64.  The applicant complained under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention that it had been arbitrarily stripped of its legal-entity status as a result of the refusal to re-register it as a religious organisation. The Court recalls that in a recent case it examined a substantially similar complaint about the refusal of re-registration of a religious organisation from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention read in the light of Article 9 (see The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, no. 72881/01, §§ 74 and 75, ECHR 2006‑...). The Court observes that the religious nature of the applicant was not disputed at the national level and it had been officially recognised as a religious organisation since 1994. In the light of this, the Court finds that the applicant's complaints must be examined from the standpoint of Article 11 of the Convention read in the light of Article 9.


107.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


39.  The Government considered that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the present case on the grounds that neither the first applicant nor the other persons wishing to join the applicant trade union had held employee status. They pointed out that in its relevant well-established case-law the Court had confirmed the applicability of the part of Article 11 of the Convention relating to trade union freedom exclusively in cases in which the applicants had, in fact, been employees. The Government quoted the examples of the Case of National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (27 October 1975, Series A no. 19), Case of Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden (6 February 1976, Series A no. 20), Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom (nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96, ECHR 2002‑V) and Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (cited above).


54.  The Government further argued that the bans had been prescribed by law, namely section 12(2)(2) of the Meetings and Marches Act. Also, the measures complained of had pursued a wide range of legitimate aims: protecting national security and public safety, guaranteeing public order in the local community, protecting the rights and freedoms of others and preventing disorder and crime. They had also been necessary in a democratic society, because the authorities had acted in conformity with the laws of the country, their actions had not been arbitrary and they had complied with their positive obligations to guarantee the citizens’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II, pp. 652‑53, § 45), the Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to be employed to attain a legitimate aim.


32.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that UMO Ilinden – PIRIN had been declared unconstitutional and as a result dissolved. They submitted that this interference with their freedom of association had not been prescribed by law, as in its interpretative judgment no. 7 of 1996 the Constitutional Court had held that restrictions of freedom of speech – which, in the applicants’ view, applied mutatis mutandis to freedom of association – would only be justified if the speech in issue posed an immediate threat of violent overturning of the constitutional order and democracy. The applicants further submitted that the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society, as the Constitutional Court had failed to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons for declaring the applicant party unconstitutional.


49.  The applicant argued that his convictions under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 had constituted an interference with his right to freedom of assembly. He stated that the interference in question had not been prescribed by law, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, since he had been unable to foresee that his participation in the funeral of 28 March 2006 or the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and his conduct during those events would lead to his prosecution and conviction for membership of an illegal organisation and a prison sentence of seven years and eleven months. The applicant referred to the opinion of the dissenting assize court judge (see paragraph 21 above).


81.  The applicant alleged a violation of his right to peaceful assembly. He complained, in particular, of disruptive security measures implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square, the early termination of the assembly, and his own arrest followed by his conviction for an administrative offence. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


229.  The Government did not appear to contest that the fifth applicant, regardless of the fact that proceedings against him had been discontinued, could still claim to be a “victim” of a violation of his right under Article <mask> of the Convention and that there had been an interference with that right (see paragraph 199 above). In any event, like the other applicants, the fifth applicant was removed from the site by the police, which in itself constitutes an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and later formally reprimanded for his actions (see paragraphs 43 and 62 above). Therefore, the applicant can continue to claim to be the victim of an interference with his right under Article 11 of the Convention.


61.  The applicants submitted that the ban on meetings organised by them in commemoration of certain historical events, and the attitude of the authorities at the relevant time were aimed at suppressing the free expression of ideas at peaceful gatherings. As such they amounted to an interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, seen against this background as lex specialis in relation to Article 10 of the Convention.


42.  The Government went on to say that in upholding the mayor’s decision to ban the rally, the Blagoevgrad District Court had not relied on the fact that the organisation staging the rally had not been registered – grounds previously found deficient by this Court – and therefore no issue arose under Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to that aspect of its reasoning. That court had relied on public-order considerations and had had regard to the discretion enjoyed by the mayor in such matters. The rally planned for 30 September 2006 had coincided with an event planned by the municipality, and the mayor had been entitled to take measures to ensure that that event unfolded smoothly.


50.  The applicants complained of an interference with their freedom to hold opinions, the opinion in question being that an employee should be allowed to choose to be represented by a trade union in negotiations with the employer. The Court does not, however, consider that any separate issue arises under Article 10 that has not already been dealt with in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention. It is not, therefore, necessary to examine this complaint separately.


82.  The Government further submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed by law. They noted in this regard that the applicant’s conviction had been based on section 23(b) of Law no. 2911 and Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. According to the Government, these provisions, and in particular Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code, fulfilled the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


106.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the domestic proceedings had been excessively long and that the courts had been partial and biased because they had ruled against him. He also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the imposition of an administrative fine. In so far as the applicant complained about the unfavourable outcome of the judicial proceedings concerning his right to freedom of assembly, the Court notes that this issue has already been addressed above and has led to a finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The proceedings lasted less than one year, which is not in excess of a “reasonable time”, and the allegation of partiality and bias is not supported by any material in the case-file. It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


49.  The applicant organisation claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for the non‑pecuniary damage arising out of the violation of its Convention rights. It claimed that its opposition to the actions of the municipality had been frustrated which had been further intensified by the involvement of the police and the latter's insistence that its leaders sign declarations that they would not violate the issued prohibition. The applicant organisation also claimed that the lengthy proceedings before the domestic courts and the uselessness of the resulting judgment created further frustration and a sense of helplessness in the face of the unlawful actions of the authorities. It also referred to other cases against Bulgaria, where the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and had awarded compensation for non‑pecuniary damage to the applicants in those cases (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 121; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 122; and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, § 67, 20 October 2005).


169.  The Government argued that the applicant’s punishment for participation in mass disorder and using violence against the police officer related to acts unconnected with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of assembly. The Court observes that the acts imputed to the applicant included chanting anti-government slogans during the dispersal of the assembly and throwing an unidentified round yellow object in the direction of the police cordon; the object hit police officer F. causing no injury. The Court has previously examined a number of cases where the demonstrators had engaged in acts of violence and found that the demonstrations in questions had been within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention on the basis that the organisers of these assemblies had not expressed violent intentions and there were no grounds to believe that the assemblies were not meant to be peaceful. The Court found that the applicants in those cases enjoyed the protection of Article 11 of the Convention and examined whether the measures taken against them were justified under the second paragraph of this provision. In one of these cases it found a violation of Article 11 of the Convention on account of a disproportionate sentence imposed on the applicant for attending a demonstration and throwing stones at the security forces (see Gülcü v. Turkey, no. 17526/10, §§ 91-97, 19 January 2016). In other cases it found that the authorities’ response to violence had been proportionate and complied with Article 11 of the Convention (see Osmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 50841/99, ECHR 2001‑X; Protopapa v. Turkey, no. 16084/90, §§ 104-12, 24 February 2009; and Primov and Others v. Russia, no. 17391/06, §§ 156-63, 12 June 2014).


14.  The applicant complained that the failure by the Ministry of Justice to register the public association in a timely manner constituted an interference with her freedom of association. As the Ministry evaded registering the organisation by significantly delaying the examination of the founders' registration requests and breaching the statutory time-limit for the official response, her association could not acquire legal status. This allegedly constituted a violation of her right to freedom of association, as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


113.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant's right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant's rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


34.  The applicant alleged a breach of her right to freedom of peaceful assembly with other aliens for the purposes of denouncing their treatment. The interference with that right was not prescribed by law (as the evacuation order was illegal), and was neither justified by a legitimate aim, nor proportionate. She alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


28.  The applicant complained under Article 13 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention that they did not have an effective remedy against the alleged violation of their freedom of assembly. They complained that there was no effective procedure which would have allowed them to obtain a final decision prior to the date of the planned demonstrations. Article 13 of the Convention reads:


72.  The applicant complained that the statutory ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public deprived her of the possibility of wearing the Islamic full-face veil in public places. She alleged that there had been a violation of her right to freedom of association and discrimination in the exercise of that right. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, taken separately and together with the above-cited Article 14. Article 11 reads as follows:


116.  The applicants maintained that their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached since their employer had acted with the intention of deterring and penalising trade union membership. They submitted that the State had been directly involved in a number of unfavourable acts against them as members of the DUR trade union, as it controlled the Kaliningrad seaport company. They alleged that twenty percent of the shares had been held by the Kaliningrad Regional Development Fund and a further thirty-five percent had been controlled by Mr Karetniy, who had held simultaneously the positions of first deputy Governor, manager of the Fund and member of the board of the seaport company.


49.  The applicants claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. They submitted that the ban of the meeting in issue in the present case had been only one of many such bans. They also pointed out that despite the numerous rulings by the Court relating to earlier breaches of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Bulgarian Government’s policy toward them had improved little if at all. This had made them feel a particularly acute sense of injustice and helplessness, and had exacerbated the distress suffered by them on account of the breach of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly.


41.  The applicants went on to argue that the only reason for the violation of their right to freedom of association had been their Macedonian ethnicity. That was evident from the broader context, and in particular, two elements. The first was the systematic restrictions of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, as well as the rights of other ethnic Macedonians, during the past two and a half decades, and the second element was the Bulgarian State’s policy of denying the existence of a Macedonian ethnic identity in Bulgaria (see Kiril Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 17599/07, §§ 66-67, 11 January 2018).


103.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant’s right to demonstrate under Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in an aggravated and serious manner. The acts of the respondent Government were a deliberate and provocative attempt to disrupt a lawful demonstration in an area which was subject to UN patrols and not even within the claimed jurisdiction of the “TRNC”. The interference with the applicant’s rights was not prescribed by law and was an excessive and disproportionate response to a peaceful and lawful demonstration. The respondent Government had not identified any legitimate aim that they were seeking to serve by assaulting the applicant.


17.  The applicant association complained that the refusal of the respondent State to register it as a religious community constituted a violation of its rights under Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention. For the reasons stated in the OOA case, the Court considers that these complaints should be analysed from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention read in the light of Article 9 (see ibid., § 61). These Articles read as follows:


38.  The applicants pointed out that the articles and drawings were not signed and concerned a debate in exclusively employment and trade-union matters, conducted via the union’s medium of communication. It was thus arbitrary to consider that its members had all been personally responsible for this publication, resulting in either disciplinary liability of a collective nature or a patently illegal action, requiring the dissolution of the trade union within the company by dismissing its founder members in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


49.  The Government objected that the dismissal of employees of the Tukaş company had not interfered with trade-union freedom as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Even assuming that there had been such an interference, the labour courts had afforded redress for it by finding in favour of the dismissed employees. Each of them had received compensation for wrongful dismissal equivalent to one year’s wages.


43.  The applicants pointed out that the interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had not been lawful. The police had had no power to give them orders because they had not committed any administrative or criminal offence. The authorities had failed to effectively inform the demonstrators of the termination of the assembly and of the order to disperse. The applicants had been unaware of their decision to end the assembly. They pointed out that under domestic law the police were required to suspend the assembly first, and to give the organisers time to remedy any breach, before they could terminate it. However, in the present case no time had been given either to the organisers or to the demonstrators to follow the police instructions to disperse.


139.  The applicants placed particular emphasis on the deficiencies of the reasoning adduced by the domestic authorities. Both sides asked the Court to re-examine the proportionality of the “interference”, while raising a disagreement about certain circumstances having significance for such an assessment. The Court, for its part, is not satisfied that the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the “interference” under Article <mask> of the Convention were sufficient for then sentencing four applicants to detention. Faced with the domestic courts’ failure to give reasons that would be both relevant and sufficient to justify the interference, the Court finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have “applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 11” or to have “based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts” (see paragraph 131 above; see also Novikova and Others v. Russia, nos. 25501/07 and 4 others, § 152, 26 April 2016, and Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, § 24, 26 January 2017).


66.  The Government were of the opinion that the applicant was free to put his Convention complaints before the civil court in summary proceedings. There was nothing to prevent the applicant from seeking an interim measure in summary proceedings, for which legal representation is not mandatory and, in any event, free legal aid was available to him. Moreover, the applicant was well aware of this possibility because, together with four other inmates of the Point Blanche Penitentiary, he took civil proceedings before the Court of First Instance of St. Maarten, claiming the same remission of sentence granted to detainees in the Koraal Specht Prison on grounds of overcrowding, as well as claiming the right to create an association of detainees in the Penitentiary. This resulted in a judgment of 18 April 1997 in which it was held inter alia that, on the basis of Article <mask> of the Convention, inmates could claim the right of assembly and that, consequently, in all reasonableness and for the purposes of formalising the proposed association, the inmates’ representative and notary public could not be refused entry to the Point Blanche Penitentiary. It therefore ordered the authorities of the Netherlands Antilles to allow a notary public entry into the establishment. However, for reasons that are unclear, the applicant failed to avail himself of this remedy.


74.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court observes in this connection that the applicants had permission to organise a meeting on the premises of the University on 3 July 2006 and that they had availed themselves of that opportunity. During the first phase of their protest on that day they gathered, as duly authorised by the University administration, in one of the lecture halls (see paragraph 11 above). They moved, however, soon afterwards to the acting Rector’s office, protesting against the ongoing University reform and demanding his resignation. The events which developed subsequent to their unauthorised entry to the Rector’s office do not represent, in the Court’s view, a standard situation of a “peaceful assembly” within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. As noted in Kudrevičius and Others, although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention (cited above, paragraph 97; see also Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, §§ 123-128, 25 July 2017). Nevertheless, the Court notes that the applicants were not held responsible for using violence. While the events at issue happened in a situation of tension, the applicants’ conduct was not established to have been of a violent nature. The Court thus does not consider that the applicants’ protest on 3 July 2006, viewed as a whole, was of such a nature and degree as to exclude them from the scope of protection under Article 11 of the Convention, read in the light of Article 10.


34.  The Government disputed that there had been any restriction on the applicant’s right of association, as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention, with respect to either his right to form and join trade unions or his right not to belong to an association. The applicant was not a member of the FII and had not been coerced in any way into becoming a member. The applicant was only one of 10,000 – in a country with a population of 300,000 – who were subject to the industry charge. The amount of the industry charge was very low, constituting 0.08% of business turnover. It was not a membership fee but a tax imposed for a specific purpose laid down in statute, in the Industry Charge Act (“the 1993 Act”), namely to promote industry and industrial development in Iceland. Like other taxes, the charge was collected by the State. In accordance with the Act, the funds were disbursed to the FII, which was obliged to use them for the stated purpose. It should be stressed that, even though the FII was a non-governmental organisation, it had been given a clear and legally prescribed role in one aspect, which was to use the industry charge for the benefit of industry as a whole. This included the applicant as a self-employed individual.


47.  The Government disputed that there had been any interference with the negative aspect of the applicant’s right to freedom of association, as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. It submitted that the applicant company was merely under the obligation to pay contributions to the Social Welfare Fund which were used to pay benefits to employers and employees in the building industry. The applicant company did not become, nor was it obliged to become, a member of the Social Welfare Fund on account of the declaration of general applicability of the VTV, nor of the employers’ associations which concluded the VTV. It was not threatened with sanctions or other disadvantages if it did not join. There was, therefore, no compulsion that the applicant company join an association.


65. The applicant invokes two separate Convention provisions: Article 10 and Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Court’s opinion, in the circumstances of the present case, Article 10 of the Convention is to be regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11, which is a lex specialis. The thrust of the applicant’s complaint is that he was prevented from attending a peaceful assembly, the March of Dissent in Samara. The Court therefore finds that the applicant’s complaint should be examined under Article 11 of the Convention alone. At the same time, notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 of the Convention must also be considered in the light of Article 10, where the aim of the exercise of freedom of assembly is the expression of personal opinions as well as the need to secure a forum for public debate and the open expression of protest (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, §§ 85 and 86, ECHR 2015).


47.  The applicants alleged a violation of their right to peaceful assembly. They complained, in particular, of disruptive security measures implemented at the site of the meeting at Bolotnaya Square, of the early termination of the protest and about their arrest followed by their conviction for administrative offences. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


127.  The applicants complained that, as they had been victims of aggression in relation to their participation in a peaceful assembly, by failing to conduct effective investigations the State had breached its positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention, taken alone or together with Article 14. They further complained that they had had no effective remedy at their disposal to complain either about the fact that the crimes against them had been motivated by their sexual orientation, or that the criminal investigation had lasted too long and had been inefficient, thus hindering their access to civil redress. The complaints were communicated to the respondent Government under Articles 11, 13 and 14, which read as follows:


41.  The applicants alleged that the forfeiture of their parliamentary seats following the dissolution of the DEP by the Constitutional Court had infringed their right to freedom of association under Article <mask> of the Convention. They also alleged a violation of Articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.


45.  The Government submitted that the main reason why the domestic courts had declared the Annex null and void, with retrospective (ex tunc) effect, was that it had not been entered into by all the trade unions that had concluded the main Collective Agreement for the Health and Health Insurance Sector (see paragraphs 23 and 26-29 above). Given that the applicant union must have been aware of that fact before calling the strike, the Government concluded that the union must also have known that the Annex had been invalid from the outset and that therefore any industrial action in support of it had been unlawful and unnecessary. In particular, given that the main ground for the strike had been the alleged non-observance of the obligations arising from the Annex (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant union must have been aware that by organising and holding the strike it could not have forced the State to comply with the invalid Annex. Consequently, in the Government’s view, the applicant union could not have protected the interests of its members by holding the strike in question and thus could not complain of its prohibition by relying on Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The Government conceded that the refusal of the domestic courts to register the applicant association amounted to an interference with its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the refusal had been lawful and had pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, the reasons adduced by the courts had been relevant and sufficient. In this connection they submitted that the language used in the minutes of the constituent assembly (see paragraph 4 above) demonstrated that the applicant association was disrespectful of the MOC and offended the religious beliefs of its adherents.


63.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that given its violent character, the demonstration was clearly outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention and constituted an unlawful assembly. Knives and other cutting instruments had been found in the possession of some of the arrested demonstrators. The Government referred on this point to sections 70, 71, 80 and 82 of the Cyprus Criminal Code, which was applicable in the “TRNC” (see paragraphs 22-25 above) and recalled that according to Chapter 155 of the Criminal Procedure Law (see paragraph 26 above), the police had the power to arrest persons involved in violent demonstrations. Moreover, it was an offence under the laws of the “TRNC” to violate the borders of the State.


37.  The Government contested that argument. They considered that the proposal made by the city authorities as to the change of the venue of the rally ignored by its organisers should not be construed as an infringement of the applicant’s rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the applicant’s arrest and ensuing administrative proceedings, the Government considered such measures proportionate to the aim of maintaining public order pursued by the law enforcement authorities. Lastly, they submitted that the fine in the amount of RUB 500 imposed on the applicant had not been a severe sanction.


44.  The applicant asserted that the State had the positive obligation to secure to him the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention (see Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668/96 and 2 others, § 41, ECHR 2002‑V, and Gustafsson v. Sweden, 25 April 1996, § 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II). He considered, in particular, that it was the authorities’ primary obligation to enact legislation governing the effective execution of railway employees’ right to strike. However, Parliament had failed to enact a federal law listing those categories of railway workers who were prohibited from participating in strikes under Article 26 § 2 of the 2003 Railway Act.


49.  The Government conceded that the Zagreb County Court’s judgment of 8 April 2005 (see paragraph 19 above) prohibiting the applicant union from holding a strike on 11 April 2005, which had been upheld by the Supreme Court’s judgment of 27 April 2005 (see paragraph 23 above), had constituted an interference with the applicant union’s freedom of association. The Court, having regard to its case-law according to which strike action is protected under Article <mask> of the Convention (see Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01, § 24, 21 April 2009, and National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, no. 31045/10, § 84, ECHR 2014), sees no reason to hold otherwise.


49.  The applicants alleged that the dissolution of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and the temporary prohibition barring its leaders – including Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Şevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal – from holding similar office in any other political party had infringed their right to freedom of association, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:


65.  The applicants claimed jointly 50,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for the non‑pecuniary damage they had sustained as a result of the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention found in the present case. In support of their claims they stressed that the applicant party had been politically active for approximately a year before being dissolved and had successfully participated in local government elections. They further argued that as persons who identify themselves as ethnic Macedonians they faced a long‑standing policy of denial of their political rights, which was apparent from the Court’s judgment in the case of Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden (cited above). In their view, this called for a higher award of non‑pecuniary damages.


85.  The Government maintained that in all cases where there had been an interference with the applicants' rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, that interference had been lawful and had been based on the unambiguous wording of section 12 of the Meetings and Marches Act. This was the sole basis for the decisions of the mayors and for those of the courts examining the applications for judicial review of the mayors' decisions.


33.  The applicant submitted that for an employee to lose his job for exercising his right to freedom of association struck at the “very substance” of that right. Consequently, he contended that the Government had a positive obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention to enact legislation which would have afforded him protection from the termination of his employment by Serco on the ground of his involvement with the BNP. However, since he had less than one year’s qualifying service, he was unable to bring a claim for unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996.


49.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings in his case. He further complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that the courts dealing with his case had not been impartial. Relying on Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been unlawfully induced to sign an administrative record documenting his offence. He finally alleged that he had been discriminated against on the ground of social status, in violation of Article 14 of the Convention.


20.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective channels of complaint on the same basis that they had argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. Having rejected the latter argument above (paragraph 13), the Court concludes that the applicant did not have an effective domestic remedy, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, to redress the damage created by the delay in the present proceedings (see Voytenko cited above, §§ 46-48). Accordingly, there has been a breach of this provision.


24.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint that she did not have at her disposal an effective remedy by which to complain about the excessive length of the proceedings in her case. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


73.  The applicants complained of a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on account of the mental suffering caused to them by the disappearance of their brother and the unlawfulness of his detention. They also argued that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, there had been no available domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violations, in particular those under Articles 2 and 3. These Articles read, in so far as relevant:


135.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and had availed themselves of it. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


26.  The applicant complained about the Bankya mayor’s refusal to comply with the judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 9 January 2009 ordering him to issue a certificate and a plan of the plot of land. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court is of the view that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


26.  The applicant complained that he had been arbitrarily held in detention in Turkey for a long time. He also argued that he had had no domestic remedy whereby he could obtain compensation for his allegedly arbitrary detention. In this connection, the applicant relied on Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 5 of the Convention. He further invoked a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, stating that he had no effective remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention.


59.  The Government submitted that the investigation into the killing of Khozh‑Akhmed Akhmadov had not yet been completed. They further argued, in relation to the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, that it had been open to the applicant to lodge court complaints about any acts or omissions on the part of the investigating authorities. Moreover, she could have applied for civil compensation.


94.  The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings which concerned each of them had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The second and the third applicants further complained, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, that they had not had effective remedies in respect of the excessive length of the proceedings.


45.  The Government’s main argument was that Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 did not apply in the instant case. Firstly, since 7 November 2005 (the date on which he had obtained refugee status), the applicant no longer faced a risk of deportation, with the result that the complaint under Article 3 was no longer “arguable” and Article 13 could no longer be relied on in conjunction with that Article. Secondly, the Government argued, the applicant had lost his status as victim, as Article 13 could not be dissociated from the Articles to which it applied. As he could no longer claim to be the victim of a violation of Article 3, neither could he claim to be the victim of a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with that Article.


110.  The applicants also alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the administrative proceedings conducted against them. In view of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


61.  The Government maintained that the applicant’s allegations were effectively examined in the course of the relevant criminal inquiry and investigation. The Court notes that, in addition to the theft, the domestic criminal law provided for a series of offences which potentially covered the actions complained of by the applicant (see paragraphs 33 - 35 above). Moreover, the applicant’s civil claim was joined to the criminal case concerning the alleged theft for a joint examination of criminal responsibility and civil liability arising from the same culpable actions (see paragraph 15 above). Accordingly, the Court will examine whether the criminal procedures pursued by the applicant were effective for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


72.  The applicants maintained that they had become direct targets in China on account of their political and religious beliefs. For that reason, they would be exposed to a real risk of being executed or subjected to incommunicado detention, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if returned to China. They further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that there was no effective domestic remedy at their disposal with regard to their complaints under Articles 2 and 3, whereby the risks involved in their deportation could be subjected to meaningful judicial scrutiny in a timely manner. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:


31.  The applicants complained, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention, that they had been ordered to pay into the insolvency estate the money received from K. without any proof of bad faith on their part and without any reasonable chance to recover that money, in particular by joining the insolvency proceedings.


21.  The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he had been threatened with deportation to Iran or Iraq, alleging that he would be exposed to a clear risk of death or ill-treatment if deported. He maintained that removal to Iran would expose him to a real risk of death or ill‑treatment. In particular, as a former member of the PMOI, he runs the risk of being subjected to the death penalty in Iran. The applicant further submitted that, in Iraq, he would be subjected to ill-treatment as in that country he is considered by the authorities to be an ally of the former Saddam Hussein regime. The applicant finally submitted under Article <mask> of the Convention that he did not have an effective domestic remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. In this connection, the applicant maintained that he had not been served with a deportation order and that he had been denied access to the asylum procedure in Turkey.


128.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and had availed themselves of it. They added that participants in criminal proceedings could also claim damages in civil proceedings. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


54.  The Government submitted that the applicant's right guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention had been fully respected as police officer Mr N., who had broken into the applicant's house and had beaten him and his daughter up, had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. In addition, compensation of RUB 25,000 had been awarded to the applicant and his daughter. The Government stressed that the applicant's tort action against State bodies, including the Yemelyanovskiy district police department which had employed officer N., had lacked any legal basis as “dual compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the same actions of the person concerned [was] impossible”.


118.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


92.  The applicant also complained, under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, that his rights during the enforcement of the judgment against him had been breached, and that the District Administration had acted unlawfully in taking the books from the publishing house, not returning them in accordance with the court order of 5 October 2000, and distributing them as they saw fit having cut out the pages containing the disputed statements. In addition, he complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had had no effective remedies to complain about various elements of purported procedural unfairness in the proceedings to which he was a party and the allegedly unlawful conduct of various authorities and cited Article 17 of the Convention with respect to the facts of the present case.


117.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court, and the first applicant had availed herself of it. They added that participants in criminal proceedings could also claim damages in civil proceedings and referred to cases where victims in criminal proceedings had been awarded damages from state bodies and, in one instance, the prosecutor's office. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


86.  The applicant also alleged that the police had purposefully delayed the criminal proceedings to cover up the unlawful search, seizure and retention of his property and that there had been no way for him to obtain redress for this situation. In this connection, he referred to Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 13 reads as follows:


25.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant's complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for complaining about inhuman and degrading conditions of his detention. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government's objection to the merits of the applicant's complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


60.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been deprived of property they had acquired by virtue of the Sozopol land commission’s decision of 20 October 1997 and the Burgas District Court’s judgment of 26 July 1999. Relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, they further complained that the restitution procedure, taken in its entirety, had continued for an unreasonably lengthy period of time.


54.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint that he did not had at his disposal an effective remedy for the complaint that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by being deprived of effective medical care and being detained in inadequate conditions at the medical colony. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


70.  The applicants complained that, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the domestic courts had not been independent and impartial. They noted that, in accordance with the law applicable at the time of the events in question, the selection of candidates to judicial positions in Azerbaijan was performed by the Judicial Legal Council under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, presided over by the Minister of Justice. The applicants alleged that, in such circumstances, the judges of the domestic courts could not be independent and impartial in the proceedings against the Ministry of Justice, because their subsequent re-appointment to the courts would depend on the discretion of the Minister of Justice as the Chairman of the Judicial Legal Council. Furthermore, in conjunction with Article 6 § 1, the applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts could not be considered as an effective remedy because they had never ruled against the Ministry of Justice in cases concerning the delays in registration of non-governmental organisations.


71.  The Government contended that, in so far as the applicant’s allegation could be considered to constitute an arguable claim, the Romanian legal system had offered an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had been able to contest the decisions of the prosecutor’s office before independent and impartial courts and those courts had examined his complaints.


36.  The Government have raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant’s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for the complaint that he was being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by being detained in inadequate conditions. The Court thus finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


67.  The applicant also submitted that she had no effective remedy whereby she could raise the issue of the excessive length of the proceedings in her case. Furthermore, the domestic legal system did not provide for any measure that would oblige defendants in paternity disputes to comply with a court order for DNA tests to be carried out. In her view, that amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


35.  The Government raised an objection, arguing that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Court considers that the question whether the requirement that an applicant must exhaust domestic remedies has been satisfied in the instant case is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection raised by the Government under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


102.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants had had the opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and that they could have also claimed damages in civil proceedings. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


58.  The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court and about the outcome and length of the proceedings. She further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a lack of effective remedies against the Administrative Court’s judgment. She additionally complained under Article 14 of the Convention that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her Serbian origins. Finally, she complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she had been deprived of her severance pay.


153.  The Government raised the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicants. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicants’ complaint that they did not have at their disposal an effective remedy in respect of the non-enforcement complaint. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicants’ complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027/10, § 54, 8 January 2013, and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 70, 10 January 2012).


93.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about a lack of an effective remedy in respect of the two contradictory judgments given by the Supreme Court on 12 March 2002 and on 2 October 2002 on the same issue (see paragraphs 34, 42 and 43 above). In this regard, he pointed out that the Commission had followed the first judgment by annulling his appointment of First Officer of Town Planning and totally ignored the second one by not appointing him as Director of Town Planning.


12.  The applicants complain that their removal, direct or indirect, to Serbia and the refusal to regularise their stay in Belgium amounted to a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, in that it put their oldest daughter’s life at risk and placed all of the applicants at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment (see paragraph 173). Furthermore, they complain that they did not have access to an effective remedy, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 174).


13.  The applicants complained about the State authorities' failure to enforce the judgments given in their favour in due time. They invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The first, the fifth, the seventh, the ninth and the tenth applicant additionally invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, complaining about their inability to obtain the judgments debts within a reasonable time. The impugned provisions provide, insofar as relevant, as follows:


54.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings were unfair and that the authorities had failed to enforce a final decision in his favour. Under Article <mask> of the Convention he complained that there was no effective remedy in respect of the non-enforcement of a final court decision. He also made a complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


163.  The applicants complained of a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on account of the mental suffering caused to them by the disappearance of their relatives and the unlawfulness of their relatives’ detention. They also argued that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, there had been no available domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violations, in particular those under Articles 2 and 3. These Articles read, in so far as relevant:


132.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and had not been prevented from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court pursuant to Article 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure or to bring civil claims for damages.


40.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention claiming that they did not have an effective remedy at their disposal against the decision of the Regional Land Reform Board of 26 March 2008 to interrupt the proceedings for three years which resulted in a standstill of the proceedings. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention.


79.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court or before higher prosecutors and to bring civil claims for damages. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


113.  The Government argued that the applicants had had effective domestic remedies, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, and that the Russian authorities had not prevented them from using those remedies. In particular, the applicants had been declared victims and had received reasoned replies to all their requests made in the context of the investigation. They also argued that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, it had been open to the applicants to lodge a court complaint in respect of the actions of the investigating authorities or, if the applicants had considered that any action or omission by public officials had caused them damage, to seek compensation for that damage in court by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Russian Civil Code. In support of that argument, the Government referred to a decision of the Urus-Martan Town Court dated 6 August 2004 which had ordered the Urus-Martan prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation into the disappearance of a claimant’s son, a decision of the Shali Town Court dated 13 March 2006 by which a claimant had been allowed access to a criminal investigation file, a judgment of Nazran Town Court dated 26 February 2003 by which a plaintiff had been awarded a certain amount in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage inflicted by the federal armed forces, and a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia dated 19 October 2004 by which a plaintiff had been awarded a certain amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage inflicted as a result of the unlawful actions of a prosecutor’s office. The Government did not enclose copies of the decisions to which they referred.


369.  The applicants complained of a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on account of the mental suffering caused to them by the disappearance of their relatives and the unlawfulness of their relatives’ detention. They also argued that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, they had no available domestic remedies against the alleged violations, in particular those under Articles 2 and 3. These Articles read, in so far as relevant:


106.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had the opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. It had also been open to them to file a civil claim for damages. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


130.  The applicant also alleged that he had not had at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints under Article 3 concerning the conditions of his detention and the standard of medical assistance available to him in Odessa and Kyiv SIZOs, Sokyriany Colony and during his transit to Torez Colony, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. This provision reads as follows:


73.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Prosecutor General had refused his requests for a supervisory review of his conviction in the first set of criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that no provision of the Convention guarantees the right to the reopening of proceedings which have been closed by a final judgement (see Mumladze v. Georgia, no. 30097/03, § 35, 8 January 2008, and the jurisprudence cited therein).  It follows that the applicant’s complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.


67.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the proceedings he instituted in October 2002 against the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see, as a recent authority, Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393/05, § 23, 13 March 2007), finds that the above complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 6 of the Convention, which was cited above.


28.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


102.  The applicants disagreed with the Government’s allegation that they had not exhausted domestic remedies and claimed that they had attempted several avenues of redress. They maintained that they had not had an effective remedy for their complaints concerning the inadequate conditions of detention and transfer. They pointed out that on 6 December 2011 the Justice of the Peace had refused to examine their complaints concerning the conditions of detention and transfer, without giving reasons. 103.  The Court considers that the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicants’ complaint that they did not have at their disposal an effective remedy for the complaints concerning inhuman and degrading treatment on account of being transferred and detained in inadequate conditions. The Court thus finds it necessary to join the Government’s objection to the merits of the applicants’ complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


157.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had the opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and they could also have claimed damages in civil proceedings.


23.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective channels of complaint on the same basis that they had argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. Having rejected the latter argument above (at paragraph 14), the Court concludes that the applicant did not have an effective domestic remedy, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, to redress the damage created by the delay in the present proceedings (see Voytenko cited above, §§ 46-48). Accordingly, there has been a breach of this provision.


130.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a result of non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions given in their favour. The first and fifth applicants also complained of the lack of effective remedy in domestic law in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In so far as relevant, these provisions read as follows:


92.  The applicant maintained that, although he had taken every reasonable step in order to ensure that his son’s disappearance was properly and thoroughly investigated by the State, the investigation conducted by the authorities had been insufficient to meet the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. He also alleged that the respondent State tolerated the practice of ineffective investigations into allegations of disappearances involving Kurds.


34.  The applicant further complained under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for his complaint, described above, about the conditions of his detention in the remand centre; that there had been no effective investigations into his complaint. The Court will examine the above grievances under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


49.  The Government argued that a constitutional complaint was an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention to complain about the length of criminal proceedings and the applicant therefore should have exhausted that remedy. The Court’s findings in its judgment of 8 June 2006 in the case of Sürmeli v. Germany ([GC], no. 75529/01, ECHR 2006‑...) that a constitutional complaint was not an effective remedy to complain about the length of civil proceedings and that applicants therefore did not have to avail themselves of that remedy did not apply to complaints about the duration of criminal proceedings. In the latter case, the Federal Constitutional Court could not only find that the duration of criminal proceedings had been excessive, it could also provide both preventive and compensatory redress. According to its case-law (compare paragraphs 43-44 above), measures to be taken to redress an excessive delay in the proceedings included the limitation of criminal prosecution pursuant to Article 154 and Article 154a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the termination of the proceedings by dispensing with a penalty or by issuing a warning with sentence reserved, a mitigation of the penalty or the discontinuance of the proceedings pursuant to Articles 153 and 153a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a rule, the criminal courts provided such redress on remittal of a case from the Federal Constitutional Court. However, the latter also had jurisdiction to discontinue the criminal proceedings itself in exceptional circumstances if it considered that the excessive length of the proceedings had led to a constitutional impediment to the proceedings. The Government stressed that a constitutional complaint could be used to complain both about the excessive length of terminated criminal proceedings and, under the conditions of section 90 § 2 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 45 above), to complain about the duration of pending criminal investigation proceedings.


112.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and to bring civil claims for damages, but had failed to do so. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


29.  The Government argued that Article 13 was not applicable in the absence of a violation of either Article 6 § 1 or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They added that the applicants had not used all available domestic remedies in respect of their complaint under Article 13, such as requesting the initiation of administrative or criminal proceedings against the person responsible for non-enforcement. They relied on the direct applicability of the Convention in Moldova's domestic legal order. Finally, they conceded a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.


32.  The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Some of the applicants also relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaints must be examined solely under Article 6 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


132.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at her disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented her from using them. The applicant had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. They added that participants in criminal proceedings could also claim damages in civil proceedings, and referred to cases where victims in criminal proceedings had been awarded damages from state bodies. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


139.  The Government submitted that, even assuming that there was an arguable breach of any of the rights invoked under the Convention, an effective remedy was provided for any breach of Article 2 by the procedures of criminal investigation, the civil proceedings for damage and the inquest proceedings. These were capable of satisfying the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention taken together. The applicant also had the possibility of challenging by way of judicial review the DPP's decision not to prosecute.


120.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective domestic remedies, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, but had been unwilling to make use of them. They submitted that the first, fifth and twenty-third applicants had been granted victim status and therefore had been afforded procedural rights in the criminal proceedings, and in particular, the right to give oral and other evidence, to file motions, to receive copies of procedural decision, and to access the case file and make copies of the materials of the file on completion of the investigation. The Government further argued that if the applicants had considered that any action or omission of public officials had caused them damage, they could have sought compensation for that damage in court by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Russian Civil Code. In support of this argument, the Government referred to decisions by the domestic courts, which they submitted to the Court (see paragraph 67 above).


52.  The applicants in the first, fourth, sixth and ninth applications complained that they have not had an effective domestic remedy in connection with their complaint about the irreducibility of their whole-life sentences. The applicants in the first, seventh and tenth applications complained that they had not had an effective domestic remedy in connection with their complaint about the “special” detention regime. They all relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


64.  The applicant submitted that in her further appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, the highest competent domestic tribunal in the matter, she raised six elaborate complaints which were dismissed by the Division without giving any reasons. In her opinion, it cannot be said that this part of the legal system constituted an effective legal remedy for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


15.  The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, relying on the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others (cited above). In the latter case the Court joined the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies to the merits of the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. After finding a violation of the latter provision it rejected the Government’s objection (§§ 62 and 98-113). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. It further finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It should therefore be declared admissible.


112.  The Government contended that the applicants had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court pursuant article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition, they could have lodged a claim for compensation under Article 151 of the Civil Code of Russian Federation. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


76.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 that, due to the excessive length of the proceedings, he had been time-barred from bringing a new application and, consequently, from raising his relevant property claims before the domestic courts. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of an effective remedy in respect of the above complaints.


103.  The applicant, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and on Article <mask> of the Convention, complained about the excessive court fees in the proceedings for damages against the State and the alleged lack of effective remedies in that respect. He also complained under Article 14 of the Convention that the State unduly benefited from court fees system applicable to such claims. He contended that the compensation awarded in respect of the conditions of his detention had been very low and had been rendered meaningless by the requirement to pay high court fees on the parts of his claims which had been dismissed by the courts.


52.  The applicant also relied on Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of his complaints under Article 5 of the Convention. However, the Court considers that, as it relates to Article 5 §§ 1-3 of the Convention, this complaint should be understood as referring to the applicant's inability to effectively challenge his detention under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and to the alleged lack of an enforceable right to compensation under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. In addition, the Court observes that Article 5 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention constitute lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Nikolova, cited above, § 69, and Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, judgment of 29 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑III, p. 927, § 73).


17. The applicant complained under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention that the panel had not given reasons for detaining him in prison and that the latter's decision of 14 February 2009 had been given in private following the public prosecutor's appeal, which had not been communicated to him. He also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that Articles 6 and 13 complaints are in fact a restatement of the complaints under Article 5 of the Convention and should be considered accordingly. This Article, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


34.  The applicant also complained of a violation of his right to a fair hearing. In particular, he maintained that the judicial authorities, in adjudicating the case brought against him, had arbitrarily refused some of his procedural requests; had incorrectly assessed the facts and applied the law. He relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention.


124.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. The Government also stated that participants in criminal proceedings could also claim damages in civil proceedings. They further pointed out that the applicants had successfully applied to domestic courts for compensation for damage caused by the death of Bilkis Askhabayeva. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


73.  The Government submitted that the investigation into the killing of Asradiy Estamirov had not yet been completed. They further argued, in relation to the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, that it had been open to the applicant to lodge court complaints about any acts or omissions on the part of the investigating authorities. Moreover, she could have claimed damages.


12. The Government submitted that the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should be declared inadmissible since no complaint about non-enforcement has been raised under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and no violation of Article 6 § 1 in that respect has been found by the Court. They further alleged that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable since no issue arose under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


115.  The applicant claimed EUR 9,000 for non-pecuniary damage, of which EUR 5,000 was claimed for the breach of his right not to be detained in inhuman and degrading conditions, EUR 2,000 for the breach of his right to correspond with his mother and EUR 2,000 for the breach of his right to have contacts with his wife and daughter. Insofar as Article <mask> of the Convention is concerned, the applicant submitted that a finding of a violation would be sufficient just satisfaction for him.


58.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he did not have at his disposal effective domestic remedies for his Convention complaints. The Court considers that, as it relates to Article 5 §§ 1-3 of the Convention, this complaint should be understood as referring to the applicant's alleged inability to effectively challenge his detention under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and to the alleged lack of an enforceable right to compensation under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. In addition, the Court observes that Article 5 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention constitute lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Nikolova, cited above, § 69 and Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, judgment of 29 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑III, p. 927, § 73). Accordingly, the Court must examine the complaint that the applicant lacked effective domestic remedies under Article 5 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention.


67.  The applicants complained of violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on account of the mental suffering caused to them by the disappearance of their relative and the unlawfulness of his detention. They also argued that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, they had no available domestic remedies against the alleged violations, in particular those under Articles 2 and 3. These Articles read, in so far as relevant:


40.  The applicant complained that the authorities had lacked diligence in investigating the circumstances of Oleksandr Lanetskyy's death, and that as a consequence the investigation had been ineffective and the criminal proceedings against A.Y. had lasted an unreasonably long time. She relied on Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention, which read as follows, in so far as relevant:


159.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and could also claim damages in civil proceedings. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


155.  The Government argued that the applicant had effective remedies at his disposal, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he had been granted victim status, which had enabled to him to participate effectively in the investigation concerning the alleged ill-treatment. Furthermore, the applicant had successfully applied to a higher-ranking prosecutor, who had reopened the investigation into his ill-treatment complaint, and to a court, which issued a decision on the applicant's complaint on 17 March 2005. The Government also referred to favourable court decisions issued in similar circumstances, without providing copies of them. In their submission, the applicant could also have applied to civil courts for compensation under Articles 151 and 1069 of the Civil Code. In that connection the Government referred to a successful example of the use of that remedy by an unnamed person, without providing a copy of the related decision.


39.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Court of Appeal dealing with his case had been biased. In his submissions dated 22 March 2011, the applicant further complained under the same provision about a violation of the principle of legal certainty as the judgments in his case had been quashed several times. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, he also complained of the lack of domestic remedy for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him.


118.  The Government referred to the ongoing investigation into the murder and contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at her disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented her from using them. The applicant had had an opportunity to challenge the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court pursuant to Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had availed herself of it. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


177.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at her disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had the opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court and could also have claimed damages in civil proceedings. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


138.  The applicants did not however have available to them an appropriate means of obtaining a determination of their allegations that the local authority failed to protect them from serious ill-treatment or the possibility of obtaining an enforceable award of compensation for the damage suffered thereby. Consequently, they were not afforded an effective remedy in respect of their claims of a breach of Articles 3 or 8 and there has, accordingly, been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


29.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings on Z.’s claim had been unfair and she had been prevented from accessing courts in the Donetsk region. Relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, she complained of the lack of prosecution of K.Vi. and K.Vo. for taking her and O.’s property and assaulting their honour and reputation.


60.  The applicant companies complained that the implementation of the New Regulations and the introduction of a completely new schoolbook management system by the State, without providing any opportunity for them to seek judicial review or redress, amounted to violations of their rights under Article 6, as well as under Article <mask> of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


381.  The applicant complained under Article 13 that neither he nor the Orhans had an effective domestic remedy in respect of the Orhans' disappearance or in relation to the destruction of Deveboyu. The Government referred to the investigations conducted into the applicant's allegations. They also suggested that the applicant could have taken administrative or civil proceedings seeking damages or made a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor, which constituted effective remedies within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


118.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had been granted victim status; moreover, they had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


52.  The applicant maintained that a constitutional complaint about the non-enforcement of a final court judgment was not effective as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Constitutional Court’s judgments (see paragraphs 21–27 above) were limited to the finding of a violation of a declaratory nature. They did not provide a remedy or eliminate the continuing violation in respect of the non-enforcement of a final court judgment.


60.  The Government contended that the complaint should be declared inadmissible as premature, as the investigation of the disappearance of Khamzat Umarov had not yet been completed. They further argued, in relation to the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, that it had been open to the applicants to lodge complaints with the courts about any acts or omissions on the part of the investigating authorities. They could also have claimed civil damages.


34.  The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


100.  The Government enclosed statements by several inmates who confirmed that cold water had always been available in the living premises and that hot water could be obtained from heating facilities. In support of their position they provided the statements by other inmates summarised above. They also challenged the witness statements originally submitted by the applicant on the ground that some of the persons who had allegedly made them had subsequently repudiated their statements. They considered that the applicant’s complaints had been thoroughly examined, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention.


90.  The Government argued that the applicants’ reference to section 205 of the Civil Procedure Law was not relevant, as it provided an option for a party to request that a judgment be executed without delay. As the applicants had not requested it, the 23 May 2002 judgment did not contain such an obligation. In as far as the applicants’ complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was concerned the Government submitted that the domestic law provided for effective remedies. They referred to section 632 of the Civil Procedure Law (a civil remedy) and sections 15 (civil, criminal and disciplinary remedies), 53 and 54 (a disciplinary remedy) of the Law on Bailiffs.


29.  The applicant further complained that the prosecution authorities' refusal to institute criminal proceedings against A. (a pension expert) amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court recalls that the right to have criminal proceedings instituted against a third person is not, as such, guaranteed by the Convention (see, Kubiszyn v. Poland (dec.), no. 37437/97, 21 September 1999). It finds, therefore, that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and rejects it in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


70.  The applicant also complained that in the second case he had not had an effective remedy to protect his right to freedom of assembly, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, referring to Articles 14 and 18 of the Convention the applicant complained that the real reason or motive for his arrest and conviction was his political activism.


27.  The applicant company further complained that the Supreme Court had dismissed its appeal on points of law and that in its two decisions the Constitutional Court had refused to examine its complaint against the judgment of the Regional Court of 5 February 2002 and the Supreme Court judgment of 12 June 2003. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


280.  The applicant bank also complained that it had no remedy in the Croatian legal system to recover the sum seized from it in the enforcement proceedings, despite the fact that it had managed to prove that this enforcement had had no basis in law. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto. Article 13 reads as follows:


165.  The applicants further complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts in the proceedings concerning the annulment of their property rights had disregarded their arguments and had adopted unfair and unfounded decisions. They lastly complained under Article 14 of the Convention that they had been discriminated on the basis of their national origin – they submitted that the majority of individuals who had had their rights to forests restored and later annulled had been Polish.


31.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had not received any answer from the prosecuting authorities regarding her criminal complaint lodged with the Câmpina Prosecution Office in 1994 against A.M. and that the courts had lost her file. On 14 December 2007, in her observations in response to the Government’s observations, she also complained of the lack of domestic remedies by which to complain of the unreasonable length of the proceedings.


134.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge any acts or omissions on the part of the investigating authorities in court. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


110.  The Government contended that the applicant had had effective remedies at her disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented her from using them. The applicant had had an opportunity to challenge the acts or omissions of the investigating authorities in court. They added that participants in criminal proceedings could also claim damages in civil proceedings and referred to cases where victims in criminal proceedings had been awarded damages from state bodies and, in one instance, the prosecutor's office. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


12.  The applicant complained about the State authorities’ failure to execute the judgment of 6 October 1998 of the Zhovtnevy District Court of Odessa. He alleged that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and that he had had no effective remedies in respect of the non-enforcement, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. These provisions provide in so far as relevant as follows:


21.  The applicants complained under Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention that they had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. They further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) and Article <mask> of the Convention that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation of their allegations of ill-treatment and to duly examine the evidence they had submitted in support of their allegations. The applicants claimed that the authorities had also failed to punish the police officers responsible, which cast doubt on their independence and impartiality. Lastly, the applicants maintained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the decisions of the Izmir public prosecutor and the Karşıyaka Assize Court lacked reasoning.


40.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that no effective remedies had been available to him to challenge his conviction. As the judicial review had been inadequate, there had been no possibility to appeal; a constitutional appeal could have been lodged in exceptional circumstances but had not been available in cases such as his. Lastly, he complained that the administrative authorities and the local court had not given reasons for their decisions, which had compromised his right to an effective remedy.


35.  The applicant also invoked Article 13 in respect of his complaint about the length of the proceedings. Having regard to its findings under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraphs 34 above), the Court concludes that this complaint is admissible, but considers that it is not necessary to rule whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Kushnarenko v. Ukraine, no. 18010/04, § 25, 13 November 2008, and Kukharchuk v. Ukraine, no. 10437/02, §§ 39-40, 10 August 2006).


114.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. In particular, the applicants had received reasoned replies to all their complaints lodged in the context of criminal proceedings. Besides, the applicants had had an opportunity to appeal against the actions or omissions of the investigating authorities in court.


86.  The applicants complained of violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention as a result of the mental suffering caused by the disappearance of their close relatives, who they claimed had been unlawfully detained. They also argued that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, they had no available domestic remedies against the violations claimed under Articles 2 and 3. Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention read, in so far as relevant:


125.  The Government further pointed out that the first applicant had availed himself of the opportunity to appeal before a court, under Article 463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to extradite him. Under that provision a court must examine an appeal within one month and either declare the extradition decision unlawful and quash it or dismiss the appeal. In the latter case a cassation appeal could be lodged against the decision. The fact that the first applicant’s appeal had eventually been dismissed did not mean that the remedy had been ineffective, as the requirement of effectiveness did not mean that the outcome of the proceedings should be favourable to the applicant (relying upon Kaijalainen v. Finland (dec.), no. 24671/94, 12 April 1996). The Government also noted that the effectiveness of the remedy was further corroborated by the fact that in the cases of Soliyev v. Russia, no. 62400/10, § 27, 5 June 2012; Khodzhamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 64809/10, § 19, 5 June 2012; and Abidov v. Russia, no. 52805/10, §§ 26‑27, 12 June 2012, the Russian court had annuled extradition orders issued by the Prosecutor’s Office. Therefore, the first applicant had had an effective remedy in respect of his complaint under Article 3 as required by Article <mask> of the Convention.


72.  The Government contested these arguments in general terms. They pointed out in particular that Article <mask> of the Convention does not require that recourse to a remedy always be successful irrespective of an unfounded claim. They argued that in the present case the applicant was able to raise her arguable claims of ill-treatment before the competent authorities but her claims were not found to be justified. The remedies provided for by the Hungarian criminal law qualify as effective remedies for well-founded claims. Therefore, the Government considered that the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention was manifestly ill-founded.


55.  The Government raised an objection arguing that the applicants had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to them. The Court considers that the question whether the requirement that the applicants must exhaust domestic remedies has been satisfied in the instant case is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection raised by the Government under Article 3 of the Convention should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.


60.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 9 and 10 about the refusal by the Supreme Administrative Court to review the merits of the decisions of the STC and the NRTC. They also claimed that they had been denied an effective remedy on account of the need to go through two separate sets of proceedings.


100.  The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal as required by Article <mask> of the Convention and that the authorities had not prevented them from using them. They pointed out that the first applicant had made use of domestic remedies available pursuant to Articles 124 and 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as she had brought her complaints both to a higher prosecutor and to a court. The mere fact that the outcome of such complaints had not been favourable for her had not undermined the effectiveness of those remedies. The applicants had not brought any complaints in relation to Adnan Akhmadov’s kidnapping to courts of the Stavropol, Krasnodar and Rostov Regions or to the courts of Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia. Furthermore, the applicants could have brought civil claims for damages. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13.


13.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. He further complained of the fact that in Turkey there was no court to which application could be made to complain of the excessive length of proceedings. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


26.  The applicants complained about the State authorities’ failure to enforce the judgments taken in their favour in due time. In this regard they invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Mr Shylkin also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had no effective remedy in that respect. These provisions provide, in so far as relevant, as follows: