57.  The applicant essentially submits that the Government are under a positive obligation to provide effective protection for the rights guaranteed by the Convention. Given the terms of Article <mask> of the Convention, the absence of an effective domestic remedy as regards invasions of privacy by the press constitutes a failure to effectively respect her right to respect for her private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see Earl and Countess Spencer v. the United Kingdom, nos. 28851/95 and 28852/95, Commission decision of 16 January 1998, Decisions and Reports 92-A, p. 56).


69.  The Government argued that the interference was prescribed by law. Section 38(1) of the 1881 Act was an integral part of the published and accessible legislation. Moreover, case-law had established that the impugned prohibition applied to all documents from criminal case files and had set its scope, which included extracts from such documents (they cited Tourancheau and July, cited above, § 26). Lastly, the domestic courts had examined the relevant publications in the light of Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 47 above).


91.  The Government maintained that the Court had only a limited role in reviewing the compatibility of the national electoral systems with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Government also referred to the interrelation between the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention (freedom of expression) and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, and to the States’ wide margin of appreciation in establishing a fair balance between these two guarantees.


40.  The applicant complained that there had been an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, in the application form, the applicant made lengthy and detailed submissions criticising the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted before the first-instance court, especially the appointment of experts and admission of evidence and the manner in which the first‑instance court and the Court of Cassation had assessed the evidence and the applicable procedural rules. In this connection, the applicant emphasised what he described as the inappropriate way in which the domestic courts had praised the plaintiff in their decisions. In his view these flaws in the proceedings demonstrated that the domestic courts lacked the requisite impartiality vis-à-vis the plaintiff, and that they had been unduly influenced by his status. He claimed a violation of his rights under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention.


61.   The applicant association further complained about having been discriminated against vis-à-vis the journalist M. and other animal rights activists who had been allowed to continue the publication of the impugned material. It submitted, in particular, that there was no reason to treat the applicant association any differently from the other animal rights activists. It furthermore referred to the proceedings in Switzerland (see paragraph 28, above). It relied on Article 14 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 14 of the Convention provides:


122.  The Government pointed out that, according to the Court’s case-law, regulation of the activities of television companies was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention, which did not prevent States from examining the technical aspects, the rights and needs of a specific audience, the nature and objectives of channels, their potential audience at national and local level, and the obligations deriving from international undertakings (see Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276).


73.  The Government maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable, since the findings in the case of Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (no. 37374/05, § 14, April 2009, hereinafter referred to as “Társaság”) could not be decisive in the present application. In that case, in the absence of an objection from the Government, the Court had not been required to examine the applicability of Article 10. They added that their concession with regard to the applicability of Article 10 in the Társaság case had been based exclusively on domestic-law considerations and could not serve as a basis for expansion of the Convention into areas which it had not been intended to cover.


105.  The Government disputed the existence of a causal link between these costs and expenses and the events now found by the Court to have violated the Convention. They assumed that any violation which the Court might find, if violation there were, would relate to the lack of procedural safeguards. In their view, the seizure of the journalistic materials as such was a distinct issue; the decisions of the domestic authorities had not in themselves been contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention and could therefore not give rise to an award of the sums claimed by the applicant company.


94.  The applicants argued that their detention had violated both their freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention and their freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention. The interference with those rights by their detention had not been justified. It had not been “prescribed by law” and had not pursued a legitimate aim for the reasons they set out in relation to Article 5 § 1 (see paragraph 57 above). In particular, it had been uncertain if, when and where the applicants would display the banners “Freedom for prisoners” and “Free all now”. Doing so would, furthermore, not have been an offence under the Criminal Code. The slogans could not have been understood as an incitement to a very uncommon crime but had had a different, more obvious meaning. With more than 1,000 demonstrators having been detained in connection with the G8 summit but only 100 detentions having been approved by the courts, there had been more than enough reason to criticise the deprivations of liberty that had taken place in connection with the summit.


36.  The applicant further argued that it was of no relevance for the assessment of whether the facts of the case amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal case against the applicant had been instituted by J.K., bringing a private prosecution in the local court. The only relevant fact was that the applicant had been convicted and that this conviction had been by a court acting in the name of the respondent State, whose responsibility was thereby engaged.


31.  The applicant complained that he had been fined and ordered to pay damages in relation to the complaints he had made to various competent public authorities, as well as for expressing his concerns and his own opinion on posters in his shop. He claimed that that was in breach of his right to freedom of expression as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:


47.  The Government argued that Article 10 was not applicable in the current case. In their opinion, the acts for which the applicant had been convicted could not be considered as journalistic investigation because they had not resulted in the publication of the information in question. The Government therefore raised an objection of incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention.


33.  The Government agreed that the applicants’ conviction, the fines imposed on them and the obligation to pay costs and damages to K.U. constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government agreed with the applicants that the impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code. The interference had also had a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the private life of others.


40.  The applicant complained that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic source to be identified, in violation of her right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In her submission, the interference with her freedom of expression was not prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The applicant further asked the Court to clarify the duties of the State under this provision in these circumstances. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


69.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated. According to them it is of essential importance that the freedom of expression not only stipulates the right to hold opinions, but also imposes duties and responsibilities, and therefore cannot be interpreted as allowing the promotion or dissemination of the ideas of ethnic hatred, hostility and the superiority of one nation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The Government admitted that by imposing an administrative punishment there was interference with the applicant's freedom of expression; however it had been justified by the necessity to protect the democratic values on the basis of which Lithuanian society is based. Stressing the sensitivity of the questions related to national minorities and territorial integrity after the re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, the Government submitted that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” was clearly promoting the extreme ideology of nationalism, which rejected the idea of the integration of civil society, incited ethnic hatred and intolerance, and questioned territorial integrity and promoted national superiority, which had been proved by the notes sent by the embassies of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation. By withdrawing the publication from distribution and imposing an administrative warning on the applicant, the authorities had sought to prevent the spreading of ideas which might violate the rights of ethnic minorities living in Lithuania as well as endanger Lithuania's relations with its neighbouring countries. In view of the clear threat to these legitimate interests posed by the publication, as well as the minor nature of the penalty ordered against the applicant, the Government considered that the interference had been compatible with the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.


35.  The Government argued that the freedom of expression enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention was not absolute. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 formulated certain conditions and restrictions concerning its exercise. Journalists, in order to comply with the duties and responsibilities referred to in that provision, were obliged to act in good faith and to provide accurate and reliable information to the public.


62.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a breach of the right to information and dignity. The Court notes that the applicant failed to elaborate any further and to substantiate the violation complained of. As a result, this complaint must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


13.  The applicant complained that the French courts had convicted him of aiding and abetting public defamation of a civil servant on account of statements he had made during a television programme called Tout le monde en parle, broadcast on France 2 during the night of 23 to 24 October 1999. He complained of a violation of his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention, which is worded as follows:


59.  The Government maintained their argument stated above (see paragraph 40) that the present case essentially concerned a labour dispute governed by the provisions of private law. They reiterated that the applicant had been dismissed after having addressed an email to the Rector of the University which contained illegal requests as well as threats and blackmail. They considered that a distinction should be drawn between the expression of criticism that might disturb or offend other persons, on the one hand, and incitement to perform unlawful activities that infringed individuals’ honour and dignity on the other. The latter was at issue in the present case, as the applicant’s behaviour constituted a particularly grave infringement of the principles of ethics and breached the University’s staff regulations and the provisions of the Labour Law. Therefore the content of the email written by the applicant – an incitement to perform illegal activities – did not enjoy the protection afforded by Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the Government asserted that the applicant had failed to substantiate which prior public remarks had formed the alleged basis for his dismissal, and pointed out that the Rector had not made any statements to the effect that the applicant should be dismissed from the University because of his criticism towards it.


24.  The applicant association argued that the public exhibition of a painting contributed to a debate between the artist, the exhibitor and the public and was therefore protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. It accepted that the impugned interference was prescribed by law, but maintained that the interference had been neither necessary nor proportionate. It submitted that the Government's submissions as regards the protection of morals were irrelevant as in the present case the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on Mr Meischberger's prevailing personal interests as protected under section 78 of the Copyright Act. Mr Meischberger could not, however, claim any personal interest worth protecting as the painting obviously did not state or suggest that the way in which he was portrayed corresponded to his actual behaviour. The painting presented the artist's personal history in an allegorical way and depicted, among several other well-known persons, the painter himself and some of his friends and benefactors. All these persons were depicted engaging in sexual acts, reflecting the painter's conception of the interrelation between power and sexuality. Mr Meischberger had been one of the figures who had characterised the history of the FPÖ party in the past few years, and he had been portrayed with the other three members as an allegory of that party, which had always strongly criticised the painter's work. Furthermore, Mr Meischberger and, in any event, the actions he considered libellous were not recognisable after the painting had been partly damaged. In the applicant association's view, the fact that he had instituted proceedings only after the painting had been partly damaged demonstrated that rather than protecting his personal interests he was aiming to discredit the painter's work.


38.  The applicant complained of the impossibility of accessing his Internet site as a result of a measure ordered in the context of criminal proceedings which were wholly unrelated to his site. In his view, the measure amounted to an infringement of his freedom to receive and impart information and ideas, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


24.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the interference with her right to freedom of expression had been based on the decisions of the domestic courts. As the applicant did not complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the impugned court proceedings were unfair, and as the Court had limited jurisdiction regarding the assessment of the facts and the application of the law by the domestic courts, the Government invited the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.


34.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, inter alia, that there had been a lack of intent, which was a necessary requirement for any criminal conviction. Even though the applicant has not lodged any complaint specifically under Article 7 of the Convention, the Court considered that his above-mentioned complaint under Article 10 fell to be examined also under Article 7 and for that reason communicated the complaint from the standpoint of the legality principle.


110.  The Government considered these claims unfounded. They submitted that some of the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings were not related to the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (in connection with the Ombudsman’s review and other discussions between the applicant and her lawyer). They also considered that the applicant had not adduced adequate details of the breakdown of the work carried out in relation to the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings. Lastly, the Government argued that the amount claimed for legal services was unreasonably high.


35.  The applicants also pointed out that the District Court, when dismissing the charges against the first applicant, had found that his criticism had not overstepped the limits of propriety. When doing so, the District Court had not referred at all to Article <mask> of the Convention, including, in particular, the “necessity” requirement in Article 10 § 2. It had found that neither the first applicant nor the complainant had made a false statement. The complainant could himself be criticised for having used similar expressions in his programme. Moreover, both parties had had the opportunity to state their opposing views in Seura magazine.


50.  The applicant argued (see paragraphs 31-32 above) that she had made the impugned media statements in the exercise of her constitutionally guaranteed right of reply. She added that she had acted primarily with a view to responding to what she had seen as groundless criticism of her in the same newspaper by another officer of the same company, namely the chairman of its General Meeting, who had also been the municipal mayor. In that connection the Court reiterates that the right of rectification or of reply, as an important element of freedom of expression, falls within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Kaperzyński v. Poland, no. 43206/07, § 66, 3 April 2012, and Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, ECHR 2005-IX). This flows from the need not only to be able to contest untruthful information, but also to ensure a plurality of opinions, especially in matters of general interest (ibid.). At the same time, the restrictions and limitations of the second paragraph of Article 10 are equally pertinent to the exercise of that right (see Melnychuk, cited above).


223.  The Government argued that the taking of Mr Savchenko to the police station and, indirectly, the termination of his solo demonstration were related to his use of foul language in a public place rather than to the fact that he was holding a demonstration. While the applicant has not argued that use of foul language was protected under Article <mask> of the Convention, he has contested that during his demonstration he used any utterances that could be perceived as foul language. Indeed, it remains unclear what exact words were allegedly uttered by and held against the applicant. The domestic decisions, in particular those issued by the courts, do not contain an adequate assessment as to whether the words concerned could be reasonably classified as “foul language”.


31.  The applicant concluded that the authorities had overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them. Moreover, the national courts’ findings had been based on an assessment of the relevant facts which could not be considered reasonable and justified and failed to interpret the matter in the light of the principles set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, punishing the applicant for having published the interview in question was a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression and constituted a violation of the Convention.


110.  The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression, and especially its freedom to impart information and ideas. It complained in particular that for a period of almost ten years the Government had not allocated it any frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting. It submitted that the failure to apply Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraphs 56-61 above), the failure to enforce the Constitutional Court’s judgments nos. 420/1994 and 466/2002 (see paragraphs 54-55 and 62 above) and the duopoly existing in the Italian television market were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


33.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant company’s rights had been compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. There was no doubt that it had had a basis in law and had served the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others.  As to whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the Government averred that the statements contained in the impugned article had for the most part been statements of fact. It had been stated that the then Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General were tolerating a prosecutor who was a drug dealer. Furthermore, it had been stated as a fact that the claimant had been present at the scene of the drug transaction as a guarantee of security.  Although the claimant had not been referred to by her full name, a detailed description had made her identity obvious to local legal circles, in particular as her position as spokesperson for the Appellate Prosecutor’s Office had been mentioned. One of the witnesses had confirmed this. The claimant had suffered negative consequences immediately after the article had been published.


63.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation had been biased, because they had wrongly assessed the evidence, had grossly misconstrued the applicable law, including Article <mask> of the Convention, and had not approached the case as neutral adjudicators, instead seeking to justify her dismissal.


47.  The applicant argued that the trial court had not taken all reasonable measures to ensure the attendance of I.B. and Še.A. at the hearing. Firstly, the trial court could have used the international legal assistance available under the “Treaty between Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia concerning Legal Aid in Civil and Criminal Matters” to request that I.B. and Še.A. be questioned by a court of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the participation of the applicant and counsel (see paragraph 41 above). Secondly, the Slovenian judge, the defendants and counsel could have travelled to the relevant country to examine the two witnesses. Thirdly, under section 244a of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 39 above), the witnesses could have been questioned by video-conference. Moreover, the trial court could have requested assistance from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the European Convention on Mutual assistance in Criminal Matters and, in particular, Article 9 of the Second Additional Protocol to that Convention (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above). With respect to Italy, the Slovenian authorities could have relied on Article <mask> of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (see paragraph 44 above). The applicant further argued that if any of those measures had been used then the length of the proceedings would not have become unreasonable and the criminal offence would not have become time-barred.


41.  The applicant companies maintained that the interference with their right to impart information had not been necessary in a democratic society as there had been an overriding public interest in reporting in every detail on the case in issue. The applicant companies’ reporting concentrated on the perpetrators of the crime, but in view of the very nature of the criminal offence – violence and sexual abuse within the family – this meant that reporting on the offenders, that is the parents, and the criminal proceedings against them, necessarily revealed the identity of the victim C. The press must be allowed to report in an identifying manner on crimes of sexual abuse of minors within the family revealing the identity of the offender, as accurate and detailed reporting also served to protect and help the victims of such crimes. A restriction on detailed reporting and on revealing the identity of the offenders was not only in contradiction to Article <mask> of the Convention but also against the principle of victim protection as it would protect the offenders from public attention but not the victim.


48.  The Government observed that the nature and severity of the punishment was also to be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of the interference under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the De Diego Nafría judgment, cited above, the Court had considered that, even though a dismissal had serious consequences for the employment relationship of a worker who had overstepped the acceptable limits of criticism, in assessing the proportionality of the interference it was necessary to take into account all the circumstances of the particular case. In the present case, the Spanish courts had assessed the direct damage caused to the reputation of the persons mentioned in the union newsletter, through coarse and insulting comments and images. Even if the applicants’ opinions could be regarded as legitimate, they had been expressed in a gratuitously offensive manner, being in written form and deliberate.


33.  The Government maintained that the applicants’ dismissal from their posts, following their statement of 24 February 2008, was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. Their dismissal was prescribed by law as it had been based, in particular, on section 40, subsection 1, point (j), of the Diplomatic Service Act which provided that a diplomat should be dismissed from office if he violated any of the restrictions prescribed in section 44 of the Act. One of those restrictions was that a diplomat had no right to use his official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of political parties or non‑governmental organisations, or in order to carry out other political or religious activity. Contrary to what the applicants claimed, at the relevant time the existence of a single element made the provision applicable. This Act was both accessible and foreseeable and the notions used in it were sufficiently clear. The Act had been designed to cover relations within the diplomatic service and it was thus designed for professionals. The applicants had had from 11 to 15 years’ professional experience as members of diplomatic corps. Had they been uncertain about the content of the Act, they could have sought advice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking into consideration the applicants’ positions and professional experience, they had to be aware of the legal framework regulating their service, including the restrictions. They had also been well aware of the political situation in Armenia, the character of their public statement and its possible impact. The applicants could, and must, have foreseen the consequences of their statement, especially as the ambassadors who had issued the original statement had been dismissed from their posts the day before and their dismissal had been widely reported in the media.


45.  The applicant submitted that her dismissal had been the result of the airing in her show of the results of journalistic investigations that revealed unpleasant facts about the then ruling political party. There had been a direct causal link between her show and the ensuing disciplinary measures against her. Those measures had infringed her freedom of expression. She had had the right to select the persons who were to take part in the show, and had not breached the technical rules or the weekly schedule, because she had obtained the agreement of the editor in charge, who had approved the show’s script, topics and participants. Her disciplinary dismissal had had nothing to do with the breaches set out in the order of the BNR director general, and the ensuing dispute had been an employment one only ostensibly, while in reality having a deeply political subtext. That assessment had been shared by the entire journalistic guild, and had been reflected in declarations made by the Union of Bulgarian Journalists and other organisations. Even the Supreme Court of Cassation had, by saying in its judgment in the applicant’s case that Article <mask> of the Convention allowed limitations on the exercise of freedom of expression, acknowledged that the applicant’s dismissal had related to the exercise of her freedom of expression. That dismissal had been a direct result of the exercise of the applicant’s profession as a journalist and of the disclosure of unpleasant facts about the then ruling political party.


31.  The applicant considered that the ban on his accessing the websites of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn, the Chancellor of Justice and the Riigikogu violated his right to receive information and was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that he had been engaged in a number of court proceedings against the Estonian prison system. The information available on the websites in question was relied on by the Estonian courts; thus, the applicant also needed access to this information in order to be able to protect his rights.


27.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had found that the impugned passages constituted not the opinions of or speculations by the authors of the article but statements of fact which had presented the plaintiff in a negative light. The newspaper had failed to verify the veracity of those statements prior to publication. Accordingly the domestic courts were right to rule in favour of the plaintiff and the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was justified in terms of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Government’s view, there had been no violation of this Convention provision.


26.  The applicant complained that the decision of the Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal implied that, during trial proceedings, a lawyer was not allowed to conclude from facts known to him that unacceptable pressure had been exerted on his client. He alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:


18.  The applicant complained that his conviction in criminal proceedings for the protest of 29 January 2013 amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint should be examined from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention alone, which reads as follows:


67.  The Government did not accept that the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression lacked an adequate legal basis for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention. Media companies in Ireland were familiar with the domestic rules on defamation and damages. The applicant company should have expected that the level of damages might be very high if the jury found that it had acted in a reprehensible manner against the plaintiff. Moreover, in the Independent News and Media case the Court had considered that the criterion of lawfulness was satisfied; there was no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.


56.  The Government emphasised that the applicants had not been convicted for expressing strong criticism of the police, but exclusively for having taken it upon themselves to make the very specific, unsubstantiated and extremely serious accusation against the named chief superintendent that he had intentionally suppressed evidence in the murder case. The Danish Supreme Court had fully recognised that the present case involved a conflict between the right to impart ideas and the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of others, and it had properly balanced the various interests involved in the case in conformity with the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention.


23.  The Government denied that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they argued that the domestic authorities had not had the information sought by the applicant. According to the Government, Russian law required information centres to prepare crime statistics reports by processing statistical data cards. Data cards differed in type and covered a wide range of information related to a specific crime committed. The data processing carried out by the information centres was predominantly manual and not all information from the data cards was processed. Only selected types of crimes and parameters were included in crime statistics reports.


85.  The Government did not contest that the impugned judgments constituted an interference with the applicant company’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and submitted that it had been prescribed by law, in particular by the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, that it had followed the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others and that it had been necessary in a democratic society.


28.  The Government did not dispute that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable and that there had been an interference with the applicants’ rights under that provision. In their view, that interference had been “prescribed by law” – sections 45 and 49 of the Obligations and Contracts Act 1951 –, and had been intended to protect the reputation and rights of others.


15.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, and his subsequent conviction, had constituted a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Referring in particular to the Court’s judgments in Savgın v. Turkey (no. 13304/03, 2 February 2010) and Gül and Others v. Turkey (no. 4870/02, 8 June 2010), the applicant claimed that his conviction had not been necessary in a democratic society.


80.  The Government submitted that the disciplinary action against the applicant, followed by his removal from the position of chief prosecutor on account of the manner in which he had presented to the press information concerning the pending criminal investigation, could be considered as interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that such interference was provided for by law. The disciplinary offences of which the applicant had been accused and the sanction imposed on him were defined in Law 303/2004. Moreover, in his capacity as the staff member assigned to impart information to the press, the applicant should have complied with the practice guidelines regulating cooperation by the courts and prosecutors with the media adopted by the SCM (Decision no. 277/2006) and with the provisions of Order no. 116/2007 of the General Prosecutor.


24.  The Government contended that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The third sentence of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention specifically envisaged the power of States to require broadcasting licences. This requirement applied not only to technical aspects but also, as the Court had pointed out in Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, to other conditions, such as “the nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, [and] the rights and needs of a specific audience” (see judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 14, § 32). In Switzerland, there was no audiovisual monopoly. Rather, the mixed system set up by the RTA provided for a plurality of media. Access thereto was nevertheless subject to a licence which was granted if certain conditions were met; the fact that no right was conferred did not contradict the Convention.


22.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not been tried by an independent and impartial court on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Adana State Security Court which convicted him. He further maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his criminal conviction and sentence had infringed his right to freedom of expression.


21.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts’ decisions imposing sanctions on him for expressing his views concerning a demonstration, which had been organised by the trade union of which he was the chairman, had violated his right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. This provision in so far as relevant reads as follows:


78.  The Government contested the existence of a causal link between the pecuniary damage suffered and the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the event of a violation being found under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government conceded that the applicant company was entitled to compensation. However, no calculation of the interest paid had been provided. The Government left it to the Court's discretion whether the applicant company had submitted sufficient documentation to support its claims.


103.  The applicant also complained under Articles 6 §§ 1-3 (a)-(d) and 8 of the Convention about the police putting pressure on him and, in particular, tapping his telephone. With a reference to Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant complained that he was unable to vote in the election of the Russian President on 2 March 2008 because of persecution by the police.


83.  The Government submitted that both Article <mask> of the Convention (in referring to “duties and responsibilities” as well as to formalities, conditions and penalties) and the domestic law permitted the State to put in place a framework containing the procedure of and conditions of the information flow. While Article 10 of the Convention included the freedom to impart information, Russian law provided for constitutional “freedom of mass information” along with the freedom of expression and freedom of thought. The Constitutional Court also recognised a higher degree of responsibility relating to the exercise of the freedom of mass information on a professional scale.


40.  The applicants’ request for information on public defenders in criminal proceedings was rejected by the domestic courts on the basis of the Hungarian Data Act (see paragraph 32 of the judgment), which provides that “personal data”, held by public authorities is not amenable to public access unless very limited exceptions are found to apply, which was not considered to be the case at domestic level. Thus, the Data Act prevented the domestic courts from examining the potential public-interest nature of the information (see paragraph 176 of the judgment), and this is an important element in the Court’s reasoning in finding a violation of Article 10 on the facts of the case (see paragraph 199). In other words, the practical consequences of the Court’s judgment is that member States of the Council of Europe may now have to change fundamentally their national freedom‑of‑information laws in order to take account of the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention that logically flow from today’s judgment. They will also, where relevant, have to reconcile those requirements with national and EU data-protection legislation.


19.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. They contented, however, that it was prescribed by law and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of § 2 of Article 10. They argued in the first place that the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicant company's submissions and set out clearly why, in the present case, Mr Kabas' interest in protection of presumption of his innocence continued beyond the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, the interpretation of section 7b of the Media Act in conformity with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention called for an extensive understanding of the protection of the presumption of innocence. While there was certainly public interest in the discussion of the “police information affair”, Mr Kabas' right in the presumption of his innocence outweighed the applicant company's right to freedom of expression. In the impugned article the applicant company depicted Mr Kabas as already convicted and did not inform the reader that the charges against him had already thoroughly been examined by the Public Prosecutor's Office which had closed his file months ago. When weighing the respective interests, the domestic courts had furthermore had regard to the fact that Mr Kabas was not given the opportunity to comment. Moreover, the ex-post appraisal of the present case confirmed that the court's assessment was correct. As Mr Kreiβl and Mr Kleindienst were finally both acquitted, the alleged assistance of Mr Kabas in their criminal acts was impossible. The Government further argued that the measures taken by the Austria courts were also proportionate.


147.  The applicant argued that public nudity was a clear form of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The term “expression” had been widely construed by the Court to cover various different forms of expression, including expression in words, in pictures, by video and through conduct intended to convey an idea or information. In his case, the decision not to wear clothes was a direct expression of his principled views on the human body. His complaint therefore fell within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention.


103.  The applicants argued that the order to surrender the original documents, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring the documents to the AIVD, had in fact been intended to make possible the positive identification of the journalistic source. The applicants alleged a violation of their freedom, as purveyors of news, to impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention.


76.  The applicant company submitted that the advance viewing of the programme in issue by the Brussels Court of Appeal in order to monitor its content before it was broadcast, and the subsequent banning of the programme as a preventive measure, had infringed freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom to impart information, all of which were guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


176.  The applicant’s case is troubling, since his intransigence has led to his spending a substantial period of time in prison for what is – in itself – usually a relatively trivial offence (see paragraph 100 above). However, the applicant’s imprisonment is the consequence of his repeated violation of the criminal law in full knowledge of the consequences, through conduct which he knew full well not only goes against the standards of accepted public behaviour in any modern democratic society but also is liable to be alarming and morally and otherwise offensive to other, unwarned members of the public going about their ordinary business. Having regard to the considerations set out above and to the wide margin of appreciation, the Court finds that the reasons for the measures adopted by the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts, and in particular those adopted in respect of his arrest in 2011, were “relevant and sufficient” and that the measures met a pressing social need in response to repeated anti-social conduct by the applicant. It cannot be said that the repressive measures taken in reaction to the particular, repeated form of expression chosen by the applicant to communicate his opinion on nudity were, even if considered cumulatively, disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, namely the prevention of disorder and crime. In particular, Article 10 does not go so far as to enable individuals, even those sincerely convinced of the virtue of their own beliefs, to repeatedly impose their antisocial conduct on other, unwilling members of society and then to claim a disproportionate interference with the exercise of their freedom of expression when the State, in the performance of its duty to protect the public from public nuisances, enforces the law in respect of such deliberately repetitive antisocial conduct. Even though, cumulatively, the penalties imposed on the applicant undoubtedly did entail serious consequences for him, the Court cannot find in the circumstances of his case, having regard in particular to his own responsibility for his plight, that the public authorities in Scotland unjustifiably interfered with his exercise of freedom of expression. Accordingly, no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention has been established.


26.  The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. In that regard they relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary ((dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006); Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France ([GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV); Pfeifer v. Austria (no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007); Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine ((dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008); Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus (no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008); and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia (no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013).


28.  The applicant disagreed. He maintained that the domestic courts had held him liable for inability to prove the truth of value judgments whereas the veracity of the underlying statements of fact had not even been contested. In particular, it had not been contested either that there had been significant financial contributions to the educational system, or that many boarding school pupils become social misfits. However, he was held liable for failure to prove the existence of a link between the two phenomena. Likewise, it had not been contested that Mr Geraschenko was the head of the entity responsible for the assessment of teachers. However, the applicant was found liable for expressing his opinion that given the situation teachers might have been afraid to voice their concerns. As for the last statement, the passage concerning purchases without tenders had been based on the earlier publication in Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The issue had also been discussed in the Bryanskoy Vremya issue of 16-22 September 2004. The misappropriation of funds had been subject to investigation by two commissions instituted by the Bryansk Administration. The passage concerning the “dismissal of uncooperative members of staff” was based on the fact that one of the authors, S.F., had been dismissed without any reasons for the dismissal having been provided to him. In the applicant’s view, in the present case the domestic courts had overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them for restriction on debates of public interest in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


45.  The applicant alleged that his right to freedom of expression had been breached as a result of the administrative sanction applied to him. He contended that there had been an interference with his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention, but conceded that it had been “prescribed by law”. He doubted that the real aim of the sanction had been to protect the reputation of I.M. rather than to punish him for making many complaints against the region's leadership.


49.  The applicants began by arguing that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable in the present case. They observed that in spite of their numerous endeavours they could not gain access to the radio station’s studios and equipment, thus finding it impossible to secure the enforcement of the decision of 6 December 2002 and, consequently, being unable to exercise their profession of radio journalist. They mentioned that before and after the partnership agreement they had run the newsroom of Radio M Plus. In their submission, and contrary to what the Government had claimed, the radio station had continued to broadcast even after October 2002 when they were first refused access to the newsroom, the work of which had then been taken over by other journalists from the company Tele M. The applicants asserted that this situation was the result of a conflict between the first applicant and the local representatives of a major political party, who were annoyed by the first applicant’s independent journalism. In this connection, the applicants referred to the Court’s case-law to the effect that dismissal from employment following “a course of action made up of an indeterminate number of acts of communication or expression that [the applicants] had committed over a period of several months, in the particular context of a labour dispute between them and their employer” represented a breach of their right to freedom of expression (Cârstea and Grecu v. Romania (dec.), no. 56326/00, 21 September 2004). In their opinion, even though the present case did not concern a dismissal, in several aspects their situation was tantamount to a de facto dismissal, with similar effects: the inability for the applicants to exercise their profession as radio journalists. Moreover, they observed that the Court had previously examined, under Article 10 of the Convention, the impact of unlawful actions by third parties which were perceived as de facto obstacles to freedom of expression.


76.  The applicant complains that the refusal to publish a paid advertisement by Rzeczpospolita, breached his right to the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court observes that the applicant could not publish an advertisement in the Rzeczpospolita newspaper, owned by a limited liability company, as the publisher refused to publish that advertisement. Subsequently, the civil courts examined the applicant’s claim for a decision ordering that newspaper to publish the advertisement. The courts found against him.


50.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not be considered the victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because the domestic proceedings in question had been concerned with statements made by her late father and not by the applicant herself. The Government argued that, since the applicant had complained that she should not have been the defendant in the domestic proceedings, she could not at the same time complain that those proceedings had affected her freedom of expression.


29.  The applicant newspaper also considered that the wording of its article had been accurate and moderate. No information about the private life of V.S. had been discussed, and the information about allegations of his use of public funds had not been presented to the reader as an established fact. Moreover, the press was allowed a certain degree of exaggeration. The domestic courts had not analysed any of the above-mentioned elements in their judgments. They apparently simply insisted on the strict application of Article 16 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 21 above): that the applicant newspaper had to prove the truth of what they had published. The law was thus so inflexible as to leave the courts no choice but to adopt judgments contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


33.  The applicant maintained that although it could be argued that some of the remarks published were statements of fact rather than value judgments, it was clear that this was not a sufficient reason for restricting her freedom of expression as a journalist under Article <mask> of the Convention. She had acted in good faith and her intention had not been to damage Mr Y’s reputation but to contribute to an on-going social debate on the operation of strip clubs. The article had concerned a matter of serious public concern. By prohibiting dissemination of the information in question, the Supreme Court’s judgment had entailed an unreasonable restriction on the applicant’s journalistic freedom as protected by Article 10 that could not be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. By having been required to adduce solid evidence as proof of Mrs Z’s statements, the applicant had been faced with an unreasonable, if not an impossible, task (Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 65, Series A no. 239).


28.  The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on its right to freedom of expression in its case had not been prescribed by law as the Penal Code provision applied had not defined adequately the scope of private life. Nor had the restrictions been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. B. had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially since the case had been very newsworthy. Moreover, the information in the articles had in every respect been correct.


24.  The applicant company argued that the open letter of Mr Heller fell under the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. It was part of a debate in the media concerning cultural and educational policy which included fundamental political aspects, included true statements of fact and value-judgments based on a factual basis and addressed, inter alia, Mr Westenthaler as leading politician of the FPÖ party. Consequently, the quotation of parts of this letter also enjoyed the protection of Article 10. In addition, the applicant company did not make the objectionable statements itself but restricted itself to a careful quotation. As criminal proceedings against Mr Heller were at that time pending, this information was of public interest. The structure and wording of the article at issue were neutral. Reporting about pending court proceedings could only be informative if also the subject of these proceedings was mentioned. The domestic courts had interpreted the article at issue and the applicant company's possibility of justifying the quotation of the impugned statements narrowly and in breach with Article 10 of the Convention. The mere fact that a statement had to be considered as an offence within the meaning of the relevant legislation did not imply that a report about such a statement amounted ipso iure to an offence against a person's honour. The wording of section 33 of the Media Act was not in conformity with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention as it did not provide for protection of a correct quotation. The measure at issue constituted a punishment which nature remained unchanged irrespective of the severity of its consequences. It had suffered material damage from the order of forfeiture.


47.  The Government argued that according to the Court’s case-law (they cited Mladina d.d. Ljubljana v. Slovenia, no. 20981/10, 17 April 2014) offensive language enjoyed the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention only if its purpose was stylistic, whereas that protection was excluded if the sole purpose of such language was to insult. Since, in the Government’s view, the impugned article consisted almost exclusively of insults (the headline itself represented an insult) that had no basis in fact (in respect of the allegations concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the search, breach of judicial ethics or conflict of interest) or wider context, they argued that the insults in question had not had any stylistic purpose. The Government thus considered that the article in question had constituted a gratuitous personal attack on Judge B.B., which was not protected under Article 10 of the Convention.


52.  The applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, about the breach of her freedom of expression suffered due to her criminal conviction, the subsequent civil defamation judgment rendered against her, and, also, the way in which the latter was enforced domestically, causing her, as it did, extreme financial hardship, numerous health problems and even endangering her very life. The applicant additionally referred to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in this context, as well as to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


19.  The Government agreed that in the present case the refusals to register the titles of periodicals amounted to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the compatibility of this interference with the restrictions laid down by the second paragraph of that Article in that it should be “prescribed by law”, the Government disagreed with the conclusion of the Commission that the domestic law at issue, the Press Act and the ordinance, had not been formulated with sufficient precision for the applicant to be able to regulate his conduct. In their view, the legislation in question was clear, comprehensible, precise and accessible.


43.  The applicants complained about the Vienna Court of Appeal’s judgment of 13 December 2007 and the Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 March 2009 in the main proceedings under the Copyright Act. They asserted that the injunction prohibiting them from further publishing Mr Küchl’s picture in the context of specific statements had violated their right to impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


63.  The applicant complained that the real reason for her repatriation was the quarrel that she had had with the commander of Police Precinct no. 19, in violation of her right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention the applicant complained that she had been expelled from Romania although she had been granted a temporary visa valid from 5 to 12 May 2000 and that her expulsion had taken place before she had had the opportunity to challenge the measure.


22.  The Government acknowledged that the finding against the applicant in defamation proceedings had constituted an interference with his freedom of expression. They maintained that the interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it had been based on foreseeable and accessible legal provisions and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation of a civil servant. In addition to that, the interference had not been disproportionate to the aim pursued. The disputed statements had contained numerous factual allegations, the accuracy of which the applicant had been unable to prove during the domestic proceedings. Those statements had therefore been defamatory. Accordingly, it had fallen to the applicant to verify their accuracy before disclosing the content of the letter at a public meeting. The applicant had not known the identities of all the authors of the disputed letter, and those identities could also not be discerned during the meeting. Accordingly, the domestic courts had correctly classified the letter as an anonymous application by citizens, which the applicant had had no right to read publicly, especially without verifying the facts. In view of the applicant’s conduct, the defamatory statements had been widely disseminated in the small village where G.Sh. lived with his family. Thus, he had experienced considerable emotional distress, and his reputation as a civil servant had been negatively affected. In these circumstances, the symbolic fine imposed on the applicant had been justified and not disproportionate.


42.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of their right to freedom of expression, on the ground that they had been ordered to pay damages for reporting on pending criminal proceedings which dealt with a matter of general interest. Their intention had not been to reveal any information about X’s private life. Article 10, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:


37.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts failed to apply the case law of the Strasbourg Court concerning Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular the case of Lingens v. Austria (judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103), in the assessment of their value judgments. The applicant also complained that the domestic courts found that the publications at issue did not correspond to the truth. It maintained that the courts were not able to distinguish between the “value judgments” and “facts” contained in the impugned publications of 19 August 1999 and 14 September 1999. The applicant also alleged that the court decisions interfered with its right to impart information freely. The applicant invoked Article 10 of the Convention, which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:


186.  The applicant complained that the decisions of the CRTA finding that it had violated the provisions of Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations, and the imposition of a fine, constituted a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. First, the applicant submitted that the provisions of the above Law and regulations had not been formulated with sufficient precision and clarity for the applicant to be able to regulate its conduct. They were drafted in general terms and covered all types of broadcasts, without taking into account their different nature and the need to apply varied standards depending on the particular broadcast. They were also excessively rigid and did not keep pace with changing circumstances and evolving societal attitudes.


27.  The applicant submitted that his trial, which had lasted for more than seven years and which had resulted in his being convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, had amounted to an interference with his right guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. He also claimed that the interference in question had not been necessary in a democratic society. In that respect, he submitted that the book in question was like an historical novel and that, read in its entirety, it did not incite violence.


75.  The applicant submitted that the refusal to publish a paid advertisement by Rzeczpospolita, which had subsequently been endorsed by the courts, had breached his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. His book concerned issues of public concern and interest, given that Gazeta Wyborcza was a powerful newspaper which played an important role in shaping the political views and attitudes of its numerous readers. The book aimed to present the general public with significant facts concerning the manner in which that newspaper had been created and how it had risen to its position of significance and power. No reviews of his book had ever been published in the printed media. The applicant was of the view that this was most likely to be because the book had been embarrassing for the publishers of Gazeta Wyborcza, who had been sufficiently feared and respected to be able to prevent anything hostile to it being published in the press. For an effective exercise of the freedom of expression and for a genuine political debate among citizens it was important that views and facts ignored or silenced by the mainstream media would be allowed to see the light of day. The applicant had been prevented from publishing the advertisement in Rzeczpospolita and also in a number of other newspapers. The fact that he had been silenced in that way breached both the Constitution and the Convention.


31.  The Government agreed that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable to the present case and that the criminal conviction of the applicants constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression as prescribed under the second section of that Article. However, the Government submitted that the criminal conviction and the sentence imposed were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and thus necessary in a democratic society.


123.  The applicant complained that his mandate as President of the Supreme Court had been terminated as a result of the views he had expressed publicly in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice, concerning legislative reforms affecting the judiciary. He alleged that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


21.  The applicants complained that the judgment against them did not meet a pressing social need and had therefore breached their right to freedom of expression. The fact that the case had not been initiated by the public prosecutor was proof of this, in their view. The applicants further claimed that the offending book had caused no prejudice to G.M.'s presumption of innocence, it being publicly known that he was under judicial investigation. In this connection they invoked their right to impart information in the context of an affair of state and argued that this public debate concerned the exercise of power, with its excesses and its checks and balances, and that the debate pre-dated the book's publication, the purpose of which was not to impede the investigation. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows:


14.  The Government rejected this complaint as manifestly ill-founded. In his interview the prosecutor had not asserted that the applicant had been or would be found guilty. He had spoken only about the applicant’s complicity in the crimes. Article <mask> of the Convention guarantees the freedom of speech, and newspapers carry only authors’ personal opinions, which the courts can choose to ignore. Article 6 § 2 may not stop the authorities from reporting on ongoing criminal investigations (see Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 38, Series A no. 308). The prosecutor had told the interviewer merely about facts found by the investigation. The article had not been an official statement; it merely continued a series of the newspaper’s own reports on crime in the town. The prosecutor had been discreet and tactful. Such interviews had proven successful against violent crime.


55.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in the present case because the applicant had not been punished by the domestic court for his ideas or the information which he had been imparting but for his behaviour. The content of the applicant’s statements had been, in the Government’s view, irrelevant for the assessment of whether he had deserved disciplinary punishment. He had in fact received disciplinary punishment for breaching the dignity of the court and for hampering its work.


64.  The applicant argued that the purely formal notion of secrecy, on which Article 293 of the Criminal Code was based and which had been confirmed by the Federal Court, had adverse consequences for freedom of expression. According to that provision, the publishing by an official of any document, regardless of its content, which had been declared secret or confidential had to be punished, without it being possible to review the compatibility of the penalty imposed with Article <mask> of the Convention. In the applicant’s view, such a definition of secrecy was clearly at odds with the requirements of the Convention.


51.  The Government argued that the domestic courts’ decisions were intended to protect Mr and Mrs Aubrac from defamation in a case in which the damage to their reputation was considerable given the accusation of treachery that had been levelled against them. The decisions were thus aimed at “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” and the interference had pursued a legitimate aim for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention.


23.  The applicant maintained that her conviction for criminal insult because of the article she had written and published in Politika on 7 September 2003 had been a clear interference with her right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. She accepted that it was “in accordance with law” as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, and that it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others. However, she maintained that her criminal conviction, although it had entailed a judicial warning, had been disproportionate under the circumstances of the case, in particular since it had caused her later dismissal from Politika, and represented a threat and warning to all Serbian journalists.


37.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. The restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages.


23.  The applicant insisted that he had checked the accuracy of facts with a reasonable degree of care, as might be required from a journalist. He had obtained and submitted to the domestic courts medical reports noting Mr S.’s injuries, the records of the confessions made by Mr S. and Mr M. at the police station and copies of Mr S.’s and Mr M.’s complaints about ill-treatment. Mr S. and Mr M. had confirmed the accuracy of the information contained in the article. However, the domestic courts had dismissed that evidence as untrustworthy without explaining the reasons for that finding. The fact that the authorities had refused to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of the allegations of ill-treatment had not, in itself, proved that the information published by the applicant had been untrue. The applicant had mentioned in his article that the authorities had refused to initiate criminal proceedings and had criticised them for that. The purpose of the article had been to denounce the authorities’ failure to investigate the allegations of police brutality. The applicant maintained that there existed a sufficient factual basis for his statement. Although he had failed to prove in court that his description of the events at the police station had been true in all its particulars, he was still under the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. Even harsh criticism in strong, polemical language published “on a slim factual basis” was protected under Article 10 (see Dichand and Others v. Austria, no. 29271/95, § 52, 26 February 2002).


33.  The applicants, who are members of the executive committee of the trade union Nueva Alternativa Asamblearia (NAA), complained that they had been dismissed on account of the content of the union’s newsletter of March 2002. They claimed that the company P. had not verified their individual level of participation and personal responsibility. They alleged that they had been dismissed by way of reprisal for the union’s demands and that the allegedly offensive content of the newsletter had served as a pretext. They took the view that the cartoons and two articles in question had not overstepped the limits of admissible criticism under Article <mask> of the Convention, because the impugned expressions had been used in a jocular spirit and not with any intent to insult.


188.  The applicant claimed that as a result of the premature termination of his mandate as President of the Supreme Court and the entry into force of retroactive legislation concerning the remuneration of his post (see paragraph 52 above), he had lost his salary as President, other benefits attached to that position as well as the post-term benefits (severance allowance for six months and pension supplement for life) to which he would have been entitled as former President of the Supreme Court. He provided a detailed calculation of his claim for pecuniary damage, which amounted to 742,520 euros (EUR). The applicant argued that there was a clear causal connection between the pecuniary damage claimed and the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


33.  The applicant submitted that he had been an active journalist for many years and had often participated in public debates on issues relating to the recent history of Poland. The radio debate from which the present case originated was one of a series of public discussions on a range of political issues, including lustration. He had, therefore, been fulfilling his rightful mission to inform the public about an important matter relating to a public figure. The applicant had become aware that Mr J.M. had been a collaborator with the secret services after having consulted all the available documents and other sources which he needed to protect. He had not intended to offend Mr J.M. but only to contribute to a debate about the importance of lustration, which J.M had criticised. Taking into account all those elements the applicant considered that his statement did not overstep the limits of protection afforded to him by Article <mask> of the Convention.


29.  The applicant submitted that the injunction issued by the Austrian courts was not necessary in a democratic society. In particular, the Austrian courts wrongly qualified the impugned statement as a statement of fact, when it was a political value judgment criticising the plaintiff in the injunction proceedings and contributing to a political debate on a question of general importance. It was in the public interest to point out the dangerousness of a politician like Mr Haider who had proposed contemptible measures in an opinion poll against immigration (“Österreich zuerst” – “Austria first”). As a value judgment and not a statement of fact, its truth did not require proof. To require proof of a value judgment would itself be a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The applicant contested the submission that there had been relevant and sufficient grounds to justify the impugned interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Mr Köck had entered the public arena as he had been commissioned as an expert by the regional government and had, furthermore, repeatedly expressed his views on this subject in public. He had done so in an exceptionally provocative manner and the applicant had merely responded to those views. Given the nature of his commission, Mr Köck should have been required to exercise particular restraint until the study was completed in order to avoid anticipating and forestalling its conclusions. Any expert who stated the direction his findings would take before he had concluded his report left himself open to a high degree of legitimate criticism. The applicant's statements had been value judgments with a sufficient factual basis, namely Mr Köck's provocative public comments and his general conduct. The matter at issue was of the greatest public interest and the applicant had relied upon information which was already within the public domain. The applicant had also explained his principal reasons for concern, namely Mr Köck's involvement in the creation of a private hospital management company with an abbreviated name (KABAG) confusingly similar to that of the holding company which operated Carinthia's regional hospitals (Landeskrankenanstalten–Betriebsgesellschaft, KABEG). The statement that Mr Köck intended to smash the Carinthian health system had to be seen in the whole context of all the statements. Obviously every reader would understand that Mr Köck was not accused of smashing the system himself but of recommending measures to that effect. The mere reference to another expert who had failed and had been pursued by the criminal justice could not be understood as an implied accusation of Mr Köck. The applicant contended finally that the courts' decisions ordering him not only to refrain from further similar statements, but also to retract his comments had not been proportionate either.


47.  The Government found it uncontested that the applicant’s conviction for defamation and the liability to pay damages had amounted to an interference with her right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in domestic law, namely in Article 12 of the Constitution and Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law”. The impugned measures had also pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the private life and reputation of the child’s father.


57.  The Government acknowledged that advertisements and other forms of commercial expression may fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, this provision was not applicable to the circumstances of the present case because it concerned a dispute between private parties, whereas the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention were of a vertical nature, in that they concerned relations between the State and individuals.


52.  The Government argued that section 10 of the 1981 Act, as applied in the applicants' case, was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the domestic courts were entitled to make the findings they did on the basis of the evidence and to take those findings into account in making the delivery up order. As to the harm suffered by Interbrew, the Government pointed to the drop in its share price and the rise in SAB's share price. The Government also considered that the court was justified in reaching its conclusion as to X's purpose given, inter alia, the anonymity, the lack of any attempt by X to justify the leak and the absence of any evidence to contradict Interbrew's assertion that the leaked documents had been manipulated. Finally, the Government argued that the applicants' contention regarding the adequacy of Interbrew's investigation into the leak was an attempt to appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment, which had rationally concluded that as much as possible had been done to track down the source of the leak.


26.  The Government submitted that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society and thus compatible with Article 10 § 2. The disclosure of the identities of the former Chief Security Director and his deputy in an obvious manner had made them possible targets of terrorist attacks as it had been suggested several times in the article that the two officials should be eliminated. The article could just as well have been published without disclosing the identities of the two officials concerned. The interference was therefore proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient. The national authorities had applied standards which conformed with the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention.


69.  The applicant was convicted for speech which, as the domestic courts adjudged, incited hatred and violence rather than being merely insulting (compare and contrast Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 32, ECHR 1999‑I) or defamatory (compare and contrast Bartnik v. Poland (dec.), no. 53628/10, § 28, 11 March 2014) in respect of police officers. The Court stresses that not every remark which may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular individuals or their groups justifies a criminal conviction in the form of imprisonment. Whilst such sentiments are understandable, they alone cannot set the limits of freedom of expression. It is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article <mask> of the Convention and that which forfeits its right to tolerance in a democratic society (see, for a similar approach, Vajnai v. Hungary, no. 33629/06, §§ 53 and 57, ECHR 2008). The key issue in the present case is thus whether the applicant’s statements, when read as a whole and in their context, could be seen as promoting violence, hatred or intolerance (see Perinçek, cited above, § 240).


60.  The applicants maintained that nor had the interference been “necessary in a democratic society”. The press had the right and obligation to distribute information and thoughts about all issues of public interest and concern. A journalist was entitled to the protection safeguarded by Article <mask> of the Convention at least in circumstances in which the journalist was distributing public information that was both correct and reliable. Journalistic ethics required a journalist to tell readers what was going on in society. This requirement was of particular significance with regard to the reporting of trials as trial accounts fostered the openness of court proceedings and was at the very core of the freedom of expression. Trials, and especially the already delivered court decisions, had to be reportable in the media.


67.  The Government contested the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the applicant NGO’s complaint and invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In their view, Article 10 of the Convention covered only the freedom to receive and impart information, while any reference to “freedom to seek” information had been deliberately omitted from Article 10 during the drafting process, in contrast to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.


42.  The applicant complained that the Supreme Court’s decision of 30 September 2011, rejecting her appeal against the judicial order requiring her to give evidence about her contacts with Mr X, had given rise to an unjustified interference with her right not to be compelled to disclose her journalistic sources as inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


24.  The Government relied in substance on the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in the matter. They argued that the applicant’s statement had exceeded the limits of freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. They endorsed the domestic courts’ arguments that the impugned statements had injured the plaintiff’s reputation, and deliberately so. The Hungarian courts had duly balanced the applicant’s Convention rights and the plaintiff’s right to his good reputation, and had justifiably concluded that the latter outweighed the former in the particular circumstances of the case. They stressed that the sanctioning of statements capable of damaging a person’s good reputation should not be regarded as a breach of the Convention. Lastly, in the Government’s view, the sanction imposed had not been disproportionate, especially as it was of a civil rather than a criminal character.


62.  The Government submitted that the sums claimed in respect of pecuniary damage had been awarded to V.K. by the domestic courts as fair compensation for the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained, and that no award should be made to the applicants under the head of pecuniary damage. They further submitted that, in the absence of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage should be made.


53.  The applicant complained that the existence of Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code interfered with his right to freedom of expression. He maintained that the mere fact that an investigation could potentially be brought against him under this provision for his scholarly work on the Armenian issue caused him great stress, apprehension and fear of prosecution and thus constituted a continuous and direct violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


16.  The applicant complained that the measures of fining him and banning his interpellations infringed his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention, since they did not serve a legitimate aim and were disproportionate. He claimed that declaring interpellations inadmissible for the protection of Parliament’s prestige constituted censorship and deprived the Members of Parliament of the possibility to express their opinion on issues of public interest.


37.  The Government noted that before the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, the applicant had maintained that he was not the author of the statements for which he had been ordered to pay damages, and that they had been made up by the journalist who had interviewed him. They therefore concluded that, by insisting that the disputed statements were not his, the applicant had admitted that he had not actually imparted any ideas or information within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In other words, the applicant in the present case could not have enjoyed the protection of that Article because he had not exercised his right to freedom of expression. If the Court were to hold otherwise and find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, that would have led to an absurd situation, as it would have found a violation of the applicant’s right which the applicant himself claimed he had not exercised.


30.  The Government argued that the Commission’s refusal to provide anonymised paper copies of all decisions issued since 1 January 2000 could not be regarded as an interference with the applicant association’s rights under Article 10. According to the Court’s case-law, Article <mask> of the Convention prohibited Contracting States from interfering with the receipt of information that someone wished to impart. However, it did not impose a positive obligation on the State to collect and disseminate information itself. Although the State had to set up its information system in such a way that an individual could obtain generally accessible information, it was not obliged to provide access to confidential information.


35.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on his right to freedom of expression had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had actively participated in the incident of 4 December 1996. A conviction was public information that could not fall within the scope of private life. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest. The applicant had only written the articles, and he had had no say in the manner in which they had been published. No intent had been shown. Moreover, the information in the articles had been in every respect correct. The courts had failed to strike a proper balance between the protection of private life and freedom of expression in the manner required by the Convention.


42.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s conviction for defamation constituted interference with his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained, however, that this interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of Mrs P.’s reputation, and was necessary in a democratic society. In this regard they submitted that the applicant had overstepped the limits of permissible criticism of a civil servant, in particular, as he had directly accused Mrs P. of having committed serious criminal offences, thereby undermining her right to presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the financial penalties imposed on the applicant had not been disproportionate to his income, and the prison sentence was not long and in any case the applicant had not served it.


25.  The applicants complained that their freedom to receive information had been breached because the restrictions imposed on them either had not been prescribed by law or had been more far-reaching than necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, they claimed that the consequences – the eviction from their flat and the move to another town – had been disproportionate to the aims pursued. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


21.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and his conviction under that section, had constituted a violation of his right to freedom of expression. He further complained under the same Article about the seizure of copies of the book on 30 September 2003. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


46.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the first applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They further submitted that that interference had been based on Article 484 of the Civil Code. The legitimate aim pursued by the authorities had been the protection of the reputation of others and the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, as provided by the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention.


70.  The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the ordinary courts had (i) incorrectly required its legal predecessor to prove the absolute truthfulness of the published information, (ii) failed to assess the situation under the established criteria, (iii) found arbitrarily against the applicant’s legal predecessor, and (iv) awarded an excessive amount of damages. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


34.  The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be victims of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the interference with their right to freedom of expression had been based on the decisions of the domestic courts. The applicants did not complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the impugned court proceedings had been unfair, and there had been no irregularities in those proceedings and the Court had limited jurisdiction regarding the assessment of facts and the application of law by domestic courts. On these grounds, they invited the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.


53.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was compatible with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the interference in question was based on Article 8 § 2 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and that it pursued a legitimate aim. They contended that the expression of an opinion of a kind which incites and provokes people to commit crimes cannot be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. In this connection, they referred to Article 17 of the Convention.


22.  The Government argued that the Austrian courts' injunction did not constitute an interference with the applicant association's rights within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted in that regard that Article 10 did not protect artistic freedom as such but only provided protection to artists who intended to contribute through their work to a public discussion of political or cultural matters. The present reproduction of public figures in “group sexual situations” could, however, hardly be regarded as a statement of opinion contributing to a cultural or political debate.


35.  The Government agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention but regarded this interference as justified to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or the rights of others and to prevent the dissemination of confidential information. Referring widely to the arguments of the Federal Labour Court and the subsequent judgment of the Labour Court of Appeal of 16 November 2004, the Government stressed that the applicant’s primary motivation was to defame the mayor personally. They argued that the applicant could not use the term “perverting the course of justice” without distinction as a lay person not working in a legal area might do.


77.  The Government submitted that the finding against the applicant in the defamation proceedings constituted a legitimate restriction of his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of M.L.’s reputation, and had been based on provisions of the domestic law which were accessible and foreseeable. They submitted that the interference was also “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the aim pursued. In particular, the domestic case-law at the material time had been well-equipped to differentiate between value judgments and statements of fact. The applicant in the present case had been held liable not for expressing a value judgment, but for having made false factual allegations accusing M.L. of serious misconduct. He himself had treated those allegations as factual in both the domestic and the Convention proceedings in his case, and had sought to have documentary and other evidence examined in support of his position. The domestic courts had thoroughly examined the evidence presented by both parties and had dismissed the applicant’s arguments as speculative and unsubstantiated in their reasoned judgments.


52.  The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the court proceedings had been unfair on account of the unlawful order that it offer apologies to the claimant. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds and must, therefore, be declared admissible. In view of the Court’s finding in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention, there is no need to examine the issue again in the context of Article 6 (see Karman, cited above, § 47).


177.  The applicant complained before the Chamber, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, that he had been deprived of an effective domestic remedy in relation to the premature termination of his mandate as President of the Supreme Court. The applicant did not explicitly raise this complaint before the Grand Chamber. Article 13 reads as follows:


18.  The applicant submitted that his statements about a local politician were true. He reported on the criminal proceedings against the deputy mayor of Ostóda and expressed his opinions about him. The applicant complained that he had been found guilty for having made statements such as “stormy and lucrative career in local government” that were value judgments, the truth of which could not be proved. He argued that under Article <mask> of the Convention he had the right to give his opinions. Unfortunately, the Polish judiciary did not understand the Convention standards as regards the right to freedom of expression.


31.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. The Court observes in this connection that the impugned statement was not made by the applicant but by his political opponent. It follows that – the applicant’s own freedom of speech not having been at stake – the facts of the case do not give rise to any issue under Article 10 from the applicant’s perspective. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


36.  The Government in turn reiterated the above position in their observations before the Court, acknowledging that part of the applicant’s actions, namely his complaints to various authorities, were protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they emphasised that the applicant’s conduct had also involved the public dissemination of damaging statements in respect of a third party. Such action was not covered by the protection of Article 10 and the sanctions that had been imposed were justified as they fell within the permissible limitations on the right to freedom of expression, had pursued a legitimate aim, namely protection of the rights of others, and had been proportionate to the applicant’s conduct in the circumstances of the case.


53.  The applicant drew attention to the chronology of the events and contended that the impugned email of 20 March 2010 had merely been used as a pretext to dismiss him and that the real reason for his dismissal was his persistent criticism of the University. He dismissed the Government’s argument that he had not been prevented from exercising his right to freedom of expression and considered that his dismissal constituted interference with his rights protected under Article <mask> of the Convention.


30.  The applicant complained, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, about the defamation proceedings brought by judge B., alleging that the proceedings had been unfair, that his letter to the relevant authorities could not be regarded as disseminating defamatory information, and that the award in the case had been disproportionate and arbitrary. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


183.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. First of all, they submitted that the interference complained of had been prescribed by law. It had been based on Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations. The relevant provisions were clear and their effects reasonably foreseeable, especially with the assistance of a lawyer. Secondly, the Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right pursued legitimate aims and in particular the protection of the rights of others. In this respect, they emphasised the need to safeguard the rights and interests of viewers, including children, who were vulnerable, and to protect them from abusive practices. The Government relied on the reasoning given by the CRTA in its decisions concerning the broadcasts in question. They further highlighted the need to regulate the mass media in view of the significant influence they had on people and society at large. The measures taken by the CRTA had been necessary in securing compliance with the relevant legal provisions and regulations.