69.  The applicant complained that his detention in the Simferopol ITT had been in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention since that facility was not appropriate for a long-term detention of a person. He further complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings in his criminal case had been unfair. He also complained that his rights under the Convention had been violated by the enforcement of the confiscation order adopted in his criminal case. Lastly, the applicant complained that he was not paid invalidity allowance for a certain period of time.


70.  The Government maintained that the grounds of the applicant's pre‑trial detention were clearly defined and the law itself was foreseeable in its application, so that it met the standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention. They maintained that the applicant had been detained on the ground of suspicion of having committed a serious crime and with the aim of ensuring his continued participation in the legal process. Furthermore, the periods of the applicant's detention covered by the court decisions protected the applicant from “arbitrariness”, which protection is intrinsic to the meaning of “lawfulness” of detention under Article <mask> of the Convention.


137.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ administrative imprisonment had been ordered by the Sunzhenskiy District Court in a decision of 24 September 2001, of which the applicants had been immediately informed. In their observations submitted prior to the Court’s decision as to admissibility of 15 November 2007, the Government stated that the domestic investigation obtained no information about the applicants’ detention between 24 September and 12 October 2001 and that, therefore, there was no evidence that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In their observations submitted after that decision, they stated that on 24 September 2001 the applicants had been transferred to officers of the mobile detachment of the Ministry of the Interior, in breach of the applicable procedure. However, in the Government’s view, the dismissal of the head of the criminal police of the Sunzhenskiy ROVD and the reprimand given to the officer of the Sunzhenskiy ROVD, who had been in charge of the detention facility on the relevant date, constituted both an acknowledgment of the violation and provided redress for the applicants.


18.  The Government maintained that the applicant had failed to respect the six-month time-limit, laid down by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant’s initial conviction of 3 July 2002 turned his “pre-trial detention”, which had started on 17 November 2000, into a detention following a conviction. A six-month time-limit for lodging a complaint about this period of detention had thus started to run on that date and had expired on 3 January 2003. After the judgment of 3 July 2002 had been quashed on 6 December 2002, a new period of pre-trial detention had commenced, which lasted until the applicant was convicted on 1 April 2004 for the second time. The six-month period for lodging a Convention complaint about this period of detention had, therefore, expired on 1 October 2004. In the meantime, the Government noted that the first reference to Article <mask> of the Convention had been made by the applicant only in his application form of 10 November 2004. In their opinion, his complaints under this provision had, therefore, been lodged out of time. The Government also contended that in any event the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, as his detention had not been in contravention of the provisions of Article 5.


135.  The applicant questioned the availability of judicial review in respect of his detention pending extradition. He submitted that the Russian legislation had no mechanisms for such review, as the courts had refused for over one year to consider his complaints, alleging that they had no jurisdiction to do so. He had finally been released with direct reference to Article <mask> of the Convention, but not to any provisions of domestic law.


43.  The applicant also lodged other complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, having regarding to the above finding of a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, the other complaints under Article 5 of the Convention are admissible and whether there have also been violations of that provision (see, for the approach, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014)..


108.  The applicants stated that there had been no grounds for their relatives' arrest or detention, and in particular, no reason to believe that they had committed any criminal offence. At the time of their apprehension, the Musayev brothers had been at home with other family members, had identity papers, had no firearms, and had not attempted to assist A., the man who had run into their house, or to resist the federal servicemen. They voluntarily reported to the district office of the Interior for questioning. Furthermore, the officers who had taken the Musayev brothers away had not given any reason for their detention. The applicants thus argued that their relatives had been detained in breach of the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention.


36.  The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a “victim” of the alleged breach of Article <mask> of the Convention because the domestic courts had declared his detention on remand unlawful and had awarded him compensation of RUB 100,000. They stated, in particular, that the courts had found unlawful the entire period of the applicant’s detention on remand, which, in the Government’s submission, was to be understood as also covering the time span between 20 and 22 March 2005 in respect of which the applicant had complained to the Court. The Government concluded that the domestic authorities had not only acknowledged the breach of the applicant’s rights but had also afforded him appropriate redress.


149.  The Government further submitted that the domestic authorities had been obliged to hold the applicant in custody because the Strasbourg Court had applied Rule 39 and indicated to them to suspend his extradition. Referring to the Chahal case (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V), they stressed that paragraph 1 (f) of Article <mask> of the Convention provided for a level of protection different from paragraph 1 (a)-(e), requiring only that extradition proceedings be pending. Hence, it was immaterial for that provision whether there existed sufficient grounds for holding the person in custody. Accordingly, the applicant's detention from 5 August 2008 onwards had been “lawful” within the meaning of the above provision.


59.  The applicant took the view that his preventive detention had violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, it had not been justified under sub-paragraph (a) of that provision. He argued, firstly, that the developments which had occurred after he had lodged his application in 2004 had to be taken into account. Since 21 March 2006 he had been in detention for a period exceeding ten years. His preventive detention as of that date had, in any event, breached Article <mask> of the Convention for the reasons set out in the judgment in the case of M. v. Germany (cited above).


55.  The Government submitted that on 12 June 2004 the District Court had taken a decision to remand the applicant in custody in view of a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of a particularly serious criminal offence and having concluded that the applicant might abscond or otherwise obstruct the proceedings. In coming to such a conclusion the District Court took into account that previously, on 23 October 2001, the applicant had been convicted of attempted bribery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. By the same judgment the applicant, a former officer of the criminal investigations department in police operational work, had also been deprived of the right to work in the police force for three years. The custodial measure in respect of the applicant was chosen and extended by the competent domestic authorities in compliance with the procedure established by domestic law and in accordance with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. On each occasion the court took into account circumstances which gave grounds to believe that, if released, the applicant might obstruct the course of justice by putting pressure on victims and witnesses. The Government particularly emphasised the fact that the grounds warranting the choice of custodial measure had remained unchanged throughout the proceedings. They concluded that the applicant’s remand in custody had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons and had been in line with the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.


91.  The applicants contended that Mr Sakhrab Abakargadzhiyev had been subjected to torture and inhuman treatment by the abductors and that no effective investigation had been conducted in this connection. The applicants further contended that their relative had been detained in violation of the guarantees contained in Article <mask> of the Convention. They also argued that, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, there were no available domestic remedies against the violations alleged, in particular those under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Those Articles read, in so far as relevant:


269.  The applicants in all cases except for Tashuyeva v. Russia (no. 70438/14) also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the unlawfulness of their relatives’ detention. They furthermore argued that, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, they had no available domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention.


55.  The Government submitted that the Court had never found the exercise of a power to stop and search to constitute a deprivation of liberty within Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, in a number of cases the Convention organs had refused to find that restrictions on liberty far more intrusive than those at issue in the present case fell within the ambit of Article 5 (the Government referred inter alia to Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February 1994, Series A no. 281‑A; Trijonis v. Lithuania, no. 2333/02, 15 December 2005; Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII; Gartukayev v. Russia, no. 71933/01, 13 December 2005; and also Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 8007/77, Commission decision of 10 July 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) 13, p. 85, § 235; X. v. Germany, no. 8334/78, Commission decision of 7 May 1981, DR 24, p. 131; Guenat v. Switzerland, no. 2472/94, Commission decision of 10 April 1995, DR 81-B, p. 13). The Government argued that when the power to stop and search was looked at against this background, the ordinary exercise by the police of such a power would plainly not in usual circumstances engage Article 5, and did not do so in the applicants' cases. There were a number of specific features which argued against the applicability of Article 5 in the particular circumstances of each applicant's case. First, the duration of the searches (20 minutes in respect of the first applicant and either five or 30 minutes in respect of the second) was clearly insufficient to amount to a deprivation of liberty in the absence of any aggravating factors. Secondly, the purpose for which the police exercised their powers was not to deprive the applicants of their liberty but to conduct a limited search for specified articles. Thirdly, the applicants were not arrested or subjected to force of any kind. Fourthly, there was no close confinement in a restricted place. Fifthly, the applicants were not placed in custody or required to attend a particular location: they were searched on the spot.


120.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention should be declared inadmissible, because he failed to exhaust available domestic remedies, namely to appeal against the decisions concerning the extension of his detention of 19 February, 20 March, 18 April, 14 July and 26 December 2003, 18 March, 29 September and 28 December 2004, and 30 March 2005. They further submitted that the decisions to remand the applicant in custody were lawful and well reasoned. The length of his detention was justified by the complexity of his criminal case, the necessity to perform an expert psychiatric examination, the non-appearance of his lawyer, the seriousness of the charges against him and his state of health.


42.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


115.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the national courts by wrongly finding that her claim for damages had been lodged after the statutory limitation period had expired, deprived her of the right of access to court because they had not examined her claim on the merits. She also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the taking of her husband by uniformed persons in November 1991.


31.  The applicant complained in general under Article <mask> of the Convention that his detention had been unlawful. The applicant maintained that he had had to enter into a written undertaking not to abscond, which violated his right to freedom of movement. He relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. He further complained that his detention had led to a deterioration of his health and had placed his life at risk. He invoked Article 2 of the Convention. He also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him had affected his private and family life.


106.  The Government submitted that the second applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, given that the Constitutional Court had expressly recognised a violation of his right to liberty related to his continued pre-trial detention. According to the Government, it therefore remained open for the second applicant to seek damages for his allegedly unjustified detention, as provided for under the relevant domestic law. Similarly, the applicant could claim compensation for the overall period he had spent in detention given that he was eventually acquitted. The Government further provided documents showing that in fact subsequently the applicant had availed himself of that possibility and he had been accordingly awarded an adequate compensation of damages.


92.  The Government denied that the applicant had ever been “detained” because he had not been “arrested in procedural terms” and because no formal “detention measures” had been taken. Rather, the applicant had not been permitted to cross the Russian border and had been offered the possibility of staying in the transit hall of the airport, where he could use the bar and telephone. Accordingly, the Government considered that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. In any event, they claimed that the applicant had been able to lodge an application for judicial review of his alleged detention with the Moscow Regional Court, which had satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 4.


97.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had not been based on a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that his pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


132.  The Government took the view that the Bremen Court of Appeal’s assessment of the relevant facts and interpretation of the applicable provisions of national law had not been arbitrary and that the proceedings had therefore not been unfair. They referred in this connection to their submissions concerning Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the applicant and her counsel had had ample opportunities – which they had seized – to question the expert appointed by the court and to comment on his report both orally and in writing. The Court of Appeal, in giving reasons for its judgment, had carefully considered the positions of the parties and the three expert reports before it, two of which had been submitted by the applicant.


77.  The applicant submitted that special police supervision fell within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention and pointed out that failure to observe the rules of conduct attaching to that measure was punishable by a custodial sentence (section 9 of the 1956 Act). The restrictions imposed on him during the period from 4 July 2008 to 4 February 2009 had deprived him of his personal liberty. In his submission, the present case was comparable to Guzzardi v. Italy (6 November 1980, Series A no. 39), in which the Court had found that in view of the particular circumstances of the case, the applicant – who had been subjected to similar measures to those imposed on the applicant in the present case – had been deprived of his liberty, and that there had been a violation of Article 5.


93.  The applicant submitted that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 did not require the United Kingdom to hold him in internment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In Resolution 1546 the Security Council conferred on the United Kingdom a power, but not an obligation, to intern. As the International Court of Justice stated in the Namibia case, “the language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect” (see paragraph 49 above). Where appropriate, the Security Council could require States to take specific action. It did so in the resolutions under consideration in the Kadi and Bosphorus cases (cited above), where States were required, “with no autonomous discretion”, respectively to freeze the assets of designated persons or to impound aircraft operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In contrast, the language of Resolution 1546 and the letters annexed thereto made it clear that the Security Council was asked to provide, and did provide, an authorisation to the Multinational Force to take the measures that it considered necessary to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. It did not require a State to take action incompatible with its human rights obligations, but instead left a discretion to the State as to whether, when and how to contribute to the maintenance of security. Respect for human rights was one of the paramount principles of the Charter of the United Nations and if the Security Council had intended to impose an obligation on British forces to act in breach of the United Kingdom’s international human rights obligations, it would have used clear and unequivocal language. It followed that the rule of priority under Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations did not come into effect.


153.  The Government found the claim excessive and stated that no compensation for non-pecuniary damage should be awarded since neither the applicant’s nor his successor’s rights had been violated in the present case. They further submitted, however, that should the Court find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the applicant, (i) it would be irrelevant to the claim made by his mother; and (ii) the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction in the present case.


44.  The Government contested the applicant’s argument that house arrest had constituted a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They suggested that the measure should be examined as a restriction of freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. In any event, they considered that the coercive measure had been justified in view of the prior breach of the applicant’s residence order. They submitted that although the investigator’s order to apply a written undertaking not to leave the city of Moscow, dated 17 December 2012, could be “interpreted in different ways”, it did not absolve the applicant from obtaining prior authorisation from the investigator for travelling to Moscow Region. They maintained that the requirement of prior authorisation set out in Article 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had remained valid irrespective of the investigator’s decision of 17 December 2012. They submitted that the cancellation of that decision by the investigator himself on 13 January 2014 corroborated their argument. They also pointed out that the applicant had not gone to the investigator’s office to study the criminal case file on 19 December 2013.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s detention had been lawful within the meaning of the domestic law and had been justified by the reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. They added that there had been “adequate” and “sufficient” grounds for the applicant’s continued detention. They thus considered that his detention had been in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention.


61.  The applicant complained that the supervisory review of his release on bail conducted on 15 June 2006 and his ensuing remand in custody on 20 June 2006 had, as such, been unlawful, and that the procedure followed, in particular, the authorities’ failure to ensure his presence at the hearing, had been incompatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The relevant parts of Article 5 of the Convention read as follows:


16.  The Government stated that there was no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. Initially the applicant was placed in detention because there was a “reasonable suspicion” that he had committed a crime. The preventive measure was selected according to the procedure and on the grounds prescribed the domestic law. Before deciding on the prolongation of the applicant’s detention the court examined the case-files and heard the arguments of the interested parties, the courts’ decisions were lawful and substantiated.


116.  The applicant’s submission was that his placement in the Īle Centre together with people with mental disorders did not fall within any of the grounds on which deprivation of liberty could be justified under Article <mask> of the Convention. The domestic authorities had based their decisions to place the applicant in the Īle Centre solely on the fact that his family were not prepared to take care of him and that he needed social assistance. The authorities had not examined whether the necessary assistance could be provided through alternative measures that were less restrictive of his personal liberty.


85.  The Government further submitted that there had been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of any incorrect application of the national law. The applicant had not attempted to institute criminal proceedings against the persons responsible for her detention in Dr Heines’s clinic. Her civil action for damages against the clinic had been dismissed by the Bremen Court of Appeal. However, even assuming that Article <mask> of the Convention had to be taken into consideration by that court in construing the provisions of German civil law applicable to the case, its interpretation could not be regarded as arbitrary. Regard had to be had to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in this sphere.


19.  The applicant complained that, contrary to Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, her remand in custody had not been based on a reasonable suspicion that she had committed a criminal offence and that the courts had failed to give any relevant and sufficient reasons for its decision. The relevant part of Article <mask> of the Convention reads as follows:


55.  The Government argued that a degree of friction between the capacity available in custodial clinics and the capacity required should be regarded as acceptable, having regard to the need to manage and balance public spending. Given the twofold purpose of a TBS order, namely to provide the person concerned with care and treatment for his mental disorder and to protect the public against the danger posed by this disorder, a period in which no treatment could be given could not be regarded as unlawful or incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


65.  The Government further submitted that appeal prohibitions could be set aside, in accordance with the case-law of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (see above § 26), if a decision that was excluded from appeal concerned a person’s civil rights or obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. Therefore, if the applicant’s complaint was considered to be a civil right, she would have had the right to have her case examined on the merits by a court of law, notwithstanding the appeal prohibition in Section 39 of the 2000 Ordinance. Hence, the Government contended that the applicant should have submitted an appeal to the domestic courts. By not having done so, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.


19.  The Government submitted that, as a result of a bailiff's error in the course of the enforcement proceedings conducted in 2001, the amount of RUR 30,084, instead of being transferred to the applicant, had been used to cover the bailiffs' fees. The mistake had been rectified on 9 March 2006, when the amount was transferred to the applicant by postal order. The Government acknowledged that the five-year delay in executing the judgment in the applicant's favour constituted a violation of her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


66.  The applicant submitted that once a warrant of prohibitory injunction was issued, it continued to have effect until the final outcome of the proceedings, unless it was revoked before that date. Thus, the injunction proceedings in which the warrant was granted affected the civil rights of the parties, albeit provisionally, for a certain period of time. Thus, considering the far-reaching effects resulting from such a warrant, Article <mask> of the Convention applied, especially in the Maltese context.


40.  The applicant complained that she had not had access to the Austrian courts in connection with her claim for payment of salary from September 1996 onwards arising out of her employment contract with the embassy of the United States of America in Vienna. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:


24.  The applicant company submitted that the decisions in the present case did not concern obvious mistakes. The addition of costs which had not been included in the original decisions cannot be regarded as evident. The applicant company relied on the case of Beer v. Austria in which the Court had found that the failure to serve a cost appeal in summary appeal proceedings against a cost order constituted a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention (Beer v. Austria, no. 30428/96, § 20, 6 February 2001). Subsequently the Austrian legislature changed the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure introducing a new Article 521a § 4, according to which also in cost proceedings the opposing party had to be heard. Even though the instant proceedings differed in their subject matter from appeal proceedings against a cost order, the applicant company should have been given the opportunity to comment on the opposing parties' request for correction.


27.  The Government argued that at this preliminary stage there was no objective need for more complex reasoning by the judge rapporteur, apart from a reference to the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Law. In support the Government relied of the cases of Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) ([GC], no. 12686/03, 20 March 2009), and Bufferne v. France ((dec.), no. 54367/00, ECHR 2002‑III (extracts)) in which the Court has not found such a practice incompatible with the requirement of sufficient reasoning under Article <mask> of the Convention. Given that the applicant submitted her appeal on points of law in an attempt to achieve a re-examination of evidence already assessed by the appellate court, and that the appeal on points of law did not cite any violation susceptible to the institution of cassation proceedings, the Government contended that the impugned decision contained sufficient reasoning.


44.  The applicants referred first of all to the principle established in the Court’s case-law concerning the application of Article <mask> of the Convention, to the effect that the accused must be given the opportunity to be confronted with witnesses against them and to examine them. They argued that this principle was particularly important when the testimony in question was the main evidence for the prosecution. The opportunity to be confronted with and to examine a witness could be provided when the statement was taken or at another stage of the proceedings.


72.  The applicant complained under Article 6 that he did not understand the charges against him during his deportation. The Court notes that there were no judicial proceedings concerning the applicant’s removal from the territory of Ukraine and that any such proceedings would fall outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 40, ECHR 2000‑X). Despite its findings that the applicant’s expulsion has appearances of extradition in disguise (see paragraph 58 above), the Court considers that this does not preclude it from examining the question of whether the removal of the applicant from the territory of Ukraine, which was formally presented as expulsion, complied with the Convention requirements. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court decides to examine the problem raised by the applicant under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, which reads as follows:


58.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s ill-treatment had been the subject of a thorough investigation which resulted in the identification and punishment of the perpetrators. The punishment received by the police officers was proportionate to the seriousness of the crimes which they had committed. Moreover, Moldovan law distinguished between petty crimes, crimes of average gravity, as well as serious, very serious and exceptionally serious crimes. Since the crime committed by the police officers was considered an average level one, the punishment of two years’ imprisonment passed on 22 April 2002 constituted an appropriate punishment. The quashing of that judgment had been the result of a desire by the domestic courts to observe the accused’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention to have a fully reasoned judgment.


48.  The applicants complained that they had been unlawfully denied access to court and that the rejection of their claim for trespass had interfered with their property rights. They belatedly submitted comments, which, for that reason, were not admitted to the case file. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, and Article 1 of Protocol No 1, respectively, the latter of which provides:


46.  The Government submitted that the applicant had enjoyed full access to a court. He had been able to challenge the order for his dismissal, and the Supreme Administrative Court had, within the limits of its competence, ruled on that order’s lawfulness. The psychological assessment underpinning the order had not been the subject matter of the judicial review proceedings. It had not been an administrative decision and could not have itself been challenged by way of judicial review. The body which had made the assessment, the Psychology Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was a specialised body whose tasks included assessing, on the basis of a range of criteria laid down in Instruction no. I‑37 of 5 March 2001, the mental fitness of the Ministry’s staff. Because of that, its assessments could not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Once the Institute had assessed a member of staff to be mentally unfit for work, the Minister had no discretion and was bound to dismiss that person. The Supreme Administrative Court had found that in the applicant’s case the procedure governing the manner in which the assessment was to be carried out had been followed, that the Institute had assessed the applicant to be mentally unfit for work, and that as a result the Minister had, by means of a reasoned decision, dismissed the applicant from his post. The Government also drew attention to this Court’s statement in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007‑II) that its conclusion on the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to proceedings concerning the employment of civil servants was without prejudice to the question as to how the various guarantees of that Article should be applied in such proceedings.


45.  The Government further argued that the applicant had not complained of a violation of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in the proceedings before the domestic courts. In particular, in his constitutional complaint the applicant had only complained of violations of his constitutional rights to equality before the courts and a fair hearing, which corresponded in substance to Article <mask> of the Convention.


78.  The applicants complained that the forest authority had launched a campaign against them and had fined some of them for having used their own land. Mr Aliosman Kehaya complained, in addition, that he had not been summoned to the 1998 proceedings concerning the fines against him. Mr Kestendjiev complained that he could not obtain reimbursement despite the fact that the fine imposed on him had been set aside. The applicants relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and also on Article <mask> of the Convention.


20.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention because of the refusal of the domestic courts to suspend or adjourn the criminal proceedings initiated by C.T. against him for false accusation, perjury and slander until the end of the criminal proceedings he had initiated against C.T. for breach of duty, extortion and bribery. The provision in question reads as follows:


24.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that in the District Court’s decision of 18 June 2009, by which his pre-trial detention had been extended, it had been taken as established that he had committed a criminal offence, which violated his right to be presumed innocent. The relevant part of Article <mask> of the Convention reads as follows:


27.  The Government submitted that the right of access to a court was not absolute and the requirement to pay fees in connection with civil claims could not be regarded as incompatible per se with Article <mask> of the Convention. They further maintained that the fee required from the applicant in the present case had been neither excessive nor arbitrary.


44.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had erred in the assessment of the facts of the case and their legal qualification. He also challenged the assessment of evidence and testimony of the prosecution witness and the expert. Lastly, relying on Article 7 of the Convention, he complained that there had been no proof that he had committed any crime.


19.  The applicant company submitted that the quashing of the judgment of 18 July 2007 had violated its right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The letter of 13 July 2007 of the Department for the Execution of Judgments had not disclosed any “new and essential facts or circumstances which were unknown and could not have been known earlier” in the sense of Article 449 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant company stressed that the information in the letter of 13 July 2007 could have been obtained by the applicant at any time between 2001 and 2007. The applicant company concluded that the request for review had in essence been an appeal in disguise and breached the principle of legal certainty.


25.   The applicant complained that the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention had been violated and submits that the Independent Administrative Panel had applied a reversal of the burden of proof. The applicant further complained about the Austrian authorities’ failure to hear J. Z. in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel as a witness. The applicant complained that no prosecuting authority participated in the proceedings before the Independent Administrative Panel and that therefore the member of the Independent Administrative Panel acted both as judge and prosecutor. He submits that, therefore, he did not have a fair hearing by a tribunal within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Finally, the applicant complained about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court.


116.  The applicant complained that she had not been able to initiate compensation proceedings against the State authorities in respect of the ill-treatment and death of her son in the army because of a jurisdictional conflict between the national civil and administrative courts. She therefore complained that she had been denied an effective domestic remedy in respect of her complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Although the applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court considers, having regard to the substance of this complaint that it would be more appropriate to examine it from the standpoint of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:


43.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied a fair trial with regard to their civil rights, as they had been refused a full legal review of the Government’s decision to permit the construction of the railway, which was situated on or close to their properties. The latter decision had significantly affected the applicants’ property as well as the environment in the area concerned. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


37.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings leading to the imposition of the custodial penalty on him. In particular, the applicant complained of a lack of impartiality on the part of judges in that the judges who had witnessed the impugned incident had later imposed the penalty for contempt of court. He also alleged inequality of arms and a lack of objectivity on the part of the court in that he had had no time and facilities to prepare his defence, he had not been allowed to present arguments by the court or even, to be present when the penalty had been ordered. The applicant also complained that the decision on the imposition of the penalty for contempt of court had not been reasoned.


31.  The applicant contested the argument that he had not exhausted domestic remedies. He argued that even though he had not explicitly referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, he had raised such a complaint in substance before the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation. The domestic courts had been aware of the Court’s first judgment and therefore the only interpretation of a refusal to grant his request for a suspension was that such a refusal would not be in line with the first judgment. He had thus given the domestic courts the opportunity to provide redress for the alleged violation.


18.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that her right to a fair trial had been violated stating, inter alia, that she was unable to lodge an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 15 October 2007 since she could not afford the services of an advocate licensed to act before the Court of Cassation. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint essentially raises an issue of access to court and should therefore be examined from the standpoint of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


57.  The applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court had changed its interpretation of the Salduz judgment in 2012 and 2013 (see relevant domestic law) and that different conclusions had been arrived at in such cases. He noted that these conflicting judgments ran counter to the principle of legal certainty. It was the Constitutional Court’s role to create certainty; however, concerning this subject matter it had done just the opposite. The applicant relied on the case of Beian (cited above). He noted that in The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011 and The Police vs Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011, the Constitutional Court had held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. This interpretation had been reversed in the judgments in the cases of Joseph Bugeja vs The Attorney General, 14 January 2013, The Police vs Tyron Fenech, 22 February 2013 and The Police vs Amanda Agius, also of 22 February 2013, as well as in the applicant’s case, decided on 26 April 2013. The interpretation had again been reversed by the first-instance court in The Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri of 12 November 2012, albeit that, pending proceedings before this Court, the decision was once again overturned by the Constitutional Court in retrial proceedings. Moreover, the Government’s argument that the Constitutional Court had created a linear interpretation dependent on the age of the victim was also disproved by the recent judgment in Taliana vs Commissioner of Police et al, (Civil Court (First Hall) constitutional jurisdiction, 30 April 2014 – now pending on appeal before the Constitutional Court), which had not found a violation despite the applicant being a minor.


59.  The Government submitted that, although the applicant had not been given the opportunity to follow the interviews of the four victims by the police and had not been able to have questions put to them, the use in evidence of these four victims' statements was not contrary to his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the first place, the applicant had consistently disputed the victims' identification of him as the perpetrator, but not the facts of the case. Secondly, the public prosecutor had refused the applicant's request to take further evidence from the victims considering that this would be extremely distressing for the children. Moreover, the applicant had failed to indicate on what grounds he wished to query the identification procedure and the statements taken from the four boys during the initial investigation. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal did grant his request to take further evidence from the adult witnesses, Mrs E. and Mrs F., whose statements corroborated the children's statements, and from the police officers X., Y. and Z. The Government further pointed out that, after X., Y. and Z. had been heard before the Court of Appeal on 16 April 1998, the applicant's lawyer had indicated that the defence did not wish to take further evidence from them or any other witnesses and did not explicitly persist in its request to hear the four children.


22.  The Government disagreed. They emphasised that the extent to which the duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Although Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle, simply endorse the reasons for the lower court’s decision. Moreover, while Article <mask> of the Convention guarantees a right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts.


54.  The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings initiated at his request were unfair and that therefore, there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee the right to pursue criminal proceedings against third persons and that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings aimed at instituting criminal proceedings against third persons. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.


24.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Khabarovsk courts lacked impartiality and independence and that the proceedings on his claims had been unfair and excessively long. He further complained under Articles 9, 10, 14 and 17 of the Convention and Protocol No. 12 that he had been persecuted for his beliefs and discriminated against. Finally, he complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 that, lacking residence registration, he could not buy a plane ticket.


15.  The applicant complained that the non‑communication of the principal public prosecutor’s written opinion to him infringed the right to a fair trial, resulting from the failure to respect the principle of equality of arms. He further alleged that the fairness of the proceedings had been undermined by the attendance of the prosecutor at the deliberations of the Court of Cassation and the length of the proceedings. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant, read as follows:


60.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings had been unfair. In particular, they complained that costs had been unfairly ordered against them, in view of the fact that they had not been responsible for the errors committed by the first-instance court. Furthermore, they complained that they had not been heard in relation to this matter and that the Supreme Court’s judgment had not been reasoned in this respect.


42.  The Government submitted that the applicant had expressly waived his right to a lawyer and the waiver had been compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. The domestic courts had lawfully relied on the self-incriminating statements made by the applicant and the absence of the lawyer at that time had not affected the overall fairness of the proceedings. They argued that the applicant had voluntarily confessed to the murder and that his privilege against self-incrimination had not been affected.


31.  The Government maintained that the judgment of 23 October 2000 had been reviewed by the Supreme Court by way of the cassation appeal procedure provided for under the Code of Civil Procedure and that such review therefore complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further insisted that the quashing of the judgment of 23 October 2000 by the President of the Supreme Court had pursued the legitimate aim, in particular, of rectifying the errors made by the lower court when considering the applicant’s case.


45.  The Government argued that the two decisions cited above were in contradiction with each other in that the complaint under Article 6 about the fact that the applicant had been convicted under the summary procedure had been rejected by means of a decision against which no appeal lay, that being surely incompatible with the Court's intention to look into “the question whether the provisions introduced by Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000 infringed the principles of fair trial”. Moreover, before the decision on admissibility no specific question relating to compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention had been put to the Government by the Court's Registry, so that the Government had been prevented from submitting detailed observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaint in question.


23.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in view of the alleged failure to provide him with the relevant decisions concerning his son's case. The Court considers that this complaint raises essentially the same issue as that raised under Article 2 of the Convention, namely, whether the authorities complied with their procedural obligations under Article 2. It will therefore not examine this complaint separately.


73.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention. He alleged that on all seven occasions the proceedings in which he was convicted of an administrative offence fell short of the fair hearing guarantees, in particular the principles of equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, independence and impartiality of the tribunal, and the presumption of innocence. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:


77.  The Government submitted that, in any event, the applicant’s right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated. The Court of Appeal had taken evidence in compliance with the requirements of that provision. Pursuant to Article 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in particular, the same rules for the taking of evidence applied both to the prosecution and the defence. Under the German Code of Criminal Procedure, it was for the criminal courts themselves to investigate the truth of their own motion. Even though the investigation into offences committed abroad raised considerable procedural problems, the defendants were protected by the rules on criminal procedure and by having the benefit of the doubt.


99.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of his rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that he understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to provide him with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of his own choosing and to prepare his defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


87.  The Government submitted that face-to-face meetings were prohibited in order to protect the identities and the safety of the police officers responsible for the investigation. That prohibition was offset by the verification of lawfulness carried out by the Indictments Division. The latter drew on the confidential file to check the identities and the reliability of the undercover agents, thus verifying whether the case had involved any incitement, and if so, deciding on the lawfulness of the evidence. At all stages in the proceedings before the investigating authority the defendants had had the opportunity of consulting the opened case file, which had necessarily contained all the relevant evidence. In addition, throughout the proceedings in the instant case the domestic courts had sought to ensure that the defence rights and the fairness of proceedings were being respected, in compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


26.  The Government submitted that the applicant was not precluded from lodging an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation but there was a certain procedure envisaged by the law at the material time which should have been respected by a person willing to apply to this court. They argued that procedural requirements for lodging appeals were not incompatible with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, the domestic law envisaged a possibility to receive free legal assistance upon the initiative of an advocate. The Government finally submitted that the requirement that appeals on points of law could only be lodged by licensed advocates pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the quality of appeals lodged with the Court of Cassation and was later abolished due to difficulties revealed during the practical implementation of the relevant procedural rules.


42.  The applicant argued that, whenever the court authorities transmit the summons solely to counsel, the latter will bear the burden and risk of delivery, which, in the applicant’s view, would run counter to Article <mask> of the Convention. A request by counsel that the applicant be summoned in person would have been in vain, as the direct service of a writ to an accused, who was assisted by counsel, was not provided for by the Code of Administrative Offences. In any event, the applicant, having made two requests to attend the hearing, was entitled to be heard at least once. In particular, evidence could have been obtained whether or not he had received information on the prolongation of the provisional work permit of A., and, if he had got such information, what kind that was. Furthermore, the applicant had been excluded from examining witnesses.


52.  The applicant observed that, at the relevant time, the Constitutional Court in several restitution cases quashed judgments which had been adopted without a public hearing pursuant to section 250(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Invoking Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Article <mask> of the Convention, the Constitutional Court found that cases involving controversial arguments could not be considered to be simple cases. Thus in decision No. II. ÚS 269/95, the Constitutional Court expressly stated that “restitution cases cannot be re-examined without a public hearing taking into account their complexity and the fact that former acts of deprivation of property rights had taken place a long time before”. Similarly, on 29 November 1994 the Constitutional Court quashed a judgment of the Prague Municipal Court given without a public hearing in another restitution case (decision No. Pl. ÚS 41/94) holding that “the simple cases mentioned in section 250(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure are, according to the legislator, cases in which the necessary evidence has been obtained and the cases themselves are quite clear and only points of law are really at issue”.


71.  The applicant submitted that prior to July 1999 in Bulgaria there had not existed any formal remedies against the unreasonable length of civil proceedings. He further submitted that the remedy created in July 1999 – the “complaint about delays” – was not an effective one. In particular, the applicant argued that for a remedy to be effective, it had to be able to lead to a finding that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable and to result in an award of compensation for delays which had already occurred. Measured by this yardstick, the procedures available under Bulgarian law did not constitute effective remedies for the purposes of Article 13. Prior to July 1999 the applicant could address the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council. However, those were unregulated hierarchical appeals which could not lead to binding remedial action. As regards the “complaint about delays”, it did not lead to a finding that Article <mask> of the Convention had been breached and could not result in compensation; therefore it was likewise not effective.


89.  The Government further alleged that no evidence originating from X’s case had been used in the proceedings against the applicants. In any event, the use of evidence from the disjoined proceedings would have been lawful under Article 154 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject to Article 240 of the Code which requires a judgment to be based solely on evidence examined in a court hearing. They submitted that under these conditions, using evidence from the disjoined proceedings was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


83.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial.


42.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, in the domestic proceedings which concluded in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 July 2002, they lacked access to a court having full jurisdiction because the domestic courts refused to review the valuation of the Properties and relied entirely on the method and calculations undertaken by the Privatisation Agency and the Ministry of Industry in determining their entitlement to shares under section 18 of the Privatisation Act. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows:


30.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s failure to object to postponements of the hearings prevented him from claiming a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Ciricosta and Viola v. Italy, 4 December 1995, § 32, Series A no. 337‑A). However, the Court considers that the circumstances of the present case are distinct from the special situation obtaining in Ciricosta. In that case the Court noted that a remedy for delays in proceedings had recently been introduced and that at the time of its judgment it was too early to verify its effectiveness (§ 31). This was not so in the present case. Moreover, the total number and duration of postponements in Ciricosta were so extensive as to affect the duration of the proceedings seriously, while the Government submitted evidence of only several such postponements in the present case and these were not capable of affecting the overall length of the proceedings. The Court concludes that the applicant did not contribute in any significant manner to the length of the proceedings.


53.  The Government submitted that during the hearing of 12 October 1992 Mrs M. did not complain that she had not been given an opportunity to make submissions, nor did she lodge a request to make further submissions. Similarly, she did not challenge the judge at any stage of the proceedings and during the same proceedings she failed to raise before the relevant courts the issue under Article <mask> of the Convention that her right to an impartial tribunal was “likely” to be infringed. Mrs M. never requested that the Chief Justice withdraw from her case, a plea which would not have been decided by the Chief Justice alone, but by the three judges sitting in the case. According to the Government, Mrs M. could have made such a request under Article 734 § 1 (e) of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure (see paragraph 28 above) which reflected the nemo iudex in causa propria rule in general. The Government made reference to various domestic decisions in which the courts had repeatedly attributed overriding importance to the fact that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done and that this had been an acknowledged legitimate ground for the withdrawal of or challenge to a judge. However, at the hearing before the Grand Chamber the Government admitted that there had been no domestic case-law proving that a challenge under Article 734 § 1 (e) of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure in such a case as the present one would have been successful.


52.  The Government also disputed the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6. They pointed out, primarily, that the Court could not create a substantive right which had no legal basis in the country concerned. Luxembourg domestic law did not recognise any “right” on the part of the applicant which could bring Article 6 § 1 into play. Under section 7 of the 1986 Law and Article 4 of the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 19 February 1989, prison leave was not a right but merely a privilege granted to prisoners. The legislature, in giving responsibility for matters relating to the execution of sentences imposed by the criminal courts to the Attorney General or his or her representative, had sought to remove the enforcement of judicial rulings from the control of the ordinary courts, whose task was confined to hearing and determining cases. Hence, the granting of prison leave would remain a matter exclusively for the Attorney General or his or her representative, ruling, in the case of persons whose sentence exceeded two years, in accordance with the majority decision of the Prison Board. Furthermore, prison leave, including the arrangements for its implementation, fell wholly within the State’s powers of discretion in the sphere of justice and penal policy. Thus, a dispute (contestation) over “rights” for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention could not be said to exist. The Government added that prisoners, who had the benefit of the safeguards provided by the Convention throughout the criminal proceedings until their conviction by the courts, had to serve their sentence to its end, forfeiting their liberty in the process. Hence, the applicant had been subjected to generally permissible restrictions applied to prisoners convicted under ordinary criminal law, arising solely out of the custodial sentence imposed on him. In that respect, the present case differed from Enea v. Italy ([GC], no. 74912/01, ECHR 2009‑...), where the applicant had been placed under a more severe confinement regime entailing more substantial restrictions on his rights compared with other inmates imprisoned under the ordinary criminal law. As to whether the alleged right relied upon was a “civil” right, the Government argued that any supposed right to prison leave did not by its nature have mainly or exclusively pecuniary implications. The applicant’s action in the administrative courts had not had a pecuniary aim, as it had sought the setting-aside of the decisions of the Prison Board rather than the recognition of a possible right to prison leave for the applicant. The outcome of the administrative proceedings, moreover, had not been directly decisive for the granting of prison leave, as the administrative courts could not substitute their assessment for that of the Prison Board. Lastly, in so far as the applicant relied on his right to see his children and reintegrate into social and professional life, the Government submitted that, if there had indeed been any restriction in that regard, it had been brought about solely by the offence which the applicant had committed and which had led to his custodial sentence. The Prison Board had taken no measures to prevent the applicant from seeing his children or resuming work. As to his social and professional reintegration, the Government pointed out that the applicant had received vocational training throughout his detention, of which he could make use when he had completed his sentence. The Government concluded that the proceedings before the Prison Board did not fall within the scope of Article 6 of the Convention.


22.  The Government contested the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the proceedings on the postponement of enforcement. According to the Court's case-law, a “civil right” exists if there is a genuine and serious dispute which relates to the existence, the content or the conditions of a right and which is, at least on arguable grounds, recognised under domestic law. The outcome of the proceedings must have a direct impact on the right in question.


17.  The applicant complained in the first place that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Ankara State Security Court. The applicant further maintained that the principle of equality of arms had been violated since he had not been notified of the public prosecutor’s observations at the appeal stage. In this connection, he invoked Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows:


82.  The applicant organisation complained of a violation of a right to a fair hearing. In particular, the applicant organisation complained that the principle of equality of arms had not been respected as regards the extension of the limits of the counterclaim in the second set of proceedings. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:


36.  The applicant complained that lack of diligence on the part of the competent Romanian authorities in assisting him in the enforcement procedure of a judgment in his favour had infringed his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and also his right to property as provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Insofar as relevant, these provisions read as follows:


28.  The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the law did not allow them to seek an increase in rent to reflect market values, thus it made them bear an excessive burden which could not be justified by any legitimate interest. Under Article <mask> of the Convention they complained that they did not have an effective remedy which could determine a rent increase, since the law provided for a cap on rent levels which had to be applied by the Rent Regulation Board.


24.  The applicant complained that in the appeal hearing of 24 April 2003 he had not been represented by counsel. As regards the new appeal hearing of 1 October 2008, he alleged that the defence provided by State-appointed counsel had not been effective; that the video link had been of poor quality and he had been unable to hear and to follow the court session. Furthermore, he argued that the fee awarded to counsel by the appellate court had been excessive. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


23.  The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue because, at the time of the events, the Court's judgment in the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV), had not yet been given and under the Pellegrin test (Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, § ..., ECHR 1999‑VIII) Article 6 would not have been applicable to disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant such as the applicant.


47.  The applicant replied, with reference to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution and the practice of the Constitutional Court, that in order to exhaust all domestic remedies, individuals had to file a complaint with the Constitutional Court if and when they alleged a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. Indeed, the applicant’s claims before the Constitutional Court, namely the impartiality of the court, the breach of the principle of legal certainty and the failure to enforce a final judgment, fell within the Constitutional Court’s competence as confirmed by its practice. Hence, the Constitutional Court had both the competence and an obligation to consider and decide the case, if necessary, by means of a judgment. Accordingly, the applicant’s claims had been lodged in time as, irrespective of the fact that it was a de plano inadmissibility decision, the Constitutional Court’s decision was dated 8 April 2002.


25.  The Government submitted that the complaint under Article 7 had not been brought before the constitutional jurisdictions, as the complaint before such courts had been raised solely under Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted that, while it was true that the applicant had tried to amend his application before the constitutional jurisdictions, he had done so too late, at a point when the case had been adjourned for judgment. Referring to Article 175 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, they noted that putting forward pleadings under Article 7 would have substantially affected the defence on the merits, which had been based on Article 6. The Government contested the applicant’s allegation that they had opposed his request, and noted that no right of reply to the applicant’s request had been granted to the respondent. Given the above, it had thus been for the applicant to lodge a fresh set of constitutional redress proceedings. Lastly, the Government noted that the Court’s power to decide a complaint ex officio under a different Article from the one relied on by the applicant did not override the need to exhaust domestic remedies.


117.  The applicant contended that compulsory questioning by police officers engaged the right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the purpose of the investigation was to enable the police to determine whether the person being questioned appeared to be a “terrorist”. Although the definition of “terrorist” was extremely broad, in most cases such an inquiry would include an investigation into whether someone had personal involvement in criminal offences. Moreover, the Schedule 7 powers had the substantive characteristics of a police power to investigate criminal activity.


16.  The Government further submitted that the judgment of 15 March 2004, by which the applicant had been awarded arrears in respect of food and disability allowances, and the judgment of 9 September 2004 had not been enforced because the Ministry of Finance had not allocated necessary funds to the local department of the federal treasury. The Government acknowledged that the non-enforcement of those judgments infringed the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Subsequently the Government submitted that the applicant had received monthly and annual allowances for the period up to 1 July 2006.


35. The Government maintained that the applicant’s representative had submitted his appeal in person to the first instance court, and that the date stamp on the appeal showed that the appeal had been submitted on 23 March 2001. The courts had therefore rejected the appeal as having not been submitted within the time-limit, as provided under the then Act. They further stated that the Court of Appeal had made efforts to establish the truth as to the date of receipt of the appeal. Acting upon its instructions, the first-instance court had established that 23 March 2001 had been recorded in the register as date of introduction. That date had been indicated on the copy of the appeal which had been communicated to the defendants for consideration. In addition, the applicant had had the right to challenge that decision before the Court of Appeal. They therefore concluded that the State could not be held responsible for errors made by the applicant’s lawyer, namely having failed to submit the appeal in good time. Finally, they stated that the applicant had been afforded the guarantees embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention.


32.  The applicant complained that the courts had refused his request for an alternative expert examination concerning the quality of the poppy-tar and that they had based their decisions on the expert reports produced by the same Ministry as had brought the criminal charges against him. He further complained that he had been incited by a police agent acting as an agent provocateur to commit the offence of which he was later convicted. He also alleged that the courts had refused to accept that he had decided to call off the sale of poppy-tar. He alleged procedural unfairness, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


90.  The Government argued that according to Article 217 § 1 of the new Civil Code, the absolute nullity of an act can be invoked by any person without any limitation in time. According to them, the absolute nullity of the sale and lease was an essential premise for the admission of the Prosecutor General’s action and the upholding of those actions after the expiry of the general time-limit did not breach the principles of fairness guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government also submitted that the fourth applicant was summoned at its official address and the court was not obliged to send a summons to another address.


17.  The Government, relying on the Court's judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant's complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant had been a military officer and the judgment award had concerned wage arrears for his military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of the invoked Convention provision as he had had no right to receive “payments in the amount desirable”. He neither had an “existing possession” nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 22 February 2002 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied material law.


53.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the Supreme Court’s refusal of 12 November 2001 to examine his cassation appeal (see paragraph 28 above). He submitted that the May 2000 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, which provided for the possibility to leave a cassation appeal without examination, had come into force after his cassation appeal against the judgment of 9 November 2000 had been lodged with the Supreme Court. As a result, he had been unfairly deprived of his right to have access to that court.


20.  The Government submitted that the judgments of 30 June 2003, 24 March 2004 and the judgment of 8 June 2004, by which the applicant had been awarded RUB 9,494.52, had been enforced in full. They further submitted that the judgments of 1 April and 8 June 2004 had not been enforced. They acknowledged that the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgments in the applicant's favour violated his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


25.  The Government argued that, in the assessment of the relationship between the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and the obligation to withhold information pertaining to ongoing police operations from the parties to court proceedings, a difference should be made between the withholding of facts not affecting nor relating to the case and the withholding of facts affecting or relating to the case. The right of everyone “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him” under Article 6 § 3 (d) cannot be considered to extend to the examination of witnesses in respect of facts which do not affect or relate to the case.


35.  The Government maintained that based on an overall assessment and in the light of the specific circumstances of the cases, the criminal charges against the applicants were determined within a reasonable time as prescribed by Article <mask> of the Convention. They agreed that the cases were uncomplicated as concerned the facts, but found that they were to some extent complex due to problems in law as well as procure. In this respect the Government referred inter alia to the involvement of EU-law issues, notably the question whether the relevant provision of the 1989 Act should have been notified to the European Commission and the question whether the cases should have been referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, the Government found that the applicants to a very considerable extent had been a contributory cause to the length of the proceedings. Finally, the Government maintained that it could not give rise to criticism that the city courts decided to adjourn the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the “test-cases” as these decisions were reasonably motivated. All in all the Government found it inappropriate that the applicants on the one hand requested adjournments of the proceedings; extensions of time-limits for submission of pleadings; were unable to appear before court hearings before certain dates; raised questions of principles, including a request for a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice; requested an expert witness; and a special counsel assigned, and on the other hand claimed that the length of the proceedings were excessive.


50.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the judgment of 3 December 2003 had been given in her absence. She further alleged that the examinations of experts had been carried out in breach of the national law, that the domestic courts had refused to assist her in collecting the evidence and that the amount of compensation awarded was insufficient.


71.  The applicant submitted that a complaint to a court about the unlawfulness of her detention would have been ineffective because the Prosecutor General's Office had a two-fold duty of making a case for holding her in custody and ensuring respect for her rights. She further complained that she had not been taken to the hearing before the Golovinskiy District Court. The applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention in connection with these grievances. The Court considers, however, that they fall to be examined under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention which is a lex specialis in such a situation. Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:


43.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the compensation proceedings against the law-enforcement authorities were unfair. Relying on Articles 6, 13 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicants alleged that the harvest of sunflower seeds belonging to Mr V. Pozhyvotko had been unlawfully appropriated by his business colleagues.


16.  The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that his guilt had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the presiding judge had exerted undue influence on the jury and that witness Sh. had not been questioned in court. The applicant relied on in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:


104.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damages concerning her proprietary interests had no causal link to the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In relation to the claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Government argued that a finding of a violation would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction in the instant case. Alternatively, they argued that the compensation for non-pecuniary damage should be determined bearing in mind the awards made in similar cases, such as Andrejeva v. Latvia ([GC], no. 55707/00, ECHR 2009), Užukauskas v. Lithuania (no. 16965/04, 6 July 2010) and Pocius v. Lithuania (no. 35601/04, 6 July 2010).


38.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not raised the complaints of a violation of his right to be assisted by a lawyer and of the Odessa Court’s non-compliance with the requirement of a “tribunal established by law” before the Supreme Court and had therefore not exhausted domestic remedies in that respect. According to the Government, the remainder of the applicant’s complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention were unsubstantiated.


74.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the judgment of 20 November 1973 had not been enforced and that the Moldovan authorities were responsible for the non-enforcement of the 2003 judgment. He further complained under Article 2 of the Convention that he was deprived of his right to life, in the sense of normal life, and under Article 14 that he was discriminated against since the reason for the non-enforcement of the judgments in his favour was his being Russian by origin.


71.  The Government contended that the complaint made under Article 6 that the constitutional jurisdictions had taken an unreasonably long time to decide the case had never been brought before the domestic courts as the applicants had failed to institute a new set of constitutional proceedings in this respect. Arguing that such a remedy would be effective, the Government made reference to domestic case-law, namely Lawrence Cuschieri v. the Honourable Prime Minister (6 April 1995), Perit Joseph Mallia v. the Honourable Prime Minister (15 March 1996), and The Honourable Judge Dr Anton Depasquale v. the Attorney General (19 September 2001), where the constitutional jurisdictions had taken cognisance of complaints against the Constitutional Court in relation to the fairness of proceedings under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the first of these cases, the Constitutional Court held that it could not a priori exclude review of questionable behaviour or actions of the constitutional jurisdictions. In the Perit Joseph Mallia case, both the first-instance court exercising its constitutional jurisdiction and the Constitutional Court on appeal had upheld the applicant’s claims and had found a violation of Article 6.


44.  The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings initiated at his request were excessively long and that therefore there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee the right to pursue criminal proceedings against third parties and that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings aimed at instituting criminal proceedings against third parties. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.


60.  The Government further maintained that the applicants’ employment contracts did not provide for the jurisdiction of national courts in case of a dispute. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention the Embassy had its seat in a foreign State, which had its own legal personality. They referred to section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act and section 46 of the Resolution of Conflict of Laws and Regulations of other States Act (see paragraphs 30 and 35 above). They maintained that granting immunity to a foreign State in civil proceedings pursued a legitimate aim of complying with international law and encouraging good diplomatic relations between States, and could not be considered as a restriction on access to a court. They concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention.


80.  The Government maintained that the proceedings in the applicants’ administrative cases had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that each applicant had been given a fair opportunity to state his case, to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his behalf, to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, in particular the police officers, and to present other evidence. The applicants were given an opportunity to lodge written requests and they availed themselves of that right. The Government claimed that the hearings had been open to the public, including to journalists, who had been present in the courtroom.


24.  The applicants complained in their submissions of 29 March 2005 that the Court of Cassation’s decision was not reasoned. They also complained that due to the fact that they were detained three hundred kilometres away from İzmir, their representative did not have the possibility to visit them regularly during the criminal proceedings with a view to preparing their defence. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


61.  The applicant raised additional complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


44.  The applicant contended that throughout the investigation and the court proceedings there were several periods of inactivity or almost no activity, in particular from March 1995 until June 1998; from May 2001 until September 2002; and from May 2005 until June 2006. Moreover, although not formally objecting to his case having been heard together with the co-defendants’ cases, having regard to the overall period and what was at stake for him, the applicant maintained that the length of the proceedings exceeded the reasonable time requirement within Article <mask> of the Convention.


27.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not been given the opportunity to examine and comment on the extracts from the electoral rolls of 2006, 2008 and 2010 submitted as evidence by the Ministry of Justice and cited in its reasoning by the Administrative Court. Under the same Article, he complained about the authorities’ refusal to change his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll, as that refusal had violated his right to an ethnic identity. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], no. 37685/10, § 124, 20 March 2018, and Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 57, ECHR 2013), considers that this latter complaint should be analysed from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention. Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


14.  The applicants complained that the authorities’ failure to comply with the binding and enforceable judgments of 27 December 2006, 2 August 2006 and 11 October 2006 had violated their right to a court under Article <mask> of the Convention and their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:


22.  The applicant emphasised that the claim he had attempted to lodge against the Ministry of Finance had contained references to many procedural and substantive violations committed by the Tverskoy District and Moscow City Courts during the examination of his claim against the Savings Bank. The domestic courts may not have rejected his claim de plano for a lack of justification or insufficient evidence, as those were the issues to be determined in the judicial proceedings. The Basmanniy District Court's refusal to examine his claim had been in breach of the constitutional requirements and Article <mask> of the Convention.


62.  The Government added that it was not reasonable to require that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, the higher courts had to hold an oral hearing on the specific question of whether leave to appeal should be granted in order to comply with the requirement of fairness in Article <mask> of the Convention. This might result in an individual intentionally refraining from requesting an oral hearing at the first instance in order to request one on appeal, thereby circumventing the system of leave to appeal. As concerned the present case, they observed that the applicant had been represented by legal counsel during the entire process, including before the Social Insurance Office, for which reason it could not have been difficult for him to submit in writing his arguments and the written evidence that he wished to invoke. Consequently, the Government concluded that it had been justified for the Administrative Court of Appeal not to hold an oral hearing.


69.  The Government contested the applicant’s claim, submitting that the amount was unsubstantiated and excessive. The Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction (see Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703/11, § 117, ECHR 2015). It further considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, should he so request (see Salduz, cited above, § 72). It therefore rejects the applicant’s claim.


33.  The applicant in case no. 3159/10 also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the failure of the domestic authorities to enforce the judgment of 28 February 2007 providing her with a plot of land for the construction of a house. She also complained under Article 6 of the unfairness of the proceedings before the Chișinău Court of Appeal, which had failed to summon her and on 24 June 2009 had examined the case in her absence.


22.  The Government submitted that the complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention should be dismissed as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, since tax disputes did not fall within the scope of Article 6 under its civil head (they cited Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, ECHR 2001-VII) and since the criminal head was unconnected to the facts of the case.


13.  The applicant complained that the appeal lodged by the State Licensing Chamber against the judgment of the Court of Appeal was late and that its upholding by the Supreme Court of Justice breached its right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In so far as relevant, Article <mask> of the Convention provides as follows:


85.  The applicants argued that, although they had made use of that remedy, it had finally proved to be ineffective because the examination of the applicants’ complaints was procedurally flawed. The Court would observe, however, that not every procedural shortcoming results in the “ineffectiveness” of the remedy in question. Article 13 does not impose on States the same obligations as Article <mask> of the Convention. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to extending the scope of Article 6 beyond disputes concerning “civil rights and obligations” (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 33, Series A no. 18, and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, § 113, Series A no. 61, with further references).


14.  The Government submitted in the first place that the application should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In this respect, they referred to the Court's case-law (Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, § 67, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and maintained that disputes relating to the career of civil servants were outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention.


22.  The Government argued that a hearing held in the absence of the defendant did not violate Article <mask> of the Convention if the defendant was not punished for his absence in the proceedings and if his right to legal assistance was not restricted, on account of the fact that the defendant was represented in the proceedings by legal counsel. Moreover, the presence of the defendant at an oral hearing was not necessary when the only questions addressed were those which merely required an assessment of evidence and did not relate to the personality of the defendant. According to the applicant's written submission, which was completely identical to the counsel's oral pleadings, he merely claimed that he had left the motor vehicle with a third person and that therefore the applicant's presence was not necessary. Moreover the IAP took full account of the applicant's submissions. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant had waived his right to attend the hearing on 22 February 2005, since he had not presented any medical certificate as evidence of his sudden illness.


67.  The Government submitted that under the Court's case-law, the guarantees contained in Article <mask> of the Convention applied less stringently to civil proceedings than to criminal proceedings and that in appellate proceedings restrictions on publicity were permissible if the circumstances of the case required. They said that “special circumstances” had existed in the present case that justified restrictions being placed on publicity in the proceedings. In any event, the applicant company had been able to present all the arguments it had considered appropriate to the Supreme Arbitration Tribunal in writing and the tribunal had addressed each of those arguments. There had been a hearing in public at first instance. The Government therefore considered that the trial had been fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.


101.  The applicant further complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that the criminal proceedings against him had been instituted unlawfully and that his representative, B., had not been allowed to represent him. The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, that his requests to call witnesses and for the ordering of forensic examinations had been rejected by the court.


88.  The applicant complained about the delayed enforcement of the final judgment in her favour. She also complained of the unfairness of the proceedings for compensation, stating that in the absence of any specific knowledge regarding military equipment or access to any information about the details of the military operation in Chechnya, apart from that made public in the mass media, she was not in a position to obtain any evidence as to what type of weapon destroyed her property or to what unit of the federal forces it had belonged. Lastly, the applicant complained that her housing and other belongings had been destroyed during the attack of 4 January 2000 but that no compensation had been awarded to her for their loss. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which, in so far as relevant provide as follows:


113.  The Government contended that there was no causal link between a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and the loss of income which the applicant alleged he had sustained as, in view of his financial situation, he would have been declared bankrupt in any event on account of the taxes assessed by the Tax Authority. Thus, the tax surcharges had been of no relevance to the bankruptcy decision. In addition, the applicant had failed to substantiate any loss of income. The Government further stated that the Court had no power under Article 41 to oblige a State to cancel a tax debt. Moreover, they contested that there was any causal link between the alleged pecuniary damage relating to the tax debt and the alleged violations of the Convention, which did not relate to the imposition of taxes and surcharges but to the enforcement of the decisions. In any event, only a very small amount of the relevant tax debt had actually been paid; the remainder had become statute-barred on 31 December 2001.


95.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair.


43.  The Government submitted, secondly, that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings before the Supreme Court for granting a review of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 19 December 2007 and that the present case involved no factual or legal issues liable to trigger a fresh examination by the Court under Article 6 of the Convention.


61.  The Government contested the applicant’s claims. They asked the Court to dismiss the applicant’s just satisfaction claims as not related to the alleged breach of the “reasonable-time requirement” under Article <mask> of the Convention. They invited the Court to consider that the finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient compensation for any damage in the present case.


38.  The applicant complained that he had been unable to attend some of the civil court hearings where he was a party owing to the refusal to escort him to those hearings. He also complained of a refusal by the domestic courts to examine some of his court actions in the absence of a preliminary decision by the Complaints Committee, the latter having refused to issue him with any of its decisions concerning his complaints. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention.


105.  The Government commented that the applicant's Article 14 complaint added nothing to her complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that, if privileges are compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention alone, then they must be equally compatible with the requirements of Article 6 taken in conjunction with Article 14. They argued further that a person about whom damaging remarks have been made in Parliament is not in a relevantly similar position to a person about whom such remarks have been made outside Parliament.