32.  The Government submitted that the reason why the Court, in Chassagnou and Others, cited above, had found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention had been that the system instituted by the Loi Verdeille had not allowed small landowners who were opposed to hunting to avoid the transfer of their hunting rights to an ACCA. The Government referred to paragraphs 85 and 95 of the judgment, pointing in particular to the Court’s finding that the difference in treatment between large and small landowners under the Loi Verdeille had been discriminatory and in breach of those combined provisions because the result had been “to give only the former the right to use their land in accordance with their conscience”. The legislature had drawn the necessary inferences from that judgment: since the entry into force of Law no. 2000-698 of 26 July 2000, landowners who did not hunt could object to the inclusion of their land if they were “opposed to hunting as a matter of personal conviction”, irrespective of the surface area of the land.


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. and/or Article 8.


40.  The Government observed that, according to the judgment of 23 July 1968 in the Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits) (Series A no. 6), the equality of treatment enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention is violated only where a distinction has no objective and reasonable justification (loc. cit., pp. 34-35, § 10). In the light of their arguments concerning the alleged violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 taken separately, the Government submitted that the distinction criticised had been based on such a justification. They pointed out in particular that the applicant was not the only candidate on her list who was required to undergo a verification of her linguistic competence. There had accordingly been no violation of Article 14.


111.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been discriminated against in prison and before the domestic courts on grounds of language (as a Russian speaker), ethnic origin and his pecuniary and prisoner status. In his observations, he emphasised the alleged language discrimination. He contended that he had been unable to obtain translations of or explanations about the relevant texts concerning prisoners’ rights and duties, although Russian was understood by everyone.


130.  The applicants also alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 on account of the difference in the statutory treatment of members of families of Russian military officers who were required to leave Latvia, and that of other Russian-speaking residents of Latvia who as former Soviet citizens could obtain residence in the country.


88.  The applicants complained that the dissolution of HADEP had violated their rights guaranteed by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with the above Articles, the applicants alleged that HADEP had been dissolved because it was regarded as a Kurdish party, as the great majority of its supporters were Kurds.


126.  The applicants also complained that they had been discriminated against by the social authorities since the children had been prohibited from speaking their maternal language, Assyrian, between themselves or with the second applicant. They had also been refused contact with their relatives on their mother's side and priests from the Assyrian church. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


85.  The Government did not contest the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nevertheless, they argued that the applicant’s income as a prisoner was insufficient for him to pay contributions to the old-age pension system: following deduction of the maintenance contribution, his remuneration did not exceed the marginal earnings threshold below which any employee was exempted from compulsory insurance under the General Social Security Act. The Court considers that this argument, which is itself intrinsically linked to the applicant’s position as a prisoner, cannot invalidate the conclusion reached above.


53.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his preventive detention was unlawful as he had been refused a social therapy or relaxations in the conditions of his detention in view of his future expulsion. However, at the same time his sentence was not suspended because the prosecution authorities argued that he was not impressed by the execution of his sentence and had not changed his attitude towards his offences. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, he further argued that he had suffered discrimination because of his Bulgarian origin as a result of the refusal of the said measures when the order for the execution of his preventive detention was made.


62.  The applicants complained that the custody decisions had been taken on the ground of their status as disabled persons, and that the State had failed to fulfil its obligation to provide them with adequate conditions in order to preserve their family. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. The relevant provision reads as follows:


45.  The applicant party complains under Article 13, in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, of having been denied an effective remedy against the violation of its Convention rights. The applicant party complains, in particular, that the Lower Saxony Parliament lacked impartiality and independence in proceedings regarding the validity of the electoral result. Furthermore, in the view of the applicant party, it did not receive a fair hearing in the proceedings before the Lower Saxony Constitutional Court, which had decided its case without an oral hearing and without a comprehensive examination of the facts of the case


85.  The applicant alleged that in relation to a civic obligation that had been imposed on him he had had to face criminal proceedings, had been ordered to pay a fine and had been threatened with imprisonment in default. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6. The relevant part of the latter provision reads as follows:


100.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the courts which had examined the issue of his pre-trial detention had lacked impartiality and independence as, in particular, on several occasions the same judges had been involved in considering whether to extend the custodial measure. Additionally, he complained under the above provision that the courts had refused to consider his appeal against the ruling of 30 September 2010 on the institution of criminal proceedings against him under Article 364 § 3 of the CC (see paragraph 37 above). Lastly, the applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the judicial authorities had referred to his prominent social status and wealth as an argument for holding him in custody.


90.  The applicants complained that the domestic courts’ rejection of their civil claims and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by other claimants had resulted in a breach of their rights guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol no. 12 to the Convention. The Court, however, considers that the applications fall to be examined solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in relevant part reads as follows:


73.  The applicant complained under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings had been instituted against him only because of his political opinions and his participation in the anti-government demonstration. In addition, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with his other complaints he contended that he had been discriminated against on account of his political views.


15.  The Government made a number of objections to the admissibility of the present application. Firstly, they requested the Court to dismiss the application as an actio popularis because it was lodged by three persons. They construed the right of individual petition in Article <mask> of the Convention as requiring each applicant to file a separate application. Secondly, they contested the admissibility of the application on the ground that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They claimed that the applicants should have brought an action against the Administration of the Voronezh Region, which was liable for outstanding debts of the welfare office. They also alleged that the applicants should have brought an action against the bailiff service which was in charge of the execution proceedings.


23.  The Government argued that the applicant company could not be considered a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The District Court had rejected the public prosecutor’s request that the court declare the criminal proceeds forfeit to the State. This decision had been upheld by the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. Moreover, the applicant company had received compensation of 6,000 euros for its legal expenses. The domestic courts had never ordered the applicant company to withdraw the book from sale, nor had any attempts been made to prevent its sale. Accordingly, the applicant company had not been able to show that it had been a victim of the alleged violation. Therefore, this part of the application should be declared incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. In any event, the Government argued that the applicant had not suffered significant disadvantage and that the complaint should therefore be declared inadmissible.


20.  The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of her right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court had provided the applicant with preventive and compensatory redress, which the Government considered to be adequate and sufficient.


16.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of her constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded her compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost her victim status.


154.  The applicant submitted that there had been no reason for the prosecutor to come to his flat. Firstly, he had not concealed the information about his remarriage to his former wife and the birth of their fourth child from the authorities. On the contrary, he had informed the head of his military unit about these facts. If it had been necessary to obtain further information from him, he could have been summoned to the prosecutor’s office, which was not the case. The Government’s allegation that summonses had been sent to him were not supported by any evidence. Moreover, it was significant that night visits were unlawful under domestic law. In the applicant’s opinion, it was clear from the above that the sole purpose of the night visit was to put pressure on him before the Grand Chamber hearing in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (he referred to Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 249, 13 July 2006; Fedotova v. Russia, no. 73225/01, § 51, 13 April 2006; Knyazev v. Russia, no. 25948/05, § 115, 8 November 2007; and Ryabov v. Russia, no. 3896/04, § 59, 31 January 2008). Indeed, the applicant and his family had felt intimidated and frightened.


70.  The applicants also submitted that the Government’s former representative Mr Matyushkin was biased. According to the applicants, M.’s father was Mr Matyushkin’s personal aikido trainer and a close friend. They submitted a photograph featuring Mr Matyushkin and M.’s father together and claimed that it had been taken at M.’s father’s birthday party in 2009. By omitting to disclose his personal connection to the case, Mr Matyushkin had misled the Court; the observations submitted by him should not be accepted therefore (Rule 44D of the Rules of Court). Those observations contained personal gratuitous attacks on the first applicant and many distortions of the facts of the case. Thus, Mr Matyushkin had concealed relevant information and documents, in particular those showing that M. had not complied with the contact orders and that the domestic authorities had acknowledged the bailiffs’ failure to ensure her compliance. The applicants later stated that they no longer insisted on not accepting those observations as they had been endorsed by the Government’s new representative Mr Galperin – who had submitted the Government’s further observations where he had continued to conceal and distort the facts of the case. The applicants also argued that Mr Matyushkin’s behaviour should be interpreted as amounting to a failure to participate effectively in the case (Rule 44C of the Rules of Court) and therefore a hindrance of the effective exercise of the right of petition (Article <mask> of the Convention).


80.  The Government submitted that the complaints of the applicants Ms Zamorozda and Ms Golovatenko should be found inadmissible since they were not participants in the civil proceedings concerning the invalidation of the OM's property transaction. For this reason, their complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention should be rejected as incompatible ratione personae in accordance with Article <mask> of the Convention. As to their complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they should be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention as these applicants failed exhaust the domestic remedies.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant had no standing to bring the case before the Court. The applicant had not inherited the claim in respect of the judgment debt since he had not registered succession as required by the Civil Code. Moreover, the applicant’s representative had recovered the judgment debt on 30 August 2001 and the applicant had an opportunity to dispose thereof. Lastly, the applicant had not informed the domestic courts of his father’s death and had not been a party to the domestic proceedings. His representative had always acted on his father’s behalf before the domestic courts. Therefore, the Government stated that the applicant had abused the right of application and could not claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


38.  The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


37.  The Government submitted that Mr Crepulja could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violations of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention following decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Kiseljak Municipal Court of 25 June and 29 November 2013, respectively, and the payment of the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 20 above).


77.  The applicant alleged that, following communication of his complaints under Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention, his family had been subjected to persecution by the Russian authorities. In particular, on 7 February 2010 an official at the prosecutor’s office in Grozny had made threats to his mother and on 8 February 2010 someone had set the house where his family resided on fire. The Court will examine this complaint from the standpoint of the right of individual petition guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads:


113.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the LIU-10 authorities had put illicit pressure on him in relation to his complaint to Strasbourg. In particular, he alleged that the LIU-10 authorities had demanded that he disclose the contents of his letters to the Court and that they had impeded his correspondence with the Court on a regular basis. He also insisted that the LIU-10 authorities had unfairly sanctioned him for his complaints to Strasbourg. Article 34 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


43.  The applicant disagreed. He referred to principles established by the Court in cases pertaining to Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court. He further pointed out that the authorities had failed to comply with the Court’s request under Rule 39 that he should be subjected to an examination by medical specialists independent of the penal system. The medical examination carried out in April 2014 had not been independent, and the commission had not included a neurologist or an epileptologist. The commission’s interpretation of the applicable domestic law had been erroneous, and their findings had not been in accordance with the medical evidence. The Government’s failure to immediately subject the applicant to an independent medical examination had stripped him of procedural guarantees under Article 34, since he had had no opportunity to rely on an independent expert report.


118.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was manifestly ill-founded and unsupported by any evidence. The Government further argued that the search of the office of the applicant’s representative had been lawful, had not been intended to exert any pressure on the applicant or his representative, and had not influenced the proceedings before the Court.


41.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention for the following reasons. First, following a friendly settlement, the applicant had been exempted from liability for the remainder of his debts subject to the debt recovery procedure. Second, the criminal case was still pending before the prosecutor and no court proceedings concerning the offences investigated in the pre-trial investigation had been instituted. Thirdly, the applicant had not been present at the Bailiff’s office in order to give information about his assets but had only informed the Bailiff that he was unable to be present owing to his right to remain silent. No incriminating information had been given. There had thus not been any use of compulsion for the purpose of obtaining information which might incriminate the applicant in pending or anticipated criminal proceedings against him, and no use of incriminating information compulsorily obtained outside the context of criminal proceedings in a subsequent criminal prosecution (see Weh v. Austria, no. 38544/97, §§ 42-43, 8 April 2004). The application should thus be declared inadmissible under Articles 34 and 35 § 3 of the Convention.


22.  The Government argued that the applicant can no longer be considered a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, the Government referred to the settlement reached between the State Attorney's Office and the applicant in another applicant's case (no. 21147/03) struck out by the Court on 1 April 2008, in which the applicant also complained about the excessive length of proceedings. According to the Government, the proceedings in the case no. 21147/03 and the proceedings in the present case relate to the same factual background and the two sets of proceedings were mostly conducted in parallel. As a result, the Government argued that the applicant could not have suffered double prejudice and had therefore already been awarded a sufficient amount in respect of both sets of proceedings. The Government thus invited the Court to reject the application as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.


142.  The applicants maintained his complaint. The first and fifth applicants insisted that they had never denied having applied to the Court. According to them, the investigator had put in the transcripts the statements they had never made and then had misled them into signing the transcripts. They also pointed out that while the first applicant’s complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic concerned the transcript of his questioning on 25 October 2005, the Prosecutor’s Office failed to address this issue and instead referred to the transcripts of 21 and 26 October 2005. The applicants contended that, in view of the above, the Government had failed to comply with their obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


22.  The applicant company disagreed, stating that according to Ukrainian law it was a private company, whose aim was to receive profit through business operations and to divide it among its shareholders. The applicant submitted that it acted according to its articles of association which were of an ordinary private-law nature, that the State's share did not allow it to control the applicant, and that it did not perform any public-law functions. The mere fact that originally there were two State entities among its founders could not deprive the applicant of its right to have recourse to the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention.


50.  The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, § 92). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The Government asserted that the settlement of 20 November 2006 had deprived the applicant of victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention or, alternatively, resolved the matter within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention. According to the settlement of 20 November 2006, the applicant had been granted a lump sum of EUR 14,000. In exchange he had declared all his claims settled. The Government observed that the present application had already been introduced when the settlement was concluded. While the university organs were not aware of the Convention proceedings at that time, the applicant could have been expected to refer to them if he intended to exclude them from the settlement.


29.  The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicants granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, they could no longer be considered “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicants’ constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court’s practice on the point. Moreover, the proceedings before it had been easily accessible to the applicants, they had been speedy and had been conducted in the applicants’ language and the compensation had been paid to them without any delay.


20.  The Government submitted that the applicant cannot claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because she obtained a favourable ruling of the domestic court. They maintained that “the alleged violation of Article 6 was rectified by (...) dismissing the plaintiff's claim”. The Government concluded, that the application should be declared incompatible ratione personae with the Convention.


26.  The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 28 June 2004, she was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. She argued that the Constitutional Court had not responded to her complaint regarding access to a court, but solely to her length complaint. Moreover, the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


22.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer be considered “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because domestic courts had acknowledged violations of their rights and had provided them with redress. The Government argued that the amounts awarded to the applicants had been adequate, taking into account the duration and extent of the violation, the negative consequences suffered by the applicants, and the economic conditions in the country, as well as other relevant criteria.


25.  The Government submitted that the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants could not claim to be “victims”, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts of which they complained. In support of their objections, the Government claimed that these applicants had not taken part in the previous criminal proceedings that had been declared void by the Supreme Court in view of the presiding judge’s lack of impartiality.


173.  The applicant also submitted that his representative had been refused permission to meet with him in the prison. The impossibility of meeting his representative had amounted to an infringement of the effective exercise of his right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant also argued that his representative had submitted a valid authority form to the Court and to the domestic authorities.


28.  The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source” that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was legally binding. They further stressed that the Rules of Court, and accordingly the interim measure applied, did not have binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court in its letter of 17 October 2014 did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention.


18.  The Government pointed out that the domestic proceedings had ended with a settlement which had been accepted by all parties and had been confirmed by the District Court. According to the terms of the settlement, the applicants had agreed to pay to the plaintiff EUR 17,000 each and had agreed not to take any legal action in the European Court with respect to the excessive length of the proceedings. The Government claimed that the applicants were thus no longer victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


55.  The applicant complained that the Government’s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


42.  The Government submitted that the applicant had originally lodged his application against the Federal Republic of Germany. They were of the opinion that the application should have been communicated to the German Government with a view to enabling the Court to examine it in a comprehensive manner. The present case concerned the second compensation scheme in which the Polish Foundation had acted in conformity with the GFA. The Government maintained that the communication of the present application to the Polish Government was contrary to the applicant’s will and in contravention of Article <mask> of the Convention.


23.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


57.  The Government argued that the application was already inadmissible. The applicant’s complaints relating to the prosecution’s failure to apply Article 456a of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002/2003, raised in his initial application to the Court, were declared inadmissible by the Court on 20 February 2007 (application no. 30182/03) and were not the subject-matter of the present application. Furthermore, the applicant failed sufficiently to set out his present complaints in relation to the proceedings under Article 67c of the Criminal Code here at issue, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, when lodging his application with the Court, the applicant had not yet exhausted domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the proceedings concerning relaxations in the conditions of his detention, his admission to a social therapy and the suspension of the execution of his preventive detention in view of his deportation.


24.  The Government contested that argument. As regards the first proceedings, they claimed that the applicant could not be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this respect they pointed out, that the domestic courts not only accepted that the proceedings exceeded a reasonable time but they significantly reduced his sentence solely on this ground. As regards the second proceedings, the Government submitted that they ended with the service of the final decision more than six months prior to the introduction of the application. As to the third proceedings, they claimed that the applicant contributed to the protraction of the case to a great extent.


92.  The applicant unions observed that their constitutions provided that they should defend the interests of their members, professional athletes who, by definition, were included or liable to be included in the testing pool. FNASS and the unions stressed their legitimate claim to assert the interests of all athletes, who, acting for the most part individually, had no practical opportunity to put forward their grievances and arguments. The applicant unions submitted that their standing before the domestic courts should enable them to apply to the Court on the basis that they were responsible for the conditions in which sports were practised at national and international level; to decide otherwise would deprive them of an effective remedy. They argued that they should therefore be considered at least as potential victims for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


66.  The applicant further maintained that he had not lost his status of victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Even though the Federal Court of Justice had found that his detention on remand had lasted an unreasonably long time, national law did not provide for adequate redress in this respect. In particular, his sentence had merely been mitigated by the Oldenburg Regional Court after the remittal of the case because of the protracted length of the criminal proceedings, irrespective of his prolonged detention on remand. It was altogether not comprehensible in how far his sentence had been reduced because of the violation of his Convention rights.


153.  The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had interfered with their ability to communicate with the Court effectively. They also pointed to a lack of interpreting services, which had further hindered their effective participation in the proceedings before the Court. Article 34 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


107.  The applicants complained of several violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 99-101 above). They also noted that the Government had failed to present a copy of the investigation file into Mr Bekirski's death. The applicants argued that, had the file been presented to the Court, the latter would have had the opportunity to fully acquaint itself with all the facts of the case, including the complete statements of the numerous witnesses attesting to the ill-treatment inflicted on Mr Bekirski after 30 August 1996 and the photographs graphically illustrating the injuries he had sustained as a result. In addition, it would also have been easy to clearly establish that the authorities had failed to carry out a prompt, effective and impartial investigation. Thus, the applicants argued that, by withholding a copy of the investigation file, the Government had obstructed and violated their right of petition guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. They reiterated the Court's position in similar such situations and referred to paragraph 77 of the judgment in the case of Velikova v. Bulgaria (no. 41488/98, ECHR 2000‑VI) which states as follows:


18.  The Government made a preliminary objection that the applicant had failed to submit “any documents demonstrating that he had ever complained to the competent national authorities of the alleged violations of his rights and what [had been] their reply”. They considered that he had thereby failed to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention and had not properly lodged an application in the sense of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, the Government referred to Lord Woolf who in the Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights recommended the Court to deal only with properly completed application forms which contained all the information required for the Court to process them. The Government pointed out that the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention had been communicated only in 2009 and that the relevant documents had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory storage period for archival documents.


41.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this regard, they referred to a document issued by the director of the medical department of Grīvas prison, which indicated that the applicant had been diagnosed with a “paranoid personality disorder with a querulous tendency”. Taking this information into account, the Government submitted that the present application to the Court was “one of the numerous complaints submitted by the applicant, containing imaginary information and facts since the applicant has a tendency to see himself as a victim”. In conclusion, the Government requested the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3.


197.  The applicant further stressed that the extraordinarily precipitated enforcement of the deportation order against him and the fact that the authorities hid him from his lawyer on that day strongly contradicted the Government’s assertion that the domestic bodies had not intended to act in breach of the interim measure and Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, he contested their argument that the scope of the interim measure had been limited to extradition. He averred that it had been aimed at preventing the irreparable damage which he risked suffering if he was removed, in any form, to his country of origin, at allowing him to pursue the proceedings before this Court, and at securing him effective Convention protection.


65.  The Government appear to consider that this refusal has not been detrimental to the applicant branch. The Court recalls in this connection that the existence of a violation is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice or damage; the question whether an applicant has actually been placed in an unfavourable position is not a matter for Article <mask> of the Convention and the issue of damage becomes relevant only in the context of Article 41 (see, among many other authorities, Marckx, loc. cit.; Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, § 66, Series A no. 51; and Wassink v. the Netherlands, 27 September 1990, § 38, Series A no. 185‑A).


69.  The Government submitted that the applicant had lost his victim status for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Supreme Court, when dealing with his cassation appeal, had acknowledged that there had been a violation of his right to marry within the meaning of Article 12. In its judgment of 27 May 2003 the Supreme Court expressly stated that the Kraków District Court’s refusal to grant the applicant leave to marry in the remand centre had amounted to a flagrant breach of the Convention. In the Government’s view, such an assessment made by the highest domestic judicial authority should be considered an acknowledgement of the Convention violation and a form of moral redress for the applicant.


20.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


156.  The Government argued that the applicant’s lawyers had not lodged any request with the Psychiatric Hospital for information concerning the applicant’s state of health and about the medical assistance provided to him. As regards an examination by a private doctor, the Government reiterated that the applicant received all necessary medical care from the Psychiatric Hospital doctors. The Government did not submit any observations in respect of the merits of the complaint, which was made by the applicant for the first time in his observations dated 31 March 2006. They made only a general submission in their observations on just satisfaction to the effect that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


17.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because on 4 January 2000 she obtained a favourable ruling of the domestic court. They further maintained that “after 4 January 2000 there was no longer a causal link between the duration of the proceedings and the frustration suffered”. The Government concluded, that the application should be declared incompatible ratione personae with the Convention.


75.  The Government asked the Court not to grant any pecuniary damage to the applicant, since no plausible pecuniary damage could have been caused from the alleged breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In their view, should the Court find a violation of the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 34 in the present case, such a finding should constitute sufficient just satisfaction. With respect to the non-pecuniary damage claimed for the alleged violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention, the Government submitted that it was speculative, excessive and unsubstantiated.


68.  The Government stated that the applicant had not complained that the search of her house had been unlawful or disproportionate, and thus arbitrary (contrast Ratushna v. Ukraine, no. 17318/06, §§ 70-72, 2 December 2010). In the Government’s submission, she had complained about the use of force against her, about her property being damaged and seized and about various procedural shortcomings during the search, such as the presence of unauthorised persons in her house and the failure to give her a copy of the search warrant. Therefore, in the Government’s view, the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of her rights under Article 8.


152.  The Government reiterated that the submission of the case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also pointed out that it had been suggested that a Court delegation have access to the file at the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted. The Government further maintained that there was no breach of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since his application had been accepted for examination by the Court. As for the relevant domestic proceedings, he could have access to those materials of the investigation that could be produced to him at the present stage and, upon the completion of the investigation, to all the materials contained in the case file.


35.  The Government’s argument may be interpreted as a claim that the applicant is no longer a “victim” of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, or that the matter has been resolved, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b). In both cases, the Court must ascertain that, in addition to an acknowledgement of the alleged violation of the Convention which is a required element for the determination of the applicant’s victim status, the circumstances complained of by the applicant have ceased to exist and that the effects of the alleged violation have been redressed (see Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999‑VI, and Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 97, ECHR 2007-I).


45.  The Government argued that the complaint under Article 5 § 1 was inadmissible on several grounds. Firstly, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not claimed compensation for his detention under the State Liability Act 2003. Secondly, the application was manifestly ill-founded, as the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 had been complied with. Thirdly, and in any event, given the redress which the applicant obtained in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, he could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


95.  The applicants argued that the Government's failure to submit the documents requested by the Court, namely the entire criminal investigation file, disclosed a failure to comply with their obligations under Articles 34 and 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the above issue should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


64.  The applicant complained, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, that the monitoring of his correspondence had amounted to a hindrance in the effective exercise of his right of application. He also complained, relying on Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention, that he had not been allowed to contact his lawyer by phone. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article 34 of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:


38.  The Government argued that an effective investigation had taken place and that, subsequently, the applicants were awarded compensation. Thus, they considered that the applicants were no longer victims under Article 2, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government further maintained that Kamuran Alican and Ahmet Alican had failed to observe the six‑month rule prescribed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


40.  The Government did not show that there was any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, § 92). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39, in breach of its obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


24.  The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 November 2004, she was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. She argued that the Constitutional Court had not responded to her complaint regarding access to a court, but solely to her length complaint. Moreover, the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


26.  The Government argued that the first applicant’s complaints should be declared inadmissible, since the Constitutional Court had awarded her a certain amount of money as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered. They also implicitly indorsed the Constitutional Court’s arguments in respect of the rejection of the first applicant’s claim for pecuniary damages. The first applicant had thus, according to the Government, been provided with adequate redress and had lost her victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


40.  The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, § 92). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


85.  The Government, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s judgments of 27 October 2003, argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, in respect of any delays in the proceedings covered by those judgments. They argued that the just satisfaction awarded by the Constitutional Court was not disproportionately low in the particular circumstances. In addition, the Constitutional Court had ordered the District Court to proceed with the cases without any further delay.


24.  The Government raised an objection that the applicant cannot be considered a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Court notes that this issue falls to be determined in the light of the principles established under the Court's case-law (Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69‑107, ECHR 2006‑... and Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178‑213, ECHR 2006 - ...).


49.  The Government submitted that the applicant did not have victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted that the prosecuting authorities had never instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 301 of the Criminal Code. On the contrary, they had issued a non-prosecution decision in regard to a criminal complaint lodged against the applicant holding that the applicant’s views were protected by his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.


43.  The Government maintained that the applicant lost his status as a “victim” of an alleged violation of his right under Article 6 § 1 within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that in its decision of 20 July 2000, the Federal Constitutional Court had found that the proceedings before the Saarland Court of Appeal, which had been pending since 1989, had lasted unreasonably long and had breached the applicant's Basic Law rights. Thereby, the Constitutional Court also implicitly established a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.


37.  The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source” that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 was legally binding and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court had not entailed a violation of Article 34, or any other provision of the Convention.


21.  The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 24 March 2004, he was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


102.  The applicant submitted that she was subjected to threats in relation to her complaint to the Court, as a result of which she was forced to seek asylum abroad. She also argued that the Government's failure to submit the documents requested by the Court, namely the entire criminal investigation file, disclosed a failure to comply with their obligations under Articles 34 and 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the above issues should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


21.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


66.  The applicants complained in reply that the fact that the Representative of the Russian Federation had concealed his close acquaintance with M.’s father and had distorted relevant facts had amounted to a lack of cooperation and a hindrance to the exercise of his right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. The relevant Convention provisions read as follows:


52.  The Government raised several preliminary objections in their observations. First of all, they noted that the applicant had lived for one year in Northern Finland but had been back in his home town for more than eight and a half years. He had not raised the idea of moving away from his home town for a long time. There was no guarantee that a change of mentor would have led to a different outcome as far as the applicant’s place of residence was concerned since another mentor would also have been obliged to safeguard his best interests. The applicant’s allegation was thus purely hypothetical. Therefore the applicant could not, at least any longer, be considered as a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. His complaint was thus incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


146.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the administration of the Simferopol SIZO had refused to dispatch his letter of 30 August 2006 to the Court containing his complaints about the conditions of detention in that SIZO. He also complained under the same provision that the authorities had not provided him with copies of documents, which he intended to attach to his application form. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 34 of the Convention that the administration of the Simferopol SIZO had been turning off the light too early in the cells and that that practice had impeded the exercise of his right of application to the Court.


41.  The applicant complained that the authorities had not reacted to his request for copies of documents which the Court had asked him to provide. He further complained that the prison administration had reviewed his letters to and from the Court in his presence, had failed to send or delayed in sending some of his letters to the Court and had withheld documents contained therein, which had put him at real risk of being subjected to psychological pressure and ill-treatment by prison staff and which had hindered his communication with the Court. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


80.  The Government contended that Ukraine had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant could have obtained copies of the necessary documents with the help of his relatives, with whom he had maintained contact, and that the situation in the present case was analogous to that of Chaykovskiy v. Ukraine (no. 2295/06, §§ 96‑97, 15 October 2009). They further argued that the Supreme Court had acted in accordance with the law; that the applicant should have submitted his requests to the Kyiv Region Court of Appeal, which had been the court of first instance in the applicant’s case and thus could have provided the applicant with the requested documents; and that the applicant had not sought copies of documents pertinent to his allegations of police torture.


56.  The Government maintained – and the applicants disagreed – that Mr Marinić and Mr Hadžić could no longer claim to be victims of the alleged violations of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention following the decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Constitutional Court”) of 21 December 2006. In respect of Mr Tokić and Mr Alibašić, the Government submitted that their applications should be dismissed because of their failure to complain to the Constitutional Court.


242.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that on a number of occasions State officials had threatened him in connection with his complaints concerning the conditions of detention and medical assistance in the YaCh-91/5 prison in Sarapul. In particular, he alleged that he had been approached by officials of the Department for the Execution of sentences and by prison officials on 25 and 27 January 2005, as well as on 14 and 17 February 2005. He claimed that the officials had questioned him with regard to his application before the Court and tried to force him to withdraw first his complaints related to the conditions of detention and then the allegations of having been threatened. The applicant also complained that prison authorities had interfered with his correspondence with his representative in connection with his application before the Court.


30.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that since the charges against the applicant were dismissed on appeal and the applicant received no criminal record, neither his professional life nor his freedom of expression was impaired by the criminal proceedings in issue.


92.  The Government submitted that the individual applicants' property rights were limited by the contractual agreement they had concluded with the applicant company. The individual applicants' complaint about a breach of their property rights should have been directed towards the applicant company within the framework of the agreement they had concluded with it. Consequently, in the Government's view, the seven individual applicants could not be considered victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, the individual applicants had not instituted any legal proceedings concerning the alleged violation of their property rights.


52.  The Government challenged the applicant’s victim status. They pointed out that, by a decision of 3 October 2011, the Court of Impeachment had upheld the applicant’s claim for dismissal in respect of counts 1.1 and 1.2 of the indictment and that, by its judgment of 23 April 2012, the court had acquitted him of counts 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. Referring to the case of Osmanov and Yuseinov v. Bulgaria ((dec.), nos. 54178/00 and 59901/00, 4 September 2003), the Government stated that an acquitted person or a person against whom criminal charges had been dismissed could not claim to be a victim of violations of the Convention. Therefore, the applicant could only claim to be a victim as regards complaints concerning count 2 of the indictment. Nevertheless, the Government invited the Court to consider whether he could claim to be a victim at all under Article <mask> of the Convention since he had not been sentenced to any punishment or payment of legal costs.


58.  The Government submitted that the applicant had ceased to be a victim of the alleged violations of the Convention, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, by virtue of the fact that he had collected his entire claim for supplementary and indexed-linked pension, together with statutory interest and damages (see paragraph 23 above). Alternatively, the Government argued that the applicant had abused his right of petition given that he had failed to inform the Court of this fact, which was critical for the outcome of the proceedings before it.


158.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that on a number of occasions State officials had exerted pressure on him in connection with his application lodged with the Court. In particular, he claimed that the officials had tried to force him to settle the case in return for a promise that he would be allowed to stay in the detention facility in the Udmurtiya Republic. He further complained that the prison administration had impeded the dispatch of his letters to his representative.


37.  The applicants submitted that, following the Court's admissibility decision in the present case, the Austrian Constitutional Court declared Article 209 of the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional and that subsequently Parliament decided to repeal this provision. However, the Constitutional Court's judgment, which is based on other grounds than those relied on in the present application, has not acknowledged, let alone afforded redress for, the alleged breach of the Convention. Moreover, their convictions still stood. The applicants therefore argued that they were still victims, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the violation alleged. Nor can it be said that merely repealing the contested legislation has resolved the matter within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention.


29.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because he himself had decided not to go to the funeral and had therefore not been affected by the conditions of transport in the prison van. The mere potential for a violation and the applicant’s fear that his life would be endangered in the prison van were not sufficient.


79.  The applicant further complained that he was hindered in the effective exercise of his right to make an application to the Convention organs. In this respect he noted that his letters of 8 October 1998 and 2 June 2000 had not been sent to Strasbourg. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the same article, he alleged that he lacked the means to buy envelopes and stamps to send correspondence to the Court. Finally, he alleged that he could not obtain copies of certain documents necessary to support his application. Article 34 of the Convention reads as follows:


67.  The Government maintained that the applicant had lost the status of victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that in its judgment of 11 September 2003, the Federal Court of Justice had expressly established and recognised a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of the proceedings and the undue length of the applicant’s detention on remand. In addition to that, the Oldenburg Regional Court, in its judgment delivered on 2 September 2004, had also expressly acknowledged that Article 5 § 3 of the Convention had been violated. Furthermore, the said court had explicitly and measurably reduced the applicant’s prison sentence from nine years to six years and six months, not only because of the excessive length of his proceedings, but also because of his prolonged detention on remand. In its decision delivered on 17 March 2005 the Federal Court of Justice had affirmed the Regional Court’s fixing of the sentence. There had not been any further delays imputable to the judicial authorities which would have warranted a further reduction of the applicant’s sentence.


94.  The applicant’s inability during his treatment in hospital for several months to communicate in any way with his representative before the Court was found to amount to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in Shtukaturov v. Russia (no. 44009/05, § 140, 27 March 2008). The Court concluded that the restrictions had made it almost impossible for the applicant to pursue his case before the Court; as a result, the application form had been completed by the applicant only after his discharge from the hospital.


60.  The Government referred to the Supreme Court’s decision of 22 January 1997 in which it had refused to grant a further extension of the applicant’s detention on remand on the ground that the previous period of his detention had been excessive in the particular circumstances of the case. They further referred to the fact that, following the applicant’s conviction, the domestic authorities had included the period of his detention on remand in the prison term which the applicant had to serve. The Government concluded that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his rights under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.


70.  The Government submitted that there has been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the applicant had not been pressured, directly or indirectly, by the State in order to be dissuaded from pursuing his application before the Court. The delay referred to by the applicant was of a purely technical nature, a fact well-known to the Court which has encountered the same problem in many other cases against Serbia currently pending before it.


56.  The Government opened their line of argument with the assertion that the legally binding force of the interim measure issued under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court may not be drawn from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source”. They further stressed that the Rules of Court and accordingly the interim measure applied did not have a binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court in its letter of 3 October 2013 did not entail a violation of Article 34 or any other provision of the Convention.


36.  The applicant pointed out that his wife had been prevented from ending her life within the privacy of their family home, as originally planned by the couple, and instead he had been forced to travel to Switzerland to enable his wife to commit suicide. The Court had previously considered closest family members to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because of their close relationship to the person mainly concerned, if the interference had implications for the family member lodging the application. In the case at hand, the applicant and his wife had found themselves in a terrible situation, which also concerned the applicant as a compassionate husband and devoted carer. As the relationship between husband and wife was extremely close, any infringement directed against the rights and liberties of one partner was directed against the rights that were shared by both partners. It followed that each partner in the marriage was entitled to defend the joint rights and liberties of both partners and that the applicant was himself a victim of a violation of his Convention rights.


49.  The Government emphasised that in the domestic proceedings before the County Court, the applicant’s explicit position was that she intended in any event to leave the site when her parents left. In their view, it therefore followed that she was neither directly affected nor at risk of being directly affected by the order of 28 July 2006, which suspended possession for the period sought, or the statutory scheme under which it was made. According to the Government the applicant was now seeking to challenge the statutory scheme in abstracto. They therefore invited the Court to find that the applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The Government accepted that the delay in the enforcement of the judgment in the applicant’s favour had taken place and submitted that at the relevant time there had been systematic delays in payments of similar payments due to the nation-wide changes in the system of distribution of budgetary allocations. They also argued that since the judgment has been enforced the applicant cannot be regarded as a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


41.  The Government submitted that these complaints had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit established in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 9 September 2008 (see paragraph 36 above), on which the applicant had put much emphasis, had been the final domestic decision in respect of the complaints under Article 3. Therefore, the present application (lodged on 10 June 2009) was out of time.


23.  The Government relied on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 21 June 2011, and considered that by virtue of that judgment the applicant had lost his “victim” status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the alleged violation of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It was true that the Constitutional Court had granted the applicant no compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. However, in the Government’s submission, this was compatible with the Court’s own approach in cases where it had found that the finding of a violation of applicants’ Article 5 rights constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non‑pecuniary damage they had sustained.


97.  The Government maintained in their submissions to the Grand Chamber that the applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because the case was lodged with the Court before Law no. 273 had been promulgated. Relying on Očič v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 46306/99, ECHR 1999-VIII), they further contended that the applicant’s claim was an actio popularis seeking review of legislation in the abstract as at the time of his application to the Court, the Law in question had never been applied to him to his detriment. The cases to which the Chamber referred to support its conclusion that the applicant was a victim were distinguished by the Government because, in those cases, unlike in the present case, the Law being challenged had entered into force. Although the Court had considered an applicant a potential victim of an enacted Law which had never been applied to him, it had never before found an applicant to be a victim or a potential victim of a draft law. The Government relied on The Christian Federation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in France v. France ((dec.), no. 53430/99, ECHR 2001-XI), where the Court observed that it had accepted the notion of a potential victim in cases where the applicant was not in a position to demonstrate that the legislation about which he complained had actually been applied to him because of the secret nature of the measures it authorised (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28); where a Law punishing homosexual acts was likely to be applied to a certain category of the population, to which the applicant belonged (see Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45); and, lastly, where the forced removal of aliens had already been decided on but not yet carried out and enforcement of the measure would have exposed the persons concerned to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the country of destination (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161) or would have infringed the right to respect for family life (see Beldjoudi v. France, 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234‑A). The Government argued that States Parties had not agreed when ratifying the Convention that draft laws could be challenged before the Court. If such challenges were possible, where there was no possibility at domestic level to challenge a draft law applicants would be encouraged to come directly to the Court, breaching the principle of subsidiarity and leading to a large increase in the number of cases before the Court.


69.  The applicant noted that he had received correspondence from the Court with significant delay and, further, that the envelope itself had already been opened by others. In this connection he suggested that this could either have been an “innocent mistake” on the part of the Serbian postal services or a deliberate hindrance in the effective exercise of his right of petition to the Court within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In support of the latter proposition, the applicant recalled that the Serbian postal services were State-run, and emphasised that his application before the Court involved sensitive police-related issues.


24.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violations within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted that the applicant had obtained a decision of the Constitutional Court, which had found a violation of Article 5 of the Convention and ordered his release. Hence, he could not still claim to be a victim of the alleged violation.


99.  The Government pointed out that in the judgment of 7 May 2003 the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court had ordered the District Court to avoid further delays in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant’s costs. In view of the applicant’s conduct that decision provided appropriate redress to the applicant in the circumstances. The Government concluded that the applicant had lost the status of a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The applicants emphasised the clear consequences of the contested proceedings on their civil rights. Firstly, they pointed out that they all lived in Itoiz, where their immovable property was situated. Construction of the dam would result in flooding of this area and, consequently, of their homes and other assets. In addition, they submitted that, as members of the Coordinadora de Itoiz association since its formation in 1988, they had taken part in the proceedings with that association as their intermediary. They stressed the indisputable direct link between them and the damage that would be sustained from the dam's construction, and submitted that the remedy used was the only one which, if successful, would have allowed for the definitive protection of their civil rights and interests. In this connection, they stressed that they would have been acting unreasonably had each of them brought a separate individual appeal against the proposed dam and thus entered long and costly proceedings with the same final outcome as that achieved by the association. Moreover, it was clear that, from the outset, they had entrusted the association with the defence of their civil rights and interests. Indeed, this was the logical result of one of the association's stated aims, namely the “defence of an alternative way of life on the site”. In conclusion, they contended that they could claim to be victims of a violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


51.  The Government submitted that the Regional Court had already expressly acknowledged that the period of inactivity between 30 January 2013 and 11 February 2015 had been in contravention of the principle of the rule of law. The applicant, however, had already been compensated for that delay by having had three months of the prison sentence declared as served. The court had thereby reduced the applicant’s sentence in an express and measurable manner. The fact that the applicant had been given a prison sentence suspended on probation had not changed the fact that sufficient redress had been granted. In the event that the suspension of the sentence had been revoked, the applicant would have had to serve only five months instead of eight. Therefore, the mental strain of the sentence had been less severe. In addition, a condition of a suspended sentence was that compensation by means of a reduced sentence would only take effect if the suspension was revoked. In that regard, the consequences of the “new” execution approach had been the same as those of the previous mitigation approach. As pointed out by the Federal Court of Justice in its judgment (see paragraph 33 above), under both approaches compensation would only be actually awarded if the suspension was revoked and the prison sentence then had to be executed. Furthermore, in determining the sentence the Regional Court had not only expressly reduced the sentence but had also taken into account, in the applicant’s favour, the lengthy overall duration of the proceedings and the time that had elapsed since the criminal act. According to the Government, this had resulted in a quite lenient prison sentence of only eight months. Having regard to the above, the Government concluded that the applicant had already been compensated for the excessive length of the proceedings and could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


61.  The applicant complained that on many occasions the authorities had interfered with his correspondence with the Court. In particular, he alleged that his copies of documents concerning the criminal proceedings against him had been unlawfully confiscated by the prison administration, that the authorities had refused to send some of his letters, that the Court’s letter of 28 June 2007 had been opened by an officer of the correctional institution and that he had not received many of the Court’s letters. The Court decided to examine his complaint from the standpoint of the right of individual petition guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads:


29.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 21 July 2004 the applicant had lost his status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the violation of the applicant's right, that it had ordered acceleration of the proceedings and that this order had been effectively implemented. Furthermore, they considered that the reasons relied on by the Constitutional Court in its ruling dismissing the applicant's claim for just satisfaction and compensation in respect of costs and expenses were sufficient.


22.  The Government argued that the applicant company could not claim to be the “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts complained of. They observed that the Constitutional Court had indeed acknowledged a violation of the “reasonable-time” principle and awarded the applicant company MTL 100 for non-pecuniary damage, thus providing adequate redress for the breach of the Convention.


50.  The Government contested the admissibility of this complaint on several grounds. First of all, they submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because he had failed to provide relevant documents, to fill in an application form, and to inform the Court of the change of his address resulting from his transfer to a prison in Russia. Secondly, they contended that the applicant had not wished to pursue his application and invited the Court to strike it out of the Court’s list of cases. Thirdly, they considered that the applicant had not suffered any significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. They did not, however, provide more detail with respect to this argument.


99.  The Government contended that there had been no hindrance of the applicant’s right of individual petition. Referring to the Court’s case-law, the Government stated that in order to find that the State failed to comply with requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant’s allegations should be supported by facts and, in particular, the State’s intention to hinder the applicant’s right to lodge an individual petition should be demonstrated (see, among other authorities, Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).


150.  The applicant’s representatives complained that by repatriating the applicant or by aiding his repatriation to Tajikistan despite the interim measure issued by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Russia had failed to comply with its undertaking under Article <mask> of the Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of individual application.


62.  The applicant agreed that the complaint was to be examined under Article 8. He nevertheless considered that the incident was also incompatible with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention in that the reading by prison staff of letters from the Court which might concern allegations against prison authorities or prison officials could create the risk of reprisals by prison staff against the prisoner concerned. In this regard the applicant referred to the case of Klyakhin v. Russia (no. 46082/99, § 118, 30 November 2004).


23.  The Government stressed that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the decision of 16 June 1998 had been executed, the applicant can no longer be considered a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court’s list of cases.


49.  The Government submitted that Mrs Sardaryan could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and invited the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases. In particular, they pleaded that no “civil rights and obligations” of Mrs Sardaryan had been determined in the divorce and in rem proceedings between her parents.


55. The Government submitted that, in light of the agreement on post-adoption contact of 30 March 2007, the applicants were no longer victims for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. They had received contact on the terms recommended by Professor Triseliotis and had not been prejudiced by the approach taken by the Trust, which found suitable adopters who agreed to post-adoption contact. The agreement had worked as intended so the applicants had been afforded all that they could reasonably have wanted or expected.


61.  The Government also noted that the Constitutional Court had concluded that the Convention had been violated, although in respect of a different provision of the Convention from Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The applicant had received certain satisfaction and therefore was not a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government added that more than seven and a half years had passed since the applicant’s release from custody.


136.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not been prevented from exercising his right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, he was able to do so only through his mother – his official guardian. Since his mother had never asked Mr Bartenev (the lawyer) to represent her son, he was not his legal representative in the eyes of the domestic authorities. Consequently, the authorities acted lawfully in not allowing him to meet the applicant in hospital.


24.  The applicants submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 28 April 2004, they were still “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002-II).


36.  The Government argued that in so far as the Regional Court had already found a delay in the proceedings, the excessively long duration of the proceedings had already been acknowledged and redressed. In addition, the Regional Court had also taken into account the long duration of the proceedings when determining the applicant’s criminal sentence. Therefore, the applicant had lost the status of victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


197.  The applicant complained that he had been hindered in the exercise of his right of individual application in that his lawyers in Amsterdam had not been permitted to contact him after his arrest and that the Government had delayed in replying to the Court's request for information. He alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


24.  The Government maintained that the application in the present case had not been lodged by the alleged victim of the Convention violation, namely the applicant’s husband, who had died on 15 April 2002 before the final decision of 24 April 2002 of the Supreme Court. The Government argued that the widow did not have the requisite standing under Article <mask> of the Convention and therefore the application must be rejected as being incompatible ratione personae pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


17.  The Government submitted that, in line with the Court’s case-law, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the sum of the award has been deposited with the Bailiffs’ Service and will be transferred to the applicant, provided he informs the Bailiffs about his banking details, the judgment of the Bagaliyskyy Court of 18 December 2000 has been enforced and the applicant can no longer be considered a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1.


48.  The Government submitted that the applicant was not a victim of the alleged violation of the Convention because he had not requested that the national authorities recognise him as a victim during the domestic criminal proceedings even though he was not precluded from doing so and such recognition would have significantly expanded his procedural rights. Although the Government accepted that victim status in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention was not necessarily the same as the national criteria relating to locus standi in legal proceedings, its purpose was to provide practical safeguards for persons who were not able to seek redress under domestic law for violations of their Convention rights. This was not the applicant’s case, as he had had an available domestic remedy for the complaints raised before this Court.


14.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints should not be examined by the Court, as he had not observed the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They contended that although the applicant had sent a letter to the Registry on 30 August 2006, he had never submitted a duly completed application form.


110.  The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be “victims”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the events of which they complained. They disputed the existence of a genuine risk that the applicants would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of their return to Libya. That danger had to be assessed on the basis of substantial grounds relating to the circumstances of each applicant. The information provided by the parties concerned was vague and insufficient.


60.  The applicant lastly complained that on 20 January 2006, when delivering him a letter from the Registry of the Court, a prison guard had started opening the envelope, and when the applicant objected had made the applicant open the envelope himself in the presence of the guard, who had threatened him with having his cell searched if he refused. In its partial inadmissibility decision of 9 February 2010 the Court had erroneously indicated that the events described had taken place in Jelgava Prison. The applicant was transferred to Jelgava Prison only on 6 April 2006. Thus the applicant’s complaint pertains to events in the Central Prison. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court decided to communicate the complaint under Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant, read as follows:


141.  The Government contested the applicants’ submissions. They stated that in the course of the investigation the first and fifth applicants had been questioned with regard to their application before the Court. During the questioning on 25 October 2005 the first applicant had stated that neither he nor other members of his family had applied directly to the Court, but that he had applied to human rights organisations. The fifth applicant, questioned on 26 October 2005, had stated that she had not applied to any organisations in connection with her brother’s abduction. The search for her brother had been conducted by her father. The Government clarified that in the reply of 12 April 2006 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic referred to two transcripts of the first applicant’s questioning on 21 and 26 October 2005, when no questions concerning the application before the Court had been put to him. They averred that all transcripts had been authentic and accurate and reflected the applicants’ statements made during the questioning. The Government argued that there was no interference with the applicants’ right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention.


87.  The Government submitted that on 17 June 2015 the Constitutional Court had found a violation of Article 5 § 1 as regards the period of the applicant’s detention between 21 March 2013 and 14 March 2014 (see paragraph 43 above). The applicant could therefore no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to that period.


28.  The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to ensure he have a medical examination to answer the questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


24.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the domestic courts had acknowledged the violation of Article 8 and had granted her adequate redress. The Government also contended that the complaint had the nature of an actio popularis by which the applicant was seeking a review in abstracto of the contested legislation in the light of the Convention. Finally the Government claimed that the application was manifestly ill-founded because the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies for the breach of her right to privacy.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicants had entered Turkish territory illegally and had been deported to Iraq, where they had come from, pursuant to the national legislation prior to their arrest on 21 June 2008. They maintained that, despite this, the applicants did not have victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as no deportation order was issued in their respect.


14.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants' constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status.


24.  The Government argued in the first place that the application should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal against the Buca District Governor’s decision, dated 28 December 2001, not to prosecute the gendarme officers. They also maintained that the application must be dismissed for failure to comply with the six-month rule. Furthermore, they contended that the applicant could not be considered as a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as no medical examination had been performed on her since she had not given her consent.


20.  The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had provided the applicant with preventive and compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient.


140.  The applicant complained that his extradition to the United States had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court in accordance with Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, and that the extradition had therefore amounted to a violation of his right of individual petition. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


51.  The Government submitted that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as the applicant had requested leave from the Hague Regional Court to join a pending civil action in tort brought by another former EBI detainee claiming, inter alia, compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of having been subjected to allegedly humiliating and unnecessary strip-searches in the EBI. Furthermore, if the applicant were to be awarded any compensation in those proceedings, he could no longer be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government were therefore of the opinion that the application should be declared inadmissible.


15.  The Government relied on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 24 September 2014, and considered that by virtue of that judgment the applicants had lost their “victim” status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In so far as the applicants claimed to have been awarded insufficient compensation by the Constitutional Court, the Government further submitted that they had failed to comply with the requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to exhaust domestic remedies, since they had failed to claim damages under the State Liability for Damage Act (Law no. 514/2003 Coll., as amended - “the SLD Act”).


62.  The applicant argued that, as in Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien], cited above, he could still claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to him, the alleged violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 8 had already occurred by the time the Administrative Court gave judgment. At the hearing he explained that at the time of his arrest and removal he had just turned 18, and as a result, under French law he should have had until June 2007 to regularise his situation (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above). He had nevertheless been expelled and obliged to run the risk of paying a smuggler to return him to French Guiana illegally.


24.  The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 7 July 2004, he was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


28.  The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) of 29 April 2004 the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant’s right of which he complained before the Court. The Constitutional Court further provided the applicant compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient and maintained that it was compatible with the relevant principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court.


26.  The applicant argued that it was unjust for the Government now to seek to rely on a point that they had agreed not to advance during the domestic proceedings, during which they had conceded it was irrelevant to the issues of principle at stake. She objected strenuously to the attempt to re-introduce the issue before the Court. The applicant further argued that the notion of victim under Article <mask> of the Convention was without reference to detriment, prejudice or damage. This was a matter for consideration under Article 41, in the event of the Court holding that there had been a violation of Convention rights. Even supposing that the material disadvantage in her case had ultimately been reduced – which she did not concede – she argued that the basis for her complaint was that the child support system offended her dignity by ignoring a most important and intimate aspect of her private life and personality. This was not excused or justified by the operation of a mechanism that was entirely unconnected to the alleged discrimination.


94.  The applicant also complained under Articles 5 §§ 1(a) and (c), 6 §§ 1, 2, 3(b) and (d), 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that he had been detained arbitrarily and unlawfully, that the proceedings had been unfair, and that he had been discriminated against due to his status. He also submitted under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his property rights, including a right to an old age pension and security of his assets, had been breached and under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not been provided with copies of properly certified and signed copies of the domestic courts’ decisions. He further referred to Article 13 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 in so far as his appeals had not been examined in due time. Relying on the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and without referring to any provision of the Convention, the applicant also complained about the refusal to grant him a pension.


86.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” of the alleged violation of Article 6, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as it was the Voskhod company, and not the applicant in his personal capacity, who had been a claimant in the proceedings before the commercial courts. In this respect they referred to the cases of F. Santos Lda. and Fachadas v. Portugal ((dec.), no. 49020/99, 19 September 2000), and Pires da Silva and Pereira v. Portugal (no. 19157/91, Commission decision of 5 July 1993), stating that a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party, despite the fact that she or he was a shareholder and/or executive director of a company which was a party to the proceedings.


30.  The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source” that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 was legally binding. They further stressed that the Rules of Court, and accordingly the interim measure applied, did not have binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention.


131.  The applicants argued that the Government’s failure to submit the documents requested by the Court, namely the entire criminal investigation file, disclosed a failure to comply with their obligations under Articles 34 and 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the above issue should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


101.  The applicant claimed 65,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage in relation to the suffering and mental distress caused to her by her husband’s disappearance and the violation of her right to respect for her home. In addition, in the event that the Court found a breach of the State’s obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention the applicant sought an award of EUR 10,000 for herself and an equal amount for each of her two sons and for her nephew.


80.  The Government contested that argument. They firstly submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Government noted that the applicant ought to have lodged complaints with a prosecutor’s office or with the Prison Administration. In this regard, the Court observes that a complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Ponushkov v. Russia, no. 30209/04, § 78, 6 November 2008). The Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore misconceived.