39.  The Government argued that the applicant's case had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor domestic law guaranteed a right to have a civil case heard at three levels of jurisdiction. The right to a court was not absolute and could therefore be subject to certain limitations, in so far as they did not impair the very essence of that right. In particular, the criteria of admissibility of appeals to be lodged with the highest courts could be strict and the procedure more formal than that before the lower courts, without the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention being breached thereby. The mere fact that it was necessary for a cassation appeal to be lodged by a qualified representative was not open to criticism.


47.  The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to give reasons for their judgments, that they had refused to hear defence witnesses and that they had been denied access to court on account of the imposition of fines at the rectification of judgment stage. They further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the damages awarded to the claimants had been excessive.


23.  The applicant also submitted other complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In particular, she complained about the State's failure to provide her with a car, the length of the proceedings and the allegedly insufficient amount of compensation granted in 1998. Finally, she complained that she had been unable to withdraw those monies from her bank account and that the money had lost its purchasing value due to inflation.


41.  The applicant further complained of violations of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, he alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing since the domestic court decisions were arbitrary and without reasoning. He also submitted that the compensation he had been ordered to pay to the plaintiff had amounted to a violation of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.


35.  The applicant complained that he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody. He also complained that the trial court had convicted him on the basis of his police statements, which he alleged had been obtained by torture. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows:


30.  The applicant complains under Article <mask> of the Convention that she was not notified of the hearings on 30 October 2001 and 22 April 2003 and therefore did not attend them. She also complains about the length of proceedings in the first land dispute. Finally, she complains in general terms that the courts were biased in favour of the other party and delayed the proceedings.


77.  The applicant submitted that she had been deprived of her right of access to court, as she had not received the plaintiff’s claim or summonses to the hearings. Hence, she had been unaware of the divorce proceedings. As a result, she had been deprived of other procedural rights emanating from the right to fair trial, such as the right to take part in the proceedings, present her arguments and evidence, consult the case file, contest the arguments and evidence of the other party, appeal against the judgment, and so forth. Also her right to an oral hearing and right to equality of arms had been violated. Besides, the conclusion of the Senate of the Supreme Court that Article <mask> of the Convention had not been applicable to the instant case, merely because it had viewed the case as having no prospects of success, had constituted a serious violation of her right to a fair trial.


24.  The applicants further complain under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of reasoning in the Supreme Administrative Court decisions. Article 6 of the Convention does not require that an appeal court, when rejecting an appeal by reference to the reasoning given by a lower court, accompanies its decision by detailed reasons (see Kabasakal and Atar v. Turkey, nos. 70084/01 and 70085/01, 19 September 2006). Accordingly, the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court has to be interpreted to have fully accepted the reasoning of the judgment of the Bursa First Instance Administrative Court. As such this complaint must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.


43.  The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, of the quashing of the final judgment in their favour (see paragraph 12 above). The Court reiterates that the quashing of a final judgment is an instantaneous act which does not create a continuing situation, even if it entails a reopening of the proceedings (see Frunze v. Moldova (dec.), no. 42308/02, 14 September 2004). The quashing of the final judgment in this case took place on 26 January 2000. The six-month period started running from that date, while this application was introduced on 7 March 2003, more than three years later.


70.  The Government finally submitted that the applicant himself did not wish to have a lawyer, despite the fact that the police officers explained to him his right to have a lawyer and advised him to avail himself of this right. Moreover, the applicant did not wish to have a lawyer during the entire procedure, including the court hearing, which he indicated in the record of an administrative offence. In sum, the applicant's trial as a whole complied with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention.


327.  The applicant highlighted the importance of the right of access to court in a democratic society. Such a right entailed an opportunity for an individual to have a clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act which interfered with his rights. The applicant pointed out that there had been no trial in respect of his daughter’s death. He further complained about the failure of the Cypriot authorities to ensure his effective participation in the inquest proceedings and to provide free legal assistance. Accordingly, he submitted, the Cypriot authorities had violated his right of access to court guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account. The Court further refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210 in fine, ECHR 2005-IV, and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 264, 13 July 2006). The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 17 above).


82.  The Government maintained that the proceedings in the applicant’s administrative cases had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant had been given a fair opportunity on each occasion to state his case and to have the relevant witnesses called and cross‑examined. The Government contested the assertion that the domestic courts had taken on the function of the prosecution. They claimed that the administrative-offence case files had been prepared by the police, who had collected the evidence and had presented charges in writing, whereas the court had resolved the cases as an independent adjudicator. The Government considered that the video materials provided by the applicant were of limited evidentiary value and contended that it was in any event within the competence of the domestic courts to decide on the relevance and admissibility of particular items of evidence.


45.  The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that because of his unlawful conviction, he had been obliged to pay an administrative fine and compensation to the victim. The Court cannot speculate on the outcome of the proceedings had the applicant’s case been examined in full compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. For these reasons, this part of the application should be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.


28.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been unable to participate in the proceedings in which he had been deprived of his membership of company A’s supervisory board. Under Article 13 the applicant also complained that the Ljubljana Higher Court had not considered his appeal on the merits. Bearing in mind that the role of Article 6 in relation to Article 13 is that of a lex specialis, the requirements of Article 13 being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6 (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 181, ECHR 2016), the Court will examine the applicant’s complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 65, 29 November 2016), the relevant parts of which read as follows:


26.  The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The trial had been adjourned once, to ensure the presence of officers S. and A.; the authorities had made reasonable efforts in this respect but to no avail. The applicant had consented to the reading out of their pre-trial statements. Thus, he had unequivocally waived his right to examine them. This decision had been taken by him without legal advice since he had voluntary declined the services of counsel at an earlier hearing.


50.  The Government argued that the applicant’s case had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor domestic law guaranteed a right to have a civil case heard at three levels of jurisdiction. The right to a court was not absolute and could therefore be subject to certain limitations, in so far as they did not impair the very essence of that right. In particular, the criteria of admissibility of appeals to be lodged with the highest courts could be strict and the procedure more formal than that before the lower courts, without the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention being breached thereby. The mere fact that it was necessary for a cassation appeal to be lodged by a qualified representative was not open to criticism.


18.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention numerous breaches of law allegedly committed by the domestic courts in the course of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that State-appointed lawyers, who had represented him before the trial and appeal courts, had failed to carry out their duties properly. In particular, counsel Sh. (1) had made an affirmative remark about the applicant’s guilt during the preliminary court hearing, (2) had referred to the applicant as “a robber and a drunkard” during the closing arguments, (3) had not visited him in prison and (4) had failed to appeal against the guilty verdict in the applicant’s case. He further complained that he had not been represented during the appeal hearing of 21 July 2005 and that State-appointed counsel R., who had represented him at the appeal hearing of 16 August 2007, had not provided an effective legal assistance. The applicant also alleged that the prosecution had failed to disclose promptly certain evidence to him, that he had been convicted on the basis of inadmissible evidence, that one member of the jury had been appointed in breach of applicable laws and that he had not been provided with adequate facilities to prepare for his defence. Lastly, he submitted that the supervisory-review hearings had not been unfair. The Court will examine the applicant’s grievances from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


24.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue, because the applicant, as a judge, exercised State authority and therefore belonged to a group of public servants excluded from the scope of Article 6. Moreover, they submitted that the proceedings did not concern an ordinary labour law dispute, as the fundamental question was whether the applicant’s study visit was to be considered as an official journey or not – a question which did not constitute a civil law claim.


28.  The Government argued that the charges against the applicant were not “criminal” but “administrative”. They emphasised the necessity of keeping administrative offences independent of the criminal justice system, and they considered that a dividing line had been drawn between disciplinary and criminal charges in a manner consistent with Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government submitted that the offence was not of a criminal nature since it was punished with a sanction which had an “educational” and a “preventive” purpose. The sanction provided by the Code of Administrative Offences for the offence in question varied between MDL 36 and MDL 90 and the minimum fine was imposed on the applicant. According to the Government, the fine constituted approximately ten percent of the average monthly salary in Moldova at the material time and it was not converted into imprisonment. The Government also submitted that the applicant did not run any risk to have his fine converted to imprisonment.


45.  The applicant complained that she had lost her source of income, previously secured by the disability pension, because under the new system, in place as of 2012, she was no longer entitled to that, or a similar, benefit, although her health had not improved; and she submitted that this was a consequence of the amended legislation, which contained conditions she could not possibly fulfil. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


117.  The Government submitted that the trial court’s judgment of 24 April 2003 had been set aside because of the unlawful composition of the trial bench. The Russian court had thus acknowledged that there had been violations relating to the trial. That acknowledgment, together with the fair retrial the applicant had received, constituted adequate redress. The applicant had received proper legal advice from counsel K and had unequivocally waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to be tried by a judge. Thus, the applicant was no longer a victim of the initial alleged violations under Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the criminal proceedings against him.


19.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the final judgment in her favour. She further complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the same facts. Both provisions, in so far as relevant, are read as follows:


43.  The applicants complained that they had not had access to a court as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the Supreme Administrative Court did not have full jurisdiction over questions of fact and law in respect of the part of the proceedings which concerned their application lodged in 1990. This was so since under Polish law the court was only able to examine the lawfulness of the decision under appeal and could not consider any other aspects of the case, such as questions of facts and of expediency.


64.  The Government disagreed with the claim. They contended that the second applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had sustained any non‑pecuniary damage. Alternatively, the Government submitted that if the Court were to find a violation, that in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. However, should the Court decide to make an award for the violation found under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government invited it to award compensation on an equitable basis, taking into account the existing socio-economic circumstances in Latvia and the Court’s case-law under which, according to the Government, the amount of compensation should not exceed EUR 3,000.


29.  The Government underlined that the admissibility of evidence was primarily a matter for regulation by national law and that the use of evidence obtained at the pre-trial stage was not in itself incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, the decision of the first‑instance court had been issued following an extensive and exhaustive hearing of evidence and had been upheld by all of the domestic appellate courts. The first-instance court had rightly based its judgment on the statement of J.G., who had been examined by the investigating judge in London and whose statement had been in all key respects identical to his defence before the criminal court in London and consistent with the findings of the final judgment of the Freiburg Regional Court sentencing the fourth member of the criminal group, D.M., for the same criminal offence. The possibility that J.G. had been manipulated should be excluded, as his mental capacity had been verified and several questions and follow-on questions had been put to him.


40.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted despite the fact that there was no evidence to support the charges against him. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that his conviction had been based on unlawfully obtained evidence, in particular his fingerprint found in the cellar, in respect of which no search warrant had been issued; the domestic judgments had been based on the expert reports produced by the Bureau, which could not be considered an impartial expert; and the courts had refused to hear witnesses in his defence and admit as evidence alternative expert reports. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, taken together, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


33.  The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of its right to defend itself in the proceedings terminated by the final decision of 18 March 2005 (see paragraph 17 above), about the outcome of those proceedings and that the domestic courts had failed to assess the facts correctly, had misinterpreted the domestic law and had not been impartial. Without invoking any Article, it further complained that that judgment had violated its right to update the debt in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Proceedings and to receive the loss of profit or any benefit caused by the fact that the due amounts had not been paid in due time.


37.  The applicants complained that they had been unable to prepare their defence on account of lack of access to the secret surveillance file containing the complete transcripts of their telephone conversations; the secret surveillance file had not adequately been adduced and discussed at the trial in their presence, and the domestic courts had relied mainly on the unlawfully obtained recordings of their telephone conversations to convict them. Moreover, the domestic courts had lacked impartiality and independence, in so far as the third and the fourth applicant had been convicted by military courts and the courts had failed to examine the appeal point raised by the fourth applicant concerning his argument that no criminal investigation had been initiated against him. They all relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


53.  The applicant complained that the judgment by which her company had been awarded compensation for pecuniary damage had remained unenforced for approximately two years, and that this delay had been due to the State’s inactivity. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which, in their relevant parts, read as follows:


88.  The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Van State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further complained under the same head that her right to a public hearing as well as free legal assistance had been infringed. Finally, the applicant claimed that the principle of “equality of arms” had not been respected, since the bill of indictment was not in a language she could understand. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


77.  The applicant complained that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been infringed by the use of the confession extracted from him as a result of ill-treatment in police custody, when he had no access to a lawyer. The Court will examine his complaint under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which, in so far as relevant, provides:


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention that, in the criminal proceedings against him, the appellate court had failed to deal with his appeal on the merits because he had not attended the hearing, despite the fact that his counsel had been present and ready to defend him. He claimed that his right of access to court, his right to be heard in court and his right to defend himself through a lawyer had been violated thereby. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


23.  The applicant contested the Government’s submissions as giving misleading, erroneous interpretations of domestic and Convention law. According to the applicant his case required, both under the domestic legislation and under Article <mask> of the Convention, a mandatory oral hearing owing to his need for legal protection and the fact that the credibility of witness statements played a significant role in the determination of the case. According to the applicant the matter did not concern only 308.80 euros (EUR), but altogether a financial liability of EUR 7,374.92. The applicant maintained that the lack of an oral hearing de facto placed the burden of proof on him. He also emphasised the importance of the threat of the punishment and the impact on his business from having to pay unjustified taxes with no legal basis.


31.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted on the basis of his statements extracted under torture. Finally, the applicant maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


52.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings at issue and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she was not able to purchase the flat at issue. She also relied on Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention, without substantiating those complaints by any relevant arguments.


24.  The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing had not been ensured by the court. In particular, the courts had failed to give sufficient reasons for their findings and had not taken the requisite steps to procure and assess the evidence which was relevant to his civil claim. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


17.  The Government asked the Court to reject the complaint raised under Article <mask> of the Convention for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the applicant had failed to raise his complaints before the domestic courts. In the alternative, the Government claimed that the applicant had failed to comply with the six months time-limit because he had not lodged his application within six months of the end of his police custody on 13 July 2002.


24.  The Government submitted that the judgment of 3 February 2004 had been fully enforced on 21 February 2006. They believed that the delay in the enforcement of the judgment was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as far as the debtor had been reorganised and the applicant had failed to apply to a court in order to define the debtor's legal successor.


35.  The Government argued that the search and seizure had indeed been in accordance with the law. Referring to the Court’s finding in Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria (no. 74336/01, § 65, ECHR 2007‑XI) that the search of a lawyer’s premises and his professional and business activities could have an impact on the lawyer’s duty of professional secrecy and consequently on the proper administration of justice as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government maintained that the search had been carried out in a way that had not interfered disproportionately with the applicant’s rights.


69.  The applicant alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the ground that the criminal proceedings were unfair because the additional security measures had prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury and therefore breached the principle of the presumption of innocence and/or his right to a public hearing; because the prosecution had failed to comply with its continuing duty of disclosure and/or because the law governing disclosure in the United Kingdom did not comply with Article 6 of the Convention; and because the trial judge had erred in allowing the statements of VO to be read to the jury.


30.  The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. He further complained in his application form, dated 7 January 1998, that the written observations of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation on the merits of his appeal were not served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


198.  The applicant also submitted that the overall length of the criminal proceedings against her had exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is “charged” within the autonomous and substantive meaning of that term and ends with the day on which a charge is finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued (see, among many other authorities, Kalashnikov, cited above, § 124). In the present case, the applicant was detained and questioned as an accused on 28 February 2000 and her conviction was upheld on appeal and became final on 23 May 2001. Thus the overall length of the proceedings at issue was less than fifteen months, during which period the applicant's case was examined at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court does not find such a length of the proceedings excessive within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


56.  The applicant also complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that she had not been a party to the adoption proceedings, that she had not given her consent to the adoption and that she had never even been informed that such proceedings had been instituted. In this connection, the applicant complained that her child’s guardian N.J. had been an employee of the same Centre that had carried out the adoption proceedings, claiming that she had influenced the initiation of the adoption proceedings, instead of protecting the applicant’s rights. Lastly, she complained that she had been deprived of the right to an effective remedy in that she could not have appealed against the decision on the adoption. She relied in this respect on Article 13 of the Convention.


37.  The Government first submitted that under domestic law there was no civil right or claim to be appointed a liquidator, nor the State’s corresponding obligation to appoint someone in this capacity. The commercial courts were granted discretionary powers in this respect. Moreover, whereas it could be accepted that the court, when conducting insolvency proceedings, had been acting as a tribunal within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, the same did not hold true in respect of proceedings in which the applicant was dismissed from his post of a liquidator. In these proceedings the court had performed an act of administrative, not judicial, character.


62.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the imposition of compulsory administration on the applicant bank and to any extension thereof since neither involved the determination by a tribunal of a dispute (“contestation”) concerning civil rights and obligations. The Prague Municipal Court did not determine such a dispute and neither Mr Moravec nor the applicant bank itself were capable of being parties to the proceedings before that court. To criticise the Municipal Court, as the Commission did in the course of finding a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, for not having used its competence to examine the reasons for which the compulsory administration had been imposed and extended, as if it were determining a dispute between the CNB on the one hand and Mr Moravec and the applicant bank on the other, is to reproach that court for something which formed no part of the proceedings before it. The essential function of the court under Article 200(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, when deciding on matters relating to entries in the Companies Register, is not to determine a dispute concerning civil rights and obligations but to verify whether the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation for making an entry in the Register have been fulfilled. In matters relating to the Companies Register, the court does not deliver a judgment or decision. Since the procedure is exclusively a written procedure and is in private, in the sense that there is no hearing, the final ruling of the court is not published. However, the ruling must be reduced to writing and notified to the party applying for registration, from which moment it becomes binding. While it is true that there exists a possibility of appeal from rulings of the court relating to the Companies Register, if by the ruling the application is granted in all respects, no appeal lies since an appeal can only be lodged by the party in whose favour the court has ruled. Subject to the conditions provided by Article 236 et suiv. of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal of points of law possible even in respect of proceedings relating to the Companies Register.


22.  The applicant complained that the proceedings had been unfair, namely that she, unlike the public prosecutor, had been deprived of the opportunity to be present at the Court of Appeal's session of 16 November 2004. She further complained that the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy; that her conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence, namely on evidence submitted in the form of photocopies; that the expert report of 2004 had been drawn up by the Bureau, which had operated within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, which was the aggrieved party; that the trial court had refused to hear the claimants and lastly, that the courts had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


34.  The Government submitted that the proceedings in the applicant’s case had complied with the requirement of fairness set out in Article <mask> of the Convention: they had been carried out in accordance with the domestic law on criminal procedure; the applicant was assisted by counsel of his own choosing; the defence participated actively in the questioning of witnesses and victims; and the applicant had an opportunity to express his own position on the case before the court. As to the partial announcement of the 1990 judgment against the applicant, the Government stressed that this was done by the trial judge at the request of the prosecutor at the stage of the examination of the case file material, and not during the questioning of witnesses and victims as alleged by the applicant, and that the applicant did not raise any objections in this respect. The Government explained that a copy of the 1990 judgment was included in the case file because the applicant’s unspent conviction under this judgment had legal importance for determining the latter’s sentence, as account needed to be taken of the applicant’s recidivism and the type of correctional facility where the applicant was to serve his sentence. The Government further relied on the record of the hearing of 26 July 2004, from which it follows that witness M. and victims T. and P. testified without being subjected to any pressure by the trial judge. The applicant’s applications for the withdrawal of the trial judge were duly considered by the court and dismissed with relevant reasons being given. The Government summed up that the reading out of part of the 1990 judgment could not serve as a reasonable justification of the applicant’s doubts as to the court’s impartiality.


27. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 that the awards made by the Ankara Administrative Court in respect of compensation and his lawyer's costs and expenses were insufficient and disproportionate. He finally alleged under Article 14 of the Convention that he had not been appointed to a post in the civil service on account of his political opinions.


29.  The applicant, referring to his constitutional complaint, submitted that it was apparent from the documents available to the domestic courts that in 1952 he had been in a situation under pressure, which had been used to turn him into an informant against his will. He claimed that if he had been heard in person he would have been able to illustrate his desperate situation as an immature young man who consumed too much alcohol. Better than any file of the Ministry of State Security, he could have explained in person that he had never knowingly passed on information to harm others. Furthermore, the applicant referred to a judgment of the constitutional court of the Land of Brandenburg (Brandenburg Constitutional Court) of 24 January 2014 (VfGBbg 2/13) which set aside lower instance decisions revoking compensation grants on the grounds that a former prisoner had committed to work for the state security service. The constitutional court, also considering Article <mask> of the Convention, found, inter alia, that not holding a hearing, thus denying the claimant an opportunity to explain in person a situation of insupportable pressure because his submissions to that end had not been supported by evidence from the files of the state security service, was in breach of relevant provisions of the Land’s constitution.


50.  The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 thereto, that the domestic courts’ refusal to examine their civil claims on the merits deprived them of their right of access to court. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 55, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) the Court considers that the applicants’ complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


25.  The applicant complained that the trial judge, R., had not been impartial, that the trial court had relied on the statements of five witnesses given earlier in the course of the investigation without questioning them in person, and that the appellate court had refused to accept his twelve additional statements of appeal. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


12.  The Government, relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant had been a military officer at the material time and the judgment award had concerned allowances for his military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of that Convention provision as he had had no right to receive “payments in the amount claimed”. He had neither an “existing possession” nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 25 July 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law.


27.  The applicant complained that she had been incited to commit the crime of accepting a bribe and that the domestic courts had not given sufficient reasons in their decisions. She also complained that her right to be presumed innocent had been breached by the prosecutor in charge of the case, who had stated in an interview that she had accepted a bribe. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


57.  The Government considered that the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had properly analysed the applicant’s plea under Article <mask> of the Convention, but had dismissed it on the ground that he had never been refused legal assistance. Given that neither the Court of Appeal nor the Court of Cassation had found any breach of his defence rights, it had not been incumbent on those courts to provide redress. According to the Government, even if the Court of Appeal had decided to nullify the first interview, such a decision would have had no effect on his conviction, as the trial court had based the conviction on other elements in the case file. The Court should pursue a flexible approach based on an overall reading of the situation in the light of the whole proceedings in order to satisfy itself that the aims of Article 6 had been secured (see John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑I, and Rupa v. Romania (no. 2), no. 37971/02, 19 July 2011).


72.  The Government also argued that there had been no evidence that the applicant had actually paid the awarded costs and expenses to the respondents. The amount of costs and expenses awarded was the sole responsibility of her predecessor, who had committed errors in indicating the value of the subject matter of the dispute. At all events, in the Government’s view, this was a property issue that should be addressed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, not under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the applicant’s predecessor had never asked for exemption from the payment of court fees. He had also had an opportunity to request a return of the erroneously calculated fee in the period of one year from the moment of its payment (until 5 June 2007), but he had never made such a request. In these circumstances, although the first-instance court’s error in its calculation of the costs and expenses of the proceedings was regrettable, the Government did not consider that this was sufficient in itself to find a violation of Article 6.


27.  The applicants stated that even if Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to a decision to postpone enforcement until a final decision on the action under Section 35 of the Enforcement Act was taken, Article 6 of the Convention was applicable to the final decision which ordered the applicants to pay the costs. They stated that the subject-matter of their application to the Court was not the decision to postpone enforcement, but the fact that they had to bear the costs for the debtor's appeal without having been heard or having been able to settle the matter with the debtor.


41.  The applicant, on the other hand, considered that as the Constitutional Court had set aside the judgment of the Madrid Employment Tribunal, no court had examined the merits of her claim. She referred to the Hornsby case cited above, and submitted that the fact that the Constitutional Court had set aside the judgments of the lower court did not suffice to make the proceedings compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


54.  The applicant bank complained that its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated in that it had no remedy in respect of the administrative decision of the CNB to place it in compulsory administration or in respect of the subsequent decisions of administrative and judicial organs. It submitted that, during the compulsory administration, its statutory organ should have retained limited competence regarding the acts of the CNB as a public authority, but that it was not notified about the registration of the compulsory administration or of its first extension and that its appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was dismissed as having been introduced by an unauthorised person. The statutory organ of the bank was therefore deprived of any means of redress in breach of the requirements of Article 6.


141.  The applicants further complained that the refusal to recognise the applicant Church was preventing it from acquiring legal personality, thus depriving it of its right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, so that any complaint relating to its rights, and in particular its property rights, could be determined. In addition, they alleged that the refusal to recognise, coupled with the authorities’ stubborn persistence in holding to the view that the applicants could practise their religion within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, infringed their freedom of association, contrary to Article 11 of the Convention.


26.  The Government contended that Article 6 did not apply in the present case. Relying on the Court’s reasoning in its decision in the case of Pitkevich (Pitkevich v. Russia, no. 47936/99, 8 February 2001), they maintained that disputes relating to dismissal from the judiciary fall outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government further argued that the applicant was expressly denied access to a court to challenge the President’s decree on her dismissal from office and that this exclusion was justified, based on the State interest in ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.


44.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Firstly, they claimed that the applicant should have complained under Articles 73 and 234 of the CCP to the responsible investigator or prosecutor about the alleged planting of drugs by the police. Secondly, the applicant had failed to apply to the first-instance court, under Article 111 §§ (g) and (d) of the CCP, to reject the report of his personal search and the ensuing evidence as inadmissible. Thirdly, the applicant had failed, when lodging his appeal on points of law, to separately challenge the decision of the Appeal Court of 6 December 2005 to admit the search report as evidence. Lastly, according to the Government, the applicant could have asked, on the basis of Article 364 of the CCP, for an alternative forensic examination to determine his possible state of drug intoxication, which request he had also failed to make.


42.  The Government maintained that if the offence had been committed after 1 June 2005, that is to say, after the entry into force of the Misdemeanours Act and the recent Code of Criminal Procedure, the fine would have been imposed directly by the relevant official authority, without any court proceedings. They stated that the domestic court had taken the new provisions into account in the applicant’s favour and had sentenced him to an administrative fine, which could not be converted into imprisonment and had not been registered in the criminal records. They argued that the outcome of the proceedings could therefore hardly be considered important for the applicant. They further argued that in the present case the relevant law had been clear and the facts undisputed, leaving little room for judicial discretion. The case file included many witness statements and an official report proving that the applicant’s hotel was being used for prostitution purposes. Moreover, the applicant had been heard by the authorities during the preliminary investigation stage and had been able to submit his written arguments to the court during the course of the proceedings. The Government concluded that the imposition of an administrative fine without the holding of an oral hearing did not contravene Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular taking into account the requirement for efficiency and expediency in the administration of justice.


95.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their conviction had been based on evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment and in the absence of any real evidence of their guilt. They added that they had not been allowed to see a lawyer for 24 hours following their placement in detention in Moldova, and had been de facto prevented from having such meetings in the period of 4-8 November 2000 and thereafter; and that they had not been allowed to meet in private with their lawyers.


43.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, in so far as it concerned the charge involving OZ, he had been convicted of an offence which had been incited by the police and that his conviction was based on evidence from the police officers involved and from OZ, an individual acting on their instructions. Article 6, in so far as relevant, provides:


74.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


82.  The applicant also rejected the Government’s argument that the flaws in the appointment procedure of A.E. had not amounted to a flagrant breach of domestic law and thus the Supreme Court’s interpretation of domestic law should not be questioned by the Court. The applicant submitted, firstly, that the Supreme Court’s judgments of 19 December 2017 had confirmed that there had been a flagrant breach of domestic law when A.E. had been appointed as a judge of the Court of Appeal. It had been so flagrant that she would not have been appointed if the Minister of Justice had followed the applicable legal procedure. Secondly, the Supreme Court had concluded that there had been a flagrant breach of domestic law in its previous judgments. Therefore, the court should not have been interpreting domestic law in its judgment against the applicant but rather Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court’s case-law required that judges be appointed according to foreseeable and lawful procedures and not arbitrarily. When it had been demonstrated that A.E.’s appointment had indeed been unlawful and arbitrary and in breach of Article 6 § 1, such an appointment should always be considered a flagrant breach of any domestic law. Alternatively, domestic law that did not provide remedies against unlawful or arbitrary judicial appointments should not qualify as “law” under the autonomous meaning of that term under Article <mask> of the Convention.


91.  The applicant submitted that the present case reflected both subjective and objective bias on the part of the Chief Justice, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. The Chief Justice had been biased on account of the fact that his brother had been the lawyer of the opposing party during the injunction proceedings. His bias was evident from the incident of 12 October 1992, which left both the other judges on the panel speechless, as well as from the final judgment. The latter judgment found against Mrs M. and ordered the removal from the records of a report drawn up by the judicial assistant which had been in favour of Mrs M. and made reference to her legal counsel’s actions vis-à-vis the brother of the Chief Justice (see paragraph 20 above). Indeed, since the personal impartiality of a judge was presumed until there was proof to the contrary, the applicant had had no reason to request the judge’s withdrawal until the above events occurred. However, the Chief Justice should have known that he himself would have brought up the issue related to his brother and should therefore have withdrawn of his own motion. Moreover, the applicant opined that the Chief Justice’s behaviour during the incident and the sibling relationship were not separate issues but reflected two sides of the same coin.


103.  The Government submitted that the application did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular having regard to the time elapsed after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia. They submitted further that the subject matter of the applicant's cases did not call for particular urgency in deciding them. They referred to the Court's case-law, arguing that the cases that did call for special urgency were those that related to family-law matters or to payment of damages to the victims of road accidents, those that involved the interests of a great number of persons and cases concerning dismissal from work.


24.  The Government rejected that argument. In their submission, Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply to the procedure followed by the applicant to obtain legal aid. They pointed out, firstly, that the relevant procedure, which was governed by the Legal Aid Act of 10 July 1991, enabled any litigant to apply for legal aid in connection with civil or criminal proceedings. Such applications, which were optional, were made before the court proceedings commenced or while they were under way, without in any way affecting their outcome.


71.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the remaining two sets of proceedings in cases in which he was involved had been excessively long. In so far as this complaint relates to the civil proceedings in which he sought compensation for damage arising out of another part of the 1961 decision (see paragraphs 34 – 37 above), this part of the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as he failed to have recourse to the complaint about excessive length of judicial proceedings available under the Polish law.


59.  The applicant complained that on the first two occasions when he had been questioned by the prosecutor, he had been subjected to ill-treatment and denied the assistance of his own chosen counsel, being allocated against his will a counsel who was already representing one of the co-accused. He further complained that he had not been allowed to question or confront the co-accused who had made incriminatory statements against him during the investigation stage. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


37.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the proceedings against the Central Bank and the ARKO as the proceedings did not concern the applicant’s civil rights or obligations. In the Government’s view, the proceedings merely pertained to the enforcement of the judgment issued in the applicant’s favour. They insisted that the complaint should be dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae. In alternative, the Government argued that the Presidium of the Voronezh Regional Court had quashed the judgments in the applicant’s favour with a view to correcting the judicial error committed by the lower courts.


47.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the judgments given in her civil cases had been erroneous, that the courts had wrongly applied substantive law and that, as a result, her rights had been breached. She further argued that the courts had committed errors in the assessment of evidence and that their reasoning had been illogical and contradictory.


78.  The Government submitted that the fairness of proceedings held by the Supreme Court in the context of a cassation appeal had been examined by the Court in the case of Walczak v. Poland (dec.), no. 77395/01, 7 May 2002. The Court had declared the case inadmissible, finding that the proceedings complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case no circumstances had obtained which would justify a different conclusion. Moreover, in the present case, after the hearing had been held by the Supreme Court on 23 September 2004, the presiding judge had publicly pronounced its decision dismissing the applicant's cassation appeal and the judge rapporteur orally explained the reasons of that decision, in the presence of the applicant's lawyer. Hence, the applicant had been duly informed of the reasons why his appeal had not been successful.


97.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Vienna Court of Appeal, in its decision of 24 May 2006, had wrongly assessed the evidence before it and in particular the information conveyed by the photograph published in Profil on 12 July 2004. In particular, he alleged that the court had found that the photograph showed the applicant with his left arm around a seminarian and his right hand on the seminarian’s crotch, and not just accidentally in front of it as maintained by him, without giving sufficient reasons for that finding.


44.  The Government of Serbia and Montenegro submitted that the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was not incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention. They noted that the acts had been committed either on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro or on the territory of Italy, while the consequences had been suffered solely in Serbia and Montenegro. In their submission, the first point the Court had to take into consideration was that the aircraft which had bombed the RTS building had taken off in Italy, where the decision to carry out the raid had been taken in coordination with NATO headquarters in Brussels. The acts concerned also included all the physical and logistical preparation of the operation, which had resulted in the deaths of sixteen people. At the time, Italy and the other NATO member States had total control over the use of weapons in Serbian and Montenegrin airspace, but ultimately it was Italy which had had the aerial capacity to bomb the RTS building. These factors clearly showed the link between the events in issue and Italy, even though the consequences were suffered only in Serbia. In the Government of Serbia and Montenegro’s submission, the present case was, therefore, sufficiently distinguishable from Banković and Others (cited above) as to warrant a different conclusion and one that would avoid a denial of justice. They concluded from the above that the act complained of in the present case was not exclusively extraterritorial.


53.  The Government argued that the applicant's case had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor domestic law guaranteed a right to have a civil case heard at three levels of jurisdiction. The right to a court was not absolute and could therefore be subject to certain limitations, in so far as they did not impair the very essence of that right. In particular, the criteria of admissibility of appeals to be lodged with the highest courts could be strict and the procedure more formal than that before the lower courts, without the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention being breached thereby. The mere fact that it was necessary for a cassation appeal to be lodged by a qualified representative was not open to criticism.


85.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. He alleged that the domestic courts had violated his right not to incriminate himself and in convicting him had had regard to a confession given under duress. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


47.  The Government considered that the applicant had relied on Article 13 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. In view of the lack of any reason to believe that Article 6 had been breached in the present case, the Government considered that Article 13 could not be relied on, since the applicant had not had an arguable claim under Article 6 of the Convention.


62.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings related to the determination of his nationality had been unfair. He invoked Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant also complained about the conditions of his detention in Russia pending extradition, relying on Article 3. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


87.  The applicants submitted that a “reasonable time” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention had been exceeded. They pointed out that the second applicant's tax assessment had been examined by the County Administrative Court on 29 March 2000 and had only recently been finally determined by the courts although he had appealed against the relevant Tax Authority decision already in December 1995. The first applicant's appeals – which had been lodged before the declaration of bankruptcy – had been dismissed by the County Administrative Court on 17 July 2000, that is about three and a half years after that declaration. The applicants disputed the Government's contention that the cases had involved complex issues.


40.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the civil proceedings instituted against him had been unfair because the domestic courts had not considered the testimony of his fiancée to be credible and had allowed the plaintiff's action. He further submitted that the medical fee claimed by the plaintiff was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the applicant claimed that he had not had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention before the domestic courts because they had wrongly found against him.


56.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that in the decisions of the national courts in the civil proceedings he was treated as having committed a criminal offence. He further complained, under Article 5 §§ 3 and 5 of the Convention, that his pre-trial detention had exceeded a reasonable time and that he had no right to compensation. Lastly, he invoked Article <mask> of the Convention but without further elaboration.


30.  The applicant alleged that the proceedings on 21 February 2001 and the ensuing criminal proceedings before the national courts, taken together, had violated his rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (d), Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7. The Court has examined the applicant's complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, which in the relevant parts reads as follows:


106.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


49.  The applicant alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been convicted of an act which had not constituted a criminal offence when it had been committed. He submitted that offshore banking activities had not been regulated under national law at the material time. He therefore concluded that the acts in dispute could not have given rise to an offence of aggravated fraud and that his conviction had been based on the new Criminal Code, which had entered into force in 2005, after the impugned acts. Article 7 of the Convention reads:


83.  The Government rejected that argument, observing that Article <mask> of the Convention did no more than prohibit any retrospective application of criminal law in relation to “the time the criminal offence was committed”. They observed that the provisions of the Criminal Code which established penalties for the offences of which the applicant was convicted had not been amended after 2 September 1999, the date when they were committed. They noted in particular that the offences concerned were punishable by life imprisonment with daytime isolation and that the penalty imposed by the national courts had not exceeded that limit.


147.  The Government submitted in the alternative that the applicant's conduct during the attack on Mazie Bati “was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. In that connection, the Court notes that on virtually every occasion the Convention institutions have examined a case under the second paragraph of Article 7, they have not considered it necessary also to examine it under the first paragraph (De Becker v. Belgium, no. 214/56, Commission decision of 9 June 1958, Yearbook 2, p. 214; X. v. Norway, no. 931/60, Commission decision of 30 May 1961, Collection of Decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights no. 6, p. 41; X. v. Belgium, no. 1028/61, Commission decision of 18 September 1961, Yearbook no. 4, p. 325; and Naletilić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 51891/99, ECHR 2000‑V, as also the decisions of X. v. Belgium (no. 268/57), Touvier and Papon (no. 2) cited above; for more extensive reasoning, see Penart v. Estonia (dec.), no. 14685/04, 24 January 2006, and the Kolk and Kislyiy decision cited above). The Court sees no reason to deviate from that approach in the present case. Since it has examined the case under the first paragraph of Article 7, it does not consider it necessary also to examine it under the second paragraph. In any event, even supposing that that paragraph was applicable in the instant case, the operation of 27 May 1944 cannot be regarded as “criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”.


80.  The applicant noted in the first place that, according to the case-law of the Italian courts (Court of Cassation, combined divisions, judgment of 6 March 1992 in the Merletti case), Article 442 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets out the penalty to be imposed when the summary procedure has been adopted is – despite its inclusion in the CCP – a provision of substantive criminal law. He argued that, unlike the provisions examined by the Grand Chamber in the Kafkaris v. Cyprus case (no. 21906/04, 12 February 2008), that clause did not concern the procedure for execution of sentence but the fixing of the sentence. It should therefore be considered a “criminal law” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The Government observed that the applicant had been sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment for an offence committed in 1995. His sentence had indisputably been provided for in the legislation applicable on that date, namely Article 222-37 of the Criminal Code, concerning drug offences, and Article 132-9 of the same Code, concerning recidivism, of which the 1995 offence constituted the second component. The penalty imposed on him, having been applicable at the time when the offence had been committed, had therefore satisfied the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


55.  The applicants maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been arrested and the criminal proceedings had been brought against them on account of an act which did not constitute a criminal offence under domestic law. The applicants also complained that the unlawful restrictions placed on their right to freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, the criminal proceedings brought against them and their inability to raise their complaints before the domestic judicial authorities into their allegations constituted a violation of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention.


95.  The applicant considered his conviction contrary to the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention as it did not fall into any of the three exceptions laid down therein. His conduct towards the villagers of Mazie Bati did not constitute an offence under either international or national law at the time, nor was it “criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”.


124.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as regards the applicants, both of whom had been convicted of large-scale embezzlement, a criminal offence under Article 160 § 4 of the Criminal Code. They maintained that the relevant domestic courts had correctly decided on the legal classification of the offence, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidelines of 27 December 2007. They also noted that the applicants’ appeal on points of law had been rejected at a higher level.


15.  The applicant complained under Article 3 that he had been subjected to psychological torture in police custody. Relying on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, he further complained that he had been held in police custody for a long time. Under Article 6, the applicant alleged that the State Security Court which had tried and convicted him was not an independent and impartial tribunal. He also complained about the length of the proceedings. Finally, the applicant alleged that his conviction, which was based on his visit to Iran, had been in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


110.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


92.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


21.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been dismissed from his post on the basis of his criminal conviction for having disseminated communist propaganda under the provisions of the former Criminal Code, which had been repealed in 1991, and despite the fact that his criminal record had been erased following the repeal of the Articles in question. The applicant submitted that both the administrative authorities and the courts had failed to take into account the fact that his criminal record had been erased. He further noted that he was a fully qualified teacher and had been able to practise his profession between 1985 and 1999 without any problems. The applicant maintained that he had been prevented from practising his profession and had sustained psychological damage.


166.  The applicant submitted that the commutation of the death penalty into life imprisonment without parole infringed Article <mask> of the Convention, such commutation having resulted from a legislative amendment made subsequently to his conviction (under Law no. 4771, which came into force on 9 August 2002). Prior to this amendment, persons sentenced to the death penalty whose execution had not been approved by the National Assembly had remained in prison for a maximum term of thirty-six years.


39.  The applicant pointed out that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as the essential elements of the crime in the present case had not been fulfilled. The applicant had been charged with having concealed property which Mr A. had obtained by a criminal act, namely property which Mr A. had failed to declare. In Finland only a failure to declare property was criminalised, not the failure to surrender property to a bankruptcy estate. From the legality point of view, it was difficult to interpret the term “not to declare property” in a way that would lead to “acquiring property”. If Mr A. was no longer under a duty to declare property, to what property illegally acquired did the applicant’s indictment refer? Mr A did not acquire any property as the real estate concerned was already in his possession. The essential elements of the crime with which the applicant was charged were thus not fulfilled.


194.  The applicant maintained that because of a close association between the enactment of the 2005 Amendment and the criminal case against him, no comparison could be made with the case of Coëme and Others v. Belgium. Furthermore, the Court’s findings in that judgment with regard to the extension of limitation periods were only relevant in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention and not with respect to the assessment of a complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


86.  The applicant submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention guaranteed not only the non-retrospectiveness of the criminal law but also the principle – set forth explicitly in Article 15 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by Article 49 of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental rights and by Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (see paragraphs 35-37 above) – that, in the event of a difference between the law in force at the time of the commission of an offence and later laws, the law to be applied was the law more favourable to the accused. That meant that Article 7 was breached whenever courts imposed a heavier penalty than the one prescribed by the law in force at any time between the commission of the offence and the delivery of judgment. The applicant referred on that point to the dissenting opinion of Judge Popović annexed to the Achour v. France judgment ([GC], no 67335/01, ECHR 2006-..).


41.  The applicant complained that the Criminal Code had been applied retroactively in his case, pointing out that he had been convicted of a continuous offence of abusing a person living under the same roof which, according to the courts, encompassed his conduct even before that offence had been introduced into the law. He also alleged that the courts had not duly examined whether his actions prior to that date would have amounted to a criminal offence under the old law. He relied in that regard on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


37.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the conduct leading to her conviction did not constitute a criminal offence under national law as S.K. had voluntarily transferred the money to her account. From that moment on the money had no longer formed a part of his, and subsequently his estate’s, possessions. She had, therefore, not been obliged to report the money in the estate inventory. She further complained that the unlawful conviction even constituted a breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, as the presumption of innocence had not been respected by the courts.


37.  The applicant submitted, in particular, that, while increasing the sentences applicable to recidivists was justified by the greater danger they posed on account of their persistence despite warnings from the courts, the concept of recidivism was considered above all to be a means of ensuring exemplary conduct on the part of those who had committed an offence of some seriousness, through a form of probation resulting from the risk of receiving an increased penalty in the event of them reoffending. The rules on recidivism were therefore intended to contribute to reforming convicted persons; that aim, which formed one of the main trends in modern crime policies, accordingly had some bearing on the determination of issues concerning the application of successive laws. In a democratic society the requirements of protecting the social order had to be reconciled with the aim of reforming offenders. He observed that Article <mask> of the Convention related to the requirement of legal certainty.


92.  The Government submitted that the interpretation of the notion of “official document” was consistent throughout both criminal codes and that the courts had rightly applied Article 325 of the new CC. There was therefore no issue of legal certainty under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government submitted a number of examples of domestic practice in support of their position.


107.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in relation to his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. He had failed to complain either expressly or in substance about a breach of his right not to have a heavier penalty imposed on him than the one applicable at the time of his offence in his constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court. In that complaint, he had only raised a breach of his constitutional right to liberty.


40.  The applicant further pointed out that even if there existed a legal basis in Finnish law for the applicant’s conviction, the quality of that law was not in accordance with Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Finnish system, the dismissal of a charge did not automatically mean that claims for damages arising from the same facts should also be dismissed. In the present case the Supreme Court, when dismissing the charges against Mr A., also dismissed the compensation claims. This meant that the Supreme Court itself regarded Mr A.’s right not to incriminate himself as a ground of justification and not a ground of excuse. This highlighted the poor quality of the law: this law was at the time, and still is today, very much unforeseeable as regards situations like the applicant’s.


202.  The applicant complained, invoking Article <mask> of the Convention, that he had been convicted in the absence of criminal intent, as one of the constituent elements of the offence of espionage, and that he should instead have been acquitted. Thus, he had not realised that he was dealing with information containing State secrets, since he had received that information from open publications. Questions had not been put to the jury as to whether he transmitted information containing State secrets and whether he collected it from closed or open sources; the jury therefore found that he had transferred non-classified information to foreign intelligence – acts which were not embraced by the corpus delicti of espionage. Furthermore, it had not been established by the jury verdict that he had had criminal intent to damage the national security of the Russian Federation by abetting foreign intelligence services. Hence, the presiding judge should have acquitted him on the basis of such a verdict by the jury. The applicant concluded that the presiding judge had manipulated the questions to the jury, having disregarded the request by the defence to change their formulation, and had changed the constituent elements of the offence of espionage to his detriment. The applicant further disagreed with the application of domestic law in his case. He argued that the Official Secrets Act defining the list of classified information, which had in any event been rather vague, had not been applicable to him since he had never had admission or access to State secrets by virtue of his office; that the list of classified information had also been defined by presidential decree no. 1203 of 30 November 1995, although under Article 29 of the Constitution such a list was to be defined in a federal law; and that the expert assessment of the secrecy of the transmitted information of 18 July 2002 had been carried out on the basis of unpublished Ministry of Defence decrees nos. 055 and 015 of 10 August 1996 and 25 March 2002 respectively, to which he had not had access. The applicant considered that this situation had contributed to his arbitrary conviction by the presiding judge. The applicant further complained that all of the above had also led to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Articles 7 and 10 of the Convention provide:


105.  The Government submitted that any possible interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly had been prescribed by law. The applicants had been convicted under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, prescribing punishment for serious breaches of public order. Referring to the Court’s judgment in Galstyan (cited above, § 107) and taking into account the diversity inherent in public-order offences, the Government considered that the domestic legal norm had been formulated with sufficient precision (see also the arguments developed by the Government under Article <mask> of the Convention – paragraphs 188-91 below).


238.  The Government observed that, in the Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others judgment (merits, cited above), the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the ground that confiscation was not a foreseeable consequence of the applicant companies’ conduct (they had been acquitted as the courts had not found them liable for the offence in question) and that the confiscation measure imposed on them had not therefore been provided for by law for the purposes of Article 7 of the Convention.


48.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that it had not been clear from the Penal Code provision applied that their conduct might be punishable, as the provision had not defined the scope of private life. The convictions of A. and B. had been public information that could not have fallen within the scope of private life. Furthermore, even though a conviction for invasion of private life allegedly required that intent be shown, the Appeal Court had failed to state how this requirement had been fulfilled.


87.  The Government pointed out that in the judgment of Vasiliauskas (cited above, § 159) the Court did not deny the right of the State to take action against the perpetrators of the repressions committed during the Soviet occupation regime. What led the Court to find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in that case was the domestic courts’ reference to the Lithuanian partisans as a separate political group, which had been excluded from the definition of acts of genocide at the relevant time (the 1950s) and the lack of reasoning of the domestic courts that the Lithuanian partisans constituted a significant part of a protected group, namely the Lithuanian national group. The domestic courts were criticised for not explaining what the notion of “representatives” entailed, and for not providing much of a historical or factual account of how the Lithuanian partisans were representative of the Lithuanian nation (see Vasiliauskas, cited above, §§ 159 and 179-86). The judgment of the Court showed that the lack of arguments of the Lithuanian courts in that specific case had been of the utmost importance.


60.  The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive and that he had not had any domestic remedy whereby he could challenge the unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention. He also complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention that his defence lawyer had not had adequate time to prepare his additional defence submissions. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been convicted for carrying out lawful acts in his capacity as president of the local branch of a political party, and that criminal law had been extensively construed to his detriment by analogy.


66.  The Government argued that neither during the administrative offence proceedings nor in his constitutional complaint had the applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, in his constitutional complaint the applicant had alleged violations of his constitutional rights to equality before the law and a fair hearing, which rights corresponded to those guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.


98.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that it had not been clear from the Penal Code provision applied that their conduct would have been punishable as the provision had not defined the scope of private life. Moreover, the conviction of B. could not have fallen within the scope of private life as a conviction for assault could never be a private issue, especially as B.'s case file had not been declared secret. Furthermore, no intent had been shown.


18.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and that it had acted as a first and only instance court, which had also infringed his right to an effective remedy. He further maintained under Article 6 § 1 that he had been denied a public hearing due to the lack of reference to the principal public prosecutor’s name in the court decisions. The applicant contended that his expulsion from the military academy had amounted to a punishment without a law, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, he maintained under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been expelled from the military academy by reason of his father’s affiliations with a certain trade union, which amounted to discrimination.


122.  The applicants complained that the legal provision on the basis of which they had been convicted of embezzlement had not been applicable to their acts. They claimed that the authorities extended the interpretation of the offence to such broad and ambiguous terms that it did not satisfy the requirements of foreseeability. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


38.  The applicant noted that Article 132-9 of the new Criminal Code had doubled the period between the two components of recidivism and that in order to apply these new, harsher, provisions to him, the Court of Cassation had laid down a rule which, albeit simple, was extremely questionable in the light of Article <mask> of the Convention, not least because it placed sole emphasis on the second component. The applicant considered that the first component of recidivism, which had been totally ignored by the Court of Cassation, was nevertheless an essential aspect of the process. He complained, firstly, that the Court of Cassation had applied harsher legal provisions of which he could not have been aware on the date of his initial conviction and, secondly, that the retrospective application of the new Criminal Code had brought back into being the possibility of recidivism even though its first component had quite simply ceased to exist.


127.  The applicant submitted that the circumstances that had led to the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention had also breached the principles of fair trial. In February 2000 he had opted for the summary procedure, and in doing so had waived a number of procedural safeguards, because he knew, on the basis of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time, that in the event of his conviction he would be punished by thirty years' imprisonment and not a life sentence. However, the CCP had been amended unfavourably, and in exchange for his waiver he had not been granted a reduction of his sentence (the only advantage being that he had avoided daytime isolation). But adoption of the summary procedure implied a “public-law contract” between the defendant and the State; once entered into, that “contract” could not be rescinded or varied unilaterally.


19.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts examining the charges against him had failed to respond to his argument that it had not been shown that he had acquired the counterfeit bank notes after 26 March 2005, namely at a time when acquiring such notes had been an offence. He relied generally on Article 6 and Article <mask> of the Convention.


18.  The applicants complain about the legality and proportionality of pecuniary and non-pecuniary penalties. According to Article 187 ter of the TUF, the pecuniary sanctions applicable to the administrative offence of market manipulation could reach five million euros[28], and be increased up to three times or even ten times the proceeds of the offence or the profit therefrom, taking into consideration the personal situation of the guilty party, the scale of the proceeds of the offence or the profit therefrom, or the effects on the market. While the punishment of administrative offences on the basis of the proceeds of the offence or the profit therefrom, without any fixed upper limit for the pecuniary sanction, raises per se an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention in its limb of the principle of nullum poena sine legge stricta, the extremely wide range of the increased pecuniary penalty foreseen by Article 187 ter no. 5 of the TUF is even more problematic[29]. Be that as it may, the concrete sanctions imposed are neither lawful nor proportionate.


62.  The applicants raised certain additional complaints with reference to Article 6 and Article <mask> of the Convention. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as it has jurisdiction to examine the allegations, the Court has not found any appearance of a breach of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols regarding that part of their applications. It follows that that part must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


37.  The Government pointed out that the Supreme Court had confirmed in its judgment of 22 October 2009 that attributing the aggravated receiving offence to the applicant did not violate the legality principle laid down in Article <mask> of the Convention. It was clear that, after a person was declared bankrupt, that person could no longer possess any property lawfully. The applicant must have considered it possible that, at the material time, concealing and obliterating the origin of property possessed by a bankrupt person could lead to prosecution and conviction.


78.  The applicant complained that his conviction under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code had been retroactive and therefore amounted to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He also pointed out that the crime of genocide, as described in that provision of the Criminal Code, did not have a basis in the wording of that offence as laid down in public international law. The Lithuanian courts’ interpretation of the concept of genocide in his case had been too broad.


48.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had retrospectively applied and extensively construed the State Secrets Act in his case. He further complained under Article 10 of the Convention of a violation of his freedom of expression. The applicant claimed that he had been subjected to an overly broad and politically motivated criminal persecution as a reprisal for his critical publications. In particular, he had never transferred any information containing State secrets to Mr T.O., a Japanese journalist. Nevertheless, he had been convicted for his alleged intention to transfer his handwritten notes, which had been found to contain State secrets, to Mr T.O., the only basis for such a finding being the fact that he had previously legitimately communicated information to the Japanese journalist on several occasions. The applicant further complained that in so far as his handwritten notes had been found to have contained the actual names of military formations and units and the activities of radio electronic warfare units, this information had been publicly accessible from a number of public sources, including internet sites, and that he had been unable to foresee that this information had constituted State secrets, as this finding had been based on the unpublished – and therefore inaccessible – Decree no. 055 of the Ministry of Defence. The respective Convention provisions, in their relevant parts, provide:


137.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, according to legal opinions produced by him, the first set of proceedings should have been discontinued, as no offence had been committed. The applicant also complained that he had not been able to initiate criminal proceedings against a prosecutor for allegedly withholding information pertaining to his release. He also complained that his private correspondence had been monitored and that his case had received wide media coverage in Poland.


37.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention had not been breached. Although the applicant's company lacked any bookkeeping as from 5 May 1993, this state of affairs continued after the entry into force of Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code on 20 July 1993. Moreover, the applicant had the obligation to keep proper accounting records also prior to that date, according to the Government decree of 6 July 1990.


76.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been the victim of the retrospective application of a criminal statute. He submitted, in particular, that the acts of which he was accused did not, at the time of their commission, constitute an offence under either domestic or international law, while the exception set out in the second paragraph of Article 7 could not apply in his case because the alleged offences manifestly did not come within its scope. Article 7 of the Convention provides:


144.  The Government submitted that an award of compensation by the Court to a person convicted of acts as murderous as those committed by the applicant – who had been found guilty in judicial proceedings that met all the requirements of a fair trial – would be difficult to understand. They argued that in the Kafkaris judgment (cited above), “having regard to all the circumstances of the case”, the Court had considered that the finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered.


28.  The Government argued that the compulsory hospitalisation and the measures ordered pursuant to Articles 706-135 and 706-136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute penalties within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because they did not follow a criminal conviction. The declaration of criminal insanity and the finding by the judicial authority responsible for pre-trial investigation that there was sufficient evidence that the individual had committed the offences as charged did not amount to an assessment of guilt; only the material attribution of the acts to the person charged had thereby been ascertained. In the Government’s submission, this is what distinguished the measures at issue from the system of preventive detention (Sicherungsverwahrung) under German law, as examined by the Court in M. v. Germany [(no. 19359/04, ECHR 2009)].


29.  The applicants complained that the law had been applied retroactively to their disadvantage, as they had been found guilty of bribery in accordance with the wording of a criminal provision that had not yet been in force at the time of the facts. They pointed out that the present case had been the first criminal proceedings for corruption in the small Republic of San Marino. They invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


100.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The Government took the view that the measures imposed on the applicant pursuant to sections 706-135 and 706-136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute “penalties” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that the application should be declared inadmissible for being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, in accordance with Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.


65.  The Government submitted in reply that the institutional therapeutic measure had been ordered following a review of the judgment to the applicant’s detriment. In such circumstances, Article 65 § 2 of the Criminal Code referred to the rules applicable to the reopening of proceedings, namely – prior to the entry into force of the unified Code of Criminal Procedure on 1 January 2011 – the relevant provisions of the cantonal Codes of Criminal Procedure. They inferred from this that paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (1), of the transitional provisions of the 13 December 2002 amendment to the Criminal Code, in conjunction with Article 65 § 2 of the same Code, “thus provided for the retrospective application of a specific ground for reopening proceedings”. The case of a review to the convicted person’s detriment was governed by Article 189 § 1 (e) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canton of Basle Urban. In accordance with that provision, criminal proceedings that had been concluded by means of an “enforceable” judgment were to be reopened where, among other situations, circumstances or evidence unknown to the trial court appeared likely to result in an acquitted person’s conviction or to give rise to a more severe punishment for a convicted person. The Government further submitted that the substantive law in force at the time had provided for institutional therapeutic measures, in particular under Article 43 § 1, second sub-paragraph, of the former Criminal Code, and noted that that provision allowed the indefinite detention of a convicted person who, “on account of his mental state”, “pose[d] a severe threat to public safety”, on condition that “such a measure [was] necessary to prevent a danger to others”. Accordingly, by deciding to impose an institutional therapeutic measure, the Court of Appeal had not ordered a heavier penalty than the one that would already have been possible and acceptable at the time of the criminal courts’ decisions. In conclusion, there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, regardless of whether such a measure, like the indefinite detention provided for in Article 65 § 2 of the Criminal Code, constituted a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention.


8.  The applicant’s conviction was therefore based upon legal provisions that were not in force in 1953 and, most importantly, could not have been in force at the relevant time, given that Lithuania was under occupation. Such provisions were applied retroactively. It follows that this would constitute a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention unless it can be established that his conviction was based upon international law as it stood at the relevant time. The applicant’s conviction, in our view, must therefore be examined from that perspective.


44.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been convicted in criminal proceedings of acts that had been lawful at the material time. They argued that the authorities had extended the interpretation of the criminal law applied in their case in such broad and ambiguous terms that it did not satisfy the requirements of foreseeability. Article 7 of the Convention reads as follows:


31.  The applicant maintained that in his case the courts should have applied the most favourable wording of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, which was that which had been in place between 29 December 1999 and 29 March 2000, when the death penalty had already been abolished and life imprisonment had not yet been introduced. Failure to do so, in his opinion, violated Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


109.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.