This in the court’s opinion would be sufficient to sustain its conclusion that the board’s finding was an unreasonable one and an abuse of its discretion under the circumstances. However, both at the public hearing and in the decision of the board reference was repeatedly made to the over-all development of which the drive-in is a part. While the status of the proposed restaurant and office building is not disclosed, these are uses expressly permitted in the business district and do not require approval of the Board of Appeals. An application for the 100-room hotel and <mask> use was pending before the same respondent board, and a decision on an application for a gas station was pending before the Town Board.


(c) New evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff did not perpetrate the crime and was not an accomplice or <mask> to the acts that were the basis of the conviction, results in the reversal or vacation of the charges in the judgment of conviction or a gubernatorial pardon, and results in either dismissal of all of the charges or a finding of not guilty on all of the charges on retrial.


Any person who drives a vehicle, not his or her own, without the consent of its owner or lessee, and with intent temporarily to deprive the owner or lessee of his or her possession of the vehicle, without intent to steal the vehicle, is guilty of a felony. The consent of the owner or lessee of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall not in any case be presumed or implied because of the owner's or lessee's consent on a prior occasion to the taking or driving of that vehicle by the same or a different person. Any person who assists in, or is a party or <mask> to or an accomplice in any unauthorized taking or


The determination of respondent New York City Environmental Control Board (ECB) that the signs at issue constituted *448“advertising” signs, rather than “accessory” signs, under New York City Zoning Resolution § 12-10, was not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Atlantic Outdoor Adv., Inc. v Srinivasan, 110 AD3d 598 [1st Dept 2013]). The court should have deferred to ECB’s fact-sensitive analysis of whether the <mask> use was clearly incidental to and customarily found in connection with the principal use of the property (see Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 420 [1998]). Concur — Tom, J.E, Acosta, Saxe, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.


It appears that prior to October 3, 1983, subject properties in the Village of Mexico were zoned for residential use only. This restriction on use was imposed by resolution of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Mexico on the 17th *532day of May, 1957, which stated, in part: “Other customary <mask> uses and buildings provided that such uses are incidental to the principal use and do not include any activity commonly conducted as a business.” (Art IV, § 2, par 9.)


This court further finds that the auxiliary equipment, <mask> apparatus and the various shore connections mounted on the power plant barges as well as the spud and clamp fixtures, take-off towers, feeder cables, power and control wirings, etc. are essential to the function of the power plant barges and that the fuel supply barges and their requisite equipment for supplying oil to the power barges are indispensable to their operation and that, taken as a whole, are a collection of instruments, appliances and machinery designed for a particular use and designed for a specific action or operation — an integrated system for the generation of and distribution of electric power throughout the city and the northeast grid— and as such have been properly classified as property assessable as real property under subdivision 12 of section 102 of the Real Property Tax Law. From the legislative history of the statutes and the decided cases it is clear to this court that it is and always has been the policy of this State and the intention of the Legislature that power-generating apparatus and machinery and equipment, whether movable or permanently affixed to realty, used in connection with the generation and distribution of power and an integral component part of a unified system — are taxable as real property per se under subdivision 12 of section 102 of the Real Property Tax Law because they generate and distribute power. This court finds that historic tests and common-law rules defining fixtures *1080simply are not determinative of what is properly taxable as real property in this area.


Now, as to the cause of action brought by Frank Galluzzo, the third-party plaintiff, against the Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, the third-party defendant, on the insurance policy issued by the third-party defendant, the court finds these additional facts which will complete the factual background in this case: The policy which was issued covered the occupation of the third-party plaintiff, more specifically “ top soil delivery,” and the term of the policy commenced May 20, 1954 and terminated May 20, 1955. The accident upon which this suit was originally brought occurred on October 20, 1954, within the term of .the policy. On October 20, 1954 the third-party plaintiff was making a delivery of material to a construction job located at 94th Street in the borough of Queens. The truck was driven to the location of the construction job and the material removed from it for the purpose of completing delivery. Since the material could not be driven to the point where it was desired, .it was necessary to carry the material from the truck to the point where delivery was finally to be effected. To complete the delivery the third-party plaintiff used a payloader. This is an <mask> vehicle used to move the material from the truck to the site of the construction job itself. It is the payloader which injured the plaintiff Paul Kemnetz.


Defendant’s answering papers ask that summary judgment be granted defendant because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, which include a possible 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning under section 3(e) of article X of the Ordinance. Defendant made no cross motion, however, and the granting of summary judgment to defendant is, therefore, discretionary (compare the last sentence of CPLR 3212 [subd. (b)] with the third sentence of that subdivision). Plaintiffs served no reply affidavits and their moving papers do not fully meet the thrust of defendant’s argument. Nonetheless, the court will not grant summary judgment to defendant, for on the trial plaintiffs may well be able to bring themselves within the rule of Howsey v. Village of Kensington (257 N. Y. 221), that application for a variance is not a condition to a declaration of unconstitutionality as to an ordinance which' destroys the greater part of the value of the property by precluding use for which it is reasonably adapted (see Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N. Y. 493 and note, at p. 499, the use of the phrase “ precludes the use for which it is most readily adapted” [emphasis supplied]); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 22 A D 2d 895, 897). At basic issue in this action is whether plaintiffs may be required to use the Residence A portion as a park <mask> to the Apartment B portion while at the same túne being prevented from counting the Residence A portion of the purpose of the 35% land coverage limitation which determines the number of units that the multiple dwelling can contain. If plaintiffs can prove that, assuming that they will be granted a 25-foot extension of the Apartment B zoning, the 52-foot Residence A portion would be so greatly reduced in value if it is limited to accessory park use as to amount to confiscation within the rule of the Howsey ease, *437they will be entitled to judgment. Whether they can prove such reduction is a matter of expert opinion, and would not be decided on affidavits even if plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit had fully met the defendant’s argument. The issue is a subtle one which should be decided only after trial.


(10) Defendant initially refused inspection of the main house after granting access to the detached garage. Defendant did reluctantly grant access to the main house after being told by Inspector Parker that Town policy requires an inspection of all structures on the lot as the <mask> apartment can never allow more than two residential units or eight people living on one lot. The inspector advised that he would leave if access was not granted.


The Court of Appeal observed that, at the time of its decision (in 1969), the question of "[w]hether a falsehood to the police or other public investigators may violate the <mask> statute is a new question in California." ( Duty , supra , 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 103, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.) The court explained that "[a]ccording to some American decisions, the offense is not committed by passive failure to reveal a known felony, by refusal to give information to the authorities, or by a denial of knowledge motivated by self-interest. On the other hand, an affirmative falsehood to the public investigator, when made with the intent to shield the perpetrator of the crime, may form the aid or concealment denounced by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 103-104, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606.)


The original property had been owned by the plaintiff’s father from 1906 until his death in 1957 and since then by the plaintiff. The affected parcel has an area of over 83,000 square feet. Since 1926 it has been occupied and used solely for residential and <mask> purposes. In 1929 part of the property was zoned Business F for that portion running back 201.01 feet from Merrick Boad. In 1953 the full plot was zoned Business F. The plottage fronting on Merrick Boad was valued at $70,000 in transfer tax proceedings following the father’s death. An additional value was allocated to the area immediately behind that plottage (which area was larger then than it is now).


Arguendo, we may assume that the operation of school buses is a proper <mask> use for a nursery school. The difficulty with the defendants’ position is that no special exception has been granted Lots Nos. 174 and 175 for the conduct of a nursery school. No case has been cited which would permit an accessory use on a parcel not zoned for the main or primary use (here an operation of a nursery school). If the defendants’ position were valid, the ordinance could be avoided by extending the nursery school to include any of the adjacent property, without regard to the zoning or permitted uses of such adjoining property provided only that the use were an accessory use. Specifically, it is here held that unless Lots Nos. 174 and 175 are granted a special exception by the Town Board after a public hearing, the accessory use violates the ordinance.


Consolidated with the above action is an action by the Town of East Hampton to enjoin defendants from maintaining a concrete block foundation and dwelling (the cottage) moved thereon which was erected and so placed without a permit and which structures, it is alleged, are prohibited by the zoning and tidal flood hazard ordinances Of the Town of East Hampton. Said Lot No. 3 is located in a Residential A District and a single family dwelling is a permitted use thereon (East Hampton Code, § 153-18, subd [2]). It is also permitted to have “<mask> buildings” thereon and section 153-18 E provides: “Accessory Buildings: The use of which is customarily incidental to that of the main building on the same lot. A main building is one in which is conducted the principal use of the lot on which it is located.”


The People filed an information charging defendant with possession of marijuana for sale ( Health & Saf. Code,1 § 11359) and cultivation of marijuana (§ 11358). At the time, both crimes were classified as felonies. (Former §§ 11358 & 11359, as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, §§ 160 & 161, eff. Apr. 4, 2011.) The information also charged two prior prison term enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Under a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded guilty to a single felony count of <mask> ( Pen. Code, § 32 ),2 and the trial court dismissed *803the balance of the charges. Because defendant was found to have played a minimal role in this offense, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years' formal probation. He served 228 days in county jail and received 114 days of credit for time served.


Petitioners commenced this special proceeding by the service and filing of an order to show cause in lieu of a notice of petition dated September 16, 2008 and petition. Demanded therein is a stay of a criminal proceeding commenced by the People of the State of New York, Town of Brookhaven, against petitioner, Davin M. Fortuna, in the Sixth District Court of Suffolk County. The petitioners further demand judicial declarations regarding the conforming nature of certain alterations and improvements made to the residence and the <mask> building situated on the petitioners’ residential lot.


The evidence established that all units, ranging from about 2 tons’ to 20 tons’ capacity, are standard items made by a number of well-known companies; that the units under 10 tons generally are installed by a licensed electrician or contractor roughly estimating the tonnage required for those premises and furnishing electrical wiring, plumbing piping lines and, rarely, ductwork for better distribution of the cool air; that such units may be readily used elsewhere under conditions which may vary within a 25% range from the original installation; that, where units of 10 tons or over are needed, an engineer may be asked to make a more precise survey of the heat load and distribution *1011for that particular layout, type of structure, use of premises, number of people, etc., and the type of unit and nature of <mask> wiring, piping and ductwork in such case may possibly qualify as an integrated and specially adapted air-conditioning system.


Thus, the contextual approach set forth in Samuels and reiterated in Grimes does not permit a mechanical analysis of statements offered under Evidence Code section 1230. This approach is not by any means novel. In People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251 (Gordon ), the Supreme Court considered statements made by an <mask>, Rauch, who told law enforcement officers that he had provided the defendant, his nephew, with shelter and medical care after the defendant had been wounded in a robbery. Although the statement minimized the declarant uncle's role and portrayed his nephew in a much harsher light, the court found the statement admissible: "The court could have reasonably concluded that at the time it was made, Rauch's statement so far subjected him to the risk of criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made it unless he believed it to be true. This is because Rauch all but confessed that he was an accessory to the crimes committed in the Riverside K mart incident.... To be sure, Rauch did not expressly admit either intent or knowledge. But he impliedly admitted both by his suspicious conduct throughout the incident in question. [¶] Defendant argues to the contrary. He *791claims Rauch's statement should be considered untrustworthy in view of its substance. He says it must be characterized as neutral or exculpatory, and therefore unreliable, because it admits no more than it does. We cannot so characterize the statement. To be sure, the criminal liability that the statement risks is not the highest.But it is significant nonetheless ." (Id. at p. 1252, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251, second italics added.)


Plainly, the term "walkway" can be used in different ways, but we conclude the statute here uses it in the sense of an external walking path. We reach this conclusion primarily based on the principle of statutory construction noscitur a soclis , i.e., where a word is used in a list, its meaning can be demonstrated by the other items in the list. (See People v. Drennan (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 ["The rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis , a word takes meaning from the company it keeps, is useful here. 'A word of uncertain meaning may be known from its associates and its meaning "enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used" ' "].) Aside from walkways, *90the other items in the list-carport, garage, overhang, patio, enclosed patio, and detached <mask> structure-are typically located at or near the periphery of a residential structure. In other words, they could arguably be included within the perimeter. The Legislature, therefore, felt compelled to specify that it did not mean to include those areas within assessable space. Accordingly, we conclude a covered or uncovered walkway, as used in section 65995, subdivision (b)(1), refers to an external *1195walkway, not an interior hallway. Any "similar area" is likewise on the periphery of the residential structure and does not include an interior hallway.


*473There is no doubt in principle that a legacy of a specific productive thing carries with it, after its kind, its “ accessories ” (Matter of Strasenburgh, 136 Misc. 91), its “ appendants ” (Matter of Althaus, 94 id. 43) and “ all accretions and increment thereon ” (Matter of Michaelis, 110 id. 185, 189; Matter of Gans, 60 id. 282, 286); which are also called its “ produce ” (Platt v. Moore, 1 Dem. 191), or its “increase” (Murphy v. Marcellus, Id. 288); but if inanimate and unproductive articles of property are specifically bequeathed, and not delivered, it does not follow that the legatee is entitled to interest upon their value out of the estate by way oi recompense for detention — if withheld, the remedy is against the executor personally, (Isenhart v. Brown, 2 Edw. Ch. 341, 347). In the class of primitive cases, e. g., the mare in foal, the unshorn sheep, or the growing crop (Stall v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158; Matter of Chamberlain, 140 id. 390), the line of demarcation is suggested by a hkening of interest in default to “ a fruit fallen from the tree in the life of the testator ” (Matter of Althaus, 94 Misc. 43, 48), but in the more complicated cases arising out of social obligations and the symbols in which they are embodied, it is not so easy to trace the causality that brings forth the “ produce,” the “ increase ” and “ increment,” or that draws unto itself the “ <mask>,” the “ accretion ” and the “ appendant.” A corporation, for instance, does not produce dividends of any sort with any natural or normal constancy. Dividends come if and when they are earned or declared; but interest on money or securities is continuous or constant, rather than contingent.


Evidence was then given tending to establish the guilt of the several persons named in the indictment contained in the record. It is not necessary to determine to what extent the judgment record is evidence against the prisoner, to establish the guilt of the <mask>. It of course conclusively establishes that the person tried under the indictment set forth in the record had been convicted,but the question whether his guilt is conclusively established as against the person charged as accessory, who was not a party to the record, and had no opportunity to be heard upon the trial, is quite a different proposition. On looking into the evidence in this case given for the purpose of showing that tho offence had been in fact committed, it is apparent that all of it was admissible with a view to show circumstances tending to establish the prisoner’s guilt as accessory, and as it was clearly admissible for *385that purpose, there was no error in receiving it, even if it were not necessary to have gone beyond the record for the purpose? of proving the guilt of the persons convicted under the principal indictment. The exception was not therefore well taken.


Defendant argues charging her with crimes purportedly carrying a potential 40-year sentence3 constituted prosecutorial overreaching and asks this court to *758"emphatically reject this prosecutorial overreach, and reaffirm that recalcitrant witnesses can be subjected to coercion and punishment for contempt, but cannot be thrown in prison for decades." Defendant, however, has not shown she raised this argument in the trial court. Nor does she cite any authority on prosecutorial overreaching in support of her claim. She cites no authority precluding the <mask> and contempt charges based on her refusal to testify. The Attorney General did not specifically address the overreaching claim in his brief or at oral argument. Defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court.


“ The following uses and no other are permitted in A Residential Districts: ‘ ‘ A. Single family dwelling. “ B. <mask> use and accessory building, provided such use or building does not include any activity commonly recognized as a business. “ C. Church or similar place of worship, parish house, public school, parochial school * * *. “ D. Office in the residence of a physician, dentist, lawyer, architect, accountant, engineer, insurance or real estate salesman or one engaged in a similar profession or business * * *. ‘ ‘ E. Rectory, Convent. ‘ ‘ F. Private garage. “ G-. Private stable, * * *. “ H. Farm.” It is respondents’ position that the uses proposed by the Diocese fail to constitute permitted residential A zone uses as a ‘ ‘ church or similar place of worship, parish house * * * parochial school * * * rectory (or) convent.” The following excerpts from the Board of Appeals decision demonstrate its position clearly: ‘ ‘ though the Diocese proposes to carry on a religious activity at Thornfield, it has elected to do so by and through an instrumentality other than a church within the meaning of the town zoning ordinance, * * * the Diocese proposes to maintain a chapel upon the premises, but a chapel * * * is not a church or similar place of worship within the meaning of the zoning ordinance * * * (but) would simply serve as an adjunct to the Diocese conference *518center. * * * (and) is not designed or intended to serve the religious needs of the residents of the Town. * * * (So that) the mere fact that the conference center possesses a chapel would not authorize the existence of the conference center in the residential zone. ’ ’ The use “for conference center purposes does not constitute a church or other similar place of worship use within the meaning of the Zoning Ordinance.”


In a later case, Kendrick v. Lomax, (2 Cromp. & Jer. 405) the last indorser of a bill, after it became due, went to the plaintiff with another bill, with the same parties’ names, and requested him to renew the first by taking the second bill. The plaintiff hesitated for some time, and ultimately the indorser left the second bill with him. On the trial, Justice Bayley, an eminent authority on the law of bills of exchange, intimated that such a receipt of the second bill would prevent the plaintiff’s right of suing on the first, until the second was dishonored, and he left it to the jury to say whether the second was left and received on account of and in renewal of the first. The jury found that it was, and the Judge having told the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the expenses of the first bill, the second havirig'been paid at maturity, they found a verdict for the plaintiff for that amount. But the verdict was set aside, upon the ground that as the plaintiff was precluded from suing on the first bill, until the second matured, he could maintain no action for the expenses, the second bill having been duly paid. “When,” says Bayley, J., in delivering an opinion for the entering of a nonsuit, “ the plaintiff took the new bill, he virtually agreed, not only to postpone his right to sue on the first, but also to sue for the charges that were <mask> to it,”—which is going quite as far as we have gone in this State in the application of the rule that the taking of *490the new note suspends, until it falls due, the right to sue upon the previous one.


*736"Note: Parking garage spaces may be rented for periods of not less than one week and not more than one month to persons who are not occupants of the residences to which the spaces are <mask> for the accommodation of the private passenger motor vehicles used by such non-residents, provided that such spaces are operated in a manner which will not adversely affect the residential character of the neighborhood. Such spaces shall be made available to the occupants of the residences to which they are accessory within 30 days after written request therefor is made to the landlord.”


The 36th clause, which was typewritten, provided as follows: “It is expressly understood that the dining car and/or <mask> buildings placed on the premises shall be considered personal property and not as part of the realty. At the end of the term or upon expiration date of this lease, the Tenant agrees to remove the diner and any accessory buildings and fill in the cellar excavation to the level of the remaining land and shall leave the entire premises free of foundation blocks and clear of refuse. ’ ’


Not all of them testified in Linville's later murder trial. According to law enforcement records attached to the prosecution's opposition to Linville's motion to dismiss the later complaint charging her with murder, however, one inmate, Jamie Anderson, told authorities Linville had said her co-defendant had "told on" both of them and that if she had been arrested within 24 hours of the homicide the authorities would have found gun residue all over her. Another inmate, Belle Peterson, overheard Linville say on a transport bus to court that Moreno had "snitched" on her. Peterson also said Linville was very angry with Moreno, and was telling everyone that Moreno had told the police on her. Inmate Isabela Verela reported that Linville had said she wanted to see what it felt like to kill someone, picked her victims randomly, had no feelings about the killings, and laughingly told Verela "How do you want me to feel, I don't know them, I don't care about them." Verela reported that Linville would brag about committing the murders and that she "got away" with it, and said she had been in Dixon driving around with Moreno because they were on a mission to kill people. And Paula Moyer, who was Linville's cellmate while in county jail awaiting trial, reported extensive incriminating statements by Linville, including that Linville admitted killing one of the victims and said Moreno had killed the other one, the police would never find the gun, and that murder charges could not be refiled against her. According to Moyer, after Linville was sentenced on the <mask> charge, Linville freely admitted killing one of the women and would laugh about it. She bragged that she was sentenced to just three years and eight months and had got away with murder. Moyer also reported that Linville became infatuated with serial killer Richard Ramirez, and wrote him a letter boasting about the murders.


In almost every charter or grant of franchise, there may be found many minor duties, sometimes expressed, often implied; none of which are strictly essential to the due execution of the trust. These ought to be performed; still if executed substantially though not to the very letter, or if by change of times they become useless, they may be neglected without perverting the objects of the grant. For the neglect of these when any person is aggriev*582ed, the law has provided various fit remedies, short of that of forfeiture, which the authorities just cited regard as reserved for a violation of the main objects of the trust. Such minor omissions of <mask> ^duties seem well left to the writ of mandamus, of prohibition, of injunction, or to indictment or civil suits for damages. Sometimes, as in the present case, the cumulative remedy of a pecuniary penalty is added by special statutory provision. It is true that our revised statutes authorize the filing of an information against corporate bodies “ whenever they shall offend against any [ *583 ] of the provisions ‘of the act creating such corporation.” But as the judgment can only he pronounced upon a finding of “ guilty” of unlawful usurpation or holding, the question whether such offence amounts to cause of forfeiture or not, is still open to inquiry and must depend upon the terms of the grant and the nature of the offence.


At the suppression hearing, Henry testified that on May 12, 2014, she went to the jail to serve Pitts with a parole-violation report. When Henry informed Pitts that he had been charged with capital murder, he said, "Why do they not have an <mask> law in Arkansas?" Henry asked Pitts if he was an accessory, to which he responded, "Well, I'm not a capital murderer." According to Henry, Pitts said that he should not have been charged with capital murder and that no motive could be proved. She said that Pitts had initially used the pronoun "we," before stopping midsentence to instead say "they," when referring to the police's lack of understanding why the perpetrators committed the crime. Henry said that Pitts had stated that the police did not know whether the suspects had gone to the home to rob the place, talk with someone, or "deal with a prior situation between people." Henry said that Pitts-not in response to questioning-discussed the lack of evidence against him. For example, he stated that he knew that his face was not shown on camera. Henry testified that she saw Pitts again the following day, May 13, to notify him of his right to a hearing. She said that Pitts again spoke of the evidence against him and what he had told investigators without any questioning by her, aside from asking whether he wished to waive the hearing. Henry admitted that, although Pitts was in custody, she did not read him Miranda warnings before speaking with him on either day. She explained that she had been "acting under the scope of a parole officer, not an investigator."


In Boreth v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment (396 Pa. 82) appellant’s application for a permit to operate a beauty shop in her residence had been denied. In affirming such denial, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that such a beauty shop conducted in a residence, was not a “ home occupation ”, within the meaning of the Philadelphia Zoning Ordinance which permitted <mask> uses in residential districts, as that phrase *303was defined therein, viz.: ‘ ‘ Any lawful occupation customarily conducted in a dwelling as an incidental use ” (emphasis added).


The reasons given by the courts in support of that rule as to those merely donative or testamentary transfers are deduced from the general nature of a corporate dividend. Cases too numerous to cite here, hold that the declaration of a dividend is a written admission of an indebtedness in a fixed sum, which does not give rise to a contractual relation between the corporation and the stockholder; but merely created a debt of definite amount in favor of the latter against the corporation; nor does the declaration necessarily add an <mask> to the stock itself; but the dividend is an independent obligation, separate from the stock itself, and forming no part thereof. Any modification of that essential feature is the result of contract or market sales customs.


Each <mask> count specifically identified defendant as aiding a single individual in violation of section 32 : count 1-Robinson, count 2-Green, count 3-Bryant Clark and count 4-Byron Clark. Each count also specifically alleged defendant harbored, concealed and aided the individual "with the intent that [he] might avoid and escape from arrest, trial, conviction, and *641punishment for" the charged felony-murder. Each count had its own verdict form and the jury found defendant guilty as an accessory as to each individual.


When section 421 was enacted in 1971, there was no exemption for commercial space. In 1975, section 421 was amended and commercial, community and <mask> use space not exceeding 12% for the first time came under the exemption. The issue posed in Teleon (supra) was how the mini-tax was to *307be apportioned between commercial and residential space, and not whether condominiums were excluded.


On April 15, 1999, defendant filed an omnibus motion and served a request for a bill of particulars on the People. In that motion, defendant claimed, inter alla, that all seven charges in the indictment were legally insufficient and should be dismissed. In defendant’s request for a bill of particulars, defendant specifically asked that the People, with respect to each count of the indictment, “state whether the defendant is alleged to have acted as a principal or as an <mask>.”


Petitioner’s premises are situated in a Residence “ B ” zone in which are permitted single-family occupancy and (§ B-1.6) ‘ ‘ <mask> use on the same lot with and customarily incidental to any of the above permitted uses, including a private garage. This shall be understood to include the professional office or studio of a doctor, dentist * * * provided the office * * * is located in the dwelling in which the practitioner resides ”.


"(a) Signs of a duly constituted governmental body: including traffic or similar regulatory devices, legal notices, or warnings at railroad crossings "(b) Flags or emblems of a political, civic, philanthropic, educational, or religious organization "(c) Temporary signs announcing a campaign, drive, or event of the above organizations "(d) Memorial signs or tablets "(e) Signs denoting architect, engineer, or contractor when placed on construction sites and not exceeding 25 square feet in area "(f) Signs required to be maintained by law or governmental order, rule, or regulation, with a total surface area not exceeding ten square feet on any zoning lot "(g) Small signs displayed for the direction or convenience of the public, including signs which identify rest rooms, freight entrances, or the like, with a total surface area not exceeding five square feet on any zoning lot.” (Zoning Resolution § 12-10, "Sign”.) Section 42-52 of the Zoning Resolution provides that "<mask> business signs or advertising signs are permitted with no restrictions on size, illumination, or otherwise, except as provided in * * * Section 42-53.” Section 42-53 provides that, in Ml, M2 and M3 districts, "no advertising sign shall be located * * * within 200 feet of an arterial highway * * * if such advertising sign is within view of such arterial highway.” Appendix C of the Zoning Resolution lists the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway as an arterial highway.


Defendant urges strongly in support of her position the decision in Matter of Wise v. Michaelis (203 N. Y. S. 2d 247, affd. no opn. 12 A D 2d 788 [2d Dept.]) wherein the Supreme Court, Nassau County, annulled a determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals, Town of Hempstead, denying petitioner a permit to use a portion of her residence to practice hairdressing and cosmetology, and directed the issuance of the permit. The Hempstead Ordinance expressly permitted certain <mask> uses in a Residence “ B ” District, in the following pertinent language: “ Accessory use * * * customarily incidental to any of the above permitted uses, * * *. This shall be understood to include the professional office or studio of a doctor, dentist, masseur, teacher, artist, architect, real estate broker, engineer, musician, or lawyer, or rooms used for home occupations such as dressmaking, millinery or similar handicrafts ” (emphasis added).


prohibits uses for which it does not provide permission.” Treisman v. Kamen, 126 N.H. 372, 375 (1985); see 15 Peter Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice: Land Use Planning and Zoning § 9.02, at 174 (2010) (explaining that under a “permissive” ordinance, uses of land are generally prohibited “unless they are expressly permitted as primary uses or can be found to be <mask> to a permitted use”). The zoning ordinance does not expressly permit storing of junk for personal use. Accordingly, the defendant’s storage of junk for personal use, not being permitted by the ordinance, is prohibited.


It unnecessary to decide whether the different time/different location test retains continuing vitality under section 654, at least as a stand-alone test. (Compare, e.g., People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 798, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ( Valli ) [ Britt reflects that " Kellett is not necessarily a simple 'different time/different place' limitation"] with People v. Marlow , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 143-144, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126 [ Kellett held inapplicable to murders argued to be related by common motive but carried out at different times in different locations].) Here, Linville's offenses were committed at different times in different places. The murders were committed on November 16, 2007, in Vallejo and Dixon, which are in Solano County, whereas Linville disposed of the vehicle days later in Richmond, which is in Contra Costa County.6 But there is more. Examining "the totality of the facts" in light of section 654 's legislative goals ( People v. Flint (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 333, 336, 124 Cal.Rptr. 269 ), and focusing on the conduct Linville herself committed, the offenses were not so "interrelated" ( Kellett , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 827, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206 ) as to prohibit the state from pursuing a separate prosecution against Linville, after she pled guilty to being an <mask>, for the much more serious murder charges.


a. The partnership. On April 10, 1941 there was a triparty agreement, between a man named Shamamian, who was the owner of the Sterling Tire & <mask> Co., on one side and James Zolli and Vilma Zolli on the other. The plaintiff’s signature on that agreement is clear as crystal, and his denial thereof brands him as one entitled to little credence from this court. I find that in 1941 the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral partnership at will, to which each contributed an equal share of the assets and under which they were to share the *586profits and losses equally. I find that profits were so shared until the parties separated in 1952, when the plaintiff wrongfully excluded the defendant from the business. I hold that there was a partnership at will, that the partnership should be dissolved and that the defendant is entitled to an accounting and the appointment of a receiver.


By approving the permit, the Village Board has in effect (1) usurped the power of the building official by extending the definition nf “ <mask> use ” to the proposed helipad; and (2) bypassed the safeguards of review by a Board of Appeals, thus engaging in “ back-door rezoning ” without the benefit or safeguard of the required public notice and hearings.


The Zoning Law provides the Zoning Board with the power to interpret various provisions of the statute, including the meaning of the term "accessory”. While the Zoning Board now asserts that its earlier interpretation of "<mask> use” was erroneous, it had the power to reach that interpretation. The Board also had the power to change its position since it found its prior interpretation to be erroneous. Administrative agencies are "free, like courts, to correct a prior erroneous interpretation of the law * * * by modifying or overruling a past decision” (Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 519). Thus, the Zoning Board properly exercised its power to reverse its earlier erroneous decision.


It appears .that in June of 1956, Country Bidge Club, Inc., applied for !a special use permit (on property which it leased) for permission to conduct a country club with the usual <mask> uses and facilities incidental thereto. Pursuant to the provisions of the zoning ordinance, the Town Board referred this application to the planning board. On July 25, 1956, the planning board recommended the issuance of the' special use permit upon six conditions to be complied with. Generally, these conditions related to and called for certain buffer landscaping, the location and screening of the parking area, the road layout, connections to be made from habitable structures to the sanitary sewer system and from swimming and other pools to storm water drainage, and also for the preparation of plans relating to the foregoing as well as to the locations of existing and contemplated buildings, structures, play areas and general lighting; said plans were to be approved by the planning board. On September 8, 1956, after due notice and a public hearing thereon called pursuant to the provisions of said zoning ordinance, the Town Board issued the aforesaid permit subject to the aforesaid conditions recommended by the planning board and subject also to a further condition that the privilege of membership be extended to all persons who resided in the *107community. Thereafter and pursuant to said conditions, plans were submitted which were approved by the planning board ■subject to six additional requirements including drawings showing the same. Additional plans were then submitted and on August 5, 1957, the planning board again requested further plans which would set forth and show the proposed compliance with new and additional requirements then further imposed by said board.