. The “ <mask> ” amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure (§ 180-a, subd. 1) provides that“ A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of ” certain specified misdemeanors, and subdivision 2 provides that when a police officer has stopped such a person, “ and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon.” A “ ‘ frisk ’ is distinguishable from a constitutionally protected search ” because “ the right to ‘ frisk ’ is justified as an incident to an inquiry upon grounds of safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search” (People v. Pugach, 15 N Y 2d 65, 69).


It seems clear enough that the hallways and other common areas of a large multiple dwelling would not be part of the "home”. Access, while perhaps not open to the public-at-large, is nevertheless relatively uncontrolled, and common understanding would not label such areas as living space; see People v Peters (18 NY2d 238, 244 [a <mask> case]); People v Beltrand (63 Misc 2d 1041, 1048, affd 67 Misc 2d 324 [a criminal trespass case]); People v Terrell (53 Misc 2d 32, 38 [a search and seizure case]); but see Matter of Jakeway v Bauer Co. (218 App Div 302 [a workmen’s compensation case]); *176White v United States (283 A2d 21 [a gun case in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals]).


The right to detain individuals short of arresting them or subjecting them to a full-scale search has long been recognized in certain situations as a legitimate police function. In fact, the so-called ‘ ‘ <mask> cases ’ ’ are primarily court authorizations to detain individuals in suspicious circumstances, with the “frisk” considered as a proper precautionary prelude to the investigation (People v. Rivera, 14 N Y 2d 441; Sibron v.New York, 392 U. S. 40; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1).


Contrary to the defendant’s contention, a "<mask> report” containing a statement made by a prosecution witness regarding his negative identification of another individual did *631not constitute Rosario material. The right to inspect statements of a prosecution witness is limited to those statements relevant to the subject matter of the witness’s testimony (see, People v Rios, 182 AD2d 843; see also, People v Poole, 48 NY2d 144, 148-149). As no testimony concerning the negative identification of another individual was elicited during the direct examination of the prosecution witness, the People were not obligated to make the "stop and frisk report” available to the defendant (see, People v Rios, supra; People v Bailey, 200 AD2d 677; People v Melendez, 178 AD2d 366; People v Goldman, 175 AD2d 723; cf., People v Perez, 65 NY2d 154).


"Q: When you fill out a report, <mask> report; amongst the things included, is the fact that you include in it to believe that person should be stopped and frisked; correct? "A: Correct.” Thus, it is plain that Officer Gogarty’s testimony, relied upon by the dissent, concerns what is generally put into such a report and cannot be relied upon in any way as evidence of what was actually contained in the Stop and Frisk Report here in question. This interpretation of the testimony is substantiated by defense counsel’s next question after the one quoted above, in which defense counsel specifically refers to the report in question stating: "And, your partner didn’t mention in this stop and frisk report that either you or he had seen a bulge in my client’s waistband; isn’t that correct?” (Emphasis supplied.)


The anonymous tip that a black, heavyset man wearing a black hat, black pants and blue jersey/sweatshirt with “FUBO” printed on it, carried a gun in a black bag at Waverley Street and Red Cross Place is very specific and particular. P.O. Rodriguez was under a duty to investigate such a report. (People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 374; People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, *402270.) P.O. Rodriguez, upon arriving at the named location, observed the defendant fitting the description given. The information provided was specific and consistent with the observations of the officer. (People v Kinlock, 43 NY2d 832.) Thus P.O. Rodriguez had reasonable suspicion to <mask> the defendant. (People v Salaman, 71 NY2d 869.) A “frisk” of the bag carried on the shoulder of the defendant would also have been proper under these circumstances (People v Brooks, 65 NY2d 1021; People v Cartagena, 189 AD2d 67; People v White, 156 AD2d 741; People v Tratch, 104 AD2d 503).


In the instant application, the defendant cannot succeed on any ground. Principally, the exclusionary rule is not *833applicable to an off-duty auxiliary policeman, and the evidence seized by him — whether he acted improperly or not — should not be suppressed. Moreover, even if the exclusionary rule could be considered so pervasive as to be pertinent here, the circumstances of this defendant’s flight from a group; the oral sounding of an alarm with respect to defendant; and particularly, defendant’s display of a weapon, albeit with a missing part, in the officer’s face, constitute more than sufficient reasonable suspicion (CPL 140.50), at least for a <mask>, if not for an actual arrest.


In Florida v J.L., the police received an anonymous tip which provided a physical description of an individual including the color of his shirt. The tip provided a location and maintained that the individual was carrying a gun. The officers arrived at the location, and observed three individuals, one of whom matched the description in the tip. The officers approached the defendant and frisked him. The Court found that the anonymous tip lacked any indicia of reliability and was insufficient to justify a <mask> (see Florida v J.L., 529 US at 275). The tip only corroborated the identity of the individual. There was no corroboration of any criminal activity (see Florida v J.L., 529 US at 272).


Also, appropriate analogy may be made from section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, known as the “ <mask> ” law which permits a police officer to stop any person in a public place for temporary questioning when he reasonably suspects such person is committing or is about to commit a felony, and to frisk the suspect for weapons if he reasonably suspects that his life is in danger. This law is not cited for comparison of any factual pattern suggested by that law. The section points up, however, that one of the absolutes under the Fourth Amendment, namely, probable cause, is displaced by reasonable suspicion for the reason that a frisk, sometimes likened to a lesser invasion of a search, is necessary as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search (see People v. Taggart, 20 N Y 2d 335; see, also, People v. Peters, 18 N Y 2d 238; People v. Sibron, 18 N Y 2d 603).


In People v Mosley (68 NY2d 881, cert denied — US —, 107 S Ct 3185), the defendant and two companions were stopped and frisked on the street by police who observed them engage in conduct which the Court of Appeals later found to be equivocal and insufficient to justify the stop. The frisks revealed nothing on the defendant, but one of his companions, Mackie, was found to be in possession of a starter pistol. All three men were arrested for its possession, and a subsequent search of the defendant at the station house uncovered a loaded and operable weapon in his pocket. Charged with possession of that weapon, the defendant moved to suppress it as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The Court of Appeals held *745that, because the arrest had resulted from an unlawful <mask>, the defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted. Moreover, although a defendant would not ordinarily be thought to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the person or clothing of another, the court observed: "Inasmuch as the People rely on the discovery of the starter pistol on Mackie as the basis for the arrest of defendant — that defendant constructively possessed the weapon concealed on Mackie’s person — defendant has standing to contest the frisk of Mackie.” (68 NY2d, at 883.)


The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A <mask> by law enforcement implicates the Fourth Amendment's protections.21 This is true whether the person detained is a pedestrian or the occupant of an automobile.22 A Fourth Amendment analysis regarding an officer's stop and frisk has two prongs.23 A court must first decide whether the officer's action was justified at its inception.24 Next, a court must decide whether the search and seizure were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.25


The courts, in the various “ <mask> ” cases have also examined the present circumstances and the question of slight intrusion of an individual’s privacy or that a short detention of the person would not be violative of his constitutional rights. In People v. Morales (22 N Y 2d 55), although the case was limited to the facts presented therein (an unsolved murder case) the court allowed the detention of a suspect at the police station after he had been requested to come in for questioning and did so in the accompaniment of the officers, and while under questioning, confessed to the murder. The questioning of á "person on the street, or requesting, as in this, case, a person to leave an automobile to present his identification, is within the confines of proper police routine methods, providing that it is reasonably done. A person’s constitutional rights cannot be subverted to a point where law enforcement agencies would run. roughshod of individual’s privacy. The word “ reasonable ” is mandated in our own criminal jurisprudence as neces*938sitating proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the “ reasonable ” circumstances surrounding inquiries should be based on the circumstances presented to the court and not in varied obtuse semantics. It is noteworthy that in most cases, especially narcotics cases, minute questions are considered that have no bearing as to what is reasonable under the circumstances.


The court’s next inquiry is to determine whether the ensuing warrantless frisk or search was justified because the "exigencies of the situation made that course imperative” (Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 220). A Terry emergency frisk is permissible where the officer has reason to believe that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. Under the statutory provision, the self-protective search is available if the police officer or court officer, after stopping a person in or about the courtroom, "reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury” (CPL 140.50, subd 3). The codified <mask> authority engendered by the Terry, Sibron and Adams trilogy (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, supra; Sibron v New York, 392 US 40; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143) underscores the "reasonable suspicion” test validating a self-protective frisk or search. The officer should in the same manner as making a stop, "indicate specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted that intrusion. Vague or unparticularized hunches will not suffice” (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 113, supra). Neither "gut reaction” (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 564) nor "a sincere, good faith belief by police officers that a crime is about to be committed, without objective evidence of criminal activity” (People v Santiago, 64 AD2d 355, 360, supra, citing Terry v Ohio, supra; People v Sobotker, supra; People v Cantor, supra) will serve as a predicate for the search. An "emergency” type frisk or search premised on mere belief by a police or court officer that he was confronted with a dangerous or armed person is offensive to a citizen’s Fourth Amendment guarantees and expectation of privacy rights however limited they may be in a courthouse atmosphere. To justify such conduct, the sovereign must not only show that its agent believed "his safety or that of others [was] in danger” (United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 880, supra; Terry v Ohio, supra) but that *1107in fact the agent had reasonable suspicion for such belief. Otherwise, we would be involved with the creation of illusory rights — a result not intended by the Constitution, nor to be countenanced by the court.


The <mask> Law (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a) broadened the scope of a reasonable search to provide that a police officer may stop for questioning any person in a public place, whom he reasonably suspects is committing a crime and, if he reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon.


"These exceptions include searches and seizures conducted incident to a lawful arrest, those yielding contraband in plain view, those in the hot pursuit of a fleeing criminal, those limited to a <mask> based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, those based on probable cause in the presence of exigent circumstances, and those based on consent." Id. (quoting State v. Day , 263 S.W.3d 891, 901 n.9 (Tenn. 2008) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State carries the burden of proving that a warrantless search was constitutionally permissible. State v. Ingram , 331 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tenn. 2011)


The court then sought to correct any misapprehension regarding its holding in Mosley (supra). The court wrote: "We concluded [in Mosley] that the <mask> were unjustified and that no probable cause existed for the subsequent arrest of defendant and station house search that led to discovery of the pistol in Mosley’s pocket. Mosley unquestionably had standing to contest whether the discovery of a gun in his friend’s possession constituted probable cause for his own arrest” (People v Wesley, 73 NY2d 351, 362, supra). The court continued: "Mosley plainly does not stand for the proposition that defendant had standing to litigate the validity of the search of his friend, a third party” (supra, at 362, n 4).


In People v Moore (32 NY2d 67), a man was arrested after being accused of menacing his girlfriend with a knife. On his *403way to the precinct, the man told the police officer that his girlfriend, the defendant, “was ‘sick’ [and] * * * had a gun” (supra, at 68). At the station house, the police officers asked the defendant for her handbag. When the defendant gave her handbag to the police officers, a search produced an unlicenced gun. The Court of Appeals upheld the “search” under the <mask> law (CPL 140.50). The Court pointed to the fact that the informant was known to the police and had little motive for fabrication as he was also at the station house. An immediate search was held to be justified as the information was reliable, and the belief of danger to the officer and others was real and reasonable. The Court noted that a pat down of the handbag would have been ineffective. It should be noted that what was portrayed as a search was the opening and looking into the handbag.


"Q: Well, how far were you from Jose when your partner searched him? "A: I was right on the other side of him.” The sole testifying officer further conceded that his partner had prepared a "<mask> report” and that such a report (which here did not mention any sighting of a bulge) contains "the fact that you include in it to believe that [a] person should be stopped and frisked”.


In United States v Colon (supra), the government, unlike here, conceded that the defendant was stopped and frisked on the basis of an anonymous call. The government also conceded that the 911 operator did not transmit to the NYPD dispatcher the entire message that the 911 operator had received from the caller. The court held that the additional knowledge of the civilian 911 operator which was never conveyed to the NYPD dispatcher could not be imputed to the dispatcher or arresting officer, and, absent that additional knowledge, the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to <mask> defendant.


By memorandum decision and order dated February 22, 2000, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction (People v Breazil, 269 AD2d 537 [2000]). Defendant’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was subsequently denied (People v Breazil, 95 NY2d 851 [2000]). By pro se motion dated May 21, 2001, defendant moved to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 on the ground that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to <mask> defendant based solely on an anonymous tip and that defendant was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel. The motion to vacate the judgment was denied (People v Breazil, 191 Misc 2d 817 [2002, Feldman, J.]). A justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department (Townes, J.), granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal. By order dated January 24, 2006, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme *495Court’s order denying vacatur of the judgment of conviction (People v Breazil, 25 AD3d 719 [2006]).1 Defendant then moved to reargue the Appellate Division’s order, and, by order dated July 5, 2006, the Appellate Division, Second Department, granted the motion to reargue, and, upon reargument, recalled and vacated the January 24, 2006 order (People v Breazil, 31 AD3d 461 [2006]).2 The final order stated that “the People should be afforded an opportunity, at a new suppression hearing, to show that the police conduct was lawful.” (Id. at 462.) More specifically, the Appellate Division ordered the new hearing since “[a]t the original suppression hearing, the question of the source of the information provided by an unidentified caller to the police and the question of when the police learned of the complainant’s existence was not explored” (id.). Thus, a Dunaway/Mapp hearing was ordered and held. Given the circumstances of this case, this court not only granted the People the opportunity to present evidence as to the identity of the 911 caller, but, over the objection of defense counsel, to reopen the hearing in its entirety (see People v Crandall, 69 NY2d 459 [1987]). The People called three witnesses: retired New York City Police Officer Kurt Twining, Detective David Gross and New York State Division of Parole Supervisor William McCarthy.


Glaser , however, expressly declined to adopt "a general rule" that when police have a warrant to search a home, " 'the mere arrival or presence of someone at the warranted premises, by itself,' justifies a detention for the purpose of determining identity and connection to the searched premises." ( Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 373-374, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.) Glaser noted that "[s]uch a blanket approval of detentions in the course of searches would present too great a danger 'of slippage into a guilt by association pattern whereby anyone seen near prospective drug activity becomes fair game for a <mask>.' " ( Id . at p. 374, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.)


In rebuttal, the defense makes two salient observations: first, that the defendant was not a parolee and the attache case, which was between his legs, by all observable indicia belonged to him; second, that New York’s “ <mask> ” statute (CPL 140.50) applies only to “police officers” while parole officers, who hold “peace officer ” status (CPL 1.20, subd. 33, par. [i]) are not defined as “ police officers ” {id., subd. 34).


Moreover, the evidence also failed to establish that Officer Castro properly seized the knife incident to a frisk for weapons. Level three of Be Bour authorizes a police officer to frisk a suspect for deadly weapons where he reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury (Be Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; see also CPL 140.50 [3]). Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that Officer Castro had reasonably feared for his safety at any time, justifying a frisk for the knife. On the contrary, Officer Castro clearly testified that he did not fear for his safety when he observed the clip sticking out of defendant’s pocket. There was no evidence in this record that the officer had any reason to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous. Defendant never made any furtive movements or threatening gestures during the confrontation. He never tried to reach for the knife or conceal it. On the contrary, defendant never exhibited any suspicious behavior and was completely cooperative with Officer Castro during the encounter. Furthermore, since he had not committed a violent offense and was merely being questioned regarding an open bottle possibly containing alcohol, Officer Castro had no reason to believe that defendant would subsequently become violent. Accordingly, Officer Castro would not have been justified in seizing the knife pursuant to a <mask> under level three of Be Bour (see Irizarry, 509 F Supp 2d at 209 [object clipped to defendant’s pocket which appeared to be gravity knife did not rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; portion of item visible could have “represented many innocuous objects”]).


. The Office of the Attorney General commenced an investigation into the New York City Police Department’s use of <mask> practice on March 18, 1999. This was the first systematic study of these practices and was based on a quantitative analysis of approximately 175,000 US-250 forms that the police are required to complete after stop encounters. The forms covered stops that occurred in 1998 and in the first three months of 1999. The study employed statistics from police precincts and compared rates at which members of different racial groups were stopped. While it is universally acknowledged that stop and frisk serves as an important tool in furthering NYPD crime fighting strategies, the Attorney General Report focused on the consequences of stop and frisk practice for people in the communities most directly affected. The report’s focus was to determine and compare the extent to which minorities and Whites were the subject of stop and frisk activities and to determine the extent to which officers described a legally sufficient basis for effecting the stop. For the period covered, the report concluded that Blacks were stopped at a higher rate than Whites, relative to their percentage within the New York City population. Blacks, while comprising 25.6% of the city’s population, constituted 50.6% of all persons stopped. By contrast, Whites were 43.4% of the city’s population, but accounted for only 12.9% of all stops. This disparity in stop rates is particularly pronounced in precincts where the majority of the population is white. In those precincts where Blacks and Hispanics each represent less than 10% of the total population, more than half of the total stops during the period came from these groups. The report also notes that precincts where minorities constitute the majority of the overall population tended to see more stop and frisk activity than precincts where Whites constitute the majority. Interestingly, while only one out of nine stops resulted in an arrest, Whites were arrested with more frequency after such stops than minorities. One out of every 9.5 Blacks stopped was arrested, while for Whites there was one arrest for every 7.9 Whites stopped. Acknowledging that higher crime rates in minority communities can explain the higher rate at which minorities are stopped, using various regression analysis adjustments, the Attorney General Report still found that different crime rates alone cannot fully explain the increased rates of stops of minorities. After accounting for the effect of different crime rates, Blacks were stopped 23% more often than Whites across all crime categories. Regression analysis revealed that for specific crime categories there were statistically significant disparities in the stop rates of Blacks versus those of Whites.


When the officers stopped him, they drew weapons and ordered him to lie on the ground to frisk him. The Court of Appeals said that, under the circumstances, the police acted reasonably in effecting this “<mask>.” In so deciding, the Court noted, “when the intrusion involved is of sufficient magnitude, an ‘arrest’ will be said to occur, whether or not the person is eventually transported to the police station and *159charged with a crime. However, it is equally as clear that not every seizure constitutes an arrest. [Citation omitted.]” (People v Chestnut, at 20.) Given the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the presence of the drawn gun did not transform the stop and frisk of defendant into an arrest.


In determining the validity of the police action in this case, we believe the prescribed standards of initial action and the grounds and scope of the invasion of the person questioned to be applied are those contained in section 180-a of the code, since the action here involved was subsequent to the effective date of the ‘ ‘ <mask> ’ ’ statute.


With respect to the first arm of his motion, defendant claims the <mask> of him by the police was unconstitutional under Florida v J.L. (529 US 266 [2000]). Defendant contends that he is entitled to the benefit of the rule enunciated in J.L. (supra) because although the decision was rendered after his conviction became final, it should be applied retroactively to suppress the weapon seized in his case.


The defendant contends that the <mask> was contrary to his rights — and the fruits of that alleged illegal action by the police — the finding of the gun and the statement must be suppressed. The People contend that the frisk was lawful and there was a reasonable basis to suspect that the defendant had a gun based upon the information given by the two informers, who concededly, are anonymous.


The law is clear that the police may not <mask> a citizen based solely upon information of criminal conduct provided from an anonymous source without other “indicia of reliability” (see Florida v J.L., supra at 271; People v Folk, supra; see also People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496 [2006]; People v Heapps, 13 AD3d 107 [2004]). The issue which required clarification pursuant to the order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, was the source of the information provided to the police which led to the stopping of defendant. It is quite evident that the Appellate Division was affording the People an opportunity to relay to the hearing court whether the anonymous tipster was the complainant in the robbery. However, since both police officers who testified at this hearing were unable to provide the identity of the 911 caller, and the People offered no other substantive evidence regarding this fact, this court has no choice but to grant defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of the arrest, the weapon and the subsequent lineup (see People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 417 [1984] [“Inasmuch as the lineup identification followed directly from the illegal arrest and detention of defendant, it was error to admit evidence of that identification at trial”]). Both police witnesses testified in no uncertain terms that they stopped defendant based solely upon the uncorroborated information provided by an anonymous 911 caller, which is directly in contradiction to the law (see Florida v J.L., supra; People v Folk, supra; see also People v Moore, supra; People v Heapps, supra). Moreover, the description relied upon by the officers did not place defendant on a bicycle, which further dilutes the reliability of the information.


■Counsel for the defense asserts that the warrantless search conducted of the trunk and interior of the Cadillac was illegal in that, before the trunk was unlocked, the defendants were not under arrest and the officer had no knowledge of any crime having been committed. Generally, all searches and seizures *465are deemed unreasonable if conducted without a warrant unless they fall within various recognized exceptions, which include a search on consent,1 a search incident to a lawful arrest,2 a search under the “ <mask> ” rule,3 a .search of impounded vehicles and property subject to forfeiture,4 a search conducted in the course of a “ hot pursuit,”5 a search of an open field, even if private property,6 a search of abandoned property,7 a search conducted in an emergency situation or under exigent circumstances,8 and a search of a vehicle where probable cause exists for the .belief that the vehicle contains contraband.9 Since, in the instant case, the search of defendants’ automobile preceded their arrest and thus cannot be considered as incident to a lawful arrest, the search can only be upheld if it comes within the ambit of at least one of' the other exceptions.


The People contend that the consent was valid and the search was justified as a precautionary measure for the safety of airplane passengers. Since the purpose is to prevent hijacking, the People contend that rigid standards should not be applied to these types of searches. The compelling need for affording airline passengers adequate protection from hijackers has made these searches imperative. As a matter of fact a task force was appointed to consider effective meaps of combating this ter*539rifying and heinous course of conduct. It was the task force which devised the anti-hijacking system which consists of a profile selection, magnetometer detection, and the “ <mask> ” or limited search. For a detailed and illuminating description of the system, see United States v. Lopes (328 F. Supp. 1077, supra). (See, also, United States v. Epperson, 454 F. 2d 769 [1972]; United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797; Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40.)


For example, searches may now be sustained under principles of attenuation (Nardone v United States, supra), the automobile exception (Arkansas v Sanders, 442 US 753), exigency (People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173), consent of a person with apparent authority (People v Adams, 53 NY2d 1), impoundment and inventory (South Dakota v Opperman, supra), administrative procedure (People v Rizzo, 40 NY2d 425), inevitable discovery (People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499), plain view (People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d 640), standing (People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160), harmless error (People v Coles, 89 AD2d 471), <mask> (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1), and within the recently enlarged “grabbable area” associated with a lawful arrest (New York v Belton, 453 US 454).


Family Court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress the gun and ammunition recovered upon his arrest, based on the arresting officer’s testimony that appellant matched the detailed description, spontaneously provided to him and his partner moments before by a man in the street who flagged them down, of a youth who was trying to fire a gun that appeared to be jammed, and, when questioned whether he had a gun, reached with his hand toward his waistband. Such testimony, which was sufficient to show reasonable suspicion to <mask>, was not incredible as a matter of law by reason of the arresting officer’s omission from his memo book of the details of the informant’s description of appellant or of appellant’s act of reaching toward his waistband. Since nothing in the memo book actually contradicted the officer’s testimony, the memo book entry could be viewed as simply a more abbreviated account of the incident than the testimony, and certainly did not make the testimony " 'impossible of belief ” and " 'manifestly untrue’ ” (People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88). Questions of credibility are primarily to be resolved by the trier of fact who actually sees and hears the witnesses, and whose determination is to be accorded great weight and not disturbed on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record (People v Woodham, 158 AD2d 494, 495). Concur—Wallach, J. P., Asch, Rubin and Williams, JJ.


Furthermore, the subsequent police conduct was reasonably limited in scope and intensity to the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. The officers did not <mask> defendant. The officers did not immediately seize and search the bag. Officer Hellmer first asked only a few pertinent questions. He inquired if defendant lived in the building and what he was doing there. And, in light of the radio report that the suspect had a gun inside a brown bag, the officer naturally asked about defendant’s bag. (See People v Rogers, 259 AD2d 398 [1st Dept 1999] [common-law inquiry including request to view contents of plastic bag defendant was holding ruled lawful]; People v Boyd, 91 AD2d at 1046 [officer’s inquiry about contents of defendant’s bag properly based on common-law right to inquire].) Thus, the officers lawfully approached defendant and reasonably questioned him, and, absent an arbitrary intrusion, based upon whim, curiosity or caprice or with an intent to harass, there was no constitutional violation. (See People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 217.)


On the other hand, the alleged facts of the instant case present a clearly contrasting pattern of individual conduct. At the time of the <mask> of the defendant, auxiliary police officer Leon was not on duty; was not in uniform; did not display a badge; and was not then under police department authority, supervision or control. He had neither police equipment nor a police-related assignment. He was not working as an agent for or in co-operation or collusion with regular police personnel.


While there has been considerable law review discussion as to the constitutionality of New York’s “ <mask> ” law, I do not pass upon that issue since every statute is presumed to be constitutional (Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N Y 2d 74, 78) and ‘ ‘ courts of first instance should not exercise transcendent power of declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional except *46in rare eases where life and liberty is involved and invalidity of the act is apparent on its face ”. (National Psychological Assn. v. University of State of New York, 18 Misc 2d 722, 726, affd. 10 AD 2d 688, affd. 8 N Y 2d 197, app. dsmd. 365 TI. S. 298.) And more particularly so in a ease like this where the Court of Appeals has, if not explicitly, certainly implicitly, upheld the validity of the statute (People v. Rivera, 14 N Y 2d 441; People v. Pugach, 15 N Y 2d 65, supra).


Accompanied by another officer, Detective Goodin traveled to the pool room on Kentucky Avenue in Pineville, Kentucky. He entered the rear of the pool room, as directed by the text message sender, while the other detective stayed out front. As he entered, the detective observed a man-subsequently identified as Steve Turner-standing next to a machine looking at his cell phone. Detective Goodin approached, identified himself as a police officer, and asked if Turner had any weapons. Before the detective could perform a "<mask>,"2 Turner voluntarily removed two pill bottles from his pocket.


In Terry v. Ohio (392 U. S. 1 [1968]) and in CPL 140.50 the right to “<mask> ” a suspect by an investigating officer is not limited to his own protection but extends to “ others * * * in danger ’ \ In light of the wave of plane hijackings, kidnappings, extortion, and other crimes perpetrated by some ill-intentioned passengers with concealed weapons at our nation’s airports, such limited searches had to be initiatéd. In Terry v. Ohio (supra) the United States Supreme Court, in upholding a “stop and frisk” law, held, though the police must whenever practicable secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer * ' * * is required.


6 “The law is clear that citizens are protected by both federal and state constitutional provisions from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8.” Martin, supra at 1228 (case citation omitted). A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8, subject to a few established, well-delineated exceptions. See id. (emphasis added). Such exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception . . . the <mask> exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).


Dispositive of the issues here is a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Sibron v. New York (392 U. S. 40). This case arose in the context of the New York’s “ <mask> Law”. (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a.) The conviction of Sibron and one Peters, for the unlawful possession of heroin, was upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York on the ground that the evidence was properly admitted and that the searches which uncovered the evidence were authorized by the statute.


Contrary to the defendant’s contention, we discern no basis for disturbing the hearing court’s express determination that the <mask> in this case was validly supported by reasonable suspicion. In this regard, the defendant’s analysis of the stop pursuant to the more stringent probable cause standard for an arrest is erroneous (see, People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369; People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267; People v Olsen, 93 AD2d 824; cf., People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342; People v Elwell, 50 NY2d 231). The evidence adduced at the hearing, including the radio report of an armed robbery in progress at a specified location, the descriptions provided by citizen informants to other police officers during a face-to-face encounter at the scene, and the independent corroborative observations made by the arresting officer in close temporal and geographical proximity to the scene, provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop of the defendant (see, People v Salaman, 71 NY2d 869; People v Landy, supra; People v Klass, 55 NY2d 821; People v Benjamin, supra; People v Mills, 198 AD2d 236). Moreover, the protective pat down of the defendant was appropriate, given the nature of the reported crime and the officer’s reasonable belief that the defendant might be armed (see, People v Salaman, supra; People v Benjamin, supra). Upon recovering a gun from the defendant’s person, the police had probable cause to arrest him (see, People v Sattan, 200 AD2d 640; People v Thorne, 184 AD2d 797). Accordingly, the defendant’s contention that the police conduct in this case was unlawful is without merit. Sullivan, J. P., Balletta, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.


Depending on the case, other documents that might be prepared and listed are the request for a lab report, sprint reports, aided cards, any notes about the case in the daily activity log (memo book entries) of an officer involved in the case, the handwritten on-line booking arrest sheet, the police officer’s supporting deposition if the complainant is unable to go to the complaint room, requests for commendation, and the <mask> report, also known as UF250.


Appellant nonetheless insists that the search was not "justified at its inception." He reasons that the information leading to the search came from an anonymous source and was therefore unreliable because there were no means of testing the informant's knowledge or credibility. On this point, he relies principally on Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 ( J.L. ), a case arising outside the school context, in which the high court addressed "whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's <mask> of that person," and concluded it is not. ( Id. at p. 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375.)


The issue in this matter involves the sufficiency of the information the police had to support the stop and arrest of defendant and brings into play the law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v J.L. (529 US 266 [2000]). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a <mask> conducted on the basis of an anonymous report that there was an individual with a concealed firearm at a specified location was illegal. The Court stated that “the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the defendant]” was insufficient to justify a stop (id. at 271; see also People v Folk, 284 AD2d 476 [2001]).


The warrantless <mask> of defendant had to be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, viz., " ' "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational *336inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion” ’ ” (People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238, quoting People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 420, quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21). Here, even disregarding the specific descriptions given to him over the radio, Detective Lauro was told by a reliable informant that he had just bought narcotics from three men standing at a specific intersection. When he arrived at the scene approximately a minute later and saw three men standing at the specified location, he certainly had a founded suspicion that they were the narcotics sellers. While there was no-hearing testimony as to what was said to defendant, it is undisputed that Detective Lauro, who was in plainclothes, displayed his badge, which was hanging on a chain around his neck, as he approached defendant, but did not draw or display his revolver (cf., People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531). Although defendant "was patted down for the presence of any weapons”, none were found and the propriety of such frisk is not at issue and does not affect the legality of the subsequent arrest.


The authority to intercept persons upon the public street emanates from two independent sources, the common-law right of inquiry (People v Rivera, 14 NY2d 441, cert den 379 US 978), and the so-called <mask> law (CPL 140.50). The latter requires the officer to have a "reasonable suspicion” that the detained person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Cantor further defines "reasonable suspicion” as that quantum of knowledge which under the circumstances then present, would prompt an ordinarily prudent and cautious man to believe that criminal activity is at hand. A line must be drawn in these instances between vague or unparticularized hunches which will not suffice, and specific, articulable facts which will.


This court finds the Officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to justify the level three <mask> of the defendant. Even if the Officers had possessed the level three reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime (i.e., criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree, Penal Law § 221.10), which would have permitted only a temporary detention of defendant, the full-blown search of defendant was not permitted. A level three temporary detention justifies only a pat-down frisk if there is reason to believe that the suspect is *370armed and poses a threat to officer safety. It does not permit a full-fledged warrantless search for evidence. (De Bour at 223.) There is no evidence in the hearing record that either Officer observed anything which would have indicated defendant possessed a weapon. Prior to being ordered to turn around and face the wall in order to be searched, there was nothing threatening or unusual about defendant’s behavior and there certainly was nothing to suggest defendant was in possession of any weapon. Officers Niemi and Slattery made it clear that defendant wasn’t going to be just frisked, rather he was going to be “searched for marihuana.” While the Officers were permitted to ask defendant Brukner questions of an accusatory nature, the Officers were not authorized to order the defendant to turn and face the wall in order to be frisked and searched. This court cannot find precedent for and is unwilling to fashion what the People refer to as a “plain smell” exception to the search warrant requirement when officers possess nothing more than the odor of marihuana emanating from a pedestrian. The detention, frisk and search of defendant was not authorized. In short: the mere odor of marihuana emanating from a pedestrian, without more, does not create reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, and consequently does not authorize law enforcement to forcibly stop, frisk, or search the individual.


While the People argue that defendant’s illegal conduct of riding a bicycle on a New York City sidewalk could have provided a basis to stop defendant under the theory of a pretextual stop, the People’s mere speculation that the police could have and would have stopped defendant for this conduct is insufficient to cure the tainted police action. Given the record before the court, it strains the bounds of credulity to believe that the aggressive <mask> would have occurred for such a minor infraction of the law, especially given the police witnesses’ unequivocal responses to defense counsel’s questions regarding the true reason for the stop.


The defendants have the burden of establishing that they have standing to contest the allegedly unlawful search. The defendants argue that the hiring of the cab places that area of the cab, where the defendants sat, within the zone of a legitimate expectation of privacy, namely, the area in the back of the cab where the passengers are seated. They also argue that the officers lacked probable cause to <mask> the defendants. Defendant Judge also argues, separately, that he has standing by virtue of the automobile statutory presumption of possession statute. (Penal Law, § 265.15, subd 3.)


The dissent also relies upon the testimony concerning the <mask> Report prepared by Officer Fallon, to conclude *370that no weapon was seen by Officer Fallon prior to his seizure of the gun and, as further support for the conclusion that a frisk or pat down had to precede the seizure of the gun in this case. We note first that the report in question was not submitted to us on appeal. Second, there is no testimony in the record as to the contents of the report, except for the testimony that there is no mention in it of a bulge being seen by either officer. Third, the complete version of the question asked by defense counsel, which is relied upon by the dissent, to suggest that Officer Gogarty conceded that the Stop and Frisk Report contained a statement that the defendant was searched in order to locate the weapon, is as follows:


In these circumstances, Mackie would plainly have standing to challenge the frisk and be entitled to suppression of the diamond as well as his statement and subsequent identification. Under this new reading of Mosley (supra), however, Mosley himself would be in a very different position. He would only have "standing” to argue that the circumstances, including the discovery of the diamond on Mackie, were not sufficient to warrant his detention. He would not have standing to challenge the frisk of Mackie which uncovered the diamond although he himself had been subject to a contemporaneous *695and equally unlawful <mask> by the very same officers. The diamond itself, together with the resulting evidence, the statement and the identification, would all be admissible against Mosley.


The People urge that a fire escape, like a hallway, stairway or lobby of a multiple dwelling, is a public place, and thus not within the ambit and protection of the Fourth Amendment and cite People v. Peters (44 Misc 2d 470, affd. 24 A D 2d 989, affd. 18 N Y 2d 238). In the Peters case, an off-duty policeman, while in his apartment located in a multiple dwelling, heard a loud noise outside of his door. On looking into the hall through the peephole of his door, he saw two men tiptoeing out of an alcove toward the stairway. Suspicious, he called the police and returned to his observations. Seeing them still tiptoeing up the stairs, he took his service revolver, slammed his door and ran into the hall. He chased the defendants and stopped them. On inquiry by the policeman resident as to what he was doing in the building, Peters replied — looking for a girl friend — whom he declined to name. The policeman then frisked Peters, looking for a weapon. Instead of a weapon he found burglar tools, which he turned over to the police on their arrival. The defendant was then taken into custody. The defendant thereafter moved to suppress the evidence. The motion was denied and affirmed by the appellate courts. In its affirmance the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the <mask> Law, section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and held that hallways and stairways of multiple dwellings are public places within the intendment of that section and all that was necessary to bring the statute into effect was “ reasonable suspicion ” as distinguished from “ probable cause ”.


Therefore, with respect to the question of whether a pat down occurred in this case, the report is silent. The denomination of the report as a "<mask> Report” and the fact that the officer, who did not prepare the report in this case, testified as to what is usually contained in such a report, do not constitute evidence that Officer Fallon had to search defendant for. a weapon he did not readily see. The only evidence we have is Officer Gogarty’s testimony that Officer Fallon "reached * * * in and pulled the gun out”. We note also, that the use by the Presentment Agency and the defense in their briefs, of the terms, "frisk”, "pat down” and "limited search”, etc., to describe the seizure of the weapon also do not constitute evidence; the terms are words of art universally used to describe these street encounters between the police and the general public. The specific manner and attendant circumstances of each "stop and frisk” are unique, and we evaluate these encounters on a case by case basis. In our *371evaluation of this encounter we are concerned with what actually occurred as shown by the evidence in the record and not, as the dissent seems to be, with semantics.


After reviewing the pertinent appellate cases, certain rules can be discerned. The presence of reasonable suspicion permits a <mask> of a suspect for weapons as well as a frisk or pat down of any bag that he might be carrying or that is within his reachable area. (People v Brooks, 65 NY2d 1021, supra.) A bag that is flexible and whose contents can be felt by touching its exterior must be patted down and may be opened for a search only when after a pat down, the officer reasonably believes it contains a weapon. (People v Coleman, 215 AD2d 576, supra; People v Morales, 198 AD2d 129; People v Cartagena, 189 AD2d 67, supra; People v White, 156 AD2d 741, supra.) When, however, due to a closed container’s rigid exterior, its contents are not susceptible of being identified by touch, then a bag or container may be opened and visually inspected even absent probable cause especially if other aggravating factors are present (e.g., the person alleged to be carrying a weapon is on a busy street [People v Tratch, 104 AD2d 503, supra] or in a police station [People v Moore, 32 NY2d 67, supra], or if the safety of children is involved [People v Taggart, 20 NY2d 335]).


Defendant Derrick O’Neal Henderson and codefendant Zuri James entered an apartment, pointed guns at the occupants, and threatened to shoot them. A jury found defendant guilty of, among other counts, one count of making a criminal threat, and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and found true personal use of a semiautomatic firearm allegations as to each of those counts. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted gang evidence, and defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the evidence; (2) evidence was insufficient to prove defendant was not acting in <mask>; and


4. The Court of Appeals improperly concluded that <mask> was not available to Jeremiah because he was the initial aggressor. To reach this conclusion, the Court of Appeals credited Porter’s testimony over Jeremiah’s, which was a question for the jury to decide. The relevant question was whether Jeremiah had put forward “some evidence” that he had acted in defense of others and was not the initial aggressor. Given Jeremiah’s claim that he had acted to defend Micheline after Porter smashed an ashtray on her head, the jury could have considered Porter’s conduct to be the initial act of aggression. Regarding the felonious-assault charge, whether Jeremiah reasonably and honestly believed that his wife was in imminent danger when he gained possession of the knife presented a closer question. But Jeremiah’s testimony that he had picked up the knife and pleaded with Porter to let them go, after observing his severely injured wife, could have allowed a jury to find that he reasonably and honestly believed that he needed to use force to protect Micheline.


There do not appear to be any other New York State cases that have interpreted these policy provisions specifically in the self-defense context. There are two Fourth Department cases that seemingly have facts suggestive of self-defense or <mask>, although not labeled as such, yet the majority decision in each found for the insurer and denied a defense and indemnity. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Whiting (53 AD3d 1033 [4th Dept 2008]), in a 3-2 split, the majority found that no occurrence under the policy had taken place. It cited the insured’s deposition testimony that he intended to hit the victim, who had shoved him and was again advancing toward him, and that the insured knew when he hit the victim that he could be hurt from the punch. Although the majority apparently recognized the rule from Cook that if the insured accidentally or negligently caused the victim’s death, such an event may be considered an occurrence prompting coverage (Cook, 7 NY3d at 138), it concluded under the specific facts of the case that “there is no view of the evidence to support [the] conclusion that the result of the defendant’s intentional act of punching [the victim] in the face ‘accidentally or negligently’ caused [the victim’s] alleged injuries” (Whiting, 53 AD3d at 1035).


It is time for the civil law to recognize that children are entitled to equal protection. The tort of battery, which once protected only the bodily integrity of men, must now protect *561all persons, be they adults or children, from unauthorized physical contact. Physical abuse in even the slightest degree seriously harms children. It is not only immoral and unethical, but also unfair and unjust and therefore intrinsically illegal. It is most appropriate to consider such abuse as the tort of battery. Any person who physically assaults a child for any reason other than self-defense or the <mask> is liable to that child for monetary damages.


whether the common-law affirmative defense of <mask> may be raised as a defense to the felony and misdemeanor charges against them, see People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693 (2010); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52 (2016), and whether trial defense counsel’s failure to request such an instruction deprived the defendants of the effective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984). [People v Leffew, 506 Mich 1031, 1031 (2020)].


II Insufficient Evidence Defendant contends insufficient evidence shows he did not act in lawful <mask> because he only acted to protect James from imminent harm. Defendant argues he reasonably believed James was in danger because A.J. had “grabbed” her when defendant entered the apartment, and defendant did not know who A.J. was. Moreover, defendant used only the requisite amount of force before leaving the apartment. We disagree. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “ ‘The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” (People v. Kaufman (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 370, 381.) “The conviction shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508.) “Self-defense negates culpability for assaultive crimes.” (People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-341.) It requires a reasonable belief in the need to defend against “imminent danger of suffering bodily injury” or “imminent danger of being touched unlawfully.” (People v. Clark (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 235, 250.) “Although


ROBINSON, C. J. In this appeal, we consider whether evidence that the victim had conducted Internet searches for dangerous weapons in the days preceding the alter- cation at issue is admissible in support of a criminal defendant’s claim of self-defense. The defendant, Daniel Richard Streit, appeals1 from the judgment of convic- tion, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that evidence that the victim had searched an Internet shopping site for weapons in the days leading up to the altercation in which the defendant fatally stabbed the victim was both irrelevant and not admissible as uncharged misconduct evidence under § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.2 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. At all relevant times, the defendant lived in New Haven with his girlfriend, Kathleen O’Dwyer. The defendant was also dating Kathryn Wallace, who was the ‘‘on- again, off-again’’ girlfriend of Keith Wylie, the victim. After the victim broke into Wallace’s home in Septem- ber, 2017, which resulted in the issuance of a protective order and second degree breach of peace charges against him, Wallace no longer felt safe at her home and moved in with O’Dwyer and the defendant. On the morning of October 3, 2017, the defendant and the victim engaged in a fistfight near the APT Foun- dation (clinic), a methadone clinic on Congress Avenue in New Haven where Wallace was participating in a treatment program. After the fight was broken up, the victim threatened to kill the defendant. The defendant and Wallace, who was also involved in the fight, returned to their residence, where O’Dwyer photo- graphed their injuries—the defendant had cuts and scrapes, and Wallace had a black eye. Several days later, the victim and the defendant fought again in front of the clinic. After this second fight was broken up, the victim, who had a reputation among the participants in the treatment program as a violent and aggressive person, once again threatened to kill the defendant. The defendant previously had expressed animosity toward and a desire to ‘‘get’’ the victim, or to ‘‘kick his ass,’’ because of the victim’s physically abusive behavior toward Wallace when they were dating. Several days later, on Saturday, October 7, 2017, the defendant and Wallace walked to the clinic. While Wal- lace went inside, the defendant, who was wearing latex gloves on both hands and carrying a Smith & Wesson ‘‘special ops’’ knife, waited in front of the clinic. The victim arrived approximately thirty minutes later, parked his car, exited his vehicle, and walked directly toward the defendant. According to the defendant’s statement to the police, the victim told him that they were ‘‘ ‘going to finish this right now.’ ’’ The defendant then lunged at the victim, and a fight ensued between them on the sidewalk in front of the clinic; during the fight, there was a struggle over the knife, and the defen- dant stabbed the victim seventeen times, causing nine significant wounds to the victim’s neck, torso, and right arm that resulted in his death. During the altercation, the defendant was yelling for someone to pull the victim off of him. Once the defendant was able to, he and Wallace ran from the scene, with the defendant ripping off his gloves and the blood-stained Spiderman sweat- shirt that he had been wearing and discarding them while running. A few minutes later, New Haven police officers responded to a call about the fight and appre- hended the defendant and Wallace nearby on York Street. The police arrested the defendant, who had visi- ble facial and hand injuries at that time. When arrested, the defendant stated that he had no regret for what had happened and that the victim ‘‘got what he deserved.’’ Subsequently, the state charged the defendant with manslaughter in the first degree, to which he pleaded not guilty, and the case was tried to a jury. At trial, the defendant sought to establish that he had acted in self- defense.3 In support of his claim of self-defense, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking permission to offer into evidence an ‘‘[e]xtraction [r]eport,’’ generated using forensic software called Cellebrite, that a forensic examiner had used to examine the victim’s cell phone, which had been seized by the police. The extraction report indicated that, between October 3 and the fatal altercation on October 7, the victim’s cell phone had been used to search a shopping website, eBay, for weap- ons, including stun guns, mace guns, and brass knuckle gloves. The defendant argued that these searches, con- ducted after the victim had threatened to kill the defen- dant on October 3, were relevant to his claim of self- defense—even though he was not personally aware of them—as evidence (1) of the state of mind of both the victim and the defendant with respect to the subjective and objective reasonableness of the defendant’s fear of the victim, and (2) that the victim was the initial aggressor.4 As a basis for admitting the extraction report, the defendant cited §§ 4-1, 4-2 and 4-4 (a) (2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence5 and the Massa- chusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Common- wealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 974 N.E.2d 624 (2012). The defendant also sought an ‘‘extension’’ of this court’s decision in State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107, 405 A.2d 622 (1978). He further relied on his federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense. The state objected to the defendant’s motion in limine. After a hearing, the trial court agreed with the state’s objection and denied the defendant’s motion in limine. Considering the defendant’s claims of relevance in the context of the well established subjective-objective standard that governs claims of self-defense under Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-19 (a);6 see, e.g., State v. O’Bryan, 318 Conn. 621, 632–33, 123 A.3d 398 (2015); the trial court concluded that the proffered evidence was out- side the ‘‘parameters specific to issues regarding self- defense and the <mask> with regard to past conduct related to the complainant or decedent, vis-à- vis the defendant in such a case.’’ Assuming the authen- ticity of the searches and that the victim was the person who had conducted them, the trial court first observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that indicated anything was actually purchased’’ as a result of the Internet searches. Emphasizing that there was no evidence that the defen- dant was aware of the Internet searches or that any of the weapons he searched for were found on the victim’s person or at the crime scene, the court reasoned that the evidence of the searches had a ‘‘clear’’ prejudicial effect insofar as they were not relevant to the defen- dant’s state of mind for purposes of admissibility under § 4-4 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The trial court further determined that the searches were not admissible to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor because, under the line of cases following State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 107, such as State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 799 A.2d 1034 (2002), evi- dence of specific acts of violence not resulting in a criminal conviction may not be used to establish a vic- tim’s violent character.7 Ultimately, the trial court deter- mined that the ‘‘jury ha[d] . . . ample evidence to con- sider as to the nature of the relationship between the defendant and [the victim] sufficient to [allow the defen- dant to] make the argument with regard to his subjective state of mind and his fear of [the victim]. The court conclude[d] that [the Internet search evidence was] not admissible or relevant or material to any issue the jury must decide, and, even if [the evidence had] some slight relevancy, it ha[d] the potential to confuse or arouse the jury [such] that any probative value [was] out- weighed by its prejudicial effect.’’8 Thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the manslaughter charge; the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to part B of the information seeking an enhanced penalty pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40 (a) on the ground that he was a persistent dangerous felony offender.9 After denying the defendant’s motions for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court rendered judgment of convic- tion in accordance with the verdict and plea and sen- tenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion in limine because the victim’s Internet searches were relevant to prove the state of mind of both the victim and the defendant under the principles discussed in State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 107, and were not, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, offered to establish the victim’s violent character. The defendant renews his reliance on Com- monwealth v. Carey, supra, 463 Mass. 379–80, 392, in which the court upheld the admission of a criminal defendant’s Internet searches about strangulation as probative evidence of his intent in a sexual assault and attempted murder case, in support of his argument that the victim’s repeated Internet searches for weapons, made within the week before the fatal altercation and after their fights, ‘‘ ‘corroborat[e] and validat[e]’ ’’ the legitimacy of the victim’s threat to the defendant, along with the defendant’s fear of the victim. The defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to admit evidence of the searches as evi- dence of prior misconduct under § 4-5 (c) of the Con- necticut Code of Evidence. The defendant argues that the timing and voluminous nature of the searches estab- lish the victim’s intent to arm and prepare himself for a confrontation with the defendant. The defendant fur- ther contends that these improper evidentiary rulings require reversal because they substantially swayed the jury’s verdict. In response, the state contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the evi- dence because the victim’s Internet searches were not admissible evidence of his violent character for either of the two purposes permitted by § 4-4 (a) (2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, namely, to establish (1) the defendant’s state of mind or apprehensions about the victim’s violent character, or (2) that the victim was the initial aggressor. Specifically, the state contends that the evidence was not admissible for the first pur- pose because the defendant was not aware of the searches at the time of the altercation, which renders Commonwealth v. Carey, supra, 463 Mass. 378, distin- guishable, and it was not admissible for the second purpose because our precedent allows only the admis- sion of specific violent acts that result in criminal con- victions. See, e.g., State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 14, 6 A.3d 790 (2010). Citing State v. Byrd, 136 Conn. App. 391, 397, 44 A.3d 897, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 906, 52 A.3d 732 (2012), which held that a conviction for crimi- nal possession of a firearm was not a crime of violence admissible to show a murder victim’s violent character, the state posits, ‘‘a fortiori, that a mere search for weap- ons on eBay could not have had any meaningful bearing on the victim’s state of mind at the time of the fatal altercation, let alone the reasonableness of the defen- dant’s fear of the victim when the defendant, who was ignorant of the victim’s Internet activity, approached him.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The state also argues that, even if the evidence were relevant, including as uncharged misconduct under § 4-5 (c) of the Connecti- cut Code of Evidence, the trial court reasonably deter- mined that any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We agree with the state and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit evidence of the victim’s Internet searches for weapons. ‘‘Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical ten- dency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the exis- tence or nonexistence of any other fact more probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence. . . . The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and [e]very reasonable pre- sumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Best, 337 Conn. 312, 317–18, 253 A.3d 458 (2020); see Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. This discretion extends to the trial court’s applica- tion of §§ 4-4 and 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evi- dence. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 329 Conn. 272, 279–80, 186 A.3d 1 (2018); State v. Osimanti, supra, 299 Conn. 13; see also State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218–20, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (considering function of trial court’s discretion and contrasting standards of review applica- ble to interpreting and applying Code of Evidence). We begin with the defendant’s reliance on the Massa- chusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Com- monwealth v. Carey, supra, 463 Mass. 378, in support of his argument that the trial court improperly cabined its analysis to the strictures of § 4-4 (a) of the Connecti- cut Code of Evidence as they pertain to proving a vic- tim’s violent character, rather than focusing on the rele- vance of the Internet search histories to proving the victim’s state of mind at the time of the fatal altercation. In Carey, the Massachusetts court held that, despite ‘‘scant evidence establishing a temporal connection between the defendant’s consumption of these materi- als and the incident at issue,’’ photographs and videos of strangulations, as well as search histories of strangu- lation murders, found on the defendant’s computer were ‘‘highly probative of his intent and motive, as well as the victim’s alleged consent’’ in an attempted murder case in which the defendant’s specific intent to kill was ‘‘the principal issue at trial’’ when he ‘‘alleged that he . . . strangled the victim [only] as a means toward sex- ual gratification and without any intent to do her harm.’’10 Id., 388. The defendant contends that the search history evidence at issue in this case is even more probative than that in Carey, given its temporal relationship to the altercations at issue. We disagree. The defendant’s reliance on Carey is an attempt to thread the eye of a needle created by well established principles of Connecticut case law, particularly our leading decision in State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 109–11, which are now embodied in § 4-4 (a) (2) and (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. ‘‘In a homicide or criminal assault case, an accused may introduce evi- dence of the violent, dangerous or turbulent character of the victim to show that the accused had reason to fear serious harm, after laying a proper foundation by adducing evidence that he acted in self-defense and that he was aware of the victim’s violent character.11 . . . [W]e joined a majority of courts when we expanded this rule to allow the accused to introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character to prove that the victim was the aggressor, regardless of whether such character evidence had been communicated to the accused prior to the homicide. . . . In Miranda, we determined that the victim’s violent character could be proved by reputation testimony, by opinion testi- mony, or by evidence of the [victim’s] convictions for crimes of violence, irrespective of whether the accused knew of the [victim’s] violent character or of the particu- lar evidence adduced at the time of the death-dealing encounter. . . . This court has not, however, departed from [its] precedent that specific violent acts not resulting in a criminal conviction may not be introduced to prove the victim’s violent character. . . . This is because the admission of such evidence, other than convictions, has the potential to surprise, to arouse prejudice, to multiply the issues and confuse the jury, and to prolong the trial.’’12 (Citations omitted; footnote added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, supra, 299 Conn. 13–14; see State v. Jordan, supra, 329 Conn. 283 (trial court has discretion to admit convictions arising from ‘‘a sub- sequent act that is close in time and highly similar to the charged incident’’ to prove that victim was initial aggressor but not to prove defendant’s state of mind); State v. Whitford, supra, 260 Conn. 636–40 (trial court properly declined to admit testimony that victim, when intoxicated, had attempted to strangle two people but properly admitted reputation testimony that victim was violent person when intoxicated); State v. Carter, 228 Conn. 412, 425–26, 636 A.2d 821 (1994) (trial court abused its discretion in not permitting defendant to reopen evidence to introduce evidence that victim had assault and narcotics trafficking convictions ‘‘close in time to the deadly encounter between the victim and the defendant’’ because they ‘‘would have provided objective corroboration of the defendant’s claim that the victim was a person of violent character who had acted as the initial aggressor’’); State v. Smith, 222 Conn. 1, 19–20, 608 A.2d 63 (The trial court properly declined to admit evidence of the information or arrest warrant charging the deceased victim with assault because ‘‘[a] conviction is indisputable evidence of the commission of a violent crime. On the contrary, a charg- ing document is a mere accusation, not a settled disposi- tion, and, as such, would invite dispute over collateral issues at trial.’’), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942, 113 S. Ct. 383, 121 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1992); State v. Collins, 68 Conn. App. 828, 838, 793 A.2d 1160 (‘‘in the case of self-defense, eyewitness testimony of prior specific acts of violence perpetrated on a defendant by his or her victim is admis- sible to show the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the killing’’), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 941, 835 A.2d 58 (2002); State v. Carter, 48 Conn. App. 755, 762– 64, 713 A.2d 255 (trial court properly precluded defen- dant’s mother from testifying about whether she had seen victim selling drugs outside her home or with weapon, while permitting defendant to testify about violent acts that victim had committed against him per- sonally but not against others), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 901, 719 A.2d 905 (1998); State v. Knighton, 7 Conn. App. 223, 228–29, 508 A.2d 772 (1986) (following Miranda and concluding that police officer or defen- dant could not testify about specific acts of violence allegedly committed by victim ‘‘to show the victim’s propensity for violence, and [the defendant’s] own testi- mony should have been admitted to show his state of mind when he confronted [the victim]’’). ‘‘[N]otwithstanding this general rule of admissibility,’’ under § 4-4 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, ‘‘we have held that the defendant is not authorized to introduce any and all convictions of crimes involving violence, no matter how petty, how remote in time, or how dissimilar in their nature to the facts of the alleged aggression. In each case the probative value of the evi- dence of certain convictions rests in the sound discre- tion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Osimanti, supra, 299 Conn. 15; see State v. Byrd, supra, 136 Conn. App. 397 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of victim’s conviction for criminal possession of firearm because it showed that ‘‘the victim possessed the gun solely as collateral [for a loan of money] and . . . did not intend to use the gun in a violent manner’’). Although the defendant contends that he did not offer the Internet search evidence to establish the victim’s character pursuant to § 4-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the case law embodied in that provision nevertheless continues to inform the extent to which that evidence is admissible under the more general prin- ciples of relevance relied on by the defendant. These cases reflect a ‘‘narrow’’ exception to the rule followed by the ‘‘vast majority’’ of jurisdictions and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ‘‘prohibit the use of specific acts to prove character in this context. . . . Courts have cited the same concerns about inquiry into poten- tially confusing collateral matters . . . unfair surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered . . . and prejudice to the prosecution if the deceased is shown to have been a detestable person . . . .’’ (Cita- tions omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 222 Conn. 18–19. This is particularly so given that the Connecticut Code of Evidence is, in essence, a codification of the com- mon-law standards that ‘‘was not intended to displace, supplant or supersede common-law evidentiary rules or their development via common-law adjudication . . . .’’ State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 455, 953 A.2d 45 (2008); see T. Bishop, ‘‘Evidence Rulemaking: Balancing the Separation of Powers,’’ 43 Conn. L. Rev. 265, 298– 301 (2010). Put differently, the overall relevance deter- mination remains the same, regardless of a party’s claim that it is not attempting to shoehorn evidence into or beyond the strictures of a particular rule of evidence, such as the restrictions embodied in § 4-4 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Cf. State v. Whitford, supra, 260 Conn. 640 (rejecting argument that would admit victim’s prior bad acts under § 4-5 (c) of Connecti- cut Code of Evidence in manner that would ‘‘nullify’’ or evade ‘‘limitation’’ of § 4-4 (b), which ‘‘reflects a conscious choice by the code’s drafters to exclude spe- cific acts evidence as permissible proof, consonant with [Connecticut] case law’’). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s determi- nation in the present case that the defendant’s lack of awareness of the victim’s Internet searches for weapons rendered them irrelevant for purposes of establishing the defendant’s state of mind during the encounter. This is because the well established subjective-objective standard that governs self-defense involving the use of deadly physical force under § 53a-19 (a) requires the jury to consider the reasonableness of the force used while ‘‘view[ing] the situation from the perspective of the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O’Bryan, supra, 318 Conn. 632; see footnote 6 of this opinion. The searches are rendered even less relevant, given that the defendant does not claim that they, in and of themselves, amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of § 4-4 (a). The defendant argues further that the Internet searches constituted a prior act of misconduct relevant to establish the victim’s state of mind under § 4-5 (c)13 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.14 We disagree. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the victim’s otherwise legal Internet searches were themselves evi- dence of prior misconduct admissible to prove his state of mind pursuant to § 4-5 (c), this court’s decision in State v. Whitford, supra, 260 Conn. 610, squarely fore- closes the defendant’s efforts to use prior misconduct evidence under § 4-5 (c) to evade the strictures of § 4- 4 and the well established case law that it embodies. In Whitford, the defendant invoked § 4-5 (c) and ‘‘sought to introduce the testimony of three witnesses that the victim, when drunk, had violently attacked and attempted to strangle them’’ in support of his claim of self-defense, as ‘‘relevant to his assertion that the victim was the aggressor in their altercation because it would tend to prove both the victim’s character for violence and his specific habit of strangling people while he was intoxi- cated.’’ Id., 635. The trial court declined to admit evi- dence of the specific acts and limited the testimony to only ‘‘knowledge and opinion of the victim’s violent character.’’ Id. After reviewing the body of case law governing the admission of evidence of victims’ violent acts in self-defense cases; see id., 636–37; this court concluded in Whitford that the ‘‘defendant’s assertion that the proffered testimony was admissible pursuant to § 4-5 (c) . . . fail[ed] because it effectively would read § 4-4 (b) out of the code. . . . [Section] 4-4 (b) specifically limits the methods of proving the victim’s character in a homicide or criminal assault prosecution to reputation or opinion testimony, or evidence of prior convictions for violent crimes. This limitation reflects a conscious choice by the code’s drafters to exclude specific acts evidence as permissible proof, consonant with our case law. Were we to adopt the defendant’s argument and read § 4-5 (c) to permit what § 4-4 (b) forbids, we would nullify this intentional exclusion of specific acts evidence . . . .’’15 Id., 640. The court emphasized in Whitford that § 4-4 embodies our case law on this point, notably State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 107. See State v. Whitford, supra, 638–39. Accord- ingly, the court determined that, ‘‘[b]ecause § 4-4 of the code explicitly provides for the admissibility of evi- dence concerning the victim’s violent character under certain specified circumstances, it trumps the more gen- eral rules set forth in § 4-5 regarding the admissibility of specific acts. Thus, § 4-5 (c) does not apply to evi- dence of the victim’s violent character in homicide or criminal assault cases, which is specifically covered by § 4-4, but rather applies to evidence admitted to prove the issues enumerated in § 4-5 (b).’’ Id., 641; see id., 642–43 (rejecting defendant’s claim that specific acts preclusion does not apply to habit evidence offered pursuant to § 4-6 of Connecticut Code of Evidence). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit into evidence the victim’s Internet searches for weapons. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other justices concurred. * October 22, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. The defendant appeals directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). Section 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) General rule. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity, or criminal tendencies of that person except as provided in subsection (b). *** ‘‘(c) When evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony. . . .’’ At trial, the state’s theory of the case was that the defendant had ‘‘a bruised ego’’ from losing the fights earlier in the week that had led him to ‘‘attack’’ the victim. The defendant argued that, although he had not been aware of the victim’s Internet search for weapons, the evidence could be ‘‘highly relevant in helping the jury to determine whether the defendant’s story of self-defense [was] truthful. The jury’s knowledge that [the victim] was conducting searches for various types of weapons adds significant credence to the claim that his escalating and focused hostility toward the defendant culminated in his aggressive conduct on [October 7, 2017].’’ The defendant also argued that, not only was the search evidence relevant to the victim’s intent and state of mind, but it would also corroborate the testimony of a defense witness, who was anticipated to—and did—reveal that the victim had threat- ened to kill the defendant. Section 4-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a trait of character of a person is inadmissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity with the character trait on a particular occasion, except that the following is admissible: *** ‘‘(2) Character of the victim in a homicide or criminal assault case. Evi- dence offered by an accused in a homicide or criminal assault case, after laying a foundation that the accused acted in self-defense, of the violent character of the victim to prove that the victim was the aggressor, or by the prosecution to rebut such evidence introduced by the accused. *** ‘‘(b) Methods of proof. In all cases in which evidence of a trait of character of a person is admissible to prove that the person acted in conformity with the character trait, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion. In cases in which the accused in a homicide or criminal assault case may introduce evidence of the violent character of the victim, the victim’s character may also be proved by evidence of the victim’s conviction of a crime of violence. ‘‘(c) Specific instances of conduct on cross-examination of a character witness. A character witness may be asked, in good faith, on cross-examina- tion about specific instances of conduct relevant to the trait of character to which the witness testified to test the basis of the witness’ opinion.’’ (Emphasis added.) When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, § 53a-19 (a) requires the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘‘reasonably believes both that (1) his attacker is using or about to use deadly physical force against him, or is inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm, and (2) that deadly physical force is necessary to repel such attack. . . . We repeatedly have indicated that the test a jury must apply in analyzing the second requirement, i.e., that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force, as opposed to some lesser degree of force, was necessary to repel the victim’s alleged attack, is a subjective-objective one. The jury must view the situation from the perspective of the defendant. Section 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O’Bryan, 318 Conn. 621, 632, 123 A.3d 398 (2015). Citing the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Byrd, 136 Conn. App. 391, 397, 44 A.3d 897, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 906, 52 A.3d 732 (2012), which held that a victim’s conviction of criminal possession of a firearm by itself is not a crime of violence, the trial court further stated: ‘‘It’s hard to say, under these circumstances, [that] a search on eBay, [which is] not even a conviction, would be relevant to the [victim’s] state of mind when the defendant was not even aware of it.’’ The trial court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of the motion in limine. We note the trial court, Clifford, J., accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to part B of the information. All other references in this opinion to the trial court are to Judge Vitale, who presided over the defendant’s trial and sentencing, and made the evidentiary ruling at issue in this appeal. Our research has revealed other decisions, consistent with Carey, hold- ing that Internet search histories may furnish relevant circumstantial evi- dence of an actor’s state of mind. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 245–47, 84 N.E.3d 820 (2017) (concluding that trial court properly admitted searches on defendant’s computer for information about poison and antifreeze, as well as victim’s Internet history, including research about her kidney illness and doll-making hobby and her e-mails to friends and acquaintances, to show her ‘‘positive outlook’’ on her health in week prior her final hospitalization, as relevant to disprove defendant’s theory at murder trial that victim had committed suicide), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1038, 200 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2018); Julio Garcia v. State, 300 So. 3d 945, 974 (Miss. 2020) (Internet searches on defendant’s video game console for sexually explicit and violent phrases, some of which pertained to young females, conducted ‘‘just days’’ before sexual battery and murder of young child were relevant to show motive, opportunity, or intent and were not unduly prejudicial in case involving sexual battery and murder of young child), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 2706, 210 L. Ed. 2d 874 (2021). Case law from other jurisdictions highlights that the key to the introduc- tion of evidence of the specific bad acts of a victim in a self-defense case is the defendant’s knowledge of those acts. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 187–89 (D.C. 2014) (trial court improperly excluded evidence of defendant’s belief that drug dealer victim knew that defendant had talked to police, which resulted in raid of victim’s apartment, because evidence was relevant to claim of self-defense and to prove that victim was first aggressor); State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 595, 363 P.3d 1101 (2016) (evidence that victim had attempted to rape woman was not relevant to defendant’s claim at murder trial that he killed victim in defense of his wife because there was no evidence that defendant knew of that attempted rape, meaning ‘‘the record lack[ed] any evidence establishing a nexus between the alleged prior bad act of the victim . . . and the defendant’s state of mind at the time the defendant claims to have acted in self-defense or defense of another’’). In Miranda, this court rejected the approach taken in its earlier decision in State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 138 A. 456 (1927), which did not permit the admission of character evidence to prove that the decedent was the aggressor on the ground that ‘‘the result of an unlimited application of such a rule would be to interject the character of the deceased with the resulting temptation ‘to measure the guilt of the accused by the deserts of the victim’ into all such cases.’’ Id., 459; see State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 110. While acknowledging in Miranda that ‘‘[t]here is always the risk that the jury may be unduly diverted and confused by collateral matters such as character,’’ the court observed that ‘‘the sound discretion of the court is relied [on] to focus the jury’s attention on the material issues in the trial.’’ State v. Miranda, supra, 110–11. ‘‘We have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions [set forth in § 4- 5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence]. . . . Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. . . . Because of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process, the trial court’s decision will be reversed only whe[n] abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] an injustice appears to have been done. . . . On review by this court, therefore, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . ‘‘In determining whether the prejudicial effect of otherwise relevant evi- dence outweighs its probative value, we consider whether: (1) . . . the facts offered may unduly arouse the [jurors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) . . . the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) . . . the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) . . . the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Raynor, 337 Conn. 527, 562, 254 A.3d 874 (2020); see footnote 2 of this opinion (text of § 4-5 of Connecticut Code of Evidence). The state argues that the defendant did not preserve his claim that the victim’s Internet searches were not acts of prior misconduct relevant to prove the victim’s state of mind for purposes of § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. In response, the defendant contends in his reply brief that he properly preserved his uncharged misconduct claim, despite the lack of an ‘‘express’’ citation to § 4-5 (a) in his motion in limine, given his citations therein to common-law uncharged misconduct case law, such as State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 126–27, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919, 112 S. Ct. 330, 116 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1991). The defendant emphasizes that the record demonstrates that the prosecutor, in responding to the motion, understood that the defendant was advancing a claim that the searches were admissible as uncharged misconduct, rather than ‘‘pigeonholing’’ it as a character claim under § 4-4. Although the defendant did not specifically cite § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence before the trial court, our review of the record indicates that the defendant’s arguments repeatedly emphasized the use of the searches to prove the victim’s state of mind in juxtaposition with the limita- tions imposed by existing case law reflected in § 4-4. We conclude, therefore, that these arguments ‘‘functionally preserved’’ this uncharged misconduct claim for purposes of appeal, eliminating any concerns that the trial court was not on notice of the argument. State v. Best, supra, 337 Conn. 317 n.1. This court also observed in Whitford that the defendant’s claim that the specific acts evidence was admissible pursuant to § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence ‘‘ignores that portion of § 1-2 of the code and its commen- tary . . . [that] indicates that the code was intended only to codify the common law. If, as the defendant suggests, we were to read § 4-5 (c) as permitting introduction of evidence regarding a victim’s specific violent acts, we would be interpreting the code in a manner that would effectuate a substantive change in the law. Because such a result would be contrary to the express intention of the code’s drafters, we reject it.’’ State v. Whitford, supra, 260 Conn. 639–40. We note that this limited understanding of this court’s authority vis-à-vis the code was later overruled in State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. 418, in which we concluded that the Connecticut Code of Evidence ‘‘was not intended to displace, supplant or supersede common- law evidentiary rules or their development via common-law adjudication, but, rather, simply was intended to function as a comprehensive and authori- tative restatement of evidentiary law for the ease and convenience of the legal community.’’ Id., 455; see id. (‘‘the judges of the Superior Court did not intend for the [Code of Evidence Oversight] [C]ommittee to recommend substantive changes to the common-law evidentiary rules codified in the code, but, rather, intended for the committee simply to recommend revisions reflecting common-law developments in evidentiary law, clarifications of the code to resolve ambiguities and additions to the code in the absence of governing common-law rules’’); see also id., 460 (‘‘[T]he evidentiary rules articulated [in the code] are subject to change, modification, alteration or amendment by this court in the exercise of its constitutional and common- law adjudicative authority. To reiterate, we conclude that the code neither is, nor was intended to be, anything more than a concise, authoritative and, as the commentary to § 1-2 (a) of the code describes it, ‘readily accessible body of rules to which the legal profession conveniently may refer.’ ’’ (Foot- note omitted.)).