The second sentence of § 452.375.5(5)(a) specifically provides that before a court awards custody, temporary custody or <mask> to a third person, the court shall make that person a party to the action. Because a husband and wife are always parties to an action to dissolve their marriage, the statutory requirement that the court make the third person a party to the action indicates the General Assembly did not intend that the term 'third person' include a husband or wife in a dissolution action. Id. at 844. The Southern District found the husband's petition failed to allege the children's biological father was unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian, hence, he failed to state a cause of action. Id.7 The Southern District limited its holding to the "extraordinary facts" of the case. Id. at 845.


The respondent has refused to establish a home for these children in spite of the requests, direction and planning of the probation staff for the children. She has refused to keep appointments and resisted foster home planning. She has consistently failed and refused to comply with rules of <mask>, conduct and behavior. On some occasions she has requested the return of the children to her home, but has vacillated repeatedly by countering these requests by refusing to plan and prepare for their return. She has been most unco-operative with the agencies in their planning for the readjustment of her home. She has been examined psychiatrically and has refused and resisted psychotherapy in order to enable her to adjust to the needs of the children. Although quite co-operative and pleasing in some interviews and in her promises at times, this has been immediately followed by refusals and resistance immediately thereafter. Her contacts with the children have been so upsetting to their lives that such visits had to be curtailed and eventually suspended. This conduct and behavior was the basis of the original finding of neglect on August 3, 1954, and has continued to the present date. It is the conclusion of the court that the conduct, demeanor, resistance and ineffectiveness is virtual and complete abandonment of these children. The children in turn have been so emotionally traumatized that Leslie Karen now 14 years of age and Carolyn now 12 years of age refuse to see or talk to their mother. All of this is due to her conduct, demeanor and neglect.


*979In further rebuttal to the husband’s claims, the wife’s affidavit before this court contains a litany of comments that suggest she is using a shotgun approach to discredit her former husband. She casually mentions—without any corresponding authority— that he suffers from bipolar disorder.4 She condemns his smoking and raises a specter that smoking impacts one of their son’s asthma, but there is no medical data proffered to support this claim. She adds that she does not “trust the husband to keep his anger in check.” However, the wife accompanied the husband on his visits with the children and there is no evidence, during the repeated visits by the father to Rochester, that his “anger” (as the wife describes it) has ever flared up or caused the children any trepidation. The wife also challenges the husband’s version of spring break in April 2013 and the request for travel to Singapore in 2013. She claims that the husband never made such requests, with the exception of the summer of 2012, and at that time she told him that the children were too young to travel. The wife also strongly disputes the husband’s claim that his agreement to have the children relocate to Rochester was based on her agreement that the children would travel to Singapore “at least once per year.” The wife’s disagreement here is somewhat limited. She does not dispute that she agreed that the children would have the option to travel to Singapore—she simply disputes whether it was scheduled to happen every year. The wife does state that she repeatedly told the father that the children could not stay overnight with him “until they were older and could make decisions on their own.” In these conflicting versions of events, a number of items are undisputed. After the entry of the judgment of divorce in Singapore, the father visited Rochester and the wife would not allow him overnight <mask>. In 2013, the husband sought summer time with his children, but was told that his ex-wife had enrolled them in summer camp for the entire summer and he was unable to see them. Over Christmas break in 2013, the husband claims he visited Rochester, but the wife enrolled the children in a program that consumed most of the daytime, and refused *980to allow the husband to have access without her present. In addition, it is undisputed that the wife has never permitted the children to travel to Singapore. The wife admits that she never allowed the children to stay overnight with their father when he was in Rochester because she made the decision that they were too young. In April 2014, the father again visited with his children. The wife told him that she did not want him to take the children to New York City, but the father took them anyway and returned them on Easter Sunday. According to the wife, the husband impeded the mother’s ability to communicate with her children via telephone while they were with him. She describes the New York City trip in April 2014, as an instance in which the husband “violated my trust.” After the episodes in April 2014, the father complained about the mother’s interference with his visitation and eventually, she was contacted by the father’s counsel.


We note that the trial court stated that A. would be with S.Y. from Sunday evening through Thursday morning and with Omar from Thursday morning (or end of preschool) through Sunday evening. Considering that A. would be asleep at night, this schedule essentially gave four days to Omar and three days to S.Y. - the opposite of the court's stated intention. But the court gave *333leeway to the parties to work out their own days and hours of time with A. and invited counsel to return ex parte if the parties could not work this out. We trust that the parties have worked out acceptable <mask> hours and if not have returned to the trial court for resolution.


The California Supreme Court reviewed the grandparent <mask> statutes in In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141 ( Harris ): "Grandparents' rights to court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren are purely statutory. [Citation.] Three California statutes expressly address grandparent visitation: [S]ection 3102, which permits visitation by a deceased parent's children, siblings, parents, and grandparents if such visitation would be in the best interests of the child; section 3103, which permits a court in specified proceedings involving the custody of a child to grant grandparent visitation; and section 3104, which permits grandparents to petition for visitation if the grandchild's parents are not married or if certain other conditions are met." ( Id . at p. 219, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141, fns. omitted; see also Stuard v. Stuard (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 768, 777, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 ; In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1091, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 63.) "In addition, section 3100 provides that in making an order for joint custody of a minor child, '[i]n the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having in interest in the welfare of the child.' ( § 3100, subd. (a).)" ( Harris , at p. 220, fn. 5, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 96 P.3d 141.)


modifications to a <mask> order and not the court’s burden to propose such modifications sua sponte. (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 [indicating that changes to a visitation order “are better handled, in the first instance, through communications with [the Agency], and as needed, through motions to modify the visitation order. It is the parent’s burden to initiate those procedures, not the court’s.”].) Further, even if these alternative options for contact between Mother and J.P. had been raised, courts of appeal have authorized no-contact orders where, as here, the evidence supports a finding that contact would be detrimental to the minor. (See Daniel C.H., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 839 [“Although the evidence here might have supported an order of closely supervised visitation, the evidence of stress on [the minor] is equally supportive of a no contact order.”]; In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238 [juvenile court’s no-contact order between mother and child was “reasonable” where mother had not protected the child from sexual abuse and where evidence showed child was angry with mother and was refusing visits].) 2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not Compelling J.P. to Testify at the Disposition Hearing Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by excusing J.P. from testifying. She asserts that his testimony was “material to the prospect of renewing his contact with his family,” and thus he should have been compelled to testify at the dispositional hearing. As a preliminary matter, Mother did not request for J.P. to testify at the contested disposition hearing on July 26, 2021. In fact, Mother’s counsel did not offer any affirmative evidence, and no witnesses were called to testify at the disposition hearing. Although Mother raised the matter of J.P. testifying at an earlier hearing on June 4, 2021, her counsel’s arguments at that hearing indicated


not protect the child from him. Mother remained enmeshed with Father such that she could not retain custody. The court did not err by removing A.C. from parental custody. We note, however, the juvenile court made a clear record of Mother’s progress. While it was insufficient at this phase to retain custody of A.C., we emphasize the court’s encouraging words to Mother: “the court is confident that [Mother] can keep that trajectory going in a positive direction. I’m really confident you can do that ma’am.” It is rare this court sees such inspiring words to a parent. While we affirm the court’s orders, we also echo the juvenile court’s kind words of encouragement for Mother to continue working towards her goal of regaining custody of A.C. II. Visits with A.C. Mother asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her request for more frequent visits with A.C. We disagree. The juvenile court may set the frequency and length of visits and impose any other conditions on <mask> consistent with the child’s best interests under the “‘particular circumstances’” of the case. (In re Shawna M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686, 1690.) During the reunification period, visitation with a parent must be “as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) The visitation order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under that standard, we determine if the order exceeded the bounds of reason and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the underlying determination. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.) Mother asserts the juvenile court erred when it denied her request for an extended 29-day trial visit or five overnight visits in the paternal grandparent’s house. However, as discussed previously, Mother could not be counted on to protect A.C. from Father having unauthorized contact while he was using drugs and from the risk from his unresolved domestic violence issues. The court reasonably determined Mother’s lack of insight, evidenced by Mother returning to Father despite domestic violence and his


Rule 5.695(a) provides, "At the disposition hearing, the court may: [¶] "(1) Dismiss the petition ...; [¶] (2) [p]lace the child under a program of supervision for a time period consistent with section 301 and order that services be provided; [¶] (3) [a]ppoint a legal guardian for the child ...; [¶] (4) [d]eclare dependency and appoint a legal guardian for the child ...; [¶] (5) [d]eclare dependency, permit the child to remain at home, and order that services be provided; [¶] (6) [d]eclare dependency, permit the child to remain at home, limit the control to be exercised by the parent or guardian, and order that services be provided; or [¶] (7) [d]eclare dependency, remove physical custody from the parent or guardian, and: [¶] (A) After stating on the record or in writing the factual basis for the order, order custody to a noncustodial parent, terminating jurisdiction, and direct that Custody Order-Juvenile-Final Judgment (form JV-200) be prepared and filed ...; [¶] (B) After stating on the record or in writing the factual basis for the order, order custody to a noncustodial parent with services to one or both parents; or [¶] (C) Make a placement order and consider granting specific <mask> rights to the child's grandparents."


Ms. Roberman opines that Adrian will suffer great pain at being separated from Petitioner who Ms. Roberman finds to be a loving, caring father. Ms. Roberman stated that Respondent’s desire to move to Saudi Arabia is as a result of her “blind adherence” to her husband’s desires. Ms. Roberman submits that longer, but not as frequent <mask> with the Petitioner (Respondent has proposed and stated that she will pay to have Adrian visit with his Father on two 21-day periods and one 28-day period which corresponds to Adrian’s trimester school schedule) will not substitute for the more regular visitation as is now in place. Ms. Roberman concludes: “Adrian’s best interest would be served by remaining in New York with both of his parents * * * If Dr. Fogelquist insists on joining her husband in Saudi Arabia then Adrian should not be thrust into a new environment without the proximity of his father. He should, therefore, remain in New York with his father and a visitation schedule should be arranged with his mother.”


Moreover, both petitioner and her current husband are committed to fostering a relationship between the child and respondent father (see Sonbuchner v Sonbuchner, 96 AD3d 566, 567 [1st Dept 2012]). Although petitioner’s relocation will have an impact upon respondent’s ability to spend time with his child, the liberal <mask> schedule set by the court will allow for respondent and the child to continue to have a meaningful relationship (see Matter of Carmen G. v Rogelio D., 100 AD3d 568 [1st Dept 2012]).


The juvenile court's bare assertion that the "relationship [between Caden and mother] outweighed any prospective adoption" sheds no light on how the court balanced these competing detriments. In the absence of any explanation, we look to the evidence as a whole to ascertain if it supports the juvenile court's determination. We conclude it does not. At the time of the permanency planning hearing, legal guardianship was not a viable option. The only remaining alternative-foster placement-had already proved itself destabilizing, with Caden removed from four different homes due to mother's constant interference and efforts to undermine the foster families. When we previously affirmed the juvenile court's order reducing <mask>, we concluded that "mother consistently fueled Caden's belief that he would soon return home, a belief that was unrealistic given mother's inability to cease using methamphetamine, and one that fostered anxiety in the minor and that undermined placement after placement." ( C.C. v. Superior Court , supra , A151400.) In addition, the record discloses a recent example of a failed guardianship, N.C.-G.'s, which the social worker attributed to a long child welfare history characterized by "poor boundaries [and] a lack of protection for [N.C.-G.] regarding Mom being able to basically maneuver in and out of her life. ... Hence, she's now a dependent at 16 years old."


On cross-examination and when questioned by the circuit court, Bari said that they (the Sargents) contacted DHS when the children were removed in Arizona and in Arkansas. She explained that when they contacted Arkansas DHS, she was told that "it has to go to another department because you're out of state. It will probably be at least six months before you hear from anyone." After not hearing from anyone for six months, the Sargents began calling. DHS did not return many of the 32 *585to 33 phone calls made; and for their sustained efforts the Sargents never received any requested <mask>, not even phone visitation-"nothing." After "going over the head" of the unresponsive local DHS office and contacting Mischa Martin (the director of the Division of Children and Family Services) in January and April 2018, Bari received a request from the State of Arkansas to the Indiana Department of Child Services for an ICPC home study.


Syl. Pt. 11, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002). As noted, petitioner’s assertion that E.S. requested contact is unsupported. To the contrary, the circuit court denied post-termination <mask> between petitioner and the children “due to the trauma the older children have suffered, age of the two younger children, and the lack of bond” between them. Additionally, the circuit court heard evidence that “any recommendation regarding contact between E.S. and [petitioner] would depend on her progress in treatment.” As noted above, petitioner failed to address the conditions of abuse and neglect in her treatment and no improvement was expected. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court denying petitioner post-termination visitation with the children.


The stipulation of discontinuance signed by the parties and their attorneys was received in the mail by the probation department of this court with a covering letter from the attorneys for the respondent father. Upon submission of the papers to the court for its action, the court examined the files and records of *966the case and in view of the psychological and psychiatric reports on the parties, directed the parties and the attorneys to appear before the court with a view to safeguarding the interests of the child by inquiring into the statement contained in the stipulation that “ the parties having made satisfactory disposition among themselves as to the matters now before the Court.” (Italics supplied.) The testimony of the parties then revealed that in August of 1956, the parties had entered into a separation agreement which, among other things, provided “ that absolute and sole care and custody of the said infant issue of the marriage ’ ’ shall henceforth be with the mother; that the father did l( waive and relinquish for all time, his right to visit the said child ’ ’; and said agreement further provided that the mother did “ renounce and relinquish any right to support for the said infant issue of the marriage for so long as the waiver of the aforementioned right of <mask> shall continue but there shall be no reinstitution of visitation rights without the prior consent of the (mother), the termination of the waiver not being in the discretion of the (father) it being clearly understood that in the event that the (father) is required to support the infant issue of the marriage, then he shall likewise have the right to visit the child ”; that the terms of the agreement would merge and be made part of any decree of divorce which either party might obtain.


The Legislature did not, however, identify this unenumerated “constitutional right.” Nor did the Legislature enumerate the “certain family court proceedings” to which this provision applies. Apparently, Family Court Act § 262 specifies these proceedings. However, the use of the phrase “the loss of a child’s society” would lead to the conclusion that the legislative intent was to apply this statute to proceedings, not relating to custody with attendant <mask> with the child awarded to the noncustodial parent, but those where the litigant’s contact with the child is terminated. “Society” equates with “companionship” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary) not with custody. “Custody” equates with “immediate charge and control” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary). Awarding custody, with visitation to the noncustodial spouse, is not a deprivation of the child’s society. The purpose of visitation is that warring spouses may still share the child’s society. Therefore, it appears that the legislative intent (Family Ct Act § 261) and the eo nomine provisions of Family Court Act § 262 may not be the same.


This court recognizes that there have been circumstances under which courts have allowed postadoption <mask> as well as circumstances in which a Surrogate’s Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, included provisions for visitation of a child in the order of adoption (Matter of Raana Beth N., 78 Misc 2d 105 [1974]). However, that was a case where the court indicated there were unusual circumstances, circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. That case involved a stepparent adoption of a 5 Vz-y ear-old child with whom the biological father wanted to resume visitation.


*801Erik testified that Monica's and her mother's conduct in 2015 and 2016 changed things. According to Erik, he stopped the school lunch visits because Monica's mother would also show up and chill C.V.'s interaction with him. Monica requested that Erik undergo drug and alcohol testing, and all tests were negative. Though the most recent summer <mask> went well, CPS investigated Erik anyway, apparently at Monica's request. He also testified that Monica has been trying to turn C.V. against him-trying to "brainwash" him-and he feared that her efforts would continue absent a custody modification.


Pearson voiced concerns with both Whitney's and Jonathan's anger problems. She explained that Jonathan has aggression issues and that Whitney cannot calm him. She referenced a staffing meeting where Whitney and Jonathan became upset with her, pushed a table, and stormed out of the room. She also testified that Jonathan had approached her in an aggressive manner when a <mask> was canceled because he spoke negatively about DHS. She noted that Whitney became angry and that, from inside the building, she could hear Whitney yelling on the street. She further testified that Jonathan had left her a voicemail threatening to "blow up" her and the DHS building.


On July 25, 2016, father called DPSS and provided his current address in Jurupa Valley. Father then attended the section 366.26 hearing in August 2016 and objected to DPSS's recommendation to terminate his parental rights. He asked the court to establish a legal guardianship over D.H. instead of proceeding with adoption and argued he shared the type of bond with D.H. described in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), commonly referred to as the "parental benefit exception" to terminating parental rights. DPSS argued for adoption and termination of parental rights, arguing father's <mask> had been "inconsistent throughout the dependency."


It' is claiming that the society or its officers are entitled, upon such an investigation, to all the rights secured by the constitution and laws to a defendant in a civil action or proceeding, or to an accused person upon a criminal charge; such as a specification of the claim or charge, the' right to cross-examine witnesses called to establish it, to introduce testimony in their own defense, and from the commencement to the close of the proceeding to appear by and have the aid , of legal counsel. There is no foundation in such an inquiry as this, for any such claim as a matter of right. The visitorial power over charitable institutions, and the investigation into their conduct and management, authorized by this act, is in no sense analogous to a civil action or proceeding, or to a criminal accusation or charge, as it does hot and cannot result in any judgment or sentence affecting person or property. All the power which the commissioners possess after instituting and completing the investigation they are authorized to make, is to embody the result of their inquiry in an annual report to the Legislature, or to make a special report to the attorney general, to the effect that, in their opinion, some matters in regard to the management or affairs of an institution, subject to their <mask>, or to any inmate of it, or some person connected with it (2 L. 1867, p. 2897, § 5; L. 1873, p. 885, § 5), requires legal investigation or action of *195.some kind; when it becomes the duty of the attorney general to make inquiry and take such proceedings in the premises as he may deem necessary and proper, reporting his action and the result of it to the State Board.


Upon a comparable set of facts the court in Matter of Porras (13 A D 2d 239) concluded that a finding could be justified of abandonment and that consent would not be necessary for adoption; the court did conclude however, because of other unusual circumstances in that case, that there was no abandonment and dismissed the adoption petition. Those circumstances, however, do not exist in the instant case. As impoverished as the father was, he certainly could have financed an occasional trip to see his child during the last five years; there is no evidence here of any rejection of any gifts or greetings; and he should have insisted on his <mask> rights had he possessed, during this five-year period, some minimal degree of paternal concern or interest.


On July 21, 2016, Nicole filed a motion to modify <mask> and child support in which she asserted that she had moved from Cave City, Arkansas, to Viola, Arkansas, and that she had enrolled the children in school in Viola, where she now works. Nicole alleged that a material change in circumstances had occurred because she was no longer employed at White River Medical Center (WRMC) where she had been required to work weekends. Nicole alleged that she now works Monday through Friday and that the visitation schedule should be modified such that she will have the children every other weekend. Nicole further alleged that there was also a material change in circumstances regarding her need for support given that the parties now live a greater distance apart.


Seven years later, on August 18, 2016, Alicia filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. In the petition, Alicia alleged that the prior criminal charges against her had been nolle prossed. Alicia further alleged that she lived in a suitable home in West Memphis raising her two older children, that she was gainfully employed, and that she was a fit parent. The petition also stated that Jannelle had not abided by the <mask> order and had only allowed her only sporadic visitation with J.M. The petition further stated that, about a month earlier, Jannelle was homeless and had temporarily moved into Alicia's home with J.M. Finally, Alicia alleged that she and J.M. had bonded and established a strong parent-child relationship, and also that J.M. was bonded with his two older siblings. Jannelle filed a response, requesting that Alicia's petition to terminate the guardianship be denied. The trial court subsequently held a hearing on the petition.


These parties must learn how to control themselves. This court has heard tape recordings of messages left on the father’s cell phone which are both disgusting, shaky, clearly inappropriate and, if in fact the child has heard them, furthers her confusion and her belief that she needs to be aligned with her mother. These parties in the interest of their children must stop. The father must recognize that periods of <mask> are for him and him alone, that his events and places which he takes this child to are important to him but that a teenager may not benefit from such visits with others. The court recognizes the father’s special role as a leader within the New York City Police Department. The court recognizes that when a police officer is unfortunately killed or injured in the line of duty the father’s responsibilities become greater and there is the need to cancel visitation, but clearly the events that are important to the father, such as including the child in Father’s Day celebrations with the fraternal organization, may not be in the child’s best interest when their relationship is in and of itself shaky.


Heather challenges several rulings, on many grounds. She contends the juvenile court erred: (1) by allowing C.W. to live in Louisiana with his father on a "trial home visit"-which she contends was done improperly without notice, without any ruling on her objections and without any judicial review after 90 days, all in contravention of the court's own local rules (see Super. Ct. Sonoma County Local Rules, rule 10.26); (2) by later deeming that visit to become a "family maintenance" placement-which she contends on many grounds was done improperly, in violation of section 386 without notice,20 in violation of the statutorily mandated standards and procedures under section 366.3, subdivision (f) for potentially returning a child to a parent's home during the permanency phase, without any findings that were required to be made under section 366.3, subdivision (e) at the periodic review hearings to ensure C.W.'s safety, and without any statutorily mandated oversight in the way of family maintenance services or even a case plan (see § 16506, subd. (c); § 16501, subds. (a)(2) & (g); § 366.3, subd. (e)(4)); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(b)(1), b(2); id ., rule 5.708(e)); (3) by allowing C.W. thereafter to be placed into the residential treatment program in Louisiana-which she contends was done improperly without the filing of a supplemental petition under *482section 38721 or compliance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (see Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq. ; id. , § 7911.1), and also in violation of section 361.21 which requires a determination that "[i]n-state facilities or programs [are] unavailable or inadequate to meet the needs of the minor" before a dependent child is placed in an out-of-state group home (§ 361.21, *858subd. (a)(3)); and (4) by dismissing jurisdiction and awarding sole custody of C.W. to his father, a result she says was an abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence. She also challenges the <mask> order on the ground the court improperly delegated its authority to determine her visitation rights to C.W.'s therapists. Recognizing that she did not file separate appeals earlier to challenge the first three sets of claimed errors (and, did not object to several of them), Heather argues that those rulings exceed the court's jurisdiction, and as such are void and may be challenged at any time.


Jean and Lewis, the natural parents of said child, entered into an agreement dated June 3, 1957 wherein Jean was given the custody and control of David with the right of <mask> by Lewis at all reasonable times. By the agreement Jean assumed *325and agreed to provide for the support and maintenance of said child while living with her. That subsequent to this agreement a decree of divorce was granted to Jean against Lewis in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe, on the grounds of extreme mental cruelty, wherein the written agreement heretofore referred to was confirmed and approved by the court and it was continued and survived the entry of the decree and was not merged therein.


A filiation order was issued in the Family Court of Erie County on April 26, 1971. The child was born on November 14, 1970. It was indicated at the trial that the natural father felt strongly before the birth of the baby that the natural mother should permit the baby to be adopted, the natural father so stating in court. This feeling continued for some period after the birth of the child even though the natural mother decided after giving birth that she would not consent to the adoption of the baby. The natural father contends that now that the child is older, while he has not contributed substantially to the child’s support, he feels it better for the child’s welfare that the Family Court filiation order be amended to permit regular <mask> rights. He feels this is more important than the stability that might be furnished by the child becoming legally a part of the family unit. The natural father was married in September, 1973. Testimony indicates the natural mother is now pregnant and both she and her husband testified they felt it better for the child to be legally part of their family unit. They further stated the anticipated birth of the child would in no way change their views so far as the adoption is concerned.


Notwithstanding the omission of JHO Radin’s custody award to the mother in any of the judgments, it is apparent that the parties lived pursuant to JHO Radin’s decision of January 31, 1997 and the judgments of divorce, as the mother exercised custody and the father exercised <mask> and paid the mother child support which was ordered in the amount of $252 per week. The father appealed the child support portion of the judgment to the Appellate Division and was not successful.


DHS supervisor Mydeana Bridges testified that between March and August 2016, DHS provided drug-screening services, drug assessments, transportation, a gas card, and homemaker services. She explained that C.H.3 had missed critical appointments at Arkansas Children's Hospital in Little Rock and that Stephanie would go to work and leave C.M. in charge of all three children. She said that Jonathan Napp never provided the background checks and forms that he was asked and ordered to provide. Loretta Harrell, a DHS program assistant, testified that there were issues with Stephanie's <mask> with the children. DHS presented a piece of hard candy as evidence. Harrell also said that Stephanie did not give C.H.3 "the thickening and the milk" that was in the backpack during the visits.


In this State a <mask> dispute would not excuse a father’s violation of a court order for support of his child (see Grossman on New York Law of Domestic Relations, § 162, and cases cited; also, the discussion in “ Almandares ” v. “ Almandares ”, 186 Misc. 667). “ It is not the policy of the law to deprive children of their rights on account of the dissensions of their parents for causes of which they are innocent and by proceedings to which they are not parties. The legal and natural duty of the father to support his children is not to be evaded by him * * * on the ground of any dissensions whatsoever with his wife. A natural father would not think of doing so, and an unnatural one should not be permitted to do so.” (17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 693, p. 529.) “ While the decree of divorce dissolves the marital relations of the parties, it did not divorce the father from his child or dissolve his liabilities to it.” (Carmody on New York Practice [2d ed.], § 194, p. 293, citing Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237 N. Y. 357.)


Numerous court decisions across this country have protected mental-health professionals when they make mental-competency recommendations to courts, who must in turn decide whether a defendant may proceed under the "normal" course of the criminal laws. E.g. , Seibel v. Kemble , 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981). Some decisions involve courts relying on mental-health professionals to give opinions in the child-custody or <mask> realm, as our supreme court did in Chambers .1 It is a mistake, however, to hold that a psychiatrist performs a judicial function when his or her primary role is to treat a patient according to professional standards of care in the field of psychiatry, for example-an endeavor that is not integral to how the judiciary functions. If the Arkansas General Assembly chooses to evaluate the issue and expressly immunizes health-care personnel who treat Act 911 participants like Kenneth McFadden, then we have a different case. If the Arkansas Supreme Court evaluates the issue in a case on point and expressly confers immunity, then we have a different case. But this court should not award judicial immunity to Dr. Smith, not today.


In a divorce action, the purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. Verzal v. Verzal, 29 Neb. App. 904, 962 N.W.2d 563 (2021). Equitable property division is a three-step process. Id. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. Id. The second step is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. Id. The third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties. Id. The ultimate test in determining the appropriateness of a property division is fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case. Id. Dler contends that he should not have been ordered to assume all of the parties’ debts, but fails to mention that he was also awarded the majority of the parties’ assets. The evidence showed the Dler had retained possession of most of the marital assets and the court awarded those to him. The only marital asset in the possession of Bari was a Honda Accord, which the court awarded to her along with the debt associated with the vehicle. She was also awarded the funds in two bank accounts. The other marital assets, which consisted of household furnishings, another vehicle, and “miscellaneous cash” were awarded to Dler. The court’s distribution and calculation resulted in Dler receiving nearly twice the amount of the parties’ net marital estate as Bari. Accordingly, the court ordered an equalization payment to provide a fair and reasonable division of the marital estate. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s division of the parties’ marital estate. Dler’s last two assignments of error fail. CONCLUSION We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its physical and legal custody and parenting time determination for the parties’ three minor children, in ordering Dler to pay the costs associated with Rawez’ counseling and his supervised <mask>, and in its division of the marital estate. Accordingly, the decree of dissolution is affirmed in its entirety. AFFIRMED.


On November 29, 2016, the court held a pre-trial conference hearing. The court stated it had read the Department's jurisdiction and disposition report and watched a video-recorded interview of G.B. conducted by the child's therapist. The court noted that during the interview, G.B. appeared "very happy," "bouncy," and "practically giddy," and she admitted to the therapist that mother's boyfriend never sexually abused her. The court warned that if it concluded the allegations against mother and her boyfriend were false, it would "amend[ ] the petition to have the father be offending for calling in false allegations" and issue a custody order giving "sole legal, sole physical [custody] to the mother, with monitored <mask> for the father."


According to Swartz, reunification services ordered for Father included: attend abusive parenting classes; participate in supervised <mask>; cooperate with CHFS; submit to random drug screens; and, complete a substance abuse assessment after any positive drug test. In describing Father's compliance, Swartz testified he submitted to some drug screens. According to the trial court's findings of fact, Father tested positive for marijuana, but failed to complete the substance abuse assessment. Swartz referred Father to abusive parenting classes at Centerstone Transitions where he attended only two classes-on April 18 and 25, 2016, before being discharged from the program. Via letter to Sisson, Amy Noll, Principal Therapist/Supervisor at the Transitions Unit of Seven Counties Services, Inc., described Father's performance in those classes.


Although very broad jurisdiction over local correctional facilities has been delegated to the defendants, such jurisdiction does not include the regulation of <mask>. The 1975 legislation conferring regulatory powers upon the defendants cannot be said to have repealed sections 500-c and 500-j by implication. "Repeals of earlier statutes by implication are not favored and a statute is not deemed repealed by a later one unless the two are in such conflict that both cannot be given effect.” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 391; also, see, Matter of Corning v Donohue, 29 NY2d 209; Carter v Board of Supervisors of County of Nassau, 31 AD2d 945, revd on other grounds 25 NY2d 420.) Sections 500-c, 500-j and subdivision 6 of section 45 of the Correction Law are not in such conflict. It follows that the defendants were without authority to promulgate regulations pertaining to visitation and that 9 NYCRR Part 7008 is invalid.


The probable-cause order reflects that it was still in the children's best interest to remain in DHS custody because of AP's allegations of sexual abuse in the home. The circuit court also found that appellants did not have stable housing and that the children had many unexcused absences in school. The parents were granted supervised <mask> and ordered to (1) cooperate with DHS; (2) attend the case-plan staffing; (3) keep DHS informed of their address and phone number; (4) refrain from using illegal drugs or alcohol; (5) obtain and maintain stable housing, employment, and a clean, safe home; (6) demonstrate the ability to protect the children; (7) maintain contact with their attorney; and (8) follow the case plan and court orders.


A probable-cause order was entered on March 14, 2016, finding that probable cause for D.J.'s removal existed and continued to exist by stipulation of the parties. Because a named father had yet to be added as a party to the matter, "any legal and biological father" was ordered to submit to random drug screens, complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment, complete a counseling assessment, complete a psychological assessment, and maintain stable housing and income. Appellant was ordered to establish paternity, and all <mask> and services were ordered to begin for him once his paternity was established. Appellant was not present at the hearing, but a positive drug test for THC from appellant was submitted as an exhibit.


On October 19, 2015, the father entered a stipulation of neglect and waived a formal adjudication hearing, and the following day, the family court entered an adjudication order finding the child to be neglected pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 600.020(1), continuing to place the child with the mother, and permitting the father to have supervised <mask> at the Butterfly House. The court found that the father had been charged with fourth-degree assault that had been committed in the child's presence.


On January 11, 2017, the court entered a permanency-planning order. The court authorized DHS to proceed with termination of Stampley's parental rights, although the court found that Abdi had made substantial, measurable progress and ordered that services to him should continue. The court believed placement with Abdi could occur by or at the next hearing, which would be within three months. The court granted Abdi unsupervised <mask> at the DHS office with progression to day visits at Abdi's home, at DHS's discretion. The court further ordered him to ensure that all his criminal fines, fees, and requirements were up to date.


In the event defendant fails to pay the retainer in accordance with this court’s decision, the clerk is directed to enter a *278judgment for such amount upon Ms. Douglas filing an affidavit of noncompliance. (Domestic Relations Law § 244; Stephens v Stephens, supra.) This is in addition to Ms. Douglas moving for any other available remedy, including contempt and a stay of defendant’s right to go forward with his claims for custody and/or increased <mask> until the contempt is purged. (Wolf v Wolf, 50 AD2d 740 [1st Dept 1975]; Naveja v Naveja, 110 Misc 279 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1920]; Moncrief v Moncrief, 155 NYS 592 [Sup Ct, NY County 1915].)


This case also presents similarities to a more-recent case, *664Nein v. Columbia , 517 S.W.3d 492 (Ky. App. 2017). In Nein , as in the current case, the paternal grandparents were the primary daycare providers for the child for most of his life. In addition to the close bond between the child and the grandparents, the grandparents also gave both mother and child significant financial support. Furthermore, there was evidence that the lack of contact had a negative impact on the child. The child told the court that he wanted to spend more time with his grandparents. In addition, the court noted that the mother's decision to restrict <mask> was motivated, in part, by the grandmother's refusal to lend her money. The court noted that the mother would likely discontinue all visitation in the absence of a court order. Id. at 497. In light of all of this evidence, the trial court in Nein found, and this Court agreed, that the grandparents rebutted the presumption that the mother was acting in the child's best interests. Id. at 498.


The petition alleging neglect is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Custody of both children is awarded to the petitioner. <mask> rights of the mother may be agreed upon between the attorneys for the parties, on the condition that the mother shall not have visitation at any time when she is in the company of or entertaining male companions, to whom she is not married.


In addition, this court finds that Nadeem has not attained an age and degree of maturity to warrant this court to take account of his views so as to avoid his return to London. He is only nine years old. The in camera interview revealed that Nadeem did prefer to stay in the United States. However, this appeared to be very much the result of his being wooed by his father during the <mask>. Given Nadeem’s age and maturity, this reaction to the summer vacation is to be expected.


As a general rule, failure to object at the hearing forfeits a claim of error on appeal. ( In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 ( Dakota H. ); In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562.) The parents not only failed to object to the proposed scope of the hearing; each expressly agreed to it. Mother's attorney stated that the law required a showing of detriment to oppose the recommended tribal customary adoption, and expressly acknowledged that Mother's testimony about her feelings and <mask> "do[ ] not necessarily go to the crux of the [tribal customary adoption] issues." Father's attorney similarly stated on the record that minors' counsel's motion in limine provided the court with "an accurate reflection of the law." This acquiescence to the scope of the section 366.26 hearing forfeits the parents' right to claim on appeal that the court improperly limited the scope of the hearing. ( Civil Code, §§ 3515, 3516 ; Dakota H., at p. 221, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 337.)


Kelly and Angie Hewett were divorced on October 29, 2012. Based on an agreement of the parties, the court awarded Angie primary custody of the couple's son, who was five years old at the time, and awarded Kelly standard <mask>. The record reflects that the parties have had significant difficulty communicating since the divorce and that they have continually argued. In 2013, Angie obtained an ex parte order of protection against Kelly, which was dismissed after a full hearing and that which resulted in the court increasing Kelly's visitation. In August 2016, Angie obtained an ex parte order terminating Kelly's visitation, stemming from an incident on July 31, 2016, in which Kelly's current wife, April Hewett, called Angie and reported that April and Kelly had gotten into an argument, Kelly had been drinking, the police had been called, and Kelly had left with G.H. to go to a hotel room. Angie retrieved G.H. from the hotel room and refused to allow Kelly to have further visitation. The court entered an ex parte order suspending Kelly's visitation but subsequently vacated the order and reinstated visitation after a full hearing.


Indeed, the Family Court is regularly used to modify or enforce custody, support and other matters involving children. This court recognizes that in most counties, concurrent jurisdiction for modification and enforcement of Supreme Court orders is the norm.3 The Family Court has more free resources available to it. It maintains a clinic with professional psychologists and certified social workers, which makes it easier for the *251pro se litigant to enforce or modify not only custody and <mask>, but also child support and maintenance. The Supreme Court has no internal resources for these matters.


A person seeking appointment as guardian files a petition with the court, pursuant to Probate Code section 1510, upon which the court sets a hearing. (See Prob. Code, § 1511.) Unless waived by the court, a court investigator investigates each proposed guardian, thereafter filing a report with the court, which the court must read and consider prior to ruling on the petition. ( Prob. Code, § 1513.) On proper showing, the court appoints the guardian by issuing an order appointing the guardian, as well as letters of guardianship. ( Prob. Code, §§ 2310, 2311.) "The parent's rights over the child are suspended for the duration of the probate guardianship. ( Fam. Code, § 7505, subd. (a) ; [citation].) However, the court retains discretion to grant <mask>, and may terminate the guardianship on a petition by the guardian, a parent, or the child, based on the child's best interest. ( [Citation]; [Prob. Code] § 1601.)" ( Guardianship of H.C. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 160, 1245, 198 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, as mod. on den. of rehg. (Sept. 1, 2011).) Thus, while the legal community often refers to the issuance of letters of guardianship as the order of "permanent" guardianship6 , no guardianship is truly permanent, and any can be revoked by court order on an appropriate showing. If not terminated *1049by court order, the guardianship ends once the child attains majority, dies, is adopted, or becomes emancipated. ( Prob. Code, § 1600.)


The court rejects petitioner’s arguments that the new statute is “punitive” or an ex post facto measure creating a new sanction for petitioner’s criminal act. As stated earlier, <mask> with his son is not solely Mr. R’s “right”. Visitation is a right jointly shared by parent and child, intended to benefit both. Nevertheless, it is the child’s interest that is paramount and it is the child’s interest that the new legislation addresses. The Legislature has twice demonstrated its concern for the impact on children of acts of domestic violence inflicted by one parent against the other, first in the 1996 amendments, and now in chapter 150. These laws reflect a public policy determination that children are to be protected from exposure to domestic violence, and as such they may be considered remedial in nature.


The father here also argues that his 15-plus-year estrangement from his sons was the fault of their mother who “poisoned” them against him. Such mitigating circumstances or reasons for a parent’s abandonment of his children, even if supported by credible evidence,2 are immaterial to an inquiry under EPTL 4-1.4. The sole inquiry is whether the parent did or did not, in fact, by his own voluntary action discontinue performance of his legal duty of personal training and care of his children (Matter of Schiffrin, supra). It has been noted that if the other parent were to blame for his separation from his children, he had legal remedies he could have pursued through the courts (Matter of Emiro, supra; Matter of Schiffrin, supra). Even a court order restricting parental <mask>, while it may lessen the measure of the parent’s obligation, does not eliminate it, so that, in determining whether the noncustodial parent has fulfilled his responsibility of care and training to the extent permitted by the order, the test is whether there is a failure to meet even this reduced standard (37 NY Jur 2d, Death § 274). The fact is that, regardless of his motives, the father here elected to absent himself from decedent’s life and is thereby disqualified from inheriting (Matter of Gonzalez, supra). The father here did not even exercise his court-ordered visitation rights, nor did he pursue any legal remedy to their alleged denial. Such failure to avail oneself of court-ordered visitation evinces an intent to voluntarily relinquish such rights (see Estate of Kris Robert Hughes, supra).


The witness to the will, Nellie M. Drummond, first testified that she was walking in a northerly direction on the westerly side of Warburton avenue on the day of the will making. Later, she was not positive as to whether she was on the westerly or easterly side of the avenue. She says Mr. Oliver beckoned to her from the *515window to come into the house, which is located eight)' feet back from the easterly side of the street line. She says: “ By the time I got across the street and up the path he was on the front porch and said: ‘ Nell, I wish you would come in here and do something for me/ ” This witness also testified, first, that Mr. Oliver was standing in the window next to the front door. Subsequent to the date of that testimony a picture of the house, taken during the trial at the court’s request, was offered in evidence, which discloses the fact that there is a heavy wistaria vine which almost covered the entire front porch, making it barely possible for a person standing on the sidewalk to observe a person standing in the window next to the front door. Later, her testimony on this point was changed so that Mr. Oliver was standing in the window of the dining room, which the same picture discloses to be quite free from obstruction. Miss Drummond testified that she did not see the housekeeper at the time of her <mask>.


Standard custody disputes are not usually subject to res judicata because the "best interests” of children are more important than any of the benefits of closure. As stated in Matter of Bachman v Mejias (1 NY2d 575, 582 [1956]), "[a] child is not a chattel” and a proceeding need not be accorded res judicata effect when the best interests of the child dictated otherwise (Matter of Berlin v Berlin, 21 NY2d 371 [1967]). However, this case is not a standard custody and <mask> dispute between parents, in which the court is always obligated to inquire into the best interests of the children, but rather, a grandparent visitation case in which the court already determined that the issue of "best interests” should not even be reached; the court has already decided that equity did not require that petitioner be given standing to sue (Matter of Gloria R. v Alfred R., supra).


Felice K. Shea, J. In this action for divorce, the court must determine whether or not to order joint custody of the parties’ infant daughters, ages five and seven. The plaintiff mother seeks sole custody of *643the children, with liberal <mask> to the defendant father. Defendant urges that custody be awarded jointly and that the children divide their time equally between the two homes. In the alternative, the father requests that he be the custodial parent.


At the adjudication hearing, Sills was again present and still unrepresented. The court entered an adjudication order finding that Sills had been served by certified mail. The court also found B.S. to be dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness and the drug use of the mother and that Sills had not contributed to the dependency-neglect of the child. However, the court further found Sills was not a fit parent for purposes of custody and <mask>. The court continued its previous orders and specifically ordered Sills to resolve his criminal issues and to complete the case plan and court orders before placement or visitation would be provided.


In response to the court stating A.B. would move in January 2018, between semesters, Mother replied, "Your Honor, I fear that-[A.B.] is very grown-up. And he has-he can't-him and his father are not in good communication. It's going to go really bad for [A.B.]." The court replied that the parties presented their evidence and he followed the law. Mother ignored the rules for seven years. Mother responded that Father was unavailable, as reflected in e-mails. The court told Mother she had conceded at the beginning of the case that she had violated the custody order, and did so for seven years. Mother replied, "I did. He wasn't around for the weekends. I did everything I could. He's far away." The court nevertheless ordered A.B.'s custody changed from Mother to Father, with <mask> for Mother.


*896On April 19, 2017, the trial court heard Maya's motion to set aside the default, Maya's sanctions request in connection with the motion to set aside the default, Cody's motions to quash the two subpoenas regarding his *1140medical treatments, and Maya's additional requests regarding custody, <mask>, child support, and $100,000 in attorney fees. The trial court denied Maya's motion to set aside the default and the related request for sanctions, granted Cody's motions to quash the VISIONS and Cedars-Sinai subpoenas, and denied Maya's additional requests, including her request that Cody be ordered to finance her attorney fees.


“An inmate’s right to a contact visit may be limited or denied only when it has been determined that such visits constitute a serious threat to the safety or security of a facility. Should a determination be made to limit or deny an inmate’s right to contact visits, alternative arrangements for affording the inmate the requisite number of visits shall be made, including but not limited to non-contact visits. This determination must be based on specific acts committed by the inmate while in custody under the present charge or sentence that demonstrates his/her threat to the safety and security of an institution, or on specific information received and verified that the *539inmate plans to engage in acts during the next visit that will be a threat to the safety and security of the facility. Prior to any determination, the inmate shall be provided with written notification of the specific charges and the names and statements of the charging parties, and be afforded an opportunity to respond. At the inmates’s request, this determination shall be reviewed by the Deputy Warden for Programs every thirty (30) days” (emphasis added). Petitioner’s argument that the Department denied him his due process rights by violating the provisions of this Directive is persuasive. As noted above, petitioner was subjected to a mandatory drug test on January 11, 2008, to detect the presence of controlled substances.5 Five months later, after testing positive for THC-marijuana and serving his punitive segregation time, petitioner received a visitor and was placed in a non-physical-contact booth for the entire visit. Petitioner contends, and the court agrees, that the Department has proffered no relationship, causal or otherwise, between the petitioner’s positive drug test and the indefinite revocation of his contact visits. More significantly, the Department has abjectly failed to demonstrate any act of the petitioner suggesting that he poses a threat to the safety and security of the correctional institution. Where an inmate’s behavior bears no relation to his contact visits, such visits may be neither revoked nor limited (Dawes v State of New York, 194 Misc 2d 617 [2003]). Quoting Kozlowski v Coughlin (871d 241, 242 [2d Cir 1989]), the court stated that “<mask> sanctions may not be employed to punish or discipline . . . [0]nly misconduct between an inmate and a specific visitor can result in deprivation of visitation rights.” (Dawes at 618.) It is especially interesting to note that while the revocation of contact visits in Dawes was based on the inmate’s violent behavior, there was no demonstrable relationship between that behavior and the contact visits. As such, the revocation of contact visits was held to be improper. Surely then, where the inmate’s behavior was entirely nonviolent, e.g., drug use, and had no relationship to any contact visits, revocation of contact visits is improper.


With respect to Family Court’s determination that the adoption be conditioned upon <mask> with respondent and the maternal grandparents, we find it to be in error. Social Services Law § 384-b contemplates an adversarial proceeding. It does not contain a provision that upon a determination that parental rights should be terminated a court can require or permit contact by and between a biological parent and a child who has been adopted. While Family Court was correct that the Legislature has amended Social Services Law § 383-c to allow a parent to condition a voluntary surrender for adoption upon, inter alia, contact with the child or information concerning the child, the proceeding herein did not involve such a voluntary surrender. Accordingly, the provisions of Social *869Services Law § 383-c are wholly inapplicable and, therefore, Family Court was without authority in this adversarial proceeding to require such continued contact as a condition of adoption.


With respect to the first question, we hold that the order of adoption is controlling and that its effect is to supersede the prior order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County. The Supreme Court order appears to have been the culmination of a proceeding initiated by either writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause for the sole purpose of establishing custodial and <mask> rights. In such a proceeding the Supreme Court acts as parens patria of the infant and, motivated exclusively by what is in the best interests of the child, makes a decision which is at best temporary in nature and always subject to review or modification. At the time when that proceeding was argued, it must be remembered that the natural mother had died and that the natural father was incarcerated; It could not seriously be argued that the determination of custody would, for example, he of such a permanent nature as to preclude the natural father upon release from jail from seeking to obtain custody of his natural horn son. The order granting custody to Mary Rado and visitation rights to the petitioner would stand until modified by a subsequent order of the Supreme Court or until another court of competent jurisdiction would make a permanent change in status.


I would hold that at no time should a twelve-year-old child be in a position of dictating to a parent when <mask> will occur. Adults are in charge of children. The adults in this case failed in their responsibility. And, by this decision, the trial court has allowed the adults to abandon their responsibility of determining what is in the best interests of children. I cannot concur with that result.


The sixth cause of action alleges that defendant Druzba’s conduct in interfering with plaintiffs <mask> rights constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm. This court, in a related action, analyzed in great detail the viability of such a cause of action within the context of a matrimonial dispute (Harley v Harley, Sup Ct, Rensselaer County, Sept. 30, 1989, Keniry, J.). The court reasoned in that case that an action by a spouse against a spouse and a mother-in-law for the intentional infliction of emotional distress did not lie for policy reasons.


A social worker who investigated stepdaughter's case testified that stepdaughter was "very fearful" and "very embarrassed" and felt "a tremendous amount of guilt that she hadn't come forward earlier" to protect Daniela. The worker also characterized Daniela as "a very young eight-year-old" who was "not sophisticated" and might not "even know[ ] what sex is" or fully understand what father had done to stepdaughter except that it was "something bad." This worker agreed it would be "harmful" to both girls if they had to testify in court in front of father. The worker also indicated that <mask> with father would be detrimental to Daniela because father had engaged in "grooming behaviors," denied any abuse, and failed to seek treatment.


“[t]he court should also ascertain the wishes of the children, particularly when, as here, the children are of a sufficient age to articulate their needs and preferences to the court [citations omitted]. While the express wishes of children are not controlling, they are entitled to great weight, particularly where their age and maturity would make their input particularly meaningful [citation omitted].” The Court went on to state that the preferred practice in a custody/<mask> case, in order to determine best interest, is to have an in camera interview with the child on the record in the presence of the Law Guardian. In the case at bar, independent forensic evaluations on consent have been conducted pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.16 (f) (3), and as indicated above, an in camera interview has already been held of the child. After the court hears testimony from the independent neutral forensic evaluator as to the effect of a second in camera interview on a child of this age, given the history of the breach of this child’s confidentiality by the father obtaining the prior Family Court in camera interview with the child, this court will determine whether another in camera interview would serve a “useful purpose” (see Mascoli v Mascoli, 132 AD2d 653 [2d Dept 1987]) and whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem is necessary.


While we note that, during a period of time in 2020, COVID-19 may have prevented Mother from having in-person contact with Riley regardless of Mother’s inability to pass the random drug screens, Mother had been denied in-person <mask> based on her drug use for several months leading up to Montgomery County’s decision to cease in-person visitation, and she continued to test positive for illicit substances throughout the entire DCS case. - 11 - DCS created three permanency plans with each plan pertaining to both Mother and Father. Each plan required Father to: (1) make voluntary child supports payments; (2) maintain consistent visitation with Riley; (3) obtain a legal source of income and provide proof to DCS; (4) notify DCS when adequate housing was obtained and provide proof of rent and utilities; (5) allow DCS to conduct a walkthrough of the family home; (6) complete a non-self-reporting alcohol and drug assessment and comply with all recommendations; and (7) fully care for the child at visitations.


DHS is mistaken on the law. An adopted individual becomes a stranger to his or her blood relatives, save one exception for sibling <mask>. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (c)(1) (Supp. 2017); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215 (Repl. 2016); see also Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 314 Ark. 92, 97, 858 S.W.2d 122, 125 (1993) ("These statutes point to a public policy which, in determining what is in the child's best interest, favors a complete severing of the ties between a child and its biological family when he is placed for adoption.").


Trial courts have great discretion in fashioning child custody and <mask> orders. We therefore review those orders for an abuse of discretion. ( In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 569 ( Fajota ).) "A court abuses its discretion in making a child custody order if there is no reasonable basis on which it could conclude that its decision advanced the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court also abuses its discretion if it applies improper criteria or makes incorrect legal assumptions . [Citation.]" ( Id ., at p. 1497, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 569.) "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exceeds the bounds of reason; even if we disagree with the trial court's determination, we uphold the determination so long as it is reasonable.


After Mr. Kern went into the house, Mr. Crumb said he had desired to give Emma Crumb a little remembrance, and to give a half sister something, to which Mrs. Crumb said that his relatives had never done anything for him and had never treated him decently, and he was under no obligations to give them anything, and so far as the other persons were concerned, she would carry out his wishes if she lived the longest; whereupon Mr. Crumb said: “ I have *485had Mr. Kern draw the wills as we agreed, embodying this arrangement.” At this point of time Mr. Kern said to Mr. Crumb he had drawn the wills in pursuance of what he had told him, and that they were ready for execution, whereupon Mr. Crumb signed the will, declaring it to be his last will and testament, and requesting Mr. and Mrs. Kern to sign the same as witnesses, which they immediately did in his presence; that the said will was not read by Mr. Crumb before its execution, nor was it read to him by anyone, nor had he seen it before this time; that from the time the will was drawn Mr. Kern had the <mask> of it, and he had not disclosed its contents to any one; that, immediately after the will was executed, Mr. Kern and Mr. Crumb left the house together and went down town, leaving the will upon the table, Mrs. Crumb’s will being also executed at the same time, and left in the same place.


Shortly thereafter, Mother and Father were reincarcerated. The family court suspended Father's visitation and awarded L.B. and B.B. <mask>. Both biological parents were paroled in 2016. Father's Day, June 19, 2016, was the last day either Father or Mother visited with Child. Both were reincarcerated in 2017, when Mother violated the terms of her parole and the Commonwealth charged Father with robbery.


Finally, Kali argues that the custody order should be set aside because the family court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) for S.J.C. during the custody proceeding. However, Kali did not raise this issue at any point before the *419family court. Furthermore, while a GAL must be appointed for a child in termination proceedings, KRS2 625.041, appointment of a GAL in custody matters is generally permissive. See Morgan v. Getter , 441 S.W.3d 94, 106 (Ky. 2014), citing FCRPP3 6(2). Given Kali's failure to raise this matter in support of her CR 60.02 motion before the family court, we decline to address the issue further. Consequently, any matters relating to custody must be addressed in the Grayson Circuit action based upon Kali's prior waiver of her superior right to <mask>.


Heather challenges several rulings, on many grounds. She contends the juvenile court erred: (1) by allowing C.W. to live in Louisiana with his father on a "trial home visit"-which she contends was done improperly without notice, without any ruling on her objections and without any judicial review after 90 days, all in contravention of the court's own local rules (see Super. Ct. Sonoma County Local Rules, rule 10.26); (2) by later deeming that visit to become a "family maintenance" placement-which she contends on many grounds was done improperly, in violation of section 386 without notice,20 in violation of the statutorily mandated standards and procedures under section 366.3, subdivision (f) for potentially returning a child to a parent's home during the permanency phase, without any findings that were required to be made under section 366.3, subdivision (e) at the periodic review hearings to ensure C.W.'s safety, and without any statutorily mandated oversight in the way of family maintenance services or even a case plan (see § 16506, subd. (c); § 16501, subds. (a)(2) & (g); § 366.3, subd. (e)(4)); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(b)(1), b(2); id ., rule 5.708(e)); (3) by allowing C.W. thereafter to be placed into the residential treatment program in Louisiana-which she contends was done improperly without the filing of a supplemental petition under *482section 38721 or compliance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (see Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq. ; id. , § 7911.1), and also in violation of section 361.21 which requires a determination that "[i]n-state facilities or programs [are] unavailable or inadequate to meet the needs of the minor" before a dependent child is placed in an out-of-state group home (§ 361.21, *858subd. (a)(3)); and (4) by dismissing jurisdiction and awarding <mask> of C.W. to his father, a result she says was an abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence. She also challenges the visitation order on the ground the court improperly delegated its authority to determine her visitation rights to C.W.'s therapists. Recognizing that she did not file separate appeals earlier to challenge the first three sets of claimed errors (and, did not object to several of them), Heather argues that those rulings exceed the court's jurisdiction, and as such are void and may be challenged at any time.


However, plaintiff shipper’s tried cause of action is based upon negligence and not barred by any subsequent ratification by acceptance of a check, visibly and patently stale (Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-404) and altered on its face so, in effect, a worthless piece of paper, not fiscally revivable and collecting nothing. (Joseph Mogul, Inc. v C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 NY 20 [Cardozo, Ch. J.]; see Freedman & Slater v Great Lakes Forwarding Corp., 7 AD2d 978, 979, which expressed definite doubt and a contrary holding [based upon right, if not duty to avoid damages] about the 1879 Rathbun decision.) This court takes judicial notice that 1879 was one year after opening of the first commercial telephone exchange (January 28, 1878, New Haven, Conn.) and predated the following inventions and development thereof: automatic and radio telephone (1891, 1902, 1906); wireless telegraph (1896); radio receiver and transmitter (1913-1914); radio signals (1895); teletype (1928); phototelegraphy (1925); iconoscope and electronic television (1923, 1927) and the entire transcontinental telecommunications and computer technological revolution over the past 50 years. (See The World Almanac & Book of Facts [1976], p 807 et seq.) Surely, such modern technology in February, 1974, imposed a duty upon defendant, a well-known and highly regarded interstate motor carrier, with national facilities to contact shipper before acceptance of a patently stale and altered check and delivery of subject C.O.D. shipment. It was only carrier (not shipper) who had <mask> and control to relinquish possession of subject C.O.D. shipment at the moment of unauthorized acceptance of such check that was, on *45its face, stale and altered. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation. (Palsgraf v Long Is. R. R. Co., 248 NY 339, 344 [Cardozo, J.].) While the parties’ original relation was conceived in contract, whose duties are based upon intention, American courts have extended tort liability for misfeasance, as herein, to virtually every type of contact where defective performance injures the promisee, i.e., an agent collecting upon a note. (See Prosser, Law of Torts [4th ed], § 92, pp 613-621.) A carrier receiving a C.O.D. shipment is not only a bailee to transport goods but also an agent to receive or collect the price. (See Joseph Mogul, Inc. v C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., supra p 22.)


In People v Henson (33 NY2d 63 [1973]), the Court of Appeals ruled that the introduction into evidence of matters concerning the defendant’s alleged prior conduct toward the child/victim constituted reversible error. This case is distinguishable in that the evidence in Henson related to prior conduct of the defendant where the case at bar does not deal with prior conduct. However, the Henson Court went on to ad*32dress the issue of admissibility of expert medical testimony concerning the “Battered Child Syndrome”. In Henson questions were posed by the prosecutor to medical experts that were designed to elicit testimony about the so-called “Battered Child Syndrome”. The defendant objected and the trial court sustained the objection. On appeal, the defendant argued the questions themselves prejudiced the jury. The Court held (at 73) “the trial court would have been entirely justified in allowing the witness to respond to the questions as part of the prosecution’s offer of circumstantial proof’. The Court of Appeals concluded by stating (at 74) “This sort of expert medical testimony — that the victim is a ‘battered child’ — coupled with additional proof — for instance, that the injuries occurred while the child was in the <mask> of the parents — would permit the jury to infer not only that the child’s injuries were not accidental but that, in addition, they occurred at the culpable hands of its parents.”


Morton I. Willen, J. The plaintiff mother in this proceeding, M.A.B., applied to the court in June 1985, seeking to modify a judgment of divorce entered June 14, 1984. She wishes the court to permit her to move to Florida with her three children. The defendant father, R.B., cross-moved for a modification of the same divorce judgment, seeking to have <mask> of their 12-year-old son, B., awarded to him. He does not seek custody of the two younger children and opposes their removal to Florida. The matters were consolidated and a trial was held starting in March 1986, and concluded in May. The matter was reopened at the mother’s behest in September based on subsequent facts and finally completed in October.


Here, the 2018 Modification Judgment granted Father's motion to modify the 2014 Judgment. Under the 2014 Judgment, Mother had sole legal and physical custody of Daughter. The 2018 Modification Judgment awarded joint legal and physical custody as well as transferred residential custody of Daughter from Mother to Father. In order to modify the 2014 Judgment, Father must have shown a change in circumstances since the 2014 Judgment. Section 452.410.1. Notably, that change must be substantial because the trial court reversed Mother's <mask> and removed Daughter from the home where she lived with Mother from approximately age five to age nine. Tienter, 482 S.W.3d at 490 (citing Russell, 210 S.W.3d at 197 );


Contrary to the mother’s contention, under the circumstances presented here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion by, in effect, granting the father’s petition for <mask> of the child Lawrence, Jr., and by, in effect, granting the father’s separate petition to modify a prior custody order so as to award him sole custody of the child Larry, Jr. The Family Court possessed adequate relevant information to enable it, without a hearing, to make an informed and provident determination that it was in the best interests of the subject children to award sole custody to the father (see Assini v Assini, 11 AD3d 417 [2004]; Matter of Porter v Burgey, 266 AD2d 552 [1999]).


A parent’s obligation in raising a child is owed to the child, not to the other parent. “[C]hildren are entitled to the love, companionship, and concern of both parents. So, too, a joint award [of custody] affords the otherwise noncustodial parent psychological support which can be translated into a healthy environment for the child.” (Braiman v Braiman, 44 NY2d 584, 589 [1978] [emphasis added].) Thus, where joint custody is awarded, it is done for the purpose of enhancing each parent’s ability to promote his or her child’s best interests. Joint custody allows both parents to “work together in a cooperative fashion for the good of their children.” (Matter of Jemmott v Jemmott, 249 AD2d 838, 839 [3d Dept 1998] [emphasis added], lv denied 92 NY2d 809 [1998].) If one parent ceases to cooperate with the other, the aggrieved parent’s recourse is to seek a termination of joint custody and an award of <mask> to protect the best interests of the child. The non-offending parent does not become entitled to money damages for the breach because it is not to the parent that the duty is owed. None of the cases cited by plaintiff would warrant this court finding such a duty by extension of existing law.


By a notice pursuant to CPLR article 31 dated January 31,1984, the defendant seeks to take the oral depositions of the plaintiff and her current husband with respect to evidence material and necessary in the prosecution of his application for <mask>. The notice states that “this is NOT A FINANCIAL EXAMINATION. IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS ACTION.”


Christopher C. (“Father”) and Samantha L. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of one child, Hailey C. Father and Mother were never married. After the couple separated, Mother and Hailey moved in with the maternal grandmother in Kentucky. Father moved to Tennessee. On August 7, 2015, a Kentucky court awarded <mask> of the child to Mother. Father had parenting time every other weekend. He was also ordered to pay monthly child support.


In addition to Burns and Hendricks's children, Hendricks has given birth to three other children. Her rights to one of those children has been terminated, and her other two children are in the <mask> of their father. Hendricks's parental rights to EB and LB were also terminated in this action; however, Hendricks is not a party to this appeal.


6 These documents were Exhibits A through H in opposition to mother’s request for an order; Exhibits 1 through 16 concerning text messages and other items relating to an alleged rape incident in Las Vegas; mother’s request for order; mother’s August 20, 2020 declaration; father’s August 21, 2020 declaration; and father’s September 21, 2020 responsive declaration. have to do with your request today to have possible <mask> of the [children]? “[Mother]: It’s a [section] 3044 request as well. So I want a domestic violence finding if Your Honor will be willing to. “The court: You’ve already made that request, and it was denied. “[Mother]: I didn’t know that that request was made before. I didn’t have— “The court: You’ve made it multiple times. And I can tell that the speech I gave you fell on deaf ears. And you’re not required to listen to my speeches, but I went through this with you last time. And nothing’s changed. [¶] . . . [Father] has parental rights. And this issue with respect to the rape has already been litigated. It’s done. It’s passed. You’re entitled to your view of what happened when the [children] were conceived. The father is also entitled to his. [¶] But what remains is the [children.] . . . I don’t know why I’m doing a speech again. . . . [I]f you want to do what’s best for the [children], you’re going to stop exposing them to all the anger you have to the father.” The court denied mother’s request to modify custody, finding there had been no material change in circumstance since the last hearing and ordering the previous orders to remain in effect. The court then considered father’s request for section 271 sanctions. Father’s counsel argued mother had shown a pattern of violating the court’s orders and filing motions or ex parte requests that were “res judicata.” He asserted that the judge who made the initial custody order and the present family court judge had both urged mother to “move past the situation” and successfully coparent. Father’s counsel asked the court to tell mother that a possible consequence of violations and bad behavior was the loss of custody. In response to the


So far, courts, when determining custody matters, have been slow to join practitioners in jettisoning the traditional custody-centric model in favor of one that is centered on decision-making. This is evidenced by a series of recent Appellate Division decisions, all of which treat parental decision-making as a function that is tied to legal custody, as opposed to one that, in and of itself, constitutes the method by which parents will raise their children. In some of these decisions, parental decision-making is viewed as being subsumed within the context of legal custody (see e.g. Phillips v Phillips, 146 AD3d 719, 719 [1st Dept 2017] [awarding “sole legal and physical custody” to mother; no mention of decision-making]; Matter of Dayvon G. [Amber B.], 146 AD3d 414, 414 [1st Dept 2017] [“sole legal and physical custody” to mother; no mention of decision-making]; Karlsson v Karlsson, 145 AD3d 639, 639 [1st Dept 2016] [“sole legal and primary physical custody” to mother; no mention of decision-making]; Matter of Michael B. [Lillian B.], *983145 AD3d 425, 431 [1st Dept 2016] [“primary physical custody” and “sole legal custody” to mother; no mention of decision-making]). In others, it is seen as being incidental to it (see e.g. Douglas H. v C. Louise H., 138 AD3d 497, 497 [1st Dept 2016] [awarding “<mask> and decision-making authority” to father]; Matter of Carlos S. v Ana S., 137 AD3d 700, 700 [1st Dept 2016] [“sole custody and decision-making authority” to father]; Tatum v Simmons, 133 AD3d 550, 551 [1st Dept 2015] [“shared legal custody of the child with each party having final authority over separate decision-making zones”]).


On October 15, 2007, the wife met with Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith handed her the stipulation and left her to read it, occasionally coming back in to check on her. They spent no more than 5 to 20 minutes together. Ms. Smith told the wife that the stipulation reflected what they had discussed. With regard to BC, the stipulation provided that the wife had <mask>, subject to the husband’s visitation, consisting of alternate weekends, from 7:00 p.m. on Friday to 7:00 p.m. on Sunday; alternate holidays; and one month during the summer. The stipulation further provided that “neither party may relocate without notice and consent of the other party or court order.” The stipulation further provided that the parties had already divided their property and waived all further claims for equitable distribution. Finally, the stipulation provided that each party had received full financial disclosure from the other.


To summarize Mr. B.’s relationship with his children: he was never married to Antoinette M.; he has court orders of filiation *275for four of the five children; he had <mask> of the four older children from 1996-1997, and thereafter received court orders for visitation; from 1998 to June 2003 he was incarcerated; he has never lived with Shaqueal, does not have an order of paternity for him, and has had very limited contact with him (including three visits while incarcerated at Rikers Island in 1999); he filed new petitions for custody of all five children in 2002, while on “work release” (Dockets No. V-20135/02, V-20139-42/02) which were dismissed without prejudice when he was reincarcerated later that year; and he opposes termination of his rights and adoption. The agency relies on Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) to assert that Mr. B. does not meet the statutory criteria for an unwed father whose consent to adoption is required, and specifically “objects to and disputes the characterization of Notice Father’s relationship with any of the children as ‘very significant.’ ” Mr. B. argues that, based on the undisputed factual history summarized above, he has a substantial relationship with his children which is entitled to protection, and that application of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) to him would deprive him of his constitutional rights.


The appointment of a guardian in this matter is occasioned by reason of the mother’s present disability. If that disability is removed the mother is eo instante remitted to her common-law control and right to custody. Matter of Deming, 10 Johns. 232, 483. I do not quite understand why the Supreme Court originally saw fit to deprive the mother, being the innocent party to the divorce action, of the <mask> of her infant under fourteen, ordinarily granted to innocent parties. No doubt there were good reasons. In England special acts of Parliament were regarded as *465necessary to alter the common-law rights of parents to custody, 6. g., 2 & 3 Vict. chap. 54. The New York acts on this subject do not go so far as the English acts.


I think, in a case of this kind, and especially where a claim of such magnitude is presented by an executor or administrator, who has <mask> of the books of account, correspondence and documents relating to *442the claim presented, that he should be held to the clearest possible proof of the claim. An air of suspicion naturally gathers around it, which must needs be dispelled before it can be allowed.


J. started first grade in September 2009. The father continued to take him to school every day except when he was traveling. After the father came back from a business trip in the fall, J.’s teacher told him that J. had not been on time for the early morning class at all while the father was away. That was one of the factors that caused Mr. D. to seek <mask>. Ms. R. often went to the school very upset and told the school principal three *525or four different times that she was being evicted and had to move because the father would not pay her rent and she had no money. The school principal did not encourage Ms. R. to share such personal information and observed that she was “excited” and “rambling” and always in “crisis mode.”


Mother believed under an agreement with the school, which both she and Father signed, Father was not allowed to be on the emergency contact list. She stated that Santillan offered to give the child a ride once and denied Santillan's suggestion that the child had poor hygiene, explaining that the child bathed daily and wore a uniform to school. Mother visited with the N.V.M.'s school teacher several times a week and understood that his reading abilities needed improvement. She explained that she loved her son. She and N.V.M. read every day, cooked together, in addition to a variety of other activities. While she did not have much money, she nevertheless makes the best of their time together. She did not understand why Father was petitioning for <mask> and explained that in doing so, Father would turn N.V.M. against her. Mother stated that N.V.M. informed her that there is a lack of discipline at Father's house and that they "let [N.V.M.] do whatever."


Certainly, the claim at bar does not approach the overbearing circumstances apparent in Parker v Parker (66 AD2d 328) where the wife, without representation by counsel and after having been hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital for 5 of the preceding 11 months, signed a stipulation at the request of her husband, who was represented by an attorney, in which she relinquished <mask> of their child, conveyed her interest in the marital home, and waived her rights to support or alimony and to an attorney. There the court nullified the fraudulently obtained stipulation, clearly one-sided in favor of the husband who took advantage of his overmastering influence over his wife.


Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court did not err in granting her cross petition for <mask> only to the extent that she “shall have sole medical and educational decision-making authority,” for the subject child and in granting the father’s petition for joint custody to the extent that “the parents will have joint decision-making authority with respect to all other custodial matters outside the spheres of medical and educational needs.” Although it is evident that there is some antagonism between the parties, it is also apparent that both parties generally behave appropriately with the child and in a relatively civilized fashion toward each other. Furthermore, there is no evidence that they are so hostile or antagonistic toward each other that they would be unable to put aside their differences for the good of the child. Under these circumstances, the Family Court’s determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Carter v Carter, 111 AD3d 715, 716 [2013], lv denied 22 AD3d 863 [2014]; Prohaszka v Prohaszka, 103 AD3d 617, 618 [2013]). Rivera, J.E, Lott, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.


Here, the change in circumstances was that Robin's bad acts were happening in the presence of the child, where they were presumably hidden before the divorce. To her detriment, the judge believed the testimony that Robin had men in the house overnight at least once while the children were present; that marijuana was found in Robin's house by Lynzi; that Robin spoke disparagingly of Lathaire in the children's presence; that Robin was drunk and smoked in front of the asthmatic child; and that while the parties were able to work out the schedule most of the time to give each other one-half of Krysten's time, they were in disagreement now. The judge apparently was persuaded by Lathaire's explanations for not paying child support when he was frustrated, and for his arrest in the children's presence. We must defer to the credibility calls made by the trial judge. Moreover, joint custody should only stand where the parties are very agreeable. Given the standard of review, we affirm the change from joint custody of Krysten to Lathaire having full custody. Id. at 166, 189 S.W.3d at 480 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Phillip *291contends that this court should award him <mask> of L.P.


Family Court’s order should be affirmed. Respondent’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the award of <mask> of the children to petitioner is without merit. In this case, a "fair interpretation of the evidence” (Matter of Bogert v Rickard, 199 AD2d 587, 588) supports Family Court’s conclusions (see, Matter of Liccione v John H., 65 NY2d 826, 827-828). The evidence indicates that respondent becomes violent when intoxicated and has, on numerous occasions in the past, verbally and physically abused petitioner (see, Vogel v Vogel, 149 AD2d 501, 502).


Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified to the friction between the parties, the threats, harassment and intimidation she has *644suffered, the father’s unwillingness to share in the care of the children while he lived at home, and his exposure of the children to his romance with her erstwhile friend. Plaintiff sees the joint custody arrangement, in which she acquiesced with reluctance, as failing to meet the needs of the children and she asks the court to award her <mask> with liberal visitation to defendant.


On July 19, 1987 the infant, John Meyers, Jr., was involved in a car accident which resulted in the death of his father and stepmother. John Meyers, Jr., had been in the <mask> of his natural father for many years prior to the accident. After the accident, the infant lived with and was cared for by his grandmother. On September 23, 1987, the boy’s grandmother *266was appointed the legal guardian of the infant pursuant to a Family Court order.


Leslie B. cannot change his sex or (unilaterally) his marital status in order to acquire the rights granted to married fathers and all mothers under subdivision (1) (b) and (c) of Domestic Relations Law § 111. He did, however, manifest his significant, substantial relationship with his children. Although his name is not on any of the birth certificates, he obtained orders of filiation for the four eldest children. According to the grandmother’s testimony, Mr. B. was very much involved with the four older children’s daily care even before he obtained custody. He then sought and obtained orders of custody, which were in effect for 11 months. (The record does not show whether, as is usually the case, he had physical custody for some period before he obtained the court orders.) He, unlike Mr. Caban, had <mask>, not merely sharing custody with the children’s mother during periods of cohabitation. When custody was transferred to the grandmother, he (but not the mother) was granted court-ordered visitation. His ongoing telephone contacts with his children was established unequivocally by the grandmother’s testimony, who also testified that he had visits after his release from prison in June 2003. In this court’s view, Mr. B.’s circumstances more closely resemble those of Mr. Stanley and Mr. Caban, rather than Mr. Quilloin. He satisfies the parameters set out in Raquel Marie X.: “The protected interest is not established simply by biology. The unwed father’s protected interest requires both a biological connection and full parental responsibility; he must both be a father and behave like one.” (Raquel Marie X., supra at 401.) There is no doubt that an unwed mother — who at one point had custody, then lost it, who was incarcerated but maintained some contact with her children while imprisoned, who resumed contact upon her release — could not be deprived of her rights unless a petition pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b were filed and granted. This father is entitled to no less. To impose the requirements in subdivision (1) (d) to Mr. B., when they are not required of mothers and married fathers, would, in this court’s judgment, constitute denial of equal protection based on sex and marital status. The court concludes, therefore, that Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) is unconstitutional as applied *284to Leslie B. and his four older children. Since the agency relies solely on that subdivision to argue that he is not a “consent father,” the petitions concerning those children against him are dismissed. As to Shaqueal, born in December 1997, shortly before Mr. B. was incarcerated, his relationship is not so substantial as to create parental rights under Stanley, Caban and Raquel Marie X. He did not live with Shaqueal, or obtain an order of paternity, or obtain court orders of custody or visitation. Accordingly Mr. B.’s motion to dismiss that child’s petition (B-27605/02) is denied.


Second, although Bianka's petition does not expressly seek to terminate Jorge's parental rights, the order she seeks would have a similar effect. Bianka asked the court to place her in her mother's sole legal and physical custody. Ordinarily, a <mask> order does not deprive the noncustodial parent of all parental rights. (See In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 958, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 610, 127 P.3d 28.) But here, although Bianka's petition takes no position on visitation, *866as a practical matter she would have to oppose any visitation rights for Jorge, as visitation is incompatible with the requested SIJ finding that reunification is not viable. Substantial geographic separation, which will often (if not always) be present in cases in which SIJ findings are requested, further exacerbates the effect of a sole custody order in this case. In our view, the court was reasonably concerned about making such an order in a nonadversarial proceeding to which the noncustodial parent is not a party, as is the case here.