We hold that, when a defendant is charged with <mask> "knowing that the monetary instrument represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal activity," the prosecution must demonstrate that the amount of the illegally obtained funds equals or exceeds the amount of the monetary transaction, whether or not the illegally obtained funds have been commingled with legally obtained funds. ( Pen. Code, § 186.10, subd. (a).) The prosecution need not trace every illegal dollar to the monetary instrument. In this case, there was sufficient evidence that the amount of money defendant embezzled from the law firm and placed in his Wescom Credit Union account was greater than the amount of the monetary transactions charged in the money laundering counts. Therefore, defendant's convictions for money laundering must be affirmed.


In 2010, the BLP collapsed and Plaintiffs lost their investments. An FBI investigation revealed that Sigillito operated the BLP as a Ponzi scheme. Unsealing the indictment in May 2011, the United States charged Sigillito with <mask>, wire fraud, and mail fraud. The federal indictment asserted that, inter alia , Sigillito and Brown retained unauthorized placement fees after transferring their clients' assets. A jury found Sigillito guilty, and the federal district court sentenced him to forty years in prison. Sigillito's convictions and sentences were affirmed. United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 941 (8th Cir. 2014).


Applying the capable-of-ascertaimnent test objectively, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs demonstrate that their damages were capable of ascertainment by May 2011, The parties agree that the BLP collapsed after an FBI investigation in 2010 and that Plaintiffs received notice of their extensive investment losses shortly thereafter. The parties acknowledge that Sigillito's federal indictment was unsealed in May 2011. Sigillito's indictment revealed the charges of <mask>, wire fraud, and mail fraud arising from BLP operations. The federal indictment exposed the wrongful nature of the BLP venture, linking Plaintiffs' investment losses to, and unveiling the damage caused by, the BLP's administration. The federal indictment also established that Sigillito, in managing the BLP, retained numerous unauthorized placement fees before directing the distribution of his clients' assets to overseas borrowers and committed improper self-dealing in these transfers.


Appellant was tried on one count of engaging in organized criminal activity. That count alleged that Appellant, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination3 or in the profits of a combination, committed second degree theft or second degree <mask>.4 The theory was that Appellant was part of a criminal ring that committed multiple jewelry store heists. The biggest heist, and the focus of the trial, was that of a Houston store called Karat 22, which was owned by Aku Patel. As the name might imply, Karat 22 specialized in high-quality gold jewelry.


Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, KELVIN LYNN O'BRIEN, heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, with intent to establish, maintain or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, said combination, consisting of Kelvin O'Brien and at least two of the following: John O'Brien and/or Derenda O'Brien and/or Jason Kennedy, commit the offense of theft in that the defendant on or about February 6, 2011 did unlawfully appropriate by acquiring or otherwise exercising control over property, namely, gold, jewelry, gems and watches owned by C. Patel or Karat 22 Jewelers of the value of over two hundred thousand dollars with the intent to deprive C. Patel or Karat 22 Jewelers of the property then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment; or If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, KELVIN LYNN O'BRIEN, heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, with intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, said combination consisting of Kelvin O'Brien and at least two of the following: John O'Brien and/or Derenda O'Brien and/or Jason Kennedy, commit the offense of <mask>, namely in that he heretofore on or about August 13, 2007 and continuing through April 12, 2013, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly transfer, invest or expend funds which constituted the proceeds of criminal activity, of the value of at least two hundred thousand dollars by purchasing a house, by purchasing a pool, by purchasing motor vehicles, by purchasing a boat, by purchasing a watch, by purchasing heavy equipment, by moving funds from one bank account to another or by paying bondsmen's fees, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. The word "unanimously" appeared in the section of the jury charge dealing with selection of the jury foreman:


After you retire to the jury room, you should select one of your members as your Foreman. It is his or her duty to preside at your deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict, to certify to your verdict by using the appropriate form attached hereto and signing the same as Foreman. *382Without objection, the prosecution explained at closing, as it had in voir dire, that the jury did not have to agree on whether Appellant committed the predicate offense of theft, or that of <mask>. Appellant was convicted and punishment was assessed at life in prison.


Though Appellant did not object to the jury charge at trial, he argued on appeal that the jury instructions permitted a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, he argued the application paragraph did not require the jury to be unanimous regarding which predicate offense had been committed by Appellant and his criminal combination. According to Appellant, the predicate offenses of theft and <mask> were essential elements of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity rather than alternate manner and means.


If the specific enumerated offense was an essential element of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, then the use of the term "one or more" would be meaningless, because the commission of each enumerated offense would constitute a separate instance of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity.8 Appellant petitioned this Court to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that unanimity is not required with respect to the predicate offenses of theft and <mask>. As he points out, his case is unique in that he was charged with committing two different predicate offenses rather than multiple instances of the same predicate offense. We therefore granted review.


As we explain more fully below, engaging in organized criminal activity is a "circumstances of the conduct," offense, the circumstance being the existence or creation of a combination that collaborates in carrying out criminal activities.23 Consequently, the jury was not required to be unanimous regarding the individual predicate offenses because they are a different manner and means of committing the same offense. Moreover, treating the predicate offenses as manner and means in this case does not run afoul of due process because the offenses at issue are morally and conceptually equivalent. Consequently, the trial court properly instructed the jury in the disjunctive with regard to the predicate offenses of theft and <mask>.


In sum, we must return to eighth-grade grammar to determine what elements the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt. At a minimum, these are: the subject (the defendant); the main verb; and the direct object if the main verb requires a direct object (i.e. the offense is a result-oriented crime); and the specific occasion (the date phrase within the indictment, but narrowed down to one specific intent regardless of the date alleged). Generally, adverbial phrases, introduced by the preposition "by," describe the manner and means of committing the offense. They are not the gravamen of the offense, nor elements on which the jury must be unanimous.36 In this case, the indictment and the jury charge used the preposition "by" to describe the manner in which the predicate offenses were alleged to have been committed rather than as a way to differentiate between the two predicate offenses of theft and <mask>.37 According to Appellant, this indicates that predicate offenses are elements rather than manner and means.


Appellant argues, however, that engaging in organized criminal activity is one of those crimes. We need not decide that question in this case because it is enough to say that the two predicate offenses alleged here-theft and money laundering-are morally and conceptually equivalent.85 Significantly, the <mask> statute requires proof of a temporal connection or nexus between the transferred money and some criminal activity, in this case the theft of the jewelry.86 So the jury was required to determine, when reaching its verdict, whether the "proceeds of criminal activity" came from the alleged theft in order to convict Appellant under a money laundering theory of engaging. In this way, the different predicate offenses are tied together similar to the way the underlying felonies are tied together in the felony murder statute.87 Moreover, the degree of offense for both theft and money laundering is tied to the same value ladder rendering both offenses first degree felonies.88 Consequently, the Legislature's decision to treat these predicate offenses as alternate manner and means of committing the same offense did not run afoul of due process.89


Appellant essentially argues that permitting a conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity without requiring unanimity as to the predicate offense seems "contrary to due process" given the broad range of enumerated predicate offenses (e.g. , gambling to capital murder). There are two flaws with appellant's position. First, as this Court's majority opinion points out, here the two offenses that were pleaded in the alternative were both first-degree felonies involving the unlawful treatment of property-theft and <mask>. Second and perhaps more importantly, appellant fails to consider the statute as a whole, as required by this Court's precedent. See Yazdchi v. State , 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The punishment range for engaging in organized criminal activity is dependent on the punishment classification of the highest predicate offense found by the jury.3 Given the plain statutory language *397prescribing the punishment range for engaging in organized criminal activity, it is clear that the jury must unanimously determine any predicate offenses on which it relies as alternative manner and means if they are not the same grade misdemeanor or felony. Here, the two predicate offenses that the jury was permitted to find in the disjunctive were both first-degree felonies and thus, under the plain language of the statute, appellant would be sentenced to the same punishment range regardless of which predicate offense had been found by the jury. Appellant has made no argument to explain how there could be a due process violation under the circumstances here where the two predicate offenses alleged are both first-degree felonies involving property.4


Additionally, even though the majority already holds that the jury does not need to be unanimous as to the predicate offenses, it nevertheless engages in Schad analysis to reach the holding that the theft and <mask> in this case are both morally and conceptually equivalent. The majority's analysis in this regard is hedging its bets: in case it is wrong about whether the predicate offenses need unanimous verdicts as a general rule of law, at least the predicates in this case do not. As far as the actual analysis about why the offenses are morally and conceptually equivalent, I am unsure if the majority's reasoning is sound. Essentially, the reasoning is: (1) the offenses are connected because the money laundering is laundering the proceeds of the theft; (2) they are both first degree felonies in this case. This is nowhere near the same as the kill-and-burn/burn-and-kill example given by Justice Scalia.


O'Brien , 482 S.W.3d at 607 ("The indictment states that Kelvin committed the enumerated offense of theft 'by acquiring and otherwise exercising control over property ... owned by' Karat 22 and the enumerated offense of <mask> 'by purchasing a house, by purchasing a pool, by purchasing motor vehicles,' etc."). The application paragraph of the jury charge adopts this construction.


Tex. Penal Code § 34.02(a)(1) ; see also Deschenes v. State , 253 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) ("In order for a conviction for <mask> under § 34.02(a)(1) to be upheld, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence of a temporal connection, or nexus, between the money and some criminal activity."). Arguably, the State could have even chosen to charge Appellant with theft of money rather than money laundering, making this case conceptually identical to the different thefts at issue in Renteria . This would further suggest that the underlying brute facts of the two alleged predicate offenses were morally and conceptually equivalent.


Compare Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(e)(7) (listing theft as a first degree felony if the value of the property stolen is $300,000 or more) with Tex. Penal Code § 34.02(e)(4) listing <mask> as a first degree if the value of the funds is $300,000 or more); see also White , 208 S.W.3d at 469 (holding that the state-jail-offenses of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and evading arrest or detention in a vehicle were morally and conceptually equivalent).


smuggling or failing to report cash is more serious than the Court is willing to acknowledge. The drug trade, <mask>, and tax evasion all depend in part on smuggled and unreported cash. Congress enacted the reporting requirement because secret exports of money were being used in organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, pp. 12-13 (1970). Likewise, tax evaders were using cash exports to dodge hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes owed to the Government.


524 U.S. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent noted that because <mask> and drug smuggling are so difficult to prove, and “[o]ne of the few reliable warning signs of some serious crimes is the use of large sums of cash,” Congress made a strategic decision to punish all cash smuggling or nonreporting with heavy fines, so long as the conduct was “willful.” Id. at 353-54. State v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, No. 99407-2 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)


Per Curiam. On February 8, 2013, in the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), the respondent pleaded guilty to 13 felony counts: 10 counts of grand larceny in the second degree, a class C felony, in violation of Penal Law § 155.40 (1); <mask> in the first degree, a class B felony, in violation of Penal Law § 470.20 (1); scheme to defraud in the first degree, a class E felony in violation of Penal Law § 190.65 (1) (b); and conspiracy in the fourth degree, a class E felony, in violation of Penal Law § 105.10 (D.


On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court sentenced the respondent to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 2 to 6 years for each of the grand larceny convictions, 3 to 9 years for the <mask> conviction, 2 to 6 years for the scheme to defraud conviction, and 1 to 3 years for the conspiracy conviction. The respondent was also directed to pay a crime victims’ assessment fee of $25, a DNA fee of $50, and a surcharge of $300. The respondent failed to notify the Court of his convictions.


In September 1994 the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York informed petitioner of an investigation her office had conducted in 1990, which implicated respondent in narcotics trafficking and <mask>. Respondent’s alleged involvement in these activities was through her relationship with one Selwyn Wilson, a young man whom her firm had represented in a criminal matter in the mid-1980’s. Charged with assault and robbery, Wilson had pleaded guilty to reduced charges and received a sentence of probation, on condition that he maintain lawful employment. Respondent developed a "warm familial relationship” with Wilson (counsel describes him as respondent’s "surrogate son”), employing him briefly as an office clerk and then as her personal assistant and driver. According to Wilson, he escorted respondent in the latter capacity to meetings and social functions, and on those occasions he often spent the night at her homes in the Bronx or in Brookville, Long Island.


Subsequently, respondent was convicted in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, of one count of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 USC § 371 and one count of <mask> in violation of 18 USC § 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i). By order and decision entered November 15, 1994 (Matter of Stern, 205 AD2d 162), this Court determined that respondent’s convictions constituted "serious crimes” within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and 22 NYCRR 608.12 (b), suspended respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f) and referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee for a hearing as to sanction.


Two weeks before the scheduled trial date, and four months before the trial actually commenced, Suh filed an ex parte application to stay this action indefinitely. Counsel for Suh had recently learned the district attorney was investigating Suh's participation in the <mask> scheme. Citing her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Suh argued: "Clearly, any discovery sought by plaintiffs in this matter, or testimony offered by [Suh] in her defense at trial, would necessarily require [Suh] to answer questions related to the very documents and events that would form the basis of a criminal prosecution for insurance fraud." During a brief hearing on the application, counsel for Allstate observed that Suh was "one of two ringleaders in this case" and "a central witness" and that, if the court were to issue a stay, the stay should apply only to discovery. The trial court denied the ex parte application.


This court is of the firm belief that the public policy goal announced in Schaubman v Blum (supra) and pointedly affirmed in Matter of Camperlengo v Blum (supra, at 255) and Grand Jury v Kuriansky (supra), that is, an assurance that public funds from Medicaid will not be fraudulently diverted into the hands of an untrustworthy provider of services, is equally applicable to the inherent design and orderly functioning of the Federally funded Medicare program. No rational distinction may be drawn, insofar as record keeping and reporting requirements are concerned, between these two publicly funded health insurance programs. It should be a matter of sound public policy that those officials, who are charged with maintaining vigilance over public funds dedicated to the Medicare program, have available to them a legitimate and unqualified means of access to medical reports required for specific investigations, in light of the potential for massive <mask>.


Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations.


Plaintiffs, moreover, have remedies available to them that are not available to the millions of New York motorists that pay the additional premium costs that the Court of Appeals has identified as resulting from automobile <mask> (see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 861 [2003]). Service providers may explicitly include in their assignment documents provision for recourse against the assignor if the insurer does not pay because of lack of coverage, and the providers may bring an assignor into any action against the carrier when the carrier defends nonpayment on the ground of lack of coverage.


. People v Alfaro (121 Misc 2d 804 [Sup Ct, Queens County], affd 108 AD2d 517 [2d Dept 1985]), cited by defendant, is not controlling. In Alfaro, the defendant’s fraudulent claim was rejected by the insurer. In the absence of evidence that defendant’s claim included any dollar amounts the court found defendant guilty only of the misdemeanor <mask>. The situation here, involving claims settled for a sum certain, is distinguishable.


*594Lastly, in Rosenberg , the defendant, a physician, retained an attorney for an investigation related to alleged <mask> and any criminal litigation that may result from it. The United States charged the defendant with two counts of knowingly receiving and retaining stolen property of the United States. The defendant pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to two years' probation and ordered to pay restitution of $209,435.78.


The indictment before the jury charges the defendant, Paul Novak, for the murder of his estranged wife, arson in connection with the burning of the marital residence, burglary, grand larceny and <mask>. Jury selection for this trial began on August 5, 2013. At some point prior to jury selection, defendant sought out and gave an interview to the reporter for the Record who has been reporting on this case for some time.2 That interview occurred on August 2, 2013. The Times Herald-Record ran a front-page story about the defendant and on the *751interview in the August 4, 2013, Sunday edition of the paper. It also posted a “portion” of the video recorded interview on its website on August 4, 2013. The running of the story and posting of the interview detrimentally affected the jury pool, but the parties were eventually able to seat 12 jurors and eight alternate jurors. Opening statements and testimony commenced the following week, on August 12, 2013.


The present indictment charges the defendant, a lawyer whose office is in Manhattan, with <mask> and falsifying business records of Dr. Kaiser and the insurer. The charges, clarified by a bill of particulars, allege that the defendant solicited Kaiser on the telephone to make up and submit back-dated bills for fictitious visits by two clients, to beef up claims on insurance policies for injuries from automobile accidents. During the conversation, Kaiser was in Kings County, having telephoned the defendant’s office in Manhattan from the District Attorney’s office in Brooklyn.


On November 7, 2017, the Fourth District, Division Three, issued Hoffman v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1086, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 818, after an order to show cause on substantially similar issues at the direction of the Supreme Court. Hoffman involved similar <mask> charges, aggregated to form felony counts, contained in an information and reviewed for probable cause at a preliminary hearing. It was also subject to a demurrer, which that superior court overruled. Here, petitioner was indicted by a grand jury, which heard testimony and received exhibits into evidence. The case is presented here as a writ petition following denial of a section 995 motion. Substantively, the cases are closely related. The Supreme Court denied review of Hoffman on February 14, 2018. Because of the difference in procedural posture in this case from Hoffman and because this case also addresses Insurance Code section 1871.4, which Hoffman does not, we issue Heidary v. Superior Court as a published opinion.


Here, an attempted larceny or attempted <mask> within the unlawfully entered premises can be inferred from the conduct at the Regency Warehouse. "A person is guilty of an attempt * * * when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.” (Penal Law § 110.00.) Evidence that an insured has arranged for his own property to be destroyed or "stolen” in preparation for filing a false insurance claim has been held to constitute an attempted insurance fraud. (People v Vastano, 117 AD2d 637; see also, People v Trepanier, 84 AD2d 374.)


"The business of insurance involves many transactions that have the potential for abuse and illegal activities," and "[a]utomobile <mask> is the biggest and fastest growing segment of insurance fraud ...." ( Ins. Code, § 1871, subds. (a), (b).) The Insurance Frauds Prevention Act ( Ins. Code, § 1871 et seq. ) addresses this problem by creating civil liability for violating several insurance fraud provisions of the Penal Code, including section 550.


The issue of materiality has already been discussed in connection with the charges of <mask>, and the same reasoning would apply in regard to the charge of perjury in the first degree. In other words, false testimony, to the effect that the defendant did not have other insurance coverage, would be material only if it altered the insurance carrier’s financial liability, or, otherwise, adversely affected the carrier’s position.


Moreover, identity is not at issue; thus, the court fails to see how this exception to admission is applicable. Furthermore, the *744People have not demonstrated that the evidence is admissible under the common plan or scheme since it is not so inextricably interwoven as in some of the cases upon which they rely to support this proposition.6 Additionally, although this case does involve a crime of intent, it is this court’s opinion that intent, and thus absence of mistake or accident, may be inferred from the charged crimes for which defendant is on trial involving two incidents of <mask> with two different undercover officers. (See People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 856 [1996] [court properly denied admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct to prove intent, although it was element of crime, since issue was one of credibility whereby defendant claimed consent and intent could be inferred from act itself].)


On March 5, 2009, petitioner pleaded guilty to the felonies of falsifying business records in the first degree, <mask> in the fifth degree, and leaving the scene of an accident which resulted in death. On April 28, 2009 he was sentenced to a “split” sentence of six months “shock” incarceration at the Westchester County Jail and five years’ probation. Petitioner’s *580driver’s license was revoked for one year and the order of revocation, signed by petitioner, required him to obtain the permission of both the Westchester County Department of Probation and the court before reapplying for a license. Despite this license revocation, petitioner, shortly after his release from six months’ incarceration, drove his car to an appointment with his Probation Officer. He was promptly arrested. On November 24, 2009, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (the AUO conviction) for so doing, and received a 30-day jail sentence.


Frank J. LaBuda, J. Defendant in the above-captioned matter is on trial by indict*734ment charged with murder in the first and second degrees, burglary, arson, larceny and <mask> involving the death of his estranged wife, Catherine Novak, on December 13, 2008. The case is currently before a jury on the People’s direct case as the trial enters its fourth week.


The crimes alleged are <mask>, for soliciting the doctor to change the MRI findings with intent to defraud insurers; falsifying business records, the MRI reports at the radiologist’s office; and attempted grand larceny, an attempt by false pretenses to gain money in a lawsuit against the New York City Transit Authority. At the time of the crimes charged in the indictment, the doctor, unknown to the defendant Lessoff, was working undercover with the District Attorney’s office during the Grand Jury investigation and was secretly recording his telephone conversations with Lessoff. The indictment alleges 10 separate transactions involving 10 separate clients of Lessoff and the partnership. At all times Lessoff was acting in the name of the law firm. There is no evidence implicating anyone else in the firm in the alleged crimes.


At issue is whether the statutory funding scheme for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation <mask> ( Ins. Code, § 1872.83 ) created a conflict of interest for the district attorney. As argued by Pierce, a conflict exists because the Kern County Workers' Compensation Fraud Unit receives grant funding from the California Insurance Commission. The funds, based *343on assessments statutorily imposed upon insurance companies, are used to criminally prosecute workers' compensation fraud cases, and includes the salaries and benefits of the two prosecutors in the unit (the prosecutor in this case being one of the two), as well as the salaries of the unit's investigator and paralegal, the computers and software. The grant funds are determined by the Fraud Assessment Commission, as outlined in Insurance Code section 1872.83, which provides in relevant part:


The essence of <mask> is the filing of a false written statement as part of a claim for insurance. (People v Alfaro, 108 AD2d 517, 520, affd 66 NY2d 985; People v Dybdahl, 144 AD2d 949, 950). Contrary to the contention of defendant, the fact that County Court found her not guilty of arson did not mean that she could not be. convicted of insurance fraud. The proof at trial was overwhelming that defendant was fully aware that the fire was intentionally set to collect on the insurance policy. The fact that defendant presented sworn proofs of loss to the insurance company, knowing that they contained materially false information, or that they concealed information for the purpose of misleading, is sufficient to establish the crime of insurance fraud (see, People v Dybdahl, supra, at 950). The People established that defendant gave materially false information on her proofs of loss when she swore that the cause of the fire was unknown. She also gave materially false information when she claimed that the microwave oven was new when, in fact, it was old and broken.


. It is worth noting that by this argument, defendant undermines his claim, discussed in point I, supra, that the prosecution failed to prove the value of the <mask>. If, as he states, "neither Kramer nor his client were entitled to the proceeds of any insurance claim” then the entire settlement amount received from each issue would constitute the value of the proven fraud — in each case, over $1,500.


The Board has promulgated a list of “dishonorable or unethical” conduct under 24 Del. Admin. C. § 1700–8 (hereinafter “Regulation 8”). According to Regulation 8, “[t]he phrase ‘dishonorable or unethical conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public’ as used in 24 Del.C. § 1731(b)(3) shall include, but not be limited to . . . [a]ny . . . act tending to bring discredit upon the profession.”43 Imhof’s assertion that the Board’s conclusions were “summary [in] nature”44 are not supported by the Order, which found that Imhof committed acts, to which he admitted, that included 1) intentionally damaging his spouse’s vehicle, (2) committing <mask> in connection with contemporaneous damage to his own vehicle, 3) accessing his spouse’s home without permission and destroying clothing and bedding within; and 4) peering through the window of his spouse’s home to watch her and another individual engage in sexual activity.45 It is not difficult to perceive how these actions would bring discredit to the profession.46 Imhof argues that because his actions involved “private conduct between spouses,” it was not likely to “deceive, defraud, or harm the public.” Imhof’s actions, however, affected not just his spouse, but others as well: e.g., during both the “keying” incident and the incident involving surreptitious entry into his


In the instant case, the defendant’s submissions in support of its defense of fraud fail to establish a lack of coverage defense that may be deemed exempt from the preclusion remedy. The expert’s conclusions are insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the medical services rendered “do[ ] not arise out of an insured incident” (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199), so as to implicate a lack of coverage issue. Moreover, the acts allegedly constituting the fraudulent conduct are inadequate to demonstrate that the accident was in furtherance of an <mask> scheme so as to invoke the lack of coverage defense and exemption from the preclusion remedy (see Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2002], supra).


The respondent was indicted in or about March 1993 in Kings County and charged under Indictment No. 13104/92 with <mask>, attempted grand larceny, and falsifying business records. The respondent entered a plea of guilty, on March 1, 1994, before the Honorable Michael R. Juviler in the Supreme Court, Kings County, to attempted falsifying of business records in the first degree, a class A misdemeanor and a serious crime. On May 3, 1994, Justice Juviler ordered the respondent to pay $5,000 in reparation to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection and to perform 300 hours of community service.


We are as mindful as our dissenting colleague of the steep increase in fraudulent no-fault benefits claims arising both from traffic incidents staged to defraud and from provider claims where the services or supplies were either never rendered or are based on excessive or unwarranted treatment or supplies (e.g. Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 571 [2005] [“Abuse . . . abounds”]). The Court of Appeals clearly determined that only defenses based on the former are not subject to the preclusion sanction (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 199). Indeed, juxtaposed to that holding is the concurring opinion in Chubb which, recognizing the majority’s rejection of the argument, sought to merge claims based on unnecessary or excessive treatment, however fraudulently sought, with the mandatory endorsement’s limitation on recoverable benefits to items of “basic economic loss,” that is, the “necessary expenses” incurred by eligible injured persons (90 NY2d at 203 [Wesley, J., concurring]; see Insurance Law § 5102 [a] [1]). However, we are bound by the majority’s unequivocal construction of the No-Fault Law which limits an insurer’s ability to resist “ill-founded, illegitimate and fraudulent claims” submitted by providers of medical services or medical equipment to the “strict, short-leashed contestable period” set forth in, the verification protocols (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d at 285 [emphasis added]). The clear *79implication is that a defense based on a provider’s alleged fraudulent claim for no-fault benefits is precluded by an insurer’s failure effectively to invoke its remedies in the “contestable period,” one of the “tradeoff[s] of the no-fault reform” which the Legislature recognized as the cost of providing “prompt uncontested, first-party insurance benefits” (id.). The dissenter’s conjoining of a provider’s fraudulent claim arising from an otherwise covered accident with the exception to the preclusion rule of claims based on traffic incidents staged to defraud, elides the critical distinction between claims based on noncovered, fraudulent events, which implicate an insurer’s obligations under an insurance contract, with claims based on fraudulent excessive treatment or supplies, or unprovided treatment or supplies, or fraudulent overbilling therefor, which concern only the extent of an insurer’s liability for no-fault benefits following a covered accident. The former are not subject to preclusion because an insurer has not contracted to provide benefits for such events, while the latter are subject to preclusion because, if arising from a covered incident, they “do[ ] not ordinarily constitute ... [a] lack of coverage classification” but merely excessive no-fault benefits otherwise payable under an insurance contract (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d at 202 [excessive no-fault payments are merely “a matter of degree”]). Indeed, we see no meaningful distinction between a fraudulent claim for a $25 item of unprovided medical equipment following a covered accident, a fraudulent claim for $500 medical equipment where the item’s cost to the provider was $25 (that is, well in excess of 150% of cost), and a $500 claim for physical therapy treatments where only $25 of such treatments were medically necessary or, for that matter, were actually administered. In essence, the Court of Appeals declined to distinguish forms of provider fraud according to the method of perpetration; thus, fraudulent provider claims, whether by “fraudulent overbilling” or whatever other forms of fraud the dissent means by “classic fraud,” remain collectively subject to the preclusion rule. Only coverage defenses are not subject to the preclusion sanction. The dissent attempts to expand the coverage defense exception to provider fraud which is contrary to prevailing Court of Appeals decisions and applicable law which only the Legislature is empowered to change. We note in passing that an insurer precluded from defending a claim based on provider fraud is not without remedy; after paying such a claim, the insurer, for example, may have an action *80to recover benefits paid under a theory of fraud or unjust enrichment (cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 322 [2005]) and it may seek criminal sanctions for <mask> and obtain restitution (Penal Law § 176.00 et seq.; § 60.27).


The indictment before the jury charges the defendant, Paul Novak, for the murder of his estranged wife, arson in connection with the burning of the marital residence, burglary, grand larceny and <mask>. Jury selection for this trial began on August 5, 2013. At some point prior to jury selection, defendant sought out and gave an interview to the reporter for the Record who has been reporting on this case for some time.2 That interview occurred on August 2, 2013. The Times Herald-Record ran a front-page story about the defendant and on the *751interview in the August 4, 2013, Sunday edition of the paper. It also posted a “portion” of the video recorded interview on its website on August 4, 2013. The running of the story and posting of the interview detrimentally affected the jury pool, but the parties were eventually able to seat 12 jurors and eight alternate jurors. Opening statements and testimony commenced the following week, on August 12, 2013.


*594Lastly, in Rosenberg , the defendant, a physician, retained an attorney for an investigation related to alleged <mask> and any criminal litigation that may result from it. The United States charged the defendant with two counts of knowingly receiving and retaining stolen property of the United States. The defendant pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to two years' probation and ordered to pay restitution of $209,435.78.


Based on all of these factors, and after consultation with Hazel Johnson, the original claims representative who had forwarded the file to her, Ms. Pryce determined that the accident was staged and therefore not a covered incident, and had the subject claims denied on that basis. She also duly notified the National Insurance Crime Bureau and the New York State <mask> Bureau.


From an entirely different perspective, a criminal purpose within the warehouse may be inferred in that the break-in and removal of the crates were part of the actus reus of the intended larceny from the insurer. That is to say, apart from constituting a variety of discrete, anticipatory crimes, the bogus theft of the collection from the warehouse was one act in a series of acts required before the larceny from Lloyds could be consummated. The break-in and removal of the collection, in other words, constituted a partial performance or an "ingredient act” of the object crime of stealing from Lloyds; the <mask> or theft may be deemed to have partially occurred inside the warehouse.


Suh and Chang perpetrated a deceitful insurance scheme designed to acquire insurance proceeds illegally for personal gain. Suh and Chang deceived Allstate into believing the attorneys whose names they were using actually and lawfully represented its insureds. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.2(c) [only attorneys, family members, adjusters, or other persons authorized by law may represent insureds].) In their communications with Allstate, Suh and Chang misrepresented that attorneys represented the insureds. They concealed the fact they were masquerading as attorneys when they filed the insurance claims. And the misrepresentations were material: Allstate would not have released settlement proceeds to Suh or Chang or their sham law firms had Allstate known the truth. The conduct of Suh and Chang constituted <mask> under section 550 and section 1871.7.1


This court respectfully declines to adopt the reasoning of the majority. opinion of the Second Department in People v Alfaro (108 AD2d 517), i.e., that the jury may have concluded the defendant intended to defraud the insurance company but did not intend to steal property. As pointed out by the dissent in that case, "[Tjhere does not appear to be any logical way that a person could engage in <mask> by knowingly and with intent to defraud submitting papers in support of a false claim for payment, without at the same time attempting to commit a larceny. That is, when one submits false papers in support of a claim for payment for his own benefit or that of another, he is concomitantly attempting to commit a larceny by wrongfully obtaining property by false pretenses from the insurer * * * Thus, even though the language of the statutes is not the same, the underlying meaning clearly coincides.” (People v Alfaro, 108 AD2d 517, 528-529 [Eiber, J., dissenting].)


Thereafter, defendant was arrested and charged on or about December 11, 2002 with commission of these crimes. On September 2, 2003, a four-count indictment was filed charging defendant with acting in concert to commit two counts of <mask> in the third degree (Penal Law § 176.20) and two counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.10). The trial in this matter is currently pending before this court.


. People v Alfaro (121 Misc 2d 804 [Sup Ct, Queens County], affd 108 AD2d 517 [2d Dept 1985]), cited by defendant, is not controlling. In Alfaro, the defendant’s fraudulent claim was rejected by the insurer. In the absence of evidence that defendant’s claim included any dollar amounts the court found defendant guilty only of the misdemeanor <mask>. The situation here, involving claims settled for a sum certain, is distinguishable.


This court previously inspected the grand jury minutes and found that there was legally sufficient evidence establishing all of the charges against all of the abovenamed defendants. The evidence presented to the grand jury established sufficiently that defendants, all of whom were New York City police officers and/or PBA (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association) delegates or trustees, engaged in a scheme involving the fixing1 of summonses given for illegal parking and for moving violations. As will be discussed, the investigation into ticket-fixing was an outgrowth of an earlier investigation into the illegal activities of Police Officer Jose Ramos (who is separately indicted) which *413included, amongst other activities, the sale of large quantities of marijuana and counterfeit DVDs from two barbershops in the Bronx owned by Ramos, as well as a robbery, a burglary and <mask>. The investigation into Ramos’ illegal activities included the use of court-authorized eavesdropping on Ramos’ cell phone. During the course of the eavesdropping on Ramos, a number of conversations were intercepted in which Ramos was overheard communicating with fellow police officers in order to fix summonses for moving violations that had been issued to people known to Ramos. Those interceptions formed the basis for this court’s order, issued on December 23, 2009, authorizing eavesdropping on Police Officer Virgilio Bencosme’s cell phone, this court having found that there was probable cause to believe that Bencosme’s phone had been used and would continue to be used in furtherance of the crime of grand larceny in the fourth degree and the conspiracy and the attempt to commit this crime. Following the December 23, 2009 order authorizing eavesdropping on Bencosme’s phone, this court authorized wiretaps to investigate ticket-fixing on 16 additional mobile telephones operated by 13 other Bronx police officers who were either delegates or officers of the Bronx PBA or SBA (Sergeants Benevolent Association). The eavesdropping, which ended on December 14, 2010, resulted in the interception of over 10,000 telephone conversations and text messages.


Thus, even if I was required to determine whether the <mask> charges were "related” to defendant’s pursuit of her insurance claim for which she had retained counsel, I would conclude, based on Smith (supra) and Snyder (supra), that the two investigations were not so related. (See also, People v Cortes, 224 AD2d 309 [1st Dept 1996] [defendant’s right to counsel did not indelibly attach in an arson investigation based on prior representation by an attorney in purchasing the building set afire].) Because defendant’s civil and criminal cases are not related as a matter of law, the burden is on defendant to establish that John Biller represented her on the criminal charges. (See, People v Rosa, 65 NY2d 380, supra.) For the reasons given above, defendant has failed to sustain that burden.


On the issue of decedent’s medical condition at the time he executed the applications, evidence of decedent’s end-stage medical history, less than a year and a half after signing the applications, shows a very sick man, suffering, at the time of his death, from ailments which appear likely to have been of long standing. These include end-stage renal disease, end-stage liver disease secondary to hepatitis C, and diabetes. (See aff of James J. McCarthy, exhibit B, death summary.) However, decedent answered in the negative when asked on the applications if he had any preexisting medical conditions. The evidence of the severity of decedent’s health so soon after he filled out and signed the applications strongly indicates that the representations made on the applications may have been false and made with knowledge of their falsity. As MetLife has a cause of action under the New Jersey <mask> Prevention Act, it also has a viable defense to plaintiffs’ action on the ground of possible fraudulent representations made on the applications. Disclosure remains to be taken to determine whether decedent misrepresented his physical health when he executed the applications. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate on this issue.


*816Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) has three sentences. The first sentence provides that a "civil penalty" of no less than $5,000 and no more than $10,000, plus an assessment of no more than three times the amount of the underlying claim for compensation, "shall" be imposed on "[e]very person who violates any provision of this section or Section 549, 550, or 551 of the Penal Code." As noted, ante , sections 549 through 551 of the Penal Code criminalize various forms of <mask>, including but not limited to the filing of a fraudulent claim. The second sentence of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) provides that the superior court also has the power to grant equitable or injunctive relief as necessary to protect the public from insurance fraud. Finally, the third sentence provides that the "civil penalty" mentioned in the first sentence "shall be assessed for each fraudulent claim presented to an insurance company by a defendant and not for each violation."


Defendants argue that, notwithstanding the incorporation of all predicate violations of Penal Code sections 549 through 551 into the first sentence of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b), the third sentence limits penalties to the sole predicate violation of filing a fraudulent claim, and that the only available remedies for other predicate violations is the equitable and injunctive relief mentioned in the second sentence. But "[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.]" ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 ; accord, Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 544, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 165.) The most reasonable reading of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b), which harmonizes all three sentences, is that the "civil penalty" mentioned *877in the first sentence may only be assessed once per underlying claim for compensation regardless of how many predicate violations occurred, and the equitable and injunctive remedies mentioned in the second sentence are supplementary to the civil penalty. In other words, rather than limiting the IFPA's statutory penalties to one type of predicate violation, the most reasonable reading of Insurance Code section 1871.7(b) is that it limits the number of penalties that can be imposed for <mask> violations related to a single claim.


The Chicago Complaint asserts 10 counts: (I) Consumer Fraud-Deceptive Practices; (II) Consumer Fraud-Unfair Practices; (III) Misrepresentations in Connection with Sale or Advertisement of Merchandise; (IV) False Statements to the City; (V) False Claims; (VI) Conspiring to Defraud By Getting False or Fraudulent Claims Paid or Approved by the City; (VII) Recovery of City Costs of Providing Services; (VIII) <mask>; (IX) Civil Conspiracy; and, (X) Unjust Enrichment. Of these, counts I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, and X are asserted against Watson. Against Watson, the Chicago Complaint seeks injunctive relief, restitution, treble restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement of profits based on unjust enrichment, treble damages, and costs incurred by the City of Chicago that were related to the violations of state, federal, and local law.


At issue is whether the statutory funding scheme for the investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation <mask> ( Ins. Code, § 1872.83 ) created a conflict of interest for the district attorney. As argued by Pierce, a conflict exists because the Kern County Workers' Compensation Fraud Unit receives grant funding from the California Insurance Commission. The funds, based *343on assessments statutorily imposed upon insurance companies, are used to criminally prosecute workers' compensation fraud cases, and includes the salaries and benefits of the two prosecutors in the unit (the prosecutor in this case being one of the two), as well as the salaries of the unit's investigator and paralegal, the computers and software. The grant funds are determined by the Fraud Assessment Commission, as outlined in Insurance Code section 1872.83, which provides in relevant part:


The petitioners acknowledge that the courts have created an exception to the privilege in Medicaid and Medicare fraud investigations, citing Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Dec. 14, 1984 (supra) and People v Bhatt (160 Misc 2d 973 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1994]), but maintain that there is no rationale for extending this exception to no-fault <mask> investigations. They assert that the situations are not analogous because (1) New York’s no-fault insurance program provides a system for the payment of contested claims, citing 11 NYCRR part 65; (2) Medicaid and Medicare impose stringent record-keeping requirements on participating health care providers, which are not imposed on health care providers seeking payment from no-fault insurance carriers; and (3) there *189are no public funds at issue in the payment of no-fault insurance claims. The petitioners contend that unlike Medicaid/ Medicare fraud, no-fault insurance fraud victimizes “not the state and not the patients,” but only private insurance companies, and declare that “this [defrauding of insurance companies] is hardly a sufficient competing interest to justify the abrogation of a privilege of confidentiality long held sacrosanct by the legislature and the courts.”


Furthermore, the proof is legally sufficient to establish that defendant attempted to wrongfully obtain property valued in *875excess of $3,000 (Penal Law § 176.20), thus satisfying the value element of <mask> in the third degree. The proof establishes that defendant submitted sworn proofs of loss in which she attempted to obtain from the insurance company $50,000 in damages to the building and $25,000 in damages to its contents. (Appeal from Judgment of Wayne County Court, Sirkin, J.—Insurance Fraud, 3rd Degree.) Present—Green, J. P., Pine, Balio, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.


*977In the case at bar, the defendant maintains his right to assert the physician-patient privilege on behalf of the subject patients, since the patients were not the "victims” of the alleged fraudulent billing practices. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (1405 [5th ed 1979]), a victim is "[t]he person who is the object of a crime or tort, as the victim of a robbery is the person robbed.” The object(s) of the alleged crimes under this indictment, that is, the victim(s) of the <mask>, grand larceny and scheme to defraud are, in fact, found to be GHI, the insurance carrier, and the United States Government, the funding source of the Medicare program. This finding is made upon a literal reading of the express language contained within the enumerated counts of the indictment and a review of the evidence adduced before the Grand Jury.


The defendant, by his counsel, relies upon the definition of <mask>, as contained in section 176.05 of the Penal Law, which requires materiality to be established as an essential element of the crime. This section, in relevant part, reads as follows: “A fraudulent insurance act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to defraud presents * * * to * * * an insurer or purported insurer, or any agent thereof * * * a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy for commercial or personal insurance which he knows to: (i) contain materially false information concerning any fact material thereto; or (ii) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto.” (Emphasis added.) In essence, the defendant contends that the failure to disclose other insurance coverage, in connection with submitting each of his proofs of loss of his personal property, could not be material because his total loss exceeded the combined liability coverage of the three policies, and, therefore, each of the insurance companies would not be relieved from payment of the respective policy limits. At the time of the loss, which resulted from an alleged burglary at the defendant’s residence on September 5, 1983, the total liability coverage for the three insurance policies maintained in effect was $68,000 (Travelers Ins. Co. — $28,000, General Acc. Ins. Co. — $25,000, Royal Ind. Co. — $15,000).


Howard E. Goldfluss, J. The defendants above named are two of several who have been indicted for grand larceny and other related counts in connection with an alleged larcenous scheme resulting in a widespread <mask>. The People in this application request that the court order the said defendants to submit exemplars of their handwritings giving as reason for such request that numerous file cards which were seized pursuant to a search warrant contain instructions by defendants to codefendants and employees. The People allege that by reason of the fact that these instructions were carried out, the defendants were able to defraud insurance companies.


On May 21, 1997 plaintiff, Dr. Martin A. Lehman, an orthopedic surgeon, was arrested and charged with <mask>. His arrest was in connection with an undercover sting operation which was conducted in part to investigate insurance fraud by medical providers in the area of automobile no-fault, disability and workers’ compensation claims. The District Attorney’s Office of Nassau County, along with other government agencies, conducted the undercover investigation. As a result of the investigation, 20 individuals were arrested, including plaintiff. *3The sting operation was widely reported by the media. Eighteen of the 20 individuals pleaded guilty; however, plaintiff went to trial and, on March 3, 1999, was acquitted of all charges.


Michael D. Stallman, J. In this action to recover under two insurance policies, plaintiffs Janet Johnson and Albert Nicklas (Nicklas) move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment on the complaint, and for the dismissal of defendant’s counterclaims. Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) cross-moves for leave to amend its answer to include a claim under the New Jersey <mask> Prevention Act (FPA).


Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations.


The court is mindful that there was no direct evidence that any of the plaintiffs here knowingly participated in any <mask> scheme, or even suspected one. But “[w]here a loss is caused by the fraud of a third party, in determining the liability as between two innocent parties, the loss should fall on the one who enabled the fraud to be committed.” (Fidelity Natl. Tit. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Consumer Home Mtge., 272 AD2d 512, 514 [2d Dept 2000].) Although any fraudulent conduct of the assignors might not be “properly imputed” to plaintiffs (see id.; see also A&S Med. v Allstate Ins. Co., 196 Misc 2d 322, 324 [App Term, 1st Dept 2003], affd 15 AD3d 170 [1st Dept 2005]), plaintiffs would be among the “primary beneficiaries of [the] fraud” (see Chubb & Son v Consoli, 283 AD2d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2001]). And, generally, “[a]n assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor” (see Arena Constr. Co. v J. Sackaris & Sons, 282 AD2d 489, 489 [2d Dept 2001]).


*180With respect to the indictment filed in October 2012, respondent pleaded guilty to identity theft in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 190.80 (1), a class D felony, and <mask> in the third degree in violation of Penal Law § 176.20, a class D felony, based on his admission that he had assumed the identity of a woman, who was not a client, had used her name and personal identifying information to settle an insurance claim, and then had stolen the proceeds of the settlement that he had fraudulently negotiated.


Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to vacate the respondent superior court's order denying his motion to set aside indictment, and that such motion be granted with charges against petitioner dismissed. He broadly argues that *116the indictment lacks reasonable or probable cause on all counts for various reasons, and that the indictment cannot be amended to effect a demand for an election. Among his arguments are that the <mask> and workers' compensation fraud claims are improperly aggregated, and that the indictment does not give due process notice of the charges against him to prepare a defense for trial. The Supreme Court's order quoted above focuses on these last two points. We disagree with petitioner and specifically address the petition as framed by the particular issues the Supreme Court articulated.


The People charged defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, with four counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree (Penal Law § 175.30), <mask> in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 176.10), and petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), alleging that over a period of several years, defendant had filed reports with the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), affirmed under the penalty of perjury, to the effect that his patient was totally disabled from his work as a corrections officer and was not, in fact, working, while knowing, from his own examinations of the patient and his observations of the patient engaged in substantial work activities, that these reports were false. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was found guilty of the often*27ses charged. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the proof, arguing that the questions at issue on the reports (the C-4 forms) were sufficiently vague and ambiguous as to permit the inference that defendant’s responses thereto were both responsive to the questions and factually true. Defendant also argues that the proof was legally insufficient to establish defendant’s knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that his answers were knowingly false, and that the verdict, in any event, was against the weight of the evidence.


Defendant first contends that section 954 prohibits the People from alleging multiple acts, each of which constitute a distinct offense, in a single count. Because each count describes multiple patient files over an extended timeframe, and because <mask> is completed upon the preparation of a fraudulent document ( § 550, subd. (a)(5) ), or the submission of a fraudulent claim (subdivision § 550, subd. (a)(6) ), defendant contends each count contains multiple discrete offenses. (See People ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1193, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 566 [a violation of section 550" 'is complete when a false claim for payment of loss is presented to an insurance company or a false writing is prepared or presented with intent to use it in connection with such a claim whether or not anything of value is taken or received' "].)


An illustration of this principle is found in People v . Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353, overruled on a different point as stated in People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 503-504, footnote 9, 170 Cal.Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d 587. In Ruster , the Supreme Court held that the defendant's crime could be prosecuted only under the specific statute criminalizing as a misdemeanor fraudulent representation to obtain unemployment benefits as opposed to the general statute criminalizing forgery. The general forgery statute had an element not contained in the specific statute-that the defendant sign the name of another to one of the documents enumerated in the statute. ( Ruster , supra , at p. 698, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353.) The Supreme Court, however, applied the Williamson rule, concluding that "the Legislature unquestionably contemplated that the special statute might be violated by means of forgery. Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the *488most common forms of unemployment <mask>." ( Id . at p. 699, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353.)


We find these principles applicable to the facts herein, and we are satisfied that the proof supported the City Court’s conclusion that defendant understood the nature of the questions as to the meaning and scope of the patient’s disability (see Rubeis v Aqua Club, Inc., 3 NY3d 408, 417 [2004]) and whether the patient was working at any job. The evidence was also legally sufficient to establish that defendant had falsely answered the questions, knowing that, if his answers were credited by the Board, the natural and inevitable consequence would be that the patient would obtain workers’ compensation benefits to which he was not entitled. Such conduct also established that defendant had committed <mask> and larceny. Whether or not the patient was compensated for his work is of no consequence (Matter of Bottieri v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 27 AD3d 1035 [2006]). As there was no challenge at trial to the legal sufficiency of the proof of the remaining elements of the offense of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree, defendant failed to preserve any issue with respect thereto (CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19-21 [1995]).


"(e) Therefore, in order to ensure the efficient, just, and orderly administration of the workers' compensation system, and to accomplish substantial justice in all cases, the Legislature declares that it is necessary to enact legislation to provide that any lien filed by, or for recovery of compensation for services rendered by, any provider of medical treatment or other medical-legal services shall be automatically stayed upon the filing of criminal charges against that provider for an offense involving fraud against the workers' compensation system, medical billing fraud, <mask>, or fraud against the federal Medicare or Medi-Cal programs, and that the stay shall remain in effect until the resolution of the criminal proceedings." (Stats. 2016, ch. 868, sec. 16.)


"Many older policyholders have years-old whole-life policies that have accumulated a sizable cash surrender value. An insurance agent encourages them to trade in these policies and buy new ones that pay higher death benefits. This practice, known as churning, earns the agent a large sales commission while substantially increasing the policyholder's premium cost.... [¶] Insurance agents' selling annuities of dubious value under the guise of estate planning is common." (Lawrence A. Frolik, <mask> on the Elderly (June 2001) TRIAL p. 2, at < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428476> [as of June 2, 2017].)


MBIA contends that to succeed on an <mask> claim, the insurer must prove only that the application for insurance made a material misrepresentation that, had the insurer known of the true facts, would have led the insurer to either not issue the policy or issue the policy on different terms. MBIA also asserts that to succeed on a breach of warranty claim, the insurer must prove only that the breach of warranty materially increased the insurer’s risk. MBIA argues that it is not required to establish a causal link between Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations and claims MBIA paid under the insurance policies. MBIA supports its argument with Insurance Law §§ 3105 and 3106, respectively.


The section under consideration (Penal Law § 176.20) was enacted in 1981 as part of article 176 — <mask>. Previously, the Penal Law had contained only a single misdemeanor statute prohibiting personal injury insurance fraud. That section (Penal Law former § 175.50 [presenting a false insurance claim]) prohibited knowingly presenting "with intent to defraud an insurer with respect to an alleged claim of loss upon a contract of insurance * * * a written instrument containing a false material statement relating to such claim.” The article 176 definition of a "fraudulent insurance act” is an almost verbatim reenactment of this quoted language. Under the new legislation "committ[ing] a fraudulent insurance act” is, in itself, insurance fraud in the third degree — a class A misdemeanor. The newly created felony-level first and second degrees of insurance fraud include as additional elements "wrongfully * * * obtaining] or, attempting] to * * * obtain * * * property with a value in excess of’ $1,500 or $250, respectively. While the Governor’s memorandum approving this 1981 legislation mentions that the three-tier insurance fraud system tracks that of grand larceny, there is no other mention of the relationship, if any, between the two statutes *758(Governor’s approval memorandum, 1981 NY Legis Ann, at 384).


However, there are certain industries that require intensive and regular governmental oversight. Their practices are so fraught with criminality or danger, it is reasonable, indeed prudent government requires, that they be closely regulated and inspected to insure compliance with health, fire, safety and reasonable regulatory laws to insure that they do not become dangers, menaces or nuisances to the general community. The Supreme Court has upheld warrantless entries upon the premises of "pervasively regulated” or "closely regulated” businesses and industries (United States v Biswell, 406 US 311, 316; Colonnade Corp. v United States, 397 US 72). Indeed some businesses, liquor, bars, hazardous chemicals, explosives and firearms have had a long history of governmental regulation and oversight. Understandably any entrepreneur embarking upon such a business accepts the burdens with the benefits and voluntarily subjects himself to plenary and intrusive governmental regulations. He has no reasonable expectation of privacy. (Marshall v Barlow’s, Inc., 436 US 307). This does not mean that the 4th Amendment’s benefits are denied him. It is still a bar to a trespassing police officer seeking evidence of criminality without an appropriate search warrant (See v City of Seattle, 387 US 541). When an entrepreneur embarks upon a closely regulated business, he tacitly consents to entry by the authorities upon his premises for the purposes of inspection and enforcement of valid regulatory schemes (Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266). New York (along with many other States) has long licensed and regulated the junk industry. Automobile dismantlers are part of both the junk and automobile repair industries. While both industries have honest practitioners, many junkyards, body shops and dismantlers are little more than fronts or essential elements of stolen car rings and <mask> schemes.


Although the case had originally been adjourned until March 19, 1985 for the court’s decision on the motions, the matter was advanced at the People’s request to February 26, 1985, since the People had apparently decided to "acquiesce in the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to request leave to represent.” On that date, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that an insufficient number of grand jurors had heard the evidence presented and granted the People’s application for leave to re-present. In doing so, this court expressed its concern over the delay in prosecution. The case was then adjourned to April 1, 1985, pending re-presentation. On April 1, 1985, the People were not yet ready to proceed with the new indictment and the matter was again adjourned. On April 19, 1985, the Grand Jury voted a true bill and returned indictment number 1300/85, charging defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 105.05), with attempted grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.35), with 16 counts of <mask> in *270the first degree (Penal Law § 176.20) and with 16 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.10). The indictment was filed on that date and defendants were directed to appear for arraignment on April 22, 1985, at which time the People announced their readiness on the record. This was the first time that the People announced their readiness on either indictment. The defendants were arraigned on the new indictment on May 3, 1985. On that date the People announced for the second time on the record that they were ready for trial. Motions were served and filed on July 15, 1985. Defendant Alexander’s motion papers, in which defendant Gelfand joined, requested, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (g) on the ground that the People had not been ready to proceed within the time set forth by CPL 30.30 (1) (a).


The AG maintains that the underlying purpose of the physician-patient privilege will not be subverted by ruling that it does not apply in no-fault <mask> investigations; to *191the contrary, the AG posits that such a ruling could not encourage less candid patient-physician communications where they have not been candid in the first place, and would not deter honest accident victims, whom the AG submits would prefer not to undergo unnecessary treatments “to enable a scam,” from seeking medically appropriate care. Moreover, the AG notes, records produced for grand jury consideration are “cloaked with secrecy” by law (CPL 190.25 [4] [a]).


Nevertheless, our appellate courts commonly invoke the term “fraud” when discussing the defense of lack of coverage; this may be because so many cases involving allegedly noncovered incidents center on accidents purportedly staged for the purpose of generating fraudulent insurance claims. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre, 305 AD2d 490, 491 [2d Dept 2003] [“A deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an <mask> scheme is not a covered accident”]; see also Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751 [2d Dept 2002]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Encompass Ins., 10 Misc 3d 127LA], 2005 NY Slip Op 51892[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 138[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51745[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; Careplus Med. Supply Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51598[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v State-Wide Ins. Co., 7 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50785[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]; Melbourne Med., P.C. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2004]; A.B. Med. Servs. v Eagle Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 8 [App Term, 2d Dept 2003].) Perhaps the seminal embodiment of this formulation is the Second Department’s pronouncement that “[a] deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme is not a covered accident.” (State Farm v Laguerre, 305 AD2d at 491.) No-fault insurers and practitioners (including the parties and their counsel in this case) have also adopted the nomenclature of fraud when litigating claims involving allegedly staged accidents. This is true even though the no-fault regulations do not mention “fraud” as a defense to payment, but rather refer only to noncovered incidents. (See, e.g., 11 NYCRR 65-3.8 [e] [2].)


The present indictment charges the defendant, a lawyer whose office is in Manhattan, with <mask> and falsifying business records of Dr. Kaiser and the insurer. The charges, clarified by a bill of particulars, allege that the defendant solicited Kaiser on the telephone to make up and submit back-dated bills for fictitious visits by two clients, to beef up claims on insurance policies for injuries from automobile accidents. During the conversation, Kaiser was in Kings County, having telephoned the defendant’s office in Manhattan from the District Attorney’s office in Brooklyn.


In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant argued at trial that there was no coverage for plaintiffs assignor’s alleged injuries because the injuries, were not sustained in a covered accident. Following the nonjury trial, the Civil Court dismissed the complaint, finding that defendant had sustained its burden of proving lack of coverage by a preponderance of the evidence. On appeal, plaintiff contends that defendant had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged injuries were the result of an <mask> scheme. Plaintiff further argues that even if the Civil Court correctly determined that defendant’s burden could be satisfied by defendant proving its defense by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the evidence presented by defendant was insufficient to satisfy this burden.


The conclusion that <mask> in the first degree is completed upon the filing of the statement is supported further by a comparison of the various degrees of insurance fraud. When one commits a "fraudulent insurance act” without claiming a dollar loss, he commits insurance fraud in the fifth degree. (People v Alfaro, supra.) However, when one commits a "fraudulent insurance act” and claims in excess of $1,000, he now commits insurance fraud in the fourth degree. (Penal Law § 176.15; see also, Hechtman, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 176.10, at 236 [1987 Pocket Part].)


“A deliberate collision caused in furtherance of an <mask> scheme is not a covered accident.” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Laguerre, 305 AD2d 490, 491 [2d Dept 2003]; see also Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co., 293 AD2d 751, 751-752 [2d Dept 2002].) Indeed, when a collision is “an intentional act, not an accident,” there is no coverage (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 309 AD2d 927, 928 [2d Dept 2003]), “regardless of whether the intentional col*824lision was motivated by fraud or malice” (see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Shaulskaya, 302 AD2d 522, 523 [2d Dept 2003]).


The facts are not in dispute. By a decision and order, dated November 30, 1987, claimant’s conviction for <mask> and other crimes was reversed on appeal and the indictment dismissed. (People v Rohany, 134 AD2d 627, lv denied 70 NY2d 1010.) He filed a claim under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act of 1984 (Court of Claims Act § 8-b) on April 14, 1988 and the State answered. No objection was contained therein with respect to the timeliness or manner of service of the claim.


Allstate discovered Suh's fraudulent scheme and filed this action. Allstate alleged, not that the insurance claims contained false or fraudulent statements about the insureds, but that obtaining insurance proceeds by posing as law firms was <mask> in violation of applicable provisions of the Penal and Insurance Codes. Allstate sought civil penalties and assessments and an injunction under the unfair competition law.


Moreover, identity is not at issue; thus, the court fails to see how this exception to admission is applicable. Furthermore, the *744People have not demonstrated that the evidence is admissible under the common plan or scheme since it is not so inextricably interwoven as in some of the cases upon which they rely to support this proposition.6 Additionally, although this case does involve a crime of intent, it is this court’s opinion that intent, and thus absence of mistake or accident, may be inferred from the charged crimes for which defendant is on trial involving two incidents of <mask> with two different undercover officers. (See People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 856 [1996] [court properly denied admission of prior uncharged sexual misconduct to prove intent, although it was element of crime, since issue was one of credibility whereby defendant claimed consent and intent could be inferred from act itself].)


Renewing an argument made at the close of the prosecution’s case, defendant asserts that because there was no evidence establishing what portion of the settlements was specifically attributable to the fraudulent medical reports, the verdict cannot stand. Citing the requirement under the grand larceny statute,2 that the value wrongfully obtained must be shown, defendant maintains that the same element exists in prosecutions for <mask>.


An analysis of the statute itself shows that it is the commission of the "fraudulent insurance act” itself which is the actus reus, and further, that it is that act alone which completes the crime of <mask> in the first degree. The presentation to an insurer of a written statement knowing that it contains materially false information, or that it conceals information for the purpose of misleading, is the criminal activity. Once such written statement has been presented the crime of insurance fraud, in one of its degrees, has been committed. This is evidenced by the fact that an unsuccessful attempt to fraudulently obtain insurances moneys in excess of $1,500 *1013constitutes the crime of insurance fraud in the first degree. There is no requirement that the perpetrator of the crime actually obtain the money; the attempt to obtain the money wrongfully is treated the same way as the actual obtaining of the money, by the statute. It is clear that said provision of the statute is only meant to define what degree of crime is committed — and said degree of the crime is a function of the amount of money involved; at the time involved herein, a fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $1,500 was classified as insurance fraud in the first degree. In 1986, the statute was amended, in that the amounts and degrees of crime were changed; otherwise the operative language of the sections was retained.


The amended indictment alleged that Pierce conspired to commit <mask> pursuant to section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), (5), (7), and (8) and pursuant to Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(2). A violation of section 550, subdivision (a), subsections (1), (2), and (5), is designated as a felony, whereas a violation of subsections (7) and (8) is either a misdemeanor or felony wobbler. ( § 550, subd. (c)(1) and (2)(A)(B).)


The plain language of Penal Law § 10.00 (7) authorizes an indictment of the partnership on such facts. That section provides that a "person” — which includes a person charged with a crime — means, "where appropriate,” "a partnership.” Similarly, the section defining the crime of <mask>, Penal Law § 176.00 (3), provides that a "person” chargeable *1098with the crime of insurance fraud includes any "firm, association or corporation”; under the Partnership Law, a partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.” (§ 10 [1] [emphasis added].) Unmistakably, therefore, the Penal Law applies to a law "firm,” whether it be a partnership or a professional corporation, and the law firm may be charged if one partner has committed a crime in the name of the law firm, as alleged in this case. Presumably, if there is a conviction of a partnership, the sentence can be a fine, a conditional discharge, or an unconditional discharge, as for a corporation. (See, Penal Law §§ 60.01, 60.25.)


Here, an attempted larceny or attempted <mask> within the unlawfully entered premises can be inferred from the conduct at the Regency Warehouse. "A person is guilty of an attempt * * * when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.” (Penal Law § 110.00.) Evidence that an insured has arranged for his own property to be destroyed or "stolen” in preparation for filing a false insurance claim has been held to constitute an attempted insurance fraud. (People v Vastano, 117 AD2d 637; see also, People v Trepanier, 84 AD2d 374.)


Jospeh Kevin McKay, J. *236These defendants are the only ones now remaining in a multidefendant, multicount indictment brought by the New York State Attorney General, alleging larceny, <mask> and similar charges in a scheme to defraud certain insurance companies during the operation of a medical clinic, which treated no-fault patients. Their present application is deemed to be one for reargument of that part of this court’s decision and order of December 17, 2007 sustaining original count 55 (now count 45). Reargument is hereby granted and for reasons addressed infra the court now amends its decision and order in accordance with this opinion.


*828Whereas in McNair application of the litigation privilege supported the public policy of encouraging unfettered disclosures of confidential medical information in the interest of public safety ( McNair , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1167-1168, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 ), applying the privilege to fraudulent communications made in support of or in opposition to a claim for insurance benefits would frustrate the remedial purpose of the IFPA. Civil statutes enacted for the protection of the public are to be construed broadly in favor of their protective purpose. ( Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores , Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 530, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 246 P.3d 612 ; People ex rel . Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 313, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042.) The Legislature was "presumably aware of the extant broad litigation privilege in section 47" ( Komarova , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 340, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ) when it enacted the IFPA to provide civil liability for fraudulent communications related to claims for insurance benefits, including liability for communications that are otherwise at the core of the privilege. This strongly suggests the Legislature balanced the public interest in preventing <mask> with the interest in encouraging free and unfettered communications in litigation, and "struck that balance" in favor of preventing insurance fraud. ( Begier , supra , 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 885, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158.) Applying the privilege here would "encour[age] rather than suppress[ ]" ( Banuelos , supra , 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 332, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 772 ) the type of fraud the IFPA was designed to *887combat and would upset the legislative balance enshrined in the Act.


Defendant argues otherwise. Plaintiff is entitled to payment on these claims under the workers’ compensation fee schedule and under the no-fault regulations only if Dr. Kogen provides “active and personal supervision over an authorized psychologist.” Defendant alleges that plaintiff is misrepresenting Dr. Kogen’s active role in these cases, and specifically in the case of Monise Chery, and that this misrepresentation negates the necessity for a 30-day denial. Defendant cites Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group (90 NY2d 195 [1997]) to support this proposition. The Court of Appeals in this case ruled that the insurer’s untimely disclaimer does not prevent it from raising a defense of lack of coverage based upon the fact or founded belief that the alleged injury did not arise out of an insured incident. Defendant analogizes that an insurer’s untimely disclaimer should not prevent it from raising a defense of lack of coverage based upon the fact or founded belief that the claims are a result of claimant’s fraud or misrepresentation of a critical issue; in this case plaintiff’s misrepresentation of Dr. Kogen’s active role in this case. Defendant also cites Matter of Metro Med. Diagnostics v Eagle Ins. Co. (293 AD2d 751, 752 [2d Dept 2002]), where the Court held that “if the collision at issue was a deliberate event caused in the furtherance of an <mask> scheme, it would not be a covered accident,” and the insurer “was not precluded from asserting [that] defense despite [the insurer’s] untimely denial of the claim.”


In any event, assuming arguendo that the trial court should have struck the section 550, subdivision (a)(5) allegation, Pierce can show no prejudice. The remaining allegations against him in the count 1 conspiracy to commit <mask> ( § 182, subd. (a)(1) ), was that Pierce did so by knowingly presenting a false claim or multiple false claims for health care benefits ( § 550, subd. (a)(7) & (8) ) and knowingly presenting any false or fraudulent material statement in support of a claim for workers' compensation benefits ( Ins. Code, § 1871.4, subd. (a)(2) ). The jury found count 1 true based on one or more of the alleged overt acts, none of which involved the preparation of a fraudulent document, as alleged in section 550, subdivision (a)(5). Thus, even had the section 550, subdivision (a)(5) allegation been struck, Pierce would still have been found guilty.


MBIA contends that to succeed on an <mask> claim, the insurer must prove only that the application for insurance made a material misrepresentation that, had the insurer known of the true facts, would have led the insurer to either not issue the policy or issue the policy on different terms. MBIA also asserts that to succeed on a breach of warranty claim, the insurer must prove only that the breach of warranty materially increased the insurer’s risk. MBIA argues that it is not required to establish a causal link between Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations and claims MBIA paid under the insurance policies. MBIA supports its argument with Insurance Law §§ 3105 and 3106, respectively.


Between 1992 and 2001, reports of suspected automobile <mask> increased by 275% the bulk of the increase occurring in no-fault insurance fraud. Reports of no-fault fraud rose from 489 cases in 1992 to 9,191 in 2000, *571a rise of more than 1,700%. No-fault fraud accounted for three quarters of the 16,902 reports of automobile-related fraud received by the Insurance Department’s Frauds Bureau in 2000, and more than 55% of the 22,247 reports involving all types of insurance fraud. In 1999, the Superintendent established a No-Fault Unit within the Frauds Bureau to focus specifically on no-fault fraud and abuse. By one estimate, the combined effect of no-fault insurance fraud has been an increase of over $100 per year in annual insurance premium costs for the average New York motorist.


The instant case is distinguishable from Goldfinger (supra) in a number of important ways. First, in the case at bar, the civil and criminal investigations, while both involving the same incident, each had a different focus, and were thus, not "virtually the same”. The criminal investigation focused on whether arson had been committed; whereas, the civil investigation focused on whether <mask> had been committed. Granted, defendant Wright was ultimately only charged with one count of insurance fraud based, in part, on her statement. However, the mere fact that at the conclusion of his investigation, Ryan only had probable cause to arrest defendant for insurance fraud, and not arson, does not alter the reality that *682Ryan — a member of the Arson and Explosion Squad — was primarily interested in whether arson was committed. Given the wholly different purposes of the instant criminal and civil investigations, to shield defendant from the questioning that occurred here would place an undue limitation on law enforcement’s ability to investigate potential criminal charges.


Although the case had originally been adjourned until March 19, 1985 for the court’s decision on the motions, the matter was advanced at the People’s request to February 26, 1985, since the People had apparently decided to "acquiesce in the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to request leave to represent.” On that date, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that an insufficient number of grand jurors had heard the evidence presented and granted the People’s application for leave to re-present. In doing so, this court expressed its concern over the delay in prosecution. The case was then adjourned to April 1, 1985, pending re-presentation. On April 1, 1985, the People were not yet ready to proceed with the new indictment and the matter was again adjourned. On April 19, 1985, the Grand Jury voted a true bill and returned indictment number 1300/85, charging defendants with conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 105.05), with attempted grand larceny in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.35), with 16 counts of <mask> in *270the first degree (Penal Law § 176.20) and with 16 counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.10). The indictment was filed on that date and defendants were directed to appear for arraignment on April 22, 1985, at which time the People announced their readiness on the record. This was the first time that the People announced their readiness on either indictment. The defendants were arraigned on the new indictment on May 3, 1985. On that date the People announced for the second time on the record that they were ready for trial. Motions were served and filed on July 15, 1985. Defendant Alexander’s motion papers, in which defendant Gelfand joined, requested, inter alia, dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (g) on the ground that the People had not been ready to proceed within the time set forth by CPL 30.30 (1) (a).


Even assuming, arguendo, that competent evidence had been presented to the grand jury, the facts of this case would impermissibly stretch the acceptable limits of CPL 20.60 (1). Criminal Procedure Law § 20.60 (1) should in fact be given a narrow application. (People v R., 160 Misc 2d 142 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1994].) In People v R., the prosecution relied on CPL 20.60 (1) to establish jurisdiction in Kings County over an <mask> and related crimes. The defendant created the fraudulent bills in his Manhattan office and submitted them to the insurer’s office in Nassau County. (Id. at 143-144.) The Kings County District Attorney sought jurisdiction based on a single phone call made by an informant at the behest of the Kings County District Attorney from a telephone at the Kings County District Attorney’s Office to the defendant’s office in Manhattan. People v R. held that a contextual analysis of section 20.60 (1) compelled rejection of this jurisdictional claim:


Although posited slightly differently than the argument in MBIA Ins. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (34 Misc 3d 895 [2012] [MBIA v Countrywide]), a related case also before this court having arguments corresponding to those made in this matter by both plaintiff therein and Countrywide, defendants in both cases, the base issue before the court in this motion is when causation occurs in claims for <mask> and breach of representations and warranties. Syncora asserts in both its fraud and breach claims that causation occurred, and liability results, when Countrywide made misrepresentations that were material and which induced Syncora to issue financial guaranty insurance policies. Syncora asserts that had it known the true facts of the underlying mortgage loans, it may have either declined to issue its financial guaranty insurance policies or issued the policies on different terms. Syncora contends that it was denied the opportunity to examine the facts based on proper information, and, thus, all payments it has made pursuant to the policies result from Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations.


The crimes alleged are <mask>, for soliciting the doctor to change the MRI findings with intent to defraud insurers; falsifying business records, the MRI reports at the radiologist’s office; and attempted grand larceny, an attempt by false pretenses to gain money in a lawsuit against the New York City Transit Authority. At the time of the crimes charged in the indictment, the doctor, unknown to the defendant Lessoff, was working undercover with the District Attorney’s office during the Grand Jury investigation and was secretly recording his telephone conversations with Lessoff. The indictment alleges 10 separate transactions involving 10 separate clients of Lessoff and the partnership. At all times Lessoff was acting in the name of the law firm. There is no evidence implicating anyone else in the firm in the alleged crimes.


Although the evidence indicated that defendant Hirsch did call the Metropolitan office and ask when a check would be forthcoming, the People failed to sustain their burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the statement was meant to be a claim for a payment in excess of $1,500. The court cannot simply regard the statement as a claim for payment and circumstantially ascribe a specific value to the repairs without additional proof of such cost. Therefore, the People having proven a fraudulent insurance act, but having failed to prove the value thereof to the defendants, the court finds both defendants guilty of violating section 176.10 of the Penal Law committing an <mask> in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor.


Distinctions have to be made between charges which go to the heart of the integrity of a sport or business and those charges which are extrinsic to the sport or business itself. There is a serious risk in keeping a possible race fixer, an *955embezzler, or a crooked policeman in a position where he can continue his misdeeds. A jockey accused of throwing a race, or a trainer accused of doping a horse, if he is kept on without further inquiry, can continue to tip the scale in future events, much more than one who has committed past perjury or tax fraud. The crimes here charged, although involving egregious cruelty to animals, do not directly impact on the conduct or the outcome of future horse shows and exhibitions. Even if plaintiffs had been guilty of <mask>, in the coming meets their horses would run no faster, jump no higher, nor perform any better. If they are suspect, they may not be given universal public approbation. But even under a cloud they may perform. If ultimately plaintiff Lindemann is convicted of the crime charged, he can be stripped of any titles and trophies he may have won. If he is acquitted after having been suspended, he has been denied any chance to compete, and unlike the ordinary job holder, he cannot be reinstated or compensated with back pay.