The first obstacle is section 1301 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USC § 1301) which provides a stay in any action to collect a consumer debt from the bankrupt’s codebtor. Consumer debt is defined in 11 USC § 101 (7) as a “debt incurred by an *603individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose” (see, CPLR 105 [f]; and General Obligations Law § 5-327, for similar definitions of <mask> transaction and consumer contract). This definition, however, does not cover a lease which conveys an interest in real property and for which the Bankruptcy Act specially provides in 11 USC § 365.


There is a case from the Court of Appeals of Michigan which, although factually very different from the case at bar, *539concludes that where a <mask> transaction was never "consummated” under Michigan law, the three-day right to rescind under TILA never began to run, and the consumer’s rescission rights were effective even against an assignee who was a holder in due course (Thomas v Leja, 187 Mich App 418, 468 NW2d 58 [1991]). In that case, the consumer had executed a promissory note along with a mortgage on residential property, and then canceled orally, rather than in writing, as required by TILA. The mortgage company seemingly honored the cancellation, never distributed the funds, and circulated an internal company memorandum indicating that the transaction had been canceled. However, it recorded the mortgage and assigned the note and mortgage to a holder in due course. Michigan’s Court of Appeals held that since the funds were never distributed to the consumer, he cannot be said to have been contractually obligated as a result of a credit transaction, and under Michigan law, a consummation never occurred. The court concluded that the consumer’s right to rescind the transaction, under TILA and Regulation Z remained effective, since the three-day period never began to run (supra, 187 Mich App, at 422-423, 468 NW2d, at 60-61). Thomas, therefore, allowed implementation of the right of a rescission even without the closing.


Although the court has found no authority that assignment of the right to health insurance benefits in exchange for medical services is a secured transaction within the scope of UCC article 9, that right could be construed as collateral for the services rendered. The law does recognize circumstances where medical services may be <mask> transactions, which may be secured by an interest in insurance benefits. (State of New York v Monteleone, 138 AD2d 821, 822 [3d Dept 1988]; Neurological Servs. v Allstate Ins. Co., 181 Misc 2d 98 [Civ Ct, Bronx County].) An assignment intended to grant a security interest in insurance benefits thus may constitute a secured transaction governed by UCC article 9. (See, UCC 9-102; Wonsey v Life Ins. Co., 32 F Supp 2d, supra, at 941, n 4.)


“License to do business. Where the plaintiffs cause of action against a consumer arises from the plaintiffs conduct of a business which is required by state or local law to be licensed by the department of consumer affairs of the city of New York . . . the complaint shall allege, as part of the cause of action, that plaintiff is duly licensed and shall contain the name and number, if any, of such license and the governmental agency which issued such license; provided, however, that where the plaintiff does not have a license at the commencement of the action the plaintiff may, subject to the provisions of rule thirty hundred twenty-five of this article, amend the complaint with the name and number of an after-acquired license and the name of the governmental agency which issued such license or move for leave to amend the complaint in accordance with such provisions. The failure of the plaintiff to comply with this subdivision will permit the defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of rule thirty-two hundred eleven of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) While CPLR 3015 (e) does not define “consumer,” it is noted that CPLR 105 (f) provides that “[t]he term ‘<mask> transaction’ means a transaction wherein credit is extended to an individual and the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” Thus, a “consumer credit transaction” is *233a transaction that involves a purchase or loan for “personal, family or household purposes” (Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3015:6, citing Matter of Migdal Plumbing & Heating Corp. (Dakar Devs.), 232 AD2d 62, 65-66 [1st Dept 1997] [noting that while the term “consumer” is undefined in the statute, it “may reasonably be construed to apply to a person, family or household”]; Bayonne Block Co. v Porco, 171 Misc 2d 684 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 1996] [declining to permit another contractor to invoke CPLR 3015 (e)]). The contract herein is not between a debt collection agency and a consumer as that term is contemplated under CPLR 3015 (e). It is between the debt collection agency and a merchant. Therefore, as the agreement at issue does not constitute a consumer credit transaction, dismissal based on CPLR 3015 (e) is unwarranted.


Plaintiff argues that the said subdivision (a) of section 1635 and the recovery rights provided by subdivision (b) of section 1635 are applicable to this transaction. Defendants’ contention is that the “ more than four installments ” rule (Regulation Z) duly promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 12, § 226.2, subd. [k]) brings this transaction without the act. Subdivision (a) of section 1635 provides, in pertinent part: “ in the case of any <mask> transaction in which a security interest is retained or acquired in any real property which is used or is *110expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section # * * whichever is later,- by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board, of his intention to do so.”


In opposition, plaintiff does not dispute that a bilingual summons was not served. Contrariwise, plaintiff asserts that no credit of any kind was ever afforded to defendant’s deceased.; that subject medical services were rendered on a cash basis only; that it was anticipated that full payment of the bill would be *217made upon the completion of services; and that the medical services were normally rendered and not in connection with any <mask> transaction.


In First Nat. City Bank v Drake (N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 1973, p 17, col 6) the plaintiff bank sued in New York City Civil Court for the balance of a note and the defendant cross-moved to interpose a counterclaim for statutory civil TIL penalties. Although it was held that the causes of action in the counterclaim were time-barred by the TIL Statute of Limitations, the interposed counterclaim was permitted under CPLR 203 (subd [c]) as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim. The same result was found in a New Mexico case, Collectors v Atrisco Assn. (4 CCH <mask> Guide, par 98779 [N.M. Dist. Ct., Jan. 31, 1974] and under an Illinois statute in Wood Acceptance Co. v King (18 Ill App 3d 149). A contrary result was arrived at in a Georgia case (Hodges v Community Loan and Inv. Corp., 133 Ga App 336) apparently because no set-off statute similar to CPLR 203 (subd [c]) was there in effect.


While the house itself may not be strictly exempt from execution pursuant to section 137-a of the Social Services Law which applies only to “ wages, salary, commissions or other compensation paid or payable by an employer to a person while he is in receipt of public assistance,” it is nonetheless true that the *488sought-after home here is not merely a peripheral asset, but is a basic necessity integrally related to the meeting of daily needs of this family of six. Therefore, while the Holmes ’ equity in the property is not the equivalent of the current basic shelter grant and is not exempt from execution under section 137 of the Social Services Law (see <mask> Corp. v. Lewis, 63 Misc 2d 928; 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 334), the home nonetheless represents a current vital resource presently enjoyed by virtue of prior public assistance grants, the loss of which might fairly be described as catastrophic to the family welfare. In principle then, under these circumstances, an equitable priority exists in the continued use of the property to house the needy family.


According to the complaint, the plaintiff is a national bank currently engaged in the banking business in Nassau, Queens, Kings and New York Counties through 55 branch offices, 45 of which are situate in Nassau County. Since 1949, it has carried on business under the trade-mark or trade name ‘ ‘ Meadow Brook”. Its services and facilities include savings and checking accounts; commercial and industrial loans; <mask> loans; mortgage loans; foreign banking services and trust and estate services. The plaintiff also alleges that many of its services and facilities are closely connected with the securities market, i.e., it buys and sells securities in its capacity as an executor and trustee; it maintains a security clearance department for handling the receipt and delivery of securities for *113various securities brokers; it performs services as a transfer agent and registrar for the common stock of numerous publicly held corporations; it bids on municipal bond issues on its own account and for the account of others. In addition, Meadow Brook National Bank stock is now issued and sold to the public and is actively traded on the over-the-counter market.


We also reject the conclusory argument in defendants' briefing that a real estate transaction simply cannot be considered to be a "consumer" transaction. The defendants contend, in essence, that a "real estate transaction" is an "economic transaction for a fixed and permanent asset," and usually involves "relative complexity" and a "mountain of paperwork, only some of it related to the actual funding of the transaction." According to the defendants, these facts somehow mean that such a transaction cannot be considered to be a "consumer transaction." As we have explained, however, the Legislature provided a specific definition of a "<mask> transaction," and that definition is sufficiently broad to include transactions that involve real property; there is no indication in the text of the provision that it is intended to exclude transactions that involve real property or the use of real property as security for the debt, nor is there any indication that the statute excludes transactions that are complex or involve "a mountain of paperwork."


The FCRPA defines the term "debt" in a manner similar to the way in which the Rosenthal Act defines a "<mask> transaction." "[D]ebt" under the FCRPA "means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes , whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a, subd. (5), italics added.)


On May 27, 2014, Lang filed a complaint against Watkins on behalf of Cavalry. The complaint alleged breach of contract and common counts and sought damages in the amount of $1,603.22, plus attorney fees according to proof. It did not seek interest on the alleged damages. In response, Watkins filed a cross-complaint, and later a first amended cross-complaint, alleging that Cavalry and CPS violated the Rosenthal Act, the <mask> Reporting Act (CCRA; § 1785.25, subd. (a)), and the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act (FDBPA; § 1788.50 et seq.)3 by, among other things, "falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the alleged debt," "failing to verify that the amount demanded was accurate," and "failing to provide an accurate accounting of the alleged debt."


“notice: ANY HOLDER OF THIS <mask> CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF” Further, as a matter of policy, plaintiff should not be permitted to recover on an obligation upon which the unlicensed contractor cannot recover. It would make little sense to preclude an unlicensed contractor from recovering but permit his assignee to recover. This would allow wholesale evasions of the licensing law. If the public is to be protected from unlicensed contractors, this protection must extend to those who acquire obligations from unlicensed contractors. That plaintiff has paid the unlicensed contractor in this case is immaterial. Plaintiff had the opportunity to make a simple inquiry in order to determine whether the contractor was licensed. Having failed to do so, any loss which plaintiff may sustain is a result of its own carelessness in failing to make this inquiry. Moreover, in this particular case, plaintiff is not a party who just happened to purchase this one obligation. As already noted, the printed form used by the unlicensed contractor indicates that it was contemplated that plaintiff would be the assignee of the contract. Thus, plaintiff here should have been particularly careful to assure itself that the contractor with whom it was doing business and from whom it was purchasing home improvement obligations was licensed (cf. Star Credit Corp. v Molina, 59 Misc 2d 290, 293-294).