In an election of general interest, restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age and <mask> must promote a compelling State interest in order to survive a constitutional attack (Kramer v Union School Dist., 395 US 621 [1969] [emphasis added]). However, in special interest elections, where one group of citizens is distinctly affected by the action or proposed action of a governmental entity, restrictions for such elections will be upheld as long as a reasonable basis for the limitation exists (Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Water Dist., 410 US 719, supra; Moorman v Wood, 504 F Supp 467 [ED Ky 1980]; Adams v City of Colorado Springs, 308 F Supp 1397, 1403, affd 399 US 901 [1970] [emphasis added]).


Plaintiffs’ original complaint, filed on or about June 29, 2004, had sought a judgment declaring that the Does are the legal *426parents of the three children and enjoining the defendants from recording the birth mother and/or her- husband as the parents on the children’s respective birth certificates. Mrs. Roe’s obstetrician and the hospital, originally named as defendants, stipulated to comply with any final order issued by the court. DOHMH answered the complaint on or about July 27, 2004. DOHMH opposed the grant of a prebirth order, arguing that it violates article 8 of the Domestic Relations Law, as that statute declares all surrogate parenting contracts void and unenforceable in New York State. DOHMH further argued that the hospital and its physicians are required to report to DOHMH the true medical facts surrounding a live birth, including the identity of the woman giving birth to a child, so that the medical records remain accurate and to prevent fraud or mistake in the determination of such matters as identity, <mask>, inheritance and insurance coverage.


But even if this were not so and <mask> were not a constitutional qualification of a juryman, nevertheless it is of such magnitude and importance as to justify a new trial when the objection is not discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence until after the trial. The statutory qualifications of a juryman are rarely inquired into, but on the contrary it is uniformly assumed that every juryman summoned is a citizen and otherwise generally *383qualified as required by statute. The examination on voir dire is almost universally directed to his bias, prejudice and partiality and it is not strange that neither the district attorney nor the defendant’s counsel asked the jurymen in this instance if they were citizens. In the face of an almost universal pract'ee of accepting the persons chosen by public officers to serve as jurymen as statutably qualified, it would be straining for a reason not based upon experience to say that the defendant should have asked the jury in this instance whether or not they were citizens. The question of age is sometimes brought out in the examination by counsel but usually because of the appearance of some juryman, but there is nothing in the appearance of an ordinary man to indicate whether or not he is a citizen. A man above or below the required age or one lacking the property qualifications (People v. Cosmo, 205 N. Y. 91) may make an excellent juryman. These are formal prerequisites. But not so with the qualification of citizenship. There is no presumption that an alien owing allegiance to a foreign government can act acceptably where the life of a citizen is at stake. A jury entirely made up of those not qualified as to age, residence or property may still render an impartial and just verdict but one made up entirely of aliens to try a citizen is fundamentally obnoxious. And if it is proper to convict of homicide with one alien, where shall the line be drawn when the number of those disqualified by alienage becomes sufficiently serious to vitiate the verdict? The defect in the personnel of the jury in this instance is too grave and profound to pass over with a mere expression of opinion that the defendant ought to have discovered the disqualification before trial. We pride ourselves that under our judicial system a plea of guilty to a charge of murder in the first degree will not be accepted and that however guilty the accused may appear to be, he is presumed to be innocent and is entitled to a fair and impartial trial and to have Ms guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it would seem like a travesty indeed on these principles to hold that he can have such a trial when one or more of the jurymen are aliens and to call his conviction under such circumstances a “ judgment of his peers.” See 18 L. R. A. 476; 50 L. R. A. (1914) (N. S.) 973. Motion for a new trial granted.


The language “nor to a person not a citizen of the United States, unless sncli person reside within this State,” seems to be very significant in this connection, because it contains a clear implication that a person who is a citizen of the United States, although not residing within this State, is not intended to come within the prohibition of the law. In this provision of the statute the framers thereof had before them the question as to the residence of the applicant for administration, and if they had intended to exclude, or had supposed that the policy of the law excluded nonresidents from administering, they certainly, in connection with the provision in regard to <mask>, the absence of which they pronounced to be a disqualification unless the person applying resided within this State, would have included non-residence of a citizen among the disqualifications. It is no answer to these suggestions to say that the provisions in reference to non-residents, who are not citizens, were intended to apply only to those who were seeking to obtain ancillary letters of administration, because if that-had been the intention of the legislature, it would have been very easy for them to have said so. .No reference is made to ancillary letters and the statute is entirely general in its character. The statute having expressly provided as to the priority of the persons to whom letters ol administration shall be granted, and having determined as to disqualifications, nothing can be added to it by judicial legislation, and the withholding of letters of administration cannot be *70justified unless the applicant is disqualified by the statute itself. (Coope v. Lowerre, 1 Barb. chap. 45; Emerson v. Bowers, 14 N. Y., 449.) Restrictions or modifications of statutes by implication are not to be favored, and unless the provisions are clearly inconsistent and cannot stand together, full effect must be given to all. No provision of the statute is impaired in any manner by giving to section 32 its full effect, and restricting it to its declared provisions. Simply placing non-residents upon a different position from residents as to notice of applications for administration upon assets existing within this State conveys to our mind no intimation or intention upon the part of the legislature to exclude any others than those whom they have expressly declared shall not be entitled to administration.


Defendant, in its motion, asks for relief based on the Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 4) in that the “Agreement” contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Both federal and state law favor the resolution of disputes by the use of arbitration and title 9 *732of the United States Code is in place to foster this end. For title 9 to be applicable, the transaction must be one that arises from interstate commerce. The fact that defendant is in South Dakota and the claimant in New York and interstate commercial means were used to order and ship the equipment places the subject matter of the contract under the general definition of title 9 (9 USC § 2). However, it is also clear that the existence of this title does not in and of itself create a cause of action under federal law and any attempt to bring an action in Federal District Court to enforce an arbitration clause must have an independent basis of federal jurisdiction (Kehr v Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 736d 1283 [9th Cir 1984]; Klocek v Gateway Inc., 104 F Supp 2d 1332 [D Kan 2000]). There is no federal question involved in this dispute, nor is there an amount in controversy that would permit the action to be brought on diversity of <mask> grounds. Since the amount in dispute is less than $2,000, the jurisdiction is a state court matter and small claims court is the appropriate forum for the resolution of the claim.


A foreign corporation has no corporate existence beyond the limits of the State in which it is created, yet it may transact business outside of such State, but elsewhere its existence is recognized as mere matter of comity. (Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 558; Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 220.) It is the mere creature of the law of the State or government which gave- it existence, and the validity of its acts, outside of the State of its creation, depends upon the laws of the sovereignty where they are transacted. When it attempts to transact business in another State, it does so upon the conditions prescribed by its laws, and subject to the process of its courts. (Lafayette Ins Co. v. French, 18 How. U. S. 408; Austin v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. 1 Dutcher, 381; People v. N. J. Central R. R. Co. 48 Barb. 478.) Allen, J., in Stemens v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (24 How. Pr. 517), says: “ When they avail themselves of this comity, and of the privileges thus conferred, and transfer their business, or any part of it, to another State, and establish agencies within such State, although they remain inhabitants of the State of their incorporation, for the reason that the £ artificial, invisible, and intangible being the mere creation of law,’ and of a positive law which has no force ex propria vigore, beyond the State jurisdiction, cannot migrate; they, quoad the business thus transferred, lose their <mask> and become to that extent citizens of the State under whose laws they transact their business, and of whose governmental protection they avail themselves.”


Up to a certain period the human being is immature both mentally, emotionally, socially, and in every other direction. Age is not the factor that is productive of maturity. Chronologically one may be presumed to be old enough to know, to understand, to be mature emotionally, mentally, and socially. However, he may remain emotionally, socially, and mentally immature. Chronological age alone does not determine maturity. Children certainly are immature. We have come to recognize that. And the law now recognizes that children cannot be charged with responsibility for their acts as adults are charged. Children respond to their emotions, and their emotions are influenced by the environment in which they are bred. Infiltrations from without are impacts upon the emotions and the life styles and life patterns of children to a very large degree. They are what it is possible for them to be. Under our law we no longer treat children as criminals. Indeed, the State has an interest in rehabilitating and so, conserving children for future <mask>, and hence, contributing to the common good. (See People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171.) I am grateful, as we all should be, for the change in social attitudes toward our child life and the change which has been wrought in the law to meet the needs of our children.


There is ample authority that a railway union’s duty to fairly represent the class of employees for whom it is certified as the bargaining representative derives from the powers and respon*439sibility conferred upon it by the Railway Labor Act (Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 [1952]; Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S. 210 [1944]; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 [1944]; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 [1957] and Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U. S. 232 [1949]) but it does not follow that the mere fact of such derivation will bring every action asserting a breach of that duty within the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court where diversity of <mask> does not exist. In other words, to say merely that the right asserted is derived in a general way from Federal statutes is not synonymous with the phrase “ arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States ” which is used in section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code, nor with the language used in section 1337 of title 28 of the code referring to ‘ ‘ any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraint and monopolies (Strawser v. Reading Co., 80 F. Supp. 455 [U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa. 1948] ; Bohannon v. Reading Co., 168 F. Supp. 662 [U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa. 1958].)


Gonzalez ultimately pled guilty to possession of marijuana for sale at a hearing on July 26, 2000 at his arraignment in the high intense drug trafficking area court. At that hearing, two other defendants were present. The court asked the defendants if they could read and understand English. Gonzalez responded in the affirmative. The court then informed the defendants of the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea: "Each of you should understand if you're not citizens of the United States, your guilty plea will affect your status in this country. And it will result in the departure, denial of <mask> or exclusion."2


At common law aliens were incapable of taking by descent. This disability, however, is removed by the act of 1845. That act (Laws 1845, ch. 115, sec. 4, as amended by Laws 1874, ch. 261, Laws 1875, ch. 38), recognizes the right of alien kin of a person deceased who was at the time of his death a resident alien or a citizen of the United States, to take as his heirs, the lands which would have descended to them in that capacity had they been citizens of the United States. The title of an alien male of full age is, however, made defeasible by the state upon his failure to file an affirmation or deposition respecting his intended <mask> in the manner provided by sec. 1 of the act. Kilfoy v. Powers, 3 Dem. 198, and cases cited.


*524Grand jurors are selected by the court with the assistance of the jury commissioner. (§§ 896, 903.1-903.4.) Persons are competent to act as grand jurors if they meet certain minimum qualifications. (§ 893.) "The qualifications for service as a grand juror in California are prescribed by statute and relate to matters such as <mask>, age, mental competency, intelligence, and character. (§ 893, subd. (a).) The trial court determines these qualifications by personal interview and examination. (§§ 896, subd. (a), 904.6, subd. (b).) An individual who is otherwise qualified is nevertheless deemed incompetent to serve only if he or she (1) is currently serving as a trial juror in another case; (2) has been discharged as a grand juror within the preceding year; (3) has been convicted of either malfeasance in office or any felony; or (4) is an elected public officer. (§ 893, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a).)" ( Packer v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 152, 163, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 649, fn. omitted ( Packer ).)


The substance of the tax is to be found in the operation and effect of the statute as applied to the relationship here. Thus plaintiff argues that Local Law No. 47 in imposing a tax of 10 cents payable by the hirer of a taxicab to the driver thereof for each trip or each use of a taxicab cannot dissociate the hiring from the person owning the contract and thus the tax is imposed upon the hirer and his ownership, ad valorem, at the maximum rate permitted by the statute. It is contended further that the tax invades the privilege and immunity of a citizen in relation to his freedom to travel within and without the city and State, and is in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The use of the streets is not a privilege granted by the city but rather derives from <mask> and the public benefit for which the fee of the streets is held by municipal corporations. Thus, in this context it is argued the tax is personal upon the hirer and not a charge for the use of the highways or of the vehicle as a regulatory measure or upon the use of the vehicle, for the hirer does not own the vehicle. Bather, the tax is upon the enjoyment of (the contract of hire, which the passenger alone owns. All of which is, indeed, an imposing array of arguments in ’alleged support of claimed unconstitutionality.


Thereafter, the' petitioner’s attorneys were advised by an employee of the respondent that Anastasios Bakas, because of his Canadian <mask>, would have to divest himself of his ■stock interest bef ore the application would be approved. Accordingly, the two stockholders of petitioner corporation entered into an agreement whereby Pericles Bakas became the sole stock*593holder and agreed to pay Anastasios Bakas for his interest by a series of promissory notes. This agreement was filed with the restaurant liquor license application which was before the respondent board.


In Walker v Kruse (484d 802), a prisoner brought a malpractice action against the attorney who had represented him in a criminal matter. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that since jurisdiction had been founded on diversity of <mask>, it had a duty to decide the case as an Illinois State court would have. The court unanimously believed that a State court might have dismissed the complaint because Walker failed to plead his innocence. “In these circumstances, it is questionable whether the Illinois courts would conclude that the defendant’s alleged professional shortcomings proximately caused an injury to the plaintiff which entitles him to damages.” (Walker v Kruse, supra, p 804.)


and country of <mask>. If the applicant is not a United States citizen, the application shall include the applicant’s place of birth and his or her alien or admission number. If the application is made in person, the applicant shall also present a current Nebraska motor vehicle operator’s license, state identification card, or military identification card, or if the application is made by mail, the application form shall describe the license or card used for identifica- tion and be notarized by a notary public who has verified the identification of the applicant through such a license or card. An applicant shall receive a certificate if he or she is twenty-one years of age or older and is not pro- hibited from purchasing or possessing a handgun by 18 U.S.C. 922. A fee of five dollars shall be charged for each application for a certificate to cover the cost of a criminal history record check. Section 69-2405 states that the chief of police or sheriff shall deny the certificate if it is determined that the purchase or possession of a handgun by the applicant would be in viola- tion of applicable federal, state, or local law. Further, the chief of police or sheriff has 3 days to conduct an investigation to determine whether the applicant is prohibited by law from purchasing or possessing a handgun, after which time the cer- tificate shall be either issued or denied with specific reasons, in writing, for the denial. Section 69-2408 describes the felony of providing false information on an application for a certificate authorizing the holder to acquire handguns: Any person who willfully provides false information on an application form for a certificate under section 69-2404 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a Class IV felony, and any person who intentionally violates any other provision of sections 69-2401, 69-2403 to 69-2407, and 69-2409.01 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a Class I misde- meanor. As a part of the judgment of conviction, the court may order the confiscation of the handgun. - 617 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. HOFMANN Cite as 310 Neb. 609


country_FY09_19.pdf (showing that between 2,901 and 8,508 extraordinary ability visas were granted annually from 2009–2019). Several advantages flow from obtaining an extraordinary ability visa. Applicants for most forms of employment-based immigration must prove that they have a job waiting for them in the United States, and the Department of Labor must certify that their employment will not disadvantage similarly employed Americans. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5). Extraordinary ability applicants do not need to meet those requirements. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(5). Also, the priority date of extraordinary ability visas is always current, meaning visa holders avoid the years-long waiting periods that apply to most other employment-based immigration categories. Josh Effron, Permanent Residency for Immigrants of Extraordinary Ability, 32 L.A. Law. 12, 13 (2009). For those seeking the coveted visas, the statute is only the beginning of the framework. <mask> and Immigration Services (USCIS) further explained the extraordinary ability standard in a notice-and-comment rule. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h). The rule defines “extraordinary ability” as “a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor.” Id. § 204.5(h)(2). This narrow definition reflects the stringency of the “extraordinary ability” standard. After all, a different visa is available to those whose ability is merely “exceptional.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). The regulation also lists the “[i]nitial evidence” applicants must include in their extraordinary ability application. Id. § 204.5(h)(3). An applicant can submit proof of a one-time achievement—“a major, international[ly] recognized award” like an Olympic gold medal or Nobel Prize. Id. Or an applicant may show that they meet “at least three” of ten listed criteria:


In September 2012, Rigoberto S. paid defendant $4,480 to obtain a work permit and some kind of visa. He had seen an ad saying that she provided *1099immigration services. He met with her in her office. However, he never received any documentation from the United States <mask> and Immigration Services (USCIS) or from defendant. He contacted defendant, but she had no explanation, so he sued her in small claims court.


It is the duty of the court to give these laws a fair and reasonable construction and to secure harmony in their operation whenever the same can be done without disregarding any positive provision or necessary intendment of the statute, and to reject any construction which would make one section inconsistent with the other relating-to the same subject. It is the <mask> of the parents which operates to confer citizenship on their children. In the original act of 1802, now brought forward and incorporated in title 30 of the Revised Statutes, the word “ naturalized,” as it occurs in the section now number 2172, is used as indicating that the parents have become citizens, and is not limited to cases where such parents have become citizens by a compliance with the provisions of the-act of 1802, but is susceptible of a construction which embraces all cases where the parents of the child became citizens by' operation of any existing law. The law of 1855, now section 1991, has not placed any limitations or qualifications on the effect of the intermarriage by the mother with a citizen, and declares in the most general terms, that any woman who is now, or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen. The words “ duly natural*81ized,” as used in section 2172, sbonld be construed as having the same meaning as if tbe words used were “ have duly become citizens ” and should be construed accordingly. The primary meaning of the word “ naturalization ” “ is the act of investing an alien with the rights or privileges of a native subject or citizen.” (Webster.)


Because civil death revoked the full spectrum of rights of people convicted of certain offenses, it was historically "limited to very serious crimes" and imposed "only upon judicial pronouncement in individual cases." (Ewald, Civil Death , supra , 2002 Wis. L.Rev. at p. 1061 ; see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 373 [civil death applies only "when it is ... clear beyond all dispute that the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to human society."].) In the United States, however, this distinction eroded in the years following the Civil War as federal constitutional rights began to constrain the activities of individual states. (Grady, Civil Death is Different (2013) 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 441, 447 ; see U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [equal <mask> rights regardless of race]; U.S. Const., 15th Amend. [universal male suffrage]; compare Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (1833) 32 U.S. 243, 247, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 [5th Amend. takings clause limited only federal power and did not apply to the states] with Chicago, Burlington & R'D v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 [takings clause applied to states via 14th Amend.].) Many states, including California, began to impose forms of civil death broadly and automatically.


The question of whether defendant’s limited activities constitute the practice of a profession restricted to natural persons has not been directly passed upon by our appellate courts. Foreign decisions, moreover, are in conflict. The right to engage in a lawful occupation is a fundamental, natural, essential, and inalienable right, one of the privileges of <mask>. Like other *417rights equally fundamental, however, the right to engage in any legitimate trade, occupation, business, or profession, is not absolute, but is subject to a reasonable and necessary exercise of the regulatory powers of government in the public interest or welfare. The inalienable right of every citizen to follow the common industrial occupations of life does not extend to the pursuit of those professions which are subjected to supervision in the interest of the public welfare. As to what is a profession, the term connotes something more than mere proficiency in the performance of a task; it implies intellectual skill as contrasted with that used in an occupation for the production or sale of commodities. Originally, and historically, the word “ profession ” was applied only to law, medicine, and theology or divinity. From early times, moreover, the “learned professions ” were given “ exclusive rights and subjected to peculiar responsibilities.” The practice of law or of medicine was not a business open to all, but a privilege conferred upon the individual engaged therein. A corporation, it was held some 50 years ago, could not practice law or medicine, nor might it hire lawyers or doctors to act for it (Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 484). As the applications of science and learning were extended to other fields, other vocations became known as “ professions ”. The liberalization of the term, however, to embrace chemists, editors, electricians, landscape architects, teachers, and shorthand reporters, among others, did not give to such “ professions ” exclusive rights nor subject them to peculiar responsibilities. If wrongs were practiced by individuals engaged in these callings, a State might not seek to remedy such evils by imposing unreasonable and unnecessary restraints upon them. If it was felt that only natural persons should be authorized to carry on one of these vocations, such a statute would have to bear “ a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of general welfare. * * * A state cannot, ‘ under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.’” (Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 112-113.)


As a practical matter, however, our courts, as well as immigrant children seeking our assistance, should bear in mind the factors considered by *422the USCIS when it reviews a petition for SIJ status. In 1998, Congress modified the SIJ statute to require the Attorney General's express consent to the dependency order serving as the basis of the SIJ petition. (H.R.Rep. No. 105-405, 1st Sess., pp. 22-23 (Nov. 13, 1997).) According to the legislative history, Congress modified the SIJ statute "in order to limit the beneficiaries of this provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely abandoned, neglected, or abused children, by requiring the Attorney General to determine that neither the dependency order nor the administrative or judicial determination of the alien's best interest was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect." (H.R.Rep. No. 105-405, 1st Sess., p. 130 (Nov. 13, 1997).) Although Congress has since modified the SIJ statute to require the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security (rather than the Attorney General) to the grant of SIJ status (rather than the underlying dependency order), see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii), the agency's concern remains the same: "The consent determination by the Secretary, through the USCIS District Director, is an acknowledgment that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide. This means that the SIJ benefit was not 'sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.' (See H.R.Rep. No. 105-405, at p. 130 (1997).) An approval of an SIJ petition itself shall be evidence of the Secretary's consent." (U.S. <mask> and Immigration Services, Memorandum (Mar. 24, 2009) Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions, by Donald Neufeld & Pearl Chang, available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.) The proposed federal rule designed to implement the 2008 amendments to the SIJ statute, if adopted, will authorize the USCIS to "consider, among other permissible discretionary factors, whether the alien has established, based on the evidence of record, that the State court order was sought primarily to obtain relief from abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law and not primarily for the purpose of obtaining lawful immigration status; and that the evidence otherwise demonstrates that there is a bona fide *860basis for granting special immigrant juvenile status." (76 Fed.Reg. 54985 (Sept. 6, 2011) [proposed 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(i) ].)


“[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: “(a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual orientation or alienage or <mask> status of any person . . . “(2) To refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person; or “(3) To discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [emphasis added]). The New York Court of Appeals has held that marital status is


Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U. S. 510) held unconstitutional a statute that sought to prohibit the operation of parochial or private schools. The Pierce case did not hold that the State could not compel children to receive secular education. Bather did it hold that the State could not prescribe the place where, or the auspices under which, secular education was to be obtained. The court expressly stated: “No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good <mask> must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.” (P. 534.)


Under Section 1605(a)(2), a foreign state’s sovereign immunity is subject to abrogation based on the state’s commercial activities. This statutory exception codifies the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity that the United States Department of State first endorsed in 1952, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992), pursuant to which foreign states were not afforded immunity in cases “arising out of purely commercial transactions[,]” id. at 613 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703 (1976)). The Supreme Court had long held that when “a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it,” id. at 614, its private acts might be sufficient to justify the invocation of the jurisdiction of American courts, see id. (distinguishing acts of the state as a market participant from undertakings aimed at “fulfilling its uniquely sovereign objectives”); see also Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007). Thus, the FSIA’s commercial activities exception carves out, and exempts from sovereign immunity, a sphere of private commercial action that foreign states sometimes undertake. Notably, as Congress has worded it, the commercial activities exception is also designed to ensure that there is a sufficient connection between the foreign state’s commercial activity and the United States to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. See Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 766 (2019). Thus, the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) requires a plaintiff’s claim to be “based upon” an aspect of the foreign state’s commercial activity that has a “substantial contact with the United States.” Odhiambo, 764 F.3d at 36; see also Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (clarifying that the degree of contact required must be more than isolated or transitory, and a plaintiff’s mere <mask> status or place of residence will not suffice). The second clause of the commercial activities exception permits a suit against a foreign state when the plaintiff’s claim is based “upon an act performed in the United States[,]” and that act is taken “in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). And the third clause of the exception permits a suit against a foreign state if the claim is based upon an act outside the United States that is related to the foreign state’s commercial activity if that act “causes a direct effect in the United States.” Id.


Following the service of a copy of the summons and complaint upon Ernest Boehm, the superintendent or managing agent of the premises, the action was removed on the ground of diversity of <mask> to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The petition of “ B eland Realty Corporation ” was verified on January 3, 1955, by Joseph W. Levin, who stated he was its assistant secretary. In his affidavit sworn to the same date, he stated that this corporation was in existence pursuant to the laws of the State of New Jersey. The answer thereafter served by said defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint, including paragraph “ 2 ” thereof, wherein, as already noted, its corporate existence under the New *643Jersey law was alleged as well as its ownership of the premises at the time of the occurrence underlying the action.


I repeat, therefore, that there is nothing in the general policy of the naturalization laws which requires such a construction of the act of 1855 as will exclude the wife of a citizen from <mask>, either, because at the time of the marriage she was an alien, or because her husband was an alien, if he subsequently became a citizen, or because she had not resided five years within the United States, or was under twenty-one years of age.


In Quinby v. Duncan (4 Harr. [Del.] 383) it was said, “ a man *733is to be regarded as a citizen of his native state until it-can be shown that he has changed this relation by leaving animo manendi, or by acquiring a <mask> elsewhere. * * * And -this is to be not merely by a change of habitancy or residence, but by a change of citizenship.”


Section 434a-8.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York provides that only United States citizens may be appointed to the police force. Subsequent to the Sugarman v Dougall decision, a three-Judge court of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that subdivision 3 of section 215 of the Executive Law of the State of New York, which requires United States <mask> as a prerequisite to appointment to the State Police, was not in violation of the Constitution. Foley v Connelie (419 F Supp 889.) That case involved a class action by a citizen of Ireland who was refused permission to take the competitive examination for appointment to the State Police on the ground that he was not a citizen of the United States. In dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, the court, referring to the portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion quoted above, concluded that Sugarman v Dougall did not prohibit a State from barring aliens from specific positions in the civil service if the nature of the position warranted such restriction. The court held that upon a proper showing of a compelling interest, the State could exclude all aliens from certain employment. One such area of employment was the police force. The court stated that (p 895), "We believe that the state has a special interest in the composition of its police force which justifies exempting it from the class of ordinary occupations from which aliens cannot be excluded.” The court further noted (p 896): "This court believes there is a strong similarity between the role played by the juror and the policeman in our society, and it has been often recognized that states and the federal government have a compelling interest which justifies excluding aliens from jury service.”


The "right to hold public office, either by election or appointment, is one of the valuable rights of <mask>. ... The exercise of this right should not be declared prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of law. Ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of eligibility to office." ( Carter v. Commission on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments (1939) 14 Cal.2d 179, 182, 93 P.2d 140.)


The Act provides: "It is unlawful for any person, for compensation, other than persons authorized to practice law or authorized by federal law to represent persons before the Board of Immigration Appeals or the United States <mask> and Immigration Services, to engage in the business or act in the capacity of an immigration consultant within this state except as provided by this chapter ." ( Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22440, italics added.)


The <mask> Act of 1924, and the Nationality Act of 1940, conferring citizenship on Indians, have been held not unconstitutional as to the Six Nations, notwithstanding that the relation of these tribes to the United States may have been that of an independent nation by virtue of treaties between the signatories and that the above acts may have been' at variance with the treaty status of the Six Nations. (Ex parte Green, 123 F. 2d 862, certiorari denied, Green v. McLaren, 316 U. S. 668.) In the above case the court followed the general proposition that a, domestic law conflicting with an earlier treaty must be honored by domestic courts.


On June 28, 2016, the federal court summarily remanded the case to the superior court. Although defendant's notice of removal filed in the superior court included only the face page with the above quoted language, the order of remand disclosed the additional allegations defendant made in support of his notice of removal. Specifically, the remand order stated, inter alia, "Plaintiff could not have brought this action in federal court in the first place, and so removal is improper. Notably, even if complete diversity of <mask> exists, Defendant cannot properly remove the action because Defendant resides in the forum state [citations]. [¶] Nor does Plaintiff's business tort action raise any federal legal question. [Citation.] Pursuant to the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' federal-question jurisdiction exists 'only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.' [Citation.] Although Defendant claims that he 'filed suit in [ ] federal court claiming matters which involve federal questions,' he fails to allege that any federal law appears on the face of Plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. [Citations.] Thus, there is no basis *37for federal-question jurisdiction or for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). [Citations.] [¶] Finally Defendant contends that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). [Citation.] As a rule, a successful petition for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel , 384 U.S. 780, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966), and City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock , 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966). 'First the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the prosecution, rights that are given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights.' [Citation.] 'Second, petitioners must assert that the state courts will not enforce that right, and that allegation must be supported by reference to a state statute or a constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to ignore the federal rights.' [Citaiton.] [¶] Assuming, without deciding, that Defendant satisfies the first prong of this test, he fails to satisfy the second. That is, Defendant fails to identify Any 'state statute or ... constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to ignore [Defendant's] federal rights.' [Citation.] Defendant's vague assurance that he 'will[,] at trial[,] [ ]show that there is [such] a state law' is insufficient [Citation.] Thus, there is no basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)."


Suppose the executor whose letters have been revoked had been the only one named in the will, and an administrator with the will annexed had been duly *83appointed, and afterwards the ground of revocation had ceased to exist, could the court displace the administrator and replace the executor ? . So, if an executor, after entering upon his duties, should remove from the State, and, on being required, should fail to give a bbnd, in consequence of which his letters should be revoked, would he, afterwards, on removing into the State again, be entitled to be restored to the office he had vacated ? And again, suppose he were, while executor, convicted of an infamous crime and imprisoned in a State prison, in consequence of which his letters were revoked; and suppose that, pending his term of imprisonment, he should be pardoned and restored to <mask>, could the court again create him executor ? These questions require an answer in the negative. Where letters have once been revoked, the appointment of the executor has ceased to exist, just as completely as if he had never been named by the testator. He cannot be rehabilitated.


Sections 1 and 2 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (TJ. S. Code, tit. 46, §§ 801-842) define the terms vessels, persons, <mask>, etc., which restrict the transfer of a vessel documented under the laws of the United States. Section 9 of this act (U. S. Code, tit. 46, § 808) in effect decrees that it shall be unlawful to transfer in any manner a vessel or interest therein documented under the laws of the United States, owned in whole or part by a citizen of the United States to a noncitizen without the approval of the United States Maritime Commission and imposes forfeiture *922and criminal sanctions for its violation. The transfer may not be accomplished by a corporate arrangement whereby the title to the vessel is vested in an American corporation while the control of this corporation passes to citizens of a foreign country. (See United States v. The Meacham) 107 F. Supp. 997, affd. 207 F. 2d 535, app. dsmd. 348 U. S. 801.) The court must as sumé from the plaintiff’s failure to submit any proof of approval by the United States Maritime Commission, that the acquisition by Prudential of Champion was in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916.


Even while the issues relating to the desirability of a Civilian Complaint Review Board have forged to the forefront of daily news reports, substantial evidence is exhibited, day after day, that New Yorkers have every reason to be justifiably proud of their police force. Concomitant with every press release calling for a reconstructed board, one finds the minor news item detailing another heroic act of a police officer. By virtue of its dedication, efficiency and discipline, the Police Department of this city has earned the respect of our citizenry and the reputation of being “New York’s Finest”. One can only hope that the review board will not detract from the present high standard maintained by the force. Too often, it is insisted that there be legal limitations upon police powers. Perhaps not enough has been said about the converse, to wit, the public’s duties to the police. The rallying call that the “ police are the servants of the people ” should never be construed to mean that the “ police are subservient to the people ”. The concept of equality together Avith a recognition of the duties and rights of <mask>, and the proper place of authority under law, must be common objectives.


*340In Graham v Richardson (403 US 365 [1971]), the Supreme Court held that State welfare laws which conditioned benefits on <mask> and duration of residency violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court noted that it has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside, and that “the Court’s decisions have established that classifications.based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny” (403 US 365, 371-372). Thus, wrote Justice Blackmun, “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority (see United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)) for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” (403 US 365, 372.)


The duties of the board of election inspectors are not of an inquisitorial nature; their duties are of a purely ministerial nature, and are fully defined by the Election Law. Their duty in attending the business of the registration of voters is to ascertain the electors *263who are qualified to cast votes, and the questions they are permitted to ask are asked for the purpose of testing the intending voter’s qualifications. The petitioner herein had his <mask> papers with him which he exhibited, and answered all questions in an orderly and sufficient way and, in my judgment, was duly qualified to register.


We conclude that the information provided by the bus driver to Tanaka was *296sufficient to reasonably justify a brief stop of defendant to determine if he was actually the suspect sought in the "288 case." Tanaka knew that pictures of the suspect in the "288 case" had been widely disseminated. The bus driver told Tanaka that he had seen a picture of the suspect on a "Be on the Lookout" flier and that the picture on the flier "matched" a passenger on his bus. That flier had just been issued on the very day that the bus driver saw the passenger, so the picture must have been fresh in the bus driver's mind. Although Tanaka had only a vague recollection of the video he had seen, it was not inconsistent with the man identified by the bus driver as the suspect in the "288 case." And Tanaka had no reason to suspect that the bus driver had any motivation other than good <mask>. Just because Tanaka lacked "the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest," he was not required "to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." ( Adams , supra , 407 U.S. at p. 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921.) The information that Tanaka possessed was sufficient to support a brief detention. "[T]he grave risks posed by" a person who appeared to be the man sought for sexually assaulting a child justified "the minimal intrusion of a brief investigatory" detention to determine if he in fact was the person sought. ( Wells , supra , 38 Cal.4th at p. 1082, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810.) *406IV. Disposition


(In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.)” (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) B. Applicable Law 1. Indian Child “The juvenile court and social services agencies have an affirmative duty to inquire at the outset of the proceedings whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child.” (In re K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 118-119; see § 224.2, subd. (a).) An “ ‘Indian child’ ” for purposes of the ICWA is defined in the same manner as under federal law as, “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.) 2. Reason to Know Section 224.2, subdivision (d) provides a juvenile court has reason to know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child under any of the following circumstances: “(1) A person having an interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[;] [¶] (6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or <mask> in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)-(6).)


Based on the text of section 922(b)(3) and the overall statutory context, we conclude that the phrase “reside in . . . the State” in section 922(b)(3) cannot be interpreted differently for citizens and aliens and therefore may not be construed to impose different substantive requirements when aliens and citizens seek to obtain a firearm from an FFL. The residency requirement in the text of section 922(b)(3) is estab- lished with a single phrase, “reside in . . . the State,” that applies to all “person[s].” More specifically, section 922(b)(3) provides that a covered firearms transaction may not take place when “the [FFL] knows or has reasonable cause to believe” that the “person” who would receive the firearm “does not reside in . . . the State” where the FFL does business. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3). The plain text of the statute thus appears to require ATF to apply the same standard to determine whether “any person . . . reside[s] in . . . the State,” regardless of the <mask> status of the pro- spective buyer. See id. The proposed final rule, however, would effectively adopt two different definitions of “reside in . . . the State.” Citizens would be required to show only an intent to make a home in the state in which they were pre- sent, whereas aliens would be required to show that same intent and also prove that they had been present in the state for 90 days. We recognize that what it means to “reside” in a state may itself be susceptible to nu- merous interpretations. See, e.g., Downs v. Comm’r, 166 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1948); Assistant U.S. Attorneys—Residency Requirement, 3 Op. O.L.C. 360, 361 (1979). But regardless of how that term is defined, the plain text of section 922(b)(3) contemplates that the same definition will apply to “any person,” citizen or alien, to whom an FFL seeks to sell or deliver a firearm (with the exception of members of the Armed Forces on active duty, to whom the Act expressly applies a different definition of state residency, see supra p. 51). Nothing in the concept of state residence, moreover, suggests that it is appropriate to read a distinction between aliens and citizens into the statute where no such distinction exists in the text. We are aware of no background common-law definition of state residency, for example, that would suggest that state residency should be defined differently for aliens and citizens. Cf. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S.


There is complete diversity because SDM and Drexel are not citizens of the same state. As a limited liability corporation, SDM takes on the <mask> of its members and submembers. See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that determining an LLC’s citizenship requires drilling down “through however many layers of partners or members there may be” to evaluate the citizenship of each (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 111 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“There is no good reason to treat LLCs differently from corporations for diversity-of-citizenship purposes.”). Accounting for those members and submembers, SDM is a citizen of Delaware, Maryland, and California for purposes of the diversity statute.1 As a non-profit corporation, Drexel has citizenship for purposes of the diversity statute in the state of its incorporation and in the state of its principal place of business – Pennsylvania in both instances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 419. Without any overlap in the citizenship of SDM and Drexel, the complete diversity requirement is satisfied.


The petitioner Robert Wechsler is a native born United States citizen, a college graduate and apparently a man of some wealth. His former wife, Rozi Marash, was born in Romania, became a naturalized citizen of Israel, then came to the United States and was naturalized here. She now claims dual <mask>. Her mother, who had lived in this country, has gone to Israel *613and she has other relatives living there. Her present husband Joshua Marash has worked for El A1 Israel Airlines, a government-owned company for 16 years. He has been assigned to the Hew York branch of the company for six years and just recently has been reassigned to Israel. He has in the past spent about four years in England and about 18 months in Italy. If he refuses to return to Israel, he will lose his position and all the rights and privileges acquired during his 16 years of service.


“ Many things that a legislature may do if it does them with no ulterior purpose, it cannot do as a means to reach what is beyond its constitutional power. * * * New Jersey cannot tax the property of Hill or McDonald outside the State and cannot use her power over property within it to accomplish by indirection what she cannot do directly. It seems to me that that is what she is trying to do and therefore that the judgments of the Court of Errors and Appeals should be reversed. “ It seems to me that when property outside the State is taken into account for the purpose of increasing the tax upon property within it, the property outside is taxed in effect, no matter what form of words may be used. It appears to me that this cannot be done, even if it should be done in such a way as to secure equality between residents in New Jersey and those in other States.” Maxwell v. Bugbee seems to have relied very substantially upon Blackstone v. Miller (188 U. S. 189). Blackstone v. Miller has been expressly overruled (Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra, p. 209; First National Bank v. Maine, supra, p. 324). There is suggestion in the opinion in Maxwell v. Bugbee that the result there might be justified by the decision in LaTourette v. McMaster (248 U. S. 465). The case last cited held valid a statute of South Carolina which discriminated between residents and non-residents of that State with relation to the license of insurance agents therein. The statute was held to limit citizens of other States lawfully, since it operated to limit likewise citizens of South Carolina resident elsewhere. Thus the court found no discrimination against citizens of other States. While there is a difference between <mask> of the United States and citizenship of a State (United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542), and while the Fourteenth Amendment forbids abridgement by a State of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States only (Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. [16 Wall.] 36, 74), there is no support for the idea of difference between residence and citizenship in respect of tax matters because the term “ residence ” when used in the Tax Law is synonymous with “ domicil ” and hence with “ citizenship.” As is said in the Restatement by the American Law Institute of the Law of Conflict *684of Laws (Chap. 2, § 9, p. 20): “ In statutes relating to taxation and voting, residence means domicil unless the contrary is indicated in the statute.” Of course a citizen of the United States domiciled in a State thereof has State citizenship in the State of domicil as well. He may temporarily reside in another State, retaining ■ his citizenship of the State of domicil. The discrimination between “ citizenship ” (i. e., “ domicil ”) and “ residence ” made in LaTourette v. McMaster (supra) is not applicable to a tax question because the term “ resident ” in the Tax Law means a domiciled person and hence a citizen. In other words, the provisions in the Tax Law could be revised to refer to taxation on citizens of New York State and on non-citizens thereof without changing their meaning. So, LaTourette v. McMaster (supra) has no pertinence.


Upon the trial of the issue petitioner’s sister was called as a witness and testified, in substance, that the petitioner was born in this State, that both parents always were citizens of this country, and so far as she knew never renounced that <mask>. From this the petitioner argues “ once a citizen always a citizen ” unless the contrary affirmatively appears.


A roving patrol stop must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for its initiation under Terry v Ohio (392 US 1 [1968] at 29). A roving patrol detention is permitted on less than probable cause because of the legitimate enforcement interests, but the trade-off is that the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. With respect to roving Border Patrols, the Brignoni-Ponce rule is that “the officer may question the [suspected aliens] about their <mask> and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.” (422 US at 881-882; see also Florida v Royer, 460 US 491 [1983].) This rule is followed in both the federal and state courts. (See discussion in United States v Bews, 715 F Supp 1206, 1210 [WD NY 1989], and in People v Carrillo, 257 AD2d 780 [3d Dept 1999].) In short, the Border Patrol agent must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing — something more than a “mere ‘hunch.’ ” (United States v Arvizu, 534 US 266, 274 [2002]; Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266 [1973]; United States v Sharpe, 470 US 675 [1985]; United States v Cormier, 77 Fed Appx 65 [2d Cir 2003].)


Necessity for legislation on that subject undoubtedly provoked it. A very able review by Mr. Horace Binney of the acts of congress in force on that subject and of the various attempts to remedy the existing legal defects will be found in the second volume of the American Law Register (Phil.) p. 193, and I entertain the belief that the review mentioned contributed much to the enactment of the law. It will not be necessary for the determination of the question involved in this case, however, to consider in detail the whole scope of legislation upón the subject of <mask> of children born abroad whose parents were or whose father was a citizen of the United States, but to refer to it as incidental to the question on hand, the two subjects embraced in the act of 1855 being kindred to and growing out of each other. It will be sufficient, therefore, in relation to the subject embraced in the first section of the act of 1855 to say that under the then existing laws the child of a citizen of the United States born abroad was an alien, and that even under the act of congress passed in 1802 (Brightley’s Digest, p. 35) the child of an alien mother born abroad was an alien although the father was in fact a citizen. Some attempts were made in congress to remedy this, and bills were introduced for that purpose. One reported by Mr. Wall in 1841, another introduced by Mr. Webster in 1848, and still another by Mr. Bradbury in 1852.


ports of entry. See Homeland Security Act §§ 403, 442, 451, 471, 116 Stat. at 2178, 2193, 2195, 2205; see also Name Change from the Bureau of <mask> and Immigration Services to U.S. Citizenship and Immigra- tion Services, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,938, 60,938 (Oct. 13, 2004); Name Change of Two DHS Components, 75 Fed. Reg. 12,445, 12,445 (Mar. 16, 2010). The Secretary of Homeland Security is thus now “charged with the ad- ministration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). As a general rule, when Congress vests enforcement authority in an ex- ecutive agency, that agency has the discretion to decide whether a particu- lar violation of the law warrants prosecution or other enforcement action. This discretion is rooted in the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and it reflects a recognition that the “faithful[]” execution of the law does not necessarily entail “act[ing] against each technical violation of the statute” that an agency is charged with enforcing. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Chaney, the decision whether to initiate enforcement proceedings is a complex judg- ment that calls on the agency to “balanc[e] . . . a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.” Id. These factors include “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and . . . whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.” Id.; cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (recognizing that exercises of prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases involve considera- tion of “‘[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan’” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))). In Chaney, the Court considered and rejected a challenge to the Food and Drug Ad- ministration’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings with respect to alleged violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, conclud- ing that an agency’s decision not to initiate enforcement proceedings is presumptively immune from judicial review. See 470 U.S. at 832. The Court explained that, while Congress may “provide[] guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers,” in the absence of such “legislative direction,” an agency’s non-enforcement determination


While under Swedish law, the <mask> of a testator is determinative of the obligation to pay Swedish inheritance taxes, the citizenship of the donee of an inter vivos trust is determinative of the obligation to pay a Swedish gift tax. Thus if the presumptive remaindermen residing in Sweden survive their mother, a Swedish gift tax will be imposed upon the remainder interest distributed to them. No Swedish inheritance tax would be imposed upon the remainder interest of a testamentary trust received by a Swedish citizen. Pursuant to the provisions of the gift tax laws of Sweden, a Swedish gift tax of approximately 53% of the remainder interest received by the Swedish presumptive remaindermen, will be imposed at the time of the death of decedent’s daughter, Estelle Ekstrand. As the present value of the share of the inter vivos trust held for the benefit of Estelle Ekstrand, is approximately $2,266,000, a Swedish gift tax of approximately $1,200,000 would be imposed.


. Contrary to the People’s position, these deportation consequences are not analogous to those of registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act, which were deemed collateral in People v Gravino (14 NY3d 546 [2010]), or to the consequences of civil forfeiture. Neither are they similar to the consequence of inability to renew lawful permanent resident status or to attain United States <mask>, discussed in People v D’Pierre (Sup Ct, NY County, Mar. 13, 2012, indictment No. 1966/92), also cited by the prosecution.


Although most of the parties maintain residences in New York, or travel here from Uruguay fairly regularly, all retain Uruguayan, or dual <mask> and all, except plaintiff and, perhaps, her two sons maintain residences in Uruguay. Despite the parties’ connections to New York, all of the remaining witnesses of importance, Horacio’s surviving sisters Olimpia and Ifigenia and his mother Manolita, reside only in Uruguay. All of these persons are quite elderly, Manolita being, it is reported, 109 years old, Ifigenia has been declared incompetent, due to Alzheimer’s disease, and has been provided by the courts of Uruguay with a guardian. Although plaintiff annexed purported "consents” to be made party plaintiffs to this action, written in English and signed by Olimpia, Augusto (since deceased) and Manolita, there is no indication that any of these elderly parties is willing, or able, to come to New York to testify.


Operating an automobile on the highway is not a right a person may exercise because of his <mask>. (People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 121.) Highways, as they were originally developed, were for the convenience and easy passage of persons on foot, on horseback, in vehicles drawn by horses or oxen, and also for the *241transportation of commodities by the same means. They were open to unrestricted use by all persons. No license might be required. Toll roads were open to all upon payment of the same fee for the same or similar vehicles.


The Naturalization Service stresses that in the event naturalization is granted and should the petitioner be subsequently convicted of a crime, it would impose a more onerous burden of proof to cancel <mask> than is required to deny naturalization. I am not impressed by that argument for if, indeed, the petitioner is ultimately convicted of such grievous crime, it should impose no undue burden upon the Naturalization Service to succeed in a revocation proceeding.


2 Those circumstance are: (i) a person having an interest in the child informs the court that the child is an Indian child; (ii) the residence or domicile of the child, the child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village; (iii) the court is informed by any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child; (iv) the child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child; (v) the court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court; and, (vi) the court is informed that either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or <mask> in an Indian tribe.


DHS’s authority to remove aliens from the United States rests on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. In the INA, Congress established a comprehensive scheme governing immigration and naturalization. The INA specifies certain categories of aliens who are inadmissible to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182. It also specifies “which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). “Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227); see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (providing that “[a]ny alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be re- moved if the alien” falls within one or more classes of deportable al- iens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (listing classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas or be admitted to the United States). Removal proceedings ordinarily take place in federal immigration courts administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a component of the Depart- ment of Justice. See id. § 1229a (governing removal proceedings); see also id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A), 1228(b) (setting out expedited removal pro- cedures for certain arriving aliens and certain aliens convicted of aggra- vated felonies). Before 2003, the Department of Justice, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), was also responsible for providing immi- gration-related administrative services and generally enforcing the immi- gration laws. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Congress transferred most of these functions to DHS, giving it primary responsibility both for initiating removal proceedings and for carrying out final orders of removal. See 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 374 n.1 (2005) (noting that the immigration authorities previously exercised by the Attorney General and INS “now reside” in the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS). The Act divided INS’s functions among three different agencies within DHS: U.S. <mask> and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which oversees legal immigration into the United States and provides immigration and naturalization services to aliens; ICE, which enforces federal laws govern- ing customs, trade, and immigration; and U.S. Customs and Border Pro- tection (“CBP”), which monitors and secures the Nation’s borders and


“As we construe this act, it confers the privileges of <mask> upon women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous acts of congress provide. The terms ‘married,’ or ‘who shall be married,’ do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that whenever a woman who under previous acts might be naturalized, is in' a state of marriage to a citizen,'whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. T-Tis citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are *239citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her. citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested. The terms, “ who might lawfully under the existing laws,” only limit the application of the law to free white women * * *.” The defendants also contend that the plaintiff does not come within the decision of either of the two foregoing cases, because- on the day of Hafner’s death she was not twenty-one years of age, and for that reason could not, on that day, have been naturalized under the laws existing prior to the act of 1855. This objection has no greater force, if as much, than the objections urged against Mrs. Burton. The plaintiff was no more incapacitated on that account, than Mrs. Burton was by reason of non-residence. Indeed she was not so much, for, if necessary, she. could confessedly have become naturalized under the naturalization acts within a few months after Hafner’s death, while Mrs. Burton could not for five years after her husband’s death. Age of twenty-one years, under the then existing laws, was simply one of the qualifications necessary for an applicant to have, just as it was necessary for him to show a five years’ residence. The plaintiff comes clearly within the reasoning, if not the letter, of the two decisions. The statute says, “ any woman,” and not “ any woman of twenty-one years of age.” There is no more reason, in considering the general policy of the naturalization laws, why, in case of marriage with a citizen, the requirement of twenty-one years of age should not be dispensed with, than the requirement of a five year’s previous residence. They are both made requirements for the purpose of furnishing evidence of fitness to undertake the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, and one is no more important or necessary than the other. The fact of marriage furnishes evidence of such fitness, and the law says that *240a woman who is capable of lawfully entering into the marriage relation, and does so, marrying a citizen, is fitted to become, and, ipso facto, becomes a citizen. The duties are no more onerous upon her than upon a native female of the same age, and she is still under the same disabilities. Her naturalization simply removes the disability resting upon alienism, and throws around her the protection of the nation. The propriety of this may be urged as a cogent reason in support of such a construction to the act as will give to the wife of the citizen the same protection as it gives to him and to their children. She has linked her destiny with the country by the strongest of ties. Citizenship does not depend upon age. To be qualified as a voter, a citizen must be of the age of twenty-one years, and upwards. On the other hand, infants may be citizens by birth.


the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.” Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 203, 102 Stat. 4646 (1988). We applied the statute accordingly in Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1997). However, the “deemed a citizen” language upon which we relied in Foy—which we decided in 1997—comes from an ear- lier version of § 1332(a); in 2011, Congress removed this language from the statute as part of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act. See Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 101, 125 Stat. 758 (2011). Under the current version of § 1332(a), a foreign citizen admitted to the United States for permanent residence is not a “cit- izen[] of a State,” but rather a “citizen[] or subject[] of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Under the amended version of the statute, there is no diversity between citizens of a foreign state. Tagger v. Strauss Grp. Ltd., 951 F.3d 124, 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that the amended version “does not confer diversity jurisdiction where a permanent resident alien sues a non- resident alien” and “federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over lawsuits between two foreign parties”). As a result of this change in statutory law, Foy no longer controls. See United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (“As a rule, our prior precedent is no longer binding once it has been substantially un- dermined or overruled by . . . a change in statutory law . . .”). Given the language of the 2011 amendment, there is no diversity of <mask> under the current version of § 1332(a) between the USCA11 Case: 19-11330 Date Filed: 02/03/2022 Page: 10 of 22


The provisions of this act apply only to offenses committed subsequent to the passage of the act. But in order to provide, as near as possible, a remedy against false and fraudulent certificates of <mask> previously obtained and yet avoid the objection which might be raised to an ex post facto law, the use of such certificates, .'and. even their possession with intent to use them, was' prohibited as therein- provided. The cer*20tificates, the use or possession of which is thus prohibited, may be divided into four classes, viz.: 1. Certificates which am forged or counterfeit and, hence, are not at all the act of the. court whose seal they profess to bear. 2. Certificates which, though genuine in all respects and issued pursuant to the direction of the .court, were procured by or for the applicants named therein by means of some imposition or fraud practiced upon the court. 3. Certificates issued by the clerk or other officer of the court without lawful authority in cases in which there was no appearance and hearing of the applicant in court; and 4. Certificates issued to a person other than the one who uses or attempts to use it. But the prohibition does not apply to a case in which there was an honest compliance on the part of the applicant with the requirements of the law, and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, made or gave the proper order of judgment, but of which the clerk neglected, to make an entry, though he filed it and although he issued the certificate. In such a case the certificate is valid and conclusive. Much less does it apply to a case like the cases at.bar in which every thing was done which the law and the practice of the court required to be done.


The UGMA is silent with respect to the custodian’s residency or <mask>. Historically in the Surrogate’s Court, the eligibility of a person to serve as fiduciary is governed by SCPA 707, which requires that a nonresident alien may serve only with a resident of this State. But is a custodian a fiduciary? EPTL 1-2.7 includes a custodian under the definition of fiduciary; but a custodian is not included in the definition of a fiduciary under SCPA 103 (21). Furthermore, since letters do not issue to a custodian, it would appear that SCPA 707 does not apply. Indeed, it is clear the draftsmen of the UGMA intended that in most instances a custodian would be appointed and serve without court involvement.


Ultimately, I am sufficiently convinced that the settlors did not intend to grant exclusive jurisdiction to New York. Articles Second and Seventh explicitly provide that validity and construction of the trusts, and intestacy distributive eventualities shall be determined by the laws of the State of Maryland. These provisions, combined with the right of appointment of any trust company or bank as successor trustee (art. Third), makes an argument, based on intention, a convincing and valid one, particularly in the aura of its place of execution and the <mask> of the settlors: Maryland.


It has often been .said that an attorney is an officer of the court and his position is a matter of privilege, subject to certain burdens (Matter of Zuckerman, 20 N Y 2d 430, cert. den. 390 U. S. 925; Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, cert. den. 246 U. S. 661). However, the right to conduct a business and enter a profession is considered a property right within the meaning of various constitutional provisions (9 N. Y. Jur., Constitutional Law, §§ 226-229, 356; 16 Am. Jur. 2d., Constitutional Law, § 371). It has been said that the right to practice in any profession is “ a valuable property right, in which, under the Constitution and laws of the State, one is entitled to be protected and secured ’ ’ (Matter of Bender v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 262 App. Div. 627, 631; Ann. 6 L. ed. 2d 1328, Professional License — Due Process). Whether an attorney’s right to practice is regarded as a property right or a privilege (cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 239), such right is protected by the Federal Constitution (Matter of Ruffalo, 390 U. S. 544; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36) since “ lawyers also enjoy first-class <mask> ” (Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511,. 516). Admission to the Bar is not a matter of grace (Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96; Ann. 2 ALR 3d 1266 Admission to Bar — Due Process). Membership in the Bar with its attendant stringent requirements is a device designed to protect the public and assure them of competent advice (Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v. Dacey, 28 A D 2d 161, revd. other grounds 21 N Y 2d 694).


"(1) Completing a form provided by a federal or state agency but not advising a person as to their answers on those forms. "(2) Translating a person's answers to questions posed in those forms. "(3) Securing for a person supporting documents, such as birth certificates, which may be necessary to complete those forms. "(4) Submitting completed forms on a person's behalf and at their request to the United States <mask> and Immigration Services. "(5) Making referrals to persons who could undertake legal representation activities for a person in an immigration matter." ( Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22441, subd. (a).) We will use "immigration consultant" as shorthand for a person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of an immigration consultant, according to these definitions.


The age of the plaintiff was a necessary part of the information required by the steamship company, the passport and immigration authorities and the <mask> bureau. The plaintiff’s age would appear to be material, when leaving his own country, embarking from England and arriving in the United States. The court may infer, in view of the testimony as to his entry in this country, that he came, here legally, after complying with the requirements of his native land, the land from which he sailed and the land of his adoption. Military service was obligatory between the age of twenty and twenty-one, but, according to his own story, he did no military service at all, arriving in this country when he was twenty-one, having been married at the age of twenty, and yet there is no testimony that he left or fled from Russia avoiding military service. The court may infer that he could not, therefore, have arrived in the United States when he was twenty-one years old.


removal costs,” an “action for contribution for any removal costs or damages,” and an “action based on rights subrogated pursuant to this Act”). It precisely defines the forum in which any such action must be brought, noting that “[v]enue shall lie in any district in which the discharge or injury or damages occurred, or in which the defendant resides, may be found, has its principal office, or has ap- pointed an agent for service of process.” Id. § 2717(b). And it lists the courts that may lawfully exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over its claims, providing (for instance) that “the United States dis- trict courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all contro- versies arising under this Act, without regard to the <mask> of the parties or the amount in controversy.” Id. Like the statute at issue in Bormes, then, the OPA is a “detailed remedial scheme” that constitutes the exclusive source of liability for oil-removal claims. Whether oil-spill liability extends to the federal government, in other words, must be determined by the OPA’s own text. 9


On the first trial day she was asked to return the following-week and offer testimony or documents which would establish the relationship. She is not represented by an attorney and the court is of the opinion that she should be given every reasonable opportunity to establish her claim, if any. All that she has done to this point is offer a certified copy of her petition for <mask>. This document fails to indicate who her mother was. The testimony of Miss French is, to the court, both incredible and fantastic.


Border Patrol Agent Germano saw the Dodge and thought it was out of place. The Texas license plates near the northern New York border late on a midweek night were at odds with his observation of usual traffic in that area. His job was to watch for aliens, smuggling and contraband that he might encounter. When the Dodge made a series of improbable turns and appeared evasive to Germano, given the proximity to the border and the fact that something didn’t seem right, he was justified in making an initial investigative stop to seek proof of <mask> and make a limited inquiry into his concerns. However, nothing in his testimony suggested any expressed concern about aliens or smuggling, and he did not assert such concerns as the *626basis for his stop. Therefore, when he received assurances as to citizenship and satisfied himself that there were no apparent aliens in the vehicle, his basis for further detention ended, and he was required to end the encounter.


In such conflicts there is already, I conceive, a primary principle which is rarely considered by state courts in cases of this character. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution every citizen now has a national <mask>, as contradistinguished from his or her citizenship of a particular state of the Union. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73; United States v. Gruikshank, 92 IT. S. 542.) The federal law *534regulating national citizenship alone determines the nationality of an American, as contradistinguished from his domicil, and it ought, I conceive, to be controlling in cases of this character, where a citizen of the United States is claimed to be domiciled legally in two or more-states of the Union. That the federal law is here controlling I do not say. It is quite unnecessary in this cause to go so far. But where there is a conflict of state laws on the status or state citizenship of a particular citizen of the United States, the collision or conflict seems to present a federal question within the true meaning of the amended Constitution, and in the interest of order and good government it would be highly convenient if the federal law comes to be supreme on this point throughout the United States, just as the law of imperial Rome came to be supreme on all disputed points over Italian particularism and provincialism. In other words, particularism or provincialism should in America give way to some higher principle or authority, in order that the rights and dignity of federal citizens may be properly maintained throughout the Union. If not now territoriality in the instance of federal citizens will at a time not long distant defer to nationality. Then if the courts of Vermont shall hold that “A,” a federal citizen, is a citizen of Vermont and the courts of Yew York shall also hold that he is at the same moment a citizen of Yew York, the nation may step in, in order that the evil consequences to “A” may be impartially prevented, or equitably adjusted, in some federal or national tribunal. This extension would be but an amplification of the theory of our Federal Constitution which makes federal law the arbiter of controversies between states or citizens of different states. It is of course probable that the judgment of the state courts, first in order of time determining the liability, would be held binding and given effect everywhere by federal law, but this might be at the expense of the real principle of domicil or state citizenship. Such temporary evasions do not benefit in the end the substance of constitutional law.


under ICWA, and the court ‘shall reverse its determination if it subsequently receives information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.) C. Analysis Father argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s ICWA finding on March 18, 2020. On this point, we disagree. At the time the juvenile court made that determination, all the information in the record supported that the minor was not an Indian child. Mother and father had denied any Native American ancestry in an interview with the Department and filed form ICWA-020’s to that effect at the detention hearing at which they were present. Nonetheless, this does not end the inquiry. In fact, it is the propriety of the juvenile court’s implied determination that ICWA did not apply at the termination of parental rights hearing (not its earlier determination) that is properly before this court. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 6, 9, 14-15; In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303, 312 [reviewing court’s adoption at termination of earlier ICWA finding in light of successive ICWA-020 form filings].) Here, later the same day of the court’s ICWA determination, at 3:31 p.m., mother (acting in pro per) filed another ICWA-020 form under the penalty of perjury with a box checked that indicated “Either parent or the child possesses an Indian identification card indicating membership or <mask> in an Indian tribe.” Father argues this triggered the Department’s duty to interview mother and her extended family, to review the identification card, and to contact any relevant tribes. We concur that the record does not answer whether the Department or the juvenile court complied with their continuing duty to investigate whether the minor may be an Indian child in light of mother’s filing of the second ICWA-020 form.


Rhinehart relies on In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 299, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 ( P.O. ), which found the condition " 'be of good <mask> and good conduct' " vague. ( Id. at p. 299, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) But in P.O. , the Attorney General conceded the "good behavior" condition was vague ( ibid. ), and there is no such concession nor reason for it here. Though similar sounding, the terms are sufficiently different. The phrase conjunctive to "good conduct" in P.O. -"be of good citizenship"-lacks the reasonable certainty of "obey all laws" and makes P.O. distinguishable. Beyond P.O. , Rhinehart identifies no case where this standard prohibition condition has been struck in whole or in part on vagueness grounds, nor have we found any. We see no reason to do so here.


As part of a 1997 revision to the Welfare Reform Law, Congress granted the states authority to use state funds to issue food benefits to those individuals whose entitlement to federal food stamps had been revoked. (See 7 USC § 2016 [j].) Pursuant to this federal authorization, New York, in 1997, adopted its own Food Assistance Program (FAP) to assist certain *610groups of legad, immigrants who had lost benefits as a result of the Welfare Reform Law. (See Social Services Law § 95 [10] [b].) In establishing this program, New York choose to restrict the group of immigrants who could apply for FAP benefits to lawful permanent residents or qualified aliens who are either elderly, disabled, under 18 years of age or victims of domestic violence. In addition, the immigrants must have (1) resided in the United States on August 22, 1996 (see § 95 [10] [b] [ii]), (2) applied for food stamps in the same social services district in which they resided on August 22, 1996 (see § 95 [10] [b] [ii]), (3) not been outside the United States for more than 90 days in the year preceding their application for benefits (see § 95 [10] [b] [iv]), and (4) either applied for <mask> within 30 days of the application or, if not yet eligible to apply for citizenship, apply within 30 days of becoming eligible (see § 95 [10] [b] [v]). Finally, the statute gave each of the state’s 58 local social services districts the option of participating in the FAP It appears that, as of August 2002, only 10 of the 58 districts were participating in the program.


The relevant facts are as follows: in 1978 the decedent Albert Goldberg married Alicia, at that time a citizen of Columbia, who was in the United States on a limited <mask>. Two days before their marriage they executed an antenuptial agreement which provided that Albert agreed to support Alicia and maintain her as his wife, that Albert’s burial and interment would be the responsibility of his sister Ethel Schuman (petitioner) and that the parties waived their statutory rights of election and intestate succession.


companies including Enursul and Husky Energy, and contributed to novel inventions, including a portable sulfur-forming unit, modularized well pads, and a high-efficiency drill rig. Amin applied for an extraordinary ability <mask> in January 2020. He did not claim to have won a major international award. Instead, he asserted that he met four of the ten regulatory criteria: judging the work of peers (criterion four); making original contributions of major significance to his field (criterion five); leadership in distinguished industry organizations (criterion eight); and enjoying a high salary relative to his peers (criterion nine). A USCIS adjudicator denied Amin’s application, finding that he only satisfied criterion four. Amin did not appeal the decision to higher agency authority. Instead, he challenged the denial in federal district court. After Amin filed this lawsuit, USCIS’s field office agreed to reconsider his application. Upon second review, the agency adjudicator again denied Amin’s application. This time, the adjudicator found that he met three criteria: judging the work of others, holding leadership roles, and commanding a relatively high salary, but still concluded Amin did not show original contributions of major significance. The adjudicator acknowledged that Amin played an “important role” for his employers but found that he failed to show a significant impact on the field of chemical engineering as a whole. Still, because Amin satisfied three regulatory criteria, the adjudicator then considered whether the record established his sustained acclaim and status at the top of his field. The adjudicator concluded that he did not. Again, the agency credited Amin’s contribution to his employers but found evidence of his impact on the field lacking. Amin then amended his federal complaint, and the litigation continued. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary


The decedent was born in Ireland in 1880 and came to the United States in 1907 landing in 'San Francisco, California, where he resided until 1912 when he went to the Republic of Chile where he worked as a miner. He resided in Chile until 1951 during which period he was always a British subject and had received authorization to reside permanently in Chile from the British Consul. In 1951 he applied for and received from the United States Consul in Santiago, Chile, a passport authorizing him to come to the United States on a quota immigration <mask> for the purpose of attending the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, He entered the United States at Houston, Texas, on April 28, 1951 and on May 4, 1951 he registered at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. He left the clinic in December, 1951 and went to Tucson, Arizona and from there to Truth or *916Consequences, New Mexico. He again entered the Mayo Clinic on August 25, 1952 and gave his address as Truth or Consequences in New Mexico. In September, 1952. he rented an apartment in Truth or Consequences where he resided until his death on December 7, 1959 and was buried there.


When the matter appeared on the calendar of this court it fixed a date for a hearing to be held regarding the personal claim of the accounting party and said hearing was held on August 8,1966. The decision of the court was made on September 1, 1966 allowing the claim in the sum of $6,500. Prior to that time no representative had appeared on behalf of the Soviet resident and no notice of appearance or authorization was filed on his behalf until February 1, 1967 when the aforementioned New York law firm filed an appearance for the Deputy Chief of the Consular Division of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Washington, D. C., the latter acting on behalf of the Soviet national. Thereafter the court was informed that the attorneys for the estate were exploring with the attorneys for the Russian Consulate a method for paying over his share to the residuary beneficiary. The court was advised that the beneficiary had contacted his *42own attorneys in Moscow and was attempting to obtain a <mask> for him to travel to Vienna for the purpose of receiving payment of his share.


Plaintiff states she arrived in the United States from Bulgaria on a visitor’s <mask> in July of 1990. After arrival, she filed an application for asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which is still pending. Plaintiff has had a work authorization issued by the INS since the fall of 1990, and has been employed for approximately six of the last seven years. Allegedly as the result of the violence of a roommate, plaintiff went to the Rockland Family Shelter in the fall of 1997. Plaintiff states that she became homeless in March 1998 and either voluntarily went to the Rockland County Emergency Shelter, or was placed there by the Rockland County Department of Social Services (RCDSS), on March 10, 1998. She was moved to a motel in May of 1998. On May 9, 1998 the RCDSS notified plaintiff it was discontinuing all assistance. A fair hearing was held June 4, 1998, and the May 9, 1998 decision was affirmed on June 25, 1998. Following the June 25, 1998 decision, the complaint was allegedly amended to include a challenge to that decision under CPLR article 78.


*222This type of conduct poses serious economic problems for our citizenry. "Employment of illegal aliens in times of high unemployment deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.” (De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351, 356-357.) Additionally, the court cannot give credence to plaintiff’s claim of ignorance. As stated in Londono v Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (433d 635, 636): "The petitioner was warned in his application for a visitor’s <mask> that gainful employment in the United States would constitute a violation of visa conditions, and he agreed, in making that application, to abide by all the terms of his admission.”