28.  The Government noted that the applicant had failed to bring his grievances to the attention of a competent domestic authority and considered that his complaint should be rejected for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that it had been open to the applicant to bring his grievances to the attention of the prosecutor. They cited the following examples from the domestic practice in support of their position. In response to a Mr N.'s complaint about the conditions of his detention the Novosibirsk prosecutor's office conducted an inquiry which confirmed N.'s allegations that the food rations had been insufficient and the water supply had been irregular. As a result, the prison administration renovated the detention facility and purchased medical supplies. In the Vladimir Region, a special section for detention of inmates diagnosed with tuberculosis was established following an NGO's complaint on behalf of a Mr B. In the Khabarovsk Region the administration of the prison where Mssrs Sh. and Z. were detained renovated the shower and laundry rooms, upgraded the ventilation system in the disciplinary block and set up an area for medical consultations. Alternatively, in the Government's opinion, the applicant could have brought a civil action for damages resulting from the conditions of his detention. The Government cited three cases in this connection. The Yoshkar-Ola Town Court in the Mariy El Republic granted a Mr S.'s action for compensation for non-pecuniary damage resulting from a violation of his rights set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the appalling conditions of his detention in a remand prison. A Mr D. had been awarded 25,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage arising from the unsatisfactory conditions of his pre-trial detention. On 23 April 2004 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of Oryol found that a Mr R.'s pre-trial detention had been unlawful that he had not received food for five days of his detention. The court awarded Mr R. RUB 30,000.


49.  The applicant submitted that, while not disputing that he had been arrested and detained in the manner alleged by him, the Government did not explain in a plausible way the origin of the injuries noted on him the next day. It had to be borne in mind in this connection that his complaint comprised six relatively separate ways in which he had been ill-treated: the unjustified use of force to pin him to the ground for about half an hour upon his arrest; the wide publicity given to that, with no efforts to preserve his anonymity; the “stress position” in which he had been kept for about two hours in the corridor of the police station; his stay for several hours in an overcrowded and stuffy cell with no access to food, drink or medical care; the blows and kicks administered in the course of his arrest; and the blows and kicks administered in the corridor of the police station. Even though each of these acts, taken individually, fell afoul of Article <mask> of the Convention, there was no use to examine them in isolation, as the Government did not seek to justify any of them by reference to his conduct. It was true that the police operation in the course of which he was arrested had been intended to protect participants in the Sofia Gay Pride parade, and that in such circumstances the police could be given some latitude to tackle aggressive groups without assessing the dangerousness of each of their individual members in advance. However, this did not mean that they were free to flout the absolute prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment.


96.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the SIZO were adequate and did not reach the threshold required by Article <mask> of the Convention. In support of their statements, the Government submitted a document, certified by the SIZO Governor, which contained a description of the cells in which the applicant had been detained. In particular, the document says that in every cell there was a 120x40 centimetre window, with natural and artificial lighting and ventilation.


28.  The applicant submitted that the prolonged imposition of the “dangerous detainee” regime had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In his opinion, there had been no reasonable grounds for applying the regime to him. All of the decisions imposing and extending the regime lacked justification and did not refer to any individual circumstances attributable to him. The regime was imposed arbitrarily and extended automatically. Moreover, his good behaviour in the remand centre had not been taken into account by the penitentiary commission.


120.  The Government pointed out that the fact that the applicant had occasionally been detained in overcrowded cells could not serve as the basis for finding a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because the remaining aspects of the detention conditions (availability of an individual sleeping place, bedding, compliance with sanitary norms, etc.) had been satisfactory. The Government further noted that the problem of overcrowding exists in the detention facilities of many member States of the Council of Europe. The Government submitted that the applicant had actively used available domestic remedies, in particular by lodging a number of tort actions against the administration of the detention facility.


52.  The applicant further complained that his defamation by fellow villagers amounted to his inhuman treatment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He also complained under Article 6 § 1 about inadequate assessment of the facts by the courts. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, he next complained about the respondent’s obtaining his medical certificate and its adducing to the case file. Lastly, referring to Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the dismissal of his cassation appeal in the first set of proceedings on the ground of missing the time-limit had constituted his deprivation of a domestic remedy and denial of the access to court.


193.  The applicant's prison cell is indisputably furnished to a standard that is beyond reproach. From the photographs in its possession and the findings of the delegates of the CPT, who inspected the applicant's prison during their visit to Turkey from 2 to 14 September 2001, the Court notes that the cell the applicant occupies alone is large enough to accommodate a prisoner and furnished with a bed, table, armchair and bookshelves. It is also air-conditioned, has washing and toilet facilities and a window overlooking an inner courtyard. The applicant appears to be under medical supervision that is both strict and regular. The Court considers that these conditions do not give rise to any issue under Article <mask> of the Convention.


44.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies available to him, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They raised a preliminary objection similar to that relied on in the case of Łatak v. Poland (see Łatak v. Poland (dec.) no. 52070/08, 12 October 2010, §§ 63-64). In particular, they stressed that the applicant had already been released on 26 September 2008. In these circumstances, the situation giving rise to the alleged breach of Article <mask> of the Convention no longer existed and the applicant should bring a civil action under Article 24 taken in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code in order to seek compensation for the past violation.


43.  The Government contested that statement. They pointed out that, according to the Court’s case-law, damage to personal integrity did not necessarily require a criminal-law remedy, especially where the harm had been inflicted as a result of negligence. Hence, a lack of criminal-law remedies in itself could not constitute a breach of the State’s positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention.


105.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been unlawfully classified as a “dangerous detainee” and that he had been treated in an inhuman and degrading manner for a period of 692 days. He referred, in particular, to routine humiliating strip-searches to which he was subjected three times a day and such restrictions as wearing shackles on his hands and feet at all times whenever he was outside his cell, frequent searches of his cell, excessive isolation from his family and the constant monitoring of his cell, including sanitary facilities, via CCTV cameras. He also submitted that the authorities attempted to isolate him to the maximum and that during the application of the regime he was constantly held in a solitary cell.


93.  The applicant complained of the allegedly inadequate medical assistance he had received in detention, the authorities’ refusal to release him on health grounds or transfer him to a civil hospital with a higher standard of care and the allegedly inhuman conditions of his transport on 21 December 2007. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


261.  The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that Mr Shchiborshch had been subjected to ill-treatment which led to his death. They referred to forensic reports, which stated that in the course of the police operation he had sustained seventy injuries, including a craniocerebral multitrauma, stab and slash wounds to the neck and several fractured ribs. They also claimed that the investigation in this respect had not been effective. Article 3 reads as follows:


40.  The Government submitted that the domestic investigating authorities had conducted a thorough inquiry into the applicant’s allegations and had taken a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings in the absence of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant had sustained his injuries at the hands of the police. The domestic court reviewed the conclusions reached by the investigating authorities and found them lawful. In such circumstances, the Government concluded that there had been no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, under either its substantive or its procedural heads.


94.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been beaten by the police following his arrest on 3 July 2009. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, he also complained that there had not been any adequate domestic investigation into the matter. The applicant further complained under Article 3 that the physical conditions of his detention in the SIZO had been appalling, that he had unjustifiably been placed in a disciplinary cell on several occasions and that other coercive measures had been used on him. He also complained, with reference to Article 2 of the Convention, that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention.


29.  The Government argued that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment were ill-founded and stressed that the applicant had not undergone a medical check-up until some twenty-two days after his release, on 29 April 2009 at the Memoria centre. In any event, only medical reports issued by authorised forensic doctors could be taken into consideration, and therefore that report had no probative value. The Government expressed doubt as to conclusions of the Memoria centre as to the cause of the injuries found on the applicant’s body, and submitted that they could have been caused by acts of violence during the manifestations of 7 April 2009 or by co-detainees. In any event, according to the Government, the injuries found on the applicant’s body had not been not sufficiently serious as to raise an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the effectiveness of the investigation, the Government submitted that the prosecutors had done everything which it had been necessary to do in order to investigate the applicant’s allegations. Therefore, the investigation had been effective within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.


38.  The Government admitted that the applicant had indeed sustained minor physical injuries. However, the Government maintained that there were no indications that the applicant had ever been assaulted by the police officers. According to them, the injuries in question had been sustained by the applicant during his fight with the taxi drivers. The Government pointed out that although during the first medical examination of the applicant, which took place on 8 July 2002 at 1.25 a.m., it had been revealed that the applicant had had only some scratches on his forehead and a bruise to his eye, this examination had been limited to verifying whether the applicant had been intoxicated. Therefore, the doctor did not check whether the applicant had other injuries but noted only the most visible ones. The Government further submitted that it had only been when the applicant was hospitalised that he had been diagnosed with concussion because due to the applicant’s being under the influence of alcohol it had been impossible to diagnose it earlier. Moreover, once the applicant had complained that he was not feeling well an ambulance had immediately been called for him by the police officers. The Government further indicated that the applicant had changed his allegations several times as to who had beaten him up. On different occasions he had told doctors that he had been beaten by unknown persons, by the taxi drivers and by the police officers on his arrest but he had never stated that he had been beaten up in the police station. Furthermore, the Government maintained that the investigation in the applicant’s case had been adequate and effective. In particular, all important witnesses of the events at issue had been questioned (police officers, taxi drivers and passengers and so on). Although the outcome of the investigation had not been favourable for the applicant, this did not automatically mean that the investigation had been ineffective. Therefore, the Government contended that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case.


93.  The applicant’s second argument concerned the risk of his being subjected to the death penalty as a form of “punishment” in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, it is common ground between the parties that the charges against the applicant under Article 139 § 1 of the Belarusian Criminal Code, as stated in the extradition request and as examined in the extradition order, do not carry the death penalty as a possible punishment (see paragraphs 61-62 above; see also, by contrast, Koktysh, cited above, § 61, in which case the applicant was charged under Article 139 § 2 of the Belarusian Criminal Code).


24.  The applicant insisted that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading. He further argued that, despite the fact that the domestic courts had acknowledged that the conditions of his detention in the ward had not met the requirements of Russian law, he had not lost his “victim” status, as his detention for an aggregate period of a month in appalling conditions could hardly be considered to have been adequately compensated with RUB 500. He also pointed out that the Government had not acknowledged that his rights had been violated under Article <mask> of the Convention.


59.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been compatible with the standards set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government relied upon excerpts from the remand prison population register and certificates prepared by the administration of the remand prison in August 2010. The Government also considered that the applicant had an effective remedy in respect of his grievances under Article 3 of the Convention. He had lodged a civil action seeking damages resulting from his detention in the remand prison. His claims were duly considered and granted in part by domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction which fact showed the accessibility and efficiency of the remedy.


30.  The applicant's lawyer submitted that as result of the police officers' actions the applicant had sustained a number of injuries which were sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. The police had acted in a manner not appropriate to a person suffering from mental illness and had used excessive force against him, especially as regards the shot directed at the applicant's leg. According to the lawyer, the police should have used a restraining net to immobilise the applicant.


74.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Odessa and Kyiv SIZOs, Sokyriany Colony and in transit therefrom to Torez Colony, including physical, sanitary and healthcare arrangements had been incompatible with human dignity and that the prison and convoy authorities had treated the detainees in inhuman and degrading manner. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect, which reads as follows:


76.  The Government did not dispute the principle that the Court was competent to give a set of facts a different legal characterisation by, for example, examining an alleged violation of Article 8 under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, this did not mean that the Court was entitled to discern, for example, from the documents provided by an applicant, facts that he or she had never complained of, and still less to do so against his or her wishes.


64.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies available to him, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They raised a preliminary objection similar to that relied on in the case of Łatak v. Poland (see Łatak v. Poland (dec.) no. 52070/08, 12 October 2010, §§ 63-64). In particular, they stressed that the applicant had been moved to a cell in which he had been secured at least the minimum standard space of 3 m2 per person shortly after the delivery of the Orchowski and Norbert Sikorski pilot judgments. In these circumstances, the situation giving rise to the alleged breach of Article <mask> of the Convention no longer existed and the applicant should have brought a civil action under Article 24 taken in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code in order to seek compensation for the past violation.


85.  The Government, whilst not denying that the abduction of the applicant’s son must have caused considerable emotional distress to her, submitted that there was no causal link between the authorities’ actions and the applicant’s mental and emotional suffering, in the absence of any findings by the domestic investigation confirming the involvement of State agents in the aforementioned offence. According to them, the investigation had obtained no evidence that the applicant had been subjected to treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention.


96.  The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with the infliction of bodily injuries on the first applicant during the night of 26-27 May 2005. Throughout the proceedings all possible investigative measures were carried out to establish the circumstances of the alleged beatings. However, since it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators, the proceedings were discontinued. The Government concluded therefore that there had been no violation of either the substantive or the procedural aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case.


117.  The applicant further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that her son had been ill-treated during his apprehension and that the State had failed to investigate properly the events. She also claimed that as a result of her son's disappearance and the State's failure to investigate the events, she had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


38.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been detained in the temporary detention centre with persons who were hostile to law enforcement officers and that he had been beaten up by police officers or interrogators. He complained that he had had to study the case file over three days without rest or food, in the presence of the investigator and convoy officers. He alleged that the length of the criminal proceedings and his pre-trial detention had been in breach of Article 3. The applicant also complained under Article 5 of the Convention about his detention until in April 2002. Lastly, he complained mainly under Article 6 of the Convention of a number of alleged irregularities, which, in his view, had made his trial unfair.


39.  The Government pointed out that in the applicants' case the alleged ill-treatment, resulting in minor injuries, had taken place in the course of the lawful arrest of the applicants' relatives. The applicants themselves had been actively involved in the conflict and had been obstructing the police officers in the performance of their lawful duties. Furthermore, the Government had serious doubts that the minor injuries sustained by the applicants reached a level of severity sufficient to bring them within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Whilst admitting that any recourse to physical force against the applicants, if it had not been made strictly necessary by the applicants' own conduct, could be seen as a possible breach of Article 3 requirements, the Government also submitted that the force used by the police officers was strictly necessary and not excessive, according to the applicants' actions. Lastly, as regards the effectiveness of the investigation and the judicial proceedings, the Government argued that the investigation into the incident had been prompt, independent and thorough and that twenty-two witnesses had testified. Given that two sets of proceedings concerning precisely the same incident had been conducted and the investigators in both cases had shared the material, there was no reason to hold that any of the evidence had not been secured and the establishment of the truth thereby precluded.


51.  The applicants complained that the conditions of their detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they complained of severe overcrowding, which had led to a lack of personal space, and poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restrictions on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cell, inadequate health care and psychological assistance, and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security.


63.  The Government have not disputed that the injuries detailed in the medical reports of the three applicants had been caused while they were in the hands of agents of the State. In the absence of any explanation by the Government, who bear the burden of providing a plausible explanation for those injuries (see, in this connection, Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII), the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in its substantive aspect in respect of the three applicants.


124.  The Government contested the first applicant’s arguments. They noted that, in the first place, the extradition request of 29 December 2010 had contained assurances that in Tajikistan the first applicant would not be subjected to inhuman treatment or punishment or persecuted on political or religious grounds and that he would only be prosecuted for the offences in respect of which the extradition request was granted. The Russian courts had examined the first applicant at the hearing and had studied the relevant materials; the first applicant’s lawyer had also been given an opportunity to present his position in the case. Furthermore, the first applicant had been living in Russia illegally for a long period of time. He had never applied for either a resident permit or a work permit, had not been in gainful employment, had not registered as a taxpayer and had only applied for temporary asylum on 15 December 2011. According to the Government, when deciding on the applicant’s extradition to Tajikistan all his arguments concerning the risk of ill-treatment had been duly examined by the Russian authorities and courts and found to be unsubstantiated. Therefore, his extradition would not be in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


196.  The Government submitted that the State had indeed honoured the positive obligation flowing from Article <mask> of the Convention to conduct an independent, impartial and thorough investigation. They affirmed that the authorities had adopted all the measures required by the Court’s case-law (see Gäfgen, cited above, §§ 115-116, and the references therein), to identify those responsible for the impugned ill-treatment and to impose on them penalties proportionate to the offences committed and to provide compensation to the victim.


27.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been held in custody despite the fact that he was suffering from a number of ailments. He further alleged that he had been deprived of adequate medical treatment while held in custody and that the conditions of detention had been unsatisfactory. He complained under Article 5 of the Convention that his arrest and his detention had been unlawful. He also alleged under the same Article that his detention had been excessive in length.


100.  The applicant disagreed with the assertion that the Russian authorities had made a thorough assessment of the risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention in his case, pointing out that the authorities’ conclusions in that respect had been based on the scant information obtained from a handful of official sources. He asserted that both the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and the Moscow City Court had adopted an excessively formalistic approach towards the assessment of the evidence in his case. He referred to the general situation in Tajikistan, as reported by numerous sources, and highlighted the testimonies of the witnesses in support of his argument that he would undoubtedly be tortured if he were extradited to that country. He added that the statements of the witnesses allegedly renouncing their previous statements had been recorded by a law-enforcement officer in the absence of a lawyer. In addition, the prison records which the Government presented in respect of the detainees did not refute the witness statements, but only recorded the lack of marks of torture on the bodies of the individuals concerned in 2010, whereas the pre‑trial investigation had been carried out in 2007 and 2008. The applicant argued that his situation had been further endangered by the Russian authorities’ decision to divulge information to their counterparts in Tajikistan concerning his application for refugee status and asylum, as well as the statements of the witnesses with regard to the use of torture by Tajik investigative bodies (see paragraph 35 above).


54.  The applicant complained of the impunity his torturers had allegedly enjoyed following a trial he claimed itself violated the essence of the right enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. In connection with the same complaint, the applicant also relied on Article 13 of the Convention, while explaining that the main aim of the remedies he sought at the national level had not been to obtain damages but to establish the criminal and administrative responsibilities for what had happened. The Court considers that the complaint, as presented by the applicant, concerns the positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to protect people’s physical and psychological integrity through the law (see, mutatis mutandis, Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 95, ECHR 2004-XII). Article 3 reads:


32.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been afforded the necessary procedural guarantees within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. An investigation had been conducted into the actions of the police officers, who had subsequently been brought to trial. At the end of that trial, one of the police officers had been convicted and the proceedings against the remaining two had been suspended. In the Government’s opinion, Law no. 4616 could not be regarded as an amnesty law and the suspension of the criminal proceedings against the two police officers did not mean that they were acquitted.


28.  The applicant complained that the anguish and distress suffered by her on account of the attitude of the authorities towards their duty to investigate the circumstances of her husband’s death, including their systematic failures to update her of the progress in the investigation and to respond to her inquiries and demands amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


32.  The Government next referred to the Court’s case-law, according to which the applicant had a duty to submit evidence capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that she had been subjected to ill-treatment that had attained the minimum level of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this regard, the Government submitted that the applicant had not submitted any credible statements or evidence concerning her situation in Iļģuciema Prison and that in any case her complaints were purely hypothetical and abstract.


77.  The Government submitted that the factual circumstances of the case did not disclose that the applicant had been subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. There had been no evidence to substantiate or create any suspicion that the police officers had used violence against him, or that his injuries had been caused by them. The applicant’s statements did not constitute a “credible assertion”, as they were contradictory. The investigation had proved the fact that the applicant had been a protagonist in the physical dispute which had resulted in the use of beer bottles and other hard objects. Except for the applicant’s inconsistent statements, there had been no other statements saying that the police officers had used objects like these. There was no basis for saying that the applicant’s injuries had not been caused as a result of his physical dispute with the other people. Furthermore, the witnesses had not stated that they had had a physical dispute with the police. The standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” had not been met in the present case. The violence used by the police officers, if any, used with the aim of protecting others involved in the fight, could not be qualified as torture within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


113.  The applicant submitted under Article <mask> of the Convention that Cemal Uçar had been subjected to coercion while in police custody. He further maintained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his son had been kept in police custody for nine days without being brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. The applicant finally contended under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that there was no remedy in domestic law to obtain compensation for the alleged violation of Article 5 § 3.


102.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their suffering on account of the death of their son, further exacerbated by the alleged lack of volition on the authorities’ part to establish the truth, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, they further complained that the detention of their son had been unlawful and had lacked adequate judicial review.


21.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, during his transfer between prisons and from prison to hospital, he had been subjected to strip-searches, including anal inspections, which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He further alleged that, because he had resisted such measures, he had been punished by solitary confinement, which had led to the deterioration of both his physical and psychological problems. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:


70.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance, despite his suffering from HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. He further argued that the authorities’ persistent refusals to release him on medical grounds had exposed him to additional, continuous suffering amounting to torture. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


146.  The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that, as a result of their relative’s disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate it properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. They also argued that they had serious grounds to believe that Mr Ali Khadayev had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment when in detention and complained that no effective investigation had been conducted in this respect. Article 3 reads:


109.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that Visadi Shokkarov had been ill-treated while in police custody from 6 January to 2 February 2003, but that no effective investigation had been carried out on that account. The applicants also claimed that the death of Visadi Shokkarov and the disappearance of Visita Shokkarov and the authorities’ failure to properly investigate these incidents had caused them profound moral suffering. Article 3 reads:


62.  The applicants complained that the poor material conditions of their stay in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport had been incompatible with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further complained that their confinement to the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport amounted to an unlawful deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. These Convention provisions read, in so far as relevant, as follows:


57.  The applicant complained that on 8, 22 and 28 June 2004 he had been subjected to violence by officers from the ORB police unit. He had then been transferred to correctional colony IK‑14 and during his detention there from July to November 2004 had been subjected to further violence by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions with the connivance of the prison administration. He argued that the violence had been used to make him confess to crimes, and had amounted to torture. Furthermore, no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaints. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


27.  The Government argued that there were several effective domestic remedies that had not been used by the applicant in the present case. In the first place, they alleged that the applicant had not requested a domestic court, under Article 24 and 33(1) of the Code of Administrative Procedure, to order the relevant authorities to take additional measures for the protection of his health in prison. Secondly, according to the Government the applicant should have sued the relevant State authority and requested compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Article 207 of the General Administrative Code and Article 413 of the Civil Code. Since neither of these judicial remedies were resorted to by the applicant, the Government were of the opinion that the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention should be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


179.  The applicant’s second complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention concerned the harsh conditions of his detention. In particular, he complained about the lack of natural light and ventilation in the cell, which was very small, the fact that the authorities had provided him with light, inadequate clothes and the fact that the furniture was permanently fixed to the floor. He also submitted that during certain periods he had been kept in overcrowded cells.


39.  The applicant complained that his confinement in a metal cage in the remand prison for the purposes of his participating, by means of a video link, in the court’s examination of his appeals against the detention orders on 6 April and 28 June 2011 had violated his human dignity. The complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


88.  The Government argued that there had been an effective investigation in response to the first applicant’s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment on 30 June 2004. They distinguished the present case from Labita v. Italy on the facts, stating that the actions of the Cēsis District Police Department had never been the subject of explicit media attention. Moreover, the applicants’ allegations had given rise to certain doubts as to their credibility. In this regard the Government referred to Avşar v. Turkey (no. 25657/94, ECHR 2001‑VII (extracts)), noting that the obligation under the procedural aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention was one of means, not result (ibid., § 394): an effective investigation could well end with a finding that no violation had taken place.


132.  The applicant complained, with reference to Article <mask> of the Convention, about the searches of his SIZO cell on 27 March and 3 April 2007, as having allegedly resulted in the seizure of his personal belongings, namely his copy of the Code of Criminal Procedure with comments and his notepad with some telephone numbers and other important information, as well as that some of his food had been spoiled.


30.  The applicant submitted that the police officers had subjected him to humiliating and degrading treatment during his arrest and detention. He complained that they had exposed him to the public in handcuffs and then taken him to his workplace and his home, still in handcuffs. He contended that the police officers' conduct during his time in their custody had been designed to humiliate and debase him in front of his colleagues, neighbours and family. He alleged that this humiliation had affected him to such an extent that he had lost all capacity to cope with it psychologically, had lost his job as a result and had been undergoing psychiatric treatment ever since. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


50.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies available to him, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They raised a preliminary objection similar to that relied on in the case of Łatak v. Poland (see Łatak v. Poland (dec.) no. 52070/08, 12 October 2010, §§ 63-64). In particular, they stressed that the applicant had already been released on 20 November 2009. In these circumstances, the situation giving rise to the alleged breach of Article <mask> of the Convention no longer existed and the applicant should bring a civil action under Article 24 taken in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code in order to seek compensation for the past violation.


96.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the authorities’ failure to ensure that he enjoyed eight hours’ sleep on court hearing days. The Court has already examined a similar issue in the case of Bagel v. Russia (no. 37810/03, § 70, 15 November 2007), concluding that the six hours’ sleep afforded to the applicant in that case on the days of his participation in court hearings did not reach the threshold proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion. The applicant had no less than six hours of sleep per night. Moreover, the authorities took steps to ensure that he had enough sleep during at least three nights per week (when he did not take part in court hearings). The Court also does not lose sight of the fact that Wednesdays were chosen as days to allow the applicant to recover from participating in court proceedings and any possible shortage of sleep suffered during the week. Lastly, the situation only continued for a short period of time during the trial. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


40.  The applicant complained that he had been detained in appalling conditions from 17 August 1999 to 30 May 2002 in remand prisons nos. IZ-48/2 and 48/3 in Moscow. He further complained that he had not received adequate and proper medical treatment for tuberculosis while in detention in the hospital of remand prison no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow and at medical correctional colony no. LIU-10 in the Omsk Region. He further alleged that during the transfers to and from medical correctional colony no. LIU-10 in the Omsk Region he had not been treated at all. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


80.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in remand centre no. IZ-71/1 in Tula had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, he claimed that no domestic remedy had been available to him in order to obtain an improvement in the conditions of detention. The relevant Articles provide:


42.  The Government submitted that the applicant's allegations were unsubstantiated. They maintained that the applicant had failed to adduce any concrete evidence in support of his allegations. They contended that the allegations were deceitful and were part of a scenario used by the terrorist organisation to dishonour the fight against terrorism. They concluded that there was no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


52.  The applicant then referred to a linguistic specialist report, which suggested that the text of the confession of 29 December 2007 had been written by the applicant with the assistance of another person. For the Court, this sole piece of evidence is not sufficient to find that the applicant was subjected to psychological influence or that this had been serious enough to reach the threshold of Article <mask> of the Convention (compare Zamferesko v. Ukraine, no. 30075/06, § 48, 15 November 2012). In the present case this aspect of the complaint comes rather to the issue of availability of a lawyer in that period of time who, among other things, could effectively prevent the alleged psychological influence on the part of police officers. However, the question of access to a lawyer is examined below under Article 6 of the Convention.


32.  The Government contested that argument. In their opinion, the applicants’ allegations about the existence of a risk of their being subjected to ill-treatment were hypothetical. They were not relevant to the issue of the legality of their stay in Russia and could not be considered in the course of expulsion proceedings. Besides, the applicants had not even referred to the existence of such a risk when challenging their expulsion. The applicants’ allegations were thoroughly reviewed by the Russian migration authorities, which found them unfounded. The Government also noted that Uzbekistan had ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and was obliged to act in compliance with it. Accordingly, no issue would arise under Article <mask> of the Convention if the applicants were to be deported to Uzbekistan.


24.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been subjected to torture whilst in police custody. Relying on Articles 6 and 13, he further alleged that he had been denied an effective remedy in respect of his ill-treatment complaint due to shortcomings in the proceedings, in particular their excessive length and the lack of a hearing before the Court of Cassation, which amounted to an unfair trial.


94.  The Government disagreed with these allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. Likewise, since it had not been established by the domestic investigation that Luiza Mutayeva had been abducted by State agents, the applicant's mental suffering could not be imputable to the State.


42.  The Government submitted that the Court had previously found violations of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of applicants being confined in metal cages in courtrooms. However, the present case was different. The applicant had not been physically present in the courtroom during the hearing. He had remained in the remand prison and participated in the hearing by means of a video link. The metal cage had separated the applicant from the video equipment and the technical staff at the remand prison who had operated it. The applicant had not alleged that he had been exposed to the public and thus subjected to humiliation. In any event, the degree of such humiliation would be much lower if a person was not physically present in the courtroom, and would hardly go beyond “the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment”.


36.  The applicant complained that the material conditions of detention in Jilava Prison amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. He alleged, in particular, overcrowding, squalor, rats, bedbugs, lice and scabies infestations, lack of ventilation, lack of heating in the winter and extremely high temperatures in the summer. He also complained that the food was poor, the drinking water was infested with bacteria and that he did not have access to sporting, cultural and educational activities. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


55.  The applicant complained of the conditions of his detention in Lukiškės Remand Prison from 7 June 2011 until 25 May 2012. The domestic courts found that for 268 days, ten evenings and three mornings the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). The Court finds that this is the relevant period to consider because although he had spent time also in other facilities, the applicant had less than 3 sq. m of personal space at his disposal for the majority of this period, and this created a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 (see Muršić, cited above, §§ 136‑37). As for the days he had between 3 and 4 sq. m at his disposal, which, according to the information at the Court’s disposal, amounted to twenty‑five and a half days and in respect of which no strong presumption of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention arises, the Court must have regard to other relevant factors (ibid., § 139). Those are the possibility of sufficient freedom of movement and out‑of‑cell activities and the general conditions of the applicant’s detention.


43.  The Government also maintained that, as far as the conditions of detention in the Ladyzhynska Colony were concerned, the applicant’s submissions were vague and general and not such as to demonstrate that he had been ill-treated by the Colony authorities within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government also submitted excerpts from the applicant’s medical record, which indicated that his state of health had been monitored regularly (see paragraph 19 above).


109.  The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies regarding some of his complaints concerning the alleged procedural violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, in his complaint against the police authority’s decision on the termination of the investigation, he had failed to mention that the proceedings had failed to satisfy the requirement of promptness and independence and had not been public because he was not allowed to be present during the questioning of witnesses and put questions to them (see paragraph 35 above).


91.  The applicant alleged that he continued to suffer very serious negative consequences as a result of the lack of any effective, independent and impartial investigation. The identification of the police officers responsible and the acknowledgement of their responsibility were very important to the applicant even though, owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period, they could no longer be punished. These consequences could be remedied only by a decision to reopen the criminal proceedings in case no. 50207598. Although the applicant had already served nine years’ imprisonment for robbery, it was of paramount importance to him to receive recognition that his conviction had been based on criminal proceedings in which he had been ill-treated by police officers contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention at the investigation stage.


54.  The applicants maintained that they faced a real and personal risk of being persecuted and ill-treated, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, if forced to return to Uzbekistan. They stressed that they had invoked their need for protection since their arrival in Sweden and throughout the national proceedings as well as before the Court. The risks against them emanated from the first applicant’s participation in the events in Andijan in 2005, where he had been arrested and tortured by the Uzbek authorities. He was now suspected of crimes in relation to this. Moreover, the applicants had left Uzbekistan illegally and they had been in Sweden as asylum seekers since December 2005 and the Uzbek authorities were aware of this since the Migration Board had contacted the Uzbek Embassy in Riga. Furthermore, and although for a limited time, the first applicant had been involved politically in Birdamlik in Sweden and the Uzbek authorities knew about this since they had approached the first applicant’s parents in Uzbekistan about his activities. The authorities had probably been informed by an Uzbek spy in Sweden who had met the first applicant.


66.  The Government reiterated that in their opinion the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, given that he had not lodged an appeal against the decision of the Federal Asylum Office in the first set of proceedings. The Government referred to the Asylum Act 2005 and the legal remedies established therein against a decision rendered by the Federal Asylum Office at first instance. Acknowledging that an appeal lodged against such a decision had no automatic suspensive effect, but that it could be awarded such effect, they explained that even though a deportation or transfer order might be legally enforceable, the authorities were barred from executing it until the seven-day period in which the Asylum Court could award suspensive effect to an appeal lodged with it had passed. Furthermore, current Austrian law reflected the principles and provisions laid out in the Dublin Regulation itself, in particular in its Article 19 § 2. Finally as regards legal remedies, the Asylum Court had to take a decision on an appeal for which suspensive effect had been granted within two weeks. The Government concluded that the remedies provided in Austrian law successfully balanced the various interests involved and had provided the applicant with an effective avenue of appeal, one which had allowed for the award of suspensive effect if there had been a real risk of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention upon his transfer, combined with a guarantee of a speedy appeal decision.


91.  The Government contended that the medical assistance provided to the applicant while in detention had been adequate. The applicant had not been subjected to medical tests for hepatitis C upon his arrest and placement in custody because he had demonstrated no clinical evidence of the illness and the prison regulations then in force had not provided for mandatory hepatitis C tests. The Government submitted that they could not produce a copy of the applicant’s medical record for the period between 10 June 1996 and 28 May 1998 because it had been destroyed. On 29 November 2004 the applicant had been diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C. The absence of acute hepatitis had proven that the infection with the virus had occurred before the placement in the penitentiary facility. Once the illness had been revealed, the applicant had received essenciale, cerucal, riboksin and vitamins. The applicant had not suffered from acute hepatitis C while in LIU-10 and had not required inpatient treatment. In the absence of clinical evidence of acute hepatitis C the applicant had been provided with palliative care and subjected to monitoring of blood biochemical characteristics and dynamic therapeutic control. The applicant had been repeatedly placed in LIU-10 on account of tuberculosis where he had been prescribed with anti-tuberculosis treatment. However, on several occasions he had refused to take the prescribed medicines. According to the Government, the existing system of providing detainees with medical assistance is compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and the applicant’s complaint was entirely unsubstantiated.


79.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the conditions of his detention in the lock-up of the Bucharest Police Inspectorate. The Court notes that the applicant was transferred from that lock-up to Rahova Prison at the latest on 16 January 2004, but only lodged the complaint with the Court on 13 October 2004. It follows that this complaint was introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


19.  The applicants submitted that they had been arrested and detained unlawfully, contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. They further complained under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention that they had not been brought before a judge in order for the lawfulness of their arrest to be decided upon and therefore could not appeal against a non-existent decision to detain them. The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been held in inhuman conditions of detention, ill‑treated and refused medical assistance. They lastly complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention since they had not had a remedy before the Moldovan or Russian courts.


176.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the video surveillance and strip searches in the detention facility; the conditions of detention in the remand centre and in the transit prison; the beatings inflicted on her by a warden and some other issues in relation to the detention regime. She also complained under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention in relation to certain detention-related and post-conviction proceedings. Lastly, she raised a number of grievances with reference to Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 18 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.


56.  The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated by officers A.R. and A.P., as well as a third officer who remained unidentified. As a result of the lengthy investigation and court proceedings, and by incorrectly applying a shorter limitation than that provided for by law, the authorities allowed A.P. to escape criminal responsibility. The applicant had therefore not obtained sufficient satisfaction and could continue to claim that he was a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the prosecuting and judicial authorities had taken all possible steps to delay the proceedings and to shield the police officers from responsibility. The applicant allegedly received threats from anonymous persons to withdraw his complaint. On 26 September 2001 he was allegedly arrested following an order of officer Adajii, who had been called as a defence witness by A.R. and A.P.


179.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ complaints were unsubstantiated. However, such general reference, in the absence of any explanation on the part of the authorities, is in the present case insufficient to discharge them from the obligation requiring them to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination. Having assessed all the relevant elements and drawing inferences from the Government’s failure to put forward any arguments showing that the incident was ethnically neutral, the Court finds that there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 14 of the Convention.


36.  The applicant complained about the physical conditions of his detention in all the prison facilities in which he had been detained since 2004, the fact that during his detention he had become ill with toxic hepatitis, obstructive bronchopneumonia, anaemia, breathing difficulties, sinusitis, otitis and a deviated septum, and the lack of adequate medical treatment for his illnesses. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


48.  The applicant further complained of the fact that at the time of his arrest he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He also invoked Article 5 § 4, submitting that there had been no review of the lawfulness of his detention and that during the investigation the principle of equality of arms had not been respected. He further complained under Article 6 § 1 of a violation of his right to have his case heard within a reasonable time. Lastly, the applicant invoked Article 8 of the Convention, maintaining that his right to respect for private and family life had been violated because during his detention he was denied contact with his fiancée for 6 months.


51.  The applicant pointed first to the State’s special responsibilities towards persons deprived of their liberty, in particular as regards their right to have access to medical care. In this connection he stressed that a person was usually free to choose a specialist to treat his condition and a method of recommended treatment. Furthermore, a person could always refuse to undergo an operation, even if it was life-saving. As concerns those who were detained, however, their choices in this respect were very limited. They could not opt for a particular specialist to treat them, nor did their lack of consent relieve the custodial authorities of the duty to provide the necessary medical assistance, by force if required. This followed from the State’s duty to protect those under its jurisdiction, in particular those in a vulnerable position in custody. Having regard to that duty, the applicant stressed that compulsory medical treatment did not violate Article <mask> of the Convention, provided that it was necessary from a medical point of view and carried out in conformity with standards accepted by medical science. Even an obstructive attitude on the part of the person concerned did not constitute an obstacle to providing necessary and urgent treatment.


79.  The applicant submitted that his conditions of detention on İmralı Island were inhuman and exceeded the severity threshold deriving from Article <mask> of the Convention. He also alleged a violation of Articles 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention, on the grounds of the social isolation imposed on him during his detention in İmralı Prison. The Court considers these complaints primarily under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


45.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been beaten by the police whilst being apprehended on 22 January 2004 and that there had not been an adequate domestic investigation into the matter. The applicant further complained that the physical conditions of his detention in Odesa SIZO had been appalling. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


232.  The Government submitted that the mere fact that Mr Harakchiev had been sentenced to whole life imprisonment did not amount to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention because he could seek presidential clemency at any time. There was already a precedent in which a person serving a whole life sentence had had his sentence commuted by the Vice-President. A ruling that that was not sufficient would not do justice to the work of the Clemency Commission attached to the Vice-President and would engender legal turmoil not only in Bulgaria but also in other member States. Whole life imprisonment, introduced in 1998 as a result of the abolition of the death penalty, was a very important component of the punitive system of Bulgarian criminal law. It was a penalty that was imposed very rarely and reserved for the most serious offences. There were at present fifty-seven persons in Bulgaria serving a whole life sentence and 106 persons serving a life sentence.


28.  The applicant complained that the overcrowded conditions of detention, including the lack of separation between smokers and non‑smokers in Aiud, Gherla, Rahova, Jilava, Slobozia, Dej and Miercurea‑Ciuc Prisons and the overcrowded and poor transport conditions every time he was transferred between those facilities, had been inappropriate. He further complained that he had been subjected to ill‑treatment by police officers, and that the medical care during his pre-trial detention had been inadequate. This amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


55.  The applicants complained about the conditions in which the bodies of their deceased relatives had been stored during the identification process. Except for the fourth and the sixth applicant who did not take part in the identification, they were also dissatisfied with the circumstances of their personal participation in the identification process. According to the applicants, this treatment by the authorities caused them such mental suffering that this amounted to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


57.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He submitted a statement made by V. and N., the inmates detained and transported together with him. In the applicant’s view, the domestic authorities had failed to ensure that his detention during the period in question had been compatible with the requirements set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. His pre-trial detention and the appalling conditions in which he had been transported had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by the said Article and had resulted in serious damage to his health.


156.  The Government requested the Court to declare the complaints raised under Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention inadmissible on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the applicant had not raised them in compliance with the procedural requirements of domestic law before the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that in accordance with its established case-law, the Constitutional Court was bound not by the reasoning of a constitutional appeal but only by the final plea in the appeal (they referred to the domestic judgments in I. ÚS 89/09 of 29 November 1994 and Pl. ÚS 16/93 of 24 May 1994). In addition, the Constitutional Court could only decide on an interference which the appellant had explicitly specified in the final plea in his constitutional appeal (see ÚS 3336/09 of 18 February 2010). They maintained that it appeared from the final plea in both the applicant’s constitutional appeals that he had properly raised only his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government emphasised that the Constitutional Court had constantly allowed legally incapacitated persons to resort to it independently and had not dismissed their constitutional appeals on the grounds that they had not been entitled to lodge them (they referred to ÚS 412/04 of 7 December 2003; II. ÚS 303/05 of 13 September 2007; II. ÚS 2630/07 of 13 December 2007; and II. ÚS 1191/08 of 14 April 2009).


23.  The Government stated that there was no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. Initially, the applicant was placed in detention because there was a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a crime. The preventive measure was selected according to the national legislation. The Sokal Court’s decisions were lawful and substantiated. The period of the applicant’s detention of about one year and two months and the duration of the criminal proceedings against him were not excessive. Moreover, the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention was reviewed on reasonable intervals.


126.  The Government asserted that Visadi Shokkarov had been detained on 20 January 2003, that on 22 January 2003 his detention on remand had been authorised by the Nadterechniy District Court, and that he had had unrestricted access to his lawyer. In sum, they submitted that Visadi Shokkarov’s detention had fully complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the allegedly unlawful detention of Visita Shokkarov, the Government submitted that no evidence had been obtained by the investigators to confirm that he had been deprived of his liberty. Visita Shokkarov was not listed among the persons kept in detention centres and none of the regional law-enforcement agencies had information about his detention.


314.  The applicants in Satovkhanova and Others (no. 29844/11), Tembulatovy (no. 38134/11), Shavanova and Others (no. 44296/11) and Sugatiyeva and Others (no. 13874/12) additionally complained about the lack of effective domestic remedies against the alleged violation of Article 3. The applicants in Satovkhanova and Others (no. 29844/11) and Tembulatovy (no. 38134/11) also complained about the lack of effective domestic remedies against the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The relevant Articles read, in so far as relevant, as follows:


17.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention that they had not been promptly informed of the reason for their arrests. Relying on Article 5 § 3 and 4 of the Convention, they complained that their period of detention in police custody had been excessively long and that they had not had the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


34.  The Government submitted that, at the time of the events, the period of detention of the applicants was in compliance with the requirements of the domestic law. Referring to their derogation of 5 May 1992, the Government argued that it was absolutely essential that they derogate from the procedural guarantees governing the detention of persons belonging to terrorist armed groups and that, on the facts, it was impossible to provide court supervision in accordance with Article <mask> of the Convention owing to the difficulties inherent in investigating and suppressing terrorist criminal activities. The Government pointed out that the detention periods laid down under Turkish law had been amended in compliance with the case-law of the Court.


83.  The Government agreed that house arrest constituted deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. Nevertheless, they considered that lesser reasons were required in order to justify house arrest because this measure was milder than detention in custody. That was moreover so in the instant case where the applicant had himself requested placement under house arrest.


37.  The applicant claimed that his detention between 7 July 2010 and 15 November 2012 on the basis of a judgment delivered by a “court” of an entity which had not been recognised by the respondent Government violated his right to liberty guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. He alleged that the failure of the domestic courts to follow the procedure for the recognition of a foreign decision in criminal matters rendered his detention unlawful.


35.  The applicant disagreed. He submitted that the President of the Kraków Court of Appeal had recognised that errors had been committed by the judge who had issued the detention order. However, that statement had been made informally in a letter addressed to a local MP. The applicant argued that the implicit admission of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention by the President of the Kraków Court of Appeal and the fact that he could seek damages on account of his wrongful detention had not deprived him of his “victim status”.


66.  The applicant alleged that he had not been informed about his rights. Since the burden of proof was on the respondent State, which had the obligation to keep a record, the applicant’s version is more tenable than that of the Government. Hence, the omission of the national authorities to inform the applicant of his right to have a lawyer of his choosing meant that the fairness test was failed from the outset. By analogy, the absence of a detention record is considered to entail a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article <mask> of the Convention, securing the right to liberty and security. It discloses a most grave violation of that provision and is incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 (see Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, § 78, 25 October 2005; Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, § 87, ECHR 2006-III; Smolik v. Ukraine, no. 11778/05, § 45, 19 January 2012; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 125, Reports 1998-III). The lack of a proper record of an individual’s arrest and detention is thus sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 157, ECHR 2002‑IV, and Menesheva, cited above, §§ 87-89). If this formality of keeping an official record is indispensable for guaranteeing a non-absolute right, as it is for the right under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, one may wonder why such a formality should not be all the more indispensable for guaranteeing an absolute right, namely the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


107.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government argued that the applicant had several remedies at his disposal, including Article 108 of the Code, which provided for a procedure for challenging a measure of restraint, and Chapter 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid down the procedure for challenging decisions taken in the course of criminal proceedings. Finally, a suspect or accused could lodge applications or complaints with a court or another public authority under section 17(1)(7) of the Custody Act.


36.  The applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful, unjustified and arbitrary, that several decisions concerning his detention had been taken while he had had no legal representation despite its being mandatory and that the procedure in respect of his requests for release had fallen short of the applicable standards. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


16.  The applicant argued that the compensation awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice in respect of the breach of Article <mask> of the Convention had not been adequate and proportionate to the severity of the breaches of his rights. In support of this contention the applicant cited cases in which the Court had found breaches of Article 5 of the Convention and the awards made had been considerably higher than that of the Supreme Court of Justice in his case. In his view, as a result of the insufficient amount of compensation awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice, he still had the victim status within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


39.  The applicant complained, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, that his arrest and detention had not been based on reasonable grounds for suspecting that he had committed a criminal offence. In his observations lodged with the Court on 15 June 2011, the applicant also complained that his arrest on 10 November 2007 had been unlawful, because he had been unlawfully detained by the investigator. The relevant part of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


62.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention and house arrest had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


108.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention as he had not complained about either the alleged unlawfulness or the length of his detention pending extradition to a prosecutor's office or a court. They also submitted that the applicant had not appealed against the decisions of 30 November and 28 December 2007.


58.  The applicant also complained that his detention on remand, which ended on 26 August 1996 (paragraph 14 above), was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention (the right to liberty and security of person). However, the application was introduced on 22 December 2001, more than six months after the applicant’s release on bail. In view of his allegation of an absence of domestic remedies for this complaint, he has failed to comply with the six month time-limit of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IX).


11.  The applicant complained about the length of his detention in police custody, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of this detention and the absence of a remedy in domestic law to obtain compensation for the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He relied on Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


42.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He considered the ex post facto authorisation of his pre-trial detention from 27 October 2007 to 10 January 2008 tainted with arbitrariness and contrary to the safeguards provided by Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, he argued that the reasons underlying the extension of his pre-trial detention from 28 April to 6 May 2008, namely “prompt consideration” of his appeal, had not been prescribed by domestic law.


225.  The applicant argued that the respondent State was responsible for the violation of his rights under this Article, by its own agents and/or foreign agents operating in its territory and under its jurisdiction. His detention in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without charge or judicial oversight had violated his Article 5 rights. His prolonged disappearance during his subsequent detention in Afghanistan constituted a violation of Article 5, for which the Macedonian Government was responsible. In addition, the Government had violated Article <mask> of the Convention by failing to conduct an effective investigation into his credible allegations that he had disappeared for an extended period as a result of a joint operation by Macedonian and US agents.


60.  The applicant complained in passing that he had been ill-treated in 1995 by the domestic authorities. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant further challenged the lawfulness of the decisions to remand him in custody taken in 1995 and 2000 and the lawfulness of his detention on remand in 1995-1999. The applicant further complained under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (b, c, d) and Article 7 of the Convention that his convictions on 25 December 2001 and 27 April 2004 had been unlawful and the proceedings against him had been flawed. The applicant also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his and his late parents’ property had been embezzled from him and that the domestic authorities had failed to return to him certain items of his property seized as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 34 of the Convention that on 15 April 2008 the Chervonozavodskyy District Court of Kharkiv had unlawfully rejected his lawyer’s request for a copy of the case file.


33.  The applicant disagreed with the Government. He argued that his complaints fell under Article <mask> of the Convention and, as such, were submitted in conformity with the requirements of the Convention because they related to his period of “detention on remand” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which ended on 10 April 2000 with the judgment of the Plovdiv District Court.


52.  The Government maintained that the grounds of the applicant's pre‑trial detention were clearly defined and the law itself was foreseeable in its application, so that it met the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention. They contended that the applicant had been detained on the ground of suspicion of committing a serious crime and also with the intention of ensuring his participation in the proceedings. Furthermore, the periods of the applicant's detention covered by the court decisions protected him from arbitrariness − which protection is implicit in the meaning of “lawfulness”, as regards detention, as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention.


96.  The Government contended that, following his acquittal, the applicant had lost his victim status in respect of his complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, in their view, it remained open to the applicant to bring a civil claim for compensation for the damage allegedly resulting from unlawful and unreasonably lengthy pre-trial detention as provided for in Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Russian Civil Code. As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant's pre-trial detention, the Government conceded that from 25 November to 31 December 2002 his detention had not been authorised by a court order. They further submitted that the applicant had been remanded in custody pending investigation and trial owing to the gravity of the charges against him. In addition, it had been made known to the judicial authorities that, if released, the applicant could have absconded. Lastly, they argued that, as the applicant had been accused of having molested a boy of less than fourteen years of age with a learning disability, his pre-trial detention had also been necessary to ensure his own safety and security of person.


41.  The applicant complained that his detention after 11 March 2009 had been unlawful in that it had exceeded the maximum statutory time-limit and that he had been detained in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the crimes he had been charged with. He further alleged that his pre-trial detention had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons; that on and after 21 February 2008 the courts had failed to address the applicant’s arguments about unlawfulness of his detention; that on 28 May 2008 his counsel had not been afforded an opportunity to inspect in full the case-file; that the review of his detention had not been speedy; and that he had no enforceable right to compensation for his detention. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


65.  The applicant argued that Article <mask> of the Convention protected individuals against arbitrary detention by the State. In the present case, the applicant had been detained without a warrant past the 72-hour period of detention on remand permitted under national law. A warrant had only been issued at 4 p.m. Therefore, the applicant's detention between 12.15 p.m. and 4 p.m. had been unlawful and arbitrary. Indeed, according to Moldovan Criminal Procedure Code, the applicant should have been released immediately upon the expiry of the 72-hour period. Moreover, the heavy caseload of the investigating judge on the day was not a relevant and sufficient excuse for the applicant's arbitrary detention between 12.15 p.m. and 4 p.m.


45.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to give reasons to justify his detention, and that there had not been relevant and sufficient reasons for the extension of the detention period. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:


83.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the national courts by wrongly finding that their claim for damages had been lodged after the statutory limitation period had expired, deprived them of the right of access to court because they had not examined their claim on the merits. They also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the taking of their respective husband and father by uniformed persons in August 1991.


99.  The Government claimed that the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated. As to the placement of the applicant in a psychiatric hospital in December 2002, the Government indicated that he had been taken there at the request of the district psychiatrist. Upon his arrival at the hospital the applicant had been immediately examined by a doctor on duty. In the ensuing forty-eight hours he had been examined by a panel of three psychiatrists. Following that examination the hospital had sent a hospitalisation request to the court. Consequently, his confinement had been requested and authorised in accordance with the domestic procedural rules established in the Psychiatric Care Act of 1992.


224.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been detained unlawfully and kept incommunicado, without any arrest warrant having been issued, and that he had never been brought before a judge. He claimed that the respondent State bore direct responsibility for his entire period of captivity between 31 December 2003 and his return to Albania on 28 May 2004. Lastly, he complained that the absence of a prompt and effective investigation by the Macedonian authorities into his credible allegations had been in breach of his Article 5 rights. Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:


16.  The applicant complained that contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention his involuntary placement in a psychiatric facility had been unlawful owing to the failure of the national authorities to meet the substantive requirements for hospitalisation and that the application for judicial authorisation of his hospitalisation had been submitted in violation of the procedural time-limit of forty-eight hours. The relevant parts of the Article read as follows:


203.  The applicant complained of various defects in the proceedings concerning his detention, namely the detention orders of 25 October 2003, 22-23 December 2003, 20 May, 8 and 16 June 2004. He referred to Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 in this respect. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under paragraph 4 of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


270.  The applicants in the cases of Golbatsova v. Russia (no. 77701/12), Pashayeva v. Russia (no. 79938/12), Khamzatovy v. Russia (no. 1969/13), Reshidovy v. Russia (no. 73593/13) and Mezhiyev and Others v. Russia (no. 63000/14) also alleged a lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of their complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition to those complaints the applicants in Golbatsova v. Russia (no. 77701/12), Pashayeva v. Russia (no. 79938/12) and Khamzatovy v. Russia (no. 1969/13) alleged a lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. The Articles in question read, in so far as relevant:


56.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they were arrested on the basis of an order issued by a prosecutor who according to the Romanian Constitution could not be considered a magistrate. They also claimed that their arrest was ordered by a bill of indictment, contrary to Romanian law. In this respect the Court notes that the bill of indictment ordering their arrest was issued on 25 May 2000, while their application was lodged with the Court on 5 April 2004.


75.  The applicants explained that under Italian law (Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, see paragraph 33 above), the only legal form of deprivation of liberty of an unlawful migrant awaiting return was placement in a CIE, subject to judicial supervision (validation of administrative detention decisions by a Justice of the Peace), as required by Article <mask> of the Convention.


65.  The Government submitted that after the expiry of the maximum eighteen-month period of detention the domestic courts had extended the applicant’s detention in accordance with Article 109 §§ 7 and 8 of the CCrP (cited in paragraphs 50 and 51 above), which provided for the possibility of extending a defendant’s detention pending investigation beyond the maximum period on the ground of the need for him or her or to study the case file or when some of his co-defendants had not finished studying the case file. In particular, the extension of the applicant’s detention until 17 February 2009 was necessary to allow her and her counsel to finalise familiarising themselves with the materials of the case. After that date the applicant’s detention was further extended, because some of her co-defendants had not finished familiarising themselves with the materials of the case. Referring to the decisions of the Constitutional Court (cited in paragraphs 56 and 58 above), the Government submitted that the above provisions of the CCrP fully complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention since, aside from the need to study the case file, they made such an extension conditional on the existence of relevant and sufficient reasons for continued detention and the impossibility of applying another preventive measure.


63.  The applicant stated that he had in addition pursued a criminal remedy and that the inadequacy of that remedy had only become obvious to him in late December 2011, when he had been repeatedly refused victim status in the ongoing criminal proceedings (see paragraph 22 above). The Court does not accept the applicant’s argument. Leaving aside the question of whether, in the light of the unsuccessful habeas corpus proceedings, the applicant also needed to resort to a criminal remedy before applying to the Court, it notes that the applicant did not voice his grievances under Article <mask> of the Convention in a sufficiently explicit way in any of his complaints to the prosecution authorities (see paragraphs 19, 21 and 23 above). Although he referred to the fact of his arrest at the Kintsvisi Monastery, he did not allege that it had been unlawful or that it had amounted to an unrecorded detention. The applicant, in the Court’s view, had no basis to expect the prosecution authorities to investigate the allegations of initial unlawful detention on their own initiative.


27.  The applicant submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention required domestic courts to review the lawfulness of a person’s deprivation of liberty at regular intervals. Under domestic law that obligation was embodied in Articles 121 and 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which required the Court of Appeal to carry out reviews no later than every three months, once the duration of remand detention had exceeded six months. He argued that the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal had arbitrarily omitted to carry out such a review between 28 July 2014 and 15 April 2015. It had taken its decision more than five months after he had requested, on 7 November 2014, that the detention order against him be set aside.


129.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention was not based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


45.  The applicant alleged that his detention in the Edirne and Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centres was unlawful and thus in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He complained, under the same provision, that he did not have at his disposal a remedy by which he could challenge the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty. The applicant finally complained about the fact that he had been held in solitary confinement for eight months in both the Edirne and Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centres. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention in this connection.


88.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that Oksana Belenko’s detention had been unlawful. The Court notes that the latest decision in connection with this complaint was taken on 20 May 2004, whereas the application was lodged on 20 May 2006, which is more than six months later. It follows that this complaint was introduced out of time and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


295.  The applicant further contested the Government’s allegation that he had been deprived of his liberty for disciplinary reasons. In reality he had been arrested as a suspect in a criminal case. This had been done unlawfully and in violation of the prescribed procedures, which led to his being deprived of legal assistance and other rights enjoyed by a suspect. His unlawful arrest had pursued the aim of extorting a confession and the disciplinary penalty had been used simply as a pretext to cover up the irregularities. He had never been taken to a disciplinary isolation cell, where disciplinary penalties were to be served, but instead was at the disposal of agents of the Prosecutor’s office investigating a criminal case. He had been kept at various law enforcement agencies and questioned as a suspect. The relevant Isolation Notice contained no notes concerning his admission and release from the disciplinary isolation cell. Consequently, the Government’s reference to Armenia’s reservation in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention was groundless.


108.  The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court reiterates that the decisive question in assessing the effectiveness of a remedy is whether the applicant could have raised that complaint in order to obtain direct and timely redress, and not merely an indirect protection of the rights guaranteed in Article <mask> of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Belousov v. Russia, no. 1748/02, §§ 67-69, 2 October 2008). Further, it is incumbent on the respondent Government claiming non-exhaustion to indicate to the Court with sufficient clarity the remedies to which the applicant did not have recourse and to satisfy the Court that the remedies were effective and available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that they were accessible, were capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Cennet Ayhan and Mehmet Salih Ayhan v. Turkey, no. 41964/98, § 65, 27 June 2006).


93.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the national courts by wrongly finding that their claim for damages had been lodged after the statutory limitation period had expired, had deprived them of the right of access to court because they had not examined their claim on the merits. They also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the taking of their respective husband and father by uniformed persons in August 1991.


187.  The applicant, who has been held in compulsory confinement in a social protection facility since January 2004, has submitted his complaints – concerning the fact that he did not receive psychological or psychiatric treatment in that facility as a result of a language problem – under both Article 3 and Article <mask> of the Convention. The Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, has found a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of adequate treatment for the applicant’s condition for the period between January 2004 and August 2017 (see paragraphs 135 and 159 above). With regard to Article 5, however, the Chamber held that there had been no violation, and found that the link between the reason for the compulsory confinement and the applicant’s mental illness had never been severed (see paragraph 170 above).


59.  The applicant inter alia claimed that the domestic legislation did not provide for judicial review or any other remedy for his complaint concerning the breach of his right to liberty as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. This complaint is to be separated from his claim that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty for the period he spent under police officers’ control and at the T.N.A.D. prior to his placement in police custody. The Convention specifically empowers our Court not only to review whether, in a particular case, the conditions of Article 5 § 1 were met, but also and independently whether the person deprived of his or her liberty was entitled to challenge the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty before a national court in conformity with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


11.  The Government submitted that all three applicants had lost their victim status as a result of the fact that the domestic courts had acknowledged a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention and had compensated them in the civil proceedings initiated by them against the state. Moreover, the first and the second applicants were part of a group of persons considered to be victims of the events of April 2009 and were awarded by two Government decisions MDL 10,000 and MDL 7000, respectively. Those amounts should also be considered as making part of the compensation for the breach of their Convention rights.


349.  The applicant further submitted that the planning of the military operations in the Çağlayan area in April and May 1994 was inadequate and that the recording of detentions during such operations was deficient. The Court considers that it is not necessary, given its conclusions above, to consider the former complaint and has considered the latter complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention below.


74.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that at the time of his arrest, there had been no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. Under Article 6 of the Convention he complained of the lack of access to the Supreme Court on account of the latter’s decision to reject his appeal on points of law as inadmissible. He further alleged that his personal search had been carried out in violation of Article 8 of the Convention.


20.  The applicant complained that that his detention with a view to deportation was irregular and unlimited in time. The Court will consider firstly whether there was effective judicial supervision over the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, as required by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, and secondly whether it was compatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention (see Kim v. Russia, no. 44260/13, § 38, 17 July 2014, with further references). The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention provide as follows:


204.  The Government submitted that, since the applicant’s detention had been ordered and extended in accordance with the domestic law, it had also been in compliance with the procedural requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the courts had taken a lawful and justified decision to close the detention hearing to the public at the initial stages of the proceedings; during the trial the detention hearings were held openly.


40.  The applicants contended that after their arrest they were not brought promptly before a judge. The applicants further complained that the Moskovsky District Court did not examine their request for release for several months and that the decision of that court to discontinue the review proceedings concerning their request was not based on law but on the Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraphs 18 and 34 above). The applicants referred to Articles 6 § 1 and 5 § 4 of the Convention. Relying on Article 5 § 5 they also complained that they had no enforceable right to compensation in respect of the alleged breaches of Article 5. The relevant provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention read as follows:


42.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the alleged unlawfulness of his detention pending the outcome of the trial and the domestic court’s use of a stereotyped reasoning for refusing his requests for release. Relying upon Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, he argued that although he should have been placed in a medical institution with a view to receiving treatment for his addiction, he had been obliged to serve his sentence in prison. Lastly, the applicant maintained under Article 8 of the Convention that his reputation had been damaged and that he had been humiliated as a result of his unlawful arrest and handcuffing by police officers.


52.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


50.  The applicant complained about the overall length of his pre-trial detention and the lack of adequate judicial review of its lawfulness. He also alleged that his detention after 28 May 2003 had been unlawful, not having been covered by any order in that regard. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


515.  The applicant complained that from 5 December 2002 to 22 September 2003 Poland had enabled the CIA to hold him on its territory in secret, unacknowledged detention, which had been imposed and implemented outside any legal procedures and designed to ensure the complete denial of any of the safeguards contained in Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, by enabling the CIA to transfer him from its territory to other secret CIA detention facilities elsewhere, it had exposed him to a real and serious of risk further undisclosed, incommunicado detention.


59.  The applicants complained under Article 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention that their detention on remand was unreasonably long, and that their requests for release pending trial received no serious consideration by the court. Moreover, they contended that they were prevented from working whilst on remand, as a result of which they incurred financial loss. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as relevant: