66.  The applicant maintained his complaint. In particular, he submitted that he had been attacked because of articles he had written criticising the activities of the Ministry of Defence. He pointed out that the domestic authorities’ failure to investigate the attack on him had amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (no. 23144/93, 16 March 2000), the applicant also argued that the Government had failed to comply with their positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention.


32.  The Government accepted that the decision complained of by the applicant constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Nevertheless, they argued that the interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 998-1000 of the Civil Code in force at the time. Furthermore, the interference aimed at the protection of the reputation of a third party, and was thus legitimate.


56.  The applicants pointed out that the Government had not put forward any arguments showing that restrictions on freedom of expression had been necessary in the present case for a pressing social need or for any other reason. Neither had the District Court nor the Court of Appeal taken into account Article <mask> of the Convention or considered the necessity requirement under that Article in their judgments. While it was true that X. had been publicly criticised in the media over the years, this could not be attributed to the applicants. Bearing in mind that the applicants had been obliged to pay not only the fines but also close to EUR 26,000 in compensation and costs, they maintained that Article 10 of the Convention had been violated.


21.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any part of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident on 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the article had in every respect been correct. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in the present case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages


54.  The applicant complained that the decision of the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow to bar her from holding judicial office in view of her critical public statements was incompatible with the principles enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. She contended that judges, like other persons, enjoy the protection of Article 10 and that the interference with her freedom of expression was not “prescribed by law”, did not pursue a legitimate aim and, finally, was not necessary in a democratic society. Her submissions under these heads may be summarised as follows.


40.  The Government alleged that the applicant’s complaint did not fall under Article <mask> of the Convention as it essentially concerned an employment dispute as to whether the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful under domestic law; it therefore concerned a labour dispute of a private-law nature. They noted that the reasons for the applicant’s dismissal had been gross infringements of the staff regulation and of ethical and behavioural norms which affected the University. Moreover, the Government emphasised that in his civil claim of 11 May 2010 the applicant had not made any allegations that the University had acted in violation of his freedom of speech.


21.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Bryanskiy District Court's judgment of 31 May 2004, upheld on appeal by the Bryanskiy Regional Court on 1 July 2004, had violated his right to express his opinion protected by Article 10 of the Convention. He submitted that the domestic courts had failed to draw a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments and held him responsible for failing to prove the truth of value judgments. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:


28.  The applicants contested that the Austrian courts' judgments had been necessary in a democratic society. They contended that the impugned statements constituted value judgments which had a factual basis, namely the reasoning of the judgment concerned. This factual basis was also known to the readers because it had been published on several occasions, including by “Der Standard” in its issue of 1 September and another article on 2 September 1998 which explicitly referred to the commentary at issue on page 32. Further, the domestic courts as well as the Government had disregarded that the article was earmarked as a “commentary”, thus, indicating to any knowledgeable reader that it contained a critical assessment by the author. In the applicants' view, the courts had also ignored that the impugned statement only concerned the judgment of the private prosecutor and not the way in which he had conducted the proceedings. Therefore the applicants did not share the argument of the Government and the findings of the domestic courts that they had reproached the judge with not having observed the principle of an adversarial hearing or with having been partial. Moreover, they considered the Government's view to be inconclusive and overstepping the requirements of this Court's case-law in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention that their critical remarks should have contained the fact that the proceedings had been (otherwise) conducted in a fair manner. In conclusion, the applicants' convictions were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society.


30.  The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. In that regard they relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary (dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007; Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008; Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus, no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008; and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia, no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013).


99.  The applicants reiterated that, compared to the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case, the present jury had even less guidance and the Supreme Court did not exercise a more stringent review. Accordingly, if the law in that case violated Article <mask> of the Convention, so did the domestic law at issue in the present case. They accepted that a State enjoyed a margin of appreciation as regards how it complied with Article 10 of the Convention: however, it was much reduced given the press and political speech context. In addition, while that margin meant that a State could choose how to develop the safeguards and, notably, could develop them differently to the Court of Appeal in the above-described Rantzen and John v. M.G.N. cases, this did not change the fact that, as domestic law stood at the relevant time, it was in violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


56.  The Government finally observed that by publishing the material concerning the telephone interceptions, the press exercised its right, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, to impart information to the public. It is true that the press should not overstep the bounds imposed by the protection of the reputation of others; however the Government observed that the applicant had failed to produce any document showing that the persons involved in the telephone interceptions had availed themselves of the domestic remedies protecting their right to enjoy a good reputation, such as an action for damages before the civil judge or a request for the opening of criminal proceedings.


45.  The applicants stressed that the content of the impugned article had mainly been political and that it had concerned the Finnish presidential election campaign. The article had aimed to have an impact on public discussion and the information contained in it had been of public interest. The journalists had acted in good faith and the information had been correct and in accordance with the ethics of journalism. There had been no compelling reasons to interfere with the applicant's freedom of expression. No just balance between the freedom of expression of the applicants and the protection of private life had been found. The actions of the national courts had been conducive to preventing the free flow of information and free discussion of issues relating to political activity. There had thus been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


43.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that the judgments of the domestic courts had been unfair and unfavourable. He further mentioned, with respect to the proceedings against Komsomolska Pravda, Argumenty i Fakti and Fakty i Kommentari that the domestic courts did not assess the facts of the cases correctly and have misapplied domestic procedural and substantive law. However, it is not the task of the Court to act as a court of appeal or, as is sometimes stated, as a court of fourth instance, in respect of the decisions taken by domestic courts (see Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, ECHR 2005-IX).


26.  The applicants complained that the judgments given in the case were in breach of freedom of expression. In particular, they claimed that the amount awarded to the plaintiff as compensation for non-pecuniary damage was disproportionate and had had a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of opinion. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


28.  The applicant submitted that the refusals to register the titles of the periodicals, Germany – A thousand-year-old enemy of Poland and The Social and Political Monthly – A European Moral Tribunal by the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court and the Katowice Court of Appeal had undoubtedly violated Article <mask> of the Convention. The decisions of the courts were in contravention of the Polish Constitution in so far as it guaranteed freedom of expression and also in breach of the applicable provisions of Polish law.


49.  The Government argued that the present case differed crucially from the case Juppala v. Finland. In the latter case the applicant had clearly seen the child’s bruised body, she had acted in good faith and was thus entitled to use the reporting system without any potential “chilling effect” of a criminal prosecution, whereas in the present case the applicant had already used the reporting system and a careful pre-trial investigation had been concluded in the matter with no results. The Government maintained that the applicant could not be considered as having acted in the same kind of good faith as the applicant in the Juppala case, as there were no veritable signs or symptoms supporting her allegations. Moreover, the Appeal Court had examined the case as a whole and taken into account the applicant’s particular status in sentencing. The national authorities were thus entitled, in the circumstances of the case, to interfere with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and that interference was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. There was thus no violation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


63.  The applicant considered that when examining the question of “necessity” it was necessary to take into account the role played by lawyers – the specificity of which the Court had highlighted in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention – as well as the importance of confidentiality in the practice of their profession, which was what protected the confidence that existed between them and their clients, as well as individual freedom and the smooth functioning of justice. In his opinion, requiring lawyers to report their suspicions was asking them to take action that was in contradiction with the social purpose of their profession and shed doubt on the traditional role they played.


18.  The applicant company complained that its right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed by the Austrian courts' injunction in so far as it prohibited the comparison of sales prices of the Neue Kronenzeitung and the Salzburger Nachrichten without indicating the differences in their reporting styles as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law. Article 10 provides as follows:


29.  The applicants contested that assertion. They contended that the second applicant had been subject to an order to pay compensation for something which had been written by her husband. Given the situation, one could not fail to consider that the freedom of expression of the first applicant encompassed that of his spouse, given that she had been considered jointly responsible for it. Therefore, the second applicant had been the victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention for the purposes of Article 34.


42.  The Government contested the applicants’ arguments. They reiterated their argument that the applicants’ complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In their submission, the applicants could not be said to have been directly affected by the facts allegedly constituting the interference. In any event, they had not substantiated their allegation of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


43.  The Government noted that the contested article was published by the applicant company during the mayoral elections in which Mr Y. was one of the main candidates. Therefore, there had been an important public interest in holding fair elections. Furthermore, the domestic courts had been protecting the rights and reputation of Mr Y. which was not only a permissible ground for interference under the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention but also protected one of the rights guaranteed by Article 8.


18.  The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they emphasised that paragraph 2 of that provision allowed the Contracting States to restrict this right in certain circumstances. According to the Court’s case-law, States have a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether or not a restriction on the rights protected by Article 10 is necessary.


138.  The applicant placed particular emphasis on the deficiencies of the reasoning adduced by the domestic authorities. Both parties have asked the Court to re-examine the proportionality of the “interference”, although they disagree about certain circumstances having significance for such an assessment. The Court, for its part, is not satisfied that the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the “interference” under Article <mask> of the Convention were sufficient for sentencing the applicant to two days’ detention. Faced with the domestic courts’ failure to give reasons that would be both relevant and sufficient to justify the interference, the Court finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 or to have based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, for a similar approach, Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, § 24, 26 January 2017, and Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, § 139, 25 July 2017).


39.  The applicants also complained that the loss of their former jobs and the subsequent employment restrictions under Article 2 of the Act also breached Article <mask> of the Convention (which guarantees freedom of expression), and constituted discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention. The Court observes however that in the Sidabras and Džiautas case it found no scope for the application of Article 10 of the Convention, either alone or taken together with Article 14 of the Convention (loc. cit., §§ 64-73). The Court finds no basis on which to distinguish the present cases from that conclusion.


48.  The applicant complained that there was an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression in that his right to impart information and ideas guaranteed by the Convention was undermined by his convictions for his role in the publication of all the above-mentioned books. He relied under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides insofar as relevant as follows:


39.  The Government, after summarising the principles of the Court’s relevant case-law on Article <mask> of the Convention, pointed out that whilst the Court had established the right of the general public to receive information, it had also imposed on journalists an obligation of “good faith”, requiring that they provide “reliable and precise information in accordance with the obligations of journalism”. Citing the Grand Chamber cases of 17 December 2004 of Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania ([GC], no. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI) and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark ([GC], no. 49017/99, ECHR 2004-XI), the Government referred to the Court’s finding that the stronger the criticism, the stricter the obligation of scrutiny had to be. In assessing the necessity of a limit to freedom of expression, the Court had also taken into account the scope of the debate referred to in the article in question and the capacity of the victim. On that point, it was necessary, according to the case-law (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, and Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, ECHR 2001-III), to make a distinction between politicians, who inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and civil servants, who should not be treated on an equal footing with politicians when it came to criticism of their conduct.


37.  The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. They relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary (dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006; Lindon, Otchakovsky‑Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007; Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008; Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus, no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008; and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia, no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013).


40.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that her disciplinary dismissal, ostensibly on technical grounds, had in reality been a sanction for the way in which she had exposed corrupt practices during her radio show on 9 October 1998. She submitted that that dismissal had been unlawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society.


10.  The applicant complained that the disciplinary punishment imposed on him for using “Kürt Halk Önderi” (the leader of Kurdish people) when referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK in his letter, had constituted an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant, based on the same facts, also invoked Article 9 of the Convention. The Court will examine these complaints solely under Article 10 of the Convention.


146.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies either expressly or in substance. The grounds of appeal that had been filed and subsequently argued by the applicant before the Supreme Court had not included any allegation of a violation of the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, to all intents and purposes, was reproduced in Article 19 of the Cyprus Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court had had no opportunity to consider the matter and adjudicate on it.


40.  The applicants complained that the ban imposed by the governor on 1 December 1997 on the distribution of the daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem in the state of emergency region constituted an unjustified interference in the exercise of their right to impart information or ideas. They relied in that connection on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides:


35.  The Government conceded that there was an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that this measure was lawful, having its basis in Article 124 of the Criminal Code, Article 47 of the Law on Information and Article 26 of the Printed Media Act and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others.


71.  The applicant complained that during his detention on remand his letters had been monitored by officials at the detention centre. He further complained that he had been punished for having sent a letter bypassing the detention centre’s official channels. In both cases the applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will examine these issues under Article 8 of the Convention, which is the relevant provision and which reads as follows:


25.  The applicants argued that the judgments given by the domestic courts had violated Article <mask> of the Convention. They were accused of defamation for having published critical articles about a local councillor in which they had exposed his reprehensible behaviour. Despite the fact that all of the information presented by the first applicant in her articles was true, the applicants were sentenced for having used the term “offending activities” which did not have a precise meaning in the Polish language. Furthermore, the legal meaning of the word “offender” was different from its meaning in the ordinary language.


102.  The Government reiterated that the applicant, acting as a representative of another presidential candidate, had imparted false information about the death of the latter's rival. He had thus participated in a dishonest electoral campaign and had damaged the interests of Ukrainian society in having fair elections. By convicting the applicant of the offence provided for in Article 127 of the CC (see paragraph 41 above), the Ukrainian courts had acted strictly within their margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the applicant had been given a probationary sentence, which could not be considered disproportionate in the circumstances of the case. They concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the interference with the applicant's right to disseminate information in the course of the elections.


31.  The applicant’s conviction and sentence (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above) constituted an “interference”, in the form of a “penalty”, with his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. Such interference will only be compatible with that Article if it was “prescribed by law” and was “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the aims set out in its second paragraph.


21.  The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression. It submitted that the domestic courts' injunctions prohibiting it from distributing the book Le Grand Secret had not been prescribed by law, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been “necessary in a democratic society”; it further complained that the “exorbitant” award of damages which it had also been ordered to pay had not been proportionate to the aim pursued. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


33.  The applicant's lawyer submitted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression had been in breach of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. She considered that the domestic courts had failed to take into account that the impugned statements had been made at a session of the City Council, in the course of public debate devoted to the future functioning of the Knyszyn School Complex. The applicant's lawyer considered that, by holding the applicant criminally responsible for his statements, the domestic courts had failed to strike a fair balance in weighing the interests of K.Ch.'s right to respect for his private life and the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In this respect she considered that in the present case there had been no element of “pressing social need”. Finally, she criticised the provisions which provide for criminal sanction for defamation without leaving any room for exceptions for matters of public debate; in her view such a construction of responsibility for defamation deprived the public debate of any sense.


26.  The Government submitted that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae or manifestly ill-founded. They argued that the dispute in the case had been limited to the question of the actual positioning of the satellite dish, having regard, primarily, to contractual obligations. The alleged interference had not arisen as an effect of a ruling by a public authority on the right to receive information or even the right to use or own a satellite dish. Instead, it had come about only as an effect of the Court of Appeal's interpretation and application of an obligation in a contract between two private parties within the framework of private litigation. In any event, the Swedish authorities would only be responsible to the extent that the State had a positive obligation to protect the rights of the applicants in a case of this nature. In this connection the Government were of the opinion that the Court of Appeal had struck a fair balance between the competing interests of the landlord and the applicants and that there did not exist a positive obligation to protect the applicants' right to receive information from the interference of others. There had therefore not been an interference by a public authority within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


38.  The applicant association concluded that there was no pressing need to prohibit the poster just because it mentioned a website address. Pointing out that Article <mask> of the Convention also protected the form in which ideas were conveyed (it cited Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, § 45, ECHR 2001‑III), and sharing the opinion of the dissenting judges Rozakis and Vajić, according to whom the authorities’ margin of appreciation was narrower when it came to negative obligations (Women On Waves and Others, cited above, § 40), the applicant association argued that there had, in the present case, been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


45.  The applicants then submitted that the interference had not been “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Whilst recognising that domestic courts had a margin of appreciation as to whether the offending comments were defamatory or not, they complained, firstly, about the unforeseeable and contradictory nature of the solutions found for the interpretation of the adjective “rocambolesque”, the description of the judges as “slow” and the expression “accumulation of anomalies”, and about the legal uncertainty thus created. Secondly, they complained about the fact that the author of the article had been criticised for not having produced it in the form of an interview, and argued that the form chosen – an account of a press conference – had been unfairly interpreted as lacking in good faith. They added that the journalist had imparted information, by reporting on the organisation and content of a newsworthy media event, without any bias or animosity, as the Paris tribunal de grande instance had found, and submitted that the domestic courts had thus disregarded domestic case-law and French legislation, rendering them both unforeseeable.


192.  The applicant's complaint, as noted at paragraph 157 above, concerns the impact on it of a costs award which, under domestic law, included success fees calculated at almost twice most of the base costs of two appeals to the House of Lords. The Court considers, and it was not seriously disputed by the Government, that the requirement to pay these success fees, as an unsuccessful defendant in breach of confidence proceedings, constituted an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention.


71.  The applicants submitted that the interference with their right to freedom of expression as a result of their conviction by the national courts had not met a “pressing social need” capable of justifying it under the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained, firstly, that by publishing the impugned article in a local newspaper they had intended to draw public attention to the public and political issues relating to the irregularities committed, in their opinion, by the city authorities in the signing of a public partnership contract with a private company.


51.  The applicant did not deny that there had been a statutory basis for the interference under section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law. She denounced the quality of the law and argued that the law should be both sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct. She noted that Latvian law did not set any limits as to the grounds for conducting a search of a journalist or the methods used. The applicant referred in this regard to the Court’s case-law under Article <mask> of the Convention and to Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information (see paragraphs 32 and 33 above).


28.  The applicants submitted that the grounds for contesting the landlord's action had not been only their denial that the positioning of the satellite was in breach of the lease, but also that that action infringed their right to freedom of information under the Swedish Constitution and Article <mask> of the Convention. They further claimed that the Court of Appeal had not balanced the various interests in any real or meaningful sense. It had not attached proper significance to the applicants' right to freedom of information and had failed to take into account that there had been no safety risks in the individual case, instead allowing the landlord to make general risk assessments. The applicants therefore claimed that there had been an interference with their rights under Article 10. This had occurred as a consequence of the Court of Appeal's application of the law and, accordingly, the State's exercise of judicial power in a civil-law dispute. Consequently, the State could not evade its responsibility in the matter.


25.  The Government acknowledged the existence of an interference in the instant case but submitted that it was justified under the provisions of the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. The interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been based on Article 6 of Law no. 3713 as well as Additional section 2 of Law no. 5680. The interference had been in the interests of national security, territorial integrity and the protection of the rights of others owing to the disclosure of the identities of certain public officials.


100.  The Government argued that there had been no “interference by public authority” under Article <mask> of the Convention because at no point on 27 August 2009 or later had the applicant been found liable for any offence or otherwise; he had not been prohibited from publishing material; the material that had been copied had not been subjected to a confiscation measure; and there had been no disclosure of any confidential sources. The customs officers’ actions had been limited to the inspection and copying of some data on account of a reasonable suspicion that it might contain extremist material. Their actions had had no “chilling effect” vis-à-vis the journalistic freedom to hold and express opinions. It could not be decisive in the present case and had not been decisive for the customs officers that the applicant was a photojournalist. The applicant had not been approached or threatened because of his professional status. The “regardless of frontiers” phrase in Article 10 had no import in the present case.


30.  The applicants further submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention protected not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they were conveyed. Journalistic freedom also covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. Freedom of expression applied not only to views deemed harmless or neutral, but also those which shocked, disturbed and offended. They referred to the Court’s judgment in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24).


37.  The Government conceded that the denial of a broadcasting licence to Glas Nadezhda EOOD had amounted to an interference with the applicants' freedom to impart information and ideas. In their view, however, this interference had been authorised under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article <mask> of the Convention. The licensing of radio broadcasters had been specifically envisioned by the Radio and Television Act 1998. It had been entrusted to a special body, the NRTC, charged with protecting freedom of expression. Moreover, the law regulating licensing had been sufficiently clear in its terms. The NRTC's decision had been based on quite detailed and publicly announced criteria. The NRTC had clearly indicated, as could also be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, which of those criteria had not been met by Glas Nadezhda EOOD. Some of the criteria were formal, while others had related to the utility and the feasibility of the proposed radio station. This could not be seen as unlawful, arbitrary or discriminatory, as indicated by the former Commission in its decision in the case of Verein Alternatives Lokalradio Bern et Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel v. Switzerland (no. 10746/84, Commission decision of 16 October 1986, Decisions and Reports 49). The decision to refuse the licence had been based on the failure by Glas Nadezhda EOOD to meet a number of the announced criteria. This decision had been the result of a detailed examination and had been reviewed by two levels of court.


19.  The Government conceded that there had been interference with the applicants' rights, but that it was prescribed by law and sought to protect the reputation and rights of others. Furthermore, the interference had been necessary and proportionate within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. The article had quoted and commented on excerpts from various Austrian newspapers. In a total of eighteen quotations it had referred to headlines and passages from various other articles reporting statements which had actually been made in connection with Hermann Maier's accident. The impugned statement, attributed to Stefan Eberharter, was the only fictitious statement amongst all those quotations. As the Austrian courts had rightly pointed out, in those circumstances only a highly concentrated reader could have been expected to realise that this passage was pure fiction with comic exaggeration. The offending statement conveyed a negative image of Mr Eberharter's person in a striking and blatant manner. Even considering the satirical nature of this statement, the limits to the guarantees under Article 10 of the Convention had clearly been transgressed as there was no factual basis for the reproach of envy and inappropriate glee. The Government also referred in this regard to the judgment in Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal (no. 37698/97, ECHR 2000‑X) and the decision in Österreichische Schutzgemeinschaft für Nichtraucher and Rockenbauer v. Austria (no. 17200/91, Commission decision of 2 December 1991, unreported). Mr Eberharter's interest in protection against statements which seriously affected his image as a sportsman had outweighed the applicants' interest in embellishing their article, which was of no particular public interest, by means of the impugned statement. Moreover, the interference with the applicants' rights had been proportionate as the fine imposed on the first applicant was a suspended penalty and the amount of compensation the second applicant had been ordered to pay was minor.


54.  The Government pointed out that, as part of their general policing powers, the administrative authorities had the power to order the seizure of French publications when they considered that they were liable to cause a serious threat to public order. The administrative authorities were empowered therefore to prohibit the publication of a work in the event of a serious threat to public order whether the publication was of French or of foreign origin and, accordingly, the same review was conducted by the courts in both cases (assessing proportionality and necessity). Hence, two publications with the same content, one of French and the other of foreign origin, could not at bottom be treated substantially differently. The alleged difference in treatment actually amounted only to a difference in the legal basis and the procedure followed. It had now become a largely formal difference precisely because of the Association Ekin judgment of 9 July 1997. As a result of this leading decision, the administrative courts were now expected to ensure that, in cases like the one before the Court, contested decisions were in exact proportion to the seriousness of the facts, which themselves had to be of the exact type to justify the decision in law. For instance, only a serious threat to the public interest could justify such a serious sanction and it had been on that basis that the decision affecting the applicant association had been set aside. Moreover, if an individual measure was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, it would inevitably also be in breach of section 14 of the Law of 1881 as it was now interpreted by the case-law of the Conseil d’Etat because it would exceed the limits to policing powers set by this case-law. Therefore, regardless of any factual considerations, and for all the reasons given above, there was nothing to warrant the argument that the policing powers conferred on the administrative authorities by the contested law were not in themselves in keeping with the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention.


65.  The Government maintained at the outset that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, because he had not experienced any negative effects in relation to the publication in Kauno Diena. They noted that the majority of cases examined by the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention had involved either final criminal convictions or civil decisions against a person. In the instant case, however, the internal inquiry into the applicant’s actions regarding the publication, although opened on the very same day as that of the publication, 1 March 2006, was discontinued on 22 March 2006 on the ground that the acts committed by him did not constitute a disciplinary violation of the Statute of Military Discipline because he had acted within the bounds of his right to impart information, in accordance with Article 21 § 3 of LMS. A mere internal inquiry into the applicant’s actions, which in itself did not create any consequences for the applicant, therefore could not be considered as constituting an interference with the right to freedom of expression. Even if the Court assumed that the mere opening of an internal inquiry could be seen as interference, the Government considered that it was authorised by, inter alia, Article 36 of LMS which establishes certain restrictions associated with military service, including public expression of disagreement with policies being implemented by the Government of a democratically elected State. The opening of the internal inquiry into the applicant’s acts pursued a legitimate aim “in the interests of national security” and “for the prevention of disorder”. Lastly, the inquiry was “necessary” and proportionate, given that the applicant’s criticism of the new Statute of Military Discipline had been expressed publicly and not internally (see E.S. v. Germany (dec.), no. 23576/94, 29 November 1995; and Grigoriades v. Greece, 25 November 1997, § 47, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VII).


39.  The Government observed that cases like the present one, where an individual’s right directly opposes another right of another individual, have their special features. The Government referred in this respect to the subsidiarity principle. In their view, the impugned measures could be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons adduced by the domestic courts had been relevant and sufficient. There was thus no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that her prosecution and subsequent conviction on account of a speech she had made during the Newroz celebrations had constituted an unjustified interference with her freedom of expression. She further alleged under Article 7 of the Convention that section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 had been insufficiently precise to justify her criminal conviction.


24.  The applicant submitted that strict liability established by domestic law in cases of disseminating information damaging dignity, honour or reputation (see paragraph 18 above) was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In the applicant’s opinion a journalist was liable to pay compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage only if he had acted with malice and his fault had been established by a court. In cases where a journalist had defamed a public official unintentionally, only rectification and pecuniary damages should be available to the plaintiff. The applicant further argued that a journalist could not be required to prove the veracity of his every allegation according to the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard applied in criminal law. A journalist who published an article about police brutality might not be reasonably required to act as a prosecutor and collect the evidence of guilt in a criminal case. His role was to urge the prosecution authorities to initiate criminal proceedings by making public the facts of ill-treatment and by drawing attention to them.


66.  The applicant submitted further that the refusal to allow the evidence of Mr Moule and Mr Walusimbi violated Article <mask> of the Convention. As a result of the refusal, his defence had failed and, ultimately, he had been bound by an injunction prohibiting repetition of allegations which he said were true. In the circumstances, it was disproportionate for the domestic courts to have excluded the evidence merely on the basis that, if it were allowed, an adjournment would have been necessary.


36.  The Government highlighted that the present case also engaged the Article 8 and Article 6 rights of G.L. In the choice between the single-publication rule and the Internet publication rule, these competing interests should be balanced. They pointed to the fact that there was no consistency of approach to this issue in other jurisdictions and concluded that, on the facts of this case, the application of the Internet publication rule was a permissible and proportionate restriction on the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and did not violate Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The applicant complained that his criminal convictions for defamation had violated his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court will confine its examination to the complaints as submitted by the applicant in the application forms, which were communicated to the respondent Government and did not include the compensation proceedings brought against him (paragraph 19 above). Article 10 reads as follows:


73.  The applicant further complained that the decision of the Migration Board and the judgment of the Federal Administrative Court infringed his rights under Article 2, Article 5 and Article <mask> of the Convention. He did not provide any specific arguments as to how the Swiss authorities had violated these rights and why he thought that these Convention rights had been infringed. It follows that these complaints are not substantiated. They are therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


22.  The Government argued that the applicant’s expressions fell outside the scope of protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it had been established in the domestic proceedings that the applicant had intended to insult E.P., as proven by the fact that he had accompanied the diffusion of the true facts with adverse judgments relating to her position in public office and inappropriate characterisations which had exceeded the limits of admissible criticism. The applicant’s words were susceptible of harming E.P.’s honour and reputation and therefore the applicant’s conviction could not be considered as an interference with his right to freedom of expression.


82.  The applicant disputed, in essence, that the domestic law applied in his case had met the criteria of foreseeability and accessibility, or, in other words, that his conviction had been “lawful” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, the Court notes firstly that, as it has already held above, the State Secrets Act, taken together with Presidential Decree no. 1203, were in themselves sufficiently precise to enable the applicant to foresee the consequences of his actions. In so far as the applicant complained of the extensive and therefore unforeseeable interpretation of the said legal instruments by the domestic courts, which had allegedly relied on an unpublished ministerial decree, it is clear from the facts of the present case that the applicant, by virtue of his office, had access to Decree no. 055, read it and signed a document to that effect in autumn 1996 (see paragraph 19 above), that is, prior to the commission of the offences imputed to him. Against this background, the Court rejects the applicant's argument concerning the alleged lack of accessibility and foreseeability of the domestic law applied in his case.


28.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint had been thoroughly examined by the national courts, which had applied the law in force at the relevant time to the particular circumstances of the case. They emphasised the fact that in its judgment of 8 April 2005, the Craiova District Court had taken into consideration the Court’s case-law under Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The applicants alleged a violation of their right to peaceful assembly. They complained, in particular, about the disruptive security measures implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square, the early termination of the assembly and their arrest followed by their conviction for administrative offences. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


27.  The Government emphasised, firstly, that Turkish legislation, while granting public-sector employees the freedom to set up associations to defend their rights, did not guarantee trade-union freedom in the public sector, covering the rights to strike and to conduct collective bargaining. They noted, secondly, that the trade union's representatives had argued from the outset before the national courts that their association was a trade union of public-sector employees and that the concept of trade union included the rights to strike and to collective bargaining. Referring to National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (27 October 1975, § 39, Series A no. 19) and Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden (6 February 1976, § 34, Series A no. 21), they asserted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not secure any particular treatment of trade-union members by the State or the right to conclude collective-bargaining agreements. They alleged that the Convention's requirement was that trade unions be authorised to strive for the protection of their members' interests through means that the State was free to determine. In the instant case, the decision to dissolve Tüm Haber Sen had been intended to prevent unlawful unionisation, and the interference had been justified in terms of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.


62.  The applicants furthermore maintained that physical force had been used against them by police, and that that force had not been necessary in a democratic society and had in any event been disproportionate to whatever legitimate aim the Government had claimed to be pursuing. While reiterating the Court’s reasoning in the case of Bukta and Others v. Hungary (no. 25691/04, § 37, ECHR 2007‑III), they submitted that the public authorities should have shown a certain degree of tolerance towards their peaceful gatherings at the University. Lastly, in their view, the imposition of administrative fines had only served to punish them for their having exercised their rights under Article 10 and Article <mask> of the Convention and had been intended to have a “chilling effect” upon anyone who might have been willing to protest against the Government’s reforms in the educational sphere.


44.  The applicants alleged that their conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 constituted an interference with their right to freedom of assembly. They stated that the interference in question was not prescribed by law, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, since they had been unable to anticipate that their participation in the demonstrations of 17 December 2005 and 19 February 2006 and their conduct during those events would lead to them being prosecuted pursuant to these provisions and to the sentences imposed on them. They stressed in this connection that both the ESP and the SGD, in whose activities they had participated, were legal civil society organisations and that the demonstrations in question had been lawful and peaceful.


96.  The Government considered that neither Article 10 nor Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached. The interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression and freedom of assembly by their detention had been justified. It had been based on section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA, a provision which had been sufficiently precise to be foreseeable in terms of its application to the applicants. It had pursued legitimate aims, as the applicants’ detention had been in the interest of public safety and for the prevention of crime.


26.  The applicant organisation complained that there had been an unlawful interference with its right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, on account of the prohibition issued by the municipality of the public rally planned for 19 April 2000. It also complained of the lack of an effective domestic remedy for its complaint under Article 11 of the Convention on account of the domestic courts having declared null and void the prohibition issued by the municipality almost a year after the date of the planned event and also in view of the alleged inability to seek redress for the actions of the municipality.


12.  The applicant complained that the disciplinary sanction that had been imposed on him for his participation in trade union activities, had amounted to disproportionate interference with his rights under the Convention. In this regard, he relied on Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention alone.


34.  The applicants argued that by refusing to register Ilinden the authorities had infringed their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The refusal of the courts had been based on deliberately erroneous findings in respect of the relevant facts and a misconstruction of the applicable law. It was clear that freedom of association could not be subjected to restrictions other than those which were provided for by law for the protection of national security and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


56.  The applicant union urged the Court to reject any narrow concept of trade-union freedom of association that would be limited to the protection of the strictly personal interests of individual workers. Such an interpretation would impoverish the substance of Article 11. In the many cases it had decided involving strikes, the Court had never attached any significance to what was at stake for the workers in the dispute. It was entirely legitimate for unions to pursue broader, common objectives. Trade unionism was fundamentally about solidarity among union members and among workers more generally, and the wording of Article <mask> of the Convention should be construed in keeping with this. Workers should be able to take industrial action to protect those who may be prevented from doing so, or who, on their own, lack the collective strength to defend their interests at work. This broad concept of freedom of association was espoused by the two most eminent international bodies in the field of trade-union rights, the ILO Committee of Experts and the ECSR. Both had repeatedly criticised the United Kingdom for its ban on secondary action, which they deemed to be incompatible with the relevant international legal standards. These had been interpreted to mean that the only acceptable condition that could be attached to secondary action was that the primary dispute itself be lawful. The applicant union urged the Court to adopt the same position. If that were overbroad, a criterion of proximity might be envisaged, that is to say, a requirement of a link of some sort between workers engaged in primary action and those striking in sympathy with them. Such a link was present here, since the group of workers concerned had originally been Jarvis employees and continued to perform the same work at the same sites after the transfer. A worsening in their terms and conditions could have had negative consequences for all workers in that sector. In the modern economy, the workforce was becoming increasingly fragmented through the transfer of undertakings or part of them, the creation of complex corporate structures, agency work, privatisation, the contracting-out of services leading to further sub-contracting, non-genuine self-employment, and so forth. This led to a situation in which persons performing the same job at the same place of work could have different employers, meaning that they could not legally support one another in time of industrial conflict.


23.  The Government stated that the meeting in issue had been organised unlawfully. They pointed out that the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention imposes limits on the right of peaceful assembly in order to prevent disorder. In their view, the organisation of the Labour Day celebrations in Taksim would have caused major disruption to public life. While the Istanbul Governor’s office had pointed out that a meeting in Taksim Square would not be allowed, as an alternative, four other squares had been indicated, namely two on the European side and two on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. The Government maintained that the gathering of the representatives of the trade unions was permitted by the Beyoğlu district governor, and as a result a small group of representatives could have celebrated Labour Day at the Taksim Square to commemorate their friends who had lost their lives during the demonstrations of 1 May 1977. The Government further stated that they had received intelligence reports that a terrorist organisation would interfere in the Labour Day celebrations to provoke commotion. They also maintained that there were terrorists in the DISK’s headquarters and stones were thrown from the windows towards the police force. Referring to the testimony of the Chief of Şişli Etfal Hospital, the Government stated that it was the demonstrators who had attacked the hospital and the police had intervened to secure the area.


237.  The Government further noted that there was sufficient eyewitness and video evidence proving the violent intentions and violent actions of the demonstrators, as a result of which a number of police officers and civilians had been injured and a significant amount of public and private property had been damaged. On the basis of the above, the Government argued that the demonstration could not be considered a “peaceful assembly” and, accordingly, could not be afforded the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention.


102.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant’s right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant’s rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


30.  The applicants considered that the suspension of Tüm Haber Sen's activities and its dissolution constituted a violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government argued that there had been no interference since, in their opinion, the domestic courts had penalised the applicant trade union on the ground that it laid stress on its supposed legal attributes to strike and to conduct collective bargaining, attributes which fall outside the scope of Article 11 of the Convention.


78.  The applicant party contended that the interference with its right to freedom of association had not been “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. It stated that the interference in question was based principally on Article 69 § 3 of the Constitution, which provided that “the income and expenditure of political parties shall be consistent with their objectives”. There was, however, no guidance in the law or elsewhere to clarify what expenses could be lawfully incurred within the scope of the “objectives of a political party” or what would be considered to constitute “political activities”. Moreover, section 74(1) of the Political Parties Act, which entrusted the Constitutional Court with the duty of inspecting the “lawfulness” of the finances of political parties, was also framed in imprecise terms, thereby leaving that court at liberty to adopt an overly formalistic and restrictive interpretation of the vague requirements of the Act. That uncertainty as regards the exact nature of the expenditure requirements, coupled with the lack of precision regarding the scope and extent of the Constitutional Court’s authority, had made it impossible to foresee the possible consequences of the expenses incurred. By way of example, it had had no way of knowing that travel expenses, legal fees or court costs, gifts and flowers presented at weddings, or official dinners connected to the party’s political activities could not lawfully be charged as party expenses.


37.  The Government agreed that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association had amounted to an interference with its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, in particular adherents of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they averred that in the domestic case file there had been no proof attesting to the Macedonian nationality of the applicant association’s founders, a fact which the applicants had failed to remedy in the impugned proceedings.


49.  The Government submitted that the applicant had had effective domestic remedies at his disposal in respect of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as required by Article 13 of the Convention. In particular, it was open to the applicant to lodge an acknowledgement claim under Article 68 of the CAP contesting the actions of the police, namely the dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square. They argued that this remedy was effective both in theory and in practice, stating that at the material time there had been cases in which plaintiffs successfully brought proceedings before the Administrative Court concerning rights protected by Article 11 and submitting in support of their argument copies of three judgments rendered by that court between August and October 2008. Having failed to avail himself of this remedy, the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies and his complaint under Article 11 was therefore inadmissible.


116.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


45.  The applicants also complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that they had been forced to become co-owners of their company with persons with whom they did not want to be partners. The Court considers that they failed to substantiate their complaint, given that the domestic courts did not order them to be partners with the employees, but to split the assets of the company, effectively ending any form of cooperation with them. In any event nothing prevented the applicants from leaving the company at any time.


21.  The applicant complained that the failure by the Ministry of Justice to register the public association in a timely manner had constituted an interference with his freedom of association. As the Ministry evaded registering the organisation by significantly delaying the examination of the founders' registration requests and breaching the statutory time-limit for the official response, his association had not been able to acquire legal status. This allegedly constituted a violation of his right to freedom of association, as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


201.  The applicant argued that, where a person falls into a category of people who are at risk from unlawful violence from State officials on account of trade union activities, the issues under Article 2 and Article 11 need to be considered separately. She asked the Court to find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as follows:


80.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The demonstration in which the applicant had taken part was not held in a permitted location and the measures taken by the national authorities had not furthered the aim of preventing the dissemination of ideas. Those measures had been taken with a view to preventing disorder and crime.


26.  The Government submitted that the application should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as although the applicant had raised a claim under Article <mask> of the Convention in the EAT it did not press that submission at the oral hearing and accepted that the EAT should proceed to interpret section 174 without reference to Article 11. It was then not able to pursue an appeal against the EAT for ignoring that claim. In particular, the applicant did not require the EAT to apply section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, by seeking to construe the legislation so as to make it compatible with its Convention right. It was only concerned to ensure that it could rely on Mr Lee's various activities as the basis for expelling him; it did not propose any construction of section 174 which would have accorded with its case before this Court, namely that it had an Article 11 right to determine its own membership. They submitted that Article 35 § 1 was not satisfied where an applicant relied on some other ground for impugning a measure, ignoring a possible Convention argument (Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, § 38, ECHR 2004‑III). They asserted that, if the applicant had pressed its submission that Article 11 entitled it to choose its own membership save where exclusion or expulsion caused loss of livelihood and that submission had been accepted, there was ample scope for a creative interpretation of section 174 which would have given effect to that conclusion, including the possibility of reading in a clause “save as necessary to avoid breach of Convention rights”.


105.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


53.  The Government raised two objections to admissibility before the Grand Chamber: one to the effect that it was impossible to rely against them on international instruments other than the Convention, particularly instruments that Turkey had not ratified; and the other to the effect that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the applicants as they were civil servants and not ordinary contractual employees.


22.  The Government submitted that under Article <mask> of the Convention the right of assembly was not an absolute right and therefore could be subjected to restrictions. In Hungary, the possibility of interfering with that right was laid down in an Act of Parliament. The holding of certain assemblies and meetings on public areas must be notified three days ahead. Under section 11(2) of the Assembly Act, the police were empowered to remove from the venue those who disturbed the assembly. In the course of securing an assembly, a police officer might, upon the well-founded suspicion of an administrative or criminal offence, apprehend the perpetrator; under section 142(2) b) of Act no. LXIX of 1999 on Administrative Offences, disobedience was punishable with a fine. Thus, the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly had been restricted in compliance with the conditions prescribed by law.


31.  The applicants submitted that the authorities’ suggestion to change the venue of the “demonstration”, the forceful termination of the “demonstration”, their arrest and the fines imposed in the administrative proceedings constituted an interference with their right of peaceful assembly under Article <mask> of the Convention, considered in the light of Article 10. In the applicants’ view, the applicable legislation did not meet the quality of law required under the Convention because this legislation did not indicate the scope of a public authority’s discretionary power to change or restrict the location or time of a proposed gathering. The legislation did not determine the legal consequences of non-compliance with the authority’s alternative proposal regarding the venue and/or timing of the event. It was not clear whether failure to comply with the proposal entailed administrative liability.


31.  The applicants complained of interference with their freedom of association on account of the acts directed against them, the participation of the clergy and municipal authorities in those acts, and the inactivity of the police when a group of demonstrators broke into and ransacked the party headquarters. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


232.  The Government alleged in the present case that the demonstrators had been the first to attack the police, which proved that they had had violent intentions. The applicant, however, contested such an account of events, both before this Court and the domestic courts (see, by contrast, Primov and Others, cited above, § 158) and claimed that, in fact, the exact opposite had happened and the police had been the first to attack the peaceful demonstrators camping at Freedom Square, brutally dispersing the assembly and intentionally provoking clashes. The Court notes that the Government’s allegation appears to be based on the official account of events as provided in the above-mentioned letter of the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police (see paragraph 22 above). Those findings, however, do not appear to have been reached as a result of any impartial and independent investigation and seem to be based entirely on the testimony of the police officers who had played an active role in the events of 1-2 March 2008, including the confrontation at Freedom Square, and were, moreover, alleged to have used excessive force against the demonstrators. The findings in question are not backed by any objective evidence and, moreover, appear to contradict a number of other materials of the criminal case, including the decision to institute criminal case no. 62202508 and several other documents, from which it appears that the clash at Freedom Square between the demonstrators and the police may in fact have been the consequence of certain unspecified measures taken by the police, aimed at forcibly terminating the demonstration, as opposed to it being a preemptive attack by the demonstrators as alleged by the Government (see paragraphs 15, 28, 29, 30 and 39 above). It is noteworthy that the courts examining the applicant’s criminal case did not in any way address the circumstances of the clash, including the question of who initiated it, omitting from their judgments any relevant details. Even the applicant’s disputed assault on police officer A.Arsh. was presented as a sporadic act, without any assessment of whether the violence was premeditated or a spontaneous development (see paragraph 84 above). It is true that the applicant was also found to have carried a clasp knife, which may suggest that he had had violent intentions. However, taking into account the manner in which that finding was reached and the evidence on which it was based (see paragraphs 208-210 above), as well as the absence of any evidence or even a suggestion that the applicant ever tried to put the alleged knife to use, the Court does not consider this, in the particular circumstances of the case, to be a sufficient and reliable element to deprive him of the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court lastly notes that there are a number of credible reports produced by various international and domestic bodies regarding the events of 1 March 2008 which allege that the demonstrations at Freedom Square were peaceful and cast doubt on the official account of events, including the circumstances of the clash between the demonstrators and the police (see paragraphs 124, 125, 129, 131, 132 and 134 above). Lastly, the Government, while referring to the testimony of a person called V.N., did not, however, provide any details or explanation regarding the identity of that person, his alleged involvement in the events of 1-2 March 2008 or the relevance of his testimony to the applicant’s particular case.


63.  The applicants criticised the manner in which the Government had raised the question concerning interpretation of the Convention. They pointed out that the Chamber had not applied the above-mentioned provisions of the European Social Charter in the present case, but that it had taken into account, in its interpretation of Article <mask> of the Convention, an opinion of the Committee of Independent Experts (now called the European Committee of Social Rights) concerning the connection between the right to organise and collective bargaining.


51.  The applicants complained that their peaceful protests at the University over the period of 19-20 June and 3-4 July 2006 had been violently dispersed and that the prosecuting authorities had failed to initiate an investigation against the responsible authorities. They also denounced the imposition of administrative fines on them in connection with the events of 3 July 2006. They relied on Article 3, Article 5, Article 10 and Article <mask> of the Convention, which in their relevant parts read as follows:


261.  The applicant complained that the refusal by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to allow her to cross the “green line” in order to attend a meeting organised by a radio station in southern Cyprus had prevented her from exercising her right to freedom of assembly and assembly with Greek Cypriots in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


117.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


160.  The Government contended that the disorder at Bolotnaya Square had occurred when some of the organisers and participants had refused to follow the agreed plan, disregarded the police instructions to proceed to the designated venue at Bolotnaya embankment, and sat on the ground causing scuffles and disorder. The intervention of the police had been justified since the assembly had ceased to be “peaceful” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In dispersing the protesters, the police had not resorted to excessive force: only police truncheons had been used; only the most aggressive perpetrators had been targeted; and no tear gas or smoke bombs had been deployed.


45.  The applicants maintained that the provisions on political parties and Article 84 of the Constitution, which established a system of automatic forfeiture of parliamentary office following the dissolution of a political party, were incompatible with the Convention, in particular its Preamble and Articles 9, 10 and 11. They submitted that they had in no way caused the dissolution of the DEP by their words or deeds and concluded from that that the interference in question had not been justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention.


161.  The applicants complained that the unjustified refusal of Russian authorities to grant the applicant community re-registration as a religious organisation violated their rights under Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that complaints about the refusal of registration fall to be examined from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention read in the light of Article 9 (see The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army, cited above, §§ 74 and 75, with further references). As the religious nature of the applicant community was not disputed at the national level and it had been officially recognised as a regional religious organisation, the Court considers that this approach must be followed in the instant case.


40.  The applicants maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention encompassed a negative right to freedom of association on an equal footing with the positive right and that consequently the Danish Protection against Dismissal due to Association Membership Act of 9 June 1982, as amended on 13 June 1990, violated that Article. In effect, it allowed an employer to require an employee to be a member of a trade union or a specific trade union in order to obtain employment.


19.  The applicant submitted that since in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2) (cited above) the Court had already examined the authorities’ actions in relation to the rally on 12 September 2007 and found a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, it was no longer justified to examine that complaint. By contrast, his complaint under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 11 in relation to that rally still required examination.


54.  The applicant complained that her unlawful detention for preventive purposes violated her right to liberty as provided in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. That detention further served the purpose of preventing her from expressing her views on the transport of castor containers in demonstrations or by climbing actions, in breach of her rights under Article 10 and Article <mask> of the Convention. Articles 5 § 1, 10 and 11, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


84.  The Government submitted that in some of the cases about which the applicants complained there had been no interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, on 30 July 2000, even though the mayor had banned the meeting and the District Court had upheld that ban, Ilinden had been able to hold it without interference by the authorities. Likewise, there had been no interference with Ilinden's meeting in April 2000. Despite the provocative attitude of some of the organisation's leaders, the police had been able to preserve public order without impinging on their freedom of assembly. Further, there had been no interference with the meeting held on 22 April 2001 near the Rozhen monastery. The applicants' averment that the police had ordered the removing of the band on the wreath laid by members and followers of Ilinden and had arrested one person was untrue. The police had merely taken one person who was drunk out of the area where the meeting had been taking place. This could not be interpreted as an interference with the applicants' freedom of assembly. There had been no interference with the meeting held on 4 May 2001 either. The members and followers of Ilinden had gathered in the centre of Blagoevgrad and the police had asked them to continue the event in a nearby church only with a view to protecting them. The applicants' averment that the police had seized a camera and had ordered the members and followers of Ilinden to remove the band from the wreath they had laid at the monument was untrue. Finally, the meeting held on 12 September 2002 had not been interfered with. Despite the presence of a hostile crowd, the police had been able to secure the members and followers of Ilinden access to the site of the event. Only the adequate actions of the police had prevented the occurring of serious incidents.


22.  The applicant association complained of a violation of its right to peaceful assembly. It claimed that the ban imposed on it on holding a demonstration had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


48.  The applicant finally complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that trade unions did not protect his rights, that the judgment of 18 December 2002 remained unenforced and that he could not receive the wage arrears because the proceedings in his case had been excessively long. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


22.  The applicant complained about the refusal of the domestic courts to register it as an association. It further complained that it could not even reapply for registration, given the fact that by the time the registration request had been refused the deadline for the setting up of such professional associations had expired. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which reads as follows:


13.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of his right to freedom of association, arguing that the rejection by the domestic courts of the application for registration of the association founded by him and four other associates had not been necessary in a democratic society and that the courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for that restriction. The relevant part of the aforementioned Article reads as follows:


42.  The applicants complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of association had been infringed in that they had not been admitted to the ABA because of the views that they had expressed about the state of the legal profession in the country. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the applicants’ complaint does not raise a separate issue under Article <mask> of the Convention and falls to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


38. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the Association’s Articles and Programme null and void had violated their freedom of association, in that it led to the dissolution of the Association and deprived its members of the possibility jointly to pursue the purposes they had laid down in its Articles and Programme. In so far as relevant, Article 11 of the Convention provides:


84.  The Government further alleged that the disorder at Bolotnaya Square had occurred when some of the organisers and participants had refused to follow the agreed plan and had attempted to march outside the agreed area. They had disregarded the police instructions to proceed to the designated venue at Bolotnaya embankment, even though the venue had been accessible, and had sat on the ground, causing scuffles and disorder. According to the Government, two State Duma deputies, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation and a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation had supported the police’s demands and tried to convince the protesters to follow the route, to no avail. Then, at 6 p.m. one of the organisers, acting at the request of the police, had announced the early closure of the meeting; from 5.58 p.m. to 7 p.m. some of the protesters had attempted to break the police cordon and had thrown various objects at the police. From 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. the police had gradually forced the protesters to leave and had arrested those who offered the most active resistance. The Government submitted that the intervention of the police had been justified since the assembly had ceased to be “peaceful” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In dispersing the protesters, the police had not resorted to excessive force: only police truncheons had been used; only the most aggressive perpetrators had been targeted; and no tear gas or smoke bombs had been deployed.


24.  The applicants complained that the refusal of the respondent State to register the applicant association as a religious association had been in violation of their rights under Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention. For the reasons stated in the Ohrid Archdiocese case the Court considers that these complaints should be analysed from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention read in the light of Article 9 (ibid., § 61). They further alleged that the refusal had also been in violation of Article 14 to the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 9. These Articles read as follows:


28.  The applicants argued that the refusal to register the Civic Committee had not been in accordance with the law, that it had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. The applicants also alleged that their case concerned several aspects of the national legislation and administrative practice which run counter to the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention.


18.  The Government submitted that in United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov (no. 2) (cited above) the Court had already given a broad ruling in relation to interference by the authorities with rallies organised by Ilinden. It was therefore not warranted to take up the same issue in a case brought by an individual claiming to have himself suffered a breach of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Although the applicant had not been a party to that earlier case, he did not have any separate legal interest requiring protection, and could not claim that he had suffered separate damage calling for an award of just satisfaction. Nor did the case concern a continuing breach, so as to require consecutive rulings by the Court.


30.  The applicants submitted that the reasons given by the Sofia Court of Appeal to uphold the refusal to register Ilinden had been arbitrary, insufficient and contrary to this Court’s case-law under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Sofia Court of Appeal had not properly explained the link between, on the one hand, the allegedly tense situation in some unidentified “neighbouring States” and the migrant crisis affecting Europe and, on the other hand, Ilinden’s registration. Nor had it duly substantiated its finding that the applicants had caused breaches of public order, basing it on a mixture of speculation and hostile propaganda by the Bulgarian media. The applicants noted that it was them who had in the past fallen victim to provocations by nationalist groups and violent acts by law-enforcement officers. The Sofia Court of Appeal had also overstated the meaning of the statements contained in Ilinden’s articles of association in relation to the treatment to which Macedonians had been subjected in the past. Ilinden had not levelled allegations in that respect against ordinary Bulgarians but against nationalist groups and the public authorities. Moreover, contrary to the position of the Sofia Court of Appeal, the mere inclusion of such statements in the articles of association had not restricted the possibility for others not to believe them. The approach of that court had been contrary to pluralism and to the possibility, in a democratic society, to express opinions which offended, shocked and disturbed.


31.  The applicants complained that the suppression of the demonstrations and the arrests made by the police were in violation of their rights to freedom of expression and assembly as provided in Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. In respect of the events of 3 February 2009, the first applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the State had not discharged its positive obligation to protect his right to freedom of assembly. The applicants also complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that their deprivation of liberty had been unlawful. Article 5 § 1 reads as follows:


262.  The applicant contended that she had been invited to attend a meeting to be held on 20 June 1997, which had been organised by a radio station on the side of the line controlled by the Cypriot Government. The applicant and her daughter had applied, in advance, to the “TRNC” regime's Foreign Ministry for permission to cross over to that side. Permission had been refused without any reason being given but journalists from the northern side had been granted permission to go. This impugned measure had constituted an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of association under Article <mask> of the Convention.


15.  The applicants complained that the dispersal of the demonstrations of 20 October 2012, 12 January, 26 January and 30 April 2013 by the police and their arrests and convictions for administrative offences had been in breach of their right to freedom of assembly, as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention, and their right to freedom of expression, as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention, which read as follows:


29.  The applicants complained that the failure by the Ministry of Justice to register their organisation in a timely manner constituted an interference with their freedom of association. As the Ministry evaded registering the organisation by significantly delaying the examination of their registration requests and breaching the statutory time-limits for the official response, their association could not acquire legal status. This allegedly constituted a violation of their right to freedom of association, as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


46.  The applicant disagreed that the prohibition on participating in strikes for certain categories of railway workers was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. He alleged that the right to strike could be restricted, but not completely prohibited. Furthermore, such restrictions had to be “prescribed by law”, pursue a “legitimate aim” and be “necessary in a democratic society”, as provided by Article 11 § 2 of the Convention and Article 8 § 1 (a) and (d) and § 2 of the ICESCR. The applicant argued that (in violation of Article 26 § 2 of the 2003 Railway Act) no federal law had specified for which categories of railway workers strikes were prohibited and unlawful. In any event, the applicant asserted that the right to strike of the railway workers and locomotive drivers could not be restricted to such an extent as to impose a blanket prohibition (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 82, ECHR 2005‑IX). The applicant submitted that the Russian courts should have examined the particular circumstances of his case, such as specific nature of his duties (see, for instance, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 107, 12 November 2008), whether his participation in the strike had indeed affected the railway traffic and whether it had been possible to replace him by other workers not participating in the strike.


20.  The applicants complained that the failure by the Ministry of Justice to register their association in a timely manner constituted a violation of their right to freedom of association. As the Ministry had evaded registering the organisation by significantly delaying the examination of their registration request and breaching the statutory time-limit for the official response, their organisation could not acquire legal status. Moreover, they complained that the founders’ failure to include the description of the association’s activity in its name, as well as to sign its charter, could not be a ground for refusal to register the association. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as follows:


51.  The applicants pointed out that the interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had not been lawful. The police had had no power to give them orders because they had not committed an administrative or criminal offence. The authorities had failed to effectively inform the demonstrators of the termination of the protest and of the order to disperse. The applicants had been unaware of their decision to end the protest. They pointed out that pursuant to domestic law the police had been required to suspend the protest first, and to give the organisers time to remedy any breach before they had terminated it. However, in the present case no time had been given either to the organisers or to the demonstrators to follow the police instructions to disperse.


45.  The applicant reiterated that the Court had held – for instance, in National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (27 October 1975, § 39, Series A no. 19) – that the Convention safeguarded freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by engaging in trade union action, the conduct and development of which the Contracting States had to both permit and make possible. Article <mask> of the Convention nevertheless left each State a free choice as to the means to be used towards this end. The granting of the right to strike represented without a doubt one of the most important of these means, but there were others. Such a right, which was not expressly enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, might be subject under national law to regulation of a kind that limited its exercise in certain instances (see, for instance, Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden, 6 February 1976, § 36, Series A no. 21).


26.  The Government accepted, in view of the domestic courts’ findings, that the refusal to renew the applicant party’s registration and its dissolution were unlawful. However, they maintained that there has been no violation of the applicant party rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordovia, acting as a supervisory instance, acknowledged that and on 5 September 2002 ordered the registration of the applicant party.


113.  The Government of the Republic of Moldova submitted that the Chamber had not struck a sufficient balance between the freedom of association claimed by the applicant union and the freedom of religion and right to autonomy of the Orthodox Church. They contended that Article <mask> of the Convention could not be construed as imposing a positive obligation on the State to recognise a secular association within a religious community where such recognition would be at variance with the State’s duty of denominational neutrality.


35.  The applicants further complained of violations of Article 5 § 1 (c), Article 10 and Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, they alleged that they had not been informed of the reasons for their arrest and that their rights to freedom of expression and association had been breached since they had been prevented from participating in the festivities.


65.  The applicants also complained that the levying of the monitoring fees on their wages had violated their right to negative freedom of association under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the fees had been tantamount to forced membership of the Union and had contributed to the general union activities. Moreover, under that Article, read in conjunction with Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, they claimed that, through the payment of the fees, they had come to support the Union’s political and ideological programme. Finally, under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 11 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they asserted that they had been discriminated against in relation to members of the Union as well as members of other trade unions.


53.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to peaceful assembly. He claimed that the ban repeatedly imposed by the Moscow authorities on holding the Pride March and the picketing had not been in accordance with the law, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


28.  The applicant union complained, firstly, that the domestic courts had refused to recognise it as having the necessary representative status for collective bargaining within a company as a result of their incorrect approach to the calculation of its membership among the employees of Tukaş, and secondly, that the legislation and the courts had not prevented the company from eradicating trade unions from its premises by means of wrongful dismissals. To that end it relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


40.  The applicants contested the Government’s interpretation, which they considered restrictive, of the concept of “trade union” set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They affirmed that that article, including its aspect relating to trade unions freedom, concerned “everyone”, and not just persons with employee status. That meant that Article 11 was also applicable to farmers. The applicants submitted that to exclude farmers from the scope of Article 11 of the Convention would be to deprive a large number of persons of the possibility of collectively defending, by means of trade unions, their professional interests, which they summarised.


37.  The applicants argued that the fact that they were fined for organising and/or participating at the CDPP gatherings amounted to a breach of their right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. According to them, the present case was to be distinguished from Ziliberberg v. Moldova ((dec.), no. 61821/00, 4 May 2004) because the CDPP gatherings were peaceful, they concerned a matter of major public interest and contributed to a public debate, and that the highest fines possible under the law had been applied to them.