30.  The applicant argued that the situation was analogous to the case of Amirov (cited above) in which the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention following the Government’s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the Amirov case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order by the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent medical specialists assessing the applicant’s state of health.


21.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants’ constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


54.  The applicant further maintained that the case-law of the Court was clear on the point that the concept of “victim” under Article <mask> of the Convention should be interpreted broadly. The Government’s argument that he had not been sentenced to punishment was unfounded, as his conviction of a criminal offence had entailed various other legal consequences. Also, given the political nature of the proceedings, the severity of the sentence was not the key issue. Rather, the important elements were that the case had been brought against him and that he had been convicted for a punishable offence. In this respect, the applicant referred to the case of Lüdi v Switzerland (no. 12433/86, 15 June 1992).


86.  The Government contended that there was no breach of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since his application had been accepted for examination by the Court. They further argued that they had complied with their obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a), as they had furnished the Court with copies of the main procedural documents and provided information on investigative measures taken in the case. The Government reiterated that the submission of the entire case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure.


27.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out, in view of the fact that the civil proceedings had been stayed pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings, that the domestic courts had acknowledged a violation of his right to a trial within reasonable time, adopted their decisions within the relevant time-limit ordered by the higher court and awarded the applicant sufficient compensation.


43.  The applicant disagreed and insisted that her application, together with the enclosed documents, had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. She had submitted the relevant available documents which, according to her, were the search warrant and the final decision dismissing her complaints. The latter document as well as the Ombudsman’s opinion contained a sufficient summary of her complaints at the national level.


17.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because, despite his allegations to the contrary, he had seen his lawyer on 13 March 2003 prior to his questioning by the police, albeit briefly. In the alternative, the Government asked the Court to reject this complaint for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention on the ground that the applicant had failed to raise it before the domestic courts.


142.  The Government submitted that Mr Voskoboynikov had applied to the Court on behalf of the applicant on 9 February 1998. According to the Government, the applicant had said that he had not met Mr Voskoboynikov a single time in his statement of 27 October 1998 to the Prosecutor General. Moreover, in his of 25 February, 29 April and 27 October 1998 to the Prosecutor General, he had not made any complaints concerning his detention conditions or medical care. The Government therefore contended that the applicant did not have the status of a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


64.  The applicant complained that the authorities had refused to provide him with the copies of the documents which he needed to substantiate his complaint before the Court. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2008), the Court considers it appropriate to examine this complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


178.  The applicant’s representatives reiterated their submission that the applicant’s forcible removal to Uzbekistan would not have been possible without the authorisation, or at least acquiescence, of the Russian authorities; thus, that removal had been performed in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. By failing to comply with the interim measure, the respondent State had violated its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention.


72.  The applicant complained that in February 2006 domestic authorities had questioned him in connection with his application to the Court and urged him to testify that his submissions to the Court had been untrue. He further complained that the authorities had put pressure on Mrs Gasanova, his mother, Mrs Lisina, his acquaintance and Mr Ya., his former counsel. The Court will examine this complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as follows:


32.  The Government argued that the time to be taken into in consideration in the present case should be only as regards the part of the proceedings conducted against the applicant and not the company. In the Government’s view the continuation of the proceedings against an owner of a company constitutes “singular legal succession”. Taking into account the part of the proceedings against the company for the examination of the complaint brought by the applicant would therefore be in contravention of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the Government the duration of the part of the proceedings conducted against the applicant and not the company was not excessive (five years at two levels, see paragraph 15 et seq. above). The Government proposed that the Court should reject the application as manifestly ill-founded.


25.  The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, he could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicant's constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court's practice on the point. Moreover, the proceedings before it had been easily accessible to the applicant, they had been speedy and had been conducted in the applicant's language and the compensation had been paid to him without any delay.


17.  The Government argued that Ms Ljiljana Simović, Mr Kazimir Jurić, Mr Abdulah Burek, Mr Amer Sunulahpašić, Ms Nasira Kurtović, Mr Nidaz Ugarak, Mr Jasmin Hodžić and Ms Jasmina Mezildžić had submitted their applications outside the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The final decision concerning their complaints was taken by the Constitutional Court on 17 September 2014. The Government further submitted that Mr Hodžić and Ms Mezildžić could no longer claim to be victims of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in view of the fact that they had settled their claims with the cantonal government.


63.  The applicant complained that the Government had not complied with its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention in the context of the interim measures indicated to it under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to provide the applicant with adequate medical care. However, in the light of the Court’s findings concerning the adequacy of the medical care administered to the applicant (see paragraphs 44-48 above), the respondent State cannot be considered to have failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.


103.  The Government further objected that the first and second applicants had lost their victim status, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, in view of the redress which (i) the second applicant had obtained in the context of the civil proceedings, and (ii) both the first and second applicants had obtained from the Constitutional Court in respect of the alleged breach of their procedural rights under Article 3 of the Convention.


18.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant’s constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


162.  The Government reiterated their submission (see paragraph 121 above) that the essence of the applicant’s complaints had been his relationship with his wife and not “his continued incapacitation”. He could not therefore claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, he had failed to lodge an appeal against the 17 May 2000 judgment or to ask for a restoration of the time-limit for the appeal. The Government considered that these remedies were still available to the applicant.


52.  The applicant submitted that he was a victim under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the revocation of his Maltese citizenship threatened the very basis of his ability to reside in Malta. He was directly affected by the impugned measure, in line with the Court’s case-law. In this connection, he referred to Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland (28 March 1990, § 47, Series A no. 173). The applicant submitted that even though a deportation or removal order was not in force, the threat of such an order was imminent. Indeed, the Government had not stated that a deportation or removal order would not be issued and had expressed the view that following the annulment of his first marriage, “the applicant’s stay in Malta was precarious”. It was probable that no such action had been taken by the authorities only because they had been informed that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no further steps were to be taken. The applicant submitted that once the Maltese Government had accepted that he could establish his second family in Malta, as he had in fact done, any subsequent curtailment of his status in Malta would directly affect that family life.


18.  The Government argued that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 16 April 2003, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant's right and had provided him with preventive and compensatory redress. This redress was adequate and sufficient and it was compatible with the principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court. The Government emphasised the accessibility of the procedure before the Constitutional Court to the applicant and the promptness with which the Constitutional Court had dealt with his complaint and with which the just satisfaction had been paid to him.


108.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of its rights under the Convention to the extent that its complaints were directed against the CRTA’s decisions in cases nos. 18/2000(3) and 113/2000(3), which had been annulled by the Supreme Court and the amount paid as a fine by the applicant refunded. This applied to both the judicial review proceedings and the civil proceedings


48.  The Government argued that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's judgments of 8 December 2004 and 14 January 2005, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant's right and had provided him with preventive and compensatory redress. This redress was adequate and sufficient and it was compatible with the principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court. The Government emphasised the promptness with which the Constitutional Court had dealt with the applicant's complaints, submitted that further to the Constitutional Court's injunctions for acceleration of the proceedings there had no longer been any delays and concluded that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.


22.  The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 24 March 2004, he was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


80.  The applicant asked the Grand Chamber to uphold the Chamber's judgment, which had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He considered that by transferring him to the prison hospital, the respondent Government had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. The Government Agent and the trial court had “deliberately disregarded the interim measure”, as had the medical authorities. There was sufficient evidence of the untruth of the Agent's assertion that he had taken action aimed at complying with the interim measure as early as Friday 11 November 2005.


46.  The Government contended that Ukraine had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that while a copy of the judgment convicting the applicant had been issued to the applicant’s wife upon her request (see paragraph 32 above), neither the applicant nor his relatives had lodged a written request with the courts for a copy of his appeal in cassation. The Government further stated that during the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant had been assisted by several lawyers who had been given the opportunity to make copies of all documents included in the case file. The Government also noted that a copy of the applicant’s appeal in cassation had been joined to their observations on the case.


23.  The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In their opinion, the domestic courts had acknowledged that there had been a breach of the applicant’s rights guaranteed by the Convention and he had been awarded proper compensation for the damage he had sustained. Additionally, the Government noted that the applicant had not appealed against the first‑instance judgment, which had deprived him of victim status. The Government requested that the application be declared inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.


277.  The applicant’s representatives contested the Government’s arguments, pointing out that the facts of the present application were different in crucial respects from the aforementioned case of Cruz Varas and Others, since in Cruz Varas the applicant had remained at liberty and had been able to contact his representatives before the Court. In the present case, on the contrary, the applicant had been transferred to Uzbekistan against his will, there had existed a serious risk of him being subjected to arrest and torture in the detention of the destination country, his whereabouts had remained unknown, and he had been deprived of any opportunity to contact his representatives or otherwise to participate in the Court proceedings. To that extent, the facts of the present case were similar to Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], (nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 128-29, ECHR 2005‑I), where a violation of Article 34 was found in similar circumstances. Referring further to the recent cases of Abdulkhakov (cited above, §§ 222-31), and Zokhidov (cited above, §§ 201-11), they maintained that the respondent State had failed to comply with the interim measure, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


51.  The Government further disputed the applicant’s victim status as regards his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They argued with reference to the certificates of 20 March and 13 June 1996 (see paragraph 27 above) that the mill complex and petrol station had been registered in the company’s name rather than in that of the applicant, whereas under the Court’s case-law only the person directly affected by the act or omission at issue may claim to be a “victim” of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this latter respect they relied on the case of Nosov v. Russia (no. 30877/02, decision of 20 October 2005).


19.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the domestic courts had acknowledged a violation of his rights and had provided him with monetary compensation. The Government argued that the amount awarded to the applicant had been adequate, taking into account the duration and extent of the violation, the negative consequences suffered by the applicant, and the economic conditions in the country, as well as other relevant criteria.


37.  The applicant also complained under Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention that the courts had incorrectly determined the merits of her counterclaim, that the lay judges had been appointed in violation of Russian law, and that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. Lastly, she alleged under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that by bringing his claim against the applicant, the prosecutor had unlawfully interfered with her possessions. Lastly, she alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that the resumption of the criminal proceedings against her was aimed at intimidating her.


151.  The Government reiterated that the submission of the case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also pointed out that it had been suggested that a Court delegation have access to the file at the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted. The Government further maintained that there was no breach of the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since her application had been accepted for examination by the Court. As for the relevant domestic proceedings, she could have access to those materials of the investigation that could be produced to her at the present stage and, upon the completion of the investigation, to all the materials contained in the case file.


23.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants' constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status.


51.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” in terms of Article <mask> of the Convention. They contended that an applicant could be considered a victim only if the State had already decided to take steps against him, and interference would come about only upon the execution or implementation of that decision. In the present case, despite the lack of any interim measure by the Court, no removal order was awaiting execution or implementation, as no such order had been issued, and no practical steps had been taken by the authorities in order to remove the applicant from Malta. The Government referred to Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241‑B), in which the Court had distinguished the applicants’ case from that of the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom (7 July 1989, Series A no. 161), since in the former case no expulsion order had been made in respect of the applicants. They explained that deprivation of Maltese citizenship did not mean that the person so deprived would be removed from Malta. In order for the person to be removed from Malta, a removal order would have to be issued. Such an order had not been issued in the case of the applicant in the present case.


59.  The applicant argued that pursuing civil proceedings would not be effective in her case. To date, there had been no final judgment of a Polish court in a case in which compensation had been awarded for damage to a woman’s health caused by a refusal of a therapeutic abortion allowed under the 1993 Act. She emphasised that the two cases referred to by the Government post-dated her petition to the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention. Importantly, they were immaterial to her case because they concerned situations fundamentally different from the applicant’s, both as to the facts and law: one related to a claim for damages arising from the unlawful refusal of an abortion where the pregnancy had been caused by rape; the second concerned a claim for damages arising from the refusal of a prenatal examination.


53.  The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to provide her with immediate access to the entire range of drugs available for cancer patients or to transfer her to a civilian medical institution was a breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated her right to individual application. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


27.  The applicants replied that the constitutional complaint was not an effective remedy for alleged violations of the right of access to a court. In particular, the Constitutional Court had not responded to the first applicant's complaint regarding access to a court, but solely to his length complaint. Furthermore, the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II). For these reasons, the first applicant was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention of the alleged violation, and the second applicant had not had to lodge a constitutional complaint in order to exhaust domestic remedies.


44.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be the victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the alleged violation of her property rights on account of the investigating authorities’ negligence. They pointed out that the domestic commercial courts had examined the applicant’s relevant claim and had explicitly acknowledged, at two higher levels of jurisdiction, that the negligent actions of Mr S., the investigator in charge of the criminal case concerning misappropriation of property belonging to the applicant’s company, had resulted in the loss by the company of that property, and had awarded it compensation for pecuniary damage as well as reimbursement of costs and expenses. As regards the awarded amount, the Government argued that the Federal Commercial Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit was justified in reducing the initial amount awarded to the applicant’s company; the new amount had been calculated on the basis of the price at which the applicant’s company had intended to sell the sugar before it had been lost, and had taken into account the intended profit. The Government also pointed out that the applicant’s company had not alleged before the commercial courts that it had sustained any non-pecuniary damage in connection with the investigator’s negligence and had not lodged a claim to that end; it had only sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of damage to its business reputation, which claim had been rejected in the absence of any causal link with the established negligence. The Government further stressed that the awarded amounts had been paid to the applicant’s company in full. Lastly, they argued that Akvilon had received back the equivalent of the amount of sugar lost, as on 6 August 2002 it had been transferred to the company for safe storage. Along with the amount awarded later by the commercial courts, that had constituted, in the Government’s view, double compensation.


132.  The applicant’s representative complained that, by expelling the applicant before the examination of his appeal against the removal order, and despite the measure indicated by the Court on 24 October 2006 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Russia had failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention. The Court considers that that complaint gives rise to an issue of whether the respondent State is in breach of its undertaking under Article <mask> of the Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of individual application.


91.  The applicant further complained that on 17 October 2007 the administration of correctional colony no. IK-7, where he was serving a prison sentence, had failed to dispatch his application form to the Court. He relied on Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


56.  The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be “victims”, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts of which they complained. The applicants had asserted, without providing official identity papers in support of their claims, that they had taken part in the assault on the Melilla border crossing at dawn on 13 August 2014 and had recognised themselves on the video footage which they supplied (see paragraph 14 above). Basing their assertions on expert assessments, the Government criticised the poor quality of the video recordings in question, which in their view made it impossible to compare the footage with the photos in the official identity archives that had been checked when the applicants had entered Spanish territory subsequently. Furthermore, even assuming that the persons visible in the video footage were indeed the applicants, the latter had ceased to have victim status in so far as, a few months later, they had succeeded in entering Spanish territory unlawfully via the same border crossing and had been the subject of expulsion orders issued in the context of proceedings which, in the Government’s submission, had been attended by all the necessary safeguards. Moreover, neither of the applicants had applied to the Spanish authorities for international protection before applying to the Court. Only N.D. had done so subsequently, despite the fact that, when they had entered Spain unlawfully after the events in the present applications, both applicants had been assisted by lawyers and interpreters. The Government therefore concluded that the applicants were not victims of the alleged violations.


139.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with copies of the documents from his case file which he had wished to submit to the Court in substantiation of his application. The applicant also complained that the authorities had blocked his correspondence with the Court. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


47.  The Government observed that the applicant complained that she had been obliged to pay both the employer’s and employee’s social security contributions. However, in so far as her obligation to pay the employee’s contributions was concerned, she could not be regarded as a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. For the relevant period, namely September 1988 to June 1995, the contributions had been included in the amount paid by the United States in compliance with the Vienna Labour and Social Court’s judgment of 14 July 1995 (see paragraph 10 above).


21.  The Government submitted that the applicant had ceased to be a victim of a violation, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as on 24 September 2003 he had received the entire amount which had been due to him under the judgment of the Pleven Regional Court. Unlike the situation obtaining in the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002‑III), this payment had taken place before notice of the application had been given to the Government. Moreover, the applicant had signed a declaration to the effect that he had no further claims in respect of the amount due to him.


34.  The Government argued that the applicants were not victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that the disciplinary sanctions imposed on the applicants by the University had been annulled by the domestic courts and that following the first-instance courts’ decisions to stay the execution of the impugned sanctions the applicants had been able to effectively attend their courses and sit their exams. In this connection, they considered that the applicants had abused the right of petition because they had failed to mention the latter fact in their application forms.


13.  The Government mentioned that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the judgment of the 13 May 1998 has been executed in full, the applicants can no longer be considered victims of a violation of their rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court's list of cases.


37.  The Government noted that the applicant had been “fully compensated” by S.B. and that the Municipal Court had sent her an official apology for the excessive length of the impugned proceedings. She was therefore no longer a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Faulkner v. United Kingdom, no. 37471/97, decision of 18 September 2001).


39.  The applicant argued that the situation was similar to the case of Amirov, cited above, in which the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention following the Government’s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the Amirov case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order of the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent medical specialists assessing the applicant’s state of health.


77.  The Government took the view that the applicant had suffered no actual adverse consequences as a result of the facts complained of. There was, after all, no doubt that the applicant was aware of the sanction taken against him and the reasons for it: the Court of Appeal had explained the reasons for the order in question orally to the applicant in person. It followed that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


79.  The Government argued that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of their rights within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention given that the Regional Court had found in respect of the Expert Panel that the applicants’ right to equal treatment and education had been violated by the Expert Panel’s failure to individualise their diagnoses or to specify the cause and nature of their special educational needs. Each of the applicants had been awarded HUF 1,000,000 as non-pecuniary damages. Moreover, the Supreme Court had found that the County Council was liable for its failure to supervise the legality of the functioning of the Expert Panel which had conducted a gravely unlawful practice by failing to observe the legal guarantees concerning the parents’ rights to be present, be informed, consent or seek a remedy. The prejudice suffered on account of the applicants’ deprivation of the right to a remedy provided for by law and thereby of the theoretical chance of obtaining a more favourable assessment of their learning abilities had been compensated by non-pecuniary damages.


24.  The Government further maintained that the first applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the amount of compensation he had claimed before the domestic courts (MDL 0.1) had been so low as to suggest that the true purpose of his libel action had not been to obtain redress for being defamed, but rather to make a political example of the President and the governing party. In the alternative, the Government submitted that the first applicant’s application was inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention because he had suffered no significant disadvantage.


114.  The applicant also submitted that his representative had been refused permission to meet with him in the prison. The impossibility of meeting his representative had amounted to an infringement of the effective exercise of his right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant also argued that his representative had submitted a valid authority form to the Court and to the domestic authorities.


70.  The applicant claimed 182,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage in relation to the breaches of his rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, that is EUR 200 for each day of unlawful detention in inhuman conditions, which had caused him a lot of suffering. He also claimed EUR 10,000 for the breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He asked for the money to be transferred to his lawyer’s account, in order to avoid problems with the authorities in the “MRT”, where he lives.


19.  The Government argued that the applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because the criminal proceedings initiated against him had subsequently been discontinued on the ground that they had become time-barred. Accordingly, they requested that the Court declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and reject the application.


81.  The applicant’s representative argued that his allegations of a risk of ill-treatment had not been examined by the Russian authorities. She relied on several reports by United Nations agencies and international and regional organisations and argued that the applicant had run and continued to run a risk of torture in Uzbekistan on account of his religious beliefs. She gave examples of cases when Muslim detainees had been ill-treated, and in certain cases killed, because of their religious beliefs, or unjustifiably subjected to disciplinary penalties such as placement in punishment cells without food or water, in particular because of their attempts to pray. She also referred to recent reports on the allegedly appalling conditions of detention and the lack of monitoring of detention facilities in Uzbekistan. The applicant’s representative also relied on the third-party interveners’ submissions before the Court in the cases of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I) and Ismoilov and Others v. Russia (no. 2947/06, 24 April 2008). According to the applicant’s representative, the applicant’s expulsion had been in fact “an extradition in disguise”, as a result of which the applicant had been convicted of the offences in respect of which the Russian authorities had refused extradition. The applicant had been expelled in flagrant violation of Russian law before his appeals against the expulsion order and the dismissal of his refugee application could be examined. Besides, no diplomatic assurances had been obtained from the Uzbek authorities in the present case and, even if they had been obtained, they could not have been effective in the context of an administrative expulsion formally unrelated to any pending criminal proceedings against an applicant. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005‑III), it was argued that the respondent Government’s failure to comply with an indication under Rule 39 should not necessarily prevent the Court from examining on the merits a complaint under Article 3. Otherwise, it would be less burdensome for a respondent State to remove an applicant from its territory in cases in which Rule 39 was applied and to be held in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention than to comply with Rule 39 and to be found to have breached Article 3 and/or Article 6.


21.  The Government submitted that the applicant company did not have the capacity to apply to the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the State held 28.56% of its share capital through the Ukrresursy State Enterprise and the State Property Fund. The Government also stated that the applicant company had been established pursuant to an agreement between the Ukrainian and Russian high governmental officials in order to create an infrastructure for the cooperation between the Ukrainian and Tyumen companies and to implement the intergovernmental decisions aiming at improving effectiveness of the cooperation between the businesses of two countries. Thus, the applicant had to be classified, for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, as a governmental organisation. The Government further argued that in the case Kosarevskaya and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 29459/03, 4935/04 and 26996/04, 6 December 2005) the Court had found the State responsible for the debts of the company, in which it had held 32.67% of the share capital. The Government suggested that the same approach should be taken in the present case, as moreover the dispute at hand had concerned a building which belonged to the State.


206.  The applicant submitted that the conduct of the Government during the course of the proceedings, and in particular during the course of the fact‑finding hearings, had been such as to breach their obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention. He alleged in this connection that the Government had failed to provide documents or had not provided them on time, and attempted to impose inappropriate conditions on the hearing of certain witnesses and had also failed to provide necessary and relevant witnesses.


12.  The Government submitted that the case should be struck out of the Court’s list of cases on the ground that the applicant’s widow and children were not affected by the alleged violation, and thus they could not claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, they claimed that the application should be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, since the Court of Cassation had upheld the decision of the first instance court on 18 April 2000, while the application was lodged with the Court on 9 January 2002.


99.  The Government, referring to the Court's judgment in Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (20 March 1991, Series A no. 201), considered that the applicant's removal had not interfered with his right under Article <mask> of the Convention to lodge an individual application with the Court without the effective exercise of that right being hindered in any way by the State.


79.  The Government lastly asked the Court to declare the complaint inadmissible because the applicant had lost his status as a victim as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. In its judgment of 20 May 2014 the Supreme Court had reduced the additional disciplinary penalty by half, explicitly mentioning that the length of the disciplinary proceedings and the length of the maintenance of the interim measure constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention.


59.  The applicant noted that the District Court judgment had been very severe as in such circumstances a suspended sentence was normally imposed. He had thus not been afforded any redress to make good the violation based on the entire length of the proceedings. The remedy used by the District Court had not been such a remedy as meant in the Convention. After the District Court judgment the proceedings had still continued for more than fourteen months. The applicant could therefore still claim to be a victim under Article <mask> of the Convention.


30.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court had accepted their constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right to a hearing within reasonable time and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status.


68.  The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, § 92).  Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention.


31.  The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant’s right of which he complained before the Court and had provided the applicant with preventive and compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient and maintained that it was compatible with the relevant principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court.


28.  The Government do not dispute that the prison administration refused on two occasions to post the applicant’s letter to the Court. Consequently, the lodging of this application has been delayed by more than eight months. The Court concludes that this constituted an interference with the applicant’s right of individual petition, which amounted to a failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with its obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention. Accordingly there has been a breach of this provision.


91.  The Government submitted that the applicant unions could not claim to be victims, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of measures which allegedly infringed their members’ rights under the Convention. They stressed that the recognition that these organisations had standing before the Conseil d’État was not to be confused with the requirement for the legal entities per se to be directly affected by the measure at issue.


39.  The Government submitted a preliminary objection to the effect that the applicant had not provided the Court with the relevant evidence, namely, copies of the relevant reports pertaining to his administrative detention and the administrative offence, as well as copies of any interlocutory applications or other documents in support of his allegations. They considered that he had thereby failed to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention in that he had not properly lodged an application within the meaning of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as in force at the material time.


81.  The applicant argued that his transfer from the RNC, in manifest disregard of the interim measure indicated by the Court, had caused him particular feelings of distress and contributed to a worsening of his health, as proved by subsequent medical evidence. As a result, he had experienced “anxiety and inferiority, a state of desperation and of fear that not even the interim measure indicated by the Court could help him obtain the medical assistance required to treat his illnesses”. This had hindered the exercise of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention.


85.  The Government submitted that the complaints of the first applicant under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention should also be found inadmissible since she joined the above mentioned proceedings only in December 2001, and that that part of the proceedings complained about was not unreasonably long. As to her complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they should be rejected under Article <mask> of the Convention as the applicant was a minor shareholder of the OM.


24.  The applicants submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 17 September 2004, they were still “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the Constitutional Court had not responded to their complaint regarding access to a court, but solely to their length complaint. Moreover, the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


134.  The applicant’s representative submitted that Russia had disregarded the Court’s indication under Rule 39. The applicant had been put on board a plane leaving for Tashkent at 11.50 p.m. on 24 October 2006. Thus, the Russian authorities had been afforded sufficient time to comply with the Court’s indication under Rule 39. She contended that urgent notification could be made “by any appropriate means” such as publication of the relevant information on the secure website. With reference to the Court’s judgment in the case of Shamayev and Others (cited above, §§ 5-12 and 475), the applicant’s representative argued that even a short delay in transmission and execution of the Court’s indication under Rule 39 would violate Article <mask> of the Convention. Finally, she deplored the Russian authorities’ failure to assist her in re-establishing contact with the applicant in Uzbekistan.


18.  The Government objected that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 2 July 2003, the applicant could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicant's constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court's practice and was reasonable in the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had been easily accessible to the applicant, had been speedy and had been conducted in the applicant's language and the compensation had been paid to her without any delay.


50.  The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, she could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further submitted that the applicant could have raised the issue of recurring delays in the proceedings on the increase of maintenance contributions in the period after the Constitutional Court's judgment (nález) of 7 April 2004 by way of a fresh complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. As she had not done so, she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


37.  The Government also claimed that the post-sentencing judge’s decisions of 26 January 2011 and 1 April 2011 could not be considered a form of pressure or intimidation directed against the applicant to prevent him from lodging his application with the Court. The post-sentencing judge’s decision of 26 January 2011 had been as a result of the fact that she had been unaware that the Constitutional Court had already delivered a decision in the case. Her subsequent decision of 1 April 2011 had been a result of the analogical application of domestic rules governing individual constitutional appeals to the Constitutional Court to proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights. That analogical interpretation could be considered “erroneous or formalistic” in view of the Court’s practice, but it could not be deemed obstructionist or intimidating for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention.


32.  The Government denied that there had been any breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, calling the applicant’s allegations “erroneous and untrue”. They stated that the applicant had been sanctioned for improper performance of his duties and that the sanctions had been imposed prior to the communication of the case by the Court. They submitted that the Court should thus declare this complaint inadmissible for abuse, calling it “offensive” or “defamatory”.


37.  The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, he could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicant’s constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court’s practice and was not manifestly inadequate or insufficient in view of all the circumstances. In support of this contention, the Government relied on the Court’s findings in the cases of Šedý v. Slovakia (no. 72237/01, §§ 74-75, 19 December 2006) and Gergouil v. France (no. 40111/98, 21 March 2000). They argued further that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had been easily accessible to the applicant, speedy and conducted in the applicant’s language.


61.  The applicant complained that the Government’s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


46.  The applicants further alleged that their deportation to Iran, despite the interim measure indicated by the President of the Section under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, constituted a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They alleged that their representative had been informed of the interim measure at around 1.00 p.m. Turkish local time and that they had been deported at 4.00 p.m. Turkish local time.


27.  The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


60.  The Government thus appear to argue that the applicants cannot claim to be victims of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as, in the specific circumstances of the case, they were not directly affected by the law complained of. However, the Court notes that the Government have not raised an explicit objection as to admissibility on that ground. The Court considers it appropriate to deal with the issues raised by the Government in the context of the examination of the merits of the case.


128.  The Government argued that an applicant ceased to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention if the authorities acknowledged, at least in substance, a violation of a protected right and provided appropriate and sufficient redress. As regards acknowledgment of a violation, the Government pointed to the findings of the Court of Appeal in 2007 and the High Court in 2009. The Government submitted that a finding of a violation was itself appropriate and sufficient redress. They relied on Benham, Perks and Others, and Lloyd and Others, all cited above.


156.  The applicants argued that the Government's failure to submit the documents requested by the Court, namely the entire criminal investigation file, disclosed a failure to comply with their obligations under Articles 34 and 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the above issue should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


95.  The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with copies of the documents from his case file which he had wished to submit to the Court in substantiation of his application. The applicant further complained that the authorities had blocked his correspondence with the Court. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows:


33.  The Government disputed that the applicant was a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They observed that at the time of her marriage the applicant, who was a trainee lawyer, was not qualified to practise as a lawyer. When she began practising she had already taken her husband’s name. The Government therefore maintained that the applicant’s change of name following her marriage could not have created problems in her professional life.


72.  The Government submitted that the representative of B.Z. and H.D. had complained to the FMS and a prosecutor about obstacles he had faced in meeting with B.Z. and H.D., but he had lodged the application with the Court before his complaints had been examined by the domestic authorities. Therefore, the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. With regard to S.W., the Government submitted that he had not asked to meet with his representative.


57.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not be considered a “victim” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention because he had not suffered discrimination on the ground of his sexual orientation. In particular, he had not demonstrated that he had indeed been treated less favourably than other persons in an analogous situation. The domestic courts had based their decisions on the objective prerequisite, namely the fact that the applicant had not met the basic condition laid down in section 8(1) of the 1994 Act since he had not resided permanently with the statutory tenant until his death. The same condition – which, as such, could not be regarded as unreasonable or unjustified – would have been applied to all individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation.


123.  The applicant complained that the authorities had obstructed his access to the criminal case file and had refused to provide him with copies of the documents he had requested to substantiate his application to the Court. He also complained that the SIZO administration had blocked his correspondence with the Court. In raising the above complaints, the applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


68.  The applicants' representative complained that by expelling the first applicant on 5 December 2007 despite the measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Russia had failed to comply with its undertaking under Article <mask> of the Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of individual application. Article 34 of the Convention provides:


13.  The Government objected that the applicant could no longer be considered a victim, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, as on 1 September 2004 he withdrew his writ of execution and, consequently, from that time onwards the State was not responsible for the enforcement of the award. The Government also indicated that the judgment in the applicant’s favour had been enforced.


38.  The Government contested Mr Miettinen’s status as a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention for the purposes of the complaint under Article 8. They submitted that he did not at any point in the proceedings admit that the material belonged to him. At any rate, as he did not request in the domestic proceedings that the material be returned to him, he had not exhausted domestic remedies in this respect.


22.  The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts complained of. They observed that the Constitutional Court had indeed acknowledged a violation of the “reasonable time” principle and granted the applicant Lm 100 in compensation for moral damage, thus providing adequate redress for the breach of the Convention.


19.  The Government contested their argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicants did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of their conviction had been suspended. They further submitted that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security and public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, by referring to Abdullah Öcalan as a “leading figure” and an interlocutor for the State of Turkey, the applicants had conveyed to the public the idea that their client was still active. Moreover, their statements contained expressions referring to the strategy of a terrorist organisation. Noting that the applicants had not been imprisoned or subjected to any other restrictions, the Government contended that the interference in question had therefore not been disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.


24.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he was subjected to pressure from the State authorities in order to oblige him to withdraw the present application from the Court. However, he did not substantiate this complaint and did not provide any evidence in support of it. In such circumstances and in the light of the material in the case file, the Court considers that there has been no failure of the State to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.


212.  The applicant’s representatives alleged that his disappearance and possible unlawful removal from Russia, the failure of the Russian authorities to put in place the necessary protective measures, and the lack of an effective investigation into the matter had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39. These claims, substantively focusing on a violation of the right to individual application, fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


58.  The applicant further submitted that he was still a victim of unlawful detention in breach of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The German authorities had neither acknowledged a breach of his Convention rights nor had they afforded him compensation. The fact that following his possible release from preventive detention, he might be detained under the Therapy Detention Act, which served to circumvent the Court’s findings of violations of Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention, could obviously not be considered as such compensation.


135.  The Government reiterated that the submission of the case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also pointed out that it had been suggested that a Court delegation have access to the file at the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted. The Government further maintained that there was no breach of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since her application had been accepted for examination by the Court. As for the relevant domestic proceedings, she could have access to those materials of the investigation that could be produced to her at the present stage and, upon the completion of the investigation, to all the materials contained in the case file.


19.  The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants' constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status.


31.  The Government argued that the second applicant Mr Ahmet Demir could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as he had only been elected as HADEP's general secretary a short time before HADEP's dissolution. Furthermore, unlike some other executive members of HADEP, no ban had been imposed on him by the Constitutional Court.


21.  The Government argued that the second applicant could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because the revision proceedings examined by the Supreme Court of Justice on 27 November 2006 did not concern the issue of transfer of shares between the first and the second applicant. Moreover, the second applicant received the shares from the first applicant free of charge and therefore she could not have suffered any loss even if the shares had been taken away from her. In any event, the Government expressed the opinion that the transfer of shares between the first and the second applicant by way of donation was not genuine but was only intended to avoid restitution of shares to I.A and S.A.


57.  The Government submitted that the applicant had lost her victim status under Article <mask> of the Convention in view of the positive outcome of the domestic civil proceedings against the hospital. As regards the Supreme Court’s refusal to award non-pecuniary damages, they further argued, without referring to the relevant domestic case-law, that the domestic law had entitled the applicant to claim non-pecuniary damages if a criminal element had been established by the investigation (see paragraph 52 above). Noting the applicant’s objections to the implementation of the exhumation orders and the subsequent inability of the investigation to establish that a crime had been committed, the Government argued that that fault could only be attributable to the applicant.


37.  The Government, with reference to the Constitutional Court’s judgments of 9 June 2004 and 22 June 2005, argued that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the just satisfaction awarded by the Constitutional Court was not disproportionately low in the particular circumstances. In addition, the Constitutional Court had ordered the District Court to proceed with the cases without any further delay and the District Court had complied with that order.


32.  The applicant argued that the situation was similar to the case of Amirov v. Russia (no. 51857/13, 27 November 2014), in which the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention following the Government’s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in Amirov (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order by the Court to provide an expert opinion from independent medical specialists on the applicant’s state of health.


48.  The Government submitted that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as the applicant had requested leave from the Regional Court of The Hague to join a pending civil action in tort brought by another former EBI detainee claiming, inter alia, compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained on account of having been subjected to allegedly humiliating and unnecessary strip-searches in the EBI. Furthermore, if the applicant were to be awarded any compensation in those proceedings, he could no longer be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government were therefore of the opinion that the application should be declared inadmissible.


116.  The applicant asserted that between 22 March and 12 April 2004, while in detention, he was not allowed to meet one of his lawyers, Ms Liptser, who represented him before the Court. He alleged that this had constituted an interference with his right of individual petition, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 34 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


71.  The applicant complained that the administration of correctional colony no. IK-1 in Tambov, where he had been serving his prison sentence from 12 April 2004 to 29 December 2009, had refused to dispatch his correspondence to the Court in view of his inability to cover the postal costs. The Court decided to examine his complaint from the standpoint of the right of individual petition guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads:


24.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument. They claimed at the outset that the applicant did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. They further claimed that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, given that the proceedings against him had ended with the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. The Government submitted that should the Court conclude that there had been an interference, that interference had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aims of maintaining national security, territorial integrity and public safety, as well as preventing disorder and crime. The Government claimed that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, as a politician, the applicant had showed his support for a terrorist organisation’s activities by chanting the slogans noted in the first-instance judgment. Taking into account the necessity to fight against terrorism, the Government contended that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate.


37.  The applicant contested that view and submitted that declaring three months as having been served had not constituted sufficient redress for the acknowledged delay in the proceedings. Moreover, there had been further delays in the proceedings, which so far had not been acknowledged by the domestic authorities. Consequently, he had not lost his victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


19.  The Government claimed that the second applicant did not have victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as he had not been convicted at the end of the proceedings. They also claimed that the second applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, because he had not objected to the decision of 22 October 2009 suspending the pronouncement of the judgment against him. They submitted that the second applicant could have raised his Convention grievances by using the remedy in question. In support of their submissions, the Government provided a copy of the Plenary Court of Cassation’s decision dated 22 January 2013 (decision no. 2013/15). In that decision, the Court of Cassation had held that in a case where the accused had been convicted of illicit substance use and where the first-instance court had ordered the accused’s treatment and the application of judicial control measures after his treatment, an objection by the public prosecutor regarding the qualification of the accused’s acts and challenging the court’s above-mentioned orders had to be examined on its merits and in adversarial proceedings.


27.  The Government maintained that the applicants did not have requisite victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicants Arzu Doğan and Sami Evren had been acquitted of the charges by the Ankara Criminal Court and that no proceedings had been brought against the other five applicants for participating in the demonstrations.


27.  The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, she could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicant’s constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court’s practice.


84.  The applicant complained that the State had interfered with the effective exercise of his right of application. In particular, the domestic authorities had unreasonably refused his lawyer permission to meet with him. Furthermore, obstacles were placed in the way of the applicant's complaining to the European Court of Human Rights about the fairness of the proceedings in his case and the conditions of his detention. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention:


142.  The Government first of all pointed out that according to the Court’s case-law, particularly the Mamatkulov and Askarov judgment (cited above, § 108), the purpose of an interim measure was to facilitate the exercise of the right of individual petition secured under Article <mask> of the Convention, and therefore to preserve the subject of the application when the Court considered that there was a risk of the applicant suffering irreparable damage. In the instant case, however, the Court should have deduced from the inadmissible nature of the request (see paragraph 39 above) that the interim measure lacked any real justification.


47.  The applicant also complained that he had not been properly informed about the nature and cause of the charges against him, as required by Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention. The Court observes, nevertheless, that the applicant was eventually acquitted of all the charges against him. The Court holds that under such circumstances the applicant may not be considered to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Consequently, this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


50.  The Government submitted that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as the applicant had brought a civil action in tort against the Netherlands State claiming, inter alia, compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of having been subjected to allegedly humiliating and unnecessary strip-searches in the EBI. Furthermore, if the applicant were to be awarded any compensation in those proceedings, he could no longer be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government were therefore of the opinion that the application should be declared inadmissible.


30.  The Government maintained that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the judgment of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal of 29 November 2001 had been executed, the applicant can no longer be considered a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court’s list of cases.


143.  The Government reiterated that the submission of the case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also pointed out that it had been suggested that a Court delegation have access to the file at the place in the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted. The Government further maintained that there had been no breach of the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since their applications had been accepted for examination by the Court. As for the relevant domestic proceedings, they could have access to those materials of the investigation that could be produced to them at the present stage and, upon the completion of the investigation, to all the materials contained in the case file.


43.  The Government contended that the applicant organisation had acted merely as an intermediary between the users of artistic works and the authors, who had transferred only the implementation of part of their pecuniary rights to the applicant organisation. The Government argued that the applicant organisation had not been directly affected by any measures and it had not by virtue of its administrative and representative function acquired any “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The recognition of the applicant organisation’s locus standi in the domestic proceedings according to the Government did not automatically envisage compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government maintained that the applicant organisation could not claim to be a victim of a measure that infringed the rights guaranteed by the Convention to its members.


60.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had granted the applicant's constitutional complaint, found a violation of her constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded her compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost her victim status.


89.  The applicant’s representatives alleged that his disappearance and possible unlawful removal from Russia, the failure of the Russian authorities to put in place the necessary protective measures, and a lack of an effective investigation into the matter had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39. These claims, substantively focusing on a violation of the right to individual application, fall to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows:


34.  The Government further submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 11 March 2004 she had concluded an in-court settlement whereby the State had obliged itself not only to return the vehicle but also to compensate her for the loss of its value. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied at the domestic level and the applicant had lost her victim status.


116.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the delays in handing over the Court's letters to him, preventing him from complying with the time-limits set by the Court; the prison staff's refusals to dispatch his letters to the Court; the non-delivery of one letter in 2009 and pressure allegedly put on him. He also complained under Article 5 of the Convention that he had not been informed of any charges against him after the arrest; that he had not been brought before a judge for a review of his detention. He alleged under Article 6 of the Convention that the civil proceedings had been excessively long and unfair, in particular because the courts had not summoned his witnesses. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the search of his home had been unlawful. Lastly, the applicant complained under Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention of the absence of effective remedies and of discrimination against him.


13.  The Government contested his argument. They claimed at the outset that he did not have victim status, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that the pronouncement of his conviction had been suspended. The Government further submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the State as a whole and had been necessary in a democratic society. They noted that the article in question glorified the PKK and promoted hatred, hostility and the use of arms, militancy and revenge. They lastly contended that the circumstances of the case were similar to the case of Sürek v. Turkey ((no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999‑IV) in which the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.


113.  The Government pointed out that, under the Court’s case-law, where the national authorities had found a violation and their decision constituted appropriate and sufficient redress for it, the party concerned could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention (they referred to Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178 et seq., ECHR 2006-V). Where these two conditions were satisfied, the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention would preclude examination by the Court (they referred, inter alia, to Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, §§ 64-70, Series A no. 51; and Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470/99, ECHR 2001-X). Loss of victim status depended, among other things, on the nature of the right that was alleged to have been infringed, the reasons given for the decision (Jensen, decision cited above) and the persistence of the adverse consequences for the applicant after that decision (they referred to Freimanis and Līdums v. Latvia, nos. 73443/01 and 74860/01, § 68, 9 February 2006). The appropriateness and sufficiency of the redress offered to the applicant was dependent on all the circumstances of the case, having regard, in particular, to the nature of the Convention violation at stake (they referred to Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 116, ECHR 2010).


62.  The Government opened their line of argument with the assertion that the legally binding force of the interim measure issued under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court may not be drawn from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source”. They further stressed that the Rules of Court and accordingly the interim measure applied did not have a binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court in its letter of 16 August 2013 did not entail a violation of Article 34 or any other provision of the Convention.


13.  The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant’s constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status.


18.  The Government noted that the Constitutional Court had awarded the applicant a certain amount of money as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered. They also implicitly indorsed the Constitutional Court’s arguments in respect of the rejection of the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damages. The applicant had thus been provided with adequate redress and had lost her victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


23.  The Government submitted that the seventh applicant could not claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because she had never participated in the restitution process and the decisions to annul the restoration of property rights had not directly affected her. They submitted that the seventh applicant had not been deprived of her property because the money which she had paid to the other applicants pursuant to the preliminary sale agreements had been returned to her (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above).


49.  The Government pointed out that the Sofia District Court, whose judgment had been upheld by the Sofia City Court, had set the applicant's dismissal aside. As a result of these judgments the applicant had had to be reinstated in his post. However, as in 2003 the Criminological Studies Council at the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office had been abolished and a new Criminological Studies Council had been established at the Ministry of Justice, the applicant had been offered employment there. Therefore, the applicant had lost his victim status under Article <mask> of the Convention. Even if it could be admitted that his dismissal had been the result of the publication of his letter, his reinstatement and the damages which he had been awarded had adequately remedied it.


24.  The Government acknowledged that the nine 1982 State premium bonds may be considered as a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. At the same time they contended that the interference with the applicant’s property rights had been lawful since the necessary domestic legal framework had been put in place. They further stressed that, as the Court had acknowledged in the case Malysh and Others v. Russia (no. 30280/03, § 80, 11 February 2010), the harsh economic situation in Russia in the 1990s necessitated some restrictions on private property, and thus the interference had pursued a legitimate aim. Lastly, the Government argued that a fair balance between public and private interests had been ensured in the applicant’s case, because he had been afforded the opportunity – and indeed had chosen – to convert the majority of his 1982 State premium bonds into 1992 Russian bonds. In respect of the remaining bonds, he had not used that option and thus could not be considered to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


88.  The applicant also alleged that the authorities' failure to assist him in gathering evidence in support of his complaint before the Court concerning the conditions of detention amounted to a violation of the respondent State's obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he alleged that a letter dated 23 January 2003 had not been dispatched by the prison administration (see paragraph 43 above).


3. The applicant was transferred from the neurological centre to a prison hospital on Friday 11 November 2005. On Monday 14 November 2005, the next working day, he was transferred back to the neurological centre. It follows that compliance with the interim measure was merely delayed for three days. On the particular facts of the present case, I am unable to find that the delay in implementing the interim measure can be said to have hindered the effective exercise of the applicant's right of individual petition within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this respect the case is very different from those where the removal of an applicant from a country in disregard of the terms of a Rule 39 indication has the inevitable consequence of rendering nugatory the exercise of the right by preventing the Court from conducting an effective examination of the Convention complaint and, ultimately, from protecting the applicant against potential violations of the Convention rights invoked.


83.  The Government added that they had had no intention of disregarding the interim measure, and had indeed taken all the necessary steps to ensure compliance as a matter of urgency. Moreover, the short delay in complying with the interim measure had not in any way impeded the applicant in pursuing his application before the Court or communicating with the latter. Neither had there been a risk of irreparable damage to his health capable of depriving the proceedings before the Court of their object. The existence of such a risk was, however, a mandatory condition for finding a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government relied on an order of the International Court of Justice (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006 on a request for the indication of provisional measures), submitting that that court had also taken the existence of a risk of irremediable damage to the interests of the parties as the basis for its decisions concerning compliance with interim measures.


243.  The Government submitted that the six applicants (Mr Kurić, Ms Mezga, Mr Ristanović, Mr Berisha, Mr Ademi and Mr Minić) who had been granted both ex nunc and ex tunc permanent residence permits after the 2010 Chamber judgment (see paragraphs 95, 123, 133, 158, 173 and 194 above) could no longer claim to be “victims” of the facts complained of within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention.


22.  The applicants submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 7 July 2004, they were still “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II).


52.  The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant's right to respect for his correspondence. In their view there was no indication that the correspondence had been censored or that the contents of the letter had been checked. The applicant's letter to the Court bore a stamp “censored”, however without any signature, date or the name of the authority which might have stamped it. Thus, the Government had serious doubts whether the applicant's letter had indeed been censored by the authorities. The Government further submitted that the applicant had been in no way hindered in the exercise of his right of petition to the Court, therefore, the facts of the case disclosed no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


17.  The Government further appeared to link the issue of victim status of the first applicant to the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Furthermore, they explicitly claimed non-exhaustion in respect of the third applicant. In this connection the Court recalls that the exhaustion requirement in respect of the length remedy provided for in the Courts Act of 2008 concerns applications that post-date the Adzi-Spirkoska and Others case. There is no such requirement in respect of cases already pending before it unless the impugned proceedings have not ended yet and the applicants can use the length remedy before the Supreme Court. The Court reaffirms that as regards length cases pending before it where applicants have used the length remedy, such as the first and third applicants, any redress provided by the Supreme Court shall be assessed through the prism of whether the applicants can still be considered to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Adži-Spirkoska and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), nos. 38914/05 and 17879/05, 3 November 2011). Consequently, that the first applicant did not challenge the decision of the first-instance panel of the Supreme Court and that the third applicant’s length remedy was rejected on procedural grounds do not have any bearing on their victim status in respect of the alleged violation complained of before the Court. The applicants can accordingly still claim to be “victims” of a breach of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Consequently, the Government’s objections must be dismissed.


29.  The Government requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible in accordance with Article <mask> of the Convention as the applicant had not lodged a request for retrial under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Proceedings to redress the alleged breach. Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Proceedings would provide for a retrial in criminal proceedings if the European Court of Human Rights had found a violation of the Convention. The Supreme Court had extended this remedy by analogy, stating that a judgement by the European Court of Human Rights was not a necessary prerequisite for a retrial in criminal proceedings (Supreme Court, judgment of 1 August 2007, no. 13Os135/06m). It was thus possible to challenge a violation of the rights under the Convention in the context of criminal proceedings at the domestic level by applying for a retrial on the basis of Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Proceedings directly to the Supreme Court.


17.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicants’ complaints in respect of the independence and impartiality of the İzmir State Security Court must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and for failure to comply with the six-month rule. In this regard, they maintained that the applicants have not invoked this complaint before the domestic courts. They further argued that the applicants should have lodged their application with the Court within six months of the date on which the State Security Court rendered its judgment.


17.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as he had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to him under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, he would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if he had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


53.  The applicant contested that view. He argued that he had exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the initial order for his retrospective preventive detention on 13 March 2008 here at issue prior to lodging his application with the Court. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court’s leading judgment of 4 May 2011 did not cover preventive detention under paragraph 3 of Article 66b of the Criminal Code. In any event, in the subsequent statutory proceedings for judicial review, the continuation of his preventive detention had been ordered.


15.  The Government argued under Article <mask> of the Convention that the applicant's complaint in respect of the independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court must be rejected for failure to comply with the six-month rule. They maintained that since the applicant complained of the lack of independence and impartiality of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date on which that court rendered its judgment, namely on 3 June 1999.


83.  The applicants disputed the respondent Government’s submissions and claimed that there had been no failure on their part to comply with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They stressed that the “TRNC” courts were not properly established under the law applicable in northern Cyprus, but by the “TRNC” in the part of Cyprus which was under illegal Turkish occupation.


41.  The Government contended that the application was inadmissible, having been lodged out of time. As the Constitutional Court had declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible on 26 April 2002, the final decision for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention was in fact the Supreme Court’s decision of 20 June 2001, whereas the applicant had filed his application on 20 September 2002.


45.  The applicants filed their complaint about the length of the other sets of proceedings set out in paragraphs 23-25 above on 28 November 2002. At that time the proceedings at issue were pending before the courts of first instance. Having regard to the practice of the Constitutional Court and its decision in the case of Andrášik and Others referred to above, the applicants were required, for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention, to use the constitutional remedy prior to submitting this complaint to the Court.


14.  The Government asked the Court, firstly, to dismiss the application as inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article <mask> of the Convention. For the purposes of that provision, time had started to run on 20 April 1999. However, the applicant had not lodged his application with Court until 7 January 2000, that is eight months and seventeen days after the payment of the additional compensation awarded by the Dinar Civil Court of First Instance.


11.  The Government maintained that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as they had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to them under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, they would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if they had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


12.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention, as he had failed to make proper use of the remedy available to him under Article 105 of the Code of Obligations. Under that provision, he would have been eligible for compensation for the losses allegedly sustained as a result of the delays in payment of the additional compensation if he had established that the losses exceeded the amount of default interest.


41.  The Government contended that the Constitutional Court decision of 3 July 2002 declaring the applicants’ appeal inadmissible as being “outside its jurisdiction” could not be considered an effective remedy to be exhausted. Therefore, the final effective remedy within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention was the Supreme Court’s judgment of 24 July 2000. The Government submitted that the application should be declared inadmissible as out of time, having been lodged on 21 December 2002.


21.  The Government asked the Court, firstly, to dismiss the application as inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month time-limit under Article <mask> of the Convention. For the purposes of that provision, time had started to run on 20 December 2001. However, the applicant had not lodged his application with Court until 30 April 2003, that is one year and four months after the final domestic decision.


45.  The Government argued, as they had done before the Chamber, that the second and fourth applicants, the husbands of the first and third applicants respectively, had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention because they had failed to lodge an application themselves with the Constitutional Court for review of the constitutionality of section 3 of the Artificial Procreation Act.


21.  The Government alleged that the applicants have failed to comply with the six-month rule of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that in the present case the final domestic decision was taken on 29 November 2001 by the Court of Cassation; however the application was introduced on 26 September 2002 that is more than six months after that date.


83.  The Government submitted that the application was abusive as the applicant was attempting to have the merits of his case decided by this Court. They noted that the applicant had given false information to the press in so far as in various interviews and press releases his legal representative had alleged that the application had already been declared admissible by the Court, which was clearly untrue. They considered that the applicant was using the Court to apply pressure and influence and lengthen the domestic proceedings against him – in the latter respect he had also requested that the domestic courts suspend the proceedings pending a judgment by the Court, a request which had been rejected by the domestic courts. Relying on the Court’s case-law the Government noted that completely irresponsible behaviour by applicants or their lawyers was clearly contrary to the true mission of the Court and may lead to the dismissal of the application as being abusive. They thus requested that the Court declare the application inadmissible as being abusive under Article <mask> of the Convention.


47.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. First of all, her claim lodged with the domestic courts was directed against the Government but not the Savings Bank of Armenia. However, it was the latter and not the former which was the legal successor of the Armenian branch of the USSR Savings Bank and bore all the ensuing obligations. Secondly, the applicant contested the decision of the Kentron and Nork‑Marash District Court only on the ground of a procedural but not a substantive violation of the law, thereby failing to raise in substance any of her complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Finally, the claim lodged by the applicant with the District Court was different in substance from the complaints which she raised before the Court.


18.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint concerning the conditions of detention during his initial detention in Prison no. 13 (between 17 October and 27 November 2007) should be rejected as lodged outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article <mask> of the Convention. They relied on the Court’s case-law such as Koval v. Ukraine ((dec.), no. 65550/01, 30 March 2004) and I.D. v. Moldova (no. 47203/06, § 31, 30 November 2010) and considered that the two periods of the applicant’s detention in Prison no. 13 were distinct instances and did not constitute a “continuous situation”.