Our analysis tracks that of the Supreme Court in Gonzales. In Gonzales , a defendant had been charged with two felonies-forgery and second-degree burglary-where each involved the same property: forged $125 checks that he attempted to cash at a bank. ( Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 862, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) The defendant had pled guilty to the burglary charge and the court had dismissed the forgery charge. ( Ibid. ) The Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's claim that the defendant was "not eligible for resentencing because he also entered the bank intending to commit <mask>." ( Id. at p. 876, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.) It instead agreed with the defendant's position that "even assuming he entered the bank with an intent to commit identity theft, section 459.5, subdivision (b) would have precluded a felony burglary charge because his conduct also constituted shoplifting." ( Ibid. ) Thus, "the shoplifting statute would have precluded a burglary charge based on an entry with intent to commit identity theft here because the conduct underlying such a charge would have been the same as that involved in the shoplifting, namely, the cashing of the same stolen check to obtain less than $950." ( Id. at pp. 876-877, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285, 392 P.3d 437.)


The detectives searched Schaiy’s purse and found a debit card with someone else’s name, a counterfeit postal arrow key, and a cell phone. The cell phone contained photos of credit cards with other people’s names, photos of driver’s licenses belonging to different people, more “profiles,” and text messages between Schaiy and Saini about mail and <mask>. For example, one text message referred to stealing mail: “[A]re you going mailboxing?” 2 Another text


The parties agree that a person must assume the identity of another in order to be guilty of <mask>. Where the parties differ is on the question of whether engaging in one of the statute’s enumerated methods—here, using another’s personal identifying information in the form of a credit card account number—necessarily constitutes an assumption of identity. In other words, is assumption of identity a discrete element of the statute that must be proven independently of one of the methods by which identity can be assumed, or do the People automatically prove assumption of identity by proving that a defendant used another’s personal identifying information? This question requires us to refer to the canons of statutory interpretation.


“A person is guilty of <mask> in the first degree when he or she knowingly and with intent to defraud assumes the identity of another person by presenting himself or herself as that other person, or by acting as that other person or by using personal identifying information of that other person, and thereby: . . . “2. causes financial loss to such person or to another person or persons in an aggregate amount that exceeds two thousand dollars . . . .” (Penal Law § 190.80 [2].) Under New York Penal Law, the term “financial loss” is not defined in the context of identity theft.


*492*684The jury here was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2040 that to find defendant guilty of <mask> in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), "the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully obtained someone else's personal identifying information; [¶] 2. The defendant willfully used that information for an unlawful purpose; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The defendant used the information without the consent of the person whose identifying information he was using." The jury was further instructed that "An unlawful purpose includes ... Falsely representing or identifying one's self as another person to a peace officer, upon a lawful detention, to evade the proper identification of himself. [¶] or [¶] Giving information to a peace officer, who is performing his duties under the vehicle code, when he knows the information is false." Defendant concedes that not every violation of section 148.9 or Vehicle Code section 31 results in a violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a) but argues that the rule applies in this instance because the manner in which he violated section 148.9 and Vehicle Code section 31 would commonly result in a violation of section 530.5. We disagree.


While this court is cognizant of the many difficulties confronting the attorney representing a client who may be the target or subject of a Grand Jury investigation (Arkin, Target or Subject of Inquiry — Defense Counsel’s Dilemma, NYLJ, Oct. 18,1984, p 1, col 3) and the uncertainties of dealing with complex computer technology, here defendants were aware the Grand Jury was investigating “the taking of computer code from Stony Brook University Hospital and delivering it to Albert Einstein Hospital in Philadelphia” (Motion to dismiss, exhibit B, at 2 and exhibit D, at 4 of affidavit of defendant’s attorney) and that the Grand Jury was investigating the activities of the employees or agents of Stony Brook Systems, Inc., in this regard (Motion to dismiss, exhibit B, at 2). Furthermore, in accordance with the aforementioned oral decision of Judge Namm dated December 13, 1984, the Special Prosecutor informed defendants that the offense occurred during the period of approximately June 1981 through August 1981 and that “Frank Russo and Stony Brook Systems, Inc. were involved in the taking of computer code from *882the University Hospital at Stony Brook”. Defendants also knew that this code consisted of computer “software.” (Motion to dismiss, exhibit D, at 6 of affidavit of defendant’s attorney and exhibit H.) At a minimum, this information differentiated the crimes being investigated from other types of computer-related criminal activity (Raysman and Brown, Evolving Statutes on <mask>, NYLJ, Jan. 11, 1983, p 1, col 1).


While research of the case law shows that the prosecution’s theories may be novel, they comport with the Legislature’s direction to construe the Penal Law "according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law” (Penal Law § 5.00; see, People v Ditta, 52 NY2d 657, 660). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recently approved an expansive interpretation of the Penal Law in the specific area of computer crimes. In People v Versaggi (83 NY2d 123), the defendant’s conviction for the crime of computer tampering in the second degree under Penal Law § 156.20 was affirmed, with the Court holding that the element of alteration of a computer program was satisfied by evidence that the defendant had accessed a computer program designed to control telephone service and caused that program to shut off a number of telephones *551for a period of time. Recognizing a legislative response to the burgeoning problem of <mask>, the Court of Appeals chose not to "legislate or nullify statutes by overstrict construction” (People v Versaggi, supra, at 131, citing People v Abeel, 182 NY 415, 421-422), and so avoided a restrictive interpretation of the term "alter” which would leave acts such as those committed by the defendant in Versaggi without penal sanction.


This case involves perhaps the first prosecution under New York’s new <mask> statute, Penal Law article 156, which went into effect on November 1, 1986, just days before the incidents charged herein. As of yet, the statute has not been construed by any court, and the reported decisions involving prosecutions under similar statutes in other States offer little substantive guidance. (See, e.g., People v Brown, 726 P2d 638 [Colo 1986]; State ex rel. Hall v Wolf, 710 SW2d 302 [Mo 1986].)


The defendant has suggested that the criminal activity which took place constituted interrupting the operation of the computer system, as opposed to altering a computer program. In some States, interrupting the operation of a computer system is classified as a crime. (See, e.g., Cal Penal Code § 502 [c]; Conn Gen Stat Annot § 53a-251 [d].) This classification is absent, however, from New York’s <mask> statute. The New York State Legislature has instead chosen to focus on the activity itself rather than the result of that activity. (See, Comment, The Challenge of Computer-Crime Legislation: How Should New York Respond?, 33 Buffalo L Rev 777, 785 [1984].) Therefore, the court must look to the statute and the alleged activity to determine whether that activity is within the purview of the statute.


“any and all numbers, text messages (SMS), picture messages (MMS) and direct connect contained within said cellar telephone which are believed to have been used in furtherance of the attempted kidnaping of T.C., and any and all evidence tending to establish ownership of the cellular telephone and connect persons to said cellular telephone.” The affidavit attached thereto, sworn by Police Officer Johnny Chalen, states that defendant first met T.C. in September 2013 in an online chat room, that they exchanged text messages on their respective cell phones, that on November 16, 2013, they met in person at defendant’s apartment at 1995 Davidson Avenue, and that while inside defendant’s apartment, defendant asked T.C. to work as a prostitute and showed her photos of male clients that were stored on his computer. When T.C. refused defendant’s entreaties, defendant placed a gun to her head and did not allow her to leave the apartment. (See aff of Police Officer Chalen ¶¶ 5-7.) Pursuant to this search warrant, Police Officer Jonathan Reifer of the New York City Police Department, <mask> Squad searched the contents of the seized cell phone utilizing forensic software that extracts data from cell phones and converts it into a format readable to a layperson. It is uncontested that all of the text messages, chat logs, emails, locations, images and video that were contained on the cell phone were recovered from it. (See exhibits C, D attached to defendant’s motion.) It is also uncontested that, although the forensic software permitted a trained user to limit the search of the cell phone by key word, date, time, and type of file, no such limitations were utilized by Officer Reifer. Included in what was recovered from this cell phone are conversations between defendant and his male clients about T.C. and conversations between defendant and T.C. (See People’s mem of law at 5.) In addition, almost all of the text and picture messages recovered from this cell phone relate to defendant’s escort business. These include voluminous communications between defendant and male clients and defendant and other sex workers, regarding prices, locations, and sex acts, as well as numerous photographs of sex workers that were sent to male clients. (See People’s mem of law at 9-10.)


On February 16, 2015, the New York City Police Department was notified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Cyber Tipline (NCMEC) that a suspected image of child pornography had been uploaded onto an email account, A_@juno.com, provided by Internet service provider (ISP) Juno Online Services. The parent company of Juno, United Online, had reported the upload the day it occurred, December 26, 2014, and that the image came from a particular Internet protocol address (IP address), xx.xxx.xx.49. Police Officer Anthony Santilli, who was assigned to the <mask> Squad and who applied for the search warrants at issue here, viewed the image and determined that it fell within the definition of child pornography. He used the American Registry for Internet Numbers to learn that Verizon was the ISP that as*966signed the IP address used to upload the image. He subpoenaed Verizon and discovered the name of the subscriber to the email account and the address of the subscriber, a business, Pink Label, with a Brooklyn, New York address. The particular customer who signed onto the computer at the time was identified as “Joseph H.” Through another subpoena served on United Online, Santilli found subscriber information about the account, that it had been opened the day before the uploading, the member name, and that it was connected to the IP address originally reported. He also gained access to the connection logs which showed the time during which five additional IP addresses were connected to the Internet, the amount of data that was transferred, and the identification numbers of additional IP addresses used. With this information Santilli subpoenaed Verizon again and learned that one of the five additional IP addresses was assigned to Pink Label and the other four were associated with defendant, Joseph Hayon, at his home address in Brooklyn, New York.


According to the National Institute of Justice, the number of security guards has increased by 50% over the last 10 years, and there are indications projecting an even further expansion, for example, there exists grave concern about the ability of many police departments to competently investigate the technical complexities of corporate crime, <mask>, as well as commercial bribery and/or industrial espionage, etc.


To further this policy, section 170.00 (1) of the Penal Law was amended in 1986 by the insertion of the phrase "including computer data or a computer program”. (L 1986, ch 514, § 5, eff Nov. 1, 1986.) This was done in acknowledgment of the "proliferation of computers and the technological advances of recent years [which] have left the State without adequate protection against the many insidious forms of <mask>.” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1986, ch 514, 1986 NY Legis Ann, at 233.) The amendment to include computer data and computer programs was designed to "[fill] the legal void by providing [a] comprehensive statutory framework for responding to the illegal and unethical use of computers.” (Id., at 234.)


This case brings into question the applicability and reach of various sections of Penal Law article 156, which was enacted in 1986 to "adapt New York’s statutes to the realities of the computer age. By prohibiting the unethical and illegal use of computers, the bill provides the first line of defense against the burgeoning threat of computer crime” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1986, ch 514, 1986 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 3172). Curiously, despite the bill’s laudable goals and the ubiquitous use of computers in business and personal affairs, the number of <mask> prosecutions is exceedingly modest. To this date, there are but a handful of reported decisions involving Penal Law article 156.


MCL 752.796(1) provides: “A person shall not use a computer program, computer, computer system, or computer network to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit, or solicit another person to commit a crime.” Thus, the <mask> has two elements: (1) the commission, attempted commission, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of a crime; and, (2) through the use of a computer. In this case, the record reflects that the prosecution presented evidence that defendant violated MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1) through the use of a computer. The circuit court erroneously quashed the two counts of use of a computer because it erroneously concluded that the district court abused its discretion by binding over defendant to face trial for the predicate offenses, the violations of MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1). Because the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover on those two underlying offenses, it necessarily erred by quashing the two related use of a computer counts. The evidence supported the district court’s ruling that crimes had been committed and that probable cause existed to believe that defendant committed violations of MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 750.248(1) by using a computer to alter and falsify the QVF.


Regarding the asserted need for more time to try to recover the text message, defense counsel's declaration stated "the defense investigators [ ]who have done extensive work on this case [ ]since the Public Defender's Office was appointed approximately four months ago" had sent Connie and her boyfriend's damaged cell phones to the <mask> Institute at Dixie State University (the Dixie State Institute). The declaration explained the phones had been previously sent to another laboratory that had no success in recovering "crucial text messages" and the Dixie State Institute was one of the only labs that could attempt "chip extractions" that might recover the message. Defense counsel declared he left a message with the Dixie State Institute the day before filing the continuance motion to determine when their work would be completed but had not "heard back yet."


Recent advances in technology appear only to reinforce Justice Scalia’s concerns that Navarette further opened the 911 system to abuse by weakening the requirement that a tipster’s assertion of illegality be reliable. Those advances have made it even easier for bad actors to exploit the 911 system by “spoofing” a phone number so that the 911 dispatcher thinks the call is coming from a different phone number, providing even more cover for malevolent tipsters. See Brumfield, Chapter 284: Deterring and Paying for Prank 911 Calls That Generate a SWAT Team Response, 45 McGeorge L Rev 585, 586 (2014) (explaining the process of spoofing a phone number); Kenyon, FTC Issues Warning of Social Security Scams, CQ Roll Call Washington Data Privacy Briefing (April 16, 2019) [2019 CQDPRPT 0288], available at <https:/perma.cc/WG42-A242> (“[T]he FTC recommends consumers to not trust caller ID systems because it is easy for official-seeming phone numbers to be spoofed . . . .”). In recent years, individuals have used spoofing technology to make fake 911 calls in order to prank or harass individuals. See Chapter 284, 45 McGeorge L Rev at 585; Jaffe, Swatting: The New <mask> Frontier After Elonis v. United States, 64 Drake L Rev 455, 456 (2016). After Navarette, some commentators have cited spoofing as one reason why 911 calls may not be sufficiently reliable—specifically in the context of the Navarette decision. See, e.g., Gelb, How


There are only two major differences between parole and <mask> proceedings in New York. The first is the *421agency who was supervising the release of the petitioner at the time of the alleged violation — New York State Division of Parole oversees parolees while city and State Departments of Probation oversee probationers. The second is that a criminal or Supreme Court Judge presides over and adjudicates at probation violation proceedings while members of the New York State Parole Board preside over and adjudicate at parole violation proceedings. These are procedural, not substantive differences.


We affirm. We reject defendant’s contention that the People failed to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Filipowicz, 111 AD3d 1022, 1022 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1156 [2014]; People v D’Entremont, 95 AD3d 1507, 1507 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1025 [2012]). Defendant’s probation officer testified that she contacted him by phone on June 1, 2012, shortly after she had taken over his case, to inform him that he was still on probation and needed to report. Despite that admonition, defendant failed to appear for three scheduled meetings in June and July 2012, as well as a court date on June 20, 2012 for a hearing on the original <mask>. Additionally, the officer spoke with defendant on July 13, 2012 and informed him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and, despite defendant’s assurance that he would turn himself in, he failed to do so. The officer testified that defendant failed to report for supervision appointments and had no further contact with the Probation Department until his arrest in October 2012. Accordingly, defendant’s violation of probation was established by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Welch, 55 AD3d 952, 953 [2008]; People v Walts, 34 AD3d 1043, 1043 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 850 [2007]).


"The probation officer filed a notice of <mask> against appellant under ... section 777, subdivision (a) on December 19, 2013. The petition alleged minor failed to attend the Community Care Program, was truant in school attendance, failed to observe curfew, and tested positive for marijuana. The minor admitted the truancy violation and the court dismissed the remaining allegations. As a result of the violation, the court ordered 30 consecutive days of detention.


We think that the meaning of the phrase "in all cases" is unambiguous and a <mask> hearing is simply a part of the underlying misdemeanor "case." Therefore, we hold that a misdemeanor defendant is entitled to have an attorney appear on his or her behalf at a probation violation hearing under section 977 ; the defendant's personal appearance is not "lawfully required," until such time that the court orders a defendant to personally appear. (§ 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).)


In contrast, the similarities between the two are considerable. Both proceedings occur only after conviction and sentence of the petitioner has been imposed and prisoner treatment and rehabilitation have been considered. Both proceedings are administrative in nature, not criminal, even though the charges of a violation of either parole or probation, if determined to be valid, may result in incarceration. Neither proceeding requires the filing of an indictment or information to be initiated, nor do they require a trial to be resolved. In light of these minor differences and substantial similarities, and because <mask> proceedings are not considered to be covered by the IAD (see Carchman, supra; Capalongo, supra), the logical conclusion is that parole violation proceedings should be similarly excluded from its umbrella.


The only regulation cited in plaintiff’s complaint which imposes a clear duty is found at 9 NYCRR 352.1 (b): “In the absence of court direction, a court shall be notified upon a conviction of crime, absconder status, or a significant violation of technical conditions of probation, within seven business days of the probation department’s knowledge of the conviction or determination of absconder status or significant violation.” Similarly, the St. Lawrence County <mask> policies require notification within five business days. While there is a real question that the County’s own written probation policies constitute part of a “well-developed body of law and regulation” upon which to predicate General Municipal Law § 205-e liability, *440for the reasons that follow (discussing 9 NYCRR 352.1 [b]), plaintiffs cause of action premised upon either would fail for lack of causation.


On March 22, 2017, Deputies F. and B. were driving a marked patrol car and recognized Jimenez, who had an active felony no bail warrant for his arrest for a <mask>. The deputies activated the patrol car's lights and sirens and attempted to conduct a traffic stop. Although Jimenez initially pulled into a parking lot, he did not stop; instead, he pulled into traffic on a busy street without yielding, causing another car to brake suddenly to avoid collision. He led the deputies on a high-speed pursuit, accelerating to 50 and 55 miles per hour on streets with speed limits of 25 and 35 miles per hour, *414speeding through numerous intersections and stop signs without slowing or stopping, again requiring another vehicle to slam its brakes to avoid a collision. At one point, he was speeding so fast that he was able to "catch air" after coming to a dip in the road.


The St. Lawrence County Probation Department, failing to abide by its own <mask> policies that a memorandum of investigation be provided to the sentencing court within five days of the Probation Department being notified of an arrest, sent a belated violation package to the jurisdictional court on December 18, 2006. Canton Village Justice Michael Crowe signed a declaration of delinquency and issued an arrest warrant on December 29, 2006, which was faxed to the Probation Department on January 2, 2007. Thereafter, plaintiff alleges the defendants failed to properly process Trim’s arrest warrant since it was neither forwarded to the local police nor input into the warrant entry/registrant system by the Probation Department. It is alleged the fax was shredded or destroyed. It is further alleged these acts caused Brinkerhoff s death since these delays permitted Trim to remain at large for months. During oral argument, plaintiffs counsel stated he only recently learned Trim had previously been stopped on the Thruway without incident, and had defendants timely applied for the arrest warrant and properly processed it, Trim could have been successfully taken into custody without event during that traffic stop. This information, he urges, can and should be developed during discovery.


If this <mask> hearing is a criminal proceeding, then the case of People v Parker (82 AD2d 661, affd 57 NY2d 815) must be considered. There, the court held inadmissible in a prosecution for a new crime statements made in the absence of counsel to a parole officer who knew that the parolee was *816represented by counsel. Not only was the 6th Amendment right to counsel violated, but the court held that 5th Amendment rights were also applicable, and Miranda warnings were required. The court distinguished between a parole violation hearing and a criminal proceeding.


Aleman's attorney asked the court for permission to use the Letter because "it is relevant and material with respect to [Cabral's] credibility."5 The prosecution asked the court "to exclude" the Letter under Evidence Code section 352, because it was pure speculation that Cabral received any kind of benefit. Aleman's counsel countered that the Letter is "something the jury can consider in determining [Cabral's] credibility and whether he's benefiting from being a witness in this case," i.e., the jury could infer that Cabral falsely testified against defendants to avoid being sent to prison for a <mask>. Medrano's counsel chimed in, "the jury is entitled to know how many benefits he's receiving." The court allowed the defense to use the Letter, because it is relevant to whether Cabral sought to benefit from his cooperation with the prosecution, and specifically noted that Cabral could be questioned about his conviction for transporting drugs in Arizona.


Unlike the defendant in Allen, defendant in this case was incarcerated for the <mask> under a detainer. Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree home invasion and possession of burglar tools on July 10, 2013. He was then sentenced to three-years’ probation with a year in the county jail, with credit for 160 days. On March 17, 2017, five days after Black’s death, a warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest regarding the probation violation. Under Allen, defendant’s detention, beginning March 17, 2017, had “nothing to do with a denial of or inability to furnish bond in the new criminal proceeding.” Id. Instead, his inability to post bond was a result of the probation violation. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to credit under MCL 769.11b, and the trial court did not plainly err when it sentenced defendant. D. DUE PROCESS


confinement to order execution of sentence (or make other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed (3d par., 3d sentence). Failure to comply with any one of these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction. (5th par.)” (Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 999.) The purpose of section 1203.2a is to “to prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under [ ] section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant’s confinement.” (Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507, fn. omitted (Pompi).) “Because loss of jurisdiction is such a severe sanction, however, courts have been unwilling to impose it ‘unless the sentencing court’s jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 156.) II Additional Facts On June 4, 2020, defendant sent a letter to the Tehama County District Attorney (not the probation office) to request “under section 1203.2(a)” that the prosecutor accept his admission to a <mask> in the Tehama County case and have that term be one year consecutive to his Butte County sentence, or alternatively, to run them concurrently. The letter came with a form notice of demand for trial or disposition under section 1381. Both the letter and form reference his Butte County conviction. On May 27, 2020, the Tehama County Superior Court issued an order for production of prisoner to the Butte County Jail to produce defendant for a July 6 hearing. On July 1, 2020, the Tehama County Sheriff’s Office filed a letter with the Tehama County Superior Court stating defendant was “unavailable for pickup for his court date on July 6, 2020. He has been sentenced to state prison, and BUTTE COUNTY JAIL will not release him on the order of production due to his pending delivery to state prison.”


Several months later, in March 2016, Charley, still 16, was arrested a third time, again for violating probation. This time, in his second <mask> petition, he was alleged to have twice tested positive for marijuana, repeatedly been late to school and been discharged from his court-ordered counseling program for missing three consecutive weekly sessions. Charley once again admitted the violations and the juvenile court sustained the petition. He was continued as a ward of the court and again reinstated on probation.


a suspended or revoked license and driving without proof of insurance in case number OBL04059 were dismissed in connection with Simpson’s July 29, 2020 no contest plea to simple battery in case number OBL04328. Simpson admitted to a <mask> based on the battery conviction. 3As set forth above, Simpson’s first payment on his fines and fees in this case was not due until November 22, 2020, more than a month after this probation violation hearing.


On April 5, 2011, Boswell was arrested in Jackson County on unrelated charges. While incarcerated in the Jackson County Detention Center awaiting trial on the 2011 charges, Boswell signed a waiver of the <mask> preliminary hearing on his 2009 case. On April 28, 2011, his probation officer filed a probation violation report with the Clay County Circuit Court recommending revocation of Boswell's probation for the 2009 case.


Amay Lott, who had been housed in the county jail in 2005 at the same time that Smith and Williams were there, testified that while in jail, Smith had spoken about a burglary and murder in which she and Mitchell had been involved.25 According *35to Lott, the original "story that [Smith] had in there [i.e., in the county jail]" was that "[s]he was in there for a <mask>." However, Lott testified that she overheard Smith tell Williams about a burglary at a house where an "old lady" was home. According to Lott, Smith said that her boyfriend Michael was there, as well as another woman and another man. Although Lott initially said that she overheard Smith talking to Williams about the crime,26 Lott later indicated that Smith had told Lott details about what "happened inside the house." According to Lott, Smith said that "[t]hey went in there to rob the house, and apparently she-the lady was there. It scared them. That they ended up putting-she was telling them just leave her alone, let's go, let's go. They put a pillowcase over her head, and the boys proceeded to beat her. And she was trying to get them to stop, but they-." Lott testified that Smith told her that "[t]he boyfriend" put the pillowcase over the woman's head, and that "[t]he cousin" was the one who "tied up the elderly lady." Lott indicated that the group had taken items from the house, including rare coins, bottles of change, and jewelry.


A sentencing court has broad power to revoke or modify a term of probation at any time during the probationary period, which includes the power to extend the probationary term. ( People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095 & 1100, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278 ( Cookson ).) This power is not limited to cases where a *508<mask> has been committed. ( Id . at p. 1098, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278.) However, "[a] change in circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to extend or otherwise modify probation.... 'An order modifying the terms of probation based upon the same facts as the original order granting probation is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court, for the reason that there is no factual basis to support it.' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1095, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 820 P.2d 278, italics omitted, quoting In re Clark (1959) 51 Cal.2d 838, 840, 337 P.2d 67.)


Moreover, when granting probation, trial courts ordinarily suspend the imposition of sentence, as happened in this case. (§ 1203.2, subd. (c).) In other words, Santillan's sentence had not been imposed, and therefore the same criminal "case" continued during his probationary period. There is simply no basis to conclude that a <mask> hearing is not part of a defendant's continuing criminal "case."


The surety argues that once a defendant is convicted he is no longer charged with, nor is he accused of a misdemeanor, therefore any subsequent <mask> hearings are not included within the "case" under section 977. The surety's interpretation of the statute is somewhat contrived and wholly unsupported by case law. Taken to its logical extreme, this argument would also apply to a sentencing hearing (a defendant has also been convicted at that point). But it is settled law that a misdemeanor defendant may waive the right to be personally present at sentencing. (See Olney v. Municipal Court , supra , 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 461, 184 Cal.Rptr. 78 ; § 1193, subd. (b) ["If the conviction be of a misdemeanor, judgment may be pronounced against the defendant in his absence"].)


The defendant, while on probation for the felony of driving while intoxicated, was incarcerated for the definite sentence of one year from December, 1976, until April, 1977, in connection with the unrelated charges of obstruction of governmental administration and resisting arrest. He was released on bail for the latter matters in April of 1977 pending an appeal of the convictions. On March 10, 1977, the defendant was sentenced for a <mask> of the earlier matter to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed three years in a State correctional facility.


With these immutable jurisdictional rules in mind, it is clear that “the appropriate court” having jurisdiction over matters relating to a transferred probation sentence can and must only be determined based upon the geographic location of the defendant’s offending conduct as circumscribed by CPL 20.40 and 20.50. As applied here, the defendant’s failure to make the restitution payments to the Essex County Probation Department, located in the Town of Elizabethtown, provides the necessary geographic nexus for the Town of Elizabethtown Justice Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s <mask> proceeding premised upon such nonpay*1020ment. Similarly, the violation proceeding could properly have been brought in the defendant’s town of residence (CPL 20.40 [3]) or in Essex County Court (see People v Roberts-Alexandrov, 102 AD3d 219 [3d Dept 2012]).


The result here is not inconsistent with the cases cited by either the defendant (Matter of Rogers, 194 Misc 2d 103, 104 [Elmira City Ct 2002]; People v Murtovic, 42 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52180[U] [Newburgh City Ct 2013]), or by the People (People v Roberts-Alexandrov). In Rogers, the court clearly applied the jurisdictional constraints imposed by CPL 20.50: “Where a county contains multiple different local criminal courts, section 20.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets the geographical jurisdiction of offenses, and the jurisdiction of the cities, towns and villages located therein.” (Matter of Rogers, 194 Misc 2d at 104.) Nothing in Rogers indicates that the offending conduct of the defendant there occurred in the city of Elmira. Because CPL 410.80 (2) (a) (ii) requires that, upon transfer of a probation case, “[t]he sending probation department shall consult with the probation department to which supervision will be transferred to determine the appropriate criminal court to receive the case,” the Rogers court held that “the [receiving] Probation Department, in making its recommendation as to the appropriate local criminal court to receive the case, must take into consideration the geographical residence of the defendant and the geographical jurisdiction of the local criminal court.” (Id. at 105.) Notably, the failure to designate the proper court to which the powers of the sentencing court will be transferred, or, presumably, the incorrect designation, on the intrastate order of transfer is a ministerial act which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which ultimately considers a <mask> (see People v Perry, 188 AD2d 909 [3d Dept 1992], llv denied 81 NY2d 975 [1993]; People v Roberts-Alexandrov). In Rogers, the appropriate court was the Town or Village Court of Horseheads, where the defendant resided.


While CPL 390.20 (2) does not explicitly address the requirements of a presentence investigative report upon resentencing for a violation of probation, the courts have uniformly interpreted CPL 390.20 (1) to require such a report in felony cases. (People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93.) There appears to be no good reason why the same rule should not apply in misdemeanor cases. The purpose of obtaining a presentence investigative report is to provide the court with a summary of the defendant’s conduct and any relevant changes in his status since the previous PSI. Courts have permitted an updated presentence report or its functional equivalent, such as a <mask> packet with updated summary to be used. (People v Goon, 124 AD2d 347; People v Jackson, supra.) But the information must be current. (People v Laster, 140 AD2d 233; People v Roberts, 143 AD2d 560.) Courts have also approved sentencing without an updated PSI if the probation officer at the time of the probation violation hearing gives information on the defendant’s conduct and any changed conditions since the time of the original report. (People v Allen W., 129 AD2d 867.)


The only regulation cited in plaintiff’s complaint which imposes a clear duty is found at 9 NYCRR 352.1 (b): “In the absence of court direction, a court shall be notified upon a conviction of crime, absconder status, or a significant violation of technical conditions of probation, within seven business days of the probation department’s knowledge of the conviction or determination of absconder status or significant violation.” Similarly, the St. Lawrence County <mask> policies require notification within five business days. While there is a real question that the County’s own written probation policies constitute part of a “well-developed body of law and regulation” upon which to predicate General Municipal Law § 205-e liability, *440for the reasons that follow (discussing 9 NYCRR 352.1 [b]), plaintiffs cause of action premised upon either would fail for lack of causation.


Violation of probation involves an infraction by a defendant of a condition of a sentence. Examination of CPL 410.60 and CPL 410.70 points up the difference between <mask> and parole revocation procedures. The defendant probationer must be brought before the court that imposed the sentence. Based on a formal declaration of delinquency, the probation violation procedure calls for a formal hearing at which the court may receive any relevant evidence that is not legally privileged. The probationer, entitled to appear with counsel, may cross-examine witnesses and may present evidence on his own behalf. The court’s finding, if it involves violation of a condition of the sentence, must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may revoke, continue or modify the sentence of probation and in the event of revocation, must impose a sentence as specified in the Penal Law. Although the hearing is termed a "summary one”, and the court may receive any *1034"relevant evidence”, it still is necessary to have competent evidence to support a finding.


take domestic violence classes. On February 20, 2003, after a hearing on a <mask>, the court imposed a three-year state prison sentence of for his 2001 spousal abuse conviction, stayed the sentence, and ordered Huerta to serve 270 days in county jail. On September 29, 2003, after another violation, the court ordered Huerta to serve the remainder of the three-year term in state prison. 2. Corporal Injury to a Child’s Parent in 2013 On September 25, 2012, police arrested Huerta following another incident with Torres, which had occurred on July 10, 2012. In case No. BA400409, the People charged Huerta with corporal injury to a child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), with a prior conviction within seven years (§ 273.5, subd. (e)(1)). According to the preliminary hearing transcript, Huerta and Torres had an on-again-off-again relationship for 14 years and had two children together. Torres testified that Huerta attacked her when she discovered him pulling the sensor cables from her car. When she demanded to know why he was vandalizing her car, Huerta yelled back at her and shoved her against a concrete wall, injuring her. Two days later, she reported the incident to police because Huerta had showed up at her house, calling her names. Based on this evidence, the court held Huerta to answer for the corporal injury to a child’s parent. On March 4, 2013, Huerta pled no contest and the court sentenced him to two years in prison. 3. Motions to Vacate In June 2019, Huerta filed motions to vacate his 2001 spousal abuse and 2013 corporal injury to a child’s parent convictions based on newly discovered evidence of actual


Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and <mask> (2013); second degree burglary, vandalism, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016).


P.O . and Appleton suggest the probation condition at issue here is reasonably limited. Unlike the conditions found overbroad in those cases, the probation condition here is tailored and limits the types of data that may be searched. The condition explicitly requires Juan to "[s]ubmit [his electronic devices] to search ... for electronic communication content information likely to reveal evidence that the minor is continuing his criminal activities *272and is continuing his association via text or social media with co-companions . This search should be confined to areas of the electronic devices including social media accounts, applications, websites where such evidence of criminality [or ] <mask> may be found ." (Italics added & underscoring omitted.) Thus, under this condition, a probation officer may infringe Juan's privacy interests, but only to the extent the electronic communication content searched is reasonably likely to yield evidence of continued contact with coparticipants or gang members, drug use, or other criminal activity and noncompliance with probation conditions. Other data that may be present on his electronic devices, such as banking information and medical records, is not subject to search under the condition.


Turning to the merits, we find no reason to disturb County Court's determination that the People proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation (see CPL 410.70 [3]). "<mask> hearings are summary in nature and evidence presented thereat may include hearsay, although that may not be the sole basis for the finding of a violation" (People v Bevilacqua, 91 AD3d 1120, 1120 [2012]; see People v Finch, 160 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2018]).


Any other interpretation of the regulations would squarely place the defendant in the position of monitoring, unilaterally, the progress of his treatment at the expense of the Probation Department and the court, which have primary responsibility for such supervision. It would also effectively prevent a <mask> finding, because such a determination cannot be made in this state wholly on the basis of hearsay testimony. (People v Henderson, 256 AD2d 1131 [4th Dept 1998]; People v Raleigh, 184 AD2d 869, 870 [3d Dept 1992] [testimony of clinic director and discharge summary held competent nonhearsay evidence].) HIPAA’s Privacy Rule cannot be read sensibly to allow offenders to cut off access to treatment information whenever the offender begins to fail the treatment program, nor can it be read to require the Probation Department and the judiciary to resort to a court order to access protected health information previously disclosed (or subject to disclosure) in reliance on an authorization whenever an offender unilaterally chooses to revoke his authorization. “One recalls the venerable maxim of Pascal: ‘No one should be Judge in his own cause.’ Phrased less elegantly, in the vernacular, it is akin to having the fox guard the henhouse.” (Matter of Windsor Park Tenants’ Assn, v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 59 AD2d 121, 147 [2d Dept 1977] [Hawkins, J., concurring].)


In October 2016, appellant's probation officer filed a notice of <mask> under section 777 alleging that appellant had violated probation by (1) assaulting another juvenile at camp; (2) refusing to follow school regulations, resulting in his suspension; (3) assaulting a probation officer; and (4) attempting to start a fight by spitting at another juvenile. Following a hearing on December 22, 2016, the court found the alleged violations true and ordered appellant committed to DJF for a maximum period of five years and eight months.


*748Minor argues a finding that the commitment order is unlawful would not eliminate YOTP or similar programs because juvenile courts could set a fixed term of confinement and, if the minor failed to successfully complete the custodial program in that time, the probation officer could file a notice of <mask> to extend the confinement period. The availability of an alternative commitment order does not render the current order unconstitutional.


Upon completing this sentence in December 2020, Hibshman was released to his fiancée’s house to begin his term of supervised release. But soon after, the Indiana state court revoked his probation on his state forgery conviction due to his federal escape conviction. Hibshman was ordered to report to the county jail to serve a two-year term of imprisonment for the state <mask>. He failed to do so. Hibshman instead moved out of his fiancée’s house and stopped communicating with his federal probation officer. Authorities found him more than three months later at the scene of a car accident where he gave a fake name and stated he was a minor.


In Point III, Townsel contends the circuit court erred in allowing the State to use confidential documents, specifically, <mask> reports, to impeach defense witness Kambria Williams. On direct examination, Williams testified that Townsel was in her (Townsel's) apartment when Collins was killed. Williams further testified on direct that she had been living in the apartment complex where the crimes occurred for about a year prior to the incident.


Revocation of probation is a matter of discretion of the court. There are no limiting requirements as to the manner of the hearing or determination. A probationer brought before the court for such determination, without being furnished counsel, has not been deprived of his constitutional rights. (Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F. 2d 410.) A hearing on a charge of <mask> is in the nature of a summary proceeding and is not a ‘ ‘ criminal prosecution”. (United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987.)


Both defendant and Valencia testified at the <mask> hearing. Both testified that the methamphetamine was Valencia's, and that defendant did not know that Valencia had methamphetamine until Officer Chin pulled up behind defendant's car and Valencia started to panic. They also testified that they had never met before that morning. They said they met when they both came to help a mutual friend who had been kicked out of her apartment move her belongings; after defendant drove the friend and her belongings to her ex-boyfriend's apartment, he agreed to give Valencia a ride.


This theory is flawed. First, Andrews is distinguishable as it dealt with the 1985 version of K.S.A. 22-3716, which did not require district courts to impose graduated sanctions for probation violations. 11 Kan. App. 2d at 324; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22- 3716(2). Rather, the statute gave district courts the option to impose a defendant's full underlying prison sentence following a single <mask>. Similarly, the Lumley court analyzed a version of K.S.A. 22-3716 that did not mandate intermediate sanctions.


This court has not found any reported appellate decision in this state addressing whether a <mask> specification adequately sets forth the condition violated if the specification does not precisely name the probation condition allegedly violated. In the absence of any specific precedent on this issue, the court rules that a purely technical defect in the notice does not prevent a court from finding a violation of probation and determining whether probation should be revoked (see Hammons v Sheriff of Jefferson County, Tex., 901d 59, 60 [5th Cir 1990] [technical and nonprejudicial variances in parole revocation proceedings does not violate due process]; Perry v U.S. Parole Commn., 831d 811, 813 [8th Cir 1987] [same]; Atkins v Marshall, 533 F Supp 1324, 1328 [SD Ohio 1982] [same]).2 After all, the notice required by CPL 410.70 (2) is a component of the defendant’s general right to be heard before probation is revoked, and a defendant’s right to be heard is not violated by a defect in notice that does not prejudice the ability to present a defense at the probation hearing (see Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778 [1973]; People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113 [1953]).


For the reasons discussed above under the first prong of Lynch , the threshold test does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality. (Cf. Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 92-93, 130 S.Ct. 2011 *451(conc. opn. of Roberts, C.J.).) [strong inference found as to juvenile sentenced to life without parole where the crime and <mask> were less serious than offenses like murder or rape, and defendant's youth and immaturity made him "markedly less culpable than a typical adult who commits the same offenses"].) Although Baker's insignificant criminal record and low recidivism score point in his favor, his three separate sexual offenses against A.D. and abuse of trust against a vulnerable victim do not. Certainly, a comparison of all the relevant factors does not lead to an " 'inference of gross disproportionality.' " ( Id. at p. 60, 130 S.Ct. 2011, italics added.) Baker cannot show that the sentence imposed on him, severe as it may be, violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to him.9 *734DISPOSITION


Last year, in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ( Hall ), the high court addressed the need for an express knowledge element in two probation conditions that prohibited the defendant from possessing firearms or illegal drugs. ( Id. at p. 498, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Hall rejected the argument that these conditions were unconstitutionally vague because they did not expressly define the mental *1128state necessary to sustain the <mask>. ( Ibid. ) It held that the conditions "include[d] an implicit requirement of knowing possession" and therefore afforded the defendant fair notice of the required conduct. ( Id. at p. 497, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ) The court stated, "California case law already articulates not only a general presumption that a violation of a probation condition must be willful, but also specifically provides that probation conditions barring possession of contraband should be construed to require knowledge of its presence and its restricted nature." ( Id. at p. 501, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Because case law requires the conditions to be construed as prohibiting knowing possession of contraband, Hall concluded the substance of the conditions would not be changed if they were modified to include the word "knowingly." ( Id. at pp. 503-504, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) Accordingly, the Court "decline [d] [the] defendant's invitation to modify those conditions simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit." ( Id. at p. 503, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.) The Court added that while trial courts are free to explicitly "specify the requisite mens rea" when imposing such a probation condition, inclusion of the express knowledge requirement is not constitutionally compelled. ( Id. at pp. 503-504, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794.)


2. Charges, plea, and sentence Van Eck was charged in case number KA122021 with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69, count 1)2 and exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, on January 21, 2020, Van Eck pled nolo contendere to count 1. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea existed in the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Van Eck on probation for a period of three years, on condition that he serve 365 days in jail. It awarded 261 days of custody credit. It ordered count 2 dismissed and struck the section 667.5 enhancement. 3. <mask> hearing On August 27, 2020, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation, based on Van Eck’s three recent arrests: a June 28, 2020, arrest for possession of a blackjack in case number KA125558; a July 30, 2020 arrest for driving under the influence in case number 0WC04752; and an August 6, 2020 arrest for misdemeanor drug offenses. On December 16, 2020, defense counsel declared a doubt, the proceedings were stayed, and Van Eck was referred to mental health court pursuant to section 1368 for an assessment of his competency. On January 15, 2021, criminal proceedings were reinstated after Van Eck was found competent. The matter was set for a combined preliminary hearing in case number KA125558 and


The district court treated the hearing on June 11, 2020 as a <mask> hearing. Generally, once there has been evidence of a violation of the conditions of probation, the decision to revoke probation rests in the district court's sound discretion. State v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of proof. State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 45, 290 P.3d 562 (2012).


at his <mask> hearing on July 29, 2020. This assertion is belied by his statements at the October 20, 2020 probation violation hearing indicating he knew he had a reporting requirement and was prepared to admit he violated his probation by failing to report. In any event, at the July 29, 2020 hearing, when the trial court reinstated his probation, the court indicated the terms and conditions of probation remained the same—meaning the reporting requirement to which he was “orientated” on October 5, 2017 remained in place.


Harris (supra) stated the general proposition that a Probation Department’s delay in filing a violation of probation does not deny a defendant due process of law; Cherry (supra) rejected a defendant’s claim that laches and his right to a speedy trial invalidated the revocation of his probation, where he was charged with a violation almost three years after his conviction for a second crime which served as the basis for the violation; and Douglas (supra) held that a defendant, against whom a declaration of delinquency was filed in 1991, and whose resentence for a <mask> was on June 3, 1996, had failed to object that the proceeding was untimely, but that in any event the objection was without merit.


*545Even assuming extradition were an available alternative, Arizona did not request Ramirez's extradition. It requested his return under the ICAOS. The Arizona court order and arrest warrant were prominently marked with the notation "INTERSTATE COMPACT <mask>." In a "NOTE TO COURT" that was part of the court's order, the Arizona probation officer noted that Ramirez was subject to an "INTERSTATE COMPACT WARRANT" and identified an ICAOS rule (Rule 5.111) prohibiting bail during the ICAOS retaking process. Although the warrant form also referenced extradition in standard notations, the documents read as a whole make clear that Arizona sought Ramirez's return under the ICAOS; it did not seek his extradition. The ICAOS rules impose certain requirements on California in this situation, including the probable cause hearing described above, and those requirements have the force of statutory law. California authorities could not treat Arizona's request under the ICAOS as a request for Ramirez's extradition and thereby avoid these requirements.


Several months after Oliver's conviction in 18CR2402, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation based on new crimes he was alleged to have committed in violation of the terms of his probation. Oliver admitted the <mask> at the hearing on the State's motion. With respect to Oliver's new crimes, he entered into a plea agreement with the State that resulted in him pleading guilty to one reduced charge and the rest were dismissed. The sentence imposed for that new conviction is the subject of Oliver's current appeal.


The parties appear to be in agreement up to this point. Both sides recognize that defendant may not be deemed in violation of the firearms or narcotics conditions of probation if his possession or control of the prohibited items was unwitting. In other words, a <mask> can occur only if defendant knowingly owned or possessed these items or had them in his custody or control. Consequently, the issue presented here is not what state of mind is required to sustain a violation of probation, but the extent to which that state of mind must be expressly articulated in the probation condition itself to provide defendant with fair warning of what the condition requires. In defendant's view, the conditions at issue in this case are unconstitutionally vague and must be modified to state explicitly that knowing possession is required. The People respond that these conditions implicitly include a knowledge requirement already, rendering them sufficiently precise to afford defendant fair notice of what is prohibited.


Our colleagues in Division One have examined the distinction between knowing what you are supposed to avoid, which is pertinent to vagueness, and the mens rea of willfulness, which is required for a <mask>. (People v. Gaines (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1039, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 842 (Gaines ).) "[P]robation may not be revoked unless the evidence shows that a probationer's conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms of his or her probation. [Citation.] Thus, sentencing courts need not include a requirement that a probationer knowingly violated a condition in order to protect against enforcement of unwitting violations." (Ibid. )


Finally, we are unpersuaded that our holding in this factually unique case will encourage defendants in work release programs to abscond and hide out until their probation expires. There is good reason for them not to engage in such behavior. The sheriff can notify the court or the probation department, and the court can revoke probation. Or, if the sheriff chooses not to notify the court, defendants still risk discovery within the probationary time. At any <mask> hearing, the court can impose additional time in custody or impose any suspended sentence. The prosecutor can also charge defendant with a misdemeanor ( § 4024.2 ). Moreover, in this case, that probation expired before law enforcement caught up with Barber cannot be wholly attributed to his evasion of law enforcement. Barber was not in hiding. He was in the sheriff's own custody at the Los Angeles County jail from at least December *37519, 2011 through January 4, 2012, after the IRC Want had issued in 2010 for his failure to complete the work assignment. He appeared in court at probation violation hearings on January 4, 2012 and June 5, 2012, again after the IRC Want had issued. Law enforcement therefore had ample opportunity to apprehend Barber within the period of probation, but did not.12


"(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of <mask>, the defendant must file in that superior court-with the notice of appeal required by (a)-the statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. [¶] ... [¶]


The salient facts of this case are relatively simple. Howard Blake is charged under a governor’s warrant with being the South Carolina fugitive, Larry Barnett, who allegedly escaped from the Anderson South Carolina Stockade in 1976. Barnett was serving a sentence of seven years for passing several bad checks and a <mask> from a prior grand larceny. Howard Blake has lived continuously at the same address in Suffolk County, New York, since 1983. He was married in 1987, helping to raise his wife’s three children from a prior marriage. He and his wife also had two children of their own in 1988 and 1992.


11 While the Commonwealth now insists Appellant did not complete the batterer’s course, there was no mention of this probation condition during the revocation hearing. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. To the extent the trial court implies Appellant failed to establish he completed the course, we note that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof in a probation revocation hearing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4 n.9 (“There was no evidence introduced to suggest that [Appellant] had completed the course.”); Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The Commonwealth establishes a <mask> meriting revocation when it shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer’s conduct violated the terms and conditions of his probation[.]”).


The St. Lawrence County Probation Department, failing to abide by its own <mask> policies that a memorandum of investigation be provided to the sentencing court within five days of the Probation Department being notified of an arrest, sent a belated violation package to the jurisdictional court on December 18, 2006. Canton Village Justice Michael Crowe signed a declaration of delinquency and issued an arrest warrant on December 29, 2006, which was faxed to the Probation Department on January 2, 2007. Thereafter, plaintiff alleges the defendants failed to properly process Trim’s arrest warrant since it was neither forwarded to the local police nor input into the warrant entry/registrant system by the Probation Department. It is alleged the fax was shredded or destroyed. It is further alleged these acts caused Brinkerhoff s death since these delays permitted Trim to remain at large for months. During oral argument, plaintiffs counsel stated he only recently learned Trim had previously been stopped on the Thruway without incident, and had defendants timely applied for the arrest warrant and properly processed it, Trim could have been successfully taken into custody without event during that traffic stop. This information, he urges, can and should be developed during discovery.


A citizen not on probation cannot have her cell phone or computer searched absent probable cause and a warrant. It is reasonable to treat probationers differently due to their diminished rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when an officer has "reasonable suspicion that a probationer ... is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable." ( Knights , supra , 534 U.S. at p. 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.) Under what I think is the most appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment authorities we have, I would require that reasonable suspicion standard of blanket electronic search conditions, at least where the probationer's crime did not involve the internet or computers. A warrantless and suspicionless digital search could be based on some ground that is tailored to the probationer in advance, as part of the conditions of probation, or it could be based on reasonable suspicion that the probationer has committed a crime or other <mask>. But it should have some such articulable basis. Where digital evidence is concerned, we should ensure that "the Fourth Amendment [does not] fall[ ] out of the picture entirely." ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at 392, 134 S.Ct. 2473.)


This court has not found any reported appellate decision in this state addressing whether a <mask> specification adequately sets forth the condition violated if the specification does not precisely name the probation condition allegedly violated. In the absence of any specific precedent on this issue, the court rules that a purely technical defect in the notice does not prevent a court from finding a violation of probation and determining whether probation should be revoked (see Hammons v Sheriff of Jefferson County, Tex., 901d 59, 60 [5th Cir 1990] [technical and nonprejudicial variances in parole revocation proceedings does not violate due process]; Perry v U.S. Parole Commn., 831d 811, 813 [8th Cir 1987] [same]; Atkins v Marshall, 533 F Supp 1324, 1328 [SD Ohio 1982] [same]).2 After all, the notice required by CPL 410.70 (2) is a component of the defendant’s general right to be heard before probation is revoked, and a defendant’s right to be heard is not violated by a defect in notice that does not prejudice the ability to present a defense at the probation hearing (see Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778 [1973]; People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113 [1953]).


confinement to order execution of sentence (or make other final order) if sentence has previously been imposed (3d par., 3d sentence). Failure to comply with any one of these three time limits divests the court of any remaining jurisdiction. (5th par.)” (Hoddinott, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 999.) The purpose of section 1203.2a is to “to prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under [ ] section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant’s confinement.” (Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507, fn. omitted (Pompi).) “Because loss of jurisdiction is such a severe sanction, however, courts have been unwilling to impose it ‘unless the sentencing court’s jurisdiction has been ousted by strict compliance with the statute. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Murray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 149, 156.) II Additional Facts On June 4, 2020, defendant sent a letter to the Tehama County District Attorney (not the probation office) to request “under section 1203.2(a)” that the prosecutor accept his admission to a <mask> in the Tehama County case and have that term be one year consecutive to his Butte County sentence, or alternatively, to run them concurrently. The letter came with a form notice of demand for trial or disposition under section 1381. Both the letter and form reference his Butte County conviction. On May 27, 2020, the Tehama County Superior Court issued an order for production of prisoner to the Butte County Jail to produce defendant for a July 6 hearing. On July 1, 2020, the Tehama County Sheriff’s Office filed a letter with the Tehama County Superior Court stating defendant was “unavailable for pickup for his court date on July 6, 2020. He has been sentenced to state prison, and BUTTE COUNTY JAIL will not release him on the order of production due to his pending delivery to state prison.”


A collateral question not reached in this litigation is the burden of proof required for a parole violation. Is it beyond *92a reasonable doubt, a preponderance of the evidence, substantial evidence or entirely satisfactory evidence? Interestingly enough there has been virtually no litigation in this State on the burden of proof either for parole or <mask>. This court adopts the standard set forth in a probation violation case, People v. Valle (7 Misc 2d 125) that the evidence and facts must reasonably satisfy the board that a parole violation has occurred.


On April 5, 2011, Boswell was arrested in Jackson County on unrelated charges. While incarcerated in the Jackson County Detention Center awaiting trial on the 2011 charges, Boswell signed a waiver of the <mask> preliminary hearing on his 2009 case. On April 28, 2011, his probation officer filed a probation violation report with the Clay County Circuit Court recommending revocation of Boswell's probation for the 2009 case.


The court declined to strike the prior robbery conviction and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 55 years to life in prison based on a term of 15 years to life for the murder, doubled to 30 years under the three-strikes law, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The court sentenced defendant *649to a concurrent two-year term for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court terminated probation for the prior robbery and applied custody credits to the <mask>. The court told defendant, "it is entirely possible-some might say likely-at some point the law will provide you with a means of shortening your sentence and whether that happens and whether your sentence is ever shortened, whether you are paroled, would depend largely on your conduct in prison. I hope you see that as an incentive to turn your life around."


Although defendant's ability to "maintain" "training, schooling or employment" may not be entirely within her control, any non-compliance with these requirements due to "circumstances beyond ... her control" cannot give rise to a <mask>. ( People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 858.) That is because courts routinely imply a "willfulness" requirement into conditions of probation. ( Id. ;


On March 30, 2017, Hall again appeared in court for another <mask> hearing. Hall's attorney advised the court that Hall refused to attend the long-term treatment program. Counsel further advised that, given the options attending treatment or revocation, Hall preferred revocation. Based on Hall's admitted violations and his refusal to comply with the conditions of his supervision, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve out his remaining three-year sentence. The trial court also ordered Hall to pay the remaining balance of his restitution within ninety days of his release. Hall now appeals from this order.


A summary of the evidence and testimony before the court is necessary to understand and address the issues Sills raises on appeal. Sills was the first witness called by DHS. He testified that he had been incarcerated on the day B.S. was born and was not responsible for the child's removal. He *253continued to be incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction on a <mask> (failure to pay fines), he had been incarcerated for 17 months, but he was set to be released soon. He testified that his expected release date was August 1 but that he fully anticipated to be released mid-June. He stated that he is on parole until January 2021. He testified that once he is released from custody, he intends to live with his mother and work at Anchor Packaging.


The final requirement for collateral estoppel is that there be a final and valid judgment. The People contend that a probation hearing is not a final judgment because a defendant still remains on probation after a hearing and because new charges may be brought at any future time while the defendant remains on probation. The court is not persuaded by this argument. *545While the court may make a finding of “non-violation” and restore the defendant to probation, any future violations lodged would result from new acts or omissions, and not those already resolved by the court. The People would not be permitted to try again to establish a <mask> based upon the same accusation of sexual abuse (see generally, CPL 410.70).


Deen filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Post-conviction counsel filed a timely amended motion in July 2016. The amended motion asserted three claims for post-conviction relief, all based on an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The amended motion claimed (i) that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity at the time of his offenses, which could have established that Deen was not responsible for his criminal conduct because of mental disease or defect under section 552.030;1 (ii) that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity at the time of his guilty plea to possibly establish that Deen lacked the capacity to understand the plea hearing or assist in *138his own defense pursuant to section 552.020; and (iii) that counsel at Deen's <mask> hearing was ineffective for failing to investigate Deen's mental capacity to possibly establish that Deen lacked the capacity to understand his probation hearing or assist in his own defense pursuant to section 552.020.


This theory is flawed. First, Andrews is distinguishable as it dealt with the 1985 version of K.S.A. 22-3716, which did not require district courts to impose graduated sanctions for probation violations. 11 Kan. App. 2d at 324; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22- 3716(2). Rather, the statute gave district courts the option to impose a defendant's full underlying prison sentence following a single <mask>. Similarly, the Lumley court analyzed a version of K.S.A. 22-3716 that did not mandate intermediate sanctions.


Revocation of probation is a matter of discretion of the court. There are no limiting requirements as to the manner of the hearing or determination. A probationer brought before the court for such determination, without being furnished counsel, has not been deprived of his constitutional rights. (Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F. 2d 410.) A hearing on a charge of <mask> is in the nature of a summary proceeding and is not a ‘ ‘ criminal prosecution”. (United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987.)


*545Even assuming extradition were an available alternative, Arizona did not request Ramirez's extradition. It requested his return under the ICAOS. The Arizona court order and arrest warrant were prominently marked with the notation "INTERSTATE COMPACT <mask>." In a "NOTE TO COURT" that was part of the court's order, the Arizona probation officer noted that Ramirez was subject to an "INTERSTATE COMPACT WARRANT" and identified an ICAOS rule (Rule 5.111) prohibiting bail during the ICAOS retaking process. Although the warrant form also referenced extradition in standard notations, the documents read as a whole make clear that Arizona sought Ramirez's return under the ICAOS; it did not seek his extradition. The ICAOS rules impose certain requirements on California in this situation, including the probable cause hearing described above, and those requirements have the force of statutory law. California authorities could not treat Arizona's request under the ICAOS as a request for Ramirez's extradition and thereby avoid these requirements.


On May 7, 2015, Caretto appeared for a <mask> hearing. The trial court appointed a public defender and suggested that a motion to reduce the charges under Proposition 47 might be appropriate. The next day Caretto filed a one-page motion asking that the two charges for which he was convicted be reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. While he alleged the value of the stolen property was less than $950, he did not identify the stolen property or attach a declaration or other evidence showing the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950.


In June 2016, the trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Arevalo on probation for 12 years subject to various terms and conditions, including that he serve 365 days in jail. The court explained that before it could grant probation Arevalo was required "to waive the excess" custody credits over 365 days to comply with Johnson . In accepting the waiver, the court then stated, "Mr. Arevalo, as I indicated as part of my sentencing here, in order for me to grant you probation you would have to *826waive what would be 968 days of custody credits. So in other words, that if you were to come back to court on a <mask> your credits towards any prison sentence you might receive would be limited to 365 days. That's actual time plus conduct credits. Do you understand that?" Arevalo responded, "Yeah." He was awarded 365 days of custody credits, composed of 183 days of actual credits and 182 days of conduct credits, resulting in the jail term being deemed served.


Indeed, father's criminal history spanned almost 30 years, with multiple arrests for possession of narcotics for sale, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of crack cocaine. Recent arrests include petty theft (2010); possession of a controlled substance and violation of probation (2010); second degree robbery, possession of a controlled substance, and trespass (2012); possession of a controlled substance for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and carrying dirk/dagger (2012); burglary, assault with great bodily injury, receiving known stolen property, and committing an offense while on bail (2012); unlawful driving/taking of a vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and <mask> (2013); second degree burglary, vandalism, and battery (2014); possession of a controlled substance (2015); domestic violence (2015); assault with great bodily injury, possession of a switch blade, and resisting/obstructing police officer/EMT (2016); reckless driving, forgery of registration, driving without a valid license, and receiving stolen property (2016); and petty theft (2016).


On December 2, 2002, defendant appeared in court without counsel to answer a violation of probation specification alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to notify the Department of Probation that he had changed his address. No <mask> hearing was conducted on that day. During the court proceeding, the court agreed with the Department of Probation’s liaison, who was in court, that this purely technical violation would not result in a revocation of probation, provided that defendant had paid the fine imposed as part of the sentence. Defendant informed the court that he had paid the $5,000 fine.


At the July 6 hearing, for which defendant was absent, the trial court said, “I think what you need to do or what I assume the People are going to do is submit another order of production probably a couple weeks down the road, once he is transferred; but I don’t know if CDCR is actually taking people,” implying it had been impacted by the COVID- 19 pandemic. The trial court discussed possible next steps with the parties, telling defense counsel, “[T]o the extent that they are not going to deliver [defendant] because he has the state prison commitment, . . . if you want to talk to [defendant] and when you talk about, you know, the benefit that he could have if he had concurrent sentencing or something like that, if you have something from him that says he is going to waive his appearance pursuant to—I can’t remember the section—it gets done within 30 days. [¶] . . . He makes that demand and if he does that then the Court will sentence him accordingly and then he’ll get the benefit.” The trial court ultimately left it up to the parties to decide whether the People wanted to submit another order of production or whether defendant would ask to be sentenced immediately on the <mask>. On July 10, 2020, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Tehama County. Defendant stated the petition’s grounds for relief were: “1381/1382, Time Credits (1/3 time CDCR) MCRP Eligibility without Hold. (Timed Out in Butte Case) (Teh[a]ma ‘Hold’) pc 1203.2(a).” Defendant explained that he was “in limbo” because there had been a custodial hold in Tehama County since October 9, 2019, and he could not be transferred to prison from the Butte County Jail because of the COVID-19 pandemic. He asked to be moved to Tehama County Jail so the hold could be resolved or he could be moved to a residential program, “or 1203.2(a).” On July 14, 2020, the trial court ordered the petition transferred to Butte County because “[i]t appears that [defendant] is being held in the Butte County Jail on a Butte County Superior Court case that he has been sentenced on.” The trial court’s order included a footnote that, to its “knowledge, no request pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.2a has been made by [defendant].”


<mask> prior to ordering her to serve her prison term or make particularized findings explaining why the safety of the community or Hays' welfare justified a deviation from the sanction structure. Thus, Hays' case is reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new probation violation hearing where either a sanction is imposed, or the proper findings can be made if warranted.


We think that the meaning of the phrase "in all cases" is unambiguous and a <mask> hearing is simply a part of the underlying misdemeanor "case." Therefore, we hold that a misdemeanor defendant is entitled to have an attorney appear on his or her behalf at a probation violation hearing under section 977 ; the defendant's personal appearance is not "lawfully required," until such time that the court orders a defendant to personally appear. (§ 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).)


Finally, the surety points out there is a different standard of proof at a <mask> hearing than at a criminal trial. ( People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 445, 272 Cal.Rptr. 613, 795 P.2d 783 ; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 348-349, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223.) While that observation may be accurate, it is unremarkable and irrelevant. Different standards of proof apply at preliminary hearings and various pretrial evidentiary hearings, but the surety could not credibly argue that those hearings are not a part of a particular defendant's same underlying criminal "case."


Several months after Oliver's conviction in 18CR2402, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation based on new crimes he was alleged to have committed in violation of the terms of his probation. Oliver admitted the <mask> at the hearing on the State's motion. With respect to Oliver's new crimes, he entered into a plea agreement with the State that resulted in him pleading guilty to one reduced charge and the rest were dismissed. The sentence imposed for that new conviction is the subject of Oliver's current appeal.


But as the State asserts, the record reflects that Galloway was placed on probation under the supervision of court services on the day of sentencing. In fact, the district court stated: "Sentence will be 12 months or a year in jail, Court Services for 12 months starting today." The order for probation filed by the district court stated that Galloway was placed on probation for a period of 12 months effective January 17, 2020. The order included a special condition that Galloway "[m]ust serve 90 days in the Reno County Jail or serve 3 days in the Reno County Jail followed by 2160 hours of house arrest to be started within 3 weeks." Because Galloway's assignment to house arrest was a condition of her probation, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(b)(3)(B), governing the procedure for a <mask>, was all the legal authority the district court needed to revoke the house arrest order when Galloway violated the rules of the house arrest program.


For the same reason, the other case relied upon by defendant, People v George (59 AD3d 858 [3d Dept 2009]), which in turn cites People v Tausinger (55 AD3d 956 [3d Dept 2008]), another case involving failure to pronounce a period of PRS, is no more helpful to him than Morbillo. George, in any case, is to be distinguished from both Morbillo and this case, as it involved a failure to inform the defendant of the consecutive running of a new sentence with a resentence upon a <mask>, the terms of which lay entirely within the discretion of the sentencing judge, rather than an omission to mention an undischarged incarceratory term arising out of a parole violation, which, pursuant to statute, must be served consecutively. The former related to a revocable sentence (under Penal Law § 60.01 [2] [a], *1151[b] [regarding terms of probation or conditional discharge under Penal Law article 65, or intermittent imprisonment under Penal Law article 85]), the latter to an undischarged term being served by á predicate felony offender (pursuant to Penal Law § 70.25 [2-a] [relating to terms of imprisonment imposed under recidivist sentencing provisions of Penal Law article 70]). It is clear that Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a) does not relate to a revocable sentence such as was at issue in George. And as has already been noted, the First Department’s decision in Wilson is precisely on point and is controlling. The consecutive running of defendant’s sentences was statutorily mandated, and the court’s failure to inform defendant of that fact neither caused his sentence to be incomplete, as was true in the PRS cases, nor rendered his plea unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent under Fifth Amendment due process standards.


*395Prior to the disposition hearing , the prosecutor filed a section 777 notice of <mask> based on the juvenile hall assault. Admitting he had erred in filing a new section 602 petition instead of proceeding by way of a probation violation, the prosecutor moved to both set aside the minor's admission to the allegations of the petition and to dismiss the petition. The prosecutor explained that he was " 'trying to get to a [DJF-eligible] offense' " due to the probation department's concerns and noted that none of the available placements were willing to accept the minor. ( Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 402, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 283 P.3d 1160.) The court granted the motion and dismissed the petition pursuant to section 782. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that section 733(c) prohibited the juvenile court from invoking section 782. ( Ibid. )


Defendant also argues the stay away condition is vague because it does not more specifically define the "Apple campus." But the word "campus" is understandable enough and is not unconstitutionally vague. ( In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1237, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 [probation condition prohibiting being on a school campus not vague].) Because any violation of a probation condition must be willful, if defendant were to be in a place that he did not know is within the Apple campus, he would not be in violation of his probation. ( Ibid. , citing People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494, 501-502, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 561, 388 P.3d 794 ; see also People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 858 [no <mask> unless the probationer willfully violates a condition].)


With these immutable jurisdictional rules in mind, it is clear that “the appropriate court” having jurisdiction over matters relating to a transferred probation sentence can and must only be determined based upon the geographic location of the defendant’s offending conduct as circumscribed by CPL 20.40 and 20.50. As applied here, the defendant’s failure to make the restitution payments to the Essex County Probation Department, located in the Town of Elizabethtown, provides the necessary geographic nexus for the Town of Elizabethtown Justice Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s <mask> proceeding premised upon such nonpay*1020ment. Similarly, the violation proceeding could properly have been brought in the defendant’s town of residence (CPL 20.40 [3]) or in Essex County Court (see People v Roberts-Alexandrov, 102 AD3d 219 [3d Dept 2012]).


A citizen not on probation cannot have her cell phone or computer searched absent probable cause and a warrant. It is reasonable to treat probationers differently due to their diminished rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when an officer has "reasonable suspicion that a probationer ... is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable." ( Knights , supra , 534 U.S. at p. 121, 122 S.Ct. 587.) Under what I think is the most appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment authorities we have, I would require that reasonable suspicion standard of blanket electronic search conditions, at least where the probationer's crime did not involve the internet or computers. A warrantless and suspicionless digital search could be based on some ground that is tailored to the probationer in advance, as part of the conditions of probation, or it could be based on reasonable suspicion that the probationer has committed a crime or other <mask>. But it should have some such articulable basis. Where digital evidence is concerned, we should ensure that "the Fourth Amendment [does not] fall[ ] out of the picture entirely." ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at 392, 134 S.Ct. 2473.)


The Appellate Division, Second Department, has never explicitly stated its reason or rationale for prohibiting the sentencing court from considering offenses of which a defendant has been found not guilty. Thus, under Appellate Division, Second Department, precedent a court may find a violation of the condition of probation that a probationer live a law-abiding life (Penal Law § 65.10 [1]) based upon criminal activity of which a defendant has been acquitted (see, cases cited above), yet when sentencing such a defendant the sentencing court may not consider the acts constituting the <mask>.


The sentencing court also noted: "It's not reasonable or supported by objective facts that the defendant would have rejected the deal, risked going to trial on the new [section] 11378 [drug charge] with a strike prior, with six years of state prison exposure, mandatory state prison exposure at 80 percent time, while the Court was hearing the <mask> in the older case, the [section] 245 [strike prior probation] case, concurrently with four years['] exposure itself. [¶] His Johnson waiver [of custody credit] I think shows the defendant's willingness to negotiate a deal. The facts suggest he took the best deal he could to physically avoid going to state prison, as I said. [¶] There's no evidence, I don't think on this record, that his counsel inaccurately conveyed the DA's offer to him or affirmatively misadvised him on immigration consequences. [¶] ... I'm finding that the defendant has not established ... he has not proved prejudicial error under [ section 1473.7 ] subdivision (a)(1). " (Italics added.)


We need not determine whether the State's cross-examination of Williams violated Section 559.125.2 because Townsel cannot prove that a miscarriage of justice or a manifest injustice *741resulted.6 See State v. Kunonga , 490 S.W.3d 746, 756 (Mo. App. 2016) (noting that, under plain error review, we need not determine if the circuit court's action was erroneous where the appellant cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice occurred). She "must prove that the jury's verdict would have been different but for the inadmissible evidence, not merely that the inadmissible evidence contributed to the jury's verdict." Id. Townsel cannot meet this burden because the evidence of her guilt was overwhelming. In addition to the multiple identifications of Townsel as Collins's attacker, the knife found in her sink had Collins's blood on the blade and her DNA on the handle. Additionally, evidence of Mandy's spontaneous remark during the 911 call that the attacker had cut herself while stabbing Collins, combined with evidence that Townsel had a cut on her hand and testimony explaining the various ways that a person can cut themselves while stabbing someone else, points to Townsel's guilt. In light of this evidence, Townsel cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different but for the State's cross-examination of Williams about information contained in her <mask> reports. The circuit court did not plainly err in allowing the cross-examination. Point III is denied.


2. Charges, plea, and sentence Van Eck was charged in case number KA122021 with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69, count 1)2 and exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, on January 21, 2020, Van Eck pled nolo contendere to count 1. The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea existed in the police reports and preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Van Eck on probation for a period of three years, on condition that he serve 365 days in jail. It awarded 261 days of custody credit. It ordered count 2 dismissed and struck the section 667.5 enhancement. 3. <mask> hearing On August 27, 2020, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation, based on Van Eck’s three recent arrests: a June 28, 2020, arrest for possession of a blackjack in case number KA125558; a July 30, 2020 arrest for driving under the influence in case number 0WC04752; and an August 6, 2020 arrest for misdemeanor drug offenses. On December 16, 2020, defense counsel declared a doubt, the proceedings were stayed, and Van Eck was referred to mental health court pursuant to section 1368 for an assessment of his competency. On January 15, 2021, criminal proceedings were reinstated after Van Eck was found competent. The matter was set for a combined preliminary hearing in case number KA125558 and


On September 29, 2016, a <mask> hearing was held. Movant's probation officer testified that since Movant was placed on probation, Movant had three law violations - shoplifted at Wal-Mart, convicted of forgery, and committed assault - and one citation for using marijuana. Finding *239that Movant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, the court revoked Movant's probation and ordered that his previously imposed sentences be executed.


"(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of <mask>, the defendant must file in that superior court-with the notice of appeal required by (a)-the statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. [¶] ... [¶]


The California Fostering Connections to Success Act, often referred to as AB12, allows nonminor dependents to remain under the juvenile court’s dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age 21 if they comply with certain statutory requirements. (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess); In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 285 (Shannon M.).) In this appeal, Leon E. challenges the juvenile court’s decision to terminate his status as a nonminor dependent, contending: (1) the court abused its discretion in finding he was not meeting AB12 eligibility requirements; (2) termination of the dependency was not in his best interest; and (3) termination was premature, as the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) failed to comply with its obligations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 391, subdivisions (a)–(c), (h), 1 to verify that Leon had received statutorily required information, documents, and services. During the pendency of this appeal, Leon turned 21 years old, and the Bureau now contends, among other things, that the appeal is moot because Leon has aged out of the nonminor dependency system. We conclude the appeal is not moot because a reversal could still afford Leon effective relief. As to the merits of the appeal, we conclude that while the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Leon failed to meet AB12 eligibility requirements, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction must be reversed and the matter remanded to ensure compliance by the Bureau and the juvenile court with the procedural requirements of section 391, subdivisions (a)–(c), (h), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.555(c) and (d). 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2015, Leon, at age 15, was declared a ward of the juvenile court in Solano County after admitting to three misdemeanors and six felonies, including two sex crimes. He was removed from his home and placed at Turning Point Family Care, a residential treatment facility that focuses on the rehabilitation of sex offenders. In February 2018, Leon turned 18 years old, and he was transferred the following month back to Solano County juvenile hall after a <mask>. His case was then transferred to


Defendant's conviction for felony false personation in violation of section 529, subdivision (a)(3) must be reversed.5 Since we reverse his conviction on that count in case No. SS160618, we remand the matter for resentencing. The trial court's revocation and termination of probation in case Nos. SS120317A and MS338702A is attributable in part to defendant's guilty conviction for violating section 529, subdivision (a)(3). Since the conduct leading to defendant's <mask> should not have been charged as a felony, the trial court should again exercise its discretion and determine if it should revoke probation for both cases. If the court chooses to revoke probation again, it should select the appropriate sentence.