She further testified that Dler took Mohammed and Rawez to stay with his family and left her at her family’s home with Bayar and Yar and told her, “you take care of these two.” Bari testified that after a month in Iraq, she ran out of medicine for Yar and was unable to get it in Iraq. She contacted the U.S. Consulate to get an expedited <mask> and returned to the United States to get Yar the medicine he needed. When describing Bari’s return to the United States, Dler stated that he had taken her to Iraq for a family reunion but that she “escaped” and went back to the United States with the two youngest children. Dler returned to Nebraska with the two oldest children a short time later. There was evidence of a third domestic altercation that occurred in May 2019 in which Dler claimed Bari stabbed him four times with a kitchen knife. Dler testified that Bari told him she was moving out and she was taking the children with her. Dler refused to let her take the children, an argument ensued, and Bari attacked him with a knife. He stated that Rawez called the police. Rawez testified that on the day of the incident, he heard his father scream and he ran outside, where he observed his parents struggling in the grass outside of their apartment. He testified that he saw his mother with a knife in her hand and his father was holding onto his mother’s hand, trying to get the knife out of her hand. He did not see his father actually get stabbed. Rawez called 911 and Bari was arrested and Dler was taken to the hospital. Bari’s account of the stabbing was much different that Dler’s or Rawez’ account. Bari testified that the parties were living separately at the time and she had taken Bayar and Yar to


world class athletes, and renowned artists and musicians to live and work in the United States. Recipients include Beatles frontman John Lennon, whose application for classification as an “outstanding person in the arts or sciences” was supported by letters from prominent artists including Andy Warhol. Leon Wildes, John Lennon vs. The USA: The Inside Story of the Most Bitterly Contested and Influential Deportation Case in United States History 69-77 (2016). This case involves Bhaveshkumar Amin’s attempt to obtain the modern version of this preference: an extraordinary ability <mask>. Amin, a Canadian citizen, is a talented chemical engineer who has made valuable contributions to oil and gas projects. But given the lofty bar for extraordinary ability classifications, we cannot say that the agency acted arbitrarily when it determined that Amin was not “extraordinary” but merely very good. I A The current preference for highly talented immigrants was enacted in 1990, when Congress created a pathway to citizenship for noncitizens with “extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A). This visa, colloquially dubbed the “Einstein” or “genius” visa, is available to those whose extraordinary ability “has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation.” Id. Although only a few thousand extraordinary ability visas are awarded each year, they are highly sought after. See Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker Number of Petitions and Approval Status for All Countries by Fiscal Year Received and Approval Status, U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/I140_by_class_


(1) Reservation record Hotel Shelburne, 9-27-29, “ Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger ” (Exhibit BB). (2) Shelburne Hotel to Dillon, acknowledging reservation for “ Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger ” (Exhibit CC). (3) Letter 8-26-29, Shelburne Hotel to Dillon, referring to Mrs. Erlanger (Exhibit DD). (4) Photostatic copy registration at the Arizona-Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, Ariz. (Exhibit T-12), “ Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger.” (5) Letters between Knickerbocker Tours and Meyer Keen in reference to the arrangements for the European trip in 1928, in which Mrs. Erlanger is mentioned, date April or May, 1928 (Contestant’s Exhibits,, G-4, K-4, L-4, M-4, N-4, 0-4, P-4, R-4, S-4). (6) Knickerbocker Tours suggestion of route for Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit *198P-9). (7) Further correspondence with the Knickerbocker Tours in which the names are used (Contestant’s Exhibits R-9, S-9, T-9). (8) Berengaria passenger list westbound commencing February 27, 1929, on which the parties returned from France, reading, “ Mr. and A. L. Erlanger and manservant, Mrs. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit Z-4). (9) Ticket steamship Columbus, sailing May 11, 1928, North German Lloyd, ticket made out to Mr. Abraham L. Erlanger and Mrs. Charlotte Lesley (Contestant’s Exhibit V-3). (10) Return trip ticket on the steamship Roma, sailing February 22,1929, “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger and valet ” (Contestant’s Exhibit J-4); they did not return on the Roma, but came back on the Berengaria. (11) Letter North German Lloyd Company to Goodman Open Road Travel Service, dated 5-15-28, referring to Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger and their trip (Contestant’s Exhibit X-3). (12) Passenger berthing list, steamship Olympic, sailing September 12, 1928, showing the names Mr. A. L. Erlanger and Mrs. C. Lesley (Contestant’s Exhibit D-4). (13) Original and copy of ticket steamship Augustus, sailing June 3, 1929, in the names of Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger and Gaetano Tommaselli (Contestant’s Exhibit H-4). (14) The sailing sheet of the steamship Augustus, 1-3-29 (Exhibit U-4) bearing the names Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger (passenger list of steamship Augustus (Exhibit 41] does not bear their names). (15) The purser’s list of passengers Berengaria, leaving Cherbourg 2-27-29, bearing the names Abraham L. Erlanger and manservant and Mrs. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit A-5). (16) Ticket issued by the Cunard Line for Cherbourg, sailing 2-27-29, to Mr. Abraham L. Erlanger, Mrs. Abraham L. Erlanger and valet (Contestant’s Exhibit B-5). (17) Paris Herald, 9-9-28 (Contestant’s Exhibit H-3), with an announcement in the columns headed “ News of Americans in Europe,” the item “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger of New York are at the Hotel George V, Paris.” (18) Paris Herald, dated 2-12-29, under the heading “ At Monte Carlo,” the news item “ Another American staying at the Hotel d’Paris is Mr. A. L. Erlanger, theatrical owner and manager, accompanied by Mrs. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit M-2). (19) Paris Herald, 2-23-29, under the heading “ News of Americans in Europe,” the item “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger of New York, who have been at Lyons for a short sojourn, have returned to Hotel George V ” (Contestant’s Exhibit K-2). (20) Paris Herald, 2-27-29, containing an item under the same heading “ Mr. Abraham L. Erlanger, New York theatrical manager, and Mrs. Erlanger, are returning to the States by the Berengaria, sailing today from Cherbourg (Contestant’s Exhibit 1-2). (21) Certified copy of New York Herald Tribune, 5-11-28, in the list of passengers sailing *199that day, printed in the column entitled “ Paris, Majestic and Columbus sailing today,” appear under the paragraph referring to the Columbus the names “A. L. Erlanger, theatrical producer, Mrs. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit P-15). (22) Photostatic copy, New York Times, 5-11-28, in the column giving the names of some of the persons departing on different vessels has under the headline “ Aboard the Columbus ” the names Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit R-12). (23) A contract for purchase of a Packard car made with Park Avenue Packard, Inc., in the name of A. L. Erlanger and signed at the bottom with the name in ink, “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger,” with pencil notation “ Address all communications to J. J. Dillon, c fo A. L. Erlanger, 214 West 42nd Street, residence address, 175 Riverside Drive,” the purchase price being $3,480 and the date 5-11-29 (Contestant’s Exhibit M-l). (24) A supplement to contract with the same company with the name A. L. Erlanger, underneath it in typewriting “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger,” dated 10-1-29 (Contestant’s Exhibit K-l). (25) A bill of the Park Avenue Packard, Inc., covering the car mentioned in the first contract (Exhibit M-l), said bill being made out to Mr. A. L. Erlanger, 214 West Forty-second street, New York city, total bill covering the price $3,480 and extras, being $4,229.75, and showing a deposit of $1,000 paid, leaving a net of $3,229.75; bill has in pencil “ O. K. Dillon ” and also “ O. K. J. J. Revett,” Erlanger’s chauffeur; the receipt of payment is indicated on this bill (Contestant’s Exhibit U-l). (26) Check A. L. Erlanger, dated 6-12-29, to the order of Park Avenue Packard, Inc., for $3,229.75, the balance shown upon said bill (Exhibit V-l). (27) Check A. L. Erlanger, 6-11, to the order of J. J. Dillon for $1,000 to cover deposit made by him on said car (Contestant’s Exhibit V-l). (28) Check A. L. Erlanger special, signed by Baron and Pratt to the Park Avenue Packard, Inc. (Contestant’s Exhibit W-l). (29) Similar check drawn A. L. Erlanger special account, by Baron and Pratt, to the Electric Service Engineering Corp., $10.22 (Contestant’s Exhibit P-1). (30) Bill of the Electric Engineering Service stamped “ O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.,” which bill is for electric service covering the period from 11-11-29 to 12-11-29, paid 12-16-29; this bill is made to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 176 Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit R-l). (31) Bill, Park Avenue Packard, Inc., for $18 for Packard emblem and license plates frames, receipted by the company, bearing “ O. K. Pratt ” and “ O. K., Dillon;” the bill is dated 10-26-29, and made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive; bill also has the stamp of the financial department on it (Contestant’s Exhibit L-l). (32) Park Avenue Packard, Inc., bill for supplies to the Packard car made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside *200drive (Contestant’s Exhibit X-l). (33) Contract with the Park Avenue Packard, Inc., 7-1-29, by A. L. Erlanger, signed at the bottom “ Charlotte Erlanger, business address 214-West Forty-second street; residence address, 175 Riverside drive ” (Contestant’s Exhibit B-2), (34) Check drawn to the order of the Park Avenue Packard, Inc., dated 10-21-29, amount $3,840, signed by Charlotte Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit C-2). (35) Bill, Taylor Trunk Works, made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, New Amsterdam Theatre Building, dated 4-13-28, for $139.50, with the “ O. K., Dillon ” and “ O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.,” which bill is marked “ Paid,” a check drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account by L. E. Bergman (his general manager and nephew) for the amount of said bill, check being dated 4~3~28 (Exhibit P-12). (36) Letter Stearn Company, Cigar Importers, dated 8-7-29, to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, thanking her for order of cigars for the account of Mr. Erlanger; the envelope with the letter is addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, postmarked 8-7-29. The bill for cigars stamped paid, has upon its face “ O. K., Mrs. Erlanger; O. K., Dillon; O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.” (Contestant’s Exhibit T-10). (37) Electric Service Engineering Corp. bill, 8-13 to 10-11-28, for electric service, stamped paid; bill is addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, and stamped “ O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.” (Contestant’s Exhibit S-l). (38) Bill marked paid of Laffay Motor Coach Corporation for repairs to a Flint coupe, said bill being made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, bearing the indorsement “ Airs. E., O. K.; O. K., Dillon; O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.” (Contestant’s Exhibit B-6). (39) Bill, Laffay Motor Coach Corporation repairs a Packard touring car, stamped paid, made out to Mr-. A. L. Erlanger, with indorsement “ O. K., Mrs. E.; O. K., Dillon; O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.; O.K., F. Revett” (Contestant’s Exhibit W-6). (40) Check 10-4-29, to the order of the Laffay Motor Coach Corporation drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account and signed by Baron and Pratt (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-6). (41) Bill stamped paid, of Warnock, Inc., makers of uniforms, made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 25 Broadview, New Rochelle, New York (summer home of contestant and decedent, summer of 1929), for uniform for chauffeur bearing the “ O. K., Dillon and O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.,” on its face (Contestant’s Exhibit 0-6). (42) Check 8-10-29, drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account by Baron and Pratt, and made out to the order of the Warnock, Inc. (Contestant’s Exhibit 0-6). (43) Check paid to Courtney, village clerk, Garden City, $353.60, 7-6-28, and drawn upon the A. L. Erlanger special account by his nephew and general manager, L. E. Bergman (Contestant’s Exhibit P-13), the check being paid for taxes of the *201Garden City property, deeded to her by him, 9-26-27. (44) Three bills for taxes on the Garden City and Lawrence property are marked as contestant’s Exhibit Q-13 and the Erlanger check which paid these bills was marked contestant’s Exhibit S-13, this check being a personal check drawn by A. L. Erlanger himself, dated 1-3-29 (p. 5749). (45) Contestant’s Exhibit R-13 is a memorandum showing how the one check was distributed on the several bills. (46) The investment ledger sheet (Contestant’s Exhibit T-13) showed how these items were carried on the books of account. Pratt said that these bills were paid under a direct order from Erlanger. (47) Bills for taxes for 1928 (Contestant’s Exhibit TJ-13) were paid for by check marked Exhibit V-13, drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account by L. E. Bergman, his nephew and general manager. (48) Taxes for 1929 on the Garden City property (Contestant’s Exhibit X-13) and paid for by check dated 8-6-28 (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-13), drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account by L. E. Bergman, his general manager and nephew. (49) The mortgage interest on the Garden City property was paid by Erlanger, Baron’s check for the same (Contestant’s Exhibit A-14); the bill for this interest on the Garden City property dated 1-3-28, was made out in the name of Charlotte Fixel, has stamped on the back “ O. K., M. Pratt, Jr., personal account, A. L. E.; ordered by S. B.;” Baron was reimbursed by check of 1-18-28 for $300, drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account by A. L. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit B-14). (50) A bill of the Liberty Music Shop in the name of A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, and envelope with the same address on it, sent by that firm (Contestant’s Exhibit N-l); the face of this bill bears the following indorsement: “ O. K., Dillon; O. K., Mrs. E.; O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.;” and two stamps of the financial department; postmarked and addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive; this bill was for services rendered in December, 1928 (1069). (51) Contestant’s Exhibit N-4 is a batch of copies of thirteen letters addressed to managers of Italian hotels in Rapallo, Messina, Siracusa, Genoa, Venice, Rome, Taormina, Nice, Milan, Florence, Palermo, Naples, St. Remo, introducing Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Lincoln Erlanger and requesting that everything possible be done to insure Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger’s having an entirely comfortable and enjoyable sojourn at their hotel. (52) Bill for taxes of 1928 on the Garden City property under the name Mrs. Charlotte Fixel, c ¡o Abraham Erlanger, 214 West Forty-second street, with notation indicating the payment by check signed L. E. Bergman (Contestant’s Exhibit 0-13). (53) Bill, Liberty Music Shop, 12-17-29, made out to Mrs. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, for radio supplies; it has on its face: “ O. K,, Mrs. E.; 0. K., *202Ditton; O. K., M. Pratt, Jr.” (Contestant’s Exhibit B-6); was paid by a check drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account by Baron and Pratt. (54) Bill, Liberty Music Shop, radio supplies, 11-1-28, stamped paid, bearing upon its face, “ O. K. Dillon, and O. K. Pratt,” with two stamps of the financial department on it; this bill is .made out to “ Mr. A. L. Erlanger,” paid for by check on his personal account, drawn by L. E. Bergman (Contestant’s Exhibit). (55) Bill, Liberty Music Shop, made out to Mr. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, indorsed, “ O. K. Dillon ” and stamped with a stamp of the financial department; paid for by check drawn on A. L. Erlanger personal account, by L. E. Bergman (Contestant’s Exhibit E-6). (56) Bill dated 7-29-29, made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, from Dr. Phillip M. Grausman, for professional services, together with (Contestant’s Exhibit XX) a stamped envelope postmarked addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside Drive, and readdressed to 25 Broadview Avenue, New Rochelle. (57) Receipted bill dated 7-31-29, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit WW), together with stamped envelope postmarked and addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive; this bill was for services rendered in 12-28 (1069). (58) Copies of letters written by Knickerbocker Toms to thirty-five hotels in different places in Europe, referring to Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Lincoln Erlanger, and the accommodations to be furnished to them (Contestant’s Exhibit V-9). (59) Letter from the general manager of the Excelsior Hotel, Naples, 12-9-28, to Knickerbocker Toms, Paris, in regard to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit W-9). (60) Contestant’s Exhibit X-9 consists of carbon copies of various letters and three telegrams; one is addressed to Erlanger by Knickerbocker Toms, concerning the itinerary of the Emopean trip; the second is addressed to Abraham Lincoln Erlanger and concludes with: “ With kind regards also to Mrs. Erlanger;” a third from Knickerbocker Toms to Erlanger at Hotel Excelsior, Naples, welcomes him and “ Mrs. Erlanger ” on Emopean soil again; and the next is addressed to Erlanger in New York and refers to “ Mrs. Erlanger;” the next is addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger from Knickerbocker Toms; the next is addressed to Mrs. Erlanger from Knickerbocker Toms; the next is addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Villa Igiea, Grand Hotel, Palermo; the next is a telegram addressed to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Ber eng aria, Cherbourg, by Gockinga, of Knickerbocker Toms; the next is addressed to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Excelsior, Naples; the two fmther telegrams are addressed to Erlanger, Hotel Miramare, Genoa, and to Erlanger, Hotel Excelsior, Naples, by Gockinga. (61) Registration record of the Hotel Villa *203Igiea, Palermo, showing arrival of “ Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger ” of New York and 'Dr. Gustave Paul, arriving there on 1-21-29 (Contestant’s Exhibit D-10). (62) Receipted bills for their stay at the hotel, issued to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit C-10). (63) Letter Dr. J. C. Marshall, 6-22-28, to Mr. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Esplanade, Marienbad, with the opening line, “ My deal Pal, and his dear wife, Charlotte,” and closing with “ With much love to Charlotte and yourself,” etc. (Contestant’s Exhibit H). (64). Letter of Dr. J. C. Marshall, 1-27-30, addressed to “ My dear Pal and Mrs. Pal,” and closing with “ With much love to you both, I am as ever Your Pal ” (Contestant’s Exhibit F). (65) Letter of Dr. J. C. Marshall, 12-1-27, addressed to “ My dear pal and his Blue Angel ” (Contestant’s Exhibit K). (66) Envelope of postmarked letter of Dr. J. C. Marshall, from Atlantic City, addressed “ Mrs. Charlotte Erlanger, Ambassador Hotel,” 10- 24r-27 (Contestant’s Exhibit M). (67) Card from Dr. J. C. Marshall, 11-22-28, in a postmarked envelope, addressed “Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York,” postmarked 11- 23-28 (Contestant’s Exhibit N). (68) Letter of Dr. Marshall, 10-22-27, “ My dear Mrs. Erlanger,” sent from Atlantic City in stamped envelope to “ Mrs. Charlotte Erlanger, Ambassador Hotel, New York ” (Contestant’s Exhibit P). (69) Letter, 12-10-29, addressed to “ My dear Charlotte,” together with postmarked envelope addressed to “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York ” (Contestant’s Exhibit O). (70) Letter of Dr. J. C. Marshall, 9-23-29, mailed from Atlantic City, “ Mrs. C. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city” (Contestant’s Exhibit Q). (71) Letter from Dr. Marshall, 11-29-29, envelope addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, postmarked 11-30-29 (Contestant’s Exhibit R). (72) Telegram, 1-2-30, A. E. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, “ just to wish you a happy New Year and a delightful trip through the West with your good wife, and I will be so glad to see you when you return East again; with much love, I remain, Your Pal” (Dr. Marshall) (Contestant’s Exhibit T). (73) Christmas card, 12-18-28, J. Chandler Marshall, with envelope postmarked Atlantic City, 12-18-28, addressed to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city (Contestant’s Exhibit S). (74) Card addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger by Mr. Al. Woods, in 9-28, to announce himself at the Hotel George V when calling upon them (Contestant’s Exhibit G-3). (75) Telegram from Joe Toplitsky, 3-7-30, addressed to Mrs. Charlotte Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, “ Received sad news this morning, and I can appreciate your feelings as measured by mine; I believe you and I had a deeper appreciation and a better realization of the wonderful *204man he was than anyone else in the world; I exceedingly regret being unable to be there at this time, but am detained here for at least ten days by an engagement that cannot be broken or postponed. However, I hope to see you in about two weeks. In the meantime please realize that my thoughts are with you in sincere sympathy. Your realization of your wonderful devotion should be a source of comfort to you now. Joe Toplitsky, Los Angeles, California ” (Contestant’s Exhibit T-4). (76) Entering card, French Hospital, of A. L. Erlanger; “ History of Patient, French Hospital, 2-11-80, of A. L. Erlanger,” with the printed word “ single ” and “ widowed ” stricken out and a check marked over the word “ married,” with the entry “ Nearest relative or friend,” the name “ J. Dillon ” (Contestant’s Exhibit YY). (See testimony of Augustine Mathieu, pp. 1089-1091, as to how these records were made.) (77) Transcript of a record kept in the regular course of conduct of French Hospital with the name of A. L. Erlanger and the letters S. W. crossed out and M. standing (Contestant’s Exhibit ZZ). (78) Bound book of “ Patients admitted ” shows the entries for 2-11 of A. L. Erlanger, age 60, civil condition, M; occupation, theatrical; birthplace, IT. S.; time in U. S., 60; time in New York, 40 (Contestant’s Exhibit A-l). (79) Letter, Knickerbocker Tours, New York, to Meyer Keen, 12-17-28, referring to the Erlanger tour and to Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit M-4). (80) Letter, Open Road Travel Service, Inc., to N. G. I. Line, inclosing check for $5,768.67 and a direction to “ Kindly issue tickets account Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, who are sailing on the steamship Augustus, 1-3,” this letter is dated 11-7-28 (Contestant’s Exhibit G-4). (81) Receipt of North German Lloyd, dated 2-20-29, made out to the Open Road Travel Service, Inc., acknowledging remittance of a $1,000 as deposit and referring to Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger and valet (Contestant’s Exhibit R-4). (82) Letters from the Knickerbocker Tours to Meyer Keen, suggested automobile trip in Europe, dated 11-1-28, the title of the letter is “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger;” the itinerary is headed “ Suggested automobile trip of Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit L-4). (83) Letter from the Italian-American Shipping Corporation to the Open Road Travel Service, Inc., with the heading “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger and valet, Suite G and No. 75, steamship Augustus, 1-8-29” (Contestant’s Exhibit P-4). (84) Two cablegrams to Dr. Gustave Paul, Vienna, sending holiday greetings, both dated 12-25-28, one from A. L. E. and the other from Charlotte (Contestant’s Exhibits N-7 and 0-7). (85) Letter of Dr. Gustave Paul to Erlanger, acknowledging receipt of a fee, and saying, “ With heartiest greetings to you and your charming wife.” Letter dated 8-5-28, in Vienna, and delivered personally in an *205envelope addressed “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit D-12). (86) Letter of Dr. Gustave Paul addressed to “ My dear friends, My dear Charlotte, My dear A. L. E.,” and beginning with this sentence, “ Since my last letters addressed to you both and since your redeeming word, ‘ Mezpah ’ quoted from you, my dear Charlotte, again, months have passed without any news from you;” dated 12-8-29, signed “ Dr. Paul ” (Contestant’s Exhibit H-12). (87) Envelope from Dr. Paul, postmarked and addressed to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York (Contestant’s Exhibit K-12), envelope of letter from Dr. Paul addressed Mister and Missus A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city, TJ. S. A. (Contestant’s Exhibit G-12). (88) Application for <mask>, made 4-6-28, by A. L. Erlanger, in which the checking is in the space next to the word “ Married ” and no checks beside the words “ Single, widowed or divorced ” (Contestant’s Exhibit N-10). (89) Signature card, Corn Exchange Bank and Trust Company, dated 4 — 1929, with the name Lesley, Charlotte, Miss, printed above, with the signature, Charlotte Lesley, contained thereon, and then added below, “ Charlotte Lesley ” in other handwriting, “ c /o Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E (Contestant’s Exhibit X-14). (90) Signature card dated 9-20-29, by which the former account was changed into a new one; has in print at the top line “ Erlanger, Charlotte,” down below the signature “ Charlotte Erlanger, Charlotte Lesley ” (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-14). (91) Signature card, Central Savings Bank with the signature Charlotte Lesley, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, dated 3-21-29; opposite the words “ Name of wife or husband ” appears A. L. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit TJ-14). (92) Ticket on steamship Columbus, sailing 5-11-28, made out in the name of Mr. Abraham L. Erlanger, Mrs. Charlotte Lesley, suite 143-145 (Contestant’s Exhibit V-3). (93) Return ticket steamship Olympic, sailing Cherbourg 9-12-28, suite 40-42-44, in the names of Mr. Abraham L. Erlanger, age 64; Mrs. Charlotte Lesley, age 43 (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-3). (94) New York Times, 5-11-28, news article, lists among those sailing on the Columbus “ Mrs. C. Lesley,” the same list has the names “ Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit R-12). (95) Envelope from Dillon addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, c ¡o Knickerbocker Tours, Paris, forwarded to her at Hotel Bristol in Vienna, postmarked 7-28, containing a letter addressed “ My dear Charlotte,” with references to Mr. Erlanger and Mrs. Erlanger and her devotion to him (Contestant’s Exhibit W-8). (96) Letter dated 8-16-28, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, c /o Knickerbocker Tours, Paris, forwarded to Hotel Bristol, Vienna, beginning: “ Hello, Mama,” referring to *206Mrs. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit X-8). (97) Letter from Dillon in envelope addressed in typewriting, “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, c/o Brown’s International Travel Office, Naples, Italy,” dated 1-29-29; the letter opens: “ My dear Charlotte,” referred to “ Mr. Erlanger and Charlotte Darling,” closing with “ God bless you both;” signed “ Your Jack Rabbit ” (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-8). (98) Letter 2-14-29, Dillon to contestant, with the opening “ My dear Mama,” referring to theatres and theatrical personages (Contestant’s Exhibit Z-8). (99) Envelope addressed in typewriting, Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, c/o Brown’s International Travel Office, Naples, Italy, postmarked 1-31-29, containing a letter from Dillon to contestant, opening: “ Hello, Mama,” referring to Mr. Erlanger and to “ You and Mr. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit A-9). (100) Envelope 2-18-29, sent to Paris, to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger and readdressed from the George V Hotel to 175 Riverside drive, containing letter from Dillon to her, opening with the lines: “ Oh, Mama,” referring to Mr. E., and closing “ God bless you both, and always your Jack Rabbit ” (Contestant’s Exhibit B-9). (101) Envelope addressed Mrs. A. L. Erlanger Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, Cal., readdressed Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, Ariz., containing letter from Dillon to contestant, opening with “ Charlotte, Dear,” dated Tuesday, 1-14--80, referring to Mr. Erlanger and closing “ with all my love, always your Jack” (Contestant’s Exhibit C-9). (102) Envelope addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Biltmore, Phoenix, Ariz., postmarked 1-16-30, containing letter from Dillon to contestant, opening “ My dear Charlotte,” and referring to Mr. Erlanger and closing with “ Lots and lots from me, too ” (Exhibit E-9). (103) Envelope addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, Cal., postmarked 1-9-30, addressed to contestant by Dillon, opening with, “ Hello, Mama,” referring to Mr. Erlanger, and closing with “ All our love always, Jack ” (Contestant’s Exhibit D-9). (104) Envelope dated 1-18-30, addressed Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, readdressed to 175 Riverside drive, from Dillon to contestant, opening with “ Dear Charlotte,” referring to Mr. Erlanger and closing with “ Always Jack ” (Contestant’s Exhibit). (105) Letter from Joe Toplitsky to Erlanger, Hotel Esplanade, Marienbad, dated 7-8-28, addressed: “ Dear Mr. Erlanger.” It concluded with the expression, “Ido hope that you and Charlotte had a marvelous trip and that you are both enjoying every minute of your stay;” and closing, “ Hoping this finds you enjoying the best of health, believe me your friend — Pal — Partner Joe” (Contestant’s Exhibit S-ll). (106) Letter of Joe Toplitsky, dated Los Angeles, 2-8-80, addressed to Mrs. Charlotte Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city: “ Thanks for your kind note *207of 1-29 apprising me of your safe return home. Words cannot express my appreciation of your letting me know how the boss stood the trip, also that he has improved * * *. Again thanking you with all my heart and with love to Mr. Erlanger, not forgetting yourself, sincerely yours, Joe ” (Contestant’s Exhibit R-ll). (107) Telegram dated 5-11-28, addressed from Douglaston, N. Y., to Mr. and Mrs. Erlanger, steamship Columbus, Pier 86, N. R., signature, “ Coodie and Bertie ” (Bert C. Whitney) (Contestant’s Exhibit A-ll). (108) Letter, Adlon Hotel, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, referring to their prospective arrival at the Adlon on July fourth (Contestant’s Exhibit B-ll). (109) Five envelopes which were sent through the mails by Miss Marie Wells to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, three to the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles, and two to the Hotel Biltmore in Phoenix, Ariz., during 1-80 (Contestant’s Exhibit E-ll).. (110) Envelope and announcement card, Millinery Company, N. Y., 1-7-28, addressed to Mrs. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit X-ll). (Ill) Envelope postmarked 12-18-29, to Mrs. Charlotte Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, from Madame Laura (p. 3591) (Contestant’s Exhibit P-11). (112) Postmarked envelope, Chicago, 111., from Mrs. Quigley (p. 3589), 1- 8-80, addressed “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, Calif.” (Contestant’s Exhibit G-ll). (113) Postmarked envelope from Evan Vranken, 153 Dana avenue, Albany, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Biltmore, Phoenix, Ariz., readdressed to Apt. O-12-E, 175 Riverside drive, New York (Contestant’s Exhibit M-ll). (114) Postmarked envelope, Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Biltmore, Los Angeles, postmarked 1-17-80 (Contestant’s Exhibit 1-11). (115) Two postmarked envelopes addressed “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Hotel Biltmore, Phoenix, Ariz., from Mrs. Lucian Denni, 1037 S. Holt, Los Angeles, Cal.,” dated 1-18-30 (Contestant’s Exhibit F-ll). (116) Stamped envelope, Hotel Algonquin, 59 West Forty-fourth street, from Amy Ashmore Clark, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, Cal. (Contestant’s Exhibit N-ll). (117) Five envelopes from Mrs. McCulloch, postmarked four of them airmail, and one with a two-cent stamp, addressed to the Biltmore Hotel, Cal., one readdressed to 175 Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit"E-ll). (118) Envelope postmarked Babylon, N. Y., from Mrs. Greve, p. 3590, “ Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles ” (Contestant’s Exhibit J-ll). (119) Two envelopes from the Arizona-Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, Ariz., from Mrs. Natalie Lewis (3590) to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city, dated 1-27-80 and 2- 11-80 (Contestant’s Exhibit H-ll). (120) Letter dated 10-28-28, from J. Heulsenbeck, from the Radium Ore Re-vigor Company, *208New York, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit V-10). (121) Letter, Cuevas Diaz, Cigars, New York city, dated 5-13-29, addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York (Contestant’s Exhibit W-10). (122) Telegram 5-11-28, to A. L. Erlanger, steamship Columbus, expressing regret that he missed him. Wishes for his health and concluding “ Love to you and Charlotte. Bon Voyage and safe return," signed Flo Ziegfeld (Contestant’s Exhibit R-10). (123) Letter from San Francisco, from the Consulate of Luxembourg to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, New York city, dated 10-22-28, addressed to “ My dearest Lottie ” and referring to Mr. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit Y-ll). (124) Letter, 3-5-30, from P. Reiter, Jr., addressed to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, postmarked .3-5-30, letter opening “ My dear, dear Lottie,” and referring to Mr. Erlanger (Contestant’s Exhibit Z-ll). (125) Postal card postmarked Atlantic City, 2-11-29, addressed to Mr. ■and Mr-s. A. L. Erlanger, 232 West End avenue from Evelyn L. Friedberg, c/o Boardwalk Art Gallery (Contestant’s Exhibit B-12). (126) Application for visa for passport 3-12-28, .giving 150 West .Eightieth street as the present address; signed “ Abraham L. Erlanger ” (Contestant’s Exhibit C-12).. (127) Bill, electric service, made out to Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, covering period from 6-12-29 to 9-12-29, marked “ paid ” and stamped with the .finance department and bearing “ O. K., Pratt," immediately over the name “ Airs. A. Erlanger;” also certain bookkeeping notations (Contestant’s .Exhibit L). (128) Bill, electric service, 5-11-28 to 6-11-28, stamped with the stamp of the financial department, bearing the stamp, “ O. K., Pratt,” immediately next to the address “Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city ” ■(Contestants Exhibit L). (129) Bill, electric service, addressed to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, covering a period from 2-10-28 to 3-1,2-28, .stamped with the stamp of the financial department, with another stamp indicating that the charge is to the. account .of A. L. E., personal (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (130) Bill, electric .service, dated 1-11-28 to 2-10-28, addressed to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 17.5 Riverside drive, stamped “ O. K., Pratt ” and with another stamp indicating that it was charged to the account of A. L. E., personal (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (131) Bill, electric service, 4-11-38 to 5-11-28, addressed to Airs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, bearing the stamp “ 0. K., Pratt ” and another stamp indicating that it was charged to the •personal account of A. L. E., Riverside drive -(Contestants Exhibit L). (132) Bill, •electric service, 3-12-28 to 4-H-38, .made out to Mrs. A. Erlangei;, ,1,75 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, stamped with the stamp of the *209financial department and with another stamp indicating that it is charged to A. L. E., personal account, Riverside drive, also stamped “ O. K., Pratt” (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (133) Bill, electric service, 10-11-28 to 11-10-28, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, stamped with a stamp indicating that the bill was charged to the personal account of A. L. E. for home; also stamped with the 0. K. of Pratt (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (134) Bill, 12-11-28 to 1-10-29, electric service, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, with the O. K. of Pratt upon it, the stamp indicating it was paid, and another stamp indicating that the bill was charged to the personal account of A. L. E., Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (135) Bill, electric service, for the period 1- 10-29 to 2-13-29, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, stamped paid with an 0. K. of Pratt, also stamped with another stamp indicating it was charged to the personal account of A. L. E., Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (136) Bill, electric service, 2-13-29 to 3-12-29, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, Apt. 0-12-E, stamped with O. K. of Pratt (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (137) Bill, 3-12-29 to-29, electric service, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, 0-12-E, stamped with 0. K. of Pratt, and 0. K. of Dillon, also bearing bookkeeping notations stamped on the back to indicate that it was charged to the personal account of A. L. E., Riverside drive (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (138) Bill, electric service, 10-11-29 to 11-11-29, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, 0-12-E, stamped with 0. K. of Pratt (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (139) Bill, electric service, 9-12-29 to 10-11-29, made out to Mrs. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, bearing on its face “ 0. K., Pratt,” pencil notation, “ Riv. Drive ” (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (140) Bill, electric service, 12-11-29 to 1-10-30, made out to Mrs. A. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, stamped with the 0. K. of Pratt, also stamped with another stamp indicating charge to the personal account of A. L. E. (Contestant’s Exhibit L). (141) Thirteen checks to Electric Service Engineering Corporation drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account by L. E. Bergman, who was general manager and Erlanger’s nephew, of the following dates: 11-16-27, 12-24-27, 1-18-28, 2-24-28, 3-19-28, 4-18-28, 5-23-28, 6-20-28, 7-17-28,10-17-28, 11-21-28, 12-17-28, 1-15-29; also five checks to the order of the Electric Service Engineering Corporation, drawn on the A. L. Erlanger special account and signed by M. Pratt, Jr., and Saul J. Baron, upon the following dates: 2- 16-29, 3-22-29, 4-16-29, 6-18-29, 1-17-30 (Contestant’s Exhibit M-12). (142) Three checks to the order of the Electric Service *210Engineering Corporation, drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account and signed by Saul J. Baron and M. Pratt, Jr., on the following dates: 9-23-29, 10-21-29, 11-23-29, and one check to the order of New York Telephone Company, drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account, signed by Saul J. Baron and M. Pratt, Jr., dated 2-17-30, and nine checks order of Elesel Holding Company, Inc., drawn on A. L. Erlanger special account, signed by Saul J. Baron and M. Pratt, Jr., on the following dates: 7-1-29, 8-1-29, 11-1-29,11-4-29, 12-2-29, 12-2-29, 1-1-30, 2-1-30, 3-1-30; one check Consolidated Gas Company, A. L. Erlanger special account, signed Saul J. Baron and M. Pratt, Jr., dated 12-31-29 (Contestant’s Exhibit N-12); these fourteen checks were for electricity, rent, phone and gas. (143) Letter from Dr. Gustave Paul, dated 12-3-29, addressed “My dear friends, my dear Charlotte and my dear A. L. E.,” expressing his friendship to them and concluding “ with the most hearty greetings, I am, in love and devotion, your G. Paul ” (Contestant’s Exhibit H-12). (144) Letter (1-29-30) from Dr. Paul to “ My dear friends,” expressing his joy over learning that “ both of you are in good health,” and signed “ Your true friend, Paul ” (Contestant’s Exhibit J-12). (145) Envelope with canceled stamp thereon, addressed to Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York city, U. S. A. (Contestant’s Exhibit K-12). (146) Letter dated 6-28-29, to Robert H. McConnell, M. D. (Erlanger’s physician and a witness fqr contestant), as follows: “My dear Doctor, thanks for your fine attention, Yours, A. L. Erlanger,” in Erlanger’s handwriting (Contestant’s Exhibit M-13). (147) Telegram Dillingham to contestant as follows: “ Western Union, 1927, Dec. 16, p. m. 9:15, Received at GZ A480 33 N.L.W. 12 MK, Springfield, Mass. 16, Mrs. Erlanger, 175 Riverside drive, New York, N. Y. On return to New York and next week contracts made with Boss today require Betty Brown Pudding with dinner as they are unique and extraordinary have placed case in equity hands, love to both ” (Exhibit R-14) Charlie (Dillingham). (148) Letter dated 7-7-28 (Exhibit M-14), Dillingham to contestant, in part as follows: “ July 7,1928. Dear Charlotte: Your letter of June 26th is received and I was very glad to hear from you and to learn that you and Abe are fine. Best love to you and Abe and, as Jay Gould said to his sons when he gave them the Missouri, Texas & Pacific R.R.’s: ‘ I hope these lines will find you well.’ Sincerely, Charlie (Dillingham).”


Morales did not file his motion in the face of any removal proceeding. Rather, he filed it as part of his effort to obtain legal status in the United States. He stated in a declaration that he had been a victim of a store robbery in East Palo Alto in 2009, and that he had assisted law enforcement's investigation of that crime. He contended that his assistance made him eligible to *780receive a "U <mask>," a temporary nonimmigrant visa created by Congress to provide legal status for noncitizens who assist in the investigation of serious crimes in which they have been victimized. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) ; Fonseca-Sanchez v. Gonzales (7th Cir. 2007) 484 F.3d 439, 442, fn. 4.) Morales further declared he had submitted a U visa application, that this application was pending, and that it included a written certification from a law enforcement official that he had cooperated in the investigation of the store robbery. In this certification, a copy of which Morales attached to his declaration, a law enforcement official identified Morales as the victim of armed robbery, false imprisonment and felonious assault, or attempts to commit these crimes, and stated that Morales had cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators.


marriage with Ms. Rakes for consideration and to obtain immigra- tion benefits. In September 2011, DHS filed a Notice to Appear that initi- ated removal proceedings against Mr. Knezevic. The Notice to Ap- pear charged Mr. Knezevic with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) as a noncitizen whose conditional permanent resi- dent status was terminated. In February 2012, Mr. Knezevic admit- ted the allegations in the Notice to Appear but denied the charge of removability. The IJ concluded Mr. Knezevic was removable as charged. Because of a pending <mask> petition, the IJ continued Mr. Knezevic’s case. In December 2011, Mr. Knezevic married Rachael Knezevic. In September 2012, Mrs. Knezevic filed a visa petition on behalf of Mr. Knezevic. In August 2013, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a notice of its intent to deny Mrs. Knezevic’s visa petition because of Mr. Knezevic’s fraudulent marriage to Ms. Rakes. In response, Mr. Knezevic filed affidavits and evidence to show that his marriage to Ms. Rakes was bona fide. Ultimately, USCIS denied his petition. After USCIS denied his visa petition, Mr. Knezevic sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). 1 At the


*638In February 2013, the Coalition Against Slavery and Trafficking (CAST) contacted the FBI and reported that Siti was a victim of human trafficking. During interviews with FBI and LAPD investigators, Siti stated she had been recruited by Halim's sister in Indonesia to work for defendants. Halim's nephew helped procure a <mask> for Siti, and instructed her to misrepresent their relationship and the purpose of her travel to the United States. Siti believed she had a two-year contract and would be paid $250 each month plus a $50 monthly stipend during the first year. Two days before she departed to the United States, she was presented with a five-year contract and felt obligated to sign it.


The trial court appears to have deemed Kao a trainee in the months before his work <mask> application was approved. The court stated, "For the brief time before the [February 2010] work agreement was in place plaintiff was only *588in the United States as a guest of Harry Chen and Jessy Lin. He was at Joy Holiday to determine if this was the type of job that he wanted to pursue. During this time, Harry Chen and Jessy Lin provided plaintiff with money to live on while waiting for results on his visa petition."


In any event, defendant’s expired <mask> was merely one factor to consider in his determination of whether to plead guilty, which the Appellate Division has considered to be “a calculus, which takes into account all of the relevant circumstances” {Picea, 97 AD3d at 183). Consequently, we cannot conclude on this record alone that defendant suffered no prejudice due to his counsel’s failure to warn him of the immigration consequences that flowed from his decision to plead guilty (see People v Reynoso, 88 AD3d 1162 [2011]; People v Williams, 72 AD3d 1347 [2010]). Moreover, since defendant demonstrated that issues of fact exist as to whether it would have been a rational decision for him to have rejected the plea offer, and there were other factors for the court to consider when determining whether prejudice had resulted (see Peque, 22 NY3d at 199; Picca, 97 AD3d at 184), in order for the Criminal Court to make the required “findings of fact essential to the determination” of the motion (CPL 440.30 [5]), a hearing is necessary, as a proper determination of the motion called for factual findings which could not be summarily made (see CPL 440.30 [5]; Reynoso, 88 AD3d 1162; Williams, 72 AD3d 1347; People v Wilson, 48 Misc 3d 129[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50976[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; People v Hassan, 36 Misc 3d 160[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51823[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]).


It is set forth on behalf of Marine that in June, 1979 about one year after defendant had received the improperly issued credit slip and after the bankruptcy of Constantine Gems, he did contact Marine "about a possible credit to this Master Charge”. Marine did not credit defendant’s account because defendant’s Master Charge account was never charged for the purchase for which he sought a credit, no check was received by Marine from the merchant for the purchase for which a credit was sought, the 120-day period in which to charge back to a merchant the amount of a credit slip issued by the merchant but not processed against the cardholder’s account had expired, and Marine’s voluntary attempt on behalf of *471defendant to collect the amount of the returned <mask> purchase from the merchant had been unsuccessful.


on or about the 23rd day of December, 2013, ERIC WAYNE DONALDSON, hereinafter styled Defendant, with intent to harm or defraud another, did then and there obtain, possess, or use identifying information of Patricia Ross without the consent of Patricia Ross and the number of items of identifying information obtained, possessed, or used by the said ERIC WAYNE DONALDSON was 5 or more but less than 10, to-wit: 1. A Texas Driver's License bearing the government issued identification number [driver's license number], belonging to Patricia Ross,4 2. A Chase Debit MasterCard, bearing the financial institution account number ending in 7235, belonging to Patricia Ross, 3. A Wells Fargo <mask> Card bearing the financial institution account number ending in 7779, belonging to Patricia Ross, 4. A Capital One MasterCard bearing the financial institution account ending in 1993, belonging to Patricia Ross, 5. A Capital One MasterCard bearing the financial institution account number ending in 4439, belonging to Patricia Ross, 6. An American Express card, bearing the financial institution account number ending in 7070, belonging to Patricia Ross, 7. A Beall's credit card, beaning the financial institution account number ending in 3824, belonging to Patricia Ross, 8. A Best Buy credit card, bearing the financial institution account number ending in 2418, belonging to Patricia Ross, 9. A Wal-Mart credit card, bearing the financial institution account number ending in 2401, belonging to Patricia Ross[.] The units of prosecution alleged in this count include Ross's driver's license number, which constitutes an item of identifying information under subsection (a)(1)(E) ("other government-issued identification number") of the statute;5 Ross's debit card number, which constitutes an item of identifying information under subsection (a)(1)(C) ("financial institution account number"); and seven different credit card numbers of Ross's, which each constitute an item of identifying information under subsection (a)(1)(C) ("financial institution account number"). See Tex. Penal Code § 32.51(a)(1)(C), (E).


A Rule 24 intervenor must have standing. Sault, 331 F.R.D. at 9. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants question whether Intervenors have standing, and the Court finds Intervenors possess standing. If the Court were to set aside USCIS’s new rules, the individual Intervenors would have to pay more in attorneys fees to file H-1B <mask> petitions (injury) because of the change in the rules (causation) and that injury can be avoided if the Court does not set aside the rules (redressability). See Fund For Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732–33 (D.C. Cir. 2003). ITServe Alliance, Inc., has associational standing because, as just demonstrated, its individual


The complaint alleges that in 2005, an associate of defendant Bastianich offered plaintiff, then residing in Venice, a position as a chef managing and overseeing kitchens for both Bastianich’s television show and defendants’ restaurants. Plaintiff alleges that she was to receive not less than $600 per week for 40 hours *547of work. Bastianich, through her company Tavola Productions, sponsored plaintiff’s application for an H2-B <mask>. H2-B visas are only available to individuals who can demonstrate a certain level of education or a specialty occupation. The visa application represented that plaintiff was to serve as a test kitchen and menu preparation coordinator at a salary of not less than $600 per week.


Defendant states in his answering affidavit that the first statement he received from <mask> after obtaining the credit slip was on about July 26, 1978, and it showed no credit for the ring. He presumed, he states, that it was because the attendant paperwork had not been processed. Mr. Carlson claims that afterward he moved and heard nothing from Visa until his wife was contacted by phone by plaintiff on September 16, 1978. A letter to plaintiff from the Carlson’s postmarked September 17, 1978 contained the purchase and credit slips.


To be distinguished is Katz Park Ave. Corp. v Jagger (46 AD3d 186 [2007]), in which a sharply divided panel of the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the tenant, a British citizen temporarily staying in the United States under a tourist <mask>, was precluded, as a matter of law, from maintaining a primary residence in a rent-stabilized apartment in New York City. Unlike the situation in the case at bar, it was the tenant’s immigration status as a “temporary visitor,” not any self-initiated declaration of residence, that was determined in dagger to be fatal to that tenant’s primary residence claim.


The facts as' found by the court relate an oft-repeated story and warrant serious consideration. Plaintiff had met defendant Shamsher Wadud (the principal owner of the Nirvana Restaurant) in August of 1972 in Bangladesh, at which time and place, the defendant offered to employ plaintiff at his restaurant in New York City. The agreement called for plaintiff to serve an apprentice period of about three months without salary, at the end of which time he would receive a waiter’s salary, and eventually, become the manager of the restaurant. It is conceded by both sides that defendant Wadud did make all <mask> and travel arrangements.


The immigration laws and regulations are uniquely designed statutes to control and facilitate foreign entry to this country. Because of the infinite variations of problems involved in migrating, anomalous situations can arise under this law. One such situation arose in this case. For it is obvious from the statutes involved that during the pendency of her application Ms. Redgrave was a nonimmigrant alien for some purposes (Matter of Hosseinpour, supra) and an immigrant alien for others (US Code, tit 8, § 1101, subd [a]; § 1184, subd [b]). Or paradoxically, in the best Gilbert and Sullivan tradition, she simply had no immigration standing at all. This view is both supported by Immigration’s own interpretation of the law, submitted as an exhibit on consent, and the fact that it was necessary for Ms. Redgrave to obtain a parole <mask> to leave the country during the pendency of the application.


The facts here therefore are not analogous to Zador and <mask>, because Sheppard Mullin (1) failed to inform J-M about any potential or actual conflict with South Tahoe, and (2) did not obtain J-M's informed, written consent to continued representation despite the actual conflict that occurred while Sheppard Mullin was working for J-M and South Tahoe at the same time. Written consent to all potential and actual conflicts in the absence of any knowledge about the existence of such conflicts cannot comply with the requirement of "informed written consent" in Rule 3-310(C). Because Sheppard Mullin failed to secure informed written consent to the conflict before or during its representation of J-M, the Agreement violated Rule 3-310.6


Melita testified that she wished to move to Canada to further her education, beginning with completing her Bachelor of Science degree and then moving on to medical school, stating that it "will be better for the kids if I get a better job and have a more stable financial situation." Melita also stated that moving to Canada would allow her parents to be involved in the children's lives. She explained that her parents live in Romania and that it had been difficult for them to obtain a <mask> to *714visit them in the United States; however, Romanians can travel to Canada without a visa.


The respondent was appointed administrator upon the petition of a sister of the deceased who is now herself deceased. The pleadings in this proceeding, as well as the evidence, disclose that at the time when the application for letters of administration was made the sister was a citizen of Poland and was in this country under a diplomatic <mask>. She was not an inhabitant of this State *689within the meaning of subdivision 3 of section 94 of the Surrogate’s Court Act (Matter of Gaffney, 141 Misc. 453). As an alien, not an inhabitant of this State, she was not competent to receive letters of administration (Matter of Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1; Matter of MacMillan, 133 Misc. 570), and being herself incompetent she could not designate a nominee to act as administrator. (Matter of Mora, 133 Misc. 254; Matter of Marret, 152 Misc. 713.)


Gani met Caesar a second time on November 29, 2006, on which occasion she assisted him with his application for the school, and provided him with an acceptance letter (tr at 16; claimant’s exhibit 6). Gani then had two options to obtain legal status as a student in the United States: first, he could return to Turkey and apply for an F-l student <mask> at the United States Consulate there (tr at 103),3 or second, he could remain in the United States and file an 1-539 application (Application To *745Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status) to adjust his status to that of a full-time F-l student (tr at 104, 107).4


8 DHS also observes that Congress would have been fully aware of the existence of categories of nonimmigrants who did not require visas to be admitted to the United States when it enacted section 922(g)(5)(B). The <mask> Waiver Program had been in effect for twelve years at the time Congress debated section 922(g)(5)(B), and Canadian and Mexican nationals in possession of border crossing cards had long been permitted to enter the United States without a nonimmigrant visa. See DHS Letter at 7; see also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”).


At the time, the United States had a moratorium on adoption of Cambodian children, so the only way for Chan to enter the U.S. was through a humanitarian <mask> based on alleged medical problems. Once here, ERJ and LMB tried several schemes to have LMB adopt the child through his alleged membership in an Indian tribe, or in Trinidad and Tobago, where LMB was born, and which citizenship he re-obtained in efforts to avoid the U.S. moratorium. During this time, Chan, now called William, lived with ERJ where he was cared for by a nanny who had raised ERJ’s other, biological children. LMB was a constant visitor, was acknowledged as William’s father, and he and his family were very much a part of William’s life.


one of Lozada’s requirements: He had not given his former counsel a chance to respond to his allegations of ineffective representation. Finally, in Matter of J-E-C-, the lead respondent, a native and citizen of Colombia, was admitted to the United States in 2000 on a six-month <mask>. His wife and children, also respondents, were admitted in 2001, on six- month visas as well. Lead respondent then sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture on his own behalf and derivatively for his wife and children. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security found respondents ineligible for relief and began removal proceedings. In those proceedings, lead respondent conceded removability, but renewed his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Immigration Judge denied relief, concluding that, among other things, lead respondent had failed to demonstrate persecution “on account of” a protected ground, and ordered respondents removed. Re- spondents’ lawyer filed a notice of appeal with the Board alleging four points of error, but the Board never received a brief in support of the ap- peal. Notwithstanding the absence of a brief, the Board addressed the four points of error on the merits, and affirmed what it called the “thorough and well-reasoned decision” of the Immigration Judge. Thereafter, respondents moved to reopen, contending that counsel’s failure to file a brief constitut- ed ineffective assistance and submitting a copy of the brief they would have submitted. In April 2008, the Board denied respondents’ motion. Noting its previous decision addressing the merits of the claims, and re- viewing those claims again, the Board concluded that respondents had suffered no prejudice from the failure to file a brief because a brief would not have changed the outcome of their proceedings.


Anomalies occur in the law. It would seem incongruous that persons may enter upon a valid marital relationship; yet, in spite of the rights that the relationship confers upon both to that relationship, it is claimed a divorce decree may not be granted because a party to the marriage was in the jurisdiction of the court on a transit <mask> issued by the United States Government. If the marriage had taken place it might have been induced by fraud. One of the parties may forsooth be innocent, incapable of entering into a valid marriage, or fraud might be practiced to induce the marriage. If a divorce action is not maintainable because the party suing here is on a transit visa, it would seem that no proceeding for an annulment would be entertained. That appears anomalous. As already said, marriage confers obligations and it also confers rights, and these rights cannot possibly be limited to one of the parties; they must be enjoyed equally by both of the parties. If the citizen may sue for divorce from a person who is here on a transit visa, it would be discriminatory against such person if he were denied equal opportunities and protection of the law, and the right to enjoy the same rights.


*90Around the same time, defendant proposed marriage to J.C. J.C. thought the proposal was "absurd," especially in light of the fact that defendant was still married to someone else. When J.C. declined, defendant became very angry. She accused J.C. of not loving her, and explained that her <mask> was expiring and she would not be allowed to remain in the United States. The *1136couple argued about where to raise V., with defendant wanting to return to South Korea and J.C. wanting to remain in the United States. During one such argument, in August 2009, J.C. punched a wall with such force that he broke his hand.


In May, 1977, having secured employment in the United States, more particularly in New York, plaintiff came here on an E-2 treaty trader <mask>. Defendant wife followed plaintiff here in September, 1977 as a spouse under a similar visa. Both of the foregoing visas expire in 1981. Plaintiff subsequently obtained a B-2 visa which is indefinite. Upon her arrival here defendant wife also obtained employment.


Petitioner, Solomon Racenstien, father of the decedent, contends that respondent divorced decedent in Iran, upon moving there after leaving decedent and their marital home. He argues that respondent should therefore be disqualified as a surviving spouse pursuant to EPTL 5-1.2 (a) (3) and (5) because of their divorce and respondent’s abandonment of decedent. Respondent argues that he never divorced decedent and, in fact, returned to Iran only after his <mask> expired here upon the completion of his residency in internal medicine. Respondent states that he was required to leave the United States at that time, and was ineligible to apply for a visa to return to this country for two years thereafter.


On May 13, 2010, the hotel received a completed agreement from Joseph Rizzuti, Catalfamo’s business associate who had initially introduced him to defendant. The authorization was declined, however, when the hotel attempted to charge the outstanding balance to Rizzuti’s card on the morning of May 14. That same day, the hotel received notice from <mask> stating that the company was declining all prior charges made to Mark Barden’s account between April and May. Consequently, after the “chargebacks” from the credit cards of Catalfamo and Mark Barden, the hotel had not received payment for approximately $50,000 worth of charges that defendant had incurred between March and May. Several hours later, on May 14, Angulo called the police, and defendant was arrested.


The superior court's conclusion that Morales could not prosecute his motion in the absence of removal proceedings based on section 1473.7, subdivision (b) is contradicted by the plain language of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). It authorizes a noncitizen to pursue a motion to vacate a conviction due to an error that has compromised his or her ability to address *510"adverse immigration consequences," without limitation. Specifically, it authorizes a noncitizen no longer imprisoned or restrained to "prosecute"4 such a motion because of prejudicial error that damaged his or her "ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences " of a no contest plea. ( § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The phrase "actual or potential adverse immigration consequences" *783is broad and encompasses circumstances other than removal, such as, for example, the one Morales has asserted: his claimed inability to obtain temporary legal status in the United States via a U <mask>, for which he purportedly would qualify if not for his conviction.


Petitioner is a nonresident alien, having entered the United States from the Bahamas, holding a passport issued by the *396Bahamian Government containing a <mask> granted by the American Embassy for entry into this country as a tourist. Thereafter, in violation of a condition for entry as a tourist, she obtained employment as a domestic, and her passport expired in February, 1973 at which time her application for an “ Alien Employment Certification ” was not finalized. She became ill in May, 1973 and was hospitalized in the New Rochelle Hospital in Westchester County and the Westchester County Department of Social Services denied her application for medical assistance; which determination after a “fair hearing” was confirmed by the New York State Department of Social Services.


tional,” as it is possible that Congress considered those aliens eligible for admission to the United States without a nonimmigrant <mask> to be a “lesser security risk” than aliens admitted with visas. DHS Letter at 8–9. After all, Congress has tied the decision whether to waive visa requirements to judgments about a waiver’s effects on public safety, and Congress here could have concluded that nonimmigrant aliens who do not require visas do not present the public safety risks that warrant prohibiting their acqui- sition of firearms. See id. at 8. 9 Other factors may also explain why Congress decided to treat nonim- migrant aliens eligible for visa waivers differently from nonimmigrant aliens admitted under visas. For example, nonimmigrants admitted under the Visa Waiver Program may well spend less time in the country than other nonimmigrants, see 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1) (2006) (imposing 90-day limit on aliens admitted under Visa Waiver Program), perhaps making them less likely to purchase firearms. Congress also could have thought that imposing criminal firearms prohibitions on nonimmigrant aliens admitted under the program would frustrate the objectives of the program, which include reducing barriers to and burdens upon travel. See Depart- ment of State, Visa Waiver Program (VWP), http://travel.state.gov/visa/ temp/without/without_1990.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (“The pro- gram was established to eliminate unnecessary barriers to travel, stimulat- ing the tourism industry, and permitting the Department of State to focus consular resources in other areas.”). Congress (or some members thereof) ultimately could have had all, some, or none of these considerations in mind. Whatever Congress’s motivation, these rationales demonstrate that it would have been rational for Congress to draw a statutory line between nonimmigrants with visas


The nominee of the sister, who was appointed as administrator, was at the time of his appointment a nonresident alien concededly being here under a diplomatic <mask> and therefore with temporary status in the United States. (Matter of Gaffney, supra.) Thus even if the sister had been competent to designate the respondent, which she was not, he was not competent to serve. His appointment, therefore, fails to meet the statutory requirements on either of two independent grounds.


hearing before the IJ, Mr. Knezevic testified that after his H-2B <mask> expired, Ms. Stevanovic said that she could find him some options to help him get his green card faster. Mr. Knezevic testified that marrying Ms. Rakes was mistake and that he felt that he had to stick to his story that the marriage was bona fide. Ultimately, on cross- examination, Mr. Knezevic admitted to paying Ms. Rakes $1,000 to marry him. The IJ issued a written decision and made an adverse credi- bility finding against Mr. Knezevic based on his fraudulent misrep- resentations for over ten years about his prior marriage to Ms. Rakes along with other inconsistences in his testimony and the rec- ord. The IJ also determined that Mr. Knezevic met the statutory requirements for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §


“As the underlying policy objective for an agency to act on behalf of a foreign medical graduate is to provide primary health care to the residents [in areas without adequate access to medical care], the contract shall not include a non-compete clause enforceable against the foreign medical graduate. This provision is adopted to insure that the foreign medical graduate is not forced to leave a HPSA ... or MUA at the end of his or her contract.” Prohibition of a noncompete clause in foreign medical graduate employment contracts submitted for <mask> approval, under the circumstances considered here, remains the public policy of the United States (see 22 CFR 41.63 [c] [4] [i]).


Ramani applied to the USDA for the appropriate <mask> and submitted the employment contract for review and approval. On July 23, 1997, the USDA advised Ramani and Prime that the noncompete clause forbidding Ramani from practicing medicine in the subject area, except as Prime’s employee, “[djefeats the purpose of the waiver program.” The USDA directed the parties to delete the noncompete clause.


Kao alleges defendants failed to furnish any wage and hour statements from the start of his employment in March 2009 through February 2010, when he was *592granted a work <mask> and, thereafter, furnished inadequate statements that failed to accurately itemize his gross wages earned and total hours worked. As indicated above, the trial court found that Kao was not entitled to wage statements before receiving his work visa because he was a non-employee "guest" who received no wages, only a "living allowance." The court further found that Kao was as an exempt employee following receipt of a work visa and, as such, provided sufficiently itemized statements. These findings are undermined by our determination that Kao was, in fact, a non-exempt employee throughout his time at Joy Holiday.


Among the exhibits which have been submitted to the court on this motion is a letter of one O’Connor, Commissioner, Displaced Persons Commission, United States Government. This letter, dated November 29,1948, referring to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and addressed to the National Lutheran Council, reads in part as follows: “We are aware that you have had a number of questions concerning the public charge feature of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. The following explanation may be given to anyone who raises this question with you: The law requires that assurances be given against the alien’s becoming a public charge. Although this does not constitute a legally *619enforceable undertaking, it should be predicated upon good faith and an honest resolve so to guide the alien’s activities and welfare as to give reasonable assurance against the likelihood that he may become a charge upon the public.” Another letter, by one Rosenfield, acting chairman of the Displaced Persons Commission, dated June 12, 1950, also addressed to the National Lutheran Council, reads in part as follows: “ As you know, on the assurances which are filed in behalf of a displaced person, the sponsor assures that the displaced person shall not become a public charge. However, the Commission has interpreted this responsibility on the part of the sponsor to be a moral obligation only, and not a legally enforceable undertaking.” As long ago as March 1, 1939, one Shaughnessy then deputy commissioner of immigration, wrote to a member of Congress, Mr. Seeger, in part as follows: “ A person who files an affidavit of support for the purposes of facilitating the issuance of a <mask> to an applicant does not thereby incur legal responsibility so far as the immigration laws are concerned, although it should be understood that a most serious moral obligation is undertaken by the affiant. ’ ’


The Columbia-Greene area had been designated a Medically Underserved Area (MUA) by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and a Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Because of these federal designations, Ramani, a citizen of India, was entitled to participate in a program administered by the USDA which waived certain work <mask> requirements.


In opposition, counsel for the respondent, the decedent’s cousin, submits an affirmation alleging that the exhibits annexed to the petitioner’s motion appear to be spurious. Although he submitted a Freedom of Information Law request to the Embassy to verify that <mask> applications were filed, counsel notes that the Embassy never responded to his request. In the event that the court grants this application, the respondent requests that the depositions be conducted before a consular agent with an interpreter acceptable to him and his own Indian counsel.


(2) Patrick Cassidy, the brother, in bis answer requests among other alternatives that he be appointed as the new administrator. Evidence on the question of his competency to receive letters was submitted to me. The issue is whether he is disqualified by reason of the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 94 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, which provides that no person is competent to serve as an administrator who is an “ alien not an inhabitant of this state.” He is a citizen of the Irish Free State. He arrived in this country only recently under a passport which has been received in evidence. That passport contains the <mask> of the American Consul at Dublin, Ireland, which recites that the visa was granted to him as a “ non-immigrant ” under the Immigration Act of 1924.* His classification is stated in the visa as “ Temporary Visitor.” The passport also contains a notation by the Immigration Inspector on his arrival at New York on June 15, 1931, that he was admitted under the Immigration Act for three months. Patrick Cassidy now claims that he intends to reside permanently within the United States. Despite his claim and his present intention, I hold that he is not an inhabitant of the State under the meaning of section 94 of the Surrogate’s Court Act.


A provision of the federal Gun Control Act prohibits any “alien” who has “been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa” from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving “any firearm or ammunition” that has a connection to interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B) (2006). In 2002, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire- arms and Explosives (“ATF”) issued an interim final rule interpreting this prohibition to apply to any alien who has the status of “nonimmi- grant alien,” regardless of whether the alien required a <mask> in order to be admitted to the United States. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.32(a)(5)(ii) (2011). In March 2011, in response to a request for informal advice regarding ATF’s interpretation, we concluded that the text of the statute forecloses that interpretation. We explained that the text is clear: the provision applies only to nonimmigrant aliens who must have visas to be admitted, not to all aliens with nonimmigrant status. In May 2011, you requested a formal opinion from the Office on this matter.1 This memorandum memo- rializes and elaborates upon the informal advice we provided in March. In the course of formalizing our advice, we received views from the Depart- ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 2 which also concluded that the


The Criminal Court decided that defendant’s motion could be conclusively resolved without a hearing on the second Strickland ground of prejudice, finding that defendant had failed to assert that, but for this plea, he would have any basis on which to remain in this country, to resist removal, or to seek any relief from an immigration court since, subsequent to the entry of his plea, a removal proceeding had been commenced against him based on the expiration of his <mask>. The court held that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance because the ground for his removal from the United States, as alleged in the immigration court’s notice to appear, was unrelated to the instant conviction and because he did not demonstrate that, had he been advised of the mandatory deportation consequences of taking the plea, he would have chosen to go to trial since “[b]y going to trial he would have risked jail for no potential benefit to his status in this country.”


authority to hear a case. In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787 (5th Cir. 2021) (overruling precedent holding that the six-month time limit for bringing a limitation of liability action is jurisdictional). But because we conclude there is no mandatory exhaustion requirement for the <mask> denial challenge here, we need not consider whether our precedent treating the finality requirement as jurisdictional survives. The Associate Commissioner for Examinations delegated this authority to USCIS’s Administrative Appeals Unit. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(iv).


Gani is a Turkish national who obtained a B1/B2 temporary-<mask> to visit the United States from the United States Consulate in Turkey in September 2005 (claimant’s exhibit 11).1 Under that visa, he first came to this country in September 2006 (see defendant’s exhibit E). The visa allowed him to stay in the United States only until March 20, 2007 (trial tr at 28; claimant’s exhibit 7 at 16).


Although we have limited the sanction of presumptive disbarment to cases involving reckless or intentional misappropriation and the conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude, we have also disbarred counsel in those cases where the underlying facts and aggravating circumstances require such a sanction including when we have determined that the attorney’s intentional dishonesty rises to the level of flagrant dishonesty. See, e.g., In re Bleecker, 11 A.3d 1224 (D.C. 2011) (disbarring an attorney as reciprocal discipline where the state of Maryland disbarred respondent after it found that in filing a civil complaint he misrepresented the day of the injury to hide his failure to file a complaint within the statute of limitations and that his actions were detrimental to his client and wasted court time). Contrary to respondent’s arguments, we have previously held that flagrant dishonesty does not require an associated misappropriation or that the dishonest statement be made either under oath or as part of a court proceeding. See, e.g., In re Bynum, 197 A.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. 2018) (court accepted the Board’s findings and conclusion that respondent’s multiple violations rose to flagrant dishonesty absent a lack of an attempt to fraudulent obtain client or public funds, where the intentional dishonesty is aggravated or prolonged, continues through the disciplinary process, and where respondent demonstrates no remorse and attempts to shift blame for his misconduct on others). While many prior cases have involved additional misconduct, we look to the totality of the misconduct in determining whether the dishonesty was flagrant and have considered whether the intentional dishonesty was an attempt to hide other misconduct and blame others for his misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2010) (although other factors were present, the court found flagrant dishonesty where counsel failed to return his fee to clients if their <mask> applications were not successful, failed to communicate the outcome of the visa proceedings or respond to clients’ request for the refund of their fees, and subsequently lied to both his clients and Disciplinary Counsel about his efforts to return the fees, and where numerous aggravating factors were present including the vulnerability of the clients, his failure to return fees, and counsel’s failure to take any responsibility for his misconduct); In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570 (D.C. 2016) (adopting Board recommendation of No. 21-BG-778


It does not appear whether or not the plaintiff bank issued new <mask> cards to Mr. and Mrs. Lindauer upon its approval of their May 1978 application for increased credit. However, it is clear from the opening paragraph of the application form that if the application was accepted and approved, it was the obligation of the bank to issue the credit cards applied for. Whether the bank issued new credit cards or whether it merely permitted Mr. and Mrs. Lindauer to use the credit cards then existing is not important. What is important is that the terms which applied to the use of a credit card after the bank’s approval of the new application of May 9, 1978 were those terms and conditions contained in that application form and the terms of the credit card agreement in effect on May 9, 1978. As this court pointedly notes those terms were not only a modification of the immediate prior agreement as to the amount of credit but also the resurrection and inclusion of the terms of the application form which included provision for joint and several liability.


A marriage between one who is a resident of the State of New York, and one who is in the United States on a transit <mask>, is valid. A valid marriage confers definite rights to the parties, as it does obligations flowing from one to the other. A person here on a transit visa who marries here is chargeable with the support of his spouse as his wife might be by virtue of the law as amended chargeable with the support of her spouse if he is or is likely to become a public charge and she is financially able to provide for him, or is or can be gainfully employed to so do. The obligations undertaken upon marriage by the parties to a marital relationship, while not entirely reciprocal, impose an obligation upon the wife under certain conditions to be answerable for the support of her spouse.


On June 30, 1970, defendant, a medical school graduate, was issued a <mask> to leave his native country* the Republic of Colombia, to visit the United .States to enter training as a *747physician at the Lutheran Medical .Center in Brooklyn, New York. While in the United States he lived at the Lutheran Medical Center and he obtained a New York State driver’s license and a New York State registration for his automobile, both of which listed the medical center in Brooklyn as his address. He terminated his employment with the center and' on June 23, 1972, he obtained a visa to enter Canada. Ón June 28, 1972, he arrived in Canada, as shown on the Canada entry record, for the purpose of taking a residency in orthopedics at Ottawa General Hospital. He maintained no further ties with New York State after he left the Lutheran Medical Center.


A more fundamental flaw to the theory relied on by Holdings and Proviera is that the Independent Contractor Agreement expired more than two years prior to the execution of the Promissory Note. The term of the Independent Contractor Agreement was defined as "one year or until the contractor receives a working <mask> in the USA and moves to the USA and becomes an Employee of the Company, or until terminated by the company at any time with no advance notice or terminated by the Contractor upon ninety (90) days['] notice." Holdings and Proviera posit that the Independent Contractor Agreement was still in effect in 2013 when the Promissory Note was executed because it had not been terminated by either party.7 This conclusion violates basic tenets of contract interpretation because it renders meaningless *415the "one year" language contained in the Independent Contractor Agreement's term. See Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek , 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. banc 2003) ("[E]ach term of a contract is construed to avoid rendering other terms meaningless." (citation omitted)); Belton Chopper 58, LLC v. North Cass Dev., LLC , 496 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) ("An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part ... of no effect." (citation omitted)). Instead, the logical reading of the provision is that the Independent Contractor Agreement expired in one year unless that term was shortened by the contractor obtaining a work visa and becoming an employee "of the Company" or either party electing to prematurely terminate the agreement. "If the contract language is not ambiguous, the contract language is controlling[.]" A. Zahner Co. , 497 S.W.3d at 783. Thus, the Independent Contractor Agreement entered November 3, 2009, was not in effect past November 2, 2010.8 This conclusion is consistent with the trial court's finding that "the 2009 Independent Contractor Agreement was not in existence after October 2010" as well as Holdings' and Proviera's own counterclaims, which allege that NutraPet was an independent contractor for SCD from November 2009 to October 2010.


*266Contrary to defendant’s assertions that she “ always tried to take care of him,” after she had relieved plaintiff of practically all of his worldly possessions, the credible testimony and documentary 'evidence establish that, by various means, both legal and illegal, defendant tried to rid herself of any ties to plaintiff. The record shows that (1) defendant tried to keep plaintiff from coming off his ship or landing in this country ; (2) defendant tried to have plaintiff permanently incarcerated in an insane asylum; (3) defendant attempted to have plaintiff deported; and (4) defendant removed plaintiff’s belongings from their house, refused to permit him to enter therein, and advised him of her intentions to obtain a divorce or annulment. Likewise, although defendant claims plaintiff abandoned her on September 8, 1954, it appears from the record that as a result of defendant’s attempt to have him permanently committed, as above noted, plaintiff was not released from Bellevue Hospital until on or after September 28, 1954. Moreover, the documentary proof establishes that within a day or two after plaintiff’s release from Bellevue Hospital, defendant withdrew her sponsorship of plaintiff’s application for a <mask>, in another attempt to have him deported from this country as an alien. Thereafter, when plaintiff was unable to obtain employment, defendant made him apply for unemployment insurance. Upon his receipt of each weekly check of $32, defendant charged him $20 a week for room and board, refused to give him any money to pay his union dues and doled out just enough daily for so-called “ cigarette rations.” This, despite her protestations upon the trial that “ she always took care of him.”


Nonetheless, the People argue that loss of eligibility for adjustment of status is not the same as deportation. The People’s argument misses the mark as to what is at issue here, however. Just as a plea of guilty to an aggravated felony by an LPR, while eliminating the possibility of cancellation of removal under the law in effect since the enactment of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 (IIRIRA), does not necessarily result in the LPR’s immediate removal (see 8 USC § 1229b [a] [3] [noncitizen convicted of aggravated felony ineligible for cancellation of removal]), so a plea of guilty by an undocumented immigrant to a controlled substance offense after the enactment of the INA in 1952, while eliminating the possibility of avoiding mandatory removal (see 8 USC § 1227 [a] [2] [B] [i] [mandatory deportation for noncitizens convicted of controlled substance offense]; 8 USC § 1182 [a] [2] [A] [i] [II] [barring from eligibility for admittance or <mask> noncitizens convicted of controlled substance offense]; 8 USC § 1255 [a] [2] [disallowing adjustment of status to LPR for an undocumented noncitizen who is otherwise inadmissible] [collectively, the three INA provisions]), does not necessarily result in the immediate removal of the undocumented immigrant.


Apparently she found living conditions in Ireland less satisfying than she had expected they would be. She became ill there and determined to come back to the United States. Not being a citizen and not having a return permit, she had difficulty in obtaining an American <mask>. She wrote to her various connections in this country both in New Jersey and in .New York city and eventually and after long delay obtained a visa which enabled her to sail from Ireland on December 8, 1936. She became very ill on the steamer and was taken oft at Boston, where she died on December 13, 1936. In the instrument propounded as her will and admitted to probate in New Jersey she declared herself to be of a town in the county of Offaly, Irish Free State. The instrument was executed in the Irish Free State.


The facts of the instant case, and the resultant charges leveled against defendant Ralph Timmons, are simply stated. On September 28,1983, at about 3:30 p.m., on West 46th Street, Manhattan, a man appropriated and rode away with the bicycle of complainant, Stephan Barat. As the thief fled, Barat swung his shoulder bag at him, but the man grabbed the bag and escaped. The bag contained various personal possessions of Barat, including a <mask> credit card. The expiration date on the credit card happened to be the end of April, 1983, some five months before the larceny.


Irvine schools and constantly praised the quality of education. The Bangs discussed the possibility of Lee and Kim immigrating via an E-2 <mask>, which were granted to individuals having business investments in the United States. This visa would allow Lee and Kim’s children to attend Irvine schools. The Bangs did not mention the possibility of Kim purchasing Corea BBQ to satisfy the E-2 visa requirements until after Lee returned to Korea. III. Living in America


ble for the <mask> Waiver Program unless the Secretary of Homeland Security “evaluates the effect that the country’s designation would have on the law enforcement and security interests of the United States.” See also id. § 1187(c)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring participating countries to share information regarding safety risks); Department of State, Visa Waiver Program (VWP), http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990. html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (“To be admitted to the Visa Waiver Program, a country must meet various security and other requirements, such as enhanced law enforcement and security-related data sharing with the United States and timely reporting of both blank and issued lost and stolen passports. VWP members are also required to maintain high counterterrorism, law enforcement, border control, and document security standards.”).


Finally, the court will not condone the submission of an apparently fraudulent document to the federal government for the purpose of obtaining a <mask>. The employment contract was expressly conditioned upon Ramani obtaining a visa. Both Ramani and Prime were aware that the federal government would not issue the visa unless the noncompete clause was removed. Ramani and Prime acted in concert to fraudulently obtain the visa and to defeat the very purpose of the visa waiver program.


. Caesar distinguished between applying for an F-l student <mask>, which must be done in the applicant’s country of origin, and a change of nonimmigrant status to that of an F-l student, which can be accomplished via an application filed in the United States (see tr at 107). Caesar did not indicate that there was a practical difference for the applicant in the outcome of these two processes.


The essential facts are as follows: during July of 1987, the claimant, Marsha Levin, purchased a round-trip ticket from *246New York City to Paris for her teen-age daughter who was scheduled to participate in a two-week student work-study program in France. The ticket, booked both ways on Air France flights, was purchased from Kasmir World Travel, Inc., in New York City and cost $680. Upon arriving in Paris, Mrs. Levin’s daughter was denied entry and was placed on the next Air France flight destined for the United States. She was denied entry because of her failure to present a <mask> upon her arrival in France. The claimant asserts that she was not informed of these visa requirements and that it was the obligation of the travel agent to inform her of these visa requirements which were adopted by the French government in an apparent attempt to deal with terrorist activities directed at Americans abroad. In fact, Mrs. Levin testified that only a few years before her daughter’s trip, she herself had traveled to France without being required to present a visa. She has now sued Kasmir which in turn has claimed over against Air France.


The petitioner denied all of the contentions of the Government. The court will first consider whether the petitioner has lawfully been admitted to the United States for permanent residence. The evidence shows that the petitioner entered the United States as a nonquota immigrant pursuant to section 101 (subd. [a], par. [27], cl. [A]) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (U. S. Code, tit. 8, § 1101, subd. [a], par. [27], cl. [A]) as the spouse of Loretta Mauro, a citizen of the United States. It is the opinion of this court that the petitioner has met the burden of proof required by law to show that he entered the United States lawfully by the introduction into evidence of his nonquota immigrant <mask> indicating his lawful admission to the United States at Niagara Falls, New York, March 5, 1953 and by the testimony of said Loretta Mauro.


On the basis of the foregoing, claimant maintains that defendant State of New York “owed Gani a duty of care springing from a relationship of trust or confidence” (id. ¶ 33), Gani had a concomitant right to rely on the State’s representations (id. ¶ 34), and the State damaged Gani by making “repeated fraudulent representations” about his immigration application on which Gani relied to his detriment (id. ¶ 35). Specifically, claimant asserts that “solely as a result of the negligence of the defendant[ ] . . . Gani was denied his application to change his <mask> status to an student visa” (id. ¶ 37), and thereby became ineligible “to complete a post-graduate academic degree at SUNY Maritime College” (id. ¶ 38).


Defendant's attorney testified that after being retained by defendant they did not discuss the charges until he reviewed the police report. He did not remember discussing immigration consequences with defendant or what was said, but they did discuss the subject, as counsel discusses immigration consequences with all his clients. He asks clients whether there are immigration issues and he notes that in their files, though he made no such notes in this case. Counsel then testified that he tells "every client [who is] here with a <mask> or a green card or illegal, you always have the risk of getting deported," but he does not keep notes about what he does or does not advise clients. A *1003no-jail plea agreement was reached because defendant had a job and the facts of the case deserved a no-jail disposition.


Approximately two weeks after Patricia called the police, immigration officials removed Patricia from her home. Approximately a year later, Patricia was removed from the country. Patricia remained outside of the country for four months. However, she was allowed to return to this country after applying for a <mask> that, according to Patricia, is used "when a crime happens on the family."


<mask> (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)).” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5) (2006). Because ATF has requested our view on the meaning of section 922(g)(5)(B) only, our opinion is limited to that subsec- tion, but our analysis would likely apply to section 922(d)(5), provided no relevant differences between that provision and section 922(g)(5)(B) exist.


The next question is what regulations have been made. Plaintiff points out that assurances in the same general form have been in use for over 30 years. This, however, begs the question. The extended use of the form is not a guide to the purpose behind that use. The use itself is just as compatible with the theory that the form was employed to lend an air of solemnity to a moral obligation as it is with the theory of contract. However, if a contract is authorized the use of a contract form would be a strong indication that such was intended. In this connection, it is well to note that the defendants do not argue that they were misled into making a contract. Their point is that the consular officer had no right to exact a contract from them, because the United States sought no such contract as a condition for granting a <mask>. Plaintiff produced no regulation or promulgation of any department. Actually, the record shows that the State Department has consistently refused to take a stand on whether the affidavit is an enforeible agreement, showing that this is a matter for the courts. Also, the State Department has issued a pamphlet of “ General Information Regarding Visas for Immigrants ’ ’ in which it prescribes that a sponsor may submit a statement showing his ability and willingness to contribute to the support of the immigrant. This is quite different from an agreement to supply that support. Also, there is a statutory provision for the posting of a bond where a visa would otherwise be refused for likelihood that the immigrant would become a public charge., (U. S. Code, tit. 8, § 1183.)


The denouement came on June 2, 1938 when Jane was served with papers wherein Dr. Roe sued for an annulment alleging that Jane had fraudulently induced him to marry her. At about the same time deportation proceedings were instituted against her on the ground that she had overstayed the time permitted under her visitor’s <mask>. It should be noted that deportation to her native land, which by that time had been taken over by Hitler, would have subjected Jane to penal sanctions for having married a Jew. I will make the observation without further comment that the institution of deportation proceedings against Jane at the time of her difficulties with her husband was exceptionally coincidental.


Nevertheless, the only two reported decisions found in which a court of this State has been required to consider the effect of a foreign decree of divorce rendered ex parte against a New York domiciliary with no past or present tie to the foreign jurisdiction, as was Dosie Mae Brown, both resulted in a refusal to grant comity to Mexican decrees. In Carbone v Carbone (166 Misc 924 [Dom Rel Ct, Bronx County 1938]), the decision was put upon the basis that although insofar as was shown by the proof the plaintiff in the foreign proceeding had not gone to Mexico for the purpose of instituting a divorce action, but rather did so while on a six-month stay during the winter months to improve her health, neither did she go there for the purpose of establishing a bona fide permanent residence, as was evident from her return to the United States shortly after the decree had been obtained. In Ruderman v *819Ruderman (193 Misc 85 [Sup Ct, NY County 1948], affd 275 App Div 834 [1st Dept 1949]), the spouses, both natives of New York City, had married in Mexico, where the husband had a student <mask> which was renewable yearly and the wife, who remained a schoolteacher in New York, lived with him there for a couple of summer vacations during his four-year stay. The court found that the husband had not acquired a domicile in Mexico, having inferred from the timing of his presence there that he was avoiding conscription for the Armed Forces of this country during the years of the Second World War, at the conclusion of which he promptly returned.


The district court observed that an advance waiver of potential future conflicts, such as the one executed by First Data and Heller, is permitted under California law, even if the waiver does not specifically state the exact nature of the future conflict. (<mask>, supra, 241 F.Supp.2d at p. 1105.) Citing Zador, the Vis a court emphasized that the "only inquiry that need be made is whether the waiver was fully informed," and noted that "[a] second waiver by First Data in a non-related litigation would only be required if the waiver letter insufficiently disclosed the nature of the conflict that subsequently arose between Visa and First Data." (Id. at p. 1106,.)