46.  The Government contested the assertion that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. They stated that the acts imputed to the applicants had constituted criminal offences at the material time. They referred to a ruling by the Constitutional Court of 27 May 2008, no. 8-P, which stated that the law providing for criminal liability could not be interpreted broadly when being enforced and would not apply to acts it did not directly prohibit, or by analogy, and could not be applied retroactively.


59.  The applicants argued, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that Finnish law contained no provision which defined reporting of a public trial as a punishable offence. At the time of the publication of the articles, it had been unforeseeable and surprising to the applicants that penal sanctions could be imposed on them for having published public information that had been freely available to everybody and to which anyone could have had access on the basis of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Finland. The published information remained even today freely available. The interference with the applicants' freedom of expression had thus not been foreseeable or “prescribed by law”.


41.  The applicant challenged the applicability of the Customs Code provisions to the confiscation procedure and claimed, accordingly, that the confiscation could not be imposed on him outside a two-month statutory limitation provided for in section 38 of the Code on Administrative Offences. The Court, however, in view of its relevant findings under Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 33 above), does not share this view.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s conviction under Article 325 of the new CC was compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, falsification of documents was an offence prohibited by Article 213 of the former CC at the time when the applicant committed the crime. As could be seen from its wording, the document conferring an entitlement or absolving from liability was not confined to state or societal enterprises, institutions or organisations, as various documents of legal significance could be falsified by an individual or a representative of a legal entity. Hence, Article 213 clearly defined the crime, and its provisions were in compliance with the standards of foreseeability and accessibility as required by the Convention. Furthermore, the judicial practice on interpretation and application of Article 213 did not exclude individuals having no links with the state or societal institutions from being convicted under that Article. Accordingly, the offence of which the applicant was convicted corresponded to the corpus delicti of Article 213 of the former CC. In substantiation of their claims, the Government submitted two judgments delivered by the domestic courts at the time when the former CC was still in force, by which individuals had been convicted under Article 213.


50.  The applicant further complained that Article 325 of the new CC under which he was convicted lacked legal certainty as opposed to its predecessor in the former CC, namely Article 213 which contained the words “State and societal organisations”. Therefore, the interpretation and application of Article 325 to his case went beyond what could be reasonably foreseen by him. In this respect, he invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


133.  The applicant complained that the professional regulations of 12 July 2007 did not define with sufficient clarity the obligations imposed on lawyers, subject to disciplinary action, in so far as they used such vague and general terms as “report suspicions” and “due diligence”. He alleged that this was in breach of the principle of legal certainty, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The applicant submitted that he could not be held responsible under Article 148-4 of the Criminal Code for the period prior to its entry into force on 20 July 1993. The application by the courts of the concept of a continuing offence allowed them to evade the prohibition of retrospective application of criminal law in Article <mask> of the Convention.


95.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant had been wrongly tried for acts which did not amount to offences under national or international law, and which in any event failed to meet the standards of foreseeability and accessibility required by the Convention (see G. v. France, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 325-B), in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


126.  The applicant submitted that when he had been sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment on 10 March 1989 by the Limassol Assize Court, under the Prison Regulations applicable at the time, “life imprisonment” had been tantamount to imprisonment for a period of twenty years. As a result of the repeal of the Regulations, the amendment of the relevant legislative provisions and the retroactive application of the provisions thus amended, he had been subjected to an unforeseeable prolongation of his term of imprisonment from a definite twenty-year sentence to an indeterminate term for the remainder of his life, with no prospect of remission, and to a change in the conditions of his detention. Thus, a heavier penalty had been imposed than that applicable at the time he had committed the offence of which he had been convicted, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


40.  The Government said that the applicant had been sentenced to both a custodial sentence and a customs fine, the latter being a hybrid penalty. Imprisonment in default only took effect if the convicted person failed to pay all or part of the fine. Its role was thus purely subsidiary. Moreover, in Jamil, cited above (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”), the Court expressly stated that its decision in that case applied only in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention to the specific problem of the retrospective application of the criminal statute; indeed that had been the only complaint before it. Consequently, the judgment in Jamil could not be construed as implying that imprisonment in default constituted a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, subject to all the rules in the Criminal Code applicable to prison sentences.


72.  The applicants complained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that they had not had a right to compensation in respect of the length of their detention in police custody and pending trial.  They further alleged under Articles 6 §§ 1 and 2 that the İzmir State Security Court had not been an independent and impartial tribunal in that it had relied on unlawful evidence, such as the illegal recording of their telephone conversations and statements which had been taken from them under duress, added to the case file by the public prosecutor, and that it had convicted them without awaiting the judgment of the Aydın Criminal Court. They submitted under Article 6 § 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention that their detention in Aydın prison had deprived them of the opportunity to contact their lawyer easily and that the State Security Court had not given them the opportunity to comment on the illegal telephone recordings submitted by the prosecution. The applicants further alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that their conviction had been unlawful as it had been based on insufficient evidence.


81.  The applicant raised a number of other complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: (a)  that she had been sanctioned for actions which had not formed part of her duties as a liquidator (in this respect the applicant also relied on Article <mask> of the Convention); (b)  that the Supreme Administrative Court had upheld the decision of the Minister of Justice to strike the applicant off the list of persons qualified to act as liquidators on grounds differing from those given by the Minister; and (c)  that the Supreme Administrative Court had erred in the interpretation and application of the law governing judicial review of administrative decisions such as the one issued by the Minister of Justice.


38.  The applicant, once more relying on Article 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, also complained that the Hannover Regional Court had not taken a formal decision on her request for a subsequent hearing, as foreseen in section 33(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that at the relevant time her acts were not yet punishable as money laundering.


20.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that it had not been clear from the Penal Code provision applied that their conduct would be punishable as the provision had not defined the scope of private life. Moreover, the convictions of A. and B. had been public information that could not have fallen within the scope of private life. Even though a conviction for invasion of private life allegedly required that intent be shown, the Appeal Court had failed to state how this requirement had been fulfilled.


123.  The applicant observed that social and political groups were added to the Lithuanian definition of genocide by the Criminal Code amendments of 21 April 1998. In the light of Article <mask> of the Convention, he claimed that criminal liability for genocide in respect of those two groups was thus not applicable at one particular point in time but was applicable at another, although the facts potentially giving rise to an issue were the same. In his specific case, he contended, the Lithuanian State had applied the criminal law retroactively, despite the fact that from 1992 to 1998 the State itself regarded the applicant’s actions as not constituting the crime of genocide. Even acknowledging that the crime of genocide could be prosecuted retroactively, he submitted that it was difficult to accept that criminal liability for such a crime depended on the State’s ability to amend the legislation or to find new characteristics of the crime which were relevant only for Lithuania. The applicant pointed to the fact that Lithuania itself prohibits the retroactive application of criminal law.


103.  The applicant complained that the failure of the Russian authorities to enforce the judgment of the Rîșcani District Court of Chisinau of 28 October 2009, whereby he had been awarded a residence order in respect of his son, A.P., had violated his right to family life under Article <mask> of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:


50.  The applicant complained that the Hungarian authorities had failed to take timely and adequate measures to ensure that he was reunited with his daughter following her abduction. In particular, he argued that they had not made sufficient attempts to locate K.S. and the child. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


103.  The applicants complained, relying on Article <mask> of the Convention, that their eviction from the land where they had been settled for a long time constituted a violation of their right to respect for their private and family life and their home. They further relied on Article 3 of the Convention, taken alone and in combination with Article 14 of the Convention, and on Article 18 of the Convention taken together with Article 8. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 8, which reads as follows:


82.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to family life had been violated by the Swedish authorities and courts by taking the children into public care, and keeping them there, as well as by refusing to allow the parents to have any contact with their children for prolonged periods of time, contrary to the best interest of the children, and to the detriment of the family unity. Article 8 reads insofar as relevant:


87.  The Government denied that the judgments given in the applicant’s case had been arbitrary or otherwise unlawful. Limitation periods aimed at ensuring the principle of legal certainty, under which prosecutions were no longer possible upon the passage of time. Having regard to the arguments that an effective remedy − a civil action for damages − had been available to the applicant, the Government concluded that the State had not violated the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


48.  The applicant argued that the customs officials’ actions had amounted to “interference by a public authority” with both his “private life” and his “correspondence” within the autonomous meanings arising from Article <mask> of the Convention. That “interference” had been unlawful because there had been no criminal investigation in respect of him and no court order, in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act of 1995 (see paragraphs 25, 40 and 41 above). The domestic courts had failed to make any substantive findings on the matter of legality and had carried out no proportionality assessment in respect of the impugned “interference”. It could not be reasonably accepted that the contested measures had been lawfully authorised by the Customs Code (namely Article 372) since that only concerned an “inspection” of “vehicles, cargo and goods” (see paragraph 28 above). The situation complained of had not fallen in any of the above categories. In particular, the electronic data on the applicant’s laptop was not “goods” within the ordinary meaning of that term under the Civil Code or the Customs Code.


50.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which includes protection of a person’s physical and psychological well-being. By not protecting them from domestic violence, the authorities had failed to discharge their positive obligations under that provision. They also submitted that they had not had effective remedies at their disposal in respect of their complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.


25.  The applicant submitted that the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act, read in conjunction with section 235(1)(2) of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code, and the decisions of the domestic courts had infringed her right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


41.  The applicant also submitted that although she had requested access to information about her origins once she had become an adult, a person’s vital interest in obtaining the information necessary to uncover the truth about an important aspect of his or her personal identity, which was an integral part of the right to private life safeguarded by Article <mask> of the Convention, was a subjective and highly personal right and therefore not subject to statutory limitation.


3.  The applicant's existence was skilfully and organically disrupted by the Austrian authorities' defiance of their responsibilities under Article <mask> of the Convention - which, as the majority agreed, in the present case imposed on them a duty to ensure the enforcement of the final return order issued in his favour in terms of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  The applicant and his wife had established the matrimonial residence in Michigan, USA.  The wife's relocation to Austria, together with the illicitly appropriated child, coerced the applicant into instituting legal proceedings in Austria, which necessitated his presence there to ensure their diligent and successful prosecution.


54.  The applicant argued that the provision of a widow's pension to a surviving spouse was clearly intended to promote family life. He maintained that a widow's pension was paid to, among others, a widow who had dependent children at the date of her husband's death once she was no longer in receipt of child benefits. He submitted that the provision of the pension to a surviving spouse was intended to recognise and promote the family relationship between spouses and that entitlement to it affected the way in which married partners arranged their financial affairs. He thus submitted that his complaint as regards future non-entitlement to a widow's pension fell within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention.


103.  The Government submitted that any interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had been lawful and necessary. The refusals to allow them to use the experimental product had been reasoned, made by an independent authority, and based on legal provisions which were fully in line with European Union law. It could therefore be presumed that they were compliant with the Convention. Those provisions, which took into account the need to strike a balance between the public interest and personal autonomy, sought to protect the health and life of those concerned by preventing abuses and the risks accompanying the use of untested products. For that purpose they had laid down certain conditions, which in the applicants’ cases had not been met. That regulatory arrangement could not be described as a blanket prohibition on the “compassionate use” of unauthorised medicinal products.


164.  The Government admitted that the removal of the applicant from office had constituted an interference with his right to respect for his private life within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the measure had been justified under the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, the dismissal had been carried out on the basis of domestic law which had been sufficiently foreseeable and accessible. In addition, the measure had been necessary in the circumstances of the case.


17.  The applicant relied on the findings of the Court in its judgments in the cases of Loizidou v. Turkey ((preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310), Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits), judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑VI), Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001‑IV), Demades v. Turkey (no. 16219/90, § 46, 31 July 2003), and Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey (no. 16163/90, § 31, 31 July 2003). Furthermore, in her earlier observations on the admissibility of the application, she had distinguished her case from that of Loizidou v. Turkey (merits, cited above) in so far as Article <mask> of the Convention was concerned, since her complaint related to an interference with her right to respect for the home in which she lived with her husband and children and of which she was the owner. This was irrespective of whether the area in which her home was situated was the same as that where she grew up and her family had its roots.


27.  The applicant alleged a violation of her right to home under Article <mask> of the Convention. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as this complaint falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in Article 8 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


22.  The Government submitted that the adoption of the applicant's daughter by S.A. had been carried out in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Family Code. The applicant had not been involved in the upbringing of his daughter; he had, of his own will, moved far away from her. Thus, he had himself created the circumstances under which his consent for adoption had not been necessary. S.A. had been supporting and taking care of the applicant's daughter for about three years by the time the court rendered its judgment allowing adoption. A close relationship had developed between S.A. and A., the latter thinking of S.A. as her own father. The severance of these ties would have led to a violation of their right to respect for family life, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The adoption had been in the best interest of the child. In the Government's submission the courts had legitimately given priority to the child's interests over the interests of the applicant.


31.  The applicant submits that there has been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as, in the circumstances of the case, the decision of the Regional Court was disproportionate. The Regional Court should have resorted to a less drastic measure, such as helping her with the children’s education. Meanwhile she has given birth to two more children, a daughter born in December 1996 and a son born in July 1998. She was and is taking adequate care of these children and the competent Youth Welfare Office, a different one, has found no reason to intervene. The applicant also submits that the Regional Court relied on fresh evidence of which she had not been informed and, thus, had no opportunity to react thereto.


47.  The applicant complained that the investigations carried out by the child welfare services, despite a first such investigation showing that his former wife's allegations were groundless, had constituted an unjustified interference with his right to respect for private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. He moreover complained that, because of dismissal of his case by the Norwegian courts, and hence their refusal to review the merits of his case, he had been denied access to a court and an effective remedy, in breach of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, respectively.


32.  The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that the lawfulness of the decision and the necessity to revoke the applicant’s residence permit had been duly examined by the domestic courts, which had found that the measure had been imposed by the proper authority and that the relevant procedure had been complied with. The interference had been lawful, had had a legitimate aim and had been necessary and proportionate; the public interests had been duly balanced against the private interests of the applicant. The Government illustrated the proportionality of the interference, referring to the case of Lupsa v. Romania (no. 10337/04, § 10, ECHR 2006‑VII), and stating that the five-year re-entry ban which could have been imposed on the applicant did not appear unreasonable in comparison with the ten-year ban imposed on the applicant in Lupsa on similar grounds.


88.  The applicant did not complain about the effectiveness of the criminal investigation carried out by the Swedish authorities. The Court has not found any evidence that the manner in which the investigating authorities and the public prosecution carried out their tasks was ineffective in safeguarding the applicant’s physical integrity, or that they failed to comply with their positive obligation to conduct an effective prosecution in order to ensure adequate protection of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


32.  The applicant submitted that the decision not to grant him a new temporary residence permit and the resulting expulsion order infringed Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, he claimed that that decision was based solely on the allegation that he posed a “threat to national security” contained in the file provided by the State Security Department and classified as “secret”. However, he was never informed of the contents of that file. He argued that he was genuinely integrated into life in Lithuania, where he had a business and had registered a non-governmental organisation Ibrahimas ir draugai (“Ibrahimas and friends”), the aim of which was to foster the cultural traditions of Azeris residing in Lithuania. The applicant stressed that from 1993 he had lived in Lithuania with SG, a Lithuanian citizen, whom he had married in 2001 and with whom he had two children, both of whom were also Lithuanian citizens and still underage. He was the main source of income in the household and his expulsion deprived them of financial support.


66.   The applicant complained that in taking the decision, the Bologna Youth Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and competence under the Hague Convention and accordingly had interfered with his right to respect for his private and family life – an interference which had neither been justified nor necessary under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant further complained of a violation of Article 6, in so far as he had not been given the opportunity to challenge the statements made by his wife’s attorney at the hearing on 18 June 2007 and the expert report ordered by the Bologna Youth Court, and in as much as his subsequent submissions had not been taken into account. Moreover, he had not been able to fully participate in the hearing as the relevant documents had only been made available at the hearing and only in the Italian language. Article 8, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


42.  The applicants argued that the Austrian courts had not properly examined their request for the granting of visiting rights because, on the basis of Article 148 (4) of the Civil Code, the courts had concentrated on the issue of whether the applicants had standing in the proceedings or a right to appeal and had dismissed their request merely on the ground that the refusal of visiting rights would not endanger the well-being of F. That was not the kind of weighing of interests required by Article <mask> of the Convention.


190.  The applicant submitted that his life sentence without parole, in conjunction with the social isolation imposed on him, constituted a violation of Article 3 or Article <mask> of the Convention. He also stated that a life sentence which took no account of the prisoner’s possible good conduct or rehabilitation, associated with a strict prison regime, attained the level of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention to constitute inhuman punishment.


27.  The applicant maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention was not at issue in the case because the statements had not affected A’s reputation to a sufficient degree. The statements were not defamatory or innuendoes against A. There was nothing presented in the news item to the effect that A had been guilty of a financial crime or other actions punishable by law.


27.  The applicant complained that during the events of 29 May 2000: (i) she had been ill-treated and humiliated by police, in breach of Article 3; (ii) she had been unlawfully deprived of her liberty between 9.00 a.m. and 1 p.m. on that day, which constituted a violation of Article 5 § 1; and (iii) her right to respect for her home under Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed.


32.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim did not fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention because the impugned advertisement only mentioned his forenames, which were common and could not on their own have suggested any connection with him. Only the applicant’s scuffles in 1998 and 2000, which had attracted extensive media coverage – and for which he himself been responsible – had brought him to the attention of the public at large and could thus have linked him with the advertisement. Previously, the general public and the media had shown interest in him solely in his capacity as the husband of Princess Caroline of Monaco. The Government asserted that the only option available to the applicant was to seek an injunction, under Article 8 of the Convention, against any further public reference to the incidents in question; and the Hamburg Regional Court had granted the applicant’s application for an injunction prohibiting any further distribution of the advertisement. The Government took the view that although Article 8 protected an individual’s reputation, it did not confer any right to compensation in the form of a notional licence where the individual’s reputation had been damaged by his own behaviour.


21.  The Government argued that there had been no interference with the applicants' family life, as it was open to them to settle in Greece where the first applicant is currently residing. In any event, they considered that if there was interference, it met the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they contended that the national courts had exercised full judicial review and had duly examined the grounds relied on by the executive in relation to the first applicant's expulsion.


128. The applicant submitted that since arriving in Belgium in 2007 she had given birth to three children. The children had never lived in Nigeria and the two oldest were now attending school in Belgium. She argued that, owing to the standard of education in Belgium, her children had a future there which was not possible in Nigeria. Moreover, the children’s father, who was also a Nigerian national, was in Belgium and, although he did not have a residence permit, had recently moved in with the applicant and the children. He had thus been able to develop a relationship with his children; he took care of them and took them to school regularly. In the applicant’s submission, Belgium was the only country where she could live a normal family life compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention with her partner and their children.


81.  The applicant opposed that argument, maintaining that the circumstances of his case fell within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. He stressed that the Government had again failed to argue the case on the basis of the facts giving rise to his application. Instead, they referred to the other proceedings, which had had no relation to his complaint about discrimination in the sphere of his private life. In the proceedings complained of the courts had not considered the circumstances examined in other cases but had focused on only one issue, i.e. the fact that he had remained in a homosexual relationship with T.B. In their opinion, this had been sufficient to exclude him from succession to a tenancy, regardless of whether or not he had met other statutory conditions. Compliance with those other conditions, as the courts had held, had not needed to be examined.


45.  The applicant disagreed. She noted that the application concerned the interests of her entire family. However, she had wished to be considered the applicant, since she was the owner of the house. In addition, it had been expressly on her behalf that Mrs Grishchenko had instituted the domestic civil proceedings claiming compensation and resettlement. The applicant further alleged that she had not been obliged to lodge a claim against the Highways Agency, as in her opinion the Executive Committee had been responsible for K. Street’s maintenance. Moreover, it had been the Executive Committee who had allowed through traffic on K. Street in the first place. Further, it had not organised regular monitoring of this part of the road by traffic police, or by environmental and sanitary authorities, to ensure the enforcement of anti-pollution and safety measures. The substance of her complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention had therefore been duly stated before the domestic courts.


44.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that conversations with his lawyer were conducted through a glass partition and were overheard or possibly even recorded and that the authorities had failed to provide proper conditions for private discussions with his lawyer. Although his complaint was not communicated, the Government nevertheless submitted comments on it. In his observations, the applicant referred to this complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Government, having been given the possibility to comment on this change, did not submit any further comments in respect of this complaint. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, § 44), considers that it is more appropriate to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.


49.  The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They maintained that, in accordance with the positive obligation enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention, the authorities had taken all possible steps at their disposal to reunite the applicant with his daughter. They observed that approximately 500,000 Albanian nationals lived in Greece and that half of them resided there illegally. The Government could not therefore be held responsible for the failure of the applicant to give precise details of his daughter’s whereabouts and to request an urgent measure to be taken before F.M. left Albania taking the child with her. The Government maintained that since no precise address had been given for the child and her mother in Greece, the use of the instruments foreseen in the bilateral agreement between Albania and Greece had been ineffective (see paragraph 33 above).


23.  The applicant complained that his right to respect for his family life had been infringed as a result of the non-enforcement of the final judgments granting him visiting rights in respect of T.M.P., his minor son, with the possibility to take him abroad. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention as well as Article 2 §§ 2 and 3 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 5 of Protocol No. 7.


56.  The applicant alleged that she had been deprived of all contact with her daughter and separated from her without valid reason. She maintained that the administrative authorities had decided to place her daughter in pre‑adoption care before the domestic courts had even ruled on whether she had been abandoned. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


75.  The Government submitted that the publication of such information ensured greater transparency, public access to documents in the applicant’s file and public scrutiny of the Commission’s decision-making. The Court does not consider that either purpose can be subsumed under any of the aims listed in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, it does not see how making a non-final Commission decision publicly accessible can be reconciled with the general aims of lustration that the Court has accepted as legitimate (see paragraph 74 above). In that connection, it is to be noted that the applicant was seventy-seven years old when the Commission delivered its decision and held no public office. Furthermore, it was not alleged, in the domestic proceedings or before the Court, that he was a candidate for any such office at the time. The Court finds noteworthy that the Venice Commission in its amicus curiae brief on the 2012 Lustration Act also expressed the view that the publication of Lustration Commission findings prior to their review by a court was irreconcilable with Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 41 above). The Constitutional Court extended such an approach, albeit regarding necessity, to the publication of lustration results after they had become final (see paragraph 40 above).


26.  The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired. He also alleged that his correspondence had been limited to certain identified people.


80.  The applicants submitted that the first applicant remained a victim of a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, despite ultimately, after long and protracted efforts, having undergone an abortion. The applicants had never claimed that the first applicant’s rights had been violated because she had not been allowed access to an abortion. The core of her complaint was that the State’s actions and systemic failures in connection with the circumstances concerning the determination of her access to abortion, seen as a whole, as well as the clandestine nature of the abortion, had resulted in a violation of Article 8.


54.  The applicant complained that the Romanian authorities, namely courts and administrative bodies, had failed to ensure the swift return of his daughter after his wife had retained the child in Romania without his consent. In so doing, the authorities had failed to secure his parental rights with respect to his daughter, in violation of his right to respect for his family life enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


150.  The Government accepted that the applicant could claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to his consultations with his appropriate adult from 4 May 2010 to 8 May 2010 (consultations with the appropriate adult were not affected by the court’s direction on 6 May 2010 that the applicant’s consultations with his solicitor and medical advisor should not be subject to surveillance).


31.  The Government argued that in 2004 the applicant and her son had abandoned flat A and had moved into flat B. The applicant’s former residence could therefore not be considered her “home”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government contested, in essence, the applicability of the impugned provision to the facts of the case and alleged that the present complaint was therefore manifestly ill-founded.


46.  The applicant complained that the domestic courts’ decision to refuse him information about the child’s personal circumstances violated his right under Article <mask> of the Convention to respect for his private and family life. He further submitted that the domestic courts’ failure to investigate sufficiently the relevant facts concerning his relationship with his daughter, in particular his paternity, violated Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 alone.


48.  The applicants maintained that the reversal of the award of damages in respect of their dismissal from the Police Force because they had allegedly committed acts of torture, and despite their acquittal of the same charges by a court of law, was plainly incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. The reversal of the award had undermined the protection of their moral and psychological integrity and reputation, being encompassed in the protection guaranteed by Article 8.


83.  The Government accepted that there had been interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been lawful and justified. In particular, the secret surveillance orders had been based on Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had been issued and supervised by an investigating judge pursuant to reasoned and substantiated requests from the competent State Attorney’s Office, which the investigating judge had accepted as such. Moreover, such interference had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting the crime of currency counterfeiting and had been proportionate to the circumstances and the gravity of the offence at issue and the applicant’s criminal activity.


69.  The applicant further complained in substance under Article 6 that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. In that respect he submitted that the proceedings had been based only on the testimonies of one of the co-accused. Invoking Article <mask> of the Convention, he also complained that his correspondence had been censored by the prison authorities. Finally, the applicant alleged that his right to respect for family life had been violated because, throughout his detention, he had spoken on the telephone with his wife and children only three times.


42.  The applicants complained of a violation of the right to respect for their private and family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that the measure ordering the second applicant’s return to hospital a few hours after his birth had been neither lawful nor necessary. They also complained that the interim measure, which had had the effect of a decision on the merits in the present case, had been applied in violation of the principles of fairness enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the court had not examined whether the statutory conditions for application of the measure in question had been satisfied and neither the first applicant nor her partner had in any way been included in the decision‑making process.


22. The applicant complained that the State had failed to secure her family’s right to respect for their private life as a result of the derisory sum of non-pecuniary damages awarded to her late husband, even though the domestic courts had found that a serious violation of his privacy had been committed by the newspaper Lietuvos Rytas. She also argued that the national legislation did not provide an effective remedy from the point of view of Article <mask> of the Convention as it limited the maximum amount of non-pecuniary damages for a so-called “unintentional” breach of privacy by the mass media. The applicant relied on Articles 1, 8 and 13 of the Convention.


84.  The Government considered the sum claimed by the applicant to be excessive. Firstly, they pointed out that the application related only to the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention; the applicant had relied on Article 5 only in her claim for just satisfaction. Secondly, the Government maintained that the anxiety suffered by the applicant had resulted from her own conduct rather than from the measures taken in the case by the Latvian authorities. Thirdly, they pointed out that the order for Mrs Shevanova’s deportation had never been enforced, that she continued to reside in Latvia and that she could regularise her stay at any time, as had been made clear to her. In the circumstances, the Government considered that the finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient redress for any non-pecuniary damage the applicant might have sustained; in support of that argument, they cited several judgments of the Court and several decisions by the Latvian courts.


40.  The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that such interference had been lawful and justified. Referring to the Court’s findings in the Dragojević case (cited above), the Government argued that the investigating judge’s orders contained detailed reasoning regarding the existence of “grounds for suspicion” in respect of a criminal offence, as well as reasoning as to why an effective inquiry could not otherwise be achieved. The interference had pursued the legitimate aim of investigating and prosecuting the crime of drug trafficking, and had been proportionate to the circumstances, the gravity of the offence at issue and the applicants’ criminal activity.


64.  The Government submitted that in respect of the first applicant, a search performed in his office may have constituted an interference within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. As regards the client applicants, the Government noted that correspondence with a lawyer falls under the protection of Article 8. However, the Government contested that there were any interference with the client applicants' rights. The Government argued that the applicants had not sufficiently substantiated their allegation that the retained copy of the fourth hard disk contained material which was unrelated to the offence under investigation. Furthermore, even if the disk did contain any material irrelevant to the investigated offence, that material could not have been used by the police.


145.  The applicants claimed the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The third applicant and the applicant companies each claimed 16,500 euros (EUR) with respect to the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and EUR 10,000 with respect to the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The first and the second applicants left the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage to be decided by the Court. The fourth applicant left the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage claimed in respect of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to be decided by the Court.


34.  The Government contested the allegation of a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Reference was made to sections 7(1), 10(1) and 11(3) of the Aliens’ Domicile and Residence Act as well as to Article 16 § 3 of the ordinance implementing the Act, all of which had been duly published and which provided a sufficient legal basis for the interference. According to these provisions, the residence permit of the foreign spouse of a Swiss citizen would not be renewed if there was a ground for expulsion. The Swiss authorities were called upon to examine the proportionality of the measure. Given the offences which the applicant had committed in Switzerland, there could be no doubt that the refusal not to renew the residence permit was called for in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


3.  The applicant’s expulsion order received comprehensive and exhaustive examination by the domestic courts in Norway, where Article 8 was also examined. The decision of the Directorate of Immigration was reviewed by the Immigration Appeals Board (§§ 14, 15 and 19), by the Oslo City Court (§ 20), by the Borgarting High Court (§§ 20 and 21) and by the Supreme Court (§§ 22 et sequens). At all these levels the domestic courts took into account and examined all the submissions advanced by the parties for and against the deportation order. We find it difficult to understand how and why, given the considerable margin of appreciation given to States in connection with immigration policy, and the fact that the domestic courts are best suited to appreciate the particular local exigencies on the one hand and the actual situation of the persons affected by the authorities’ decision on the other hand[1], the Court found it necessary in this case to interfere in the final decision of the Supreme Court and go against it. In our view, the Supreme Court’s decision was based on relevant and sufficient reasons and considerations. It is true that the Borgarting High Court quashed the Board’s decision of the 23 February 2007. However it is clear that this is due to the fact that Norwegian law (section 29(2) of the Immigration Act 1988, see § 26) required a twofold and separate assessment of the proportionality or otherwise of the deportation measure – one vis-à-vis the foreign national to be deported, and another vis-à-vis “the closest members” of his/her family. This dichotomy is artificial in the light of what must necessarily be a unitary concept of family life in Article 8. In any case, although the Borgarting High Court found that the measure would not be disproportionate as regards the applicant but that it would be disproportionate as regards the children, it nonetheless “assumed that the decision of the 23 February 2007 was not incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.” (§ 20).


28.  The applicants complained that they had been held incommunicado during their time in police custody and claimed that they had not been able to contact their families for more than seven days. They submitted that, as a result, they had not been able to exercise their rights under Article 128 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which the relevant parts read as follows:


206.  The Government insisted that there had been no breach of the applicants’ rights secured by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They argued that there was no evidence that the damage to the applicants’ homes and possessions could have been avoided if the Pionerskaya river channel had been cleaned up or an emergency warning system at the Pionerskoye reservoir had been in place. They referred to court decisions taken in the applicants’ civil cases at the domestic level, stating that the alleged losses had been suffered as a result of a natural disaster, in the form of exceptionally heavy rain. The Government also stated that the relevant domestic legislation imposed no obligation on the State to refund the market value of damaged property, and that given the large number of residents affected by the flood of 7 August 2001, the financial aid accorded by the State could scarcely have been more generous; however, the authorities had distributed what financial support they could to all those affected by the flood, directly, automatically and irrespective of whether they produced proof of any actual pecuniary damage.


18.  The applicant complained that medical documents concerning him (operation report of 2 April 1994) had been produced and used before the court, without his consent and without a medical expert having been appointed for such purpose. He alleged that this had entailed a breach of professional confidentiality and serious and unjustified interference with his right to respect for his private life. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which the relevant parts read as follows:


40.  The Government did not accept that the Andorran courts had unduly prevented the applicant from having contact with his children. They argued that the State had complied with its positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. It stressed that all domestic decisions had been based on the best interests of the children, both judges and public prosecutors having had regard to the children’s psychological and emotional situation. In this regard, the different judges and courts that had been called upon to decide matters had ordered that a number of psychological examinations be carried out. Those examinations had always suggested that the care and custody of the children ought to be granted to their mother and that a further psychological examination or treatment of the children ought to be performed before their father should be granted physical contact with them.


24.  The Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. The Regional Court’s refusal to recognise the applicant’s right to occupy the room previously occupied by his partner had been in accordance with the law, and had pursued the legitimate aim of protection of public interests, namely the rights of the municipal authority. It had been necessary in a democratic society, since the vacant room had to be reallocated to persons in need of housing.


124.  The Government argued that the domestic courts had been justified in their decision not to grant the applicants access to R. They pointed out that Article 67 of the Russian Family Code had established an exhaustive list of individuals entitled to have access to a child (see paragraph 66 above). Since the applicants had had neither blood ties with R., nor – after the first applicant’s guardianship had been cancelled – legal ties with him, there had been no grounds in national law to grant them access to R. The Government also pointed out that – as had been established by the domestic courts – R.’s medical condition had made it impossible to ascertain whether he had had any attachment to the applicants, and that therefore their argument to that end had been without foundation. They insisted therefore that, by refusing the applicants contact with R., the domestic authorities had not breached their right to respect for their family life under Article <mask> of the Convention.


89.  The applicant companies did not dispute that employees, contracting parties, lawyers and other affected third parties must exhaust national remedies before they could enjoy an independent right to submit a complaint before the Court. However, this did not mean that the Court was prevented from considering the interests in question in its assessment of the applicant companies’ protection under Article <mask> of the Convention.


60.  The applicant maintained that the Constitutional Court had refused to provide redress to him. The relevant law permitted the District Court to issue, of its own initiative, an injunction allowing the applicant temporarily to meet his son. By failing to issue such an injunction the District Court had disregarded the positive obligations incumbent upon the respondent State under Article <mask> of the Convention.


82.  The applicant complained that the State had failed to take appropriate actions to reunite her with her son and that the lengthy non‑enforcement of the writ of execution had breached her right to family life. She relied upon Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint of the authorities’ failure to comply with their positive obligation to secure her right to respect for her family life is at the heart of the case and thus will examine the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention (see Mihailova v. Bulgaria, no. 35978/02, § 107, 12 January 2006, and Cristescu v. Romania, no. 13589/07, § 50, 10 January 2012).


49.  The applicants complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to enforce the Centre’s decisions regarding their right to have contact with M.M. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case (see Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 57, ECHR 2013 Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, no. 16318/07, § 27, 27 April 2010), the Court finds it appropriate to examine these complaints only under Article <mask> of the Convention in view of the State’s positive obligation in the sphere of family life. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


69.  The Government submitted that “domestic authorities dealing with the applicant's case undertook all possible actions in order to preserve the proper development of the applicant's relations with his children”. The enforcement of a court order requiring the return of the applicant's children was hindered by M.C. who hid the children. In conclusion, the Government submitted that the facts of the case did not disclose a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and asked the Court to declare the case inadmissible as manifestly ill‑founded.


111.  The applicants complained that the existence of the Certificate of Approval scheme and its application to them disproportionately interfered with their right to respect for their private and family life. They further complained that they were discriminated against in securing the enjoyment of this right. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention read alone and together with Article 14.


70.  The applicant complained under Article 14 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been discriminated against on the ground of gender in that he had been denied the right to take over a tenancy after the death of A.Z. He challenged in particular the domestic court’s position that his relationship with A.Z. had amounted merely to an “economic community” and not to a “long-lasting life community”. This amounted also to a violation of his right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.


79.  The applicant argued that a positive obligation could arise under Article <mask> of the Convention even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. In the present case, he contended, the respondent State had an obligation to enable him to apply for an injunction by requiring that he be notified prior to publication of an article which interfered with his private life. The applicant emphasised that in his case details of the most intimate parts of his private life were published on the front page, and in several inside pages, of a newspaper with an estimated readership of approximately ten million people in the United Kingdom. Highly intrusive images made by means of secret recordings were also posted on the newspaper’s website and inevitably reproduced elsewhere on the internet. The applicant considered that the judgment of Eady J made it clear that had he had an opportunity to apply for an injunction, an injunction would have been granted (see paragraphs 17-18 above).


27.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the proceedings had infringed his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. He also invoked Articles 3, 6 § 3 (c), 7 and 13 of the Convention without further explanation and at the time of submission of his just satisfaction awards.


46.  The applicant complained about a violation of her right to respect for her home raising, in particular, the following arguments: the search of 15 March 2002 had been unjustified; it had been based on a warrant with a wrong address and which was not amenable to appeal; the search had wrongly been conducted in the entire property; it had been performed with brutality; and the police officers had planted drugs and arms. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in the relevant part, as follows:


1.  The applicant alleges that the prohibition under Italian law on donating embryos conceived through medically assisted reproduction to scientific research is incompatible with her right to respect for private life. The Court has ruled that her ability to exercise a conscious and considered choice regarding “the fate of her embryos” concerns an intimate aspect of her personal life and, accordingly, relates to her right to “self-determination” (see paragraph 159 of the present judgment). On this basis, it concludes that Article <mask> of the Convention is applicable. It proceeds to find no violation because, inter alia, the ban was “necessary in a democratic society” to protect the rights and freedoms of others within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.


104.  The applicant, citing the case-law of the Court, pointed out that under Article <mask> of the Convention the national authorities had been required to take adequate steps to ensure that his right to the return of his child was respected and that he could visit P. regularly. He complained that, since 1998, M.P. had intentionally and continuously evaded the Slovenian authorities, not attending hearings and other meetings at the Centre and obstructing his access to P. According to the applicant, M.P.’s behaviour amounted to child abduction under the Hague Convention and the domestic criminal law, and thus required the authorities to act of their own motion.


72.  The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted all effective remedies. In particular, he had not claimed compensation in separate civil proceedings, despite the fact that he had been entitled to do so. Such a possibility had been open to him pending the criminal proceedings and after they had been stayed. In the latter case, he could have claimed damages in the civil courts until 2 December 2007 (see paragraph 22 above). Domestic practice supported that opportunity (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above). The applicant had been required to exhaust the civil remedy given the fact that the criminal avenue of redress had been ineffective in his case. In this connection they noted the fact that the applicant had not known the identity of the author. They further stated that the two available avenues of redress, both criminal and civil, had been open, at the relevant time, to a victim of an alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, since in both cases the domestic courts could order a measure rectifying the eventual damage to the victim’s reputation. Those remedies could have been used simultaneously or independently.


85.  The applicant complained that during the first ten years of his post‑conviction detention in the special-regime correctional colony his ability to receive visits from his wife and other family members had been severely curtailed. The applicant was dissatisfied, in particular, with the lack of conjugal visits during his detention in the special-regime correctional colony. In his submissions of 12 May 2014 the applicant also complained that during his pre-trial detention between November 1994 and October 1995 his wife and family members had not been allowed to visit him in remand prison. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


100.  The applicant company submitted that neither Articles 22 and 144 of the Constitution, nor Article <mask> of the Convention, nor Articles 584 and 1035 of the Judicial Code (nor Articles 18 and 19 of the same Code in the case of proceedings on the merits), nor Article 1382 of the Civil Code constituted a law within the meaning of the Convention authorising the courts to take a preventive measure entailing restrictions.


107.  The applicant next contended that the interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a result of the temporary occupation of his estate by the consolidated police units had not been justified. He argued that the Government's reference to “a situation of war or public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” was unconvincing as a state of emergency had never been declared either nationwide or within the area of the counter-terrorist operation and that in any event the Russian authorities had never availed themselves of their right under Article 15 of the Convention to derogate from their obligations under the Convention.


116.  The Government argued, as their main submission, that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply to the circumstances of the applicants, who could not claim that there was “family life” meriting protection under that provision. They submitted that, although the applicants had been acknowledged as the adoptive parents of Florentina and Mariana in final judicial decisions, that fact alone should not be regarded as bringing their cases within the scope of Article 8, seeing that no family life had ever existed in practice. They observed in that connection that the applicants had never met their adopted daughters in their capacity as parents and had never enjoyed genuine family relations with them.


39.  The Government submitted that the search warrant had been in compliance with the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. The decision to carry out a search had been based on a reasonable suspicion that the applicants might have committed tax evasion between 2002 and 2006. Moreover, the search warrant had been subjected to prior judicial control and contained reasons justifying its issuance. Accordingly, the applicants had enjoyed sufficient safeguards against abuse.


55.  The applicant is an Uzbek national of Russian origin who has been living in Russia since 2003. Admittedly, not all settled migrants, no matter how long they have been residing in the country from which they are to be expelled, necessarily enjoy “family life” there within the meaning of Article 8 (see Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, § 63, ECHR 2008). However, the concept of “family life” must at any rate include the relationships that arise from a lawful and genuine marriage (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, cited above, § 62), such as that contracted by the applicant with his Russian spouse and in which their child was born. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the facts of the case fall “within the ambit” of Article <mask> of the Convention.


86.  The applicant complained that the Austrian courts had violated his right to respect for his family life in that they had not taken all the necessary measures that could reasonably be expected to ensure the swift return of his children. In particular, he argued that they had not made sufficient attempts to locate C.B. and the children and had not applied any other coercive measures under section 110 taken in conjunction with section 79(2) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


39.  The Government submitted that the interference, if any, in the applicant’s right to reputation, was not of such severity to attract the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Minister’s statements were made in the context of a public debate surrounding the question of medical management of the penal system, and the applicant participated therein by responding to the Minister’s accusations publicly. They reiterated the findings of the domestic courts that the applicant was to be regarded as a public figure due to her activities in the penal institutions in view of which the limits of permissible criticism towards her were wider.


23.  The applicants complained of discrimination based on their sex and sexual orientation because of their permanent exclusion from the legal institution of a registered partnership. Maintaining the arguments they had already raised in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 9 above), they argued that marriage was not a suitable alternative for them because of the differences between the legal frameworks governing marriage and the registered partnership. In their view, Article <mask> of the Convention did not oblige the Contracting States to introduce a registered partnership as such; however, if a State decided to do so, it was barred from excluding couples from this new partnership institution solely on the basis of their sex and sexual orientation. Moreover, the applicants argued that the Court’s conclusions in the case of Schalk and Kopf, which had concerned the opposite situation (namely a same-sex couple being denied access to marriage), could not be applied in the present case.


95.  The applicant also complained that Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached because her child’s health condition had been the subject of an open dispute before the domestic courts during the pension proceedings. Moreover, the applicant claimed that her son had been examined in person by a court-appointed medical expert, which had caused him considerable stress. Lastly, the applicant complained that the report produced by the expert had been transferred to the Rzeszów Social Security Board.


27.  The Government, in their additional observations of 23 March 2004 following the Court’s decision as to the admissibility of the application on 8 January 2004, contended for the first time that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of her complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted that it had been open to her, pursuant to Article 46 §§ 1 and 2 of the Russian Constitution and section 4 of the Russian law “On appeals to a court against acts and decisions violating citizens’ rights”, to lodge a complaint with a court about the unlawful acts of the police officers who had enforced her eviction on 4 September 1998. However, the applicant had not used this remedy.


23.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that conversations with his lawyer were conducted through a glass wall and were overheard or possibly even recorded and that the authorities had failed to provide proper conditions for private discussions with his lawyer. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, § 44), decided to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and to obtain the parties' submissions thereon.


85.  The applicant complained that Article 1600 of the Civil Code as construed by the Berlin Court of Appeal had discriminated against him in his capacity as a biological father compared to the mother, the legal father and the child. He further complained that the legal parents and the child were allowed to request biological testing of descent outside paternity proceedings, whereas the alleged biological father had no such right. He relied on Article 14, read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention; the former provides as follows:


40.  The applicant alleged that the proceedings before Baden District Court, which ended with the decision of 17 February 2006, had, in a number of ways, breached his right to respect for family life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. He claimed in particular that the court had clearly exceeded the six-week time-limit for reaching a decision on the child's return, as provided for by Article 11, second paragraph, of the Hague Convention, especially because it had merged the proceedings concerning the child's return with the divorce proceedings. He further claimed that the domestic courts had obliged him to prove, contrary to the clear wording of Article 13, first paragraph, of the Hague Convention, that he had not consented to the child's retention in Switzerland. He thus relied on Article 8 of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows:


31.  The Government contested that the applicant’s exclusion from Russia had violated his right to respect for his family life. They submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the decision to exclude him had been taken within the competence of the Federal Security Service and had been dictated by the need to protect Russia’s national security. The relevant procedure had also been complied with. They stated in general terms that “in refusing to grant the appeal, the courts had information which served as the basis for the decision [to exclude the applicant]”. They further stressed that the applicant’s exclusion for five years was not disproportionate as such a ban appeared reasonable in comparison with the one of ten years imposed on the applicant in Lupsa v. Romania (no. 10337/04, ECHR 2006‑VII). Furthermore, referring to the cases of Samsonnikov v. Estonia (no. 52178/10, 3 July 2012) and Senchishak v. Finland (no. 5049/12, 18 November 2014), the Government argued that the applicant was not a long-term migrant as he had not grown up in Russia. Therefore his move to Kazakhstan had not represented an extreme hardship for him.


42.  The Government submitted that Article 14 was not applicable in the present case. In their view, in S. v. the United Kingdom (no. 11716/85, Commission decision of 14 May 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) 47, p. 274) and Röösli v. Germany (no. 28318/95, Commission decision of 15 May 1996), the Commission had indicated that the protection of the family was a legitimate aim capable of justifying a difference in treatment and that a stable homosexual relationship between two men did not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Commission had also found that the deportation of an alien who was in a same-sex relationship with a person in the host State did not amount to an interference with the right guaranteed by that provision (see X and Y v. the United Kingdom, no. 9369/81, Commission decision of 3 May 1983, DR 32, p. 223; W.J. and D.P. v. the United Kingdom, no. 12513/86, Commission decision of 13 July 1987; and C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, Commission decision of 9 October 1989).


45.  The Government submitted that in examining Mr Raza’s application for judicial review the Supreme Administrative Court had fully and objectively analysed the factual and legal grounds for the expulsion order, and had given convincing reasons why the interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention was justified in the circumstances. Its decision was well‑founded and lawful.


30.  The Government agreed that the search and seizure of the applicant's office constituted an interference within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case the police had been asked in 2008 to investigate an economic crime that had allegedly been committed a few years earlier. The applicant, who represented the suspect's spouse C., had refused to give a witness statement and therefore she had been heard in her office on 7 October 2009. In the course of this hearing it had become apparent that the applicant had in her possession materials relevant to the investigation. She had refused to hand these materials over to the police, invoking the obligation of professional secrecy of lawyers. The police had contacted C. who had given her consent to the delivery of the materials in question to the police.


87.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to rely expressly on Article <mask> of the Convention in his application to the Court. The Government also stressed that the investigation into the applicant’s allegations had been effective, as the police and the State Attorney’s Office had reacted promptly and had acted according to law. Namely, a couple of hours after the alleged attack the police had interviewed the applicant and five days later had instituted the minor offence proceedings. The police had also informed the applicant of the course of the investigation. Following a request by the State Attorney’s Office, the police had undertaken further interviews and had obtained relevant medical documentation. The State Attorney’s Office had gathered all relevant information and had lodged an indictment. The abandonment of the prosecution of I.Š. by the State Attorney’s Office had been sufficiently reasoned and had not been arbitrary. The decision to abandon the prosecution had been vindicated when the Dubrovnik County Court had upheld the first-instance judgment by which I.Š. had been acquitted. The State Attorney’s Office had also prosecuted I.Š. for the offence of making serious threats. However, the criminal investigation had not shown that any offence warranting public prosecution had been committed. The Government stressed that there was no obligation under the Convention for criminal proceedings to result in a conviction.


35.  The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies regarding a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, taken on its own. They observed that he had not invoked any Convention Articles in his appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. He had simply stated, referring to the case of Zaunegger (cited above), that every father should be able to apply to the domestic courts for shared parental authority, even if the mother is opposed to it, as this is in the children’s best interests. Considering that in Zaunegger the Court had found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, the Federal Supreme Court had examined the compatibility of the Appeal Court’s decision with those provisions taken together. As the Court had not examined Article 8 taken on its own and the applicant had not invoked that Convention Article, the Federal Supreme Court had not done so either.


67.  The applicants also submitted that the Convention prohibits States from attaching further negative effects to prior human-rights violations also where those violations have not been challenged, so the fact that they had not challenged their convictions before the Court was therefore irrelevant. Sexual autonomy and prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation were general principles of European law, and the Government were therefore under an obligation to provide sound reasons to justify the necessity of continuing the negative consequences of their convictions under article 209 of the Criminal Code. Since they had failed to do so, there had been a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


125.   The applicants submitted that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention as a result of the disclosure of information concerning the first applicant’s pregnancy and their situation to priest K.P. and to the general public. They complained about the press release about the case issued by the management of the Lublin hospital, communication of information to the hospital in Warsaw concerning the first applicant’s identity, her situation and her and her mother’s wish to have the pregnancy terminated, and the disclosure of the applicants’ identity and whereabouts to the general public and the ensuing harassment by various third parties.


88.  The Government argued that the “family life”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, between the applicants and R. had only existed as long as the first applicant had officially remained R.’s guardian. They furthermore stressed that during that period R. had not lost ties with his natural parents, who, as the domestic courts had established, had not failed in their parental duties, and had provided financial support to him. In such circumstances, in the Government’s opinion, the applicant’s complaints in respect of any infringement of their “family life” were incompatible ratione materiae with Article 8 of the Convention.


33.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. They further pointed out that the eviction order had not been enforced and that the applicants continued to reside in the flat.


76.  The Government further acknowledged that, at times, video surveillance of the applicants’ cells had been performed by female operators of CCTV cameras. They argued that this had been standard practice compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, they pointed out that, under the relevant regulations regarding the recruitment of staff of law-enforcement agencies, any Russian national, irrespective of, among other things, his or her gender, who met specific requirements and was capable of performing the relevant professional duties, could be employed as an officer of such agencies.


30.  The applicant contended that his secret surveillance had been unlawful because it had not been based on orders containing proper reasoning by the investigating judge, as required under the relevant domestic law and the case-law of the Constitutional Court. Referring to the Court’s findings in the Dragojević case (cited above), he also argued that the domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate that the interference with his right to respect for his private life and correspondence had been justified and necessary, as required under Article <mask> of the Convention.


75.  The applicant’s remaining complaints regarding the lack of protective measures afforded to her in the criminal proceedings raise certain questions about the scope of the State’s obligation to protect victims of crime appearing as witnesses in criminal proceedings. In the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court takes the view that these issues should be considered under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


49.  The applicant submitted that the facts of her case should be examined under the concepts of private and family life under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, she stressed that it clearly followed from the Court’s case-law that a stable de facto relationship between same-sex couples should be considered as family life under that provision. In her case, she was in a stable relationship with D.B. with whom she maintained a relationship by constant visits for the periods of three months in which she was allowed to stay in Croatia without a residence permit.


75.  The applicant alleged that, during his detention in the Netherlands Antilles, the prison authorities interfered in his exchange of correspondence with his lawyers, the European Commission of Human Rights, Mr Gebhardt who represented him in the proceedings before the European Commission of Human Rights, the prosecution authorities of the Netherlands Antilles, the British Consul and private persons. He claimed that his correspondence was opened and read by the prison authorities and that he was prevented from establishing contacts outside prison because of the extremely limited facilities available to him to write letters or telephone. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads in so far as relevant as follows:


42.  The applicant complained of the censorship of the correspondence with his family members. He further complained that he had been allowed visits from family members once a month and that during the visits he had been separated from his relatives by a glass partition and talked to them through an interphone. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads in so far as relevant as follows:


51.  The Government, having to reply only to the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, did not deny that the impugned court decisions ordering the child's return to her father constituted interference with the child's right to respect for her family life. They were of the opinion, however, that this interference fulfilled the conditions of Article 8 § 2.


21.  The applicant submitted that he had been treated differently due to his religious convictions in respect of the enjoyment of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention from other persons seeking access rights to their children following divorce or separation. In particular, he submitted that the domestic authorities’ decision withdrawing his access rights in respect of his son on the basis of his religious beliefs had amounted to an unjustifiable interference with his right to respect for family life.


101. The applicant argued that Article 8 was clearly engaged by the covert surveillance of consultations with his legal advisor. Although he accepted that the purposes identified in the legislation permitting covert surveillance amounted to a legitimate aim, he maintained that the relevant legal framework failed both the “quality of law” and “necessity” tests under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention.


86.  The applicant companies, disputing the Government’s contention, maintained that the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had been fulfilled. The core issue in the domestic proceedings had been whether the tax authorities had had the necessary statutory authority to carry out the contested measures thereby coercing them to surrender the relevant backup tape for inspection at the tax office. That issue was now the subject of their complaint to the Court. Referring to their written pleadings before the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 31-37 above) and also to certain parts of the High Court’s reasoning (see paragraph 30 above), they stressed that they had clearly raised before the national courts the matter they were now pursuing under the Convention. As could be seen from their domestic pleadings, the applicant companies had expressly invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and had clearly argued the substance of their complaint before the national courts, which thus had had the opportunity, both in fact and in law, to assess the matter under this Article.


158.  The applicants complained that the searches of their premises violated their right to respect for their private lives and homes because: (i) the warrants permitted entry and search “on one occasion” only which could not be equated with continuous occupation; (ii) the warrants were drawn too widely, thereby permitting search for, and seizure of, almost any item of property. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


29.  The applicant company argued that the images recorded by the use of a hidden camera concerned the behaviour of a public figure who had been at the time a member of the Hellenic Parliament and chairman of the inter-party committee on the widespread use of electronic gambling. Therefore his participation in gambling games had been a matter of public interest in the light of A.C.’s public role and could have affected his duties as a member of parliament and as chairman of the parliamentary committee on electronic gambling. Viewers had had the right to learn the truth about an elected deputy. In any event, electronic gambling had been a matter of general interest in Greece at the time as many citizens had been financially destroyed owing to their participation in similar games. That had been the reason why the two television shows had prepared the broadcasts in question. In view of the above, the broadcasting of videos that had been filmed by the use of a hidden camera had been necessary, and A.C.’s right to private life had been outweighed by the applicant company’s right to impart information concerning a matter of public interest. Both the National Radio and Television Council (which had imposed the administrative sanctions) and the Supreme Administrative Court (which had dismissed the application for annulment) had failed in the present case to strike a fair balance between the applicant company’s right under Article 10 and A.C.’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention.


51.  The applicants contended that there was no opportunity before the County Court to test the proportionality of the interference with their Article 8 rights because the gateway (b) defence (see paragraph 20 above) was insufficiently broad to permit the issue of proportionality to be considered by the county court and because, in any event, the facts relevant to the issue of proportionality were not determined by the court. The only defences available in a case such as the applicants' were that the relevant law was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention or that the decision of the public authority to recover possession was one that no reasonable person would consider justifiable, which set a higher threshold than that required under the Article 8 § 2 test of proportionality.


49.  The applicant complained that the Swedish courts’ protracted custody proceedings, including their handling of his request under the Hague Convention, and the Tax Authority’s decision to remove N. from the population register, constituted a violation of his and his daughter’s right to family life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention. He also relied on Article 6 of the Convention.


32.  The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and the prevention of disorder.


23.  The applicant maintained that the domestic courts’ decision not to grant him compensation and legal costs violated his right under Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that he should not have to accept being called a rapist without having been convicted of such a crime. In the applicant’s opinion, the domestic courts’ conclusions meant that anyone could call him a rapist in speech or in writing without him being able to defend himself.


37.  The Government emphasised that even supposing that there had been interference, the German legal system guaranteed sufficient protection. They observed that the present application did not concern the applicant’s right to seek an injunction against the advertisement (Unterlassungsansruch), which the Regional Court had recognised and which had therefore not been the subject of the impugned proceedings. The question was not whether but how the German courts should have intervened. On that point the Government took the view that the possibility provided for in German law of applying for an injunction provided adequate protection against advertising. The applicant had not in fact made any attempt to seek protection against the advertisement, but rather had hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage, even though Article <mask> of the Convention did not provide for any such compensation.


66.  The applicant complained that during his detention he had been deprived of personal contact with his family. He complained that the prosecutor’s decision of 4 July 2008 refusing a visit by his wife and sons had been arbitrary and that the domestic law had not indicated with reasonable clarity the scope of the prosecutor’s discretion. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as relevant:


79.  The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. They further pointed out that the applicant had resided in the flat for only eleven months. Such a brief period could not have resulted in the applicant establishing close ties with the flat as her home. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant had a place to live.


30.  The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired.


46.  The applicant complained that the adoption of K.O.S. had adversely affected her family life and had completely blocked her attempt to become his legal tutor. Allegedly, this interference with her right to respect for her family life had been unlawful, disproportionate and arbitrary. The applicant also stated that it had not been in the child’s interests, as his links with the applicant, his half-sister and his grandparents had been essentially severed by the impugned adoption. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


33.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint did not fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention because the impugned advertisement only mentioned his forename, which was very common and could not on its own have suggested any connection with him. Only the allusion to the circumstances surrounding the publication of the applicant’s book – which, indeed, were attributable to him – had linked the advertisement to the applicant. The Government asserted that the only option available to the applicant was to seek an injunction, under Article 8 of the Convention, against any further public reference to the incidents in question. However, the company had agreed to the applicant’s request to refrain from further publication of the advertisement. The Government took the view that although Article 8 protected an individual’s reputation, it did not confer any right to compensation in the form of a notional licence where the individual’s reputation had been damaged by his own behaviour.


137.  The applicant claimed that in substance she had also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention with regard to the restrictions on her liberty, her immobilisation and the medical treatment she had received against her will during her stays in Dr Heines’s clinic both from 1977 to 1979 and in 1981. She argued that these facts should also be examined under Article 3 of the Convention.


43.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. While they accepted that matters such as dignity and personal autonomy fell within the ambit of Article 8, they argued that the care provided to the applicant during the relevant period had respected her dignity and private life even if it was not the care package that she had wanted. However, the Government accepted that if the Court were to find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 8, that interference would have constituted a violation from 21 November 2008 to 4 November 2009 because it was not “in accordance with the law” as required by the second paragraph of that Article.


42.  The Government admitted that the refusal to return of the child to the USA had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the child, and had been necessary in the circumstances. As regards the length of proceedings, the Government pointed out that the applicant had contributed to it significantly as he had failed to provide the courts with the information relevant to his case and had changed his position on the facts during the course of the proceedings, which had complicated the overall examination of the case by the courts.


23.  The Government admitted that the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. Lastly, the Government submitted that the flat had not been recovered by the State and the applicant continued to reside there.


59.  The applicant further contended that the relationship he enjoyed with his children belonged to the sphere of family life protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he contested the Government’s argument that the interference with his family life had been lawful under Article 13 § 2 of the Hague Convention. Moreover, by refusing to return his children to the U.S., the Romanian courts had forced him to become a party to divorce‑and‑custody proceedings in two different countries and had ignored the proceedings pending before the American courts. Furthermore, he had been unable to exercise his parental rights because of the geographical distance.


55.  The applicant submitted that his dismissal by his employer had been based on a breach of his right to respect for his private life and correspondence and that, by not revoking that measure, the domestic courts had failed to comply with their obligation to protect the right in question. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


27.  The Government accepted that the residence prohibition interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention as being in accordance with the law, namely the relevant provisions of the 1992 and 1997 Aliens Act. In this respect they submitted that the applicant did not meet the requirements of Section 38 § 1 (4) of the 1997 Aliens Act, as he clearly had not grown up in Austria from an early age onwards since he had left Austria when he was only seven months old and did not return until he was ten. This had also been pointed out in the reasoning of the domestic authorities’ decisions of 25 March and 27 April 1998 which dismissed his application for lifting the residence prohibition. The measure also pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder or crime. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the penalty, the Government argued that the measure had been necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation.


158.  The applicant also stated that the impugned refusals affected her adversely as she felt Austrian and did not want to have Bulgarian identity papers. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot accept that the alleged emotional distress resulting from the applicant’s being “forced” to remain Bulgarian citizen amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private life as protected by Article <mask> of the Convention.


31.  The Government further considered that the applicant could not plead that a decision on the application was in the public interest, because the Court had already clarified the relevant issues regarding Article <mask> of the Convention in its Pretty judgment (cited above), and Article 37 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable to a case in which the immediate victim of a measure taken by the State had died before lodging an application with the Court.


114.  The applicants claimed that the intrusion by the Russian military into their house on 10 December 2002 and the ensuing search had been unlawful and had infringed their right to respect for their home, private and family life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants further complained that the seizure of their belongings during the search on 10 December 2002 had not been justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Those Articles, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


35.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the withdrawal of night-time care disproportionately interfered with her right to respect for her private life. In the alternative, she complained that by withdrawing the service the respondent State was in breach of its positive obligation to provide her with a service which enabled her to live with dignity. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:


39.  The Government argued before the Court that Chapter 25 of the CCP constituted an effective remedy in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant, in turn, insisted that the suggested remedy was ineffective and that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention (see paragraph 29 above).