46.  The Government submitted that the decision ordering the demolition of the house in which the applicants lived was lawful. It had been judicially reviewed and upheld. It was also necessary for the protection of public safety. The national authorities had a wide margin of appreciation to tackle the problem of illegal construction. The impossibility to legalise unlawful buildings had been put in place in view of the strong public interest to ensure the safety, hygiene and aesthetics of construction. The demolition of a building because it had been erected without a permit was a proportionate measure required in all cases and not capable of being eschewed at the discretion of the building control authorities. Those authorities had acted straight away when apprised of the illegality of the house inhabited by the applicants, and had not tolerated an illegal situation for a long time: the applicants had started inhabiting the house at the earliest in 2009 and the demolition procedure had started in 2011. The applicants had constructed the house knowing full well that they had not obtained the required permit. All such buildings, unless falling under the transitional amnesty provisions of the 2001 Act, were subject to demolition; the courts had inquired into that point in the applicants’ case. The authorities had allowed the first applicant to comment on the intended demolition, and had invited her to comply with the demolition order of her own accord. In as much as she argued that she had no other place to live, it had to be noted that in June 2013, after the beginning of the demolition proceedings, she had donated a flat that she owned in Burgas and that, although the authorities did not have an obligation to provide the applicants, who did not belong to a particularly vulnerable group, with alternative accommodation, they had explored the possibility of settling them in a municipal flat. The second applicant was in receipt of a sufficiently high pension and the first applicant was able to work. They could thus afford to pay market rent in Sinemorets, and their personal circumstances were not as dire as they sought to paint them. The authorities had endeavoured to take all these matters into account when sending a social worker to interview the first applicant. It was equally possible to have the proportionality of the demolition reviewed in proceedings under Article 278 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006. The interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their home was therefore proportionate. Article <mask> of the Convention could not be construed as precluding the enforcement of the building regulations in respect of those who sought to flout them, or as requiring the authorities to provide persons in the applicants’ situation with a place to live.


35.  The applicant submitted that, according to the Court’s case-law, Article <mask> of the Convention applied to both the child and the mother, and the right to know one’s origins could not have the effect of simply denying a woman’s interest in remaining anonymous in order to protect her health by giving birth in appropriate medical conditions: the conflict was between two private interests – which moreover affected two adults each endowed with her own free will – which were not easily reconciled, on account of the complex and delicate nature of the question raised by the secrecy of information about a child’s origins regarding each and everyone’s right to their personal history, the choice of the birth parents, the existing family tie and the adoptive parents. She argued that the Court should seek to balance the competing interests and examine whether in the present case the Italian system had struck a reasonable balance between the competing rights and interests.


106.  The Government denied that the domestic child-care system in any way failed to respect the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, pointing out that the child's welfare and need for secure placement was at the heart of the authorities' concerns and that the importance of safeguarding the link between a child and the family of origin was recognised. Adoptions could provide for contact, where such was in the child's interests.


42.  The applicant contested the Government's arguments that she had deliberately acted or omitted to bring paternity proceedings within the prescribed time-limit. The applicant argued that she could not be blamed for the fact that she had been given the chance to identify her father only at the age of fifty-two. She had been deprived of her right to seek judicial recognition of paternity. In her opinion, the Law in question was disproportionate since her above right had been extinguished before it had been created. Hence, she submitted that there had been a violation of her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


151.  The applicants also relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, complaining about the search conducted at their home on 20 July 2004. They claimed that it had been unlawful, that some of their belongings had been damaged and that the State agents who conducted the search had stolen their money and some of their belongings. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides:


114.  The Government admitted that there had been interference with the applicant's rights secured by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as a result of a temporary occupation of his premises by the consolidated police units, but argued that it had been justified in the circumstances of the case and fully complied with “the general principles of international law”, given that at the material time a counter-terrorist operation had been underway in Chechnya in order to ensure the fulfilment of Russia's international obligations in the fight against terrorism. In this connection the Government quoted the United Nations and Council of Europe documents on combating terrorism, to the effect that States were urged to ensure that their territories were not used for the organisation of terrorist acts and that States could derogate from their obligations undertaken in accordance with international treaties on protection of human rights “when the fight against terrorism took place in a situation of war or public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”.


104.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the occupation by federal police units of his estate, which represented the only housing for him and his family, between October 1999 and June 2002, had infringed his right to respect for his home and his private and family life, and had constituted a temporary de facto expropriation of his possessions in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Under the latter head the applicant also complained about the State's failure to enforce the judgment of 14 February 2001 in a timely manner and the refusal of the domestic courts to award him compensation for the damage caused to his property by the federal forces. The respective provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


33.  The applicant submitted that, contrary to the applicant in the Loizidou case, himself, his wife and his daughter and son had had their principal residence in the town of Kyrenia. He claimed to be a displaced person under Article <mask> of the Convention and argued that the respondent Government had implicitly admitted the lack of any legal justification for the interference at issue.


2.  The applicant’s claim that he had sustained a violation of his right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 is distinct from the interference with his right to respect for his honour and reputation under Article <mask> of the Convention. Under Article 6 § 1, the applicant complained that he did not have an adequate opportunity to address the allegations of harassment in the workplace made exclusively against him during the proceedings in the High Court of Justice of Castilla-León. Following those proceedings, in which the applicant was not allowed to take part, the High Court of Justice issued a judgment which included the applicant’s identity and described his conduct as amounting to repeated psychological harassment. The applicant argued that this judgment was an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his honour and reputation as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, the two complaints, although related, are separate: one, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, relates to his right to participate in the proceedings, while, the other, under Article 8 of the Convention, concerns the harm caused by the inclusion of his name in the judgment (see paragraph 28 of the judgment).


63.  The Government referred to the Court’s jurisprudence to the effect that where immigration is concerned, Article <mask> of the Convention cannot be considered to impose on a State a general obligation to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion in this territory (see Gül v. Switzerland, 19 February 1996, § 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑I, and Pejcinoski v. Austria (dec.), no. 33500/96, 23 March 1999). In their view, it was primarily the applicant’s duty, and not that of the Russian authorities, to take care of his family and ensure that they lived together. To that end he had to comply with the relevant laws and regulations so as to obtain in due time the authorisation required for his stay in Russia. Yet, despite the numerous breaches of the immigration regulations committed by the applicant, the authorities had for a long time refrained from ordering his administrative removal. The decision on the applicant’s administrative removal was taken after he had been found guilty of an administrative offence on account of a breach of immigration laws for the fifth time. Therefore, the applicant must have realised that his failure to rectify his conduct would result in his removal. Furthermore, the applicant had been found guilty of an administrative offence on account of a breach of traffic rules sixteen times during his stay in Russia. Therefore it was only after the applicant had demonstrated particular defiance of the Russian law and order that such measure was taken. Accordingly, the applicant’s removal was proportionate and “necessary in a democratic society” as required by Article 8 of the Convention.


31.  The applicants complained that the loss of their jobs, respectively, as a private-company lawyer and barrister, and the ban under Article 2 of the Law on the Evaluation of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Present Activities of Permanent Employees of the Organisation (“the Act”) on their finding employment in various private-sector spheres until 2009, breached Article <mask> of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.


22.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been unlawfully deprived of the flat. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant alleged that the separation of the property jointly owned by him and his former wife had not been in accordance with the law.


130.  The applicants complained that the Court’s correspondence had been opened by the prison authorities and that it had been received in a disorderly state; thus, they were not sure that they had had access to all the documents submitted to the Court by the Government. They further alleged that the authorities had stopped their correspondence (with their lawyer) in an attempt to hinder their right to complain before the Court. They invoked Article <mask> of the Convention.


204.  The applicants also complained that the authorities’ failure to maintain the channel of the Pionerskaya river in a proper state of repair and to take appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of floods resulted in the damage done to their homes and property, and that no compensation had been awarded to them for their losses. They referred to Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which, in so far as relevant provide as follows:


28.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the court decisions refusing joint custody had infringed his right to respect for his family life, and under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention that the application of Article 1626a § 2 of the Civil Code amounted to unjustified discrimination against unmarried fathers on the grounds of sex and in comparison with divorced fathers.


39.  The applicants submitted that the telephone metering of the telephone in B.’s flat constituted an interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, referring to Malone v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, pp. 30-31, § 64). They conceded that the information was disclosed in accordance with the applicable domestic law (namely section 45 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 and section 28(3) of the Data Protection Act 1984). However, neither, of these legislative provisions, nor any common-law rule, provided the safeguards envisaged in the Court’s case-law (see Khan, cited above, §§ 26-28; Halford v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 June 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III, p. 1017, §§ 49-51; and Huvig v. France, judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B, pp. 55-57, §§ 32-35), in particular as regards the use to which the material could be put, the conditions under which it would be stored, provision for its destruction, etc. They argued that section 45 of the 1984 Act merely exempted telephone operatives from prosecution if they disclosed information in connection with a criminal offence. Equally, the Data Protection Act rendered personal data liable to disclosure for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. Neither Act stipulated any of the restraints on abuse which, for instance, are to be found in the Police Act 1997 in relation to covert recordings. Accordingly, the interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 was effected otherwise than “in accordance with the law”.


145.  The Government claimed that the applicant should have lodged a constitutional complaint in order to challenge the constitutionality of Article 217 of the CECS with Article 47 of the Constitution. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2 July 2009 (no. K 1/07), given on an application from the Ombudsman, in which this provision was found incompatible with the Constitution and Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as it did not specify the reasons for refusing family visits to remand prisoners. The applicant maintained that he had exhausted the relevant domestic remedies.


29.  The Government considered that the relationship between the first and second applicants and the first and third applicants did not fall within the scope of “family life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They emphasised that the first and second applicants had separated in May 2009 and were no longer cohabiting. It was thus clear that the family relationship had broken down and no longer fell within the scope of family life. The Government further submitted that the third applicant was an adult who had started her own family. The fact that the first applicant would babysit for the third applicant’s son was not sufficient to establish a specific dependence which could bring their relationship within the scope of Article 8.


111.  The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been lawful and justified. In particular, the secret surveillance orders had been based on Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been issued and supervised by an investigating judge pursuant to reasoned and substantiated requests from the State Attorney’s Office. Moreover, such interference had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting corruption and had been proportionate to the circumstances and seriousness of the offence at issue. The Government also considered that there had been no reason to rely on the OSCOC Act when ordering and conducting special investigative measures as the additional covert measures envisaged under that Act had not been used and thus that Act had not been applicable.


189.  The Government referred several times in their written submissions to the fact that the applicant herself disclosed details of the caution to her prospective employer, and that the details she disclosed were merely confirmed by the Criminal Records Office. The Court observes that the posts for which the applicant applied were subject to vetting. In this context she was asked for details of her conviction and caution history and provided them as requested. The Court notes and agrees with the comments of Lords Hope and Neuberger in R (L), to the effect that the fact that disclosure follows upon a request by the data subject or with her consent is no answer to concerns regarding the compatibility of disclosure with Article <mask> of the Convention. Individuals have no real choice if an employer in their chosen profession insists, and is entitled to do so, on disclosure: as Lord Hope noted, consent to a request for criminal record data is conditional on the right to respect for private life being respected (see paragraph 106 above). The applicant’s agreement to disclosure does not deprive her of the protection afforded by the Convention (see paragraph 110 above).


31.  The applicant maintained that the relevant passage of the High Court's judgment amounted to an affirmation of suspicion that he had committed sexual abuse. Referring to a medical statement of 7 June 2003 (see paragraph 21 above) the applicant submitted that, having been labelled a sexual abuser, he had suffered serious psychological and social problems. He also invoked a psychiatrist's statement of 4 September 2006 (see paragraph 22 above). The impugned passage entailed an unjustified interference with his right to respect for private and family life in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


133.  The applicant claimed 55,000 euros (EUR) for the non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violation of his rights under the Convention: EUR 20,000 for the violation of Article 3, EUR 30,000 for the violation of Article 5 and EUR 5,000 for the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He cited the Court’s case-law to prove that comparable amounts had been awarded for violations of these Articles.


35.  The applicant submitted that the domestic decisions interfered with his own rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Both the Federal Institute and the domestic courts had failed to appreciate that he had a personal interest in the decision on his late wife’s request. This personal interest derived from the wish that his wife’s decision to end her life be respected. Furthermore, the distressing situation provoked by his wife’s unfulfilled wish to commit suicide had immediate repercussions on his own state of health.


119.  The Government did not call into question the applicants' ownership of the property in issue, nor dispute the argument that the persons referred to had entered the house against the applicants' will. The Court is therefore satisfied that the actions of the aforementioned men constituted an interference with the applicants' right to respect for their home secured by Article <mask> of the Convention and their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Court further notes the absence of any justification on the part of the State for its agents' actions in that regard. It accordingly finds that there has been a violation of the applicants' right to respect for their home under Article 8 of the Convention and their property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


25.  The Government maintained that the domestic courts applied standards that were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention as interpreted in the Court’s case-law and that the balancing test, between the competing rights protected under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, was based on principles developed in the Court’s case-law. In the light of that and the fundamental principles of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation, the Government submitted that there had not been an interference with the applicant’s rights within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention by the Supreme Court’s decision not to award him damages and legal costs.


49.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decision to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with his right to respect for his “home” under Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that such interference had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible for social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim. In particular, the applicant had only lived in the flat for about eleven months before his eviction, which in their opinion was insufficient to develop a long-lasting connection to it. He had moreover not asked that eviction be suspended.


121.  The Government asserted that the Russian legal system provided for an effective remedy in respect of the applicants’ grievances under Article <mask> of the Convention. They referred to Chapter 25 of the CCP containing the mechanism for challenging State and municipal authorities’ decisions before the courts. The Government stated that a final domestic decision in the context of such proceedings would be “an appellate (cassation appellate) judgment of the second-instance court, where citizens ha[d] a right to apply if they disagreed with the findings of the first-instance court”.


34.  The Government submitted that the decision to deny the first applicant continued residence in the Netherlands was necessary in a democratic society and was proportionate. Referring to the guiding principles for cases of this nature as established by the Court (Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, § 48, ECHR-2001), they argued that the first applicant had been convicted of an extremely serious drug offence, of the kind that creates a sense of unease and insecurity in society. The Government added that drug offences are regarded both nationally and internationally as a very serious threat, and that considerable efforts have been made, and are still being made, to counter them. The mere fact that the first applicant had not been convicted of such crimes again should not be of decisive importance when balancing the different interests involved in relation to Article <mask> of the Convention.


57.  The Government informed the Court that the first applicant, Mr E. B., had died on 14 September 2008 and asked the Court to strike the application off the list. They submitted that his application, which essentially concerned complaints under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, related to his private life and could not be transferred to an heir.


91.  The applicant further complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Her right to respect for her private life and her psychological and moral integrity had been violated by the authorities’ failure to provide her with access to genetic tests in the context of her uncertainty as to whether the foetus was affected with a genetic disorder and also by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights.


65.  The applicants complained of the Federal Court of Justice’s refusal to prohibit the media outlets concerned from keeping on their respective Internet portals the transcript of the Deutschlandfunk radio programme broadcast at the time of the events and the written reports published in old editions of Der Spiegel and Mannheimer Morgen concerning the applicants’ criminal trial and their ensuing conviction for murder. The applicants alleged an infringement of their right to respect for their private life under Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:


78.  The applicants complained that the facts of the case gave rise to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that their right to due respect for their private and family life and for the first applicant’s physical and moral integrity had been violated by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework guaranteeing her timely and unhindered access to abortion under the conditions set out by the applicable laws.


31.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to assist him in his efforts to maintain contact with his daughter. He relied on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. Since the Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by the applicant (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 54, 17 September 2009). It thus finds it more appropriate to examine the case under the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention alone (see, mutatis mutandis, Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, no. 8673/05 and 9733/05, § 111, 1 December 2009), which reads as follows:


39.  The applicants submitted that contrary to the Government’s assertion, in order for Article <mask> of the Convention to apply, it was irrelevant that they had not suffered actual injuries, since their physical integrity had been exposed to a clear and imminent danger. The first applicant, Mr Király, was a resident of Devecser and although he had not stayed in his own house during the demonstration but had been at his brother’s house, his ties to the place and to the persons living there were close enough that it could be considered his “home” for the purposes of Article 8. They further argued that even threats that had not actually materialised into concrete acts or physical violence could affect a person’s psychological integrity as protected under Article 8. This was particularly the case if the threat of violence was made with reference to a person’s Roma origin. In their view, the threats uttered against the Roma community in an openly racist rally and accompanied by acts of violence had caused such a degree of fear and distress, as well as a feeling of menace and inferiority, that they had affected their psychological integrity, rendering Article 8 applicable in the present case. This was particularly the case, since the applicants had been subjected to intentional harassment as members of a captive audience, unable to avoid the message conveyed by the speakers and demonstrators.


36.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to respect for his family life had been violated. He claimed, in particular, that the restriction imposed by the domestic courts on his parental rights in respect of his son D. was not “in accordance with the law” and not justified, as it had not been convincingly shown that he posed any danger to his son. He also alleged that, in so far as the relevant court decisions allowed him to have contact with his son in a manner and to the extent requested by him, those decisions were illusory and meaningless, as they ordered that contact may only take place with the consent of the child’s guardian, Ms T.K., who in fact was hostile towards the applicant and had explicitly requested the domestic courts to restrict his parental rights in an attempt to minimise his contact with the boy. The applicant also complained that the restriction in question was discriminatory on the ground of his mental disability and therefore in violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.


39.  The Government submitted that the interference complained of was justified under Article <mask> of the Convention. In their view, it was in accordance with the law and based on a reasonable suspicion that the first applicant had committed an offence, namely that he had been illegally distributing software. The first applicant had not been diligent in conducting his business, as was evident from the fact that he had already been warned by the police once and could have predicted the consequences of his behaviour. The Government went on to argue that the interference had the legitimate aim of prevention of crime and maintenance of fair competition. They claimed that the interference was also proportionate: the officers who had carried out the search and seizure had known where to search and what to search for, and the operation had been conducted in the presence of the applicants, a technician and two certifying witnesses. Also, the authorities had carefully listed the seized computers in the search-and-seizure record, retained the computers in accordance with the law and in connection with the ongoing criminal proceedings, and the content of the computers had not been made public. Furthermore, the approval of the record by the court had been an important safeguard and had served as a guarantee for the justification of the measure. Lastly, the Government pointed out that unlike the cases of Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria (no. 65755/01, 22 May 2008), Kopp v. Switzerland (25 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II) and Heino v. Finland (no. 56720/09, 15 February 2011), the search-and-seizure operation had not touched upon any privileged material.


65.  The applicant complained that the allegedly defamatory sworn statements of the police officers that led to the imposition of restrictive measures against him and to a public trial were an attack on his reputation and hence on his private and family life. He argued that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


56.  The applicants submitted that they had suffered a serious interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the severe environmental pollution emanating from the thermal power plant in close proximity to their homes and the State’s failure to regulate the hazardous industrial activity. They relied on the expert reports commissioned by the domestic courts in support of their claims (see paragraphs 18-24 and 29-30 above). They further argued that the third applicant had not refused to undergo the medical examination commissioned by the first-instance court, as it had selected the claimants at random.


58.  The Government argued that protecting individuals from erroneous and defamatory statements corresponded to a pressing social need, even with respect to public figures. They submitted that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the disputed statements and had not found sufficient evidence to support them. The Government lastly submitted that the applicant had not suffered disproportionate consequences because the domestic courts had not ordered her to retract the disputed statements or to pay damages, nor had they prohibited further publication or sales of the book – the applicant and her brothers had only been obliged to ensure that the disputed statements would no longer be disseminated (see paragraph 31 above). The Government thus argued that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s rights under Article 10 and the other party’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


103.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that such interference had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim.


44.  The applicants submitted that the first applicant was integrated in Austria and had a right to an employment permit under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted in this regard that the first applicant had lived in Austria since 1992 with an indefinite settlement permit and that his wife, who also lived in Austria had become an Austrian national in 2002. The first applicant had already worked for the second applicant for six months in 1993. The applicants submitted that a claim to work by a foreign worker permanently established with his family in the host country was, at the very least, an arguable right. The right of a foreign employee to an employment permit was furthermore indirectly recognised by the case-law of the Constitutional Court according to which an alien was not to be discriminated against by another alien. Further, the competent authorities did not have an unfettered discretion to decide whether or not an employment permit should be granted but were bound by the conditions laid down in the Employment Act. The applicants argued that the first applicant’s right to employment in Austria could be deduced from the Geneva Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Association Agreement between Austria and Turkey and the European Social Charter.


27.  The applicants referred firstly to the fact that the domestic courts had established medical negligence in respect of the first applicant. There had thus been a very serious interference with her physical and psychological integrity, as confirmed by the domestic judgments. However, the finding that their rights had been breached was not sufficient to take away the applicants’ status as victims of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and the compensation awarded was far from being just or in line with comparable Article 8 cases examined by the Court.


49.  The applicant complained that the decision to divest him of his Maltese citizenship had not been made in accordance with the law. It had interfered with his right to private and family life and exposed him to the risk of being separated from his family. The decision had not been accompanied by the relevant procedural safeguards as required under Article <mask> of the Convention and the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligation to protect his rights under that provision. Lastly, the applicant complained that the decision had left him stateless. He thus had to live in a state of uncertainty, where he could not even leave the country for fear of not being let back in. The provision reads as follows:


75.  The applicants argued that the taking of the children into public care and their removal from their home were extremely drastic measures. It was not appropriate to refer to investigations done in 1992 and 1993 and to order the contested measures without hearing them or any witnesses as to the arguments put forward by the Youth Office. In particular the removal and taking into care of the child Laura-Michelle shortly after her birth, constituted a serious breach of Article <mask> of the Convention and had to be considered inhuman treatment in respect of both mother and child. Further, the removal of the new-born baby deprived Mrs Haase of the possibility of breastfeeding, which had recognised health benefits. This child was neither mentioned in the expert report nor included in the Youth Office's request to the District Court. The removal of Laura-Michelle from the hospital was therefore unlawful. In of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of 22 June 2002, they were still affected by the decision of the Münster District Court of 17 December 2001, since they were still separated from the children and some of the children from each other.


72.  The applicant submitted that the authorities should have taken urgent action in accordance with the positive obligations arising out of Article <mask> of the Convention. On the contrary, they had left her in a vulnerable situation despite being aware of the danger she faced. The initial inaction of the authorities and the subsequent inaction of the social services had thus deprived her of the protection she needed.


24.  The Government submitted at the outset that, in view of the six-month rule contained in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the period in respect of which the conditions of the applicant's detention should be examined had started only on 21 March 2006 (i.e. six months before the date on which the application had been introduced) and ended on 15 December 2006, when he had been transferred to a purpose-built unit at Sopronkőhida Prison. In respect of the latter measure, they emphasised that this institution had been equipped to accommodate disabled inmates. As regards the period spent in Szeged Prison, the Government were of the view that the conditions and incidents complained of had not attained the minimum level of severity required for Article 3 to come into play, especially in view of the speedy measures taken by the authorities to remedy them. Nor had they constituted a breach of the applicant's rights enshrined under Article <mask> of the Convention, the curtailment of his privacy being a necessary consequence of the strict-regime prison sentence imposed on him.


54.  The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not guarantee a right to receive long-term visits for detainees. They relied on, most notably, the cases of Messina v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25498/94, ECHR 2000‑X), Klamecki v. Poland (no. 2) (no. 31583/96, 3 April 2003), and Aliev v. Ukraine (no. 41220/98, 29 April 2003) to argue that such a right could not be derived from the Court’s case-law.


117.  The applicant’s situation is rather a specific situation of a stateless migrant who complains that the uncertainty of his situation and the impossibility to regularise his residence status in Croatia following his almost forty-year, at times regular and constantly tolerated, stay in Croatia adversely affects his private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The instant case thus concerns the issues of the respect for the applicant’s private life and immigration lato sensu, both of which have to be understood in the context of the complex circumstances of the dissolution of the former SFRY.


75.  The applicant complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the applicability of this provision, the applicant emphasised that the facts underlying the application had concerned a matter of “private life”, a concept which covered the physical and moral integrity of the person (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 22).


40.  The applicants argued that the interference had not been justified under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they stated that the prosecutor could have interviewed V.E. to verify his statements. They claimed that there had been no reasonable suspicion and therefore no basis for the search-and-seizure operation. In response to the Government’s assertion that the first applicant had already been warned by the police once, the applicants submitted that at that time they had presented all the necessary documents. In their view, the operation had been unlawful because the circumstances had not been pressing: the authorities had planned the operation carefully and could have sought judicial approval beforehand. The subsequent judicial review had been formalistic and had failed to provide any safeguards against abuse, and the applicants had been unable to present their arguments. Also, it had not been necessary for the authorities to seize the computers; they could have seized only the computer products by recording them on paper or by some other means. Lastly, the applicants asserted that the computers had been retained without due consideration of the fact that they had contained personal information.


27.  The applicant complained that the time-limit for establishing the paternity of children born before the entry into force of the new Paternity Act on 1 October 1976 gave rise to a violation of his rights under Article 8 as he could not have the paternity established, despite the conclusive DNA tests. Article <mask> of the Convention reads as follows:


60.  The applicant complained in substance under Article <mask> of the Convention, firstly, that the removal of tissue from her husband’s body had been carried out without his or the applicant’s prior consent. Secondly, she complained that ‒ in the absence of such consent ‒ his dignity, identity and integrity had been breached and his body had been treated disrespectfully.


37.  The applicant argued that the courts arbitrarily reduced his right of access. As a result of the conduct of the child's mother and the court decisions in the present case, he had been deprived for almost one year of any contact with his daughter. The courts should have made the child's mother aware of her obligation of offering some form of co-operation in raising their child despite the fact that the couple were no longer together. In his opinion, the obstructing of contact by the child's mother should be considered as a dereliction of her primary duty to protect  the child's rights, in particular on account of the child's right to a meaningful relationship with both parents. In his submissions, the restriction and almost complete suspension of his right of access constituted a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


118.  The Government did not contest that the police posting of the applicant’s photograph constituted an interference, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, that interference was justified because it had had been carried out as an “operational investigative measure”. The Government stated that, since the applicant’s photograph had not been circulated through the mass media, the interference was of a limited nature and could not amount to a violation. They further asserted that the competent authorities had duly conducted an investigation to identify the persons involved in the impugned act. The Government contested as untrue the applicant’s submission that his photograph had been removed after the newspaper publication of 9 February 2004. In reality, they claimed, the photograph had been removed following the authorities’ proper recognition of their “error”.


25.  The applicant maintained that her request for information about strictly personal aspects of her history and childhood came within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Establishing her basic identity was an integral part not only of her “private life”, but also of her “family life” with her natural family, with whom she hoped to establish emotional ties were she not prevented from doing so by French law.


38.  The applicant pointed out that he had never had the chance to get acquainted with the full text of his psychological assessments. In fact, it had been exactly the “disturbing, yet unclear and incomplete” information given to him about them that had provoked him to seek the full results. The applicant pointed out also that the psychological assessments concerned his state of health and his mental integrity, which justified his legitimate interest in them. The nature of the information sought by him meant in addition that it had to be considered part of his “private life”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


140.  The Government, once again, referred to the Obligations Act, as well as the relevant domestic case-law (see paragraphs 67, 68 and 69 above). Since the applicant had failed to bring a civil case on the basis of this legislation, or indeed directly under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government argued that his complaint should be rejected as inadmissible.


35.  The Government pointed out that it was the ties between the applicant and her two children that had to be considered when examining “the extent to which family life [would be] effectively ruptured” by her expulsion (see Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer, cited above, § 39). While the Government did not dispute that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in such cases, it was by no means an “extraordinary” circumstance that children were affected by expulsion measures. Hence, the mere fact that the applicant had children in Norway could not preclude expulsion, even having regard to the protection of “family life” provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. In this regard the Government subscribed to the approach of the Supreme Court set out in paragraph 62 of its judgment:


74.  The applicants submitted that, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention, they had been deprived of a member of their family. Relying on Article 14, taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, they further alleged that Stelios Kalli Panayi had been killed because of his Greek-Cypriot national origin and the fact that he was a Christian.


83.  The Government further argued that the present case was similar to the case of Guichard v. France ((dec.), no. 56838/00, 2 September 2003) where the applicant had not been able to rely on the protection afforded by the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and where the Court had found that Article <mask> of the Convention had not therefore imposed positive obligations on the French authorities to secure the return of the child. Lastly, the Government submitted that the present case was also similar to the case of Petersen (cited above) where the Court had found that the child’s interest in temporarily moving abroad with his mother and his new family had overridden the applicant’s interests. The Government’s argued that in the present case too a prohibition on leaving Russia would have violated the children’s freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. Given that the residence order had been granted in favour of the mother, the children could not have been separated from her merely because she had decided to move to Germany and to establish her family life there with a new husband. V. and N. had been moreover entitled to maintain contact with their younger half-brother born in Germany.


33.  The applicant alleged that he was the victim of interference with the exercise of his right to respect for his private life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He did not share the Government’s view that other options for ending his life were available to him. He considered that the ingestion of sodium pentobarbital was the only dignified, certain, rapid and pain-free method of committing suicide. Moreover, the fact that none of the 170 psychiatrists practising in the Basle region contacted by him had been willing to help him was, in his opinion, proof that it was impossible to satisfy the conditions laid down by the Federal Court. He submitted that this was unquestionably contrary to the principle, established by the Court, that the Convention protected rights that were practical and effective (he referred to Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37).


124.  The applicant did not claim that the respondent State had interfered with his family relations with A.P. directly: he accepted that it was clear that the interference had to be attributed to a private individual, Ms E.P. The applicant argued, however, that the respondent State had failed to meet its positive obligation to protect his right to family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he claimed that the Russian authorities had done little, if anything, to enforce the Rîșcani District Court’s judgment whereby he had been granted a residence order in respect of A.P.


41.  The applicants also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention without specifying the nature of their grievances. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that there is no indication of a violation of this provision. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


128.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, cited above, about restrictions on his correspondence and exchange of documents with his counsel. Relying on copies of three of the intercepted letters addressed to his mother, he maintained that they had not contained any subversive information or insults, contrary to the Government’s assertion. Had such information been present, under domestic law the letters would not have been returned to him. Censorship of his correspondence with the courts had been proven by the refusal of the director of the remand centre to post his complaint on the ground that it would have no prospect of success. Restrictions on the exchange of documents, including commercial documents and forms of authority, had had no basis in the domestic law.


135.  The applicants alleged that the disappearance of their relative had amounted to a violation of their right to respect for family life. They also complained that the search carried out at their house on 11 January 2003 had been illegal and constituted a violation of their right to respect for their home. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also referred to the unlawful seizure of their property during the search and relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles provide as follows:


688. The applicants MM Elçi, Tur, Acar, Çem and Kurbanoğlu contended that the search of their homes and offices was of doubtful lawfulness, given the lack of clear authority from a Prosecutor or Judge, the need to protect the confidentiality of the client/lawyer relationship, the bad faith which tainted the arrest decisions and the indiscriminate nature of the searches and seizures, with no indication of the specific items sought and no observance of any special rules governing professional papers. Moreover, it was claimed that documentation which was not used in the criminal proceedings, such as Mr Elçi's files relating to his clients' cases before the Commission, was not returned to the applicants, despite the Government's declarations to the contrary, such declarations being unsubstantiated by any written proof. In particular, Mr Elçi averred that papers concerning two applications to the Commission (Özkan and 31 others v. Turkey, application no. 21689/93, and Ismail Ertak v. Turkey, application no. 2764/92) were never returned to him. The applicants submitted that even the temporary deprivation of the documents concerned infringed Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


102.  The applicant's complaint concerning her inability to enjoy family life with her son Balavdi Ustarkhanov concerns the same facts as those examined above under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its above findings under these provisions, the Court considers that this complaint should be declared admissible. However, it finds that no separate issue arises under Article <mask> of the Convention in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Ruianu v. Romania, no. 34647/97, § 66, 17 June 2003; Laino v. Italy [GC], no. 33158/96, § 25, ECHR 1999‑I; and Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 16 December 1997, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII).


139.  The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the various criminal and civil proceedings initiated against the bailiff, the lawyer representing M.S. and the prosecutors investigating the case. He also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the domestic decisions defining the level of child support were not well reasoned. He further submitted that the same facts as constituted the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention also gave rise to a breach of Article 5 of Protocol No. 7.


54.  The applicant therefore cannot be said to have suffered from the lack of long-term conjugal visits. It follows that he cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to his complaint regarding the lack of conjugal visits from his partner (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 33, ECHR 2008).


84.  The applicant thus concluded that, in the circumstances of her case, the general interests of the Netherlands State did not outweigh the rights of the applicant and her family under Article 8 and that insufficient weight had been given to the best interests of her children. The outcome reached by the Netherlands authorities was not in line with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child nor was it proportionate for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


88.  The Government submitted that the right to exercise administrative functions in a court did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. In contrast to the cases of Oleksandr Volkov (cited above) and Özpınar v. Turkey (no. 20999/04, 19 October 2010), the applicant in the present case had not been removed from judicial office. Given this important distinction, the complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.


70.  The Government reiterated their argument concerning the unreasonableness of the applicant’s allegations under Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the amount claimed in relation to non‑pecuniary damage was excessive in the light of awards made by the Court in comparable cases. As regards the pecuniary damage, the Government noted that the documentation submitted by the applicant in support of her claim was insufficient; the copies of the two air tickets submitted showed an amount of only approximately EUR 300.


101.  The applicant further complained of the fact that there had been an interference with his right to respect for his home. In particular, he contended that the search on 29 December 1999 of his apartment was performed in contravention of domestic law, because there was a lack of legal justification, the applicable procedure was not followed and was performed in the presence of two witnesses. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides, as relevant:


73.  The Government referred to Ms L.’s right, under Article <mask> of the Convention, to respect for private and family life. The impact of the libel on her had been enormous, causing also great harm and distress to her family. The Government considered that this aspect of the case, which engaged the positive obligation on States under Article 8, distinguished it from other defamation actions.


52.  The applicant’s case was considered by no fewer than five different Russian courts, including the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. In the first round of proceedings, the courts in the Krasnodar region applied a formalistic and uninquisitive approach, considering themselves bound by the assessment made by the Consumer Protection Authority and leaving it full and unchecked discretion to determine that her presence in Russia constituted a threat to public health (compare M. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 41416/08, § 102, 26 July 2011). The Krasnodar Regional Court described that threat as a “real” one, without elaborating why it was so. Both of the applicant’s applications for a cassation review, addressed first to the Regional Court and later to the Supreme Court, were dismissed without addressing the detailed legal arguments relating to the established case-law of the Constitutional Court and the Convention or factual elements militating against the disruption of her family life. The Russian courts did not attempt to perform any balancing exercise conforming with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law under Article <mask> of the Convention (compare Gablishvili, cited above, § 56, and Liu (no. 2), cited above, § 89). The Court finds that, despite having the formal option to seek judicial review of the CPA’s actions, the applicant was not afforded a sufficiently thorough review by a national authority offering the requisite procedural safeguards against arbitrariness on the part of the authorities (compare Gablishvili, cited above, § 57).


85.  The Government accepted that the applicant had family life in the Netherlands within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Since she was still in the process of seeking a first admission for residence purposes, the pertinent question was whether the Netherlands authorities were under a positive obligation to allow her to reside in the Netherlands for the purpose of enabling her to enjoy family life with her husband and children there. This was the essential question in the case, and not the requirement to hold a provisional residence visa when applying for a residence permit.


64.  The Government contested that claim and submitted that the refusal to authorise gender reassignment surgery on the ground that the statutory conditions were not satisfied could not be said to constitute interference with the exercise of the right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addressing the issue whether the right of transgender persons to effective respect for their private life gave rise to a positive obligation for the State, regard had to be had to the “fair balance which [had] to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual.” In its judgments in Rees v. the United Kingdom (17 October 1986, Series A no. 106), and Cossey v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1990, Series A no. 184), the Court had taken into account, among other considerations, the fact that “[t]he requirement of striking a fair balance could not give rise to any direct obligation on the respondent State to alter the very basis of its system”, in order to conclude that no such obligation existed for the respondent State.


212.  The Government further contended that the alleged interference with the applicants’ rights had been lawful, given that the counter-terrorism measures within the territory of the Chechen Republic had been taken on the basis of the Suppression of Terrorism Act (see paragraph 138 above) and “relevant legal instruments of State bodies”. The Government insisted that the interference in question had been in the public interest as it was necessary to suppress the criminal activity of the illegal armed groups. They added that they had complied with their obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by enacting a number of legal instruments enabling the applicants to obtain compensation for their lost property. The Government thus concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case.


57.  The applicant complained that, owing to the negligence of Dr L., she was denied adequate and timely medical care in the form of an antenatal screening test which would have indicated the risk of her foetus having a genetic disorder and which would have allowed her to choose whether to continue the pregnancy. She also complained that the national courts, by wrongly interpreting the Medical Treatment Law, failed to establish an infringement of her right to respect for her private life in this regard. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


155.  The applicants alleged that the disappearance of their relative had amounted to a violation of their right to family life. They also complained that the search carried out at their house on 8 September 2002 had been illegal and constituted a violation of their right to respect for their home. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also referred to the damage caused to their property during the search and relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. These Articles provide as follows:


58.  The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They contended that the competent bodies had taken all the necessary steps and had used the available mechanism under domestic law for the enforcement of interim order of 27 December 2005, all the while taking care of the best interest of the children and their rights. However, the enforcement had been made difficult due to children’s continuous and strong resistance to see their father. M.G.’s health got worse at each attempt to enforce the interim order and it had been reported that he felt fear and anxiety. Moreover, after meeting with the applicant in the Social Care Centre, M.G. had been upset and the ambulance had to intervene.


33.  The applicant complained of her inability to obtain non-identifying information about her birth family. She maintained that she had suffered severe damage as a result of not knowing her personal history. She stated that she had been denied access to non-identifying information about her birth mother and family that would have enabled her to trace some of her roots while ensuring the protection of third‑party interests. She also complained that, in weighing the two competing interests, the legislature had given preference to the mother’s interests alone without there being any possibility for the applicant to request, as in French law, a waiver of confidentiality of the mother’s identity subject to the latter’s agreement. She also submitted that she had been the subject of a simple adoption order, which had not created an effective family relationship. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


41.  The Government further held that the refusal of the residence permits for the three children on the ground of family reunification was proportionate under Article <mask> of the Convention and in accordance with their right to control the entry of non-nationals into their territory. The Government reiterated that the applicants had deliberately concealed the existence of their three children when they entered Switzerland. The Swiss authorities had learned of their existence only on 4 December 2007. Furthermore, the applicants had not only concealed the existence of their three children but they had also brought them to Switzerland illegally. Instead of appealing against the decision of 28 April 2009, which had become final, they had presented the domestic authorities with a fait accompli. The Government thus maintained that in view of the applicants’ wrongful conduct, the public interests of Switzerland outweighed their private interest in being reunited on its territory.


30.  The Government submitted, firstly, that they were aware of the Court’s judgments in the cases of Taşkın and Others v. Turkey (no. 46117/99, ECHR 2004‑X); Öçkan and Others (cited above); and Lemke v. Turkey (no. 17381/02, 5 June 2007). However, they noted that the Ovacık gold mine had started operating twenty years ago and that the applicants had failed to prove that it had had any negative impact on their rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that there was no data showing that the gold mine presented a danger to the health of the local population, agricultural land or underground water sources.


66.  The Government were convinced that the conduct of the domestic courts had not violated Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant had agreed to a no-fault divorce and for years had not questioned the ruling concerning his contact with his son. In addition, the applicant had not visited his son for one year following the granting of the divorce, and in the subsequent period his contacts with his son had not been as regular as that provided for by the divorce judgement.


140.  The applicants also relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken alone, complaining that the refusal to grant the second applicant a residence permit in Denmark violated their right to respect for their family life. However, in the light of the conclusion set out in the previous paragraph, the Court is of the opinion that there is no need to examine the application separately under Article 8 of the Convention.


58.  The Government maintained that the Chamber, in applying the necessity test under Article <mask> of the Convention, had exceeded its power of review and had substituted its own evaluation for that of the domestic courts. Although stricter scrutiny was called for as regards restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access, it was nevertheless for them to establish the relevant facts, that is to take and assess the evidence, as they had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned.


126.  The applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, about the interference by the prison authorities with his right to communicate in private with his lawyer. He was only able to talk to him through a glass partition with holes which prevented normal discussion. In his opinion, there were no guarantees that their conversations were not overheard or recorded by the remand centre authorities, which he suspected they were. Moreover, he and his lawyer could not work together on any documents or exchange them. He argued that his application to this Court was signed by his lawyer and he later signed the powers of attorney for the lawyer during a court hearing.


58.  The applicant considered that there had been a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his private and family life and his home. He complained in particular that, for more than five years following the allegedly unlawful entry into his flat, he had been unable to occupy it and that he and his wife had been forced to live with members of another household under conditions that prevented normal family intimacy. The applicant further complained that his flat had been returned to him in an uninhabitable state and that the authorities had so far taken no steps to remedy the situation and punish those responsible. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


16.  The applicants complained that the way in which their two children had been killed by soldiers and the authorities’ subsequent refusal to allow them to bury their children in a cemetery of their choice ‒ exacerbated by the fact that they had been prevented from holding a religious ceremony ‒ had represented an unjustified interference with their right to respect for their private and family life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant:


30.  The applicant complained that the re-seizure of 7 March 2012 had been incompatible with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular because (i) it concerned private and legally privileged material, (ii) it had been against the object and purpose of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 2010, (iii) it was as such unlawful and disproportionate, (iv) it had been carried out under the sole authority of the PPS, without any judicial control, and (iv) in its decision of 16 May 2013 the Constitutional Court had failed to address aspects of his case that he considered crucial.


53.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to apply relevant, in particular criminal-law, measures against the participants of the anti-Roma rallies so as to discourage them from the racist harassment that eventually took place. She also maintained that by failing to properly investigate this incidence of racist verbal abuse, the authorities had neglected their positive obligations. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


26.  The applicant claimed that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the fact that when collecting and recording information concerning his identity the authorities had refused to register his Romanian ethnic identity and forced on him an ethnic identity with which he did not identify. The relevant part of Article 8 provides as follows:


34.  The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired.


31. The applicants complained that their right to respect for their home and their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions had been infringed as they had been unable to regain possession of their house for many years and it had subsequently been sold without their consent. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, which in their relevant parts read as follows:


96.  The Government referred to the Court's previous case-law (the above-cited Rees, Cossey and Sheffield and Horsham judgments) and maintained that neither Article 12 nor Article <mask> of the Convention required a State to permit a transsexual to marry a person of his or her original sex. They also pointed out that the domestic law approach had been recently reviewed and upheld by the Court of Appeal in Bellinger v. Bellinger, the matter now pending before the House of Lords. In their view, if any change in this important or sensitive area were to be made, it should come from the United Kingdom's own courts acting within the margin of appreciation which this Court has always afforded. They also referred to the fact that any change brought the possibility of unwanted consequences, submitting that legal recognition would potentially invalidate existing marriages and leave transsexuals and their partners in same-sex marriages. They emphasised the importance of proper and careful review of any changes in this area and the need for transitional provisions.


52.  The applicant reiterated that her application only concerned the search of her home, not the seizure of items. There were no explicit or, for that matter, any provisions or case-law even suggesting that a person subject to a search could have access to a court in order to challenge that search. It was true that the civil liability of the officers conducting the search could be invoked but this possibility was neither effective nor capable of providing redress for the interference with her right to respect for her home as she would have to show that she had actually suffered damage. None of the private prosecutions initiated against officers having conducted or ordered a search had been successful. This remedy was therefore theoretical as well as illusory. The same was true for lodging a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) and the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekanslern). There had been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article <mask> of the Convention.


44.  The applicants complained that the withdrawal of parts of their parental authority and the subsequent separation of the children and their parents had been disproportionate and not grounded on a sufficient factual basis, but on general considerations about the Twelve Tribes Church and their religious beliefs. They further complained that they had been prevented from raising their children in compliance with their religious beliefs and that the court proceedings had led to the stigmatisation of their religious community. As far as the underlying proceedings before the family courts were concerned, the applicants complained that they had not been heard before the interlocutory order of 1 September 2013 was issued. They also alleged that the duration of the interim proceedings before the family courts and the length of time the interlocutory order had been in place had been excessively long. The applicants relied on their right to respect for their family life, as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, they also invoked Articles 9 and 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the Court, as master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 56, ECHR 2002‑I), finds it appropriate to examine all complaints solely under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads, as far as relevant, as follows:


105.  The applicant complained under Article 8 that all his correspondence had been read by State officials and that a large number of his complaints and applications to various State authorities and a letter to his counsel, Ms Liptser, had not been sent to the addressees at all. He referred to Rule 12 of the 2001 Internal Regulations in support of his complaint. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as follows:


50.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that his administrative arrest of April 1997 and the search of his apartment in April 1997 had been unlawful. He also raised complaints under Article 6 § 3 (b) and (d), claiming that his right to prepare for a hearing before the regional court had been breached (see paragraphs 9 – 10 above) and that he had been unable to interrogate one of the witnesses in his case.


53. The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about having been denied any access to their children during their placement in public care. They further complained under Article 14 of the Convention about having been discriminated against vis à vis parents of German origin. They finally complained under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention about having been denied compensation for the erroneous decision of the German courts.


35.  The Government thus maintained that in the present case the applicant’s deportation from the territory of Lithuania had corresponded to the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of national security. On 11 June 2002 the State Security Department had started an investigation into the applicant, who was suspected of trying to set up an organisation of an anti-national character. The data collected during the investigation had proved that the applicant’s activities posed a threat to national security and public order. On that basis, the Migration Department had refused the applicant’s request for a temporary residence permit. Since all the data submitted by the State Security Department constituted State secrets, the courts had decided not to disclose it and had, exceptionally, relied on the data as evidence. However, the courts had duly examined the information marked “restricted use” and “secret”, and had found the conclusions of the State Security Department to be well reasoned. From the above, the Government deduced that the applicant’s deportation from the Republic of Lithuania had been fully compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


59.  The applicants complained that the Norwegian immigration authorities’ decision, upheld by the national courts, that the first applicant be expelled to Ghana with a prohibition on re-entry for five years would entail a breach of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. It would disrupt the relationships between the first and the third applicants in a manner that would have long lasting damaging effects on the latter.


49.  The Government noted that the applicant alleged a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, what was at stake in the present case was a weighing of the applicant’s interests protected by Article 8 on the one hand against the freedom of the press to disseminate information protected by Article 10 of the Convention on the other. It followed that the principles developed by the Court’s case‑law under Article 10 also had to be taken into account.


61.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that due to the belated enforcement of the final custody judgment of 5 May 2006, as well as the respondent State's prior failure to enforce the NSCC's order of 8 March 2005, she had been prevented from exercising her parental rights in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation. Article 8 reads as follows:


59.  The applicant complained that the Polish authorities had failed to take effective steps to enforce his right to contact with his daughter and that the process of enforcing the courts' decisions had lasted too long. He alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the Court considers that the applicant's complaints fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as follows:


93. The Government maintained that the national authorities had done everything within their power to ensure that the applicant could exercise her access rights. They submitted that in a case involving enforcement of access rights a fair balance had to be struck between the competing interests of the children and of the community as a whole. The children had expressed their reluctance to see their mother many times in the course of the divorce and custody proceedings and at the meeting in Divriği on 21 August 1997 when they firmly refused to travel with the applicant’s lawyer. In such circumstances the authorities were also under an obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention to protect the interests of the children who were mature enough to have their views taken into account. The failure to enforce access rights was first and foremost the result of the father’s refusal to co-operate and the Government could not be held responsible for his conduct.  Secondly it was the result of the children’s refusal to see the applicant, again a matter for which the Government could not be blamed.


118.  The Government submitted that the decision to grant a residence order in respect of the second applicant in favour of the mother had been based on the best interests of the child. There had therefore been no discrimination. The Government referred to the case of Tiemann v. France and Germany ((dec.), nos. 47457/99 and 47458/99, 27 April 2000) where the decisions to grant a residence order to the mother had been found to be in the bests interests of the children and therefore compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. Like in Tiemann, the first applicant in the present case had been trying to separate the second applicant from his mother. In such circumstances the domestic courts had achieved a balance between the interests of the first applicant, the second applicant and M., in particular by granting the first applicant contact rights. Despite the fact that the second applicant lived in another town, the first applicant could still visit him and maintain contact by other means.


30.  The applicants submitted that the relationship between the first and second applicants came within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention because they remained married and had chosen to maintain regular contact with each other, including in order to continue jointly raising their young daughter. The ties between the first and the fourth applicants clearly fell within the scope of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8. Furthermore, the first applicant maintained a close relationship with the third applicant – his adult stepdaughter – and her child. The Government’s contention that the family unit had disintegrated ignored the reality of their relationship, and in particular the fact that the first applicant had to a great extent relied on the support of his family to be able to cope with and stabilise his mental health condition.


145.  The applicant contended that the regime covering covert surveillance between a detainee who was a “vulnerable person” within the meaning of the Code of Practice and an “appropriate adult” (see paragraph 13 above) was not “in accordance with the law” as required by paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he submitted that even though these consultations were not protected by legal professional privilege, in view of the vulnerability of the detainee they should be as frank as possible. As such, they were analogous to consultations with legal and medical advisors and their covert surveillance should also have been treated as intrusive – rather than directed – surveillance.


35.  The applicant organisation complained that the entry of police officers onto its premises and the seizure of documents, public notary fees and taxes, as well as the questioning of its staff members, were unlawful, had impinged on its duty of professional secrecy and had breached its right to home, private life and correspondence under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


28.  The applicants also submitted that the twin daughters should, under Article <mask> of the Convention, be entitled to regular contact with their father. Moreover, the first applicant had become the father of a third child in 2012, from a relationship with another Swiss national. He was now living with her and they hoped to get married as soon as possible.


25.  The applicant complained about the courts’ judgments in the proceedings under the Media Act refusing him compensation in respect of the publication of an article and two photographs in the issue of Profil of 12 July 2004. He alleged a violation of his right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


43.  The Government did not deny that the notion of private life, which was also referred to in Article <mask> of the Convention, could sometimes encompass information enabling a person’s physical or social identity to be established. However, they pointed out that the State had not refused to furnish the applicant with information but had taken into account her mother’s refusal from the beginning to allow her identity to be disclosed.


56.  The applicant complained under Articles 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention that his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre had no legal basis and that there were no judicial remedies available to him to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. He maintained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that he had no right to compensation under domestic law in respect of these complaints. He further claimed under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to family life had been breached on account of his unlawful detention.


33.  The applicant complained that his observation via GPS and its aggregation with several further measures of surveillance, as well as the use of the data obtained thereby in the criminal proceedings against him, had breached his right to respect for his private life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


73.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he submitted that the construction of a cemetery near his house had led to the contamination of his supply of drinking water and water used for private gardening purposes, preventing him from making normal use of his home and its amenities, including the soil of his own plot of land, and negatively affecting his and his family’s physical and mental health.


13.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 3 (c) and 8 of the Convention that letters from his lawyers and from the Registry of the Court had been opened and read by the administration of Lovech Prison. The Court is of the view that the complaint falls to be examined solely under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


31.  The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had had a legal basis in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Constitution of 1991 and the relevant provisions of the CCP, which were fully in line with the requirements of the Convention. The interference had furthermore pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary for its attainment. The search in the applicant’s office had been directly related to the needs of the investigation, as the objects found and seized there had had a direct link with the offence under investigation. Moreover, both the applicant and two independent observers – neighbours who had had no interest in the outcome of the case – had been present during the search. The intrusion in the applicant’s privacy had been kept to a minimum: the contents of his computer’s hard drive and of the seized disks had been explored through a special piece of software using keywords, which meant that the contents of his electronic documents had not been checked in full. There was no indication that the information obtained had been revealed to a third party, copied or improperly used. Finally, the interference had not lasted unreasonably long, as the computer had been given back to the applicant two months after its seizure.


56.  The Government contested these arguments and maintained that the apartment block in question had not been an illegal construction although the administrative proceedings concerning the building permit disclosed some irregularities of a procedural nature. They submitted that the major part of the land in question had been, at least since the 1970s, designated for multi-family housing. It could not therefore be said that the local development plan was suddenly altered to a substantial degree. Moreover, the applicants did not sustain any damage on account of the apartment block having been constructed on the adjacent plot of land. In particular, they were not prevented from constructing on the land belonging to them as the local authorities had granted the first applicant planning permission in 1997 and 2001. Only one of the three applicants still lived in Puławy and the others had been living in Austria and in Germany and therefore they could not claim a violation of their right to respect for their “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Finally, the Government indicated several types of remedies which the applicants should have exhausted before making their complaint to the Court. In particular they should have brought a civil action for compensation if they had sustained any damage in consequence of the actions of public authorities or the private investor. The Government underlined that the apartment block had been built legally, in accordance with all safety and technical requirements, and that thus there had been no obligation on the authorities to demolish it or to prevent its construction.


44.  The applicant maintained that the reversal of the award for damages in respect of his dismissal from the Police Force because he had allegedly been negligent towards the acts of torture committed by other officers in his control, was plainly incompatible with the respondent State’s obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. The reversal of the award had undermined the protection of his moral and psychological integrity and reputation, being encompassed in the protection guaranteed by Article 8.


89.  The applicant complained that her right to respect for her private and family life had been violated as a result of her sterilisation, which had been carried out contrary to the requirements of the relevant law and without her and her mother’s full and informed consent. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides:


66.  The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had failed to secure his right to respect for his family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention in that they had not acted expeditiously in the non-contentious proceedings for the return of his son under the Hague Convention. He also complained that the length of those proceedings was incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and under Article 13 that he had not had an effective remedy for his Convention complaints. The relevant part of those Articles reads as follows:


38.  The applicants, without relying on any particular provision of the Convention, complain that their dismissal based on the allegation of the commission of criminal offences for which they have been acquitted brought great shame on them and that it deprived them of their material well-being. The Court, being a master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005), considers that this complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


41.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the courts’ assessment of the evidence and interpretation of the law and challenged the outcome of the proceedings. She further complained under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention of her own suffering and discrimination allegedly caused by the domestic courts. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the State authorities had failed to respect her right to a home guaranteed by this provision. She also relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


39.  The applicant complained that there was a breach of his right to respect of family life in that the domestic courts failed to correctly apply the Hague Convention criteria when deciding on his request for a return order. The complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention. He also claimed under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings under the Hague Convention had been unfair. Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention provide, in so far as relevant:


77.  The applicants complained, firstly, that their children had been placed in care unjustifiably, and, secondly, by a letter of 12 April 2012, that they had been unable to obtain the children’s return to their family, given the dismissal of their action by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final judgement of 20 March 2012. They relied in essence on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


110.  The applicants asserted that Article <mask> of the Convention guaranteed the right to a normal family life and was therefore applicable to the present case, regard being had in particular to the Court’s extensive view of the question. They argued that the Law of 4 March 2002 had infringed that right and constituted interference with its exercise, but that none of the conditions required for such interference to be compatible with the Convention, namely that it should be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary, had been satisfied. In the first place, the legislation was neither clear nor precise, contrary to the requirements established by the Court’s case-law, in that the reference to national solidarity remained vague and imprecise. Secondly, and above all, the interference did not pursue a legitimate and compelling objective. In particular, the considerations linked to improving the organisation of the health service, chief among which was the concern to avoid increases in insurance premiums for doctors and health-care establishments, could not justify giving the latter immunity in respect of their negligent acts or omissions. As regards the State’s positive obligation, this could not be considered to have been discharged since, by depriving C. and her parents of a remedy whereby they could obtain compensation for the damage consisting of the special burdens arising from her disability, the legislature had prevented the family’s interests from being protected practically and effectively.


64.  The applicants complained that the decisions of the domestic courts in the main proceedings to withdraw parts of their parental authority had been disproportionate and had been based on unfair proceedings that had lacked sufficient factual foundation. They further alleged that their religious beliefs were the reason their parental rights had been withdrawn and that they had been prevented from raising their children in compliance with their religious beliefs. Lastly, the applicants complained that the main proceedings before the family courts had been unreasonably long. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, they invoked Articles 6 § 1 and 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The Court, as master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 56, ECHR 2002‑I), finds it appropriate to examine all complaints solely under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads, as far as relevant, as follows:


169.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention that he had not been informed promptly of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the second set of proceedings. He also complained under Article 7 that, in both sets of criminal proceedings, the acts for which he had been convicted did not constitute a criminal offence. Lastly, he complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the searches conducted on 22 May 2007 in his flat and the newspapers' office had violated his right to respect for his home.


28.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to family life had been infringed as a result of the Austrian courts’ decisions to refuse them access to their former foster child. They also submitted that the conduct of the Austrian courts amounted to a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 of the Convention. The Government contested that argument.


80.  The applicant complained that he had not been allowed to meet in private with his lawyer and had been separated from him by a glass partition, preventing normal discussion or work with documents. As a result they had had to shout to hear each other and had both refused on several occasions to meet in such conditions, informing the court that they were unable to prepare for hearings. The applicant lodged his initial complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention but in his subsequent observations he referred to it under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


56.  The applicants initially complained that the first applicant’s expulsion to Turkey would entail a violation not only of Article 8 but also of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. However, after his expulsion to Turkey on 16 July 2011, they submitted in their pleadings to the Court of 18 October 2011 that they only maintained their complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention.


41.  The Government said in conclusion that the child's persistent refusal to see her mother was the only reason why the access arrangements had not been complied with. It would be going beyond the State's positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention to take coercive measures to force the child to meet her mother. Therefore, even assuming that there had been an interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life, it had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8.


51.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention by reason of the unlawful search at their apartment and the failure to investigate properly their complaint concerning that search. They further complained that, in relation to the search on 2 November, that the warrant issued was both imprecise and contained errors. Article 8 reads as follows:


17. The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The eviction order had been in accordance with the law; it had pursued a legitimate aim and had been necessary in order to protect the rights of individuals in need of housing. The Government also pointed out that the applicant had not brought any counter-claim against the administration of Grozny and had not submitted any claims for provision with alternative accommodation. Furthermore, the applicant had not applied to the state authorities with a request to help her with solving her housing problem. After her eviction the applicant had returned living to the flat in which she had been registered until 2005.


28.  The applicant claimed that the Swiss authorities had not complied with their obligations, inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention, to allow him to reside in Switzerland, thereby enabling him to enjoy family and private life in that country. He submitted that his personal interests in remaining in Switzerland outweighed the State’s interest in securing public order and safety, and that his expulsion for an undetermined period of time was a disproportionate measure under Article 8 of the Convention. He alleged that the facts of his case were comparable to those in Emre v. Switzerland (no. 42034/04, 22 May 2008) because he too had been living in Switzerland for a long time, had established strong social and professional ties to that country and no longer had ties with his home country, Peru. In addition, he was enjoying family life in Switzerland since he had been residing there with his second wife between 2005 and 2008, and several of his brothers and sisters were living in the respondent State. Furthermore, by contrast to Emre (cited above), he had been sentenced only once.


20.  The applicant maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his appointment to the new post -which had compelled him to move to another city- as well as alleged unfounded accusations against him, had interfered with his right to respect for family life. He further claimed that financial consequences arising from his appointment, such as transportation and accommodation costs, had amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention


58.  The Government averred that the applicants’ complaint under Article 8 refers only to the fact that the alleged perpetrators had been acquitted and that the applicants had been forced to leave town in order to protect the first applicant after the incidents. In their view, these aspects should not fall within the realm of Article <mask> of the Convention and in any case the applicants could not be considered victims of a violation of that Article. They put forward that the applicants had chosen to leave and had not been forced to do so by the authorities; the applicants had also waited for nine months after the end of the proceedings and almost seven years after the events before they had actually moved. The Government also pointed out that the applicants had failed to complain to the authorities about any impact on their private and family lives of the allegedly ineffective investigation.