12.   The Government maintained that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as they had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to them under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, they would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if they had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


34.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention as she had failed to lodge an action with the administrative or civil courts requesting compensation for the alleged damage caused to her by the conduct of the administrative authorities or civil servants. Alternatively, they submitted that the applicant had failed to lodge her application with the Court within the six-month time-limit.


60.  The applicant contested that view. He argued that he had exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention prior to lodging his application with the Court. The new proceedings for judicial review of his preventive detention following the Federal Constitutional Court’s leading judgment could not be considered as a remedy he had to avail himself of to complain about the initial order of his retrospective preventive detention under Article 66b § 3 of the Criminal Code. That order had not been addressed in the said judgment.


15.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Izmir State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicant was complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Izmir State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 18 April 1996.


40.  The Government argued that the application had not been submitted within the six-month period provided for by Article <mask> of the Convention. It had been submitted by the applicant's parents, acting on his behalf, on 20 August 2001. They submitted a form of authority, signed by the applicant, on 7 May 2002. The Government were of the view that the latter date was decisive for the assessment of compliance with the six-month requirement. The Government submitted, in addition, that the original application had been lodged by the applicant's parents, who could not claim to be victims of a violation of the right to a fair hearing in the proceedings concerning the determination of the criminal charge against their son.


3.  The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the district court’s decision of 27 April 2011 (see paragraph 40 of the judgment). Lodging an appeal against a decision of a district court is an ordinary remedy that must be exhausted under Article <mask> of the Convention. The question therefore arises if there are special circumstances which absolve the applicant, who was represented by a State-appointed lawyer, from the obligation to make use of an available and effective remedy (see, inter alia, Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 45, ECHR 2006‑II).


49.  The applicant disputed that the remedies to which the Government referred were “effective” and that he was therefore required to exhaust them under Article <mask> of the Convention. As regards Article 146 of the Constitution, the applicant highlighted that this would only provide a remedy to an existing problem or a decision confirming that there had been a violation by the relevant authority. There would be no investigation and no further proceedings against the party guilty of the violation. The applicant further averred that in order to file a recourse with the Supreme Court, supporting evidence would have been required to prove that he had been isolated in conditions in breach of Articles 3 and 8 and that his correspondence had been monitored. He contended that his isolation precluded him from obtaining such proof and that, in the circumstances, an Ombudsman’s investigation was necessary to collate the necessary proof. However, because of the monitoring of his correspondence, the Ombudsman only received his complaint on 5 November 2003 and her report dated 21 November 2003 was only brought to his attention some days later. He concluded that his failure to take proceedings before the Supreme Court was due to: the prison director, who deliberately made it difficult for him to collect the necessary papers for his application; the 75-day time limit for filing a recourse; his isolation which prevented him from submitting his application; and the refusal of lawyers to represent him.


36.  The applicants disagreed, pointing out that there was no evidence that the State authorities, having twice rejected the applicants’ claims, would reach a different conclusion if faced with another complaint. The applicants noted that Article <mask> of the Convention must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Kucheruk v. Ukraine, no. 2570/04, § 109, 6 September 2007). They indicated that they had done everything possible in the circumstances, had provided evidence to the police, and had lodged complaints and appeals, although, according to the applicants, all they had to do was bring the case to the attention of the competent authorities. The applicant noted that in the case of Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria (28 October 1998, § 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII) the Court had found that “the applicants made numerous appeals to the prosecuting authorities at all levels, requesting that a full criminal investigation of Mr Assenov’s allegations of ill-treatment by the police be carried out” and considered that, “having exhausted all the possibilities available to him... the applicant was not required... to embark on another attempt to obtain redress”. Thus, the applicants concluded that they had exhausted all available domestic remedies.


25.  The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. While, in accordance with Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), the first‑instance court’s decision concerning an alleged violation of election rights was final, Article 40 of the Electoral Code provided an exception to this rule as far as disputes related to, inter alia, the annulment of the registration of parliamentary candidates were concerned. The applicant had been informed at the court hearing, in the presence of his lawyer, of the rights guaranteed to him under Article 28 of the CCP, which included the right to appeal, but he had not availed himself of this right.


53.  The Government raised an objection of non-compliance with the six-month rule. While conceding that Article 278 of the Criminal Procedure Code provided that a complaint could be lodged against the decision of a prosecutor with the superior prosecutor and thereafter with the Prosecutor General, they submitted that the applicant's complaint lodged with the Prosecutor General's Office on 23 September 1998 was not an effective remedy. As a consequence, the six-month time-limit laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention had started to run on 4 May 1998, when the Constanţa Chief Military Prosecutor confirmed the decision not to press charges, and not, as suggested by the applicant, on 18 November 1998, when the military section of the Prosecutor General's Office informed him that they had dismissed his appeal.


22.  The Government also claimed that the applicant should have lodged a separate appeal against the ruling of 30 November 2001. The Court reiterates in this respect that domestic remedies must be “effective” in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 158, ECHR-XI). The impugned ruling concerned only the applicant’s detention pending trial. Therefore, an appeal directed against that ruling would have been limited to matters of detention. By contrast, the thrust of the applicant’s complaint before the court of appeal in Russia and before the Court was quite different: he attacked the judgment as a whole, claiming that the outcome of the trial had been predetermined. The ruling of 30 November 2001, therefore, was not a separate object of appeal but a proof of the bias of the trial court. The Court concludes that the avenue indicated by the Government was not capable of “providing adequate redress” for the applicant’s grievance under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government did not claim that the issue of the alleged partiality should have been raised by the applicant earlier, at the trial stage. Thus, the Court concludes that by lodging a general appeal the applicant exhausted effective domestic remedies, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention.


13.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants' complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicants were complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the State Security Court, they should have lodged their application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 6 February 1996.


25.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant's complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Adana State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicant had not invoked his complaint before the domestic courts. In this respect, they refer to the case-law of the Court (in particular Ahmet Sadık v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V).


67.  The Government noted that although the applicant had reported a criminal offence and contested the termination of the criminal proceedings, this could not be considered sufficient within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The criminal investigation had not established elements of a criminal offence, so the criminal proceedings had been terminated without bringing charges against anyone. In instances where elements of criminal offence were not established, the criminal-law remedy could not be seen as effective. The applicant could therefore not choose to pursue it in place of a civil remedy in order to meet the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies.


30.  The applicant submitted that she had lodged a complaint about the administrative's authority failure to deal with her case within a reasonable time (see paragraph 11 above) and was successful in that the governor acknowledged that the proceedings had been protracted and ordered the Mayor to give a decision on the merits of the case within one month. Hence, she had recourse to the relevant remedy. As to the compensatory remedy relied on by the applicant, she submitted that this was not a remedy necessary for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. She relied on the Court's judgments in cases of Cichla v. Poland, no. 18036/03, 10 October 2006 and Jagiełło v. Poland, no. 59738/00, 23 January 2007)


14.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants’ complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicants had not invoked their complaint before the domestic courts. In this respect, they refer to the case-law of the Court (in particular Ahmet Sadık v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V).


42.  The applicant called into question the effectiveness of the investigation, stating that in her case it was not a remedy under Article <mask> of the Convention. She also asserted that an administrative practice consisting of the authorities’ continuing failure to conduct adequate investigations into offences committed by representatives of the federal forces in the Chechen Republic rendered any potentially effective remedies inadequate and illusory in her case. In this connection she relied on applications submitted to the Court by other individuals claiming to be victims of similar violations.


59.  The Government raised a preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, both in respect of the decision of the Münster District Court of 18 December 2001 concerning the denial of access to the children and the decision on the merits of the same court of 6 March 2003 against which appeal proceedings were still pending. They referred to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 21 June 2002 by which the applicants' constitutional complaint, in so far as it was directed against the decision of 18 December 2001, was declared inadmissible, since the applicants had failed to appeal against it, in accordance with Section 19 of the Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings (see paragraph 28 above).


66.  The applicant insisted that his description of the conditions in remand prison IZ-39/1 had been accurate. The applicant also argued that although he had raised the issue of conditions of detention with various administrative bodies his complaints had been unsuccessful. He concluded that he had no effective remedies to complain about that situation. As to the civil proceedings against the remand prison administration, the applicant maintained that they had been brought within the statutory time-limits established for such types of claim under Russian law. He concluded that the date of the final judgment in those proceedings (30 July 2003) must be the date taken for calculation of the six-month time-limit set in Article <mask> of the Convention.


16.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, since she had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to her under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, she would have been eligible for compensation for the loss allegedly sustained as a result of the delay in payment of the additional compensation had she established that the loss exceeded the amount of default interest. The Government further claimed that the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant had been caused by the legal interest rates. They argued that in the course of the proceedings before the domestic courts the applicant had already agreed to the application of the legal interest rates to her case and that therefore she could not be said to have raised her Convention grievances before the domestic authorities.


16.  The Government also maintained that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as he had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to him under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, he would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if he had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


27.  The Government requested the Court to dismiss the complaint as being inadmissible for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant did not file a complaint against the trial judge with the domestic authorities, such as the Ministry of Justice or a public prosecutor’s office.


12.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as he had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to him under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, he would have been eligible for compensation for the loss allegedly sustained as a result of the delay in payment of the additional compensation if he had established that the loss exceeded the amount of default interest.


44.  The Government further submitted that the applicant bank had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention as it had failed to institute proceedings under Article 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure or to lodge an administrative appeal against the CNB's original decision by which the compulsory administration had been imposed on it. Mr Moravec had not used that remedy either.


70.  The Government submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25 July 2001 had been served on the applicant’s lawyer on 9 August 2001. That judgment had ultimately conferred on the authorities the right to take possession of the applicant’s plot. The subsequent decisions given in the case had only been the consequence of the fact that that right had been conferred on the authorities. The application had been lodged with the Court seven months later, on 1 March 2002. The applicant had therefore failed to submit her application to the Court within the time-limit of six months provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention.


44.  The applicant called into question the effectiveness of the investigation, stating that it was not an effective remedy for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. She also stated that an administrative practice consisting in the authorities’ continuing failure to conduct adequate investigations into offences committed by representatives of the federal forces in Chechnya rendered any potentially effective remedies inadequate and illusory in her case. In this connection she relied on the Court’s judgements in cases brought by other individuals claiming to be victims of similar violations.


98.  The Government submitted that the applicant had never complained about his ill-treatment to the competent domestic authorities, either personally or through counsel representing his interests in the criminal proceedings against him. All complaints had been lodged by his mother. In the Government’s opinion, the mother’s complaints did not count for exhaustion purposes. In any event, although the mother had appealed against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings to a higher prosecutor, such appeal did not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967/01, § 60, 1 March 2007). The only effective remedy was a judicial appeal. The mother had not applied to a court until long after the events complained of, while the applicant himself had not had recourse to that remedy at all. Therefore, the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies.


18.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicant had not invoked this complaint before the domestic courts. In this respect, they referred to the case-law of the Court (in particular Ahmet Sadık v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V).


15.  The Government maintained that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as they had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to them under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, they would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if they had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


42.  The applicant submitted that his mother represented him throughout the proceedings and that the remedies which she had pursued regarding the excessive length of the proceedings had also been brought on his behalf. He further referred to a judgment given by the Court in her case (Berent-Derda v. Poland, no. 23484/02, 1 July 2008) where it found that she had complied with the requirement set by Article <mask> of the Convention. He further submitted that he had withdrawn the complaint of 2 February 2006 (see paragraph 24 above) because it had been successful in that a decision on the merits of the case had been given after his lodging of that complaint.


21.  The Government argued that the applicants did not exhaust the domestic remedies as they did not request the rectification of the decisions delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court. They also stated that as the applicants did not submit any observations in reply to the submissions of the administration dated 4 November 1997, they cannot be considered as having exhausted the domestic remedies within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


15.  The Government averred that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, since they had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to them under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, they would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation had they established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest. The Government further claimed that the damage allegedly suffered by the applicants had been caused by the legal interest rates. They argued that before the domestic courts, the applicants had agreed to the application of the legal interest rates to their case and that, therefore, they could not be said to have raised their Convention grievances before the domestic authorities.


65.  The Government further described various legal avenues which were available to the applicant in connection with his complaint about conditions of detention. Alternatively, they claimed that the application in this part had been submitted outside the time-limit provided by Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, the application was introduced on 5 October 2002, whereas the applicant complained about the period of his detention which had ended on 26 June 2000. The Government maintained that it would be wrong to calculate the six-month time-limit from the date of the final decision in the applicant’s civil proceedings against the colony administration, since the Court has found in a number of previous cases that in the Russian legal system tort proceedings cannot be considered an “effective remedy” within the meaning of Article 35.


14.  The Government asked the Court to dismiss the application as inadmissible for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, they maintained that the applicant had to complain before the national authorities prior to his application to the Court. They stated that at no stage of the domestic proceedings did the applicant question the length of the proceedings.


57.  The applicant contested that view. He argued that he had exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the initial order for his retrospective preventive detention. In its judgment of 4 May 2011, the Federal Constitutional Court had not created a new remedy, but had only laid down conditions for the usual periodic review of preventive detention under Article 67e of the Criminal Code.


74.  The Government also stated that a criminal case had been opened in June 2012. The complaint was premature and thus inadmissible for one of the reasons under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court notes that the Government have not informed it of the course of the preliminary investigation or its outcome. In any event, between August 2009 and the date of lodging the present complaint before the Court, the national authorities were afforded ample opportunity to deal with the complaint relating to the use of force and to carry out an effective investigation in this respect. As noted above, the present complaint was lodged in time. The resumption of the investigation in 2012 does not make the complaint inadmissible under Article 35 of the Convention.


95.  The applicants complained that their rights under Article 11 had been affected by the decision by the local administration of 17 April 2006 not to allow the demonstration. The Government, in response, claimed that under Article 19 of the Public Gatherings Act it was open for the organisers of the demonstration to complain in court about the decision of the district administration of 17 April 2006 to ban the demonstration. However, the organisers did not lodge such a complaint. Therefore, they failed to exhaust domestic remedies under Article <mask> of the Convention.


35.  The Government considered that the applicant had not fully exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. In the proceedings before the domestic courts, he had failed to complain about his visual observation as such, which alone had established a link between himself and the data obtained by the GPS surveillance in that it had disclosed his presence in S.'s car. Moreover, the applicant had not contested the lawfulness of all surveillance measures other than the GPS surveillance, in particular the interception of his telecommunications, before the domestic courts.


14.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants’ complaints in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Izmir State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this regard, they maintained that the applicants had not invoked this complaint before the domestic courts. They further argued that the applicants should have lodged their application with the Court within six months of the date on which the State Security Court rendered its judgment.


19.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants had failed to comply with the six months rule. In this regard, they claimed firstly that the application had been lodged with the court outside the six-month time limit. They further submitted that the complaints pertaining to the independence and impartiality of the İzmir State Security Court and the lack of access to a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings should have been lodged with the Court within six months of the date on which the State Security Court rendered its judgment and the date on which the applicants’ detention period ended, respectively.


65.  The applicant further argued that the criminal investigation had been ongoing for more than ten years (see paragraph 48 above). The Government could not, therefore, claim in a convincing way that this constituted an effective remedy under Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular with regard to the serious nature of the alleged crime. Moreover, they did not explain why the investigation had been protracted (see Timurtas ν. Turkey (dec.), no. 23531/94, 13 June 2000; Sarli ν. Turkey (dec.), no. 24490/94, 28 September 1995; and Ertak v. Turkey (dec.), no. 20764/92, 12 April 1996). The applicant maintained that in this case the investigating authorities had failed to comply with the requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition (see, for example, Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00, .57945/00, 57942/00, 57945/00, 24 February 2005, § 155, and Yasa v. Turkey, no. 22495/93, 2 September 1998, § 102-104).


31.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint concerning the non-communication of the written observations of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. They maintained that the applicant should have lodged this complaint to the Court within six-months following the dismissal of his request for a rectification of the Court of Cassation’s decision whereas his complaint was introduced to the Court on 7 January 1998.


92.  The Government argued that the application had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by the Convention. They maintained that, in so far as the applicant’s main argument was the failure to enforce the State Arbitration Commission’s decision of 1993, which constituted the basis for the applicant’s further complaints, that decision was the last decision for the purposes of Article 35. Thus, the application should be taken to have been lodged well outside the time-limit provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention.


14.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants’ complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicants were complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court, they should have lodged their application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 9 October 1996.


14.  The Government asked the Court, firstly, to dismiss the application as inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article <mask> of the Convention. For the purposes of that provision, time had started to run on 17 March 1998. However, the applicants had not lodged their application with Court until 4 May 1999, that is almost fourteen months after the final domestic decision.


36.  The Government argued that the application had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by the Convention. They maintained that, in so far as the applicants’ main argument was that, by the letter of 2 November 2005, the Gurjaani Public Registry prevented enforcement of the Gurjaani District Court’s decision of 31 January 2005, that letter was the last decision for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


26.  The Government submitted that the application had not been made within six months of the last domestic decision as it was received by the Court on 2 November 2016. However, according to the Court’s settled case‑law it is the date of dispatch which is the relevant date for the purposes of calculating the six-month period in Article <mask> of the Convention (see by way of example Shishkov v. Russia, no. 26746/05, § 83, 20 February 2014). The postal records show that the application was dispatched on 24 October 2016 and was therefore made within six months from the date on which the final decision was taken in the case, which was that of the Supreme Court of 27 April 2016. It follows that the application was made within the six‑month time limit.


79.  The Government firstly claimed that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies. In particular, she had not begun court proceedings against the journalists whose television show, Srovės, had been based on the interview with the applicant’s psychiatrist, doctor D.Š. On that point the Government noted that domestic law allowed individuals to bring a claim directly against a producer and/or broadcaster of a television programme, irrespective of who else might have contributed to the dissemination of the information in question (see paragraph 72 above). Accordingly, and notwithstanding the applicant’s belief that the breach of her right to privacy was linked to the actions of the psychiatrist, the impact on her privacy that she had purportedly experienced had been caused by the journalists and the television channel which had broadcast the Srovės programme. The Government also referred to several Supreme Court rulings from 2005 and argued that there was a plentiful amount of Lithuanian case‑law showing that journalists could be brought to justice for breaching the right to privacy, proving that such an action was an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. It was therefore not reasonable to shift all the responsibility for the public dissemination of information which the applicant saw as concerning her private life to the hospital, or, all the more so, to the State, only because the applicant had chosen to bring her claim for responsibility against the hospital during the domestic proceedings. The Government underlined that domestic law aimed at enabling plaintiffs to approach alleged violations of their rights in the most effective way, considering all the relevant factors showing wrongful behaviour. In this case, neither the hospital nor the psychiatrist had been able to control the scope of the information broadcast, in contrast to the actual broadcaster of that information.


31.  The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They referred to the fact that the final judgment in the applicant’s criminal case had been given on 21 April 2011 and served on his lawyer on 7 June 2011. The time-limit provided for by Article <mask> of the Convention had expired on 7 December 2011. The applicant had lodged his application with the Court on 2 January 2012, as shown by the receipt stamp of the Registry on the application form.


16.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant's complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Malatya State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicant was complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Malatya State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment.


18.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicant was complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 27 November 1997.


30.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Istanbul State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicant did not raise this complaint before the domestic courts. Moreover, the Government referred to the constitutional amendment of 1999 whereby military judges could no longer sit on such courts. They contended that the applicant cannot therefore claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a trial by an independent and impartial court.


28.  The Government argued in the first place that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant could have filed an objection against the confiscation order pursuant to Article 298 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Secondly, they contended that this complaint was unsubstantiated. In this connection, they stated that the vehicle in question had been returned to the applicant in 2002 and that the confiscation order, which had been issued because there was a dispute over the ownership of the car, was in accordance with the domestic law and served the general interest.


199.  The Government claimed that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this complaint. Thus, he had not challenged the lawfulness of those searches before the courts. Alternatively, the Government claimed that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit established in Article <mask> of the Convention, if calculated from the date of the searches.


37.  The Government considered that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention – in particular, the applicant did not avail himself of the opportunity, provided for by the international conventions on legal assistance in criminal matters, to participate in the execution of the letters rogatory or to indicate the questions to be put to the witnesses outside Ukraine.


16.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicant was complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 18 November 1996.


16.  The Government further argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants' complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicants had not invoked their complaint before the domestic courts. In this respect, they refer to the case-law of the Court (in particular Ahmet Sadık v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V).


179.  The Government maintained that the applicant could have appealed against the court order committing him for compulsory psychiatric treatment. It followed therefore that the applicant had not done all that could be expected of him to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, and for that reason his complaint should have been declared inadmissible. The applicant disagreed.


16.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicant was complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Ankara State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 15 October 1997.


14.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants’ complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Izmir State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this respect, they maintained that as the applicants were complaining of the lack of independence and impartiality of the State Security Court, they should have lodged their application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely 25 March 1997.