83.  The applicant maintained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, during his detention in the temporary holding facility of the Kirovskiy District Police Department of the Stavropol Region. As regards the medical expert examination carried out on 7 October 2002, which had not established any injuries on him, the applicant referred to the findings of the District Court in its judgment of 2 May 2006, where it had established that the applicant and his lawyer had not been notified of the investigator’s order that such an examination be carried out until after it had been conducted, and therefore a note on the relevant expert report that the applicant had no comments, questions or objections regarding the experts had been devoid of any legal meaning.


150.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the manner in which the bodies of their relatives had been exhibited at the military base constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. They also complained that the prosecutor had not investigated this particular complaint and that they therefore had not had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of their complaint under Article 3 of the Convention.


39.  The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that his allegations had not been investigated properly. He referred to Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will examine these complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention, which is the relevant provision, and which provides as follows:


43.  The Government claimed that the conditions of the applicant's detention had been in compliance with the standards set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that at all times the applicant had been provided with an individual bed and bedding. The Government referred to the copies of excerpts from the remand prison population register for the period from 18 April 2003 to 10 November 2003.


56.  The applicant complained that the police had beaten him and threatened him. He complained that the conditions of his detention in the SIZO had been incompatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular, he was not able to breathe fresh air and the food given to him had not been sufficiently rich in calories. Because the conditions of his detention had been poor he had developed TB while in the SIZO. According to the applicant, he received inadequate medical treatment from February 2003 to June 2005. In particular, he was not given any medications to treat his TB even though he needed them. The applicant invoked Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention. However the Court, which is the master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the present part of the application falls to be examined solely under Article 3 of the Convention which reads as follows:


86.  The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention in Płock Prisons from 8 August 2003 to 4 June 2007 and from 9 January to 6 February 2008 had fallen short of standards compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and, in particular, those required for persons in his state of health. He complained that he had been detained in overcrowded cells and had been allowed very limited out-of-cell time, that is to say, he had been permitted only an hour of outdoor exercise per day and only one shower per week. The applicant also complained that he had been afforded inadequate medical care during his detention. Lastly, the applicant claimed that he had been forced to share one of his cells with a schizophrenic inmate with a history of violence.


60.  The applicant concluded that all of the above circumstances – in particular the insufficient and inadequate medical care and the humiliation resulting from the fact that he had had to ask for assistance from his fellow inmates in order to be able to get to and from the exercise yard – amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


54.  The Government contested that argument. In their opinion, it was impossible to determine whether the applicant had been subjected to ill‑treatment while in police custody, given that the inquiry into the applicant's allegations was still pending. They further submitted that the Russian authorities had complied with their positive obligation arising out of Article <mask> of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation in response to his complaint of ill-treatment. The earlier deficiencies in the investigation had been rectified at the domestic level.


41.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant’s injuries were caused by misconduct on the part of the police officers. In addition, the evidence had led to the conclusion that the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted by the rape victim, who had tried to defend herself during the assault.


101.  The applicant was wanted by the Tajik authorities on account of his alleged involvement in the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which he consistently denied. Regard being had to the reports by reputable organisations (see, in particular, paragraphs 73 and 75 above), the Court considers that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice of persecution of members or supporters of that organisation, whose underlying aims appear to be both religious and political. The Government's reference to the fact that the applicant did not apply for political asylum immediately after his arrival to Russia does not necessarily refute the applicant's allegations of risks of ill-treatment since the protection afforded by Article <mask> of the Convention is in any event broader than that provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (see, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, cited above, § 138).


57.  The Government argued that the investigation conducted by domestic authorities had met the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the authorities had conducted a number of investigative actions, interviewing S., G., and the applicant, conducting photo identifications and face-to-face confrontations, ordering medical examinations, and collecting information from the transport company. The applicant was recognised as a victim and informed about the progress of the investigation.


29.  The applicant submitted that the cells had been severely overcrowded and that the Voronezh prosecutor had acknowledged the existing overcrowding problem. He did not have an individual sleeping place, which indicated a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he suffered from extreme cold and heat because the mandatory ventilation and heating systems did not function, and from a lack of privacy when using the toilet.


48.  The Government contended that the conditions under the “special regime” in which the applicant had been detained in both prisons had been applied in accordance with section 167d(1) of the regulations for the implementation of the 1969 Act, and subsequently with section 213 of the newly adopted regulations for the implementation of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009. They also made detailed submissions in respect of the material conditions in which the applicant had been detained in Lovech Prison but not in respect of the conditions in Varna Prison. As regards Lovech Prison, they emphasised that the use of buckets as a toilet had been found by the Court to be in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention only in cases where the applicants had had to relieve themselves in front of other inmates. Given that the applicant in the present case had been locked alone in a cell under the “special regime” for practically the whole period of his detention, he could not claim to be affected by a breach of Article 3 in that respect. They further asserted that a breach of Article 3 of the Convention could only be established if the treatment to which an applicant had been subjected reached the minimum level of severity. This had not been the case, given that the authorities had not aimed at humiliating or debasing the applicant, nor had he shown that his suffering went beyond the inevitable inconvenience of serving a prison sentence. This was true both in respect of the material conditions in which the applicant had been detained and in respect of the restrictions which he had to endure as part of the “special regime”.


101.  The applicants complained about the conditions in which the bodies of their deceased relatives had been stored during the identification process. They were also dissatisfied with the circumstances of their personal participation in the identification process. According to the applicants, this treatment by the authorities caused them such mental suffering that it amounted to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


33.  The Government submitted that as the first applicant did not seek to rely on Article 3 before the domestic courts, he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, while the Government did not doubt that the first applicant had suffered distress due to the circumstances in which he found himself, they submitted that the circumstances in issue did not come close to constituting ill-treatment of the severity necessary to engage Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government therefore submitted that the Court should reject as manifestly ill-founded the contention that any of the matters at issue disclosed a violation of Article 3.


58.  The Government submitted that the injuries alleged by the applicant did not attain the minimum level of severity in order to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. They referred to a number of domestic medical examinations carried out, which had concluded that the applicant had only suffered negligible health impairment and that he had not required any subsequent treatment or sick leave which was due to those injuries.


34.  The Government pleaded that the applicant had failed to exhaust available effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had failed to appeal against the refusal to grant him temporary asylum of 26 November 2013. If the applicant had been granted temporary asylum, his extradition would have been suspended or even rescinded. The Government also submitted that the applicant had failed to lodge a cassation appeal under Chapter 48.1 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) against the Supreme Court’s appeal judgment of 25 February 2014 upholding the extradition order.


342.  The Government repeated their arguments that the applicants had not been subjected to ill-treatment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention and their respective complaints were manifestly ill-founded. Accordingly, their claims for the non-pecuniary damage should be rejected. Moreover, the Government, referring to the Court's case-law and the principles thereof, wished to emphasize that an applicant's claims should not serve as a basis for unjustified enrichment.


53.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he was ill-treated by police officers during his detention in Korsun-Shevchenkivsky police station in 2003. He also relied on Article 3 in complaining about the material conditions of his detention in various penitentiaries, his placement in a disciplinary cell in September 2005 and his force-feeding during that period, as well as the insufficiency of the medical assistance available to him throughout the entire period of his detention. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


73.  The Government contended that the applicant had failed to provide any detailed arguments or evidence in support of his complaints. They further noted that it was an established fact that the applicant had resisted the police prior to his arrest on 16 July 2008 and that legitimate force had been applied to him. This explained the injuries which had been revealed in the examination carried out on 17 July 2008. The Government also referred to a number of other medical examinations of the applicant, namely those of 26 and 30 July, 7 August and 7 November 2008, and 4 February 2009, which had not revealed any injuries. They argued that the present case was similar to that of Aleksandr Smirnov v. Ukraine, in which the Court had found no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention under its substantive limb for the absence of conclusive evidence in the case file in support of the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment (no. 38683/06, §§ 52-55, 15 July 2010).


62.  The applicant’s complaint under Article 3 is three-fold. First, she complained that her husband had been ill-treated upon his detention; second, that no investigation had been carried out by the authorities into this allegation; and third, that she had suffered severe mental distress and anguish in connection with his disappearance. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


64.  The applicant complained that he was subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he alleged that he did not receive the necessary medical treatment and assistance for tuberculosis while serving his sentence. He also complained that the conditions of his detention in different penitentiaries were unsatisfactory (the size of the cell in which he was detained, the number of persons in the cell, the bedding and conditions of hygiene, sanitation and ventilation, nutrition, outdoor daily walks, access to natural light and air, etc.). He further alleged that he was not provided with the required prescription drugs, medicines and the necessary medical care and attention for his tuberculosis. Article 3 provides:


127.  The applicant submitted that the minimum level of severity for Article <mask> of the Convention to apply had been reached in the present case. She had witnessed the condition of her husband’s body ‒ with the legs tied together ‒ after the tissue removal. She had also been pregnant at the time with their second child. The applicant submitted that the unlawful tissue removal amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, since it had caused her shock and suffering. In support, she provided a written statement from her sister, who stated that she had seen Mr Elberts’ body in Sigulda, after it had been transported from the Forensic Centre prior to the funeral, and that his legs had been tied together with dark tape; she had assumed that this had been due to the car accident.


40.  The applicant complained under Articles 1, 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by prison staff on 3 May 2006, that his complaint in that respect had not been investigated and that there was no effective mechanism for the prevention of ill-treatment. The Court considers that the complaints under Articles 1, 6, 13 and 14 essentially repeat that made under Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 3 reads as follows:


53.  The Government contended that both the decisions of the Asylum Office of 28 February 2012 and the Asylum Court’s ruling of 24 September 2012 had analysed not only the situation of asylum-seekers including the situation faced by Dublin II returnees, the detention practice and a possible refoulement in general, but also in particular whether the applicant’s transfer in the light of his young age might violate Article <mask> of the Convention. This was evident from the fact that the Asylum Court had set aside the Asylum Office’s decision in the first set of proceedings because of deficiencies in the investigation. The comprehensive examination in the instant case did not reveal any necessity to make use of the right to conduct the proceedings under Article 3 § 2 of the Dublin II Regulation. With reference to the UNHCR’s Note on Dublin Transfers to Hungary of people who have transited through Serbia, published in December 2012, it could no longer be assumed that refugees who had entered Hungarian territory via Serbia were refused having their asylum application examined on the merits.


37.  The Government contended that the injuries which the applicant had sustained during his arrest and transportation to the police station on 21 October 2010 did not reach the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the applicant was a healthy young man and the minor injuries which he had sustained – excoriations on his left elbow, on the left side of his chest and behind his left ear, for which he had received prompt medical assistance – could not have caused him suffering reaching the minimum level of severity to fall under Article 3 of the Convention.


60.  The applicants submitted that there was no adequate remedy for their complaints about the treatment of Judith McGlinchey in prison, or a remedy that would address the defects in management and policy which allowed the neglect and ill-treatment. Any cause of action in negligence was dependent on establishing the necessary causal link between the negligent acts and the death and/or personal injury, which was not present in this case. The treatment in issue was nonetheless inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. No other remedies, which could provide compensation and an acknowledgement of the breach, existed.


85.  The applicants complained that the first applicant had suffered ill-treatment (including sexual abuse together with a subjection to forced labour), as had to a lesser extent the second and third applicants at the hands of the Roma family in Ghislarengo, and that the authorities (especially the Public Prosecutor in Vercelli) had failed to investigate the events adequately. They also complained that the first and third applicants had been ill-treated by Italian police officers during their questioning. Thus, the Italian and Bulgarian authorities’ actions and omissions were contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


44.  The Government submitted that the physical force and special means, such as handcuffs, which had been used on the applicant during his arrest fell outside the scope of Article 3 for two reasons. Firstly, the injuries did not result in a deterioration of his health or cause any lasting consequences. Secondly, the police officers did not use physical force to cause suffering to the applicant or to humiliate him; they merely fulfilled their duties, whereas the applicant resisted them. The use of force did not pursue any other goals, such as, for instance, obtaining a confession. The Government emphasised that the applicant had disobeyed the lawful demands of the police officers and that they had used lawful and reasonable measures for putting an end to his unlawful conduct. Finally, the Government submitted that the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment had been carefully reviewed by the domestic authorities in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention.


73.  The Government did not consider that Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached. They pointed out that on his arrival in prison on 4 March 2013 the applicant had already been suffering from a disease which would have fatal outcome in the short term owing to the metastases spreading to his skeleton. They further submitted that neither the Institute of Forensic Medicine nor the doctors had imposed on the authorities any obligation to place the applicant permanently in a civilian hospital (see paragraph 14 above).


45.  The Government further argued that the applicants had not exhausted all the available remedies since they could have claimed damages against the State Treasury under Article 417 of the Civil Code. In the civil proceedings the court would have to establish whether the allegations of ill-treatment were well-founded and thus to determine whether there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government stressed that the civil courts were not bound by the findings reached in the criminal investigation.


32.  The applicant submitted that his detention at the Kırklareli Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre had not had a proper legal basis and that it had been entirely arbitrary. He noted in particular that following the judgment of the Court in Keshmiri v. Turkey (no. 36370/08, § 28, 13 April 2010), where it found that there would be a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention if he were to be removed to Iran or Iraq, it was clear that there would be no further deportation proceedings against him. He had continued, nevertheless, to be kept in detention after the aforementioned judgment.


80.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in remand prison no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow from 29 October 2002 to 20 December 2003 and on the premises of the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow. He also complained about the conditions of his transport to and from the courthouse. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


28.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by the police during his detention and that he had not been provided with food and water between 25 and 27 April 2006. He also complained of the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate properly his allegations of ill-treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


180.   The Government argued that the applicant should have pleaded the State’s vicarious liability for the patron and/or manager. However, the Government mainly relied on two other remedies. In the first place, they referred to an action claiming that the primary-education system, foreseen by Article 42 of the Constitution, breached her unenumerated constitutional right to bodily integrity (the constitutional tort action). Secondly, they argued that she could have continued her claim in negligence in her appeal to the Supreme Court arguing that the State had failed to structure the primary-education system so as to protect her from abuse. This was her complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. The High Court had summarily dismissed (“non-suited”) her claims because she had failed to adduce any evidence: indeed, her own expert (Professor Ferguson, see paragraph 24 above) had advised her against litigating on the basis of a lack of relevant awareness of risk on the part of the State. It was therefore disingenuous to argue that she should now be excused from appealing because she had been non-suited on evidential grounds. In any event, the Government maintained that certain domestic case-law indicated that a non-suit on evidential grounds was appealable and, further, that she could have appealed the non-suit because the High Court gave no clear reasons for that decision and because it failed to address her negligence claim separately.


83.  The Government argued that it had not been proven in the present case that the applicant had been treated in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the resort to physical force by the officers had been strictly necessary due to the applicant’s behaviour. The police actions were not planned in advance but were provoked by the applicant’s resistance. It is true that the applicant suffered certain bodily injuries but he could not be considered to have suffered intensely, either mentally or emotionally. As regards the civil courts’ finding that the officers had acted unlawfully and abused their powers, the Government stressed that this had been established in the context of the civil liability.


188.  The applicants submitted that Italy’s interceptions of persons on the high seas were not in accordance with the law and were not subject to a review of their lawfulness by a national authority. For that reason, the applicants had been deprived of any opportunity of lodging an appeal against their return to Libya and alleging a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.


91.  The applicant argued that her allegations of a violation of Article 3 in respect of Mr Sharani Askharov were supported by the fact that other men detained on 18 May 2001 who had subsequently been released had sustained serious injuries as a result of torture. She claimed that the Government had failed to produce any evidence that could refute her allegations. The applicant also maintained her complaint that she herself had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention because of the anguish and distress she had suffered as a result of her husband’s disappearance.


31.  The Government pointed out that the applicant had already been awarded damages in the domestic proceedings on account of the poor living conditions in Lovech Prison for the period from 8 March 2000 to 27 October 2004. They argued that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as it had been open for him to seek damages in respect of his remaining stay in that prison. Furthermore, the Government were of the view that the suffering inflicted on the applicant had not reached the minimum level of severity required under Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, they pointed out that following a refurbishment of Lovech Prison in the autumn of 2008 the cells had been equipped with sanitary facilities.


66.  The Government submitted that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected had not attained the minimum level of severity necessary to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. As regards the seriousness of the injuries sustained by the applicant and the effects of the treatment to which she had been subjected, the Government noted that the violence had not been premeditated or continuous, and that the fact that the applicant had been involved in a physical confrontation had stripped the situation of any degrading motivation. Furthermore, it had not been proved “beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant had been subjected to acts in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The deterioration of her health had been as a result of the applicant’s previous health problems and not as a result of the confrontation between the applicant and S.N.


88.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not substantiated his claim for pecuniary damage. They further submitted that the amount claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage was excessive and unfounded, and referred to several cases of the Court in which the applicants had been awarded non-pecuniary damages ranging from EUR 2,000 to EUR 5,000 for violations of the substantive and procedural limbs of Article <mask> of the Convention.


31. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been subjected to acts of police brutality inflicting on him great physical and mental suffering which amounted to torture or inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Furthermore, he alleged that he was a victim of a procedural violation of the above Article since the prosecuting authorities had failed to proceed with an effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the police officers responsible. Article 3 reads as follows:


95.  The applicant complained of the inadequate conditions of his detention in the SIZO medical unit, in particular, the lack of glass in the window of his cell and the quality of the food provided by the SIZO. He also complained that the conditions of his transportation amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because he was not transported in medically equipped vehicles. He also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy in that respect. The applicant also complained that he had been constantly handcuffed while in the municipal hospitals.


42.  The applicant submitted that the prolonged imposition of the dangerous detainee regime on him had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He referred in particular to the fact that for the whole of the period during which the regime had been imposed on him he had been strip‑searched as a matter of routine, without any particular reason being given for such searches.


44.  The Government stated that the material conditions at the Kumkapı Removal Centre complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted in this respect that the centre had a capacity of 300 persons and that the total number of detainees had not exceeded that number during the applicant’s stay. There were fifteen to twenty beds in each of the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms were sufficiently ventilated. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise in suitable weather conditions, and breakfast, lunch and dinner were provided on a daily basis. A doctor was present on the premises every Thursday and the detainees also had access to medical care in cases of emergency. As for the hygiene conditions in the facility, there were six cleaning staff working full time at the centre, and the building was disinfected whenever necessary.


44.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the conditions of his pre-trial detention and his alleged infection with tuberculosis, under Article 5 about the unlawfulness of his arrest, his detention pending trial in excess of the time-limit provided in the domestic law, and the failure of the domestic authorities to make the charges against him known to him in good time. Lastly, he complained under Article 6 of the Convention about various irregularities in the criminal proceedings against him in 2003, 2003-2005 and 2008, and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the property which he inherited after his mother’s death had been sold while he was serving his sentence.


84.  The applicant complained that during his detention in the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department between 6 and 14 March 2003 the police had subjected him to treatment incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation into the incident. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the State's obligations under Article 3, which reads as follows:


57.  The applicant argued that the fact of being treated in a medical institution not legally authorised to provide medical treatment amounted in itself to degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, even though the applicant lacked the specialist knowledge to assess the quality of the care provided to him, he had been very worried about the quality of his treatment. The applicant further submitted that while it might indeed have been the case that all the doctors working at the Prison Hospital were properly qualified, the Government had failed to provide any information about the qualification of nurses and about the certification of the medical equipment and techniques employed at that hospital.


115.  The applicant maintained that he had been classified as a “dangerous detainee” unlawfully and without any reasonable justification and pointed in this respect to a number of judgments acquitting him of the charges laid against him. The regime had been imposed on him in an arbitrary manner on account of the gravity of the charges, in particular the charge of leading an organised criminal group in respect of which the proceedings had been discontinued and the charge of corrupting a police officer in respect of which he had been acquitted. The treatment to which he had been exposed under the special regime should be considered inhuman and degrading and it had amounted to a gross violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


48.  The Government further stated that the proportion of favourable recommendations issued by OFPRA concerning applications made at border points had been 22.2% in 2005, that is, almost three times the rate of admission for that year under the procedure for claiming eligibility for asylum (8.2%). In their view, this difference demonstrated that applicants at the border were given the benefit of the doubt. They were not aware of any cases in which the removal of an alien had led subsequently to his or her being subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention or Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.


2.  The applicant Mr Stoica lodged his first complaint at domestic level eleven years after the events took place. On 25 June 2008, more than eighteen years after the events, the applicant lodged his application with the Strasbourg Court. With regard to his application, the Chamber had previously considered that, just as it was imperative that the relevant domestic authorities launch an investigation and take measures as soon as allegations of ill-treatment were brought to their attention, it was also incumbent on the persons concerned to display diligence and initiative. Thus, the Chamber attached particular importance to the fact that the applicant had not brought his complaint concerning the violence to which he was subjected on 13 June 1990 to the authorities’ attention until eleven years after those events. Although the Chamber could accept that in situations of mass violations of fundamental rights it was appropriate to take account of victims’ vulnerability, especially a possible inability to lodge complaints for fear of reprisals, it found no convincing argument that would justify the applicant’s passivity and decision to wait eleven years before submitting his complaint to the relevant authorities. Accordingly, the Chamber concluded that there had been no violation of the procedural aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention. In contrast, the Grand Chamber considers that the applicant’s vulnerability and his feeling of powerlessness, which he shared with numerous other victims who, like him, waited for many years before lodging a complaint, amount to a plausible and acceptable explanation for his inactivity from 1990 to 2001.


52.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of inhuman and degrading treatment on account of the material conditions of his detention and a lack of adequate medical care. In particular, he complained of overcrowding, poor hygiene, lack of regular access to hot and cold water, and a lack of special facilities adapted for people with disabilities. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:


42.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Łódź Remand Centre where he had been held for a period of over four years had been inadequate taking into account his particular health condition, namely epilepsy and personality disorder. He alleged that the cells had been overcrowded, badly ventilated, and without a fixed partition separating the toilet. The applicant submitted that such conditions attained a minimum level of severity amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


11.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he complained of severe overcrowding, which had led to a lack of personal space, poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restrictions on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cells, inadequate health care and psychiatric support, and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security.


192.  The Government submitted, in relation to the applicants’ prison regime, that the “special regime” normally applicable to life prisoners – which entailed keeping them permanently under lock and key and their segregation from other prisoners – was not incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. It was required by law on account of the seriousness of their offences, and was necessary for the purpose of assessing the risk posed by those prisoners. That regime could be changed to a less stringent one if the prisoner had served at least five years and had shown good conduct; it was therefore possible for a life prisoner to influence his prison regime. Under the applicable rules, life prisoners had to undergo annual risk assessments, and such assessments had been drawn up in respect of both applicants.


110.  The Government observed that the right to an effective domestic remedy was a procedural right which had to be linked to a possible violation of a substantive right under the Convention or the Protocols thereto. In paragraph 15 of its admissibility decision of 7 July 2015 the Court had found that “in the absence of an arguable complaint of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, the complaint under Article 13 is unsustainable”. The Government therefore argued that, since there had likewise, in their view, been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in the present case, no violation of Article 13 of the Convention could be found.


34.  The applicant complained that, a minor at the time, he had suffered serious bodily harm and great mental suffering at the hands of the police on 5 August 2001. He also complained that the investigative and prosecuting authorities had failed to carry out a prompt, comprehensive and effective investigation capable of providing a plausible explanation of the injuries he had sustained during his brief detention in the police station and of leading to the identification and punishment of all police officers responsible. He alleged a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


74.  The Government acknowledged that there had been overcrowding in all of the detention facilities in which the applicant had been held. More specifically, the statistics provided by the Government in reply to the applicant’s allegations of overcrowding show that most of the time the applicant’s personal space was significantly less than that required by the Court’s case-law. The Court points out that those figures were even lower in reality, given that the cells also contained beds and other items of furniture. This state of affairs in itself raises an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above, § 173; Cotleţ v. Romania (No 2), no. 49549/11, § 34, 1 October 2013; and Todireasa, cited above, § 57).


131.  The Government further stated that one of the reasons which had to a large extent contributed to the appearance of new illnesses had been the psychological and emotional burden to which the applicant had been subjected as the result of having been in detention and the criminal proceedings against him. Hence, the national authorities could not bear responsibility for the appearance of these illnesses, as it was not connected with the provision of medical treatment in the SIZO or with the material conditions of detention in the SIZO. The Government underlined that the applicant had received regular and appropriate medical treatment for the new conditions which had appeared. He had been examined by SIZO doctors, he had been repeatedly examined by medical commissions numbering the best specialists from civilian hospitals, had received everything he had been prescribed and had had all the indicated examinations; when necessary he had been admitted to a civilian hospital. The Government considered that the medical treatment provided to the applicant had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention.


98.  The applicant submitted that he had been kept in conditions that were contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular he was in a de facto isolation regime, which had not been ordered by a judge and which had gone beyond the maximum duration of ten days prescribed by law. He noted that at the time of the CPT visit in 2013 there had only been one detainee. Even so, the CPT had noted that that detainee had been subject to a regime similar to isolation, and that in such a context it would be essential for such a prisoner to be offered a programme of activities and appropriate human contact. The CPT had also highlighted that the law provided for an isolation regime only for a maximum period of ten days.


50.  The applicants submitted that any attempt to seek the imposition of criminal or disciplinary sanctions on the police officers who had carried out the searches and seizures and arrested the first applicant would have failed. Internal police investigations were normally entrusted to colleagues of those involved, and were hence not effective and impartial. They were usually not duly carried out and often amounted to a whitewash rather than a serious attempt to uncover misconduct. A complaint to the prosecuting authorities would not have led to serious investigative efforts either. Those authorities clearly knew about the incident, and yet had not investigated it. A claim under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act would have been bound to fail, as under the prevailing case-law of the Bulgarian courts, including the Supreme Court of Cassation’s 2005 interpretative decision (cited in paragraph 36 above), the actions of the police in a criminal case were not “administrative” within the meaning of that provision. Unlike in the other cases (cited in paragraph 40 above), here the police had acted on orders by the prosecuting authorities in a pending criminal case. The February 2014 judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court (cited in paragraph 37 above) had been an isolated precedent rather than settled case-law, and ran against the Supreme Court of Cassation’s interpretative decision, which was binding on all courts. Moreover, it had not resulted in a final award by the time the application had been lodged. Lastly, it had assessed the conduct of the police under the domestic rules governing searches rather than by reference to Article <mask> of the Convention.


50.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of inadequate conditions of detention in Dobrowo and Koszalin Remand Centres. In particular, he submitted that for 309 days his cells had been so severely overcrowded that each prisoner had only 60 square cm of personal space. As a result, the applicant had spent most of the day sitting on his bed, unable to move around in the cell. For an unspecified period one of the applicant’s fellow inmates had had to sleep on a mattress on the floor as there had been no space for a bed or for the inmate. The applicant also claimed that access to the toilet had been very limited, the cells had not been properly ventilated and the mattresses had been old, dirty and mouldy. Lastly, the applicant complained that he had been allowed only one shower per week and very limited time out of his cell (one hour of outdoor exercise per day).


64.  The Government commented on the conditions of the applicant’s detention. In particular, they submitted that, in violation of the domestic requirements, the applicant had usually been afforded less than four square metres of personal space during his detention in the unit. At the same time the Government, citing the court’s judgment in the case of Kemmache v. France (no. 3) (24 November 1994, Series A no. 296‑C), argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, as the domestic courts had acknowledged the violation and had redressed it by allowing the applicant’s action against the facility management and awarding him compensation for non-pecuniary damage.


57.  The applicant, first, complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment during her detention. In this respect the applicant stated, particularly, that she had been threatened with death, kept standing for long periods of time and blindfolded. She further claimed that the area of the cell in which she had been detained was six square metres, that there was no ventilation and that the lights were on twenty-four hours a day. Secondly, the applicant claimed that the circumstances in which she had been subjected to a gynaecological examination on 24 October 1997 constituted a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In this connection the applicant claimed that the examination had been performed by a male doctor during which the gendarmes took her clothes off, made her lie down and touched every part of her body and that she had not consented to it.


149.  The applicant requested the Court to go beyond its findings in N. v. the United Kingdom and to define, in the light of these considerations, a realistic threshold of severity that was no longer confined to securing a “right to die with dignity”. He relied in that connection on the recent developments in the case-law of the Belgian courts, which had distanced themselves from the findings in N. v. the United Kingdom and now afforded more extensive protection than that provided for under Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraphs 101 et seq. above).


90.  The applicant further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, submitting that her husband had most likely been tortured during his detention and that no effective investigation had been carried out on that account. The applicant also claimed that as a result of her husband’s disappearance and the State’s failure to investigate those events properly, she had endured mental suffering in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 reads:


40.  The applicant also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that he had been tortured by the police during his detention and that his allegations of torture had not been duly examined, that the authorities had not provided him with adequate medical assistance, and that the conditions of his detention in the colony had been debasing.


45.  The Government asserted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 from 15 March to 3 August 2005 had been in compliance Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had not been confined to the cell all the time. It had been open to him to meet with his lawyer and/or family. He had been able to participate in investigative actions and exercise his right to worship in special premises. Furthermore, he had been able to leave the cell in order to use shower facilities and to do his laundry. In certain remand prisons it was possible for the inmates to work in various workshops affiliated to the prison. When describing the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the remand prison (see paragraphs 15-17 above), the Government relied on excerpts from the remand prison population register, official floor plans of the cells in the remand prison. Relying on the statements provided by the administration of correctional facility no. IK-13 where the applicant had served his prison sentence following his conviction, the Government further claimed that the conditions of the applicant’s detention there from 4 to 15 August 2004 had been compatible with the standards set forth in Article 3 of the Convention.


116.  The Government also noted that according to the experts the applicant had had a transitory psychotic disorder from 8 May 2003 until 26 June 2003 (see paragraph 18 above), and it was not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts (the Government relied on Elsholz v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 66, ECHR 2000‑VIII, and Donohoe v. Ireland, no. 19165/08, § 73, 12 December 2013). Even though the domestic courts had confirmed the illegality of the applicant’s stay at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant’s claim of allegedly improper medical treatment had been rejected by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 51 above). In fact, the psychiatrists’ actions and methods applied when treating the applicant had been in line with the existing legislation and legal acts. The Government also drew an analogy with the Court’s case-law under Article <mask> of the Convention, where it had held that it was for the medical authorities to decide on the therapeutic methods to be used to preserve the physical and mental health of patients (they relied on Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 82, Series A no. 244). Even though the case at issue was of a different nature, the Government suggested that a similar approach could be followed. The priorities of medical science and the professional application of medical methods should prevail over the wishes of an individual to choose his or her own way of behaving, unless abusive conduct by medical personnel was clearly established, which had obviously not been the case here. In the instant case, the psycho-correction methods applied by the psychiatrists had been used in order “to form a critical, not a negative, attitude towards religion” (emphasised by the Government).


37.  The applicant also submitted that the investigations into his allegations of ill-treatment had been manifestly incompatible with the procedural requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. While it was for the State to provide a plausible explanation as to the cause of his injuries and to prove that any recourse to physical force had been unavoidable, in his case the prosecution authorities were not exempted from their responsibility to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances that led to his injuries.


49.  The Government maintained that the applicant's allegations of being beaten by the tax police officer had not been supported by any appropriate evidence and that, although the applicant had indeed sustained physical injuries it was impossible to conclude “beyond reasonable doubt” that they had been inflicted by S. They referred to the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations that the applicant had had only minor physical injuries which could have been inflicted three to five days before the events in question. None of the examinations established that the injuries had been inflicted on 28 April 1998. The Government also submitted that, as for the testimonies of G., who had allegedly seen the applicant being beaten by S., it had been established that G. could not have seen the events in the room properly since its windows had been covered with opaque plastic curtains. Furthermore, the Government maintained that the investigation in the applicant's case had been performed by an independent authority which had carried out a full investigation and had taken all necessary action. Therefore, the procedural limb of Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated and the applicant had had at his disposal an effective domestic remedy in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention.


264.  The Government contested the applicants’ claims. They alleged, in particular, that the applicants’ mental sufferings had not reached the minimum level of severity required for them to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, particularly on account of the minor age of certain of the applicants, and that there was no evidence that the applicants’ relatives’ had been arrested by State agents. Lastly, they averred that the domestic legislation – including Articles 124 and 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 1069 of the Russian Civil Code – provided the applicants with effective remedies for their complaints.


143.  The applicant complained that the conditions of her pre-trial detention, including a refusal of medical examination and lack of medical assistance, had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In her observations of 7 May 2005 the applicant further complained under this head that the conditions of transportation to and from the court-house were poor. The relevant Convention provision reads as follows:


102.  The Government contested the allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that the applicants and Rizvan Ibragimov had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the level of suffering allegedly caused to the applicants by the fact of their relative’s disappearance, that, in the Government’s view, was beyond the evaluation of the law-enforcement authorities and could not be objectively measured, as it related to psychological aspects, such as the emotions and personalities of the individuals concerned.


49.  The applicants alleged that they were the victims of inhuman and degrading treatment by M. F. and police officers. In particular, they referred to Article 29 of the Constitution and the Law of Ukraine “On Psychiatric Assistance” and maintained that in order to be lawful, a forced psychiatric intervention, in particular, confinement to a hospital, had to be ordered by a competent court. The decision, taken in respect of the first applicant by the Chief Psychiatrist of the local hospital unilaterally and in absence of any procedural guarantees, had been manifestly arbitrary and unlawful. The application of physical force to enforce it and deliver the first applicant to the psychiatric clinic against his will had therefore also been unlawful and arbitrary, having caused the first applicant humiliation beyond the threshold allowed by Article <mask> of the Convention, particularly in the context of the following circumstances.


47.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant “took an active part in a struggle with the police officers.” Even if he had been intoxicated, he should have been aware of the risk of sustaining injuries. The Government further argued that the exact origin of his injuries could not be established and referred to the findings of the medical experts concluding that the injuries could have resulted either from the applicant's fall or from the police actions.


48.  The applicant submitted that the cells had been severely overcrowded and that the St Petersburg prosecutor had acknowledged the problem of overcrowding. Inmates had less than two square metres of personal space at their disposal, which indicated a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, the applicant had suffered from passive smoking because the mandatory ventilation had not functioned, and from a lack of privacy when using the toilet.


31.  The Government further stated that on most occasions the experts of the Ministry of Health had established no deviations of the sanitary and catering conditions from the relevant domestic requirements. In particular, toilets and bath facilities had been adequate. In this respect the general detention conditions in the Šiauliai Remand Prison were no different from those in the Pravieniškės prison, in respect of which the Court had found no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the Valašinas v. Lithuania case (no. 44558/98, 24.7.2001, ECHR 2001-VIII). At the same time, some incompatibilities of the applicant's detention conditions with the relevant domestic norms had been duly remedied. Hence, for example, in view of the fact that the bed mattresses had become damp, immediate measures had been carried out to swirl larger holes in the beds and disinfect the mattresses. Similarly, various actions had been undertaken to eliminate rats and other pest from the cells. The Government accepted none the less that some of the measures recommended by the health experts had not been implemented in the Šiauliai Remand Prison in view of the lack of resources; thus the inmates had not been provided with toilet paper, and no new lighting system had been installed.


56.  The applicant alleged that his pre-trial detention had been prolonged excessively by the authorities’ passivity in the face of his requests for its revocation for medical reasons and in spite of the seriousness of his medical condition established by medical documents. The applicant further submitted that this situation had caused him suffering and aggravated his state of health invoking in substance a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


32.  The Government submitted that the medical records drawn up on 11 and 14 July 2003, by which the applicant’s injuries had been recorded, entirely refuted the applicant’s version of events. They stressed that the use of a rubber truncheon in the applicant’s case had been lawful and justified. It therefore did not fall under the notion of “ill-treatment” prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government insisted that the force used against the applicant did not attain the minimum level of severity envisaged by Article 3 of the Convention as the injuries sustained by him had not led to “any serious consequences and [had not] caused short-term damage to his health”. In addition, the Government noted that having used a rubber truncheon, the warder had not intended to humiliate or debase the applicant or to cause him physical or psychological suffering. The use of force constituted an adequate and lawful response to the applicant’s unruly behaviour when he resisted the warders’ lawful orders. The warders acted within their official powers and pursued lawful purposes. In the Government’s opinion, the fact that the medical personnel which had examined the applicant on 11 and 14 July 2003 had found that in the aftermath of the incident the applicant’s behaviour had been “adequate” demonstrated that he had not suffered the psychological trauma which usually accompanies inhuman and degrading treatment.


58.  The Government accepted that the applicants had suffered physical harm at the hands of the police, but argued that the injuries had not reached a level of severity sufficient to bring them within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, they pointed out that the use of force had been justified and appropriate in the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the breadth of the criminal activity in the area where the police intervention had occurred, and the applicants’ provocative conduct. They considered that there was no reason for the Court to depart from the assessment made by the domestic courts in this respect.


72.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been humiliated, intimidated and pressurised by the investigator. They further complained that they had been transported in inhuman conditions on 26 December 2002. In addition, the first applicant complained of the degrading conditions of his detention from 22 April 1999 to 16 May 2002 and from 26 June 2002 to 16 January 2003. Article 3 reads as follows:


215.  The Government set out in some detail their assertions about the conditions of the applicants’ detention in the various correctional facilities in which they had been and were being held (see paragraphs 12, 13, 16, 37‑42, 50, 52, 54, 55 and 57-60 above). Based on these assertions, they argued that, although the conditions had been deficient in some respects, they did not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The lack of some common life necessities had not reached such a level of severity as to amount to treatment proscribed by Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the Government, some of the applicants’ allegations were untrue and unsupported by evidence. Lastly, the Government referred to the terms of section 3(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 (see paragraph 107 above), pointing out that under this provision only the wilful placement in poor conditions of detention amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment. None of the applicants had been intentionally placed in such conditions; they had simply been housed in cells identical to those of all other inmates.


36.  The Government further maintained that the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment before the above-mentioned domestic authorities and the Court had been too vague. He had provided no description or details of the means of ill-treatment, nor was the complaint supported by any evidence. They emphasised that during the forensic medical examination carried out on the same day, and later during the investigation, the applicant had claimed that his injuries had been caused in another way. Moreover, the forensic expert had concluded that the injuries could not have been sustained by the applicant on 20 April 2005. Therefore, the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment was wholly unsubstantiated. His submissions before the domestic authorities had not been arguable and had not generated the procedural obligation of the State under Article <mask> of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation of his allegations of ill-treatment.


52.  The Government pointed out that the applicant had had the right to receive a visit from a family member or a phone call once a week. Moreover he had had the right to participate in educational and religious meetings and to practice sport. He had had access to press, radio and television and to a library. He had himself chosen to stay in a single cell even though he had been offered the possibility of sharing his cell with another detainee. The Government concluded that the treatment to which he had been subjected had not been incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They invited the Court to find no violation of that provision.


134.  The applicant in application no. 5402/07 (Mr Gorbunov) complained that the conditions of his detention and transport in the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 had been inhuman and degrading in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, and that he had been absent from the remand hearing of 5 July 2006 in breach of Article 5 § 4.


78.  The applicant complained that he had been held in detention and in particular in the isolation cell in the Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit of Kyiv Region (SIZO No. 1 of the Kyiv Region) despite the fact that he had been suffering from a number of chronic diseases. The applicant also maintained that he had been deprived of adequate medical treatment while remanded in custody and that the conditions of detention (hygiene, bedding and other conditions) had been unsatisfactory. The applicant alleged that he had been force-fed while on hunger strike, without any medical necessity being established by the domestic authorities, which had caused him substantial mental and physical suffering. In particular, he alleged that he had been handcuffed to a heating appliance in the presence of guards and a guard dog (in his further complaints he did not mention the guard dog), and had been held down by the guards while a special medical tube was used to feed him. He referred in this respect to Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


24.  The Government did not dispute that the applicant had been detained pending investigation and trial at the police station in a cell designed only for short-term detention. Nor did they challenge the applicant's account of the conditions of his detention. They also conceded that those conditions had fallen short of the standards set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention.


72.  The Government further contended that there was no reason to believe that the first applicant and his family would find themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation upon returning to Baghdad. The Government agreed with the Chamber that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that, owing to their personal circumstances, the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention if returned to Iraq.


95.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, because he had not brought a claim for damages under section 1 of the 1988 Act. One of his co‑accused had brought such a claim in relation to a beating by officers who had escorted him from prison to court.


69.  The Government further argued that Article 2 of the Code of Administrative Justice made it possible to challenge before the courts any possible decision on the applicants’ extradition and to raise allegations of a risk of being subjected to the treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention in case of extradition, the courts having been under the obligation to consider such allegations. In support of the latter argument, the Government submitted a copy of the resolution of the Kyiv Administrative Court of 2 July 2008, by which the prosecutors’ decision to extradite a national of that State to the Russian Federation had been annulled on the ground that the prosecutors had failed to take into account the evidence that, given his specific situation, the person faced a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in that country. The domestic court also found that the extradition decision had been contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957.


71.  The applicant’s condition was, throughout his detention, monitored by the prison health service and he received appropriate medical treatment. There is no indication of any negligence on the part of the medical services, nor has the applicant adduced any evidence to show that the authorities were negligent in administering medical treatment to him. Consequently, it cannot be said that the applicant was denied adequate medical care and attention in detention such as to raise an arguable issue of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


44.  The Government contested the applicant’s allegation. They submitted that since 2010 he had been subjected to paraclinical tests, including X-ray examinations of his knees. He had always been provided with effective in-patient and out-patient medical care. They insisted that the first-stage osteoarthrosis of the knee and hip joints with which the applicant had been diagnosed could not cause unbearable pain. The pain was apparently due to the applicant’s hepatitis C and prior drug addiction. His condition did not require placement in a specialised medical institution. All of the penal institutions in which the applicant had been detained had had the appropriate equipment and staff for the treatment of his diseases. During his detention, specialists from civil hospitals in the sphere of ophthalmology, cardiology and infectious diseases had been consulted on a number of occasions. At no point had the doctors detected any significant changes in his osteoarticular system inherent to polyarticular rheumatoid arthritis. The applicant’s condition was currently satisfactory, and he was receiving the treatment prescribed to him in full. The Government concluded by stressing that the applicant had been provided with comprehensive medical care throughout his detention, in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention.


40.  The applicant complained that, owing to his Uzbek ethnic origin, he would face a serious risk of ill-treatment if expelled to Kyrgyzstan. In his application form he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. In his observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 28 August 2015, the applicant raised for the first time a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Margaretić v. Croatia, no. 16115/13, § 75, 5 June 2014), the Court considers that the applicant’s grievances fall to be examined solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


144.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the allegedly appalling conditions of her detention from 7 to 14 June 2005 (see paragraph 46 above). The Court notes that the complaint was first raised in substance before it on 22 December 2005. Assuming, in the applicant’s favour, that she had no specific remedies to exhaust, the Court concludes that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Norkin v. Russia (dec.), no. 21056/11, §§ 15-25, 5 February 2013).


87.  The Government argued that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded, being linked to the manifestly ill-founded complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, it had been open to the applicant to lodge a tort action with the Yakutsk Town Court and he had explored that avenue. The fact that the applicant’s action had been unsuccessful did not strip that avenue of its effectiveness.


12. The applicant alleges that since he has been active organising demonstrations, detained and tortured, been abroad for a long time and received summonses he would be of interest to the Iranian authorities if he were to be returned to Iran today, 7 years later, and as a consequence would run a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The Government submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Cypriot legal system provided a variety of remedies for allegations of violations of Article <mask> of the Convention by detainees which, in line with the Court’s case-law, were both preventive and compensatory in nature. The Government relied, in particular, on the Court’s judgments in Ananyev and Others v. Russia (nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 98, 10 January 2012); Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia (nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, § 111, 20 October 2011) and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland (no. 17599/05, § 116, 22 October 2009).


29.  The Government contested that argument. Referring to the certificates prepared by the administration of the remand prison and extracts from the remand prison’s population register, they submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had been in compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. As regards the applicant’s medical condition, the Government submitted a copy of the applicant’s medical records, which confirmed the fact that the applicant had been diagnosed with tuberculosis in March 2008. However, in their observations of 20 January 2010, the Government indicated that the applicant had been suffering from tuberculosis prior to his remand in custody in April 2007. They further asserted that the applicant had received proper treatment for tuberculosis in compliance with international standards. The penal establishments in which the applicant had been detained had been provided with the necessary medicine and equipment. The medical personnel who had treated the applicant had been trained to properly administer anti‑tuberculosis treatment. The Government relied on the certificates prepared by the medical correctional facility’s administration. They also provided copies of the medical education certificates of the facility’s personnel.


27.  The Government contested that argument. They noted discrepancies between the applicant’s account of the alleged ill-treatment and the medical evidence, which had only confirmed the bruising on the applicant’s forehead but had recorded no injuries to the applicant’s chest or abdomen. They therefore considered that there were no reasons to assert “beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Government further considered that the investigation carried out into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had fully complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. There had been no procrastination or abuse of office on the part of the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case. The pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraph 13 above) into the circumstances under which the applicant had been allegedly subjected to ill-treatment had been carried out by an independent body. The applicant’s allegations had been subsequently subjected to examination by domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction, which had undertaken a proper assessment of the applicant’s arguments and delivered lawful and well-reasoned decisions.


39.  The applicant argued that he could not have caused himself the injuries in question by rubbing his buttocks against the walls of the exercise yard. Rubbing would only have left scratches, not multiple haematomas. The haematomas could only have originated from the impact of a blunt object, such as, in his case, the rubber truncheon used by police officer P. The applicant further drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the Government had failed to make any comments on the written statements by his cellmates P., I. and B. (see paragraph 15 above) to the effect that they had not seen the applicant harming himself during the exercise period on 20 July 2002, and that police officer P. had made them and other inmates sign statements to the contrary. He further alleged that the additional inquiry had been based on the material of the initial inquiry without additionally questioning those involved in the incident. The applicant concluded, therefore, that the Government’s conclusion as to the compliance of the domestic authorities with their obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention in his respect had been unsubstantiated.


12.  The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he complained of severe overcrowding which had led to a lack of personal space, poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restriction on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cells, inadequate health care and psychiatric support and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security.


31.  The applicant claimed, and it was also confirmed during an official inquiry by the region prosecutor's office (see paragraph 13 above), that at the material time the cells of the Kopeysk IVS had been overcrowded beyond their design capacity. The Government did not dispute this allegation, referring to the fact that the official records relating to the cell population had been destroyed after the time-limit for their storage had expired. The Court has frequently found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the lack of personal space afforded to detainees (see, among other authorities, Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, §§ 97 et seq., ECHR 2002‑VI; Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, §§ 104 et seq., ECHR 2005-X; Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208/00, §§ 44 et seq., 16 June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378/00, §§ 39 et seq., 20 January 2005; and Novoselov v. Russia, no. 66460/01, §§ 41 et seq., 2 June 2005). Having regard to its case-law on the subject and the materials in its possession, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.


149.  The applicant submitted that he had testified before the investigator, the prosecutor and the courts on numerous occasions about his ill-treatment, but there had been absolutely no response and no one had been held accountable. In general, not a single police officer or member of the special forces had been held accountable for the widespread violence against demonstrators on 1-2 March 2008, including the deaths of civilians. No decision had been taken to institute criminal proceedings on account of his ill-treatment and none of the courts had requested the investigating authority to institute such proceedings. Despite having multiple visible injuries, the questions which he had been asked during the investigation had been entirely about his political activity and participation in the demonstrations as a member of the opposition. This clearly showed that the investigation into the events of 1 March 2008 within the scope of the instituted criminal case had had a different purpose to that required by Article <mask> of the Convention and had not been in any way linked to his allegations of ill-treatment. Furthermore, the forensic medical expert had carried out a delayed medical examination of his injuries, which could not be considered independent and impartial. In sum, there had been no effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment.


92.  The Government disagreed with these allegations and argued that the investigation had not established that Mr Sharani Askharov had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government accepted that the applicant must have suffered as a result of her husband’s disappearance. However, since the involvement of State agents into his abduction had not been established, the State could not be held responsible for her suffering.


123.  The applicants complained that the conditions of their transportation to and from their court hearings and the treatment to which they had been subjected on the days of the hearings had been inhuman and degrading. They also complained that they had been kept in a glass dock in the courtroom under heavy security and in full view of the public, which amounted to humiliating conditions which were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. That provision reads as follows:


54.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in remand prison no. IZ-64/1 in Saratov and the temporary detention centre in Volsk from 15 June to 17 August 2007. He also complained about the conditions in which he was transported between the remand prison and temporary detention centre. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan had been considered by the national authorities and dismissed on sufficient grounds. Referring to the decisions of the prosecution and immigration authorities and the domestic courts in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings, the Government asserted that his claims had been duly reviewed and found to be devoid of substance. In their opinion, the assurances presented to the Russian authorities by the Uzbekistani authorities were sufficient and compatible with the countries’ international obligations and domestic legal developments. As regards the expulsion proceedings, the expulsion order did not specify that the applicant was to be taken to Uzbekistan, but merely stated that he was to be removed from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Government concluded that a risk of the applicant’s treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention had not been convincingly established.


50.  The applicant complained with reference to the events of 8 December 2001 that she had been violently thrown to the floor and dragged out of her apartment and down a staircase by a police officer and that the authorities had failed properly to investigate the incident. The Court will examine these grievances under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


21.  The applicant complained that the conditions of detention under the “KBK” regime – to which he was subjected for about two years – amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment on account of the almost total isolation and absence of human contacts as well as the ubiquitous application of means of restraint. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


49.  The Government argued, firstly, that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint. They further conceded that the conditions of his detention in the Berdsk IVS had fallen short of the Council of Europe’s standards. In particular, the cells had had no windows, tables or chairs, the toilet had offered detainees no privacy, and the number of cellmates had exceeded the number of available beds. Yet, the Government argued that this had been due to budgetary constraints and other reasons connected to the reform of the penal system, and that the treatment in question did not reach the minimum level of severity required for it to constitute a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


80.  The applicants also complained that they endured a terrifying experience when several heavily armed and masked police officers entered their apartment, pointed guns at them and shouted death threats. The Court considers that the psychological ordeal to which the applicants were allegedly subjected, and having regard to the presence of the infant during the arrest operation, could in principle be characterised as inhuman and degrading treatment falling within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 103, 1 June 2010). The Court reiterates in this connection that treatment can be qualified as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 167). Psychological suffering may result from a situation in which State agents deliberately instil fear in individuals by threatening to kill or ill-treat them: put differently, to threaten them with acts prohibited by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.


50.  The applicant complained that he had been kept in wretched conditions in prison which had been overcrowded. He had also been kept in solitary confinement and had had no means of communication with the outside world. On 8 May 2007 special police forces had carried out an operation in the prison and had allegedly ill-treated him. In respect of these complaints he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as follows:


65.  The applicant complained about his ill-treatment while remanded in custody. In particular, he complained that the authorities had failed to provide proper and necessary medical treatment and assistance to him between 30 November 1998 and 8 June 2000. He alleged that the poor conditions of his detention had caused him severe suffering and resulted in the deterioration of his health. He relied in that connection on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides:


43.  The applicant initially complained that his removal to Afghanistan would violate his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. In his submissions of 26 November 2013 (see paragraph 5 above), he further complained that his wife and their four children would also be exposed in Afghanistan to a real risk of treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention. This provision reads as follows:


39.  The applicant complained, under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, that he had been ill-treated by the police. Since the applicant's life does not appear to be, or to have been, imperilled, the Court considers that Article 2 is inapplicable in the present case. It will examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


61.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that (a) he had been ill-treated by police during his arrest on 12 May 2005 and the authorities had failed to investigate the incident, (b) he had been held in overcrowded cells in Tbilisi Prisons Nos. 5 and 7 and (c) there had not been adequate medical care for his various diseases in prison. This provision reads as follows:


114.  The applicants complained that the State authorities had failed to investigate effectively their allegations of indecent sexual acts perpetrated against them by a sports coach from a State sports school, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. By doing so, the State had failed to exercise its positive obligation of preventing indecent acts against minors and of protecting their physical integrity, in violation of Article 8.


56.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the conditions of her detention in the remand centre, the conditions of her transport between the remand centre and the courthouse, and the conditions of confinement at the courthouse during the trial. She also alleged that she had been beaten up in the remand centre. Lastly, she raised a number of complaints in relation to her detention pending the investigation and the trial. She referred to Articles 5, 8-11 of the Convention.


88.  The Government reiterated their account of the detention conditions at the Istanbul Atatürk Airport detention facility (see paragraphs 32-34 above) and maintained that those conditions complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They provided one photograph of the room where the applicant had been held and copies of logs indicating the number of the detainees held in that room on 9 and 12 November 2010.


137.  The applicant submits that the armed attack by village guards and gendarmes on him, his family, his house and hamlet and the experience of being forced to flee for their lives amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment under Article <mask> of the Convention. He refers inter alia to the deliberate, punitive and life-threatening nature of the violence involved.  He also claims that violations of Article 3 arise from the alleged failure of the State adequately to regulate the village guard system or to investigate allegations of serious ill-treatment.


38.  The Government further pointed out that the applicant did not complain about the alleged ill-treatment for several months, and when he did, an inquiry was conducted that found no proof of police violence. They further stated that the injuries in question were so minor that they were not capable of proving any ill-treatment reaching the minimum level of severity laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention. As regards the obligation to conduct an effective investigation, they contended that the inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had been prompt, thorough and conclusive on the point that the applicant’s claims could not be proved.


122.  The Government also submitted global arguments as regards the overall period of the applicant's detention. They argued that the conditions of the applicant's detention had not amounted to inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that he had had adequate cell space and that he had been able to have at least two hours' fresh air daily. As regards the working opportunities and leisure activities, the Government submitted that during his detention after conviction the applicant had had a possibility to work and it had depended on him to benefit from it. He had also been able to undergo computer training, watch television or read.


47.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that the proceedings in the criminal case, which had involved the determination of his civil claim, had been excessively lengthy and that he had not had an effective remedy in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention about the ineffectiveness of the investigation.


45.  The applicant maintained that the overcrowding and insanitary conditions which had been present during his long years of incarceration had had an adverse effect on his physical health and had caused him humiliation and suffering. The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had fallen short of standards compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he complained that he had been detained in overcrowded cells. Moreover, the applicant had been held in cells with people with hepatitis C and HIV.


31.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the reinstatement proceedings. She also alleged a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention in respect of the courts’ assessment of evidence and interpretation of the national law and challenged the outcome of those proceedings. Finally, under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention she complained that the criminal proceedings brought against her had been excessively long and conducted arbitrarily.


72.  The Government acknowledged that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the temporary detention centre had been unacceptable by Article 3 standards. The Court takes note of the Government’s admission and sees no reason to hold otherwise. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the centre amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that there has been a violation of this Article.


168.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, as well as with reference to Article 13, that the domestic authorities had not given due attention to his various complaints. He next complained that the court rulings of 27 April and 7 July 2004 had been contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He also complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) that his wife had been banned from representing him from 27 April to 19 May 2004. Furthermore, the applicant complained that the Crimea Court of Appeal had failed to question all the defence witnesses on 1 June 2004. Lastly, he complained that his conviction had been unfair.


113.  The applicants submitted that they had been victims of treatment prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention and had lacked an effective domestic remedy as required under Article 13. They pointed out that after the Supreme Court had upheld the normative framework as being compatible with the Convention (see paragraph 69 above), their subsequent applications for a judicial review had been bound to fail (see paragraphs 72 and 73 above).


49.  The Government asserted that the conditions of the applicant’s stay in the IK-9 facility, including the living space per inmate, lighting, heating, ventilation, sanitary facilities and food standards were “generally in compliance” with the requirements of domestic law and of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had an individual sleeping place and the personal space per inmate was in excess of two square metres. The number of toilets, at the ratio of one toilet per fifteen inmates, was sufficient. The Government pointed out that, in contrast to cases concerning detention conditions in remand prisons, the applicant had enjoyed a greater freedom of movement during the daytime and had had unobstructed access to natural light and air (here they referred to Orlov v. Russia, no. 29652/04, §  77, 21 June 2011; Pitalev v. Russia, no. 34393/03, § 38, 30 July 2009; Solovyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 76114/01, 27 September 2007; and Nurmagomedov v. Russia (dec.), no. 30138/02, 16 September 2004).


39.  The Government refuted the allegations. They submitted that the applicant had failed to substantiate them or introduce any evidence in support of his claims that he had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government further stated that the applicant had been examined by a doctor on two occasions; at the beginning and at the end of his police custody, and the forensic reports indicated no trace of ill-treatment on his body.


23.  The Government further requested the Court to declare the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant could have lodged a complaint against the police officers allegedly involved to their superiors within the Ministry of Interior in order for them to conduct an internal investigation. Furthermore, he could have lodged a formal criminal complaint against the same officers for the criminal offences of forcibly obtaining statements and ill-treatment in performing an official duty. However, he failed to use any of these remedies.


129.  The applicant – who did not initially have the assistance of a lawyer – originally alleged violations of Articles 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, he withdrew all complaints other than those relating to Article <mask> of the Convention.


76.  The Government submitted, by way of preliminary objection, that a claim under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act was an effective remedy at the applicant’s disposal. In any event, the applicant’s suffering had not reached the minimum level of severity triggering the application of Article <mask> of the Convention as it had not gone beyond the inevitable element of suffering resulting from his sentence. Furthermore, following the refurbishment of Lovech Prison in the autumn of 2008, the cells of all life prisoners, including that of the applicant, had been equipped with sanitary facilities and all window frames had been changed.


34.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers and that there had been no effective investigation into his complaints. In his complaints concerning the lack of effective investigation the applicant also relied on Article 13 of the Convention. The Court, however, considers it appropriate to examine these matters solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


29.  The Government submitted that the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention were premature, as the applicant had not sought monetary compensation for the alleged infection with TB and the subsequent lack of adequate medical treatment for that disease in prison. Referring to a number of court decisions in unrelated but relevant civil cases, the Government argued that the applicant should have sued the relevant State authority and requested compensation for non-pecuniary damage under the relevant provisions of the General Administrative Code and the Civil Code. Furthermore, if he believed that he was sharing a prison cell with inmates infected with TB in Tbilisi Prison no. 5, he could have requested the prison authorities, under the Imprisonment Act of 22 July 1999, to arrange for him to be transferred to another, uncontaminated cell. The Government thus stated that the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention should be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


16.  The applicant submitted that he had been arrested and detained unlawfully, contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He further alleged that, contrary to the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention, upon his arrest and during his first period of detention he had been ill-treated and infected with HIV. He also complained that he had not been given the requisite medical assistance for his condition and had been held in inhuman conditions of detention during both periods of detention. He also contended that he had not had a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant argued that there had been a breach of his rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention because he had not been able to have confidential meetings with his mother and because the prison administration had attempted to hinder the lodging of his application with the Court. Lastly, the applicant complained that he had not had any effective remedies, as provided for by Article 13 of the Convention.


67.  The applicant disagreed and reiterated his complaints. In particular, he contended that his allegation of having been submitted to treatment incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention had been credible, inter alia, in view of the fact that he had been detained at the county police station in an irregular fashion for thirteen hours, and the ensuing investigation into his allegation had been neither effective nor institutionally independent. In addition, he submitted that he had had asserted his rights by lodging a criminal complaint and by pursuing the remedy available in that respect and emphasised that the authorities had failed to pursue the investigation on their own initiative, despite his mother having complained about his ill‑treatment in person to the head of the county police station and by telephone to the CIS.


67.  The applicants further complained that the refusal of their petitions was a degrading treatment in itself, that they were treated like criminals following the submission of their petitions, and that they were subjected to pressure and disciplinary punishment, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further maintained that the refusal of the authorities to provide them with the opportunity to learn their mother tongue interfered with their private and family life, protected under Article 8 of the Convention, and deprived them of the possibility to learn about their parents’ beliefs and culture, in breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. Lastly, the applicants alleged, under Article 14 of the Convention, that they were discriminated against on account of their Kurdish ethnic origin and because of the fact that they wanted to learn Kurdish.


60.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been tortured in police custody. He also complained, relying on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, that his sentence had been changed from fifteen years to life imprisonment on the basis of an aggravating circumstance (the repeated offence of robbery) which had been excluded from the verdict. Lastly, the applicant complained, without referring to any provision of the Convention, of a lack of information and medical treatment in respect of his HIV infection.


46.  The applicant asserted that her treatment by the police had attained the minimum level of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this regard she stated that in addition to the haematomas recorded by the medical expert (see paragraph 12 above), she had suffered from a heart attack, high blood pressure and other medical problems. In addition, the applicant indicated that, in order to assess the severity of her treatment, it was relevant to note that the police had ill-treated her in a public place and in front of neighbours who had ridiculed her in the process. The police officers had not had any reason to detain her, since she had in fact invited them to accompany her to her apartment. She admitted that she had started to walk away from the police car by stepping two steps, when the police officers grabbed and twisted her arms behind her back.