123.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the administrative offence proceedings against him had been unfair and unreasonably long. He also complained, relying on Article 7, that he had been forced to undergo a psychiatric examination applicable only to criminal proceedings. The applicant next complained, under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of the unauthorised entry into his flat and theft of his property while he was in hospital. He complained under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention that by ordering his psychiatric confinement, the domestic courts had been punishing him for expressing his disagreement with “the political, moral, legal, religious and cultural values held by a certain sector of society”. Lastly, the applicant complained that although he had never been married, the authorities had mistakenly decided to seek a character reference from his non-existent ex-wife, which he considered to be a violation of Article 12 of the Convention.


37.  The Government considered that the applicant’s statement had not been the sole basis for his conviction and that the applicant had been represented by a lawyer throughout the domestic proceedings and had enjoyed the rights guaranteed under domestic law. For the Government, a single shortcoming had not violated the rights provided in Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as it could be concluded that the trial had been fair taken as a whole. They submitted that the domestic court decision had been in conformity with the Court’s case-law.


60.  The applicant asserted that the thirty-two hours (four days) allocated to him for familiarising himself with the case file had been insufficient to allow the preparation of his cassation appeal, regard particularly being had to the fact that the case file had contained twenty-eight volumes (some 7,000 pages). His situation had been further prejudiced by the fact that he had remained handcuffed on the occasions that he was allowed to familiarise himself with the materials, which had impeded his ability to take notes and had caused him severe physical suffering. In addition, there had been a six-month interval between the dates on which the applicant had studied the case file and the date on which he had participated in the cassation hearing, at which he had eventually found himself without legal representation. In the light of these factors, the Supreme Court’s refusal to provide him with additional time to study the case-file materials had breached the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention.


38.  The Government first submitted that the proceedings in question did not concern the applicants’ civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. This was so because the applicants had not shown that their legal predecessor W.U. had been the owner of the property concerned in 1948. The Government argued that he had never acquired ownership of this property, which had been bequeathed to him under the 1918 will drawn up by his father, K.U., on certain conditions. As those conditions had never been fulfilled, W.U. had not become owner of the property and his name had not been listed in the relevant land register.


25.  The applicants complained that the appeal and supervisory review proceedings had fallen short of the requirements of fairness. In particular, they alleged that the legal assistance provided by State-appointed counsel had not been effective and that the video links provided had been of poor quality. The first applicant also complained that the appeal court had ordered his removal from the hearing and had proceeded in his absence. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


100.  The applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court changed its interpretation of the Salduz judgment in 2012 and 2013 (see relevant domestic law) and different conclusions were then arrived at. He noted that these conflicting judgments ran counter to the principle of legal certainty. It was the Constitutional Court’s role to create certainty; however, concerning the subject matter it had done just the opposite. The applicant relied on the case of Beian, cited above. He noted that in The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011, and The Police v Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011, the Constitutional Court held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. This interpretation was reversed in the judgment in the names of Joseph Bugeja vs The Attorney General, 14 January 2013; The Police vs Tyron Fenech, 22 February 2013; and The Police vs Amanda Agius, also of 22 February 2013, as well as in his own case. The interpretation was again reversed in The Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri of 12 November 2012, albeit that decision was once again overturned.


39.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of unfairness of the proceedings in her case. She also complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention of lack of access to a court on account of the outcome of the second, third and fourth sets of proceedings. The applicant finally alleged that the State authorities had violated her right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


62.  The applicant companies relied on the Court’s principles regarding access to court and legislative intervention under Article <mask> of the Convention, and referred in particular to the Court’s judgment in Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) ([GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006‑V). They considered that there existed no legitimate reasons or compelling general interest reasons which could allow the Italian legislator to legitimately intervene in pending proceedings by enacting a law with retroactive effect concerning facts which had already come to be and proceedings which had already been initiated, thus usurping the function of the judiciary and violating the applicants’ right to a fair trial as well as impairing the very essence of the their right to a court. Indeed, the only reason behind the intervention had been financial, namely to avoid payments in a number of judgments, at first‑instance and on appeal, which had found in favour of the applicant companies and other companies in the same position. This was clear even from the name of the law – Urgent dispositions to favour development and to adjust the trend in public finances (Disposizioni urgenti per favorire lo sviluppo e la correzione dell’andamaneto dei conti pubblici). Without the intervention, and in accordance with the established case-law arising from a multitude of cases including judgments of the Court of Cassation, the applicant companies’ claims would have succeeded. However, the intervention ensured that, contrary to what had already been established, the INPS would be successful.


131.  The Government submitted that the lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case had been in line with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had been represented during the proceedings, had the right to appeal, and the Commission and the courts had given reasons for their decisions. He had had full access to all the documents available in the file, which had been examined at the hearing before the Administrative Court in his presence. Given the small size of the applicant’s personal record of around forty to fifty pages and its relatively simple content, the imposed time-limits had been sufficient for him to prepare his arguments in the case.


83.  The Government reiterated their submission (see paragraphs 40 to 46 above) to the effect that there was no obligation under Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention to reopen domestic proceedings in every instance where a violation of the Convention had been established. The individual facts of each case alone would determine whether the need to ensure restitutio in integrum required the reopening of the proceedings and whether this need prevailed over the principle of legal certainty. The Government also stressed that the applicant had manifestly failed to disclose the nature of the “very serious consequences” he allegedly continued to suffer as a result of the ineffective investigation into his ill-treatment. While the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the police officers might have led to some disappointment for the applicant, it had not entailed serious consequences for him. In that connection the Government submitted that in the present case, unlike that of Cēsnieks, cited above, no issue arose as to the impact of the applicant’s ill-treatment on the fairness of the proceedings determining the charges brought against him, since the Court had declared the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention inadmissible.


19.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the reasons given by the Indictment Division of the Samos Criminal Court presented him as the perpetrator of a crime with which he had not been charged and for which he was not standing trial. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 2 to the Convention, which reads as follows:


45.  The Government, referring to the relationship between Article 5 § 4 and Article <mask> of the Convention and, in particular, to the case of Reinprecht v. Austria (no. 67175/01, ECHR 2005‑XII), submitted that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the present case. However, even if Article 6 of the Convention were applicable, the proceedings had not lasted too long.


38.  The applicant replied that she had in fact exhausted domestic remedies. She submitted that at the outset she could choose between appealing against the CDEC's decision or directly filing an action for damages against her employer. However, in 1996, when she had to make that choice, neither alternative seemed more promising than the other. Had she chosen to appeal, she would have had to rely on Article 120 of the Constitution or Article <mask> of the Convention to persuade the domestic courts to change their then established case‑law. Had she chosen to directly file an action for damages, as she had in fact done, she could try to adduce evidence to directly prove the occupational character of her disease. The advantage of this approach was that it saved her one set of proceedings, while in the same time presenting the same chances for success: the courts examining the action for damages could have relied on the principles underlying Article 120 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention and could have examined all factual issues relevant to her claim. Having chosen one set of judicial proceedings over another, the applicant was not required to embark on a second attempt.


63.  The Government did not contest the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted, however, that, although criminal sanctions could follow a finding of contempt, it was essential when considering the requirements of Article 6 to recognise that contempt proceedings were not akin to ordinary criminal proceedings, but were a sui generis form of proceedings which aimed at securing the unimpeded functioning of a court, the safeguarding of its authority and standing and the protection, in the public interest, of the integrity of the judicial process.


54.  The Government submitted that the fact that the applicant had had no possibility to participate in ex post factum review proceedings legalising his personal search had had no bearing on his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the relevant procedure as provided for in Article 290 of the CCP (cited in paragraph 37 above), the Government stressed that the competent judge had taken the relevant decision on the basis of supporting documents, in particular the decision to conduct the search and the police report on the search, submitted by the prosecution. Thus, the alleged negative impact of the above-mentioned judicial procedure remained unsubstantiated. In this connection, the Government again reiterated their inadmissibility argument, claiming that the applicant could have challenged the decision to conduct his personal search in urgent circumstances on the basis of Article 234 of the CCP, before the relevant court had legalised its results on 5 July 2004. Furthermore, according to the Government, the fact that the applicant had not been served with a copy of that decision prior to the personal search was irrelevant. Indeed, he had never voiced any grievances in this respect during the pre-trial investigation or before the first-instance court.


27.  The applicants complained that no prosecuting party had been present at the court hearings in the administrative proceedings against them, and that the trial judges had acted in breach of the impartiality requirement. The applicants also alleged that they had not been afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


15.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had not been fair and that his defence rights had been breached. In particular, he complained that he had not been afforded access to a lawyer during the police questioning, that he had not been allowed time to prepare his defence but had been questioned immediately upon his arrest, and that he had undergone an expert forensic examination, as he and his family had requested.


40.  The applicant disagreed and maintained that the domestic remedies had been exhausted. When she had requested an oral hearing before the Administrative Court of Appeal, the court’s obligation had been to examine her request according to Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the court for some reason had failed to do so. Therefore, the applicant had expressly alleged before the Supreme Administrative Court that there had been a breach of Article 6, due to the fact that she had been denied an oral hearing by the lower court. By doing so, the applicant had given the Supreme Administrative Court an opportunity to correct the violation and to refer the case back to the lower court for an oral hearing. Therefore, the applicant had already, during the administrative court proceedings, exhausted the domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant pointed out that she was only required to try one possible remedy, which she had done by invoking the matter before the Supreme Administrative Court.


43.  The Government took issue with the Chamber’s judgment. They considered, in the first place, that the matter should be determined by reference to Article <mask> of the Convention and not Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Unlike in previous cases, the Government in this case had not appropriated property to its own use, and had not introduced legislation for the involuntary transfer of private property from one person to another in pursuit of a social-policy objective. The only interference with the applicant companies’ land came about through the actions of private individuals, the squatters, who obtained adverse possession in 1983-84. The outcome of the proceedings was dictated by the applicant companies’ own inaction. They contended that the application to the present facts of the conventional case-law as to the necessity, in principle, for compensation to be paid in respect of deprivations of property confirmed the logic of analysing the case by reference to Article 6: the purpose of a limitation period is to deprive a claimant, at the end of the relevant time period, of any opportunity of enforcing his rights through the courts. That objective would be frustrated if a limitation provision could only be compatible with the Convention if the claimant was provided with compensation against the very person against whom his claim was barred.


13.  The Government contended that the complaint is inadmissible on three grounds. They claimed, first, that the applicant is not a “victim” of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because, in consequence of his reliance on the provision before the Court of Appeal, he obtained a substantial reduction in his sentence. Secondly, they contended that even if he is a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34, he has failed to exhaust domestic remedies because it was open to him to bring a civil action under Section 7 (1) (a) of the Human Rights Act in respect of the delay of the hearing of his appeal, but he did not do so. The applicant does not comment on these pleas. Finally, as noted above, they contended that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded.


40.  The Government considered that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the instant case, as neither the interim proceedings nor the main proceedings concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Relying on the Court's judgment in the Pellegrin case (Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, § 59; § 64 et s., ECHR 1999‑VIII), they submitted that disputes on recruitment to civil service fell outside the scope of Article 6 § 1, as neither the Convention nor the protocols thereto guaranteed such right. This principle remained unchanged by the Court's judgment in the Vilho Eskelinen case (Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV, 8 August 2006). The office of a notary had to be regarded as part of the civil service, as he performed functions which were manifestations of public authority. It followed that the right to equal access to the notary profession derived from Article 12 in conjunction with Article 33 § 2 of the Basic Law did not qualify as a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1.


118.  The applicant submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable under both its civil and its criminal head. With particular reference to the latter, she reiterated the arguments she had submitted before the Chamber, arguing that the penalties liable to be imposed on her were of a criminal nature on account of their severity and the fact that they cast doubt on the honour, integrity and trustworthiness of the person concerned.


36.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the final judgment of 24 March 2000 had been annulled by way of the supervisory review on 5 February 2001. In this respect the Court notes that the applicant lodged his complaint in this regard on 25 March 2005, which was more than six months after the judgment was annulled. Therefore, this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


102.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the defamation proceedings against her had been unfair. Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as the complaint falls within the Court’s competence, it finds that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


55.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had not been allowed to see a lawyer during their initial detention at the police stations in Chişinău and Ialoveni, and that this had prevented them from challenging the court order for their detention pending trial. However, the Court notes that the applicants did not show that their case had been prejudiced as a result of the above alleged breaches. Accordingly, the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


13.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the judgment of 16 July 2003, as upheld on 14 October 2003, and the judgments of 5 January, 16 February, 15 April, 6 and 30 September 2004 were not enforced in good time. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:


138.  The applicant complained that the proceedings concerning the recognition and enforcement of the Florence District Court’s judgment of 18 September 2012 had been unfair, in that he had not been informed of the date of the appeal hearing on 12 March 2013, and had therefore been absent from that hearing. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:


17.  The applicant company complained of a violation of its right to a fair trial, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it complained that the courts had failed to apply the statute of limitations and that it had not been summoned to the hearing before the Supreme Court of Justice. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:


105.  The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He further complained of a violation of Article 13, arguing that the rules on the basis of which he had been convicted had been ambiguous. Lastly, he considered that the alleged violations also amounted to a violation of Article 17.


4.  The applicants were found guilty of the administrative offence of market manipulation, provided for by Article 187 ter of the TUF and punished under a procedure set out in Article 187 septis of the TUF in conjunction with section 23 of Law no. 689 of 24 November 1981. The procedure before the CONSOB is not fair in the light of the standards laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention[3].


36.  The Government argued that the mere fact that the Supreme Court had dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law as inadmissible did not constitute a denial of access to court, in particular given that it had been the applicants’ omission and lack of care which had led the Supreme Court to reach such a decision. The Government pointed out that the applicants neither had submitted their appeal on points of law as lawyers nor had they submitted a Bar exam certificate. In the Government’s view, it was not the responsibility of the Virovitica Municipal Court to request the first applicant to submit additional documents in support of his appeal on points of law. The Government also argued that the first applicant had failed to inform any of the courts that he had qualified as a lawyer in the course of the proceedings. Finally, the Government pointed out that the domestic courts had conducted separate proceedings to ascertain the validity of the applicants’ allegations, and had found them to be untrue. In the Government’s view, by doing so the Republic of Croatia had fulfilled its positive obligations under the access-to-court limb of Article <mask> of the Convention.


18.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried them. They further submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had never been served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. Moreover, the applicants also claimed that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:


111.  The applicant alleged a violation of her right to an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction and of her right to a public hearing. She further alleged that, following the reclassification of the facts by the CSM, she had not been informed in detail of the accusation against her and had therefore not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in its relevant parts provides:


44.  The applicant maintained that any waiver by him of a trial by court-martial could not be considered to be valid. The Government observed that the applicant declined to elect trial by court-martial and submitted that there were no important public interest considerations which might suggest that the matter should have been dealt with otherwise than summarily. In such circumstances, they argued that he made a voluntary, informed and unequivocal election to waive his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Contrary to the position in the case of Thompson v. the United Kingdom (no. 36256/97, 15 June 2004), the present applicant could have chosen a court-martial convened under the 1996 Act which would have fully complied with the requirements of the Convention (Cooper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48843/99, ECHR 2003‑XII). He could have taken legal advice and, even if he could not be legally represented at the summary hearing, he had access to the Accused’s Adviser.


79.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied a fair hearing because (i) the trial judge had been manifestly biased against them and had overtly favoured the defendants; (ii) they had not benefited from the equality-of-arms principle; and (iii) the court had refused to admit their evidence and made findings that had been perverse and unsustainable in the light of the facts. Article 6, in its relevant part, provides as follows:


25.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, he complained that the decision of the Supreme Court of 19 November 2002 had prevented him from exercising his defence rights properly and thus rendered the supervisory review proceedings unfair. The Court is of the view that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:


23.  The applicant averred that compliance of the domestic court with the reasonable-time requirement in examining her case against the company could only have been established by the proceedings against the Ministry of Finance which she had sought to initiate. However, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, the Russian courts had refused to examine her claim, relying on the fact that the domestic law had not determined territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.


22.  The applicants complained that their right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated as the Appeal Court had convicted the first applicant and ordered the forfeiture of the profit gained by the applicant company without holding an oral hearing and the Supreme Court had upheld this judgment. Due to the lack of an oral hearing, the applicants had not been able to present all evidence in the case.


161.  The applicant Mr Rakov complained that his claim for compensation had been adjudicated in his absence and the absence of his chosen representative by both the first-instance and appellate courts. The Court reiterates that the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, as worded at the material time, provided for oral hearings before courts of appeal, and that the scope of review by appellate courts was not limited to matters of law but also extended to factual issues. The appellate courts were empowered to carry out a full review of the case and to consider additional evidence and arguments which had not been examined in the first-instance proceedings. Given the broad scope of review of the appellate court, the fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention, including in particular the right to make oral submissions to the court, were as important in the appellate proceedings as they were in the first-instance courts (see Gankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 2430/06 and 3 others, § 40, 31 May 2016, and Barkov and Others v. Russia, no. 38054/05 and 8 others, 19 July 2016).


20.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the binding and enforceable judgment in her favour. She further complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the same facts. Both provisions, insofar as relevant, read as follows:


51.  The Government conceded that the courts had not examined the video cassette recording of the applicant's interviews on 4 and 5 June 1997. However, that did not raise an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention, since there was sufficient evidence that the applicant had not been ill-treated. The courts found that all the pieces of evidence in the case were consistent with each other and with the applicant's statements. They adopted judgments based on the facts of the case and having followed exactly the procedural requirements of the criminal proceedings.


23.  The applicant complained of an unjustified delay in the execution of the judgment of 23 December 2003 and a violation of his property rights as a result of non-enforcement of this judgment. Although the applicant did not specifically rely on any Convention provisions, the Court considers that the substance of this complaint must be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Article 6 reads as follows:


51.  The Government noted that the Court had repeatedly found that the Contracting States enjoyed wide discretion as regards the choice of the means to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Government’s view the flaws in the District Court’s procedure did not by themselves constitute a violation if these defects were remedied on appeal. The requirement of fairness in Article 6 of the Convention had been interpreted to mean that it covered the proceedings as a whole, and as a result flaws at one level might be put right at a later stage. Article 6 of the Convention did not require an appeal court to order a retrial at first instance if new evidence were submitted on appeal and the right to retrial was not, as such, included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In this respect the Government referred to the Commission decision in the case of Callaghan and others v. the United Kingdom (no. 14739/89, Commission decision of 9 May 1989, Decisions and Reports 60, p. 296).


44.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had been partial, that they had incorrectly assessed the facts and applied the domestic law. However, in the light of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) of the Convention.


42.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the criminal proceedings and alleged violations of the presumption of innocence and of his right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. Also, he complained under Article 13 of a lack of effective domestic remedies and, with reference to Article 14, of discrimination on the ground of his political opinions.


23.  The Government concluded that they enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in respect of the rules they introduced for the exercise of the right of access to a court and in this case, the rule that the reasons for appeal should have been included in the report by which the legal remedy was lodged did not violate Article <mask> of the Convention. The dismissal of the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible was entirely the applicant’s fault as he had omitted to include the reasons for his appeal in the relevant report, even though he could have consulted his lawyer.


18.  The applicant complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment of the Neryungri Town Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) of 16 March 2001, as upheld on 11 July 2001. She relied on Articles 1, 3 and 6 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 6, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:


137.  The applicant complained that the domestic criminal investigation had been ineffective and that the civil proceedings instituted by her had been unfair. She submitted that the courts had not been objective in their assessment of the facts and had failed to redress the grievance which she bore as a result of the beating by the police. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and, in substance, on Article 13 of the Convention.


75.  The applicant pointed out that his tax case, which concerned the assessment year 1994 and thus his income during 1993, was examined by the first-instance court on 7 December 2001 and was still pending. He submitted that a “reasonable time” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention had been exceeded, especially in view of the measures that had already been taken against him and the fact that there was no longer any point in witnesses being called, as they would not be able to give evidence about the situation in 1993.


11.  The Government indicated two recent decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) finding violations of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in circumstances similar to those in the present case (decision no. CH/03/10999 of 9 May 2007 and decision no. AP 158/06 of 18 October 2007). While the Constitutional Court awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of approximately 300 euros in one case (decision no. CH/03/10999), it rejected a similar request in the other case (decision no. AP 158/06). The Government claimed that those decisions had been enforced on 31 August 2007 and 14 March 2008 respectively. Given the developments in the Constitutional Court’s case-law, the Government submitted that an appeal to that court should now be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the non-enforcement of judgments ordering the release of “old” foreign-currency savings. Accordingly, they invited the Court to declare the present application inadmissible on non-exhaustion grounds, by reason of the applicant’s failure to use that remedy.


23.  The applicant complained about the unfairness of the proceedings, the infringement of his defence rights and the lack of equality of arms. He alleged that he had not been given sufficient access to the case file and had been prohibited from taking and retaining his notes. Further, he could not make use of his notes during hearings or outside them. The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides:


31.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings before the Supreme Court were unfair. In particular, he argued that the principle of equality of arms had been violated as he had not been given an opportunity to comment on the company's appeal on points of law and the public prosecutor's request for the protection of legality. He further complained that the Supreme Court had incorrectly applied the national law. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


93.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, as a result of the inadequate criminal investigation into the murder of his son, he had no access to court to bring civil proceedings against the perpetrators, who have remained unidentified. He further argued that the inadequacy of the investigation constituted a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.


65.  The Government disputed the applicant's submissions and argued that the criminal proceedings in his respect had been fully compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the retrial of the case by the Supreme Court and the reversal of the Court of Appeal's judgment in the applicant's absence had been fully compatible with the principles of fairness and the domestic legislation because, inter alia, the applicant had refused to attend the hearing of the Supreme Court. According to them, the Supreme Court had given sufficient reasoning for finding the applicant guilty in respect of all the charges and had submitted detailed reasons in respect of each charge on which he was found guilty.


50.  The Government further argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not guarantee the accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court. It was sufficiently proved by expert opinions that putting questions to the victim in the courtroom would have damaged the victim and would have thus been incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention. At the same time, the applicant had the opportunity to present objections to E.’s statements when the video recording of her interview was played at the court hearing.


24.  The applicant further complained about various breaches of Article <mask> of the Convention during the criminal proceedings against him. In the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that these grievances do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, the Court rejects them as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


63.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Administrative Court had lacked independence and impartiality since it had failed to apply the law and to evaluate the evidence correctly. Besides, the applicants had been denied access to a court as the Court of Cassation had failed to give any reasons when declaring their appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. The applicants further complained under Article 14 of the Convention that they had been discriminated against on the ground of their political opinion.


37. The Government argued that there had been no violation of the applicant company’s right of access to a court guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that although the applicant company had been given the opportunity to submit evidence in favour of its claims before the domestic courts, it had failed to prove that the new Practice had been the legal successor to the original Practice, even though it had had a different tax number. The fact that the applicant company had failed to prove its allegations in the domestic courts could not be considered as a violation of the right of access to a court, as guaranteed under the Convention.


70.  The Government considered that the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention had been complied with in the present case. The case had been examined by independent and impartial courts, which had given fully reasoned judgments in accordance with the law. The Government considered that the proceedings had not been time-barred, as was clear from the formulation of Article 86 of the Civil Code, relied on by the Prosecutor General when lodging his request.


45.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to her, as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued that she had not raised before the domestic courts, even in substance, specific allegations regarding the unfairness of the lustration proceedings. In particular, neither at the appellate nor at the cassation stage, had she challenged the restrictions concerning her access to the case files. Nor had she complained that the proceedings had not been public, as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government pointed out that this provision could be directly relied on in the proceedings before the domestic courts.


45.  The Government considered that there was no causal link between Mr Shaykhatarov’s claims in respect of pecuniary damage and the violation alleged. They further submitted that the applicants’ claims in respect of non‑pecuniary damage were excessive and unreasonable. In any event, the Government considered that the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated and that no compensation should be awarded to them.


94.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s grievances, except for those concerning legal assistance relating to the appeal in 2004, were either unsupported by evidence or unfounded. They considered that, in any event, all alleged shortcomings should have been definitely remedied in the new appeal proceedings in 2008. The applicant had had free legal assistance provided by A., who had studied the case file and had conducted a proper defence in support of the appeal statement lodged by Y. in 2004. The applicant’s mother could not have served as a lay defence representative for health reasons and, similarly, the applicant’s cellmate had been serving a sentence of imprisonment. The applicant had studied the case file in 2003; the new volumes had not contained any information affecting the appeal proceedings; and the applicant had been given access to all relevant submissions made by the other parties. The obligation to bear counsel’s fees was acceptable and had not offended against Article <mask> of the Convention.


30.  The applicants argued that they had been deprived of a fair trial on account of the lack of independence of the trial court. They contended that the relevant legislation on the status of assessors had not met the standard of “independent tribunal” required under Article <mask> of the Convention. They supported this contention by the findings of the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 24 October 2007 and the case-law of the Court.


39.  The Government submit that in the proceedings before the Review Chamber on the applicant’s request for release from detention on remand, oral hearings were held in which the applicant, assisted by counsel, and the Public Prosecutor participated. The applicant had therefore the opportunity to reply to the submissions made by the Public Prosecutor at the hearing. As regards appeal proceedings on such issues before the Court of Appeal, the Government submit that the standard phrase in the introduction to decisions taken by the Court of Appeal - “after having heard the Senior Public Prosecutor” - only meant that the Senior Public Prosecutor had taken note of an appeal. It did not imply that he or she had participated in the deliberations of the Court of Appeal or actually made submissions. However, even if a Senior Public Prosecutor makes written submissions to a Court of Appeal, the failure to serve them on a detainee does not violate Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as proceedings under this provision need not offer the same procedural guarantees as proceedings under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, such a step is unnecessary if, like in the present case, those submissions contain no new aspects (see No. 20055/92, Moser v. Austria, Dec. 13.4.94, unpublished).


22.  The applicant alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing. In this respect, he argued that the trial court lacked independence and impartiality, that his request for an additional expert report on the condition of his hand had been refused, and that he had not been given an opportunity to challenge the statements of several accused persons who had testified against him in their own police statements.


33.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 that the supervisory review decision of 10 August 2001 violated the principle of legal certainty. The applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that in breach of the right to a fair and public hearing neither he nor his lawyer were summoned to the supervisory review hearing held by the Supreme Court of Russia on 10 August 2001. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:


37.  The applicant submitted that the length of the confiscation proceedings breached the reasonable time requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention. While he accepted that the case was reasonably complex, as evidenced by the number of hearings, and that some delay between each stage of the proceedings was unavoidable, he argued that there were nevertheless several long periods of delay which were not a result of the complexity of the proceedings and which could be attributed to the respondent State. In particular, he submitted that significant periods of culpable delay could be identified between conviction and the making of a confiscation order, between the making of the confiscation order and the grant of leave to appeal the confiscation order, between the grant of leave to appeal the confiscation order and the stay of proceedings, and between the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v. Soneji and Others and the judgment of the House of Lords in R v. Knights and R v. Soneji.


12.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the İzmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They maintained that the domestic court relied on statements given by them under duress in police custody and failed to take into account their arguments presented during the criminal proceedings. They further complained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


101.  The Government were of the opinion that there was no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the domestic courts had acted with due diligence and expediency. They argued that responsibility for the overall length of the divorce proceedings should be attributed to the applicant and his wife. They considered that the case had been of a complex character due to the voluminous pleadings of the parties and their numerous applications. They submitted that the proceedings had been further protracted by the parties’ appeals against various interim decisions of the trial court. They also argued that – referring to the personal conflict between the applicant and his wife – the former had significantly contributed to the length of the proceedings.


48.  The applicant alleged that the domestic courts had breached Article <mask> of the Convention (the right to a fair hearing) by not allowing him to prove his allegations. He also relied on Article 11 (freedom of association).  However, the Court considers that, although these complaints are admissible, in the light of its finding above of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraphs 44-47), it is unnecessary to examine the merits of these matters separately.


51.  The Government considered that the applicant company had not submitted sufficient arguments in respect of this complaint and asked the Court to reject it, given also that no violation of its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had taken place. They also referred to the power of the higher courts to verify compliance with the reasonable-time requirement, as expressly provided for in Article 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as cited in Boboc v. Moldova, no. 27581/04, § 17, 4 November 2008).


96.  The applicant argued that the Court’s case-law guaranteed strong protection to the freedom of expression of lawyers, who played a key role in the administration of justice and the upholding of the rule of law, with any restriction having to remain exceptional. Such protection could be explained by two reasons: firstly, no special circumstances could justify affording a wide margin of appreciation to States, bearing in mind that European and international texts, on the contrary, protected lawyers in the activity of defending their clients; secondly, their freedom of expression was linked to their clients’ right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention. He further observed that the right of lawyers to make press statements as part of their clients’ defence was expressly acknowledged and that, in principle, there was, at European level, significant tolerance of lawyers’ criticism of judges, even when made in a public and media setting. He submitted, however, that the Chamber judgment highlighted some major uncertainties and vagaries in the case-law that affected the exercise of such freedom, especially outside the courtroom. He hoped that his case would enable the Grand Chamber to clarify the interpretation of the Convention on that point and to secure the protection of lawyers’ speech.


15.  The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried and convicted them and that they were convicted solely on the basis of their statements in police custody. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


155.  The Government invoked a constitutional complaint under Article 131 of the Constitution, which allows individuals to lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court if and when they allege a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Such a complaint will be considered by the Constitutional Court only after the exhaustion of remedies in the lower courts, notwithstanding any further delays that this may cause.


31.  The Government of Cyprus noted that Turkey had failed to indicate the precise remedies which were, in theory and practice, available to the applicants. In any event, given the existing legal and political context, it would have been unrealistic to expect the parents of Stelios Kalli Panayi “to seek justice at the hands of a State which ha[d] killed their son, which ha[d] put forward a wholly false account of the circumstances and which ha[d] not conducted any form of investigation into the death”. The “TRNC” was not a valid and legal State and its courts were not “established by law” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as they had not been established by Turkey through legal acts of its democratic institutions, but rather as a result of invasion and continuing military control. Turkey did not exercise control over the “TRNC” by rule of law, but simply by means of military occupation; as a consequence, the remedies available in the “TRNC” could not be considered remedies of the respondent High Contracting Party.


31.  The applicants complained that the charges against them, which they argued to be criminal within the meaning of Article 6, had been examined by a justice of the peace instead of a district court as provided by the domestic law. They argued that even though they had not raised this issue before the domestic courts, the latter should have examined this type of matter proprio motu. The applicants further submitted that in the absence of a prosecuting party, the trial judge had taken the role of prosecution and had collected and presented incriminating evidence, including by way of calling and questioning police officers. The court was therefore not “impartial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


31.  The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c), Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention that the supervisory review proceedings had been unfair, that he had not been brought to the hearings on 2 July 2001 and 2 December 2002, that he had not been able to submit his arguments and that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. He also complained about the outcome of those proceedings. The Court will examine these complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in the relevant parts, reads as follows:


101.  The applicant submitted that there had been no prosecuting party in the administrative-offence proceedings against her. The police officers who had drawn up the administrative-offence report had not been present at the hearings and, in any event, it was not their role to support charges against the accused. In the absence of a prosecuting party in the administrative‑offence proceedings, the trial and appellate courts had assumed the role of proving the accusation against her. That situation had breached the principles of impartiality, equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. Referring to Karelin v. Russia (no. 926/08, §§ 22-37, 20 September 2016), the applicant argued that the Court had already found that the absence of a prosecuting party, stemming from the domestic legislation and judicial practice, violated the impartiality requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, the trial court had proprio motu reformulated the charges against the applicant and had corrected factual and legal mistakes contained in the administrative arrest report, thereby performing a task normally performed by a prosecuting party.


44.  The applicant submitted that his detention had been devoid of any legal basis after 29 September 2010, as the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court on 20 February 2008, providing for a starting date fixed at the date of commission of the second crime, had expired. He maintained that his detention beyond that date had been in violation of Article 540 of the CCP which had not permitted the worsening of an appellant’s situation in the absence of an appeal by the prosecution. He also submitted that his detention had been extended by means of a procedure that had been in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the impossibility of having the rectified appellate decision subjected to judicial scrutiny.


109.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been afforded an opportunity to study the case file in its entirety, including audio and video tapes and physical evidence, both after the termination of the investigation and later in the course of the trial. However, since the applicant and his lawyer had been unreasonably delaying their studying of the case file, the court had limited the time afforded to them for such a purpose. The Government therefore concluded that the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant had been fair within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


17.  The applicant complained about the annulment of his driving licence. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that the application may raise an issue under Article 7 of the Convention. It reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts and as it could decide to examine the complaint submitted to it under more than one of the Convention’s provisions (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 54, ECHR 2009‑...).


23.  The applicants argued that in the absence of a prosecuting party, the trial judges had taken the role of the prosecution. In particular, they had read out the administrative-offence records, which could be considered as bills of indictment. The domestic courts had therefore not been “impartial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The first applicant also submitted that her case should have been examined by the District Court at first instance, rather than by a justice of the peace, and that her appeal had been subject to examination by the Moscow City Court.


87.  The Government argued that the report concerning the discovery of an offence while being committed did not constitute the sole evidence on which the applicant’s conviction had been based, so the fact he had not had legal assistance at the relevant stage in the proceedings did not entail a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They added that the applicant had been informed very promptly of his right to defend himself or to benefit from legal assistance. Thus, on the very day of the discovery of the offence, during his first questioning by the prosecuting authorities, and subsequently throughout the proceedings, the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing.


38.  The applicants submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention applied in the case. They stated that the Supreme Court had found that the fines imposed on them were criminal penalties for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention. This was undisputed between the parties. In this respect the applicants referred to the case of T. v. Austria (no. 27783/95, ECHR 2000‑XII) and Weber v. Switzerland (no. 11034/84, 22 May 1990, Series A no. 177) and stated that, unlike in these cases, no maximum amount for fines had been stipulated in Icelandic law.


150.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the search of his flat had been unlawful. The Court notes, however, that there is no indication that the applicant challenged the search order in the national courts. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.


20.  The Government submitted that the judgments of 19 December 2002, 9 June 2003, 16 February and 6 May 2004 had been enforced in full. They further submitted that the judgment of 25 October 2000 had been enforced in part and the judgments of 15 March and 26 August 2004 had not been enforced. They acknowledged that the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgments in the applicant's favour violated his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


30.  The applicant argued that the dispute before the domestic courts had raised an issue under EU law, which had to date not been decided by the CJEU. By arbitrarily refusing to refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, the domestic courts had violated Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, the domestic courts had not provided adequate reasoning for the refusal. The Federal Court of Justice had been the court against whose decisions there had been no judicial remedy under national law within the meaning of Article 267 of the TFEU. It had therefore been obliged, pursuant to the Court’s case-law (Dhahbi v. Italy, no. 17120/09, 8 April 2014, and Schipani and Others v. Italy, no. 38369/09, 21 July 2015), to provide reasons for the refusal, based on the CJEU’s judgment in the CILFIT case (see paragraph 18 above). However, the Federal Court of Justice had provided no reasons whatsoever and had only repeated the wording of Article 543 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It also had not made any reference to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, which had not been the court of last resort, had at least considered the question of EU law, but had neither explicitly refused a referral to the CJEU nor referred to the CILFIT criteria established in the CJEU case-law. In particular, the Court of Appeal had not explained why the correct application of Community law had been so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.


211.  The applicants raised a number of other complaints alleging a breach of their Convention rights. In particular, they complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings against them had been excessively long; that the stipendiary judge, the lay judges and the court’s secretary had been partial; and that the trial court had relied on inadmissible evidence and erred in its assessment of the evidence. They further complained of the refusal to initiate supervisory-review proceedings in their case. Under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, they complained that the trial court had accused them of forgery when commenting on the origin of the correction in Mr L.’s statement. The first applicant complained that Mr T. had not attended the hearing immediately upon the defence’s request and that Mr. G. and Mr Tr. had not appeared before the trial court at all. The first applicant also complained that his legal-aid lawyer was incompetent. The second applicant complained that the trial court had relied upon his co-accused’s testimony given in court. In his letter of 10 July 2003 the second applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his lawyer had not been present at the appeal hearing. In their letter of 23 February 2004 the applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention about the length of their pre-trial detention and about the fact that their arrest and the extension of their detention had been ordered by the prosecutor.


27.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the SJC was not an “independent and impartial tribunal” since the President of the SJC, who had been member of the Commission in his case, as well as the President of the Supreme Court, whose request had set in motion the impugned proceedings, had subsequently taken part in the SJC’s decision dismissing him. In this respect, he also alleged that the President of the Supreme Court, owing to his prior involvement in approving the judicial opinion of the criminal division of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 9 above), had a preconceived idea about the merits of the issue, namely his dismissal. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


22.  The Government disagreed. They essentially argued that the review request had been used in order to correct a judicial error and a miscarriage of justice, so as to ensure that the interests of the third party who was the real owner of the land were taken into account. They further stated that the review procedure had been conducted in a fair and adversarial manner, and in full compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


11.  The applicants complained that their right to a fair and public hearing under Article <mask> of the Convention was breached on two counts: firstly, they were never afforded an oral hearing in the determination of their compensation claim; secondly, they were never given an opportunity to reply to the public prosecutor's written opinion submitted to the Court of Cassation and the experts' report submitted to the Assize Court.


47.  The Government failed to see a causal link between the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant. In that connection, they contended that the outcome of the criminal proceedings would have been no different had the applicant had the opportunity of taking part in the appeal hearing. His conviction had been based on proven and undisputed facts. The Government further pointed out that any custodial sentence made it impossible for the convicted person to carry on a lawful, gainful occupation outside prison. They noted that the applicant had not provided any evidence of the existence of his work as a craftsman or of income arising from it.


5.  The Government further relied on the fact that, in further contrast to the Stran Greek case, the State was not itself directly party to the dispute which gave rise to the present case. This fact, again, is not in our view of central importance, the principle which precludes intervention by the legislature in pending legal proceedings being founded not only the requirement of equality of arms between the parties to the proceedings but also on more general requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention relating to the rule of law and the separation of powers. In any event, while the State was not as such a party to the proceedings in question in the present case, we note that the participation of AP-HP, a public administrative establishment under the supervision of four Ministers, necessarily had major implications for the public finances and that the State was, accordingly, directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings to which the legislation expressly related.


29.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the court that had convicted him on 29 April 2002 had not been a “tribunal established by law” because it had been composed in breach of the relevant national rules. In particular, he alleged that the terms of office of the lay judges G. and Ka. had expired before the trial in his case had started and that the trial court had not been in possession of the list of lay judges at the material time. The relevant part of the provision reads as follows:


53.  The applicant also complained in substance under Article <mask> of the Convention that in the 2002 commercial court proceedings he had been ordered to prove the fault of the State officials for the damage sustained and that the domestic courts had designated the Ministry of the Interior as the respondent and then dismissed his action because it should have been lodged against a different authority.


19.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of her right to challenge the discontinuation of the investigation, since her complaint was examined in her absence on 9 November 2004, of the lack of a right to appeal against the decision of that date, and of the repeated discontinuation of the proceedings in her son's case.


46.  The applicant alleged that, owing to the fact that she had not been properly served with the claim which had been brought against her, she had been deprived of any proper opportunity to participate in the proceedings. She also alleged that the reasoning of the domestic courts was arbitrary and insufficient. The Court is therefore called upon to examine whether or not those facts compromised the applicant’s right to a fair hearing under Article <mask> of the Convention, and, in particular, whether or not the principles of an adversarial hearing and equality of arms were respected in those proceedings.


46.  The Government contested the claim for pecuniary damage and pointed out that the present proceedings before the Court had only concerned the length of the administrative proceedings. There was no causal link between the damage suffered and the alleged violation of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants had not made any claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. No compensation should therefore be awarded under this heading.


52.  The Government contended that the applicant’s telephone conversations had been tapped in the framework of the MIT’s counter‑intelligence activities as permitted by Article 4 of Law no. 2937. Article 6 of the said law permitted MIT members to carry out counter‑intelligence activities and granted them the rights and powers enjoyed by the regular police. The MIT officers had decided to intercept and record the applicant’s conversations with a view to protecting national security. The measure in question had complied with the requirements of proportionality. Furthermore, the recorded telephone conversations of the applicant were not the sole evidence against him. The photographs of military bases, two maps, one of which was designated “top secret”, telephone and credit cards found in the applicant’s possessions had constituted the basis of his conviction. Given that the applicant’s defence rights protected by Article <mask> of the Convention had been respected, his complaints under this heading should be declared inadmissible.


79.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been convicted on the basis of search-and-seizure reports and video footage that did not reflect the truth. They had also been unable to challenge the veracity of the evidence, as the court had rejected their requests for an expert examination of the video footage without reason. They further submitted under the same head that admission of the video footage by the police in the case file had been unlawful, as the police had filmed the demonstrations illegally. The applicants also complained that the courts’ decisions had not been reasoned. Lastly, the applicants complained that the references to past arrests and detentions of some of them had been in breach of the right to be presumed innocent.


37.  The applicant maintained his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention with regard to his conviction on the charge involving OZ, which he alleged had been brought about by the police. He argued that the decision of 16 November 2000 contained neither an acknowledgment of nor a redress for that violation of the Convention. The applicant further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings before the Presidium of the Moscow City Court were unfair in that, unlike the prosecution, he had not been given an opportunity to participate therein.


65.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied the right to a fair hearing in that the courts dealing with his case had lacked impartiality and had not given enough consideration to the facts in the applicant’s favour. He further complained of ill-treatment during his arrest and the search of his property. He also argued that no search warrant had been shown to him and that the search had been conducted at night, contrary to the applicable legal provisions. The applicant further complained that he had been remanded in custody for ten months without any justification.


43.  The Government submitted that the first applicant was not precluded from lodging an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation but there was a certain procedure envisaged by the law at the material time which should have been respected by a person wishing to apply to this court. They argued that procedural requirements for lodging appeals were not incompatible with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, the domestic law envisaged a possibility to receive free legal assistance upon the initiative of an advocate. The Government finally submitted that the requirement that appeals on points of law could only be lodged by licensed advocates pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the quality of appeals lodged with the Court of Cassation and was later abolished due to difficulties revealed during the practical implementation of the relevant procedural rules.


41.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ request for reimbursement of the costs of proceedings had been examined at two levels of national jurisdiction, which provided the applicants with all procedural guarantees under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the applicants had had access to court; they had been legally represented; they had had the opportunity to raise all their arguments and to contest the submissions of the opposing party; and the domestic courts had given sufficient reasons for their decisions.


40.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint could be examined in the light of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. Accordingly, having regard to the fact that the applicant had been acquitted of all charges by the judgment of 11 January 2013, no separate issue would arise under Article <mask> of the Convention, including the issue of the applicant’s confinement in a metal cage.


56.  The applicant complained that during his detention the police questioned him several times without a lawyer being present and the statements which he had made during those questionings had been used for his conviction. He also complained that lawyer S.’s advice had “worsened his situation”. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


54.  The applicant complained that the length of certain of the impugned sets of proceedings and the non-enforcement of final judgments in the other sets of proceedings had not complied with the “reasonable time” requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention. He further alleged that the T. company had been denied the right of access to a court in the fifth and sixth sets of proceedings since the domestic law had not entitled legal entities to request exemption from trial costs and court fees. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


34.  The applicant maintained that the Court of Appeal should have held an oral hearing since there were no exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with a main hearing in the present case. He had insisted that an oral hearing be held in order to rehear the witnesses from the District Court and thereby clarify certain obvious contradictions and misunderstandings between the testimonies. Moreover, he had wanted to be heard under oath. Thus, it was clear that the oral evidence was of great importance for the settlement of the case and that a main hearing before the Court of Appeal had been necessary to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention.


33.  The Government argued that the applicant had never claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage in the proceedings against ATP-11. Thus, the proceedings had solely concerned his employment relations with the defendant and had not determined his “civil rights and obligations”. Consequently, the Government invited the Court to dismiss his application as incompatible ratione materiae with Article <mask> of the Convention. As an alternative, they submitted that the proceedings had lasted from 5 May 1998, the date of entry of the Convention into force in respect of Russia, until 10 November 1998, the date on which the Town Court refused to examine the applicant’s request for restoration of the case file, and their length had not been unreasonable. The applicant had been advised to re-submit his claims but had failed to do so.


74.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been denied access to a court on account of the unjustified refusal of the civil courts to examine her civil claim and the lengthy and ineffective pre-trial proceedings in the criminal cases. With reference to the above deficiencies, the applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that the domestic remedies available to protect her rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had proved to be ineffective in her case. The respective Articles in their relevant parts read as follows:


23.  The Government argued that the refusal of the Greek parliament to waive the immunity of M.A. did not raise any issues under Article <mask> of the Convention because it did not affect the applicant's civil rights. First, they argued that the applicant's behaviour showed that his purpose in joining the proceedings as a civil party was primarily to obtain the defendant's conviction. The Government noted in this connection that, when lodging his indictment with the prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance, the applicant had merely claimed the symbolic amount of ten euros, without prejudice to the satisfaction of all his civil rights before the civil courts. Second, the Government contended that, even if the applicant was successful in obtaining a verdict against his former wife, it would not be “directly decisive” since any consequences of the said conviction on the matter of her compliance with the terms of the applicant's access to his child would have been uncertain and remote. Third, the Government submitted that the present application fell outside the scope of Article 6 § 1 because decision no. 528/2005, with which the applicant's wife had failed to comply was an interim measure under the domestic law.


60.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had not ensured his attendance at the hearings in the proceedings concerning his complaint of lack of adequate medical assistance in Bayil Prison. He maintained that his presence would have been particularly important having regard to the fact that the domestic courts had ignored the written statements of former inmates and had not heard some former inmates detained in Bayil Prison at those hearings. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows:


42.  The Government emphasised that Article <mask> of the Convention was directly applicable under Polish law and the applicant could, therefore, have relied on that provision before the Polish courts, complaining of a violation thereof in his case. However, in his appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court the applicant had put forward arguments which had been based solely on domestic law, had concerned the merits of the case and had not been related to the question of access to the case file.


156.  The applicant complained that he had not been given the time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, and had been unable to meet his lawyers in private and out of the hearing of the guards and to exchange documents with them. He relied in this connection on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


49.  The Government submitted that the right of access to court was not absolute and was subject to regulation by the State. Thus, the fact that a special judicial remedy was not provided did not imply that the provision had been violated. The Government submitted that the person exercising parental authority could object within twenty one days of the issuance of the care order before it was confirmed by a Juvenile Court. The fact that a decision of the Juvenile Court was not subject to appeal did not raise an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention.


16.  The Government submitted that the judgment of 24 July 2000 had been fully enforced on 12 May 2005. They conceded that the delay in the enforcement of that judgment was not compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. At the same time they considered that as far as the judgment of 24 July 2000 had been enforced fully, its continuing non-enforcement was compatible with the applicant's right to “peaceful enjoyment of his possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They further pointed out that the main debt due to the judgment of 24 July 2000 had been paid to the applicant within a reasonable time, on 23 November 2000, and that the sum of RUB 9,357 was the payment of the interest, it was not the applicant's main income and therefore, the delay in payment of that amount caused no considerable damage to the applicant.


112.  The applicant further complained, without referring to any specific provision of the Convention, that his detention from 16 July to 5 November 2008 had been unlawful. He additionally complained under Article <mask> of the Convention: that his lawyers had not duly performed their duties; that the courts dealing with his case had been biased and the appellate court judges had taken a bribe from him; and that his conviction was generally unfair. He next complained under the same provision about the length of proceedings. The applicant also complained that the confiscation ordered by the courts in conjunction with his conviction concerned property which did not in fact belong to him and with which he had no connection. Lastly, he complained of some problems with the dispatching of his outgoing correspondence from the pre-trial detention centre.


32.  The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 that judge S. was biased and that the proceedings concerning her motion of bias against him were unfair. The Court notes, however, that the Salzburg Regional Court, on 16 December 1999, in any way, found that the judge S. was biased and that the proceedings were subsequently conducted by another judge. In these circumstances, the Court finds that this part of the application discloses no appearance of a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


21.  The applicant, for his part, disputed the Government's contention. In his submission, either the court responsible for the execution of sentences was not a court – in which case there had been a wholesale breach of all human rights – or it was bound to comply with the obligations imposed by statute and the conventions and, above all, to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention.


57.  The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody on 21 June 2006, in accordance with a search order based on the suspicion that he had committed the murder mentioned above (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). On the same day the applicant was informally questioned by Officers Z.K. and V.V. in relation to that murder; during that questioning he confessed to having also committed the theft (see paragraph 11 above). On the next day, 22 June 2006, the applicant was formally detained by a prosecutor in the context of the other set of criminal proceedings against him, and charges in relation to the murder and the theft at issue were only formally brought against him on 18 December 2006 (see paragraph 14 above). However, already at the time of his arrest on 21 June 2006 and interview with Officers Z.K. and V.V., the applicant’s situation was substantially affected by actions of the authorities in relation to those two offences. Accordingly, it was as of this moment that Article <mask> of the Convention, taken in its criminal aspect, became applicable in respect of the criminal proceedings at issue.


259.  The applicant did not specify in the application form with which other complaint or complaints he intended to link his complaint under Article 18. His observations do not clarify the matter either. In such circumstances, given that the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention is the main complaint in the present case, the Court considers that Article 18 was invoked in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention.


27.  The Government submitted that, following the referral of the case to the Court of Cassation, it would have been open to any party to the proceedings to obtain from the court's registry any information regarding the state of proceedings. When the applicant became aware of the advisory opinion of the principal public prosecutor, he could have asked for all necessary information, filed additional observations or responded to the prosecutor's opinion. Furthermore, the Principal Public Prosecutor's observations merely consisted of his opinion whether he approved or disapproved the first-instance court's judgment. Accordingly, non‑communication to the applicant of the Principal Public Prosecutor's observations did not infringe the “equality of arms” principle or the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


25.  The applicant complained of the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him. He further argued that the proceedings had been unfair in that he had not benefited from legal assistance during the preliminary investigation stage, could not cross-examine the witnesses against him during the trial and had not had access to the other incriminating evidence against him, specifically the computer disk. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


70.  The applicants complained of the fact that the Tax Authority's decisions concerning additional taxes and tax surcharges had been enforced prior to a court determination of the disputes. In particular, they maintained that the tax assessment proceedings had not been determined within a reasonable time and they had been unable to obtain a fair hearing in those proceedings. Moreover, they had been deprived of their right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant to the complaint, provides:


69.  The applicant complained that in the second set of contempt of court proceedings the Constitutional Court had not been impartial because one of the judges, Judge J.Z., was married to a judge that had taken part in the decision on the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 22 above). The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, as far as relevant, as follows:


32. The applicant complained that his appeal had not been examined on the merits, given that the Court of Appeal had wrongly considered it as submitted out of time. He also complained that his case had not been heard within a reasonable time. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


47.  The Government noted that although the applicant had complained to the Supreme Court of a lack of reasoning in the decisions in his case he had not done so before the Constitutional Court or the Court. They therefore invited the Court to declare that complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. They further submitted that, in accordance with the Pellegrin jurisprudence (see Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999-VIII), Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the instant case.


69.  The Government also objected that, as far as the Hague Convention proceedings were concerned, the applicant had failed to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, especially in so far as he was complaining under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of those proceedings and their alleged unfairness and under Article 8 of the Convention of a violation of his right to respect for his private and family life in those proceedings.


33.  The Government first objected that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable. In particular, the applicant was a professional soldier and participated in the exercise of public power in that capacity. He had been fined under the Military Service Act 1997 for his failure to observe military discipline. Similar disciplinary offences concerned a restricted scope of persons, namely members of the armed forces. The nature and degree of severity of the penalty imposed on him showed that the offence in question was not, in terms of Article <mask> of the Convention, criminal in nature.


50.  The applicant, relying on Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, alleged that, in his position of insolvency administrator of the company, he was an impecunious litigant and was discriminated against compared to a litigant with sufficient financial means. He submitted that an impecunious litigant depended on a judge, who must arrange for notice to be given to the defendant of the request for legal aid, to suspend the running of time for purposes of limitation. If he were a litigant with sufficient financial means, who could have lodged an action without requesting legal aid, the claims at stake would not have become time-barred.


28.  The applicant contested those arguments. His submissions, insofar as relevant to the complaints declared admissible, may be summarised as follows. The judgment of 5 December 1997, as upheld on 16 January 1998, remained unenforced due to the negligence of the bailiffs. On 18 December 1997, upon the applicant's request, the Lefortovskiy District Court ordered the seizure of the defendant company's bank account. However, despite the court order, the account was not seized. As a result, the company had time to withdraw money from the bank and thus avoid payment of the judgment debt. Furthermore, the bailiffs failed to take the necessary steps to find and seize other assets of the company. Therefore, the responsibility for the non-enforcement of the court judgment of 5 December 1997, as upheld on 16 January 1998 was fully with the State and the judgment of the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow of 10 March 1999 was correct. The applicant concluded that the quashing of the judgment of 10 March 1999 by the Supreme Court was unjustified and breached the principle of legal certainty, enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention.


46.  The applicant also complained that the proceedings had not been completed within a reasonable time, contrary to the requirement of Article <mask> of the Convention. Relying on Article 7 of the Convention, she complained that she had been expelled and banned from re-entering Turkey on account of her religious activities. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant further alleged that she had been discriminated against because, although persons who disseminated Islamic propaganda were not subjected to any sanctions in Turkey but were supported by the State, those who disseminated Christian propaganda were subjected to physical sanctions.


62.  The applicant submitted that the domestic law did not provide for any algorithm on how stakeholders and judicial authorities should act in situations where it was impossible to restore a lost case file. For the applicant, the appropriate course of action would be either a new investigation and trial or a review of the case by a higher court based on the available material. However, domestic legislation did not allow for that. The context in which this situation had arisen could explain some of the delay in enacting a solution, but the lack of a solution for more than two years had “completely eliminated the guarantees enshrined” in Article <mask> of the Convention.


23.  The Government submitted that delays in the enforcement proceedings had been caused by Mrs H. who had repeatedly failed to submit the requisite documents to the city administration. They claimed that the final decision on the applicant’s claim had been issued on 12 December 2005 and enforced within two months. They maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


34.  The Government submitted that the right of access to a court is not absolute and the requirement to pay fees in connection with civil claims cannot be regarded as per se incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted that fulfilment of the Article 6 obligation to secure an effective right of access to a court did not mean merely the absence of interference but might require the State to take various forms of positive action. However, neither an unqualified right to obtain free legal aid from the State in a civil dispute nor a right to cost-free proceedings in civil cases could be inferred from that provision.


102.  The Government considered that the amounts of the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicants were unsubstantiated and speculative. As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that if the Court were to find a violation, the finding of such a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction. They further considered that should the Court find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, it should dismiss the applicants’ claim for non-pecuniary damage in this part, given that the criminal proceedings against the applicants could be reopened if the Court found a violation (see paragraph 46 above).


5.  The Government further relied on the fact that, in further contrast to the case in Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis, the State was not itself directly party to the dispute which gave rise to the present case. This fact, again, is not in our view of central importance, the principle which precludes intervention by the legislature in pending legal proceedings being founded not only the requirement of equality of arms between the parties to the proceedings but also on more general requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention relating to the rule of law and the separation of powers. In any event, while the State was not as such a party to the proceedings in question in the present case, we note that the participation of AP-HP, a public administrative establishment under the supervision of four ministers, necessarily had major implications for the public finances and that the State was, accordingly, directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings to which the legislation expressly related.


112.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the applicant had been represented by his mother for the entire duration of the proceedings against him and that this provision of the Convention did not require an accused to be represented by a lawyer. According to the Government, even assuming that the applicant had not been duly represented at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, a State-appointed lawyer had assisted him during the trial. The latter had been able to raise before the trial court complaints concerning any irregularities in the course of the investigations.


57.  The applicant further submitted that the use of evidence obtained under torture was in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. It was evident from the judgments of the courts at all three levels of jurisdiction that the coerced statements by the applicant and witness T. played a decisive role in securing the applicant’s conviction. It was true that the applicant’s conviction had also been based on a number of other items of evidence. However, this other evidence was used simply to confirm the three main items of evidence in the case, namely the statements by the applicant and witnesses T. and A., which had been made under duress. The courts also based their findings on the statement made by witness T. during the first trial in the Syunik Regional Court. However, the case had been examined three times by the Regional Court and at both the second and third trials witness T. submitted that he had been forced to slander the applicant as a result of torture and intimidation and that he was not aware of the circumstances of serviceman H.’s death.


22.  The applicants also complained under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention about the conditions of their life, under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of the proceedings against the bailiff, and under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 about the impossibility to work or travel without the identity papers.


104.  The applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, of the unfairness of the Hague Convention proceedings, in particular that the interlocutory judgment of 13 April 2009 had been missing from the domestic case file and that the domestic authorities had failed to send him a copy of the final judgment of 25 March 2010. In respect of the divorce‑and‑custody proceedings instituted against him by his wife, after the case had been communicated to the Romanian Government he complained under the same Article that the domestic courts’ refusal to hear foreign witnesses on his behalf through the international rogatory commission proceedings or to expedite the said proceedings, and the fact that he had had to incur high financial costs in order to submit the relevant testimonial and documentary evidence, had amounted to a breach of his right to a fair trial and prevented him from defending his rights.


53.  The Government submitted that the applicant companies had lost their victim status as the Constitutional Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and awarded EUR 15,000 each in compensation. It had found that the applicant companies could pursue proceedings for pecuniary damage before the LAB. Indeed a fresh declaration had been issued in 2009, and the amended law provided for direct access by applicants to the LAB guaranteeing the applicant companies’ access to a court to challenge the compensation. Moreover, by then the applicant companies had been offered pecuniary compensation (see paragraph 15 above).


55.   The applicant finally complained that she had not been paid the “true” value of her share. In her observations of August 2005 she also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings in a labour dispute to which she had been a party had been unfair and excessively long. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


20.  The Government disagreed. They considered that, even assuming that court fees collected by Hungarian courts for dealing with civil claims constituted a form of restriction on the individual’s access to a court, they were legitimate to regulate access to courts and not in themselves contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the particular circumstances of the case, the Government’s position was that the applicant himself had been responsible for the fact that he had been ordered to pay a significant sum in court fees, as he had indicated a grossly exaggerated amount in his claim when instituting the proceedings, in the light of the domestic practice on compensation for violation of personality rights. The Government further argued that the applicant was not obliged to advance the court fees, there was a statutory upper payment limit, and the law provided for some flexibility as to the payment of court fees. Thus, according to the Government, the restrictions were proportionate to the aims pursued, especially in view of the fact that the applicant’s action had been 97% unsuccessful according to the first- and second-instance courts.


30.  The Government admitted that the proceedings that had taken place before 23 January 2001 had not met the “reasonable time” requirement enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. At the same time, they contended that the length had been justified by the objective factors, such as the complexity of the case, multiple referrals to the prosecutor’s office and orders for Mr S.’ psychiatric examinations, the applicant’s co-defendants’ illnesses and Mr K.’s remote location. They further stated that the delays had not had an adverse effect on the applicant as he had not been detained pending trial.


10.  The applicant company complained that the domestic courts had dismissed its claim contrary to established case-law without providing any reasons in their decisions for their departure from that case-law. As a result, a higher interest rate was applied to the repayment of its loan. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Article 6 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


39.  The applicants maintained that they were tried and punished in absentia before the District Court and that they had not enjoyed any rights under Article <mask> of the Convention before being fined by the District Court’s judgment of 12 December 2013. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment and concluded that it had been enough for the applicants to enjoy these rights before the Supreme Court.