32.  The Government accepted that the exercise of the right to enter the applicant’s home by the investigating officer had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered however that the interference had been justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention: the investigator had acted in accordance with Articles 178 and 179 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid down the scope and manner of exercise of the power conferred on the investigator to inspect the scene of the crime; that his actions pursued the legitimate aim of investigating the incident of forgery of an official document; and that they were necessary in a democratic society.


66.  The applicant also complained that (i) the decisions to order her to undergo a psychiatric examination and to arrest her, (ii) her detention for a total period of eighty-three days, and (iii) the restriction on her right to see members of her family to one visit every month while in detention, were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


428.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, given that they had been at an advanced stage of the adoption procedure and a bond had already been formed between the prospective adoptive parents and the children, the introduction and application to them of the ban on the adoption of Russian children by nationals of the United States provided by Law no. 272-FZ constituted an unlawful and disproportionate interference with their family life. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


157.  The Government concluded, in view of the above, that the present case was different from Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (no. 62540/00, 28 June 2007) where the Court had refused to apply the “reasonable likelihood” test because of the absence of any safeguards against unlawful interception in Bulgaria. Given that Russian law provided for adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse in the sphere of interception of communications, including available remedies, in the Government’s opinion the applicant could not claim an interference as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting secret surveillance. In the absence of a “reasonable likelihood” that his telephone communications had been intercepted, he could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


62.  The Government referred to the Court’s conclusions in Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev, cited above, and acknowledged that before 2008 the first applicant had had no domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in 2009 the SSMA had been amended and a special parliamentary commission had been created whose task was to oversee the services authorised to use covert surveillance measures. The Government observed that the commission was empowered, under certain conditions, to notify individuals of unlawful surveillance measures used in respect of them. Finally, they stated that the new point 7 of section 2(1) of the SMRDA introduced in March 2009 had made it possible to seek damages in respect of unlawful interception of communications.


30.  The applicant contended under Article <mask> of the Convention that his privacy had not been respected during the strip search in the stairwell, because the doors leading to the stairwell had transparent glass windows. His search could therefore have been seen by other prisoners who had been waiting behind the door to be let into the building. It was impossible to conduct strip searches privately in the stairwell; such searches should have been carried out in specially designated rooms located on each floor of the building.


147.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had never raised any of the specific allegations in the present complaint before any domestic authority and had never relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, or provisions of domestic law of the same or a similar nature, in his applications to the domestic authorities. The Government noted that, under Article 449 of the CCrP, it was open to the applicant to complain to the domestic courts about any actions of the prosecuting or investigating authorities that violated his rights.


82.  The Government highlighted the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the present case. That margin depended on the nature of the activities in question and the aim pursued by the restrictions. In its recent case-law, the Court had moreover left the State a broad margin of appreciation in cases concerning Article <mask> of the Convention (see A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 66, 9 April 2009, and Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 38, 25 November 2008). Generally speaking, the margin enjoyed by the States was broader where there was no European consensus. In the Government’s submission, whilst there was admittedly a trend towards harmonisation of the legal systems in Europe, differences nevertheless remained, as evidenced by the failure of the negotiations for the adoption of a regulation of the European Union on conflict-of-law rules regarding non-contractual obligations (Regulation EC No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 – Rome II Regulation). The margin of appreciation was also broad where the national authorities had to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (see Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, § 78, ECHR 2007‑V, and Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007‑I). Moreover, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union apparently took the same approach (cases of Schmidberger of 12 June 2003, C-112/00, and Omega of 14 October 2004, C-36/02).


47.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the enforcement order issued in the administrative proceedings instituted in 1988 had never been carried out. He further complained that the courts had taken no action about the length of the civil proceedings he instituted in April 2002 in the Split Municipal Court seeking the eviction of Z.G. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to respect for his home had been infringed.


40.  The Government maintained that Article 8 was not applicable to the case since the issue at stake was only the personal comfort of the applicant, who had wanted to give birth at home, which could not be part of her right to respect for her private life. There was no scientific proof that giving birth in a medical facility could in any way damage the physical or psychological integrity of a mother or child and thus the legislation concerning home birth as such could not be the subject of an examination by the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention.


99.  The Government further submitted that the interference in issue had been “prescribed by law”. Not only had the legal provisions on which the domestic courts had based their decisions been accessible, but the Court of Cassation’s position had been entirely foreseeable. Its case-law concerning preventive and restrictive measures affecting the exercise of freedom of expression had been well established since the judgment of 9 December 1981 (see paragraph 39 above) and had been applied on many subsequent occasions. In addition, the Belgian Parliament had had occasion to enact a number of measures entailing general bans on expression, for example through Articles 383 and 378 bis of the Criminal Code. A reading of Article 144 of the Constitution and Article 18, second paragraph, Article 19, second paragraph, and Articles 584 and 1039 of the Judicial Code, taken together, suggested that preventive measures affecting the exercise of freedom of expression could be taken by the urgent-applications judge on an interim basis, in the event of an emergency, to prevent the infringement of a civil right protected by the Constitution and the Convention, after the judge had weighed up the interests at stake, such measures being limited to cases involving flagrant violations of the rights of others. Lastly, the Court of Cassation had taken the view that only the provisions of the Judicial Code and Article 144 of the Constitution counted as the “law” forming the basis for the interference in issue, and not Article <mask> of the Convention, which could serve solely as the legitimate aim that could be pursued by an interference with freedom of expression but not as the law on which the interference was based.


31.  The Government agreed that the search and seizure at the applicant's home constituted an interference within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Because of the urgency of the matter, the search had been conducted on the basis of an order given orally by an officer with power of arrest only a few hours after the arrival in Finland of persons suspected of illegally entering the country. It had been necessary to conduct the search immediately to verify whether there had been other such persons in the applicant's home, and to ensure that no evidence of an offence had been destroyed. Therefore, in the Government's view, there had been a justified reason, as required by Chapter 5, section 5, subsection 2, of the Coercive Measures Act, to conduct the search at 10 p.m. The search had been performed for the purposes of the prevention of crime and it had therefore pursued a legitimate aim. It had not been possible to inform the applicant about the possibility to be present during the search as neither her telephone number nor that of her counsel had been known to the officers. The applicant had, however, been immediately informed about the search by a hand-written note left in her apartment, mentioning, inter alia, the contact details of the officers who had carried out the search. The written search warrant and the records of the seizure had been communicated to the applicant as soon as she had been located for the purposes of questioning, namely a day and a half after the search. The search and seizure had thus been carried out in accordance with the law.


61.  The Government accepted that the domestic authorities had been unable to organise a meeting between the applicant and his daughter until February 2017. However, they had taken all the necessary steps that could have reasonably been required to secure the applicant’s contact with the child. There had been no omissions or delays in the conduct of the enforcement proceedings, which had been handled with due regard to the best interests of the child and the family as a whole. The Government noted that the unresolved conflict between the applicant and the child’s mother had rendered the judgment’s enforcement very difficult: A.D. had been absent from home at the time scheduled for meetings because the child had been unwilling to see the applicant; had strongly opposed the applicant’s presence while the bailiff was carrying out enforcement actions; had hidden the child; and had complained that the bailiff’s actions had put too much pressure on her. She had made it clear to the bailiffs that no meetings between the applicant and the child would take place. The Government accordingly concluded that the State had complied with their positive obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention to ensure the applicant’s right to respect for his family life and that there had been no violation of that Convention provision.


37.  The applicants contended that the secret surveillance carried out in respect of them had been unlawful because it had not been based on orders by the investigating judge containing proper reasoning. They also argued that the domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate that the interference with their right to respect for their private life and correspondence had been justified and necessary, as required under Article <mask> of the Convention.


93.  The Government contested the applicants’ arguments and argued that the restrictions provided for in the domestic regulations were necessary to maintain order and were completely reasonable. According to the Government, the applicants had been able to receive visits twice a week for two hours and use the telephone for at least ten minutes twice a week. The Government further submitted that the applicants Mr Klanšek and Mr Dukić made no complaints as regards their visiting arrangements. The applicant Mr Štrucl had not indicated any person whom he had wished to call or have written correspondence with. However, he had received and sent a number of letters, like the other two applicants, which was confirmed by the prison records of incoming and outgoing letters submitted to the Court. According to the Government, the applicants’ allegations that the situation as regards visits, use of the telephone and correspondence had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention were unsubstantiated.


14.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. The Court notes, however, that the proceedings are still pending before the domestic courts, rendering this complaint premature. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


63.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in the absence of a registered marriage between the applicant and Ms A. An unregistered partnership (“common-law marriage”) is not recognised and does not confer any specific rights under Russian law, in particular as regards mutual pecuniary obligations of spouses, succession or benefits. The applicant failed to display the requisite diligence in seeking to obtain permission to stay in Russia, to formalise his relationship with Ms A. and to establish his paternity in respect of her daughter. He was found liable for violations of residence regulations for foreign nationals. Thus, it does not appear that the applicant was particularly concerned with the normal exercise of his “family life” in Russia. Despite this, the national courts had given a thorough examination to the related grievances.


53.  The Government took the view that the domestic courts’ decisions had not interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. They noted, at the outset, that it had not been proved that the applicant was indeed the biological father of the child M. Even assuming biological kinship, this would not be sufficient to attract the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, M. lived together with her mother and her legal father in a stable family unit. No factual family relationship existed between the applicant and the child M. The Government stressed that the marriage between the applicant and Ms D. had ended six months before the child’s birth. The applicant had neither been present at the child’s birth, nor had he lodged a request to be granted contact rights.


33.  The Government admitted that the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. As regards Ms Lunina (application, no. 7359/14), the Government noted that she had not resided in the flat. Instead she had rented it to a third party and resided with her family in a different place.


61.  The applicant complained that his employer had arbitrarily collected, retained, and used sensitive, obsolete and irrelevant data concerning his mental health in considering his application for promotion, and had unlawfully and unfairly disclosed this data to the applicant’s colleagues and to a civil court during a public hearing. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


40.  The applicant complained of an unjustified interference with her right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention due to the refusal of the Netherlands Government to grant her a residence permit, based primarily on an old conviction of a narcotics offence committed in Germany. In so far as relevant, Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


33.  The Government accepted that the impossibility for the applicant to have his father’s paternity established after the expiry of the five-year time-limit had constituted an interference with his private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish legislation, namely in section 7, subsection 2, of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act.


43.  The Government then submitted that, while acknowledging that the States enjoyed a margin of appreciation regarding the protection of the traditional family, in 2010 the Court had started examining under Article <mask> of the Convention forms of cohabitation between same-sex couples (see, inter alia, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, 2 March 2010). In the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) the Court had acknowledged that same-sex couples could rely on their right to respect for family life, but pointed out that the Convention did not guarantee them the right to marry. It had also observed that where a State chose to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means of recognition, it enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred (see, inter alia, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, § 66, ECHR 2012).


36.  The applicant complained that the respondent State had failed to discharge its positive obligation to ensure respect for his private and family life, and in particular in that it had not provided him with any legal means to challenge the declaration of paternity after he discovered in 2004 that he was not I.'s biological father. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


19.  The applicants further submitted that although male and female life prisoners had been in a similar situation (namely serving a sentence in a correctional colony for a particularly serious crime), they had been treated differently as regards their entitlement to long visits from family members. Such a difference in treatment, which had existed until 2014, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not had any reasonable justification, in breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


115.  The applicants alleged that the search carried out in their houses on 14 January 2003 was illegal and constituted a violation of their right to respect for home. Under the same heading they complained that the disappearance of their relatives after their detention by the State authorities caused them distress and anguish which had amounted to a violation of their right to family life. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


23.  The applicants complained that their right to respect for their family life, protected by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been infringed, in so far as the courts ordering the return of the second and third applicants to Italy had failed to take into account the grave risk that they would be subject to physical or psychological harm at the hands of their father. For the same reasons, the applicants considered that, in failing to protect the children against the risk of abuse, the authorities had breached their positive obligations enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention.


31.  The Government did not contest that the flat in question had been the applicant’s “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that her eviction from that flat had amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her home. The Court accepts that that interference was in accordance with law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others, namely A. The central question in this case is therefore whether the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued and thus “necessary in a democratic society”.


61.  The Government agreed that the refusal to grant the applicant prison leave in order for him to attend his father’s funeral had interfered with his right to family life, as guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. This interference had, nonetheless, been based on law and had pursued the aim of furthering the interests of public safety, preventing crime and protecting the rights or freedoms of others. According to the Government, this restriction had been based on an individual assessment, as after an inmate had served a certain proportion of the sentence, a special body could decide to transfer him to a lower-security prison. It also drew the Court’s attention to the opinion of the Ombudsperson emphasising the dangerous nature of the inmates to whom this restriction applied (see paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, in the light of the cases of Laduna v. Slovakia (no. 31827/02, ECHR 2011) and Dickson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 44362/04, ECHR 2007‑V) a wide margin of appreciation applied in questions of prisoners, penal policy and social strategy and, according to Khoroshenko v. Russia ([GC], no. 41418/04, ECHR 2015), the gravity of a sentence could be tied, a least to some extent, to a type of a prison regime. Hence, the Government considered that this interference had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim, thereby being justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


61.  The Government highlighted the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the present case. That margin depended on the nature of the activities in question and the aim pursued by the restrictions. In its recent case-law, the Court had moreover left the State a broad margin of appreciation in cases concerning Article <mask> of the Convention. (Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 38, 25 November 2008, and A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 66, 9 April 2009). Generally speaking, the margin enjoyed by the States was broader where there was no European consensus. In the Government’s submission, whilst there was admittedly a trend towards harmonisation of the legal systems in Europe, differences nevertheless remained, as evidenced by the failure of the negotiations for the adoption of a regulation of the European Union on conflict-of-law rules regarding non-contractual obligations (Regulation EC No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 – Rome II Regulation). The margin of appreciation was also broad where the national authorities had to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007‑I, and Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, § 78 ECHR 2007‑XIII). Moreover, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union apparently took the same approach (cases of Omega of 14 October 2004, C‑36/02, and Schmidberger of 12 June 2003, C-112/00).


57.  The applicants complained that the Migration Court of Appeal’s decision not to grant the first, second and fourth applicants residence permits was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that although the third applicant was to be considered legally an adult, his health and development were at such a stage that he still had a right to respect for family life with his parents.


119.  The Government also referred to the case of Guichard v. France ((dec.), no. 56838/00, 2 September 2003) where the removal of the child by the mother had not been considered to be “wrongful” within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and where the Court had found that Article <mask> of the Convention had not therefore imposed positive obligations on the French authorities to secure the return of the child.


47.  The applicant complained about the content of the programme broadcast on 24 June 1997 and the courts’ dismissal of his claim for damages. He considered that the making of a video recording without his consent during a meeting organised without his knowledge by the journalists and the transmission of that video recording had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention


78.  The Government did not contest that the domestic court decisions establishing the girls’ place of residence with their father constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Notwithstanding this, the decisions had basis in domestic law, namely Article 3.174 of the Civil Code, and pursued a legitimate aim – the best interests of the children, one of the most important factors according to the Court’s case-law (the Government referred to Pascal v. Romania, no. 805/09, § 72, 17 April 2012; and X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 96, ECHR 2013). The interference also was necessary and proportionate.


115.  The applicants alleged that the search carried out in the house of the first applicant family on 10 December 2002 was unlawful and constituted a violation of their right to respect of their home. They further complained that the disappearance of their close relatives after their detention by the State authorities caused them distress and anguish which had amounted to a violation of their right to family life. They referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


152.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and that there had been no interference with his rights. He had not complained that his communications had been intercepted. The gist of his complaint before the domestic courts and the Court was that communications service providers had installed special equipment enabling the authorities to perform operational-search activities. In the Government’s opinion, the case of Orange Slovensko, a. s. v. Slovakia ((dec.), no. 43983/02, 24 October 2006) confirmed that installation of interception equipment, or even its financing, by private companies was not in itself contrary to the Convention.


98.  The applicant also complained that Z. had unlawfully moved into the house which she had constructed and that the authorities had failed to evict and prosecute Z. for the alleged fraud. She also complained about the supervisory review proceedings of 13 September 2001, arguing that they breached her rights to respect for home under Article <mask> of the Convention.


51.  The Government maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention could not be interpreted as stipulating the right to give birth at home and the corresponding obligation of the State to provide related healthcare services. In their view, the right to choose the circumstances of giving birth, although acknowledged by the Court in Ternovszky v. Hungary (no. 67545/09, § 22, 14 December 2010), to a greater extent was linked not to the right to choose a particular place (such as one’s home) for giving birth but with the right to choose the method of delivery, the right to refuse unnecessary medical interventions, the right to choose particular medical personnel (doctors or midwives) to assist during delivery, the right for the father to be present in the delivery room, and the right to stay with a newborn after the delivery. Moreover, the right to give birth at home was not explicitly recognised under the Lithuanian legal system. The Government thus considered that the complaint was inadmissible ratione materiae.


137.  The applicant argued that the disclosure of the above-mentioned information constituted interference by the State authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, with her right to private and family life. She argued that the interference had not been in accordance with the law: the domestic legislation actually prohibited disclosing information relating to a person’s private life (see paragraphs 64 and 67 above). Furthermore, in any event, the interference had not pursued any of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention, and had not been necessary.


104.  The applicants highlighted the similarities and differences between their case and previous cases in which the Court had dealt with similar issues under Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that they were not trying to derive from that provision a right to die, but on the contrary a right to try to prolong life and avert death. The refusals to allow them access to an experimental medicinal product which might help them do so amounted to interference with their rights under that Article. The manner in which a person chose to live, even if that choice could entail harmful consequences, was part of that person’s private life. The refusals had been of a blanket nature, not taking into account the specifics of each case. They had been based on inadequate legal provisions which did not permit an individualised assessment, and did not correspond to a pressing social need. They had not been intended to protect the applicants’ lives, because all of them were terminally ill and, without recourse to some new medicinal product, had only a short span of life left. In that connection, it had to be borne in mind that the exception sought would simply have given the applicants a chance to prolong their lives, and would not have shielded anyone else from criminal liability. It might have helped them avert suffering and death, as had happened with some patients in other countries.


17.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, which had been based on Article 823 § 1 in conjunction with Article 1004 § 1 of the Civil Code, had been necessary to safeguard Dr St.’s personality rights, as enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. By calling abortions unlawful the applicant had created the false impression that Dr St. had been operating outside of the legal framework in performing such procedures. Unlike the leaflet in the case of Annen (cited above) the leaflets in the present case did not point out that abortions are permitted in Germany under the terms of Article 218a of the Criminal Code and therefore not subject to criminal liability. Moreover, given the applicant’s goal of forced “pavement counselling”, the applicant had severely disturbed the relationship of trust between doctor and patient. The Court had already rejected an earlier application by the same applicant against a desist order against similar conduct (see Annen v. Germany (dec.), nos. 2373/07 2396/07, 30 March 2010). In the present case, the domestic courts had relied on the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice, which had been the subject matter of the earlier inadmissibility decision of the Court, and concluded that the circumstances had been comparable and had not warranted deviating from the existing case-law. When coming to that conclusion the domestic courts had paid attention to the fact that Dr St. had taken a public position in the abortion debate.


61.  The applicant’s complaint concerned the respondent States’ alleged failure to secure contact with her estranged daughter. It is not disputed that these matters pertain to “family life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that this provision is applicable. On the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the primary interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life may not be attributed to either of the respondent States but rather to the actions of the child’s grandparents, third parties, who had retained the child in Bulgaria (see R.S. v. Poland, no. 63777/09, §§ 56-57, 21 July 2015; López Guió v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, § 85, 3 June 2014). It therefore remains to be ascertained whether there were any positive obligations on the part of the respondent States with a view to securing the applicant’s right to respect for her family life and, if so, whether any such positive obligations have been complied with by the respondent States.


70.  The applicant maintained that the case should be examined under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of M.C. v. Bulgaria (no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003‑XII), and Aydin v. Turkey (25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI,) she argued that the act of rape reached the level of cruelty necessary for the application of Article 3. She further argued that such an act violated the right to personal integrity protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the applicant’s view, States were under an obligation to ensure effective protection against acts of rape, even in relations between private individuals, through the adoption of criminal-law provisions which would ensure adequate punishment for acts of rape and the obligation to conduct a thorough, independent and effective investigation and criminal prosecution.


43.  The applicant complained of a breach of his right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention because of the dismissal of his Hague Convention request. The applicant elaborated on this complaint, indicating that the unfavourable outcome of the impugned proceedings resulted from the misapplication of the Hague Convention and from various alleged shortcomings in the decision-making process. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


68.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the system operated as follows: (i) prisoners would submit their correspondence in two copies; (ii) the second copy would then be stamped and dated, in response to their own requests, and returned to them; and (iii) the first copy would be placed in an envelope and forwarded to the designated address. Prisoner’s correspondence was thus neither opened nor read by the prison authorities.


37.  The applicant specified that he was not complaining regarding the issuance of the ban prohibiting his return to Austria. His complaint to the Court solely concerned the withdrawal of his subsidiary protection status and his subsequent expulsion to Kosovo, which, in his view, had violated his right to respect for his private and family life as set out in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads:


42.  The Government filed comments on the applicant’s son’s updated claims for just satisfaction on 30 June 2008 and 15 October 2008. They pointed out that the present application was part of a cluster of similar cases raising a number of problematic issues and maintained that the claims for just satisfaction were not ready for examination. The Government had in fact encountered serious problems in identifying the properties and their present owners. The information provided by the applicants in this regard was not based on reliable evidence. As concerns specifically the present application, the Government noted that the decision on the admissibility contained no specification of the property. In the application form the property at issue was described as “fields”; notwithstanding that, the applicant had also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, owing to the lapse of time since the lodging of the applications, new situations might have arisen: the properties could have been transferred, donated or inherited within the legal system of southern Cyprus. These facts would not have been known to the respondent Government and could be certified only by the Greek Cypriot authorities, who, since 1974, had reconstructed the registers and records of all properties in northern Cyprus. Applicants should be required to provide search certificates issued by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, in cases where the original applicant had passed away or the property had changed hands, questions might arise as to whether the new owners had a legal interest in the property and whether they were entitled to pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages.


208.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that their property had been destroyed in the federal attack on Urus-Martan on 19 October 1999. The third applicant also complained that her right to respect for her home secured by Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed as a result of that attack. The respective Convention provisions state as follows:


52.  The applicant complained that whenever he was outside a prison he wore hand-cuffs joined by chains with fetters. He further complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention about the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest. Invoking Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant also complained that his extended detention had put a severe strain on his family life. Finally, invoking the same Article, the applicant complained about the censorship of his correspondence with the Court, the Ombudsman and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.


41.  The Government submitted that there had been no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention because, at the material time, the applicant had been the owner of another flat in Lipetsk. The applicant replied that she lived, together with her husband and children, in the flat she had purchased from E.M.T., while the other flat, to which the Government referred, was occupied by her mother.


56.  The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the amount claimed in respect of the domestic proceedings and the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the applicant had not produced any documentary evidence of the costs and expenses incurred before the Greek courts and the overall amount claimed was excessive. The Government further stated that the legal fees for the proceedings before the Court were excessive and that the agreement between the applicant and her lawyer was not binding on the Court. They contended that a total sum not exceeding EUR 6,000 would be appropriate in respect of legal costs.


76.  The applicant complained that the domestic authorities violated her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention in that they did not enforce the 2001 judicial order granting her the custody of her minor daughter and eventually transferred the custody to the father. The applicant also complained that her daughter had suffered anguish and psychological trauma as a result of the interventions of the authorities and the protracted judicial proceedings. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows.


60.  The Government of the Russian Federation also stated that the judgment of 2 October 2012 had been given in violation of Article 167 of the Family Code of Ukraine (see paragraphs 36 above), and with no regard having been made to the opinion of the child’s relatives, including the applicant and his half-sister, which had led to the elimination of the child’s biological affinity with them and his existing family contacts. Essentially, there had been no adequate consideration of the child’s best interests, and the Ukrainian courts had provided no sufficient reasons to demonstrate that it had been in the child’s best interests to be adopted by a couple who had no family or personal link with him and who had met him only once, rather than to be taken into care by his relatives with whom the child had had emotional contact. Thus, the impugned interference had also not been necessary within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


38.  The Government emphasised that even supposing that there had been interference, the German legal system guaranteed sufficient protection. They observed that the present application did not concern the applicant’s right to seek an injunction against the advertisement (Unterlassungsansruch), which the company had recognised and which had therefore not been the subject of any proceedings in the domestic courts. The question was not whether but how the German courts should have intervened. On that point the Government took the view that the possibility provided for in German law of applying for an injunction provided adequate protection against advertising. The applicant had not in fact made any attempt to seek protection against the advertisement, but rather had hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage, even though Article <mask> of the Convention did not provide for any such compensation.


33.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the legislation authorising secret surveillance in Bulgaria did not provide sufficient safeguards against abuse and barred the authorities from giving out any information as to whether a person had been subjected to such surveillance. He further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that his first and second requests for information as to whether he had been subjected to secret surveillance had been rejected.


38.  The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, but considered that the interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was “necessary in a democratic society”. A number of Articles in the CCP clearly described the possibility of conducting searches and the manner of authorising and carrying them out. The searches were necessary in order to help an ongoing criminal investigation and were based on information in the file allowing a reasonable assumption that objects or documents important for the investigation could be found at the applicant’s office or apartment. The applicant and his lawyer had made no objections to the manner in which the search had been conducted, noting only that the search had been unlawful. The search was brief and nothing was taken from the office, with only one mobile telephone taken from the apartment.


36.  The applicants submitted that Mrs Y.B.'s flat had been their only home and that prior to their eviction they had occupied it lawfully for some ten years. The retrospective annulment of their tenancy registration and their eviction had constituted a serious, unlawful and disproportionate interference with their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, when concluding the tenancy agreement and registering it with the competent authorities, they could not have anticipated that they would be qualified as “arbitrary occupants” ten years later. In their opinion, in authorising the tenancy, the flat owner had been of sound mind and the competent authorities at the material time had duly registered their tenancy without questioning this fact. Furthermore, in 1995-1996, when the owner had acted on her own behalf in a court dispute and attended hearings, the courts had never questioned her legal capacity to do so.


93.  The Government conceded that at the material time some of the applicant’s confidential correspondence would have been restricted in accordance with the domestic law (Article 15 of the Law on Pre-trial Detention and Article 41 of the Prison Code; paragraph 60 above). However, such restrictions had been compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention (cf. the aforementioned Peers v. Greece; Valašinas v. Lithuania; Puzinas v. Lithuania, no. 44800/98, 14 March 2002). Nevertheless, the applicant’s correspondence to the Court and State institutions, including the national courts, had not been censored. Moreover, when the applicant had complained of delays in the dispatch and receipt of correspondence, he had failed to provide the domestic courts with the details of the letters concerned. However, on an examination of the relevant prison records, it had been established that the applicant’s correspondence had been handled in a timely fashion, in accordance with the law. The Government therefore concluded that the applicant’s complaint was of a purely abstract nature.


54.  The applicant did not submit a claim for pecuniary damage. As for non-pecuniary damage, she submitted that as a result of a violation of her right under Article <mask> of the Convention, she had suffered from anguish and distress caused by the disruption to her family life with her husband and child and by the lack of information concerning the alleged threat she posed to Russia’s national security. The applicant left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court and requested that, given that she was an American living in Prague, any award be paid directly to her bank account outside the Russian Federation.


19.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to freedom of correspondence had not been respected since the domestic law governing telephone tapping did not contain sufficient guarantees against abuse by the national authorities. They did not claim to have been victims of any specific interception of their telephone communications. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


47.  The applicant complained that because lawyers were under obligation to report suspicious operations, as a lawyer he was required, subject to disciplinary action, to report people who came to him for advice. He considered this to be incompatible with the principles of lawyer-client privilege and professional confidentiality. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


20.  The applicants submitted that they had victim status and that there had therefore been interference with their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Even though they did not all possess licences to practise issued by the Ministry of Justice, they all represented applicants before the European Court of Human Rights. They were all members of the Lawyers for Human Rights organisation, which was considered by the Government as a subversive organisation acting against the interests of the State. The Lawyers for Human Rights organisation represented many persons who met the criteria for the application of the interception measures referred to by the Government both in domestic proceedings and in proceedings before the Court. The applicants gave the example of such persons as P. Popovici, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, P. Stici and M. Ursu, who were accused of having killed the son of the Speaker of the Parliament, and C. Becciev and E. Duca, both accused of very serious crimes. They also referred to many persons who had disputes with the leaders of the ruling Communist Party as well as two persons who had brought proceedings against the Secret Services of Moldova. The applicants submitted that, even though not all the members of their organisation worked on serious cases, all members used the telephones of the organisation and therefore risked interception.


40.  The applicant further argued that in holding that the pecuniary components were only protected by ordinary law, the Federal Court of Justice had disregarded the fact that Article <mask> of the Convention conferred on an individual the right to decide in person to whom and to what extent he or she wished to disclose personal information to others. The distinction drawn by the Federal Court of Justice between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary components of the right to protection of personality rights was in any case artificial because that right was indivisible.


210.  The Government acknowledged that during the applicant’s detention his right to family visits had been limited and that the restrictions imposed had amounted to an interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in their view, the measures applied were in accordance with the law, namely Article 217 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, and necessary for the purposes of that provision.


79.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied access to environmental information. The Court observes that this complaint was not included in the initial application but was raised in the applicants’ observations of 26 November 2007 and refers to correspondence with the relevant authorities from 26 September 2007 onwards, more than two years after they had lodged their application. Consequently, the Court considers that this complaint was not specified or elaborated early enough to allow for an exchange of observations between the parties on the subject. It finds that, in the circumstances of the case, it is not appropriate to examine the matter separately at this stage in the proceedings (see Nuray Şen v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 25354/94, § 200, 30 March 2004).


49.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, following his decision to move to the North of Finland in order to live with his former foster parents, the powers of his mentor had been enlarged to encompass matters pertaining to his person. His wishes had not been respected and it had been impossible to have his mentor replaced in matters concerning his place of residence and his education, even though he had lost confidence in her. All these measures violated his right to respect for private and family life.


46.  The applicant asserted that the restrictions placed on his personal contact with his family amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that neither his wife nor his son were witnesses in the proceedings in question, that the authorities have never explained the reasons for the refusal of contact, that they had failed to take his age into account and that the restrictions placed had not been indispensable to the proper conduct of the proceedings.


65.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom had violated its positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention, taken alone and taken together with Article 13, by failing to impose a legal duty on the News of the World to notify him in advance in order to allow him the opportunity to seek an interim injunction and thus prevent publication of material which violated his right to respect for his private life. The Government contested that argument


149.  The applicant complained that the measure by which he was prohibited from entering or passing through Switzerland had breached his right to respect for his private life, including his professional life, and his family life. He contended that this ban had prevented him from seeing his doctors in Italy or in Switzerland and from visiting his friends and family. He further claimed that the addition of his name to the list annexed to the Taliban Ordinance had impugned his honour and reputation. In support of these complaints he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


129.  The Government admitted that while there were sufficient grounds for instituting administrative proceedings against O.H. under Article 5.35 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences for breaching the rights and the interests of her daughter by interfering with the latter’s right to communicate with her father and thwarting the exercise by the father of his parental rights, the domestic authorities had no practical opportunity to do so. They assured the Court that the domestic authorities, under the supervision of the St Petersburg City Prosecutor’s Office, were continuing to take further measures to establish the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant. There had therefore been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case.


42.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decision to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that such an interference had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible for social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim.


78.  The applicant mentioned one tangible consequence of the refusal of naturalisation: he could not vote or stand for municipal and parliamentary elections, or elections to the European Parliament. However, the Court observes that the applicant’s complaint in the present case does not concern the rights laid down in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (contrast Ždanoka, cited above, § 73). Nor does the applicant allege a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of being unable to preserve his current civil status (contrast Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 314, ECHR 2012). Above all, the Court’s decision on the admissibility of the present application determines the scope of the case currently before it and it does not include any complaints other than those under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention (see paragraphs 3-4 above).


35.  The Government asserted that the application should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded on the grounds, among others, that the Spanish courts had acted in order to protect the rights of the two police officers established by Article <mask> of the Convention, as well as citizens’ right to receive accurate information, as laid down in Article 10 of the Convention.


54.  The applicants argued that the admissibility of their complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention had already been examined and there was no reason to reconsider this matter. According to them, the situation in the case of Babjak and Others (cited above) was substantially different from their case. The applicants also emphasised that the Government had been unable to show a single final judicial decision confirming their argument that the action for protection of personal integrity was an effective remedy in a situation comparable to theirs.


24.  The Government contested that argument, claiming that the Convention required States to provide for only one institution for the legal recognition of a stable relationship. A positive obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention to provide for such an institution could only arise in so far as couples had no access to marriage within the sense of Article 12.


106.  The applicant insisted that the estate in its entirety, and not his house alone, should be regarded as his home, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that in a traditional Chechen family such as his, particularly in rural areas, personal connections between various family members were tighter than in a modern nuclear family, and that in his case the tight family connections were, in addition, reinforced by the family business. He also pointed out that all the buildings in the estate were situated very close to each other and represented a single complex with a solid fence and a single entrance. The applicant further argued that although he and his family had been absent from the estate at the time of its occupation by the police units, it had not been abandoned, as public utilities had remained in service, the mill had been operational and grain had been stored in the storage facility. He also contested the Government's argument that the police units had been unable to obtain prior authorisation to move onto the applicant's estate in the absence of the local council in the village of Bratskoye. The applicant submitted that the latter had been properly functioning and that, moreover, at the end of September 1999 the administration of the Nadterechny District had been formed and its then head had held office until 9 December 1999.


77.  The Government accepted that there had been interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been justified. In particular, the secret surveillance orders had been based on Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been issued and supervised by an investigating judge pursuant to reasoned and substantiated requests from the OSCOC which the investigating judge had accepted as such. Moreover, such interference had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting crime and had been proportionate to the circumstances and gravity of the offence at issue.


22.  The applicant complained of an infringement of his private life on the grounds that he had lived in Greece for twelve years in a situation of uncertainty as regards his status, despite the favourable opinion issued by the Advisory Board on Asylum. More specifically, he submitted that he had been living in a state of insecurity for a very long period, and complained of the impact which that had had on his working and family life throughout that period and the lack of adequate procedural safeguards to protect him against arbitrary treatment by the authorities. He also alleged that he had had no effective remedy in order to complain of the aforementioned situation. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention read alone and in conjunction with Article 13.


38.  The Government acknowledged in general terms that there had been interference with the applicants’ right to respect for family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that the lawfulness and necessity of the decision to annul the first applicant’s residence permit had been duly examined by the domestic courts. The numerous administrative infractions by the first applicant had provided grounds for his exclusion. The domestic courts had found that he “had not demonstrated loyalty to Russian law and order, had violated Russian laws, and had systematically and intentionally committed administrative violations, including those representing danger to third persons; [such behaviour] had shown that the decision to annul the residence permit had been justified, fair, proportionate and had not contradicted the case-law of the European Court”. The first applicant had committed eighteen administrative infractions during the last three years that he had been living in Russia. The Government stressed that the procedural guarantees under Article 8 of the Convention had been complied with, which had been “verified by [an] independent court”.


118.  The applicants’ complaint concerning their inability to enjoy family life with Ruslan Askhabov, Isa Dubayev and Isa Dokayev concerns the same matters as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 16 December 1997, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII).


68.  The applicant complained, under Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention, about the failure of the domestic authorities to afford him adequate protection from an act of violence. The Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the present case these complaints fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads:


82.  The Government submitted that the authorities had taken all the necessary measures, as they had immediately opened an investigation into sexual exploitation and had convicted the perpetrators of that offence and identified the perpetrators of the sexual assault on the applicant. Referring to the Court’s judgment in the case of O’Keeffe v. Ireland ([GC], no. 35810/09, §§ 191-92, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), they argued that the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention did not raise a separate issue from that raised under Article 3 of the Convention.


52.  The applicant complained, under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, that his right to a fair trial and respect for his family life had been violated on account of the courts’ decisions to discontinue contact between him and his three children and their refusal to order family therapy, and the allegedly inadequate work of the welfare authorities. The Court, master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 114, ECHR 2018), will examine these complaints from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention alone (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, §§ 56 and 57, ECHR 2002‑I, and Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, nos. 8673/05 and 9733/05, § 111, 1 December 2009). This provision reads as follows:


115.  The applicant therefore cannot be said to have suffered from a lack of long-stay visits. It follows that the applicant cannot claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as he complained about the lack of long-stay visits from his wife (for the principles concerning victim status, see Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).


46.  The Government conceded that, at the time, the operator of the Internet server could not be ordered to provide information identifying the offender. They argued that protection was provided by the mere existence of the criminal offence of malicious misrepresentation and by the possibility of bringing criminal charges or an action for damages against the server operator. As to the former, the Court notes that the existence of an offence has limited deterrent effects if there is no means to identify the actual offender and to bring him to justice. Here, the Court notes that it has not excluded the possibility that the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 to safeguard the individual’s physical or moral integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation even where the criminal liability of agents of the State is not at issue (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 128, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII). For the Court, States have a positive obligation inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention to criminalise offences against the person, including attempted offences, and to reinforce the deterrent effect of criminalisation by applying criminal‑law provisions in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (see, mutatis mutandis, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 153). Where the physical and moral welfare of a child is threatened, such injunction assumes even greater importance. The Court notes in this connection that sexual abuse is unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with essential aspects of their private lives (see Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, § 64, Reports 1996‑IV).


38.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the applicants’ case and they were not victims of a violation of the Convention right they relied upon. In this connection, they contended that since the applicants had been staying at the scene of the demonstration as visitors, they could not invoke under Article 8 their right to respect for their home. Furthermore, since the applicants had not suffered any physical injury, they could not rely on Article 8 and the State’s obligation to protect their physical integrity against attacks by third persons. The Government also maintained that the applicants’ complaint concerning interference with their psychological integrity was to be considered under Article 3 rather than under Article 8 of the Convention, as in the cases of Karaahmed v. Bulgaria (no. 30587/13, 24 February 2015) and P.F. and E.F. v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 28326/09, 23 November 2010). In this respect the Government also submitted that the impugned treatment had not reached the minimum threshold of severity required for Article 3 to come into play.


34.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that conversations with their lawyers were conducted through a glass wall and were overheard or possibly even recorded and that the authorities had failed to provide proper conditions for private discussions with their lawyers. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, § 44), decided to examine the problem raised by the applicants under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and to obtain the parties' submissions thereon.


118.  The Government contested that argument. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had failed to submit any evidence in support of her factual claim that she had been evicted from her flat by the police. The Government further submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the applicant had sold her flat to Rufan Kazimov.


71.  The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant’s circumstances were not capable of coming within the ambit of private life under Article <mask> of the Convention as the provision did not provide a right to choose the country in which a person sought to reside and work without regard to that country’s immigration laws. Even assuming that the applicant had established private life in the United Kingdom and that it had been interfered with, such interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the maintenance and enforcement of immigration control, inter alia, for the preservation of the economic well‑being of the country, the protection of health and morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and was proportionate in the circumstances.


59.  The applicant pointed out that he had been a lawyer since the age of twenty-six and that he had been elected to Parliament for the first time at the age of sixty-six, when he was at the height of his career. Politics was thus a complement to a successful career; it was not the centre of his life and did not mark the end of his career as a lawyer. However, obliged as he was to withdraw from his parliamentary duties in order to be able to pursue his professional activities – a particularly apt field for the development of any individual’s personality, talents and skills – he had been subjected to an unjustified interference in his private and professional life. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


36.  The Government raised an objection based on the inapplicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the present application, submitting that it should be examined only under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that whilst, in the Mazurek and Merger and Cros judgments, the Court had found violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of inheritance disputes concerning illegitimate children, this was only because the applicant’s parent had already died at the material time so the applicant had acquired rights to a share in the estate (see Mazurek v. France, no. 34406/97, § 42, ECHR 2000‑II, and Merger and Cros v. France, no. 68864/01, § 32, 22 December 2004). They submitted that, contrary to the aforementioned cases, the applicant in the instant case did not have any right to a share in his late mother’s estate or property. They alleged, more specifically, that the applicant had inheritance rights but that, by virtue of the deed of inter vivos division of 1970, those rights lacked any real substance. The Government concluded that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was inapplicable (see, mutatis mutandis, Alboize-Barthes and Alboize-Montezume v. France (dec.), no. 44421/04, 21 October 2008).


34.  The applicants complained of the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Criminal Code, which criminalises homosexual acts of adult men with consenting adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18, and of their convictions under that provision. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, they alleged that their right to respect for their private life had been violated and that the contested provision was discriminatory, as heterosexual or lesbian relations between adults and adolescents in the same age bracket were not punishable.


359.  The Government contested the applicants’ argument. They submitted, firstly, that the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In their view, the relations between the US applicants and the children they sought to adopt constituted neither “family life” nor “private life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and did not fall within the ambit of that provision for the purposes of Article 14 either. The Government pointed out that the right to adopt is not, as such, included among the rights guaranteed by the Convention and that Article 8 does not oblige States to grant a person the status of adoptive parent or adopted child (see X v. Belgium and Netherlands, no. 6482/74, Commission decision of 10 July 1975, and Di Lazarro v. Italy, no. 31924/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997). Furthermore, according to the Court’s case law, the right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a family and does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family (see Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, § 32, ECHR 2002‑I).


111.  The applicant complained that, by failing to secure regular contact with her sons, which was necessary to maintain family ties between them, the domestic authorities had breached their positive obligations and thereby violated her right to respect for her family life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. She also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that she had not had an effective remedy by which to complain about that violation. The relevant part of those Articles reads as follows:


35.  The Government agreed that the eviction order of 8 June 2015 constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home. However, that interference had been in accordance with the law, had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of other individuals in need of social housing and had been “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, the first applicant’s tenancy agreement had come to an end after his retirement, and after the applicants’ eviction the flat in question had been provided to Sh., an employee of the prosecutor’s office. Therefore, there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


73.  The Government added that as surrogacy was a moral and ethical issue and there was no consensus on the question among the States Parties, the latter should be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in that area and in the manner in which they apprehended the effects of the relevant legal parent-child relationship established abroad. In their view, having regard to that wide margin of appreciation and the fact that the applicants were leading a normal family life on the basis of the US civil status of their children and that the latters’ best interests were protected, the interference in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention was “entirely proportionate” to the aims pursued, with the result that there had been no violation of that provision.


289.  The Government pointed out, first of all, that the relevant applicants had not adduced any documents proving their title to the houses, or any detailed description of the property allegedly lost by them. The Government argued that it was incumbent on the relevant applicants to have their property rights confirmed under domestic law by the competent national authorities. They further argued that the alleged interference with the relevant applicants’ rights secured by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been lawful, as the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic, in the context of which the strikes of 19 October 1999 had been executed, had been launched and carried out on the basis of Presidential Decrees nos. 2137, 2166 and 2155c of 30 November and 9 December 1994 and 23 September 1999 respectively, Governmental Decree no. 1360 of 9 December 1994, and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of 25 July 1998. In the Government’s submission, the aforementioned decrees, except for certain provisions, had been found compatible with the Russian Constitution by the Russian Constitutional Court. The Government insisted that all the aforementioned legal instruments had met the requirements of foreseeability and accessibility.


42.  The Government contended that according to the available evidence, the police officers did not carry out a search of the applicant organisation’s premises within the meaning of the criminal procedure rules. Furthermore, the police officers did not enter the offices of the public notaries, and even when collecting the relevant evidence they remained in the waiting area, which was open to the general public. Given that the police officers were not present at the signing of the sale contract behind closed doors, Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the instant case in so far as it concerned the applicant organisation’s right to respect for its home.


10.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the principle of equality of arms had been infringed on account of his lack of access to the classified information submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Supreme Military Administrative Court and the non-communication to him of the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor attached to this court. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the secret security investigation conducted by the Ministry of Defence in relation to him and his family had breached his right to private life.


51.  The Government further contended that the circumstances of this case did not fall under the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as there was no sufficient connection between the applicant and her nephew. Firstly, the applicant and her nephew were not close relatives biologically (such as mother and son). Secondly, the applicant had met her nephew only once (see paragraph 12 above).


70.  The applicant complained that the welfare authorities had unjustifiably taken his children into foster care and restricted his contact with them. He further complained that the court proceedings had not been conducted diligently; in particular that they had been excessively delayed, while his family ties with Y and Z had deteriorated. The Court considers that these issues fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention (see V.A.M. v. Serbia, no. 39177/05, § 115, 13 March 2007, and Karadžić v. Croatia, no. 35030/04, §§ 33-63 and 67, 15 December 2005).


19.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to respect for family life on account of the lack of practical opportunities for prison visits stemming from the decision to allocate him to a remote penal facility and his subsequent inability to obtain a transfer elsewhere. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


66.  The Government relied on three further arguments in contending that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. Firstly, there was no evidence to suggest that the transcript of the applicant’s communications had been disclosed to his work colleagues; the applicant himself had produced the full transcript of the messages in the proceedings before the domestic courts, without asking for any restrictions to be placed on access to the documents concerned. Secondly, the national authorities had used the transcript of the messages as evidence because the applicant had so requested, and because the prosecuting authorities had already found that the monitoring of his communications had been lawful. Thirdly, the information notice had contained sufficient indications for the applicant to have been aware that his employer could monitor his communications, and this had rendered them devoid of any private element.


35.  The Government argued that the authorities had acted diligently, without delays and within the limits of their powers, and had thus complied with their positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that the applicant had not complained about the assistance received from the bailiff and reiterated that the latter could not have forcibly taken the child away from the father. In their view, the person solely responsible for the non-enforcement was I.T.


32.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about unfair outcome of the proceedings against the local hospital and the courts’ incorrect assessment of evidence and interpretation of the law. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Certificate contained his personal data and was issued in breach of his right to private life.


33.  The applicant submitted that her inability to adopt Hind constituted an interference with her family life. She asserted that, even though she had been able, by judicial decision, to give the child her surname, her inability to obtain recognition of a legal parent-child relationship was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. She pointed out that Hind was born in Algeria but that she had no family ties in that country since her biological parents remained unknown. Having arrived in France at the age of three months, and having been brought up in that country, the girl had also developed all her cultural, social and emotional associations there.


22.  The Government invokes the case of B.G. v. Poland concerning Article <mask> of the Convention and Dubjaková v. Slovakia (both cited above) concerning Article 6 and argues that the amount awarded was adequate. However, the Court is of the opinion that the findings in the aforementioned cases cannot be relied on in the case at hand because of the different nature of the alleged violation. In consequence, the amount of compensation awarded at national level in cases related to different violations of the Convention cannot be regarded as decisive in cases raising issues under Article 3. Additionally, the Polish national system does not provide for any alternative form of redress for a violation of a prisoner’s rights on the grounds of detention in inadequate, overcrowded conditions. Financial compensation is the only post-violation measure available to victims but national law does not limit the amount of compensation (see, a contrario, Stella v. Italy (dec.), no. 49169/09, §§ 59-63).


34.  The Government did not dispute the fact that the censorship of the letter from the Constitutional Court, being a State authority within the meaning of Article 102 (11), and of the letter sent by the Court’s Registry constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence. They admitted that it had been in breach of Articles 102 (11) and 103 read in conjunction with Article 214 of the 6 June 1997 Code. In this respect, the Government pointed out that the rights of persons detained on remand should, in principle be at least equal to those of convicted persons serving a sentence of imprisonment. They submitted that under the above mentioned provisions both categories of correspondence were privileged and should not have been subjected to censorship. Accordingly, the measures imposed by the domestic authorities had been unlawful. However, the Government reserved their opinion on the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect.


73.  The applicant complained that his right to privacy had been breached because (i) the Internet service provider (hereinafter “the ISP”) had retained his alleged personal data unlawfully and (ii) the police had obtained subscriber data associated with his dynamic IP address and consequently his identity arbitrarily, without a court order, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


56.  The Government further contended that, even assuming that they had owed any duty vis-à-vis the applicant under Article <mask> of the Convention, they had taken all reasonable actions to ensure a fair balance between her interests and those of the community. Firstly, K. Street had served as a through road since 1983. In 1998 the street’s status as part of the motorway had merely been confirmed during the stocktaking project. The Government should therefore not be held responsible for the decision to route the traffic via K. Street. Secondly, following the entry of the Convention into force, the authorities had been contemplating the construction of a new through road, bypassing residential streets. However, they had had no choice but to use the existing road until the necessary funding could be found, as closing it off would have caused considerable detriment to the economic well-being of the country. Contrary to the applicant’s argument, the use of the road had not been at odds with applicable law, because paragraph 1.9 of the State Construction Guidelines had recommended, but had not required, that major motorways be constructed outside populated communities.


37.  The applicant complained that it was impossible for her to obtain cancellation of Mr D.’s registration as permanently resident at her house, a fact which disturbed her and adversely affected the assessment of her situation in various contexts, such as for the purpose of social contributions towards dwelling costs and the calculation of fees for the removal of household waste. She alleged a violation of her right to respect for her private life and home under Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


31.  The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been lawful and justified. In particular, the secret surveillance orders had been based on Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been issued and supervised by an investigating judge on the basis of reasoned and substantiated requests from the competent State Attorney’s Office. The interference had also pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting the crime of drug trafficking and had been proportionate to the circumstances, the gravity of the offence at issue and the applicant’s criminal activity.


68.  The applicant complained that the circumstances of his visit to a hospital to see his seriously ill daughter had violated his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and added, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that this matter had not been addressed by the domestic courts. Article 8 of the Convention has already been quoted above. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:


87.  The applicant argued that because of the failure of the national authorities to enforce their own decisions adopted in various proceedings instituted against B on charges of verbal and physical violence against her, she had no effective remedy by which to obtain protection against B's violence. The Court notes that these very same issues have already been examined above under Article <mask> of the Convention and have led to a finding of a violation of that Article. Therefore, the Court considers that in the specific circumstances of the present case it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.


61.  The applicant submitted that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention for the same reasons for which there had been a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. The lengthy and unjustified travel ban had practically destroyed his relations with his family in Germany. That could not be regarded as justified for the achievement of any legitimate aim. Nor could his family be required to mitigate the effects of the ban by settling in Bulgaria. The applicant also submitted that because of the criminal proceedings against him he had remained unemployed for a long period of time and thus been unable to pay maintenance to his family. Lastly, he maintained that, as was evident from the divorce petition lodged by his former wife, the divorce had been a direct consequence of the travel ban.


24.  The applicant further claimed that he did not have an effective remedy to protect his rights without suffering considerable financial loss, which resulted in him not enjoying the minimum protection of the right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention.  The applicant contested the Government’s submissions that the Supreme Court’s decision not to award damages and legal costs had been foreseeable, viewed in the light of the practice in this type of case, where statements are declared null and void.


233.  The Government asked the Grand Chamber to confirm the Chamber’s finding that the two applicants had lost their “victim” status. They had been granted both ex nunc and ex tunc permanent residence permits in the course of the proceedings before the Chamber and had been afforded just satisfaction in respect of the violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the Grand Chamber could not examine those parts of the application which had been declared inadmissible by the Chamber (they cited Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 61, ECHR 2007‑I).


73.  The applicants complained that the authorities had not taken effective measures to bring the nuisances from the computer club to an end. The Milevi sisters additionally complained about the passiveness of the authorities with regard to the electronic games club and the office in the flat adjoining theirs. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:


67.  The applicant complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Her right to due respect for her private life and her physical and moral integrity had been violated both substantively, by failing to provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion, and as regards the State’s positive obligations, by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights.


133.  The applicant stressed that the relevant legislation had given the authorities a virtually unlimited power to interfere with his correspondence. He maintained that, even assuming that the authorities had intended to secure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings in his case, the duration of that measure, as well as its scope and nature had by no means been necessary in a democratic society. The need to achieve the aim pursued by the authorities had not required them to read all his letters, notwithstanding whether they had been of strictly personal or of official character. In particular, there had been no reason whatsoever to open and read his correspondence to the lawyer representing him before the Commission and the Court, as such letters were privileged under Article <mask> of the Convention.


55.  The Government, at the outset, submitted that the widow's pension did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention because it was payable following bereavement and, in contrast to the widowed mother's allowance, was not aimed at enhancing family or private life. However, later in the proceedings before the Court the Government accepted the applicant's argument that the widow's pension fell within the ambit of that Article.


32.  The applicants complained that the decision to remove the first applicant constituted an unjustified interference with their family life, in so far as it had led to the separation of the nuclear family. In particular, the applicants argued that the first applicant's removal had not been necessary in a democratic society and was in breach of the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


47.  The Government denied, however, that the inability to adopt Hind constituted an “interference” with the applicant’s family life. The Court shares that view. It observes in this connection that the applicant did not complain of any major hindrance to the continuance of her family life but argued that to ensure respect for the latter it was necessary to equate kafala with full adoption and thus to recognise a legal parent-child relationship, this being excluded by Article 370-3 of the Civil Code where the child’s country of origin prohibited adoption. In those circumstances, the Court finds it more appropriate to examine the complaint in terms of positive obligations. In this connection, the Court would draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the situation in the present case, where the law of the respondent State merely refuses to equate kafala with adoption and refers to the child’s personal law to determine whether such adoption is possible, and, on the other, the situation in the Wagner and J.M.W.L. judgment (cited above), where it decided that the Luxembourg courts, in refusing to grant enforcement of an adoption decision by a Peruvian court, had disregarded the legal status validly created abroad, in an unreasonable manner, and had thus breached Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the notion of “respect” as understood in Article 8 is not clear cut, especially as far as the positive obligations inherent in that concept are concerned: having regard to the diversity of practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case and the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the authorities may be wider than that applied in other areas under the Convention. In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must also be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual, the search for which balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention (see Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 72, ECHR 2002‑VI).


107.  The applicant argued that the courts’ interpretation of section 116 of the Family Act in her case had amounted to discrimination against people with mental illnesses. In particular, the domestic courts’ conclusion that a parent suffering from mental illness was unfit for the everyday care of his or her child and also unworthy of parental rights despite the fact that he or she did not neglect the child voluntarily was in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. States should take effective measures to tackle discrimination against people with disabilities, and those people should be afforded an opportunity to influence decisions which interfered with their rights and interests. Moreover, there was no objective and reasonable justification for her discriminatory treatment.


49.  The applicant complained about the rupture of her family ties with her daughter caused by the lack of a prompt reaction from the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities in respect of return of the child, the length of the custody proceedings in Romania, and the enforcement of her custody rights over the child. She relied in substance on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


55.  The applicant submitted that the restrictions on him practising law as an advocate had interfered with his right to respect for his private life and were therefore covered by Article <mask> of the Convention. He relied on a number of Court judgments, including Niemietz v. Germany (16 December 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251‑B). He disagreed with the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


44.  The applicant complained that the Hungarian authorities had failed to execute the judicial decision establishing the residence of her child with her and thus also failed to ensure the swift return of her child after his father had taken him without her consent. In so doing, the authorities had failed to secure her parental rights with respect to her son. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


27.  The applicant considers that donating “her” five cryopreserved embryos that are not destined for implantation pertains to her “private life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and fulfils a public interest, since it provides researchers with stem cells much needed for research on incurable diseases[35]. On the basis of the above-mentioned interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 18 of the Oviedo Convention, the Government’s argument that section 13 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004 pursues the legitimate aim of protecting the embryo’s potential for life is acceptable. In that light, scientific research on a human embryo, authorised for therapeutic and diagnostic purposes with the aim of protecting the health and development of that embryo when no alternative methods exist, is an admissible exception to the prohibition of scientific research on human embryos.


43.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that both the Assize Court and the Court of Cassation had failed to deliver reasoned judgments. Relying upon Article 6 § 3 of the Convention, he also argued that he had not been given sufficient time to prepare his defence and that he had not had the opportunity to examine witnesses. Finally, invoking Article <mask> of the Convention, he repeated the complaint he had made under Article 3.


177.  The applicants' complaint concerning their inability to enjoy family life with Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev concerns the same facts as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, judgment of 16 December 1997, § 50, Reports 1997‑VIII).


98.  The Government further indicated that in 2002 municipal decree no. 30 had been annulled, and, at present, the boundary of the sanitary security zone remains undefined. The Federal Program of 1996, which provided for the resettlement of the residents of the zone, is no longer in force. On these grounds on 12 July 2002 the Cherepovets Town Court rejected the first applicant's claims against the steel-plant. However, in the Court's view, it does not mean that the danger for the first and other applicants' health and well-being is no longer there. The de facto abolishment of the sanitary security zone was decided not because the concentrations of toxic substances reached safe levels, but on formal grounds. For almost ten years decree no. 30 was in force and applied by the courts. Its validity has not been called into question either by the steel-plant, or by the municipality itself. Moreover, on many occasions various domestic official bodies confirmed that the applicants lived in the territory of the sanitary security zone where concentrations of certain toxic substances were above acceptable levels and which was therefore unsuitable for human residence. At last, in their observations on admissibility and merits the Government admitted that the applicants' houses were located within the zone (see the decision on admissibility of the present cases of 16 September 2004). Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the annulment of decree no. 30 and ensuing changes in the legal status of the zone has no bearing on the applicants' situation from the standpoint of their complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the lack of a regulatory framework for the legal recognition of his gender identity and about the requirement, which had no basis in domestic law, that he undergo genital surgery as a precondition for having his (male) gender identity recognised. Under Article 13, the applicant alleged a lack of an effective remedy. The Court considers that this later complaint is absorbed by the applicant’s complaint about the lack of legal framework for legal gender recognition and will be analysed accordingly. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


21.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable on the grounds that at the material time or at the time of introduction of the application the SNCF could not be regarded as a public authority within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 8 and that there had been no interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life within the meaning of that provision.


37.  The applicant submitted that the interception of his mail in prison, although formally based on the relevant provisions of the 1969 Execution of Punishments Act, had been unlawful, because it had been contrary to the provisions of Articles 34 and 35 § 5 of 1991 Constitution and of section 18(2) of the 1991 Bar Act. A provision similar to the one in the applicant’s case, but applicable only to remand prisoners, had been declared invalid by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2000. Moreover, section 132g of the 1969 Execution of Punishments Act had been declared unconstitutional and contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention in 2006. However, as this declaration had had only prospective effect, it had not impacted on the applicant’s situation. His mail with his lawyer had been opened and read by the prison authorities, which had caused him to feel vulnerable and had obliged the lawyer to visit him in prison. That measure had not been authorised by a judicial authority and had not been intended to uncover or prevent offences.


66.  The Government took the view that there had not been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The domestic courts’ decisions concerning the applicant’s access to and information about F. had not interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. Referring to the Court’s case‑law (they cited, in particular, L. v. the Netherlands, no. 45582/99, and Hülsmann v. Germany (dec.), no. 33375/03, 18 March 2008), the Government argued that mere biological kinship, without any close personal relationship, was insufficient to attract the protection of Article 8 § 1. In the present case, F. lived together with his mother and his legal father in a stable family unit.