It is well recognized that parole revocation proceedings are separate and distinct from criminal prosecutions as the former are governed by an administrative agency rather than through judicial intervention. As such, the full array of constitutional rights and protections afforded a criminal defendant is unavailable to parole revocation proceedings (see Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 480 [1972]). Identifying those protections that must be extended to parolees, however, is neither simple nor clear especially when wading through the murky waters of the administrative process. Just as criminal constitutional protections cannot be applied wholesale to administrative hearings (Morrissey, 408 US at 480; Matter of State of New York v Floyd Y., 22 NY3d 95, 103 [2013]), though, so too reliance upon civil proceeding precedent, as respondent argues, is inapposite. To equate a civil commitment proceeding where an attorney need only represent the interests of his mentally incompetent client with a parole revocation proceeding requiring a parolee to assist in his own defense is patently absurd. Aside from “notice and hearing[s] [being a] prerequisite to due process” (Joint Anti-Fascist <mask> Comm. v McGrath, 341 US 123, 164 [1951]), there exists a fundamental difference between criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings.


Turning to the source of defendant’s liability, subdivision 4 of section 3202 of the Education Law, that statute reads as follows: “4. [Effective until July 1, 1981. See also subd. 4 below.] Except as provided in subdivision six of this section, children cared for in a duly incorporated orphan <mask> or other institution for the care, custody and treatment of children, other than the children of the officers and employees of such institution, shall not, by reason of their presence in such institution, be deemed to be residents of the school district in which such institution is located. The trustees or other authorities in charge of any such institution may contract with the trustees or board of education of the school district in which such institution is located for the secular instruction of such children. If such children are supported and maintained at the expense of a public welfare district, the cost of the secular instruction of such children in the school or schools in the district shall be paid by the public welfare district which is liable for the payment of the cost of their support and maintenance. If such children are not supported and maintained at the expense of a public welfare district, the cost of the secular instruction of such children in the school or schools in the district shall be a charge upon and shall be paid by the school district responsible for their instruction at the time of their admittance to said duly incorporated orphan asylum or other institution for the care, custody and treatment of children. The trustees or board of education of the school district in which such institution is located shall receive such children in the school or schools of the district for instruction for a compensation to be fixed by the trustees or board of education, unless such trustees or board of education shall establish to the satisfaction of the commissioner of education that there are valid and sufficient reasons for refusal to receive such children.”


After filing for political <mask>, plaintiff found employment in the construction industry, working for Fine-Line Building Services, Inc., which hired plaintiff to renovate and to paint the lobby area of the premises located at 17 East 89th Street, New York County. While working for Fine-Line Building Services, plaintiff was injured on June 13, 2006. A large mail cart, being handled by defendant’s employee, fell over upon plaintiff as he painted the baseboard in the hallway of defendant’s building. The instant case followed.


A careful examination of the affidavits presented in the case lead me to" the conclusion that, at present at least, the father should not have the custody of the child. The evidence is quite convincing that his desire to get the custody of the child is less on account of his affection for it than his disposition to deprive its grandfather, and especially Agnes Riemann, of it. It is not questioned that at the time the father obtained possession of it the child was receiving every kind and gentle treatment which loving and affectionate relatives could give it; that their affection for the child is unquestioned; that its care and education will be looked after without expense to Holzer; that Mr. Riemann promises, in his affidavit, that if the ctiild shall continue to live with him the interest in his property to which its mother would have been entitled shall go to it on his.decease. On the contrary, when the father took the child on the 13th day of November, he at once took it to the <mask>, with a view to placing it there. The asylum authorities refused to receive the child without some reason being shown, when he went away, and at night returned with it, with a statement that he had been unable to find any place for it, when they consented to take it on the agreement that he should at once take steps to procure the consent of the trustees of the institution. It appears that at this time there were 125 homeless and destitute children in the asylum; that many of them were sick, and some had died from contagious disease. With this state of things the child was permitted by the father to remain there until he was sent for by the managers on the following Sunday, without once calling to inquire after its comfort or welfare. This, of itself, indi*518-cotes strongly to my mind that Holzer had no affection for the child, and only •cared to deprive its grandfather of the custody of it.


“[E]ven assuming the respondent’s eligibility to apply for <mask>,” the BIA found no nexus to a particular social group. Because Plancarte had not established a particular social group, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of both asylum and withholding relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of CAT relief on the ground that “respondent did not show that she is more likely than not to be tortured, by or with the acquiescence . . . of a government official upon return to Mexico.” The BIA wrote, “The Immigration Judge . . . noted that there is no evidence that Mexican public officials were involved in the respondent being pressed into service for a criminal organization as a nurse.”


See Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 687–89, 691–92 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that IJ “continually abused an increasingly distraught petitioner,” including by repeated commands to speak through the interpreter). Morales also relies on Ignatov v. Ashcroft, 71 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2003), an unpublished decision, which is of course non-precedential. See, e.g., Wallace v. Mahanoy, 2 F.4th 133, 144 n.16 (3d Cir. 2021). Even if Ignatov were designated as precedential, it would be unhelpful for Morales. Ignatov distinguished Ponce-Leiva on the basis that the petitioner had a facially valid reason to request <mask>; therefore, the absence of a lawyer was prejudicial. See 71 F. App’x at 161–62. Here, as we will discuss, Morales cannot show prejudice. 611 F.3d at 173–75; see 8 CFR. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(2). Pet. Br. at 22 (“[W]hether Mr. Morales was aware of the existence of pro bono counsel bears no relationship to whether he felt adequately represented by his attorney.”). The Government suggests that Morales may have forfeited his ineffective assistance argument by not squarely raising it on appeal. Indeed, claims raised only in passing are deemed forfeited. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 368 n.3 (3d Cir. 2020). But here, Morales filed a motion to remand for ineffective assistance of counsel before the BIA, and he alleges that his prior counsel was ineffective throughout his brief. Furthermore, the BIA found that Morales had complied with the factors from Matter of Lozada for the preservation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638–39 (BIA 1988). As a result, we consider the claim.


“ [W]here there has been a practical construction placed by the representatives of the people upon the constitutional provision, and where great public works in localities have been carried out through the assistance of large loans and investment of moneys, advanced upon the faith of the validity of the legislation which authorized them, it would not do for the courts to construe in too strict or illiberal a sense.” (Matter of Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 429.) “ When the parties to a contract of doubtful meaning, guided by self-interest, enforce it for a long time by a consistent and uniform course of conduct, so as to give it a practical meaning, the courts will treat it as having that meaning, even if as an original proposition they might have given it a different one. * * * So, when the meaning of a statute is doubtful, a practical construction by those for whom the law was enacted, or by public officers whose duty it was to enforce it, acquiesced in by all for a long period of time * * * ‘ is entitled to great if not controlling influence ’ ”. (City of New York v. New York City Ry. Co., 193 N. Y. 543, 548-549; italics added; Matter of Kolb v. Holling, 285 N. Y. 104; Matter of Washington St. <mask>, 115 N. Y. 442, 447.) We have here a practical construction by the Town Board of its own ordinance, which to me approaches the conclusiveness of interpretations by administrative agencies of their own regulations. (Franconia Vil. Co-op. v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 33 Misc 2d 540 and cases therein *1034cited.) I conclude that in adopting the 1935 amendment to section 56 of its zoning ordinance, the Town Board thereby intended that procedures to further amend the ordinance were to be governed by the provisions of the Town Law as they might exist at the time future amendments were sought and that notice of the hearing preceding adoption of the July 25,1957 amendment was timely published.


The statute provides, in substance, that the assessed valuation of the entire property, including land and building, shall be presumed to be the fair value of the premises. For the purposes of this proceeding, the respective parties agreed that the assessed value shall be controlling. However, there is dispute as to whether the 1956/1957 assessment of $1,050,000 or the 1957/1958 assessment of $1,075,000 should prevail. It appears that the 1957/1958 assessment was fixed by the tax commission on February 1, 1957, and taxed at $43,752.50. The testimony established that no application had been filed with the tax commission to reduce this assessment, nor was any court or other proceeding pending for a reduction. So that, prior to the commencement of the instant proceeding, the 1957/1958 assessment was fixed and determined. Consequently, that figure is adopted as the value of the property for computing a fair return. The statute further provides that an annual return of 8% on the fair value of the entire property is presumed to be reasonable. A return of 8% is justified and adopted (Matter of Trustees of Masonic Hall & <mask> Fund [Liggett Drug Co.], 1N Y 2d 616, supra).


In April, 1886,' was the first time she saw Brumagim at No. 1 Fifth street; Mrs. Churchill followed him out; he only remained a few minutes; she never saw her father alone in that place; she made a visit there in May, 1886; her father said he wanted her to speak to Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Churchill to speak to her, and they did so; Mrs. Churchill said, “Robert, Mrs. McGregor is the only one of the family who understands this case.” On Sunday, the 23d of May, 1886, the daughter being on a visit to the father, he turned to Mrs. Churchill and asked her to leave the room, as he had occasion to speak to his daughter; she did not leave the room, nor make answer. When the daughter visited No. 1 Fifth street, Mrs. Churchill and Miss Baty, one or both, were always there; sometimes Mr. Brumagim was there, sometimes a Mr. Pat Lynch; one time the daughter at her own home heard her father say he was going to marry Mrs. Churchill at Pioneer Hall, and would drive the family there in a coach and four (Judge’s Notes, pages 9 to 13). A witness Mrs. Catherine Donnelly, testifies that she was employed at No. 1 Fifth street by Mrs. Either as chambermaid; that Mrs. Churchill at that time was also a chambermaid; that there was a kitchen on the second floor, and she saw the wife of deceased there when Mrs. Churchill was in the kitchen, and the wife was making beef tea. Mrs. Churchill said to her, “If she was his wife she would buy him a barrel of rotgut, *523and let him drink himself to death; that he would go to the gutter, anyhow.” On one occasion she testifies that she heard the deceased say to Mrs. Churchill, “Don’t call me Mr. Robert; call me your dear Robert,” and kissed her. On another occasion she had conversation with Mrs. Churchill about the deceased, and Mrs. Churchill had said that his wife had thrown him out, and she had picked him out of the gutter; and his wife was only a common whore, and that he had caught her in a house of assignation with a hackman. This last conversation spoken of was in March, 1885. Again she met her on Kearny street and had a conversation with her, and the witness said to Mrs. Churchill, “I see you have bought a lot; how did you get the money so quick?” to which inquiry the response was, “I have made a great deal of money in stocks, and have bought the lot and paid for it.” Once again, on Fifth street, Mrs. Churchill said, “I have had a handsome Christmas present, a pair of blankets, two oil paintings and a diamond ring, which Mr. Tiffany gave me. ’ ’ This was in April or May, 1886 (Judge’s Notes, pages 16, and 17). All of these statements are denied by Mrs. Churchill (Judge’s Notes, page 184). The deceased went to room at 628 Sutter street, in the house of Mrs. Kate E. Learned, in December, 1884, and was there about a year and a half; he came with a Mr. Rapp; he stayed in the first room six or seven months, then he took a small room for eight or nine months; he went away five or six months after he came, and then returned; his attorney, Joseph M. Wood, paid for three or four months: Mrs. Churchill paid one month, the rest of the time he paid himself; he did not stay there half the time in the first period referred to; during the second period he was absent for a month at a time; Mrs. Churchill had a key to his room, also of his trunk; Mr. Tiffany introduced Mrs. Churchill to Mrs. Learned; he said that Mrs. Churchill was a dear friend of his; she lived at 1 Fifth street, and did the chamber work for Mrs. Either; Mrs. Churchill may have remained there fifteen or twenty minutes at the time in his room; she was introduced to the witness two or three months after Mr. Tiffany first came, and the witness saw her there afterward during the first period of his stay at the house; she would come sometimes two, or three, or four times a *524month; she would be accompanied by him, and remain a half hour at a time, and he would go out with her; she would always be at his room. The witness learned from Mr. Tiffany that he went from her house to 504 Sutter street, to a Mrs. Meyers; he subsequently returned to the house of Mrs. Learned to see if he could get a room, and said, “I was sorry I left your house, but Mrs. Churchill desired it, as she and Mrs. Meyers were friends, but now they have quarreled and I now want to come back.” He and the witness had a conversation about Mrs. Churchill; he said, “What is the rent of the front suite of rooms, and what will you board me and Mrs. Churchill for? I am going to get a divorce, and am going to marry Mrs. Churchill.” The witness had a great many conversations with him upon that topic. She had also a conversation with Mrs. Churchill in the latter part of 1885. Mrs. Churchill came to her house and said she wanted his things. The witness said she was glad, as she did not want him in her house; Mrs. Churchill said she had taken a room for him in O’Farrell street, that his family had tried to put him in the insane <mask>, that she would take care of him, that his family were willing that she should take care of him, but were not willing to do anything for him; that she would show them she should take care of him, and would do so to spite his wife. Mrs. Churchill took his trunk and other things belonging to him. The witness said Mr. Tiffany would very seldom come in before 12 or 1 o’clock at night; he was always intoxicated when he came in; he wore ornaments on his person during the second period, a tooth in his necktie. The tooth, he said, was Mrs. Churchill’s, a diamond ring, which he said she gave him as a present. He told her he gave to Mrs. Churchill all the money, and she paid the bills and collected the rents. There was another conversation on that subject, in which he said he had given her certain property, and had her name put in large letters, “Churchill Court.” The witness told her that on the occasion of the divorce trial he told her he ivas going to appeal, and would beat them, and said, “I will beat them, you bet your bottom dollar, and on the first of the month I will marry Mrs. Churchill.” This was in August or September, 1885 (Judge’s Notes, page 31). Another witness, Mrs. Sallie Johnson, an *525old friend of the deceased, saw him frequently in 1885, and observed him closely, and was frequently with him, and visited him in November, 1885. On one occasion he was lying on a lounge too short for him, in the room, his clothes were badly disordered and uncleanly. This was on November 7, 1885. He was very glad to see her; he wanted to kiss her, and said, “I am very glad to see you, good lady, that you have come to see me.” She said she was very sorry to see him so ill; he spoke of some of his family very abusively. There was a woman in the room to whom she was introduced as Mrs. Churchill. The second time this witness called the deceased was very ill and very excitable, and said to her, ‘‘Do you see that on the mantle-piece there [pointing to what appeared to be a glass of jelly] ! They have brought that to poison me.” He said his daughter brought it; he asked witness to drink with him, liquor of some kind, which she declined; the liquor was handed to him by Mrs. Churchill; the deceased got angry and abusive to the witness when she declined, and said, ‘‘Damn it, cannot you take a drink with an old friend!” He abused the members of his family, said they were going to rob him and poison him; the witness communicated to the daughter the information of the conversation with her father (Judge’s Notes, pages 33 and 34). Another witness, Mrs. Sarah B. Cooper, an old acquaintance and friend of the deceased and his wife, and superintendent and manager of the kindergarten system of schools, relates many peculiarities of the deceased as a basis of her opinion that he was insane in November and December, 1885. From May to November of that year he visited her school as often as forty-eight times; that she believed him to be unsound of mind (Judge’s Notes, pages 34 to 38). A witness, E. H. Neville, a twenty-five years’ acquaintance of the deceased, very intimate with him from 1878, testifies to peculiarities indicating a change in his character, from daily observations, and recites numerous incidents and instances of his conduct indicating insanity. For five years the deceased occupied a desk in the office of the witness, and was in there every day, or nearly every day. Once in 1884, the deceased showed to the witness a human tooth, mounted as a pin on his scarf, which he told him came from the mouth of *526Mrs. Churchill, whom he described as “the loveliest and most angelic woman on earth,” and that he was going to marry her. The deceased also showed to the witness a picture of a woman pasted in his hat, on which was written, “From Lura to Robert. ’ ’ The witness related that the deceased brought several persons to his office upon one occasion and introduced them to him, one as his dear friend “Shorty Simpson,” whom he kissed and embraced; another was Herbert Slade (known as the “Maori,” a prizefighter); also another one, “Sconchin” Maloney, and others of more or less like character. One time, after the divorce suit was brought, the deceased came to the witness’ office with -his wife, and said it was the happiest day of his life, all his troubles were arranged, he and his wife were going to see his Mission property, and they went out together; subsequently on the same day the deceased came into the witness’ office and said he was much pleased that it was all arranged. The witness asked him, “How about the divorce suit?” The deceased said that was “all nonsense,” he would not have brought it, but he “was persuaded to do so by that Brumagim,” using an opprobrious epithet. Another witness, John Mason, an old citizen and acquaintance of the family, testified that after the witness had gone into business as a brewer at the Mission, Twenty-ninth and Tiffany avenue, in March, 1884, he saw the deceased as often as four times a week, from that time to his last sickness, except when he was sick and away from there; he had drank with the deceased may times, too numerous to mention; sometimes at the place called Cody’s, on Twenty-ninth and Mission streets; he had numerous conversations with the deceased, which occurred during the progress of the work of construction of the Tiffany block, when the witness, at the instance of deceased, noted the manner in which the work was done. The witness saw Mrs. Churchill once at Cody’s, and was introduced to her by the deceased, who came down to the brewery and insisted on the witness going to be introduced, which the witness did not desire. The witness said to deceased that he did not want to go; that the deceased had no grounds for separation or divorce from his wife; but he went, and in the back room adjoining the bar-room saw Mrs. Churchill; he was introduced *527by the deceased to her as the lady to whom he was going to be married as soon as he got a divorce; she made no remark; the three had a drink together. The witness saw her subsequently several times out there, and saw the deceased in the fall of 1885, sometimes at the brewery and sometimes at Cody’s. Once the deceased came out to the brewery; the deceased said that he was something of a pugilist himself, and took off his coat and vest and rolled up his shirt sleeves to show his muscles, and said he was as vigorous as a man of twenty-five or thirty years of age; that when John L. Sullivan came out he would have a set-to with him; he could not live without sleeping with a woman and Mrs. Churchill "just filled the bill.” The witness said to him that he was foolish to talk in that manner. Subsequently, and in the same conversation, the deceased said he was going back to his "mamma”; that she was a good wife to him and true, and he was going back, as his advisers were not advising him right. The deceased also said he had made his will, and everything was going to his two sons, his "mamma,” his daughter and his grandchild. Another witness, D. B. Jackson, an acquaintance of the deceased from 1843, when he worked with him in New York City, after testifying to many events during that period, says that in the fall of 1884 he met the deceased at the Bay District Race Course, accompanied by Mrs. Churchill, whom the witness identified in the courtroom as the person to whom the deceased introduced him at the time; the deceased showed the witness her card photograph in his hat. Prior to the introduction the deceased said to the witness, "I want to introduce you to my daisy”; that was after the State Pair in October, 1885. He often said to the witness, of Mrs. Churchill, that "she was the dearest creature on earth, taking the nicest and best care of him.” A few days before the deceased was taken down finally, he came to the office of the witness with his daughter and grandchild, and said that they were provided for; he had made everything all right.


The relator’s claim that the proceedings here are defective in that the indictment does not state the date the alleged crime was committed is without merit. The indictment annexed to the request for the warrant of extradition was found in compliance with the laws of the State of Alabama which provide that it is not necessary to state the precise time at which the offense was committed, but it may be alleged to have been committed on any day before the finding of the indictment. The indictment does state that the crime charged was committed before the finding of the indictment. This meets the requirements of the Alabama statute (Code of Alabama, tit. 15, § 237; Kimbell v. State, 165 Ala. 118). Under Alabama law, the particulars as to the time, place and circumstances not constituting essential elements of the crime charged, may be dispensed with by statute and be left as a matter of proof (Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 672; Boyd v. State, 3 Ala. App. 178). It is to be noted that the Alabama statute is similar to section 280 of our Code of Criminal Procedure. It is thus apparent that the indictment according to the laws of Alabama is a valid one and is not subject to attack in the <mask> State of New York (People ex rel. Marshall v. Moore, 167 App. Div. 479, 486, affd. 217 N. Y. 632; People ex rel. Gilbert v. Babb, 415 111. 349; Ex Parte Beggel, 114 U. S. 642). If the indictment is in substantial conformity with the laws of the demanding State, its sufficiency as a matter of technical pleading cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus.


*4632. The most important question arises under the following facts: A bond and mortgage had been executed by Louisa Uhl to the decedent and his wife. The decedent died before his wife, and the point to be decided is whether or not the bond and mortgage became the property of the wife on the death of her husband by right of survivorship, or whether the estate of the husband was entitled to some portion thereof. The objectors concede that in the case of real property, in case of a transfer of this kind, the right of survivorship would exist, but claim that a different rule prevails with respect to personal property. The referee held that there was no difference and cites authorities to sustain his position. The case of Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, proceeded on the theory that the statutes enlarging the powers of married women with reference to property rights, being m derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed, and that these statutes did not abrogate the common-law rule that a conveyance to husband and wife created an estate by the entirety, with the right of survivorship as an incident of that quality of title. The common-law rule as to the right of survivorship was based upon the unity of husband and wife, and a conveyance in the joint names of husband and wife was presumed to be a gift and advancement to the wife by the husband, unless evidence of a different intention was adduced. That the case of Bertles v. Nunan, supra, is an authority as to the continuance of the common-law rule with respect to personal property as well as real estate is apparent from the language of the court, who say: “The claim is made that the legislature referred to and destroyed the common-law unity of husband and wife, and made them substantially separate persons for all purposes. We are of the opinion that the statutes have not gone so far. ” Again, the court say: “The statutes had in view the enjoyment of that which is hers, not the force and effect of the instrument by which an estate may be granted to her.” In re Brooks, 5 Dem. Sur. 326; Orphan <mask> v. Strain, 2 Bradf. Sur. 37; Platt v. Grubb, 1 N. Y. St. Rep. 494; Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723, 58 N. Y. 72. The exceptions to the report of the referee are overruled, and the report confirmed.


The findings of the court do not indicate that these proceedings in question were had under that branch of the statute. The finding is, that the petition asked leave to mortgage real estate to raise $1,500 to pay this debt. A reference to the certified copy of the papers shows that this was the nature of the proceedings, and that it must be governed by the rules laid down in sections 6 to 13 of the- act. Indeed, proceedings to pay this claim of the lunatic <mask> could not be taken under the authority given to mortgage or sell to pay the debts of the lunatic. This claim was not a debt of the lunatic. It was contracted for the maintenance of the lunatic by the committee who has no power to contract for the lunatic. (Pearl v. McDowell, 20 Am. Dec., 199.) If he paid it the court might allow it in his accounts, or the court could authorize real estate to be disposed of to pay it under title 2, section 9, but not under sections 17, et seg.


Mrs. Swall was a witness for proponent and is the wife of George Swall and lived for a part of the time with her sister, who before her decease was the wife of the present husband of witness and had charge of the children, of whom she is stepmother and aunt, and who are minors and legatees under the will in contest. Witness used to live off and on for years with her uncle, Salvin Perry Collins, and subsequently for some time with his widow, and she says that Mr. Collins was a kind and courteous gentleman. He seldom quarreled or gave offense to anyone. Mrs. Collins was not an untruthful woman, but her temperament was excitable. She did accuse witness of trying to poison her, which witness denied, and she thinks that decedent believed her, although she afterward repeated the accusation. Decedent said that Mr. Scott was trying to poison her and trying to put her in an insane <mask>. Witness asked her why she married him, and she said it was in a business manner, as she wanted somebody to attend to her affairs and she thought he ivas capable, but she found he was very different. Decedent did say that Mr. Scott was running after other women; but did not specify any particular person. She had made similar remarks about" Mr. Collins, her first husband. She said that Scott was trying to get her out of the way and that he had told her that all that he had married her for was her money.


word formation and sentence structure, and a phonetic system which are not similar to English” as well as a vocabulary “derived from a variety of sources, including . . . indigenous languages, English[,] and French.”). Yet on June 9, 2019, a border patrol of- ficer interviewed Mr. Johnson in English. Before asking Mr. John- son any substantive questions, the officer made a statement in English to Mr. Johnson about the nature of the interview and asked Mr. Johnson if he understood. Mr. Johnson said that he did and then proceeded to answer the officer’s questions. In contrast, though, two months later, an <mask> officer filed a memo saying that Mr. Johnson “could not effectively communicate [in] Eng- lish” because he spoke Cameroonian Pidgin English and only re- sponded in that language. Because no Cameroonian Pidgin Eng- lish translator was available, he did not interview Mr. Johnson. On his I-589 application for asylum and withholding of re- moval, Mr. Johnson wrote that his native language was Bangwa, that he spoke Pidgin English fluently, and that he was not fluent in English. He requested and received a Pidgin English interpret- er for the merits hearing. At that hearing and through the inter- preter, Mr. Johnson explained to the IJ that although he generally did not understand English, he could understand some things. He also testified that he could not read English. Even with the inter- preter, there were several moments of confusion due to transla- tion issues during the hearing. Much of this case turns on inconsistencies between state- ments Mr. Johnson made without an interpreter and statements USCA11 Case: 20-12783 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 11 of 11


The proceeding whereby the plaintiff was restrained of his liberty may be briefly summarized as follows: A son-in-law, with whom the plaintiff did not reside, on his petition, accompanied by a certificate of two medical examiners, whose sworn statement shows; that they did not believe the plaintiff to be insane, but “ devilish ’* only, made application to the county judge, and thereupon, without *388any personal service upon, or notice to, the plaintiff, the county judge made an order committing him to an insane <mask>, and the following day made a certificate that he had dispensed with personal service because the plaintiff “ would not comprehend motive of the proceeding.”


description of her encounter with the police inconsistent and lacking important details. In both her declaration in support of her <mask> application and her hearing testimony, she had said that the police grabbed her by the hair and hit her head against the wall; however, in her declaration in support of her asylum application, she also had stated that the police forced her to kneel, slapped her repeatedly, and kicked her after she had fallen to the floor. The nature of her injuries differed as well. In her asylum declaration, she recounted that she had suffered a bloody nose and had become dizzy. However, in her testimony she said only that she was bruised and swollen. The IJ noted that “the respondent was asked both during di- rect and cross-examination to explain the assault and extent of her injuries, but [had] failed to provide details consistent with her written declaration.” “In sum,” the IJ concluded, the respondent’s testimony was internally in- consistent and inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including with the notes from the respondent’s asylum interview. The court addi- tionally note[d] certain omissions in her testi- mony. Moreover her testimony was often vague and failed to explain discrepancies. While the court acknowledge[d] that each of these find- ings alone might [have been] insufficient to war- rant an adverse credibility finding, the court [wa]s concerned with the cumulative effect of these inconsistencies.


It will be observed a trust was created expressly “ for the benefit of my son, John H. Holden, during his natural fife.” The fund clearly was to be used for the benefit of the son, both interest and principal. The one thing that was to be done was to devote the money to the care, comfort and maintenance of the son, and the amount only was left to the discretion of the trustee. In that case the evidence showed that the son was forty-seven years of age, unmarried, that he repaired clocks and sewing machines and sewed in families whenever he could get such employment; that he possessed many eccentricities and vagaries; that he had been insane and was at one time the inmate of an <mask>, and possessed neither a vigorous or healthy body or a well-balanced mind. In that case, we may well conclude, taking the language of the will and the circumstances into consideration, that the father did not intend that his son should be subjected to the stress on his mind or body to earn a livelihood but did intend that his trustee should amply provide for his support and comfort and allow him to work whenever he saw fit to do so and accumulate a little fund of his own, thinking occupation would no doubt tend to make him happier and prevent his lapsing again into insanity.


Furthermore, the doctrine of prescriptive right is not a defense available to the State of New York herein, for the law is that there can be no prescriptive right against property affected with a public interest or dedicated to a public use. (Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77; St. Vincent Orphan <mask> v. City of Troy, 76 N. Y. 108; Matter of City of New York, 217 N. Y. 1.) Although the foregoing eases are instances where individuals or private corporations attempted to assert a prescriptive right in a public thoroughfare they are applicable as authorities herein because by section 8 of the Court of Claims Act the State of New York stands in no different situation than an individual, having consented that like rules of law shall apply to it. Moreover, since prescriptive right is based upon the fiction of a lost grant it would be absurd to make a determination which would in effect hold that the town officials gave the State the right to flood and destroy a public highway every year or so at a certain season. Such action would be clearly beyond their authority, illegal and void. (Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57, 66, 67.)


“Section 40. After his incapeity has been judicially determined, a person of unsound mind can make no conveyance or other contract, nor delegate any power, nor waive any right, until his restoration to capacity is judicially determined. But if actually restored to capacity he may make a will, though his restoration is not thus determined.” *387Counsel for contestant claims that the section as amended in 1878, and as it has continued since, is a conclusive bar to testator’s act, until he shall be restored to capacity by judicial decree. But the section of the Civil Code speaks of "a person of unsound mind,” and would seem to refer to those ¡persons whose minds are so deranged as to necessitate committal to an <mask> for the insane, and even in such case it is not at all clear that "restoration to capacity” means a judicial ascertainment and declaration to that effect. If it were intended to have such meaning, one word only was necessary to place it beyond doubt; the legislator could easily have employed the epithet "judicial,” qualifying "restoration to capacity”; instead of which he has amended by striking out the clause "is judicially determined” after those words, leaving it to be implied, if it be not explicit and in no need of implication, that actual restoration to capacity is the true intent of the section.


§ 1158(b)(3). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Tomas- Perez’s appeal from the denial of her application, and she now petitions for review of that decision.1 We review the decision of the BIA and will consider the Immigration Judge’s decision only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 2016). Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 785- 86. Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s determination will be upheld “unless the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find otherwise.” Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006). Tomas-Perez cannot show that she is unable or unwilling to return to her country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group defined as “single indigenous Guatemalan women.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). Even assuming arguendo that the group she defined meets the requirements of a particular social group (a decision we need not make here), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision that the demands for money and the attempted rapes she faced were motivated by private criminality, which does not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Herrera Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 2017). Because Tomas-Perez failed to demonstrate her entitlement to <mask>, she necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent standard for


III. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Ibarra’s <mask> application was untimely and did not warrant an exception for changed circumstances. It then denied Ibarra’s request for withholding of removal and found that, even if Ibarra’s asylum application was timely, it would fail for the same reasons as did Ibarra’s request for withholding of removal. Lastly, it denied Ibarra’s request for CAT relief. Because the BIA evaluated Mexico’s country conditions and other evidence offered by Ibarra in the context of withholding of removal, we first address that claim before considering Ibarra’s application for asylum. 3 We conclude with Ibarra’s claim under the CAT. A. To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must demonstrate a “clear probability” of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Faddoul v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994)). Persecution is defined, in relevant part, as the infliction or suffering of harm “under government sanction” or by “groups the government is unable or unwilling to control.” See Chen, 470 F.3d at 1135 (citation omitted); Adebisi v. I.N.S., 952 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1992)


See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (precluding <mask> for aliens who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” which includes aggravated felonies); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (providing that conviction for “any aggravated felony” renders aliens ineligible for cancellation of removal); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that an alien convicted of one or more aggravated felonies with an aggregate prison sentence of at least five years is barred from seeking withholding of removal). See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p) (providing that a lawful-permanent-resident status “terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, removal, or recission”). See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes of moral turpitude), (II) (drug crimes). See id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). See id. § 1255(a) (providing that any inadmissible alien is ineligible for an adjustment of status). See id. (providing that an adjustment of status may be granted in the discretion of the Attorney General to aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are “admissible to the United States for permanent residence”).


47 Because Ms. Dai did not establish her eligibility for <mask>, she cannot meet the higher burden for withholding of removal. See supra note 28. Ms. Dai did not make any argument before this court regarding relief un- der the CAT; she therefore has forfeited any argument regarding that re- lief. See Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 736, 742 n.5 (7th Cir. 2017).


After July 6, 1912, until he was taken away to an <mask>, or sanatorium, Mr. Martin was at the summer hotel at Kittery Point. The various inmates of the hotel have given in great detail their evidence of what he did and said while there. Most of these witnesses were, however, before this summer strangers to Mr. Martin, and their opinions have not the fullest weight. Certainly Mr. Martin’s conduct between July 6 and 31, 1912, was in many respects very peculiar and lacking in good taste. Whether it bears evidence of the incapacity which certainly soon followed is another question. The proponents introduced circumstantial evidence which they thought tended to break the 'force of the evidence of insanity and to show that Mr. Martin was at this time sufficiently under the influence of liquor, to enable me to infer that the eccentricities and bad manners testified to may have been occasioned by drink and were not due to any mental impairment. But as Mr. Martin was shown to be always a temperate man and no witness at any time ever saw him drink to excess or actually under the influence of liquor, I cannot infer from such circumstantial evidence alone that the rather gross eccentricities and conduct of Mr. Martin testified to by the witnesses were due solely to a bare possibility of drink. These particular incidents of eccentricity and folly are, however, most important according as they tend to corroborate or *305rebut the medical testimony given in evidence or as they bear directly on the act of testamentation taking place on the 31st of July, 1912. That eight days after the 31st of July, 1912, Mr. Martin was insane the evidence conclusively demonstrated. During this last severe attack Mr. Martin died. The real question remains, Was Mr. Martin sufficiently sane in law to make his will on the 31st of July, 1912? The stupendous mass of evidence now before me is all addressed to that one narrow, definite and great question. This evidence has been exhaustively and laboriously presented and its legal effect argued by counsel in this case with the utmost ingenuity, learning and skill. That the will on its face bears internal evidence of rationality is not enough. The mere fact that an allographic will bears internal evidence of sanity does not establish capacity to make it. I know of but one authoritative case, not cited to me (Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phill. Ecc. 90), where a will was held to afford internal evidence of sanity, and that was a holograph. Now, a holograph is a declaration which may be given in evidence on an issue of sanity. The logic of the adjudication in Cartwright v. Cartwright in any respect has been criticised, and I think justly, for the will in that instance was allowed to prove sanity, and sanity being thus established the will was held valid. This is an example of the logical fallácy called circle in the proof—“ circulando in probando•


,: The evidence in this case satisfies me, and I think it must satisfy everybody, that this man might have and did have a lucid interval at that time; and that a will may be made in a lucid interval, of course, is established over and over again. It is not necessary to quote any. authority for that. The fact that this man had been committed to a lunatic <mask> may be presumptive evidence of his insanity, although that is controverted by Mr. Spink, (and I am inclined to think that he is right about it,) but for the sake of the case we will admit that. I have a case here, Matter of Pendleton, 1 Connoly Surr. Rep. 480, where the will of a person (who, at the time the will was made, was under the care and custody of á commission in lunacy) was admitted to probate. That, however, proves nothing. That case is no authority to us, except that the existence of the commission in lunacy was not regarded as conclusive at all upon the question of capacity. As to that, the court inquired independently, *452and came to the conclusion that the lunacy commission was wrong, and that the woman was sane, or ¡that she had a lucid interval. The number of .witnesses called by the contestants to sustain their, case,' by count—if we were to count them, and to thus talk about the weight of evidence—falls some five . or six short of the number called by the proponent ¡upon the very same question. There was one witness:.in .this case whose testimony was, to my mind,, a gem. Every word that fell from that woman’s lips-1. believe, was golden truth; and, if her testimony is true of the details of the conversation that she had with this man,— if what she said was true, as I believe it to have been beyond the possibility of a doubt,—then this man, Kiedaisch, the testator, was competent to execute a will; and quite aside from the testimony of. anybody else, taking that witness’ testimony—the. young ¡woman, Mrs. Beiser—taking her testimony as true, (aind I, as I have said, believe it to be,) there could be no question in the mind of anybody but that this¡.:man' was capable of making a will at the time he made, this one; and I have come to the conclusion, as you-,see, that on all the evidence I am satisfied beyond /any doubt that this decedent had capacity to make-this will, and that it is entitled to probate.- . And'I think that the testimony should satisfy the friends and ¡relatives of this man, who have so fairly and properly sought this contest and this inquiry. Let a decree be presented admitting the paper to probate.


The contentions of the beneficiary are overruled and her application for the payment to her of the amount of unpaid income or of future total net income is denied. In so far as they affect the interests of Julia Littman, the terms of the will were drawn with precision and foresight by the testator. He knew his sister’s unfortunate condition and her long record of confinement in various institutions. She was a special object of his solicitude. He intended in every possible way to provide for her comfortable support, but at the same time planned to guard her against her own improvidence or against the imposition of designing persons. The broadest powers were given to the trustees by paragraph tenth to apply “ so much of the income ” as may be necessary for her support and maintenance so long as she remained an invalid and the inmate of an <mask> or sanitarium or “ if the executors and trustees deem she is unable to care for herself.” The testator himself defined what he meant as the tests of her incapacity by his further statement that should she at any time recover her reason “ and be able to properly manage and care for herself and her property ” the trustees might pay the total net income to her after a method which he fixed for the determination of her mental strength and her capacity to care for herself and her property. A return to a condition of incapacity was foreseen and provided for. An additional formula of action for the trustees was outlined by the testator in the event that the beneficiary should again become mentally incompetent or an inmate of an institution. In such event the mandate was changed again from a direction to pay to a direction to apply. The draftsman plainly knew the technical distinction between these two legal forms of distribution of the income of testamentary trusts. (Matter of Connolly, 71 Misc. 388.)


The listed exemptions under section 1801(c) are: "[r]ental units in hotels, motels, inns, tourist homes and rooming and boarding houses"; "[r]ental units in any hospital, convent, monastery, extended medical care facility, <mask>, non-profit home for the aged, or dormitory owned and operated by an institution of higher education"; "[r]ental units which a government unit, agency or authority owns, operates, manages, or in which governmentally subsidized tenants reside"; "[r]ental units in owner-occupied dwellings with no more than three (3) units"; "[r]ental units and dwellings constructed after the adoption of this Article"; and "[w]here a unit is actually used for purposes of providing, on a non-profit basis, child care or other residential social services." None of these exemptions are applicable in this case.


I am also satisfied that, at the time the wills of 1874 and 1877 were executed, she possessed sufficient testamentary capacity. The very fact that she made the “mem. of my will,” for the latter will, which was drawn in strict accordance therewith, is the strongest evidence of that fact. It shows that she carried in her mind the provisions of the next prior one, together with the important intermediary acts, and also the condition of her pecuniary matters: That she omitted the Whelpley children from' its provisions, cannot be regarded as remarkable when it is shown that, for some cause, whether *382just or not, she had no particular regard, for them. Being of sound mind, her will stands as the reason for the act. The testimony of her attending physicians shows her competency. I agree with Surrogate Bradford, as to what he says, in Allen v. The Public Administrator (supra), in regard to the importance of such testimony. They saw, conversed with and observed her, and they give the facts and conclusions derived from them. It is, to my mind, much more satisfactory than the testimony of experts, based solely upon hypothetical questions. About three years subsequent to making the will of 1877, the old lady became palpably insane, laboring under very marked delusions, and it was not until she reached this stage, that the expert, Dr. Schmid, saw her. Able and skillful as he is, I am unwilling, from his inferences, as against the testimony of the attending physicians, to reach the conclusion that she was mentally unsound three years before. Dr. Nichols, the distinguished Superintendent of the Bloomingdale <mask>, to whose enlightened testimony I listened with great interest and pleasure, because of his thorough candor, large experience and perfect mastery of the subject, never saw the deceased. This witness failed, likewise, to impress my mind with a conviction of the mental incompetency of the testatrix in 1877. Had he been her attending physician at that time, and subsequently to the period of the manifestation of positive delusions, and had he then testified to her mental unsoundness throughout, giving the facts and the reasons, I should have felt bound to be guided by his mature judgment. As it is, I find that she was competent to make the will, and that it must be admitted to probate.


The meaning of this law seems to be that Italy holds those who remain its citizens and who return to its jurisdiction, to obey the laws of the country to which they migrate and will punish them for an infraction of certain domestic laws of the country *698of their stay and whose <mask> they accept, when they are found guilty thereof.


“ Sixteenth. In case the sum of all the bequests above made ■should exceed in value one-half of the personal estate of which I may die seized and possessed, I hereby direct my executors, hereinafter named, to take such a proportionate sum from the bequests made in Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and S'eventh clauses of this my said will, namely the bequests to the Home for Aged Men and Couples, the Home for the Homeless in the city of Utica; the House of the Good Shepherd; St. Luke’s Home and Hospital;" St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and Home; and the Utica Orphan <mask>, as will reduce the sum of all bequests heretofore made in this my will to one-half of my personal estate. “ Seventeenth. In case the sum of all the bequests above made should not equal in value one-half of the personal estate *274of which I may die possessed, I hereby direct my executors, hereinafter named, to add such an equal sum to each of the bequests made in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh clauses of this my said will as will cause the sum of all bequests heretofore made in this my said will to equal in value one-half of my personal estate. “ Eighteenth. All the rest, residue and remainder of the property of which I may die seized and possessed, or which may come to my estate after my decease, real, personal and mixed, of every name and nature and wheresoever situated, not herein-before disposed of, I hereby direct my executors, hereinafter named, to divide into five equal parts; and I hereby direct my said executors to divide one of such equal parts equally between John 3VI. Barton and Jennie Rowland, the children of my deceased brother, John Barton, or their descendants per stirpes One-half of the estate of testator, at the time of his death, amounted to much more than the total of legacies; hence, instead of any of the six legacies to charity abating as provided by-clause sixteenth, they were each more than doubled under the provisions of clause seventeenth.


a member of a particular social group. An applicant who requests <mask> or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group must establish that the group is: “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)).


A writ de iMnabico inquirendo having been granted, and it appearing upon inquisition that he was.a lunatic, and had personal property in this city, proved upon the inquest to be about-$40,000, the care of 1ns person was committed to Conner Jones, esq., and of his estate to Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., esq. Upon the appointment of a committee of his person, Colah was trans*531ferred from the Bellevue Hospital, to a private lunatic <mask>, at Fishkill, and it subsequently appearing that Major A. Gr. Constable had, from motives of humanity, taken a very active interest in his case, that that gentleman had been for some years a resident of Bombay, was familiar with the religious views, usages, and peculiarities of the Farsees, and could communicate with Colah in Mahratta, the only tongue in which he can or will converse since his insanity, it was deemed judicious by the court to transfer the future custody and care of him to Major Constable, by whom he was afterwards removed to the insane asylum at Flushing, where he is now under medical care and treatment.


The deceased was horn in 1827; she came from ancestors distinguished in the public service of this State in the early period of its history; her father died in 1830' and her mother in 1833. She was reared and educated by relatives as became her station in life and according to the custom and practice of early days. In 1840 she married. In 1865 she became insane through the birth of a child, and was thereafter confined in a lunatic <mask> until 1878, although from 1872 until her discharge in 1878, she was in the convalescent hall attached to the hospital, attending to various duties that had been assigned to her. Upon leaving the asylum she went to live with her aunt Emma Sanford in Gowanda. In 1881 on account of treatment and under the belief that her aunt intended to send her back to the asylum she left the home of Mrs. Sanford, to live with the family of Samuel M. Stuart, in Hamburg. In 1881 she applied to the Supreme Court for the removal of one George J. Greenfield, then her committee, for the restoration of her property. The proceeding resulted in the continuing of the committee, but allowed the deceased to select her residence and the persons with whom she desired to live. In 1888 her sister— this contestant—was substituted for Greenfield as committee of her person and estate. In 1889 the deceased again applied to the Supreme Court for the discharge of her sister, as committee, and also asked that the property held as such committee be transferred to the deceased. Then followed a protracted litigation between the sisters. Mr. George Gorham, to whom the matter was referred, reported that the deceased was competent to manage herself and her affairs. His report was confirmed by Mr. Justice Lambert, and on appeal to the General Term, the same was affirmed; and in 1895 the Court of Appeals die-*17missed the apptal of Mrs. Mitchell to that court. In 1893 the decedent received from her committee, after deducting costs and expenses, approximately the sum of $64,000. About that time the decedent gave to Samuel M. Stuart a power of attorney to act for her, and Stuart seems to have continued to do business for her until she died.


III. The JBoard of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church has a provision in its charter (chapter 287 of 1872), in section 5, subjecting it to all the provisions of law relating to devises and bequests by last will and testament, and it is therefore brought under the rule we have stated as to the orphan <mask>. Those words were held, it is true by a divided court, in Kerr v. Dougherty (79 N. Y., 327), sufficient to subject the corporation to the restrictions and limitations in section 6 of the act of 1848. We must follow the majority, and the decision rendered by the court.


The same publication states elsewhere that “it is the general rule, but by no means an invariable rule, that where a preceding estate is made to depend upon a contingency which never happens, the contingency affects only the estate to which it is annexed and does not extend to the ulterior limitations; the mere lapsing of intervening estates will never be allowed to defeat the remainder over unless they be coupled with conditions upon which the subsequent limitations are in some way made to depend.” (Citing Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418; 3 L. R. A. 816.) “ * * * It is a question in each case of the reasonable interpretation of the words of the particular will, with a view of ascertaining through their meaning the testator’s intention. If it appears to have been the testator’s intention not to extend the contingency beyond the estate to which it is annexed it will be limited to that estate and will not extend to the ulterior limitations. If, however, the testator seems to have contemplated no distinction between that estate and those which follow it, the contingency will equally affect the whole ulterior train of limitations.” (23 R. C. L. 554, citing Robison v. Portland Female Orphan <mask>, supra.)


The disputed lands belonged formerly to a State institution, St. Lawrence State <mask>, and were annexed to the City of Ogdensburg in 1901. The parties agree that prior to the annexation, the asylum property lay within the educational jurisdiction of the Town of Lisbon Common School District No. 1. The City School District maintains — and the Commissioner agreed — that the expansion of the municipality in 1901 worked an identical expansion of the Ogdensburg School District. Petitioner denies that the municipal annexation lawfully could enlarge the City School District and argues that the asylum property remained part of the Town of Lisbon Common School District No. 1 until petitioner annexed that district in 1956.


Amanda Johnson was employed by Mrs. Scott for nine months in 1893. Decedent was delicate, just sick. She did not tell witness what was the matter. She took massage treatment while witness was there, who used to have to stay in the room during the time. While the rubbing was going on decedent would have some covering over her. Never heard her say that she was in danger of being poisoned. *347She was not easy to get along with. She used to become angry sometimes. She said she had too much business to attend to; that she thought Scott did not care for her because she was too old; that he drank sometimes; that they would try to break her will when she was dead by trying to prove that she was crazy, that Scott would try and do this. Once when the witness was with her passing in sight of an insane <mask>, decedent pointed in that direction and said that Ball and her husband had picked out a room in that institution for her. In the opinion of the witness Mrs. Scott was sane.


While the mother was in the <mask>, the brother, Edward ft. Kimball, Jr., acted as her guardian by appointment of the court. From time to time he made reports of his stewardship to his sister, the decedent, and the report and schedules annexed of his dealings with the estate amount to the round figures of $46,000. These reports were submitted to the decedent from time to time, the last one being presented to her on March 18,1924, with the court making its final decree thereon on April 24, 1924. The mother had died on March 18, 1924, permitting the final decree of guardianship as hereinbefore stated.


but Ms. Dai only would admit to being a Christian. Accord- ing to Ms. Dai, “[t]he police became very angry and grasped [her] hair and banged [her] head on the wall and ordered [her] to confess.” At this point, her nose was bleeding, but the po- lice ignored it. They then “ordered [her] to kneel down on the ground and criticize [her]self.” They further ordered her to give the names of her fellow churchgoers; when she re- sponded that she did not know who they were, the police “kept slapping [her] on [her] face.” Ms. Dai “felt dizzy and fell down on the ground,” at which point her interrogators “kicked [her] hard.” After this encounter, she was placed in a detention room for five days with little food and water. She was released after her family paid a fine and after she signed a statement promising not to participate in religious activities and to report to the police on a regular basis. B. Ms. Dai next had an interview with an <mask> officer. The officer concluded that Ms. Dai was not credible for several reasons. First, Ms. Dai’s statements about her religious prac- tices were inconsistent. She gave varying dates for when she started attending church and, when asked to explain the dis- crepancy, she “was non-responsive and continued to


The present interest of the Richfield Springs Lodge No. 482, F. & A. M. in the trust under paragraph ‘ ‘ seventh ’ ’ of the will is void as an illegal suspension of the power of alienation, and the remainder will be accelerated, so that said paragraph *970will be construed as an outright bequest of one half of the residuary estate to the Trustees of the Masonic Hall and <mask> Fund of the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of New York, free from any trust for the benefit of the local lodge, but to be used for the benefit of the Masonic Home at Utica, New York.


Thus, under proper circumstances, hearsay alone can be sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause to extra*70dite. In the case at bar, the affidavit, although based on hearsay, is, as in Goeschel {supra), exceedingly detailed. It specifies many of the factors surrounding the investigation of the burglary and alleges how petitioner was found near the scene of the crime under incriminating circumstances. The primary sources of information are two police officers personally known to the affiant. The statement by petitioner’s alleged coconspirator is against his penal interest and probably admissible even at a trial, if he is “unavailable.” (People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154.) Additionally, there is a statement by an employee of the company allegedly burglarized and a statement on affiant’s personal knowledge is incorporated into the affidavit. On these facts, without doubt, there is probable cause to believe that petitioner participated in the crime of burglary under sections 943.10 (subd [1], par [a]) and 939.05 of the Wisconsin statutes. For the foregoing reasons this <mask> State must honor the extradition demand and the writ must be dismissed. Petitioner is herewith remanded to the State of Wisconsin for further proceedings.


The proofs show that, until about six years before his death pleasant relations had existed between the decedent and his wife and children, and that he was accustomed to speak of them in terms of praise by reason of their devotion to his interests. A change was observed in his feelings toward them about the time that his daughter Isabella, against his wishes, had become enamored of a young man named Noot, a resident of Chicago, and she, rather than forego her preference for her affianced husband, left her home and joined him in Chicago, Avhere they were married. In the instrument the decedent expressly states that the bequest of $>10 to Mrs. Noot is to show her that “ he had not forgotten her in his will and to recall to her her disobedience at the time of her marriage.” Her disinheritance under the circumstances reflects no light on the question of the decedent’s mental condition. But soon thereafter he made state*513ments to different witnesses, all intimate friends of the family, in which he represented that his children were persecuting him in various ways, and at times he stated that his wife was a party to their conduct. These statements were repeated from time to time during the remainder of his life; they were in substance, that his children were endeavoring to get his property away from him; that a son and daughter had attempted to poison him; that his children, or some of them, had declared that he ought to be in an insane <mask>; that they had employed men to watch him for the purpose of taking him to an asylum; that his son had spoken with the captain of a steamer, in which he went to Europe, to have him arrested as a lunatic when he arrived at Bremen; that his children had conspired to place him in a lunatic asylum; that they had caused carriages to be employed to remove him from his house to an asylum; had threatened to have a lawsuit begun against him by the government because he had once brought from Europe a pair of earrings without paying duty thereon, and that they had caused the children in the street to cry out to him as he passed.


It is well established that, except in the rarest of cases, once the Governor of the <mask> State has ordered extradition " 'a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding State; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive’ ” (People ex rel. Strachan v Colon, supra, at 502; Michigan v Doran, 439 US 282).


interview with the <mask> officer, she first stated that she had attended only one church meeting prior to her arrest, but then stated that she started attending meetings in September 2009. Moreover, “[w]hen asked to explain the inconsistency, [Ms. Dai] was non-responsive and continued to contradict herself.” Thus, the record supports the IJ’s determination that there were discrepancies regarding how long Ms. Dai had been practicing her faith before the incident with the po- lice. Concerning the second discrepancy—whether her grand- mother attended church services with her—Ms. Dai acknowl- edges that she gave conflicting testimony. Her counsel sug- gests that “[w]e cannot speculate as to why the Petitioner ini- tially answered incorrectly” and maintains that whether Ms. Dai’s grandmother attended church with her is trivial. However, certainly one reasonable conclusion from Ms. Dai’s different recollections is that she is prevaricating. Moreover, the IJ acknowledged that each of the inconsistencies, standing alone, “might be insufficient to warrant an adverse credibility finding,” but was “concerned with [their] cumulative ef- fect.”


In addition to the evidence of the acts and conversations of the testator, extending over a period of several years immediately prior to his death, and the opinions of some of the witnesses, who were called to detail them as to the impressions made at the time by such acts and speech, and the opinions of the subscribing witnesses to the will and codicil, expert testimony has been given. Four physicians on the part of the contestant; and three, including the state commissioner in lunacy and the superintendent of the State <mask> for Insane Criminals, on the part of the proponents, were produced as witnesses. They testified to their opinion, in response to hypothetical questions, propounded by the respective counsel. To a question presenting very fairly the principal facts established by the whole evidence five of these witnesses agreed in giving the opinion that a person thus described, would be one of sound mind. The other two witnesses answered adversely in reply, to a question embracing only the facts testified to by a portion of the contestant’s witnesses, and without the benefit of the entire history given in the case.


Testatrix left a will, executed in October, 1925, and two codicils dated respectively April 19 and November 29, 1929, all of which have been admitted to probate. By the first item of the will she left certain specified real and personal property to “ the Orphan <mask> Association of New York; ” and in the second bequeathed to her brother “ the shares of stock of the Brooklyn City Railway Company which my mother left to us upon her death, about the year 1912, together with any accretions thereto by way of stock dividends upon the shares that I received from my mother.” The remaining dispositive items of the will gave a considerable number of legacies and various specific articles to various individual legatees and disposed of the residue to Princeton University.


Section 124 of the Domestic Delations Law provides tha-t an orphan <mask> or charitable institution for the care of orphans, friendless or destitute children, may bind out as an apprentice, clerk or servant an indigent or poor child by an indenture in writing. It also provides that such child must have been absolutely surrendered to the care and custody of such asylum or institution, in pursuance of the provision of the Poor Law, or have been placed therein as a poor person, as provided in section 56 of said law, or have been left to the care of such asylum or institution with no provision by the parent, relative or legal guardian of such child, for its support for a period of one. year next preceding.


*Honorable Liles C. Burke, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation. 1 Johnson’s native language is Cameroonian Pidgin English. He says he has a limited English proficiency. 2<mask> officers conduct credible fear interviews when a person seeking entry into the United States is subject to expedited removal and he or she USCA11 Case: 20-12783 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 3 of 11


" Tenth: Subject to the life-estate of my said husband, X dis*471pose of the'property so held in trust for him as follows, viz: * * * I give, devise and bequeath a one-fourth part thereof to the said Syracuse Home Association and I give, devise and bequeath a one-fourth part thereof to the Onondaga County Orphan <mask> located on East Genesee Street, Syracuse, New York.” The first paragraph of the will directs the payment of debts; the second gives $250 to a cemetery association; the third gives $500 to the Methodist Episcopal Ohurch at North Manlius; the fourth gives $500 to the Syracuse Home Association; the fifth bequeaths $600 to each of six children of James Adams, her cousin.


Dear Sir : You will easily call to" recollection the case of James C. Griffen, whom you sent to this <mask>, from Norwich. He appears to me to be well. For a while he was in *128a confused state, but the entire removal from all the exciting causes of his insanity, with occupation, has seemed to restore his mind. He is now somewhat anxious, though reasonably so, to leave and go to live with his brother, in Wisconsin territory, and does not wish, or intend, ever to see his wife again, or go to the neighborhood where she is. His brother here, and other relatives, will join with Mm in giving any assurance you may wish that he will thus go away; and I think it would be proper, for he is, I find, naturally a very amiable and peaceful man. I have told Ms friends that all this is left to you, and I hope you will have the kindness to write me soon upon the subject, and state what kind of a writing, if any, will be acceptable in order to induce you to see fit to discharge Mm. I again repeat, that I tMnk him well and not likely to relapse, and that the community will not be endangered by Ms release.


sor, INS, have long employed guidance instructing immigration officers to prioritize the enforcement of the immigration laws against certain categories of aliens and to deprioritize their enforcement against others. See, e.g., INS Operating Instructions § 103(a)(1)(i) (1962); Memorandum for All Field Office Directors, ICE, et al., from John Morton, Director, ICE, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011); Memorandum for All ICE Employees from John Morton, Director, ICE, Re: Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011); Memorandum for Regional Directors, INS, et al., from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000). The policy DHS proposes, which is similar to but would supersede earlier policy guidance, is designed to “provide clearer and more effective guidance in the pursuit” of DHS’s enforcement priorities: namely, “threats to national security, public safety and border security.” Johnson Prioritization Memorandum at 1. Under the proposed policy, DHS would identify three categories of undocumented aliens who would be priorities for removal from the United States. See generally id. at 3–5. The highest priority category would include aliens who pose particularly serious threats to national security, border security, or public safety, including aliens engaged in or suspected of espionage or terrorism, aliens convicted of offenses related to participation in criminal street gangs, aliens convicted of certain felony offenses, and aliens apprehended at the border while attempting to enter the United States unlawfully. See id. at 3. The second-highest priority would include aliens convicted of multiple or significant misde- meanor offenses; aliens who are apprehended after unlawfully entering the United States who cannot establish that they have been continuously present in the United States since January 1, 2014; and aliens determined to have significantly abused the visa or visa waiver programs. See id. at 3–4. The third priority category would include other aliens who have been issued a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014. See id. at 4. The policy would also provide that none of these aliens should be prioritized for removal if they “qualify for <mask> or another form of relief under our laws.” Id. at 3–5.


None of these several provisions seem to have been complied with by the committing magistrate in this case, and inasmuch as the authority of the protectory to receive and keep in custody is limited to cases where compliance with those requirements appears, the commitment to that institution must be regarded as unauthorized. There is nothing in section 291 of the Penal Code which increases the authority of the protectory to receive and take charge of minors beyond that conferred upon it by statute. On the contrary, it limits the power of the magistrate in designating the charitable reformatory or other institution as the place of commitment to one authorized bylaw to receive and take charge of the childand power is not given to commit to any such institution, whether authorized by law to receive and take charge of minors or not. The warrant in this case committed the child to the house of reception of the New York Catholic Protectory, but it failed to show the case to be one upon which that house is authorized to receive the child, and none of the subsequent steps were taken, as required by law, to authorize commitment to the <mask> after the expiration of twenty days.


clarify the discrepancies “provide[d] ample support” for an ad- verse credibility finding). Johnson also contends that the IJ and the BIA failed to properly consider the country conditions report, which he con- tends corroborates his claim of past persecution. We disagree. The report describes incidents of government violence toward some Anglophone activists. But it says nothing about Johnson’s personal circumstances, including details about his detention or mistreatment by police or whether he personally would face harm if he returned to Cameroon. Given the inconsistencies in Johnson’s testimony and the record, as well as the lack of other corroborating evidence for his claims, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Johnson’s <mask> application. Further, because Johnson failed to establish his eligibility for asylum, he has also necessarily failed to meet the higher standards for withholding removal and CAT relief. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287–88 & n.4. PETITION DENIED. USCA11 Case: 20-12783 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 9 of 11


The decedent was committed to the Lunatic <mask> at Bloomingdale on the 21st of January, 1853, on the -affidavits of Dr. Edward Gray and Dr. John Hart. Dr. Hart says he was introduced to the decedent on the 21st of January. “He was represented to me to be insane by Dr. Gray, his attend*218ing physician.” “It was represented to me that he was pretty wily, and for that reason I was not introduced as a physician, hut simply as Hr. Hart.” The doctor conversed with the decedent, “found him exceedingly cautious,” and perceived no indication of insanity. Being “ completely foiled,” he withdrew .and “ conferred with his children to ascertain the leading points of his insanity—the direction in which his mind wandered.” He learned that “ he was in a state of delusion as to his children—that some of them were not his, but were palmed upon him as his, but he thought they were spurious;” with this information he returned and made another trial. He says: “I touched upon that point on my return, and he became excited, and demanded my right to question him on that subject.” The doctor finally gained his confidence, and he adds, “ he then gave me an indubitable evidence of his insanity, by denying part of his own children, stating that some of them were his, and some of them were not.” Dr. Hart came to the conclusion that he was insane on that point, and he also thought there were other indications of insanity besides. He says: “ The family wished him removed, and stated that he had been violent and attempted to injure himself, and that he was unsafe to be at large.” The effect of the delusion is thus stated by the doctor : “ those he regarded as his children he was fond of, and those he did not so regard he was not attached to. That was my general impression. He spoke simply of his children— some were his and some were not. Some he acknowledged and some he repudiated. He was very excited, particularly when I questioned him on his family.”


Proponents produced the subscribing witnesses to the execution of both the will and the codicils, all of whom answered “ rational ” to the customary question asked of such witnesses. Each of the instruments included an attestation clause. In the envelope with the will was found a paper in the handwriting of decedent in which were set down the names or titles of the beneficiaries in this will and opposite each the amounts to be bequeathed to each. Then on the back thereof were certain figures which apparently represented a statement of his then available property and calculations of the aggregate amounts of certain groups of bequests. Copies of addresses made by decedent on various occasions, various letters written by him at about the time of the execution of the will and codicils were the strongest evidence of a brilliant and clear thinking mind and a dominant character and commanding personality. The most impressive array of witnesses who had contact with the maker of a will and have testified in contested will trials in the *606court’s experience took the witness stand in this trial and attested the rationality of testator. They included Mr. F. Coit Johnson, of J. H. Lane & Co., Percy W. Rockefeller, Bertram E. Hood, Charles G. Coster, George J. Gillespie and Henry B..Johnson, members of the bar, Lucien Jauvaud, president, and Dr. Robert H. McConnell, chief medical officer, of the French Hospital, Mary E. Brewer, Mary Cathleen Hennessy, Ex-Governor Alfred E. Smith, Rev. Dr. Lawrence T. Cole, rector of Trinity (Protestant Episcopal) School, George McAneny, former president of the board of aldermen and ex-transit commissioner, Walter H. Bennett, president of Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, George H. B. Mitchell and Robert J. Cuddihy, president of Literary Digest. The testimony of these witnesses, of the subscribing witnesses, of Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, of Reverend Sister M. Carolus, of Mount Loretto Orphan <mask>, and Reverend Sisters M. Isabella and Clothilde, of St. Agnes Hospital for Crippled and Atypical Children at White Plains, together with the documentary evidence presented by the proponents, constituted evidence of a most preponderating character upon the question of testamentary capacity. Moreover, all the wills and codicils and trust deeds made by testator in his lifetime manifested the Same general plan of distribution of his property as set forth in the propounded papers. At the close of the trial there could not be the slightest doubt that testator when he executed the will and the codicils knew the nature of the act that he was performing, the extent and scope of his property and the names and identities of those who would be the natural objects of his bounty and his relations with them. Little if any weight may be given to the alienists who appeared for the contestants. They had never known nor met testator, they had never analyzed nor read the propounded papers previously to formulating their answers to the hypothetical question, they had not known the exact proportions of his estate bequeathed to his relatives, they frankly admitted that they knew nothing about the Catholic religion nor about Catholic doctrines. Moreover, the assumptions set forth in the hypothetical question embodied a most inadequate part of the proofs submitted during the trial and in fact no part of the proponents’ case and even that part of the testimony which was condensed in the hypothetical questions was in many instances clearly exaggerated and in almost every instance weak and unimpressive. In conclusion it should be noted that Dr. Riley, one of the alienists, testified as follows (p. 702): “ Q. May I ask you this: It [the paper in testator’s handwriting found with the will] would show he knew what he was disposing of, would it? A. Yes. Q. And it would show to him he was disposing of it, would it not? A. Yes. Q. And your *607hypothetical question assumes that he .knew, does it not, of his sister and relatives? A. Yes. Q. So that he knew who his relatives were when he made this will? A. Yes. Q. And he knew what he was disposing of, is that so? A. Yes; ” and that Dr. Orton, the other alienist, testified as follows (p. 750): “ Q. And if you found a will like that fortified by this letter to the executors and fortified by the memorandum in his own hand, what he wanted to do, you would say that he knew that he was disposing of his property, wouldn’t you? A. Would he know that he was disposing of his property? Q. Yes. A. Of course. Q. And if he mentioned in that will every one, every surviving nephew or niece and other relatives you believe that he had in mind those in whom he was interested would you not? A. No question of it.”


And where a will provided, "I give to my nephew .... and to his son all my interest, either real, personal or mixed, in the Jimeno Eanch.....And I recommend to my said nephew to leave his portion thereof after his own death, and the death of his wife” to his son and his children, or descendants, and, in default of such, to Harvard College, the court held that no trust was created in favor of the college: In re Whitcomb’s Estate, 86 Cal. 265, 24 Pac. 1028. In the case of Succession of Hutchinson, 112 La. 656, 36 South. 639, the bequest was to a university for the sole benefit of its medical department. The will contained numerous recommendations, but they were held not to amount to conditions. A somewhat similar bequest was made in Pratt v. Trustees, 88 Md. 610, 42 Atl. 51, where the residuary estate was given to an insane <mask>. One clause of the will stated that, while testator did not wish to alter the management of the asylum, it was his "wish and will” that the estate given be used to complete the present buildings, etc. The court held that no trust was created.


Margaret Donlon, a witness to this alleged will and the executrix named therein, testified that she Avas the Avife of John Donlon, of the age of forty years, had known Bridget Fox for twenty-three years, and that she had always lived in the same place where she died, and was at her house often during the time she knew her; that she lived near her and Avas well *678acquainted with her and had been to her house a good deal during that time; that she knew Martin Fqx very well during five years until he died; that the relations between Martin Fox and Bridget Fox were always pleasant; that she knew Honora Fox during the time she lived on Warren street; that she knew she lived with them and made it her home there until she went to the <mask>; that up to that time Honora Fox was a strong, healthy girl and worked out for people -in the city; that Martin and Bridget Fox were at witness’ house in Busti during the year he died, going on eighteen years ago; that witness scolded Martin for putting Mora in the asylum, and Mr. Fox told witness in his wife’s presence that he wcmted witness to take care of Nora, cmd that after his death witness wcmted Nora to ha/ve what belonged to him / that Bridget was always a good wife to him, and after she was through with it he wanted all to go to Nora / Bridget said in reply that she was satisfied with that; Bridget used to come out and see witness and said that she was well satisfied with that; that witness was the first person called when Bridget was taken sick; that Oonway told her that she was very sick and that he would be glad to have her go over; that this was nine or ten days before she died; that witness staid right along every day and nights between times, doing the best she could, and that Bridget was very glad to have her; that Mary Higgins was there as a nurse; that Father Coyle was there the Sunday night before Bridget died, being the Sunday night before the first will was drawn; and that he was in the bedroom with her alone a few minutes with the door shut; witness testified about Mr. Fowler, Davidson and Conway being there on Tuesday, January twelfth, in the morning; that Mr. Fowler asked witness how Bridget was; that she told him that she had been dying since seven o’clock that morning; that during that day the old lady could not talk at all, could not take any nourishment, even a teaspoonful; she further testified that the old lady never spoke a word after Mr. Fowler and the others went away; that she died at half-past eleven o’clock that night, and she took no nourishment; that she had taken no-*679nourishment after seven o’clock on the morning of the day she died.


The court’s research, as well as that of counsel, has failed to disclose any case having to do with the establishment of joint accounts in commercial banks. All of the cases refer to deposits in savings banks. There have been court decisions, later written in the statute, with regard to the form of the deposit in savings banks in order to create survivorship. When deposits are made in checking accounts in commercial banks, there is no thought that it is there as the poor man’s will, or for the purpose of paying funeral expenses, or latterly, for the purpose of going to the survivor of the account, unless the account is evidenced by proven intent, either by words or in writing. Here there is evidence to the contrary by the words of the bank official (Matter of Thompson, 167 App. Div. 356, 360; affd., 217 N. Y. 609), and the right of survivorship'in the face of this evidence cannot be presumed. The presumption is rebutted. It is a business account. A difference is written into the law in relation to joint accounts, between parties who do not take on the relationship of husband and wife, and where that relation exists. The pioneer cases where evidence of indebtedness belonging to the husband was taken in the name of husband and wife, in which the court held it showed that the husband intended to give it to her in case she should survive him, and that a delivery to her was unnecessary to effect the gift, are Draper v. Jackson (16 Mass. 480 [1820]); Borst v. Spelman (4 N. Y. 284 [1850]); Roman Catholic Orphan <mask> v. Strain (2 Bradf. 34 [1851]); Sanford v. Sanford (45 N. Y. 723 [1871]); Curry v. Powers (70 id. 212 [1877]). The later cases are Augsbury v. Shurtliff (180 N. Y. 138); West v. McCullough (123 App. Div. 846); Matter of Thompson (167 id. 356; affd., 217 N. Y. 609).


Through all her trials the evidence discloses the Stuarts to be steadfast in their friendship. In a postscript to a letter written by the deceased to Mrs. Blackmon in 1893' she says:. “You speak of my generosity to uncle Samuel’s family. I never shall have money enough to reward them for services rendered me for the past thirteen years. They have watched and protected me constantly from enemies fax and near. They have advanced money to carry on a long litigation not knowing that they would ever be compensated for either money or services, and were it not for their true friendship I would to-day be in an <mask> or in my grave. Yours was the service of a day. Theirs for years.”


Under our deferential substantial evidence standard, we will not disturb the agency’s finding that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish the requisite nexus to his Christian religion. As the <mask> officer reasoned, there is insufficient evidence that his faith was a central reason why gang members threatened him. On Tomas-Ramos’s own account, gang members did not mention his religion in their threats. And although Tomas-Ramos reports that gang members killed a man belonging to his church, they did not inform him why they killed that man, so there is no ground for concluding that it was an act of religious persecution. The government does not argue that the IJ’s third finding – that “[Tomas-Ramos] also had difficulty articulating his fear,” A.R. 1 – provides a basis for affirmance, and we agree. We do not understand that finding to be an independent ground for the IJ’s determination; rather, it appears to have been offered as an explanation for why the IJ was not persuaded that Tomas-Ramos had established nexus to a protected ground.


evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Garcia-Gonzalez is not eligible for <mask>.1 Garcia-Gonzalez next argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to fully analyze her withholding of removal claim. However, the BIA “does not have to ‘write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.’” Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 908 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Becerra–Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987)). In this case, the BIA correctly concluded that because Garcia-Gonzalez “did not meet her burden of proof for asylum, it follows that she cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal.” See Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2012) (“An applicant ‘who has failed to establish the less stringent “well-founded fear” standard of proof required for asylum relief is necessarily also unable to establish an entitlement to withholding of removal.’” (quoting Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2008))).2 Because further analysis was unnecessary, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by declining to analyze Garcia-Gonzalez’s withholding of removal claim further. Finally, Garcia-Gonzalez argues that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ’s finding that she is ineligible for protection under the CAT. An applicant


“ Seventh. I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my property, whether real, personal or mixed, of every kind, nature and description whatsoever, hereby intending to include any property that may be acquired by me after the date of this, my Last Will and Testament to be divided as follows, to wit: One-half thereof to be given to the Rev. Father McCarthy of St. Augustine’s Church, Sixth Avenue and Sterling Place, Brooklyn, New York, to be applied towards starting a home for the benefit of unmarried working girls, who are abused at home, after the death of their parents, and one half to the Brooklyn Roman Catholic Orphan <mask>.” Rev. Father McCarthy predeceased the testator, and testator’s next of kin contend that the half of the residue bequeathed to him lapsed in consequence, and is to be administered as intestate property. Their position is based largely upon the language of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Shattuck (193 N. Y. 446). This decision has, however, been so often criticised and limited by subsequent opinions of the Court of Appeals as to render it little more than an authority on the precise facts and language then passed upon. Thus it was said in Matter of Durbrow (245 N. Y. 469, 475): “ This conclusion seems unsound. It is based on Matter of Shattuck (193 N. Y. 446) which has been strictly confined to its own facts by later and better considered cases.”


The remaining objection involves the provision contained in the Constitution and statute to the effect that ‘ ‘ For the purpose of * * * voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence * * * while kept at any welfare institution, <mask> or other institution wholly or partly supported at public expense or by charity ” (Election Law, § 151; N. Y. Const., art. II, § 4).


Let us pursue the argument a step farther. It is simply that a failure in one part of a will defeats the whole, and lets in the statute of descents. Those who think so are certainly to be admired for great boldness and originality of conception, and their happy escape from those legal maxims which have heretofore allowed something to human frailty. Formerly, though a man might commit a mistake in one part of his will, he had some reason to hope for the salvation of other parts. Suppose Mr. James had devised the 85- shares to one of his sons by a wrong name; the devise must have failed, but the mistake would not affect the devises of the 8£ shares, where all the devisees were correctly named. Suppose the trustees and executors had all been misnamed so that the trust term had failed, the devises or administration would not fail for want of form. If trustees were necessary, the chancellor might appoint them ; and the surrogate could appoint an administrator cum testamento annexo. When Mrs. James renounced the devise to her and took one third of the real estate, the general residuary devises were all impaired; }ret it has not been contended that such partial failure should destroy the will. Suppose *186one half the devisees had died before the testator, one half the devises would have failed by lapse: yet such a circumstance was never holden to affect the residue. In any of these cases, whatever devise may fail, the subject takes the direction which the chancellor gave to the 3J shares ; it descends to the heirs. Suppose the testator had converted his whole estate into stocks of different banks, bequeathing the stock in one bank to his son John, in another to Edward, and so on to each legatee specifically, and before his death he had sold out all his stocks in one half the banks ; one half the legacies would then have failed by ademption; yet the other stocks would pass to the legatees, while the proceeds of those which were adeemed would go to the next of kin under the statute of intestacy. I shalknot stop to show that a partial failure from mistake in the creation of an estate or interest would be no more fatal than a failure from any other cause; nor am I aware of any middle ground, where we can select one valid distinct part and reject another. The same principle which would save the legacies even to the orphan <mask> and to Mrs. Gourley’s children, will save the valid devises ; and the same principle which would repudiate the latter would reduce this whole will to a tabula rasa. These few rules and illustrations will, I apprehend, be found applicable to most of the objections raised against the decree.