16.  The Government argued that the Court could apply in the instant case the same reasoning as in the cases of Korolev v. Russia ((dec.) no. 25551/05, 1 July 2010) and Holub v. Czech Republic ((dec.) no. 24880/05, 14 December 2010) and examine the disadvantage the applicant had suffered following the alleged breach of her procedural rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had never claimed that she had suffered any financial loss as a result of the way the second‑instance court had been composed, and no causal link could be identified between the two elements.


27.  The Government alleged that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been breached. They noted that the right to take part in proceedings was not absolute. Article <mask> of the Convention did not guarantee a right to appear in person before a civil court but rather a more general right to present one’s case effectively before the court and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side. States had a free choice of means to be used in guaranteeing those rights to parties in a case (see, among other authorities, Gryaznov v. Russia, no. 19673/03, § 45, 12 June 2012).


41.  The applicant maintained that his summary trial did not comply with the requirements of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. He denied that he was offered an opportunity to choose trial by court-martial. In any event, even assuming he had chosen a summary trial, he did not accept that he could be considered to have waived his Article 6 rights. He referred to the fundamental nature of the rights at issue (including independence and impartiality), he pointed out that he had not been legally advised and he stressed the unequal nature of the relationship between a soldier and his Commanding Officer. While he accepted that it was unlikely that he would have been tried by court-martial before 1 April 1997, he maintained that the post-1996 Act system also breached of Article <mask> of the Convention.


47.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied a fair hearing. In this connection, they claimed that the domestic courts had failed to take into account the evidence in their favour and had relied solely on the incident report. They further criticised the fact that they had been denied the opportunity to ask Captain Y. questions because he had been heard by a judge of another court pursuant to a letter rogatory.


37.  The Government further argued that the Constitutional Court’s task was to determine issues of constitutional law, rather than those of civil rights and obligations. On that ground, they requested the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione materiae with Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as it concerned the Constitutional Court’s alleged interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by that provision.


60.  The applicant complained that he had not been provided with an interpreter to enable him to understand the accusations against him. Furthermore, the appeal proceedings had lasted an excessively long time. Moreover, the presiding judge had not conducted the hearings in an impartial manner and that the trial court had not adequately examined his alibi. Finally, although the trial court had been unable to establish who had actually committed the murder, it had convicted both him and his co-accused and imposed the same sentence on both of them. In respect of these complaints the applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


20.  The applicant averred that the Neryungri Town Court's judgment of 16 March 2001 had not been executed since she had not accepted the sum transferred to her on 9 March 2006. She claimed that the reopening of the enforcement proceedings in 2006 had been illegal and considered that she had therefore had no right to accept the money. She stated, furthermore, that the amount had dropped significantly in value since 2001 and that no index-linking had been offered to her. Overall, she insisted that her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated.


10.  The applicant alleged that the length of the administrative proceedings exceeded the reasonable time requirement, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He further maintained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the default interest paid on the compensation awarded by the İstanbul Administrative Court was insufficient. The Government submitted that the case had been complex and that there had been no delay in the proceedings which could be attributed to the authorities. The Government further submitted that the amount of compensation paid to the applicant had sufficiently compensated him for the damage he had suffered.


30.  The Government asserted that requiring the defendant to express a positive intention to appear was not in breach of the Convention. In that connection they pointed out that, under Italian law, the participation of the defendant in the hearing was a right rather than an obligation. In the instant case, the applicant had received a notice informing him of the date of the hearing and of the existence of that right, and stating that it was for the defendant to request the prison authorities to arrange his transfer from the prison to the place of the hearing. True, the applicant alleged that the notice had not been translated into Arabic or French. However, Article <mask> of the Convention did not go so far as to require that all steps in the proceedings should be translated; if he had not fully understood the notice, the defendant could have asked to be assisted free of charge by an interpreter or asked a fellow detainee to translate it.


68.  The applicant companies further submitted that in its judgment no. 274 of 7 July 2006 the Constitutional Court had not examined the constitutional legitimacy of the law on the basis of Article <mask> of the Convention, namely the principle of a fair trial as also laid down in the Italian Constitution, and therefore it had not examined the constitutional legitimacy of the law in the light of the applicants’ arguments – the said analyses having become customary only after the 2009 judgment in Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) ([GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009). Indeed, in its judgment no. 274 the Constitutional Court had made statements which were contradictory to the principles derived from Article 6, and moreover had not categorically stated that the norm was one of genuine interpretation (see paragraph 54 above). Furthermore, the relevance of the applicant companies’ arguments had been evident also to the Attorney General to the Court of Cassation (Procuratore Generale della Repubblica presso la Corte di Cassazione) who had not considered the challenge under Article 6 as manifestly irrelevant or ill-founded and who had made statements such as “the claimants’ reasonable expectation to see their claim granted” and “[the provision] influenced the judge’s decision”.


42.  The Government admitted that, in certain circumstances, the Court had indicated that the re-examination of a case or the reopening of proceedings would constitute the most effective, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum. However, they stressed that the majority of cases in which the Court had acknowledged that a retrial or the reopening of a case would be an appropriate way of redressing the violation had concerned proceedings which gave rise to breaches of the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention and which had been decisive for the applicant concerned (the Government referred to Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, § 89, ECHR 2009, and Davydov v. Russia, no. 18967/07, § 27, 30 October 2014). The Government further stressed that unlike, for example, the awarding of just satisfaction, the reopening of proceedings was a measure to be used in exceptional cases, having regard to the rights of third parties and the principle of res judicata.


15.  The applicant complained that from November 2006 onwards the authorities had failed to honour the judgment of 27 October 1999 by applying a new method of index-linking in respect of the awarded amount, and from August 2009 had discontinued the payments. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the relevant parts of which read:


28.  The applicants complain that the administrative proceedings in their cases fell short of the guarantees of a fair hearing, including the principles of equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, independence and impartiality of the tribunal, and also that they had been prevented from calling and examining key witnesses. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


35.  The applicant made several complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. In particular, he complained that (1) the record of the hearing of 5 February 2002 had been falsified, (2) he could not question witnesses K. and B. because he had been removed from the court room on 22 March 2002, (3) the trial court had removed the public from a part of the hearing of 22 March 2002, (4) the appeal hearing of his criminal case had been held in his absence on 1 July 2002 and he could not plead his defence and confront the prosecutor. The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention provide:


26.  The Government submit in the first place that Article <mask> of the Convention does not confer the right to an appeal or an appeal in cassation. However, if such an appeal is provided for in domestic legislation, such proceedings should comply with the requirements of Article 6. In the present case, the applicant is claiming a right to lodge an appeal in cassation, which right he does not have under domestic law. In the Government’s opinion, the right of access to a court is not an issue in the present case since the applicant had access to a court at two instances. What he claims in essence is the right to submit his case – on his own terms – to a third court in order to seek a ruling on issues that have already been determined at two instances.


28.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of the proceedings before the administrative courts. He further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the considerable loss in the market value of his apartment, caused by the inactivity of the administration to demolish the illegal part of the neighboring building.


43.  The Government, firstly, noted that enforcement of the judgment of 21 November 2001 was still possible, as the Company had not yet been liquidated. They asked the Court to dismiss the complaint as premature under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Having extensively relied on the Court’s case-law, the Government further submitted that the judgment had been issued against a private company for whose debts the State could not be held liable. They stressed that the State’s responsibility did not go any further than to assist the applicants in the enforcement of the judgment, through bailiffs or by way of bankruptcy proceedings. The Government reiterated that this was not an obligation of result but of means, with the means of enforcement available to the present applicants having been adequate and effective. The State should only bear responsibility for very serious omissions committed by its officials which had negated the point of enforcing the judgment. The Government further stated that the Court should distinguish the present case from the case of Kunashko v. Russia (no. 36337/03, 17 December 2009), in which it found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the State’s failure to effectively assist the applicant in recovering a judgment debt against a private legal entity. Without providing any further details, the Government observed that, in contrast to the Kunashko case (cited above), in the case under examination the bailiffs had “under[taken] active measures aimed at the organisation of an appropriate procedure for the enforcement ... of the judgment of 21 November 2001”. At the same time, the Government noted that the Russian courts had already declared the bailiffs’ “inactivity and their failure to take every possible step” to enforce the judgment in the applicants’ favour unlawful. The Government’s final argument was that the enforcement of the judgment was at the material time in the hands of the Company’s liquidator, who was not affiliated to the State in any way.


72.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Migration Board and the Federal Administrative Court violated his right to a fair trial. The Court notes that this provision does not apply to asylum proceedings as they do not concern the determination of either civil rights or obligations or of any criminal charge (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 40, ECHR 2000-X). It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


32.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings in her case and that they were unfair. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention she complained that in March 2002 her advocate had refused to represent her before the Court of Appeal. She also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that her property rights had been violated since the domestic courts had found against her. Finally, she invoked Articles 14 and 17, on the same grounds.


49.  The applicant complained that the non-enforcement of the domestic judgment delivered in her favour on 21 September 1993, in which the authorities had been ordered to pay her salary arrears, had breached Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She also complained that she did not have an effective remedy in this respect. The relevant parts of the provisions read as follows:


22.  The applicant complained about non-enforcement of the judgments of the Commercial Court of the Primorskiy Region of 23 July 1998, 22 April 1999 and 20 January 2000, and the judgment of the Federal Commercial Court of the Far-Eastern Circuit of 18 October 2004. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


27.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he had been deprived of his right to the assistance of a lawyer during his police custody. Finally, he claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


27.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the judgments of 18 December 1997 and 12 February 1999 had been quashed by way of supervisory review on 13 December 2000. She asserted that she had not been informed about the supervisory review proceedings, or present at the subsequent hearings of 4 April 2001, after the remittal of the cases for new consideration. She submitted that she had known about the quashing only after the present case had been communicated to the Government. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (cited above).


19.  The Government claimed that the applicant had not exhausted relevant domestic remedies. First, he had never raised before the domestic courts allegations regarding the unfairness of the proceedings as presented in his subsequent application to the Court. In particular, the applicant had not questioned the alleged restrictions on his access to the case file and on taking notes from it. Nor had he complained that he could not present his arguments in accordance with the principles of adversarial hearing and equality of arms. The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was directly applicable under Polish law and the applicant could have relied on this provision before the domestic courts. However, in his appeals he had not put forward arguments related to the question of access to the case file.


244.  The applicant argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that, as a result of the absence of an impartial and effective investigation into the circumstances of her husband's death, she had been denied effective access to the courts to determine her civil right to compensation for his murder allegedly committed by agents of the State. Furthermore, the political context in the area controlled by the “TRNC” regime and the special circumstances of the applicant's case made it all more unlikely that she would receive independent and impartial justice.


16.  The Government maintained that the additional compensation had been fully paid on 4 November 2002 and 22 May 2007 whereas the applicant had omitted to mention the second payment in his complaints. In addition the applicant had not suffered any material loss as a result of the interest rates applied and the authorities’ delay in settling the relevant amount. Taking into account the Court’s above-mentioned Akkuş judgment, the State had fulfilled its obligation to respect the applicant’s right to the protection of his property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nor had there been any violation of Article <mask> of the Convention or of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


72.  The Government disagreed with these statements and submitted that the possibility to set aside an appeal prohibition, if the decision concerned a person’s civil rights or obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention, was firmly established in the case-law of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court at the relevant time. The Government further argued that the case-law cited by it, and its later codification, was adopted specifically for cases where an appeal prohibition might otherwise violate Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and also in order to ensure compliance with the Convention regardless of whether the Court’s interpretation of the term “civil rights and obligations” had evolved since the legislation at issue was adopted.


18.  The applicant complained about the unfairness of the lustration proceedings, the infringement of his right of defence and the lack of equality of arms. In particular, he alleged that the material in his case had been classified as confidential, which had limited his right of access to it. Before the institution of the proceedings he had had no access to the case file prepared by the Commissioner. After the lustration proceedings had been instituted by the Warsaw Court of Appeal the applicant could consult the documents only in the secret registry of the lustration court. The limitations on access were not applicable to the Commissioner of the Public Interest. Thus, the applicant was placed at a significant disadvantage vis‑à‑vis the Commissioner who had unlimited access to the file in his secret registry. The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads:


44.  The Government maintained that the impugned proceedings were both factually and legally complex, requiring a number of witnesses and expert witnesses to be heard. In particular, five expert opinions had been given during the period of the Court’s competence ratione temporis, all of them upon the applicant’s proposal. Secondly, the applicant himself had been mainly responsible for the length of the proceedings. In particular, he had amended and further particularised his claim on a number of occasions, two of which after the Convention had entered into force in respect of Montenegro; several hearings scheduled between 1983 and 2002 had been adjourned because of him; and the impugned proceedings had been stayed between 23 September 1985 and 6 January 1986 due to his absence (see paragraphs 9, and 16-17 above). Thirdly, Y and Z had passed away in the meantime (see paragraph 20 above), which required that their legal successors be identified, which added to the overall length of the proceedings. Lastly, the impugned proceedings were of no vital importance to the applicant and, as such, did not require priority or any urgent action on the part of the courts. The courts issued seven decisions in total, two of which were rendered at two instances after the ratification of the Convention. It could not therefore be said that they were not active. The Government concluded that there was no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


55.  The Government maintained that the facts in dispute had no bearing on the applicant's civil rights; they concerned criminal proceedings against him. As those proceedings had been stayed, there could be no question of any violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial. That being so, at this stage in the domestic proceedings the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply. In so far as the criminal proceedings in question would resume their course at the end of the applicant's term of office, and he had not yet been convicted of any offence, the Government contended that the facts complained of did not constitute a restriction of the applicant's rights under Article 6.


80.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right not to incriminate himself had been violated. He also complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) that he had been denied access to a lawyer during the first two days after his arrest and that his lawyers had not defended his rights properly. Lastly, he complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) that he had not had the possibility to get summoned and question all the important defence witnesses. The relevant provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention read as follows:


24.  The Government submitted that the right of access to a court was not absolute and the requirement to pay fees in connection with civil claims could not be regarded as incompatible per se with Article <mask> of the Convention. They further maintained that the fee required from the applicant in the present case had not been excessive and had taken into consideration his difficult financial situation of which the domestic authorities had been aware.


32.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the trial court had not been independent and impartial. They further complained about the failure of the domestic courts to suspend the pronouncement of their conviction and to provide reasoning for their decisions. The applicants also complained of a breach of Article 6 on account of the allegedly excessive length of the criminal proceedings against them and the alleged non-communication to them of the opinion of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation on the merits of the case.


31.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had assessed the evidence in an arbitrary manner and had failed to resolve contradictions in the testimonies. She also complained under Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention that she had been refused access to her criminal case file after the conviction had become final.


95.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she suffered an inequality of arms during the civil proceedings because the courts, without sufficient reasoning, dismissed her request that they order a forensic assessment of a piece of evidence; that the decision of the Senate of the Supreme Court to dismiss her application to reopen the civil proceedings was not subject to appeal; that she was deprived of access to a court because she sustained considerable financial losses as a result of the obligation to pay the defendant’s legal costs; and that the investigation of her complaint regarding the alleged falsification of her medical records was excessively lengthy. She further complained under Article 8 of the Convention of a violation of the protection of her personal data.


17.  The applicant complained under Articles 6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair trial on account of the fact that the written opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had never been served on him and of the decision to discontinue the proceedings, as he had thereby been deprived of a trial at which he could have been acquitted. The Court considers it appropriate to examine these complaints from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention alone.


13.  The Government contested the applicants' assertions. They argued that for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention the criminal proceedings commenced only when the applicants were charged on 5 and 12 February 2002. Thus, the Government considered that they had lasted for a little less than two years. Accordingly, they considered that the applicants' complaints should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.


58.  The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court had actually re-examined his case, despite not being empowered to do so under the extraordinary review procedure envisaged by Article 400 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He stressed repeatedly that the sufficiency of the evidence could not be assessed independently and required a full re-assessment of the new body of evidence from the standpoint of its relevance, admissibility, credibility and sufficiency. He claimed that in its assessment of the evidence within the extraordinary procedure the Supreme Court had gone beyond its jurisdiction defined by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore could not be considered a “tribunal established by law” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


52.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair. He submitted that the courts did not properly assess the evidence before them and that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not correct the wrong decisions by the First Instance Court. He also submitted that all judges, in particular Judge S., had been biased against him. This was evident from this judge’s initiative to have guardianship proceedings instituted against him. Moreover Judge S. should have instructed him, especially at the beginning of the proceedings, how to conduct them effectively. Further, at the time of the hearing on 7 July 1999, he had been in detention on remand and could not effectively prepare for that hearing. Lastly the applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that, while in detention on remand, he had been escorted to the court hearing on 7 July 1999 in handcuffs, which constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.


71.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention of various irregularities in the proceedings concerning his requests to have criminal proceedings instituted against the witness who had given allegedly false oral evidence incriminating him. He also alleged that in its letter of 18 January 2008 the Shchelkovo Town Court had denied him access to a court. The applicant also relied on Article 13, alleging a lack of effective remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


47.  The Government first argued that the Supreme Administrative Court satisfied all the requirements of a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They asserted that in the case under consideration the scope of judicial review, limited under the applicable domestic legislation to ensuring that the administrative authority had not acted illegally, unreasonably and unfairly, was sufficient for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. The Supreme Administrative Court was competent to examine whether there had been a breach of substantive law in the proceedings giving rise to the contested decisions and was required, in doing so, to review the merits of the applicant’s case as well.


49.  The Government agreed that the offence of which the applicant was accused qualified as “criminal” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they disputed the applicant's contention that she had not been summonsed to attend the hearing of her appeal and sent the Court a letter dated 21 May 2005 from the President of the Străşeni District Court to the Government Agent, in which it was stated that the applicant had been summonsed to attend the hearing of 16 January 2002 by means of a registered letter which, unfortunately, had been destroyed by the court after two years.


87.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which tried him. He further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention that he had been deprived of his right to legal assistance while in custody and that the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court was based on his statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment. The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention provide as follows:


34.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had wrongly applied substantive law. She finally complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic courts had refused to index-link the amount of compensation for the delayed payment of her salary. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as those complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


66.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that the domestic courts had violated his right not to incriminate himself and had had regard to his confession given under duress, that the trial court had not provided him with an opportunity to confront a number of witnesses, that the counsel representing him during the investigation stage had been assigned to him against his will; that he had not had sufficient time to study the criminal case file; and that the trial court had been partial. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


89.  The applicant considered that the proceedings in which the Criminal Court had been asked to convert the fine into a term of imprisonment fell within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. He alleged furthermore that a violation of the latter provision taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, “necessarily [arose] as a consequence of the complaint raised under Articles 14 and 4 § 3 (d)”. In that respect, the applicant submitted that there was a strong link between jury service and the proceedings that had been brought against him. The compilation of the lists of jurors, the summons served on the applicant, the fine imposed on him and the proceedings for its conversion were events that were mutually dependent and entirely interrelated.


32.  The Government, relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII), argued that the applicants’ complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention were incompatible ratione materiae because the applicants were former police officers and the awards made by the courts had concerned social payments related to their service in the police force.


38.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention of the length of their detention in police custody. Under Article <mask> of the Convention they further maintained that the first-instance court had been unduly influenced by prejudicial reports prepared by the police and that the indictment contained statements establishing their criminal guilt in breach of the right to be presumed innocent. In that connection, the applicants further complained that, subsequent to their arrest, the police had organised a press conference where they were presented to journalists as criminals. In addition, the applicants complained of the refusal of the domestic court to hear evidence from their witnesses or to allow an on-site inspection. They criticised the manner in which the procedure for rectification of judgments was set out under domestic law. Finally, they alleged that they had been convicted on the basis of statements given under torture and duress.


15.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing as the domestic judicial authorities had not assessed the facts of his case thoroughly and they had only taken into account the arguments of the administrative authorities. The applicant further contended that his purportedly unfair dismissal had amounted to a “heavier penalty” within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention. Lastly, he alleged under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that his rights to respect for private and family life and to freedom of expression had been violated on account of his unfair dismissal.


31.  The applicant maintained that his acquittal should not prevent the application from being examined. The acquittal had no bearing on the fact that the Italian procedure in such matters, as applied in the initial set of proceedings in his case, was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the damage he had sustained on that account had been irreversible. In that connection, he observed that the compensation to which he was entitled under Italian law did not cover the damage resulting from the violation of Article 6 of the Convention. However, after reserving the right to submit further particulars and specific claims for just satisfaction in the event of the Court's finding a violation, the applicant did not quantify his claims under Article 41 of the Convention and left the matter to the Court's discretion.


64.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings before the national courts had been unfair. She claimed, in particular, that, whereas the Moscow Housing Department had explicitly acknowledged that she had bought the flat in good faith (see paragraph 28 above), the domestic court had reached a conclusion to the contrary. Furthermore, the court had relied on an “informational ban” in respect of the flat, whereas such legal notion did not exist in the domestic law. Lastly, the District Court had not followed the instructions given by the Moscow City Court on 14 June 2011. In so far as relevant, Article 6 reads as follows:


34.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that they had been unlawfully deprived of their property and had not received adequate compensation for the violation of this provision upheld by the Constitutional Court. They alleged a violation of their right under Article <mask> of the Convention arguing that they did not have access to a court to challenge the measure depriving them of, or interfering with, their property.


40.  The Government maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the proceedings concerning the applicant’s exceptional appeal. They argued that the Supreme Court’s decision of 14 March 2008, rejecting her first appeal, had been an interim one and had not determined her civil rights or obligations. It was the Supreme Court’s later decision of 5 June 2008 rejecting her second appeal that had “defined” her civil rights and obligations. However, as the applicant did not complain that the June 2008 proceedings were flawed, Article 6 was not applicable.


29.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the principal of the school classified him in the wrong pay grade. He also complained that by upholding the principal’s decision the domestic courts were biased and the proceedings unfair. He further complained that as a consequence his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 have been breached since his pension will be lower.


32.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that no oral hearing was held before a “tribunal” and that the Administrative Court had wrongly applied its own case-law. The applicant further complained under Articles 13 and 14 that neither the Constitutional Court nor the Administrative Court had effectively dealt with his complaints, which was common for complaints filed by social welfare recipients. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the refusal to grant him rent allowance.


18.  The applicant company submitted that the quashing of the judgment of 19 June 2002 had violated its right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Interpretation Act had not been able to have retroactive effect and the use of it by the Supreme Court of Justice for the purpose of review of the final judgment of 19 June 2002 had been contrary to section 45 of the Legislation Act. The review procedure had in fact been an appeal in disguise.


23.  The applicants complained under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention that their conviction following the publication of a newspaper article had not been fair and had amounted to unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that this complaint does not raise a separate issue under Article <mask> of the Convention and falls to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


108.  The applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, which he argued to have suffered because his conviction in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention had resulted in the loss of his apartment due to the fact that he had not been able to pay the bank loan, and because he also had had to pay maintenance for his children. The applicant also claimed EUR 700,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage because he had to live without his spectacles and because of his wrongful trial and the fact that his conviction had caused him great despair and had ruined his life.


21.  The Government submitted firstly that this complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant association had failed to demonstrate the “economic nature” of the dispute which it had brought before the Conseil d’Etat, with the result that the dispute could not be classified as “civil” for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant association had not alleged that it had suffered any economic damage in support of its application for judicial review. Its interest in bringing an action before the Conseil d’Etat had been justified only on the basis of defending its stated aim. The applicant association did not describe itself as an association of local people defending the rights and interests of its members. Having regard to its stated aim, it was in fact an environmental-protection association whose task, in a specific geographical context, was to defend the “general” interest against any threat that could harm the environment.


31.  The applicants complained that different conclusions reached by different courts were not compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They also argued that the inability of the children to see each other, and that ordering the first applicant to pay maintenance to his ex-wife in respect of his daughter because he was a male, was discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention and infringed their rights under Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.


47.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention concerned the execution of the judgment delivered by the Court in the case of Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 1) (nos. 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, ECHR 2001‑VIII). They submitted, with reference to the case-law of the Court, that the Court’s finding of a violation was essentially declaratory. With particular reference to the decision in Leyla Zana and Others v. Turkey ([dec.]), no 2932/04, 29 September 2008), they added that even if Article <mask> of the Convention were applicable to the instant case, the reopening of the proceedings should be considered as part of an ongoing judicial process under domestic law originating in a lack of fairness in the proceedings which had led to the applicants’ initial conviction.


122.  The applicant submitted that his inability to question some of the witnesses was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the applicant, the evidence given by witnesses R. and B. was clearly inadmissible as it was unclear which authority, when and on what grounds had ordered to interrogate these witnesses. Furthermore, their oral evidence was neither properly legalised nor translated by competent translators. As regards P., A. and M., according to the applicant, at the pre-trial stage of proceedings these witnesses gave evidence against him, whilst at the trial they retracted their previous statements and witnessed in his favour. The applicant submitted that, in breach of Article 6, the court had preferred the former evidence and had failed to take account of the latter. Finally, the applicant submitted that the court ought to have rejected that evidence as inadmissible.


27.  The applicant also claimed that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the fact that under Moldovan law it was impossible for him to adduce evidence in support of his claim to have his ethnic origin changed from Moldovan to Romanian. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:


73.  The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the voice identification was ordered and carried out in breach of the relevant procedural rules. They also complained that the trial court refused to hear a further witness and to examine further material evidence. The applicants maintained that the proceedings before the Supreme Court to examine their appeals in cassation against their convictions had not respected the principle of equality of arms. The second applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody.


28.  The Government, relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999-VIII), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was inadmissible ratione materiae. The applicant had been a military officer and the dispute concerned an allowance paid to him in connection with the obligations he performed in the sphere of State defence. The disputes raised by servants of the State such as military officers over their conditions of service could not be regarded as “civil” and were excluded from the ambit of Article 6.


45.  The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and submitted that in the circumstances of the case she had been deprived of access to court. There had been over the years successive changes in the case-law of the civil and administrative courts as to which authorities, judicial or administrative, were competent to examine restitution cases. Ultimately, in 2010, the Constitutional Court had held that such cases should be decided by civil courts. Prior to that judgment her civil case had already been determined by the civil court on the basis that a civil court lacked jurisdiction until a substantive administrative decision on the merits of her restitution claim had been given. After the judgment of the Constitutional Court the administrative authorities discontinued the proceedings, thereby closing for her the possibility of access to the administrative court. Nor could she bring her case before a civil court, because the case had become res iudicata.


103.  The Government claimed that the court of appeal had had to comply with the requirements of Article 376 of the CCrP before starting the examination of the case. They appear to have been referring to the duty of the court to give the parties two weeks’ advance notice of the upcoming appeal hearing. However, the fact that the courts had to comply with some domestic formalities does not absolve the State from its obligations under the Convention. Furthermore, the Court observes that the domestic law applied the same two-week notice period to the appeal proceedings on the merits and the appeal proceedings concerning detention. The Court reiterates that detention proceedings should be conducted speedily, sometimes at the expense of certain other procedural guarantees (see the Court’s finding in Jablonski, cited above, § 93, where it held that there was special need for a swift decision determining the lawfulness of detention in cases where a trial is pending). This is why detention proceedings should only comply with the most basic, “minimal” guarantees of fairness (if compared with the more rigorous standard of fairness established under Article <mask> of the Convention – see Lebedev, cited above, § 76). The Court does not need to take a stand as to whether the two-week notice period for the preparation of an appeal in detention proceedings is sufficient or excessive per se. The Court simply finds that in the circumstances of the case, which was, by all appearances, quite simple, the application of this rule unnecessarily protracted the detention proceedings. The Court does not see why that period could not have been shorter. Lastly, the delays involved in the examination of the appeal in the present case were longer than two weeks, and the Government has not provided any explanation for the remaining time. The Court concludes that the appeals against the detention orders of 2, 9 and 21 July were not examined speedily. There has therefore been a breach of Article 5 § 4 on that account.


38.  The Government stated that the proceedings in the applicant’s case were administrative and that the domestic law made a clear distinction between a criminal and an administrative offence. They submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case, as the proceedings against the applicant did not relate to the determination of a “criminal charge” against her.


49.  The Government argued that the recent case-law of the Court suggested that the severity of a penalty was the decisive element in determining whether related proceedings fell under the criminal limb of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant, who was running a business, had not incurred any particular disadvantage from having to pay a fine of RUB 20,000. Furthermore, the proceedings had not concerned any “civil right” or “civil obligation” relating to the applicant.


32.  The Government built their argument along two lines. They firstly submitted that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had petitioned the appeal court for their personal attendance at the appeal hearing. Relying on Article 376 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the Government stressed that in the absence of such a request the Supreme Court had correctly held the appeal hearing in the applicant’s and his counsel’s absence. The Government reminded the Court that Article <mask> of the Convention did not imperatively require the personal attendance of a defendant at appeal hearings. They further argued that the Russian courts could not be held responsible for counsel’s failure to attend. The applicant’s counsel had been retained by him and it was in the applicant’s best interests to ensure that his lawyer took his responsibilities seriously.


21.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that State-appointed counsel, P., who had represented him before the trial and appeal courts, had failed to carry out her duties properly. In particular, she had not appealed against the verdict of 1 March 2005 and had not attended the appeal hearing of 25 April 2005. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


76.  The Government noted that there had been no causal link between the pecuniary damage accrued and the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. No compensation for pecuniary damage should be awarded under this heading. In the event of a violation being found under Article 10, the Government pointed out that the applicant had not provided any proof of the pecuniary damage claimed nor any receipt or other clarification of the payment of the amounts claimed. Should the Court find that an award is to be granted under this heading, it should not exceed EUR 33,390.84, that is, the total amount of legal expenses ordered by the domestic courts to be paid by the applicant as legal expenses of the opposing party. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that a part of the applicant's claims should be rejected as unfounded as they related to non-communicated complaints. In any event, the applicant's claims were excessive as to quantum and any award should not exceed EUR 5,000.


23.  The applicant also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, together with Article 13 of the Convention, on account of the forced redemption of her 1982 USSR bonds in 1992. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these facts do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


32.  The Government, however, maintained that a judge’s status and right to stay in office were unique and could not possibly be equated with “ordinary labour disputes”, as pointed out by the Court in the above-mentioned judgment (cited above, § 62). Moreover, it could be argued that the right of access to a court under Article 21 of the Constitution could have a wider scope than that of Article <mask> of the Convention, as had been found by the Supreme Administrative Court in its recent judgment in case KHO:2008:25. Accordingly, Article 6 might not have automatically applied to all situations covered by Article 21 of the Constitution.


60.  The Government argued that, in so far as the applicant could be said to be wishing to challenge the enforcement proceedings under Article <mask> of the Convention, his complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the requirements of the Convention and its Protocols. Moreover, as regards all of these remaining complaints, they raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies: a properly formulated constitutional complaint.


77.  The applicant alleged that not a single witness called on behalf of the defence was heard in the proceedings before the National Judicial Council. The Court reiterates that while Article <mask> of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, §§ 45-46, Series A no. 140, and Garcia Ruiz v. Spain [GC] no. 30544/96, ECHR 1999-I, § 28). Similarly, it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and the Court will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. This principle applies, inter alia, to the application of procedural rules concerning the nomination of witnesses by parties (see Tamminen v. Finland, no. 40847/98, § 38, 15 June 2004). In this connection, the Court further reiterates that it is not within its province to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the national courts. However, under the Court’s case-law, the requirements of fairness of the proceedings include the way in which the evidence is taken and submitted. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence was taken and submitted, were fair within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see, inter alia, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, §  31, Series A no. 274).


31.  The applicants complained that they had been tried and convicted by the Ankara State Security Court which was not an independent and impartial court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because of the presence of a military judge on the bench. They further complained that they had been deprived of their right to legal assistance while in the custody of the police. Finally, the applicants complained that the Ankara State Security Court had not taken into account their ages and had not, therefore, applied the procedures pertaining to the trial of juveniles. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


39.  The Government contended that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as they did not complain about the alleged unreasonable length of the proceedings before the national courts. The applicants’ argument before the domestic courts had been that the Crown Court had lost its jurisdiction to impose confiscation orders by failing to comply with the statutory requirements of the CJA 1988, and not that there had been a breach of the reasonable time requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention.


99.  The applicant contended that he had not had a fair trial in the proceedings before the supervisory-review court. The applicant stated that he had been deprived of an opportunity to appear in person and to submit arguments. In view of the above and having regard to the fact that the prosecution had participated in the hearing, the applicant considered that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been convicted on the basis of statements extracted from her under duress and alleged that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the State Security Court which tried her. The applicant also complained about the assessment of evidence by the domestic courts and the lack of a hearing before the Court of Cassation.


134.  The applicant also claimed that she had been denied a fair trial in that the expert appointed by the Court of Appeal had proved to be incompetent and in that the Court of Appeal had wrongly assessed his opinion. With respect to this, the Court reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article <mask> of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see, amongst others, Schenk v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, §§ 45-46, and García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I).


33.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the respondent State, by expropriating the plot for the company’s benefit, deprived them of the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Dolenec v. Croatia, no. 25282/06, § 127, 26 November 2009), considers that this complaint should be analysed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:


25.  The applicant argued that, in the absence of express exclusion of access to a court for legal disputes of civil servants, the issue was not excluded from the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, she submitted that a labour dispute related to the dismissal of a civil servant inevitably carried pecuniary consequences that obviously fell into the category of “civil rights and obligations”.


62.  The applicant contended that Article <mask> of the Convention had been engaged as from 15 January 2010 when the PRC had first met. At that point he had de jure become a suspect in an investigation which could result in a proposal from the PRC to Parliament to indict him. Alternatively, he maintained that Article 6 had become applicable on 18 May 2010 when the PRC had requested his written comments on the report of the SIC or on 28 September 2010 when Parliament had decided to commence proceedings against him. In any event, the applicant submitted that the proceedings should be viewed as a whole when assessing their fairness.


34.  The Government argued that for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention the criminal proceedings commenced only on 25 February 2003 when the applicant was charged for the first time and that the signing of the declaration for the applicant’s income and possessions was not sufficient to consider that criminal proceedings had been opened against him. Thus, they contended that the proceedings had lasted for about two years and were therefore not excessive. Accordingly, they considered that the applicant’s complaints should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.


110.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been deprived of the right to a fair trial in the criminal and civil proceedings, stating that the domestic courts had erred in their assessment of the evidence and had refused to examine further evidence in his favour. He also complained that the courts, as well as the public prosecutor, were biased. In his observations of 19 July 2007, the applicant also complained that the courts in the criminal proceedings did not respect the presumption of innocence and failed to exclude at the pre-trial stage the statements given to the police.


98.  The Government further stated, with reference to Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by a Decision of the Constitutional Court of 14 February 2000, that the summoning of parties to a supervisoryreview hearing remained at the discretion of the relevant court, provided the review procedure was not triggered by an application that would be to the applicant's detriment. The Government noted that the application for supervisory review, like the prosecutor's pleadings at the hearing, was not to the applicant's detriment. Given that the supervisoryreview procedure had benefited the applicant by entailing a shorter term of imprisonment as a result of a new legal classification of his acts, the Government were of the view that the Supreme Court's failure to secure the attendance of the applicant and his counsel had not breached Article <mask> of the Convention.


60.  The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention referring to various aspects of his trial. He referred to his confinement in glass cabins during the court hearing, the intensive schedule of hearings, and alleged that he had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. He further submitted that he had not been able effectively to defend himself owing to a lack of possibilities to consult his legal counsel in confidence during the trial. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


26.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings at issue and the discontinuation of criminal proceedings instituted against the defendant doctor. Relying on Articles 13, 14, 17 and 18 of the Convention she also complained that the Regional Court had not considered facts submitted by her and had forwarded false data to the court appointed expert.


80.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 14 taken either in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. She maintained that the reasoning underlying section 53(3)(a) of the General Social Security Act, namely that claims against employers enjoying extraterritorial status could not be enforced, was no longer justified under public international law. The ensuing distinction between employees of extraterritorial employers and other employees was therefore not justified.


32.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about a number of procedural irregularities. In particular, he complained about the failure to conduct an expert medical examination on him during the preliminary investigation so as to determine whether he could have committed the offence, taking into account his injury. Relying on Article 6 § 3 (b), he alleged that he had not been provided with the opportunity to study the case file. Invoking Article 6 § 3 (c), he complained that he had been de facto refused legal assistance because the investigator had sent his request to the law firm of his choosing too late, which rendered the presence of his lawyer impossible. Relying on Article 6 § 3 (d), the applicant also complained about the court's failure to examine the key witness Ms Y. at the hearing.


45.  The applicants complained under Articles 9, 11 and 14 of the Convention about the refusal of the domestic courts to recognise the applicant association as a religious entity in both the recognition and registration proceedings. They also alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as no oral hearing had been held in either set of proceedings. Articles 6, 9, 11 and 14, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


35.  The Government submitted that the refusal to take evidence in the proceedings was in compliance with both the relevant requirements laid down by Polish law and with the requirements of a fair hearing within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Government's submission, and as regards the evidence of witnesses, the courts refused to call the witnesses proposed by the applicant on the ground that their testimony would not have been relevant for the determination of the case. The courts considered that in the absence of any documentary evidence these witnesses would not have been able to contribute reliably to establishing whether S.N. had been an informant of the secret police. They would only have been able to testify as to whether S.N.'s name had indeed been originally included in the list and later deleted. Under Polish law pertaining to the taking and assessment of evidence, the courts were clearly been empowered to take such a decision.


59.  The Government observed that the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in cases where a defendant's failure to appear at the trial had been governed by the former Code of Criminal Procedure (they cited Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89; T. v. Italy, 12 October 1992, Series A no. 245-C; and F.C.B. v. Italy, 28 August 1991, Series A no. 208-B). The new procedural rules introduced subsequently and the special circumstances of Mr Sejdovic's case, they argued, set it apart from those cases, in which there had been cause to doubt that the applicants had deliberately sought to evade justice, or that they had had the opportunity of taking part in the trial, or grounds to believe that the authorities had been negligent in ascertaining the accused's whereabouts.


85.  The Government contested the allegation that the proceedings in this administrative case had been conducted in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant had been given a fair opportunity to state his case, to obtain the attendance of thirteen witnesses on his behalf, to cross-examine the police officers whose statements formed the basis of the charges and to present other evidence. The applicant was given an opportunity to lodge written requests and he availed himself of that right. They also pointed out that the hearing had been open to the public and that the hearing room had been full to its capacity of about twenty to twenty-five people.


87.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against them had been unfair. They referred to the absence of legal counsel during their initial interrogations; the trial court's reliance on the second applicant's confession allegedly made under duress at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and without legal advice, in connection with the murder charges. The applicants also referred to the impossibility of obtaining the attendance and examination of witness S. in relation to the arson-related charges.


22.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings at issue were unfair in that he had not been summoned to the hearing before the District Administrative Authority and could, therefore, not sufficiently prepare his case. Furthermore the Administrative Authority did not record all his comments in a transcript. He also complained that all three instances failed to deal with the merits of his submissions. Under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 the applicant complained that the granting of the permit to the municipality affected the drainage system on his real estates.


42.  The Government submitted that the proceedings at issue did not determine any criminal charge against the applicant within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The proceedings were conducted in accordance with the chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing issues relating to the execution of sentences. No new charge was brought against the applicant and the proceedings did not affect the substance of the charge that had been previously determined by the Kochubeyevskiy People's Court. The Knyazhpogostskiy District Court founded its ruling on the factual circumstances that had been established by the Kochubeyevskiy People's Court and did not question the legal characterisation attributed to those facts. The sole purpose of the proceedings was to bring the applicant's sentence into conformity with the new Criminal Code.


42.  The applicant argued that his right to fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated on account of his inability to examine the prosecution witness, Ms K., and the use of her pre-trial testimony for his conviction. In his opinion, her testimony should not have been read out and used in view of her troubled mental state. The District Court had adjourned the hearings multiple times due to the failure of the witness to appear and had issued a subpoena. However, the authorities had had no valid reasons for reading out her statements, since nothing in her medical records had indicated that she had been unable to attend the hearings or that the trial could not have been postponed until her discharge from the clinic. The applicant also stressed that similar medical treatment had not prevented Ms K. from being questioned by the police during the pre-trial investigation. He further pointed out that his conviction was based exclusively on her statements as the only direct evidence, except for the conflicting statements of the two co-accused.


5.  The applicant complains, inter alia, about a violation of Article 6. Paragraph 58 of the judgment suggests that the main reason for finding a violation is a lack of clear rules concerning the enforcement of final judgments delivered by the administrative courts. I note in this respect that the enforcement of judgments is more of an issue under Article 6 (provided that this provision is applicable in a particular case) than under Article 10. There is no doubt that final domestic judgments remained unenforced in the present case and that such a situation is unacceptable in a democratic State ruled by law. In my view, however, the subjective right to information recognised in Bulgarian law is a public right. It is not a “civil right” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


33.  The Government considered that there had been no violation of the applicant company’s rights. Article <mask> of the Convention left a wide margin of appreciation to States in organising their judicial systems. Article 6 did not guarantee an absolute right of access to court and it could legitimately be restricted, including by requiring the payment of court fees as a condition for examining court actions. Moreover, the domestic courts had fulfilled their positive obligations by giving the applicant company, on two occasions, additional time to pay the court fees. Finally, the applicant company did not show the domestic courts any document to confirm that it was going to pay those fees. In such circumstances, the courts had to take a decision in order to prevent a violation of the applicant company’s right to an examination of its case within a reasonable time.


115.  The applicant’s case was examined in an expedited procedure under the CAO: in cases concerning an administrative charge for an offence punishable by administrative detention, the police were to transmit the administrative offence file to a court immediately after having compiled it, and the court was to examine the case on the same day or within forty-eight hours of the defendant’s arrest (see paragraphs 57 and 58 above). The Court reiterates, however, that recourse to that procedure when a “criminal charge” must be determined is not in itself contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention as long as the procedure provides the necessary safeguards and guarantees (see Borisova v. Bulgaria, no. 56891/00, § 40, 21 December 2006).


12.  The Government, relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant was a military officer and the judgment award had concerned allowances for her military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of that Convention provision as she had had no right to receive “payments in the amount claimed”. She had neither an “existing possession” nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 25 July 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law.


17.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the act of quashing of the final judgments of 24 August and 17 October 2000 had violated her “right to a court”. She also complained that she had not been able to effectively participate at the supervisory-review hearing. The relevant part of Article <mask> of the Convention read as follows:


49.  The Government considered that the bench of the Court of Appeal that declared inadmissible the applicant company’s request for a retrial had been an impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They underlined that there were no elements to call into question the personal impartiality of the judges composing the bench of the Court of Appeal. As to the objective test, the Government emphasised that it would have been contrary to the interests of a fair and speedy administration of justice if the judges had had to withdraw simply because a request for a retrial, which was not prima facie admissible, had been made.


44.  The Government also submitted that the civil aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in respect of the relevant domestic proceedings under the CAO. The criminal limb of Article 6 was also inapplicable, since Russian law made no provision for free legal assistance in CAO proceedings. However, the applicant could retain counsel for such proceedings, which were in any event quite simple. The applicant had been made aware of her procedural rights and had made use of them during the proceedings, in particular by way of lodging submissions. Provision of free legal assistance was not made necessary by the circumstances of the case, in view of the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, and the simplicity of the procedure, which could be fully understood by a lay person. In fact, the contents of the applicant’s submission to the domestic courts disclosed that she was well versed in domestic law.


43.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had not ensured his attendance at the hearings in the proceedings against the Bayil Prison authorities concerning his complaint of lack of adequate medical assistance. He maintained that his presence would have been particularly important having regard to the fact that the domestic courts had ignored the written statements of former inmates. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


103.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) and (d) that the criminal proceedings initiated against him on 18 July 2005 for forgery of documents had been unfair. The Court observes that a person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention which, according to him, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he was acquitted or which were discontinued (see Osmanov and Husseinov v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 54178/00 and 59901/00, 4 September 2003). The Court notes that the proceedings against the applicant were discontinued on 17 May 2006 because the relevant limitation period had expired. The Court considers that in these circumstances the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a fair trial. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


18.  The Government further pleaded that the quashing of the judgment in the applicants’ criminal case for reasons of the differences between the two copies of the judgment would not be justified. It would involve summoning witnesses, victims and other participants to the proceedings for the fresh examination of the case and probably the applicants’ detention pending retrial. It would entail a violation of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article <mask> of the Convention. What is more, given the insignificance of the differences between the two copies of the judgments, the retrial would lead to the same outcome.


39.  The applicants complained that they had not had a fair trial on account of the absence of a lawyer during their time in police custody and the use by the trial court of their statements and other evidence taken in the absence of a lawyer to convict them. They also complained that the criminal proceedings against them had not been concluded within a reasonable time. Lastly, the first applicant alleged that he had not been able to question an important witness, namely A.A., before the trial court. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


110.  The applicant organisation alleged that there had been a number of separate violations of Article <mask> of the Convention in the 1998-2000 proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court. It also considered that the events complained of disclosed discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention since the authorities had favoured one of the rival leaderships of the Muslim community.


22.  The Government acknowledged that there was a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment in favour of Mr Timofeyev. As regards the situation of Mrs Kiryushkina, they accepted their liability only for the period of non-enforcement lasting until 10 March 2005, the date on which Mrs Kiryushkina had refused the first offer of a two-room flat.


36.  The applicant complained that there had been a breach of his right to a fair hearing under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the domestic authorities’ failure to duly notify him of the date and place of the appeal hearing in the civil proceedings relating to the conditions of his detention. He also complained under Article 6 that the proceedings concerning his ownership of the flat had been unfair on account of his alleged inability to collect evidence in support of his claim and the judge’s refusal to assist him in collecting that evidence. Article 6 § 1 reads in the relevant part as follows:


55.  The applicant company said that the reduction in value of its shareholding had been an ongoing process. Although the first two stages in that process had taken place before 11 September 1997, the third had not begun until 18 November 1997. From that date onwards, its shareholding had fallen in total from 49% to 20.7%, such that it had lost control over Sovtransavto-Lugansk's activity. The case therefore concerned a “continuing situation” that had culminated in the Ukrainian company's liquidation in June 1999. The applicant company also contended that as regards the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention the entire proceedings had been reopened after the Supreme Arbitration Tribunal's ruling of 6 March 1998, that is to say after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Ukraine.


73.  The Government, however, maintained that the applicant had had access to a court affording him a fair hearing that satisfied the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention and in which his right to be presumed innocent in accordance with paragraph 2 of that Article was respected. They claimed that even in the proceedings before the Tax Authority the applicant had benefited from many of the legal safeguards afforded by Article 6. Furthermore, the applicant had had recourse to the administrative courts which had jurisdiction to examine all aspects – both facts and law – of the matter before them. Throughout the tax assessment proceedings, it was for the Tax Authority to prove that incorrect information had been furnished and that, consequently, there were grounds for imposing tax surcharges. In so far as the immediate enforcement of the tax debt as determined by the Tax Authority could be considered to have limited the applicant's access to a court, the Government contended that that limitation had been proportionate. Enforcement served to protect the financial interests of the State and the community as a whole. Given the considerable length of time allowed for lodging an appeal against a tax decision – normally five years after the assessment year – a system giving an absolute right to a stay of execution without security having been provided would probably lead to a vast increase in the number of appeals with a view to postponing or even avoiding the payment of taxes. The Government argued, moreover, that the applicant had had a preliminary examination by the courts of the Tax Authority's decisions concerning taxes and tax surcharges in the stay-of-execution proceedings; in both those proceedings and the bankruptcy proceedings, the courts had to conduct a summary review of the merits of the applicant's tax case. They also pointed out that the applicant had been declared bankrupt on account of a tax debt of which the surcharges formed only a minor part. As he had virtually no assets, he would have been declared bankrupt even if no surcharges had been imposed. Furthermore, in the event of a successful appeal against the Tax Authority's decisions, the applicant's position could be restored by having the bankruptcy decision quashed and by bringing a claim for compensation from the State for any financial loss incurred on account of that decision.


31.  The Government submitted that the judgment of 1 June 2001 had been enforced by 23 March 2003 and that the judgment of 27 April 2002 had been enforced on 13 May 2003. They admitted that the delayed enforcement of the judgments constituted a violation of the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Government, however, claimed that the judgments had been enforced within a “reasonable time”.


18.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to a fair hearing was breached since he was tried and convicted by a State Security Court. He further submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter‑arguments. He submitted under Article 10 that his conviction and sentence for disseminating separatist propaganda by publishing a book amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Finally, the applicant alleged under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the confiscation of copies of the book at issue infringed his property rights.


68.  The Government objected that the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply ratione materiae to the proceedings commenced by the mother’s petition of 31 August 2010 for an order governing the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities in respect of the child (see paragraphs 8 to 10 above) and to those concerning her petition for reopening of the Hague Convention proceedings (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above).


15.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since he had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, he invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


85.  The Government invited the Court to conclude that the application did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular having in mind the time elapsed after the entry of the Convention into force in respect of Croatia. They submitted that the cases disclosed factual complexity as many of them involved a significant number of plaintiffs.


50.  The Government lastly submitted that although in the past the Court had not excluded that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article <mask> of the Convention by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive had suffered or risked suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country, the facts of the present case did not disclose such a risk. In particular, there were no grounds to question the reasonableness and lawfulness of the decision of the Supreme Court of Belarus of 18 May 2002 and the applicant’s statements about the risk of an unfair trial were explained by his unwillingness to stand trial. The Government further referred to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Belarus on the presumption of innocence and indicated that this provision was a sufficient guarantee against an unfair trial in the applicant’s criminal case.


44.  The Government accepted that Article 6 § 1 is applicable to the proceedings where the applicant had sought the return of his passport. In this respect they agreed that the applicant's claim concerned a determination of his civil rights since it had been directed at a return of the applicant's property, i.e. his passport. However, they contested the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the part of the proceedings which had occurred after the applicant had changed his claim and had sought only a declaration that his passport had been taken from him by the Croatian authorities on 6 February 1999 and returned on 4 April 2001. They relied on the Court's case law claiming that Article 6 was not applicable to the proceedings dealing only with a procedural issue (see Senine Vadbolski, Demonet v. France, no. 22404/93, Commission decision of 12 October 1994).


17.  The Government argued in all but two cases (Sobakar and Sereda) that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the domestic litigations at issue as the applicants were on service in the Russian military forces at the material time. They supported their argument by reference to the special jurisdiction exercised by military courts and stressed that the applicants’ cases were not amenable to ordinary courts that were competent in ordinary civil cases. Accordingly, their lawsuits in Russian military courts could not be qualified as “civil” and the applicants’ complaints were incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.


28.  The Government submitted that the applicants had lost their victim status following the Constitutional Court judgment which found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which in their view the latter court had been examining together, and owing to its award of compensation which covered the period from 1967‑2010. The Government noted that no consideration had to be given to the time prior to 1967 before the Convention had become applicable to Malta; and that since a new declaration had been issued in 2010 the value of the property had to be taken to be that in 2005 in accordance with the law (see paragraph 24 above). Moreover, since 2010 the applicants had been able to challenge the public interest of the declaration issued in 2010 by means of Article 6 § 2 of Chapter 88 as well as the compensation offered by means of Article 22 of Chapter 88 (see paragraph 24 above). Thus, the Constitutional Court had not needed to order the Commissioner to institute proceedings, unlike what the Court had pronounced in Curmi v. Malta (no. 2243/10, § 53, 22 November 2011).


32.  The applicant first complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court which tried and convicted him. Secondly, he claimed that the court had been influenced by the Army since the proceedings against him had been prompted by the request of the Second Chief of the General Staff. Finally, he maintained that he had been convicted solely on the basis of the statements of the journalist who had a personal interest in incriminating him. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


37.  The Government pointed out that it was in the first place for the national judicial authorities to ensure that the requirements of a fair hearing were satisfied. They submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the refusal to take evidence did not amount to a disproportionate restriction on the applicant's ability to defend himself in the proceedings. Accordingly, there was no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


71.  The applicants complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences that they had been incited by the police to commit and that their plea of entrapment had not been properly examined in the domestic proceedings, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. These complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


17.  The applicant complained that the continued non-enforcement of the judgments of 11 January and 14 December 1999 and that of 6 June 2000 violated his right of access to a court enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


134.  The applicant alleged a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention on behalf of her son on the ground that he had not had a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in the event that the Government were to claim that the arrest and detention of her son were lawful and that he was guilty of an offence under domestic law. The relevant parts of Article 6 of the Convention provide as follows:


47.  The applicants further complained of the fact that they were denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. In this connection, they complained about the structure of the State Security Court and the links between the judges sitting on the bench of this court and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. In addition, the applicants complained about the lack of reasoning by the Court of Cassation and the latter’s refusal to hold a hearing in their case. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


116.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 of the Convention that he had not been informed of the charges against him and that he had been deprived of his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. Although he had been unable to defend himself, he had not been appointed a lawyer. The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention provide as follows:


26.  The Government admitted that the fact that the same judge had sat twice as a judge of the Supreme Court in the same criminal case was contrary to the domestic law. However they submitted that, having regard to the specific facts of the case at hand, the rights of the applicant guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention were not disrespected. The Government referred to the fact that the Supreme Court had delivered different decisions in two hearings. In the Supreme Court’s decision of 9 August 2005, the panel of three judges, including N.H., upheld the applicant’s appeal on points of law, quashed the original appellate judgment of 18 March 2005 and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for a new examination. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence in the case should be re-examined. In its subsequent decision of 10 October 2006, the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court, including N. H., upheld the Court of Appeal’s new judgment of 12 July 2006, declaring the applicant’s appeal on points of law unsubstantiated. It was the Government’s view that the applicant’s case had been examined by the national courts in accordance with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention.


48.  The applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as neither the prosecution in seeking to adduce the tape recordings into evidence nor the judge in ruling them admissible had provided a good reason for Mr Pearman’s non-attendance at court. In Al‑Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, ECHR 2011 the Court had focused on witnesses who were either dead or in fear of attending court; nevertheless, even in cases where there was alleged fear by the witness, the Court required that appropriate enquiries be made to determine whether there were objective grounds for the fear and whether those grounds were supported by evidence. In the present case, as soon as the trial judge had been informed via a prison officer that Mr Pearman was refusing to attend court no further efforts were made to secure his attendance, even though he was in the hands of the State at the relevant time and, as such, the State had been in a position to secure his attendance, even if the privilege against self-incrimination meant that he could not be compelled to give evidence. For example, the authorities could have made a production order or special measures, such as a video link, could have been utilised to provide the applicant with the opportunity of cross-examining him.


21.  The Government argued that delays in the examination of the applicant's case had been caused by the complexity of the case and the applicant's conduct. According to them, the applicant had repeatedly amended and supplemented his claims with the result that the first-instance court had had to spend time on studying new materials. Moreover, on 26 June 2003 the applicant altered his claims so significantly that, in the Government's opinion, the proceedings could be regarded as having commenced anew, and therefore the period to be taken into account should start on this date. The Government also pointed out that on several occasions court hearings had been postponed due to the defendants' failure to appear, for which the State was not responsible. The Government further conceded that a period of inactivity between 13 October 2003 and 22 December 2005, totalling one year, eight months and twenty-six days, could be imputed to the authorities; however, they gave objective reasons for this, namely judges' sickness, annual leave, dismissal from service and their exceptional caseload. In the Government's opinion, apart from the aforementioned period, the examination of the applicant's case was rather expeditious and conformed with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


24.  The applicants argued that their case was the same as the case of Suda v. the Czech Republic, cited above, where the Court found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the account of lack of access to court. They maintained that they had also not consented to arbitration and that the arbitration proceedings did not comply with the Article 6 guarantees because, in particular, they were not public. They added that the possibility of judicial review of an arbitration decision was not sufficient because it was limited only to procedural issues and not the merits.


157.  The Government maintained that the proceedings in the applicant’s administrative case had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant had been given a fair opportunity to state his case, to obtain the attendance of three witnesses on his behalf and to present other evidence. The applicant had been given an opportunity to lodge written requests and he had availed himself of that right. The Government accepted that neither the police officers who had arrested the applicant and had drawn up the police report nor the officer who had issued the statement on the administrative offence had been called as witnesses. However, they pointed out that those officers could have been summoned to the court hearing if doubts or questions had arisen.


75.  The Government contested the claims. They proposed that the Court conclude that the finding of a violation of the Convention constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction. In addition, relying on several earlier judgments of the Court, including Dvorski v. Croatia [GC] (no. 25703/11, § 117, ECHR 2015) and Ibrahim and Others (cited above, § 315), they pointed out that it was impossible to speculate as to the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, and that any finding of a violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention would not mean that he had been wrongly convicted.


17.  The Government did not contest the applicant's claims. They referred to insufficient funding of the social-security authorities as the reason for the failure to comply with the judgment of 6 March 2000. They admitted that the delayed enforcement of the judgment in the applicant's favour constituted a violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


117.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s criminal case had been heard in compliance with the requirements of Section 51 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and that Article <mask> of the Convention in its criminal limb was inapplicable to these proceedings. In the latter connection, they referred to the cases of Antoine v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 62960/00, ECHR 2003‑...) and Kerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 63356/00, 23 September 2003) and maintained that the procedure under section 4A of the 1964 Act was similar in operation to the procedure in the case at hand. The Government argued that the purpose of the compulsory medical measures was curing the persons who had committed a socially dangerous act or improvement of their mental health as well as preventing them from commission of other such acts. According to the Government, the applicable domestic legal provisions did not prescribe mandatory attendance at court hearings by a mentally ill defendant. At the same time, they guaranteed the protection of the interests of a mentally ill defendant through mandatory legal assistance and representation by a legal guardian. Furthermore, on the facts of the case, the applicant’s lawyer had attended the hearings and had ensured the applicant’s defence.


156.  The Government of Cyprus made observations similar to those of the applicants. They submitted that given the existing legal and political context and the circumstances in which the first applicant had been abducted, detained and tried as a hostage as part of a State policy, it would have been unrealistic to expect the applicants “to seek remedies in the legal system of the perpetrator”. The “TRNC” was not a valid and legal State and its courts had not been “established by law” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as they had not been set up by Turkey through legal acts of its democratic institutions, but rather as a result of an invasion and continuing military control. Turkey did not exercise control over the “TRNC” by rule of law, but simply by means of military occupation; as a consequence, the remedies available in the “TRNC” could not be considered remedies of the respondent High Contracting Party. They submitted that the illegality of those remedies in international law amounted to a “special circumstance” absolving the applicants from the requirement of exhaustion.