146.  The applicant submitted numerous complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that the trial court had made incorrect findings of fact, misapplied national law and made an inadequate assessment of the evidence. She argued that the trial court had relied on evidence obtained through unlawful searches and on the transcripts of the (telephone) tapping prepared by the prosecution.


136.  The applicants complained of non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions given in their favour. They alleged a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The first and fifth applicants raised a further complaint under Article 13 of the Convention as regards the lack of effective remedy in domestic law. The applicants all claimed that there were no grounds for distinguishing their cases from the Court’s findings in its Ivanov judgment. On the contrary, the circumstances of their cases demonstrated that the national dysfunction identified in the Ivanov judgment persisted to date.


27.  The applicants complained that their right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions had been violated because of the domestic authorities’ continuing failure to decide on the expropriation of their plot of land and their consequent inability to make use of their property during that period. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which read as follows:


21.  The applicants complained of the prolonged failure of the domestic authorities to comply with the binding judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court, annulling the agreement to transfer Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund and its subsequent sale by the latter to the HSBC bank. They alleged that the continuing non-enforcement of the judgments amounted to a breach of their right to a fair trial and to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. The applicants further alleged that the unlawful administrative acts had constituted a breach of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. In this connection with their complaints, they relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


29.  The applicant's heirs submitted that the CLEMC's decision was decisive for the applicant's right to a pension, the amount of which was directly dependent on his degree of disability, and for his right to a supplement to his pension, which was also dependent on the CLEMC's determination whether he was in need of another person's assistance. Referring to the cases of Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands (judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 99), Deumeland v. Germany (judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 100) and Francesco Lombardo v. Italy (judgment of 26 November 1992, Series A no. 249‑A), the applicant's heirs submitted that social security rights which were not the result of a discretionary decision by a state authority but were determined on the basis of criteria contained in the law, such as those in issue in the present case, were civil rights within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


28.  The Government contended that the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention had been introduced out of time. In their opinion, the six‑month time-limit started running on 23 June 2006 (see paragraph 13 above), as that was the date of the final domestic decision concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty. As regards the subsequent compensation proceedings brought by the applicant, the Government maintained that they concerned his civil rights under Article <mask> of the Convention only and were of no relevance for his complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


27.  The Government further stated, with reference to Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by Decision of the Constitutional Court of 14 February 2000, that the summoning of parties to a supervisory review hearing remained at the discretion of the relevant court provided the review procedure was not triggered by an application that would be to the applicant's detriment. The Government noted that the application for supervisory review, as well as the prosecutor's pleadings at the hearing, were not to the applicant's detriment. Given that the supervisory review procedure had benefited the applicant by sentencing him to a shorter term of imprisonment as a result of a new legal classification of his actions, the Government were of the view that the Supreme Court's failure to secure the attendance of the applicant and his counsel did not breach Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The Government contended that the domestic courts had examined the evidence of the defence and properly assessed it in the cases of both applicants. In the Government’s view the fact that the domestic courts had emphasised the police officers’ statements could not as such be regarded as non-compliance with the requirement of fairness enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, in the case of the second applicant the courts questioned a defence witness on her motion. Furthermore, the Government argued that the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for the mandatory participation of a public prosecutor in each case concerning an administrative offence. Their submissions in that respect were similar to those made in Karelin v. Russia (no. 926/08, §§ 45-48, 20 September 2016).


35.  The applicant maintained that the proceedings had been unfair in that a large part of the recorded telephone conversations relevant to his defence had been destroyed by the police. It was unlikely that the prosecutor had acquainted himself with any of the recordings before the case was transferred to him for the consideration of charges. In any case, a procedure whereby the prosecuting authority itself attempts to assess the importance of certain evidence to the defence cannot meet the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. Nor could the testimony of a police officer concerning the intercepted material be given much weight in assessing the relevance of the destroyed recordings. The applicant pointed out that he had given specific and acceptable reasons for his requests for access to the recordings not included in the case file. The shortcomings in the legislation in force at the time of the proceedings did not absolve the State from complying with the requirement of fairness of the proceedings embodied in Article 6 of the Convention.


17.  The Government argued that the Council lacked necessary funds for execution of the judgments in the applicants' favour. They further submitted that the judgments of 28 March 2001 and 20 November 2002 remained unenforced, and thus, the applicants' rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were violated. As regards the judgment of 20 June 2001, the Government submitted that it was fully enforced on 8 August 2002.


27.  The applicant contended that the charges against him could be considered “criminal” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that CAO cases were examined by criminal sections of the courts and that in the French legal system offences of this kind were part of the Criminal Code. He further claimed to have been detained by the police for five and a half hours on 18 April 2000, during which time he was interrogated by criminal investigators. The applicant also argued that, beside fines, the Code of Administrative Offences provided for procedural measures such as detention, corporal search, search of property and administrative arrest. If a fine was not paid, the sanction could be commuted to an administrative arrest of ten days for every MDL 18 (the equivalent of EUR 1.59 at the time). Had he not had the means to pay the fine, he would have been imprisoned for twenty days. He stated that his monthly stipend as a student was MDL 50-60, depending on his academic performance, and that therefore the fine imposed on him constituted more than a half of his monthly income.


86.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of his rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that he understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to provide him with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of his own choosing and to prepare his defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


141.  The applicant claimed a total amount of 210,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He claimed EUR 20,000 for the alleged infringement of Article 5 § 2, EUR 50,000 for the ill-treatment to which he claimed to have been subjected on 18 August 2003, EUR 70,000 for the inhuman conditions of detention, EUR 10,000 for infringement of his right to correspondence, and EUR 60,000 for the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He did not claim any amount in respect of pecuniary damage.


23.  The applicant alleged violation of his rights under Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention since the Supreme Court had rejected as inadmissible ratione valoris his appeal on points of law unlike its earlier judgments in the same proceedings in which it had considered on the merits the plaintiff’s appeals on points of law. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint should be analysed only under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


15.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They alleged that they had been convicted solely on the basis of their statements taken under duress in police custody. They maintained that they were denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings. They submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. Finally, they complained that Turkish law does not give the possibility to cross-examine witnesses, thereby, depriving them of their right to confront the witnesses. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


81.  The Government submitted that the proceedings brought by the applicant had been fair. They had been conducted in the usual way, with the participation of medical experts to elucidate points that required special knowledge. The independence and impartiality of those experts had been open to review by the courts, at the request of the parties to the case. That manner of proceeding was fully consistent with Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The Government claimed that the applicant had not submitted his bank details to the bailiff service and that he should have enquired about the state of enforcement after May 2001. They acknowledged, however, that a payment to an unauthorised person had been effected through the fault of the Bailiffs Office of the Central Administrative District of Moscow which had not verified the authenticity of Mr K.'s authority form. The Government admitted a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1.


54.  The applicant also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the ground that the İzmir District Court had sought only the opinion of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a public institution. In his view, that institution was not qualified to provide an opinion on Alevis since it was not specialised in the Alevi faith and had no interest in it. He added that had the court sought the opinion of the Federation of Alevi-Bektashi Associations (a private federation of Alevi associations), its interpretation would have been different from that of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The court should have sought the opinion of that federation or of religious-affairs specialists. The applicant argued that the domestic courts had therefore conducted an inadequate investigation, rendering the proceedings unfair.


26.  The Government did not raise any objection as to the admissibility of the application. However, the Court would like to make a preliminary observation on the issue of applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the legality review proceedings in the present case. Under the Court’s case-law, the legality review request is not an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention that applicants are required to exhaust (see Trajče Stojanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 1431/03, 16 September 2008 and Dimitrovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 21466/03, 30 September 2008, in which the public prosecutor rejected the applicants’ applications that the legality review request be submitted to the Supreme Court). In the Bočvarska judgment the Court considered Article 6 applicable in a situation when the legality review request was accepted to the applicant’s significant disadvantage. In that case the Court found a violation of the “reasonable time” requirement in respect of proceedings in which the legality review request had been used successfully on four occasions (see Bočvarska, cited above).  In the Gorou judgment (see Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) [GC], no. 12686/03, §§ 27-36, ECHR 2009‑...) the Court found Article 6 applicable to similar proceedings, which ended with a refusal of the public prosecutor to submit an appeal on points of law to the Court of Cassation. In the present case, the public prosecutor submitted the legality review request to the Supreme Court which the latter dismissed on the merits. Given the fact that the outcome of the legality review proceedings was directly decisive for the applicant’s “civil right in question”, there is no obstacle to the applicability of Article 6 to these proceedings after they were launched by the public prosecutor.


27.  The applicants originally complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the unlawful confiscation of their property. The applicants also complained that the domestic courts had denied them access to court to challenge the unlawful actions of the tax police. They invoked Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The applicants later complained about the non-enforcement of the judgment given in favour of the first applicant, and again invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


23.  The applicant asked the Court to rule on the merits as he remained victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He claimed compensation for pecuniary damages in the amount of DKK 350,000 and non-pecuniary damage in the amount of DKK 110,000. Accordingly, the High Court judgment did not provide adequate redress for the violation of the Convention, rather it should be viewed as an attempt by the Government to correct the errors made by the tax authorities and the prosecution, which resulted in them having to reduce their estimation of the tax evasion from DKK 2,500,000 when the proceedings started to DKK 57,252 when the final indictment was procured during the trial. In any event, the applicant submitted, the so-called compensation failed to provide a proper and adequate redress for the length of the proceedings and the negative impact that the original criminal charge had imposed on the applicant as a bona fide business professional.


82.  The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention, referring to various aspects of his trial. He referred to his confinement in glass cabins during the court hearings, and the intensive schedule of the hearings, and alleged that he had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. He further submitted that he had not been able effectively to defend himself owing to a lack of opportunity to consult his legal counsel in confidence during the trial. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


49.  The Government considered that the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention had been complied with in the present case, as the applicant had had access to court. They referred to the case of Silickienė v. Lithuania (no. 20496/02, §§ 48-49, 10 April 2012) where the Court had found that although the applicant had not been a party to the criminal proceedings, the system in question had not been without safeguards.


18.  The applicant submitted that his trial took too long and disagreed that the context of the jury trial was a relevant factor, States being obliged to organise their judicial systems so as to ensure compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the case was not complex and pointed to the fact that the first trial was concluded within thirteen months of the murder as evidence of the straightforward nature of the case.


56.  The applicant company acknowledged that Article 814 of the COCP did not compel the same judges to examine a request for a retrial. However, it submitted that this provision violated Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as it failed to guarantee the right to a fair trial of the party applying for a retrial (“the plaintiff” in the relevant Maltese legislation – see paragraphs 30-32 above).


71.  The Government further submitted that the administrative courts’ decisions finding that they lacked jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s application had not infringed his right of access to a court for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. Pointing out that the State had a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere, they asserted that the 1986 Law did not provide for any appeal against measures relating to the execution of sentences taken in accordance with the law. Once the ordinary courts had passed sentence, the Luxembourg legislature, which had not followed the French example of instituting a post-sentencing judge, sought to ensure that the implementation of that judicial decision was not controlled by the courts, and entrusted this task to the executive. This division of powers pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of public order and the prevention of crime. In that connection the Government stated that, while the 1986 Law was aimed at the gradual reintegration of prisoners into society, the sentence was designed to protect society from an individual who was liable to commit further offences outside prison. There was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved, given that prisoners had the possibility of applying for several periods of prison leave. Lastly, the Government stressed that the 1986 Law provided for other measures benefiting prisoners in the context of the enforcement of sentences, such as the semi‑custodial regime.


34. The Government argued that this complaint should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae since Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to disciplinary proceedings under either its civil or criminal head. They referred in particular to the Court's case-law in Eskelinen Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007‑...), which, they argued, suggested that Article 6 of the Convention merely applied to ordinary labour disputes such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements. Disciplinary proceedings must be excluded from the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 as the relationship between civil servants and the state was not comparable to that between employees and their employers.


71.  The Government submitted that the right of access to court was not absolute and that Article <mask> of the Convention did not prohibit the establishing of restrictions, including court fees. The courts had given the applicant company time to comply with the obligation to pay the court fees, but had had to refuse to consider the appeal when the applicant company failed to pay.


42.  The applicant maintained that the length of proceedings was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article <mask> of the Convention. She contended that the proceedings had been delayed by the domestic courts as they could have estimated T.G.’s income and, on that basis, fixed an amount of maintenance from the very beginning of the proceedings.


70.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings against him had fallen short of the guarantees of a fair hearing within a reasonable time and that his right to be presumed innocent had been violated by virtue of the Supreme Court's decisions of 31 July 2001 and 30 January 2002. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


20.  The applicant complained of unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that one of the judges at first instance had not been impartial; that his conviction had been based in part on his and his co-defendants’ statements which had been obtained under duress and in in breach of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination; that the first-instance court had refused to summon some of the witnesses he had requested it to call; that he had not been provided with adequate time to study the case-file after his conviction; and that he had not been provided with free legal assistance to prepare his appeal against the conviction of 20 December 2005. The applicant relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that this part of the applicant’s complaints falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


57.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings that she had brought before the administrative courts had not been concluded within a reasonable time. She further maintained under the same head that the domestic courts had delivered contradictory decisions in identical cases and that the Twelfth Division of the Supreme Administrative Court had failed to examine her submissions regarding the decision rendered by the General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings Divisions with regard to R.B.


35.  The applicants complained of a violation of their rights guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court cannot speculate on the outcome of the proceedings had the applicants’ action been examined in full compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. For these reasons, this part of the application should be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.


326.  The applicant contended that the Cypriot authorities violated his right of access to court under Article <mask> of the Convention by failing to ensure his participation in the inquest proceedings, by failing to grant him free legal aid and by failing to provide him with information on available legal remedies in Cyprus. Article 6 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


66.  The applicant also complained that he had not been able to participate in the supervisory review proceedings, and that the presiding judge was the very judge who had made the protest. In the light of its finding that the quashing of the decision of 13 March 2001 in supervisory review proceedings was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to deal with these issues.


33.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his trial was unfair. Firstly, he alleged that the trial judge’s ruling under Article 4 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (as to the desirability of his giving evidence) was improper and unfair. This was particularly so as the trial judge had erred in refusing to consider Dr. Davies’ evidence regarding his observations of the excluded videotaped interviews. Secondly, he alleged that the trial judge’s direction to the jury in respect of adverse inferences was flawed. The trial judge should have been required to direct the jury that they should not draw any adverse inferences unless they considered that there was a case to answer. Article 6 § 1 provides as relevant:


43.  The applicant complained that, in two respects, the procedure through which he challenged his provisional detention before the Indictment Division of the Thessaloniki Criminal Court did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 and Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article 5 § 4, which is the lex specialis for matters of deprivation of liberty (see Reinprecht v. Austria, no. 67175/01, § 55, ECHR 2005-XII). Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:


19.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been deprived of the opportunity to present his case effectively. In this connection he complained that he had been given limited access to the security files, as the copies supplied to him had been redacted; that there had been no oral hearing; that the authorities had refused to examine witnesses proposed by him; and that they had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions. He further complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention about the publication of the Commission’s decision on its website before it had become final. In his submissions of 13 November 2015, the applicant also alleged a lack of impartiality on the part of the State Judicial Council which had declared his position as a judge terminated, given the participation of V.B., a former judge in the Administrative Court, who had presided over the adjudicating panel in the lustration proceedings against him and had been elected as a member of the State Judicial Council three days after the Administrative Court had decided the applicant’s lustration case. Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


13.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court. They further alleged that the national courts had convicted them on the basis of the statements that they had made to the police and to the investigating judge. The applicants finally maintained that they had been deprived of their right to defend themselves by a lawyer. In this connection, they invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


48.  The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention that she had been detained in appalling conditions; that she had been compelled through threats, unjustified detention and psychological pressure to make admissions. She also raised a number of other complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention concerning the trial and post-trial proceedings. Lastly, she alleged under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention that she had been prosecuted and convicted due to her political opinions and activities.


43.  The Government, referring to the relevant provisions of the Civil Servants Act concerning the Appeals Commission, asserted that this body qualifies as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the applicant had waived his right to a public oral hearing as he had failed to request such a hearing before the Appeals Commission or the Constitutional Court. His statement that the conduct of an oral and public hearing would have been impossible in the light of the legal situation was incorrect. Although the domestic law governing the proceedings at issue did not explicitly provide for public hearings before the Appeals Commission, an interpretation of the relevant provisions in conformity with the Federal Constitution would nevertheless have obliged the Appeals Commission to hold one if this was necessary under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant's waiver did not appear disproportionate as the relevant facts could be adequately established and determined on the basis of the case-file. The applicant basically acknowledged having made the incriminating statements and described the escalating tensions with the Institute. The Appeals Commission, in any event, merely had to take account of objective facts. Moreover, the exclusion of the public was justified in employment disputes between the authorities and civil servants because of their duty to secrecy about the performance of official activities. This was all the more the case in the present circumstances as the proceedings at issue concerned merely incidents of an intimate nature which happened within the applicant's Institute.


112.  The Government observed that, in order to ascertain whether or not they came within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, it was first necessary to specify which civil rights were supposedly being restricted. In its only existing ruling on the subject, namely the admissibility decision in Musumeci of 17 December 2002 (cited above), the Court had not indicated which civil rights were restricted as a result of placement in an E.I.V. unit. In concluding that Article 6 was applicable, it had confined itself to citing Constitutional Court judgment no. 26 of 1999. However, that judgment in no way concerned the placement of prisoners in different prisons or in different wings within those prisons; it related in particular to the right of all prisoners to receive magazines of a “certain type” through the post.


82.  The applicant alleged that he had not been given a fair hearing in the criminal proceedings, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that the courts had disregarded the arguments about and evidence of excessive use of force by the police and had convicted him solely on the basis of police officers’ statements. The applicant further complained under Article 18 of the Convention that the security measures at the demonstration and his ensuing prosecution for criminal offences had been acts of reprisal for his expressing views critical of the authorities. Moreover, it had pursued the aim of discouraging public events led by opposition activists. Articles 6 and 18 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


17.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the principle of equality of arms had been infringed, since the courts had not examined the alleged agent provocateur, whose active involvement had secured their conviction, or the detectives and police officers who had been present at the scene. They also complained that their conviction had been based only on evidence obtained by the agent provocateur; that the courts' decisions had not been reasoned; and that the Supreme Court had denied their right of access to a court by having erroneously declined to examine their appeal on points of law. In connection with this latter complaint, they also invoked Article 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7. The Court considers that the applicants' complaints under these latter Articles are in fact a restatement of the complaints under Article 6 and should be examined accordingly. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


157.  The Government noted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence, as such, which was primarily a matter for regulation under national law. They underlined their obligation under the Convention to apply the criminal law against a murderer. The public interest in having the murderer of an abducted child convicted was of very serious weight. The Government further argued that the case-law of the United States Supreme Court, which went furthest in prohibiting the use of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”, needed careful analysis. In the leading case of Nix v. Williams (decision of 11 June 1984, 467 US 431; see paragraph 73 above), for instance, that court had held that a body found after an improper investigation could be admitted into evidence in circumstances where it would have been found in any event. It was likely in the present case that J.’s corpse, hidden at a place which the applicant had previously visited, would have been found sooner or later.


59.  The applicant complained of the fact that the Tax Authority's decisions concerning additional taxes and tax surcharges had been enforced prior to a court determination of the disputes. In particular, he maintained that the tax assessment proceedings had not been determined within a reasonable time and that he had been unable to obtain a fair hearing in those pending proceedings. Moreover, he had been deprived of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant to the complaint, provides:


48.  The Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber’s finding that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. They stated, firstly, that the legislation had been changed in 2005. Furthermore, in their submission, the restriction imposed on the applicant’s access to a lawyer had not infringed his right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275; John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑I; Averill v. the United Kingdom, no. 36408/97, ECHR 2000‑VI; Magee v. the United Kingdom, no. 28135/95, ECHR 2000‑VI; and Brennan v. the United Kingdom, no. 39846/98, ECHR 2001‑X), they maintained that in assessing whether or not the trial was fair, regard should be had to the entirety of the proceedings. Thus, as the applicant had been represented by a lawyer during the proceedings before the İzmir State Security Court and the Court of Cassation, his right to a fair hearing had not been violated. The Government further drew attention to several Turkish cases (see Saraç v. Turkey (dec.), no. 35841/97, 2 September 2004; Yurtsever v. Turkey (dec.), no. 42086/02, 31 August 2006; Uçma v. Turkey (dec.), no. 15071/03, 3 October 2006; Yavuz and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38827/02, 21 November 2006; and Yıldız v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 3543/03 and 3557/03, 5 December 2006), in which the Court had declared similar complaints inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on the ground that, since the police statements had not been the only evidence to support the convictions, the lack of legal assistance during police custody had not constituted a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.


36.  The Government referred to the Court’s case-law in the case of Y v. Norway (no. 56568/00, 11 February 2003) in support of their statement that none of the three criteria to be taken into account when deciding whether a person was “charged with a criminal offence” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention were met in the instant case. In this connection, the Government contended that the aim of Article 122 was not punitive but strictly compensatory. It was aimed at restoring the victims of a crime to the economic situation they had enjoyed before its commission and preventing the unjust enrichment of any person having gratuitously benefited from its proceeds while unaware of their criminal origin. The Government referred to the Court’s reasoning in the above-mentioned case (§ 40) to the effect that even if the victim of a crime had opted for the joining of the compensation claim to the criminal trial, as had happened in the instant case, the first claim would still be considered a “civil” one, except if otherwise established in domestic law, which was not the case in the Spanish legal system. In this connection, they also stated that it could be concluded from that case (§ 41) that a civil obligation to compensate did not amount to a “criminal charge” even if the coexistence of the objective constitutive elements of a criminal offence was critical for a determination as to civil liability and the person found civilly liable was acquitted of the criminal charges in the same criminal proceedings.


29.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the impugned proceedings, because the applicants had been charged with an administrative rather than a criminal offence. They further contended that the applicants had been given a fair opportunity to argue their cases before the domestic courts. In particular, the first applicant and his lawyers had been summoned to the appeal hearing in good time, and the first applicant’s request for adjournment had arrived after the hearing.


44.  The applicant further complained, referring to Articles 6§ 1 and 13 of the Convention about unfairness and the outcome of the proceedings in his case. He also alleged that lack of access to the expert report and refusal by the court to call experts and witnesses in his favour amounted to a violation of his defence rights as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant submitted that his efforts to institute criminal proceedings against the experts had no success. Lastly, he invoked Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.


130.  The applicant raised a number of complaints alleging breach of his rights. In particular, he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention complaining of overall unfairness of the proceedings against him that ended on 8 April 2002 and of lack of access to court as regards the civil proceedings against a private company. He further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had not provided him with a legal-aid lawyer to represent him before the Court. Moreover, the applicant relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention alleging that he had been deprived of property by the private company. He further complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 that his freedom of movement had been restricted by the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union he had been granted Russian citizenship against his will. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that the domestic authorities’ refusal to conditionally release him on health grounds had been discriminatory and alleged that his infection with hepatitis C had amounted to capital punishment contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 13.


89.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


44.  The applicant submitted that neither the Administrative Court nor the Constitutional Court held a public oral hearing, even though he had asked for one. In this connection the applicant submitted that the essential question, namely, the modification of the area zoning plan, had been examined not by the Administrative Court but by the Constitutional Court. The applicant maintained that there were no special circumstances that justified foregoing a hearing. The applicant also maintained that the Constitutional Court was not a tribunal within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The applicant complained that he had not had a fair hearing before the domestic courts inasmuch as the said courts dismissed his action seeking the removal of the fence erected by an unknown neighbour on V. Street (thus obstructing his access to his property) without properly examining the evidence submitted to them – in particular, by relying on the incorrect finding that he had not informed the administrative authorities of their mistake in misidentifying the neighbour about whom he had complained. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


23.  The applicant maintained that the general scope of application intended by Article <mask> of the Convention could not be ignored or reduced. In her submission, the restrictive effect of Article 575 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on a civil party's right to appeal to the Court of Cassation was unfair in a democratic country. She complained that the dismissal of her appeal had seriously damaged her interests because, had the Court of Cassation acknowledged the merits of her claim, she could have saved her possessions.


31.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention that that both sets of the proceedings to which she had been a party had been unfair in that the domestic courts had incorrectly assessed the evidence, dismissed her arguments, failed to give reasons for their decisions and to make available to her copies of certain documents, and that the final judgement in her second case had been quashed by way of supervisory review. She also complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that the domestic court had not presumed her husband innocent, because it had made reference to the fact that the former had obtained a certain document by abusing his official position.


72.  The Government also argued that the procedure set out by Article 2781 of the former Romanian Criminal Procedure Code does not limit the applicant’s right of access to court to such an extent as to breach Article <mask> of the Convention. The aforementioned procedure is different from the ordinary criminal procedure. Its main purpose is exerting control over a prosecutor’s orders to discontinue criminal proceedings; only in certain circumstances does it facilitate the institution of a new round of trial proceedings. The procedure in question has a legitimate aim, namely to allow applicants the legal means to obtain a review by a domestic court of orders issued by prosecutors’ offices. In addition, there is a reasonable proportionality between this aim and the means employed, because the courts are given the opportunity to save time and resources in respect of those cases which do not raise any issues under the substantive or procedural criminal law, therefore allowing them the opportunity to focus on relevant legal matters brought before them.


13.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicants further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since they had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, they invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


139.  The applicant submitted a number of complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention referring to various aspects of his trial. He referred to his confinement in glass cabins during the court hearing and the intensive schedule of those hearings, and alleged that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that he could not effectively defend himself in person or through legal assistance. He also claimed that his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him had been unduly restricted. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


45.  The Government maintained that the proceedings in the applicants’ administrative cases had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that each applicant had been given a fair opportunity to state his case and have the police officers cross-examined. The Government claimed that the hearings had been open to the public, that the applicants had been given sufficient time to prepare their defence and that they were being assisted by lawyers of their choice.


108.  The Government did not forward any formal objections to the admissibility the applicant’s complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.


41.  The Government further submitted, referring to the Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) ([GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009), that the Court had previously found that it had been competent to deal with relevant “new information” in the context of a fresh application. In this connection, the Government submitted that the refusal of the domestic courts to quash a conviction and to order a retrial had not been found by the Court to give rise to a new breach of Article <mask> of the Convention (Lyons and Others and Steck-Risch and Others, both cited above).


67.  The applicant complained that his trial had been unfair and that the principle of equality of arms had been infringed since neither he nor his lawyer had been granted an opportunity at any stage of the criminal proceedings to examine O. and P., the only direct witnesses to and victims of the offence allegedly committed by him in Göttingen in February 2007. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


24.  The Government acknowledged that the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 2004 had breached Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, they argued that the applicant company had not been entitled to claim enforcement of the judgments of 23 July 1998, 22 April 1999 and 20 January 2000 which had been made in favour of the SVL company.


74.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging lack of a fair hearing in the proceedings before the Pereslavl District Court on 9 July 2004 and before the Yaroslavl Regional Court on 17 December 2004. In these proceedings he had challenged the refusal of the prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings into the alleged ill-treatment, but the courts did not ensure his or his counsel’s presence at the hearings. Article 6 provides in so far as relevant as follows:


22.  The Government stated that in their opinion Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the present case. Firstly, referring to the case of Pellegrin v. France, a civil servant working in the financial administration of a government must be considered a “civil servant exercising specific public activities and acting as an agent of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State or other public authorities” (see Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII). The Government, taking note of the subsequent Eskelinen case (see Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑II), further distinguished that case from the present case in that the present one only concerned a post transfer and thus was not an ordinary employment dispute. They further emphasised that the post transfer had only been executed on account of an extensive general reform of the government financial administration. Applying Article 6 to situations arising from such an administrative reform process would effectively make such a reform impossible in the future. Furthermore, the Government noted that the case in question did not involve proceedings concerning monetary disadvantage, but only the transfer itself. Finally, the Government stated that the Eskelinen case (cited above) would seem to allow for a member State to exclude groups of civil servants entirely from access to a court, which would lead to the undesirable result that, even though in some cases such civil servants would benefit from at least a number of the guarantees of Article 6, a member State might be forced to exclude them from access to a court altogether.


43.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings were unfair in that the domestic authorities did not assess the evidence properly. Under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 he complained that his right not to be punished twice had been violated because, even though the penal order was no longer in force, his driving licence had actually been withdrawn.


33.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies by not bringing an action in tort (onrechtmatige daad) against the State before the civil courts on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s judgment was unlawful. According to the Government, since the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention occurred at the very last stage of the criminal proceedings in question, no domestic court had had the opportunity to consider the applicant’s claim that his rights under Article 6 had been violated by the Supreme Court’s summary reasoning, which should, therefore, have been argued before the civil courts.


73.  The Government first noted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in that he had not submitted any allegations concerning Article <mask> of the Convention, even in substance, before the domestic authorities. He should, they argued, have used the remedies available in ordinary law, such as actions deriving from the right to protection of personality, from the Code of Obligations, from criminal law, or from legislation on unfair competition.


74.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that the Austrian courts’ decisions had made it impossible for her to assert her claims and constituted unjustified interference with her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions. Furthermore, she complained under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been discriminated against as a disabled person.


60.  The Government further maintained that even though the applicant company was not a party to the share surrender proceedings, it was considered a party in the following stages of the proceedings concerning the interim measures. It could have lodged an appeal upon learning of the existence of the interim measure, and these proceedings could have resulted in the quashing of the interim measure. At the appellate stage, the applicant company’s complaint was therefore heard by a court under circumstances that met the standards of Article <mask> of the Convention in all respects.


38.  The Government submitted that the applicant's claim for pecuniary damage had no causal link to the alleged restriction on the applicant's right of access to a court. They further argued that the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was highly excessive. The Government drew the Court's attention to a number of cases in which violations of the applicants' rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had been found. They argued that the amount of compensation in those cases did not exceed EUR 3,000 and asked the Court, if it was to find of a violation in the present case, to apply a similar standard.


77.  The applicants maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they were denied a fair trial on the ground that the impugned injunction had been ordered in their absence, without any proper examination of the documentary evidence and without any reasoning, and that the ban had remained in force for an excessive period of time. They further claimed under Article 13 of the Convention that they did not have an effective domestic remedy to challenge the impugned injunction.


37.  The applicant alleged that the refusal of the Supreme Court to seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU upon his request violated his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that it follows from the Court’s case-law that the Supreme Court had a duty under Article 6 of the Convention to provide reasons for denying his request for a referral to the CJEU by indicating which of the Cilfit grounds (see paragraphs 23-26 above) was applicable, accompanied by an explanation. In the applicant’s view, a mere reference to section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, as contended by the Government, could not be accepted as adequate in this regard. The applicant contested the Government’s argument that it followed from Hansen v. Norway (no. 15319/09, 2 October 2014) that the refusal of a request for a preliminary ruling without providing specific reasons is compatible with Article 6 of the Convention when a legal provision allowing summary reasoning by an appellate court has been applied. He noted that Hansen did not concern a request for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU but a filtering procedure on appeal. Furthermore, according to the applicant, unless the Court unequivocally decided otherwise, the “Cilfit obligation” was a special obligation to provide reasons, with its own requirements.


20.  The Government also objected to the admissibility of the applicants' first complaint, that their right of access to court guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention was violated by the refusal to hold a hearing at which they could challenge the section 4(2) order made by the High Court of Justiciary on 15 February 2005. The Government relied on the Commission's decision in G. Hodgson, D. Woolf Productions Ltd. and National Union of Journalists v. the United Kingdom and Channel Four Television Co. Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 11553/85 and 11658/85, 9 March 1987, Decisions and Reports (DR) 51, p. 136, and argued that there was no “civil right” to report public court proceedings.


25.  The Government considered that the applicant’s complaint fell outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. In their opinion, it did not concern the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him. In any event, they discerned no violation of the applicant’s rights set out in the said provision. In their opinion, the applicant’s presence at the hearing before the Town Court had not been necessary given that he had taken part in the hearing of his case by the customs officer and had been able to lodge an appeal against the latter’s decision.


25.  The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the domestic proceedings in their cases (the first set – as regards the first applicant). The first and the fourth applicants additionally relied on Article 13 in this regard. The Court considers that the complaints must be examined solely under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


64.  The applicant further alleged that, for the sake of a fair trial, a confrontation should have been held between him and the President in the presence of the investigating judge or during the court proceedings. The Court notes that the President is precluded from an obligation to testify by virtue of his protective status defined in the second paragraph of Article 67 of the Constitution. His absence from the trial is thus based on a serious legal ground, provided for by the Constitution, and on objective considerations of protection which pertain to the office of a Head of State, and does not as such breach Article <mask> of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Republic of Moldova, nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07, § 47, 2 December 2014).


78.  The Government contested that argument and considered the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant compatible with the “reasonable time requirement” set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They acknowledged that the applicant’s conviction had been quashed twice on appeal, and that the trial court had returned the case file to the prosecutor, which had contributed to the length of the proceedings. The Government further submitted that the applicant’s lawyers and the interpreter had failed to appear in court on several occasions, which had also protracted the proceedings. Lastly, they pointed out that the hearing of the case had been adjourned on one occasion in view of the applicant’s counsel’s request to study the material in the case file.


20.  The applicant submitted that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention was breached where a person was refused compensation for pre-trial detention imposed for a reason which implied his or her guilt when there had been no formal finding to that effect and when the claimant had not had the opportunity to exercise the rights secured by Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, the reasoning given in the decisions of the Minister of Justice and the Appeals Board left no doubt that the applicant's claim had been refused on account of his presumed guilt. The forms of words used went well beyond mere suspicions or suppositions. The fact that claimants were required by section 28(1)(b) of the Law of 1973 to adduce evidence of their innocence established a presumption of guilt incompatible with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. In short, there had been a violation of that provision.


54.  The Government submitted that the case of Sigurþór Arnarsson v. Iceland (cited above) reflected that it does not constitute a categorical breach of Article <mask> of the Convention if a procedure before an appeal court is somewhat more limited than the procedure at first instance and that this also applied in cases where the appeal court could review questions of fact.


18.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that there had been no evidence that she represented a threat to national security and that she had not been given an opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on any such evidence. Furthermore, the authorities had not provided reasons for their decisions. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], no. 37685/10, § 124, 20 March 2018; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 57, ECHR 2013, and Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, no. 16318/07, § 27, 27 April 2010), considers that the applicant’s complaints should be analysed from the standpoint of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. This Article reads as follows:


28. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the courts had decided his case arbitrarily; that they had erred in fact and law; that their decisions had not been reasoned; and that he had not been allowed to cross-examine the court-appointed expert. He also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that he had been deprived of possessions.


127.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings against him and their excessive length, the unsatisfactory work of his state-appointed lawyers, and the violation of the presumption of his innocence. He also claimed violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of an alleged search of his apartment by the police.


35.  The Government submitted that the court proceedings initiated by the applicant had sought to obtain information about the identity of the fence’s owner and to compel the administrative authorities to take against that person the measures provided for by Ordinance no. 43/1997. They considered that the outcome of the proceedings had not had a directly decisive link to the applicant’s civil rights and therefore could not have fallen within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the proceedings initiated by the applicant had not been a pre-requisite for any other set of proceedings that could have been opened against the person who erected the fence.


32.  The applicant maintained his complaints. He submitted that after being removed from the courtroom he was unable to participate in the examination of witnesses and the assessment of other evidence, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Nor had the court appointed a lawyer to represent him during the trial despite his requests. In response to the Government's submissions regarding his victim status, the applicant argued that the measures taken by the Russian authorities did not constitute adequate redress. According to the applicant, such redress should have included monetary compensation since the appeal judgment had not been quashed until three years later. Nor had his rights been restored in full. Merely appointing a lawyer to represent him during the appeal hearing had not been sufficient to restore his rights.


153.  The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He further argued that as a result of a trial conducted in breach of the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention he was ordered to pay damages to the victim in the amount of AMD 23,063,108 and USD 119,000. Furthermore, because of his deprivation of liberty he lost earnings for the period between May 2003 and April 2007 in the amount of EUR 36,000. The applicant claimed these amounts in respect of pecuniary damage.


58.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts had principally and essentially based his conviction for participation in a terrorist organisation on evidence that was vitiated and obtained in conditions that were incompatible with the requirements of the Convention. Alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial, he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which paragraphs 1 and 3 (d) read as follows:


43.  The applicant acknowledged that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the proceedings at issue did not allow the court to review the factual basis or the legal characterisation of the offence. However, they allowed the interested party, including the convict, to make submissions to the court. The applicant inferred that the proceedings were not a mere formality but a trial requiring full guarantees under Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that the removal of the reference to his inebriated state from the original judgment called for a discussion on the effect of that measure on his sentence and that he should therefore have been allowed to present his arguments on that issue.


22.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted them and that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. In their observations dated 24 November 2003, they further complained about the length of the proceedings. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


78.  The Government conceded that the Constitutional Court had found in the present proceedings that the principle of a public hearing was a vital aspect of the right to a fair trial. Thereby, that court closed a gap in the Liechtenstein catalogue of fundamental rights which did not expressly protect that principle. It had further found that the right to a fair trial was also laid down in Article <mask> of the Convention and was not directly covered by a reservation on ratification.


58.  The Government disputed that any causal link had been demonstrated between the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the one hand and the conclusion reached in the Supreme Court's judgment on the other. In their view, the claim for pecuniary damage should be rejected. As regards non-pecuniary damage, the Government were of the opinion that the finding of a violation of the Convention would in itself constitute adequate just satisfaction.


19.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a breach of their right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal, arguing that Judge V.B. could not be impartial because his son had been expelled from the school. They also complained that the entire panel of judges of the Supreme Court of Justice had lacked independence since the arrival of the Communist Party to power and that the Supreme Court of Justice had failed to give sufficient reasons in its judgment. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a), (b) and (e) of the Convention of the excessive length and unfairness of the proceedings. In respect of the latter, he complained that he had not been given the right to use Hebrew, the only language which he understood; that the evidence had been admitted in the form of photocopies; that the domestic courts' decisions had not been reasoned; that he had not been informed, in a language which he understood, of the nature and cause of the accusations against him; and that he had not been given adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


37.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial court, that he had not been represented by a lawyer during the trial stage until 22 September 2005, that he had been unable to question, confront and examine a key witness, and that at the appeal stage he had not received the written opinions of the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation. The applicant also complained that that there was no effective remedy under Turkish law in respect of his complaints under Article 6.


120.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of various irregularities which had rendered the criminal proceedings against him unfair. In particular, he complained that the trial court had unjustifiably based his conviction on the expert reports by Ms T., dated 18 February 2005 and submitted by the prosecution, whilst rejecting the report by Ms V., submitted by the defence. In the applicant’s view, Ms T.’s reports had been unreliable as she, being only a linguist, had not possessed any other specific knowledge, and therefore had not been sufficiently competent to draw such conclusions. The applicant also claimed that the trial record had been incorrect since the testimony of the key witness, Ms T., had been falsified. He furthermore complained that Judge B. had disallowed his applications to have the transcript amended in line with the audio recording of the hearings submitted by him on the sole ground that the recording had not been authorised, and had refused to accept his supplementary appeal pleadings of 17 February 2006. In this connection, the applicant claimed that Judge B. had been biased and hostile throughout the trial. He also alleged that although his appeal pleadings of 17 February 2006 had eventually been included in the case file, the appellate court had not given due consideration to his arguments concerning the incorrect trial record. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there had been no effective remedies in respect of his complaints concerning Judge B.’s alleged misconduct.


60.  The Government maintained that the domestic courts had conducted the proceedings in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention and with section 52 of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (see “Relevant domestic law”, paragraph 54 above), as they had promoted and secured the conclusion of interim agreements. Therefore several periods were not attributable to the national courts. Furthermore the Court of Appeal could not be blamed for the three-month delay caused by the applicant’s change of lawyer.


362.  The applicants claimed that almost the entire male population of Ormaniçi had been arbitrarily taken into detention in that, except in the case of those villagers who were taken to Şırnak, there had been no reasonable suspicion that they had been personally involved in any crime, as required by Article 5 § 1. They further considered that it had been established that there had been a violation of Article 5 on account of the length of time the apprehended villagers had spent in custody before they were brought before any judicial authority; the absence of custody records in Güçlükonak and the inaccuracy of the custody records in Şırnak, together with the lack of any evidence of authorisation from the public prosecutor for the detention of any of the villagers; the length of the unacknowledged custody of those men who were transferred to hospital while still in custody; and the duration of the pre-trial detention of Mehmet Nuri Özkan and Ali Erbek. The applicants further claimed that, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, the domestic authorities had failed to undertake any investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on Ormaniçi in February 1993 or to institute any proceedings on the basis of the complaints raised before the Eruh public prosecutors in relation to the detention of the villagers in Güçlükonak and Şırnak and their treatment during that time.


56.  The Government argued that the claim was unsubstantiated and excessive. They further invited the Court, should it decide to make an award of damages in respect of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, not to depart from its previous rulings; they referred to Constantin and Stoian (cited above) and Bulfinsky v. Romania (dec.), no. 28823/04, 1 June 2010).


97.  The Government argued that the applicants’ requests were speculative, excessive and not proven. They considered that should the Court find a violation of Article 3, the acknowledgement as such could constitute sufficient just satisfaction. They further invited the Court, should it decide to make an award of damages in respect of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, not to depart from its previous rulings; they referred to Constantin and Stoian, cited above, and Bulfinsky v. Romania, no. 28823/04, 1 June 2010.


60.  The Government finally submitted that on both occasions the applicant herself did not wish to have a lawyer, despite the fact that the police officers explained to her her right to have a lawyer and advised her to avail herself of this right. Moreover, the applicant did not wish to have a lawyer during the entire procedure, including the court hearings. In sum, the applicant’s trials as a whole complied with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention.


94.  The applicant also complained that his right to have his family life respected had been breached on account of delays in the proceedings concerning child custody and contact arrangements as well as in the criminal proceedings. He also complained that as a result of the ineffectiveness of the proceedings he could not have had regular contact with A., which had impeded A.’s psychological development and their relationship as father and daughter. In this connection, he further complained that the national authorities had failed to make sufficient efforts to expedite the criminal proceedings in order to determine the applicant’s innocence and, as a result, to ensure unsupervised contact. According to the applicant, the national authorities had also failed to order the interim measures sought in civil proceedings. To this end, the applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 7 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights.


49.  The Government considered that the applicant had suffered no “significant disadvantage” (see, among others, Giuran v. Romania, no. 24360/04, §§ 21-23, ECHR 2011 (extracts), and Van Velden v. the Netherlands, no. 30666/08, §§ 37-39, 19 July 2011). The Court accepts that the fines imposed on the applicant were small. The Court observes that the present case raises issues concerning applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the procedure prescribed by the Russian Code of Administrative Offences and the absence of any provision for a right to free legal assistance under the CAO. Both issues arise in a number of similar pending applications before the Court in respect of Russia. Noting the nature of the issues raised in the present case, which also arguably concerns an important matter of principle, as well as the scope of the limitations, the Court does not find it appropriate to dismiss the present application with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012, and also paragraph 40 above).


38.  The Government submitted that the sums in question were excessive. They argued that the applicants could seek compensation only in respect of a possible violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus any claim in respect of pecuniary damage was unfounded since it was not for the Court to speculate as to whether the applicants would succeed with their claim before the domestic courts.


16.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Malatya State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He claimed that in refusing his request for the examination of the signature on the deposition, and in relying on the statements of witnesses whom he did not confront, the court violated his right to a fair hearing. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


98.  The Government maintained that the applicants had not exhausted available domestic remedies as regards this part of their application. The Government argued that in their submissions to the Supreme Court the applicants had not requested that the District Court judgment be quashed and the case be referred back for a new trial. Furthermore, they had not claimed that it was necessary to have a new trial before the District Court, even though they had maintained that the procedure before the first instance court had been flawed and in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 70 of the Constitution. Moreover, nowhere in their submissions to the Supreme Court had they argued that the court could not remedy the defects in the lower court’s proceedings.


64.  The applicant further complained of the fact that the civil proceedings in which he had challenged his conditions of detention in the IVS had been conducted in his absence on the ground that the domestic law did not provide for the participation of convicted detainees in civil proceedings. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


40.  The applicant complained that he had not been allowed to be defended by counsel of his own choosing, with whom he could have spoken Finnish and whose pleadings he would have been able to fully understand. Describing his level of Swedish as “street Swedish”, he maintained that he had been able to communicate with H., the counsel appointed for him, only via an interpreter and that H., as a consequence, had not been able to carry out his duties properly. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides the following:


19.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. The court hearing held on 18 March 2005 concerned the execution of two sentences imposed earlier on the applicant. Under Russian law, a hearing of this type was not considered to be part of the proceedings concerning determination of the criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. A hearing of this type was of a formal character. The court was not competent to decide the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to establish the circumstances of the case, or to assess evidence, or to verify the lawfulness or well-foundedness of the verdict. It was incumbent on the domestic court to determine only the way in which the applicant was to serve the two criminal sentences imposed on him consecutively in accordance with the “arithmetical” rules set out in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.


29.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried him. The applicant further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him, which are still pending, was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:


17.  The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They further complained under the same Article that the Court of Cassation, in its decision of 13 November 1984, had made a procedural mistake. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


21.  The Government further referred to an earlier case, against Russia (see Nurmagomedov v. Russia, no. 30138/02, §§ 40-51, 7 June 2007). In Nurmagomedov the Court had held that the proceedings concerning the bringing of an offender’s sentence in line with the amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation fell outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government considered that the present case bore a close resemblance to Nurmagomedov and it should, accordingly, be dismissed as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention provisions.


75.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, because neither the Constitutional Court nor the Administrative Court dealt with the first applicant’s complaints on the merits. They further complained under the same provision that the Independent Administrative Panel in its decision of 6 April 2009 did not take all factors into account when making its legal assessment. They also relied on Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention, without further substantiating their complaint.


60.  The applicant contested the Government's submissions. He stated that the President of the Regional Court lacked impartiality when lodging his protest against the ruling of 13 March 2001 and subsequently chairing its examination by the Presidium. The applicant also considered that the Presidium's decision of 27 June 2001 was incompatible with the principles of equality of arms and rule of law guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 2 about the authorities’ failure to provide him with an interpreter at a certain stage of the investigation. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the excessive length of the proceedings against him. Under the same Article he complained that his right to be presumed innocent had been breached by the length of his pre-trial detention and by the fact that during his pre-trial detention he had been held in a cell together with convicted prisoners. Finally, the applicant complained in substance under Article 6 § 3 (b) that one of the hearings on the extension of his pre-trial detention had been held in the presence of a court-appointed lawyer who had not been afforded sufficient time for the preparation of his defence.


31.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied a fair trial because the initial compensation proceedings before the Van Administrative Court had been dismissed erroneously on the ground that he had not paid some of the court fees, whereas he had duly made all the payments requested by that court. He further complained of the excessive length of the compensation proceedings and claimed, in broad terms, that courts in Turkey were not impartial. The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows:


50.  The Government contested the applicability of Article 6 to the dispute raised by the applicant. Relying on the Court's judgment in the case of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII), they argued that the complaint brought by the applicant was outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, since the proceedings in the domestic courts concerned a dispute between the applicant and his employer, the Ministry of Defence.


92.  The applicant company disagreed and argued that the quashing of the judgment of 27 October 1999 had violated its right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The letter of the Prosecutor General's Office of 8 June 2004 had not disclosed any “new and essential facts or circumstances which were unknown and could not have been known earlier” in the sense of Article 449(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The submissions made by the Prosecutor General's Office in that letter, namely that Oferta Plus had not presented enough evidence concerning the electricity supplied, had already been made by the Ministry of Finance and by the Prosecutor General's Office and had been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Justice in its judgments of 7 February 2001 and 7 May 2001.


51.  The Government pointed out that no evidence of the alleged pecuniary damage had been adduced and that there was no causal link with the alleged violation. They argued, in particular, that although the applicant’s ex-husband had admittedly stopped paying her maintenance following the declaration of enforceability of the decision annulling the marriage, the applicant had subsequently secured a friendly settlement of the issue (see paragraph 30 above): she had therefore already obtained, at least in part, payment of the maintenance due for the years 1992-99. The Government further maintained that a finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention would constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage alleged.


31.  The Government argued that the case was of some complexity as the trial court had had to order an expert examination to determine the degree of the applicant's disability. They also stated that on four occasions the hearings had been adjourned because of the applicant's and his lawyer's failure to appear and once following a request by the applicant. The applicant had made four challenges to the presiding judge, which had further contributed to the length of the proceedings. The Government submitted that even though the applicant was entitled to make use of his right of appeal, he had in fact appealed on five occasions and had thereby prolonged the proceedings for a considerable time. The domestic courts had fixed hearings at reasonable intervals and had not been responsible for any delays. In sum, the Government contended that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings.


240.  The applicants complained that, in addition to amounting to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, their conviction for “organising mass disorder” following an unfair trial had also constituted an unjustified interference with their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. They submitted that the main motivation behind their conviction was the fact that they were leaders of the opposition who had called for a public protest against the results of the presidential election.


37.  The applicant complained that the five judges of the Constitutional Court who had been called upon to decide on his case had not been impartial for the reasons he had set out in detail before the Constitutional Court and, in particular, because each of the challenged judges had taken part in the decisions on the motions for bias against the remaining four judges. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


79.  The applicant alleged that he had not been given a fair hearing in criminal proceedings, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that the courts had disregarded the arguments and evidence of excessive use of force by the police and had convicted him solely on the basis of the police officers’ statements. Furthermore, the courts had classified the same acts as two separate criminal offences. The applicant further complained under Article 18 of the Convention that the security measures at the demonstration and his ensuing prosecution for criminal offences had been acts of reprisal for his expressing views critical of the authorities. Moreover, it had pursued the aim of discouraging public events led by opposition activists. Articles 6 and 18 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provide as follows:


125.  The Government observed that the applicant had not availed himself of the possibility of withdrawing his request for adoption of the summary procedure, provided for in Article 8 § 2 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000 (see paragraph 31 above). Under the terms of Article 8 § 2 the applicant had until 21 February 2001 to exercise his right to withdraw his request, and if he had done so he would have been entitled to an ordinary trial attended by all the safeguards enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention.


27.  The Government contested that argument. They argued that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that his personal presence in court was indispensable for the proper administration of justice. In any event, given the nature of his claims, his presence in court was not required. It was also open to him to assign a representative as provided for by the applicable legislation. Given that the applicant had been convicted of a serious crime and was serving a sentence in a penitentiary establishment with strict conditions of detention, his request for participation in the civil proceedings was merely an attempt to be detained, even if briefly, in less strict conditions than those imposed on him. The domestic judicial authorities had observed all the fair-trial guarantees set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had been duly informed of the dates and time of the hearings. He had been provided with copies of the records of hearings and other documents from the case file. The court had advised him of his rights and had facilitated the collection of the evidence needed to substantiate his claims. As a result, the applicant's claims had been granted in part.


15.  The Government, relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant had been a military officer and the judgment award had concerned allowances for his military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of the invoked Convention provision as he had had no right to receive “payments in the amount claimed”. He neither had an “existing possession”, nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 14 April 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law.


30.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the contested proceedings, because the applicants had been charged with an administrative rather than a criminal offence. They further argued that the applicants had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the trial court and/or the appeal court and therefore had not exhausted domestic remedies. The Government also mentioned that the CAO did not provide for mandatory participation of a public prosecutor in each case concerning an administrative offence. Their submissions in that respect were similar to those made in Karelin v. Russia (no. 926/08, §§ 46-48, 20 September 2016).


44.  The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant could have challenged the Kúria’s judgment before the Constitutional Court under Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, which guaranteed the right to a fair trial. They referred to decision no. 7/2013 (see paragraph 33 above) in which the Constitutional Court examined, in the light of both Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law and Article <mask> of the Convention, the fairness of a high court’s final judgment, with particular regard to the question of whether the high court had observed its obligation to give appropriate reasons for its decision. In the Government’s view, the Constitutional Court’s decision demonstrated that the applicant could have brought his complaint relating to the unfairness of the proceedings and, in particular, the lack of appropriate reasoning, before the Constitutional Court – a legal avenue of which he had not availed himself.


36.  The Government argued that none of the applicant’s requests lodged with the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5 had specifically asked for the identity to be established of the person who erected the fence. Also the applicant’s submissions to the domestic courts of 9 May 2008 had not mentioned the identity of the fence owner. According to the Court’s case-law – in particular MacKay and BBC Scotland v. the United Kingdom, no. 10734/05, § 22, 7 December 2010, and Geraguyn Khorhur Patgamavorakan Akumb v. Armenia (dec.), no. 11721/04, 14 April 2009 – proceedings concerning access to information could not be described as regarding rights which are civil in nature for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention. Unlike in the case of Shapovalov v. Ukraine, no. 45835/05, § 22, 30 July 2012 – where the applicant had had a pressing professional need to access the requested information – in the instant case the information the applicant had been seeking did not lend itself to any immediate use; rather, it could have proved useful in subsequent proceedings.


151.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the criminal proceedings, alleging in particular that he had not been given adequate time to study the case and that counsel F. had been removed from the proceedings unlawfully. The Court has examined these complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


30.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article <mask> of the Convention that the expropriation of their land had not been in the public interest and that they had suffered an excessive individual burden, in view of the failure to institute compensation proceedings and the subsequent length of the proceedings, together with the fact that Maltese law did not provide for adequate compensation. The relevant provisions read, in so far as relevant, as follows:


37.  The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of a public hearing before the Constitutional Court. They also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the Republic of Austria, by repeatedly appealing against the decisions of the agricultural authorities, was trying deliberately to delay the exchange of the right to the use of the wood for ownership of the land.


20.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied the right to a fair trial since the defendant’s observations in reply to his appeals had not been communicated to him, and since the courts had not considered his arguments and had decided solely on the basis of evidence submitted by the defendant. He further complained that they had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, that they had been biased and that the proceedings had not complied with the “reasonable time” requirement. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


62.  The Government observed that, when examining the applicant company’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had considered that the matter was comparable in principle to criminal charges to which Article <mask> of the Convention applied. Both the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court had held an oral hearing in the matter to hear witnesses, and the applicant company had actively used its right to cross-examine those witnesses. The applicant company had not asked the Supreme Administrative Court to hear any witnesses other than those it had heard.


49.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the lustration proceedings had been unfair. He contested their outcome and alleged that the courts had refused to call all his witnesses. The applicant further complained that he had been required to formally undertake that everything which he had learned during the proceedings would be kept confidential. In this respect he submitted that all notes taken from the case file and during the hearings had to be deposited with the court and could not be taken away.


68.  The Government pointed out that the applicant's request for legal aid for the purposes of legal assistance in connection with the cassation proceedings had been granted by the appellate court. The State had thereby discharged its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention to ensure effective access to a court by acceding to the applicant's request for legal aid.


53.  The Government further stated, with reference to Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by a Decision of the Constitutional Court of 14 February 2000, that the summoning of parties to a supervisory review hearing remained at the discretion of the relevant court provided the review procedure was not triggered by an application that would be to the applicant’s detriment. The Government noted that the application for supervisory review, as well as the prosecutor’s pleadings at the hearing, were not to the applicant’s detriment. Given that the supervisory review procedure had benefited the applicant, by sentencing him to a lesser term of imprisonment as a result of a new legal classification of his actions, and by releasing him from serving that sentence, the Government were of the view that the Presidium of the Moscow City Court’s failure to secure the attendance of the applicant and his counsel did not breach Article <mask> of the Convention.


98.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


130.  The Government submitted at the outset that, under domestic law, the CSM was a management and disciplinary body for judges. Although it was not a judicial body, it nevertheless satisfied the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention in the exercise of its disciplinary powers. Hence, from the point at which the indictment was drawn up, the procedure before that body complied with the adversarial principle. The judge in question had the right to give evidence; he or she could be represented by a lawyer and could study the indictment and submit arguments in that regard. He or she also had the right to participate in the proceedings by contesting the charges, submitting requests, adducing evidence and raising grounds of nullity. Furthermore, the final decision was accompanied by reasons. The judicial investigator who conducted the investigation did not participate in the decision-making formation of the CSM. Moreover, the decisions of the CSM were open to appeal before the Supreme Court, with the result that the right of access to a court was guaranteed.


15.  The Government submitted that given the particular circumstances of the case and the procedural guarantees provided by the domestic legislation with regard to various types of appeal, the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage. The applicant had had access to two levels of jurisdiction as regulated by the applicable rules of civil procedure. The fact that the second-instance court sat as an ordinary court of appeal had resulted in a more detailed judicial review of the applicant’s case and on more flexible terms for the submission of evidence than in alternative circumstances. In addition, the fact that the appeal on points of law had been examined by a bench of two and not three judges had not had a decisive impact on the fairness of the proceedings, and the substance of the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention had not been breached.


96.  The applicant company complained about the length and alleged unfairness of the debt recovery proceedings initiated by it against LyNOS (named “the Lysychansk Oil Refinery” at the time) back in 1993 and continuing through 2004. It submitted, in particular, that the courts had breached the principle of res judicata by reconsidering the amount of the debt due to it after that amount had been established by the final judicial decision of 2 July 1998. It also contended that the courts dealing with the case could not be regarded impartial or independent given the intense pressure from high-ranking State officials. The applicant company relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows: