PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, Ver- non F. Carlson,1 appeals from various judgments and actions of the trial court stemming from a 2007 action commenced by the plaintiffs, Stuart C. Carlson, Patricia W. Carlson, and Alexis S. Carlson,2 and a subsequent settlement agreement that was reached by the parties in 2015. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred (1) in denying his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partnership tax returns, (2) by not addressing the dispute in the p<mask> notice between the parties before a settlement was reached, (3) in not ordering the plaintiffs to release all claims during the 2015 settlement negotiations, (4) in authoriz- ing an application for a subdivision of a property owned by the partnership, and (5) in appointing Peter Carlson as receiver. We conclude that the defendant’s first three claims must be dismissed. As for the fourth and fifth claims, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgments of the court. The court set forth the following facts and procedural history of the case in its February 5, 2020 memorandum of decision granting the plaintiffs’ motion to terminate stay. ‘‘The long history of this case began with a com- plaint filed in 2007 by the plaintiffs . . . . The com- plaint alleged, and the parties do not dispute, that the parties were members of a partnership referred to as Carlson Associates. The parties possessed varying per- centages of interest in the partnership. Stuart Carlson was alleged to have been the managing partner. The court file reveals that no written partnership agreement governed the relations among the partners or between the partners and the partnership. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that the assets of the partner- ship consisted of fourteen parcels of real estate located in the towns of Manchester . . . and Glastonbury . . . and loans by Carlson Associates to Karen [Carlson], Kristine [Carlson] and the defendant. The two count complaint asserted claims for partition of the assets of the partnership and its dissolution. These claims were grounded on the existence of significant discord among the partners, which included the occupancy of Karen [Carlson] and the defendant of partnership properties without paying rent and the refusal to remit rent received from nonpartner tenants. Karen [Carlson] and the defendant were alleged to have refused to agree to the sale of any of the partnership properties although the expenses and liabilities of the partnership, including past due real property taxes, exceeded its income. Stu- art [Carlson] and Patricia [Carlson] claimed in the com- plaint that they loaned money to the partnership with- out repayments, and further that the partnership loaned money to the defendant, Kristine Carlson and Karen Carlson, which had not been repaid. The plaintiffs addi- tionally sought settlement of accounts and contribu- tions between the [parties]. ‘‘After the filing of the complaint, four years lapsed with little activity. Stuart Carlson died on January 23, 2011, and Patricia Carlson, the administratrix of his estate, was substituted as a [plaintiff]. In 2012, the mat- ter was dismissed for failure to prosecute and subse- quently reopened. Three more years passed in the ser- vice of disagreement. During this time, the [plaintiffs] moved for court orders to sell four partnership proper- ties in 2012. . . . The defendant objected. In 2013, the defendant moved for an order permitting him to inspect partnership records. . . . Later that year, the [plain- tiffs] moved successfully, over the objection of the defendant, for a court order permitting the partnership to enter into a listing agreement with a real estate agent to market and sell the remaining properties. . . . The movants asserted that the defendant had refused to sign any listing agreement. In the meantime, foreclosure proceedings were commenced by the town of Glaston- bury for unpaid property taxes. . . . Despite the fore- closure proceedings, the defendant continued to resist the sale of the properties including those under con- tract. . . . The sale of the properties under contract was ultimately consummated, apparently in 2014. On May 26, 2015, the court . . . dissolved the partnership and appoint[ed] Richard Conti, Esq. as a receiver. . . . Despite multiple offers to purchase certain other prop- erties of the partnership, the partners were unable to agree on their sale of the listing of other properties causing the offers to be withdrawn. . . . ‘‘On November 17, 2015, the case came before the court for trial. The operative pleadings at the time of trial were the amended complaint dated November 9, 2015, and the answer with setoffs of the defendant, also dated November 9, 2015. At no time during the prior eight years during which the action was pending had the defendant asserted a counterclaim or cross claim. The [plaintiffs] reached a settlement agreement among themselves and with the partnership. On the fourth day of evidence, the defendant and the [plaintiffs] reached a settlement. The settlement included an adjournment of the trial and payment of $102,000 to Patricia Carlson. The remaining property was to be appraised and, with the exception of the property known as 637 South Main Street in Manchester, sold with the proceeds of the sales to be distributed among the partners according to their varying partnership percentages. The defendant was to receive the 637 South Main Street property, the value of which was to be deducted from his share of funds generated from the sale of the property. The bills of any creditors of the partnership and the receiver were to be paid before any distributions were made. Distributions to the partners were subject to the approval of the court, which was to retain jurisdiction of the matter for the winding down of the partnership assets and debts. ‘‘Pursuant to the settlement agreement, including the adjournment of the trial, a number of properties owned by the partnership were sold and partial distributions made to the parties with the exception of the defendant. The defendant made objections to both. . . . The defendant also objected at various times to the payment of fees to the receiver. . . . The attendant delay in making a distribution to the defendant involved the uncertainty relative to the value of the total assets of the estate and the value of the 63[7] South Main Street property. Disputes arose (1) between the defendant and an easement holder over 637 South Main Street, (2) whether the defendant and Karen Carlson remained indebted to the partnership as had previously been claimed by Stuart [Carlson] and Patricia Carlson and (3) whether to subdivide one of the parcels of property. Two attorneys’ liens for work done on behalf of the defendant by two different attorneys were presented to the receiver for payment. The court declined to treat the attorneys’ fees as partnership debt because it was work done primarily for the benefit of the defendant as evidenced by court filings. Any claims against the defendant and that might have remained after the settle- ment agreement were withdrawn, on the record and in a filing with the court, by the [plaintiffs]. The disagree- ment over the easement remains. The court granted approval, over the objection of the defendant, to subdi- vide the parcel at issue. [Karen] Carlson died in 201[7], and her interests were represented by [Kristine] Carlson as the executrix of the estate of [Karen] Carlson. ‘‘On March 21, 2019, a counterclaim was, for the first time, asserted by [the defendant] against ‘Patricia Carl- son, Alexis Carlson, Kristine Carlson and Attorney Wil- liam G. Reveley [counsel for the partnership, Patricia Carlson individually and as administratrix of Stuart Carlson’s estate, and Alexis Carlson], Attorney Mary Rossettie [prior counsel for the estate] and the estates of Stuart C. Carlson and Karen Carlson.’ The counterclaim was procedurally improper in that it was filed without a request for leave to amend, or motion to amend, as required by Practice Book § 61-10. The counterclaim named two attorneys as defendants, who were not par- ties to the action without permission of the court as required by Practice Book § 10-11 and General Statutes § 52-102a. Moreover, the court interpreted the settle- ment agreement, involving an adjournment of the trial, as a general release of any and all claims the parties had against each other. Finally, the court notes that the conduct complained of by the defendant in his counter- claim, which asserts counts of breach of fiduciary duties and abuse of process, assert claims for conduct that is outside of the statute of limitations. On April 15, 2019, all the other parties joined in an objection, expressed through the vehicle of a motion to strike, to the counter- claim on the above grounds and together filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The court granted the motions on May 28, 2019, ordered the counterclaim stricken, and the defendant appealed. ‘‘On June 21, 2019, this court granted the joint motion of all parties excluding the defendant to terminate the automatic stay imposed by Practice Book § 61-11. The motion was limited to lifting any stay imposed on the filing of a Mylar,3 necessary to effect the subdivision of 637 South Main Street, Manchester. The filing of the Mylar was a condition subsequent to the permitting of the property by the appropriate municipal boards. The receiver supported the lifting of the stay to file the Mylar because the liquid assets under his control were diminishing and the available partnership funds would become insufficient to pay its debts, a refrain commonly voiced over the prior years. The court, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (d), granted the motion finding that although the [defendant] had not filed the appeal only for delay, the due administration of justice required the termination of stay. ‘‘Thereafter, on July 19, 2019, the receiver filed a motion for discharge of lis pendens. In his motion, the receiver noted the active efforts underway to sell the remaining parcels including those that are subject to subdivision on Line Street in Manchester and two par- cels to the rear of Line Street in Glastonbury. The receiver alerted the court that notices of lis pendens had been filed by the defendant on both parcels and moved for their discharge. The motion was joined by the [plaintiffs] and objected to by the defendant. The receiver, and the [plaintiffs], asserted that the two lis pendens were significantly impeding their ability to market and ultimately sell the properties. The receiver and the [plaintiffs] referred to the diminishing liquid funds from which to pay taxes and ongoing fees related to the winding down. On September 16, 2019, the court granted the motion to discharge from which order the defendant appealed by way of amendment to the origi- nal appeal. On January 2, 2020, the [plaintiffs] moved to terminate the stay attendant to the amended appeal of the order discharging the lis pendens. A hearing was held on the motion to terminate the stay on January 28, 2020.’’4 (Footnote added.) The following appellate procedural history is perti- nent to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On June 3, 2019, the defendant appealed from the court’s May 28, 2019 judgment granting the plaintiffs’ motion to strike his counterclaim. Thereafter, the defendant filed five amended appeals challenging other actions of the court. In his first amended appeal form, the defen- dant stated that he was appealing from the following: ‘‘motion for discharge of lis pendens, interim report of receiver, request for order.’’ The defendant never briefed his appeal of the striking of his counterclaim, nor did he brief his appeal of the motion for discharge of lis pendens. These two claims on appeal are thus deemed abandoned. The defendant’s subsequent four amended appeals listed several other actions of the court. In his third amended appeal, he listed, among other things, that he was challenging the court’s decision to appoint Peter Carlson as receiver. This claim is the only action from those four amended appeals that the defendant has briefed. The remaining claims listed in the amended appeal forms are thus deemed abandoned. Additionally, this court dismissed portions of the defendant’s appeal prior to oral argument. On February 20, 2020, this court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the defendant’s second amended appeal, but only as to the portion of the appeal challenging the court’s November 18, 2019 order terminating the appel- late stay. On June 9, 2021, this court granted the plain- tiffs’ motion to dismiss the defendant’s fifth amended appeal, which stated that he was appealing from his ‘‘objection to the filing of Carlson Associates’ 2019 part- nership federal income tax returns.’’ Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant briefs that the court erred in denying his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partner- ship tax returns. The defendant’s brief appears to chal- lenge the court’s rulings on two separate motions. First, on November 6, 2018, the defendant filed a ‘‘motion to inspect and copy financial records’’ of the partnership. On November 19, 2018, the court denied that motion. The defendant did not then appeal from that judgment, nor has he done so now on any of his appeal forms. Second, on August 7, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to compel discovery of the 1986 income tax returns of SHVC, Inc.5 On August 14, 2020, the court denied that motion. In its order denying the motion, the court stated: ‘‘The discovery is not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as this case settled in 2015.’’ Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Should the trial court, subsequent to the filing of a pending appeal, make a decision that the appellant desires to have reviewed, the appellant shall file an amended appeal within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the decision as provided for in Section 63- 1. . . .’’ The defendant did not amend his appeal to include a claim regarding the court’s August 14, 2020 order denying his motion to compel further discovery. Because the defendant has not properly appealed either ruling, we cannot address his claim challenging those rulings. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of the appeal. II The defendant next briefs that the court erred by not addressing the dispute in the presettlement notice among the parties before a settlement was reached. It is unclear what judgment of the court from which the defendant appeals. The record indicates that on Novem- ber 16, 2015, the plaintiffs, Kristine Carlson, and Karen Carlson filed a partial settlement notice indicating that they had reached a settlement in the underlying action. The notice stated: ‘‘Issues remain in dispute as between the plaintiffs and [the defendant].’’ The defendant’s claim presumably stems from that notice, as we are unaware of any other presettlement notice filed by any party. The settlement occurred on November 25, 2015, nearly four years before the defendant filed the present appeal. His brief does not reference any judgment from which he is appealing and none of his appeal forms reference any judgment concerning a presettlement notice. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of the appeal as it is not from a judgment of the court and it is not a judgment encompassed in his notice of appeal. III The defendant next briefs that the court erred in not ordering the plaintiffs to release all claims during the 2015 settlement negotiations. The claim he attempts to raise, like the claim he attempted to raise in part II of this opinion, concerns events that occurred nearly four years before the defendant filed the present appeal and is not from a judgment of the court. Furthermore, none of his appeal forms references any judgment concerning this matter. Accordingly, we must dismiss this portion of the appeal as it is not from a judgment of the court and it is not a judgment encompassed in his notice of appeal. IV The defendant next briefs that the court erred in authorizing an application for a subdivision of a prop- erty owned by the partnership. At the outset, we note that this claim that he now attempts to raise is not encompassed in his notice of appeal or amended notices. His first amended appeal, however, challenges the court’s order allowing a receiver to market the lots created by the subdivision of that property. We reason- ably can interpret the defendant’s brief as challenging that order. Nevertheless, we decline to review this claim because it is inadequately briefed. The following facts and procedural history are rele- vant to this claim. At all relevant times, the partnership owned a property at 637 South Main Street in Manches- ter. On August 8, 2017, the receiver reported to the court that this property ‘‘consists of approximately eleven acres of land with an existing three family home and two barns. All partners are in agreement that the best way to sell the land left after subdividing off the front corner (which is to be conveyed to [the defendant] pursuant to the settlement reached by the partners) is to subdivide the remaining acreage into building lots.’’ On September 11, 2017, the court issued an order approving of the receiver’s report, which, in turn, authorized the receiver to proceed with an application for a subdivision of the property. The defendant did not appeal from the issuance of that order at that time or in his five later notices of appeal. On September 5, 2018, the Planning and Zoning Com- mission of the Town of Manchester (commission) approved the application for a subdivision of the prop- erty. On October 15, 2018, the receiver filed a motion for an order in which he informed the court that the subdivision application had been approved and requested the authority to list the lots for sale at prices suggested by a local Realtor. On October 29, 2018, the court granted that motion. The defendant did not appeal from the granting of that motion. On May 28, 2019, the defendant filed an objection to the ‘‘filing of resubdivision’’ of the property. The gist of the defendant’s argument was that the subdivision application that was approved by the commission did not comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. The court did not rule on the defendant’s objection. The defendant’s first amended appeal purports to appeal from the interim report of the receiver dated August 12, 2019, and from the request for an order. In that report, the receiver stated that ‘‘the resubdivision [of 637 South Main Street] is now perfected following approval, and the lots created thereby are available to transfer/sell.’’ The receiver asked the court ‘‘whether to direct the [R]ealtor to continue marketing the . . . lots’’ created by the subdivision. The court approved the report and order on September 16, 2019. In his brief to this court, the defendant states in the heading for this claim that ‘‘the trial court err[ed] in allowing a comprehensive subdivision instead of just obtaining an appraisal.’’ ‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare asser- tion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Rock v. University of Con- necticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016). In the section of his brief regarding this claim, the defendant discusses matters that are unrelated to the subdivision of 637 South Main Street. He does not brief any statute, case precedent, rule of court, or other legal authority that could render the court’s action improper. We, therefore, deem this claim inadequately briefed and decline to review it. Accordingly, we decline to review this portion of the defendant’s appeal. V Finally, in his third amended appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in appointing Peter Carlson as receiver. ‘‘The application for a receiver is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, to be exer- cised with due regard to the relevant statutes and rules, and such exercise is not to be disturbed lightly nor unless abuse of discretion or other material error appears.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Antonino v. Johnson, 113 Conn. App. 72, 77, 966 A.2d 261 (2009), quoting Chatfield Co. v. Coffey Laundries, Inc., 111 Conn. 497, 501, 150 A. 511 (1930). After reviewing and considering the record in this case, including the briefs and arguments of the parties on appeal, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in appointing Peter Carlson as receiver. There is no error. The appeal is dismissed with respect to all claims except the claims regarding the authorization of an application for a subdivision and the appointment of a receiver; those judgments are affirmed. Kristine Carlson, Karen Carlson, and Carlson Associates were also named as defendants when the plaintiffs commenced the underlying action. Kristine Carlson and Karen Carlson were removed as defendants in 2015. Following Karen Carlson’s death in 2017, the court, in 2018, granted the motion of Kristine Carlson, administrator of the estate of Karen Carlson, to be made a party defendant. Carlson Associates remains a defendant in the action but did not participate in the present appeal. Our references in this opinion to the defendant are to Vernon F. Carlson. Stuart C. Carlson died on January 23, 2011, and, on July 21, 2011, the plaintiffs moved to substitute Patricia W. Carlson, in her capacity as admin- istratrix of the estate of Stuart C. Carlson, as a plaintiff in the action. On August 1, 2011, the court granted this motion. ‘‘A Mylar map is a map prepared on a thin polyester film suitable for recording on the land records.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commission, 199 Conn. App. 115, 118 n.2, 235 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959, 239 A.3d 320 (2020). On February 5, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to terminate the stay. In that motion, the defendant stated that SHVC, Inc., was a family owned real estate investing company, and that Carlson Associates was formed in 1986 after SHVC, Inc., was dissolved.


In any event, since this was an order deciding an appeal, and the proposed order of <mask> is so materially different from the original order as to constitute in itself practically a review of such order, I am of the opinion that section 21 of the Judiciary Law bars me from resettling the order in the manner requested. That section makes clear that a Judge, other than of the appellate courts, may not take part in the decision of a question argued orally in the court when he was not sitting as a Judge (cf. Gable v. Raftery, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 520).


Certainly, the insiders cannot now seek to keep the fruits of the bargain, and, at the same time, receive a partial refund of its cost. They would keep the good and return the bad. If the reservation is as fundamental and dreadful a prospect as the insiders would have us infer, and it is stricken, should not the whole interrelated settlement be stricken and the parties put back in their original p<mask> condition? There is no insider suggestion that this be done, nor how or whether it could be done, or whether they want it that way.


The Code makes no mention of exceptions except on the trial and to decisions on matters of law arising on such trial, and a review of questions of fact is only to be had on a case or exceptions as on a trial by jury. (§ 268.) Great injustice would ensue if a new trial could be had for a refusal to insert in a decision already written and filed, adjudications upon facts not mentioned in the pleadings without a request before such a decision to pass upon such facts. If the refusal to accede to such request was made in court, either upon a motion to insert the determination of the particular fact in the case, or on the settlement of such case, and it was improperly refused, the remedy would be by motion for a <mask> or appeal from such denial as an order on a motion, not by exception to it as to a decision on a trial so as to send the whole case for a new trial.


The United Jewish Appeal of Greater New York is a New York membership corporation organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Its objective generally is to raise funds for the relief, rehabilitation and <mask> of Jews in need or in danger in various parts of the world. The funds raised by the respondent are distributed to various charitable organizations engaged in relief, rehabilitation and settlement work and by agreement these beneficiary agencies designate the respondent as their sole fund-raising agency and refrain from engaging in any fund-raising activities.


Ordered that the branch of the motion which is to strike references to <mask> at pages 20-23, and 64-65 of the respondent’s brief is granted, and those portions of the respondent’s brief are stricken and have not been considered in the determination of the appeal (see People v Stocks, 101 AD3d 1049 [2012]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012]). Rivera, J.E, Lott, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.


During the next 141/2 months, counsel attempted to prepare a resettled order to correct the defect, but has been unable to do so. For whatever reason, each submission was improper, either as to form or by the omission of some statement as to why <mask> was necessary. As far as appears, the attorney either had no idea what a resettled order was or, having moved on to other cases, he left to either a secretary or paralegal the preparation of a resettled order. In any event, this has led to substantial loss and prejudice to the infant, who has been denied the proceeds of the settlement for moré than 141/2 months. In my view, the inaction and neglect warrants a substantial reduction in the fee.


Suppose a case where the party defeated desires to review the referee’s decision, and his report does not find, or refuses to find, one way or the other upon all the facts the appellant desires to present, so that exceptions to that will not be sufficient; or that he wishes to contend that a fact found was entirely unauthorized by evidence; or wishes to insist, as he may do at the general term, (Waters v. Green, 3 Keyes, 385; McCabe v. Brayton, 38 N. Y. Rep. 196 ; Loeschick v. Baldwin, Id. 326,) that the finding was contrary to evidence. He must then prepare and serve a case containing the evidence. He should file and serve separate exceptions to the facts and conclusions appearing in the report, within ten days, or such extended time as he may procure, unless he serve his case and exceptions, containing also such exceptions to the facts *214and conclusions appearing in the report as are necessary to present the questions deemed material. If the case and exceptions contain exceptions to the facts and legal conclusions in the report, or such facts be repeated therein, followed by exceptions thereto, it is not necessary to serve them separately. The case “ will be, of itself, a compliance with the first clause of the section, and no other exceptions will be required to satisfy that clause.” (Hunt v. Bloomer, 13 N. Y. Rep. 343. Johnson v. Whitlock, Id. 347.) It is advisable, if a case he made, to insert them therein. The referee is bound to allow such exceptions as the appellant desires to insert, and if he refuse to do so, the court will send the case back to him for <mask>, and compel him to resettle it. So if he refuse to find one way or the other upon any question of fact proposed in the case, the court, on motion, will compel him to so find, without directing whether the finding shall be in the affirmative or the negative, as the appellant has a right to have his original case so settled that he can go to the Court of Appeals with it. (Johnson v. Whitlock. 13 N. Y. Rep. 349, 350. Priest v. Price, 3 Keyes, 222. Manly v. Insurance Co., 1 Lansing, 24-26. Casler v. Shipman, 35 N. Y. Rep. 533, 542. McKeon v. See, 4 Rob. 449, 464.) He should insist upon a finding one way or the other, as a matter of right, as an exception will not lie to a mere refusal to find at all, (Casler v. Shipman, 35 N. Y. Rep. 533; Colwell v. Lawrence, 38 id. 71; Preston v. Price, 3 Keyes, 222;) unless, possibly, in a case where there was no conflict in the evidence: (Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y. Rep. 476. Marvin v. Inglis, 39 How. Pr. 329.) On appeal from the judgment, an order refusing to compel a finding on any material question may be reviewed. (Casler v. Shipman, 35 N. Y. Rep. 542.) The practice has, (unless in the seventh district, as hereafter shown, prior to the adoption of the present system of departments,) so far as we are aware, been uniform. In the third district, in Phelan v. A. and S. Railroad, (reported on the merits, 1 Lans. 258,) the case was twice sent back to the referee, on his refusal to find either way upon certain facts proposed by the case; the court the last time (Albany special term, March, 1869) making an order as follows: “ Ordered that the case and exceptions herein be sent back to the referee for further settlement of the following facts proposed by the said case and exceptions, (specifying them separately.)- It is further ordered, that said referee find one way or the other upon each .of said proposed findings, and upon each portion thereof, *215whether the facts are, or are not, as proposed; and if he find that the same are not, or any portion thereof is not, as proposed, that he allow the defendant to interpose in the case and exceptions, such exceptions to his finding or findings as he may be advised.” The cases were sent back for resettlement, and similar orders made, in Hides v. Horn, (reported on the merits, 54 Barb. 172,) at the same terra, and in Watson v. Shuttleworth, (reported on the merits, 53 Barb. 357,) at a prior special term at Albany. Of course no fair minded referee would refuse to find one way or the other, upon any question as to which evidence was given on the trial, and he ought not to attempt to determine what questions are material, for the Court of Appeals may not agree with him as to what is material. If he err in such determination he deprives the party of all opportunity to procure the judgment of that court upon the question. Neither ought the court at special term, for the same reason, to do so, as a single fact, if found in favor of the appellant, may neutralize or destroy another, or turn the case.


With respect to the first item of relief prayed for this court is of the opinion that the application has not been timely made, for the rule is clear that an application to resettle an order of the subject character cannot be made after the time to appeal therefrom has expired. But even if said application for a <mask> had been timely made, it is this court’s view that the same would and should be denied, for the order, as entered (which was settled on notice and without opposition to the form and contents thereof) correctly and properly expressed and stated this court’s intentions with respect to the original motion. The respondents were clearly held in contempt for a willful failure and omission to perform acts which were then in their power to perform and which acts they had been directed to perform by the order of the Appellate Division of the Second Department. As the subject order indicates, it was the court’s intention, pursuant to sections 753 and 774 of the Judiciary Law, not only to impose a fine but also to order that the respondents be imprisoned until they had performed the aforesaid acts. It is clear that in the circumstances here present, both a fine and imprisonment may be imposed. (Cf. Ditomasso v. Loverro, 242 App. Div. 190.) An order cannot be qualified in its operation and effect by reference to the opinion of the court; the court speaks by its order, and effect must be given to it according to its terms. (Hewlett v. Wood, 67 N. Y. 394, 399.)


As to the settlement of the accounts of the administrators, they will stand as settled. No objection or exception thereto was taken by the appellants, nor is any now urged. The amount of $4,174.23, therefore, will stand as the balance in the hands of the administrators for, distribution. But so far as commissions were allowed *621to tbe administrators, or charged upon such balance, we think the learned surrogate erred. All parts of said decree allowing to the administrators commissions, or ordering the same paid out of the assets of said estate, are reversed, with costs of this appeal to. the appellants against these respondents personally, and the proceedings are remitted to the surrogate of Greene county for <mask> of the decree of distribution in accordance with this opinion.


The procedure contemplates notice in the same manner as settlement of the original order and the; form is rather simple. In addition to submission of a supporting affidavit as to why <mask> is necessary, the proposed resettled order includes the caption, with the present date and, after recital of the papers submitted, an ordering paragraph recalling, vacating and resettling the original order. Following this should be the original or*793der with the original date, caption and recital, after which the ordering paragraphs should be set forth as in the original, with the only change being those to correct the defects. Plainly, this is a rather simple procedure which does not warrant the inordinate time that elapsed in this case. Although the attorney here was carefully instructed as to resettlement, he repeatedly ignored or failed to follow the requisite procedure.


The Court of Appeals has power to send a case back to the Supreme Court for <mask>, (Westcott v. Thompson, 16 N. Y. Rep. 613,) even after argument. (Rice v. Isham, 1 Keyes, 44, 47.) As the referee is not an officer of that court, but of the Supreme Court, a motion should be made in the latter court that the case be sent back to him for resettlement. ( Westcott v. Thompson, 16 N. Y. Rep. 616.) And though the case be pending in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, at special term, has power to order a resettlement, and that the corrected case be returned to the Court of Appeals, with a recall of the former, or a request to correct it. (Whitbeck v. Whine, 8 How. Pr. 433. Luyster v. Sniffin, 3 id. 250.)


Watson, J. Defendant moves for (1) a <mask> of the order made on November 12, 1937, denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint by including therein a provision granting leave to defendant to serve an answer to the amended complaint pursuant to section 90 of the Municipal Court Code, and (2) for leave to appeal to the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, from said order, as resettled. The motion is granted to the extent of granting leave to the defendant to serve and file an answer to the amended complaint within five days from service of a copy of the resettled order to be entered herein, with notice of entry thereof.


*144In Matter of Roth (139 N. J. Eq. 588) the point under discussion was considered by the appellate court although the appeal was taken apparently only from the refusal by the lower court to vacate three decrees settling prior accounts of the fiduciary. The cause assigned for vacatur of the decrees by the income beneficiary was the making of amortization payments on a certain mortgage out of income. Although shown in the accounts, no objections had been made to the payments. The decrees were, set aside upon the appeal. The remaindermen urged that on <mask> of the accounts, a depreciation reserve be created. - This the court declined to do, although admitting that “ Such a course is in harmony with modern accounting, practice ”. It reasoned that “ A tenant for life is bound to repair only to the extent of preventing permissive or actual waste. * * * he is under no obligation in respect to the loss of economic value of a building which normally occurs.”


The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a partition of the assets and a dissolution of a family partnership, of which the plaintiffs and the named defendant were original members. The plaintiffs claimed that there was significant discord among the members, including that the defendant occupied certain real property in Manchester owned by the partnership without paying rent and refused to remit rent received from nonpartner tenants. In 2015, the court dissolved the partnership and appointed R as a receiver to wind up the partnership and to sell certain real property owned by the partnership. Later that year, during the trial, the plaintiffs and the partnership reached a settlement agreement and submitted a partial settlement notice, which stated that issues remained in dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs and the defendant reached a settlement agreement. In accordance with the set- tlement agreement, the trial was adjourned and certain real property was sold with partial distributions made to the parties, with the exception of the defendant, who was to receive a certain parcel of real property, the value of which was to be deducted from his share of funds generated from the sale of real property. In 2017, the court approved the receiver’s report, over the defendant’s objection, which authorized the receiver to proceed with an application for a subdivision of real property. In 2018, the application for the subdivision of the property was approved and the court thereafter granted the receiver’s motion for an order for the authority to list the lots for sale. Later that year, the defendant moved to inspect and copy financial records of the partnership, which the court denied. The defendant did not then appeal from that judgment. In 2019, the defendant filed a counterclaim, without a request for leave to amend or motion to amend. The defendant appealed from the court’s judgment granting the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendant’s coun- terclaim, but failed to brief that claim. In 2020, the court appointed P as receiver. Thereafter, the defendant amended his appeal five times, challenging other actions of the court. Held: 1. The portion of the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partnership tax returns and his motion to compel further discovery was dismissed, the defendant having failed to properly appeal those rulings of the court. 2. The portions of the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s failure to address the dispute in the p<mask> notice among the parties before the settlement was reached and its failure to order the plaintiffs to release all claims during the 2015 settlement negotiations were dis- missed: these events occurred nearly four years before the defendant filed the present appeal; moreover, these portions of the defendant’s appeal are not from judgments of the court and are not judgments encompassed in his notice of appeal. 3. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in authorizing an application for a subdivision of a property owned by the partnership as the claim was inadequately briefed, the defendant having failed to cite any statute, case law, rule of court, or other legal authority that could render the court’s action improper. 4. The trial court did not err in appointing P as a receiver, as the appointment of a receiver is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Argued November 9, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022


After the last amending decree in the rehabilitation proceeding he and his coexecutor initiated an accounting proceeding. A supplemental account was filed in it which accurately set forth the cost of the improvements of the various properties, the amount of amortization and the respective dates from which the contributions to it out of his income were to become effective. The decree judicially settling the account and supplemental account was dated November 18, 1940. In the present motion, no attempt has been made to change its provisions and it is clear that no legal ground ever existed for modification or <mask>.


It is an axiom of corporate organization that a corporation is managed by its board of directors (Business Corporation Law § 701). While the powers which are delegable to a committee of directors have been expanded considerably (L 1961, ch 855), there is nothing to suggest that the expansion of its function was intended to exempt the committee from the oversight and supervision of the entire board. For example, Business Corporation Law § 717 (a) provides that a director "shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements * * * prepared or presented by: * * * (3) a committee of the board upon which he does not serve”. It is clear that this provision contemplates that the committee will prepare and present "information, opinions, reports or statements” to apprise the full board of its actions. Moreover, Business Corporation Law § 712 (c) specifies that delegation of authority to a committee "shall not alone constitute performance by any member of the board who is not a member of the committee in question, of his duty to the corporation under section 717 (Duty of directors).” A director may be held accountable for actions taken by less than the full board and "does not exempt himself from liability by failing to do more than passively rubber-stamp the decisions of the active managers” (Barr v Wackman, 36 NY2d 371, 381 [1975]). Moreover, there is ample precedent for holding a director liable for payment of excessive compensation to corporate employees (Jacobson v Brooklyn Lbr. Co., 184 NY 152 [1906]; Cullen v Governor Clinton Co., 279 App Div 483 [1st Dept 1952], <mask> denied 281 App Div 659).


After the reversal of the Appellate Division, when the decree was resettled on March 8, 1918, the United States was at war with Germany, and the alien property custodian was the trustee in the United States of the property of the absent Frau Von Burtenbach. Her direct interest in the litigation was terminated. His status had been recognized by the trustees of the estate, and the sum of $4,059.67, income from the trust, had been previously paid to him on December 8,1917. No notice of the <mask> of the decree was given to him, and consequently no opportunity to object was afforded. The objectant asks herein to amend this *315decree. These facts constitute sufficient cause (even without drawing the inference of fraud or collusion) for the court of its own motion to reopen that decree and amend its provisions to comply with the public policy of the state. Matter of Regan, 167 N. Y. 338, 344. The prior decrees are not, therefore, res adjudicata, for a valid final decree was not entered.


In the case at bar the alleged clerical error consisted of the failure or neglect of the petitioners to make applications for fees now requested in the sum of $105,333.09. This court cannot understand how an oversight of such magnitude could have been made by four different firms of attorneys. It appears instead that as a result of hindsight the petitioners have now decided to seek compensation from the estate as well as, or instead of, from their clients. Such hindsight is not one of the grounds set forth in subdivision 6 of section 20 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, which would permit the vacating, amending or <mask> of the decree. There was no mistake of fact or clerical error contained in the decree. It was complete in every detail and the failure of the attorneys to seek compensation under the provisions of section 278 of the Surrogate’s Court Act is not unusual as the fees allowed under that section are limited to compensation for only such services as are of aid to the court and. the estate in the determination of the construction question (Matter of Dickinson, 10 Misc 2d 280; Matter of Gibson, 10 Misc 2d 282). The applications are, therefore, denied.


See, e.g., CRS Immigration Report at 20–23; Cong. Research Serv., ED206779, Review of U.S. Refugee <mask> Programs and Policies at 9, 12–14 (1980). And in 1990, INS implemented a “Family Fairness” program that authorized granting extended voluntary departure and work authorization to the estimated 1.5 million spouses and children of aliens who had been granted legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. See Memorandum for Regional Commissioners, INS, from Gene McNary, Commissioner, INS, Re: Family Fairness: Guidelines for Voluntary Departure Under 8 CFR 242.5 for the Ineligible Spouses and Children of Legalized Aliens (Feb. 2, 1990) (“Family Fairness Memorandum”); see also CRS Immigration Report at 10. On at least five occasions since the late 1990s, INS and later DHS have also made discretionary relief available to certain classes of aliens through the use of deferred action: 1. Deferred Action for Battered Aliens Under the Violence Against Women Act. INS established a class-based deferred action program in 1997 for the benefit of self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902. VAWA authorized certain aliens who have been abused by U.S. citizen or LPR spouses or parents to self-petition for lawful immi- gration status, without having to rely on their abusive family members to petition on their behalf. Id. § 40701(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv), (vii)). The INS program required immigration officers who approved a VAWA self-petition to assess, “on a case-by-case basis, whether to place the alien in deferred action status” while the alien waited for a visa to become available. Memorandum for Regional Directors et al., INS, from Paul W. Virtue, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, INS, Re: Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien Self-Petitioning Process and Related Issues at 3 (May 6, 1997). INS noted that “[b]y their nature, VAWA cases generally possess factors that warrant consideration for deferred action.” Id. But because “[i]n an unusual case, there may be factors present that would militate against deferred action,” the agency instructed officers that requests for deferred action should still “receive individual scrutiny.” Id. In 2000, INS report- ed to Congress that, because of this program, no approved VAWA self- petitioner had been removed from the country. See Battered Women


Plaintiff sustained herniated discs in his neck in the course of a renovation of the Owl’s Head sewage treatment facility, owned by the City of New York, when, in the course of his employment, he fell through a gap between the grated floor that he was standing on and a pipe to which he was applying insulating material. Plaintiff asserted causes of action against the City of New York, the Environmental Protection Department of the City of New York (hereinafter referred to collectively as the City) and NAB Construction Co., a prime contractor on the job site. The City impleaded plaintiffs employer, AC&S Insulation Corp., and sought indemnification from it and from NAB. All portions of the action were settled during trial except for the main action between plaintiff and the City, and the City’s claims for indemnification against NAB and AC&S. The jury returned a liability verdict in plaintiffs favor, apportioning 60% of the culpable conduct in the happening of the accident to the City and the remainder to NAB and AC&S, and a damages verdict finding that plaintiff had been damaged in the total sum of $1,529,000, comprised of $229,000 for past pain and suffering, $800,000 for future pain and suffering, and $500,000 for future medical expenses. Accordingly, a judgment was entered against defendants City of New York and Environmental Protection *52Department of the City of New York in the reduced sums of $137,400 for past pain and suffering, $480,000 for future pain and suffering, and $300,000 for future medical expenses. The City moved to resettle the judgment to include the implicit dismissal of its claims for indemnification against NAB and AC&S, which <mask> motion was denied.


The defendant cites no convincing authority to support her request for the incorporation of the stipulation of settlement into the judgment of divorce. It is true that CPLR 5019 may be used to grant relief to which a party is entitled, provided that this <mask> of a judgment does not alter the obligations of the parties or change the direction of the court. However, in the case at bar, there was no agreement between the two parties to have the stipulation of settlement incorporated into the judgment of divorce. The incorporation of the stipulation of settlement now will obviously alter the obligations of the parties.


But the allowance is sought to he vindicated on' the ground that it was made a condition of the order granted to the petitioner on his application to the court for a favor, and that, having accepted the favor, he cannot be heard to complain of the condition. The legal proposition here put forward is a sound one. (Claflin v. Frenkel, 3 Civ. Pro. B., 109; Strong v. Jones, 25 Hun, 319; Bright v. Milwaukie Railroad Company, 1 Abb. N. C., 14; In the Matter of the Waverly Water-Works Company, 85 N. Y., 478.) Then, was the petitioner’s application granted upon the condition as claimed, that the court might, in the final order to be made in the proceeding, make the allowance here challenged as irregular and improper, and did he accept or take the benefit of an order imposing such condition ? This he denies. The question of fact must be determined by an inspection of the record, and the order or orders themselves must control as to the imposition of the alleged condition. The first order following the order to show cause was the order of reference granted April 26, 1883. This, order is without condition. It was resettled by the order of May 12,. 1883, which remained without condition on its <mask>. While the reference directed by those orders was pending, and on July 7, 1883, an order was made by the judge, as is stated in the papers and as is conceded by counsel, “ on his own motion,” whereby,, after reciting the omission of any condition in the order of reference, it was ordered as follows : “ That the order of reference and intervention in this proceeding, and dated May 12,1883, be and the same is hereby amended so that the court retains to itself power to make such order in regard to costs and compensation as it deems proper, and the order of reference and intervention is granted upon that condition.” This order, which injects the condition into the prior orders of reference, is claimed to be wholly without authority and void, and it may be here noted that it does not appear that the petitioner ever accepted or took any proceeding under the order of reference after its attempted amendment of July seventh. It seems that an appearance was had before the referee on the seventeenth of *556July, when he took the requisite oath as referee, and the counsel for the parties, other than for the petitioner, announced themselves ready to proceed with the reference, but the petitioner; by his counsel, declined to proceed and withdrew from the reference. No evidence was put in before the referee, and the latter made and signed his report to the effect that the petition should be dismissed. Thus it seems that no action was taken by the petitioner under the order as declared amended. Indeed he expressly refused to further proceed in the matter. It cannot, therefore, be held that he was bound by the condition imposed by the order of July seventh by reason of an acceptance of it as an amendment of the order of reference of May twelfth. Then had the order of July seventh any binding force? "Was it of any validity against the petitioner ? We are of the opinion that it was wholly without jurisdiction. It was made by the judge “ on his own motion,” and, in so far as can be discovered from the record, without the presence even of the parties, or at least of the party •now sought to he hound by it. Certainly there is nothing in the record showing that such party was called before the court by any legal proceeding for the purpose of amending the order of reference. The contrary does in fact appear, for the order was made hy the judge “ on his own motion,” that is, of his own volition, not on due ■application of any party; and this too appears from the recital in the order itself. So according to the record before us the judge ■on the seventh of July, on his own motion, without the presence of the parties, or notice to any party, made an order in the matter pending in the court changing and amending an order granted in such matter on the preceding May twelfth. A judge of the court has no authority, any more than has any third person, of his own motion, without having the parties before him m pursuance of some formal legal process or proceeding; or unless, being present, they ■consent that the subject may be then judicially considered, to make an order in a-pending suit or proceeding, or even to correct an error In an order theretofore made therein. The same formalities are requisite to confer jurisdiction upon a judge or court to amend or ■correct an order previously granted in a matter in litigation as would be necessary to obtain the order in the first instance. We are of the opinion therefore that the order of July seventh was void for *557want of jurisdiction in the court' to make it, and it follows that the order of reference of May twelfth stood and stands without condition as claimed by th'e respondent on this appeal. If right in this conclusion the allowance of $350 to the respondent in the order appealed from .was erroneous, and as to such allowance the order should be reversed.


. For example, plaintiffs claim that the Board wrongfully disenfranchised the unit owners by preventing them from having access to the names and addresses of <mask> unit owners by denying plaintiffs’ request for this information “without explanation” (Marshall off UK 10-11; exhibit A). Plaintiffs also alert the court to the default by the defendants in appearing for depositions that plaintiffs noticed on various dates in June 2008 (Marshall off 1Í1Í11-12). Because these issues are unrelated to plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, the court disregards them for present purposes.


Old Republic asserts that Goldsmith "participated in hundreds of phone calls with a Texas resident during which Bell was worried about the federal government collecting on the Federal Lien." When communications between a <mask> and a resident are alleged as the basis for jurisdiction, we look to the quality and nature of the communications to establish purposeful availment. See id. at 74. On their own, numerous telephone communications with people in Texas do not establish minimum contacts, and we have noted that changes in technology may render reliance on phone calls obsolete as proof of purposeful availment. Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. , 168 S.W.3d at 791 (reasoning that a "caller ID" number no longer necessarily indicates anything about the caller's location and questioning: "If jurisdiction can be based on phone conversations 'directed at' a forum, how does a defendant avail itself of any jurisdiction when it can never know where the other party has forwarded calls or traveled with a mobile phone?"); see also Alenia Spazio, S.p.A. v. Reid , 130 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding that "numerous telephone and facsimile communications with people in Texas relating to an alleged contract do not establish minimum contacts").


It is to be noted that this paragraph is to be found only in subdivision 1 of this section. That subdivision is only concerned with the registration of a vehicle and, except for the question of the application of this paragraph, is not otherwise concerned with the license of operators of vehicles, the latter being provided for only in subdivision 2 of the section. In other words, does the provision that it shall be deemed that an owner of a vehicle is a <mask> of this State, if he has a place of busi*220ness in another State, owning a motor vehicle used in connection with and garaged at such place of business which he is compelled to register in the foreign State, apply to the owner’s operator’s license. Since the paragraph is included only within that portion of the section which treats with the registration of vehicles, it would at first seem that the questioned paragraph applies only to that subdivision. However, the paragraph does state that such a person shall be deemed a nonresident of this State ‘1 within the meaning of this section for the purpose of enjoying the privileges of this section with respect to such vehicle.” Thus, the Legislature has clearly stated that such paragraph shall apply to the section. Throughout section 51, there are further exemptions and exceptions and the Legislature has specified the particular ‘ ‘ subdivision ’ ’ to which such exemptions apply. I, therefore, assume that if the Legislature had intended the paragraph in question to refer only to subdivision 1 of the section, they would have so stated. I, therefore, hold that the quoted paragraph applies to subdivision 2 of that section, as well as to subdivision 1.


*676Affidavits submitted by these defendants describe them as a Massachusetts partnership and establish their principal place of business in the City of Boston, Massachusetts; admit that the summons in the action was served (on Sept. 13, 1961) upon an employee who was then in charge of certain business they were conducting in this State; and further claim (1) that no copy of the complaint was served upon the employee with the summons, (2) that no copy of the summons and complaint, together with a notice of service upon the employee was ever received by the defendants, by registered mail or otherwise, and (3) that an affidavit of compliance with the foregoing, together with a copy of the summons and complaint and registered mail return receipt (or refusal notation) was not filed with the Monroe County Clerk, as Clerk of the forum. All three of the numbered items are, of course, required by section 229-b to effect service upon <mask> individuals (including those joined in partnership) who are engaged in doing business in this State; excluding, of course, nonresident individuals so engaged, who have been personally served within the State — a situation negatived by the affidavits.


The moving party in the case of the summons is David L. Subin. Prior to the service of the summons there were already two actions pending between these parties in one of which Subin was plaintiff and in the other defendant. He is a resident of *212Pennsylvania. He was in New York for the sole purpose of being examined before trial in the action in which he was defendant, and was served at the conclusion of the hearing. A <mask> who comes into the State for the purpose of being examined in a pending suit is immune from service (New England Inds. v. Margiotti, 270 App. Div. 883). It is claimed that the privilege against service is a limited one and that it is ineffective if the party served is himself a plaintiff in our courts. No case has gone that far though it has been held that a nonresident who comes into the State to be examined in a ease where he is suing has no exemption (Resort Airlines v. Sternberg, 208 Misc. 383). It is unnecessary to inquire whether this constitutes a valid exception to the general rule. It is not the situation here. Subin was not, at the time of service, here in his capacity as a suitor using our courts.


CPLR 5201 specifically authorizes any money judgment to be enforced against any "debt” (whether past due or to become due). The Court of Appeals has held that an attachment was properly issued in order to obtain in rem jurisdiction over a <mask> defendant who owned a corporate insurer’s contractual obligation to defend and indemnify that defendant under his policy of automobile liability insurance (Simpson v Loehmann, 21 NY2d 305, rearg den 21 NY2d 990; see, also, Victor v Lyon Assoc., 21 NY2d 695).


By parity of reasoning, we conclude that the provisions of the amendment of section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, effective July 1,1958, and now part of section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, permitting service on the employer of a <mask> operator must be held — and we do so hold — to operate prospectively and are not retroactive in their effect.


As to the removal of the widow as executrix I believe the application should be denied. While it is shown that she has resided without the State since her appointment the unfortunate circumstances in which she has been placed afford satisfactory explanation, coupled with her denial of intent to become a <mask>. She is the sole legatee, devisee and executrix under the will of her husband and the mother and general guardian of his only child, an infant. With no relatives in the East her desire to remove from the scene of the death of her husband, her attendance at the bedside of her mother during her last illness and her subsequent stay among relatives in Ohio present sufficient reasons for her absence. Save for instituting transfer tax proceedings, for which the law gives her still nearly a year, she has omitted no step in her duties as the representative of her husband. ISTotice to creditors has been published and the statutory inventory filed.


*660The petitioners voluntarily sought City employment. At most, the statutory phrase — "every person seeking employment” — could be viewed as ambiguous in the context of the transferred employees. A statute that can be interpreted in different, but reasonable, ways is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant a court to consider legislative history to determine the statute’s intended scope. (United States v Pacione, 738d 567 [2d Cir 1984].) New York City Charter § 1127’s history reveals the legislative intent to apply the condition precedent to all <mask> City employees hired after the statute’s effective date. In recommending that the City Council adopt the employee condition, the committee stated: "Signing the aforesaid agreement would be a condition precedent to employment of all future City employees regardless of civil service classification or status.” (1972 Report of Comm on Finance, at 936 [emphasis added].) Committee reports are persuasive authority of legislative intent. (Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v Interstate Commerce Commn., 735d 691, 701 [2d Cir 1984] [context of congressional report].) Petitioners have not provided any authority, nor is the court aware of any, that supports a contrary interpretation of New York City Charter § 1127’s legislative intent.


There is some need to clarify and restate the status of case law with respect to the jurisdiction of County Courts over <mask> defendants. Older case law seems to assert that the court’s lack of such jurisdiction is of constitutional origin, and cases commenting upon special appearances, general appearances and demurrers, which sometimes have trapped unwary defendants and have resulted in their general appearance, are outdated and not particularly helpful.


The second alleged reason urged for remitting the forfeiture is the assertion that the people have lost no rights. This contention is based on the claim that the defendant was finally discharged on bis own recognizance on the recommendation of the district attorney, which recommendation is alleged to have been made on the ground that a conviction could not have been had thereunder, upon the authority of the case of McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 470—an authority claimed to have been controlling at the time that the indictment was found. That case held that the design of the statute against obtaining money, etc., under false pretenses was to protect those who for any honest purpose are induced by false and fraudulent representations to give credit or part with their property, and not to protect those who do this for an unworthy or illegal purpose. In the case at bar it appears that the defendant worked a confidence game upon the complainant, the basis of which was making the complainant believe that he, the defendant, had stolen $25,000, and that the *583complainant would share the stolen money. The indictment was found long before the recent amendment to the Penal Code adopted to obviate the effect of the ruling in the McCord case, and the district attorney was unquestionably right in thinking that under the authority of McCord v. People, supra, the defendant could not be rightfully convicted. It appears, however, that this was only one of the reasons why the district attorney recommended the discharge of the defendant on his own recognizance. The other reason was that the complaining witness, who had been confined in the House of Detention, had been discharged from it—that such complaining witness was a <mask> of the State, and that at the time when the district attorney made the recommendation in question the people had no trace of his then present address. This discharge of the complaining witness from the House of Detention, which in turn resulted in the inability of the people to procure his attendance as a witness, came about through the failure of the defendant to appear or attend for trial. Another witness for the people, who was also a nonresident of the State and committed to the House,, of Detention, was likewise discharged upon the defendant’s default in appearing and because of such default. A police officer was the only witness whose name is indorsed upon the indictment. It does not appear that any motion was made to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was not warranted by the evidence presented to the grand jury. The presumption is that it was founded upon sufficient evidence. Being found, the people had a right to have it disposed of according to the recognized methods of criminal procedure, which included the right in the absence of any other disposition to have the issue presented by the defendant’s plea of not guilty tried by a trial jury.


II. The process of attachment against the property of a <mask> debtor was originally given, because he could not be served with the ordinary process of the courts, so as to make a judgment against him effective. And before the Code it operated to place his property in the hands of trustees, to be distributed for the benefit of such creditors as might claim the benefit of the proceeding.


Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 193 of the Civil Practice Act, this court directs that a supplemental summons and an amended complaint issue herein to the end that Eleanor Fugazy Sherr be made and brought in as a party defendant in and to this action. If the plaintiff fails or neglects to bring her in as a party to this action by October 1, 1957, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice. It may be noted that such a dismissal must be ordered even in a case where the indispensable defendant is a <mask> and cannot be served personally within this State within the reasonable time prescribed by the court in directing that such defendant be brought into the action. (See Carruthers v. Waite Mining Co., 306 N. Y. 136, 142.)


Recourse must be made to the purposes for which the borrowing statute was enacted. The statute obviously favors *345New York residents; its primary purpose is to prevent "forum shopping” on the part of <mask> plaintiffs (Daigle v Leavitt, 54 Misc 2d 651, 652) and "to give resident defendants the benefit of the shortest period of limitations” (Martin v Dierck Equip. Co., 52 AD2d 463, 468, affd 43 NY2d 583, supra).


he resides and works in Colorado, he has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege and benefits of doing business in Texas. We disagree. We consider three factors when determining whether a <mask> defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege and benefits of conducting activities in Texas. Moncrief, 414 S.W.3d at 151; Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784–85 (Tex. 2005)). First, “only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785)). Second, “the contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 n.18 (1985). Third, “the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the [forum’s] jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Broussard’s contacts with Texas were neither unilateral activities by IPSCO nor random or fortuitous. Broussard accepted employment and executed a Confidentiality Agreement with IPSCO in Texas. That agreement included a choice- of-law provision, which designated Texas law as controlling. From 2012 to 2017, Broussard resided and worked in Texas as an employee of IPSCO. Further, Broussard continued working for IPSCO after he moved to Colorado in 2017. While residing in Colorado, Broussard (1) personally requested, and received, continuous and unfettered access to IPSCO’s trade secrets databases that were retained on servers located in Texas; (2) between July 2018 and April 2019, traveled to Texas for business purposes on at least thirteen separate occasions; (3) telephonically attended and participated in IPSCO’s weekly product development meetings and, on occasion, traveled to Texas to attend those meetings in person; and (4) traveled to Texas to visit rig locations and supervise IPSCO employees.


*362Consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, may California exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a <mask> in a paternity action where the mother and young child live in California and conception occurred in another state? Mariana L. initiated a paternity and child support action in San Diego County against David L., a Connecticut resident.1 The trial court denied David's motion to quash service, and he seeks writ review.


Both parties are <mask> aliens based upon defendant’s employment with I.B.M. Their visas expire in August, 1984, when defendant’s current employment contract expires and they are to return to Italy. Defendant claims prejudice in his career assignments with I.B.M. by the nature of the unresolved status of his marriage and the fact that he has incurred over $3,000 in legal fees to date in the defense of this action which plaintiff now seeks to abort. However, “[t]he fact that defendant has been subjected to the expense and trouble of defending the suit may entitle him to costs, but generally would not preclude plaintiff from discontinuing the [suit]”. (Valladares v Valladares, 80 AD2d 244, 258, affd 55 NY2d 388.)


The wife claims immunity from service because she was served while voluntarily appearing at hearings oh August 24 *857ami August 26 in a special proceeding initiated by the husband in the Supreme Court, New York County, by way of an order to show cause to obtain custody of or visitation rights to the children. It is freely conceded on both sides that the New York rule provides immunity from service to a <mask> who is voluntarily attending a court hearing* either as a witness, defendant, or plaintiff, and for reasonable traveling time going to court and returning home. (Thermoid Co. v. Fabel, 4 N Y 2d 494; Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y. v. Turner, 269 N. Y. 397, revg. 244 App. Div. 713; Petrova v. Roberts, 245 N. Y. 518.) The husband, however, asserts that there was a legally sufficient service effected because the wife was then attending court involuntarily (Woodward v. Continental Charters, 203 Misc. 581). The test in determining the true nature of the attendance is whether there may be imprisonment for contempt or fine for failure to appear. (New England Inds. v. Margiotti, 270 App. Div. 488, affd. 296 N. Y. 722.)


“ But this section does not apply in either of the following cases: “ 1. While a designation or appointment, voluntary or involuntary, made in pursuance of law, of a resident or <mask> person, corporation, or private or public officer on whom a summons may be served within the state for another resident or non-resident person or corporation with the same legal force and validity as if served personally on such person or corporation within the state, remains in force.” By sections 253 and 254 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law service of process may be made on the Secretary of State in accident cases involving a nonresident operator or owner of a motor vehicle or one who is a resident but is absent from the State for more than 30 days.


This is an appeal from an order vacating a levy-under an attachment against a <mask> defendant. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. An attachment has been granted against the defendant under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to nonresidents, but, in order to effect a levy, certain devices were practiced by the plaintiff to bring the property of the defendant within the State of FTew York, which do not appear to have received the favorable consideration of the court at Special Term, nor are they likely to meet with the approval of this court upon appeal.


Plaintiff now moves by order to show cause for confirmation of so much of the Referee’s report as finds her entitled to temporary alimony and for disaffirmance or modification of the remaining findings of the Referee relating to the means of the defendant and the standard of living of the parties, also the necessary legal services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff and disbursements necessarily incurred in the prosecution of this cause. Plaintiff also seeks to punish defendant for contempt for his failure to make payment of temporary alimony and for a direction that plaintiff be permitted to proceed by plenary action on the surety’s arrest bond upon default of the defendant (now a <mask> of New York) in making substantial payment of the arrears of temporary alimony and counsel fees and in failing to submit his person to the jurisdiction of this court.


Defendants Ginzburg and Epstein also urge that plaintiff will be confronted with the decision of Mr. Justice Levy in Koslow v. Fine (21 Misc 2d 642) to the effect that a <mask> of New York County is not entitled to a general preference in a malpractice action and that therefore plaintiff will be in a worse position. This is a calculated risk assumed by plaintiff.


Petitioners’ request for a declaration that New York City Charter § 1127 is unlawful as applied to them is denied. New York City Charter § 1127 (a) ("[condition precedent to employ*659ment”) provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of any local law, rule or regulation to the contrary, every person seeking employment with the city of New York or any of its agencies regardless of civil service classification or status shall sign an agreement as a condition precedent to such employment to the effect that if such person is or becomes a <mask> individual as that term is defined in section 11-1706 of the administrative code of the city of New York or any similar provision of such code, during employment by the city, such person will pay to the city an amount by which a city personal income tax on residents computed and determined as if such person were a resident individual, as defined in such section, during such employment, exceeds the amount of any city earnings tax and city personal income tax imposed on such person for the same taxable period.”


“ In effect so far as applicable to the facts in this case, the statute provides that when the defendant is a <mask> of this state, the complainant need not be a resident of this state when the court has jurisdiction of both parties. * * * “ Jurisdiction, which is the judicial power to grant a divorce, is founded on domicile under our system of law. William v. *975North Carolina, 325 TI. S. 226 * * *. This is true because domicile in the state gives the court jurisdiction of the marital status or the res which the court must have before it in order to act. * * * Furthermore it is recognized that unless one of the parties has a residence or domicile within the state, the parties cannot even by consent confer jurisdiction on the courts of that state to grant a divorce. <<<# * * The principle dominating the subject is that the marriage relation is so interwoven with public policy that the consent of the parties is impotent to dissolve it contrary to the law of the domicile * * *. ’ Andrews v. Andrews [188 U. S. 14]. * * * “ An act to be valid must be within the legislative jurisdiction of the enacting state. * * * Here the statute seeks to act on a status which is beyond the boundaries of the state. That it cannot do.” In a later case, Gee v. Gee (252 Ala. 103, 105), in commenting on the earlier case of Jennings v. Jennings {supra), the Supreme Court of Alabama said: ‘ ‘ In that case both parties were nonresident of Alabama. Therefore, we held that the proviso did not authorize the court in this State to grant a divorce. The parties cannot by consent confer such jurisdiction, nor can the legislature do so by an act, when the res is not within the power of State authorities.”


A husband residing within the city of New York may be made to answer for the support of his wife regardless of where the wife resides after jurisdiction of the persons has been acquired. It does not affect the rights of the petitioner if the abandonment or failure to support her was within the city of New York or elsewhere. That may be otherwise if a petitioning wife, a dependent wife, seeks support from her husband on the basis of likelihood to become a public charge when in fact she is not a charge upon the public within the city of New York. Referring back to subdivision (1) of section 92, it would appear that under circumstances permitting an order to be made the question of the petitioner becoming a public charge would not militate against her rights to support even though she were a <mask>. The petitioner is not a citizen of the United States nor was she a resident within the boundaries of the United States. In fact she was and still is a resident of the Republic of Mexico, as she was when the respondent abandoned her, and during the entire period that the respondent failed and neglected to provide for her support and maintenance. The respondent *401has been within the United States, although illegally, since 1936, and has failed to discharge his obligations and duties which the marital relationship imposed upon him to provide for her support.


The warrants were sought solely against Subin, a <mask> of this State. Two were issued, the first on August 11, 1958, to attach property of Subin to the extent of $300,000, and the second, on August 15, 1958, to attach further property of Subin to the extent of $741,500. Levies have been made pursuant to these warrants in excess of $1,041,500.


It seems clear that the only in rem relief sought in the complaint, as against the <mask> moving defendants, is an adjudication relating to the ownership of Class C stock and *275voting trust certificates of Pellon Corporation, a domestic corporation. In Holmes v. Camp (219 N. Y. 359), it was held that the stockholders’ interest in the capital of a New York corporation is property situated within this State and that (p. 369) “ an action * * * affecting * * * title and true ownership of that interest is one in the nature of a proceeding in rem * * * in which * * * jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant may be obtained by service of a summons by publication. ’ ’


*756The New York decisions prior to the CPLR are in conflict on the question whether security for costs are mandated when the plaintiff is a <mask> estate fiduciary. (See, e.g., Maresca v Prudential Ins. Co., 255 App Div 865 [2d Dept 1938] [nonresident fiduciary must post security]; Schmalz v Crow Constr. Co., 146 App Div 623 [1st Dept 1911] [where no property exists in State at time of motion, estate fiduciary must post costs but not clear if mandated or per discretion]; Clarendon v Milliken Bros., 116 App Div 930 [2d Dept 1907] [where suit in good faith, not required to post security]; Pursley v Rodgers, 44 App Div 139 [1st Dept 1899] [should require security as matter of discretion]; Duggan v Syracuse Univ., 20 Misc 2d 627 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County 1959] [Del Vecchio, J.] [must post security where no property in State]; Oliva v D’Amato, 198 Misc 841 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1950] [discretionary]; Gilbert v 503-507 W. 177th St. Corp., 186 Misc 78 [Sup Ct, NY County 1945] [mandatory]; see, Annotation, Statute Requiring Security For Costs, 84 ALR 252, 259-260 [1933]; Milliman, Law of Costs § 259 [1904] [discretionary].) The conflicting rulings have been commented upon by learned treatises (8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ]f 8501.23, at 85-24 ["the courts have had some difficulty with the issue”]; 24 Carmody-Wait 2d, Costs fl 148:168, at 689-691) but the conclusion they reach is that since Manente v Sorecon Corp. (22 AD2d 954 [2d Dept 1964]) held CPLR 8501 (a) applicable to a nonresident administratrix, nonresident estate fiduciaries must post security for costs. 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller (op. cit., K 8501.23), however, urges cautious counsel to make their request under both subdivisions of CPLR 8501.


With regard to the requirement that enforcement of a Supreme Court judgment must be had in that forum, section 1804 of the CCA, specifying that the provisions of the small claims article “control” in the event of a conflict with the CPLR, leads the court to conclude that this claim being for money only and for not more than $1,500, may be determined by the Small Claims Part. To require the plaintiff to have instituted a special proceeding in the Supreme Court with the concomitant legal expense involved would, as a practical matter, probably deprive plaintiff of any relief. The fact that he had to institute the original action in the Supreme Court to obtain jurisdiction over a <mask> of the city should not deprive him of the inexpensive procedure authorized in article 18 of the CCA.


Accordingly, it is concluded that the formula for computing the tax and the values urged by the respondent are correct. Nevertheless, the counter order fixing the tax submitted by the respondent may not be signed. In computing the New York gross estate, the respondent failed to subtract from the Federal gross estate the value of the car situated in Florida (Tax Law, §§ 954, 956, 960). However, since the car is not included in the New York gross estate, its value may not be considered in computing the New York marital deduction, even though the car passes to the spouse (Tax Law, § 958, subd [e]). The net result of these two changes will be that the taxable estate remains the same (the gross estate and the deductions both being decreased in the same amount). However, the tax will be slightly different because the denominator of the fraction used to compute the percentage of the New York net resident estate tax to be paid by the <mask> must be reduced by the value of the car.


“If a <mask> is a shareholder in an S corporation . . . and the S corporation has distributed an installment obligation under section 453 (h) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code, then any gain recognized on the receipt of payments from the installment obligation for federal income tax purposes will be treated as New York source income” (L 2010, ch 57, § 1, part C, as amended by L 2010, ch 312, § 1, part B [the 2010 amendment]).1 This new provision of the Tax Law applied to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2007, a more than 3V2 year period of retroactivity.2


Finally, this court is aware of the very recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rush v Savchuk (444 US 320) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson (444 US 286). Although these cases dealt with quasi in rem jurisdiction (Rush) and long-arm personal jurisdiction (World-Wide Volkswagen) the court commented on the jurisdiction of a State over <mask> defendants as follows:


Irrespective of the apparent scope of the above regulation, it has been definitely held that the culpability of an emancipated <mask> adult child may not be imputed to a parent-tenant (Matter of Edwards v Christian, supra, at 1046). The courts have reasoned that a condition imposing an absolute exclusion of the child from the entire project is unreasonable per se as it establishes an impossible burden on the parent (Matter of Rodriguez v Blackburne, supra, at 547). Therefore, to the extent that the stipulation in question imposed such a broad burden on petitioners, it is unenforceable and its breach may not form any part of the bases for respondent’s decision to terminate petitioners’ tenancy.


The defendants urge that section 1522 has been held to apply to a representative of an estate, who is a <mask>, suing as plaintiff in this State and cites a long line of cases including Gilbert v. 503-507 West 77th St. Corp. (58 N. Y. S. 2d 690); Maresca, v. Prudential Ins. Co. (255 App. Div. 865) ; Schmalz v. Crow Const. Co. (146 App. Div. 623); Allocio v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. (246 App. Div. 621). This line of cases was followed in Parker v. State of New York (100 N. Y. S. 2d 17). The reasoning therein seems to follow that of Judge Ingraham in the case of Pursley v. Rogers (44 App. Div. 139, 143). While this was a concurring opinion to that of the majority — the concurrence was in the result only — Judge Ingraham held that section 3268 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Civ. Prac. Act, § 1522) applied and that the plaintiffs were nonresidents within the meaning of that section. He stated at page 144: 1 ‘ But where the action is brought by one individual for the benefit of other individuals and both the one bringing the action and the ones for whose benefit it is brought are non-residents, no one interested in the recovery in any manner, being a resident, I cannot see upon what principle it can be said that the *570plaintiffs are not non-residents.” The majority of the court, following the opinion of Judge Barrett, held that section 3268 of the code did not apply but rather that 3271 (now Civ. Prac. Act, § 1523) applied and after considering the merits of the application under the requirements of section 3271, the majority of the court held that it should exercise its discretion and require the plaintiff to give security. The opinion of Judge Barrett, in Pursley v. Rogers (supra), has been cited with approval in Baum v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. (160 App. Div. 14, 19), in Clarendon v. Milliken Bros. (116 App. Div. 930), and in Oliva v. D’Amato (198 Misc. 841).


The second branch of the motion seeks to require the Peoples First National Bank & Trust Company, as trustee, and Hennesey & Co. (plaintiffs in two of the three actions) to give security for costs upon the ground that each is a <mask> of this State. It appears without denial that the first-named plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania and the second of New Jersey. And, no doubt, an application such as this may be made at any stage of the proceedings (see cases cited in Tripp, Cuide to Motion Practice [rev. ed.], p. 118, § 42) — at least, prior to judgment. Nevertheless, the defendants’ application to require these plaintiffs to furnish security for costs upon the ground of nonresidence is denied. For in this action as consolidated there are two or more plaintiffs, some of whom are concededly residents. The result is that the defendants cannot require security for costs to be given by the named plaintiffs as nonresidents, since the defendants are not, under the applicable statute, entitled to receive such security from all of the plaintiffs (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1522, subd. C).


The court’s review of the cases, those cited by the parties and others, does not lead to the conclusion that the Standard Fruit case (supra) contained any limitations on the persons who could be subpoenaed by service on their employer which is a party to a New York action. The question the Court of Appeals decided was whether there was the power to issue the subpoena and compel the production of the <mask> employee as a witness. There is nothing in the Court’s jurisdictional analysis which turns on the witness’s degree of knowledge about the case. Despite GM’s continual reference in its papers on this motion to a "limited exception” to the rules on the geographic scope of a trial subpoena, there is nothing in Standard Fruit to support that reading. The Court simply makes absolutely no statement that the ruling is a limiting exception to the power of the agency issuing the subpoena.


It seems to this court that the judicial arguments which were applied to the granting of immunity to nonresidents in the cases above cited apply equally as well, if not more so, to arbitration proceedings which are contractually binding and have judicial sanction and may require judicial aid or confirmation.- In Matter of Ferrari (134 Misc. 728 [1929]) a <mask> was served with process in New York State while appearing as a witness before the Moreland Commission appointed by the *940Governor of this State pursuant to the provision of then section 8 of the Executive Law. It was held that the service of the process was void. The Moreland Commissioners were not-conducting a judicial investigation but the court said (p. 729): ‘ ‘ "Whereas, in a strict and literal sense the Moreland Commission is not a judicial tribunal, it is a duly authorized official inquiry into matters deeply affecting the public interest, with powers to subpoena witnesses, etc., similar to those possessed by the usual court.”


At issue is the jurisdictional question of whether the activities of the <mask> defendants constituted the transaction of any business in New York City (CCA, § 404, subd. [a], par. 1; CPLR 302, subd. [a] par. 1). It is well recognized that due process “requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 1 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ’ ” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 [1945]). A key factor in determining whether there is a reasonable contact with the forum is the presence of some act by which the defendant voluntarily elects to invoke the protection of the laws of New York (see Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N Y 2d 443 [1965]). In a well-reasoned determination, the court below (Lane, J.) recognizing that jurisdiction cannot be premised merely on an order telephoned or mailed here from out of State, or merely on the rendition of services here, or merely on the shipment of goods here from out of State, declared that all three factors combined will support jurisdiction.


This does not mean that this court is without jurisdiction to intervene in this arbitration or that the respondent is without remedy to enforce the award. Indeed, the statute (CPLR 7502, subd [a]) permits a <mask> to commence a proceeding "in a court in the county in which one of the *1033parties resides or is doing business” to confirm the award pursuant to CPLR 7510 and to enter the same as a judgment pursuant to CPLR 7514. If such a proceeding is commenced, the court in such case, will have full jurisdiction to review the arbitration and the respective claims of the parties including the claim of the petitioner that the arbitration should be vacated. Personal service of the application to vacate would be unnecessary in such a case; after the institution of an application to confirm the award, "[a]ll subsequent applications shall be made by motion in the * * * proceeding” (CPLR 7502, subd [a]). In such case, service of a cross motion in the pending proceeding may be made by ordinary mail upon the adversary attorney. (County of Sullivan v Edward L. Nezelek, Inc., 54 AD2d 670, affd 42 NY2d 123.)


The first and third ground for dismissal are without merit. It may indeed come to pass that this court cannot obtain jurisdiction of some one or more of the necessary parties, but until an attempt is made to get jurisdiction of them, it cannot be said as matter of law that such jurisdiction will not be obtained. <mask> parties may voluntarily appear and thus jurisdiction in personam will be complete. As to the fourth ground of dismissal, we need now say only that an interpleader action having been commenced in the Supreme Court, that court has authority to stay this proceeding until final disposition of the interpleader action if it deems such action necessary and proper. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 285, subd. 4.) This court will not attempt to fetter the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court by either staying or refusing to stay this proceeding. It will simply proceed in due course with the pending proceeding unless and until the Supreme Court stays this proceeding.


Since Day v. Sun Ins. Co. (supra) is often cited and is the source of much of the confusion on this question, it is well to examine it closely. It must be noted that in the Day case the court was able to determine that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter after trial. There the plaintiff was a <mask> and the suit was upon a foreign contract. These facts are the facts which deprived the court of jurisdiction and were established upon the trial. In addition the court in that case was one *927of general jurisdiction. These are distinguishing factors which make that case and later cases which follow it without noting these distinctions, inapplicable. (Hemsted v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 134 App. Div. 575.)


"The plaintiff is a <mask>. The solitary nexus for the *550New York courts is the fact that the defendants’ insurance carrier is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in New York. Under no circumstances could these facts support an exercise of jurisdiction by the New York courts without adversely affecting the administration of justice in this State by an influx here of unwanted and unnecessary lawsuits”.


Defendant, though conceding that he maintains an office in New York City for the conduct of his business as a theatrical agent, asserts, through his counsel’s affidavit, that he is a <mask> and a nondomiciliary of this State and that he has resided continuously in the State of California from 1960 to date. Plaintiff does not deny these assertions, nor does he make any showing which would tend to controvert them. Instead, he rests his entire argument upon the proposition that this court acquired personal jurisdiction over defendant, solely by virtue of the provisions of CP'LR 308 (subd. 3) (made applicable to this court via the operation of section 403 of the CCA), when (duly diligent attempts at personal delivery of the summons to defendant pursuant to subdivision 1 of that section having failed) the summons was affixed to the door of defendant’s place of business within this city and mailed to his last-known residence in California.


In Supreme Ct. of N. H. v Piper (470 US 274), it was determined in 1985 that it was unconstitutional to prohibit a <mask> from being admitted to practice in New Hampshire (after she passed the Bar examination), holding that a "State may discriminate against nonresidents only where its reasons are 'substantial,’ and the difference in treatment bears a close or substantial relation to those reasons”, and that no such showing was made on the issue before the court (at 288). The majority did not discuss the local office requirement, but in his concurring opinion Justice White stated that he "would postpone to another day such questions as whether the State may constitutionally condition membership in the New Hampshire Bar upon maintaining an office for the practice of law” in the State (at 289). Thus, in that case the Court actually decided only the issue of the right to admission which, of course, is not an issue before me.


“UDCA § 404 carries the contact requirement just a step further by stipulating, as a condition to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, that the cause of action arise not merely within the state, but within the geographical confines of a district of *280the court. Thus, if the subject matter is within the court’s jurisdiction, and the contacts enumerated in § 404(a) were within a district, the court may, by virtue of subdivision (b), send its summons as far as the supreme court summons might go if the action had been brought there.” (Id.) CPLR 302 (a) (2) includes a provision, similar to UDCA 404 (a) (2), allowing for long-arm jurisdiction over a <mask> defendant “who in person or through an agent. . . commits a tortious act within the state.” Under case law interpretations of CPLR 302 (a), courts have sometimes gone beyond common-law definitions of a principal-agent relationship. As recognized in the Practice Commentaries, whether someone qualifies as an “agent” for jurisdictional purposes does not “turn on legalistic distinctions.” (See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C302:4 at 164.) To the contrary, the plaintiff “need not establish a formal agency relationship” to sustain long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a). (See Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988].) Rather, the plaintiff “need only convince the court” that “purposeful activities” were performed in New York, with “the knowledge and consent” of the nonresident defendant, under circumstances where the nonresident defendant exercised “some control” over the matter. (See Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp. at 467.)


Here, there is an alternative process with procedural safeguards removed. The stipulation process, involving unrepresented indigent tenants, presents an increased risk of error because of their recognized difficulty in understanding their rights and the meaning of stipulations (see 144 Woodruff Co. v Lacrete, 154 Misc 2d 301 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1992], and studies cited therein). The stipulation process also permits the substantive basis for termination of tenancy provided in the Tyson-Randolph consent decrees and the Termination of Tenancy Procedures to be changed. Once a stipulation is signed, as in Ms. Robinson’s case, without explicit admission of the original charges, a termination of tenancy hearing is held only for alleged violation of the stipulation (procedures 24), and need not at all involve “non-desirable” drug related conduct by the tenant or other member of the household. In consequence, the Housing Authority was not required ever to meet its burden of establishing “nondesirability” as a basis for *73termination. A visit by her <mask> son, without documented connection to any drug related criminal offense, became a sufficient basis for termination of tenancy.