85.  The applicant also alleged a breach of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention since the criminal proceedings against him had not established his guilt. He lastly complained under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of his separation from his family as a result of his detention and the adverse effects it had on his family. He submitted that throughout his period in detention he received no news about his family.


25.  The Government admitted that the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. As regards Mr Presnyakov (application, no. 25624/15), the Government noted that he could not claim to be a victim of the violation alleged. He had not had the flat registered as his place of residence. Pursuant to the official documents, he resided elsewhere. Nor had he been a party to the civil proceedings concerning the determination of the applicants’ rights in respect of the flat.


69.  The Government accepted that Article <mask> of the Convention protected legal professional privilege. They submitted, however, that there had been no “interference” by the authorities with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, home or correspondence within the meaning of the second paragraph of that provision, as he did not complain of any concrete event that had affected him personally.


81.  The Government conceded that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. It is well‑established in its case-law that the storing of information relating to an individual’s private life in a secret register and the release of such information comes within the scope of Article 8 § 1 (see, Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 48, Series A no. 116; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000‑V).


69.  The applicants claimed that their removal from Latvia had violated their right to respect for their “private life”, their “family life” and their “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that their removal had not been required by Latvian law or by the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, interpreted correctly, and that in any event the resultant interference with their above rights had pursued no legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. The applicants also stated that, on the basis of the Latvian courts' incorrect interpretation of the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, they had lost their legal status in Latvia and had been forced to leave the country as a result of political changes rather than of their own actions.


98.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply in this case because the applicant had not been directly affected by the contested measure and because even if he had been affected, he had willingly renounced his right to privacy by publicly exchanging the files in question (see paragraphs 92 and 93 above). In order to answer those questions, the Court must consider whether the applicant, or any other individual using the Internet, had a reasonable expectation that his otherwise public online activity would remain anonymous (see paragraphs 115 to 118 above).


46.  The applicant complained that the neighbour who had converted the attic above her flat into another flat had failed to carry out the necessary soundproofing work and that she had therefore been disturbed by the noise coming from the flat above her. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


87.  The Government challenged the sums claimed by the applicant. In particular, they considered that there were no grounds for her request for reimbursement of the costs incurred during the second set of proceedings before the Latvian courts, as the effective aim of those proceedings had been to challenge a final decision. Hence, the proceedings in question had been extraordinary and were not to be taken into consideration for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Similarly, in its partial decision of 15 February 2001, the Court had declared only one of the applicant’s complaints admissible – the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention – and had rejected the remainder. In the Government’s view, that fact should be taken into account in calculating the amount to be reimbursed under Article 41 of the Convention.


108.  The applicants stated that they could no longer enjoy family life with their sons following their abduction by the State authorities. They also claimed that the search carried out at their house on 26 April 2003 had been illegal, which constituted a violation of their right to respect for their home. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


465.  The applicants complained that they could not correspond freely with their families and with the Court. In particular, they asserted that they had not been able to apply to the Court freely, and that in order to do so they had had to call on the assistance of their wives. They further complained that they could not receive visits from their families except with the prior agreement of the “President of the MRT”. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


823.  The Government maintained that there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government emphasised that any limitation of the applicants’ rights under Article 8 was related to their criminal conviction and was inherent in the very concept of criminal punishment. The Government described the geographical position of the Krasnokamensk colony (where the first applicant had been sent) and the Kharp colony (where the second applicant had been sent) and transport routes linking them to Moscow, where the applicants’ families lived. They concluded that there had been no interference with the applicants’ private lives on account of their placement in those particular penal colonies.


822.  The applicants complained that they had been sent to serve their prison terms in very remote colonies situated thousands of kilometres from their homes. In their words, this had seriously hindered their contacts with the outside world, and, in particular, with their families and their lawyers. The applicants referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


32.  The Government argued that, while the adoption of M. constituted interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention, the interference was justified under paragraph 2 of that Article. It had a legal basis, namely Article 181 § 3 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the applicant's minor daughter, by protecting her health, including her psychological well-being, and her legal interest in consolidating and formalising de facto family ties with her adoptive father. According to the case-law of the Austrian courts, the well-being of the child concerned was in itself not sufficient to justify overruling a parent's refusal of consent under Article 181 § 3. Only persistent conduct absolutely contrary to family values on the part of a parent could justify such a decision. In the present case, the applicant had demonstrated such conduct by repeatedly threatening and grossly insulting the child's mother in the presence of the child, at that time very young, during previous contact visits. As result, the child had suffered from anxiety and severe somatic disorders. The applicant had acted as the child's father only in the first months of her life. After the breakdown of his relationship the applicant, by his conduct towards the child's mother who had custody of the child, had made the exercise of his rights and duties as a father impossible. His refusal to consent to the adoption prevented the husband of the child's mother from taking on a role which he himself could no longer fulfil. Furthermore, he had discontinued maintenance payments for the child five years prior to the adoption being granted, thereby leaving it to others to care for his daughter. When questioned about the reasons for his refusal to give consent, the applicant had merely stated that he wished to visit his daughter and that her mother was preventing him from doing so. Such submissions could not be regarded as decisive reasons. Furthermore, the applicant had insisted on evidence being heard from the child in his own and the other parties' presence, apparently without caring much about the stress that would inevitably be caused to the child. The applicant had been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process. As it had transpired after several unsuccessful attempts that the applicant, for personal reasons, was unable to attend a hearing by the court competent to deal with the case, he had given evidence before another court under letters rogatory. Moreover, he had expressly stated at the beginning of the proceedings that he did not wish to be further involved in the proceedings and that his written submissions should be regarded as his statements.


92.  The applicant further submitted that the monitoring of the correspondence sent to him by the Court on 23 February 1999 was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that under Article 103 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences 1997, which entered into force on 1 September 1998, the prisoner's correspondence should have been delivered to him without delay and was not subject to censorship. Furthermore, contrary to § 37(4) of the Rules of Detention on Remand 1998 the letter of 23 February 1999 was not opened in the applicant's presence.


56.  The applicant complained under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention that the decision on his administrative removal from Russia had violated his right to respect for his private and family life. He argued, in particular, that the severity of the punishment, which had disrupted his family life, had been disproportionate to the gravity of the administrative offence of which he had been found guilty. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


59.  The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest in 1996 and that the length of his detention in police custody in 1996 and 2002 had been excessive. The applicant further complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3, Article 6 § 2 and Article <mask> of the Convention that (i) there had been no reasonable suspicion to justify his being remanded in custody, (ii) the length of his detention had been excessive, and (iii) his right to respect for family life had been breached due to the excessive amount of time he had spent in detention.


22. The Government first contended that, taking into account the young age of the girls when they were placed with the applicants’ family, it was not possible to state unambiguously that the ties between the girls and the applicants were strong enough to be qualified as “family life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Therefore, in the original award of permanent custody of both children to SŠ and VŠ, the State had not interfered with the applicants’ rights.


25.  The Government contended that the applicant had not expressly complained of a violation of his right to respect for his private life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. His complaint had only concerned the alleged unlawfulness of the recordings, the lack of proper authorisation and the procedure followed for the transcription of the conversations recorded. In their view, those arguments pertained to the sphere of Article 6 of the Convention.


102.  The Government argued that the present case did not disclose a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that that the domestic courts had underlined on numerous occasions that the applicant’s disability was not, per se, a motive for the dismissal of his application for an extension of contact. However, taking into account the best interests of the child, it could not go unnoticed that the aforementioned disability had given rise to a communication barrier between the applicant and his son, since the applicant used only sign language and the child communicated orally. Therefore, the form of contact should be adjusted to reflect the situation of the family.


108.  The applicant further alleged that the authorities had failed to take adequate measures to secure her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Firstly, the Government had not sought to justify the interference with her Article 8 rights with any valid reason. Secondly, they had failed to implement effective measures in order to prevent or minimise environmental pollution. In spite of compelling evidence of unacceptable levels of pollution from the Severstal plant, in breach of the domestic limits, the Government had merely asserted that “no question arose of limitation, suspension, or discontinuation of its activity in connection with environmental pollution”.


115.  The applicants contended under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to respect for their family life and home had been violated as they had been forcibly displaced from their village and had been prevented from returning. They maintained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had lost the possibility of using and enjoying their property on account of the restrictions imposed by the authorities on their return to their village. They further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they had no effective remedy for their various Convention grievances.


22.  The applicant submitted that prior to his deportation he enjoyed family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention with his spouse, his three children and with his grandchild. He had co-habited with his spouse since 1980 and they have been married for twenty-two years. Their three children were born in the United Kingdom and have always lived in the family home. Even though the eldest child was an adult when the applicant was deported, he was not an independent person who had started his own family life. Rather, he was a student who still lived in the family home and who depended financially and emotionally on his parents. His daughter lived with him and prior to the applicant's deportation he relied on both of his parents to help him raise her while he pursued his studies. Following his deportation he relied solely on his mother.


53.  The Government further asserted that, if the complaints made under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention were to be considered together under Article 8 of the Convention alone, the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in that they had not sought redress before the ordinary courts by way of an action for protection of personal integrity under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code. In line with the Court’s decision of 31 August 2001 in the case of Babjak and Others v. Slovakia (73693/01), this action was an effective remedy in the Convention sense and the applicants ought to have resorted to it in order to comply with the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.


48.  The applicants did not dispute that the interference in question had had a lawful basis, namely Article 9 of the Civil Code, nor that it pursued a legitimate aim, namely “protection of the rights of others” with regard to the Prince’s right to private life and to his own image. Nonetheless, they expressed a reservation in this respect, and alleged that the domestic courts had interpreted in too broad a manner the concept of private life within the meaning of Article 9 of the Civil Code and Article <mask> of the Convention.


66.  The applicants also complained that the way in which the domestic courts had dealt with the actions of 27 May 1996 and 14 January 1997 for the deprivation of Mr P.’s parental rights over the second applicant and the action of 27 March 1997 relating to the second applicant’s adoption and, in particular, their failure to decide on the merits of these actions amounted to a violation of their right to respect for their family life. They alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


63.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. They further pointed out that the eviction order had not been enforced and that the applicants continued to reside in the flats.


22.  The Government argued that the censorship of the applicant's letters related only to his correspondence with private persons, the censorship being allowed by the valid decisions of a prosecutor in accordance with the applicable domestic law. The decisions had been taken in order to protect the witnesses and victims in a number of sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant, and as such the censorship had been justified by the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention.


60.  The Government submitted that the relationship between the applicant and the child, P., did not constitute a family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted, in particular, that the applicant and the child’s mother had ceased living together when the latter had become pregnant, and that the applicant had never lived with the child and had barely seen her. Moreover, he had demonstrated no interest in the child, either before her birth or afterwards; he had lodged a claim to establish his paternity in respect of the child only a year after the child had been born and had never paid child maintenance or otherwise supported the child, which had prompted the child’s mother to bring a claim for child maintenance and the termination of the applicant’s parental rights. Furthermore, the child had continuously lived in a family unit and was brought up by her mother’s husband, A.K., with whom she had established family ties.


121.  The Government further submitted that the information concerning the case had been made public by the first applicant. She had informed her friend of her predicament by way of a text message sent to her friend during the night of 25 May 2008 and by instant messaging, asking for assistance and also thanking her for informing the school. Later on, the Family Court, when deciding on the first applicant’s deprivation of liberty, had had regard to correspondence from the first applicant’s school referring to this evidence (see paragraph 34 above). In the Government’s submission, this correspondence confirmed that she had taken the initiative and voluntarily provided information about her private life and her intention to have an abortion. Information made available voluntarily by the persons concerned was not subject to protection under Article <mask> of the Convention (see N.F. v. Italy, no. 37119/97, § 39, 2 August 2001).


63.  The applicants complained that the custodial sentence imposed on the first applicant by the judgment of 10 July 2008; the Centre’s failure to determine the first applicant’s rights to have contact with the child for several months during and immediately after her imprisonment; and the Supreme Court’s judgment revoking her custody of the second applicant, violated their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


52.  The Government maintained that the special operation carried out under the Suppression of Terrorism Act was legal and met all the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They stated that in general, according to section 12 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act, a decision to conduct a counter-terrorist operation was delivered by the head of the federal executive body responsible for security. The search of the applicants’ home had been carried out as part of such a counter-terrorist operation, aimed at apprehending Mr Ali Taziyev. Under the Act, persons performing counter-terrorist operations had a right to enter houses and plots of land and were exempt from liability for any damage caused.


31.  The applicant also contested the argument that there was a public interest in the article at issue. Even if there were a public debate about the occurrences at the seminary or about the moral standards proclaimed by the Roman Catholic Church in respect of homosexuality, this did not justify attacking him in a defamatory manner, giving his full name and publishing a picture taken at a private party. He alleged that to permit reporting on his private life and publication of his picture just because he was a priest deprived him of the protection which was afforded to any other person under Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The Government further disputed the second applicant’s victim status under Article <mask> of the Convention claiming that, while the second applicant was the owner of the flat in which the search was performed, it was exclusively the first applicant who used the flat for his professional purposes. There were no personal belongings or any items relating to the business activities of the second applicant which could suggest that her private life was somehow connected with the flat. The Government lastly submitted that in the absence of any arguable complaint under Article 8 of the Convention no issue could arise under Article 13 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.


38.  The Government accepted that the impossibility for the applicant to have her father’s paternity established after the expiry of the five-year time-limit had constituted an interference with her private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish legislation, namely in section 7, subsection 2, of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act.


82.  The applicant further complained that as a result of defects in the court procedure and because of the outcome of the court proceedings, his right to respect for his private and family life had been breached. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention. These complaints were communicated to the respondent Government only under Article <mask> of the Convention.


170.  The applicants also alleged that the failure to carry out effective enforcement proceedings on the part of the Greek authorities had deprived them of their financial entitlement, which had been granted by several court judgments, and this constituted deprivation of property for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that by failing to assist them effectively in the recovery of the maintenance payments the Polish and Greek authorities had deprived them of a source of income which constituted a financial basis for their family life.


91.  The applicant complained that his right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been breached in view of his proposed deportation and the uncertainty of his situation owing to judicial proceedings which started in 2004 and ended only in 2010. Invoking Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant further argued that the delay in resolving his case had been caused by political pressure on the courts.


150.  The applicant further complained of the fact that there had been an interference with his right to respect for his home. In particular, he contended that the search on 26 August 1999 of the apartment in which he was living was performed in contravention of domestic law, because there was a lack of legal justification and it was performed in his absence. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides, as relevant:


29.  The Government submitted that the facts complained of by the applicant did not disclose a violation of the Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had moved into the flat and resided there in the absence of any legal basis. The applicant had not acquired ownership of the flat and, therefore, had not had a right to reside there. The applicant’s eviction had been in compliance with applicable laws and pursued a legitimate aim. The vacated flat was to be re-assigned within the municipal social mortgage programme. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the applicant had moved to another flat where she resided to date.


53.  The Government, referring to Ternovzky (cited above, § 21), also considered that the first and the fourth applicants had not been personally affected by the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, since they had not been pregnant or planning to give birth at home at the time of the introduction of the application before the Court. The first applicant had given birth on 11 July 2012, that is to say, before submitting her application to the Court on 19 October 2012 (see paragraphs 1 and 7 in fine above). The fourth applicant’s claim that she had not dared to become pregnant for the fourth time, even though she had been of “reproductive age” (see paragraph 25), was surrounded by uncertainty and therefore rendered her application an actio popularis.


24.  The applicant complained about Article 209 of the Criminal Code and about the conduct of criminal proceedings against him under this provision. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, he alleged that his right to respect for his private life had been violated and that the contested provision was discriminatory, as heterosexual or lesbian relations between adults and adolescents in the same age bracket were not punishable.


56.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s claims regarding his own rights were fully heard by the German courts. The mere fact that these courts rendered decisions of inadmissibility did not mean that they did not deal with the substance of the applicant’s claim. The Cologne Administrative Court examined the alleged violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and quoted the relevant case law of the Court. It followed that the applicant’s procedural rights had been sufficiently safeguarded in the domestic proceedings.


55.  The applicant submitted that the interference with her right to freedom of expression had not been justified in law because no law required children to accept rights and obligations related to their parents’ freedom of expression. She also submitted that the interference had not sought a legitimate aim because V.L.-Ž. had been “a minister of the Nazi Government of Lithuania” and had therefore not been entitled to protection of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant asked the Court to apply Article 17 of the Convention.


58.  The applicant complained that by allowing the second reclamation scheme to proceed, the authorities had failed to comply with a number of legal requirements and to strike a fair balance between the various interests at stake, consequently putting his and his family's health at risk and preventing him from enjoying his home. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


22.  The applicant first of all noted that, whereas the original purpose of the FNAEG had been to store DNA profiles of sex offenders, it now covered a wide range of offences, whatever their degree of seriousness and the extent of the public disorder which they entailed. The impugned information storage could not be considered legitimate in the case of all the offences listed in Article 706-55 CPP, ranging from crimes against humanity to acts committed in the framework of trade union violence. The generalised, undifferentiated nature of the data recording method rendered it contrary to the principles of Article <mask> of the Convention, as it was neither justified by the aim pursued nor necessary, given the absence of discretionary powers and of any possibility of adjustment depending on the actual offence committed.


49.  The Government refrained from expressing their opinion on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 8. They argued, however, that only two out of five letters had apparently been opened as only two letters had been stamped. As regards the remaining three, the Government submitted that the stamp “censored” cannot prove that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


20.  The applicant complained that he had lost all contact with his daughter because of the two court decisions delivered in his absence by default and because of the subsequent refusal of the domestic courts to set them aside. He relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


17.  The applicant complained that the denial of his access rights in respect of his son had been based on his adherence to the religious denomination Hit Gyülekezete, amounting to a differential treatment in respect of the enjoyment of his right to respect for family life. He claimed in this respect a violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, both taken alone and read in conjunction with Article 14.


48.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the eviction order of 14 April 2010 had infringed their right to respect for their private and family life. On 15 August 2017 the applicants asked the Court to take into account that there had also been an interference with the right to respect for private and family life of children born after the application had been lodged with the Court in 2011 (see paragraph 30 above).


48.  The applicants disagreed with the Government’s submissions. They observed that, in Schalk and Kopf (cited above, § 94), the Court had clearly departed from the Commission’s earlier case-law in stating that the relationship of a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership fell within the notion of “family life”. In their submission, the refusal to issue the second applicant with a residence permit had deprived them of any possibility of living in Italy as a couple and had resulted in a legal obligation for the second applicant to leave the country. In their view, it followed that the facts of the present case fell within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, thus Article 14 was also applicable.


17.  The applicant complained of the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Criminal Code, which criminalised homosexual acts of adult men with consenting adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18, and of his conviction under that provision. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, he alleged that his right to respect for his private life had been violated and that the contested provision was discriminatory, as heterosexual or lesbian relations between adults and adolescents in the same age bracket were not punishable.


80.  The Government invited the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention. The Government relied in this connection on two facts. First, they referred to the request from Mr Braginskis for the reopening of incapacitation proceedings (see paragraph 55 above). Second, they informed the Court about the legislative amendments that had taken effect on 13 February 2012, under which the applicant himself could seek restoration of his legal capacity before the domestic courts (see paragraph 69 above). The Government considered that this remedy was capable of resolving all matters raised in the applicant’s complaints, since these complaints alleged that the violations of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 and Article <mask> of the Convention had resulted from his inability to decide for himself whether to stay in the Īle Centre and his inability to represent his interests and defend his rights.


40.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been called as a witness in the pre-trial investigation because he was the director of company A., a company which had received a payment from company M. that had been deemed suspicious by the latter company’s director. He could therefore have provided testimony about the relationship between those two companies and the circumstances related to that payment, and not necessarily any facts which were directly related to his wife. The Government thus argued that the applicant’s family life had not been affected and Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable.


104.  The Government replied that the first complaint, concerning access rights, was not part of the subject-matter of the present proceedings before the Court. Given the sums awarded by the Court in this type of case, the Government indicated that they would be prepared, if the Court found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, to grant the applicant, in addition to the redress for non-pecuniary damage provided by the publication of the Court's judgment, the sum of EUR 7,000 under this head.


120.  The Government denied that there had been any violation of this provision, on the same grounds as those advanced in connection with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Referring to the Court's judgment in the case of Chapman v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 27238/95, § 99, ECHR 2001‑I), they also added that Article <mask> of the Convention did not guarantee the right to be provided with a home.


147.  The Government advanced another argument to justify the difference in treatment complained of. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, they asserted that the margin of appreciation was a wide one in the sphere of adoption law, which had to strike a careful balance between the interests of all the persons involved. In the present context it was even wider, as there was no European consensus on the issue of second-parent adoption by same-sex couples.


32.  The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired.


36.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts’ decision to refuse him contact with the child violated his right to respect for his private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. He further submitted that the domestic courts’ failure to investigate sufficiently the relevant facts concerning his relationship with his daughter, in particular his paternity, violated Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention.


116.  The applicant claimed that his full incapacitation had been an inadequate response to the problems he had experienced. Indeed, under Article <mask> of the Convention the authorities had to strike a fair balance between the interests of a person of unsound mind and the other legitimate interests concerned. However, as a rule, in such a complex matter as determining somebody’s mental capacity, the authorities should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (also see paragraph 125 below). This is mostly explained by the fact that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with the people concerned and are therefore particularly well placed to determine such issues. The task of the Court is rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by the national authorities in the exercise of their powers in this respect (see Shtukaturov, cited above, § 87).


84.  The applicants argued that since the domestic law did not define any clear criteria and procedure for allocating a convicted person to a penal facility by the federal penal authority, which was left completely to the discretion of the latter, no court action under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure had offered them any prospects of success. Therefore, they had not had any domestic remedies to exhaust. The applicants considered that their allocation to penal facilities far from home constituted a continuing situation, because they continued to suffer the negative consequences of the interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, and that the six-month time-limit for lodging their complaint with the Court had been complied with. The applicants submitted on the merits of the case that their placement in penal facilities far from their home region had amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their family life. The interference had not been in accordance with the law, since the law did not satisfy the “quality of law” requirement, and had not pursued a legitimate aim. Even if there had been no appropriate penal facilities in the Chechen Republic there should have been such facilities in the adjacent regions. The applicants pointed to the existence of at least one facility in the Chechen Republic, IK-2, which, although a normal-security prison, had a high-security wing. Furthermore, it was unclear how their allocation to remote penal facilities could have served to protect public safety in the Chechen Republic. Even assuming that the interference had pursued a legitimate aim, it had been disproportionate as it had unnecessarily limited their opportunity to preserve family and social ties after their conviction.


69.  The Government repeated the same arguments as those advanced with regard to Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraphs 37-41 above). In addition, the Government relied on the Commission's decision in the case of X. v. Sweden (cited above) and the Court's judgment in the case of Stubbings (cited above). They contended that the three-year limitation period commencing from the date of entry into force of the Law, rather than the date of acquiring knowledge of the father's identity after attaining majority, did not restrict or reduce the applicant's access to court in such a way or to such an extent as to impair the essence of her right.


56.  The applicant submitted that the authorities’ positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention were activated immediately when the situation of a child at risk was brought to their attention. In her case, this had applied from the moment the police had entered her home to arrest her parents. The police had questioned the applicant and had seen her identity document, from which it had been clear that she was a minor. When her parents had been arrested, there had been no one else in the apartment who could have been asked to inform the competent authorities to arrange for the applicant’s care.


72.  The Government submitted that the domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation in determining what was in the best interests of the child as they had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned. The refusal to order X’s return from her grandparents had been within the authorities’ wide margin of appreciation and based on the best interests of the child, as established by the childcare authority. The domestic authorities had taken into account X’s wishes to live with her grandparents, her strong attachment to them and her feeling that their home was her own. The present case was therefore similar to the case of Hokkanen v. Finland (23 September 1994, Series A no. 299‑A), where the Court had found that the domestic authorities’ decision to transfer custody over the applicant’s daughter to the girl’s grandparents had not breached Article <mask> of the Convention. The present case was also similar to the case of Yousef v. the Netherlands (no. 33711/96, ECHR 2002‑VIII), where the Court had accepted the domestic authorities’ decision that the child’s interest were best served by allowing her to remain with her grandmother, with whom she had been placed after her mother’s death, in accordance with the latter’s express wishes, and where she received the care needed, rather than by giving custody to her father.


402.  The applicants submitted that the deliberate destruction of their homes, property and possessions and the resulting arbitrary expulsion from their homes and village represented a serious violation of their right to respect for private and family life and of their right to respect for their home, as well as a serious interference with their way of life. They further claimed that the destruction of their homes and family life was part of a practice and that, therefore, they had suffered an aggravated violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The Government maintained that the right to a public hearing was not absolute and that an exclusion of the general public was admissible, inter alia, for the protection of the private lives of the parties or when required on grounds of private and family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that succession proceedings were not open to the general public in order to protect the private sphere of the parties. The legislator, thus, took into account that family relations and the pecuniary situation of the parties belonged to a person's private sphere which deserved protection from the disclosure of details. They concluded that the parties' right to protection of their private lives guaranteed by Article 8, and also by Article 6 § 1, justified an exclusion of the public for such proceedings were not of public interest. Moreover, the Government submitted that in the present case there had been a number of hearings at which the parties could duly put forward their arguments and that the applicant's submissions that there had been no fair hearing were unfounded. Finally they argued, referring to this Court's decision in the case of Varela Assalino v. Portugal (no. 643369/01, 25 April 2002), that the primarily “technical nature” of the issues to be determined in the present proceedings, namely the question of whether or not the farm qualified as hereditary, had justified the absence of a hearing altogether and that this, therefore, was true all the more for the lack of publicity at the hearings.


20.  The applicants disagreed. In response to the Government’s arguments concerning their complaints’ admissibility (see paragraph 17 above), they pointed out that while in the domestic judicial proceedings the first applicant had not expressly referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, he had nevertheless clearly relied on the fact that his family was in Bulgaria. As to the Government’s argument that he could have brought a tort action, this possibly referred to the proceedings relating to his detention prior to expulsion, which was not at issue in the current proceedings.


72.  The applicants also contested the respondent Government's allegation that the Latvian authorities had annulled their legal status in Latvia on the further ground that when applying for permanent residence the first applicant had submitted false information as to Nikolay Slivenko's occupation. The applicants stated that the first applicant had never lied to the authorities about her husband's status, and that the document submitted in this connection by the respondent Government was falsified (see paragraphs 19-20 above). In this respect the applicants also pointed out that during the subsequent proceedings concerning the legality of their stay in Latvia the immigration authorities had not referred to any false information submitted by them, and the Latvian courts had not established that the applicants had at any point submitted the information mentioned by the respondent Government. The applicants concluded in this respect that they ought to have been allowed to stay in Latvia, that the deportation order of 20 August 1996 had constituted an interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and that that interference had not been authorised by law within the meaning of the second paragraph of that Article.


24.  The Government raised the objection that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the facts of the case because there had been no “family life” within the meaning of that provision between the applicants and Carolina Pujol Oller. In that connection, the Government referred to the lack of a genuine relationship between the grandmother, Carolina Pujol Oller, who had died in 1949, and the first applicant, who was adopted in 1969. In the Government’s submission, the Court had always adopted a pragmatic approach to the concept of “family life” in order to protect de facto rather than de iure family life. In that sense, the existence of a formal family tie was insufficient to attract the protection of Article 8.


75.  The applicant argued that he had exhausted the remedies available to him. He had lodged numerous complaints with the prosecutor’s office and the Regional Court. He had also brought his grievances to the attention of the appeal court. The applicant submitted that, because of the authorities’ failure to ensure his access to the court’s decision authorising interception of his telephone communications, he had been unable to verify whether such interference with his rights had been in accordance with domestic law which required that the authorities’ decision to intercept the telephone communications was based on a reasonable suspicion that he had been involved in crimes. He also argued that the certificate contained in the criminal case file and relied on by the Government had not been sufficient proof that the interception of his communications had been in compliance with the standards set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, the applicant submitted that owing to the authorities’ failure to ensure he had access to the decision of 6 December 2004 he had been unable to challenge the admissibility of the evidence obtained through his intercepted telephone conversations.


102.  The applicant submitted that the combined effect of Part II of RIPA, the Revised Code and the PSNI Service Procedure did not provide, in relation to covert surveillance of lawyer/client consultations, the “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse” required by Article <mask> of the Convention, especially when compared with the clear and precise statutory guidelines outlined in Part I of RIPA in respect of the interception of communications (see Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, 18 May 2010).


39.  The applicant complained of a breach of his right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention because of the dismissal of his Hague Convention request. In particular, the applicant alleged that the domestic courts had misapplied the Hague Convention and had allowed the child to become alienated from him by failing to decide the case speedily. The Polish courts had also erred in entertaining E.N.’s divorce petition and issuing interim orders on the issues of the child’s residence and child support.


76.  The Government accepted that, taken as a whole, the applicant’s examination pursuant to Schedule 7 of TACT gave rise to an interference with the right guaranteed to her under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, in addition to being stopped and questioned, the applicant and her luggage were searched. In Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, § 63, ECHR 2010 (extracts) the Court held that the use of “coercive powers” to require an individual to submit to a “detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings” amounted to a clear interference with the right to respect for private life. While the Court expressly recognised the potential distinction between the “stop and search powers” under section 44 of TACT and “the search to which passengers uncomplainingly submit at airports or at the entrance of a public building” (see Gillan and Quinton, cited above, § 64), Schedule 7 powers were clearly wider that the immigration powers to which travellers might reasonably expect to be subjected. In view both of this fact, and of the Government’s concession, the Court would accept that there was an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.


7.  The applicants called into question the Rules as such, arguing that the supervision of their telephone conversations in Kurdish was in itself incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. The majority likewise appear to consider that no formality should be imposed on prisoners in this connection. We cannot agree with that approach, especially in view of the offences for which the applicants had been convicted (see in that connection the Government’s observations in paragraph 43 of the judgment). In the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that when the competing interests at stake, namely the right of prisoners to respect for their correspondence and the need for the authorities to maintain security in prisons and prevent crime, are weighed up, there is no appearance of any unreasonable imbalance in the impugned Rules.


92.  The applicants maintained that there had been a violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. In their view, they had been attacked by the authorities from the outset and all of the proceedings had been unfair and based on insufficient and flawed investigations. As a consequence, the domestic decisions and judgments had lacked a solid foundation.


59.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that such interference had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim.


351.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention does not guarantee a right to serve a prison sentence in the facility close to one’s place if residence. In the alternative, it was submitted that there was no interference in the circumstances of the present case since the applicant received numerous visitors all through his detention, in particular in Radom Remand Centre and Włocławek Prison, which were situated respectively 100 and 160 km from his hometown. Lastly, the Government submitted that, should the Court consider that an interference had indeed taken place in the applicant’s case, it was in any event justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


43.  The Government further maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention did not impose on a State a general obligation to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion in its territory. The Government stated that it had been the applicants who had left their children behind in their home country. Furthermore, the grounds on which the first applicant had applied for asylum in 1997 had disappeared, as was illustrated by his frequent journeys to Kosovo even before 2007. Under those circumstances it could not be concluded that the issuing of residence permits for the three children in Switzerland was the only way to reunite the applicants’ family.


34.  The applicant, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, complained that the enforcement courts had failed to secure respect for his family life. In addition, in his observations of 3 November 2016 in reply to those of the Government on the admissibility and merits of that complaint, he submitted that he also wished to rely on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


24.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the prison authorities had not allowed him to have long visits from his wife. Even assuming that the applicant had such a right under Article 8 of the Convention, it is noted that he did not use any of the remedies available to him under domestic law to challenge the refusal of the prison authorities to allow him long visits from his wife. In view of the above, this complaint must be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.


81.  The applicants complained that their allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, they complained about restrictions on visits and telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicants submitted that they had had the right to use a telephone only twice a week and that they had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate their telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired.


183.  The applicant further argued that her ability to build and sustain relationships had also been limited due to restrictions placed on her capacity to receive visitors and telephone calls. The applicant has had very little contact with members of the community outside the facility. Outsiders’ visits are generally limited and most visitors may not be received in private. The director of the Kėdainiai Home had in the past restricted visits from outsiders after the applicant’s institutionalisation, upon a request from her guardian. The list of visitors maintained by the Kėdainiai Home showed that between 2 August 2004 and 25 December 2006 only the applicant’s adoptive father had visited her, with few exceptions. Before the applicant got her own mobile phone, she had had to use the facilities provided by the institution. At that time, she had only been able to receive calls through the Kėdainiai Home’s switchboard. She relied upon the right to respect for private and family life under the above-cited Article <mask> of the Convention.


51.  The Government acknowledged that the censorship of the Court's letter to the applicant constituted a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They stressed, however, that the measures taken by the authorities had remedied the situation. In particular, the responsible persons had been identified and the need for them to be made aware and to avoid similar incidents in future had been acknowledged. The acknowledgment of that “insignificant” breach of the applicant's rights had constituted, in their view, an adequate redress and thus, he was no longer a victim of the alleged violation. On the merits, they argued, with reference to a certificate issued by colony LIU-2, that throughout his detention before and after conviction the applicant had sent 296 letters and complaints to various public authorities and had received 204 replies, including his correspondence with the Court. In the Government's view, that fact refuted his allegation that LIU-2 had interfered with his correspondence with the Court. Relying on the results of the domestic inquiries, they submitted that Z. had automatically unsealed the Court's letter. Having seen that the letter and the enclosed documents were in the English language, she had immediately passed the envelope and all enclosed documents on to Kh., head of the applicant's brigade. She had never withheld any documents. The Government stressed that Z. had had no command of English and could not have grasped the contents of the documents. Had she seen the European Court's logo, she would not have unsealed it. Kh. and V. also submitted that they had immediately passed the envelope on and had never removed any documents from it.


18.  The applicant complained of the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Criminal Code, which criminalised homosexual acts of adult men with consenting adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18, and of his convictions under that provision. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, he alleged that his right to respect for his private life had been violated and that the contested provision was discriminatory, as heterosexual or lesbian relations between adults and adolescents in the same age bracket were not punishable.


41.  The Government lastly argued that the alleged interference had met the requirement of being necessary in a democratic society. They took the view that to find such documents inadmissible would prevent courts from ruling on situations that might present a risk for the health, morals or stability of other family members, especially where there were alcohol-related problems. They added that the fact of excluding documents obtained by duress or fraud fulfilled the State’s positive obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government further indicated that the Court of Appeal had maintained the applicant’s right of contact in respect of his children pending the results of the expert’s report, and inferred from this that any interference would thus, in any event, have been proportionate. Lastly, they observed that such interference, when compared with that in Z v. Finland (cited above) and M.S. v. Sweden, (27 August 1997, Reports 1997‑IV), appeared far less significant and was circumscribed by the requisite safeguards.


26.  The Government excluded the latter possibility, contending that the guarantee of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 presupposed the existence of a family (see Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31). Although the case-law did not require cohabitation between the various members of the “family”, there had to be at the very least close personal ties. The existence of ties demonstrating an emotional relationship between two beings and a desire to pursue that relationship was essential so far as the Convention institutions were concerned. The Convention institutions had even held that in the absence of close personal ties between those concerned a mere biological link was insufficient to constitute family life within the meaning of Article 8. Thus, the Commission had expressed the opinion that the situation in which a person donated sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through artificial insemination did not of itself give the donor a right to respect for family life with the child (see M. v. the Netherlands, no. 16944/90, Commission decision of 8 February 1993, Decision and Reports 74, p. 120). In the instant case, the Government maintained that no family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention existed between the applicant and her natural mother, as the applicant had never met her mother, while the latter had at no point expressed any interest in the applicant or regarded her as her child. The applicant's natural mother had expressly manifested an intention to abandon the applicant and had agreed to her adoption by others. Only the applicant's family life with her adoptive parents could come within the scope of Article 8.


59.  The applicant complained that her placement in a correctional boarding school had not been in accordance with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and that she had been unable to have that measure reviewed by a court at regular intervals, as provided for by Article 5 § 4. She added that the automatic monitoring of her correspondence and telephone calls at the correctional boarding school in which she had been placed was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


48.  The applicant also submitted that the presence of the prison officers during his visits had violated his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The prison officers had overheard his conversations with doctors and, during his own examinations, there had been no screen between him and the members of the escort team. The applicant claimed the medical examination room had only measured about 10 square metres.


164.  The Government considered that the applicant had not made out an arguable claim under Article <mask> of the Convention and submitted that he had not adduced any proof in support of his allegations about the interception of telephone conversations. They were of the view that the application did not contain sufficient elements as required by Rule 47 of the Rules of Court enabling it to be established whether the admissibility criteria set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, namely exhaustion of the domestic remedies and compliance with the six-month deadline, had been met. In this connection, they cited the case of Sysojeva and Others v. Latvia ([GC], no. 60654/00, § 125, ECHR 2007‑II).


105.  The applicant referred to Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, complaining in substance about the excessive restriction and, subsequently, suspension of his contact rights, the non-enforcement of the contact schedule and the delays in the divorce, child custody and maintenance proceedings and the administrative and non-contentious child contact proceedings. The Court, being the “master of the characterisation” to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005), considers that these complaints are closely linked and fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention.


40.  The applicant complained about the courts’ judgments in the proceedings under the Media Act refusing him compensation in respect of the publication of the article and photograph appearing in the issue of Profil of 12 July 2004. He alleged a violation of his right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


21.  The applicant complained of a breach of her right to protection of her reputation and dignity as a result of what she submitted had been insulting and defamatory articles published in the Romania Liberă newspaper on 13 and 22 February 2002. She also complained about the dismissal by the court of last resort of her criminal complaint and civil claim in this respect. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


56.  The applicant complained on his own and his children’s behalf that they had been unable to enjoy family life together due to the length of the custody and contact arrangements proceedings and due to the judge’s refusal to enforce provisional contact arrangements. He invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it, the Court considers that these issues fall to be examined solely under Article <mask> of the Convention (see V.A.M. v. Serbia, no. 39177/05, § 115, 13 March 2007, and Karadžić v. Croatia, no. 35030/04, §§ 33-63 and 67 , 15 December 2005).


63.  The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention in the reasons for his complaint to the Constitutional Court, but he did not include this particular complaint in the text of the finding which he requested the Constitutional Court to make. The relevant domestic law prevented the Constitutional Court from expressing its view on that issue (see paragraphs 39 and 46-48 above). In respect of his complaint under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant did not, therefore, use the constitutional remedy in accordance with the formal requirements, as interpreted and applied by the Constitutional Court.


19.  The Government further submitted that the applicant’s case should be struck out of the Court’s list pursuant to Article 37 § 1(a) of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant had indicated in his observations of 19 March 2007 that he did not wish to pursue the application in so far as it related to the issue of the alleged interference with Article <mask> of the Convention.


49.  The Government accepted that the applicant’s entitlement to a State retirement pension, which was a contributory benefit, was a “property” right for the purposes of this provision. However, for the reasons given under Article <mask> of the Convention, the refusal to recognise the applicant’s acquired gender for the purposes of the State pensionable age on 31 October 1997 was within their margin of appreciation and not in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Her complaints were in any event more appropriately examined under Article 8 and no separate issue, in their view, arose.


33.  The applicants lastly argued that the compensation awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice in respect of the broadcasting of the video of the sauna scene and the defamation had not been adequate and proportionate to the severity of the breaches of their right to respect for their private lives. In support of this contention the applicants cited cases in which the Court had found breaches of Article <mask> of the Convention and in which the awards had been considerably higher than those made by the Supreme Court of Justice in their case. In their view, as a result of the insufficient amount of compensation awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice they still had victim status under Article 8 of the Convention.


361.  The Government argued that the relations between the US applicants and the children they sought to adopt constituted neither “family life” nor “private life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention for the following reasons: (i) not only was the adoption procedure not at an “advanced stage”, but in cases nos. 23890/13 and 37173/13 it had not even been started in accordance with the Russian domestic procedure; (ii) the children were not financially dependent on the US applicants and were fully provided for by the Russian Federation; and (iii) taking into account the children’s age and the psycho-neurological disorders that most of them suffer from, and in view of the fact that meetings with the US applicants took place on a few days only and always in the presence of orphanage staff, it was not possible to ascertain the existence of stable psycho‑emotional “family links” between the children and the US applicants. The Government relied in this regard on the expert opinions of A.M., Director of the Charity Fund for Prevention of Social Orphanhood (Благотворительный фонд профилактики социального сиротства), and Dr G.S., the Head of the Laboratory for the Management of Social Systems for the Protection of Childhood at the Metropolitan Academy of Finance and Humanitarian Sciences (Столичная финансово‑гуманитарная академия).


25.  The Government submitted that even if the expulsion order interferes with the applicant's family life, it discloses no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Given the seriousness of the offence which the applicant committed in Denmark the measure of expulsion was called for in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. The Government drew attention to the fact that the applicant has very strong ties with his country of origin since he was already an adult when he left Iran and had his entire school education in Iran. He masters the local language, he served part of his compulsory military service and he has family there. In comparison, the applicant does not have strong ties with Denmark. At the time the expulsion order was made he had resided for only eight years in Denmark. Moreover, in the Government's view, there is no evidence to prove that the applicant's spouse, the children of the marriage, and the spouse's child of another relationship will not be able to accompany the applicant to Iran.


27.  The Government maintained that child benefits did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the State’s general obligation to promote family life did not give rise to concrete rights to specific payments. The statutory provision of Section 1 § 3 of the Child Benefits Act and its application in the present case did not discriminate against the applicant in the exercise of his right to respect for his family life.


62.  The Government submitted that, having regard to the broad discretion boundaries of the State in resolving family disputes and the right of a court acting in the best interests of the child to dismiss a parent’s claim for determining the order of his or her involvement in the child’s upbringing, the judgment of the District Court of 14 May 2013 had been lawful and justified. There had therefore been no violation of the applicant’s right to respect for his family life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant’s procedural rights in the proceedings at issue had also been respected. The examination of the case in the absence of the parties had been possible as their failure to appear had not been due to valid reasons. In particular, the applicant had not presented any evidence to prove that he had been out of town on a business trip. Besides, the domestic courts had repeatedly examined disputes between the same parties, studied documents and expert opinions on the mental state of the applicant and his son and had heard the parties. The District Court had therefore had all the necessary material for reaching a fair and reasonable judgment. In additional observations the Government pointed out that during the proceedings which had taken place in 2015 the domestic court, having questioned the applicant’s son and examined all other pertinent circumstances, had dismissed V.’s application for restricting the applicant’s parental responsibility and banning him having communication with the child. They further noted that during the monitoring visit carried out by the childcare authority at the child’s place of residence on 30 September 2015 it had been established that V. had not been preventing N.’s communication with the applicant. N. submitted, in particular, that he had been seeing his father during breaks between classes at school and communicating with him by telephone and Skype.


50.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in a case, where, as here, the relevant family link had been established at a time when the applicants could not have had any reasonable or legitimate expectations as to the prospects of establishing and continuing a family life in Norway, and where they had failed to show that there existed insurmountable obstacles for establishing a family life in the first applicant's home country. The period of married life that existed while the Immigration Authorities considered the first applicant's application for family reunification with the second applicant, could not have given the applicants any reasonable or legitimate expectations as to the prospects of establishing and continuing a family life in Norway. It was undisputed that the first applicant, at the time of his application for family reunification with the second applicant, had been residing and working unlawfully in Norway for several months, thus disregarding the order to leave the country notified to him on 11 September 2002. The first and second applicants had both been aware of this.


23.  The applicants submitted that their complaint raised serious issues of law and fact and should be considered admissible. They further argued that the search conducted in the offices had fallen short of the standards set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. The judicial decision authorising the search had not specified in detail the scope of the search or the measures aimed at excluding information concerning other clients of the firm from that scope. In their view, the real purpose of the search had been to collect information on local politicians and businessmen who were amongst the firm’s clients. Lastly, they denied the Government’s allegation that they had asked the investigator to transfer the information stored in the computers onto a hard drive.


32.  The applicants complained that the German authorities had violated their right to respect for family life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention by withdrawing parts of parental authority (Entzug von Teilen des elterlichen Sorgerechts) – including the right to determine the children’s place of residence (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht) –, by transferring these parts to the youth office and by executing the withdrawal in the form of forcibly removing the children from the applicants and placing them in a children’s home for three weeks. Article 8 reads as follows:


63.  The applicants complained that their convictions under Article 209 of the Criminal Code remained on their criminal record even though the European Court of Human Rights had found that provision to be discriminatory and the Austrian Constitutional Court had it annulled. This amounted to discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation, in breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:


84.  The Government contested the applicants’ arguments and argued that the restrictions provided for in the domestic regulations were necessary to maintain order and were completely reasonable. They submitted that both applicants had been allowed to receive visits once a week for one hour. Mr Mandić had received only one visit and one package. Mr Jović had received fifteen visits and eight packages. With regard to the use of the telephone, the Government stated that there had been two telephones on each floor and that the applicants could have used them for at least ten minutes twice a week. According to the Government, the applicants’ allegations that the situation as regards visits, use of the telephone and correspondence had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention were unsubstantiated.


81.  The Government argued that the “presumed consent system” permitted interference with an individual’s right to private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the organ removal had been carried out in accordance with domestic law. The Law had implied the “presumed consent system” that had served the aim of protecting the heath and the rights of others. The Government pointed out that that the “presumed consent system” was not innovative and that Latvia was not even the only country employing this system; it was also instituted in eleven other States.


92.  The applicant urged the Grand Chamber to find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and to take the opportunity to confirm that monitoring of employees’ correspondence could only be carried out in compliance with the applicable legislation, in a transparent manner and on grounds provided for by law, and that employers did not have discretion to monitor their employees’ correspondence.


116.  The applicants complained that the search which was conducted in their house on 22 November 1993 constituted a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further alleged a breach of Article 9 of the Convention referring to their inability to open the grave of Mehmet Şah İkincisoy. Finally, they invoked Article 14 of the Convention alleging that they had been subjected to discrimination because of their Kurdish origin.


69.  The applicant stressed that throughout the criminal proceedings at the domestic level he had argued before all levels of domestic jurisdiction that his secret surveillance had been unlawful. That had been the only way of allowing him to raise the complaint before the Constitutional Court. Thus, by complaining in substance of a violation of his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention before the Constitutional Court, and by waiting for a decision of that court, he had properly exhausted the domestic remedies and brought his complaint before the Court within the six-month time-limit.


48.  The applicants complained, under Article 5 § 2, that Mr Ichin and Mr Dmitriyev had not been given reasons for their detention because there was no criminal case against them at that time. With reference to Articles 5 § 4 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7, the applicants complained that the decision of 14 January 2004 was not subject to appeal. They also considered that the placement of Mr Ichin and Mr Dmitriyev in the juvenile holding facility had unlawfully interfered with their family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They complained, finally, under Article 3 of the Convention of the degrading treatment of Mr Ichin and Mr Dmitriyev by the personnel of the juvenile holding facility. In reply to the Government's observations, the applicants raised new complaints under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of Ms Ichina and Ms Dmitriyeva and under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in respect of Mr Ichin and Mr Dmitriyev.


61.  The applicant further complained that the medical condition from which he was now suffering as a result of his military service, with the consequence that he was now totally dependent on his family, psychoactive drugs, and treatment in mental health centers, not therefore being able to have a life and family of his own, breached his right under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


50.  The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of alleged non-pecuniary damage. He presented a medical certificate dated 7 December 2005 indicating that his medical disorders “[had] been accentuated by his difficult family situation over the past few years”. As regards pecuniary damage, he explained that he was not in a position to evaluate or substantiate the losses he had actually sustained as a direct result of the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention or to produce any supporting documents in this connection.


29.  The applicant complained about the continuing lack of access to his son and about the insufficient measures taken by the public authorities to enforce his access rights, in violation of his right under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court observes that some of the complaints raised by the applicant which referred to Article 6 § 1 (see paragraphs 31 to 35 below) also concerned in substance the issues raised under Article 8 of the Convention. It deems it appropriate to examine these arguments in the context of the latter provision (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, §§ 56 and 57, ECHR 2002-I; and V.A.M. v. Serbia, no. 39177/05, § 115, 13 March 2007). Article 8 of the Convention, in its relevant part, provides:


38.  The Government were of the view that there had been no breach of the State’s obligations under Article 8. The authorities had not interfered with the applicant’s desire to marry, with his married life for seven years or, last but not least, with his decision to move out of the matrimonial home and start an affair with another woman. The sole fact that formalised judicial divorce proceedings existed under national law and that certain conditions had to be met for a divorce to be granted did not per se contradict Article <mask> of the Convention. Such a view would run counter to the very foundations of the European concept of family law, since such matters were regulated in every legal system of the Contracting Parties to the Convention.


74.  The Government pointed out that the courts could not award damages based on Article <mask> of the Convention as a sole legal ground. The reason for this was that, although the Convention had been incorporated into Swedish law, and the Swedish Supreme Court had established the principle whereby an individual could be awarded damages from the State for violations of the Convention without the support of specific provisions in Swedish law, according to the Supreme Court’s case NJA 2007 (p. 747) this principle could not be applied to claims between individuals, as it would be difficult for an individual to foresee from the case-law of the Court when he or she could be liable to pay damages.


157.  The applicant considered that the State had failed to provide him with access to information in violation of his rights under Article 8. The Court observes that, in addition to the primarily negative undertakings in Article <mask> of the Convention, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life. In determining whether or not such a positive obligation exists, it will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck


30.  The Government further submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. Relying on Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom (25 March 1993, § 36, Series A no. 247‑C), they contended that not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the physical or moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to an interference with private life. The Government noted that the Court, in Tig v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 8165/03, 24 May 2005), refrained from establishing whether a prohibition on having a beard would in itself constitute an interference with the right to respect for someone’s private life. That same question was examined by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania in the applicant’s case (see paragraph 12 above), and that court held that the mere wish to grow a beard could not be considered an element of human dignity that is protected by law. The Government submitted that the applicant’s desire to grow a beard had not been motivated by reasons of religious expression, nor had he had a long and established history of wearing a beard. The Government also submitted that in the domestic proceedings the applicant had not argued that the prohibition on growing a beard had interfered with his private life, but had only focused on health-related reasons. Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicant’s physical and moral integrity had not suffered to such a degree as to fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.


68.  The applicant further complained that his correspondence with his lawyer, the domestic courts and other authorities had been opened by the prison authorities. He also complained about the lack of confidentiality during his meeting with his lawyer on 30 July 2007, when he had to have a discussion with his lawyer in a visitors’ room where other detainees and their visitors were also present and could overhear their conversation. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


99.  The applicant argued that the decision to deport him from Lithuania, linked to the coercive deprivation of Lithuanian citizenship, was in breach of his right to respect for his family life, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that he had lived in Lithuania since 1962, where he had completed his secondary education, married and had children. He also observed that since 1991 he had run a business in Lithuania and paid taxes.


84.  The Government accepted that in the light of the judgment in Khan, the Court would be likely to find that no effective remedy was available to the applicants in respect of any breach of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the Court had already ruled that the operation of section 78 of PACE and the availability of the procedures before the Police Complaints Authority did not provide an adequate remedy in similar circumstances.


44.  The Government admitted that the search of the applicant’s flat had constituted an interference with her right to respect for her home as set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted, however, that the interference had been in accordance with domestic procedure and had had a legal basis, it had pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime, and had been necessary in the circumstances of the case. Referring to the information officially recorded in the report of 31 October 2005 which documented telephone conversations between B. and the applicant, the Government argued that the search had been a necessary measure, as the police had had information that certain documents important to the criminal proceedings against B. had been kept in the applicant’s flat. Furthermore, relying on the statements of the police officers, the Government submitted that the applicant had been informed of the search and she had therefore been given an opportunity to be present during the procedure.


41.  The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of this complaint. Alternatively, they did not dispute the fact that the applicants’ mobile telephones had been confiscated during their detention. However, they disputed the allegations concerning the searching of the applicants’ telephones’ memories and the deletion of files from them. According to the Government, there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and the complaint was, therefore, manifestly ill-founded.


128.  The applicants' complaint concerning their inability to enjoy family life with Ramzan Babushev concerns the same facts as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 16 December 1997, § 50 Reports 1997‑VIII).


66.  The applicant provided the Court with photographs made in 1996‑2005 showing him with his family and various residents of the Penza Region so as to demonstrate his family ties and involvement in social life in Russia. He also enclosed copies of several letters sent by a number of enterprises and local authorities of the Penza Region to the Federal Migration Service asking to authorise his entry into Russia. The applicant maintained that he was a good citizen, who had two university degrees, respected public order, had made all the efforts to duly regularise his stay in Russia and had only failed because of difficulties with obtaining certain documents from Georgia, which had been complicated by the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia in 2008. The applicant further submitted that, having lived in Russia for fifteen years and thus being a long-term immigrant, he had lost any ties with Georgia and after his deportation had to live in Belarus. In 2012 he obtained citizenship of Armenia, which constituted further evidence of the absence of any ties with Georgia. In sum, the applicant contended that the decisions of the Russian courts were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The Government observed that in his application of 11 January 2008, the applicant referred to circumstances and developments that had arisen only after the Administrative Court’s decision of 21 March 2007. It was this decision which had established the facts on the basis of which the FSC had delivered its judgment on 24 October 2007. The FSC had not yet had the opportunity to consider the following new facts, based on which the applicant’s request for reconsideration at domestic level had a good chance of success: he had once again been leading a family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and was fulfilling his financial duties towards them; he had not had any convictions, and no incidents of domestic violence had occurred since 2005; he had found a stable job with a regular income and had not accumulated further debts; and his wife was in need of support in relation to the education of the children since she was suffering from serious depression. The Government therefore proposed that the application be struck out pursuant to Article 37 § 1 c) of the Convention.


95. The Government further argued that neither the domestic courts nor other State institutions participating in the court proceedings for the applicant’s deportation could be blamed for delays. The Government admitted that, normally in cases regarding alleged violations of Article <mask> of the Convention, the passage of time could have irremediable consequences for the applicant’s family. However, in the instant case, the passage of time had had no negative impact on the applicant’s private and family life. Quite the opposite, it was a well thought-out strategy, chosen by the applicant and his lawyers, expecting that the lapse of time would possibly render the applicant’s threat to national security less significant. It was true that the administrative proceedings in the applicant’s case had started already in 2004. Nonetheless, the delays had been caused by the necessity to await the outcome of the criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 42 above), and the applicant’s or his lawyers’ requests to suspend the administrative proceedings until his case had been heard before the European Court of Human Rights, or to make interpretative requests to the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 50 and 53 above).


31.  The Government stated at the outset that the applicant did not dispute that the exclusion order and subsequent expulsion had been based on the law and had pursued a legitimate aim. At the same time, the Government did not dispute that these measures had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention.


46.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his expulsion led to a separation from his wife and children. While the measure might have had a legitimate aim, namely the prevention of disorder and crime, it had not been necessary in a democratic society. In this respect he stressed that he – having lived for more than 27 years in Germany – had fully integrated into German society and that he did not have any remaining links to Turkey other than his nationality, also lacking sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language. He maintained that he had been employed during the major part of his adult life and that he had been working in Germany from January 2001 until his second deportation in August 2003. His children could not be expected to accompany him to Turkey, as they would not be able to follow school there because of their poor knowledge of the Turkish language.


45.  The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that their family life had been compromised by the prosecutor’s order to deport the first applicant and to ban him from Romania for ten years; they had been forced to leave Romania in order to be able to continue a family life and had had to leave their respective families behind. The relevant parts of Article 8 of the Convention read as follows:


83.  The Government submitted that the first applicant had had an effective remedy to raise his complaint about the alleged violation of his right to a family life, as required by Article 13. He could have challenged the deportation and detention orders and the revocation of his residence permit before the Supreme Court by way of administrative recourse under Article 146(1) of the Constitution (M.A. v. Cyprus, cited above, §§ 67-72). Although a recourse did not have automatic suspensive effect under domestic law, upon such an application, the Supreme Court had the power to issue provisional orders suspending the enforcement of a decision taken by an administrative authority, pending the case being heard on the merits (ibid., § 79). In the context of such a recourse and an application for a provisional order, the applicant could have raised his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention and under Article 15 of the Constitution, which also protects private and family life. In cases involving deportation and the right to respect for family life, the Supreme Court took into account the Court’s case-law on Article 8 of the Convention and examined whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, deportation would be in breach of the provision. The first applicant could have challenged those decisions before or after his deportation within seventy-five days of their being issued (referring to Abbasi v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 21713/06, 5 July 2007 with regard to challenging such a decision in that manner after deportation).


59.  The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not formally requested, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, that the Constitutional Court determine whether or not there had been a violation of Article 8 as a result of the length of the proceedings in issue. The applicant could have requested that the District Court issue an injunction pending the determination of his claim. There was no need to examine separately the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in any event, was manifestly ill-founded.


53.  The Government observed that detention entailed inherent limitations on private and family life. They did not contest that the second applicant’s inability to receive an MP3 player from J.G. had interfered with his right to respect for private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the Government was of the view that that interference had been in accordance with the law (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above) and had pursued the legitimate aim of motivating inmates to work, to communicate with their relatives and to enhance their social ties, as well as the aim of preventing the possession of items acquired by criminal means.


46.  The Government asserted that the domestic authorities had taken all the necessary steps that they could reasonably have been expected to take to enforce the judgment of 25 June 2014. However, their efforts had been unsuccessful. They considered that the applicant had prevented the enforcement herself as, despite having been duly notified of the scheduled enforcement dates, she had repeatedly failed to attend. The removal of the children and their transfer could not take place in her absence. The Government concluded that the State had complied with its positive obligation to ensure the applicant’s right to respect for her family life under Article <mask> of the Convention and that there had therefore been no violation of that Convention provision.


43.  The applicants complained that, to the detriment of the children’s best interests, they were unable to obtain recognition in France of the legal parent-child relationship lawfully established abroad between the first two applicants and the third and fourth applicants born abroad as the result of a surrogacy agreement. They complained of a violation of the right to respect for their private and family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention as follows:


90.  The Government submitted that decisions concerning the carrying out of abortions belonged to the sphere of private, not family, life. Hence, solely women were able to make the relevant decisions, within the limits set by the national legal framework. They referred to the case of Boso v. Italy, where the Court had held that Article <mask> of the Convention did not give a potential father any right to participate in the decision-making as to whether or not to carry out an abortion (see Boso v. Italy (dec.), no. 50490/99, 5 September 2002). Therefore this provision could not be regarded as conferring such a right on the mother of the woman seeking an abortion.


43.  The Government argued that the present case concerned a dispute between two private parties and not an interference by the State authorities with any of the applicant's rights protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant herself had agreed to conversion of a part of the house to a bar and therefore must have known that she would have to suffer a certain level of noise, even at night since it was common knowledge that bars were generally open at night. The competent administrative authorities had conducted the relevant proceedings and in the end secured that the applicant was no longer exposed to excessive noise. Furthermore, the applicant herself had contributed to the obstruction of the administrative proceedings because although she had been invited to indicate the time of measurements of noise as early as 17 March 2008 she had submitted her answer as late as 15 December 2008.


38.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued, firstly, that the applicant could have claimed redress in the ordinary courts under the Civil Code by way of an action for the protection of her personal integrity, but had failed to do so. The mechanism for the protection of personal integrity was to be construed and applied in the context of the right to protection of privacy under Article 19 and in accordance with Article 154 (c) of the Constitution. This mechanism thus afforded the applicant guarantees identical to those provided under Article <mask> of the Convention, including the possibility of claiming just satisfaction in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.


82.  The Government argued that the domestic decisions and judgments, while interfering with the applicant’s family life, were in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim – the protection of the health and development of the children – and had been proportionate to the aim pursued. There had thus been no violation of the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


45.  The Government indicated that fourteen families had lived in the hostel. They had all belonged to socially unprotected groups of the population, for example, G., a single mother. The Government noted that Article <mask> of the Convention imposed positive obligations on the State, that is to say to take measures to protect an individual’s rights to respect for private life and in particular housing (the Government cited mutatis mutandis, Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 28 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII). The applicants had tried to create unsuitable living conditions in the hostel (for example, by cutting off the electricity) in order to evict the occupants. The prosecutor’s office had concluded that the applicants had breached the occupants’ right to respect for their homes, as indicated in its complaint to the court and its appeal against the decision of 23 January 2006. By having awarded the applicants adequate compensation, the courts had balanced their rights against the public interest. The Government further noted that the applicants had been deprived of their property in accordance with the law.