99.  The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that as a result of their relatives’ disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate it properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. They also complained under this heading that Isa and Shamil Khalidov had probably been subjected to ill-treatment upon their abduction while in the unregistered detention. Article 3 reads:


103.  The applicant argued that there had been sufficient evidence establishing that he had been tortured by the police in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. All the medical evidence indicated that he had had very serious injuries, a fact that had been corroborated by the Canadian Consul. The applicant submitted that in Cyprus there was general solidarity between the doctors in State-run hospitals and the police concerning detainees taken for treatment in connection with injuries resulting from ill-treatment inflicted by the police. Unfortunately, there had been no independent witnesses during his ill-treatment.


116.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the conditions of his detention in the police station in March 2009 and in remand prison IZ-47/4 between March and August 2009, and the conditions in which he was transported to the Dzerzhinskiy District Court in March 2009. Under the same heading the applicant complained of the lack of medical assistance during his detention in remand prison IZ-47/4. Article 3 reads:


165.  The applicants complained that at the moment of their abduction and after it Salambek Tatayev, Ramzan Dudayev, Yunus Abdurazakov, Shamil Vakayev and Shamkhan Vakayev were subjected to ill-treatment. They further claimed that as a result of the disappearance of their relatives and the State's failure to investigate the crimes properly, they had endured profound mental suffering. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads:


104.  The applicants submit that they suffered deliberate, premeditated and consistent abuse over a period of years which constituted torture and that the responsibility of the local authority was engaged as they had failed to protect them from this abuse. The local authority was under a positive obligation imposed by Article <mask> of the Convention to take preventive measures to protect them from N.C. That had required them to take the steps reasonably available to them to end the abuse of which they knew, or of which they ought to have had knowledge. They submit that the authorities were aware of the abuse. The first applicant recalled mentioning to the social worker, Mr C., that N.C. had hit them and “other things”. Though the applicants accepted that they had not expressed in unequivocal terms that they were being sexually abused, the things which were said and the way that the family was behaving should have alerted the local authority to the risk that abuse was occurring e.g. the truanting, the second applicant’s soiling, the applicants’ expressed desire to leave home, signs of distress at school and complaints of being hit at home. This should have led the social services to make serious investigation into the situation. They should inter alia have ensured that the applicants’ names were on the “at risk” register, that there was active case management, held more regular case conferences and involved social workers of sufficient experience and adequate training. Instead, they failed to take control of the situation or to react effectively, inter alia, by removing the children on 8 July 1980 after there had been complaints that N.C. had been hitting the second applicant and his twin. Though a number of professionals suggested at various points that the children should be placed away from home on a long-term basis, no effective steps were taken.


46.  The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated by the police. He referred to the Court's case-law to the effect that if an individual is taken into the police custody in good health but is found injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide plausible explanations as to how the injuries occurred (Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII). The applicant pointed to the decisions of the District Prosecutor who had confirmed the injuries sustained by him. He underlined that in respect of a person deprived of his liberty any recourse to physical force which was not made strictly necessary by his own conduct, diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant further argued that even assuming that the injuries had occurred in the circumstances advanced by the police, namely as a result of the applicant's own acts, the State remained responsible as the police officers failed to prevent them.


31.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been subjected to acts of police brutality which had caused her great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment. She also complained under the same provision, taken together with Article 13 of the Convention, that the Greek investigating and prosecuting authorities had failed to carry out an effective and impartial official investigation into the incident which could have led to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. The applicant therefore claimed that she had been denied an effective domestic remedy for her sufferings.


39.  The Government argued that a number of effective remedies had been open to the applicant in order for him to complain about the alleged violations of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, at least in so far as he complained of a lack of medical care in detention and about the conditions of his detention in the correctional facility. They cited a complaint to the administration of the facility, a prosecutor or a court as possible routes for effectively alerting the authorities to his situation. The Government further drew the Court’s attention to two judgments adopted by Russian courts in response to complaints by inmates about “unlawful placement in an inmate disciplinary unit” and unsatisfactory conditions of detention in a correctional facility. The two inmates had been awarded 25,000 and 50,000 Russian roubles respectively. The Government concluded that the applicant had not exhausted available domestic remedies in respect of his complaints about the quality of the medical services and the conditions of his detention after conviction. In addition, while acknowledging the lack of remedies under Article 13 of the Convention for complaints about conditions of detention in temporary detention facilities, as established by the Court in the case of Ananyev and Others v. Russia (cited above), the Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention as he had never complained to a court about the conditions of his detention in facility IZ‑47/1.


45.  The Government argued that effective domestic remedies had been available to the applicants in respect of their complaints of ill-treatment under Article <mask> of the Convention, as required by its Article 13, but that they had not availed themselves of those remedies. In particular, the first, third and fourth applicants had not challenged before the court the lawfulness of the decision of 8 August 2006 to dispense with criminal proceedings into their allegations. The second applicant, in his turn, had failed to appeal against the judgment of 22 December 2003 by which the Kirovskiy District Court had found lawful and justified the prosecutor’s refusal of 2 October 2003 to open criminal proceedings. The Government argued, therefore, that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.


31.  The Government referred to the findings of the domestic authorities and argued that the applicant had received his bodily injuries before the arrival of the police and had not been subjected to any treatment incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention during the arrest or while in police custody. They further argued that the investigation into the applicant’s complaints had been thorough and effective.


128.  The applicants argued that their life sentences were neither de jure nor de facto reducible and were thus in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Firstly, Lithuanian law did not provide for release on parole for life prisoners; such a measure was applicable only to prisoners serving fixed-term sentences. Any attempt to apply to a court, or to request a court of general jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court, was futile. The applicants further maintained that Article 3 of the new Criminal Code, in allowing the retroactive application of the criminal law commuting a penalty or mitigating legal circumstances could not ease their situation either (see paragraph 63 above). Even though all eligible applicants in the present case had attempted to use that remedy, their attempts had been unsuccessful and by final decisions the courts had found no grounds for commuting their life sentences. They had only one chance to request such a review. Accordingly, even if over time the danger the applicants posed to the general public had diminished, they had no opportunity to reapply under that provision.


52.  The applicant observed that he had not disputed in principle that the Lingua analysis could be used as one part of the evidence pertinent to determining his origin and hence his asylum claim. However, according to domestic law, it was an expert opinion which did not bind the deciding authority. He claimed that “close and rigorous scrutiny” was required by the domestic authorities to analyse the entirety of the evidence submitted to them. It was therefore incompatible with the requirements of Article 13 in combination with Article <mask> of the Convention for the domestic authorities to have relied on the Lingua analysis as the sole or main piece of evidence, despite the fact he had adduced various pieces of evidence, which viewed as a whole, were clearly capable of proving that he originated from Darfur. His birth certificate, the confirmation letter from the president of the SLM-Unity Switzerland, the petition signed by twenty Darfuris and his political involvement for the Darfur cause were evidence enough to prove that he originated from that region.


52.  The Government noted that pursuant to the provisions of the Dublin II Regulation, Hungary was the responsible EU member State to examine the applicant’s asylum application and had accepted responsibility pursuant to Article 16 § 1 (c) of the Dublin II Regulation. A transfer to the competent member State was inadmissible only if systematic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions for asylum-seekers constituted serious and substantive grounds for the assumption that the applicant was exposed to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment pursuant to Article <mask> of the Convention. A mere possibility, however, could not give rise to a breach of that Article, and it was for the applicant to prove sufficiently that it was very likely that he or she would be exposed to a real, serious and considerable risk within the meaning of Article 3.


29.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because he had won several court cases against various State authorities. The domestic courts had acknowledged the violation of his rights and had also awarded him compensation. Moreover, he could claim compensation at any time from the domestic courts, and recent case-law confirmed the effectiveness of that remedy (see paragraph 25 above).


33.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the Mariupol SIZO, the Sokiryanska prison no. 67 and the Dykanivska prison no. 12 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. In particular, the applicant complained of overcrowding in cells and a lack of proper nutrition, ventilation and daylight. He further claimed that despite his serious diseases he had not been provided with appropriate medical treatment and assistance. The applicant lastly argued that the regular practice of strip searches in the factory at the Dykanivska prison no. 12, conducted in the presence of other detainees, degraded his dignity. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


152.  The Government contested that argument and broadly reiterated the observations presented under Article <mask> of the Convention concerning communication between the applicant and the members of his family. They pointed out that the applicant could communicate with his relatives subject to the restrictions imposed by legislation concerning high-security prisons and the execution of sentences (that is to say, in the present case, life imprisonment. They add that where a disciplinary sanction was imposed on the applicant for failing to comply with the prohibition on transmitting messages to his former armed organisation, this had an impact on the exercise of the right to receive visits.


78.  The Government argued that the first applicant's complaint was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted, firstly, that the first applicant could have brought a civil action for assault in respect of his complaint. In the context of such proceedings he could have complained that he had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 8 of the Constitution and Article <mask> of the Convention and could have sought, in addition to damages, a declaratory judgment that there had been a violation of his constitutional and Convention rights.


70.  The Government also submitted that there was no evidence that the State authorities had openly disregarded the basic principles of humanity in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the Government drew the Court’s attention to the fact that from December 2000 to December 2001 the applicant had received a monthly disability pension of approximately 25 euros. However, owing to the applicant’s failure to undergo a medical sanitary examination the payments had been cancelled.


90.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the conditions of transport between the remand centre and the courthouse had been inhuman and degrading. The vans had been cramped, unheated and inappropriate for the transport of detainees. He had been denied food, drink and access to a toilet for up to eight consecutive hours. In his view, such treatment amounted to torture.


17.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a victim of the alleged violation because by virtue of the domestic court’s judgment of 1 March 2013 he had been awarded compensation of PLN 7,000 (approximately EUR 1,750) plus interest. Additionally, the domestic courts had relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and had thus acknowledged a breach of the Convention. Moreover, the domestic courts had taken into account the fact that overcrowding alone had not contributed to the deterioration of the applicant’s health. The Government invoked the inadmissibility decisions in the cases of B.G. v. Poland ((dec.), no. 61403/10 of 27 August 20013) and Dubjaková v. Slovakia ((dec.), no. 67299/01 of 19 October 2004) and argued that since in those cases the amount of compensation awarded at national level had resulted in a finding that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of the Convention, the same reasoning should be applied in the case at hand.


35.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. In particular, he had not challenged the prosecutors’ decision of 20 July 2011 before the investigating judge (see paragraph 22 above). They referred to Levinţa v. Moldova (no. 17332/03, § 63, 16 December 2008), in which the Court had found inadmissible a complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention since the applicants had failed to challenge the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation in court.


60.  The Government submitted that after the conviction of the three police officers the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also contended that the investigation into the applicants' ill-treatment had been thorough and prompt, and had resulted in the identification of those responsible and their conviction by the courts.


88.  The Government challenged the applicants’ arguments, claiming that the facts that they had submitted to the Court were “highly exaggerated.” According to the Government, the applicants failed to prove that the treatment to which they had been subjected had attained the minimum level of severity. In their opinion, a conflict between two religious groups could not amount to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government categorically denied any participation by State agents in the attacks at issue. They maintained that the allegations made in criminal cases nos. 1 and 2 concerning the involvement of State officials (see paragraphs 9-20 above) were exaggerated and without foundation.


57.  The applicant’s allegations of overcrowding, lack of outdoor exercise, problems with ventilation and lack of daylight in the cells, which are not disapproved by the Government, are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the physical conditions of the applicant’s detention between 8 and 15 July 2002 in the Debaltseve ITT amounted to degrading treatment, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


130.  The Government submitted that the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies with respect to fourteen of the applicants, namely Ana Maria-Paula Bidi, Denes Biga, Erika Biga, Iosif Biga Snr, Iosif Biga Jr, Ladislau Biga, Rozalia Bucunea, Carol Ciorcan, Edith Csiki (Biga), Ladislau Horvath, Petru Kalanyos Snr, Petru Kalanyos Jr, Ana Lingurar and Lela Potra. The Government contended that these applicants failed to join the rest of the applicants in contesting the Reghin prosecutor’s decision of 16 July 2007 before the superior prosecutor and subsequently before the Mureş County Court.


73.  The applicant stated that his extradition to Kazakhstan would breach Article <mask> of the Convention. He claimed that the Kazakhstan authorities had deprived him of his property, which, in his view, proved that the rule of law was not respected in the requesting country. The Russian authorities had refused to examine his complaints of deprivation of property although, in his view, it was clear that the Kazakhstan police would do everything in their power to retain the property they had stolen from the applicant, including possible attempts at “getting rid” of him with the help of criminals.


166.  The applicant claimed an amount of EUR 15,000 or such amount as the Court deemed equitable in respect of non‑pecuniary damage He submitted that the Government's failure to recognise that his expulsion would constitute a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention had led to tremendous anxiety and suffering on the part of the applicant and his family, which could not be compensated by a finding of a violation alone.


140.  The applicant further argued that there was no social assistance for disabled prisoners. The applicant had to rely on the voluntary assistance of his cellmate, which could not be considered adequate. He further submitted that being placed in a position of dependence upon the goodwill of other detainees, to whom he had to “pay” with cigarettes and tea, had been extremely humiliating for him. The applicant mentioned that, at times, he had been left outside in the walking area for long periods of time without a rain shelter, as he could not get into the building by himself. The applicant relied on the case of Farbtuhs (cited above, § 60) to argue that that leaving the assistance of disabled prisoners to other detainees was inadequate, since it in effect shifted the responsibility for such people to those other detainees, who lacked the proper qualifications, even if their help was only for a limited period of time. In his view, it was a serious issue under Article <mask> of the Convention that a disabled person such as himself had to endure concerns and worries about the inaccessibility of qualified medical assistance in an emergency. He argued that he had been dependent on the goodwill of other detainees to assist him, which had put him in a situation of uncertainty, and had caused him physical and mental suffering and distress. The applicant disagreed with the Government’s distinction between the facts of the present case and those in Farbtuhs. He considered that the Government’s analysis of the Farbtuhs case in relation to the appropriateness of the detention itself was irrelevant. The applicant submitted that the focus of his dissatisfaction was not that he had been held in continued detention despite his poor health, which had been the main problem in Farbtuhs, but rather that the conditions in Valmiera Prison had been unsuitable for him as a disabled person.


41.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, owing to belated payment of unemployment emoluments, she had been left without the means of existence and her very survival had been in danger. She further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the belated payment of unemployment allowances in an unlawfully reduced amount had impaired her property rights. The applicant also relied on Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with the above complaints.


33.  The applicant stood by his description of the events of 5 December 1999. He noted that the results of the medical examination conducted on 3 December 1999 and his interview to the TV station on 5 December 1999 could serve as evidence that he had been in good health before his unfortunate encounter with the police. Furthermore, prior to that incident he had not been disabled, nor had he informed the emergency doctors that he was disabled, despite the Government’s assertion to the contrary. He pointed out that although the Government accepted that he had been injured at the police station, they had not confirmed that the treatment he had sustained was contrary to the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, they had not commented on the effectiveness of the investigation into the events in question.


23.  The applicant submitted that as result of the police officers’ actions he had sustained a number of injuries which were sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. The police had used excessive force against him and their use of the truncheon had been contrary to the domestic law in that he had been hit on the head with it.


65.  The Government submitted that, contrary to the applicant’s allegations, his conviction had not been based on the incriminating statements extracted from him in police custody in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant’s conviction had been based mainly on the statements that his brother and P.M. had made to the police. In this connection, they contended that the statements of P.M. and the applicant’s brother had been taken during the investigation in compliance with the relevant domestic legislation. The Government lastly argued that the applicant had not made any self-incriminating statements which could have been used against him at trial.


71.  The Government also referred to the argument in paragraph 68 above that it would be unreasonable to impose on a Contracting State, which provides more extended protection than suggested by Article <mask> of the Convention, an obligation under Article 8 to refrain from removing family members who do not have the right - either under domestic law or according to the Court’s established case-law under Article 3 of the Convention - to remain in the country. In this regard, the Government emphasised that the applicant, who was born on 6 February 1991, was now 21 years old and that his health might improve over time. In the meantime there were several ways for the applicants to keep in contact.


74.  The applicant complained that following his arrest on 16 January 2002 he had been subjected to treatment incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation of that incident. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the State’s substantive and procedural obligations flowing from Article 3, which reads as follows:


25.  The Government contended that applicants who had already been released when they had lodged their application with the Court or who had been released following their application but prior to its examination had had at their disposal the remedy under section 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, in conjunction with the Penal Code and Article <mask> of the Convention. They also referred to the provisions of Presidential Decrees nos. 141/1991 and 254/2004, arguing that they could have been relied on before the national courts in conjunction with section 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code. In the Government’s view, the above-mentioned domestic remedy was capable of affording those applicants adequate redress in the form of monetary compensation for any damage caused to them.


65.  The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage that he had suffered as a result of the breaches of the substantive and procedural limbs of Article <mask> of the Convention. He asked the Court to have regard to the intensity of his suffering and the various ways in which he had been ill-treated in the course of his arrest and detention.


71.  The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention referring to various aspects of his pre-trial detention. In particular, he complained about the conditions of his detention in the remand prisons. Next, he alleged that he had not received adequate medical assistance while in detention. Further, he complained about the conditions of his transfer to and from court and the conditions of his detention in the convoy room at the Moscow City Court. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


93.  The applicant reiterated his complaints and contended that the conditions of detention in which he was held were inadequate and amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article <mask> of the Convention. He relied, inter alia, on the findings of the Court in other similar cases against Bulgaria (such as, for example, Malechkov, cited above), the assessments of the CPT in their reports, the conclusions of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee in their annual reports and the declaration of his fellow detainee, Mr R. Dobrev (see paragraph 33 above), in respect of the conditions of detention at the Pazardzhik Regional Investigation Service detention facility and Pazardzhik Prison.


106.  The applicant simply reiterated his complaints and contended that the conditions of detention in which he was held at the Velingrad Investigation detention facility and the Pazardzhik Prison were inadequate and amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article <mask> of the Convention. He relied, inter alia, on the findings of the CPT in their reports and the declarations of two other detainees at the Velingrad Investigation detention facility, Mr V.G. and Mr. D.A., who corroborated his claims.


215.  The Government submitted, with particular regard to the psychological and educational damage, that it related to the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken individually, which had been declared inadmissible by the Court in its decision of 1 March 2005. In their submission, there was therefore no causal link between any violation of the Convention and the alleged non-pecuniary damage. They further contended that the sum claimed by the applicants was excessive and that any finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.


139.  The applicant complained that on 23 October and 7 November 2001 and 21 January 2002 he had been subjected to treatment incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation of those events, amounting to a breach of Article 13. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the State's negative and positive obligations flowing from Article 3.


35.  The Government argued that the alleged ill-treatment did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention as it had not attained a minimum level of severity. They further stated that in any event the reports drawn up following the applicant’s medical examinations had not established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been subjected to any physical violence by police officers, who had been merely exercising their statutory power of arrest. With regard to the effectiveness of the investigation carried out by the Istanbul public prosecutor, the Government maintained that the public prosecutor had started an investigation in a timely manner, examined the medical reports issued in respect of the applicant, obtained photographs of all officers involved in order for the applicant to identify those who had ill-treated him and taken the statements of those officers to clarify the issue.


70.  The applicant argued that he had proved that he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while he was force-fed and that the conditions of his detention, particularly between 28 October 1998 and 23 February 2000 (the date of his release from custody), were contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. He requested the Court to find the State responsible under Article 3. The applicant further mentioned that he had been held in detention from 16 October 1998 to 13 August 1999 without any proper sanction. He alleged an infringement of Article 5 §§ 1(c) and 3 of the Convention.


85.  The applicant complained that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected was such as to fall under the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that for the treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention it must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is, by nature, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, amongst many other authorities, Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 100, Series A no. 161).


45.  The applicant complained that he had been tortured by the police between 23 and 25 November 1999. He also complained, in general terms, that in the Donetsk SIZO he had not received adequate medical aid; that the food there had been of a poor quality; and that there had been a person with mental health problems detained in the same SIZO building with him. The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention.


50.  The applicant alleged that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in either of the detention facilities, including the prison hospital. He further complained of the inadequacy of the material conditions of his detention in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 and Rustavi Prison no. 6 and in the prison hospital. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


73.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about being ill-treated by the police on 20 May 2005 and suffering a head trauma and a prolonged state of stupor as a result. He also complained about lack of proper medical assistance while in detention and about the failure to investigate properly his complaint about ill-treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


4.  The applicant, in his first application (Jeronovičs v. Latvia, no. 547/02, 1 December 2009), complained, inter alia, (a) that while he was being questioned in custody the police had subjected him to ill-treatment, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, for the purpose of extracting a confession from him; and (b) that a statement so obtained had subsequently been used in evidence against him at his trial, in breach of the fairness requirement inherent in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


46.  The Government asked the Court to take into account the fact that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies as regards the complaint raised under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As to the applicant’s claim concerning the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the conditions of his detention, the Government submitted that the amount requested by the applicant was excessive.


37.  The Government also noted that in the civil proceedings against the State the domestic courts had found for the applicant, establishing that the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police had inflicted injuries on him, and partially allowing his claim for compensation. The Government argued that the authorities had therefore fully restored the applicant’s rights. In view of the acknowledgment of a violation of the applicant’s rights and the compensation awarded to him, he could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


257.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. They stated, in particular, that the applicants’ mental suffering had not reached the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, particularly on account of the young age of some of the applicants, and that there was no evidence of the applicants’ relatives’ arrest by State agents. Lastly, they averred that domestic legislation, including Articles 124 and 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, had provided the applicants with effective remedies for their complaints.


60.  The Government reiterated that in their opinion the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as he had not lodged a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division against either the judgment of 25 January 2007 or the judgment of 10 February 2009. As to the question of whether an appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division was an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1, the Government pointed out, relying on rulings given by the Division on, respectively, 9 June 2004 (see K. v. the Netherlands, (dec.), no. 33403/11, §§ 30, 25 September 2012), and 2 August 2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division – like the Regional Court of The Hague – assessed fully whether expelling an alien to his or her country of origin would expose him or her to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The Division based its considerations on an alien’s account in so far as it was accepted as true. If it concluded in a particular case that the competent Minister or Deputy Minister had failed to carry out an adequate appraisal of an alien’s claims under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division – like the Regional Court of The Hague – could quash the decision regarding that alien. The applicant could and should therefore have raised his claims under Article 3 before the Administrative Jurisdiction Division in the context of both his asylum request and the decision to impose an exclusion order.


72.  The Government argued that the State authorities had taken all steps for a comprehensive investigation into the case. They repeatedly underlined that the applicant's behaviour – failure to appear before the investigator on seventeen occasions and failure to submit medical documents – had caused significant delays in the investigation and had affected its effectiveness. In their opinion, the investigation in the present case could not be considered contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


71.  The Government argued that, following the decision of the Constitutional Court of 17 March 2009, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the violations alleged under Article 3 and Article 5 § 3 of the Convention because the Constitutional Court had found a violation of those provisions. Furthermore, as regards the applicant's complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention (conditions of his detention), the national law had subsequently offered the applicant the possibility of seeking compensation in civil proceedings against the State.


81.  The applicant alleged that the treatment he had been subjected to during his detention in police custody had amounted to torture and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He stated that the police officers had stripped him naked, had forced him to kneel down and had rubbed an object around his anus. They had also attempted to rape him. He had then been laid on his back and his testicles squeezed, causing intense pain and shame. Furthermore, he had been kept blindfolded in a very hot place and then exposed to strong light. He had also been denied food, threatened with death, insulted and kicked.


48.  The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention that the prison authorities had failed to protect his personal security, his physical and moral integrity, despite the fact that they had been alerted about the aggressiveness of the bull, and that he had no effective right of compensation for the injuries sustained. The Court considers that these complaints should be analysed only under Article 3 as a complaint that the State failed to comply, firstly with its procedural obligation to investigate the applicant’s allegations that no preventive measure had been taken despite the fact that the prison authorities had been alerted about the alleged aggressiveness of the bull, and secondly with its substantive obligation to protect the applicant from being injured’. Article <mask> of the Convention reads as follows:


93.  The Government also maintained that the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention had not extended to the obligation of the State to provide an alleged victim of ill-treatment with free legal representation to support his allegations before the domestic authorities. Nevertheless, they stated that for the purpose of effective participation in the criminal proceedings the applicant did have access to legal representation. The right to legal assistance had been guaranteed by Article 59 of the Constitution of Ukraine and by the Social Services Act. They further noted that the new Free Legal Assistance Act had been adopted on 2 June 2011, and specifically addressed the issue. In practical terms, the applicant could apply for legal assistance to the Horodenka territorial social support centre for pensioners, handicapped people and single disabled people. He could also apply to the legal advice office at the Horodenka District Department of Justice, which opened in 2003 and which could advise the applicant on legal issues and assist him in the preparation of various procedural documents. The Government lastly submitted that the applicant could apply to the national ombudsman and other authorities who would address his requests within their competence.


23. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him. In particular, he had not complained about the conditions of his detention to a prosecutor or court. The Government further commented on the conditions of the applicant's detention, but only in facility no. IZ-77/2. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had been detained in satisfactory sanitary conditions. The Government noted that the fact that the applicant had been detained in the overcrowded cells could not serve on its own as the basis for finding a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because the remaining aspects of the applicant's detention had been satisfactory. The Government pointed out that overcrowding was a general problem in many member States of the Council of Europe.


75.  The applicant further complained that the circumstances of the case amounted to a breach of the prohibition of degrading treatment and had violated Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


118.  The applicants claimed that SIAC’s power to grant bail did not effectively function during the period when they were detained: firstly, because the scope of the remedy was jurisdictionally unclear; secondly, because the procedure was subject to delay; thirdly, because the threshold for granting bail was too high. An applicant for bail was required to demonstrate an “overwhelming likelihood” that his continued detention would lead to a physical or mental deterioration, such as to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. The jurisdiction was described as “exceptional”, requiring the “circumstances to be extreme”. Even then, the only available remedy was to substitute house arrest for detention (see paragraph 79 above).


128.  The Government stated that “the investigation of the criminal case had established that Rasul Tsakoyev had been subjected to ill-treatment and that he had died as a result of it”. They further stated that the perpetrators of the ill-treatment had not been established and that the alleged involvement of State agents had not been confirmed. The Government also submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the applicants because their complaints had been duly examined by the domestic authorities and all possible steps had been taken to have the crime resolved.


27.  The Government contested that argument. Relying on the certificates prepared by the remand prison administration and the statements made by the remand prison officers in 2009, they asserted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been in compliance with the standards required by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government were unable to submit original documents concerning the applicant’s detention, explaining that they had been destroyed on account of the expiration of the statutory time‑limit for their storage.


48.  The applicants further complained that they had not received adequate medical care while in detention. However, the Court notes that none of the applicants adduced any evidence that they had been in need of any urgent medical care during their detention. The Court therefore considers that this part of the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, in respect of all of the applicants, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


122.  The applicants submitted that the situation they had experienced had been contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention as interpreted by the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above (§ 263). The state of extreme poverty and material and psychological want in which the authorities had placed them, in full knowledge of their vulnerability as asylum-seekers and as a family with young children including a severely disabled young daughter, had reached the threshold required by Article 3. The obligation to provide for the applicants’ basic needs as asylum-seekers had also been one of the positive obligations of the Belgian State under European law and more particularly the Reception Directive, which provided that Dublin asylum-seekers had to continue being provided with reception facilities until they were actually transferred to the responsible State, as had been confirmed by the CJEU in Cimade and Gisti, cited above (§ 58) (see paragraph 105 above), and the revised European Social Charter (see paragraphs 108-09 above).


92.  The applicant complained that in view of his disability and his special needs, his protracted detention in the conditions of Szczytno and Olsztyn Remand Centres had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. More precisely, the applicant asserted that, despite his disability, the remand centre staff had not provided him with any special care. That had made his life in detention very difficult because he had not been able to carry out many of his daily or routine tasks, such as serving his meals, making his bed, cutting his toenails, washing, shaving and getting dressed, and cleaning himself after going to the bathroom. He had had to seek help from his inmates, which had put him in a position of dependency.


29.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention at Kumkapı Removal Centre had complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In support of their submissions, the Government submitted photographs of some of the sleeping and communal areas, taken at an unspecified date, as well as copies of the logs recording the number of male detainees at the removal centre on various dates during the applicant’s detention.


31.  The applicant complained that his detention from 22 May 2000 to 6 September 2002 in appalling conditions had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, he further complained that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy to obtain an improvement in the conditions of his detention. The Articles relied on read as follows:


60.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not require a judicial remedy and that the possibility to challenge a decision to discontinue an investigation before the general public prosecutor under Article 172 § 1 of the CCP had fulfilled the requirements stemming from the Convention. Even though the general public prosecutor had been the superior of each public prosecutor in the respective court district, he or she had been provided with his or her own staff and therefore had been sufficiently independent from subordinate public prosecutors.


24.  The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated by the police during his arrest and that the State authorities had failed to effectively investigate his allegations of ill-treatment. In his view, the above had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and to a breach of the State’s obligation to provide effective remedies in this respect. Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention read as follows:


72.  The Government submitted that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected did not reach the minimum threshold under Article <mask> of the Convention. Any suffering he may have experienced did not exceed what was inherent in detention. The conditions in the remand centre were appropriate, as was clear from documents submitted to the Court (see paragraph 47 above). In case of an emergency, he could be transported to a nearby hospital.


157.  The applicants argued that their relatives’ naked bodies had been displayed at the military base without showing any respect for their privacy or memory and in front of a large number of military personnel who had nothing to do with the investigation. As a result of the bodies of their relatives being displayed in such an undignified fashion the applicants argued that they had felt degraded. They submitted that the authorities could have behaved more sensitively and could at least have blocked the bodies from view with a screen; it was the failure to give thought to taking such simple measures that had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


166.  The applicant’s representatives submitted under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Russian authorities were implicated in the applicant’s disappearance, which in their opinion had resulted in his abduction and illegal transfer to Uzbekistan. They contended that the domestic authorities had failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the applicant’s disappearance. Lastly, they submitted that the investigation into the disappearance and possible abduction had been ineffective. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


48.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies because he had not complained to the competent domestic authorities about the alleged violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. On the merits, the Government submitted that the applicant had been provided with dry rations on the days he was transported to the court-house and that he had been afforded adequate opportunity to sleep between court hearings, which ruled out the alleged violation of Article 3.


56.  The applicant contended that the violence to which he had been subjected by prison guard S.N. amounted to ill-treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that he had been examined by a doctor only a few days after the incident. He further contested the number of days indicated by the forensic report as necessary for his recovery, claiming that he had needed between eighty and ninety days of medical treatment. He emphasised that the ill-treatment was inflicted by a state agent acting in his official capacity and therefore engaged the State’s responsibility.


87.  The Government did not dispute that the applicant had been kept in prison together with adults. Referring to the medical report of 25 April 2001 (see paragraph 43 above), they maintained that the applicant had not suffered any mental problems which would have exempted him from being criminally liable for his actions. They also argued that the ill-treatment allegedly suffered by the applicant had not attained the minimum level of severity falling within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The applicant claimed that after his arrest police officers had ill‑treated him in order to make him confess to the alleged crimes and pay them money. His complaints to the prosecutor and the courts in that connection had been left without proper examination. Article <mask> of the Convention, referred to by the applicant on that account, reads as follows:


45.  The applicant complained that the domestic court decisions allowing his extradition to Uzbekistan had violated his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention as extradition would have given rise to a real risk of ill‑treatment. When notifying the application to the respondent Government, the Court decided, of its own initiative, to put a question to the parties as to whether the applicant had had an effective domestic remedy whereby he could raise his allegation under Article 3, as required by Article 13 of the Convention.


33.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. According to them, he could have applied to the domestic courts with claims for compensation in respect of any nonpecuniary damage allegedly resulting from the conditions of his detention. The Government also considered that the conditions of detention in the prisons concerned had not been incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


38.  The applicant complained that his detention in the conditions of Łowicz Prison, in which he had been held from 18 November 2004 until 24 July 2008, had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the applicant complained about the prison’s overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical care and the practice of mixing healthy prisoners with those infected with HIV and HCV. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


223.  The applicant complained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and torture while in detention, referring to the methods of ill-treatment inflicted on him by the police officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD. He also complained that no effective investigation had been conducted into his relevant allegations. The applicant referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


141.  The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that Lema Dikayev had been subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of State agents. They also alleged that as a result of their relatives' disappearance and the State's failure to investigate it properly they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


55.  The Government disagreed and relied on evidence to the contrary (see paragraph 13 above). They argued that the applicant had not exhausted available domestic remedies in respect of the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. They relied, in particular, on the case of Drugalev v. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance case (referred to in Boicenco, cited above, § 68).


124.  The Government, relying on Çakıcı v. Turkey ([GC], no. 23657/94, § 98, ECHR 1999‑IV), argued that the applicant could not be considered a victim under Article <mask> of the Convention since neither she nor her husband had ever objected to the removal of tissue. They also argued that, since the applicant had never complained at the domestic level that she had been forced to bury her husband with his legs tied together, she could not claim to be a victim before the Court now. The applicant pointed out that Çakıcı was a disappearance case, whereas she had herself seen her husband’s remains before the funeral and his legs had been tied together. She had been shocked, but at the time she was unaware of the tissue removal. The Court considers that in the present case the question of whether or not the applicant can be considered a victim is closely linked to the merits of the case. It should therefore be joined to the merits.


27.  The applicant raises complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention. She alleges that she was unable to recover all the real estate she claimed, that she had no effective domestic remedy to restore her property rights, and that she is discriminated against in the enjoyment of her property rights. She also alleges, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that she was subjected to degrading treatment in view of the manner in which her numerous applications concerning the return of the property at issue were dealt with by the Latvian authorities.


216.  The applicants further complained that the circumstances created by the judicial authorities, the CTU and the children services amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, particularly as a result of the period of isolation in San Marino. Indeed, as a result, the second applicant suffered psychological distress. Moreover, the first applicant had been pressured by these entities into withdrawing her complaints against Mr X., which were eventually archived. They cited Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


90.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s fears were groundless in view of the prohibition in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 on the expulsion of aliens to a country where their health or life would be in jeopardy. The order to expel him had been intended to protect the national security of Bulgaria. However, its enforcement was subject to the provisions of section 44a, which coincided with the principles underlying Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention. The practice in such cases was for the competent authorities, which worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non‑governmental organisations, to verify the issue upon expulsion of their own motion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept an updated list of safe third countries that could receive individuals in the applicant’s position. The authorities were thus complying with the absolute prohibition of Article <mask> of the Convention, and, unlike the situation obtaining in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008‑...), were not seeking to balance national security considerations against the risk of ill‑treatment faced by the applicant. The bar in section 44a applied to all aliens, including those subject to expulsion orders on national security grounds.


136.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants’ injuries had been sufficiently serious as to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in the Government’s view, the responsibility of the State could not be engaged in the current case since the domestic investigation had concluded that the use of force had been justified and that the State agents had acted in self-defence.


59.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, stating that the police had had ill-treated them in November 2000 and had failed to properly investigate their allegations of ill-treatment; that the first applicant was not given sufficient medical assistance on 4 November 2000 and that no investigation was carried out into the second applicant’s complaint of 20 December 2000; that they were held in inhuman and degrading conditions; that the authorities had allowed the applicants’ ill-treatment by other detainees in 2003 and had failed to properly investigate their complaints concerning that ill-treatment. Article 3 provides:


34.  The Government confirmed that on 15 June 2001 the applicant was abducted and ill-treated and that he had sustained the injuries he claimed, contesting, however, any involvement of state officials in the infliction of injuries. The Government found it impossible to conclude that the applicant’s rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated as a result of any acts or omissions on the part of the state bodies or officials. They relied on the domestic decisions, which found no grounds for the prosecution of investigator D., or the convoy officers, or the relatives of G., at whom the applicant pointed as perpetrators. The Government considered that the authorities could not be held responsible for the assault of the “unidentified individuals”.


63.  The applicants complained that expulsion of the children to their home country would be in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, because they would be separated from their immediate family and sent to their home country, where they have no one to care for them. They would probably be sent to an orphanage and would depend on social services in Kosovo. Their expulsion would therefore put them at risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.


126.  The Government disagreed with these allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. The second applicant had not brought her grievance concerning her alleged beating to the attention of the domestic authorities and thus had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. The Government further argued that the applicants' mental suffering could not be imputable to the State.


42.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that from 19 to 23 June 2003 he was ill-treated by the police officers who visited him in hospital. He further complained under Article 7 of the Convention that the period of his stay in the hospital from 19 to 23 June 2003 was not included in the overall length of his sentence.


80.  The applicant complained that the absence of adequate medical care while in detention, in particular in Ploieşti Prison and Dej Prison Hospital, and the length of the proceedings concerning his request of 22 October 2007 for the temporary suspension of the execution of his prison sentence due to his serious medical condition amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


20.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the domestic criminal and civil proceedings had afforded the applicant proper redress. They submitted that the domestic courts had determined the amount of compensation on the basis of the claim as submitted by the applicant, with regard to the duration and severity of the ill-treatment and the gravity of the injury he had sustained. The Government stressed that the injury had been qualified as insignificant, and the amount of compensation could therefore be regarded as reasonable.


120.  The Government disagreed with these allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that either the applicants or Mr Suliman Malikov, Mr Adlan Khatuyev, Mr Aslan Khatuyev, Mr Sayd‑Salu Akhmatov and Mr Mansur Ismailov had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, they submitted that those applicants who had witnessed their relatives’ apprehension had themselves acted aggressively towards the servicemen at the checkpoint.


111.  The applicant further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that he and his son had been beaten by servicemen and that no effective investigation had been carried out on that account. He alleged furthermore that his son had been subjected to ill-treatment after his apprehension as well. The applicant also claimed that as a result of his son’s disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate those events properly, he had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


107.  The applicants further asked the Court not to limit its examination to the establishment of the Government's failure to assess properly the risk of ill-treatment before taking the extradition decision. They argued that they had submitted sufficient information for the Court to rule that their extradition to Uzbekistan would be incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. As additional proof of an increased risk of ill-treatment, they had produced a list of their relatives and business partners who had been convicted to long terms of imprisonment in connection with the Andijan events. They also maintained that the Uzbek authorities knew about their application for asylum and their application before the Court, which had further intensified the risk of torture.


110.  The applicants further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that their sons had most likely been tortured during and after their apprehension. They also claimed that as a result of their sons’ disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate those events properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


137.  The applicant took the view that he could still claim to be the “victim” of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. While it was true that the Joint Court of Justice had reduced his sentence in view of the extreme conditions of his detention, the reduction had been intended to compensate only for the isolation in which he was then being kept. It could not and did not compensate for the physical and mental harm resulting from ill-treatment and neglect of his physical complaints.


122.  The Government’s case was that the issue of risk would be examined upon the enforcement of the expulsion order against the applicant and that the authorities would not remove him from Bulgaria without ensuring that this would not fall foul of the prohibition set out in section 44a of the Aliens Act 1998 (see paragraph 38 above). However, the Court has already found that there are no guarantees that before proceeding with the expulsion the authorities would subject the applicant’s claims under Article <mask> of the Convention to rigorous scrutiny (see paragraphs 105 and 106 above). More importantly, the Government did not point to any procedure whereby the applicant would be able to challenge their assessment of those claims. From the provisions of the Aliens Act 1998 and the regulations for its application it does not appear that it is possible to bring a separate legal challenge against the enforcement of the expulsion order, let alone that there exists an avenue of redress that meets the two requirements set out in paragraph 120 above. The Court would emphasise in that connection that the existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, and that it falls to the respondent State to establish that (see, among other authorities, McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, § 107, ECHR 2010‑...).


64.  The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s conditions of detention from 23 December 2002 to 10 December 2008 did not comply with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that it has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of an acute lack of personal space in the cells of facility IZ-47/1 in respect of the time during which the applicant was held there (see Andrey Frolov v. Russia, no. 205/02, §§ 43-51, 29 March 2007; Seleznev v. Russia, no. 15591/03, §§ 38-48, 26 June 2008; Lutokhin v. Russia, no. 12008/03, §§ 53-59, 8 April 2010; Petrenko v. Russia, no. 30112/04, §§ 35-41, 20 January 2011; Tsarenko v. Russia, no. 5235/09, §§ 47-53, 3 March 2011; and Popandopulo v. Russia, no. 4512/09, §§ 84-89, 10 May 2011).


39.  The applicant had less than 3 sq. m of personal space during four non‑consecutive periods, which respectively lasted for one, two, thirty‑four and forty‑two days (see paragraph 30 above). The Court considers that the periods of one and two days can be considered of short duration (see Muršić, cited above, § 130). In the light of its earlier findings concerning the material conditions of the applicant’s detention, the freedom of movement outside the cell and out‑of‑cell activities available to him (see paragraph 38 above), the Court concludes that the lack of personal space during those two periods did not amount to degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention.


119.  The Government considered that the security installations in question neither constituted degrading treatment nor caused significant discomfort. They submitted, in particular, that all detainees who were in pre-trial detention were routinely placed either in metal cages or in the glass cabins which were progressively replacing the metal cages in courtrooms. They considered that, unlike the metal cages, the glass cabins did not have an appearance that could by itself raise issues under Article <mask> of the Convention. They further submitted that after the initial complaints about the cramped conditions in hearing room no. 338, the trial was moved to hearing room no. 635, where the defendants had more space because there were two cabins.


70.  The Government did not comment on all of the applicant's complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. Instead, they commented only on a few issues he raised. In particular, they submitted that as the applicant had mainly complained about the failure of the authorities to provide him with proper medical treatment and nutrition, they would address only those complaints. They denied the applicant's allegations and contended that he had not been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment during his stay in the SIZO SBU and SIZO no. 13. They further contended that the conditions in which the applicant had been detained were in compliance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention and that there had therefore been no violation of that provision.


89.  The Government, in their additional observations in reply to those of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above), submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as he had left Cyprus illegally and had gone to Iraq. He therefore did not face a risk of deportation from Cyprus to Syria. Accordingly, they invited the Court to declare the applicant’s complaint under this provision inadmissible on this ground. In the alternative, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They noted in this respect that the applicant had not filed a recourse against the second decision of the Reviewing Authority dated 26 March 2011 nor had he lodged an appeal against the first instance judgment of the Supreme Court of 31 January 2012. Last but not least, they argued that the applicant following his departure, could have had filed a new administrative appeal or submitted new information before the authorities concerning his asylum appeal or lodged a fresh claim for asylum under the Refugee Law which had, in the meantime been amended (see A.H. and J.K., cited above, §§ 98-99).


20.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a victim of the alleged violation because, by virtue of the domestic court’s judgment of 27 June 2013 he had been awarded compensation of PLN 1,000 plus interest. Additionally, the domestic court relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and thus acknowledged a breach of the Convention. Moreover, it took into account the fact that the breach of the statutory minimum standard of 3 m² had not been significant. The Government relied, inter alia, on the inadmissibility decisions in the cases of B.G. v. Poland ((dec.), no. 61403/10 of 27 August 20013), and Dubjaková v. Slovakia ((dec.), no. 67299/01 of 19 October 2004) and argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention, as the compensation of PLN 1,000 was sufficient to compensate for his detention in overcrowded cells for three days.


40.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been ill-treated during his arrest, that he had been tortured in the OCU's temporary detention facility, and that the conditions of his further detention at the Investigative Isolator No. 1 also amounted to ill-treatment. He also complained that his allegations of ill-treatment had not been investigated effectively, as required by the procedural obligation imposed by the same Article. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:


98.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, in that he remained in solitary confinement between 6 January 2006 and 31 January 2008. He submitted that the cell had been fitted with a narrow bed which was too short for him, that in winter the temperature in the cell fell below zero, and that he had not been allowed to use the library, attend mass or participate in other activities. The applicant also argued that he had been kept in isolation and had been prevented or restricted from receiving newspapers and books.


59. The Government challenged the country information relied on by the applicant. They indicated that the situation in Sri Lanka had developed to such an extent since the publication of the April 2009 Guidelines, that the UNHCR had published a note on their applicability (see paragraph 21 above). The Government argued that, insofar as UNHCR recommended that Tamil asylum-seekers from the north should be granted asylum, that recommendation was based on information about the risk to Tamils “in the region” and there was no indication that the Note had in any way considered the risk in Colombo generally. Moreover, they submitted that, following NA., little weight should be attached to the UNHCR’s assessment as its comments were not focused on the question of whether there was a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. Consequently, it provided no support for the applicant’s assertion that there was a real risk he would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if he were returned to Colombo. Instead, the Government relied on the then most recent Country of Origin Information report, published by the United Kingdom Border Agency on 13 October 2009, which contained the most up-to-date publicly available information.


40.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the impunity of officer A.C. as a result of the failure to prosecute him under applicable criminal-law provisions. They also complained, under the same Article, that the investigation of their forced undressing in front of V.D. had not been prompt and about the impunity of V.D. and M.T. Article 3 reads as follows:


88.  The Government contested those arguments and stated that in the course of proceedings under the Dublin Regulation the Austrian authorities were required to examine whether an applicant would face a real risk under Article <mask> of the Convention upon a transfer. Should the authority find that there was a danger that the applicant might be exposed to human rights violations in the event of his or her transfer, it was required to make use of the sovereignty clause. The Government referred to the fact that the Austrian authorities had repeatedly made use of the sovereignty clause in practice in respect of vulnerable people.


85.  The Government, however, asserted that the applicant had waived his procedural rights, relying on his written statements of 19 March 2004 (see paragraphs 15‑16 above). The Court reiterates in this connection that a waiver of a right guaranteed by the Convention – in so far as it is permissible – must not run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to the waiver’s importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-II). In the circumstances of the present case it finds it impossible to agree with the Government’s waiver claim as the written statements of 19 March 2004 were clearly made after the statement of surrender and confession had been drawn up on 18 March 2004. Most importantly, the applicant cannot be said to have validly waived his privilege against self-incrimination in view of the Court’s finding in paragraph 69 above that he had sustained the ill-treatment in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


116.  The Government argued that the applicant's complaint was manifestly ill-founded, being linked to the manifestly ill-founded complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, it had been open to the applicant to lodge a tort action with the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad and he had explored that avenue. The fact that the applicant was unsuccessful did not strip that avenue of its effectiveness.


70.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the detention centre for aliens had been satisfactory and had complied with both the domestic regulations and Article <mask> of the Convention. He had had sufficient personal space, an individual sleeping place and unrestricted access to lavatory facilities. All sanitary and hygiene standards had been met. The applicant had been provided with hot meals three times per day, had been able to walk in the yard and to use the library. He had not been handcuffed or placed in a punishment cell as the centre for aliens did not have such cells.


97.  The applicants complained that their relatives had been ill-treated by State agents, and that no investigation had been carried out into the matter. They also complained that during a fortnight when their relatives remained missing they had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with their relatives' disappearance. The applicants referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


87.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the prison authorities had caused him to be infected with tuberculosis by placing him in a cell with detainees who had contracted this disease. He further claimed that the authorities had not ensured adequate treatment of his hepatitis and tuberculosis and had not provided him with an adequate diet.


38.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention during the investigation and trial and about the conditions of his transport to and from court. He also complained that on 26 December 2004 he had been beaten by police officers during his arrest and in police custody. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


29.  The Government maintained that the investigation carried out in the present case had met the requirements of the procedural aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection they emphasised that, unlike in İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, ECHR 2000‑VII, the Serbian authorities had heard not only the accused officers but also the applicant, a medical expert and several eye witnesses. The Government further referred to a 2009 report of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, on his visit to Serbia according to which ill-treatment by the police had decreased since 2004 (document no. CommDH(2009)8 of 11 March 2009, § 66).


54.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody in 1995 and that, during his detention in the Donetsk SIZO from November 1995 to December 1996 he had suffered from gravely inadequate conditions of detention. Lastly, the applicant alleged that his second trial after his acquittal in 1996 had been contrary to his rights under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.


94.  The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that it was highly probable that after the abduction Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev had been subjected to ill-treatment. The applicants also alleged that the third applicant was subjected to ill-treatment during the abduction. Further, the applicants complained that as a result of their relatives’ disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate it properly they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


35.  The Government argued that the conditions of transport had not gone beyond the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with the applicant’s detention, and thus had not amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article <mask> of the Convention. They emphasised that all the conditions and aspects of transport had to be assessed cumulatively, without there being an exclusive focus on floor space. The applicant had been placed alone in a single occupancy compartment with a floor area of 0.51 square metres. The compartment was at least 60 cm wide, 85 cm long and 149 cm high, and had a strong plastic seat on a metal frame attached to the floor. As for leg space, although narrow, it met the requirements of Directive 2001/85/EC (see paragraph 27 above). During the day, the compartments received natural daylight through the two roof hatches and windscreen; if it was dark, ceiling lights were switched on. The van had three separate adjustable air heating systems and zones, including one for transported prisoners. No seat belts or handles had been designed for the compartments. The Government noted that in Voicu v. Romania (no. 22015/10, 10 June 2014), the Court had found that the absence of seat belts alone could not lead to a violation of Article 3. Considering those conditions and the fact that the applicant was young and healthy and had not spent more than twenty minutes in the van, during which time it had not left the prison premises, the treatment had not reached the level of severity to come within the scope of Article 3.


119.  The Government disagreed with these allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that either applicant had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. They also stated that the first applicant had sustained minor bodily injuries and that, under Russian law, an investigation into infliction of such injuries was opened upon a victim’s request. Since the first applicant had failed to lodge such a request, the investigation into infliction of minor bodily injuries on him had been commenced in case no. 26075. The first applicant had been granted victim status in that case and meticulously questioned about the circumstances of the infliction of injuries on him. He had undergone an expert medical examination. The investigation in this respect had not been completed.


97.  The applicants further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that their sons had most likely been tortured after their arrest and that the first applicant had been beaten, but that no effective investigation had been carried out on that account. The applicants also claimed that as a result of their sons’ disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate those events properly, they had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


29.  The Government noted that the Court had already dealt with the issue of the use of metal cages in courtrooms in Svinarenko and Slyadnev (cited above) and found that such a practice constituted in itself an affront to human dignity and amounted to degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. In view of the Court’s position on the matter, the Government acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the present three applications.


35.  The applicant maintained his complaint. He reiterated that he had been detained in severely overcrowded cells where he was afforded no more than 0.83-1.4 sq. m of personal space. He further referred to the case of Belevitskiy (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, 1 March 2007) where the Court had found a violation of the applicant's rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention on account of severe overcrowding of the cells in the same remand prison.


93.  The applicants further argued that that there was no jurisprudence to show that they could have claimed compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, such a claim, in any event, could not have improved their conditions. As regards the claim to the Administrative Court, the applicants maintained that this remedy would have been ineffective as the claim would not have been resolved in due time. In support of this argument they referred to a decision no. U 1319/2003 of 11 May 2004 issued in proceedings concerning a transfer of a sentenced prisoner because of problems relating to his mental health and conflicts with other inmates. The Administrative Court had remitted the case for re-examination one year after the prisoner’s request had been rejected by the director-general of the Administration for the Execution of Penal Sentences.


74.  The applicant contended that her son had been subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3, in view of the known circumstances of his arrest, and that the authorities had failed to effectively investigate this complaint. Referring to the Court's established case-law, the applicant claimed that she was a victim of treatment falling within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention as a result of the anguish and emotional distress she had suffered as a result of the disappearance of her son and the response of the authorities to her complaints. She relied on Article 3, which provides:


97.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s contention that Article <mask> of the Convention did not cover the issues of provision of legal representation for him to enable him to participate effectively in the criminal proceedings concerning his alleged ill-treatment. He submitted that the procedural guarantees under Article 3 of the Convention would not be effective if the alleged victim of ill-treatment, usually a lay person, had not been able to estimate whether his right to procedural protection from ill-treatment had been adequately ensured by the authorities.


38.  The Government contended that Article 2 did not come into play in the present case since the victim was still alive. Admittedly, the police officers who were involved in the chase had made use of their weapons; however, they had not intended to kill him, but only to force him to stop his car and arrest him. Referring to earlier judgments of the Court, the Government argued that the applicant’s complaints fell to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention instead.


124.  The Government submitted that there was no indication that the applicants had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. They also argued that in the absence of evidence of the involvement of State authorities in the disappearance of Mayrudin Khantiyev, there was no causal link between the applicants' alleged suffering and the actions of representatives of the State.


20.  The applicant complained of a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention since he had been detained in inhuman conditions and had not been provided with the medical assistance that his condition required. He also complained that his detention by unconstitutional authorities had been unlawful, contrary to Article 5, and that he had not had a fair trial since the “MRT” courts were not independent and impartial, thus amounting to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.


247.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. They stated in particular that the applicants’ mental suffering had not reached the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, particularly on account of the fact that certain applicants were minors and there was no evidence of the applicants’ relatives’ arrests by State agents. Lastly, the Government averred that the domestic legislation, including Articles 124 and 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, provided the applicants with effective remedies for their complaints.


46.  The applicant complained that because of his Uzbek ethnic origin, he was – and would remain, if removed to Kyrgyzstan – at a real risk of ill‑treatment. He argued that he belonged to an ethnic group whose members were systematically tortured by the Kyrgyz authorities and convicted in connection with the June 2010 mass disorder. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


199.  The applicant complained that the medical assistance available to him in remand prison SIZO 77/1 in Moscow had been inadequate. In particular, he alleged that after his arrest he did not receive regular medical supervision, including examination by specialists and specialised tests, as required following the resection of the tumour of the urinary bladder that he had undergone in 1994. He also alleged that he was not receiving the treatment appropriate to his condition and was only occasionally given painkillers. The applicant further complained about allegedly appalling material conditions of detention in remand prison SIZO 77/1 in Moscow. The applicant relied on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


77.  The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police, and that the State had failed to investigate his allegations of police brutality. In this context, he complained that the criminal proceedings against the police officers had been protracted, unlike the proceedings against him, which had been completed rapidly. That signified bias on the part of the judges. Furthermore, in the criminal proceedings against the police officers, the public prosecutor had relied solely on the evidence produced by the DCPS. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case (see Dolenec v. Croatia, no. 25282/06, § 127, 26 November 2009), the Court finds it appropriate to examine these complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


35.  The applicant died on 8 April 2015, while the case was pending before the Court. The applicant’s sister, Ms Artemyeva, wished to pursue the application after his death. The Government did not comment. The Court has already, in a number of cases in which applicants have died in the course of the proceedings, examined and confirmed the locus standi of their heirs or close relatives, such as brothers or sisters, to pursue the proceedings before the Court, including in cases brought under Article <mask> of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 39, ECHR 1999‑VI; Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII; Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359/10, § 29, 8 April 2014; Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677/10, §§ 58-68, 13 November 2012; Getiren v. Turkey, no. 10301/03, §§ 61-62, 22 July 2008; and Toteva v. Bulgaria, no. 42027/98, § 45, 19 May 2004).


29.  The applicant submitted that the prolonged imposition of the “dangerous detainee” regime had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In his opinion, there had been no reasonable grounds for applying the regime to him. He contested the allegation that he had been the leader of a collective protest. He had never been charged with or convicted of any such act. He admitted to having refused, on one occasion, to eat his breakfast while at the Opole Lubelskie Prison.


41. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been subjected to acts of police brutality, which had caused him great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Furthermore, he alleged that he had been the victim of a procedural violation of the above Article since the prosecuting authorities had failed to carry out an effective or, indeed, any official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible for the treatment. Article 3 reads as follows:


41.  The applicant complained that holding him in detention on remand had constituted a danger to his life and health given his sleep disorder and the need to use a respirator. He alleged that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention. The applicant was very anxious about the possibility of a power cut in prison or his co-detainee unplugging his respirator which could be fatal. He reported to the authorities the fact that his respirator had been damaged by the prison guards but to no avail. He averred that his detention on remand had resulted in a serious deterioration of his mental and physical health. The applicant did not invoke any provision of the Convention. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


79.  The applicant complained about the physical conditions of his detention and of a lack of adequate medical treatment in Colibaşi Prison. He alleged, in particular, overcrowding, unhygienic sanitary facilities, lice, extreme cold during winter, lack of running water and lack of activities. Moreover, he complained that at the time he was imprisoned he had been clinically healthy but that during detention he had been diagnosed with various conditions and with a Category 2 disability. Furthermore, he stated that he had not been treated adequately and his repeated requests for medicines had been refused, with lack of funds given as the reason. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


107.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to provide any reliable evidence to show that in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan he would run the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. Uzbekistan had sought the applicant’s extradition in order to pursue criminal proceedings against him arising out of ordinary criminal charges. The applicant had not alleged that he belonged to any banned religious movement or any other vulnerable group which, according to reliable international sources, systematically endured the practice of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. Moreover, in his explanations given to a Russian prosecutor on 29 June and 20 July 2010 and 2 June 2011 (see paragraphs 23 and 33 above) the applicant had stated that he had left Uzbekistan for Russia on business and had denied any persecution on political grounds there. He had never sought political asylum in Russia, or applied for Russian citizenship. The Government went on to note that the guarantees provided by the Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan were sufficient to protect the applicant from the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of his extradition.


58.  The applicant complained that he had been beaten by the police and that despite medical evidence of his bodily injuries the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an independent and effective investigation into his ill‑treatment. He referred to Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, decided to examine the problems raised by the applicant under Article <mask> of the Convention, which is the relevant provision and which provides as follows:


30.  The applicant argued that his complaint had not been premature. In 2008-09 he had actively sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers, but the domestic authorities had repeatedly refused his requests after carrying out several pre-investigation inquiries. Judicial review of the investigating authorities’ refusals was inaccessible following the revocation of those decisions by the supervising authorities (see paragraph 15 above). The pre‑investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with its short time-limits and limited powers of an investigator could not be considered an effective remedy for the establishment of the facts and circumstances of his ill-treatment. The only potentially effective remedy against the violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention would have been the prompt institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers and the timely carrying out of a full-scale criminal investigation. However, it was only after the application had been communicated to the Russian Government that the domestic authorities had decided to open the criminal case in March 2011. The delay in the opening of the criminal case had resulted in the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate the incident of ill-treatment while the matter was still fresh. In particular, the identification of the police officers three years after the incident of ill-treatment had been extremely difficult. Further, not all the police officers who had been on duty at the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008 had been presented to the applicant for identification. Although a doctor had been appointed by the investigator, no forensic medical examination had been conducted in the course of the preliminary investigation, which would have allowed the applicant to put additional questions to the medical expert – a right he had not been able to exercise when the forensic medical examination had been conducted in the course of the pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraph 18 above). Regardless of the above, in July 2011 the preliminary investigation of the case had been suspended indefinitely due to the impossibility of identifying those responsible for the ill-treatment.


44.  The Government further denied that Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated in the present case and that the police officers had subjected the applicant to inhuman and degrading treatment. They referred to the results of the forensic expert examination of 15 October 2001, according to which the injuries complained of could not have been inflicted on 10 May 2001. With respect to the cause of the applicant's injuries the Government argued that the applicant had fallen down several times whilst escaping the crime scene.


100.  The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust an effective remedy that had been open for them to complain about the alleged violations of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular as regards the alleged lack of provisions, bedding, lighting and ventilation. They considered that a complaint to the prosecutor’s office would have allowed the competent authority to resolve their situation.


43.  The applicant complained that he had been tortured by a tax police officer, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. He further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the investigation undertaken by the domestic authorities into these events had been insufficient. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective remedies in respect of the above violations.


62.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the lack of adequate medical assistance in correctional colony IK‑272/3. He alleged that the medical service was inadequate generally and, in particular, that there had been a failure to arrange for surgery on his prostate adenoma; he also complained of the ban on keeping medicines in the cell, which meant that he would have had to rely on the colony’s health care personnel in the event of a heart attack, a stroke or a deterioration in one of his other conditions.


42.  The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated on 20 June 2003 and that the investigation into his complaint had not been effective. The Court considers that the applicant's complaint should be examined under the substantive and procedural aspects of Article <mask> of the Convention only. This provision reads as follows: