In Valenza (supra), the Court of Appeals held that when a vendor collects taxes from customers, but fails to remit them to the State under circumstances evincing an intent to permanently deprive the State of the taxes, he may not be subject to criminal prosecution for larceny by <mask>. The court reasoned that the structure of the penalty provisions of the Tax Law, coupled with the Legislature’s failure to consider the wrongful withholding of sales taxes as criminal conduct, evinces an intent by the Legislature to make the civil penalty the exclusive means of punishing that conduct. The Valenza court emphasized that when two or more statutes proscribe the same conduct, a prosecutor may generally choose among the statutes when initiating prosecution. However, “that discretion may be limited by a legislative intention to make a specific statute the exclusive means of punishing particular conducf’ (60 NY2d, at p 371; emphasis added). The court further stated that “when the Legislature has desired to make the breach of a statutorily imposed duty punishable under the Penal Law, it has done so in an unambiguous manner” (supra, at pp 370-371).


It is manifest from the aforesaid that said debt arose out of a breach of a fiduciary relationship which existed between the defendant and the corporate plaintiff. Judgments arising out of such misconduct are not dischargeable in bankruptcy (U. S. *167Code, tit. 11, § 35, subd. [a], par. [4]) “ A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as * * * (4) were created by his fraud, <mask>, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity”. (Matter of Adelson [Pierpont Leasing Co.], 187 Misc. 691; Matter of Patersen, 25 F. Supp. 411 [U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y.]; Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415 [U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Ohio].)


The instructions read to the Grand Jury in regard to larceny committed by <mask> are found to have been sufficient. The Grand Jury was read the appropriate statu*475tory provisions, as well as a definition of larceny by embezzlement. As the court noted in People v Calbud, Inc. (49 NY2d 389, 395, n 1), ordinarily instructions to the Grand Jury will be found to be proper where that body is read the appropriate sections of the Penal Law.


'While it is quite true tnat the seal fixed by the law on confiden*575tial communications to professional men is not removed by the death of the party, yet the rule is not to be so far extended as to permit a failure of justice. On an allegation of fraud, <mask> or mistake, instructions received by an attorney for making the will are not privileged communications within any just and proper construction or understanding of the rule of law. (Sheridan v. Houghton, 16 Hun, 628.)


(i.) <mask> OF BUSINESS RECORDS AFFIDAVIT TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE FIRST ILLEGALLY RECORDED TELEPHONE CALL Prosecutor committed the felony criminal act of forgery of a business records affidavit which had been notarized by himself as the public notary as witness to himself taking the statement of a witness who never had appeared before the court, been cross-examined by the defense, and who also had no personal knowledge of the contents of the recordings nor was present when they were made without the recorded party's knowledge or consent.


Such being the case, the issue is narrowed down to the performance of the work, and the partnership of the defendants, which Heilman denies. There is little room to doubt that the agreement sustains the allegations of the complaint in regard to the work and the price to be paid for it, and that Heilman can in no manner be held upon it except on the theory of partnership in the venture, a fact provable only by evidence aUimde. Having proved that the agreement was signed by the codefendants, and not by Heilman (a fact not disputed), there is no conceivable ground for asking an inspection on the theory of possible <mask>, as was allowed in Hepburn v. Archer, 20 Hun, 535.


For this purpose, the material and operative allegations of the charge and specifications are to be considered. They are reflected in the <mask> statute of Maine in effect at the time of the commission of the crime (Revised Statutes, ch. 133, § 1), and thereafter renumbered without change (ch. 120, § 1) in 1944, the year of petitioner’s conviction. This statute indicates clearly that the petitioner’s prior conviction in question would have constituted the crime of forgery in the second degree if committed in New York. Consequently, as such felony conviction, it was properly considered as a basis for the imposition of punishment as for a multiple offense (Penal Law, §§ 887, 1942; Matter of Kaytes v. Donovan, supra; People v. Olah, 300 N. Y. 96).


According to petitioner, in December 2001, he applied for a security “license” from respondents and paid a $75 fee for a criminal background check in order to be cleared to work at Rikers Island (petition ¶ 26). Petitioner fully disclosed his criminal background on his application, which he states included convictions between 1972 and 1987 of weapons and cocaine possession, possession of stolen mail, conspiracy, and <mask>.3 Petitioner asserts that he was incarcerated from approximately 1987 until his release on parole on May 29, 1992.


On December 14, 1978, a warrant was executed by the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, Judge of the Circuit Court of the State of Utah (Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department) commanding the arrest of relator for the offense of <mask>, based upon the complaint of one Jerry M. Campbell.1 Bail was set in the amount of $1,500. (State v Coster Case No. 78 CRS 1059.)


The defendant further argues that in this case the presenter of the credit card was in fact authorized to use the credit card, making it legally impossible for the defendant to have committed the crime of <mask> in the second degree. It is this question of legal impossibility, the principal issue in this case, that this court must resolve in determining this motion to set aside the verdict and in considering what action, if any, this court should take.


The body of the instrument and the signatures to it were written by one person and even the alleged signatures of the witnesses were written by the same person. Neither the handwriting of the body of the instrument nor the signature, in the slightest degree, resembles the authentic writings and proven signatures of Mrs. Wood. The instrument is clearly a <mask> and apparently fabricated as a basis of a written pedigree declaration to support a claim of kinship of certain of the Mayfield and Welch claimants.


All questions of fact, such as <mask> or fraud, not appearing on the face of a petition are to be determined in court proceedings only. (Matter of McGovern [Olson], 291 N. Y. 104, 108; Schwarts v. Heffernan, 304 N. Y. 474, 480, supra; Matter of Bednarsh v. Cohen, 267 App. Div. 133, 135, mot. for lv. to app. den. 292 N. Y. 578 and 723; Matter of Frankel v. Cheshire, 212 App. Div. 664, 667, 671.)


*317The defendant however claims that Laing acquired title by virtue ■of a contract entered into with Moncrief for the purpose of stifling a criminal prosecution against Moncrief, and therefore his title was void against bona fide creditors of Moncrief. The referee refused to find that there was any legal evidence that any of the notes paid by Laing, in consideration of the bill of sale to him, were forged. We have examined the case and there was evidence sufficient to require the finding that some of the notes which Laing, in consideration of the bill of sale to him, agreed to pay and did pay were forged, and that the inducement which led him to make the contract was a feeling of compassion and kindness for Moncrief, and especially for Laing’s daughter, who was Moncrief’s wife, and the hope that if the notes were paid a prosecution for the crime would be less likely to take place, but there was no agreement that Laing or any creditor should refrain from prosecution, or that the notes should be destroyed, or any evidence withheld. No prosecution had been commenced or threatened. The amount paid by Laing exceeded the value of the property transferred by the bill of sale, and no motive of gain induced him to enter into the contract. In Ward v. Allen (2 Metcalf, 53), it was held that in order to make a promise void on the ground that the consideration thereof was the stifling of a criminal prosecution, it is necessary that the promise should be made for gain, and not merely from motives of kindness and compassion. In Laing v. McCall (50 Vt., 658), a case arising in Vermont out of this transaction, it was held that the jury ought to have been instructed that if any part of the inducement moving the plaintiff to the execution of the contract was, that, by taking up said notes Moncrief would be less liable to be arrested for <mask>, then the contract was void as to bona fide creditors of Moncrief. The court rested the decision upon the proposition “ that the intent to do a criminal act and to carry out an illegal purpose, vitiates the whole transaction.” The proposition is undoubtedly correct and the contract void if there was an intent to accomplish an illegal act by means of the transaction. The case is much like Marbury v. Brooks (7 Wheat., 556; again reported 11 id., 78). In that case one Fitzhugh had forged many notes. Marbury was his father-in-law. Fitzhugh had forged Marbury’s name upon several of the *318notes. The notes were about due and disclosure imminent and prosecution probable. Fitzhugh executed an assignment to Marbury of all bis property in trust for his creditors, preferring tbe payment of these forged notes. The assigned property being insufficient to pay Fitzhugh’s general creditors in addition to the forged notes, the plaintiffs, being such creditors, attached the property in the hands of Marbury, the assignee. The evidence tended to show that the object of the assignment on the part of both the assignor and assignee, was to provide for the forged notes, to the end that Fitzhugh would therefore be less liable to be punished, and in the hope that he would not; hut there was no agreement of that kind with any of the holders of the notes, and they were not parties to the transaction, otherwise than by being benefited by it in receiving their pay. The' assignment was upheld against the attaching creditors. Marshall, C. 1., in delivering the opinion of the court (7 Wheat., 575), said: “ To advance moiiey for a son-in-law to repair the frauds he had committed, even with the hope of concealing the perpetration of them, is not, we think, an offense which may not be excused; nor can a security taken for the repayment of money so advanced be deemed fraudulent. If the notes were to be taken, upon condition that the holders would forbear to prosecute the criminal, or if the repayment of the money advanced were to depend upon his escape from prosecution, the validity of the contract might well be questioned. But the undertaking of Marbury was unconditional, as was the security for the repayment of the money advanced. * * * It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; hut the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for man.”


Roger S. Hayes, J. *367Defendant is charged with 15 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25), four counts of criminal possession of computer related material (Penal Law § 156.35), and three counts of criminal possession of <mask> devices (Penal Law § 170.40 [2]). Defendant has filed an omnibus motion seeking dismissal or reduction of the charges and other relief. Based on my findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in part I below, defendant’s motion to dismiss or reduce is denied. The remainder of defendant’s omnibus motion is dealt with in part II of this decision.


The defense proffers the following analysis of the <mask> statutes in support of the motion. Penal Law § 170.25 in relevant part states that: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses any forged instrument of a kind specified in section 170.10.”


It is the sine qua non of any right to recovery by the plaintiffs under the second cause of action that a valid financing contract exists. A valid contract is a jurisdictional requirement of the Truth in Lending Act (Fairley v Turan-Foley Imports, 65d 475). Article 10 of the State’s Personal Property Law deals generally with a valid, enforceable agreement, and the consumers’ remedies for the unlawful conduct of lenders. The plaintiffs have alleged, and proven, the existence of a <mask>. No valid financing contract existed which would trigger the applicable laws. The plaintiffs cannot rely upon the protection of the forgery to negate any liability under the security agreement, and yet seek the remedies afforded by statutes which assume the existence of a contract.


It further appears from the testimony upon this hearing that the petitioner has had considerable experience in various criminal courts. For instance, he was convicted in the State of Florida of <mask> as a felony and after spending some time in a penitentiary or jail, by the intervention of petitioner’s father to the Governor of the State of Florida, received a conditional pardon. He was convicted on a Federal charge in the State of Arkansas and was sentenced to two years in Leavenworth Prison. That at another time at Los Angeles in the State of California, he overdrew his account and received a suspended sentence there. It appears that petitioner was acquainted with criminal proceedings at the time of his plea.


It seems to me that in cases where resort must be had to informality to carry out the wishes or will of the soldier, it is safer to follow strictly the statute which now requires that the “ execution and the tenor thereof must be proved by at least two witnesses.” The danger of relaxing this rule in favor of accepting unattested writings as testaments in themselves is obvious — it opens the' door to <mask> and fraud, coercion and undue influence and all of the evils which have sought to be eliminated by the Decedent Estate Law, which requires attestation by at least two subscribing witnesses.


The holding in Bergland was incorporated into the initial 1989 legislation codifying the enforcement of no contest clauses. (See Recommendation Relating to No Contest Clauses (Jan. 1989) 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1990) (Revision Report) pp. 12-13; former § 21306, Stats. 1989, ch. 544, § 19.) The Commission characterized Bergland as holding that "a no contest clause is not enforceable against a person who, in good faith, contests a will on the ground of ... revocation by execution of a subsequent will." (Revision Report, at pp. 12-13 & fn. 9.) That description of the good faith exception presumes that revocation through an attempt to enforce a subsequent bogus instrument would otherwise trigger a no contest provision. In place of a good faith exception, the new legislative scheme provided that a no contest clause was not enforceable against contests based on <mask> or revocation that were brought with probable cause . (See former § 21306; Stats. 1989, ch. 544, § 19.)


Applying the Economos standard, this action overwhelmingly results in Florida being the most appropriate forum. The par*1022ties all reside in Florida, the witnesses will undoubtedly be primarily Florida residents since that is where the services were rendered and where the <mask> occurred and where the banks now involved are located. Not only is another forum available but an action has been brought in Florida. Unlike New York, jurisdiction over all the relevant parties is obtainable, the situs of the underlying action appears to be Florida, and Florida is the place where the forgery occurred and where the services defendant is counterclaiming for were rendered. Finally, an unnecessary burden is placed on this court which would be forced to interpret Florida law when a Florida forum is available. This court should not be required to adjudicate a case with such a negligible connection to New York.


This explanation does several things to support the conclusion that the electorate intended not only a narrow definition of larceny in the proposed shoplifting statute, but also the use of the historical definition of larceny. First, the analysis specifically describes shoplifting as "a type of petty theft." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35.) This description not only associates shoplifting with a specific type of crime, petty theft, but further identifies shoplifting as only a subset of that crime. At a minimum, then, the voters would expect shoplifting to be narrower than petty theft if relying on this description. Second, the analysis differentiates shoplifting from burglary, explaining that shoplifting is sometimes charged as burglary, as opposed to the petty theft of which it is a subset, and explicitly preventing that future practice. (Ibid .) Thus, voters relying on these statements would expect that shoplifting would be treated differently from burglary if Proposition 47 is passed. Finally, the analysis treats shoplifting as an existing crime, listing it with other known crimes which already have statutory definitions such as grand theft, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, <mask>, and drug possession, while consistently *680using language suggesting individuals are regularly incarcerated for committing such crimes. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra , analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 35-36 ["the measure reduces the penalties for the following crimes"; "about 40,000 offenders annually are convicted of the above crimes"; "the above crimes are nonserious and nonviolent, most offenders are currently being handled at the county level"].) As such, one reading the analysis would conclude that the crime of shoplifting already exists and, knowledgeable about the general description of the crime in California case law to that point (People v. Superior Court (Cervantes ), supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 ), would likely understand the crime to be limited in line with the historical definition of larceny.


The 1,000 checks lost or stolen from defendant’s printer were, as noted above, merely blank checks. On the blank check here at issue, a person, or persons, unknown filled in the date of “issuance”, the name of the payee, the amount of the check and then proceeded to sign the check, on a line drawn above the word “teller”, “Jerry Smith”. No such *951person is employed by the defendant. We thus deal here not with an alteration of a properly executed instrument but with a fabrication of all but the blank form of the instrument. Such a fabrication is possible in regard to the loss of any “blank check”, whether a personal or teller’s check. Does it follow that liability should be imposed simply because the loss of the blank check was due to the negligence of the party in whose name the blank check was prepared? Neither the plaintiff nor the court below has presented authority for imposing liability upon the defendant under these circumstances, and I have found none in this jurisdiction. In Fred Meyer, Inc. v Temco Metal Prods. Co. (267 Ore 230), the plaintiff, as holder of 30 forged checks, sought to recover the loss it incurred after these checks had been stolen during a burglary of defendant’s office and then cashed at several of plaintiff’s stores. The complaint alleged that defendant had been negligent in failing to place the blank checks in safekeeping; in failing to place its check “protectograph” (used in forging the checks) in safekeeping; and in failing to lock the “protectograph” so as to render it unusable. While the plaintiff relied upon the Oregon counterpart to section 3-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code (i.e., Ore Rev Stats, § 73.4060), the trial court nonsuited the plaintiff on motion and that judgment was affirmed. In so affirming, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that while this is a case in which it is contended that defendant was negligent for failure to foresee that his conduct may involve harm to another through the “criminal” conduct of a third person, under normal circumstances a person may reasonably assume that no one will violate the criminal law (Restatement, Torts 2d, §§ 302 A, 302 B). Even if we could impute some responsibility to the defendant for the loss or theft of the 1,000 blank teller’s checks, I do not believe that the bank may be held liable for the subsequent <mask> of the check here at issue.


In order to determine whether there was authority for the court to issue the eavesdropping warrants on Bencosme’s and *423other police officers’ cell phones, the court, indeed, must decide whether the conduct of the defendants in fixing tickets can be fairly characterized as dangerous to life, limb or property. (See People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747, 763 [1980].) To be sure, the physical act of fixing a ticket is not inherently dangerous. However, the behavior that is encouraged by and could potentially flow from such conduct certainly is. The evidence adduced in the grand jury established that defendants fixed tickets by destroying them, by failing to file them, by not appearing to testify in traffic court, or by testifying falsely in traffic court. Some of the tickets so fixed were for reckless driving, failing to wear a seat belt, driving while talking on a cell phone, excessive speeding, failing to stop at a stop sign, parking at a fire hydrant, and failing to secure a child passenger with a seat belt.13 As a result of having their tickets deleted, motorists were allowed to escape the consequences of their reckless roadway behavior. Having not paid a fine, having not had their insurance premiums increased as a result of their reckless conduct, or having not had their licenses to drive suspended, these individuals had no disincentive to discontinue their illegal and reckless driving. Viewed in this fashion, it is not difficult to see how ticket-fixing endangered both people and property. (See People v Principe, 65 NY2d at 37 [<mask>, larceny and related crimes fell within the ambit of federal wiretapping law as crimes that are dangerous to life, limb or property where corrupt DMV employees provided forged certificates of title, driver’s licenses without road tests and inspection stickers without inspections].)


The learned surrogate has found as a fact that the alleged second will “ was never in fact his (testator’s) will or executed or intended by him as such, but was a <mask> and creation of *25and by the said Florine A. Kirkholder.” If this finding is warranted by the proofs before him, then I think it follows, as he has held, that she did in offering it for. probate and seeking to sustain it by what must have been perjured testimony, thereby “ controvert,” dispute or call in question the validity of ” the genuine will within the intent and meaning of those words as used by the testator.


Defendant claims that he was only 16 years of age at the time he was convicted and that he pleaded guilty believing that the crime charged was a misdemeanor because the amount involved was $25. He further claims that he did not commit <mask>. He further claims that he was not aware of the fact that he was entitled to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceeding and that he was not adequately represented by counsel in all stages and was ignorant of the law and legal procedures.


When Mortimer received its bank statement disclosing both the certification of the check and the subsequent charging of the account, it promptly informed Underwriters that the signature was in fact a <mask>. Investigation disclosed that Mortimer had been the victim of a series of burglaries, and that in all probability the forgery was consummated during one such nocturnal visit when checks were removed from the back of its check book, the letter was typed, and the rubber stamp was affixed to the check and letter.


Our conclusion is consistent with the voters' general intent behind Proposition 47. As noted, the initiative was designed to "ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses, to maximize alternatives for nonserious, nonviolent crime, and to invest the savings generated from this act into prevention and support programs in K-12 schools, victim services, and mental health and drug treatment." (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70.) To achieve that end, the measure "[r]equire[s] misdemeanors instead of felonies for nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug possession...." (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 3, p. 70.) Appellant's second degree burglary conviction based on using a forged check to obtain $148 is unquestionably a nonviolent offense, so reducing it to a misdemeanor certainly serves the purposes behind Proposition 47. We are confident the voters would agree, given Proposition 47 also reduced the offense of <mask> involving less than $950 from a wobbler to a straight misdemeanor. (§ 473, subd. (b).)


Frank J. LaBuda, J. *813The defendants, Theresa and Wayne Vandermeulen, are on trial, as husband and wife, for defrauding Theresa Vandermeulen’s 83-year-old and legally blind grandmother of more than $50,000 in violation of grand larceny in the second degree beginning in 2002 and continuing through May 2004 after the grandmother moved from Kisseemee, Florida, to Monticello, New York, to live with the defendants and their four minor children. It is further alleged that the defendants abused and misused a power of attorney, made unauthorized withdrawals from the grandmother’s checking and savings accounts (<mask> in the second degree) and opened an unauthorized credit card account (identity theft in the third degree).


But enough has been said to justify our premises that the extreme doctrine maintained in Price v. Neale is not now the law of England; and such was evidently the opinion entertained by Mr. Chitty as late as 1840. See Chitty on B., 11 Am. ed., p. 431, where, after referring to the ’* old rule, the following comments will be found : “ But on the other hand it may be observed that the holder who obtained payment cannot be considered as having altogether shown sufficient circumspection ; he might, before he discounted or received the instrument in payment, have made more inquiries as to the signatures and genuineness of the instrument, even of the drawer or indorsers themselves; and if he thought fit to rely on the bare representation of the party from whom he took it, there is no reason that he should profit by the accidental payment, when the loss had already attached upon himself., and why he should be allowed to retain the money, when, by an immediate notice of the <mask>, he is enabled to proceed against all other parties, precisely the same as if the payment had not been made, and, consequently, the payment to him has not in the least altered his situation, or occasioned any delay or prejudice. It seems that of late upon questions of this nature these latter considerations have influenced the court in determining whether or not the money shall be *149recovered "back ; and it will "be found, on examining the older cases, that there were facts affording a distinction, and that, upon attempting to reconcile them, they are not in contradiction, as might on first view have "been supposed.”


*817The defendant now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has failed to submit to an examination pursuant to the terms of the policy. In opposition to the motion the plaintiff alleges that since he stands accused of the crimes of arson, <mask> and other crimes in connection with the claim, which is the subject matter of this action, he could not very well submit to an examination under oath by the attorneys for, the defendant who are my accusers under circumstances tantamount to a Star Chamber inquisition without any safeguards with respect to my constitutional rights.” He also states that he is now willing to submit to an examination under the supervision of the court.


The court finds that plaintiff did not breach the warranty of presentment to the depositary or collecting bank, Ridgewood (see UCC 4-207), i.e., that defendant Brijlall had good title to *907the subject check and that the signature indorsed on it by Mrs. Brijlall for deposit into plaintiffs account was in fact genuine; and that defendant Brijlall’s claim of <mask> was a subsequent, separate act which did not impair plaintiffs warranty.


The effect of UCC 3-405 is to put the loss on the drawer, who was induced by an imposter to draw a check, and not on the drawee bank. When the imposter rule applies, the drawee bank may properly charge the drawer’s account with the amount of the check involved (Underpinnings & Found. Constructors v Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 AD2d 628, 643, supra, quoting Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-405:6 [2d ed]). Thus, the drawee bank cannot recover from the collecting bank for breach of warranty of the genuineness of the endorsement on the check pursuant to UCC 4-207, because the payee bank cannot establish that it suffered any loss incident to the <mask>. (Underpinnings & Found. Constructors v Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 AD2d 628, 643, supra, quoting Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-405:8 [2d ed].)


Great Northern now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. It claims that the loss suffered by plaintiffs because their Renoir is a <mask> is not a covered loss under the terms of their homeowner’s insurance policy. Great Northern *1044contends that plaintiffs’ policy covers only “all risk of physical loss” providing such loss occurred during the policy period. According to Great Northern, plaintiffs have not suffered a “physical loss.” In fact, the Renoir still hangs in their residence. Further, to the extent that plaintiffs claim a loss due to fraud, such loss is not a physical loss. Moreover, even assuming that the alleged fraud resulted in a physical loss, the loss occurred in 1976 when plaintiffs purchased the forged Renoir, long before the issuance of this policy.


Plea counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion. Coon, 504 S.W.3d at 892 ; Stragliati, 556 S.W.3d at 664. The record establishes that a motion to dismiss based upon Meadors's right to a speedy trial *213would have been meritless because the time between when the State filed the information for the Jefferson County <mask> charge and when Meadors pleaded guilty was only eighty-four days-not the 1700 days Meadors alleges in his motion. See State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc. 2015) ("The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints are imposed by an arrest [for the charged offense]."); State v. Williams, 120 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) ("The right to a speedy trial attaches, and the defendant becomes an 'accused,' with the filing of either a formal indictment or information against the defendant or his arrest."). Under similar facts in Williams, the Western District held that the defendant was not "arrested" or "accused" on the pending charge for speedy trial purposes until the information was filed because the defendant was imprisoned on other charges. Williams, 120 S.W.3d at 299. Likewise, here, Meadors was not "arrested" or "accused" on the Jefferson County forgery charge until the State filed the information because Meadors was arrested on separate charges in other jurisdictions and no detainer was issued by Jefferson County. See ibr.US_Case_Law.Schema.Case_Body:v1">id. Meadors's situation thus contrasts with cases in which a defendant is arrested through a joint enterprise between multiple counties and is held for a particular jurisdiction via a detainer or functional equivalent. See State v. Holmes, 643 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (Mo. App. W.D. 1982). Consequently, no prejudicial delay occurred between the filing of the information and Meadors's guilty plea to justify a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Williams, 120 S.W.3d at 300 ; Cummings v. State, 535 S.W.3d 410, 420-21 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). Therefore, we will not deem Meadors's plea counsel ineffective for failing to make a meritless motion. Coon. 504 S.W.3d at 892 ; Cummings, 535 S.W.3d at 420-21.


*209The complaint alleges in substance: the City maintained with the Chase Bank an account subject to withdrawal by checks. The City drew its check upon the Chase Bank, payable to the order of a named payee. This check, bearing the purported indorsement of the payee, the Federal Reserve Bank indorsed, thereby guaranteeing all prior indorsements upon said instrument, and presented it for payment to the Chase Bank, which latter bank relying upon said indorsement and guarantee, paid the amount of said instrument to the Federal Reserve Bank. The indorsement in the name of the payee was a <mask>. Plaintiff had insured the City and any bank in which it carried an account, subject to withdrawal by checks, against certain losses sustained through payment of any instrument drawn by the City upon which the signature of any indorser had been forged. Plaintiff paid the loss and thereby became subrogated to all rights of salvage and the Chase Bank assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff, which received the assignment as a salvage operation.


“The Warden of the City Prison and Bridewell of the City of New York will receive and safely keep for examination the body of Martin Leland, charged with <mask> on oath of-. “ First District Police Court, New York, Sept. 4,1869. “J. Dowlixg, Police Justice. “Eustace and F ablet, Officers.” The district-attorney • also produced an affidavit of one Carlisle K. Willits, who does not state where he (said Willits) resides, or where he can be found, and who says that Leland came to No. 57 South-street, Philadelphia, and bought a city warrant of the city of Philadelphia, of the value of two hundred and thirty-three dollars and ninety-five cents. He then testifies, on information and belief, that two warrants, exact counterparts of the one so bought by Leland, each for one thousand dollars, were sold to brokers in Philadelphia, and that said warrants were forged. Now, this is all the testimony in the case ; and upon this commitment and this proof I am asked to remand a citizen of this State, one who has formerly'borne an unblemished character, so that he may be sent to the State of Pennsylvania, to be there tried for this alleged crime.


Upon completing this sentence in December 2020, Hibshman was released to his fiancée’s house to begin his term of supervised release. But soon after, the Indiana state court revoked his probation on his state <mask> conviction due to his federal escape conviction. Hibshman was ordered to report to the county jail to serve a two-year term of imprisonment for the state probation violation. He failed to do so. Hibshman instead moved out of his fiancée’s house and stopped communicating with his federal probation officer. Authorities found him more than three months later at the scene of a car accident where he gave a fake name and stated he was a minor.


*401Additionally, we will point out that section 530.5, subdivision (a) is not one of the listed offenses in section 1170.18 as being subject to reclassification. We will also note that section 473 (forgery) as revised in Proposition 47, specifically excludes cases where the person is convicted of both <mask> and identity theft in section 530.5 from the $950 minimum threshold.


I, therefore, hold that the notes in question were executed by Filomena Castelli and that she did place thereon the signature of her husband. That the separate defense of incompetency to act was not sustained by the proof offered herein. The defense of <mask>, interposed by the defendant, Vincent Castelli, of his signature on the notes in question, has been sustained by the proof produced herein. Since the proof has failed to show that the defendant, Vincent Castelli, is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery, then this court finds the defense will stand. Judgment is hereby granted against the defendant, Filomena Castelli, for the amount demanded in the complaint plus costs. The action against Vincent Castelli is dismissed.


The <mask> of checks, notes, drafts and other commercial paper is common. The annual loss through this means is said to be large. Unsuspecting merchants and other business men are frequently the victims. The check worker may ply his nefarious trade alone and unaided. The forged will is in a class of its own. The very nature of the act involves a conspiracy and requires the concerted action of several persons. Single-handed fraud is impossible. A will requires at least two attesting witnesses. It must *115be admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no haste or disregard of legal requirements. Every person having a legal interest in the estate is cited to appear in court. A will must run the gauntlet of many sharp eyes and keen inquiring minds. It may be subjected to attack by hostile heirs or next of kin. Before admitting a will to probate the surrogate is charged by the law to inquire particularly into all the facts and circumstances and must be satisfied of the genuineness of the will and the validity of its execution. (Surrogate’s Court Act, § 144.)


Here, however, the subject check did not in fact bear a forged indorsement; the evidently never-investigated allegation of <mask> by defendant Brijlall has been discounted by the finding of this court. Secondly, even had there in fact been a forgery, the attempted charge-back of plaintiffs account by defendant Ridge-wood was untimely as a matter of law as it came more than two years after what the court, after trial, further finds was final settlement of the check (UCC 4-212, 4-213, 4-301).


Certain of the claims asserted in Waggoner's pro se motion (such as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; claims of instructional error; and claims of a variance between the charging instrument and the evidence at trial) are plainly claims that could-and should-have been raised in Waggoner's direct appeal. Those claims are not properly asserted in a motion for post-conviction relief, yet counsel retained them verbatim , and without any attempt to justify consideration of those claims in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Many of the other claims Waggoner asserted (such as claims of witness tampering; suborning perjury; <mask> of documents; interference in jury deliberations; alteration of the trial transcript; "rampant judicial misconduct" and juror misconduct; and "[r]ampant perjury, forgery, [and] manufacture of false evidence") are factually extravagant. Counsel retained all of those claims in Waggoner's "amended" motion, without reciting a single additional fact or legal authority, and without any indication that counsel had herself determined that a good-faith factual and legal basis actually existed for the claims. It is significant in this regard that the circuit court initially dismissed all of the claims in Waggoner's pro se motion as frivolous-yet appointed counsel later repeated all of those same claims, with no substantive revision or supplementation.8


In Point I, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Baker's Motion to dismiss Count I of the Amended Information because the facts alleged were sufficient to charge <mask>, in that the State could charge forgery, a more broad statute, or fraudulent use of a credit device, a more specific statute, at its discretion when the facts meet the elements of both crimes.


Upon the reversal of his conviction, Briggins applied for reinstatement. As a result of that request Briggins appeared before a deputy trial commissioner charged with the original allegations of misconduct (<mask> and false identification), and was informed that “if the matter [were] *977tried administratively [the] tribunal would have no choice but to dismiss the subject Charges and Specifications as * * * legally insufficient.”


16363 A. <mask> 2, attempted grand larceny 2. 16363 B. Grand larceny 2. 16363 C. Grand larceny 2. 16363 D. Forgery 2, attempted grand larceny 2. Thereafter a justice of the Supreme Court overruled the discretionary denial of bail by this court and fixed bail in sums aggregating $7,500. Upon the indictments’ being moved for trial this court learned of the admission of the defendant to bail, and now considers the question of revoking bail as fixed by the other justice and again holding the defendant for trial, without bail, as a matter of judicial discretion.


In the better and more concise language of counsel for the beneficiaries: “ If we treat the paper propounded as having four pages, the obverse and reverse sides of the first sheet being treated as pages 1 and 2, and of the second sheet as pages 3 and 4, we can then say that the will starts on page 1, is continued on page 4, and concluded on page 2.” It is page 2 which contains the signature of testator. This signature is followed *190by the ordinary attestation clause, subsigned by the attesting witnesses in the usual manner. There being no allegation of fraud or <mask> in this cause, and no suspicious circumstance disclosed, the authenticity of the testamentary script propounded being admitted, the presumption is that the will propounded is in the same condition it was in when the testator and the attesting witnesses placed their respective signatures on it and the testator duly declared it to be his last will and testament and requested the attesting witnesses to act as such. Matter of Cattrall, 1863, 3 S. & T. 419, 421. But without the aid of legal presumption, the paper propounded bears both internal and external evidences of genuineness and that it was composed and written at the same time, and in its present order. When the draftsman of the will had ended writing on the first page he had finished only a part of the third dispositive clause of the will. He then reverted to the fourth blank page where, at the top of the page, he was at pains to note in writing, “ Third (continued),” evidently meaning that the third clause of the will which began on the first page was to be continued on the fourth page as, in fact, it was.


The prosecution argues that the circuit court erred by quashing the bindover respecting this count because evidence showed that defendant violated MCL 750.248(1) by generating a false QVF that she submitted as a list of all voters who submitted an AV ballot which actually omitted 193 valid AV ballots. The prosecution argues that MCL 750.248(1) prohibits altering public records in addition to forging public records. The prosecution concedes that a <mask> requires making an instrument that purports to be something it is not, but argues that, even if defendant did not “forge” a public record, she altered one by removing the 193 names from the QVF.


This court's current classification of theft of property goes back nearly four decades to Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979). There, the court acknowledged that elements of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 are concerned with the distinction between crimes that involve dishonesty per se (e.g., "<mask>, perjury, bribery, false pretense and embezzlement") and crimes that do not involve dishonesty per se (e.g., "murder, manslaughter or assault"). Id. at 288-89, 590 S.W.2d at 859. So far, so good. Without analysis, however, the court then reached the abrupt conclusion that "theft, as it is defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code, involves dishonesty." Id.


The statute under which he was indicted and convicted is as follows: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud, shall make any false entry, or shall falsely alter any entry made in any book of accounts kept in the office of the Comptroller of this State, or in the office of the Treasurer, or of the Surveyor-General, or of any County Treasurer, by which any demand or obligation, claim, right or interest, either against or in favor of the people of this State, or any county or town, or any individual, shall be or shall purport to be discharged, diminished, increased, created, or in any manner affected, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of <mask> in the third degree.” (2 R. S. [m. p.], 673, § 34.)


Having determined that the propounded paper is a concocted instrument and a <mask>, probate thereof is denied. Since the person otherwise entitled to letters is a non-resident alien, letters of administration will issue to the public administrator upon proper application. The facts in respect of this forgery have been called to the attention of the district attorney for appropriate action.


It appears that following the defendant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated and driving without a license he falsely identified himself to the arresting authorities as one Kenneth Riley and signed a fingerprint card with the same fictitious name. Following his release from custody, the defendant’s true identity was learned and he was thereafter arrested and indicted for the crime of <mask> in the second degree in violation of subdivision 2 of section 170.10 of the Penal Law, which reads as follows:


The moving papers show substantial and reasonable cause to believe that the document is a <mask> and that the forgery was committed by the defendant. The answering papers of the defendant do not refute this contention of the People. Indeed, the defendant’s attorney avers that under the circumstances, not only would it be foolish for the defendant to use the document at trial but that the defendant has absolutely no intention of using it at trial.


Silberzweig’s work record was far from pristine. Over the course of six years, he was charged with various acts of misconduct and repeatedly disciplined. The conduct which had led to the prior disciplinary action ranged from relatively minor infractions, such as failing to safeguard the Department’s telephone order book, to a more serious charge based on Silberzweig’s conviction for <mask> in the third degree based on his unauthorized use of Department stationery to create a forged letter to participate in a sheriffs car auction. The disciplinary penalties imposed for these various prior infractions ranged from a written reprimand to two suspensions for a period of weeks without pay. However, at no point over the six-year period did the Commissioner find Silberzweig’s conduct worthy of discharge until the incident at issue herein.


This was determined quite early, in Price v. Neal (3 Burr. 1354). In that case, two forged bills were drawn upon the plaintiff. Notice of the first bill was left at the plaintiff’s house on the day it became due; plaintiff sent his servant to call on the defendant to pay it, which was done. The other bill the plaintiff accepted and paid at maturity.. On discover*291ing the <mask>, plaintiff brought an action for money had and received, to recover back the amount paid. The court held that the action would not lie. Lord Mansfield said it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn upon him was in the drawer’s hand before he accepted or paid it, but that it was not incumbent on the defendant to inquire into it.


*330However, probation thereafter reported defendant had sustained two new criminal arrests, both for <mask> offenses. In light of defendant's failure to appear for sentencing and her subsequent criminal conduct the probation department dropped its split sentence recommendation, as it "no longer appears appropriate." Instead, the department recommended denial of probation and "imposition of the full incarceration period of three years."


The following facts regarding the access card <mask> offenses at issue in this appeal (counts 1 & 5) are taken from the probation report. In January 2014, a taxi driver reported to police he had picked defendant up and driven her to several locations in Marin County. Defendant attempted to pay the $73.53 cab fare with a prepaid debit card, but the charge did not go through. When police searched defendant, they located a Green Dot prepaid Visa card with defendant's name and another individual's name embossed on it.


This court specifically finds that a Federally issued resident alien card, often referred to as a “Green Card”, is covered by this State’s <mask> laws. See People v Fury (279 NY 433 [1939]) to the effect that a Federal Reserve bank note is covered by the Penal Law on forgery. The fact that the Federal Government *191had. made uttering of counterfeit bank notes a crime and that only the Federal Government could coin money or issue legal currency or tender did not bar the State from making the uttering of counterfeit bank notes a felony. (People v Fury, supra; People v Kalmus 123 NYS2d 411 [Ct Gen Sess, NY County 1953].) The same act may constitute an offense against both the State and Federal Government. (People v Broady, 5 NY2d 500 [1959].)


Moreover, the analysis in Romanowski is not inconsistent with our determination here. First, it is notable that in its analysis, the court referenced the specific language of section 473(b) expressly reducing punishment for the seven listed instruments, and characterized the statute by saying "Proposition 47 specifically created a $950 threshold for check <mask>. " ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 913, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633, italics added.) Second, while the court observed "a check can contain some of the same information that is found on an access card, along with the owner's address and other details that would facilitate identity theft" ( ibid . ), it did not consider whether concerns about the electronic use and storage of access card information, consumer privacy, and the arguably greater potential for identity theft in access card transactions would be a rational basis for the voters to conclude access card forgery crimes are more serious than check-related forgery crimes.


All questions of fact, such as <mask> or fraud, not appearing on the face of a petition are to be determined in court proceedings only. (Matter of McGovern [Olson], 291 N. Y. 104, 108; Schwarts v. Heffernan, 304 N. Y. 474, 480, supra; Matter of Bednarsh v. Cohen, 267 App. Div. 133, 135, mot. for lv. to app. den. 292 N. Y. 578 and 723; Matter of Frankel v. Cheshire, 212 App. Div. 664, 667, 671.)


After considering all the testimony, the court cannot find that <mask> of the 45 signatures was established. Where fraud is charged, it is elementary that the burden of proof lies on the party making the claim to establish it by clear and convincing evidence (Matter of McQuade v. Heffernan, 197 Misc. 990, affd. 277 App. Div. 947), consonant with the rule in any case when fraud is the issue that it is never presumed and cannot be based on conjecture or doubtful inference (Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 400, 410; Ochenkowski v. Dunaj, 232 App. Div. 441). The court finds that the petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof as to the signatures claimed to be forgeries.


While Mr. Henry C. Hyde appears in this case as counsel, his argument is of such a character that I feel justified in treating it in the category of expert testimony, for such -it is essentially, relieved of the constraint of cross-examination and free from the burden of an oath. Mr. Hyde has made a specialty of .the study of handwriting for thirty years or more, and had used the microscope in his examination of manuscripts for above twenty years, and had frequently been called upon to employ and exhibit his talents in court in judicial inquiries in controversies over disputed writings, and had been so engaged in noted cases in probate. Mr. Hyde in his expository statement undertook to confine himself entirely to the facts connected with the charge of <mask> and to the scientific proofs demonstrated; he assumed to elucidate the elementary principles that underlie proof of handwriting, and said that the handwriting of a man is as distinctive as any other phase of personality or individual character; the qualities and habits of writers are as various and distinct as the writers themselves; there are definite limits and possibilities to the capacity of a forger and the difficulty of the task of a *77forger is the reason why so few forgers have been successful; the forger only sees effects to imitate, but he does not see how those effects are produced; it has been argued that if a small number of characteristics can be simulated an indefinite number may be imitated, provided time be given—the answer to this is, that the smaller the number of items to be imitated the easier the task of the forger and the more difficult detection; in the case at bar, Mr. Hyde asked, what was the necessity of simulating and manufacturing so many documents as are in dispute? Why should the forger act so recklessly? He must have had a sublime confidence in his own ability to fabricate and to deceive by his fabrication. It is difficult to imagine the magnitude of the task set to himself by the forger of this alleged' forged Will; it must have involved his perfect transformation into Dama himself; he "must not only have acquired his habits of hand but have become possessed of his spirit; it would have been impossible for a forger to have accomplished all these forgeries unless he were in the possession of facts and gifted with powers not given to any other man than Dama himself; no other man could possibly have executed all these manuscripts in dispute; the difficulties in the path of the alleged forger rendered his success practically impossible; the excess of loops in the Will may be accounted for by the manifest, desire of Dama to make every letter perfect and distinct—this is plain from an inspection of that instrument, and the expert counsel undertook to show the proportion of loops, blind loops, and mended loops in the various documents under examination. The expert, Doctor Piper, had set great store by the dots over the letter “i,” which, in his opinion, were enough to amount to a mathematical demonstration that the Will was a forgery, and expert Counsel Hyde engaged in an analysis of the exhibits of undisputed papers to offset and overthrow the opinion of Dr. Piper; upon an examination of the Exhibits E. S. 2, 8, 6, 5, 7, 9, respectively designated in evidence as Contestant’s Exhibit C—3, letter signed “Luigi” and addressed to “My Dear Jennie,” dated “San Francisco, *78March 28/86”; Contestant’s Exhibit I—9, letter signed “Luigi,” beginning “Brot Benj,” dated “San Francisco, Deer. 25/86”; Contestant’s Exhibit, signed “Luigi,” beginning “My Dear Sister Jennie” and dated “San Francisco, Deer. 9/83”; Contestant’s Exhibit E—5, letter signed “Luigi Dama,” beginning “Bro Ben,” dated “San Francisco, Octr. 6th, /85”; Contestant’s Exhibit H—8, letter signed “Luigi Dama,” beginning “Captn. E. W. Randall, Dear Sir,” dated “San Francisco, Feby. 24/84”; Contestant’s Exhibit J—10, letter signed “Luigi Dama,” beginning “Dear Brother” and dated “San Francisco, Deer. 15/84”; it appears that in very few of these sample letters are there not dots over the “i,” angular or rounded mixed, that is to say, examples of each kind of dot; expert Counsel Hyde thought that it looked as if expert Doctor Piper had purposely selected his standards to support his theory. Expert Counsel Hyde claims to have shown that there are rounded “i” dots and angular “i” dots- scattered promiscuously in the documents disputed and undisputed; in the word “buried,” in line 10 of the alleged Will, there is a light dot over the “i,” a light stroke or touch of the pen, and there is a prevalence in Dama’s writings to this form of dot, and the conical dot, or the dot with the point sharp downward, is often met with; there are in the alleged Will numerous examples corresponding to the “i” dots in the undisputed papers. Another point adverted to by the expert Doctor Piper and illustrated on his Tables is as to the form of the small “a.” Expert Counsel Hyde says that' there are certainly differences between the forms of the “a” small letter, but they are all made on the same principle, they are all begun with the curl on the inside, “


The court held in the Fitzgerald case that the one act of drawing a check without funds on deposit constituted the crime of <mask>. That same act also made the defendant guilty of larceny when he received property and money from the payee in exchange for the worthless check. Therefore, consecutive sentences violated subdivision 2 of section 70.25 of the Penal Law.


The court is aware of the contrary holding in People v Crean (115 Misc 2d 996, 1000-1002 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 1982]). In Crean, the defendant obtained in New York County a check payable to the victim in Westchester County, deposited the check and withdrew the proceeds from a bank in New York County. The Westchester court held that venue was proper there since Westchester was the situs of the loss to the *23victim as a result of the larceny. This holding was contrary to a previous holding in People v Brown (69 Misc 2d 412 [Suffolk County Ct 1972]), that Suffolk County did not have venue of the larceny of proceeds of a sale of land located in that county, where the sale was consummated and the proceeds thereof converted in New York County. The court in Crean distinguished Brown on the grounds that Brown was limited to considering whether an element of the offense occurred in Suffolk County. This analysis overlooks the requirement that the result upon which venue is based must be an element of the crime charged. CPL 20.10 (3) states that "[a]n offense of which a result is an element is a 'result offense’.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Crean relies on People v Schlatter (55 AD2d 922 [2d Dept 1977]), which does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Schlatter, the Court held that in the absence of proof that forged checks were made or altered in Nassau County, the deposit of such checks in a Nassau County bank was not a sufficient basis for venue of the <mask> offense in Nassau County. The Court noted that forgery is not a result offense, meaning that obtaining money in Nassau County as a result of the forgery would not support venue. The Court remanded the larceny counts for trial in Nassau County, not because larceny is a result offense, but because the checks were deposited in and paid to an account in Nassau County. In other words, property in the form of money was obtained in Nassau County. (See also, People v Zaccaro, 132 AD2d 589, 590 [2d Dept 1987] ["the only conceivable specific consequence or result of the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree by extortion is that an element of that crime would be obtaining property by extortion”].) In fact, the result of the larceny in Schlatter was felt in New York County, since the offices of the corporation on whose account the checks were drawn were located in New York County.


the <mask> ring. Video footage was presented to the jury showing Agamiri with Dargbeh when Dargbeh cashed one of the fraudulent checks. Additionally, the State presented evidence that two cars rented to Dargbeh were used by other individuals cashing fraudulent checks. Further, the jury heard testimony from the vice president of accounting at Dacotah Paper who testified that Dacotah Paper issued no checks to Dargbeh and had never employed him.


"Proposition 47's resentencing provision, section 1170.18, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part: 'A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction ... of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section ("this act") had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or added by this act.' The cited provisions include section 490.2, subdivision (a), added by Proposition 47, which provides in pertinent part: 'Notwithstanding [Penal Code] Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($ 950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor ....' [¶] Under these provisions, a person serving a sentence for grand theft under Penal Code section 487 or another statute expressly defining a form of grand theft (e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 484e, 487a, 487i ) is clearly eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18 if he or she can prove the value of the property taken was $ 950 or less. (See People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 910-914, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ) [defendant convicted for theft of access card information under Pen. Code, § 484e eligible for resentencing].)" Also relevant here is that the proposition amended the <mask> statute, section 473, to make forgeries misdemeanors unless the threshold amount of loss is more than $950. Subdivision (b) of section 473 provides:


Subdivision (1) of section 3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: “No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon.” Section 3-404 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that “[an] unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it”. The reference to “unauthorized signature” in the above section includes <mask>. (Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-201, subd [43].)


“A deed based on <mask> or obtained by false pretenses is void ab initia, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid” (Cruz v Cruz, 37 AD3d 754, 754 [2007]; see ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v Stephens, 91 AD3d 801, 803 [2012]; First Natl. Bank of Nev. v Williams, 74 AD3d 740, 742 [2010]; GMAC Mtge. Corp. v Chan, 56 AD3d 521, 522 [2008]). “If a document purportedly conveying a property interest is void, it conveys nothing, and a subsequent bona fide purchaser or bona fide encumbrancer for value receives nothing” (ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v Stephens, 91 AD3d at 803; see Marden v Dorthy, 160 NY 39, 48 [1899]; Solar Line, Universal Great Bhd., Inc. v Prado, 100 AD3d 862, 863-864 [2012]; First Natl. Bank of Nev. v Williams, 74 AD3d at 741). Here, as the Supreme Court found, the plaintiff established that the 2006 deed was a forgery.


The defendant bank in its answer pleaded a general denial and an affirmative defense of <mask>, and interposed a third-party complaint impleading the Department of Welfare. On the trial, the bank proved that six months after it had credited plaintiff for the amount of the check, it was notified by its correspondent bank that the Department of Welfare claimed the *445indorsement had been forged, forwarded a copy of an affidavit to that effect, and that as a result the bank repaid the drawee bank and the amount of the check was deducted from plaintiff’s account.


In contrast, plaintiff has demonstrated that defendant Bank accepted the checks for deposit at its own risk, having failed to require a signature verification or a guarantee of the endorsements on the checks. (See, Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski v Questex Corp., 159 Misc 2d 126, 129, affd sub nom. Morgan, Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn & Lisowski v Republic Natl. Bank, 160 Misc 2d 244 [finding that a bank’s negotiation of a check without a signature guarantee is done at its own risk and “constitutes prima facie negligence” in the case of a <mask>, “indicati[ng] * * * the absence of good faith and adherence to reasonable acceptable commercial banking standards”].) No proof has been presented indicating that defendant Bank verified, or even attempted to verify, the endorsement as being the genuine signature of Maria Guttaudaria-Ellman, despite the fact that these checks were drawn for $35,401.77 and $33,751.77. (See, Lund v Chemical Bank, supra, 797 F Supp, at 270 [citing the Kelly court for the proposition that the large dollar amount of a check could lead to a reasonable inference that bank’s handling *668of deposits recklessly gave substantial assistance to scheme to defraud].) It is clear that defendant bank was the party best situated to prevent the negotiation of the forged instruments and that it failed to do so.


The statutory directions for submission to trial juries of "lesser included offenses” (CPL 300.30) must necessarily focus on the particular facts in each case rather than upon the conceptual statutory definition (CPL 1.20, subd 37; see, People v Johnson, 39 NY2d 364; People v Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467; People v Cionek, 35 NY2d 924; People v Hayes, 35 NY2d 907). Because no reasonable view of the evidence in this case, as determined by this court, would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense (of <mask> in the third degree), but did not commit the greater offense of forgery in the second degree, the court must, in this case, refuse to charge forgery in the third degree as a lesser included offense of forgery in the second degree.


We are aware of only one published decision addressing the value of blank checks in the context of a Proposition 47 petition. The Third Appellate District has considered whether a defendant was entitled to have his felony conviction for possessing a blank check with intent to defraud (§ 475, subd. (b)) designated a misdemeanor under the <mask> punishment provision as it was amended by Proposition 47 (§ 473, subd. (b)). (People v. Gonzales (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1067, review granted Feb. 15, 2017, S240044, cited for persuasive value (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 ).) Our sister court concluded the blank checks did "not have any face value, and thus also come within the ambit of section 473(b)," which requires check forgery offenses be punished as misdemeanors if the value of the check does not exceed $950. (People v. Gonzales , at. p. 1072.) Other authorities suggest checks that do not have value as negotiable interests have a value greater than zero. (E.g., People v. Cuellar (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 833, 839, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 252 [holding a check known to be forged "had slight intrinsic value by virtue of the paper it was printed on" and "as a negotiable instrument that, if legally drawn, would entitle its holder to payment on demand"].) We conclude from these authorities that blank, unendorsed checks have a non-zero, de minimis value. The trial court therefore did not err by determining the fair market value of the checks Vandiver had in her possession did not exceed $950.


To return now to the question of the property possessed and owned by Luigi Dama at the date of the alleged Will, May 8, 1887. It is asserted by counsel for contestants that Dama never owned exactly eleven government bonds,' at the time of making the Will only $5;000 in bonds and before he had thirteen $1,000 bonds; it is claimed by contestants that the person who forged the Will slipped up on this point, as he did on some others; the forger knew he had bonds of this kind, but did not know the exact figures. Is it possible, queries counsel for contestants, that a man of Dama’s intelligence would attempt to dispose of property he did not own? Or that a man of integrity would write down a deliberate lie in so solemn a document? This is a very important factor in determining this issue of <mask>. This provision of the alleged Will challenged attention- by reason of its inaccuracy and nonexistence, wherein he undertook to give what he did not possess; it is inexplicable, contends the counsel for the contestants, why he should have attempted to bequeath what he did not own, upon any hypothesis consistent with his mental competency. Dama knew very well, no man better, what he owned and what he did not pwn, and this vain bequest cannot be explained away on the ground of the testator’s idiosyncratic character. Was it a vain bequest. Did he possess or own on May 8, 1887, eleven (11) government bonds *121of the United States of America, nine of one thousand dollars each ($1,000) and two of five hundred each ($500), as described in clause Fourthly of the alleged Will, and in clause Fourthly of the “Altered Will,” November 1, 1885, in the same terms? These are described in the same way in the “Long Memorandum,” Respondent’s Exhibit No. 2.


Unlike Count I of the Amended Information, Count I of the First Information alleged a violation of section 570.090.1(1), which criminalizes the <mask> of a "writing." As we discuss in our analysis of Point III, after seeking leave to amend its information to charge Baker with violation of section 570.090.1(3), instead of section 570.090.1(1), the State took affirmative steps to abandon its attempt to pursue criminal charges against Baker pursuant to section 570.090.1(1).


The bill charges that by fraudulent representations, Palmer obtained a letter from J. Livingston to the Sperrys, directing *522them to contract with him; and that the Sperrys without any ¡etter 0f attorney or authority whatever, other than the letter brought to them by Palmer, executed a deed under seal, with ^ covenants’not to Palmer but to Murray. The letter was ’ a special authority, and must be strictly pursued: it authorized a contract with Palmer, but not with any other person% much less did it authorize a deed under seal. A deed under seal cannot be execcuted by attorney without an authority under seal. The deed executed by the Sperrys, professing to act as the attornies of J. Livingston, was not obligatory upon him ; as to him, I apprehend, it was void. It is said that a deed which is voidable only, must be avoided by special pleading ; but when it is absolutely void, the plea is non estfactum. If John Livingston were living, and an action were brought upon the deed in question, it would certainly be sufficient to plead the general issue ; and upon the trial it must be shewn that the person professing to act as attorney, had authority by deed. According to the facts in this case, as charged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer, no such authority could be shown ; of course, the deed is not the deed of John Livingston. The entry of Murray and Palmer was therefore without a deed; they are in no better situation as to adverse posses» ' sion than if they had no deed, and in that case, I have endeavored to show that the possession could not be adverse. It is true, that to sustain an adverse possession, it is not necessary that a deed should be a valid deed, but it must be such an one as might be valid, and which the grantee relies on. ■The grantee in this case being privy to the manner in which this deed was obtained without authority, knew, for he was bound to know, as ignorance excuses no man, that the deed was inoperative and void. But the defendants, Murray and Palmer, not only knew that the deed was without authority, but they also knew that the authority which was given to contract the lot to Palmer was also void, as having been obtained by fraud. The letter in terms authorized a contract with Palmer ; and instead of this an absolute deed-is given to Murray, not even pursuing the authority of the letter. It seems to me, therefore, that the deed was a nullity, and that the defendants, Murray and Palmer, knew it to be so. It was *523therefore no foundation for an adverse possession. It did not divest the nominal grantor of any interest whatever; it vested no estate in the nominal grantee; he was a trespasser. The case of Bradstreet v. Huntington, has been cited to prove that an adverse possession may commence under a void deed, or one obtained by fraud. At common law, a feoffment could not be made without livery of seising or a delivery of the possession ; and where the owner was disseized of the possession, he could not convey to a third person, because he could not deliver possession, that being held by the disseizor; and yet it is settled law that such a deed is good between the parties to it; it is good as against the grantor and his heirs, it conveys all the interest of the grantor to the grantee, but the grantee cannot enforce it in his own name against the disseizor, though it may be done in the name of the grantor. It has been supposed in the above case that an adverse possession should more properly havebeen called an ouster or disseisin. Though they are sometimes synonimous, they are not always so. Á disseisin, it is said, may commence by force or fraud ; an adverse possession may commence by force, but, I apprehend, not by fraud, as for instance, under a deed obtained by fraud or by <mask>. The person guilty of the fraud or forgery cannot rely upon such a deed as conveying a valid title j and the arguments which have gone the greatest length in favor of adverse possession, have proceeded on the ground that the possessor relied on his title, and believed the property which he possessed to be his own. A man may think himself the true owner of property in the possession of another, and may take forcible possession under claim of title ; that is an adverse possession ; but if, with a full knowledge that such property belongs to another, a person procures a forged deed, and enters under that, what is the quo animo ? Is it an intent to enjoy his own, or to defraud another 1 And it has been often said and decided that the fact of possession and the quo animo the possession was taken, are the only tests. If the quo animo is a Iona fide intention to enjoy his own property, that intent can never exist where the possessor knows the property is not his own. If the quo animo is meant an intention to appropriate the property to his own use, right or wrong, then indeed is the possession of almost all intruders adverse.


Comparison of signatures by the court, pursuant to CPLR 4536 was precluded by the State’s failure to produce "any writing proved * * * to be the handwriting of the person claimed to have made the disputed writing”. None of the signatures admitted into evidence was proved to be the authentic signature of the U. A. Rodriguez to whom the checks were issued, since, as previously indicated, Ms. Greenstein did not personally know the interviewee, and the documents allegedly forming the basis of her comparison were not placed in evidence. (Cf. Matter of Gonzalez v Dumpson, 46 AD2d 861.) Consequently, although the signatures on the checks and the signature on the interview form are quite different, they bear equal claims to authenticity and, therefore, do not constitute evidence of <mask>.


Assuming, in argument only, that the circumstances here disclosed did give rise to certain equities on the part of claimant, no estoppel through laches has been established for no injury through such delay has been proved. Although the claimant’s complaint is the absence of Sadie Jaffe, there is nothing before the court to indicate that the delay herein has been the cause of claimant’s inability to produce her. Whether the delay in this case has operated to the actual prejudice of claimant, and, if so, to what extent, remain matters of speculation and conjecture. There is no proof in the case that any person by the name of Sadie Jaffe ever existed. In view of the foregoing, and, further, of the finding by this court that the purported signature of the decedent upon the alleged instrument of guaranty was a <mask>, there is no inference, as contended by claimant, that Sadie Jaffe, if existent and if available to it, would have testified contrary to the facts as found by the court. On the contrary, the inference to be drawn herein is that no such person as the alleged witness ever existed. Finally, assuming all things favorable to claimant, there is no way of estimating, under the circumstances of this case, the effect of any such unknown testimony upon the court.


This court specifically finds that a Federally issued resident alien card, often referred to as a “Green Card”, is covered by this State’s <mask> laws. See People v Fury (279 NY 433 [1939]) to the effect that a Federal Reserve bank note is covered by the Penal Law on forgery. The fact that the Federal Government *191had. made uttering of counterfeit bank notes a crime and that only the Federal Government could coin money or issue legal currency or tender did not bar the State from making the uttering of counterfeit bank notes a felony. (People v Fury, supra; People v Kalmus 123 NYS2d 411 [Ct Gen Sess, NY County 1953].) The same act may constitute an offense against both the State and Federal Government. (People v Broady, 5 NY2d 500 [1959].)


It is true that Gaughan committed the crime of <mask>, both when he signed the name of the maker to the $1,000 check without authority, and when he uttered the instrument thus forged with criminal intent. However, there was no forged indorsement, because of the facts which I have recited with reference to the identity of the payee named in the $1,000 check and the man who owned the account with plaintiff to whose credit the check was placed. Neither can it be claimed, so far as the case at bar is concerned, that Gaughan committed any crime when he opened the account with plaintiff as “ Oawley,” or when he transacted business pertaining thereto as “ Oawley,” so long as he merely assumed that name to designate himself and not with criminal intent for the purpose of representing himself to be a “ Michael J. Oawley ” who really existed. The only conclusion I can reach from the facts presented is that the defendant has certified as good a forged signature to a check which the plaintiff, in good faith, in the ordinary course of business and with the exercise of due caution, has paid. Therefore, under our statute, the defendant is liable.


Let us see. Is it a case of <mask> ? I am entirely with the proposition of the people that a person who exceeds his authority in filling up a paper of this character would be guilty of forgery. If he has specific authority and exceeds it,—to wit, if he had authority to fill up a check to pay a certain bill and he filled it up to pay another, or if he liad authority to fill up a check for a certain amount and filled it up for a larger amount,—either of those circumstances would make it forgery. There are a good many other circumstances under which it might be forgery. But, did the defendant exceed his authority \ The people say “ Tes,’5 because lie filled this cheek up to his own order, and at the time had a fraudulent intent.


The evidence of <mask> was sufficient as to the defendant Bilboa, however, despite his use of his own name to endorse the Murro check, since the Grand Jury could infer from Bilboa’s act of depositing Murro’s paycheck into his own account, that Bilboa knew Murro did not exist and therefore, *29also knew that he did not have authority to endorse the check as foreman (see, People v McLaughlin, 174 AD2d 418, 420 [1st Dept 1991]; United States v Brown, 236d 403 [2d Cir 1956]). This evidence also suffices to establish the pattern crime of conspiracy to commit grand larceny in regard to the Murro salary. Nonetheless, the evidence of enterprise corruption is insufficient as to Bilboa. The forgery and possession of a forged instrument alleged against Bilboa relate to a single check. The alleged forgery and possession of the forged check are therefore a single criminal act (see, e.g., People ex rel. Fitzgerald v Maher, 61 Misc 2d 22 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1969] [interpreting the phrase "single act or omission” in Penal Law § 70.25 (2)]; People v Rolling, 176 AD2d 973, 974 [2d Dept 1991]). The evidence therefore fails to establish that Bilboa committed three criminal acts included within the pattern of criminal activity. (Penal Law § 460.20 [2].)


“ I think that there is a marked difference between the two cases. Where a debtor has by fraud or <mask> obtained money or property from another, any disposition which he may make of what he has so received is unjust and unfair to the creditor whom he has defrauded, and when he applies for discharge from imprisonment in the action which his swindled creditor has brought against him, it is no reason for granting the discharge that he has lost or spent his creditor’s money; no proof need be offered that he has wrongfully disposed of any other property, it is enough that he does not restore the propert}' out of which he has swindled his creditor. An intent to injure the creditor must be conclusively presumed from the bare fact that the debtor has wrongfully disposed of the property of the creditor.


“ Charge III: Violation of the 93d Article of War “ Specification I: ‘ In that Private Bernard j. kadin, Company R, 1st Regiment, 9301 Technical Service Unit, Detachment No. 3, Army Service Forces Training Center (Ordnance), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, with intent to defraud The Western Union Telegraph Company at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, did, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, on or about 17 December 1945 forge the signature of Private Norman Fountain upon a Western Union Money Order’.” (Copy of Money Order on original of army papers.) The 93d Article of War reads: “ Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, <mask>, sodomy, assault with intent to commit any felony, assault with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, an instrument, or other thing, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. ’ ’


We agree with the superior court that Buck is instructive here. Like the victims in Buck , the Lorenzanas believed the Deo Deed of Trust they were signing was substantially different from what it actually was. Moreover, the Lorenzanas had no intention of encumbering the Wittman Property with the Deo loan or Deo Deed of Trust. To the contrary, they believed they were purchasing the Wittman Property with cash from the proceeds of the Corrals' loan with Bank of the Internet. The superior court found that they were not aware that they were borrowing additional money to be secured by the Wittman Property. Thus, the Deo Deed of Trust was a <mask>. (See Buck , supra , 232 Cal.App.2d at p. 162, 42 Cal.Rptr. 527 ; accord People v. Parker (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 664, 672, 63 Cal.Rptr. 413 ; People v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 331, 337, 55 Cal.Rptr. 450 ; People v. Bresin (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 232, 238-240, 53 Cal.Rptr. 687 ; People v. Carson (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 477, 480, 49 Cal.Rptr. 653.)


Defendant’s motion for leave to amend its pleadings to assert the affirmative defense of <mask> was properly granted *461pursuant to CPLR 3025, since such leave is to be liberally granted in cases such as this one, where the proposed amendment is not palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law and plaintiff would not be prejudiced (Shepherd v New York City Tr. Auth., 129 AD2d 574).


Thus summary judgment cannot be granted plaintiff herein and accordingly its motion for same is denied. Even though the defendant has not moved for summary judgment for himself, this court would be empowered to grant same on its own by reason of the law as set forth above, except that this court finds that important triable issues of fact remain respecting whether or not defendant knew of the <mask> and whether or not he is a holder in due course. This is inherent in the unusual fact pattern of this case. Without prejudging the issues, one must still reflect that a check for $2,200 is a rather large check for a small establishment such as Rita’s Grocery to be cashing, especially where the person cashing the check is only an employee of Rita’s and not the owner, where it is apparent he was not personally acquainted with the Gordon Jackson whom the drawer of the check purported to be, and where the Village of Green Island being a rather small place geographically, one (including the defendant) might well wonder why the person representing himself to be Gordon Jackson, if he were the genuine article, didn’t cash his check at plaintiff’s bank himself (it being a branch of the very bank in which his account was located) instead of at Rita’s Grocery.


The requirements of the Statute of Wills are highly peculiar. This statute stands in some respects only in the same category with such enactments as the Statute of Frauds and its prototype, the French Ordormance de Moulms of the year 1566. These enactments nevertheless required, in almost every instance, a substantial compliance with the direction prescribed. But the Statute of Wills refers to unilateral act only. Without adherence in every respect to the'directions prescribed by statute, a unilateral act of a party may have no validity whatever. When a unilateral act is of a gwcm-public character, and a will is such, the state universally prescribes with particularity the formalities requisite for the authentication or validity of the act itself. The reason why the requirements of the Statute of Wills demand implicit obedience is that, as an act of testamentation is unilateral and to take effect after the death of the chief actor, it is peculiarly exposed to fraud, simulation, or even <mask>. Therefore it is, that for the making of wills special forms were required by law. The forms prescribed are then closely obligatory in order to give validity to the act. The motive of the legislative requirement may be, and in the instance of testamentation is, no doubt, corroboration or authentication, and to prevent fraud. In the instance of a testamentary act it may be stated generally as a rule of law that, *217without adherence to the prescribed forms, the act itself has no juridical value whatever. The Statute of Wills does not impose forms with a view to the convenience of the parties, and their omission is consequently not optional or immaterial, but the forms themselves" go to the very essence of the legal act. It is an error to regard such directions as mere technicalities, for they are founded on the highest public policy, and a noncompliance is fatal to the validity of the act attempted.


Subsequently, in September 2005 Kay and Prudential applied to NASD for the appointment of an arbitrator to act upon the expungement request. The single arbitrator appointed issued the award without having held a hearing, apparently relying solely on the stipulation and communications from the broker. The award provided that the record of the NASD arbitration should be expunged from the CRD records because “[t]he registered person was not involved in the alleged investment-*373related sales practice violation, <mask>, theft, misappropriation, or conversion of funds.” It is noted that the arbitrator made such finding although Kay acknowledged that she had handled Abrams’ account at Prudential, and the basis of the request for expungement was on a different ground, to wit, that the claim was “factually impossible or clearly erroneous.” Kay seeks to have the award confirmed in this proceeding.


In no act of the Legislature is the intent made more plain to differentiate acts which are declared forgeries, because of the different mental elements necessary to each, than in section 514 of the Penal Code, defining <mask> in the third degree. In the first subdivision it is necessary that the acts described be done corruptly and unlawfully; in the second, that the acts be done with intent to injure or defraud; in the third, that the acts be done with knowledge of their falsity; and in the fourth, that the acts be done with intent to defraud. These subdivisions were inserted in the Code by different enactments. See Laws of 1881, chap. 676; Laws of 1884, chap. 378; Laws of 1892, chap. 692.


*531Examining the Grand Jury minutes for legal sufficiency, it is clear that the People have established a prima facie case with regard to counts 1-7 charging the crimes of advertisement or sale of unauthorized recording, failure to disclose the origin of a recording, and criminal possession of a forged instrument. In this regard it is noted that the Grand Jury was charged and voted as to the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree. The indictment, however, in part indicates "Penal Law 170.25”. That section refers to second degree criminal <mask>. The body of the indictment indicates third degree forgery. The defendant is free to make any formal motion regarding this inconsistency. With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is legally sufficient for the crimes voted by the Grand Jury and the crimes contained in the body of the indictment.


That case turned on the question of <mask>, and in reference to the admissibility of declarations the court held (relying upon Waterman v. Whitney, and Jackson v. Betts; 6 Cow., 377), that upon the probate, declarations of the testator made before the factum, that he intended to give his property to the legatees named in the will, and declarations made by him after the factum, that he made such a will, *308and stating who were the witnesses, and where the will was, were not admissible in proof of the execution of the will. But this point does not seem to have received so much consideration as others involved in the case, and the distinction pointed out by the surrogate in the case in the text, does not appear to have been adverted to.


Even assuming that this Court's majority opinion correctly concludes that applicant's claim is not cognizable in a post-conviction habeas proceeding, I respectfully disagree with its assessment that his claim cannot be considered through the vehicle of mandamus due to the lack of a clear right to relief. In other situations, this Court has treated matters that would not otherwise be cognizable on habeas as *840presenting a viable basis for mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re Daniel , 396 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). And, as I have explained above, the relevant statutes and board policies make clear that the parole board has no discretion to treat applicant's <mask> and drug-delivery sentences as a single sentence for purposes of determining his parole eligibility-rather, each sentence triggers a distinct parole eligibility date and must be considered independently. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.145(f) ; 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 145.3(4). This is particularly true in the context of an inmate who has a yet-to-commence consecutive sentence. The Government Code expressly contemplates the possibility of release on parole "on paper" as to a defendant's first stacked sentence so that he may commence serving his second stacked sentence sooner. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.150(a), (b)(2). As an alternative to habeas relief, applicant's complaint constitutes an appropriate basis for mandamus relief because, here, applicant has a clear right to relief under the relevant statutes and board policies and no other adequate remedy at law. See In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (a clear right to relief is shown when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision under unequivocal, well-settled, and clearly controlling legal principles; an issue of first impression can sometimes qualify for mandamus relief); In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Alternatively, therefore, if habeas relief is not permitted due to this Court's decision to overrule Sepeda , I would grant applicant mandamus relief.


■“ It is urged that the Surrogate’s Court has no equity jurisdiction. It is undoubtedly true. And it is further 'urged that, therefore, the court could not decree that this appellant was not the widow of the testator; and in support of this proposition our attention is called to the well-established principle that the Surrogate’s Court has no power to annul or set aside, on the ground of fraud, a release executed by the. parties interested in the estate to the executors thereof. But it has never been held that the Surrogate’s Court had no power to try the question *309as to whether any such alleged release existed or not. The Surrogate’s Court would undoubtedly have the right to try the question of a release presented before him as to whether it had' ever been signed, or whether it was a <mask>; and it is a similar question which was being determined by the surrogate in reference to the alleged marriage with the testator. He was not making a decree annulling the marriage. He was simply determining the question as to whether the contestant had any status in his court by reason of her being the testator’s widow. In order that this performance in Hew Jersey between Hamilton and the appellant should be a marriage, it was necessary that both parties should be free to contract, and, if either party was under a disability, although the parties went through the forms of a marriage, there was no marriage, and that is all that the surrogate attempted to determine.


On August 13, 1924, the said Conrad Hammer, Jr., executor, drew a check to the order of Frank A. Heisz on the funds of said estate on deposit with the Citizens Trust Company, main office, in the sum of $5,000, which said check, at the request of said Conrad Hammer, Jr., was duly certified by said the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo, Citizens Branch, the Citizens Trust Company of Buffalo having merged with the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo and then being a branch of said the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo, which said check purports to be indorsed by the said Frank A. Heisz and was indorsed by Conrad Hammer, Jr., and deposited in his personal account in the Buffalo Trust Company, it appearing as a matter of fact that the indorsement of said Frank A. Heisz on said check was a <mask>, and said check was paid out of the funds of said estate on deposit in the Citizens Branch of the Marine Trust Company of Buffalo to the credit of said estate.


This court has consistently held that theft crimes involve dishonesty, regardless of the facts underlying the particular offense. See, e.g. , State v. Cassell , 2013 Ark. 221, 427 S.W.3d 663 (stating that the crime was infamous because it was a theft offense, which involves dishonesty); Edwards v. Campbell , 2010 Ark. 398, 370 S.W.3d 250 (holding that misdemeanor theft of property, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a), is a crime of dishonesty); Webster v. State , 284 Ark. 206, 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984) (stating that grand larceny involves dishonesty); Floyd v. State , 278 Ark. 86, 643 S.W.2d 555 (1982) (holding that conviction for theft was admissible for impeachment because it is a crime of dishonesty); James v. State , 274 Ark. 162, 622 S.W.2d 669 (1981) (stating that prior convictions for theft, grand larceny, and <mask> all involved dishonesty); Gustafson v. State , 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979) (holding that convictions for larceny and burglary were indicative of dishonesty under Rule 609(a) ). Further, under Rule 609(a)(2), when considering the admissibility of a crime involving dishonesty, courts are not required to compare the weight of the probative value to the prejudicial effect, and we have held that these crimes are automatically admissible. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Tr. Dep't , 347 Ark. 826, 69 S.W.3d 20 (2002) (citing congressional commentary to Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), which is identical to our rule).