmun «sans an m rzusnxum ATAU mm xzrsmaaaw um; mazawm men wwssa seumm KEPADA an sum, EERSANGKM Asw nzpom uumozl Pu»: Im smm run: 411 wmu any mununu/I SP1dnn svz dllnm kn: mum-n mambenkan kgmvilwan m manmun wahnvun keduardnanyl (elm um kg mlhmmah flan nxenaavsm Iumpah dahm kandaw um umuk mamnen kalarinpin mefluami u,.a.a.. yang mpemnduhkzn xemnanv Tenuduh sm HUiykVVuflusH1Pn:lxnv 3 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 412 sm um um ks mlhkmuh an dalim lunar-Inganlvyl msflyflikln seam yang human 5 Pu»: unu mum cums xz wwmm mm mm 4 vwum saw. mum: mm um ADALAN uurux msumx amx Kss mm saw. MOHD wAnuumN am mzsum an nmx Bznmsmv UNYUK MEMBERI APA»APA xsrssumm mum xzs M 4 I3 sm mm»... mam! mm.u.m enggnn memhanknn .u. p. m.ma.n 4.. am... am... pemenlunn uumn mu... mu dmquk mg." .9. .9. autumn boounzn kaudun mam: lam: :1 ml n.u.. mu... mun Inn merwlulun mu." mu... aw... u. mahkamnn umnh unluk menmk bilrk kn 414 sP14 dalam kes W M. berseluyu dengan mdnngan nmak pembeman bahlwl sn mu.» mu mats mm dllam mmah umau kanadun a... nIl|hI|ka1-mun yum} .1.m.x... ..n.x.. .1... mm manmuknl mm... a... ylng berrnku dun .w.x mu. .m us Sebagamunn 5P1 spz ,..g. enggln membenknn u.»..m.n mingevm Mjldmn, .. .n mn. duanl mengeruv MM: .1. SP2 mm. mumvul mm.» bernmu sm, mm M. mm meruiwlls son A benabul us SP2 mu mmjuk mengevul lzponn polh ynng um... nleh helm bemanaan keladun mm. Alan men 3511/2| nose) Iandungnn d-lam men Jug: um dnslhknn nun SP2 mum-Inun 5P1 411 Wmaunlm sum menyavaxan haul slasalan behau ltefiman dllvalakan wan. m dlhm rumah mum nus: ad: mnaman lam yang uapil mamnaiul u.,.m.n ylng mm aw cum runuh 4 In sum wlanjutnya Jervis: man one» Tlmbahn Pendakwa Ray. yang Ievnemar menpemau mmusan snasnlnn helm mu menyalakan sepem yang n-um sm H\Jiyk7VanusH1Pn:h-IV! ‘° «W. s.n.\ nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm. dnuumnl VII .mm Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021

PLAINTIF KIRUBAKARAN A/L MUNIANDY DEFENDAN 1. ) NADRAJAN A/L CHEN CHIAH 2. ) SUGUMARAN A/L KRISHNAN

Kemalangan jalan raya - tiada saksi mata di pihak plaintif - laporan polis defendan bercanggah - sama ada plaintif berjaya membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan

02/01/2024

Puan Lailawati Binti Ali

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JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BHARU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. JA – A53KJ – 365 – 05 /2021 ANTARA KIRUBAKARAN A/L MUNIANDY … PLAINTIF DAN 1. NADRAJAN A/L CHEN CHIAH 2. SUGUMARAN A/L KRISHNAN 3. AM GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (Company No. 44191-P) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN 1. Ini merupakan tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan pertama (D1) dan kedua (D2) yang timbul daripada satu kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 9.7.2016. Di akhir kes perbicaraan Mahkamah telah menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap D1 dan D2 dengan kos. Mahkamah juga membuat taksiran gantirugi provisional bagi gantirugi am dan khas yang berkenaan. Plaintif tidak berpuashati terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah dan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi. 2. Defendan ketiga (D3) pula merupakan penanggung insuran motorsikal yang ditunggang D1 dan dimiliki oleh D2 di dalam kes ini. D3 memfailkan tuntutan balas terhadap plaintif yang mana juga ditolak oleh Mahkamah dengan kos. D3 tidak memfailkan rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah tersebut. 02/01/2024 15:46:12 JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kand. 99 S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 2 3. Mahkamah kini mengemukakan alasan-alasannya seperti berikut. LIABILITI 4. Kemalangan jalan raya yang melibatkan plaintif dan defendan- defendan yang menjadi kausa tindakan di dalam kes ini diplidkan di dalam Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut: “Pada 09 Julai 2016 lebih kurang 5.30 pagi plaintif secara sah di sisi undang-undang sedang menunggang motorsikal berdaftar no. PKA 2836 dan apabila sampai di KM 8 Jalan Johor Bharu Air Hitam semasa plaintif bergerak terus dan secara tiba-tiba motorsikal berdaftar no JPQ 3957 yang dipandu dengan cuainya oleh defendan pertama telah melanggar motorsikal yang ditunggang oleh plaintif lalu menyebabkan plaintif terjatuh.” 5. Saksi-saksi yang dipanggil oleh plaintif untuk membuktikan kesnya ialah: i. Dr Nabilah binti Halim dari Hospital Sultanah Aminah Johor Bharu (HSAJB) – SP1 ii. Sarjan Azim bin Ab Samad (pegawai penyiasat warisan) – SP2 iii. Dr Norbaizura Ismail dari HSAJB – SP3 iv. Nagendran Rajamanickam (sepupu plaintif) – SP4 v. Sarojini a/p Subramaniam (ibu plaintif) – SP5 vi. Devi a/p Subramaniam (Ibu saudara plaintif) – SP6 vii. Kirubakaran a/l Munaindy – SP7 viii. Muniandy a/l Iyaroo (bapa plaintif) – SP8 ix. Shin Chin Ai (CPO) – SP9 S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 3 6. D1 dan D2 tidak memanggil mana-mana saksi. Manakala D3 pula merupakan penangungan insuran motorsikal JPQ 3957 yang ditunggang oleh D1 dan dimiliki oleh D2. D3 telah dijadikan defendan ketiga di dalam tindakan ini melalui satu Notis Permohonan untuk Mencelah yang dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah pada 2.12.2021. D3 juga tidak memanggil mana-mana saksi di dalam kes ini. Versi Plaintif 7. SP1 merupakan doctor yang menyediakan laporan perubatan awal dari Klinik Pakar Neurosurgeri HSAJB bertarikh 18.8.2018 dan ditandakan sebagai eksibit P1. 8. Di dalam P1 tersebut dicatitkan: ‘Brief description of accident: MB rider, unsure mechanism and was found by roadside by passerby.’ 9. Maklumat ini diterima daripada paramedik yang membawa plaintif ke HSAJB pada hari kejadian. 10. Saksi seterusnya ialah pegawai penyiasat warisan iaitu SP2. Keterangan SP2 adalah berdasarkan kertas siasatan sahaja kerana pegawai penyiasat asal Sarjan Yusoff bin Adon telah bersara. Menurut kertas siasatan, laporan-laporan polis yang diterima berkaitan kes ini ialah: i. Laporan polis Trafik Johor Bharu (S) 015926/16 (eksibit P7) oleh SP4 bertarikh 27.7.2016 (FIR) iaitu 18 hari selepas Tarikh kemalangan; S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 4 ii. Laporan pembetulan trafik Johor Bharu (S) 015933/16 (eksibit P8) oleh SP4 bertarikh 27.7.2016; iii. Laporan polis trafik Johor Bharu (S) 23657/16 oleh SP5 bertarikh 30.10.2016 (eksibit P5); iv. Laporan pembetulan Trafik Johor Bharu (S) 23658/16 oleh SP5 bertarikh 30.10.2016 (eksibit P9); v. Laporan Trafik Johor Bharu (S) 023307/2016 oleh Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah bertarikh 26.10.2016 (eksibit IDD4); vi. Laporan pembetulan Trafik Johor Bharu (S) 026517/16 oleh Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah bertarikh 5.12.2016 (eksibit IDD6). 11. Menurut SP2, pegawai penyiasat asal menyediakan rajah kasar iaitu eksibit P10. Pemeriksaan ke atas kedua-dua motorsikal yang kononnya didakwa terlibat tidak dilakukan kerana tidak dibawa ke balai. 12. Selain laporan-laporan polis yang diterima, SP2 menyatakan tiada keterangan senyap di dalam kes ini untuk membuktikan kemalangan berlaku di dalam tindakan ini. 13. SP2 setuju memandangkan FIR di dalam kes ini (eksibit P7) menyatakan kemalangan disebabkan plaintif terbabas sendiri maka tiada siasatan akan dilakukan. 14. Keterangan D1 ada dirakam pada 26.10.2016 iaitu pada hari D1 membuat laporan polis IDD4. Tiada rakaman percakapan dibuat selepas D1 membuat laporan polis keduanya iaitu IDD6. Menurut SP2 S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 5 juga versi kemalangan yang dikemukakan oleh D1 berdasarkan laporan-laporan polisnya adalah bercanggah antara satu sama lain. 15. Mengenai kelewatan D1 membuat laporan polis, SP2 memberitahu alasan yang diberikan oleh D1 ialah D1 telah memberikan nombor telefonnya kepada bapa plaintif (SP8). 16. Keputusan siasatan ialah Refer to Magistrate (RTM) pada 28.7.2018 kerana kes dianggap tidak selesai tanpa plaintif membuat laporan polis. 17. Keterangan SP4 iaitu sepupu kepada plaintif ialah beliau menerima panggilan telefon daripada ibu plaintif (SP5) pada 9.7.2016 pada jam lebih kurang 8.00 pagi memaklumkan plaintif mengalami kemalangan di KM 8 Jalan Johor Bharu Air Hitam. SP4 pergi ke tempat yang dimaklumkan dan mendapati plaintif dan motorsikalnya tiada di sana. SP4 terus ke HSAJB dan mendapati plaintif sedang menerima rawatan di ICU di HSAJB. SP4 terus memaklumkan SP5 mengenai keadaan plaintif dan SP5 dan SP6 datang dari Kedah ke Johor Bharu keesokan harinya melihat keadaan plaintif sendiri. 18. SP4 membuat laporan polis 18 hari selepas itu selepas diminta oleh doctor di HSAJB kerana plaintif mengalami kecederaan serius. SP4 membuat laporan polisnya iaitu P7 pada 27.7.2016. SP4 tidak tahu bagaimana kemalangan boleh menimpa plaintif dan di dalam P7 menyatakan plaintif terbabas sendiri berdasarkan apa yang dimaklumkan oleh SP5. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 6 19. Keterangan SP5 pula ialah beliau menerima panggilan telefon daripada seorang lelaki India yang tidak dikenali pada 9.7.2016 yang memaklumkan tentang kemalangan yang menimpa plaintif. SP5 menelefon SP4 dan meminta SP4 mengesahkannya. 20. Setelah mendapat pengesahan daripada SP4, SP5 dan SP6 terus datang ke Johor Bharu dari Sg Petani, Kedah dan melihat plaintif di HSAJB keesokan harinya. Hari kedua mereka di HSJAB, mereka telah didatangi oleh seorang lelaki yang bernama ‘Rajan’ yang memperkenalkan dirinya sebagai kawan plaintif. Rajan ini telah memberikan nombor telefonnya kepada SP6 dan memberitahu akan membantu mereka dari segi kewangan sekiranya perlu. Rajan juga ada mengambil nombor telefon SP6 pada masa pertemuan di HSAJB tersebut. 21. Dalam bulan Oktober 2016, semasa plaintif sudah dibawa pulang ke Sg Petani, Kedah, SP5 dan SP6 menerima panggilan telefon daripada Rajan dan bertanya khabar keadaan plaintif. Semasa panggilan ini, Rajan mengaku telah melanggar plaintif pada hari kejadian tersebut. SP5 dan SP6 sangat marah dan meminta Rajan membuat laporan polis. Sekiranya Rajan gagal, SP6 akan memberikan nombor telefon Rajan kepada polis. Rajan berjanji akan membuat laporan polis mengenai kemalangan tersebut. 22. SP5 menyatakan selepas perbualan dengan Rajan tersebut beliau membuat laporan polisnya P5 pada 30.10.2016 di Kuala Muda Kedah. Penjelasan SP5 mengenai kelewatan membuat laporan polis ini ialah S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 7 kerana ingin tunggu plaintif sembuh untuk mengetahui bagaimana kemalangan boleh berlaku. Namun begitu semasa di soalbalas jawapan SP5 pula ialah laporan polis dibuat kerana ingin membawa plaintif balik ke rumah di Sg Petani. 23. SP5 bersetuju bahawa di dalam laporan polisnya P5 tidak dinyatakan penglibatan D1 di dalam kemalangan tersebut sunggupun mengakui P5 dibuat selepas perbualan telefon dengan Rajan tersebut. 24. Keterangan SP6 adalah lebih kurang sama dengan keterangan SP5 mengenai pertemuan mereka dengan Rajan di HSAJB dan perbualan telefon dengan Rajan dalam bulan Oktober 2016. SP6 sendiri tidak membuat laporan polis selepas mengetahui penglibatan Rajan di dalam kemalangan tersebut. SP6 juga tidak tahu bahawa isterinya SP5 ada membuat laporan polis iaitu P5 di dalam kes ini. 25. SP7 juga memberi keterangan dan secara ringkasnya beliau menyatakan selepas kemalangan beliau tidak ingat apa yang berlaku. SP7 tidak tahu bagaimana kemalangan berlaku. SP7 menyatakan dilanggar oleh motorsikal selepas ibunya memberitahu sedemikian. SP7 tidak tahu tujuan beliau memberi keterangan semasa perbicaraan. 26. Hujahan plaintif ialah berdasarkan keterangan SP5 dan SP6 dan merujuk kepada IDD4 dan IDD6 yang dibuat oleh D1, kemalangan ini diakibatkan kecuaian D1 yang melanggar motorsikal plaintif pada masa kejadian. Keterangan-keterangan yang ada adalah mencukupi S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 8 untuk membuktikan kes di atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan defendan pula tidak mengemukakan versi kemalangan mereka kerana D1 tidak hadir memberi keterangan. Oleh yang demikian, kes plaintif gagal disangkal oleh defendan. Versi D1 dan D2 27. D1 tidak hadir memberi keterangan pada Tarikh yang telah ditetapkan. Mahkamah tidak membenarkan penangguhan dan D1 dan D2 menutup kes tanpa memanggil saksi. 28. Di dalam Penyata Pembelaan, D1 dan D2 menafikan penglibatan motorsikal JQP 3957 di dalam kemalangan tersebut. Turut diplidkan motorsikal JQP 3957 langsung tiada kaitan dalam kemalangan tersebut dan tuntutan ini mempunyai elemen mempunyai elemen frod di mana plaintif bertujuan membuat tuntutan palsu di bawah polisi insuran D1 dan D2. 29. Seperti yang dinyatakan di atas D1 ada membuat 2 laporan polis iaitu IDD4 dan IDD5. 30. Laporan polis IDD4 yang bertarikh 26.6.2016 menyatakan: “Pada 09/07/2016 jam lebih kurang 0530 hrs semasa saya sedang menunggang m/sikal no. JPQ 3957 dari Skudai hendak pergi ke tempat kerja di Singapore. Apabila sampai di KM 8 Jalan Johor Bharu – Air Hitam semasa saya sedang jalan terus selekoh sebelah kiri tiba- tiba sebuah m/sikal no. PKA2836 yang dating dari arah belakang sebelah kanan telah melanggar motorsikal saya. Saya tidak cedera. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 9 Kerosakan m/sikal saya di bahagian cover set, lampu dan lain-lain kerosakan belum pasti.” 31. Laporan pembetulan D1 iaitu IDD6 yang bertarikh 5.12.2016 pula menyatakan: “Pada 5/12/2016 jam lebih kurang 1844 hrs saya datang ke Pejabat Pertanyaa Trafik Johor Bharu Selatan untuk membuat pembetulan report bersabit JBTR: 15926/16. Semasa kemalangan saya telah melanggar sebuah motorsikal no. PKA 2836 yang telah memotong m/sikal saya dari arah belakang tepi sebelah kanan bukan beliau yang melanggar saya dari arah belakang sebelah kanan. Sekian laporan saya." 32. Adalah hujahan defendan-defendan bahawa setakat keterangan yang ada plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan- defendan. Laporan-laporan polis D1 tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai eksibit kerana D1 tidak hadir memberi keterangan. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN 33. Akta Keterangan 1950 menggariskan bahawa plaintif menanggung beban pembuktian kesnya terhadap defendan. Seksyen-seksyen 101 memperuntukkan: “Burden of proof 101.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 10 (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” 34. Di dalam pembuktian tindakan kecuaian, beban pembuktian kes ditanggung oleh plaintif sepenuhnya. Prinsip undang-undang matan ini dinyatakan dengan jelas di dalam locus classicus Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 2 MLJ 175 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence. The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant’s negligence. Evidence is the foundation of proof, with which it must not be confounded. Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts which are the subject of inquiry. Evidence, if accepted and believed, may result in proof, but it is not necessarily proof of itself.”; see 15 Halsbury (3rd Edn.) p. 260.” ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH ATAS ISU LIABILITI 35. Di dalam kes ini, tiada seorang pun saksi yang memberi keterangan benar-benar mengetahui bagaimana kemalangan yang menimpa plainitf boleh berlaku. 36. FIR di dalam kes ini dibuat 18 hari selepas kejadian dan seperti keterangan SP2 tiada siasatan dibuat pada masa itu kerana FIR iaitu P7 menyatakan plaintif terbabas sendiri. 37. Siasatan hanya dibuat pada bulan Oktober 2016 iaitu selepas D1 membuat laporan polisnya IDD4 pada 26.10.2016. Pada masa ini, sudah lebih 3 bulan kemalangan terjadi dan tiada apa-apa keterangan S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 11 senyap dari segi kesan kemalangan, kerosakan kenderaan mahupun gambar-gambar polis boleh dijadikan bukti bagi membantu siasatan. 38. Plaintif hanya bersandarkan kesnya kepada keterangan SP5 dan SP6 sepertimana yang dihuraikan di atas dan laporan-laporan polis D1 untuk membuktikan kemalangan ini berlaku disebabkan kecuaian D1. 39. Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh plaintif adalah tidak mencukupi untuk membuktikan kemalangan ini berlaku akibat penglibatan D1 apatah lagi kecuaian D1. SP5 dan SP6 tiada pengetahuan langsung (direct knowledge) mengenai kemalangan ini dan hanya bergantung kepada pengakuan yang dibuat oleh individu yang mengenalkan dirinya sebagai ‘Rajan’. 40. Malahan laporan polis SP5 sendiri yang kononnya dibuat selepas panggilan telefon daripada ‘Rajan’ juga tidak menyatakan penglibatan Rajan di dalam kemalangan tersebut. Adalah sesuatu yang munasabah bagi SP5 untuk memasukkan pengakuan Rajan di dalam laporan polisnya sekiranya itu perkara yang sebenarnya berlaku. Kegagalan SP5 memasukkan maklumat penting tersebut membuatkan keterangan SP5 ini adalah disyaki dan diragui. 41. Tambah lagi, SP5 juga memberikan keterangan yang bercanggah mengenai kelewatan membuat laporan polis. Di dalam pemeriksaan awal beliau memberitahu lewat membuat laporan polis kerana menunggu plaintif sembuh sedangkan semasa di soal balas SP5 S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 12 memberitahu laporan polis hanya dibuat apabila mahu membawa balik plaintif pulang ke Sg Petani sedangkan semasa P5 dibuat, plaintif sudah berada di Sg Petani lebih kurang sebulan sebelumnya. 42. Laporan polis P5 juga bercanggah dengan keterangan SP5 di Mahkamah dan keterangan SP4. Di dalam P5 dinyatakan SP5 menerima panggilan telefon daripada anak saudaranya yang memaklumkan plaintif terlibat dalam kemalangan pada 9.7.2016. Sedangkan di dalam keterangan utama SP5 dan keterangan SP4 sendiri, SP5 yang menelefon SP4 dan memberitahu SP4 tentang kemalangan yang berlaku terhadap plaintif. Di dalam keterangan SP5 di Mahkamah mengatakan beliau menerima panggilan dari seorang lelaki India yang tidak dikenali dan bukannya dari anak saudaranya. 43. Mahkamah berpendapat percanggahan-percanggahan di atas adalah material dan menjejaskan keterangan dan kredibiliti SP5. Mahkamah tidak dapat bergantung kepada keterangan SP5 untuk menentukan dapatan liability di dalam kes ini. 44. Mahkamah juga mendapati keterangan SP6 tidak dapat menolong kes plaintif. SP6 sendiri tidak membuat laporan polis selepas pengakuan Rajan sebaliknya menyuruh Rajan untuk berbuat demikian. Lebih musykil lagi SP6 sendiri tidak tahu bahawa isterinya SP5 ada membuat laporan polis P5 selepas perbualan mereka dengan Rajan tersebut. Dan kedua-dua mereka tidak tahu bahawa D1 telah membuat laporan polis IDD4 pada 26.10.2016 iaitu 4 hari sebelum laporan polis SP5. Ini bermakna D1 telah membuat laporan polis S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 13 sebelum SP5 dan SP6 menerima panggilan telefon daripada Rajan tersebut. 45. SP6 tidak menyimpan apa-apa butiran mengenai Rajan. Nombor telefon Rajan juga tiada kerana telefon bimbit SP6 sudah hilang. 46. Mahkamah berpendapat tiada apa-apa butiran lanjut dikemukakan oleh plaintif untuk mengesahkan bahawa Rajan yang ditemui di Hospital dan yang menelefon SP5 dan SP6 adalah oleh yang sama yang dinamakan sebagai D1 di dalam kes ini. Hujahan plaintif bahawa Rajan tersebut merujuk kepada Nadrajan adalah satu kesimpulan ringkas tanpa apa-apa bukti sokongan. Hakikatnya SP5 dan SP6 tidak pernah lagi berjumpa dengan Rajan selepas pertemuan di Hospital tersebut untuk mengesahkan bahawa Rajan tersebut merujuk kepada orang yang sama. 47. Plaintif juga berhujah IDD4 dan IDD6 boleh diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah dan digunakan untuk menyokong kes plaintif. Laporan- laporan polis tersebut mengandungi pengakuan D1 tentang penglibatannya di dalam kemalangan tersebut. 48. Plaintif telah menggariskan 6 alasan untuk IDD4 dan IDD6 diterima masuk sebagai eksibit iaitu: i. Kedua-duanya merupakan ‘public document’ dibawah seksyen 74 Akta Keterangan 1950; ii. Kedua-duanya menyokong rakaman percakapan D1 yang dirakam oleh pegawai penyiasat; S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 14 iii. Kedua-dua laporan tersebut dan rakaman percakapan D1 mengandungi pengakuan tentang penglibatan D1 di dalam kemalangan; iv. Penyata Saksi D1 yang difailkan di Mahkamah menyokong kedua-dua laporan polis D1 dan rakaman percakapannya; v. Kedua-dua laporan tersebut boleh diterima masuk dibawah seksyen 32 dan 73A Akta Keterangan 1950; dan vi. Tiada apa-apa dokumen yang bertentangan dengan pengakuan yang terkandung di dalam IDD4 dan IDD6 tersebut. 49. Mahkamah menolak hujahan plaintif dan memutuskan laporan- laporan polis D1 kekal sebagai “ID” atas beberapa alasan. Pertamanya, D1 telah gagal hadir tanpa sebab untuk datang memberi keterangan. Pada Tarikh perbicaraan 10.5.2023 peguambela defendan memaklumkan Mahkamah bahawa D1 tidak dapat dikesan sedangkan sebelum ini D1 memberikan kerjasama di mana Penyata Saksi beliau ada difailkan di Mahkamah. Situasi di mana D1 tidak hadir Mahkamah untuk memberi keterangan adalah tidak sama dengan pengecualian yang dibenarkan di bawah seksyen 32 dan seksyen 73A Akta Keterangan 1950. 50. Keduanya, kedua-dua laporan kandungan laporan ini bercanggah di antara satu sama lain. Jika diteliti IDD4 D1 mendakwa plaintif yang melanggar motorsikal D1 dari bahagian sebelah kanan belakang tetapi di dalam IDD6 D1 mendakwa beliau yang melanggar plaintif yang ketika itu memotong motorsikalnya dari belakang sebelah kanan. Perlu diambil perhatian juga bahawa IDD6 dibuat lebih S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 15 kurang sebulan setengah selepas IDD4. Mengambil kira percanggahan yang material di dalam kandungan kedua-dua laporan polis tersebut dan jarak masa yang lama untuk D1 membuat laporan polis IDD4 dan IDD6, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak selamat untuk menerima masuk kedua-dua laporan polis tersebut sebagai eksibit tanpa kehadiran D1 memberikan keterangan mengenainya. 51. Ketiga, Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan plaintif bahawa laporan-laporan polis D1 ini disokong oleh rakaman percakapan D1 semasa disiasat oleh pegawai penyiasat. Keterangan saksi kepada pihak polis semasa siasatan boleh diterima masuk di dalam kes sivil bagi tujuan untuk mencabar kredibiliti saksi tersebut sahaja dan bukannya diterima sebagai keterangan substantive untuk membuktikan sesuatu kes. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Bong Nyi Moi v Narayanasamy & Anor [1973] 1 MLJ 250 @ 253 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “Apart from what was found at the scene of the accident by the police as indicated in the sketch plan, the appellant's case rested entirely on the evidence of Yong. Yong's evidence in court was discredited by what he had told the police some 5 hours after the accident. It is true that his statement to the police was not substantive evidence at the trial of the action, but there can be no doubt that it nullified the effect of his evidence in court as to how the accident took place.” 52. Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, D1 tidak hadir memberi keterangan. Oleh yang demikian apa jua keterangan D1 yang diberikan kepada pegawai penyiasat dan dikemukakan melalui S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 16 pegawai penyiasat hanyalah sekadar keterangan dengar cakap dan tidak dapat dibuktikan kesahihannya. Jikapun D1 hadir di Mahkamah, keterangan mengenai rakaman percakapan D1 hanya boleh digunakan untuk mencabar kredibiliti D1 dan bukannya dijadikan bukti substantive perkara yang dirujuk di dalam percakapan tersebut. 53. Keempat, mengenai penyata saksi D1 yang difailkan oleh pihak defendan, Mahkamah berpendapat penyata saksi tersebut tidak boleh dijadikan sandaran oleh plaintif untuk menerima masuk IDD4 dan IDD6. Penyata saksi secara lazimnya difailkan lebih awal daripada Tarikh perbicaraan untuk memudahkan pihak-pihak terlibat dan Mahkamah meneliti penyata saksi tersebut. Namun begitu sekiranya saksi tidak hadir ini tidak bermakna penyata saksi tersebut diterima masuk secara automatik sebagai keterangan. Saksi masih perlu hadir di Mahkamah dan memberi keterangan sebelum penyata saksi dijadikan sebahagian daripada keterangan di dalam perbicaraan. 54. Di dalam kes ini plaintif tidak boleh bergantung kepada dokumen yang bukan keterangan (i.e. penyata saksi) sebagai alasan untuk menerima masuk dokumen-dokumen yang juga belum ditandakan sebagai eksibit dan diterima masuk sebagai keterangan. 55. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Siti Athirah Bt Mohd Sapuan V Razanatul Ain Bt Hassan & Anor [2015] 4 MLJ 359 yang memutuskan S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 17 “The learned sessions court judge arrived at this finding based on the first defendant's police report, a document that was never tendered as evidence in court. We hardly need to stress here that a court is only bound to consider evidence that has been properly tendered before it and admitted as evidence. Anything else should be completely disregarded by the court. In the present case, the fact remains that since the first defendant did not attend court to testify, her police report was never tendered as evidence before the sessions court. As such, both the learned sessions court and High Court judges should have ignored the first defendant's police report completely when deliberating on the finding of liability.” 56. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah mengekalkan IDD4 dan IDD6 sebagai dokumen ÍD’sahaja dan tidak merujuk dan atau menggunapakai kedua-dua semasa membuat keputusan terhadap liability di dalam kes ini seperti mana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Siti Athirah Bt Mohd Sapuan V Razanatul Ain Bt Hassan & Anor, supra. 57. Sekiranya Mahkamah ini terkhilaf di dalam keputusannya menolak untuk menerima masuk IDD4 dan IDD6 sebagai keterangan dan kedua-dua IDD4 dan IDD6 sepatutnya diputuskan diterima masuk sebagai eksibit Mahkamah berpendapat kedua-dua laporan polis tersebut tidak mempunyai nilai probative untuk membuktikan kes plaintif atas alasan percanggahan yang material di dalam kandungannya dan kelewatan melampau oleh D1 membuat kedua- dua laporan polis tersebut. 58. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Karthiyayani & Anor V Lee Leong Sin & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ mengenai nilai dan keberatan yang boleh disandarkan kepada laporan polis yang dibuat lewat oleh pihak yang S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 18 berkepentingan di dalam sesuatu kes. Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “The main test as to whether there has been a delay in making the report is whether it was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there is opportunity for tutoring or concoction. This, in my opinion, is also a circumstance tending to affect a witness's impartiality, hence his veracity which must be taken into account in arriving at a decision.” 59. D1 membuat IDD4 lebih kurang 3 bulan selepas kemalangan berlaku dan alasan yang diberikan olehnya menurut SP2 ialah kerana D1 telah memberikan nombor telefonnya kepada SP6 semasa berjumpa di hospital. Alasan yang diberikan (sekiranya benar) adalah tidak masuk akal dan tidak munasabah. Peruntukan undang-undang adalah jelas di bawah seksyen 52(2) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan bahawa kegagalan membuat laporan polis dalam tempoh masa 24 jam merupakan satu kesalahan di sisi undang-undang. 60. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah memutuskan plaintif telah gagal membuktikan bahawa kemalangan yang berlaku pada 9.7.2016 tersebut melibatkan motorsikal yang ditunggang oleh D1. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan plaintif terhadap D1 dan D2 ditolak dengan kos. 61. Mahkamah juga tidak menggunapakai anggapan bertentangan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 atas kegagalan D1 memberi keterangan atas alasan plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan-defendan (rujuk Che Pah Itam v. Chang Bek Lee S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 19 [1998] 4 CLJ 517). Anggapan bertentangan tersebut hanya terpakai sekiranya plaintif telah Berjaya membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan-defendan. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG BERKENAAN GANTIRUGI 62. Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (A Child Suing Through His Father And Next Friend; Mohd Helmi Abdul Aziz) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885 di mana Abdul Hamid Embong HMP menyatakan menggariskan prinsip asas gantirugi seperti berikut: “It is trite that damages serve as compensation, not a reward, less still a punishment (see Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198; 1983] CLJ (Rep) 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324). In assessing damages, the court should not be motivated by sympathy and award fair compensation based on cogent evidence. The court should not descend into a domain of speculation. The evaluation of those evidence, which form the basis of any risk of future damage, must therefore still be undertaken. And the trial judge can only evaluate such evidence based on the recognised balance of probabilities standard.” 63. Mahkamah kini meneruskan dengan taksiran gantirugi am dan khas (provisional) untuk kes ini. KUANTUM ATAS DASAR 100% GANTIRUGI AM S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 20 64. Bagi tujuan taksiran gantirugi am, laporan-laporan perubatan yang difailkan ialah: a. Laporan perubatan dari Klinik Pakar Surgeri HSAJB bertarikh 18.8.2018; b. Laporan perubatan dari Hospital Sultan Abdul Halim (HSAH) bertarikh 27.7.2017; c. Laporan perubatan dari HSAH bertarikh 20.8.2019; d. Laporan perubatan dari Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah (HSB) bertarikh 19.8.2018; e. Laporan perubatan dari HSB bertarikh 10.9.2019; f. Laporan klarifikasi dari HSB bertarikh 13.10.2019; g. Laporan Imaging Oder dari HSAJB bertarikh 9.7.2016; h. Laporan klarifikasi dari Jabatan Neurosurgeri HSAJB bertarikh 27.12.2021; i. Laporan klarifikasi dari Jabatan Neurodsurgeri dari HSAH bertarikh 16.8.2021; j. Laporan klarifikasi dari Jabatan Oral Maxillofacial Surgery HSAJB bertarikh 9.9.2021; k. Laporan pakar neuro plaintif dari Gleneagles Hospital Penang bertarikh 14.10.2020; l. Laporan pakar neuro defendan dari Island Hospital Pulau Pinang bertarikh 20.1.2022; m. Laporan pakar ortopedik defendan dari Gleneagles Hospital Penang bertarikh 14.3.2022. 65. Kesemua laporan-laporan pakar di atas dipersetujui tertakluk kepada hujahan. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 21 66. Gantirugi am kecederaan yang dialami plaintif adalah seperti berikut. i. Polytrauma with severe head injury with left Acute subdural haemorrhage & multiple facial fracture 67. Laporan perubatan awal plaintif dari HSAJB melaporkan kecederaan plaintif seperti berikut: - Loss of consciousness with E1VTM3 pupil 2/2 reactive; - CT brain done 6 hours post trauma shows left subdural haemorrhage 1.3 cm with midline shift to the right by 0.7 cm with bitemporal contusions and efface basal cistern on CT scanning; - He underwent decompressive craniectomy, clot evacuation, fasciaduraplasty, right frontal Spiegelberg catherer insertion for intracranial pressure monitoring on 09/07/2016; - Repeated CT brain on 11th of July shows hypodense area with hyperdensities at left temporoparietal region with post operation changes; - Repeated CT brain on 13th July shows left middle cerebral artery (MCA) territory infract; - On 14/08/2016, his condition improved, GCS E4VTM3 on ryles tube feeding and trachy mask under room air before transferred to Hospital Sungai Petani.” 68. Plaintif meneruskan rawatan di HSAH Kedah di mana plaintif didiagnos mengalami ‘severe head injury with left acute subdural haematoma and bilateral temporal contusion (done left decompressive craniectomy). S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 22 69. Plaintif menjalani pembedahan left cranioplasty buat kali kedua pada 31.3.2019 dan kali terakhir diperiksa di HSB Kedah pada 16.5.2019 mendapati plaintif tiada apa-apa aduan aktif dan luka cranioplasy telah sembuh dengan baik. 70. Pakar neurosurgeon plaintif memeriksa plaintif pada 5.10.2020 manakala pakar neurosurgeon defendan pula memeriksanya pada 12.1.2022. 71. Adalah satu prinsip undang-undang matan bahawa laporan perubatan terkini diberikan keutamaan kerana menunjukkan keadaan plaintif yang terkini (rujuk Wang Yong Cheng & Anor v Thiagarajan a/l Arumugam [2019] MLJU 1278). 72. Berdasarkan laporan pakar neuro yang terkini, plaintif dilaporkan mengalami keilatan antaranya seperti berikut: • Impairement in orientation, calculation, memory reading, writing, intersected pentagon, copying, clock face drawing and Malay proverb interpretation; • He is able to communicate; • He was disoriented to date, day, month, year, place and person; • Mild right facial weakness due to left motor tract injury; • Right upper limb anf bilateral lower limb impairment due to left motor tract injury; • Severe contracture over bilateral hip, left knee and left ankle; • He was unable to stand and walk S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 23 • He requires assistance to perform his daily activities and cannot live independently; • He is able to perfom feeding by himself; • He needs assistance for dressing, toileting and grooming; • He was able to put in sitting position on bed recently • No history of seizure at home. 73. Selain kecederaan pada bahagian otak, plaintif juga mengalami kepatahan pada beberapa tulang muka dan kepala. Kepatahan tersebut meliputi: • Right parietal bone extending to right temporal; • Right temporal bone fracture extending to right middle ear cavity. Fluid within right middle ear cavity; • Right incudo-malleolar dislocation. Fractures extend to 2nd and 3rd parts of right facial nerve canal, fluid within right mastoid aircells; • Fracture line in right temporal bone extends to the right temporomandibular joint. Minimal right TMJ subluxation with air locules within the joint space; • Multiple fractures lateral wall of sphenoid sinus, fluid within sphenoid and ethmoid sinus, fluids within nasal cavity. 74. Memandangkan kecederaan pada bahagian otak dan tulang muka dan kepala adalah berada pada bahagian badan yang sama Mahkamah memutuskan memberikan satu awad global untuk kecederaan dan keilatan-keilatan yang dialami oleh plaintif. Ini S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 24 adalah selari dengan pendekatan yang diputuskan di dalam kes Tan Cheong Poh & Anor v Teoh Ah Keow [1996] 3 CLJ 665. 75. Berdasarkan laporan-laporan perubatan yang dikemukakan, plaintif mengalami kecederaan yang serius akibat kemalangan tersebut sehingga menyebabkannya lumpuh dan tidak boleh bergerak. Bukan sekadar plaintif mewarisi kecacatan fizikal sehingga memerlukan bantuan penjagaan harian, plaintif juga mengalami keilatan cognitive, memori dan intelektual yang kekal. Keilatan-keilatan ini menyebabkan plaintif sudah tidak dapat menjalani kehidupan seperti lelaki normal yang lain. Lebih malang plaintif baru berusia 20 tahun semasa kemalangan ini berlaku. 76. Berdasarkan nas undang-undang yang dirujuk kedua-dua pihak dan Compendium 2018, Mahkamah memutuskan awad RM360,000.00 bagi kecederaan-kecederaan ini adalah munasabah dan berpatutan. ii. Multiple lung contusions 77. Kecederaan ini dilaporkan di dalam laporan perubatan awal dari HSAJB. Mahkamah membenarkan RM10,000.00 berdasarkan Compendium 2018 dan nas undang-undang yang dirujuk pihak- pihak. iii. Posterior column left acetabulum fracture with inter-articular fragment (with heterotrophic calcification & fusion of the right hip joint) S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 25 78. Plaintif telah menjalani hip replacement surgery pada February 2021 and juga left knee contracture release surgery pada Mac 2020. Turut dilaporkan bahawa ‘The left acetabular fracture has now healed after knee replacement, however this surgery has become complicated with heterotropic calcification and the entire hip movement obliterated.” 79. Akibat komplikasi tersebut, plaintif mengalami: i. Diffuse osteopenia; ii. There is anklylosis of the right hip joint; iii. Severe stiffness of both hips. The right hip is completely ankylosed; iv. Difficulty in standing up as a result of the stiff hips. He may be able to be propped up in bed. • He will require attendant to look after his daily needs; • Unable to walk, unable to be employed in future. (rujuk laporan pakar ortopedik defendan) 80. Berdasarkan kecederaan acetabulum Compendium 2018 mencadangkan awad RM24,000.00 – RM35,000.00. Mahkamah membenarkan awad RM30,000.00 merujuk kepada kes Nor Shuhaida binti Mohd Ali v Ahmad bin Yeop Ahmad [2018] 1 PIR [8]. iv. Scars 81. Parut-parut yang dialami oleh plaintif ialah: i. 19 cm healed surgical scars over left hip; ii. 17 cm healed surgical scar over the left anterior part of knee; iii. Left frontoparietotemporal surgical scar; S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 26 iv. Tracheostomy scar in front of the neck v. Scar over the anterior abdominal wall (site of PEG tube) insertion. 82. Mahkamah membenarkan RM8,000.00 bagi parut-parut di atas. v. Open fracture of left index finger distal phalanx 83. Kepatahan ini telah bercantum tetapi ada sedikit kecacatan dengan ‘widening at the base of the third metacarpal bone’. 84. Berdasarkan Compendium 2018 Mahkamah membenarkan RM5,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. vi. Degloving injury over dorsum left foot 85. Kecederaan ini dilaporkan di dalam laporan perubatan Jabatan Surgeri HSAH Kedah. Mahkamah membenarkan RM15,000.00 berdasarkan kes Assokumar a/l Venugopal @ Ramus v Lai Bak Seng & Anor [2020] 2 POR [25] yang dirujuk plaintif. vii. Stable fracture of L5 lamina & spinous process 86. Kepatahan ini dilaporkan di dalam laporan perubatan awal HSAJB dan melibatkan kepatahan pada tulang vertebrae yang sama lamina and spinous process adalah sebahagian daripada lumbar process. Merujuk kepada Compendium 2018 dan nas undang-undang Papathi v Ahmad Alkif Hafizi bin Abd Wahab [2018] 2 POR 30 Mahkamah membenarkan RM15,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 27 GANTIRUGI KHAS 87. Adalah satu undang-undang matan bahawa gantirugi khas yang merupakan gantirugi yang boleh dikira hendaklah diplid secara khusus dan juga dikemukakan bukti kerugiannya. 88. Di dalam kes Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan – In an action for personal injuries, there are two classes for damages which have to be considered — special damage which has to be specially pleaded and general damage which need not be specially pleaded. In both classes of damages, the burden of proof based on the balance of probabilities in the evidence, lies on the plaintiff. Special damage consists of out-of-pocket expenses, such as hospital bills and actual loss of earning during period of total incapacity, and is generally capable of substantially exact calculation. 89. Tuntutan gantirugi khas yang dituntut oleh plaintif adalah seperti berikut: Kos Perjalanan 90. Kos perjalan yang dituntut oleh plaintif ialah kos perjalanan ahli keluarga melawatnya di hospital semasa menerima rawatan. Plaintif menerima rawatan di hospital di Johor Bharu, Alor Setar dan Sungai Petani Kedah. 91. Walaupun tuntutan ini tidak disertakan dengan resit atau bukti dokumentar yang lain, namun Mahkamah membenarkannya berdasarkan jumlah yang munasabah. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 28 92. Di dalam kes awad yang dibenarkan berdasarkan keterangan adalah seperti berikut: • Kos perjalanan keluarga melawat plaintif di HSAJB RM70 x 39 hari = RM2,730.00 • Kos perjalanan keluarga melawat plaintif di Hospital Sultan Abdul Halim RM30 x 32 hari = RM960.00 • Kos perjalanan keluarga melawat plaintif ke Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah RM50 x 4 hari = RM200.00 Kos rawatan di HSAJB 93. Kos ini dipersetujui pihak-pihak sebanyak RM500.00. Kos pembelian alatan perubatan pelbagai 94. Kos ini dipersetujui pihak-pihak sebanyak RM 6794.20. Kerosakan pakaian / barangan peribadi 95. Tuntutan ini ditolak kerana tidak dibuktikan. Kos Penjagaan Pre-trial 96. Plaintif menuntut kos penjagaan sebanyak RM700/sebulan berdasarkan keterangan SP5 dan SP6. 97. Menurut SP6 yang merupakan ibu saudara plaintif dan adik kepada SP5, memandangkan SP5 perlu bekerja maka beliau menjaga plaintif (SP7) semasa SP5 tiada di rumah. SP6 akan pergi ke rumah plaintif pada jam 7.00 pagi untuk membersihkan plaintif, menukar pampers, mengelapkan badan dan memberi sarapan. Kemudian SP6 akan S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 29 memberikan makan tengahari. SP6 berada di rumah plaintif sehingga jam 6 – 7 petang. Selepas itu SP5 akan balik bekerja. 98. SP5 memberitahu beliau bekerja kilang dengan gaji RM1600/sebulan. Suaminya iaitu SP8 tidak bekerja kerana sakit buah pinggang yang kronik. Dengan duit gaji tersebut SP5 membayar sewa rumah (RM288), bil utility (RM150), ansuran motor (RM250), duit dapur (RM300). SP5 juga perlu membayar kos ambulan sekiranya plaintif mempunyai temujanji di Hospital berjumlah RM 500 ke Alor Setar dan RM200 ke Sg Petani. 99. SP5 tidak menyimpan apa-apa rekod bayaran upah kepada kakaknya kerana semua diberikan secara tunai. SP5 juga tidak setuju kakaknya SP6 menolongnya dengan percuma tanpa bayaran. 100. SP5 merupakan ‘sole bread winner’dengan gaji RM1600/ sebulan dan dengan duit gaji tersebut beliau perlu membayar pelbagai perbelanjaan keluarga. Sungghpun SP5 memberitahu beliau mendapat RM500/sebulan dari badan kebajikan untuk membeli barangan keperluan plaintif, Mahkamah berpendapat, keadaan kewangan SP5 tidak mengizinkan beliau untuk membayar bulanan secara konsisten RM700.00 kepada SP6 sebagai upah menjaga plaintif. 101. SP6 merupakan kakak SP5 dan bukannya orang asing. Sudah tentu SP6 tahu tentang kesukaran hidup SP5 dan upah yang diterima SP6 sudah pasti berkadaran dan sesuai dengan taraf hidup SP5 seisi S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 30 keluarga dan hubungan kekeluargaan semasa mereka. Oleh yang keterangan SP5 dan SP6, Mahkamah berpendapat upah sebanyak RM400/sebulan adalah lebih munabasah. 102. Mahkamah membenarkan kos penjagaan plaintif (pre-trial) selama 85 bulan iaitu bagi tempoh 19.9.2016 sehingga 30.3.2019 dan dari Tarikh 3.4.2019 sehingga Tarikh keputusan. Jumlah yang dibenarkan ialah RM400 x 85 bulan = RM134,000.00. Kos Penjagaan Post Trial 103. Berdasarkan laporan pakar kedua-dua belah pihak, plaintif memerlukan penjagaan bagi aktiviti seharian akibat keilatan- keilatan yang dialaminya. Penjagaan yang diperlukan ialah pada masa akan datang mengikut jangkaan hayat plaintif. 104. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan dapatan di dalam laporan-laporan pakar kedua-dua pihak dan berpendapat plaintif memerlukan seseorang untuk menjaganya dalam kehidupan seharian. 105. SP6 memberitahu pada masa akan datang adalah lebih memudahkan sekiranya terdapat orang lain selain SP6 menjaga plaintif kerana SP6 ada sakit pada bahagian kaki akibat kemalangan 10 tahun yang lepas (yang mana tiada bukti dikemukakan). SP6 juga memberitahu penjaga lain meminta bayaran RM1,000.00 bagi menjaga plaintif. 106. SP5 memberitahu niatnya untuk mengambil pembantu pada masa akan datang bagi membantu menjaga plaintif pada masa akan datang. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 31 107. Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan kos penjagaan masa hadapan dengan multiplicand RM1,000/sebulan. Jumlah RM1,000.00 ini berdasarkan keterangan SP6 sendiri yang memberitahu penjaga lain meminta upah RM1,000.00 bagi menjaga plainitf. 108. Berkenaan dengan multiplier, laporan pakar neuro plaintif menjangkakan plaintif akan hidup lebih kurang 40 tahun lagi (semasa Tarikh pemeriksaan). Pada ketika itu plaintif berusia lebih kurang 22 tahun (selepas dibundarkan). Plaintif dijangkakan hidup sehingga berusia 62 tahun ataupun 744 bulan. 109. Semasa keputusan plaintif berusia lebih kurang 24 tahun 10 bulan iaitu 298 bulan. 110. Pengiraan multiplier ialah: (744 – 298) x 2/3 = 297 bulan. 111. Tolakan 1/3 dibuat mengambilkira factor contingencies, vicissitudes of life dan bayaran kehadapan (accelerated payment) yang diterima oleh plaintif (rujuk Wong Kuan Kay v Rohaizad Othman & Anor; Majlis Perbandaran Johor Bharu Tengah (Third Party) & Another Appeal [2014] MLRA 483). 112. Kos penjagaan masa hadapan yang dibenarkan ialah RM1,000 x 297 bulan = RM297,000.00. Kos membeli katil dan tilam khas S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 32 113. Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan ini berdasarkan resit yang dikemukakan. Kos membeli motorised wheelchair / electric Apex Lift / Electric Hi-Lo bed / PU Foam Mattress with PVC Covers / Ripple Mattress with Pump 114. Plaintif telah mendapatkan sebutharga bagi barang-barang tersebut daripada SP9. Keterangan SP9 ialah sebut harga disediakan berdasarkan laporan pakar neuro Plaintif. SP9 tidak pernah memeriksa plaintif sendiri ataupun melawat plaintif di rumahnya sebelum mengeluarkan sebut harga tersebut. 115. Semasa disoal balas, SP9 bersetuju sebut harga dikemukakan berdasarkan pendapat am beliau dan pengalaman beliau mengendalikan kes-kes seperti plaintif di Kawasan Kuala Lumpur dan Shah Alam. 116. SP9 mengakui selalunya peralatan yang diperlukan oleh pesakit oleh plaintif adalah berdasarkan laporan rehabilitasi (yang tidak dikemukakan di dalam kes ini). SP9 juga bersetuju peralatan tersebut boleh diperolehi melalui Jabatan Kebajikan selepas disahkan oleh jabatan rehabilitasi hospital Kerajaan. 117. SP9 turut memberitahu beliau tidak tahu keadaan terkini plaintif dan tidak pernah mencuba sebarang barangan yang dicadangkan di dalam sebut harga tersebut terhadap plaintif bagi memastikan sama ada plaintif sesuai dan berupaya menggunakannya. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 33 118. Selain tiada laporan rehabilitasi dikemukakan untuk mengesahkan plaintif perl atau tidak peralatan tersebut, SP9 sendiri tidak pernah berjumpa dengan plaintif dan membuat ujian sama ada plaintif berupaya menggunakan peralatan-peralatan yang dicadangkan. Selain itu, plaintif masih lagi di dalam rawatan susulan di Hospital dan sudah pasti sekiranya plaintif memerlukan apa-apa peralatan khas untuk tujuan pemulihannya, pihak hospital lebih mengetahuinya. Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat tiada alasan kukuh bagi membenarkan tuntutan peralatan-peralatan khas ini. Tuntutan ini ditolak. Kos pampers – post trial 119. Berdasarkan keterangan SP5 beliau membelanjakan lebih kurang RM150/sebulan bagi lampin pakai buang plaintif. Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan ini bagi masa hadapan menggunakan multiplier kos penjagaan masa hadapan iaitu RM150 x 297 bulan = RM44,550.00. Loss of Amenities 120. Tuntutan ini juga ditolak kerana loss of amenities telah dikira semasa membuat awad gantirugi am kecederaan (rujuk Jackson a/l Rechikadas v Lau Ah Piau (2019) AMEJ 1559). KESIMPULAN 121. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, tuntutan plaintif terhadap D1 dan D2 ditolak dengan kos. S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JA-A53KJ-365-05/2021 Kirubakaran a/l Muniandy v Nadrajan a/l Chen Niah & 2 Lagi 34 Bertarikh pada 2 Januari 2024 ……………………………….. LAILAWATI BINTI ALI Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Sivil 3 Johor Bharu JOHOR Bagi pihak Plaintif: Bagi pihak D1 & D2: M Humavathi Subashini Ganesan Noor Hidayah Ismail Moona T/n Othman Hashim & Co T/n S Raman & Co Bagi pihak D3: Koh Jun Wen T/n Gan, Ho & Razlan Hadri S/N AqWCUgJj0UChR0vN4crmGA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-15-01/2021

PLAINTIF MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN ANUAR (BERAMAL SEBAGAI PEGUAMBELA & PEGUAMCARA DI FIRMA GUAMAN TETUAN AMIN CHAMBERS) DEFENDAN 1. ) BADAN PENGURUSAN BERSAMA PANGSAPURI ANGGUN 2. ) KAMARUL ARIFFIN BIN KAMARUZAMAN 3. ) AZLAN SHAH BIN MUSA

PROFESION UNDANG-UNDANG – Peguam cara – Etika – Kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan kemahiran peguam cara – Kewajian peguam cara melindungi kepentingan anakguam, keadilan dan maruah profesion – Pertikaian berhubung fi guaman – Peguam cara memfailkan notis pemberhentian tanpa kebebasan memfailkan semula tanpa persetujuan dan arahan anakguam – Sama ada peguam cara melanggar kewajipan sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh Kaedah-Kaedah Profesion Undang-Undang (Amalan Dan Etiket) 1978 – Sama ada anakguam berhak menuntut ganti rugi kerugian yang dialami akibat tindakan peguam cara - Kaedah-Kaedah Profesion Undang-Undang (Amalan Dan Etiket) 1978 kk 16, 31 & 35TORT — Fitnah — Libel — Slander — Plaintif menuntut ganti rugi terhadap defendan-defendan atas emel-emel berunsur fitnah — Sama ada emel-emel yang dikeluarkan defendan-defendan mengandungi unsur fitnah – Sama ada mencela, memalukan dan menjatuhkan martabat plaintif sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara — Sama ada mengakibatkan kerugian – Sama ada elemen-elemen fitnah dibuktikanTORT – Kepalsuan memudaratkan – Konspirasi untuk mencederakan – Frod – Respresentasi palsu – Pertikaian pembayaran fi guaman – Sama ada emel-emel yang dikeluarkan defendan-defendan merupakan kepalsuan memudaratkan, konspirasi untuk mencederakan, frod, respresentasi palsu – Sama ada mengakibatkan kerugian – Sama ada elemen-elemen kepalsuan memudaratkan, konspirasi untuk mencederakan, frod dan respresentasi palsu dibuktikanKETERANGAN – Beban pembuktian – Beban pembuktian adalah ke atas Plaintif untuk membuktikan tuntutan dan kenyataan Plaintif – Plaintif mempunyai beban untuk memanggil saksi untuk membuktikan kenyataan Plaintif – Saksi tidak dipanggil defendan-defandan tidak boleh dijadikan alasan kegagalan Plaintif membuktikan kenyataannya – Akta Keterangan 1950 s 101

02/01/2024

YA Puan Jamhirah binti Ali

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33523936-3d3b-44f6-8a8b-0fd608c7988b&Inline=true

FINAL EDITED-GOJ-BA-22NCVC-15-01-2021-MUHAMMAD AMIN 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO BA-22NCVC-15-01/2021 ANTARA MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN ANUAR (NO. K/P: 890630-10-5761) [BERAMAL SEBAGAI PEGUAMBELA & PEGUAMCARA DI FIRMA GUAMAN TETUAN AMIN CHAMBERS] …PLAINTIF DAN 1. BADAN PENGURUSAN BERSAMA PANGSAPURI ANGGUN 2. KAMARUL ARIFFIN BIN KAMARUZAMAN (NO. K/P: 680323-01-5007) 3. AZLAN SHAH BIN MUSA (NO. K/P:850111-01-5477) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 05/01/2024 09:59:47 BA-22NCvC-15-01/2021 Kand. 80 S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 PENGENALAN 1. Tindakan ini berbangkit akibat daripada hubungan yang tegang dan keruh antara peguam dengan anakguamnya. 2. Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan adalah untuk fi guaman yang tidak dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan. Plaintif juga menuntut gantirugi untuk libel dan/atau slander dan/atau kepalsuan memudaratkan oleh Defendan-Defendan terhadap Plaintif. 3. Manakala Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan adalah untuk gantirugi akibat daripada tindakan Plaintif memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi tuntutan Defendan-Defendan terhadap Jasakon Niaga Sdn. Bhd. (Kes Jasakon Niaga) tanpa kebenaran dan pengetahuan Defendan- Defendan. 4. Plaintif merupakan peguam cara yang dilantik oleh Defendan- Defendan bagi mewakili Defendan Pertama dalam kes Mahkamah Majistret Bandar Baru Bangi, Guaman Sivil BI-A72NCVC-342- 09/2019 antara Badan Pengurusan Bersama Pangsapuri Anggun dengan Jasakon Niaga Sdn. Bhd., menggantikan peguam cara terdahulu iaitu Tetuan Jing Wani & Co dan Tetuan Ling & Theng Book. 5. Defendan Pertama adalah sebuah badan yang ditubuhkan pada 23 Ogos 2014 di bawah Akta Bangunan dan Harta Bersama (Penyenggaraan dan Pengurusan) 2007 (Akta 663). S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 6. Pada masa material, Defendan Kedua merupakan pengerusi kepada Ahli Jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama. Manakala Defendan Ketiga adalah pengurus bangunan Defendan Pertama. ISU UNTUK DIBICARAKAN 7. Terdapat 16 isu untuk dibicarakan seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam Isu-isu Untuk Dibicarakan. Walau bagaimanapun atas persetujuan pihak-pihak, selepas perbicaraan, isu-isu tersebut telah diringkaskan kepada empat (4) isu utama kerana kebanyakan isu- isu tersebut adalah berkaitan. Isu-isu utama untuk diputuskan adalah seperti berikut: a. sama ada Plaintif berhak untuk menuntut fi guaman bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga dan Kes 6 Pemunya Petak daripada Defendan-Defendan (gabungan isu pertama dan isu ke-2). b. sama ada emel-emel yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan- Defendan kepada Plaintif adalah fitnah dan memudaratkan Plaintif dan menyebabkan Plaintif mempunyai tuntutan terhadap Defendan-Defendan (gabungan isu ke-3 hingga isu ke-7). c. sama ada Defendan-Defendan bertanggungjawab atas kepalsuan memudarat (injurious falsehood), konspirasi mencederakan (conspiracy to injure), frod dan representasi palsu terhadap Plaintif (gabungan isu ke-8 hingga ke-13). S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 d. sama ada Plaintif bertanggungjawab menanggung kerugian yang dialami oleh Defendan Pertama seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan, atas Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga (gabungan isu ke-14 hingga ke-16). SAKSI 8. Pihak-pihak telah memanggil seorang saksi bagi setiap pihak. Saksi-saksi adalah seperti berikut: a. Muhammad Amin Bin Anuar – SP1 (Plaintif sendiri) b. Kamarul Ariffin Bin Kamaruzaman – SD1 (Defendan Kedua) FAKTA KES 9. Pertikaian utama antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan adalah berhubung fi guaman bagi tindakan-tindakan di Mahkamah. 10. Defendan-Defendan telah melantik Plaintif sebagai peguam cara untuk mengambil alih dan mengendalikan Kes Jasakon Niaga kerana Plaintif adalah peguam cara yang mengendalikan Kes Jasakon Niaga ketika Plaintif berkhidmat di Tetuan Jing Wani & Co dan kemudian di Tetuan Ling & Theng Book. Tambahan, Plaintif mempunyai akses langsung terhadap fail kes dan pengetahuan khusus tentang perjalanan kes termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada pembayaran-pembayaran berkaitan pengendalian Kes Jasakon Niaga. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 11. Menurut Defendan-Defendan, Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama telah bersetuju bahawa fi guaman Plaintif untuk mengendalikan Kes Jasakon Niaga sehingga keputusan perbicaraan kes di Mahkamah Majistret Bandar Baru Bangi, yang keseluruhannya tidak melebihi RM10,000.00, termasuk bayaran-bayaran yang dibuat sebelumnya kepada peguam cara terdahulu iaitu Tetuan Jing Wani & Co dan Tetuan Ling & Theng Book, bagi pengendalian kes tersebut. 12. Seterusnya, Defendan Pertama telah menerima invois pertama fi guaman Plaintif bertarikh 01.10.2020 sebanyak RM4,848.00. Plaintif kemudian, telah menghantar invois kedua bertarikh 19.11.2020 bagi jumlah RM5,953.00. Defendan Pertama tidak membuat pembayaran bagi invois-invois tersebut kerana menurut semakan pembayaran fi guaman bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga, Defendan Pertama telah mendapati sebanyak RM5,185.84 fi guaman telah dibuat kepada peguam cara terdahulu, Tetuan Jing Wani & Co & Tetuan Ling & Theng Book. Oleh itu, dengan pembayaran invois yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif, ianya akan menjadikan jumlah keseluruhan fi guaman Kes Jasakon Niaga melebihi fi guaman yang dipersetujui iaitu RM10,000.00. 13. Sehubungan dengan itu, Defendan Pertama telah mengeluarkan emel-emel bertarikh 03.12.2020 dan 07.12.2020 kepada Plaintif meminta supaya penjelasan diberikan berkenaan dengan invois yang dimajukan oleh Plaintif. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 14. Plaintif yang tidak berpuashati dengan Defendan Pertama telah memfailkan satu Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga di Mahkamah Majistret Bandar Baru Bangi tanpa arahan dan persetujuan Defendan Pertama. Tindakan Plaintif ini telah menyebabkan kerugian di pihak Defendan Pertama kerana tuntutan Defendan Pertama terhadap Jasakon Niaga terhenti begitu sahaja dan Defendan Pertama tidak boleh meneruskan tuntutan terhadap Jasakon Niaga secara kekal. 15. Oleh yang demikian, Defendan Pertama melalui peguam cara Defendan-Defendan telah mengeluarkan Notis Tuntutan bertarikh 06.01.2021 menuntut Plaintif membayar jumlah wang sebanyak RM99,985.84 kepada Defendan Pertama, yang merupakan tuntutan Defendan Pertama terhadap Jasakon Niaga. Plaintif telah enggan untuk membayar tuntutan Defendan Pertama sebaliknya memfailkan tindakan ini di Mahkamah ini. 16. Selain daripada Kes Jasakon Niaga, Plaintif juga telah dilantik oleh Defendan Pertama untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap 6 pemunya petak yang merupakan penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun (Kes 6 Pemunya Petak). Tuntutan Defendan Pertama adalah untuk kegagalan pembayaran caj-caj penyelenggaraan, caruman kumpulan wang diperjelas (sinking fund), insurans kebakaran dan lain-lain. 17. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan untuk Kes 6 Pemunya Petak, Defendan Pertama hanya mengarahkan Plaintif untuk S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 mengeluarkan surat tuntutan dan pemfailan writ saman sahaja dan Plaintif hendaklah menunggu arahan selanjutnya daripada Defendan Pertama sebelum melakukan apa-apa tindakan lanjut. 18. Sebaliknya Plaintif, tanpa mendapat arahan daripada Defendan Pertama telah bertindak memfailkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran terhadap 4 pemunya petak dan melakukan penyampaian ganti kepada 2 lagi pemunya petak. 19. Defendan Pertama telah membayar sejumlah RM6,648.00 fi guaman kepada Plaintif bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak dan enggan membayar untuk kerja-kerja yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif di luar arahan Defendan Pertama. 20. Rentetan daripada emel-emel dan surat menyurat di antara kedua belah pihak, Plaintif telah membuat dakwaan bahawa Defendan- Defendan telah melakukan slander dan/atau libel terhadapnya dan membuat tuntutan terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk jumlah kerugian sebanyak RM6,000,000.00. Selain itu, Plaintif juga telah mengeluarkan invois-invois baru bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga dan Kes 6 Pemunya Petak dan menuntut Defendan-Defendan membayar kesemua invois-invois tersebut. ANALISA KETERANGAN DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH 21. Setelah meneliti kesemua keterangan yang telah dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan pada perbicaraan, dan setelah S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 membaca hujahan-hujahan bertulis dan setelah mendengar hujahan lisan dari kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutan Plaintif atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan- Defendan telah membuktikan Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Alasan-alasan saya adalah seperti yang dinyatakan di bawah. A. Sama ada Plaintif berhak untuk menuntut fi guaman bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga dan Kes 6 Pemunya Petak dan sama ada Defendan-Defendan ada mengarahkan Plaintif untuk menyemak semula dan/atau mengubah fi guaman yang lebih tinggi untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga. 22. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa setelah mengambil alih fail Kes Jasakon Niaga daripada firma-firma guaman terdahulu, Tetuan Ling & Theng Book dan Tetuan Jing Wani & Co., Plaintif telah mengendalikan Kes Jasakon Niaga hingga ke peringkat perbicaraan. 23. Manakala bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak, Plaintif mengatakan Defendan-Defendan mengakui pembayaran pertama iaitu fi guaman buka fail namun gagal dan/atau enggan untuk membayar bayaran lanjutan setelah Plaintif merekodkan empat penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan mendapat arahan mahkamah untuk penyampaian ganti bagi dua kes pemunya petak tersebut. 24. Plaintif menghujahkan terdapat kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan selaku peguam dan anakguam, yang mana S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 sebagai balasan, Plaintif menjalankan kerja-kerja sebagai peguam. Oleh sebab Defendan-Defendan telah memberi arahan kepada Plaintif yang bertindak selaku peguam mereka, maka Defendan- Defendan bertanggungjawab membayar fi guaman serta bil-bil guaman seperti legal fees, disbursement dan reimbursement. 25. Plaintif menegaskan, dalam tindakan ini, Defendan-Defendan telah menghalang Plaintif daripada terus bertindak sebagai peguam apabila mereka enggan memberi kerjasama dan arahan kepada Plaintif. Di samping itu Defendan-Defendan juga telah menghalang Plaintif daripada terus menghubungi Defendan-Defendan terutama Defendan Kedua. Defendan-Defendan juga enggan membuat pembayaran yang dijanjikan. 26. Plaintif menghujahkan sekiranya Defendan-Defendan tidak bersetuju dengan jumlah invois yang diberikan oleh Plaintif, Defendan-Defendan seharusnya meminta penjelasan atau berbincang dengan Plaintif. Walau bagaimanapun, Defendan- Defendan tidak meminta apa-apa penjelasan atau berbincang dengan Plaintif, tetapi telah bertindak menerbitkan kenyataan- kenyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif bersifat mala fide. 27. Defendan-Defendan menegaskan fi guaman yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga adalah sebanyak RM10,000.00 sahaja dengan menolak apa-apa bayaran yang telah dibayar kepada peguam cara terdahulu. Defendan-Defendan telah membayar peguam cara terdahulu sebanyak RM5,185.84. Defendan-Defendan telah merujuk kepada bukti-bukti dokumen S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 yang menunjukkan Plaintif mengetahui dan telah bersetuju dengan pengaturan tersebut. 28. Defendan-Defendan juga menegaskan bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak membayar jumlah RM5,930.00 yang dinyatakan dalam invois Plaintif bertarikh 19.11.2020 kerana Kes Jasakon Niaga masih belum tamat. Jumlah RM10,000.00 yang dipersetujui itu adalah bagi keseluruhan fi guaman dari awal pemfailan tindakan, perbicaraan sehingga penghakiman direkodkan. Tambahan pula, Defendan Pertama telah membangkitkan beberapa isu untuk Plaintif memberikan penjelasan melalui emel pada 07.12.2020, seperti berikut: a) Tuntutan Plaintif tidak disertakan bukti kerja yang telah dibuat dan belum dibuat; b) Defendan Pertama masih belum menerima resit untuk jumlah fi guaman yang dibayar kepada Tetuan Jing Wani & Co; dan c) Mengikut invois Plaintif, Plaintif menggunakan akaun bank peribadi Plaintif. Oleh itu, Defendan Pertama merasa janggal dan meminta penjelasan Plaintif. 29. Defendan-Defendan menegaskan penjelasan yang diminta oleh Defendan Pertama adalah munasabah. Selaku peguam cara Defendan Pertama, Plaintif seharusnya memberikan penjelasan yang baik supaya fi guaman yang dituntut dapat dijelaskan dengan segera. Selanjutnya emel Defendan-Defendan bertarikh 15.12.2020 adalah jelas menyatakan Defendan Pertama tidak pernah S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak akan membuat pembayaran. Namun apa yang diminta adalah penjelasan, dokumen dan resit kerana ianya adalah SOP Defendan Pertama sebelum sesuatu bayaran itu dibuat. Namun, Plaintif di dalam jawapannya masih gagal memberikan bukti kerja yang telah dibuat kepada Defendan Pertama. 30. Walau bagaimanapun, Plaintif melalui emel-emel pada 03.12.2020 jam 9.31 pagi dan pada jam 6.41 petang, hari yang sama, telah menyatakan Plaintif akan menarik diri sebagai peguam cara Defendan Pertama jika Defendan Pertama gagal membayar fi guaman Plaintif pada atau sebelum 07.12.2020. 31. Namun, pada 14.12.2020 Plaintif tanpa arahan dan pengetahuan Defendan Pertama telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga. Perkara ini amat memprejudiskan hak Defendan Pertama untuk mendapatkan gantirugi dalam tindakan Defendan Pertama terhadap Jasakon Niaga. 32. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa tempoh masa antara invois dikeluarkan pada 19.11.2020 dengan tarikh pemfailan Notis Pemberhentian pada 14.12.2020 tidaklah lama dan pada masa material kerja Plaintif masih belum sempurna. 33. Selanjutnya, Plaintif telah mengeluarkan satu lagi invois baru kepada Defendan Pertama bertarikh 07.01.2021 untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga bagi jumlah RM35,656.00, selepas Notis Pemberhentian S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 tersebut di failkan. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan jumlah yang dinyatakan dalam invois tersebut langsung tiada asas. 34. Mahkamah mendapati terdapat bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa terdapat persetujuan berhubung fi guaman bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga sebanyak RM10,000.00 antara Plaintif dan Defendan dengan menolak bayaran yang telah dilakukan kepada peguam cara terdahulu. Plaintif telah bersetuju dan mempunyai pengetahuan berhubung pengaturan tersebut. Surat dan invois Plaintif bertarikh 19.11.2020 jelas menyatakan butiran terperinci fi guaman dan jumlah keseluruhan bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga setakat keputusan Mahkamah Majistrate (selepas perbicaraan) adalah RM10,000.00 sahaja. Plaintif juga mengesahkan Defendan Pertama ada membuat bayaran kepada peguam cara terdahulu dan baki fi guaman yang perlu dijelaskan oleh Defendan-Defendan ialah RM5,953.00 untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga. Malah, melalui invois bertarikh 01.10.2020 Plaintif hanya menuntut RM4,848.00 sahaja bagi mengendalikan kes tersebut sehingga keputusan kes, setelah mengambil alih kes dari peguam cara terdahulu. Oleh itu melalui kedua-dua invois ini, jelas fi yang dipersetujui pada kesuluruhannya adalah hanya RM10,000.00 sahaja. 35. Ketika pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan-Defendan yang bijaksana, Plaintif telah mengakui bahawa Plaintif telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga di Mahkamah Majistret tanpa persetujuan dan arahan Defendan-Defendan. Perkara ini telah memprejudiskan Defendan Pertama di mana Defendan Pertama tidak dapat meneruskan apa-apa tuntutan terhadap Jasakon Niaga. Mahkamah S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 mendapati “Plaintiff went on the frolic of his own”, apabila mengambil tindakan yang keterlaluan itu. Plaintif seharusnya hanya memfailkan notis untuk menarik diri dari bertindak sebagai peguam Defendan Pertama apabila timbul pertikaian berhubung fi guaman. Namun tindakan yang diambil oleh Plaintif adalah satu tindakan keterlaluan yang amat memprejudiskan Defendan Pertama yang menafikan hak litigasi Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah terhadap Jasakon Niaga. Plaintif tidak berhak untuk berbuat demikian, walaupun Defendan Pertama tidak membayar fi guamannya. 36. Apa yang lebih memeranjatkan adalah sikap tidak peduli yang ditunjukkan oleh Plaintif ketika menjawab soalan peguam cara yang bijaksana bagi pihak Defendan-Defendan ketika pemeriksaan balas. Plaintif dengan mudah menyatakan bahawa Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula yang telah difailkan olehnya dalam Kes Jasakon Niaga tidak memprejudiskan Defendan Pertama kerana Notis Pemberhentian tersebut boleh dicabar dan diketepikan oleh mana-mana peguam lain. Jelas sikap dan tindakan Plaintif adalah dengan niat untuk menghukum Defendan Pertama kerana tidak membayar fi guamannya kerana Plaintif maklum dan arif akan akibat pemfailan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula adalah serius dan Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh meneruskan tuntutan mereka terhadap Jasakon Niaga. 37. Mahkamah mendapati sikap dan tindakan Plaintif adalah tidak beretika dan melanggar etika peguam. Plaintif sebagai seorang peguam apabila menerima tanggungjawab untuk mengendalikan kes bagi Defendan Pertama, maka akan wujud hubungan peguam S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 dan anakguamnya yang akan menimbulkan kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan kemahiran kepeguaman dalam menjalankan apa-apa tugas yang Plaintif telah mengaku janji untuk melaksanakannya. Tugas dan kewajipan ini temasuk tugas untuk tidak ’mencederakan’ anakguamnya dengan kegagalan untuk menjalankan tanggungjawab yang telah diterima olehnya, yang anakguamnya telah bergantung kepadanya untuk melaksanakannya. Saya merujuk kes Subramaniam Manickam v Supramaniam Kasia Pilai [2016] MLRHU 673 “[51] Di bawah undang-undang, pada umumnya hubungan peguam dan kliennya akan menimbulkan kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan kemahiran peguam dalam menjalankan apa-apa tugas yang beliau telah mengaku janji untuk melaksanakannya. Ini adalah kewajipan berjaga-jaga yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp (a firm) [1978] 3 All ER 571, menyatakan: The solicitor were however liable to the plaintiff’s in tort because under the general law the relationship of solicitor and client give rise to a duty of a solicitor to exercise that care and skill on which he knew that his client would rely, and to a duty not to injure his client by failing to do what he had undertaken to do and which, at the solicitor’s invitation, the client had relied on him to do. Furthermore, there was no rule of law which cofined a solicitor’s duty to his client under his retainer to a contractual duty alone; nor was there any rule of law which precluded a claim in tort for breach of a duty to use reasonable care and skill if there was a parallel contractual duty of care. [52] Di dalam kes Dato’ Seri Au Ba Chi & Anor v. Malayan United Finance Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLRH 319; [1989] 3 S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 MLJ 434; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 460 di mana mahkamah telah memutuskan: Under the general law, the relationship of solicitor and client give rise to a duty as a solicitor to exercise that care and skill on which he knew his client would rely, and to a duty not to injure his client by failing to do that which that he has undertaken to do and which at the solicitor’s invitation, the client had relied on him to do.” [penekanan ditambah] 38. Oleh itu Mahkamah bersetuju Plaintif tidak layak untuk mendapatkan baki fi guaman yang belum dijelaskan oleh Defendan- Defendan bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga kerana tindakan tersebut telah diberhentikan oleh Plaintif sebelum perbicaraan kes tersebut selesai. Berhubung invois bertarikh 07.01.2021 untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga bagi jumlah RM35,656.00, yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif selepas Notis Pemberhentian tersebut difailkan, Mahkamah mendapati tiada asas bagi tuntutan ini kerana Plaintif tidak mengemukakan apa-apa bukti untuk menunjukkan mengapa dan bagaimana Plaintif layak untuk jumlah tersebut sebagai fi guaman. Tambahan, fi tersebut bukan fi yang dipersetujui antara pihak-pihak. 39. Selanjutnya bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak, Defendan-Defendan menegaskan bahawa Plaintif telah dilantik untuk mengambil tindakan ke atas 6 penghuni Pangsapuri Anggun yang telah gagal membayar “maintenance fees”. Menurut Defendan Pertama, arahannya adalah untuk mengeluarkan notis tuntutan dan memfailkan writ saman, dan apa-apa tindakan selanjutnya mestilah berdasarkan arahan Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif setelah S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 dinasihati dari segi undang-undang. Defendan-Defendan juga menyatakan fi guaman yang telah dipersetujui dengan Plaintif bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak adalah RM1,000.00 sahaja bagi setiap pemunya petak. Perkara ini telah dijelaskan semula oleh Defendan- Pertama melalui emel bertarikh 05.12.2020 kepada Plaintif. Petikan emel tersebut di bawah sub-topik Justifikasi Penolakan Tuntutan, Defendan Pertama adalah seperti berikut: - “1. Dalam perkara Writ Saman terhadap 6 pemilik yang dipersetujui melalui kiriman email bertarikh 25hb Ogos dari pejabat Pangsapuri Anggun kepada Amin Chambers. Arahan yang diberi adalah meneruskan tuntutan writ summon dengan kos dipersetujui RM1,000.00 (RINGGIT MALAYSIA) bagi setiap satu fail kes tidak termasuk kos penyediaan dan pemfailan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan bagi 6 kes sahaja. 2. Pada 25hb September pihak Tuan telah menghantar satu kiriman (email) dan menyatakan ambil maklum arahan yang telah dibuat dan akan meneruskan proses dengan writ saman seperti diarahkan beserta inbois bertarikh 25hb September 2020 (tiada no. rujukan) dengan jumlah keseluruhan tuntutan RM6,648.00, dan ada dinyatakan di dalam email tersebut pihak tuan akan memaklumkan dan mengemaskini setiap perkembangan kes kepada kami status dan tindakan seterusnya yang akan dilaksanakan, dan pada 13hb Oktober 2020 pihak kami telah membuat pembayaran penuh (RM6,648.00) kepada pihak Amin Chambers dengan bayaran dibuat ke atas akaun peribadi Tuan…” [penekanan ditambah] S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 40. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan Plaintif telah mengambil tindakan untuk memfailkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan permohonan penyampaian ganti tanpa arahan Defendan Pertama. Selanjutnya, Defendan Pertama juga dalam emel yang sama telah mengarahkan Plaintif untuk menghentikan kesemua tindakan undang-undang terhadap Kes 6 Pemunya Petak dengan serta merta, kerana Defendan Pertama mendapati Plaintif tidak rasional dalam tindakannya. 41. Defendan Pertama telah membayar fi guaman RM6,648.00 ke akaun peribadi Plaintif pada 15.10.2020. Fakta ini tidak dipertikaikan. Namun, Plaintif menegaskan RM6,648.00 hanyalah bagi penyediaan dan pemfailan writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan sahaja dan tidak termasuk fi guaman bagi pemfailan permohonan penyampaian ganti dan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran. 42. Plaintif mendakwa Plaintif telah mendapat arahan daripada Defendan Ketiga untuk memfailkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan pemfailan permohonan penyampaian ganti dalam Kes 6 Pemunya Petak. Melalui dua (2) invois bertarikh 03.12.2020 masing-masing, Plaintif telah menuntut fi guaman tambahan sebanyak RM6,088.00 bagi empat (4) kes yang dimasukkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan RM6,960.00 bagi dua (2) kes yang dimasukkan penyampaian ganti, yang jumlah keseluruhannya adalah RM13,048.00. Selanjutnya pada 07.01.2021 Plaintif telah menuntut RM34,088.00 bagi empat (4) penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan RM11,740.00 bagi dua (2) penyampaian ganti tersebut. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 43. Mahkamah mendapati tiada bukti untuk menyokong kenyataan Plaintif bahawa Plaintif telah mendapat arahan daripada Defendan Ketiga untuk memasukkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran serta pemfailan permohonan penyampaian ganti bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak. Tuntutan dalam kes ini telah difailkan oleh Plaintif. Komunikasi antara Plaintif dan Defendan Ketiga melalui “call log” yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif tidak membuktikan bahawa Defendan Ketiga telah memberi arahan tersebut. 44. Defendan Ketiga juga tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi oleh Plaintif untuk memberikan keterangan berhubung perkara ini. Plaintif menyatakan Plaintif pada asalnya bercadang untuk memanggil Defendan Ketiga, namun apabila Defendan-Defendan menyenaraikan nama Defendan Ketiga dalam senarai saksi, Plaintif telah meminda senarai saksi Plaintif. Namun Defendan-Defendan tidak memanggil Defendan Ketiga. Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun Defendan-Defendan tidak mengemukakan Defendan Ketiga sebagai saksi, tiada apa-apa yang menghalang Plaintif daripada mengeluarkan sepina terhadap Defendan Ketiga. 45. Mahkamah mendapati tiada apa-apa bukti bahawa tuntutan yang dituntut oleh Plaintif melalui invois-invois bertarikh 03.12.2020 dan 07.01.2021, masing-masing, adalah jumlah fi guaman yang dipersetujui antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan atas arahan yang diberikan oleh Defendan Pertama dan/atau Defendan Ketiga atas arahan Defendan Pertama. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 46. Merujuk kepada seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950, adalah undang-undang mantap bahawa beban pembuktian adalah ke atas Plaintif. Maka beban untuk membuktikan tuntutan Plaintif dan kenyataan Plaintif bahawa Plaintif telah menerima arahan daripada Defendan Ketiga terletak di atas Plaintif. Plaintif juga mempunyai beban untuk memanggil Defendan Ketiga sebagai saksi untuk membuktikan kenyataan Plaintif tersebut. Alasan bahawa Defendan-Defandan tidak memanggil Defendan Ketiga bukanlah alasan kukuh bagi kegagalan Plaintif membuktikan kenyataannya. Oleh kerana kenyataan tersebut dibuat oleh Plaintif, beban bukti kekal terletak atas Plaintif untuk membuktikannya. 47. Berdasarkan dokumen dan keterangan SD1, Mahkamah mendapati bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak, fi guaman yang dipersetujui antara Plaintif dan Defendan adalah sebanyak RM1,000.00 bagi setiap seorang pemunya petak, yang jumlah keseluruhan sebanyak RM6,648.00 telah pun dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama. 48. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada bukti untuk menyokong kenyataan Plaintif bahawa terdapat pengaturan dan persetujuan antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan untuk Plaintif menyemak dan mengubah amaun fi guaman yang telah dipersetujui bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga mahu pun Kes 6 Pemunya Petak. 49. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan- Defendan bahawa kontrak yang wujud adalah antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama. Tanggungjawab untuk membayar Plaintif adalah tanggungjawab Defendan Pertama. Apa-apa arahan berkenaan kes juga hendaklah diberikan oleh Defendan Pertama. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Maka, Plaintif mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk memberikan dokumen sokongan atau penjelasan kepada Defendan Pertama apabila diminta oleh Defendan Pertama. Dalam kes ini jelas Plaintif tidak mengendahkan permintaan berulang kali Defendan Pertama untuk mendapatkan penjelasan dan dokumen sokongan berhubung tuntutan fi guaman yang dibuat oleh Plaintif bagi membolehkan Defendan Pertama membuat bayaran. B Sama ada emel-emel yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan- Defendan pada 03.12.2020, 05.12.2020, 07.12.2020 dan 15.12.2020 merupakan libel dan/atau slander kepada Plaintif dan memudaratkan Plaintif 50. Plaintif menyatakan keseluruhan kandungan emel-emel bertarikh 03.12.2020, 05.12.2020, 07.12.2020 dan 15.12.2020 yang dihantar oleh Defendan-Defendan mengandungi pelbagai fitnah berniat jahat, yang bertujuan untuk menjatuhkan reputasi Plaintif di mata orang awam. 51. Plaintif mendakwa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam emel-emel tersebut telah mencela, memalukan, menjatuhkan martabat Plaintif sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara di mata ahli-ahli jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama serta semua penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun. 52. Defendan-Defendan menegaskan emel-emel yang dihantar oleh Defendan Kedua tidak mempunyai unsur ugutan atau fitnah. Emel- emel tersebut adalah maklum balas muktamad dan penjelasan berkenaan pendirian Defendan-Defendan berkenaan isu tuntutan fi S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 guaman yang dibangkitkan oleh Plaintif. Pendirian Defendan- Defendan adalah konsisten bahawa Plaintif telah bertindak tanpa mendapat arahan dan kebenaran Defendan Pertama. Emel-emel tersebut juga jelas meminta Plaintif mengemukakan dokumen- dokumen, resit dan invois yang berkaitan untuk Defendan- Defendan memproses pembayaran kerana ianya adalah prosedur pembayaran (SOP) Defendan Pertama. Walaupun permintaan telah dibuat berulang kali, namun tidak diendahkan oleh Plaintif. 53. Pertikaian berhubung bayaran fi guaman menjadi tegang antara pihak-pihak dan tiada jalan penyelesaian dicapai, oleh itu melalui emel bertarikh 03.12.2020, Defendan-Defendan telah memaklumkan Plaintif bahawa mereka akan merujuk pertikaian tersebut kepada Majlis Peguam. Plaintif melalui emel jawapannya kepada Defendan-Defendan telah menyatakan Plaintif tiada bantahan untuk merujuk pertikaian tersebut kepada Majlis Peguam. 54. Setelah meneliti emel-emel yang menjadi pertikaian dengan teliti, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa intipati dan konteks emel-emel Defendan-Defendan adalah berhubung permintaan dokumen- dokumen dan penjelasan daripada Plaintif serta maklum balas dan penjelasan berkenaan pendirian Defendan-Defendan berkenaan isu tuntutan fi guaman yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. Tiada unsur fitnah dalam kandungan emel-emel tersebut. 55. Dalam menentukan sama ada sesuatu kenyataan itu adalah merupakan fitnah, Mahkamah hendaklah meneliti emel-emel tersebut dalam konteks ‘maksud semula jadi dan biasa’ (in their natural and ordinary meaning) dan sama ada ‘orang yang S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 munasabah’ berkemungkinan memahami kenyataan itu sebagai suatu fitnah (a reasonable man would be likely to understand the statement in a defamatory way). 56. Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan bahawa emel-emel fitnah yang dikatakan telah mencederakan reputasinya dan/atau telah mendedahkannya kepada cemuhan, penghinaan atau menjatuhkan martabatnya sebagai seorang peguam. Ini kerana, Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada seorang pun saksi atau apa-apa bukti yang dikemukakan bagi menyokong dakwaan Plaintif. 57. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah mendapati perkataan dalam emel-emel Defendan-Defendan jika diambil dalam konteks yang dikatakan, tidak mungkin mengaitkan sebarang kenyataan fitnah. 58. Berdasarkan ujian ‘orang yang munasabah’ (the reasonable man test) dan standard pendapat orang yang berfikiran betul secara umum (standard of opinion of right-thinking person in general), Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa perkataan yang digunakan dalam emel-emel Defendan-Defendan dalam maksud semula jadi dan biasa seperti yang difahami oleh ‘orang yang munasabah’, yang tidak terlalu curiga, atau gemar untuk skandal, tidak akan menyimpulkan maksud kandungan emel-emel itu sebagai fitnah. 59. Merujuk kes Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 2 MLRA 345, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menjelaskan berkenaan fitnah. Mahkamah menyatakan: S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 “[29] Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes to a third person words or matters containing untrue imputation against the reputation of the plaintiff. Liability for defamation is divided into two categories, that of libel and slander. If the publication is made in a permanent form or is broadcasted or is part of a theatrical performance, it is libel. If it is in some transient form or is conveyed by spoken words or gestures, it is slander (see: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th edn at p 6). [30] In Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1988] 1 MLRH 653, His Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) has clearly laid down the necessary procedure in establishing claim for libel (with which we agree), when he said at p 155: "In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957 (Revised - 1983), the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words were published. …” [31] In other words, the plaintiff must prove three elements of the tort of defamation, which are: (i) the plaintiff must show that the statement bears defamatory imputations; (ii) the statement must refer to or reflect upon the plaintiff’s reputation; and (iii) the statement must have been published to a third person by the defendant.” S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [32] What is “defamatory imputation”? There is no precise test to be applied to determine whether or not any given words are defamatory. His Lordship Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) in the case of Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 1 MLRH 153, [1973] 2 MLJ 56, quoting Gatley on Libel and Slander, 6th edn p 4, stated the following: "There is no wholly satisfactory definition of a defamatory imputation. Any imputation which may tend "to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally”, ‘to cut him off from society’ or ‘to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule’, is defamatory of him. An imputation may be defamatory whether or not it is believed by those to whom it is published." It was further quoted that: "A defamatory imputation is one to a man’s discredit, or which tends to lower him in the estimation of others, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure his reputation in his office, trade or profession, or to injure his financial credit. The standard of opinion is that of right thinking persons generally. To be defamatory an imputation need have no actual effect on a person’s reputation; the law looks only to its tendency." [penekanan ditambah] 60. Plaintif hendaklah membuktikan bahawa terdapatnya kenyataan berunsur fitnah yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam emel-emel tersebut. Kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut mesti S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 merujuk kepada Plaintif dan terdapat penerbitan kepada pihak ketiga. Menurut dakwaan Plaintif, emel-emel bertarikh 05.12.2020, 07.12.2020 dan 15.12.2020 merupakan suatu kenyataan fitnah yang merujuk kepada Plaintif untuk menjatuhkan reputasi Plaintif dan telah diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga melalui salinan “cc” kepada pihak ketiga. 61. Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan ketiga-tiga elemen yang diperlukan untuk membuktikan bahawa emel-emel tersebut mengandungi kenyataan berunsur fitnah. Ketika Pemeriksaan balas, Plaintif menyatakan keseluruhan kandungan emel-emel tersebut adalah kenyataan fitnah. Plaintif tidak menunjukkan atau menyatakan apakah kenyataan fitnah di dalam emel-emel tersebut. 62. Pada penelitian Mahkamah kenyataan-kenyataan dalam emel-emel tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah dan ianya tidak merujuk untuk merendahkan reputasi, mencela, memalukan atau menjatuhkan martabat Plaintif sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara di mata ahli-ahli jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama dan semua penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun. 63. Mahkamah mendapati kandungan emel-emel adalah jelas berkenaan permintaan dokumen-dokumen, resit dan invois serta penjelasan berhubung fi guaman oleh Defendan-Defendan kerana pertikaian yang berpunca dari fi guaman yang tidak dipersetujui antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. Tambahan lagi, Defendan- Defendan meminta penjelasan kerana Plaintif menggunakan akaun S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 peribadinya untuk pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati apa yang diminta oleh Defendan-Defendan adalah wajar sebagai anakguam. Plaintif seharusnya memberikan penjelasan berkenaan fi guaman yang dikenakan serta penjelasan mengapa Plaintif menggunakan akaun peribadinya dan bukan akaun firma guamannya. 64. Mahkamah juga mendapati emel-emel tersebut tiada kenyataan yang membawa maksud Plaintif telah menyeleweng atau menipu Defendan Pertama. Apa yang Defendan-Defendan berulang kali meminta adalah penjelasan mengenai fi guaman yang dikenakan dan segala resit dan dokumen berkaitan untuk membuat bayaran setakat kerja yang telah dilaksanakan oleh Plaintif. Sebaliknya Plaintif telah mengugut Defendan Pertama untuk memfailkan Notis Penarikan Diri bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga, tetapi kemudiannya, Plaintif telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula. Oleh itu, Defendan-Defendan telah meminta penjelasan bagi tindakan keterlaluan Plaintif tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati tindakan Plaintif sendiri adalah amat keterlaluan yang melanggar etika peguam dan Defendan-Defendan sebagai pihak yang terkilan mempunyai hak untuk meminta penjelasan bagi tindakan tersebut. 65. Mahkamah juga berpendapat sekadar menggunakan perkataan huruf besar dan ‘bold’ tidak membawa maksud kenyataan itu berbaur fitnah. Huruf besar dan ‘bold’ boleh memberikan erti kata bahawa penulis memberikan penekanan kepada apa yang dinyatakan. SD1 juga telah menerangkan tujuannya menggunakan huruf besar dan ‘bold’ dalam emel-emel yang dihantar olehnya adalah untuk menarik perhatian Plaintif kepada perkara penting. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Mahkamah menerima penjelasan ini kerana ianya adalah munasabah. Kenyataan Plaintif bahawa penggunaan huruf besar dan ‘bold’ adalah untuk menuduh, memfitnah Plaintif sehingga Plaintif menjadi trauma dan ‘embarassed’ tidak dibuktikan melalui apa-apa keterangan atau dokumen sokongan. 66. Walaupun Mahkamah mendapati kenyataan dalam emel-emel yang tersebut bukan satu kenyataan fitnah, namun Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan sama ada elemen ketiga iaitu penerbitan (publication) wujud. 67. Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan kenyataan yang dikatakan fitnah tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga. 68. Merujuk kes Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd. v Hue Shieh Lee (supra), “[36] The final element that the plaintiff must prove is that the words of which he complains have been published to any third party by the defendant. As stated by Lord Esher MR in the case of Hebditch v. Macilwaine [1894] 2 QB 54 (at p 58): "The material part of the cause of action in libel is not the writing, but the publication of the libel." [37] "Publication" means making the defamatory statement known to some other person other than of whom it is written or spoken. The statement must be published to a third party (see: S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & Another S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Case [1988] 1 MLRA 110). The uttering of a libel to the party libelled is no publication for the purpose of a civil action (see: Wennhak v. Morgan [1888] 20 QBD 634). The fundamental principle is that the statement must be communicated to a third party in such manner as to be capable of conveying the defamatory imputation about the plaintiff (see: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th edn at p 134). [38] The test involved in determining whether or not the words complained of are defamatory is a two-stage process. Firstly, it must be considered what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary person; and secondly, it must be considered whether under the circumstances in which the words were published, a reasonable man would be likely to understand that in a defamatory way (see: Wong Yoke Kong & Ors v. Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 2 MLRH 439).” [penekanan ditambah] 69. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa kenyataan atau emel- emel tersebut tidak pernah diterbitkan kepada mana-mana pihak ketiga dan bahawa ahli jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama bukanlah pihak ketiga. Plaintif sendiri gagal mengemukakan sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa emel-emel tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada penduduk di Pangsapuri Anggun melalui “Whatsapp- group” atau mengemukakan mana-mana saksi untuk membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif tersebut. 70. Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa membuat salinan (cc) kepada ahli jawatan kuasa Defendan Pertama bukanlah penerbitan, penyebaran atau penyiaran kepada pihak ketiga kerana ahli S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama adalah sebahagian daripada Defendan Pertama itu sendiri yang dibentuk melalui mesyuarat agung tahunan. Tambahan, tiada apa-apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif bahawa kenyataan yang dikatakan fitnah dalam emel- emel tersebut telah dihantar melalui “Whatsapp group” penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun. Pendek kata, tiada apa-apa bukti langsung bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah menghantar emel-emel tersebut kepada pihak ketiga selain ahli jawatankuasa Defendan Pertama. C Sama ada Defendan-Defendan bertanggungjawab atas kepalsuan memudaratkan, konspirasi mencederakan, frod dan representasi palsu kepada Plaintif 71. Plaintif mendakwa Defendan-Defendan telah secara salah berkonspirasi untuk mencederakan Plaintif dengan menerbitkan, menyiarkan, menyebabkan untuk disiarkan libel dan/atau slander terhadap Plaintif. 72. Pertamanya, Mahkamah telah mendapati kenyataan dalam emel- emel Defendan-Defendan tidak berunsur fitnah dan jika pun ianya adalah kenyataan berunsur fitnah (Mahkamah dapati tiada fitnah), tiada penerbitan kepada pihak ketiga. 73. Selanjutnya, Plaintif langsung tidak kemukakan apa-apa bukti untuk menunjukkan Defendan-Defendan telah melakukan perbuatan- perbuatan kepalsuan memudaratkan, konspirasi mencederakan, frod dan representasi palsu kepada Plaintif. Plaintif juga gagal untuk mengemukakan apa-apa bukti bahawa akibat daripada emel-emel Defendan-Defendan tersebut, Plaintif telah mengalami kecederaan, S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 kehilangan pendapatan, tercalar social standing Plaintif atau imej firma guaman Plaintif telah tercedera. 74. Merujuk kes Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v. Hue Shieh Lee, Mahkamah Persekutuan menerangkan kepalsuan memudaratkan seperti berikut: "The Law on Malicious Falsehood [39] In order to establish a claim under malicious falsehood, it is trite law that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the following elements: (i) that the defendant published about the plaintiff words which are false; (ii) that the words were published maliciously; and (iii) that special damage followed as the direct and natural result of the publication. … [40] "Malice" has been judicially interpreted by the courts as being reckless, unreasonable, prejudice or unfair belief in the truth of the statement. "Malice" may be established by showing that the defendant did not believe in the truth of what he uttered (see: Harrocks v. Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 and Watt v. Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 at p 154, [1929] All ER 284 at p 294). [41] As defined in the Osborn's Concise Dictionary (7th edn), the word "malice" means: S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Ill-will or evil motive: personal spite or ill-will sometimes called actual malice, express malice or malice in fact. In law an act is malicious if done intentionally without just cause or excuse. So long as a person believes in the truth of what he says and is not reckless, malice cannot be inferred from the fact that his belief is unreasonable, prejudiced or unfair (Horrocks v. Lowe [1972] 1 WLR 1625). [42] In law, an act is malicious if done intentionally without just cause or excuse. So long as a person believes in the truth of what he says and is not reckless, "malice" cannot be inferred from the fact that his belief is unreasonable, prejudiced or unfair (see: Anne Lim Keng See v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Anor And Other Appeals [2008] 2 MLRA 325, Horrocks v. Lowe (supra).” 75. Mahkamah bersetuju kenyataan dalam emel-emel tersebut bukanlah kenyataan yang memburukkan Plaintif tetapi Defendan- Defendan hanyalah menyatakan pendirian Defendan Pertama dan memohon penjelasan daripada Plaintif berkenaan tindakan Plaintif serta meminta dokumen-dokumen berkaitan untuk Defendan Pertama membuat pembayaran. Mahkamah mendapati ini adalah hak Defendan-Defendan selaku litigan dalam sesuatu tindakan untuk mendapatkan penjelasan berhubung apa-apa bayaran fi guaman yang telah dikenakan oleh peguamnya. Defendan- Defendan mempunyai hak untuk mempertikaikan fi guaman yang dikenakan dan jika tidak berpuas hati, boleh mengambil tindakan yang wajar menurut undang-undang yang terpakai. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 76. Merujuk kes Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 MLRA 326, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: “[25] We now turn to the issue of conspiracy to injure. In order to sustain an action in conspiracy, the plaintiffs must plead and prove four essential ingredients. They are: (i) a combination or agreement between two or more individuals, (ii) an intent to injure, (iii) pursuant to which combination or agreement and with that intention certain acts were carried out, and (iv) resulting in loss and damage to the plaintiffs. The learned trial judge found that the evidence produced by the plaintiffs was not sufficient to establish the tort of conspiracy to injure. The 1st defendant company was not operational while the 3rd defendant was a Director of the 1st plaintiff. The defendants did not take any confidential information from the plaintiffs. There was no agreement to prevent the defendants from incorporating a new company. We have considered the evidence in totality and find that there is nothing to justify us in disturbing the findings of fact of the learned trial judge.” [penekanan ditambah] 77. Plaintif gagal membuktikan elemen-elemen untuk menunjukkan terdapat konspirasi antara Defendan-Defendan untuk mencederakan Plaintif melalui emel-emel tersebut atau mana-mana tindakan Defendan-Defendan, sedangkan emel-emel tersebut jelas hanyalah memohon penjelasan dan dokumen yang relevan untuk Defendan Pertama melakukan pembayaran. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 78. Plaintif juga mendakwa Defendan-Defendan telah melakukan frod dan representasi palsu terhadap Plaintif. Sepertimana yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 5 MLJ 1, beban pembuktian bagi kes yang melibatkan frod dan pemalsuan adalah atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Beban bukti terletak atas pihak yang mendakwa terdapatnya frod. 79. Plaintif mendakwa Plaintif telah didorong untuk mempercayai bahawa Defendan Pertama akan membuat pembayaran fi guaman bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga, namun tiada langsung bayaran yang dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama walaupun Plaintif telah mengendalikan perbicaraan pada 06.10.2020 dan 07.10.2020, serta menyediakan dan memfailkan dokumen-dokumen perbicaraan. Menurut Plaintif, Defendan Ketiga telah menjanjikan untuk membuat pembayaran paling awal pada 29.10.2020 atau 30.10.2020 atau selewat-lewatnya 07.11.2020, namun Defendan Ketiga enggan hadir memberi keterangan semasa perbicaraan. Plaintif juga mendakwa pada masa yang sama, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga telah mengarahkan Plaintif untuk menaikkan amaun dan menghantar semula invois bertarikh 19.11.2020 untuk jumlah yang lebih tinggi iaitu RM5,953.00. Walaupun Defendan Ketiga menjanjikan pembayaran namun tiada apa-apa bayaran yang dibuat. Plaintif telah mengalami kerugian atas ketiadaan pembayaran sedangkan kerja-kerja telah dijalankan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif menyatakan Plaintif telah memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga kerana tiada arahan lanjut daripada Defendan-Defendan. Pada masa yang sama Defendan Kedua tidak dapat dihubungi kerana S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Plaintif telah dihalang (blocked) daripada menghubungi Defendan Kedua melalui telefon. Bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak, Plaintif menyatakan Defendan-Defendan maklum RM6,648.00 hanyalah fi untuk membuka fail dan tidak termasuk untuk tindakan lain seperti penghakiman ingkar kehadiran dan penyampaian ganti. Oleh itu Plaintif menegaskan Defendan-Defendan terutama Defendan Pertama telah melakukan frod terhadap Plaintif kerana enggan membayar fi guaman yang dijanjikan. 80. Mahkamah mendapati apa yang didakwa oleh Plaintif sebagai frod bukanlah satu tindakan melakukan frod oleh Defendan-Defendan. Apa yang jelas melalui emel-emel yang dihantar pada masa material, terdapat ketegangan antara Plaintif dan Defendan- Defendan akibat daripada pertikaian pembayaran fi guaman. Mahkamah mendapati tiada unsur frod dalam kes ini. Apa yang berlaku adalah Defendan Pertama tidak berpuas hati dengan jumlah fi guaman yang dikenakan dan telah meminta dokumen sokongan untuk kerja-kerja yang telah diselesaikan. Defendan Pertama juga telah meminta penjelasan berhubung fi guaman yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. Pertikaian berlanjutan apabila Plaintif tidak mengemukakan dokumen dan penjelasan. Akibatnya hubungan antara Defendan-Defendan dan Plaintif menjadi amat tegang sehingga komunikasi antara mereka tidak dapat diteruskan. Namun, dalam emel-emel yang dihantar oleh Defendan-Defendan telah menyatakan mereka akan membuat pembayaran apabila Plaintif memberikan dokumen-dokumen relevan untuk membuktikan kerja-kerja yang telah dilaksanakan. Tambahan pula, Defendan-Defendan juga ada membuat bayaran kepada peguam cara terdahulu dan juga kepada Plaintif bagi Kes 6 Pemunya Petak. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 81. Mahkamah berpendapat penangguhan bayaran oleh Defendan- Defendan untuk mendapatkan penjelasan bukan satu tindakan frod. Apa yang diminta Defendan-Defendan adalah hak mereka sebagai litigan. Frod dalam semua kes, merujuk kepada tindakan yang dilakukan dengan sengaja oleh mana-mana pihak, dengan seseorang cuba untuk menghalang hak yang sepatutnya dimiliki oleh pihak lain, melalui cara yang tidak sah atau tidak adil. Dalam kes ini, Plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan Defendan-Defendan telah menipu Plaintif dengan tidak membayar tuntutan fi guaman yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. Apa yang jelas daripada emel-emel yang dihantar oleh Defendan-Defendan, Defendan Pertama berulang kali telah meminta dokumen dan penjelasan dengan menyatakan dokumen-dokumen itu perlu bagi Defendan Pertama membuat bayaran, namun tidak diberikan oleh Plaintif. Kelakuan Defendan- Defendan dalam keadaan ini tidak boleh dikatakan adalah satu tindakan frod terhadap Plaintif. 82. Mahkamah merujuk keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn. Bhd. [2017] 4 MLJ 697. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut berhubung definisi frod: “[18] What amounts to ‘fraud’? ‘It is not easy to give a definition of what constitutes fraud in the extensive signification in which the term is understood by Civil Courts of Justice. The courts have always avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying down as a general proposition what shall constitute fraud. Fraud is S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 infinite in variety (Reddaway & Co and Another v Banham & Co and Another [1896] AC 199 at p 221). The fertility of man’s invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great, that the courts have always declined to define it, or to define undue influence, which is one of the many varieties, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present itself (Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 at p 183). Fraud, in the contemplation of a Civil Court of Justice, may be said to include properly all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of a legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another (Story, Eq Jur 187). All surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair way that is used to cheat any one is considered fraud (Finch 439). Fraud in all cases implies a wilful act on the part of any one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable means, of what he is entitled to (Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 at p 535)’ (Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (7th Ed) at p 1). ‘The concept of fraud is notoriously difficult to define’ (Cavell USA Inc and another v Seaton Insurance Company and another [2009] EWCA Civ 1363 per Longmore LJ, Mummery and Toulson LJJ in agreement). We would not hazard to define ‘fraud’. We would just say that ‘fraud’ is a generic term which also covers all manner of cheat, deceit and dishonesty. Given its wide meaning, ‘an action in fraud will usually include a number of distinct causes of action …’ and ‘claims to trace assets in equity or, perhaps, at common law’ (Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (18th Ed Vol 2) at 57-01).” [penekanan ditambah] S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 83. Seterusnya berkenaan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan- Defendan untuk memulangkan kad perniagaan milik Plaintif yang dikatakan telah ditinggalkan atas permohonan Defendan-Defendan. Akibat daripada ini, Plaintif mendakwa telah mengalami kerosakan dan kerugian akibat daripada tindakan itu. Mahkamah setuju dengan hujahan Defendan-Defendan bahawa tiada apa-apa bukti yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif berhubung dakwaan ini. D Sama ada Defendan-Defendan boleh menuntut gantirugi bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga dalam Tuntutan Balas Defendan 84. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif berhak memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula itu kerana Plaintif telah memberikan Notis-Notis termasuk Notis bertulis kepada Defendan-Defendan sebelum pemfailan dan Defendan Kedua telah bertindak menghalang (block) Plaintif melalui telefonnya. Tindakan Defendan Kedua telah mengakibatkan Plaintif tidak boleh mendapatkan sebarang arahan mahupun perbincangan dengan pihak Defendan-Defendan. Plaintif telah dimaklumkan oleh Defendan Ketiga bahawa hanya Defendan Kedua berhak membuat keputusan bagi pihak Defendan Pertama. Perkara ini juga disahkan oleh kakitangan Defendan Pertama, iaitu Nur Syafika Asyikin Binti Noridi. 85. Plaintif menyatakan Plaintif terpaksa menghantar Notis-Notis untuk pembayaran, pada setiap masa material, melalui emel kerana Defendan Kedua telah menghalang Plaintif daripada menghubungi Defendan Kedua melalui telefon. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 86. Plaintif menegaskan tindakan Plaintif memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula adalah wajar dan patut. Menurut Plaintif tugas dan tanggungjawab peguam terhadap Mahkamah adalah paling utama. Oleh kerana Defendan- Defendan telah menghalang Plaintif selaku peguam Defendan Pertama daripada mendapatkan sebarang arahan dan komunikasi untuk tindakan lanjut Kes Jasakon Niaga dan untuk apa jua arahan bagi kes terhadap 6 Pemunya Petak, Plaintif menjadi malu untuk hadir ke Mahkamah tanpa sebarang arahan dan mandat daripada anakguam. Akibatnya, Plaintif tidak dapat mengendalikan kes di Mahkamah. Plaintif merujuk Kaedah 6 Kaedah-Kaedah Profesion Undang-Undang (Amalan dan Etiket) 1978, dan kes Cheah Cheng Hoc v Public Prosecutor [1986] 1 MLJ 299 dan Re Zainur Zakaria [1999] 2 MLJ 577 untuk menyokong hujahannya. 87. Defendan-Defendan menegaskan Defendan Pertama telah mengalami kerugian yang amat besar akibat daripada tindakan Plaintif selaku peguam Defendan Pertama, yang telah bertindak tanpa arahan Defendan Pertama, apabila memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula untuk Kes Jasakon Niaga. Tuntutan Defendan Pertama terhadap Jasakon Niaga melibatkan wang penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun yang berjumlah RM94,800.00. Tindakan Plaintif ini telah mengabaikan hak anakguam Plaintif iaitu Defendan Pertama dan telah bertindak dengan mala fide sedangkan Plaintif mempunyai pilihan untuk menarik diri sebagai peguam cara Defendan Pertama. 88. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan Plaintif sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara, adalah tertakluk kepada etika peguam. Defendan- S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Defendan merujuk Kaedah-Kaedah 6, 31 dan 35 Kaedah-Kaedah Profesion Undang-Undang (Amalan dan Etiket) 1978 berkenaan tanggungjawab seorang peguam cara kepada anakguam secara amnya: 16. Advocate and solicitor to uphold interest of client, justice and dignity of profession An advocate and solicitor shall while acting with all due courtesy to the tribunal before which he is appearing, fearlessly uphold the interest of his client, the interest of justice and dignity of the profession without regard to any unpleasant consequences either to himself or to any other person. 31. Advocate and solicitor to uphold dignity of profession Every advocate and solicitor shall at all times uphold the dignity and high standing of his profession. 35. Advocate and solicitor not to abuse confidence reposed in him by client. (a) An advocate and solicitor shall refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by the client. (b) An advocate and solicitor shall preserve his client’s confidence and this duty outlasts his employment. [penekanan ditambah] S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 89. Mahkamah berpendapat tindakan Plaintif memfailkan Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga adalah satu tindakan yang keterlaluan dan tanpa asas yang telah memprejudiskan hak Defendan-Defendan dalam tuntutannya terhadap Jasakon Niaga. Tindakan Plaintif telah menyebabkan Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh memfailkan tuntutan yang sama terhadap Jasakon Niaga secara kekal. Ini bermaksud Defendan-Defendan telah kehilangan hak secara kekal. Defendan- Defendan adalah satu badan yang menjaga kepentingan hak penduduk-penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun, dalam erti kata lain Plaintif telah menidakkan hak penduduk-penduduk Pangsapuri Anggun dengan tindakan keterlaluannya. 90. Plaintif selaku seorang peguam, pasti mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa Plaintif seharusnya menarik diri dari terus bertindak sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara Defendan-Defendan apabila pertikaian antara mereka menjadi tegang dan sehingga ke tahap tidak boleh berkomunikasi. Tindakan yang diambil oleh Plaintif adalah tidak bertanggungjawab dan melanggar etika peguam di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Profesion Undang-Undang (Amalan dan Etiket) 1978. Plaintif telah gagal untuk melindungi kepentingan anakguam, keadilan dan maruah profesion apabila mengambil tindakan yang tidak munasabah dan keterlaluan sehingga memprejudiskan Defendan-Defendan. Plaintif mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk berjaga-jaga dalam mengambil apa-apa tindakan bagi pihak anakguamnya dan jika Plaintif gagal untuk menjalankan tanggunjawab tersebut, Plaintif akan bertanggunganjawab bagi apa-apa kerugian yang timbul akibat daripadanya. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 91. Dalam kes Neogh Soo Oh & Ors v. G. Rethinasamy [1983] 1 MLRH 175; [1984] 1 MLJ 126; [1983] CLJ Rep 663, Gunn Chit Tuan J memutuskan seperti yang berikut: "A client may bring an action against his solicitor in contract, based on the retainer of the solicitor by the client, or in tort, or in both. A solicitor's duty is to use reasonable care and skill in giving such advice and taking such action as the facts of a particular case demand. The standard of care is that of the reasonably competent solicitor and duty is directly related to the confines of the retainer. A solicitor should consult with his client on all questions of doubt and keep him reasonably informed." 92. Merujuk kes Subramaniam Manickam v Supramaniam Kasia Pilai (supra), Mahkamah menyatakan: “[59] Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Messrs Yong & Co v. Wee Hood Teck Development Corp Ltd [1984] 1 MLRA 165; [1984] 2 MLJ 39; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 251 telah menyatakan seperti berikut mengenai dengan hubungan seorang peguam dengan kliennya: “The liability of a solicitor may be viewed in two aspects. At common law, the retainer imposes upon him an obligation to be skilful and careful and for failure to fulfil this obligation he may be made liable in contract for negligence whether he is acting for reward or gratuitously. On the other hand, like any other individual, a solicitor is liable for his wrongful acts and if the circumstances justify the change, he may be made liable to his client on tort (see Halsbury's Law of England, (3rd Ed.) Vol. 36 p. 96, S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 para 131). He owes a duty not to injure his client by failing to do that which he had undertaken to do which his client has relied on him to do (Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. )” [penekanan ditambah] 93. Melalui otoriti-otoriti yang dinyatakan, jelas tanggungjawab seorang peguam cara adalah untuk bertindak untuk melindungi anakguamnya demi keadilan dan “in best interest of his client”. Namun dalam kes ini Plaintif telah bertindak sebaliknya, mencederakan hak kepentingan Defendan-Defendan sehingga mengakibatkan Defendan Pertama mengalami kerugian atas tuntutan yang sepatutnya diterima oleh Defendan-Defendan. 94. Keterangan Plaintif menunjukkan Plaintif sebenarnya mengetahui kesandan akibat sekiranya Notis Pemberhentian Tanpa Kebebasan Memfailkan Semula difailkan olehnya terhadap kes Defendan Pertama. Merujuk kepada komunikasi Whatsapp antara Plaintif dengan Defendan Kedua pada 14.12.2020, Plaintif telah memberitahu Defendan Kedua seperti berikut: “Assalamualaikum, tuan haji, since you all x berminat nk bayar our fees, we will withdraw your matter against jasakon WITHOUT LIBERTY to file fresh. Maksudnya sampai bila2 jmb pangsapuri anggun x boleh saman jasakon lgi di mana mana mahkamah…” [penekanan ditambah] S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 95. Jelas Plaintif tahu tindakannya akan merugikan dan memprejudiskan Defendan-Defendan. Kenyataan Plaintif jelas menunjukkan Plaintif telah dengan sengaja menyebabkan kerugian terhadap Defendan-Defendan kerana tidak puas hati apabila Defendan-Defendan tidak membuat bayaran seperti yang diminta oleh Plaintif. Tindakan Plaintif itu dalam apa keadaan sekali pun adalah satu tindakan yang tidak munasabah dan tanpa asas. Seorang peguam yang beretika dan seorang yang munasabah dalam tindakannya tidak akan mengambil satu tindakan yang begitu drastik dan memprejudiskan anakguamnya. Plaintif mempunyai pilihan untuk menarik diri dan mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap Defendan-Defendan jika Defendan-Defendan masih gagal untuk membayar fi guamannya. Mahkamah berpendapat tindakan Plaintif adalah suatu ‘blatant act’ dan salahlaku yang serius. 96. Mahkamah merujuk kes Messrs Albert Ding, Lee & Partners v Cho Chooi Mei [2020] 1 MLRH 391. Mahkamah menjelaskan berkenaan dengan kesalahan tatatertib peguam cara dalam Legal Profession Act 1976 Section 94 seperti berikut: “Section 94(3)(n) and (o) of Act 166 clearly includes "misconduct" of an advocate and solicitor as gross disregard of his client's interests and being guilty of any conduct which is unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor or which brings or is calculated to bring the legal profession into disrepute. ... Hence, it is in my opinion, morally wrong for her to refuse to discharge herself and her act of continuing to appear in court again after receiving the letter was clearly an act S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 without regards of her client's interest and her conduct is a conduct which is unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor, contrary to the said s 94(3)(n) and (o) of Act 166. [82] Since reference is made to s 94 of LPA, it is imperative to scrutinise the provision. The section reads: Section 94 - Power of Disciplinary Board to strike off the Roll, suspend for misconduct, etc (3) For the purposes of this Part, "misconduct" means conduct or omission to act in Malaysia or elsewhere by an advocate and solicitor in a professional capacity or otherwise which amounts to grave impropriety and includes: ... (m) the charging, in the absence of a written agreement, in respect of professional services rendered to a client, of fees or costs which are grossly excessive in all the circumstances; (n) gross disregard of his client's interests; (o) being guilty of any conduct which is unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor or which brings or is calculated to bring the legal profession into disrepute.” [penekanan di tambah] 97. Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa Defendan-Defendan adalah layak untuk mendapat gantirugi atas kerugian dan prejudis yang dialami oleh Defendan-Defendan bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga yang telah diberhentikan tanpa kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula sedangkan kes tersebut sedang dalam proses perbicaraan. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Defendan-Defendan telah merujuk kes Kuala Terengganu Specialist Hospital Sdn. Bhd. & Anor v Ahmad Thaqif Amzar Ahmad Huzairi & Other Appeals [2023] 1 MLRA 601 untuk menyokong tuntutan Defendan-Defendan bagi kerugian yang dialami akibat tindakan Plaintif. Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: [48] We must stress that it is well settled that SD claims must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. As correctly noted by the LJ, it is trite law that special damages must be pleaded and particularized and must be proved by either oral or documentary evidence (see Jub'li Mohamed Taib Taral & Ors v. Sunway Lagoon Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 MLRH 224; [2001] 6 MLJ 669; [2001] 4 CLJ 599; ABDA Airfreight Sdn Bhd v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd [2001] 3 MLRH 434; [2001] 3 MLJ 641; [2001] 8 CLJ 1; [2001] 3 AMR 3441 and Nurul Husna Muhammad Hafiz & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2015] 1 MLRH 234; [2015] 1 CLJ 825. … [54] In our deliberation on all the relevant heads of the damages which are the subject of this appeal, we adopt with approval the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Tetuan Bahari Choy & Nongchik v. Harta Megajaya Sdn Bhd [2020] 2 MLRA 92; [2019] 6 MLJ 491; [2019] 7 CLJ 332 that: "[15] As to damages, it is settled law that in order for a claimant to succeed in its claim the claimant must show that the loss and damages is due to the breach of contract or negligence by the defendant. Once S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 that is established the claimant has the additional burden of proving the damages. …” [penekanan ditambah] 98. Tuntutan Defendan Pertama dalam Kes Jasakon Niaga adalah RM94,800.00 di Mahkamah Majistret. Maka Defendan-Defendan telah menuntut jumlah tersebut di dalam Tuntutan Balas Defendan- Defendan. Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan terhadap Plaintif adalah sebanyak RM99,985.84. 99. Walau bagaimanapun, jumlah Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan menurut keterangan SD1 di Mahkamah adalah sebanyak RM98,846.34 iaitu tuntutan Defendan Pertama terhadap Jasakon Niaga berjumlah RM94,800.00 dan RM4,046.34 yang merupakan fi guaman yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif bagi Kes Jasakon Niaga. Adalah prinsip undang-undang mantap bahawa Mahkamah ini mempunyai kuasa untuk mengawardkan satu jumlah tuntutan yang berbeza dari apa yang diplidkan berdasarkan keterangan di Mahkamah. Mahkamah boleh membenarkan satu jumlah yang telah dibuktikan. Maka itu menurut bukti yang telah dikemukakan oleh Defendan-Defendan, Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan dibenarkan bagi jumlah RM98,846.34 (lihat: BS Eramaju Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v OPS Suria (EM) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor and another appeal [2018] 5 MLJ 647). . 100. Berhubung keterangan SD1 ketika perbicaraan, Plaintif menyatakan keterangan SD1 adalah tidak konsisten dan bercanggah. Mahkamah mendapati walaupun terdapat beberapa S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 percanggahan dalam keterangan SD1, namun percanggahan itu bukanlah percanggahan material sehingga mencacatkan keseluruhan keterangannya. Kewujudan keterangan bercanggah tidak bermaksud SD1 berbohong. Kenyataan SD1 adalah berdasarkan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak disangkal oleh Plaintif. Mahkamah merujuk kes CAS v. MPPL & Anor [2022] MLRHU 1141 yang menyatakan: “[41] In assessing the credibility of a witness’ testimony, Courts recognise that there will always be discrepancies and contradictions in a witness' testimony, particularly where they have to recall an event that took place a few years prior to the trial. Such discrepancies do not automatically make the witness an unreliable witness and the whole of his/her evidence unacceptable. Charles Ho J (as he then was) in Mohamed Alias v. PP [1981] 1 MLRH 574; [1983] 2 MLJ 172 said that where there are discrepancies in a witnesses' testimony, it is for the Court "having observed the demeanour of the witness and after careful consideration of such discrepancies to accept part of the witness's evidence if it considers them to be true". [penekanan ditambah] 101. Maka atas alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian, manakala Defendan- Defendan telah membuktikan Tuntutan Balasnya atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Oleh itu, Mahkamah telah memerintahkan Tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dan Tuntutan Balas Defendan-Defendan dibenarkan bagi amaun RM98,846.34. Plaintif hendaklah membayar kos sebanyak RM50,000 kepada Defendan-Defendan. S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 Bertarikh: 29 Disember 2023 t.t. JAMHIRAH ALI PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam (NCVC1) Kepada peguam pihak-pihak: Pihak Plaintif : Muhammad Amin Bin Anuar & Norsafiqka Norman (Tetuan Amin Chambers) Pihak Defendan-Defendan : Ku Amirul Faiz Ku Seman & Nurul Atikah Che Anawa (Tetuan Kama & Wan) S/N NjlSMzs99kSKiw/WCMeYiw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

KB-12B-8-07/2023

PERAYU 1. ) MOHD AZMAN BIN AZIZAN 2. ) AZNA ULUNG ENTERPRISE RESPONDEN TAN SOH CHIN

Appeal against decision of SCJ after full trial. Claim for the return of monies paid as investment for setting up 2 driving schools. The SCJ adopted the right approach in determining the issue in the Plaintiff’s claim. This Court is satisfied there was proper judicial evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by both parties and based on that she drew the correct conclusion.

02/01/2024

YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=92f5ef79-1e2e-4955-b405-bd4d8bd99cf4&Inline=true

02/01/2024 10:26:47 KB-12B-8-07/2023 Kand. 12 S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ee/1ki4eVUm0Bb1Ni9mc9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ma-12a—a—07/2023 Kand. 12 52/31/2024 1a:2s:A‘ DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI SUNGAI FETANI DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN. MALAVSIA RAVUAN SIVIL NO. Ka»12aum2n23 AMTARA 1. MOHD AIMAN am AZIZAN (No K/P175052!-B26193) 2. AZNA HLHNG ENTERPRISE (Na Pendaflaun Fernlagnan: PGMMAIA-P) FERAVU DAN TAN son CHIN (No KlP:1A0fi25-fl2-577$W) RESFONDEN GROUNDS or JUDGEMENT Introduction 1. Fa! curwemenee. pames wm be referred |o as they wave m we Sessxcns Com 2 This 15 me De(endanI5‘ apnea! agamsl the learned Sessions Court Judge's deuslan dated 25 szozs my a mu mal The Delendanl avneaxeu agamsl ms demsmn vude name 01 appez\ da|ed s 1 ma IN a-nkusvumnamnmmnn W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 3 Nler careful cnrisidera|IL7n of the records at appeal and the wriiien and era! submissions L79 huh! DENIES‘ this Calm dismissed the De4endanis‘ appear Following are ma reasons hr the decision Proceedings in ma Session: Court. Plndinpx 4 The Piaiiitiifs ciaim against the Defendant is for the mum of RM 49'/‘EDD D0 and RM 234,460.00 paid in the Fiist and 2"“ Defendants respectively as investment far sen-ng up diiving schools in Macnaiig Eubok, Feiiaiiq and another in Kerieh, Kelanian. Nomina maieriaiised and ma Piamuii went on to demand ma reium 01 me monies and lodge a police report against me Deiendanc s in thew aiaiemem at defence‘ the Deienaania denied the viainms claim and contended no monies were advanced by the Piammi 1 Altemalrvely, me oeienaanis piaadaa that the Plainiifl and the First ueienaam had agreed to set up Akademi Msmandu cemenang Kerteh Sdn Ehd and Akademi Memandu MB iaya sun Bhd wherein may wauia be directors and shareholders m -11nAsVumnEmNiDm:BA Wane sum lhlhhfl win a. um a may m. mam.“-y Wm nnumani VI ariuws wvm 3 Any mnnies unveiled by me P\a|nI\H had gone mwams Ihs cnnsmnmon at these dnvxng schoms and me Devendams mamlaln |haI me Puamw was nu! ermflad to ask «or me re|um at mass mamas. me lrial 9 The Flammrs evidence can be summanzea as follows sne agreed In xnvesl money wun me Hrs: De4enaanx ann (owavds that end. she ewthev pa casn m Iranslermd mamas unhne to ma FvsIDe1sndan( some at memes had been paid om mm snner nev husband's bank acceum or her business accounls The Plaunw nad tatzuvated me amounts pan! to me Delendants m me smernant ofdavm and had prawued me sanespandmg ewdence my eacn payment to Allhough she was appmmeu director and sharehmder m Akzdemx Memandu cemenang Kelereh Sdn am and Akaflenu Memandu ME Jaye Sdn anus lhe Plalmifl ma nulhmg nmrelhan pay out manies and sign documents She wen almost an mahers nauaung lo genmg me venture 5! me gvound «a me First Delendam 11, The rusx Deéendam .n niscesnnmnydsnusa receipt av paynnencs made by way av cheques m -nmsvumnamnmmnia were sum an... M“ s. um In new m. nan.“-y Wm aam... VI muus wvm 12 HI: posltlon was me: me Plalnlm was a partner In the lransaarons relaling in me selllrlg up uilrle dr irlg schools and lrrerelere undenoek lhe rlsk that me lrweslmenls wlll no| pay out. 13 He helped secure me we ler llre drlvlng school In Kereleh and had apuolnled carllradms to help clear me land Walks came to a elerrdellll when llre applleallorr for lreenee In run |he drlvmg serroal was rejected Although lrley had secured Che requislle llcence |a operate me drlvlng sumo Machallg Eubuk, me Plalnlrfl was no lunger mlereeled In Ihs proleel neclslon 14 On 2552023, me Ieamed SCJ allowed me Plalnhffs clalm egalnsl the De4erldarlls and ordered — ll) me Fllsl Delendarrl lo ply RM 497.auo.uo and my me 2'“ Delerrdanl lo pay RM 234,450 00; and (ill lnlereel and casle. m nllmevumnamnmrunn we sew lhlhhfl err e. um In may he ..rern.r-r MW: nnuuvlenl VI HVLING DWI! Frocndirlgs in me High cmm Delendanm submission: «5 The Delendanlssubmmed |haMhe veamea SCJ erred when she snowed me F'\ainIWs dalm They namplamed that the leamed $0.15 finding that mere exwsled a cnnlracl heaween me pames was aomrary In me P\amM's pleaded case. 16 The Defendants also cunlendsd max ma lsamsd sex was wrong because the Plammrs own zeswnany shows lha| RM monoaa had been pan tuwavds Investment m Yayasan Terengganu. The Plamm also «sued to prove man cheques |u(aHIng RM 313.000 an were pad in me Fivs| Delendanl 17. The Detendams argued max any memes aavaneed by me Plammwere Investments and earned Ihs risk ol no returns. The monies mm been punowards me senmg up our-e two dvlvmg schcms mclnding Ieasmg me Kereleh me The projed am not malsnahse necause the avnhcallon was Ivoenee was velacled. The wammr nersew gave up on me Machang Buhuk pmjem 13 The Plamlifl on me nlher hand submmed that me Defendants‘ lesflmnny was a bare demal or me Plamms claim and mac me Issue regaramg me payment was an anennougm m ..nmevumnaam.»...m Wale sum runny wm e. um I» may he mtgmuly Wm “M... VI erwuws wvm 19. The P\ain|ifl argued Mal Ihe warned SCJ was DGUEC1 to hold that the reblmnship belween the games was conlvamual vmeleln in return luv the financwal Investment‘ the Defendants were respnnslble 60! an mallet: relating In the semng up «he dnvmg schools The evwdencs showed lhai the Delendanls did not live up In mew and M [he bnvgam Alulysis and firmng: The appeal 20 u Is |n|e man [ms court, as an appeflate mun‘ oughl not In m|ervene with the ma! courvs concmsuon on primary lasts unless n \s sausnen me man judge was p\ain\y wmng Based on nus ‘plamly wrung |es\’. an appe\!z|e courl Is enlmed lo exanune me process 0! evalualwon oc evmsnoa by me Ina! own and may set asme any flecusxon of me lnal courl mm no or msumcuenl ]udicIa\ appveuauun of me ewdsnoe (see Gan Yook Chm (P) &AnarvLee In Chm LeeT en 5015 2005 2 MLJ1 It 9 2mm 4 on ma 20m 5 AMR 751, UEM Gvoug arm V Gems s m rated En inears Pxe Ltd a An r zmo MLJU 2225 at p_ara 26 . Ng Hm: Km 5. Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Pang admims|ralnx Inrlhe euana u(Tin Ewe Kwang deoeased 1. ms 202m 12 MLJ 57 gl fij‘ Mme 0.1.; Gas Engmeenng sun Bhd v. ]'_ay ay Kwee 5. Sons Sdn End 2015 2 MLJ 425 at M) m -musvumnamnmmnia W. sum rumhnv Mu be us« w vetny m. nugmuly mm anuumnl 2. nrwuus W.‘ 21 This Conn must examme me man coun's process av evaluation o1 avidenoe and apphcanon av raw m amvmg ax me deasmn Unless the declsmn Is one wmm Vs um reasnnzbly explzmed av jushflad or one wmcn no reasanabla judge could have reached. appellate mlemenlmn Is unwarranted rm SC.l’s grounds aliudgment 22 A pemsaw acme learned SCJ's grounds auuagmem shows ma! she was oagnlsanl D! “we Plawnliffs pleaded case and the Delendanw defense 23 The Vezrned sm found mac me Pwamun had m «act wasted a sum xotalung RM 732,260 00 with the Devennamstorme semng up anne lwn drivmg schnms She new that — ‘Dapal mums: bahawa walau dzlam apa—apa benhlk Iransaksw yang (elah dualinkan sauna ad: plndihin alas «sum ueposn mum, secara Iunai a\aupun melalm cek, ne¢endan—ne1enaan hdak dapal mempemkaxakan bahawa kessmua wang pelaburin uersebm telah di|evima oleh Defendan-Defendan Du permgkal ml, Mzhkamah hen-pendapa| pelsoalan herkenaan mmaan, kuasa menammangam cek dun asbagimya max relevan Wag! Seklranya Deienaamoecenuan an perlngkat . mempenoalkan sedemxklan‘ Ianya lemyala aaam sualu 'a«enhoughr memzndangkan Defendan—Delendan |e\ahpIm menenma wang pelaburan «menu: ' m -musvumnamnmmnia Wale sum lhlhhfl wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm 24 She was scspllcal oflhe varlaus lssue raised bylhe Delendarlls durlrlg the mal and lmmd — “Fenahan kosong Delenuanoelenuan membawa keaan bahawa DefEndarl—Defendan mempunyal perlgslanuan penlm tenlang xeselurururr lurllulln warlg pelaburan Iersebul |e|a masih gagal darlla|au enggan menlelaskannya ' 25. The learned S0.’ was sallsfied that the parlles had an aglezmem whereby me Plalnllllwmm lrwesl oapnal arm ln mm, lhe Delermams would do all ma! was necessarily la sel up ma dn annuals 2s The learned SCJ held |haI me Delenuanla lallea In pmwde dncumenlallen to account lar ma morlles lnal the Flalrllifl had lrlvesled VI me ventures and suppnfl men r:nn|en|iL7rl mac may had done all me was requlred olmem. 27. She drew an adverse lnferenoe agamsl «he Delenuams var men lallura to lead evidence or call wilrresses Io subs1arltla|e their corllemlarl lhal they had iumlled |helr end onhe halgaln The learned SC.) acueplsd mal me Plammrs svlaanoe wrrrcrl she lo-ma remained unchallenged |he nelenaams m -1mAsVumnEmNlDm:IA Wale s.rr.r ...m M“ be us« In vetny r... .mar..rr., mm mm... m mulls ml 25 ms Cuun was mlndlul mat |he aecrsrun :2! me learned sc.I rnvowesvunarngs mac: and max mete should he no mxerterenne by me appeHaIe Cami umess n can be Shawn ma! the finding rs perverse and oomrary lo we evidence lhalwas led dunng max 29 This Cami «mas that me SCJ adopted me vigm approach in delermvmng me rssue m me Pnarrmlrs c\aIm From ner grounds mi ;udgmen|, «ms cam rs sacrsfied (here was proper ]udIcIa\ evumluon and appmuamon :71 the evruense preyencea by both pa s and based on |ha\ she drew lhe oonecl conduslon so She had me added benem a! seeing and evalnalmg both me Plamhfi and me First Defendant when my gave evidence before her 31 Thus Court rs unpersuaded met me Detanaanw camplimls have any mems n-clslan 32 FM me reasons set om, (his cum fllsrmsses me De4endants' apnea‘ and amrms me decwsion cf the Veamed su dated 25 e 2023 Costs 01 RMSUOU rs. awarded to me P\a|n|\Wsub]eC1 to aUoca(uv r~ -musvumnamnmmnia Wale sum lhlhhfl wm be um w may m. mtgwruuly mm 3..."... VI HVLING wvm Daced 21 December 2023 Navkunavalhy unda son Jumaal Cumrrussianer H4gh Caun of Malaya at Sungaw Petam For the Am:-Ilnm 1 5 2 Azhar hm Ahmad Messrs Aswar, smmn s. Azhzr Mn SA, Lnmng Eellam R132‘ Timan Elenam Ra wazon Kepa\a Salas, Pulzu Pmang For me Reapondenl Vrmalan 3/! s Vlsvallngam Messrs A G Raseh 2; Paul Blok B-3-9, Pusal Femlagaan Sunway‘ Ja\an Todak 4. 13700 Seberzng Jaya‘ Pulau Pinang m -nmsvumnamnmmnia Wale sum lhlhhfl wm be uud In mm m. mtgmuly MW; anumgnl VI muus wvm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023

PLAINTIF Suthan a/l Panchadcharam DEFENDAN Isha Educare Sdn Bhd

Whether there are triable issues or not to warrant an order for full trial instead of summary judgment under order 14 ROC 2012 - if summary judgment is allowed by this Court whether the application of discovery of document made by the Defendant under order 24 rules 3, 7 and 8 ROC 2012 is considered nugatory or not.

02/01/2024

Puan Rafiqha Hanim binti Mohd Rosli

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023 ANTARA SUTHAN A/L PANCHADCHARAM (NO.K/P: 741211-14-5065) …PLAINTIFF DAN ISHA EDUCARE SDN BHD (200501032075/714213-H) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 11 AND ENCLOSURE 23) A. INTRODUCTION 1. There are 2 appeals in relation to this Court’s decision in allowing the Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment application under Order 14 of the Rules of Courts 2012 (ROC 2012) with cost of RM5,000.00 vide the Notice of Application dated 13.9.2023 (Enclosure 11) and dismissing the Defendant’s application for discovery of documents under Order 24 Rules 3, 7 and 8 ROC 2012 dated 31.10.2023 (Enclosure 23). 2. In relation to these appeals, this Court will give its analysis and findings simultaneously based on all evidence and exhibits tendered before this Court. 02/01/2024 17:05:08 BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023 Kand. 52 S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 B. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 3. The cause of action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant is for the aforesaid debt owing to him as a previous director which was showed in the letter of audit confirmation of the debt owing from the Defendant’s auditor dated 20.4.2021 proves the said debt. 4. This is further supported by the reports and financial statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 prepared by the Defendant itself. 5. A letter of demand dated 7.7.2020 issued by the Plaintiff’s Solicitors, Messrs. Ngeow & Tan on the Defendant was never contested or replied by the Defendant. 6. The Plaintiff contended that this is a clear case for summary judgment against the Defendant based on clear and express admission of the debt of RM838,672.54 by the Defendant of which the Plaintiff is claiming that the Defendant did not have a bona fide and is inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents and is inherently improbable in law in view of the documents showing the admission of debt by the Defendant. 7. This dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is essentially for recovery of a debt owed by the Defendant company to its previous director namely the Plaintiff in the sum of RM838,672.54. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 8. The conclusive proof of the debt is shown in the Defendant’s own and following documents: (i) a confirmation of balance letter dated 20.4.2021 from the Defendant’s auditors to the Plaintiff; (ii) the report and financial statement dated 31.12.2020 of the Defendant; (iii) the report and financial statement dated 31.12.2021 of the Defendant; and (iv) other relevant documents which are referred in this case. 9. At all material times, the Defendant did not raise any objection or dispute the said debt as reflected in the letter of audit confirmation dated 20.4.2021 and the reports and financial statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 and the letter of demand dated 7.7.2020. 10. As a matter of fact, the Defendant pleaded the following averment with regards to the sum of RM838,672.54. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT 11. This Court had allowed the Plaintiff’s application vide summary judgment application under Order 14 ROC 2012 and thereafter disallowed the Defendant’s application to seek for discovery of documents based on the following analysis and findings as stated below: (i) The Letter of Audit Confirmation 12. This Court had seen vide exhibit SP-2, p. 21 and paragraph 9 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff which disclosed that the Defendant’s own auditors, Messrs. Koo Wee Long & Co had certified that the said debt is owing to the Plaintiff from the Defendant. 13. In furtherance to this, there was also one letter prepared and signed by the said audit firm which was addressed to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff had confirmed the said debt of RM838,672.54 as at 31.12.2019 as stated below: ’’amount due to you’’ and ’’We are writing as auditors of the above company. In the course of our regular examination of the accounts of the above company, we find that the balance of your account was as follows’’. 14. On top of that this Court also takes into consideration vide the Defendant’s Statement of Defence particularly at paragraph 6 which referred to the Share Sale Agreement dated 5.2.2018 (’’SSA 1’’) and 18.3.2019 (’’SSA 2’’) of which the Plaintiff was not a party. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 15. With this in the Court’s mind, this Court is of the view that the Plaintiff was not privy to the said agreements. In relation to SSA 1, Kuhan had denied signing the said agreement, the signature is not his and had never met the witness purportedly witnessed his signature in SSA 1 and had lodged a police report pertaining to the same (see paragraph 24, p. 98 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 16. Further, the SSA 1 is not valid since Kuhan’s 30% shares in the Defendant’s company had been sold and transferred to a director by the name of Murugamah a/p Rama Krishnan in pursuant to a Share Sale Agreement dated 22.9.2020 (’’SSA 22.9.2020’’) (see paragraph 21.2 and exhibit SP-6, pp. 104-123 Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff). 17. This agreement was guaranteed by another director by the name of Thinesvaran a/l Ponayah in pursuant to a Guarantee Agreement dated 22.9.2020, who was also a deponent of the Defendant’s in this application (see paragraph 21.2 and exhibit SP-6, pp. 124-127 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 18. In addition to this finding, even assuming that SSA 1 is a valid document this Court views that SSA 1 has been superseded under s.15.6.2 of the SSA 22.9.2020 which states: ‘’15.6.2 All previous agreements, representations, warranties, explanations and commitments, expressed or implied, affecting this subject matter are superseded by this document and have no effect’’. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 19. This Court also takes into consideration of the facts that Murugamah had agreed to the aforesaid clause by signing the SSA 22.9.2020 and therefore he is now estopped from denying it now. 20. Further, this Court also views that in paragraph 21.2 namely SSA 22.9.2020 referred to in Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff envisaged that the SSA dated 22.9.2020 superseded the other agreement dated 5.2.2018. This averment was not denied by the Defendant and therefore is deemed admitted as clearly envisaged in ALLOY AUTOMOTIVE SDN BHD v. PERUSAHAAN IRONFIELD SDN BHD [1985] 1 MLRA 309. 21. The Defendant did not deny the execution of the SSA 22.9.2020 as stated in the Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant, neither did the Defendant or Murugamah (director of the Defendant) lodged any police report disputing the execution of the SSA 22.9.2020, if she was claiming that she did execute the same. 22. As such, this Court is agreement with the Plaintiff’s submission that this is not a triable issue, as alleged by the Defendant in para 16.4 of Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant. Hence, this Court views that the validity of the SSA 22.9.2020 is further established by referring to paras 4.1 to 4.5 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff as exhibited in SP-1, pp. 22-41. (ii) The Financial Statements S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 23. With regards to the reports and Financial Statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 prepared by the Defendant as submitted to the Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM), this Court views that these financial statements have been pleaded at paragraph 5 Statement of Claim and paragraph 10 Affidavit in Support of Enclosure 11. 24. These financial statements approved and filed at SSM by the Defendant shows that these are unqualified auditor’s report (see exhibit SP-3, p. 23 and p. 49 Affidavit in Support which can be seen at p. 45 and p.71 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 25. In these exhibits evidently showed that the said endorsement had been signed by Thinesvaran a/l Ponayah being the director of the Defendant (Thinesvaran). The most recent financial statement that was filed by the Defendant at SSM being an unqualified auditor’s report is dated 31.12.2022 and filed on 15.8.2023 and executed by Thinesvaran in his capacity as the current director of the Defendant (paragraph 14.3, pp. 71-96 as stated in the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 26. Furthermore, in relation to the said financial statements, Thinesvaran had affirmed one statutory declaration in pursuant to s.251(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2016 that the said financial statements are ’’… to the best of my knowledge and believe correct…’’ as per exhibit SP-3, p.29 Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff (for 2020) and exhibit SP-3, p. 55 (for 2021) Affidavit in Support by the S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Plaintiff and exhibit SP-3, p.51 (for 2019) and exhibit SP-3, p. 77 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 27. In the said financial statements the Defendant had also confirmed which can be seen in exhibit SP-3, p. 27 and p.53 of the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff as stated below: At the date of this report, the directors are not aware of any circumstances: i) that would require any other amount to be written off as bad debts or provided for as doubtful debts…’’ 28. The same statements also appeared in the 2019 and 2022 financial statements (as per exhibit SP-3, p. 49 and p.75 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff), which was duly approved by the Defendant. 29. Nonetheless, should the debt sum not a bona fide claim, as alleged in paragraph 12, Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant, they had certainly contradicted themselves as this Court takes into consideration on the evidentiary documents showed in the contemporaneous documents namely financial statements for the year 2019 to 2022 were indeed duly approved by the Defendant. 30. In addition to the abovementioned view, this Court also takes into consideration, the financial statements for the years, 2020, 2021 and 2022 shows that an amount of RM838,672.54 is still owed by the Defendant to the previous director as stated below: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (i) for the year 2020 as exhibited in SP-3, p. 45 and p. 47 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff; (ii) for the year of 2021, exhibit SP-3, p. 71 and p. 73 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff; and (iii) for the year of 2022, exhibit SP-3, p. 93 and p.95 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 31. In addition to this finding, this Court also takes cognizance, as at 15.8.2023, based on the filing by the Defendant at SSM on the financial statements for the year 2022, it is evidently clear that the amount of RM838,672.54 is still recognized as owing to the previous director namely the Plaintiff. 32. The Defendant had also admitted in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Defence that RM838,673.00 (nearest sum to RM838,672.54) was the amount owed to a previous director. 33. Surely, this Court cannot deny this fact and should take this statement as a judicial admission by the Defendant in its pleading. 34. On top of this admission, this sum is also shown in the auditor’s confirmation of balance dated 20.4.2021 and also in the financial statements of 2020, 2021 and most recently 2022 of the Defendant. 35. Thereafter, the Defendant had also filed the latest financial statement dated 31.12.2023 of the Defendant at SSM again confirming that RM838,673.00 is S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 owing to a previous director/Plaintiff (p.93, note 6 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff) in which the director of the Defendant namely Thinesvaran again had confirmed by way of a statutory of declaration affirmed on 31.5.2023 that the contents financial statement is true (see p.77 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 36. Based on this admission of facts in a defence, this Court is guided by the High Court decision in GLOBAL DESTAR (M) SDN. BHD. v. KUALA LUMPUR GLASS MANUFACTURES CO. SDN. BHD. [2003] 3 MLRH 127 where Abdul Malik Ishak J held at page 131 as stated below: ’’…the effect of the defendant admitting the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim is this: that there is no issue between the parties on that part of the case and there is no necessity to proceed to trial. And no evidence is admissible in regard to those admitted facts (Pioneer Plastic Containers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise [1967] Ch. 597). It is my judgment that the defendant has specifically pleaded that they do not deny paras. 4(b) and 5(A)(b) of the statement of claim in that the sum of RM151,361.98 is owing to the plaintiff. It is a clear admission on the part of the defendant. A plain and unequivocal language cannot be considered as a statement of non-admission or a statement of non- denial. Bluntly put, the defendant has by way of their pleadings - their statement of defence, admitted to the plaintiff's claim of RM151,361.98. In Esso Malaysia Bhd v. Hills Agency (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 5 MLRH 142 ; [1994] 1 MLJ 740, in construing the effect of an admission to the affidavit evidence, Idris Yusoff J had this to say at p. 752 of the report: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 What is more damaging in this case is that the defendants go to the extent of admitting paras 3 and 4 of the plaintiffs' affidavit - thereby obviating the necessity for the plaintiffs to provide further proof to substantiate their averment. Admissions are the strongest evidence possible and even a wrong construction of a document will be assumed to be correct in view of the admission. A fortiori an admission by way of pleadings are formal admissions and cannot be easily explained away (Ruby Investment (Pte) Ltd v. Candipark Pte Ltd [1989] 4 MLRH 469 ; [1989] 3 MLJ 396). 37. Further, on the judicial admission in a defence, this Court is guided by the Federal Court in YAM KONG SENG & ANOR v. YEE WENG KAI [2014] 4 MLRA 316 held as below: ’’ [16] The above averment was in response to para 12 of the statement of claim wherein the appellants averred that the company and the respondent had confirmed in writing of the amount owing and payable to them. It is trite law that a judicial admission made in a pleading stands on a higher footing than evidentiary admission (Sarkar’s Law of Evidence) with the respondent’s admission therein be made the foundation of the rights of the parties (Satish Mohan Bilal v. State of UP [1986] AIR All 126). Any failure on the part of the respondent to rebut the admission to avoid the legal consequences of his admission would entitle the appellants to enter judgment against him. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [17] Having perused the defence in particular para 8, we find that there is clear judicial admission of the debt owed. The question that must follow would be whether the respondent was avoiding responsibility to pay up. In Jacob and Goldrein’s Pleadings: Principles and Practice [1990] pp 133-134 in dealing with confession and avoidance, the following is stated: Confession and Avoidance Meaning The term ‘confession and avoidance’ is the description of a plea in the defence which, while expressly or impliedly admitting or confessing or assuming the truth of the material facts alleged in the statement of claim, seeks at the same time to avoid or destroy the legal consequences of those facts. The plea is invoked by alleging fresh or additional facts to establish some legal justification or excuse, or some other ground for avoiding or escaping legal liability. The defendant, as it were, confesses the truth of what is alleged against him but proceed immediately to ‘avoid’ the effect of such allegations. [18] Having scrutinised the defence we find that the respondent has failed to avoid legal liability. With there being judicial admission by the respondent sufficient to hold him liable to the amount claimed the answer to the first question of law in this appeal must be answered in the positive. 38. In relation to a certificate of indebtedness (in which for this present case is the confirmation of balance of the auditor), this Court is guided by the Federal Court’s decision in CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD. v. HO LAI YING & ANOR [2005] 2 MLRA 736 which states: ’’ The above dictum establishes firmly the conclusive nature and extent of a certificate of indebtedness. A certificate of indebtedness S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 operates in the field of adjectival law. It excuses the plaintiff from adducing proof of debt. Such a certificate shifts the burden onto the defendant to disprove the amount claimed.’’ (iv) Letter of Demand dated 7.72020 sent by the Plaintiff which was not replied by the Defendant 39. This Court takes cognizance on the evidence, that the Plaintiff’s Solicitors had served a letter of demand dated 7.7.2020 to the Defendant as shown in paragraph 13, exhibit SP-4, pp.76-77 Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff. 40. In relation to the above facts, the Defendant had duly admitted that they had received the said letter of demand which can be seen in paragraph 11 of their Statement of Defence and paragraph 12 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant. 41. Based on these evidences, it is clearly showed that the Defendant did not object or deny to the contents of the said letter including the demand sum of RM838,673.00 till to date. 42. This is clearly an admission of the sum owing to the Plaintiff since the said letter states that the demand is being made by their client Mr.Suthan a/l Panchadcharam who is the Plaintiff in this suit. 43. With this in mind, the failure to reply the letter of demand sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendant can be taken as an admission by the Defendant based on the S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Court of Appeal in JOHN AMBROSE v. PETER ANTHONY & ANOR [2017] 1 SSLR 625 that states as follows: ’’[33] The first defendant in his evidence admitted having knowledge of the plaintiff ’s solicitors' letter dated 29 November 2013 yet the first defendant did not at any time respond to or protest the plaintiff ’s assertions of the oral agreements. In Ling Hock Ling v. Tai Lian Land Development Co [2006] 2 MLRA 149, this Court through Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said at p 149: “Now, here we have a case where the defendant upon receiving copies of the plaintiff ’s letters to FELDA did not make any protest about his description as a subcontractor. If it was not the truth he would have said so. But he kept quiet. In these circumstances it does not lie in his mouth to say that he was not the plaintiff ’s contractor. ...” 44. Similarly, this Court is also guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in DAVID WONG HON LEONG v. NOORAZMAN ADNAN [1995] 1 MLRA 708 held: [9] During argument, we registered our surprise at the learned Judge’s reluctance to enter judgment for this sum of RM100,000. After all, the appellant had failed to respond to the letter of 17 December. If there had never been an agreement as alleged, it is reasonable to expect a prompt and vigorous denial. But, as we have pointed out, there was no response whatsoever from the appellant. [10] In this context, we recall to mind the following passage in the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J in Tan Cheng Hock v. Chan Thean Soo [1985] 2 MLRH 562; [1987] 2 MLJ 479: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 In Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534, 537 an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was held, that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she stated that he had promised to marry her, was no evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony in support of such promise. Lord Esher MR, in his judgment, remarked: Here, we have only to see whether the mere fact of not answering the letters, with nothing else for us to consider is any evidence in corroboration of the promise. ’Earlier, in his judgment, he said,’ Now there are cases – business and mercantile cases in which the Courts have taken notice that, in the ordinary course of business, if one man of business states in a letter to another that he has agreed to do certain things, the person who receives that letter must answer it if he means to dispute the fact that he did so agree. (v) No indemnity by a third party 45. The Defendant had pleaded a case of in indemnity by third parties to the Defendant purportedly for being jointly liable for the debt being owed to the Plaintiff. The Defendant, in other words, is saying in their defence that the third parties are responsible for the said debt and the purported third parties must indemnify the Defendant on the same as stated in paragraphs 3, 4.1 to 4.4, 4.4.1(no. 1), 4.4.1(no.2), 4.5, 4.6, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12 in their Statement of Defence. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 46. However, this Court views that this defence is not meritable as the third parties do not have any privity of contract with the Plaintiff which can be seen in paragraphs 5 and 9.1 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan. 47. As duly mentioned above, this Court views that the debt is owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff based on the confirmation of balance by the Defendant’s auditor, financial statements for the years of 2020, 2021 and 2022, letter of demand and a recent confirmation provided by the directors of the Defendant in a letter dated 24.4.2023 addressed to the Plaintiff which can be seen in paragraph 6.3 and exhibit SP-2, p. 43 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 48. On the issue of indemnity by a third party raised by a Defendant, this Court sees that there is no foundation on this statement as there is no denial made by the Defendant that the said third party had no linkage nor privity in the debt owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 49. This Court’s view is based on the Federal Court’s decision in UNITED MERCHANT FINANCE BHD v. MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM NEGERI JOHOR [1999] 1 MLRA 98 which states as below: ’’[9] It should also be noted that any statement by a defendant that he is entitled to be indemnified by a third party is no answer to the plaintiff’s claim in an O 14 application, unless the third party has discharged the plaintiff’s claim (Thorne v. Steel [1878] WN 215 CA). See The Supreme Court Practice 1997 Vol 1 para 14/3 - 4/2 p 156.’’ S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 50. Based on all evidence and case laws as above, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission that there are no triable issues raised by the Defendant which could warrant a full trial vide viva voce evidence to be given by witnesses. This is clearly a plain and obvious case where summary judgment ought to be allowed. 51. This Court is guided by the decision of the Federal Court in NATIONAL COMPANY FOR FOREIGN TRADE v. KAYU RAYA SDN BHD [1984] 1 MLRA 190 where the Court succinctly held: We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under O 14 the first considerations are : (a) whether the case comes within the Order; and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under O 14. For the purposes of an application under O 14 the preliminary requirements are: (i) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (ii) the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; and (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r 2 of the O 14. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [9] If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he comes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why judgment should not be given against him [see O 14 r 3 and 4(1)]. 52. Further, this Court is also guided by the Supreme Court’s decision of BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA v. MOHD ISMAIL ALI JOHOR & ORS [1992] 1 MLRA 190 where the Court held: [13] Under an O 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 D. CONCLUSION 53. Based on the abovementioned analysis and findings, this Court allowed the summary judgment application with the cost of RM5,000.00 to be entered against the Defendant as the Defendant have failed to show neither any bona fide meritable defence nor triable issue in relation to the Plaintiff’s claim of RM838,672.54 as there are numerous clear admissions of debt based on documentary evidence presented in this case. 54. In lieu of the above decision, the Defendant’s application vide Enclosure 23 for the discovery of document is now nugatory. Based on this reason, Enclosure 23 is dismissed with no order as to cost. Prepared by: RAFIQHA HANIM MOHD ROSLI SESSIONS COURT JUDGE SESSIONS COURT (6) SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR 7 DECEMBER 2023 S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 PARTIES: FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KALYANSUNDARAM A/L RAJAGOPAL TETUAN KAL & PARTNERS FOR THE DEFENDANT: LEE BOON KOON & LOW JIAH YEE TETUAN ARISSA TAN, CHIEN & CO. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal A. INTRODUCTION B. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT D. CONCLUSION

Tika 2.6.0

BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023

PLAINTIF Suthan a/l Panchadcharam DEFENDAN Isha Educare Sdn Bhd

Whether there are triable issues or not to warrant an order for full trial instead of summary judgment under order 14 ROC 2012 - if summary judgment is allowed by this Court whether the application of discovery of document made by the Defendant under order 24 rules 3, 7 and 8 ROC 2012 is considered nugatory or not.

02/01/2024

Puan Rafiqha Hanim binti Mohd Rosli

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=84e83e9c-820e-4982-9ac3-4dea7f2b89da&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023 ANTARA SUTHAN A/L PANCHADCHARAM (NO.K/P: 741211-14-5065) …PLAINTIFF DAN ISHA EDUCARE SDN BHD (200501032075/714213-H) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 11 AND ENCLOSURE 23) A. INTRODUCTION 1. There are 2 appeals in relation to this Court’s decision in allowing the Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment application under Order 14 of the Rules of Courts 2012 (ROC 2012) with cost of RM5,000.00 vide the Notice of Application dated 13.9.2023 (Enclosure 11) and dismissing the Defendant’s application for discovery of documents under Order 24 Rules 3, 7 and 8 ROC 2012 dated 31.10.2023 (Enclosure 23). 2. In relation to these appeals, this Court will give its analysis and findings simultaneously based on all evidence and exhibits tendered before this Court. 02/01/2024 17:05:08 BA-B52NCC-99-07/2023 Kand. 52 S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 B. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 3. The cause of action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant is for the aforesaid debt owing to him as a previous director which was showed in the letter of audit confirmation of the debt owing from the Defendant’s auditor dated 20.4.2021 proves the said debt. 4. This is further supported by the reports and financial statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 prepared by the Defendant itself. 5. A letter of demand dated 7.7.2020 issued by the Plaintiff’s Solicitors, Messrs. Ngeow & Tan on the Defendant was never contested or replied by the Defendant. 6. The Plaintiff contended that this is a clear case for summary judgment against the Defendant based on clear and express admission of the debt of RM838,672.54 by the Defendant of which the Plaintiff is claiming that the Defendant did not have a bona fide and is inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents and is inherently improbable in law in view of the documents showing the admission of debt by the Defendant. 7. This dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is essentially for recovery of a debt owed by the Defendant company to its previous director namely the Plaintiff in the sum of RM838,672.54. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 8. The conclusive proof of the debt is shown in the Defendant’s own and following documents: (i) a confirmation of balance letter dated 20.4.2021 from the Defendant’s auditors to the Plaintiff; (ii) the report and financial statement dated 31.12.2020 of the Defendant; (iii) the report and financial statement dated 31.12.2021 of the Defendant; and (iv) other relevant documents which are referred in this case. 9. At all material times, the Defendant did not raise any objection or dispute the said debt as reflected in the letter of audit confirmation dated 20.4.2021 and the reports and financial statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 and the letter of demand dated 7.7.2020. 10. As a matter of fact, the Defendant pleaded the following averment with regards to the sum of RM838,672.54. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT 11. This Court had allowed the Plaintiff’s application vide summary judgment application under Order 14 ROC 2012 and thereafter disallowed the Defendant’s application to seek for discovery of documents based on the following analysis and findings as stated below: (i) The Letter of Audit Confirmation 12. This Court had seen vide exhibit SP-2, p. 21 and paragraph 9 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff which disclosed that the Defendant’s own auditors, Messrs. Koo Wee Long & Co had certified that the said debt is owing to the Plaintiff from the Defendant. 13. In furtherance to this, there was also one letter prepared and signed by the said audit firm which was addressed to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff had confirmed the said debt of RM838,672.54 as at 31.12.2019 as stated below: ’’amount due to you’’ and ’’We are writing as auditors of the above company. In the course of our regular examination of the accounts of the above company, we find that the balance of your account was as follows’’. 14. On top of that this Court also takes into consideration vide the Defendant’s Statement of Defence particularly at paragraph 6 which referred to the Share Sale Agreement dated 5.2.2018 (’’SSA 1’’) and 18.3.2019 (’’SSA 2’’) of which the Plaintiff was not a party. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 15. With this in the Court’s mind, this Court is of the view that the Plaintiff was not privy to the said agreements. In relation to SSA 1, Kuhan had denied signing the said agreement, the signature is not his and had never met the witness purportedly witnessed his signature in SSA 1 and had lodged a police report pertaining to the same (see paragraph 24, p. 98 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 16. Further, the SSA 1 is not valid since Kuhan’s 30% shares in the Defendant’s company had been sold and transferred to a director by the name of Murugamah a/p Rama Krishnan in pursuant to a Share Sale Agreement dated 22.9.2020 (’’SSA 22.9.2020’’) (see paragraph 21.2 and exhibit SP-6, pp. 104-123 Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff). 17. This agreement was guaranteed by another director by the name of Thinesvaran a/l Ponayah in pursuant to a Guarantee Agreement dated 22.9.2020, who was also a deponent of the Defendant’s in this application (see paragraph 21.2 and exhibit SP-6, pp. 124-127 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 18. In addition to this finding, even assuming that SSA 1 is a valid document this Court views that SSA 1 has been superseded under s.15.6.2 of the SSA 22.9.2020 which states: ‘’15.6.2 All previous agreements, representations, warranties, explanations and commitments, expressed or implied, affecting this subject matter are superseded by this document and have no effect’’. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 19. This Court also takes into consideration of the facts that Murugamah had agreed to the aforesaid clause by signing the SSA 22.9.2020 and therefore he is now estopped from denying it now. 20. Further, this Court also views that in paragraph 21.2 namely SSA 22.9.2020 referred to in Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff envisaged that the SSA dated 22.9.2020 superseded the other agreement dated 5.2.2018. This averment was not denied by the Defendant and therefore is deemed admitted as clearly envisaged in ALLOY AUTOMOTIVE SDN BHD v. PERUSAHAAN IRONFIELD SDN BHD [1985] 1 MLRA 309. 21. The Defendant did not deny the execution of the SSA 22.9.2020 as stated in the Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant, neither did the Defendant or Murugamah (director of the Defendant) lodged any police report disputing the execution of the SSA 22.9.2020, if she was claiming that she did execute the same. 22. As such, this Court is agreement with the Plaintiff’s submission that this is not a triable issue, as alleged by the Defendant in para 16.4 of Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant. Hence, this Court views that the validity of the SSA 22.9.2020 is further established by referring to paras 4.1 to 4.5 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff as exhibited in SP-1, pp. 22-41. (ii) The Financial Statements S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 23. With regards to the reports and Financial Statements dated 31.12.2020 and 31.12.2021 prepared by the Defendant as submitted to the Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM), this Court views that these financial statements have been pleaded at paragraph 5 Statement of Claim and paragraph 10 Affidavit in Support of Enclosure 11. 24. These financial statements approved and filed at SSM by the Defendant shows that these are unqualified auditor’s report (see exhibit SP-3, p. 23 and p. 49 Affidavit in Support which can be seen at p. 45 and p.71 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 25. In these exhibits evidently showed that the said endorsement had been signed by Thinesvaran a/l Ponayah being the director of the Defendant (Thinesvaran). The most recent financial statement that was filed by the Defendant at SSM being an unqualified auditor’s report is dated 31.12.2022 and filed on 15.8.2023 and executed by Thinesvaran in his capacity as the current director of the Defendant (paragraph 14.3, pp. 71-96 as stated in the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 26. Furthermore, in relation to the said financial statements, Thinesvaran had affirmed one statutory declaration in pursuant to s.251(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2016 that the said financial statements are ’’… to the best of my knowledge and believe correct…’’ as per exhibit SP-3, p.29 Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff (for 2020) and exhibit SP-3, p. 55 (for 2021) Affidavit in Support by the S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Plaintiff and exhibit SP-3, p.51 (for 2019) and exhibit SP-3, p. 77 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 27. In the said financial statements the Defendant had also confirmed which can be seen in exhibit SP-3, p. 27 and p.53 of the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff as stated below: At the date of this report, the directors are not aware of any circumstances: i) that would require any other amount to be written off as bad debts or provided for as doubtful debts…’’ 28. The same statements also appeared in the 2019 and 2022 financial statements (as per exhibit SP-3, p. 49 and p.75 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff), which was duly approved by the Defendant. 29. Nonetheless, should the debt sum not a bona fide claim, as alleged in paragraph 12, Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant, they had certainly contradicted themselves as this Court takes into consideration on the evidentiary documents showed in the contemporaneous documents namely financial statements for the year 2019 to 2022 were indeed duly approved by the Defendant. 30. In addition to the abovementioned view, this Court also takes into consideration, the financial statements for the years, 2020, 2021 and 2022 shows that an amount of RM838,672.54 is still owed by the Defendant to the previous director as stated below: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (i) for the year 2020 as exhibited in SP-3, p. 45 and p. 47 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff; (ii) for the year of 2021, exhibit SP-3, p. 71 and p. 73 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff; and (iii) for the year of 2022, exhibit SP-3, p. 93 and p.95 (note 6 and note 13) in the Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 31. In addition to this finding, this Court also takes cognizance, as at 15.8.2023, based on the filing by the Defendant at SSM on the financial statements for the year 2022, it is evidently clear that the amount of RM838,672.54 is still recognized as owing to the previous director namely the Plaintiff. 32. The Defendant had also admitted in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Defence that RM838,673.00 (nearest sum to RM838,672.54) was the amount owed to a previous director. 33. Surely, this Court cannot deny this fact and should take this statement as a judicial admission by the Defendant in its pleading. 34. On top of this admission, this sum is also shown in the auditor’s confirmation of balance dated 20.4.2021 and also in the financial statements of 2020, 2021 and most recently 2022 of the Defendant. 35. Thereafter, the Defendant had also filed the latest financial statement dated 31.12.2023 of the Defendant at SSM again confirming that RM838,673.00 is S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 owing to a previous director/Plaintiff (p.93, note 6 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff) in which the director of the Defendant namely Thinesvaran again had confirmed by way of a statutory of declaration affirmed on 31.5.2023 that the contents financial statement is true (see p.77 of Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff). 36. Based on this admission of facts in a defence, this Court is guided by the High Court decision in GLOBAL DESTAR (M) SDN. BHD. v. KUALA LUMPUR GLASS MANUFACTURES CO. SDN. BHD. [2003] 3 MLRH 127 where Abdul Malik Ishak J held at page 131 as stated below: ’’…the effect of the defendant admitting the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim is this: that there is no issue between the parties on that part of the case and there is no necessity to proceed to trial. And no evidence is admissible in regard to those admitted facts (Pioneer Plastic Containers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise [1967] Ch. 597). It is my judgment that the defendant has specifically pleaded that they do not deny paras. 4(b) and 5(A)(b) of the statement of claim in that the sum of RM151,361.98 is owing to the plaintiff. It is a clear admission on the part of the defendant. A plain and unequivocal language cannot be considered as a statement of non-admission or a statement of non- denial. Bluntly put, the defendant has by way of their pleadings - their statement of defence, admitted to the plaintiff's claim of RM151,361.98. In Esso Malaysia Bhd v. Hills Agency (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 5 MLRH 142 ; [1994] 1 MLJ 740, in construing the effect of an admission to the affidavit evidence, Idris Yusoff J had this to say at p. 752 of the report: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 What is more damaging in this case is that the defendants go to the extent of admitting paras 3 and 4 of the plaintiffs' affidavit - thereby obviating the necessity for the plaintiffs to provide further proof to substantiate their averment. Admissions are the strongest evidence possible and even a wrong construction of a document will be assumed to be correct in view of the admission. A fortiori an admission by way of pleadings are formal admissions and cannot be easily explained away (Ruby Investment (Pte) Ltd v. Candipark Pte Ltd [1989] 4 MLRH 469 ; [1989] 3 MLJ 396). 37. Further, on the judicial admission in a defence, this Court is guided by the Federal Court in YAM KONG SENG & ANOR v. YEE WENG KAI [2014] 4 MLRA 316 held as below: ’’ [16] The above averment was in response to para 12 of the statement of claim wherein the appellants averred that the company and the respondent had confirmed in writing of the amount owing and payable to them. It is trite law that a judicial admission made in a pleading stands on a higher footing than evidentiary admission (Sarkar’s Law of Evidence) with the respondent’s admission therein be made the foundation of the rights of the parties (Satish Mohan Bilal v. State of UP [1986] AIR All 126). Any failure on the part of the respondent to rebut the admission to avoid the legal consequences of his admission would entitle the appellants to enter judgment against him. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [17] Having perused the defence in particular para 8, we find that there is clear judicial admission of the debt owed. The question that must follow would be whether the respondent was avoiding responsibility to pay up. In Jacob and Goldrein’s Pleadings: Principles and Practice [1990] pp 133-134 in dealing with confession and avoidance, the following is stated: Confession and Avoidance Meaning The term ‘confession and avoidance’ is the description of a plea in the defence which, while expressly or impliedly admitting or confessing or assuming the truth of the material facts alleged in the statement of claim, seeks at the same time to avoid or destroy the legal consequences of those facts. The plea is invoked by alleging fresh or additional facts to establish some legal justification or excuse, or some other ground for avoiding or escaping legal liability. The defendant, as it were, confesses the truth of what is alleged against him but proceed immediately to ‘avoid’ the effect of such allegations. [18] Having scrutinised the defence we find that the respondent has failed to avoid legal liability. With there being judicial admission by the respondent sufficient to hold him liable to the amount claimed the answer to the first question of law in this appeal must be answered in the positive. 38. In relation to a certificate of indebtedness (in which for this present case is the confirmation of balance of the auditor), this Court is guided by the Federal Court’s decision in CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD. v. HO LAI YING & ANOR [2005] 2 MLRA 736 which states: ’’ The above dictum establishes firmly the conclusive nature and extent of a certificate of indebtedness. A certificate of indebtedness S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 operates in the field of adjectival law. It excuses the plaintiff from adducing proof of debt. Such a certificate shifts the burden onto the defendant to disprove the amount claimed.’’ (iv) Letter of Demand dated 7.72020 sent by the Plaintiff which was not replied by the Defendant 39. This Court takes cognizance on the evidence, that the Plaintiff’s Solicitors had served a letter of demand dated 7.7.2020 to the Defendant as shown in paragraph 13, exhibit SP-4, pp.76-77 Affidavit in Support by the Plaintiff. 40. In relation to the above facts, the Defendant had duly admitted that they had received the said letter of demand which can be seen in paragraph 11 of their Statement of Defence and paragraph 12 of the Affidavit in Reply by the Defendant. 41. Based on these evidences, it is clearly showed that the Defendant did not object or deny to the contents of the said letter including the demand sum of RM838,673.00 till to date. 42. This is clearly an admission of the sum owing to the Plaintiff since the said letter states that the demand is being made by their client Mr.Suthan a/l Panchadcharam who is the Plaintiff in this suit. 43. With this in mind, the failure to reply the letter of demand sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendant can be taken as an admission by the Defendant based on the S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Court of Appeal in JOHN AMBROSE v. PETER ANTHONY & ANOR [2017] 1 SSLR 625 that states as follows: ’’[33] The first defendant in his evidence admitted having knowledge of the plaintiff ’s solicitors' letter dated 29 November 2013 yet the first defendant did not at any time respond to or protest the plaintiff ’s assertions of the oral agreements. In Ling Hock Ling v. Tai Lian Land Development Co [2006] 2 MLRA 149, this Court through Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said at p 149: “Now, here we have a case where the defendant upon receiving copies of the plaintiff ’s letters to FELDA did not make any protest about his description as a subcontractor. If it was not the truth he would have said so. But he kept quiet. In these circumstances it does not lie in his mouth to say that he was not the plaintiff ’s contractor. ...” 44. Similarly, this Court is also guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in DAVID WONG HON LEONG v. NOORAZMAN ADNAN [1995] 1 MLRA 708 held: [9] During argument, we registered our surprise at the learned Judge’s reluctance to enter judgment for this sum of RM100,000. After all, the appellant had failed to respond to the letter of 17 December. If there had never been an agreement as alleged, it is reasonable to expect a prompt and vigorous denial. But, as we have pointed out, there was no response whatsoever from the appellant. [10] In this context, we recall to mind the following passage in the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J in Tan Cheng Hock v. Chan Thean Soo [1985] 2 MLRH 562; [1987] 2 MLJ 479: S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 In Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534, 537 an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was held, that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she stated that he had promised to marry her, was no evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony in support of such promise. Lord Esher MR, in his judgment, remarked: Here, we have only to see whether the mere fact of not answering the letters, with nothing else for us to consider is any evidence in corroboration of the promise. ’Earlier, in his judgment, he said,’ Now there are cases – business and mercantile cases in which the Courts have taken notice that, in the ordinary course of business, if one man of business states in a letter to another that he has agreed to do certain things, the person who receives that letter must answer it if he means to dispute the fact that he did so agree. (v) No indemnity by a third party 45. The Defendant had pleaded a case of in indemnity by third parties to the Defendant purportedly for being jointly liable for the debt being owed to the Plaintiff. The Defendant, in other words, is saying in their defence that the third parties are responsible for the said debt and the purported third parties must indemnify the Defendant on the same as stated in paragraphs 3, 4.1 to 4.4, 4.4.1(no. 1), 4.4.1(no.2), 4.5, 4.6, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12 in their Statement of Defence. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 46. However, this Court views that this defence is not meritable as the third parties do not have any privity of contract with the Plaintiff which can be seen in paragraphs 5 and 9.1 Jawapan kepada Pembelaan. 47. As duly mentioned above, this Court views that the debt is owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff based on the confirmation of balance by the Defendant’s auditor, financial statements for the years of 2020, 2021 and 2022, letter of demand and a recent confirmation provided by the directors of the Defendant in a letter dated 24.4.2023 addressed to the Plaintiff which can be seen in paragraph 6.3 and exhibit SP-2, p. 43 Affidavit in Reply by the Plaintiff. 48. On the issue of indemnity by a third party raised by a Defendant, this Court sees that there is no foundation on this statement as there is no denial made by the Defendant that the said third party had no linkage nor privity in the debt owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 49. This Court’s view is based on the Federal Court’s decision in UNITED MERCHANT FINANCE BHD v. MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM NEGERI JOHOR [1999] 1 MLRA 98 which states as below: ’’[9] It should also be noted that any statement by a defendant that he is entitled to be indemnified by a third party is no answer to the plaintiff’s claim in an O 14 application, unless the third party has discharged the plaintiff’s claim (Thorne v. Steel [1878] WN 215 CA). See The Supreme Court Practice 1997 Vol 1 para 14/3 - 4/2 p 156.’’ S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 50. Based on all evidence and case laws as above, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission that there are no triable issues raised by the Defendant which could warrant a full trial vide viva voce evidence to be given by witnesses. This is clearly a plain and obvious case where summary judgment ought to be allowed. 51. This Court is guided by the decision of the Federal Court in NATIONAL COMPANY FOR FOREIGN TRADE v. KAYU RAYA SDN BHD [1984] 1 MLRA 190 where the Court succinctly held: We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under O 14 the first considerations are : (a) whether the case comes within the Order; and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under O 14. For the purposes of an application under O 14 the preliminary requirements are: (i) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (ii) the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; and (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r 2 of the O 14. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [9] If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he comes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why judgment should not be given against him [see O 14 r 3 and 4(1)]. 52. Further, this Court is also guided by the Supreme Court’s decision of BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA v. MOHD ISMAIL ALI JOHOR & ORS [1992] 1 MLRA 190 where the Court held: [13] Under an O 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 D. CONCLUSION 53. Based on the abovementioned analysis and findings, this Court allowed the summary judgment application with the cost of RM5,000.00 to be entered against the Defendant as the Defendant have failed to show neither any bona fide meritable defence nor triable issue in relation to the Plaintiff’s claim of RM838,672.54 as there are numerous clear admissions of debt based on documentary evidence presented in this case. 54. In lieu of the above decision, the Defendant’s application vide Enclosure 23 for the discovery of document is now nugatory. Based on this reason, Enclosure 23 is dismissed with no order as to cost. Prepared by: RAFIQHA HANIM MOHD ROSLI SESSIONS COURT JUDGE SESSIONS COURT (6) SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR 7 DECEMBER 2023 S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 PARTIES: FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KALYANSUNDARAM A/L RAJAGOPAL TETUAN KAL & PARTNERS FOR THE DEFENDANT: LEE BOON KOON & LOW JIAH YEE TETUAN ARISSA TAN, CHIEN & CO. S/N nD7ohA6Cgkmaw03qfyuJ2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal A. INTRODUCTION B. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT D. CONCLUSION

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