ELGO, J. The plaintiffs, Robert L. Parker, Peter E. Rogness, and Randi M. Solomon, trustee for the Randi M. Solomon Revocable Trust, appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court denying their appeal from the decision of the defendant Zoning Commission of the Town of Washington (commission) to grant the applica- tion of the defendant 101 Wykeham Road, LLC (appli- cant), to modify a special permit previously approved by the commission in 2013 pursuant to a settlement agreement.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the application did not con- stitute an impermissible expansion of both a noncon- forming structure and a nonconforming use. The plain- tiffs further claim that the court ‘‘failed to require compliance with [the] special permit standards’’ con- tained in the Washington Zoning Regulations (regula- tions).2 We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.3 This appeal concerns the development of a 26.9 acre parcel of real property owned by the applicant and known as 101 Wykeham Road in Washington (prop- erty). The property is located in the ‘‘R-1 Farming and Residential’’ zoning district.4 Among the uses authorized by special permit in that zone is an ‘‘Inn or Tourist home.’’ Washington Zoning Regs., § 4.4.1. The regula- tions, however, provide no definition of the terms ‘‘inn’’ or ‘‘tourist home.’’ In May, 2008, an entity known as Wykeham Rise, LLC (Wykeham), the predecessor in title to the applicant, applied for a special permit to construct an ‘‘inn and associated appurtenances’’ on the property. Following a lengthy hearing over the course of several months, the commission, by a vote of three to two, denied that application.5 Wykeham appealed from that decision to the Superior Court, claiming that (1) the commission lacked a valid reason for its denial, and (2) the commis- sion’s decision must be reversed due to the improper participation of alternate members in its deliberations and the improper predetermination of the merits of the application by one regular member of the commission. While that appeal was pending before the Superior Court, Wykeham alternatively sought special permit approval to operate a school on the property,6 and it is undisputed that the commission granted such approval. Although the record before this court is voluminous and contains materials that reference ‘‘Wykeham Uni- versity,’’ it does not contain copies of any such special permit applications or the commission’s formal deci- sion to approve such a special permit. The record nonetheless indicates that Wykeham agreed, as a condi- tion to the settlement agreement at issue in this appeal, to surrender the special permit approval that it had obtained for a school once the settlement agree- ment was ratified. See footnote 7 of this opinion. In October, 2011, the Superior Court issued its memo- randum of decision on Wykeham’s appeal from the com- mission’s denial of its request for a special permit to construct an inn on the property. The court concluded that none of Wykeham’s claims constituted reversible error. At the same time, the court noted its concern about the conduct of the commission, stating in relevant part: ‘‘The court observes . . . that certain commission members engaged in a level of conduct that skirted the boundaries of what is appropriate for municipal public officials sitting on a commission. First, during the course of the five public hearings held on Wykeham’s application . . . Commissioner [Valerie] Friedman made observations and comments that might lead one to believe that the application was being predetermined and prejudiced in such a way that the principles of fundamental fairness during the proceedings were being undercut. . . . The court finds that . . . Com- missioner Friedman, as a sitting member of the commis- sion, created the appearance, in form, if not in sub- stance, of predetermination and, therefore, contradicted the spirit of the statutory mandate of Gen- eral Statutes § 8-11. The court further observes that the participation by [two] alternate commission members . . . in the deliberative process by way of comment or submission on why the application should be denied, was inappropriate.’’ The court concluded with the fol- lowing admonition: ‘‘The court . . . strongly advises that Chairman [David] Owen, along with all of the com- missioner members, should undertake some remedial training and orientation concerning their duties as municipal public officials sitting on boards and commis- sions, including their obligation to remain impartial and nonjudgmental during such proceedings, and to with- hold judgment until all of the evidence and arguments have been presented for their deliberation.’’ Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judi- cial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 11, 2011). Wykeham then filed a petition for certification, seek- ing appellate review of the propriety of that judgment, which this court granted. In addition to Wykeham and the commission, the parties to that appeal included three neighboring property owners—Eric A. Federer, Wendy R. Federer, and Teresa Rosen Peacocke. While that appeal was pending, the parties settled their differences and entered into an agreement dated January 9, 2013 (settlement agreement). That settle- ment agreement noted that Wykeham ‘‘desires to con- struct and operate an inn’’ on the property and then set forth sixteen ‘‘terms and conditions by and under which neither [the Federers] nor Peacocke would oppose Wykeham in its efforts to obtain [c]ommission approval [of] an [i]nn on the [p]roperty.’’7 At a special meeting held on January 7, 2013,8 the commission, by a vote of four to one, approved the settlement agree- ment ‘‘per the site development plan by Arthur H. How- land and Associates, dated July 8, 2011, revised to December 17, 2012, 32 sheets’’ (2012 plan). The commis- sion also incorporated by reference into its approval ‘‘[t]he architectural renderings [marked] ‘A’ and ‘B’ ’’9 and six conditions of approval that were contained in its previous special permit approval to operate a school on the property.10 Following the commission’s approval of the settle- ment agreement, a motion for approval was filed with the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (n), as the appeal of the commission’s 2008 decision to deny Wykeham’s special permit request remained pending.11 Through legal counsel, the plaintiffs in the present action—who were not parties to the settlement agreement or the proceeding before the Superior Court—opposed the settlement agreement.12 After hear- ing from all interested parties, the court concluded that the settlement agreement ‘‘reflects honest, good faith compromise on the part of all parties to this appeal.’’ Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commission, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2013 WL 951156, *1 (Conn. Super. February 5, 2013). The court further emphasized that ‘‘[t]he settlement reflects a substantially reduced proj- ect, which should be much more acceptable to the neighbors. The settlement includes the following: (1) the removal of some buildings which were part of the original proposal; (2) reduced parking; (3) reduced res- taurant; (4) a prohibition on amplified music; (5) closure of one means of access and egress; (6) limitation on the number of events which can be held; [and] (7) plant- ings to screen the activities of the project.’’ Id. Accord- ingly, the court approved the settlement agreement, thereby memorializing Wykeham’s ability to construct an inn on the property, as depicted on the 2012 plan.13 See footnote 7 of this opinion. The settlement agreement also contemplates modifi- cation of the 2012 plan. In this regard, the agreement requires that ‘‘[a]ny amendments to this [s]ettlement [a]greement must be consented to by all the parties herein or their heirs, successors or assigns.’’ The settle- ment agreement further provides that ‘‘[a]ll modifica- tions to the approved plans must be approved by the [commission] or its authorized agent prior to implemen- tation.’’ On March 22, 2018, the applicant, as successor in title to the property, filed an application for the ‘‘modifica- tion of [the] existing special permit’’ that had been approved by the commission at its January 7, 2013 spe- cial meeting (modification application). That applica- tion was accompanied by several documents, including a new site development plan prepared by Arthur H. Howland & Associates, P.C., dated December 2, 2016, revised to February 5, 2018 (2018 plan),14 a copy of the applicant’s February 8, 2018 application for a building permit and related documentation,15 and copies of both the settlement agreement and the commission’s January 7, 2013 approval thereof.16 In accordance with the instructions provided by the commission on its special permit application form, the application also included a written description of the proposed modification. In that correspondence, the applicant’s legal counsel stated in relevant part: ‘‘The [a]pplicant’s goal is to build the [i]nn that it is entitled to build as a result of the settlement agreement reached with the [commission] in January of 2013 and approved by the court on February 5, 2013. To do that, the [a]ppli- cant [is requesting] a modification to the [2012 plan] incorporated into the [s]ettlement [a]greement. This modification is in part necessary in order to comply with newer building code requirements for fire egress. It is also discretionary in part as the [a]pplicant wishes to add grading and stone walls in the rear of the main building. . . . It is noted that there is an inconsistency between the [2012 plan] footprint . . . which defines the footprint of the main building, and [r]enderings A & B, (incorporated into the [commission’s] approval of the [s]ettlement [a]greement). To wit, the footprint of the [r]enderings (to the extent that it is discernable) does not comply with the [s]ettlement [a]greement/ [2012 plan]. Understanding the limited purpose of the [r]enderings was merely to demonstrate the architec- tural style of the main building, the [s]ettlement [a]gree- ment/[2012 plan] was used for the footprint and the [r]enderings for the architectural [style; therefore, the] plans submitted substantially comply with both.’’ The commission held a public hearing on the modifi- cation application on April 17, and July 19 and 23, 2018, at which it received documentary and testimonial evi- dence.17 One contentious issue concerned the appli- cant’s proposal to permit individual ownership of guest room units at the inn, as multifamily housing was not permitted under the regulations. Another major issue with the 2018 plan was the proposed addition of a 2000 square foot ballroom and parking concerns related thereto. Some members of the public also opined that the 2018 plan constituted an expansion of the noncon- forming structure memorialized in the 2012 plan and approved as part of the settlement agreement. In response, Peacocke, who had opposed Wykeham’s 2008 special permit application and who was a party to the settlement agreement, stated at the public hearing: ‘‘I just [want] to remind members of the commission . . . that there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusionary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we’d have said so, and we didn’t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a compre- hensive agreement . . . .’’ The commission also was presented with evidence as to how the applicant’s proposal compared with the Mayflower Inn, which was located ‘‘right down the road’’ from the property and was ‘‘the only inn in [Wash- ington]’’ at that time. Commission members were reminded that, because the regulations do not define the term ‘‘inn,’’ the commission had ‘‘repeatedly said [that] it uses the Mayflower Inn . . . as a de facto model of what [constitutes] an inn . . . in Washing- ton.’’ Due to the similarity of the Mayflower Inn to the applicant’s proposal, Paul S. Szymanski, a civil engineer, testified that the Mayflower Inn provided ‘‘a wonderful basis for comparison,’’ and the commission was pre- sented with evidence as to how the applicant’s proposal compared with that existing inn.18 The commission deliberated the merits of the appli- cant’s modification request over the course of three nights on August 7, 27 and 28, 2018. At the conclusion of those deliberations, the commission, by a vote of three to two, approved the application to modify the existing special permit in accordance with the 2018 plan.19 The commission attached twenty-five detailed conditions to that approval.20 See General Statutes § 8- 2 (a) (special permits may be subject ‘‘to conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, conve- nience and property values’’); Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 594, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979) (§ 8-2 ‘‘expressly’’ provides that municipal ‘‘com- mission[s] [are] authorized to impose conditions as a prerequisite to certain uses of lands’’); St. Joseph’s High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. App. 570, 576, 170 A.3d 73 (2017) (‘‘in granting a special permit, the commission has the authority to place reasonable restrictions on the proposed use’’). Notably, the commission prohibited both the proposed ballroom and individual ownership of guest room units. See footnote 20 of this opinion. Although the commis- sion did not provide a collective statement of the basis of its decision,21 the motion it granted to approve the modification application concluded by stating: ‘‘The [c]ommission finds that all of the foregoing conditions must be met in order for the proposed use to be success- fully accommodated on the chosen site in accordance with the applicable [regulations]. Therefore, if a court should determine that any of the foregoing conditions are invalid or unlawful, this approval shall be null and void . . . .’’ The plaintiffs, all of whom are owners of property located within 100 feet of the applicant’s property,22 filed a timely appeal with the Superior Court, challeng- ing the propriety of the commission’s decision to grant the modification application. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the commission improperly authorized the expansion of both a nonconforming structure and a nonconforming use in contravention of the regulations. The court rejected that contention and further concluded that the commission ‘‘had substantial evidence to approve and modify the application and did so only after imposing certain conditions to protect the public health and safety. The court finds that the commission did not act arbitrarily or illegally . . . .’’ Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a petition with this court for certification to appeal pursuant to § 8-8 (o).23 We granted the plaintiffs’ petition, and this appeal followed. Before considering the claims advanced by the plain- tiffs in this appeal, we note certain well established principles. ‘‘[T]he function of a special permit is to allow a property owner to use his property in a manner expressly permitted under the zoning regulations, sub- ject to certain conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience, and surrounding property values. . . . The basic rationale for the special permit [is] . . . that while certain [specially permitted] land uses may be generally compatible with the uses permit- ted as of right in particular zoning districts, their nature is such that their precise location and mode of operation must be regulated because of the topography, traffic problems, neighboring uses, etc., of the site.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Joseph’s High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 176 Conn. App. 585–86. Judicial review of a commission’s decision to grant or deny a special permit must be mindful of ‘‘the significant discretion that a commission is afforded . . . . In reviewing a decision of a zoning [commission], a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which . . . [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning] commission must be upheld by the [Superior Court] if they are reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [commission]. . . . The question is not whether the [Superior Court] would have reached the same con- clusion . . . but whether the record before the [com- mission] supports the decision reached. . . . If [the Superior Court] finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning [commission’s] findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the [commission]. . . . If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning commission’s stated rationale, the reviewing court . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the commission. . . . The [commission’s] decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that sup- ports any one of the reasons given. . . . Moreover, [s]ubstantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . ‘‘[T]he substantial evidence standard is highly defer- ential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review. . . . In light of the significant amount of deference that the substantial evidence standard affords a commis- sion, the court has described it as an important limita- tion on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . [that] provide[s] a more restrictive standard of review than standards embody- ing review of weight of the evidence or clearly errone- ous action. . . . [O]n appeal, judicial review [of a com- mission’s denial of a special permit application] is confined to the question of whether the commission abused its discretion in finding that an applicant failed to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of applicable zoning regulations. When there is evidence in the record to substantiate the commission’s deter- mination, the determination must stand.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commis- sion, 200 Conn. App. 307, 318–20, 240 A.3d 709, cert. granted, 335 Conn. 978, 241 A.3d 131 (2020). At the same time, when a question of law is presented, such as the proper interpretation of a zoning regulation, our review is plenary. See, e.g., Reardon v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 311 Conn. 356, 364, 87 A.3d 1070 (2014); Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 302 Conn. 535, 547, 29 A.3d 898 (2011). This appeal concerns the alleged expansion of a ‘‘non- conforming use,’’ a term of art with both general and specific meaning. In Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 Conn. App. 796, 818 A.2d 72 (2003), this court, citing a noted treatise on land use in this state, observed that, ‘‘[t]he term nonconforming uses is often used without consideration as to what aspect of the use of property is nonconforming, and in determining whether an activity is an expansion or change of a nonconforming use, the nature of the nonconformity is important.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 806. The court then detailed four distinct types of nonconfor- mity: ‘‘(1) nonconforming use—the use of the land or structure on it is nonconforming (e.g., commercial use in a residential zone); (2) a nonconforming lot—the lot is undersized, irregularly shaped, has inadequate width or depth or inadequate frontage; (3) nonconforming building or structure—the structure does not meet the minimum or maximum size requirements, floor area ratio, height or bulk requirements of the existing zoning regulations; (4) nonconformity as to location of struc- ture, i.e., it does not conform with one or more of the setback requirements.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. App. 657, 690 n.20, 111 A.3d 473 (2015). In the present case, the first and fourth types of nonconformity are implicated, as the plaintiffs claim that the commission improperly approved the expan- sion of both a nonconforming structure and a noncon- forming use on the property. We address each claim in turn. I We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the court improperly concluded that the applicant’s proposal did not constitute an impermissible expansion of a noncon- forming structure. To resolve that claim, we must deter- mine, as a threshold matter, whether the principles that govern nonconforming uses are applicable under the unique facts and circumstances of this case.24 That inquiry entails consideration of not only the undisputed fact that the alleged nonconformity was the direct result of the settlement agreement ratified by the Superior Court in 2013 but, also, the undisputed fact that, at all relevant times, no structure proposed by the applicant existed on the property, nor had construction of any such structure commenced. A ‘‘A nonconformity is a use or structure prohibited by the zoning regulations [that] is permitted because of its existence at the time that the regulations [were] adopted.’’ Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 710, 535 A.2d 799 (1988). ‘‘Where a noncon- formity exists, it is a vested right which adheres to the land itself. . . . A vested right . . . to continue the nonconforming use is in the land . . . . [T]he right to a nonconforming use is a property right and . . . any provision of a statute or ordinance which takes away that right in an unreasonable manner, or in a manner not grounded on the public welfare, is invalid. A lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483–84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). As this court has noted, ‘‘[o]ur General Statutes recognize and protect this bedrock principle.’’ Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn. App. 684; see General Statutes § 8-2 (a) (prohibiting municipality from amortizing or eliminating nonconformities through enactment or amendment of zoning regula- tions); General Statutes § 8-13a (a) (providing statutory protection to certain nonconforming ‘‘building[s] or other structure[s]’’); General Statutes § 8-26a (b) (3) (providing that change in subdivision or zoning regula- tions, or boundaries of districts, ‘‘shall not alter or affect a nonconforming use or structure as provided in [§] 8-2’’). Although the right to continue a nonconforming use is statutorily protected, it is equally well established that, absent extraordinary circumstances warranting variance of the zoning regulations by a municipal zoning board of appeals,25 such nonconformity cannot be expanded or enlarged. As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘nonconforming uses should be abolished or reduced to conformity as quickly as the fair interest of the parties will permit—[i]n no case should they be allowed to increase.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 205 Conn. 710; see also Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221, 243, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995) (‘‘a nonconforming structure cannot be increased in size in violation of zoning ordinances’’); Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corp., 173 Conn. 175, 181, 377 A.2d 280 (1977) (noting ‘‘the indisputable goal of zoning to reduce nonconforming to conforming uses with all the speed justice will tolerate’’); Kleinsmith v. Plan- ning & Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 303, 314, 254 A.2d 486 (1968) (‘‘[t]he advantages which the owners of nonconforming property acquire by the enactment of a zoning ordinance are not to be subsequently aug- mented except as permitted by the ordinance’’); Guil- ford v. Landon, 146 Conn. 178, 182, 148 A.2d 551 (1959) (‘‘the accepted policy of zoning . . . is to prevent the extension of nonconforming uses’’); Planning & Zon- ing Commission v. Craft, 12 Conn. App. 90, 96, 529 A.2d 1328 (‘‘[z]oning regulations in general seek the elimination of nonconforming uses, not their creation or enlargement’’), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 804, 531 A.2d 937 (1987). Those principles are memorialized in the regulations at issue here, which provide in relevant part that ‘‘[i]t is . . . the intent of these regulations that the nonconforming aspects of [any nonconforming] lots and structures shall not be enlarged, expanded, or extended . . . . A nonconforming use of a structure or lot shall not be extended, expanded, or enlarged . . . .’’26 Washington Zoning Regs., § 17.1. Under the traditional analysis applicable to noncon- forming uses, ‘‘[f]or a use to be considered nonconform- ing . . . [it] must possess two characteristics. First, it must be lawful and second, it must be in existence at the time that the zoning regulation making the use nonconforming was enacted.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, 201 Conn. 700, 712, 519 A.2d 49 (1986); see also Washington Zoning Regs., § 17.4 (permitting ‘‘a lawfully constructed, but currently nonconforming, structure’’ to be ‘‘continued so long as it remains otherwise lawful’’); Washington Zoning Regs., § 17.1 (intent of nonconforming use regu- lations is to permit nonconforming structures that existed ‘‘before the [r]egulations as currently amended were passed’’ to ‘‘continue until they are removed’’). The proposed structure in question here, known as the ‘‘main building,’’ possesses neither characteristic. A ‘‘lawful’’ use is one that complied with both ‘‘state law’’ and all zoning regulations that were in effect when the use commenced. Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 712. At all relevant times, the applicable regulation governing a ‘‘Tourist Home or Inn’’ provided in relevant part that ‘‘the minimum setback of any structure . . . shall be . . . [fifty] feet from any lot line.’’27 Washington Zoning Regs., § 13.9.C. The footprint28 of the main building, as depicted on the 2012 plan that was incorporated by reference into the settlement agreement, was, at its closest point, to be located thirty-one feet from the property line. That loca- tion thus resulted in a nineteen foot intrusion into the setback area. Accordingly, the main building depicted on the 2012 plan cannot be deemed a lawful structure, as it does not comply with the setback requirements of the regulations. See Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 712. In addition, to constitute a nonconforming structure under established case law, the main building had to ‘‘be in existence at the time that the zoning regulation making the use nonconforming was enacted.’’ (Empha- sis in original.) Id. The precedent of our Supreme Court instructs that ‘‘[t]o be a nonconforming use the use must be actual. It is not enough that it be a contemplated use [or] that the property was bought for the particular use. The property must be so utilized as to be irrevoca- bly committed to that use.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 228 Conn. 785, 789, 639 A.2d 519 (1994); see also Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 399, 426 A.2d 784 (1980) (explaining that, ‘‘to be irrevocably commit- ted to a particular use, there must have been a signifi- cant amount of preliminary or preparatory work done on the property prior to the enactment of the zoning regulations which unequivocally indicates that the prop- erty was going to be used for that particular purpose’’); Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 176 Conn. 482–83 (‘‘[t]he lot and building in question’’ qual- ified as legally protected nonconforming uses because they were in existence prior to enactment of zoning regulations and had not ‘‘changed in size or shape’’); Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 197, 215 A.2d 112 (1965) (because tract of land ‘‘was not ‘irrevocably com- mitted’ to development,’’ it ‘‘was not a nonconforming use’’); MacKenzie v. Town Planning & Zoning Com- mission, 149 Conn. 678, 684, 183 A.2d 619 (1962) (‘‘a contemplated use cannot constitute an actual use’’); Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 308, 170 A.2d 267 (1961) (‘‘[a] proposed use cannot constitute an existing nonconforming use’’); Fairlawns Cemetery Assn., Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 138 Conn. 434, 444, 86 A.2d 74 (1952) (To establish a nonconforming use, ‘‘[i]t is not enough that it be a contemplated use, even though plans for that have been put on paper. . . . It is not enough that the property was bought for the particular pur- pose.’’ (Citations omitted.)); DeFelice v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 130 Conn. 156, 161, 32 A.2d 635 (1943) (‘‘[a]ctual use as distinguished from merely contem- plated use’’ is required). Although the main building was a contemplated use of the property, and its footprint was memorialized in the 2012 plan, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the property was irrevocably committed to that use. There is no evidence that construction of that structure ever commenced, nor has any party so argued. The main building was merely contemplated but did not actually exist. As a result, it does not satisfy the com- mon-law standard for a nonconforming use. That determination does not end our inquiry, as that common-law standard evolved in cases concerning non- conforming uses that ‘‘antedate the enactment of zon- ing’’ regulations. Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 176 Conn. 482; see also Pleasant View Farms Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 265, 271–73, 588 A.2d 1372 (1991); Helicopter Associates, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 201 Conn. 711; Poneleit v. Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 419–20, 106 A.2d 479 (1954); Lane v. Cashman, 179 Conn. App. 394, 438–39, 180 A.3d 13 (2018); Verrillo v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 155 Conn. App. 683–87. Given that context, the present case is fundamentally distinct, in that it origi- nates not from a preexisting use on the property but, rather, a settlement agreement regarding a proposed use. That crucial distinction requires us to more care- fully consider the precise nature of the use at issue in this appeal. As one treatise notes, a variety of uses of land are entitled to protection under our law, including special permit uses, nonconforming uses, and ‘‘[a]uthorized ille- gal uses . . . allowed by variance granted by the zon- ing board of appeals.’’ R. Fuller, 9B Connecticut Prac- tice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (4th Ed. 2015) § 52:1, p. 219. The use at issue here—the operation of an inn on the property with a main building partially inside the setback area—technically is not the proper subject of a special permit, as the application did not strictly comply with the setback requirements of § 13.9 of the regulations. It also is not an illegal use authorized by a variance issued by the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Washington. Rather, the use here is something altogether different and is perhaps best described as a lawful use resulting from the approval of a settlement agreement by both the municipal zoning commission and the Superior Court. ‘‘[S]ettlement of disputes . . . is to be encouraged as sound public policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Yale University v. Out of the Box, LLC, 118 Conn. App. 800, 809 n.7, 990 A.2d 869 (2010). In the context of a municipal land use agency’s settlement of a pending appeal, there exists a ‘‘powerful interest in the promo- tion of settlement of litigation by agreement of the par- ties.’’ Sendak v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 7 Conn. App. 238, 242, 508 A.2d 781 (1986). Moreover, the statutory requirement that any settlement involving a municipal land use agency must be approved by the Superior Court following a hearing; see footnote 11 of this opinion; ‘‘provides a forum for the presentation of any challenges to a settlement, including any allegations of bad faith, collusion or other improper conduct by the parties to the settlement,’’ and ‘‘serves to protect the public interest by guarding against any attempt on the part of the settling parties to evade judicial review and scrutiny by potentially aggrieved landowners.’’ Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Com- mission, 259 Conn. 607, 616, 793 A.2d 215 (2002); see also Willimantic Car Wash, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 247 Conn. 732, 742 n.16, 724 A.2d 1108 (1999) (legislative history of § 8-8 (n) ‘‘indicates that the requirement of court approval was designed to guard against surreptitious dealing between zoning boards and applicants, to avoid frivolous appeals initiated for ‘leverage,’ and to ensure that settlements are fair’’). That statutory requirement ‘‘recognizes . . . the legitimacy of settlement of zoning cases . . . .’’ Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 617. As was the case in Brookridge District Assn., the settlement agreement in the present case resolved a pending appeal involving the commission and an appli- cant that had been denied an application for a special permit. See Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Zoning Commis- sion, supra, 2013 WL 951156. The settlement agreement was formally approved by the commission at a special meeting held on January 7, 2013, and thereafter was approved by the Superior Court following a hearing conducted in accordance with § 8-8 (n). Because all statutory requirements were followed and the settle- ment agreement was ratified by both the commission and the Superior Court, we agree with the plaintiffs that the proposed main building, as depicted in the 2012 plan, constitutes a lawful use of the property.29 Although lawful, the main building does not comply with the setback requirements for structures con- structed on property that is used as an inn. At all rele- vant times, § 13.9.C of the regulations required a fifty foot setback ‘‘from any lot line.’’30 The regulations define a ‘‘nonconforming building’’ as ‘‘[a] building, which does not conform to all the applicable provisions of these [r]egulations.’’ Washington Zoning Regs., § 21.1.49. Because it does not comply with the lot line setback requirements of § 13.9.C of the regulations, the main building is nonconforming under the regulations. We therefore conclude that the main building depicted in the 2012 plan and incorporated into the settlement agreement constitutes a lawful, albeit nonconforming, structure as a result of the approval of the settlement agreement by the Superior Court. The principles that govern nonconforming uses in this state thus apply to such lawful nonconforming structures. Like any non- conforming structure, the main building depicted in the 2012 plan cannot be expanded or enlarged within the setback area in the absence of a variance from the Zoning Board of Appeals. B The question, then, is whether the commission improp- erly authorized the expansion of that nonconforming structure when it approved the modification application in 2018. In its memorandum of decision, the Superior Court concluded that the commission properly deter- mined that the modification application did not consti- tute an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming structure. Our review of that determination is guided by the substantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 218 Conn. 324, 329–30, 589 A.2d 351 (1991); Woodbury Donuts, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 139 Conn. App. 748, 760 n.11, 57 A.3d 810 (2012). The regulations prohibit the expansion of noncon- forming structures.31 To determine whether the com- mission improperly approved the expansion of the non- conforming main building within the setback area, we must determine, as a preliminary matter, the extent of the nonconformity that was memorialized in the 2013 settlement agreement. ‘‘A settlement agreement . . . is a contract among the parties.’’ Ackerman v. Sobol Family Partnership, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 532, 4 A.3d 288 (2010). At its essence, a settlement agreement that resolves a pending zoning appeal in accordance with § 8-8 (n) is a stipulated judg- ment, as it is ‘‘a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and . . . recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . [and] is binding to the same degree as a judgment obtained through litigation . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Roe, 246 Conn. 652, 664–65 n.22, 717 A.2d 706 (1998). We thus interpret the settlement agreement before us ‘‘according to general principles governing the con- struction of contracts. . . . [T]he language used [in a contract] must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unam- biguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . [Additionally], in construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation . . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Awdziewicz v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 122, 129–30, 115 A.3d 1084 (2015). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he interpretation of the intention of the parties to the settlement agreement is a question of fact . . . and we review such a determination by an administrative agency to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 51, 66–67, 591 A.2d 1231 (1991). The settlement agreement consists of five compo- nents: (1) the settlement agreement document itself, which contains sixteen conditions; see footnote 7 of this opinion; (2) the commission’s January 7, 2013 approval of the settlement agreement;32 (3) the 2012 plan, which was incorporated by reference into both the settlement agreement document and the commission’s motion to approve the settlement agreement; (4) six additional conditions that the commission attached to its approval; see footnote 10 of this opinion; and (5) the two architectural renderings. See footnote 9 of this opinion. Those materials contain little in the way of dimen- sional limitation on the proposed main building. The 2012 plan is pivotal in that regard, as it was incorporated by reference into both the settlement agreement and the commission’s approval. The 2012 plan circum- scribes the parameters of the footprint of the main building. It is undisputed that the main building depicted in the 2018 plan sat on the same footprint as it did in the 2012 plan and did not intrude farther into the setback area, and the commission was presented with evidence to that effect.33 Accordingly, there was no horizontal expansion of that lawful nonconforming structure, nor has any party so claimed. Rather, the plaintiffs claim that the commission improp- erly approved a vertical expansion of the nonconform- ing main building. Whether the vertical extension of an existing footprint constitutes an impermissible expan- sion of a nonconformity depends on the particular lan- guage employed in the applicable zoning regulations. See E & F Associates, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 320 Conn. 9, 12 n.3, 127 A.3d 986 (2015) (noting that ‘‘variances were required because the vertical expan- sion of the building within the applicable setbacks con- stituted a prohibited expansion of the nonconforming use under the [Fairfield] zoning regulations’’); Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 811 (concluding that vertical expansion of nonconforming structure through addition of second story caused ‘‘a substantial increase in the nonconformity’’ in contra- vention of Branford zoning regulations); Doyen v. Zon- ing Board of Appeals, 67 Conn. App. 597, 602, 612, 789 A.2d 478 (vertical expansion of nonconforming struc- ture permitted under Essex zoning regulations), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 901, 793 A.2d 1088 (2002). The regulations here proscribe the vertical expansion of nonconforming structures.34 The settlement agree- ment, however, contains no restriction on the height of the main building. Notably, the 2012 plan does not specify the height or volume of that building, and nei- ther the conditions included in the settlement agree- ment document nor the conditions imposed by the commission contain any such dimensions or height restrictions.35 Although no height limitation is specified anywhere in the settlement agreement materials, the plaintiffs submit that such a limitation may be found in two other materials, namely, Wykeham’s proposed ‘‘university’’ plans from a previous special permit application (school plans) and a set of plans that were submitted to the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection in December, 2012, as part of an application for a general permit to discharge from subsurface sewage disposal systems on the property (discharge permit plans).36 It nonetheless remains that the commission did not refer- ence the school plans or the discharge permit plans in either its motion to approve the settlement agreement or the conditions attached to its approval. Had the com- mission wanted to incorporate those plans into its approval of the settlement agreement, it certainly knew how to do so, as it had done with both the 2012 plan and the two architectural renderings. See Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 579, 119 A.3d 570 (2015). In this regard, we note that the settlement agreement document that was before the commission described the 2012 plan as the ‘‘complete site plan’’ for the proposed inn. Yet, the commission chose to incorporate only ‘‘the [2012 plan], the [two] architec- tural renderings . . . and the [six] conditions of approval’’ into its approval of the settlement agreement. Put simply, the school plans and the discharge permit plans are not part of the settlement agreement that was approved by the commission and the Superior Court. Although the settlement agreement did incorporate two architectural renderings, those ‘‘representative’’ renderings do not contain any dimensions or numerical specifications. Moreover, the transcript of the January 7, 2013 special meeting indicates that those renderings were offered merely for illustrative purposes regarding the design of the main building. See footnote 9 of this opinion. There is no indication whatsoever in the record before us that the commission considered those render- ings as accurate depictions of the height of the proposed main building; indeed, the height of the main building never was discussed at the commission’s January 7, 2013 special meeting. At the public hearing held on the modification appli- cation five years later, Reese Owens, an architect, opined that the height of the main building that was approved as part of the settlement agreement could be extrapolated from a comparison of the architectural renderings and the discharge permit plans.37 Although that may be true, there is no indication in the record before us that commission members in 2013 ever made that comparison or intended to impose a height restric- tion on the main building stemming therefrom. We reit- erate that the height of the main building was a topic never broached at the January 7, 2013 special meeting. Moreover, the commission heard testimony at the 2018 public hearing from Szymanski, a civil engineer who (1) was involved in the drafting of both the 2012 and 2018 plans, (2) had participated in the 2013 special meeting, and (3) offered the architectural renderings in response to a question from the commission’s admin- istrative assistant as to the design of the main building. Szymanski unequivocally stated at the 2018 public hear- ing that the architectural renderings were provided sim- ply to illustrate ‘‘the architectural style’’ of the main building. The commission, as the sole arbiter of credibil- ity, was entitled to credit that testimony.38 See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 443, 941 A.2d 868 (2008). The commissioners also were presented with uncon- troverted evidence that the settlement agreement was a compromise between the parties intended to resolve the pending appeal of the denial of Wykeham’s special permit application, to which the commission was a party. In addition, the commission heard testimony from Peacocke, who also was a party to the settlement agreement. Peacocke stated: ‘‘I just [want] to remind members of the commission . . . that there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusion- ary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we’d have said so, and we didn’t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a comprehensive agreement . . . .’’ As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘[w]e will not insert limitations into a contract when the parties did not do so themselves. . . . This is especially so when, as here, the agreement is between sophisticated . . . parties represented by counsel. . . . In these cir- cumstances, we presume the parties used definitive language to describe their agreement.’’ (Citations omit- ted.) Salce v. Wolczek, 314 Conn. 675, 690–91, 104 A.3d 694 (2014); see also Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 59, 34 A. 765 (1895) (‘‘[w]e assume no right to add a new term to a contract’’). Those maxims apply here, as the settlement agreement was crafted by multiple attorneys and subjected to scrutiny at hearings before both the municipal zoning commission and the Superior Court. That settlement agreement contains no height limita- tion on the main building, and the record does not reveal an intent on the part of the commission to impose such a restriction in 2013. There is substantial evidence from which the commission, in approving the modifica- tion application in 2018, reasonably could conclude that no height restriction was intended to be included in the settlement agreement. We therefore reject the plaintiffs’ claim that the commission improperly approved the vertical expansion of a nonconforming structure. For those same reasons, the plaintiffs’ claim that the commission improperly approved an expansion of the floor area or volume of the main building is unavailing. Significantly, no floor plans were included in the settle- ment agreement. Moreover, no floor plans were pre- sented to the commission in its review of the settlement agreement. The January 7, 2013 transcript indicates that the floor area and volume of the main building were never discussed at the special meeting. The settlement agreement likewise does not contain a restriction as to the floor area or volume of the main building. It is noteworthy that the settlement agreement does specifically address the maximum floor area of a different structure proposed on the property. Paragraph five of the settlement agreement states in relevant part: ‘‘The Inn’s spa and fitness center will be limited to the area within the building that is labeled ‘Fitness Building’ on the Site Plan and cannot exceed floor area totaling more than 11,400 square feet SAVE THAT a single exer- cise room no larger than 3,800 square feet and con- taining only exercise equipment may be located within the ‘Main Building,’ labeled as such as depicted on the Site Plan. If the single exercise room is located in the Main Building, the size of the Fitness Building would then be reduced by the same amount so that the com- bined floor area devoted to spa and fitness facilities in the Fitness Building and Main Building cannot exceed 11,400 square feet in total.’’ That restriction demon- strates that the parties to the settlement agreement were mindful of floor area considerations and knew how to incorporate such restrictions into that contract. They nevertheless did not include a floor area limitation for the main building in the settlement agreement, and we decline to insert such a limitation into that contract now. See, e.g., Salce v. Wolczek, supra, 314 Conn. 690–91 (‘‘[w]e will not insert limitations into a contract when the parties did not do so themselves’’); R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61, 279 n.104, 156 A.3d 539 (2017) (‘‘if the parties had intended that the [contract] would provide defense coverage . . . they easily could have said so expressly’’), aff’d, 333 Conn. 343, 216 A.3d 629 (2019). We also note that all three commissioners who voted to approve the modification application in 2018 were members of the commission when it approved the 2013 settlement agreement. See footnote 19 of this opinion. Those commission members were entitled to rely on their personal knowledge of the settlement agreement and the January 7, 2013 special meeting. See, e.g., Frito- Lay, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 206 Conn. 554, 570, 538 A.2d 1039 (1988) (‘‘commission members may legitimately utilize their personal knowledge in reaching a decision’’); Burnham v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 189 Conn. 261, 267, 455 A.2d 339 (1983) (‘‘members of [a zoning commission] are entitled to take into consideration whatever knowledge they acquire by personal observation’’); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 558, 562, 192 A.2d 40 (1963) (‘‘[o]bviously, the members of the board had personal knowledge of the situation, and they were entitled to take that knowledge into consideration’’). One of those members, Nicholas N. Solley, voted against the approval of the settlement agreement in 2013. During delibera- tions on the 2018 modification application, another member who was not on the commission in 2013 stated to Solley, ‘‘You were there [in 2013] . . . and I would like to hear . . . what you were thinking’’ at that time. In response, Solley noted that, in considering the settle- ment agreement in 2013, the commission ‘‘didn’t even deliberate over . . . any elevations or any . . . floor plans’’ and stated that the commission ‘‘never approved specific floor plans.’’39 Solley also stated that, for pur- poses of comparing the 2018 plan to the settlement agreement, ‘‘we simply have no baseline from which to, other than [the 2012] plan, from which to draw a comparison . . . .’’ Commissioner David Werkhoven, who also was a member of the commission in 2013, similarly stated that the commission ‘‘never discussed volume requirements’’ during the special meeting to approve the settlement agreement. Werkhoven further noted that a ‘‘floor plan shows you rooms and how they’re divided . . . . We didn’t . . . get any of that. . . . We didn’t talk about that. . . . We talked about the general outline of the [main] building. . . . We didn’t say how they could use it or how they couldn’t use it.’’ In voting to approve the modification applica- tion, those commissioners were free to rely on their personal knowledge of the 2013 settlement agreement proceeding. On our review of the record, we conclude that sub- stantial evidence exists from which the commission could conclude that no floor area or volume restrictions were included in the settlement agreement. The Supe- rior Court thus properly determined that the commis- sion did not authorize an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming structure when it approved the modifi- cation application. II The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly concluded that the applicant’s proposal did not consti- tute an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to that claim. Subsequent to the commission’s approval of the settlement agreement, the regulations were amended to require at least 500 feet of frontage ‘‘on a state high- way’’ for any ‘‘Tourist Home or Inn’’; see Washington Zoning Regs., § 13.9.B; which the property here conced- edly lacks. As a result, the operation of an inn on the property is a nonconforming use. Although that noncon- forming use is entitled to protection under state law; see General Statutes §§ 8-2 (a) and 8-26a; it cannot be expanded under established precedent and §§ 17.1 and 17.3.A of the regulations. See part I A of this opinion. A On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the commis- sion, in granting the modification application, improp- erly expanded the scope of that nonconforming use. They argue that only those <mask> uses specifically mentioned in the settlement agreement are permitted on the property. See footnote 7 of this opinion. The commission counters that the settlement agreement neither explicitly nor implicitly limited the scope of permissible accessory uses. We agree with the commis- sion. The regulations in the present case define an ‘‘acces- sory use’’ as ‘‘[a] use customarily incidental and subordi- nate to a main use and located on the same lot with such main use.’’ Washington Zoning Regs., § 21.1.7; see also O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 421 n.1, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995) (‘‘[a]ccessory uses are, by definition, uses located on the same lot, and must be subordinate and customarily incidental to, the principal use’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The regulations do not con- tain an explicit list of permitted accessory uses for inns in Washington. At the same time, the regulations define a ‘‘lot’’ in relevant part as a ‘‘parcel of land occupied or capable of being occupied by one principal building and the accessory buildings or uses customarily inci- dental to it . . . .’’ Washington Zoning Regs., § 21.1.38. The parties agree that accessory uses are permitted on a lot used principally as an inn. They disagree about the extent to which the settlement agreement here limits accessory uses on the property. As we have noted, the proper construction of a settle- ment agreement is governed by principles of contract interpretation. See part I B 1 of this opinion. ‘‘A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . In contrast, a con- tract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the con- tract is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santos v. Massad-Zion Motor Sales Co., 160 Conn. App. 12, 18, 123 A.3d 883, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 959, 125 A.3d 1013 (2015). The settlement agreement here lacks any language addressing accessory uses generally or indicating that unspecified accessory uses are prohibited on the prop- erty. At the same time, the settlement agreement does contain explicit limitations on three accessory uses, namely, the proposed restaurant,40 the proposed spa and fitness center,41 and tented events held on the prop- erty.42 No other accessory uses are specified in that agreement. Because the settlement agreement is sus- ceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation as to the scope of permitted accessory uses, we agree with the commission that the settlement agreement is ambiguous in that regard. ‘‘When a contract is ambiguous the [finder of fact] must consider extrinsic evidence and make factual find- ings as to the parties’ intent.’’ Chiulli v. Chiulli, Supe- rior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV- XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 8, 2014) (reprinted at 161 Conn. App. 639, 650, 127 A.3d 1147), aff’d, 161 Conn. App. 638, 127 A.3d 1146 (2015). ‘‘The interpretation of the intention of the parties to the settlement agreement is a question of fact . . . and we review such a determination by an administrative agency to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 219 Conn. 66–67. The record before us contains evidence to substanti- ate a finding that the parties did not intend to restrict accessory uses on the property to only those addressed in the settlement agreement. Although the record indi- cates that the parties deliberately incorporated specific plans into that agreement, such as the 2012 plan and the architectural renderings, they did not include any floor plans depicting the uses contemplated for the interior areas of the main building.43 The transcript of the January 7, 2013 special meeting contains no discus- sion of the scope of accessory uses on the property, and the main building in particular, nor were any floor plans presented at that hearing. In addition, the commis- sion heard testimony during the public hearing on the modification application from Peacocke, who was a party to the settlement agreement. Peacocke empha- sized that ‘‘there were four attorneys who negotiated and drafted the [settlement agreement]. If we had intended to create an exclusionary agreement itemizing all and only those matters, we’d have said so, and we didn’t. . . . [W]e . . . never undertook to create a comprehensive agreement . . . .’’ The commission was entitled to credit that testimony by a party to the settlement agreement. See, e.g., Gerlt v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 290 Conn. 313, 322, 963 A.2d 31 (2009) (assessing credibility of witnesses is sole prov- ince of zoning commission); see also Landry v. Spitz, 102 Conn. App. 34, 49 n.9, 925 A.2d 334 (2007) (‘‘[t]his court will not revisit credibility determinations’’ in case regarding interpretation of settlement agreement). The substantial evidence standard ‘‘is highly deferen- tial and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palomba- Bourke v. Commissioner of Social Services, 312 Conn. 196, 202, 92 A.3d 932 (2014). On our review of the whole record, we conclude that substantial evidence exists to support a finding that the parties to the settlement agreement did not intend to restrict accessory uses on the property to only those specifically mentioned therein. B We turn next to the question of whether the uses at issue constitute permissible accessory uses. On appeal, the plaintiffs maintain that the inclusion of a bar, a ‘‘prefunction’’ meeting area, and a ‘‘meeting room/ library’’ in the 2018 plan approved by the commission are not permitted accessory uses for inns in Washing- ton.44 We do not agree. ‘‘[I]n the land use context, the term ‘accessory use’ traditionally connotes a relationship with the primary use.’’ Morgenbesser v. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecti- cut, 276 Conn. 825, 831, 888 A.2d 1078 (2006). As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[a]n accessory use is determined specifically by reference to the primary use of the property to which it is incidental.’’ Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 287 Conn. 746, 767, 950 A.2d 494 (2008). ‘‘[An] accessory use [is] a use which is customary in the case of a permitted use and incidental to it. . . . An accessory use under a zoning law is a use which is dependent on or pertains to the principal or main use. . . . The word incidental as employed in a definition of accessory use incorporates two concepts. It means that the use must not be the primary use of the property but rather one which is subordinate and minor in significance. . . . But inci- dental, when used to define an accessory use, must also incorporate the concept of reasonable relationship with the primary use. It is not enough that the use be subordi- nate; it must also be attendant or concomitant. To ignore this latter aspect of incidental would be to permit any use which is not primary, no matter how unrelated it is to the primary use. . . . In examining the use in question, it is not enough to determine that it is inciden- tal in the two meanings of that word as discussed [pre- viously]. The use must be further scrutinized to deter- mine whether it has commonly, habitually and by long practice been established as reasonably associated with the primary use. . . . In situations where there is no . . . specific provision in the ordinance, the question is the extent to which the principal use as a matter of custom . . . carries with it an incidental use so that as a matter of law, in the absence of a complete prohibi- tion of the claimed incidental use in the ordinance, it will be deemed that the legislative intent was to include it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 753–54. ‘‘[W]hether a particular use qualifies as an accessory use is ordinarily a question of fact for the zoning author- ity, to be determined by it with a liberal discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clifford v. Plan- ning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434, 451, 908 A.2d 1049 (2006). On appeal, a zoning commission’s determination ‘‘is subject to a very narrow, deferential scope of review’’; id.; and must be sustained if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. Id., 452; see also Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 287 Conn. 756. The primary use of the property here is an inn. Although the regulations do not define the term ‘‘inn,’’ the evidence in the record before us indicates that the commission had used the Mayflower Inn, which, at all relevant times, was the only existing inn in town, ‘‘as a de facto model of what [the term] inn means in Wash- ington.’’ The record includes uncontroverted evidence that the Mayflower Inn featured a bar, two libraries, and ‘‘six separate’’ meeting areas.45 The record also contains evidence that ‘‘all’’ of the accessory uses proposed by the applicant ‘‘are typical of what [i]nns do’’ and that the proposed uses in question were of ‘‘a smaller scale than what is currently offered [and] what has been offered at [the Mayflower Inn] for decades.’’ On that evidence, the commission reasonably could find that the three uses in question had commonly, habitually, and by long practice been established as reasonably associated with the primary use of an inn in Washington. See Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 287 Conn. 754. The plaintiffs further claim that the court misapplied the precedent of our Supreme Court in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 218 Conn. 324. We disagree. In Zachs, the court explained that, ‘‘[i]n deciding whether [a] current activity is within the scope of a nonconforming use consideration should be given to three factors: (1) the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the original use; (2) any differences in the character, nature and kind of use involved; and (3) any substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted on the property.’’ Id., 332. Here, the original use memorialized in the settlement agree- ment and the use approved by the granting of the modifi- cation application are one and the same: an inn on the property with accessory uses typical of inns in Wash- ington. Indeed, the commission required, as the very first condition attached to its 2018 approval, that ‘‘[t]his approval remains subject to all of the conditions and limitations set forth in the settlement agreement approved by the commission on January 7, 2013, together with the conditions of approval that were incorporated into the commission’s motion for approval of the settle- ment agreement.’’ (Emphasis added.) Moreover, in approving the modification application, the commission imposed additional, more restrictive limitations on the use of the property.46 Last, from the evidence adduced at the public hearing, the commission reasonably could find that the use of the property proposed in the modifi- cation application would not result in a substantial dif- ference in effect on the surrounding neighborhood. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there is evidence in the record to substantiate a finding that the proposed uses in question were within the scope of the lawful nonconforming use memorialized in the settle- ment agreement. The commission’s determination that those uses constituted permissible accessory uses, therefore, was proper. III As a final matter, the plaintiffs claim that the court ‘‘failed to require compliance with [the] special permit standards’’ contained in the regulations. We do not agree.


The tenant removed, and replaced with substitutes, a series of wall cabinets in the kitchen which were so physically annexed and affixed as to have long been <mask> to and part and parcel of the realty. Besides installing metallic wall-covering material in the living room and bedroom, the tenant annexed to the freehold for use in connection with it, so that they cannot be removed without injury to the freehold, extensive and substantially imbedded ceiling and wall reconstructions and lighting arrangements.


As to the other appellants, the evidence of combination is overwhelming. The testimony of Hunter, as to the declaration of Griffeth, that he was afraid the respondent would return before the day of sale, and get the proceedings stayed, receives strong and ample confirmation from Griffeth’s whole subsequent conduct, and from all the circumstances in the case. It is the first glimmering we discover of the spirit and object with which the proceedings were conducted ; and makes him an <mask> before the fact, to all the subsequent acts of violence and oppression. It is followed up by an abandonment of all official discretion; and an entire submission to the plaintiffs in the execution. Instead of acting as the minister of the law, and guarding its precess against misapplication and abuse, he became the passive instrument of a party in the accomplishment of his illegal purposes. It was contended upon the argument, that he was not bound to incur the hazard of a suspension or adjournment of the sale, and that the law will not inquire into the extent of the hazard. Is it indeed true, that the law will not exercise a supervision or control over the discretionary acts of its ministerial officers ? That they are omnipotent and irresponsible in the exercise of the power entrusted to them ? “ It is a proposition,” as was once said by Ld. Hardwicke, “ too monstrous to be debated.”