81.  The Government maintained that the restrictions imposed on the applicant had been necessary in a democratic society. The means employed had been proportionate to the aims pursued. The authorities were under a positive obligation to provide an effective mechanism for the enforcement of judgments debts to be paid by private persons and for the protection of creditors’ property rights. If they failed to do so, their responsibility under Article <mask> of the Convention could be engaged. The applicant had not paid the judgment debt voluntarily and enforcement proceedings had therefore been instituted. The bailiffs’ service had taken various measures to secure payment of the judgment debt. However, all those measures had proved insufficient for the enforcement of the judgment debt, in large part owing to the applicant’s behaviour. As established by the decision of 19 October 2004 (see paragraph 11 above), the applicant had attempted to hide his property in order to avoid its forfeiture in the enforcement proceedings. In the absence of any other means of ensuring that the applicant honoured his debt, the bailiffs’ service had decided to impose a travel ban on him.


22.  The applicant contested the Government’s argument. Relying on the Court’s case-law, he argued that Article <mask> of the Convention applied to all stages of criminal proceedings, including the proceedings whereby a sentence is fixed (see Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, § 39, ECHR 2001‑VII). In the applicant’s view, the hearing was in any event decisive for the determination of his civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The question to be decided by the domestic court concerned the determination of the aggregate prison sentence to be served by him. Accordingly, it was the applicant’s right to liberty, which was a civil right, that was at stake (see Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, § 59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑V).


48.  The Government reiterated that the case did not concern the determination of the applicant's civil rights or obligations within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Hence, she could not derive a right of access to a court from this provision. The Polish authorities had never accepted the obligation to redress the wrongs done to Polish citizens by Nazi Germany. The Polish Foundation had been acting merely as an intermediary between the claimants and the founder, the German “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation. It had been playing only a supporting role, collecting documents, processing applications and establishing the eligibility of claimants. Furthermore, the charitable nature of the payments made by the Polish Foundation did not allow them to be regarded as civil in character. This was confirmed also by the size of the Polish Foundation's assets which, given the magnitude of wrongs committed by the German occupying regime to the Polish citizens during the Second World War, would clearly be insufficient to compensate the victims for damage which they had suffered.


34.  The applicant maintained that the failure to enforce the judgment of 30 July 2008 had constituted a violation of her Convention rights. By its judgment of 30 July 2008, the Administrative Court had obliged the Mayor’s office to conclude the agreement mentioned in the decision of 10 October 2002 no. 1785-A with the applicant. The domestic authorities had had no right to deviate from this clear judgment. The other plots of land offered to the applicant had been unacceptable since they had been located elsewhere than at the specific address identified in the judgment and they had been in an area where business would have been less profitable than at the address indicated in the judgment. The applicant had proposed nine different acceptable new locations but they all had been refused by the Mayor’s office. Although the applicant had taken all possible steps for its enforcement, the judgment had remained unenforced for more than eight years. By discontinuing the enforcement proceedings, the domestic authorities had violated the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention.


65.  The applicant also complained under Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 and 7 of the Convention about a lack of a fair trial and a violation of the legality principle in respect of the embezzlement charges. He complained that, as far as he was convicted of aggravated tax fraud and bookkeeping crime as a representative of the company, Article 7 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 had been violated. Finally, he complained about the proceedings before the Appeal Court during which there had been a failure to provide detailed information about the charges, an impossibility to question one of the witnesses, a failure to record his statement correctly, and a failure to reason the judgment adequately. In his letter dated 16 January 2012 the applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of reasoning in the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 December 2011 concerning the extraordinary appeal.


39.  The applicant complained of the lack of legal assistance during his questioning by the police on 17 December 2009 and of the lack of effective legal assistance before the investigating judge on 18 December 2009. He further complained that the Court of Appeal, and later the Court of Cassation, had failed to provide redress for the consequent infringement of his defence rights. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


28.  The applicant contended that he did not have a fair trial in the proceedings before the supervisory review court. In his view, he had faced a new charge. He was informed of the proceedings and the contents of the Deputy President's request too late. The applicant stated that he had been deprived of an opportunity to be present and to submit arguments on that particular issue. In view of the above and having regard to the fact that the prosecution had participated in the hearing, the applicant considered that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The applicant alleged under Articles 5 § 1 (c) and 13 of the Convention that he had been detained under a prison regime from 28 July to 9 August 2005 and from 22 to 30 September 2005 in contravention of the applicable domestic regulations. He further complained under Articles 5 § 1 (c), 8 and 13 of the Convention that his arrest on 18 September 2005 had been unlawful. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the national courts had reinstated a time-limit to permit the prosecutor to appeal against the decision of 19 August 2005 and had then quashed the said decision in contravention of the principle of legal certainty. The Court will examine the complaints under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention which reads as follows:


25.  The applicants also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of unfairness of the supervisory-review proceedings. However, in their later observations they did not appear to maintain this complaint. Given the Court’s finding that the applicants’ right to a court was violated by the quashing of the judgments in their favour in the supervisory-review proceedings (see paragraph 23), the Court does not find it necessary to examine separately this issue.


32.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that by the final judgment of 4 December 2002 the domestic court incorrectly resolved her case and rejected her claim for non-pecuniary damage. She further complained that the courts had ordered that the award of the arrears should have been paid from the regional budget. Finally, she alleged that the first instance court had been biased because judge P. had examined her case twice.


29.  The applicant company complained that the domestic court’s retrospective application of legislation which had specifically aimed to protect the party unlawfully using its trademark had unlawfully restricted its use of its property, specifically its registered trademark. It alleged a violation of its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


67.  The applicant claimed that her husband's detention was not attributable to any of the exhaustive purposes listed under Article 5 and hence unlawful. Under the same provision, the applicant contended that none of the guarantees listed under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 were respected. The applicant stated under Article <mask> of the Convention that her husband's unlawful detention and subsequent disappearance had deprived him of his rights to defence, his right to see his family and counsel, his right to know of the charges brought against him and his right to be brought before a court within a reasonable time.


77.  The applicants complained in the first place that they had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. The applicants further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since they had not been given the opportunity to put questions to all the witnesses. They also contended that the domestic authorities violated their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. In this connection, they invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


53.  The applicant reiterated that her application only concerned the search of her law office, not seizure of items. There were no explicit or, for that matter, any provisions or case-law even suggesting that a person subject to a search could have access to a court in order to challenge that search. It was true that the civil liability of the officers conducting the search could be invoked but this possibility was neither effective nor capable of providing redress for the interference with her right to respect for her home as she would have to show that she had actually suffered damage. Nor could a private prosecution be regarded as access to a court. The threshold for “reason to suspect” was very low and none of the private prosecutions initiated against officers having conducted or ordered a search had been successful. This remedy was therefore theoretical as well as illusory. The same was true for lodging a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) and the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekanslern). If the Court were to find no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, there was in any event a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 8 of the Convention.


43.  The applicant company complained that the judgments by which the Prosecutor General's actions were upheld had had the effect of infringing its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions as secured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The applicant argued that the interference was not provided by law since the guarantees provided by Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached and that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. The Government disputed the applicant's contention and argued that the applicant company received back the price paid for the shares bought in 2000 and that the applicant company was allowed to keep the profits earned between 2000 and 2007. In the Government's opinion, it was the State's right to property that had been breached as a result of the unlawful sale of the shares in 2000 and the applicant company had profited from the unlawful use of twenty-seven carriages by the quarry.


26.  The applicant complained that the proceedings before the Family Court and Family Court of Appeal were unfair and thus in violation of her right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. She also complained that the failure of the Court of Appeal to properly consider her appeal meant she was deprived of her right of access to Court, in further breach of Article 6. Where relevant, that article provides:


2.  The applicant newspaper Flux submitted complaints relating to two violations of Article <mask> of the Convention. The majority declared inadmissible the first complaint on the lack of independence and impartiality of Judge I.M. A second complaint regarding the alleged failure of the domestic courts to give reasons for their decisions was disposed of by the majority with a finding that this complaint did not raise an issue separate from the freedom of expression complaint under Article 10, and that consequently the Court did not consider it necessary to examine it separately.


32.  The Government submitted that the applicant's acquittal following the retrial meant that his application no longer raised a live issue and that he had ceased to be a “victim”. They asked the Court to declare the application inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that he had applied to the Court before the retrial proceedings had ended or, in the alternative, that, since his situation had been remedied at national level, he could no longer claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. Failing that, the Government requested the Grand Chamber to confirm the judgment of the Chamber, which had held that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the instant case, and to dismiss the applicant's claims for just satisfaction.


55.  The applicant further submitted that the supervisory review court determined issues of both law and fact. In this connection, he claimed that, depending on the amount of drugs concerned, the unlawful procurement of drugs was punishable either as a criminal offence or as an administrative offence subject to a light penalty. The applicant stated that he had been deprived of an opportunity to be present and to submit arguments on this particular issue. In view of the above and having regard to the fact that the prosecution had participated in the hearing, the applicant considered that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect.


49.  The applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as the Court of Appeal had relied on the pre-trial statements of witnesses L.G., A.A., A.B. and A.At. in its judgment. This evidence, although used by the Court of Appeal to substantiate the finding of her guilt, had not been read out and examined in court and, moreover, she had no opportunity to question these witnesses. The applicant conceded that witness A.A. had testified before the District Court. She observed, however, that in its judgment the Court of Appeal had referred to A.A.’s pre-trial statement made on 18 February 2002 and not her testimony made at the trial.


39.   The Government argued that the sum claimed by the applicant was excessive in view of the financial situation of the country. In the Government’s view, the mere finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. In any event, there was no causal link between the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and the amount requested by the applicant.


18.  The Government did not dispute the applicability of Article 6 to the present case. For its part, the Court recalls that it has already established that “in principle, the general character of the Code of Administrative Offenses (“the CAO”) and the purpose of the penalties, which are both deterrent and punitive, suffice to show that for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention the applicant was charged with a criminal offence” (Ziliberberg v. Moldova, no. 61821/00, § 33, 1 February 2005). It does not see any reason to depart from that finding in the present case. Accordingly, Article 6 was applicable to the applicant’s case under its criminal head.


46.  The Government maintained that, in so far as the applicant complained about the length of the court proceedings, she could introduce a complaint concerning the delay in the proceedings with the Regional Court, relying directly on Article <mask> of the Convention, and the court would have to react to it. As an example, the Government furnished a separate ruling given by a Regional Court within a set of civil proceedings, where the court, with reference to the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, decided to inform the Regional Qualifications Commission about delays in proceedings caused by a judge of a first instance court. In the Government’s opinion, such a decision could entail the disciplinary liability of the judge who was responsible for the delay in the proceedings.


51.  The applicant appears to argue that she was compelled to assume liability for crimes allegedly committed by her late husband who had not been convicted. In this context, the Court recalls that it is a fundamental rule of criminal law that criminal liability does not survive the person who has committed the criminal act. Imposing criminal sanctions on the living in respect of acts apparently committed by the deceased person calls for its careful scrutiny (see A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland, 29 August 1997, §§ 46 and 48, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V). The Court further reiterates that the scope of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is not limited to pending criminal proceedings but extends to judicial decisions taken after a prosecution has been discontinued (see, most recently, Vulakh and Others v. Russia, no. 33468/03, § 33, 10 January 2012). With regard to the application of the presumption of innocence, the Court’s case-law also shows that the autonomous meaning of the expression “charge” in Article <mask> of the Convention means that a person can be considered to have been “charged” for the purposes of that Article when that individual’s situation has been “substantially affected” (see Serves v. France, 20 October 1997, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI).


129.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to a fair and public hearing during the appellate proceedings had been restricted, that he had been unable to obtain examination of witnesses prepared to testify on his behalf, and that the court had been biased in favour of the prosecution and had rejected the majority of his petitions without justification. Article 6 provides, where relevant, as follows:


41.  The Government submitted at the outset that Article <mask> of the Convention under its “criminal head” was not applicable to the confiscation procedure at issue. In the criminal proceedings against the criminal organisation led by M.S., in which the confiscation of the applicant’s property had been imposed, the applicant was not accused of any criminal offence and the domestic courts did not determine any charges in her respect. Neither was Article 6 applicable under its “civil head”, given that no question concerning the applicant’s property rights in the sense of civil law had been determined. In the Government’s view, the confiscation of certain property imposed on the applicant was merely a preventive measure, aiming at deterrence of serious crimes based on property reasons. In that connection the Government also noted that in her application the applicant had made no express reference to Article 6 in so far as it related to “her civil rights and obligations”.


40.  The Government also contended that legal aid had been granted to both applicants when they had complained of a violation of their right to a fair trial and about not being provided with legal aid. Moreover, they stated that the requirement to be assisted by a lawyer in the cassation proceedings was not contrary to requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The fact that the applicants were rejected legal aid to prepare their cassation appeal did not impair their right of access to court as their cassation appeal would have probably been rejected as not raising important legal issues.


57.  The applicant further argued that the Supreme Administrative Court should have granted him a hearing since the Administrative Court of Appeal had refused him one and it was in the interest of the fairness of the proceedings that he be granted one. In his view, an oral hearing would not have been unnecessary and there had been no particular reasons against holding a hearing in his case. Furthermore, the appellate courts had in several other cases granted a hearing to determine whether or not to grant leave to appeal and so, by rejecting his request for a hearing, they had deprived him of his right to a fair procedure, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


60.  The Government distinguished the present case from that of P.S. v. Germany (no. 33900/96, 20 December 2001), the four victims having given statements independently of each other concerning the same suspect and similar acts, which statements corroborated one another. In the opinion of the domestic judicial authorities, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the victims' statements, including the statements given by Mrs E. and Mrs F. The Government argued that, in balancing the respective interests of the applicant and the victims, the judicial authorities could conclude in all reasonableness that there was no need to summon the latter to give further evidence in court. On this point, the Government further emphasised that the defence had an opportunity at every stage of the proceedings to challenge the reliability of the statements given by the four boys and, relying on the Court's considerations in the case of Asch v. Austria (judgment of 26 April 1991, Series A no. 203, p. 10, § 27), that Article <mask> of the Convention does not require a direct confrontation with witnesses in all circumstances.


27.  The Government argued that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. As regards the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention, they referred to the cases of Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands (dec. nos. 19005/91 and 19006/91, 9 December 1994); Pančenko v. Latvia, (dec. no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999) and Kiryanov v. Russia (dec. no. 42212/02, 9 December 2004) and argued that the applicant's pension dispute involved the interpretation of pension legislation rather than the determination of her right to pension benefits and that the method of the calculation of an old-age pension belonged to the public-law domain.


29.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the final appeal judgment of 3 August 2004 had been quashed by way of supervisory review on 7 October 2004. Mr Kucherov also complained that the judgment of 6 July 2004 and the appeal judgment of 17 August 2004 were quashed via supervisory review on 28 October 2004. In so far as relevant, this Article reads as follows:


60.  The Government argued that the applicant's “civil rights and obligations” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention were not at stake in the proceedings in question. Referring to the Court's judgment in Ferrazzini v. Italy ([GC], no. 44759/98, ECHR 2001-VII) and previous judgments by the Court concerning tax proceedings, they concluded that tax disputes fell outside the scope of Article 6, which provision was thus not applicable to the enforcement of taxes in the present case.


47.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair in so far as his conviction had been based on the confession of 22 March 2005 obtained from him under duress and when he had had no legal representation. The Court will examine his complaint under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which, in so far as relevant, provides:


65.  The applicant argued that at the time of the facts, police practice was not to admit solicitors to attend with an accused person during police interviews. To vindicate his Constitutional right to a trial in due process of law and his right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention, the State ought to have ensured that he was entitled to have a solicitor present during his interrogation. The applicant submitted that he was vulnerable as he was inexperienced in the interrogation process. The absence of his solicitor from the interrogations meant that the police were able to pressure him to give his confession which was ultimately relied upon at trial. The applicant recognised that he had been cautioned and advised of his right to remain silent at the beginning of each interview. He argued, however, that the interviewers sought to undermine his caution in a manner calculated to instil fear and anxiety and erode his will not to self-incriminate. In view of the above, he was deprived of a fair trial.


40.  The applicant submitted that his application had been originally based on Article <mask> of the Convention and that, from this point of view, his wife’s salary had no significance for revocation of his retirement pension. He further noted that he had lodged the application himself, without the assistance of a professional lawyer, and that he had had submitted information which was relevant according to his best knowledge. He also argued that the application had been lodged only on his behalf and therefore the facts concerning the members of his family seemed irrelevant.


26.  The applicant submitted that the present case resembles the case Yavuz against Austria (no. 46549/99, 27 May 2004) where the Court found a violation because of a lack of personal hearing of the applicant before the IAP. The facts of the present case were even more blatant, as the applicant not only did not know about the hearing but, without efforts being made by the IAP, did not have the legal possibility to re-enter Austria. The applicant further argued that when court authorities transmit the summons solely to counsel, the latter will bear the burden and risk of delivery, which, in the applicant’s view, runs counter to Article <mask> of the Convention. A request by counsel that the applicant be summoned in person would have been in vain, as the direct service of a writ to an accused who is assisted by counsel, is not provided for in administrative criminal proceedings. In any event, counsel had received the summons for the hearing on 11 June 1997 only less than three weeks before, namely on 21 May 1997. During this short period, which moreover consisted of several public holidays, it would not even have been possible to obtain a visa for the applicant. The IAP should have heard the applicant, in particular, as to the question whether he had acted in good faith when staying illegally in Austria. The IAP, in any way, had not summoned any witnesses for the hearing of 11 June 1997 so that there were no technical difficulties in postponing this hearing. However, despite the applicant’s repeated requests to be heard, the IAP had undertaken nothing to allow the applicant a short-term visit to Austria.


29.  The applicant raised several complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the criminal proceedings against him. He firstly alleged that the Gabrovo Regional Court had appointed counsel for him with such short notice before the hearing that she had been unable to defend him effectively. He secondly complained that the Supreme Court of Cassation had refused to appoint counsel for him. Lastly, he alleged that the courts which had examined his case had erred in assessing the evidence and in establishing the facts.


57.  The applicants complained that the courts decided arbitrarily in the 1997-2000 proceedings, disregarding the judgments of 1995 and 1996 and thus in violation of one of the fundamental principles of the rule of law – the final nature of judicial decisions. The applicants also submitted that they had been deprived of their property by way of arbitrary decisions. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and also on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


22.  The applicant submits under Article <mask> of the Convention that he was denied a fair hearing as the domestic courts erred in their assessment of the facts. The applicant argues that the same court, namely the Supreme Administrative Court, examined both the requests for leave to appeal and for rectification of the judgment, in violation of his right under Article 13 of the Convention.


49.  The Government agreed with the applicants that the fines in question had constituted penalties and that the offences committed by the applicants should be considered “criminal” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. This had also been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. The Government furthermore acknowledged that the applicants had been tried and convicted by the District Court in absentia.


99.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not been subjected to ill-treatment while in custody and that his statements could therefore not be considered as having been obtained under duress. They noted in this connection that at the end of the criminal proceedings instituted against the police officers, it had been established that the applicant had sustained his injuries as a result of his own conduct (see paragraph 39 above). The Government further contended that the trial court had also taken other evidence into consideration in establishing the applicant’s guilt. They noted that in its reasoning the Istanbul State Security Court had not made any reference to the applicant’s police statements. The Government concluded that the applicant’s trial had complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


56.  The applicant considered that he had exhausted the domestic remedies available to him. He contended that meeting the conditions for the reopening of the proceedings as suggested by the Government would be possible only if he came to Croatia and sought a retrial, which would mean that he would be arrested and imprisoned. In his view, this trading of his liberty for securing his right to a fair trial in his presence was contrary to the basic principles of Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention inter alia that the Court of Appeal was biased, in that the Chairman of the Court of Appeal made a comment which displayed actual or apparent bias in favour of the prosecution; that it failed to conduct a full oral hearing, re-hearing only eight of the witnesses heard in the District Court, that its judgment misinterpreted the evidence, failed to address critical elements of the offences charged and contained serious misapplications of Finnish law; as well as convictions for offences inappropriate to the facts. These factors he relied upon as violations of Article 6 as well as supporting his allegations concerning lack of impartiality and lack of a full oral hearing. He invoked Article 6 § 3(a), alleging that he was convicted of offences the details of which were never supplied to him and in respect of which he had no opportunity to defend himself, Article 7 (prohibition of retrospective penalties) alleging that he was convicted of offences that were not offences at the time of the events in question and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, alleging that he was convicted of more than one offence based on the same conduct.


100.  The Government argued that the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention had not been upset. They submitted that the decision to close the trial to the public was aimed at ensuring the safety of the victim of the applicant’s crime, and was justified by the seriousness of the charges against the applicant. They also noted that the sentence was announced publicly.


22.   The applicant complained that he had been denied effective access to the Supreme Court, in that his legal-aid lawyer had refused to lodge a cassation appeal in his case and he had not had a possibility to have a cassation appeal lodged by another lawyer. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


19.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings concerning her initial dismissal were unfair. She stated in particular that the District Court, when hearing her case in the second set of proceedings, was, contrary to domestic law, composed of the same single judge as in the first set. The applicant claimed to have suffered a violation of her right to have her case heard by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


48.  The Government submitted that the lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case had been in line with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had used all available means in the administrative proceedings to contest the initial findings of the Commission. That the courts had not given weight to his evidence did not mean that the proceedings had not been adversarial or had violated the principle of equality of arms. Any concerns as to the authenticity of the information in his file should have been decided, as stated by the Administrative Court, in separate proceedings before a competent court and “before the impugned decision had been delivered”. The Government also argued that the applicant had not requested an oral hearing. Furthermore, it had been possible to decide all the issues of fact and law on the basis of documentary evidence and so holding an oral hearing would have been in conflict with the principles of economy and efficiency. Lastly, they maintained that the courts had provided sufficient reasons for their decisions. The courts had accepted the documentary evidence on which the Commission had based its decision as authentic and had regarded it as “facts”.


11.  The applicant complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment of 11 September 1998 given in his favour, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no effective remedies in respect of the above complaints. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the second, third and fourth sets of proceedings. The applicant finally complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the ineffectiveness of the judicial system as a whole. The Articles invoked provide, insofar as relevant, as follows:


52.  The Government argued that the Supreme Court had acknowledged that the District Court procedure had been flawed and not in accordance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the applicants’ access to the appeal procedure before the Supreme Court had not in any way been limited on the grounds that they had been absent from the District Court’s proceedings. They had been able to present their case before the Supreme Court in such a way that the procedure as a whole complied with Article 6 of the Convention. The process before the Supreme Court had sufficiently remedied the defects of the District Court proceedings.


49.  The Government further contended that the applicants had merely repeated the objections already presented in the course of the administrative proceedings, without submitting any new evidence, which they had also failed to do at the hearing before the Varaždin County Court. The County Court, finding that the administrative bodies' application and interpretation of the relevant legal provisions had been correct, had dismissed the applicants' claim. In the Government's view the expropriation proceedings, taken as a whole, had satisfied the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The Government considered that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been conducted in strict compliance with the domestic rules of criminal procedure and disclosed no violation of the applicant’s rights set out in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the applicant had consented to be represented by counsel Sh. who had conducted his defence during the investigation and trial and that the applicant had not complained about his alleged incompetency during the investigation or trial. He had raised this issue only after the jury had delivered a guilty verdict in his case. The Government admitted that the applicant had not been provided with legal assistance before the appeal court on 21 July 2005. However, on 6 June 2007 the supervisory-review court had expressly acknowledged the violation of the applicant’s right to legal assistance, had quashed the judgment of 21 July 2005 and had remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the appeal court. In a new set of appeal proceedings, counsel R. had been appointed to represent the applicant. R. had studied the materials of the case-file, had met with the applicant and had taken part in the appeal hearing. The applicant had consented to be represented by R. The defence carried out by counsel R. had been competent and effective. The mere fact that R. had not filed an additional statement of appeal was not sufficient to disclose a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


37.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Supreme Court, instead of referring the case to a trial court for fresh consideration, had reassessed the facts and evidence in his case, despite having no jurisdiction to do so. The applicant further complained under the same provision that his right to remain silent and his right to defence had been violated anew, given that the Supreme Court had excluded part of the evidence obtained in breach of these rights but had relied on other pieces of evidence obtained in the same manner. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 3 (a-d) that the retrial had been conducted in his absence, that he had had no adequate facilities to prepare his defence as he had not been informed of the evidence on which the prosecution had intended to rely if his initial confessions had been excluded, and that the exclusion of some of the evidence from his case had changed the situation to the extent that it had required the witnesses to be re-questioned, but this had not been done. The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention read as follows:


60.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing as he had not been properly defended by a lawyer and that he had not been able to question certain witnesses or to obtain the appearance of witnesses on his behalf. The relevant parts of Article <mask> of the Convention read as follows:


41.  The Government considered that Article <mask> of the Convention was only applicable in the present case from the moment when the applicant had been formally charged with the murder of Mrs K. on 25 February 2002. In their opinion, the investigative procedures that had been conducted with the participation of the applicant prior to that day did not fall within the ambit of Article 6, as the applicant participated in them voluntarily as a witness and therefore did not have a right to be represented by a lawyer.


14.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the appeal judgment of 2 April 2004 had been quashed by way of supervisory review on 23 September 2004 and that the supervisory-review hearing had been unfair because he had not been informed about it and therefore had not been able to attend it. In so far as relevant, these Articles read as follows:


26.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the judicial authorities’ failure to inform him of the date and place of the appeal hearing and the resultant violation of the principle of equality of arms. He also complained that the reclassification of the offence by the trial court from accepting a bribe to fraud had prevented him from exercising his defence rights properly. Article 6 in its relevant parts provides:


34. The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings before the Croatian Health Insurance Fund. Those proceedings had not involved any contentious issue between two conflicting parties. In the Government’s view, Article 6 of the Convention could be applicable to proceedings before the administrative authorities in cases where there was a dispute between an applicant and the relevant administrative body, but only with regard to complaints concerning the length of such proceedings. In other situations, such as the instant case, which concerned a complaint about the lack of fairness in the proceedings concerned, Article 6 of the Convention would not be applicable.


23.  The Government submitted that all four applicants had been duly notified of the forthcoming appellate hearings, and that Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 16 above) allowed the courts to proceed with examination of appeals in their absence. By contrast with criminal proceedings, civil disputes do not require the presence of both parties on appeal, and neither Russian law nor the Convention provides for the absolute right to be present before courts of both levels. In the cases of Mr Belkin and Mr Kiryushkin, the Government argued that not all types of civil proceedings required an oral hearing and that, given the nature of the applicants’ claims, the courts considered their presence unnecessary. In Mr Belkin’s case, the Government further submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not provide for a specific form of service of summonses. Lastly, in the case of Ms Shevchenok, they pointed out that the summons had been sent to a post-office box to which only she had access. It was therefore impossible to ascertain whether she had actually received it.


149.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about a denial of access to a court on account of the suspension in the functioning of the courts in Chechnya from October 1999 until January 2001, the unreasonable length of the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 14 February 2001 and the unfairness of the proceedings in 2002 in view of the arbitrary findings made in his case by the domestic courts, together with their failure properly to examine his legal arguments and the evidence adduced by him, as well as to address his claims regarding compensation for the occupation of his estate and non-pecuniary damage. With reference to the above deficiencies in the domestic proceedings, the applicant complained under Article 13 that the domestic remedies had proved to be ineffective in his case. The respective Articles in their relevant parts read as follows:


84.  The Government of Serbia and Montenegro added that the underlying explanation for Article <mask> of the Convention was to be found in the principle of the rule of law enunciated in Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. They said that it would be difficult to envisage that principle being applied without access to a court and referred to the judgment in Fayed v. the United Kingdom (21 September 1994, § 65, Series A no. 294‑B), in which the Court stated: “[I]t would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with the basic principle underlying Article 6 § 1 – namely that civil claims must be capable of being submitted to a judge for adjudication – if, for example, a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from civil liability on large groups or categories of persons.”


29.  The applicant complained that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been infringed by the use of the confession extracted from him as a result of coercion in police custody, during which he had been denied access to a lawyer. He further contended that his conviction had been based on statements that had been taken unlawfully from him and the other co-accused H.K. despite the fact that they had later been retracted. Furthermore, the applicant complained that the Adana Assize Court had not taken any steps to test the veracity of these statements. Lastly, he argued that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive. The Court will examine his complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which, in so far as relevant, provides:


15.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that while assessing the disciplinary proceedings, the domestic courts had delivered their decisions on the basis of the case files without holding hearings. He maintained that he had been deprived of his right to defend himself in person or through the assistance of a lawyer. The applicant, based on the same facts, also invoked Article 13 of the Convention. The Court will examine these complaints solely under Article 6 of the Convention.


71.  The Government argued that the applicants' “civil rights and obligations” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention were not at stake in the proceedings in question. Referring to the Court's judgment in the Ferrazzini case (Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, to be published in ECHR 2001-VII) and previous judgments by the Court concerning tax proceedings, they concluded that tax disputes fell outside the scope of Article 6, which provision was thus not applicable to the enforcement of taxes in the present case.


47.  The applicant argued that Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated in that she had not been invited to take part in the court proceedings involving the determination of her civil rights and obligations. As she had been a minor at the time when the criminal proceedings had been brought before the court, the authorities should have provided for the representation of her rights and lawful interests by appointing a representative for her. Even if the applicant’s legal representation had been carried out by her mother V. before she reached the age of majority, the quality of that representation was highly questionable and had not ensured the full protection of her interests. To fully protect the minor’s rights under such circumstances, the same social service authority of the municipality that had approved the sale of the apartment at 9 Mahtra Street should have been involved in the court hearings.


26.  The applicant disagreed. He argued that the relevant regulation applicable to court record keeping was not the list of standard documents relied on by the Government, but the instructions governing documentation and record keeping at the administrative courts (see paragraph 15 above). He referred to provisions of the Code of Administrative Justice and the instructions, which required that court documents be sent by registered rather than ordinary untraceable mail, and that delivery slips be kept in the case files (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above). Accordingly, his application was admissible and disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


97.  The applicants replied that had the Agency acted in accordance with the law they would have had the building permit by 8 August 2005 at the latest and there would have been no need for the court proceedings which followed. They also maintained that the 2006 DUP no longer provided for construction of the initially planned shopping centre and that thereby the subsequent calculation of the charges, as well as their right to a final decision and its enforcement, became pointless, which was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


47.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the quashing of the judgments of 27 June and 15 August 2001 by way of supervisory review. The Court observes that the supervisory review took place on 14 October and 11 February 2002 respectively, while the above complaint was first raised before the Court in 2009. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.


14.  The applicant complained that the prolonged non-enforcement of the judgment of 6 September 2001, as upheld on appeal on 9 January 2002, violated his right to a court under Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


56.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the respondent State had failed to enforce a final and enforceable decision of 16 May 1994 rendered in his favour and that he had been unable to obtain payment of the difference between the pension actually paid to him and the pension for the period between September 1990 and December 1993 as awarded to him by that decision. The applicant also complained under Article 13 that he had had no effective domestic remedy by which he could have had the 1994 decision enforced.


42.  The applicants contested the Government’s public policy argument, asserting that the interests in an effective prosecution of traffic offences could not justify curtailing the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, which were core contents of the notion of a fair trial. Moreover, the example of other member States showed that it was possible to secure the prosecution of traffic offences without resorting to a provision which was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The Government did not explicitly contest the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention. They rather argued that the text of the police decision reflected a state of suspicion that the applicant had committed a criminal offence and could not in the circumstances be considered to be a statement of fact or opinion, since it was issued prior to the initiation of any criminal prosecution. Moreover, a criminal prosecution had not been possible under the applicable domestic law as the applicant's husband had not given his consent as required under Article 163 (a) (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (see paragraph 16 above).


34.  The applicant claimed that Article 6 was applicable to her case. In particular, her case concerned a “dispute” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as with her claim she challenged the legality of the decisions and actions of the public authority. Furthermore, such dispute related to a civil right under Article 6 as the disputed right was recognised under the domestic law.


51.  The Government emphasised that Article <mask> of the Convention did not grant the accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court. It was normally for the national court to decide whether it was necessary or advisable to call a witness. In the present case the court had conducted fair, extensive, detailed and diligent proceedings when taking evidence. The applicant had been able to avail himself of all his procedural rights. He had requested that new evidence be taken and certain of his requests had been granted. All this evidence was examined in the applicant's presence.


30.  The Government added that neither the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court nor the prefect’s decision to reafforest had violated the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In deciding the admissibility of the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court had held that the Supreme Administrative Court’s finding that the prefect’s decision was not an operative act was not arbitrary. Furthermore, under Article 117 of the Constitution, the protection of forests was guaranteed without any limitation in time and notwithstanding any illegal destruction or deforestation. The decision to reafforest was not left to the discretion of the authorities but had to be taken when necessary and when the conditions laid down in Article 117 were met. The Supreme Administrative Court had found, on the basis of a large amount of evidence, that it was probable that the disputed area had been a forest in the past. It followed that the prefect’s decision was not arbitrary but dictated by reasons of public interest, namely the protection of the environment.


26.  The applicant complained that her right of access to a court had been violated as a result of the District Court’s refusal to examine her counter‑claim on the ground that the power of attorney submitted by her representative did not comply with the requirements of the law. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


47.  The Government contested the applicants’ position and submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention required accused persons to be given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the evidence, which had to be presented to them at the hearing. There could be exceptions to this principle, but they should not infringe the rights of the defence, which as a rule required accused persons to be entitled to examine or have examined a witness against them, either when the witness gave a statement or at a later stage (they cited Solakov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 47023/99, § 57, ECHR 2001‑X). Furthermore, in Schatschaschwili v. Germany ([GC], no. 9154/10, § 107, ECHR 2015), Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, § 119, ECHR 2011) and Seton v. the United Kingdom, (no. 55287/10, §§ 58 and 59, 31 March 2016), the Court had established three criteria which criminal proceedings had to satisfy in order to be compatible with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) where witness statements had been admitted in evidence without the witness having been examined by the accused.


78.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that the domestic courts had relied on a confession that he had only given under duress and that he had been deprived of the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


125.  The Government contended that there was no causal link between a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and the loss of assets or income which the applicants alleged they had sustained. The Government contended that the first applicant had had hardly any assets at all at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy and, in view of its financial situation, would have been declared bankrupt in any event on account of the taxes assessed by the Tax Authority. Thus, the tax surcharges had been of no relevance to the bankruptcy decision. Further, the second applicant had failed to substantiate any loss of income as his average declared income during the years 1997 to 2000 had been well above the income received from the first applicant the year before its bankruptcy. The Government further stated that the Court had no power under Article 41 to oblige a State to cancel a tax debt. Moreover, they contested that there was any causal link between the alleged pecuniary damage relating to the tax debts and the alleged violations of the Convention, which did not relate to the imposition of taxes and surcharges but to the enforcement of the decisions. In any event, only a very small amount of the relevant tax debts had actually been paid; the remainder had become statute-barred on 31 December 2001.


18.  The Government argued that the Katowice Court of Appeal had informed the applicant about his legal-aid lawyer's refusal and held that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal would start to run anew, starting on the date on which the refusal had been served on the applicant. They reiterated that the mere fact that a legal aid lawyer could refuse to represent a defendant in proceedings before the highest court could not be said to be, of itself, tantamount to a denial of legal assistance which would have been incompatible with the State's obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, in case of a lawyer's refusal to draft a cassation appeal, the State Parties were not obliged to provide assistance by successive legal-aid lawyers.


56.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the contested proceedings, because the applicant had been charged with an administrative rather than a criminal offence. They further argued that the applicant had been able to argue her case in the domestic courts. In particular, she and her representative had lodged an application for the examination of a video-recording, which had been granted by the appellate court. While the justice of the peace had refused the representative’s request to admit two photographs and a video-recording into evidence, it had granted his application for the release of street camera footage which could allegedly show the events of 15 September 2012. The Government concluded that the domestic courts had examined and assessed all the evidence at their disposal.


22.  The applicants complained, notably, under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the supervisory review of the judgments. Mrs Gladkova complained under these provisions that she was not notified of the supervisory review hearing and could not be present at the examination of her case. These Articles, insofar as relevant, provide as follows:


107.  The applicant alleged in his original application that he had had no effective domestic remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaint about the courts’ refusal to examine his complaints involving a disciplinary reprimand he had received at the Rasų Prison (Article <mask> of the Convention also being invoked in this respect). Moreover, he complained of the refusal of the domestic courts to entertain his complaints against certain private newspapers, journalists, the police and other State institutions.


28.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to equality of arms had been infringed as a result of his inability to consult the criminal file submitted by the prosecutor to the Râşcani District Court before its decision of 14 June 2004. He also complained, under the same Article, of absence of relevant and sufficient reasons for the various decisions in his case. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:


41.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the quashing, by way of supervisory review, of the judgment of 3 July 2001. The Court recalls that the quashing of a final judgment is an instantaneous act, which does not create a continuing situation, even if it entails a reopening of the proceedings as in the present case (see Sardin v. Russia (dec.), no. 69582/01, 12 February 2004 and Khanyan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 19065/05, 5 July 2007). The Court further recalls that, in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only examine complaints in respect of which domestic remedies have been exhausted and which have been submitted within six months from the date of the “final” domestic decision. If there is no adequate remedy against a particular act, which is alleged to be in breach of the Convention, the date when that act takes place is taken to be “final” for the purposes of the six months’ rule (see, for example, Valašinas v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 44558/98, 14 March 2000).


31.  The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial ‒ because he had not been provided with a legal aid lawyer at any stage of the criminal proceedings ‒ and that the trial court which convicted him had lacked impartiality to the extent that a substantial part of his trial had been conducted in the absence of a prosecutor. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:


12.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the quashing of the judgment in her favour on supervisory review and the issuing of a new decision by which her claims had been dismissed in full. She also invoked in this connection Articles 13 and 17 of the Convention. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provide in the relevant parts as follows:


78.  The applicant raised numerous complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention about the criminal proceedings against him. He complained that there had been a violation of his defence rights regarding the examination of the undercover witness, that the judges had been biased, had not given reasons for their decisions and had rejected his requests for the admission of evidence. He further alleged that his conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence obtained by using special investigative techniques and that the witness whose statement had served as the main evidence against him had been involved in the operation as an agent provocateur. He complained also that the documents in the case file had not been translated into a language that he understood. The Court considers that these complaints should be analysed under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the latter concerning particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, which, in so far, as relevant, read as follows:


48.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Commissioner of Public Interest had refused to call advocates of the Koszalin Regional Bar as witnesses for him. Furthermore, the lustration courts had refused to hear a number of the applicant’s witnesses who were to testify that he had not been a secret and conscious collaborator of the security service. He also complained that he had been deprived of the right to practise as an advocate for ten years and accordingly sustained significant moral and pecuniary damage. Lastly, the applicant alleged that judges of the Lustration Chamber of the Warsaw Court of Appeal had not been permanently assigned to either the first or the second-instance lustration court but had heard cases sometimes sitting on the first-instance court and sometimes sitting on the second-instance court.


24.  The Government were of the view that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings concerning the imposition of solitary confinement on the applicant. This provision did not apply to incidental proceedings conducted in the course of criminal proceedings concerning the determination of a criminal charge, even when important procedural issues were determined in them. Such proceedings did not relate to the merits of the criminal case against the applicant. As a consequence, they did not concern the determination of a criminal charge against him. The procedural safeguards laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention did not, as a rule, apply to various preliminary measures which could be taken as a part of a criminal investigation before bringing a criminal charge, such as the arrest or interviewing of a suspect (Escoubet v. Belgium [GC], no. 26780/95, § 34, ECHR 1999‑VII).


41.  The applicants submitted that in the absence of a prosecuting party the trial judges had taken on the role of the prosecution. The court therefore was not “independent and impartial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The first applicant also alleged that the domestic courts had dismissed the testimonies of the defence witnesses and video recording favourable to him while giving weight to the written statements of the police officers.


38.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts had not taken into consideration the evidence proving the unlawfulness of the Ministry's refusal to register the association and had failed to properly examine the complaint concerning the Ministry's breach of statutory time-limits for an official response to the state registration request. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


30. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. He further argued that the Supreme Court had re-established the facts of the case although it had not been vested with such a jurisdiction; that it had not been impartial and independent, as it had decided under the Government's influence. He further maintained that it had not decided in public. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


57.  The applicant submitted that the disciplinary proceedings against him had been a drastic step. By their very nature and consequences a “right” in the sense of Article <mask> of the Convention had been created. Any public‑law features of a disciplinary nature in the case did not exclude the proceedings from the scope of Article 6 since their outcome had been severe and far-reaching: the applicant had been dismissed from his post, affecting his career and professional activities. The fact that Articles 12 § 5 and 30 of the Constitution, which contained equivalent guarantees to Article 6 of the Convention, had been applicable to the disciplinary proceedings were indicative of the civil nature of the right at stake.


19.  The applicant complained that the manner in which the domestic courts had dismissed his claim had not been in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, he also relied on Article 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined as an “access to a court” complaint under Article 6 (see Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005). The applicant also complained that the judges had been biased and the principle of equality of arms had been violated. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


135.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that various irregularities in the criminal proceedings against him had rendered them unfair. In his view, his conviction had been based on insufficient and inadmissible evidence. In particular, the courts had taken into account the expert report of 13 April 2004, and had rejected an alternative expert report submitted by the defence. Also, the courts had incorrectly assessed statements by a number of prosecution witnesses and referred, in convicting the applicant, to a statement by a witness who had lodged an anonymous complaint, and to a statement by another witness who had been biased against the applicant. At the same time, in the applicant’s view, the courts had failed to give appropriate weight to the statements of the defence witnesses. The applicant also disputed the establishment of facts by the trial court, stating that its relevant findings had not been substantiated with sufficient evidence.


26.  The applicants also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of non-enforcement of the judgments of 11 December 2001 delivered by the Ryazan Garnison Military Court. Invoking the same provisions the applicant S. Panchenko also complained of delayed enforcement of the two other judgments delivered by the same court on 13 and 20 December 2001 and of insufficient compensation subsequently awarded by the same court on account of this delayed enforcement. The relevant parts of the Convention’s provisions are cited above.


45.  The applicant complained that the prolonged failure to enforce the judgments of 12 May 1999, as clarified on 7 September 1999, 21 July 1999, as upheld on 5 October 1999, 10 May 2000, as upheld on 22 June 2000, and 16 May 2000 violated Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of Article 6 provide as follows:


26.  The applicant argued that the dismissal of her “Pinto” compensation claim as being out of time had disregarded the Court’s case-law to the effect that the execution phase is an integral part of the “trial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, according to the applicant, based on the principles set out in the Cocchiarella judgment (cited above, §§  87‑90), the “final domestic decision”, to be taken as a starting point for the six-month period within which to bring a claim for just satisfaction under section 4 of Law no. 89 of 2001, should be the garnishee order of 25 January 2005 issued by the enforcements judge.


27.  The Government submitted that the proceedings regarding the trial of the preliminary issue of jurisdiction of the Larnaca District Court and the appeal lodged against the decision of that court in this respect should be excluded from the period concerned in determining the overall period of the proceedings. They relied on the case of Buchholz v. Germany (judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42) which in their view was applicable in the present case, since the courts were not called on to determine the dispute between the parties; their ruling did not relate to the right claimed by the applicant against the defendant. Therefore, they argued that these proceedings did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention.


80.   The applicant further complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in that the courts had refused to obtain an opinion from an expert in photographic analysis in order to show that the impression created by one of the published photographs, namely that he was exchanging a French kiss with the seminarian K., was an optical illusion.


64.  The Government, referring to the complexity of the case, number of participants and conduct of the parties to the proceedings, pleaded that the proceedings had been held within the reasonable time. In particular, they submitted that the authorities had carried out twenty-three forensic examinations and interrogated more than six hundred witnesses. The criminal limb of the proceedings had been also complicated by civil actions brought by the victims, numbering in total up to twelve persons. The civil limb of the proceedings had been complicated by the claimants, including the applicant, who had enjoyed their procedural rights (for example, modified their claims, inter alia, indicating new defendants to the case whose number on different stages of the proceedings ranged from four to eight, appealed against court decisions, lodged various requests, etc.). On several occasions the parties had requested the hearings be adjourned and had failed to appear before the courts, which according to the Government had delayed the progress of the proceedings for eleven months. The domestic authorities, on the other hand, had caused no delays and a fortiori had taken measures to speed up the proceedings. Accordingly, the Government concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case.


32.  The Government submitted that the judgments in Phillips v. the United Kingdom (cited above) and in R. v. Benjafield (see paragraph 26 above) had recognised that the 1994 Act was designed to combat the serious problem of drug trafficking, by punishing convicted offenders, deterring other offences and reducing the profits available to fund future drug-trafficking ventures. The objectives of the legislation reflected not only national but also international policy, as was made clear by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, as also found in those judgments, the operation of the legislation was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and provided a number of safeguards for the defendant.


70.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied access to court twice (in November 2005 and June 2006) in connection with several charges related to a cover-up, racist behaviour towards him and a breach of his personal rights because of violation of data protection. He also complained that the Patras Court of Appeal's judgment lacked sufficient reasoning. Under Article 6 § 2 the applicant complained of a claim made by the Patras prosecutor that the applicant had signed a forged document in order to incriminate the police officers. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his private and family life had been violated because one of the defendant police officers had submitted information on past criminal activity of the applicant's relatives in order to discredit the applicant's statements.


60.  The applicant also alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the fact that under Moldovan law it was impossible for him to adduce evidence in support of his claim to have his ethnic origin changed from Moldovan to Romanian. Since this complaint relates to the same matters as those considered under Article 8, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine it separately (see, mutatis mutandis, Megadat.com S.R.L. v. Moldova, no. 21151/04, § 80, 8 April 2008).


16.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right of access to court was violated by the refusal to hold a hearing at which they could challenge the order made by the High Court of Justiciary on 15 February 2005. They further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that this was an unjustified interference with their right to impart information as guaranteed by that Article. Finally, under Article 13 of the Convention, they complained that there was no effective remedy to challenge the making of an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1983.


24.  The applicant submitted that the Administrative Court had unlawfully dismissed his request to hold an oral hearing, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to discuss the expert opinions in the context of a public hearing. Since an oral hearing could have elucidated the facts of the case, the Court's refusal to hold one was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The applicant submits that the right to a fair trial in which a lawyer can defend the accused in his or her absence – and therefore without fear of arrest – is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the Court’s findings in Lala and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands (judgments of 22 September 1994, Series A nos. 297-A and 297-B), the applicant argues that, in weighing the State’s interest in securing the appearance of accused at their trial against that of defendants in exercising their right to be defended by counsel, the latter interest should prevail.


103.  The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account. It reiterates that when an applicant has been convicted despite an infringement of his rights as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position that he would have been in had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be trial de novo or the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see Öcalan v. Turkey, cited above, § 210 in fine).


11.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments of 4 February 2004 and 27 May 2005, as well as, in substance, about the quashing of the judgment of 27 May 2005 and the unfairness of the supervisory-review proceedings. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:


37.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of other proceedings. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, the applicant complained about the outcome of the first set of the proceedings and the proceedings instituted by the company, G., against the Inspectorate, and that both sets of proceedings were unfair. He complained under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 that pecuniary damage had been caused to him and his company.


61.  The Government submitted that, considering the limited and technical nature of the issues arising in costs proceedings, Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable. In any event the applicants had not raised the question of costs before the court or addressed the Supreme Court on this matter, although they had had the right to do so at any stage of the hearing of their appeal or in their written addresses. The applicants had known that the Supreme Court would decide on the issue of costs at the end of its judgment. The Government referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kypros Economides and Christos A. Theodoulou v. the Republic of Cyprus through the Council of Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and Director of Town Planning (appeal no. 3196, 4 July 2007) in which the appellants had raised the issue of costs before the Court in their written pleadings and the Supreme Court had addressed the matter in its judgment and applied the general rule that costs follow the outcome of the case.


72.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not necessarily require a hearing in all proceedings. They argued in that connection that where no controversy existed over the facts of a case and the legal question was not particularly complex, proceedings could be dealt with on the basis of written submissions. They submitted that in proceedings before enforcement courts the examination of a case was done on the basis of the case file. The only exception to this rule concerned objections against disciplinary penalties, where a hearing would be held. In the present case, the fact that no hearing had taken place had not prevented the applicant from submitting his arguments against the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court before the Assize Court. They also argued that in certain proceedings, such as the present one, the demands of efficiency and economy could justify dispensing with a hearing. They maintained in that connection that if each application submitted to an enforcement court were to be examined by holding a hearing, thousands of detainees and convicts would be required frequently to go outside of the prison institutions which would, economic hardships aside, jeopardise the security and the discipline of the institution.


13.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They further complain that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


59.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, under various heads. Firstly, they complained that the 2004 Act had introduced a legislative amendment that interfered with their rights in pending proceedings. Secondly, they complained that the proceedings regarding the compensation due to them have not been concluded within a reasonable time. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


85.  The Government put forward an admissibility objection as regards one specific complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. They contended that the applicants had not contested the decision to disjoin the case against X from the criminal proceedings against them. They claimed, in particular, that the first applicant had not challenged the rulings of 17 October 2012 and 10 December 2012 under the procedure set out in Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the second applicant had not lodged any complaints at all. The Government therefore argued that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as regards this complaint. If they had considered this remedy ineffective, the Government claimed in the alternative that they had missed the six-month time-limit for lodging their complaint with the Court.


22.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim was of a public-law nature and fell outside the material scope of the application of Article <mask> of the Convention, therefore it was incompatible ratione materiae with its provisions, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a). They stressed that although access to a court was not excluded expressly in respect of the right claimed by the applicant, this could not create a substantive right under Hungarian law, to be recognised as a civil right for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention.


161.  The applicant submitted that the civil limb of Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable to each set of domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 31-33 above) aimed at declaring his administrative arrest in breach of domestic law and arbitrary, and at obtaining compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of such arrest. The civil courts had wrongly declined jurisdiction by referring to the competence of courts in a CAO case to assess the legality of administrative arrest and related actions on the part of the police. In both sets of proceedings, the civil courts had wrongly reasoned that the courts in the applicant’s CAO case had assessed the legality of the arrest, by emphasising that the related court decisions had become final. The CAO contained no provision requiring courts in CAO cases to assess related issues of legality. The courts in the second set of proceedings had omitted to assess the relevant factual and legal elements arising from his claim.


27.  The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair trial on account of his trial by the Istanbul Security Court whose composition included a military judge, the denial of access to a lawyer during the preliminary investigation, the use of statements taken under duress to convict him, the non-communication of the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court Cassation and the failure of the trial court to hear important witnesses. He further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive. Article <mask> of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:


30.  The Government maintained that the Respondent State’s liability may only be engaged in so far as it relates to the enforcement proceedings against the debtor while the subsequent insolvency proceedings against the debtor should not be assessed in the context of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued, taking into account that the debtor was at one point a privately owned company, that the Respondent State cannot be held responsible for the failure to fulfil its obligations. They finally argued that the State cannot be held responsible for the debtor’s lack of assets.


85.  The applicant also complained that at the material time the courts were not functioning in the Chechen Republic, and therefore the company had to bring court proceedings in a neighbouring region. It was thus placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party, as the company had difficulty in securing the attendance of witnesses and obtaining necessary materials, and because its representative incurred additional travel expenses. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in its relevant part, reads as follows:


62.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not had the opportunity to question witnesses. He further complained, without invoking any Convention provision, that his health had deteriorated in detention and that the medical assistance provided had been inadequate. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention that the judicial authorities had failed to take into account his detention before 16 January 2005 when calculating his prison sentence and under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that he had had no opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his pre-conviction detention.


27.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied access to a court since their claim had remained undecided on the merits due to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the national courts to decide the case. They also complained about the excessive length of the proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


46.  The applicant contended that the reports on his background check had been based on unverified and incorrect insinuations made by the police. Although he had asked for disclosure of the information on which the reports had been based, it had never been provided to him. Instead, the Administrative Court had reviewed it ex parte and thus prevented him from effectively arguing his case. In the applicant’s view, this had run counter to the requirements of equality of arms and adversarial trial under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant also considered that he had sufficiently demonstrated that he had no problem of alcohol abuse and there had therefore been no reason not to renew his firearms licence.


34.  The Government stated that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the applicant's case. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had been duly informed of the hearing on appeal on 17 August 2005 and had been able to request the adjournment of that hearing, that her lawyer had also been aware of that hearing, which was confirmed by his request of 7 September 2005, and that after the hearing of 17 August 2005 the decision of the Court of Appeal together with other materials of the case had been available at that court. On these grounds, the Government contended that the applicant and her lawyer had had a real opportunity to submit an appeal in cassation within the time-limit set by the law.


23.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and that the prosecutor’s office had refused to initiate criminal proceedings against third parties. The Court considers that there is nothing in the material submitted by the applicant to suggest that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair in any way. This part of the complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. As to the second part of the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee the right to pursue criminal proceedings against third persons and that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings aimed at instituting criminal proceedings against third persons. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.


70.  The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against them had been arbitrary and unfair, in particular on account of the failure to comply with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms when the evidence and witnesses had been admitted and examined. They complained about their conviction for acts which had not fallen under the legal classification assigned to them. They also alleged that they had been deprived of having the judgment against them delivered in public because the date of delivery had been moved to prevent attendance by the public and press and because only the operative part of the judgment had been delivered at the hearing. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


93.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he complained that his inability to take part in the supervisory-review proceedings before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia had rendered those proceedings unfair. The Court is of the view that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:


72.  The Government, agreeing that the delays in the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s rape had been excessive, argued that the situation had been appropriately redressed by the competent domestic authorities, which had awarded the applicant EUR 5,000 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time. Taking the view that in the specific circumstances of the present case the remedy in question had constituted appropriate and sufficient redress with regard to both the alleged violations of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention and of the applicant’s procedural rights under Article 3 of the Convention, the Government argued that she had lost her victim status. They pointed out that in the proceedings for compensation under the 2006 Act, the domestic courts had taken account of the particular circumstances of the criminal proceedings, emphasising that the applicant’s case had not been handled in a careful, resolute and rapid manner, as required by the serious nature of the criminal acts involved, and that during the lengthy proceedings the applicant had had to relive the abuse she had suffered, which had caused her severe mental distress. Consequently, the applicant had been awarded a considerably higher amount than would normally have been granted under the 2006 Act. In the Government’s opinion, the domestic courts had therefore appropriately examined the substantial deficiencies in the criminal proceedings on which the applicant had based her allegations concerning a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 3.


38.  The Government contested these claims stating, firstly, that there was no causal link between the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and any pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered the applicant’s claim exorbitant as to quantum. In the event that the Court were to find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not exceed EUR 3,000.


42.  The applicant further claimed that both Article 70 § 3 of the CCP and Article 22 of the Law on State Fees contradicted the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. These provisions created inequality between physical and legal persons, the former being able to obtain an exemption from payment of the court fee in case of insufficient financial means, while the latter was deprived of this possibility. Even if a legal person which was experiencing financial difficulties was granted a deferral of payment of the court fee, it would still find itself in a difficult financial situation in the future. In sum, the applicant company claimed that the non-examination of its cassation appeal violated its right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6.


33.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the circumstances of the present case concerning the proceedings relating to the applicant’s family disability benefit request. Those proceedings had not involved any contentious issue between two parties. They had been principally conducted by the administrative authorities and only later by the Administrative Court. In the Government’s view, Article 6 of the Convention could be applicable to proceedings before the administrative authorities in cases where there was a dispute between an applicant and the competent administrative body, but only with regard to complaints concerning the length of proceedings. In other situations, such as the instant case, which concerned a complaint about the lack of fairness in the proceedings, Article 6 of the Convention would not be applicable.


19. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the fairness of the domestic proceedings, the assessment of the evidence by the domestic courts and their alleged failure to examine all his arguments. In particular, he complained, inter alia, that the domestic courts had committed errors of fact and law and the decisions had not been well reasoned. He further complained about the absence of a hearing prior to the imposition of the fine in question.


15.  The applicant complained that judge N.H. had been a member of both Supreme Court panels that had examined his two successive appeals on points of law. He noted that the participation of the judge in the examination of the same case for the second time had been in breach of the requirements of the domestic procedural law and therefore that the Supreme Court panel composed in this manner could not have been impartial. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as follows, in the relevant part:


38.  The Government argued that it could not be inferred from this Court’s case-law that Article <mask> of the Convention requires domestic courts to refer a case to the CJEU or to provide specific reasons for refusing such a referral, irrespective of the content or grounds of that request. According to the Government, the duty to provide reasons when refusing to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling is “a specific element of the general duty of courts to give reasoned decisions” and, referring to Hansen (cited above, § 80), an appellate court was not required to provide more detailed reasoning when it applied a specific legal provision to dismiss an appeal in cassation as having no prospects of success, without further explanation. Therefore, in the Government’s view, the Supreme Court’s judgment containing a summary reasoning based on section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act was compliant with Article 6 of the Convention and it should be read as that court’s conclusion that the applicant’s request for the referral of a question to the CJEU did not relate to a point of law that required answering.


37.  The Government submitted that the application did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular having regard to the time elapsed after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia. They submitted further that the subject matter of the applicant's case did not call for particular urgency in deciding it. They referred to the Court's case-law, arguing that the cases that did call for special urgency were those that related to family-law matters or to payment of damages to the victims of road accidents, those that involved the interests of a great number of persons and cases concerning dismissal from work.


94.  The applicant further complained about the outcome and conduct of the custody proceedings (5 F 283/98 and 5 F 18/99); he alleged in particular that the District Court had been obliged to take one single definitive decision on the attribution of custody when the spouses separated, that the attribution of sole custody to the mother had been contrary to the children's best interest and that the acting judge had been biased. He further complained that his children had not been heard in either set of proceedings, and that he and his former wife had also not been heard. The applicant further complained about the court's failure to determine his contact rights within the scope of the joint judgment granting the divorce and determining the custody rights. With respect to the proceedings 5 F 283/98 and 5 F 18/99 the applicant finally complained under Articles 8 and 17 of the Convention about the possibility of one parent to apply for sole custody according to Article 1671 of the German Civil Code. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of his contact rights (5 F 272/98, 5 F 271/04 and 5 F 33/08) the applicant, relying on Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention further complained about the content of the court settlement of 5 September 2002 and that he had allegedly not been involved in its conclusion. He also complained that his children had not been heard prior to the settlement, that the acting judge had been biased and that the domestic courts had failed to protect his relationship with his children, who had now been alienated from him. Finally, he also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of the proceedings instituted under file no. 5 F 33/08. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of the children's contact rights with their father (5 F 134/01) the applicant complained under Articles 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention that he had been prevented from representing his children in these proceedings. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of the grandparents' contact rights the applicant, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, again complained that he had also been prevented from representing his children and that the domestic courts had given priority to the grandparents' contact rights.


92.  The Government noted that, in Morris, the Court had rejected the applicant's general argument (as had the House of Lords) that service tribunals could not try service personnel on criminal charges consistently with Article <mask> of the Convention. The core question in Morris and the present case was not whether military tribunals were acceptable under Article 6 in times of peace or war but rather whether the applicant had obtained a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Government maintained that he had.


111.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the investigator’s decisions to recommence the investigation of his case and the allegedly unsafe sentence that was based on contradictory witness statements and misrepresentations in the trial court records. In his application form of 25 April 2003 he also claimed that the late service of formal charges against him breached his rights provided by the Convention. The relevant parts of Article 6 provide: