31.  The applicant also complained, under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, that the outcome of the proceedings in his case had been unfavourable and, therefore, the proceedings as a whole had been unfair, in particular, because the domestic courts had allegedly erred in the assessment of the facts and in the application of the law. He further complained, relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that he had been prevented from enjoying his possessions (his recalculated pension). Lastly, the applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that he had been discriminated against because his pension had been lower than that of some other pensioners retired from the armed forces.


38.  The Government rejected the view that other Fund members had been treated differently from the applicant when it came to the restriction of their benefit rights, thus resulting in a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. There were many Fund members in a similar or identical position to the applicant.


18.  The applicant complained that the removal, in respect of tobacco, of the previous licence of the family business, in allegedly discriminatory circumstances and without compensation, amounted to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, read alone or in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, especially because he was not granted a similar licence under the new rules.


141.  The applicant argued that the circumstances of this case disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 5, 13 and 18. He submitted that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the Kurds in south-east Turkey had been subjected to systematic unlawful treatment. His son had also suffered discrimination on the grounds of race. He finally submitted that there was sufficient evidence to disclose an administrative practice of violations of Article 14 taken together with the Articles referred to above.


183.  The applicant complained before the Chamber that he had been treated differently from other office holders in analogous situations (other court executives, the president of the Constitutional Court), as a consequence of his having expressed politically controversial opinions. The measures directed against him therefore constituted unjustified differential treatment on the ground of “other opinion”. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 6 § 1 and 10. The applicant did not explicitly raise this complaint before the Grand Chamber. Article 14 provides as follows:


64.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been discriminated against by the authorities, including the courts, which had given preference to V.K. in his child-care case because of his gender and disability. After the termination of the court proceedings he had allegedly continued to suffer discrimination in the exercise of his parental rights as regards A.M.


47.  The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that he had been unlawfully and arbitrarily arrested and placed in detention on remand. Relying on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the applicant further complained that he had been arrested on account of his political activities. Finally, under Article <mask> of the Convention the applicant alleged that he had been discriminated against due to his Kurdish origin and political opinions.


168.  The applicant further complained that the failure of the authorities to review the lawfulness of her detention and to carry out an effective investigation into the arbitrary deprivation of her liberty on account of her association with MISA had breached her rights guaranteed by Article 5 § 4, taken alone or in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. Those provisions read as follows:


95.  The Government maintained that the applicant had offered no evidence to the effect that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The official investigation into the attacks against the applicant had been impartial and all allegations of religious motivation behind these incidents had been thoroughly checked by the competent domestic authorities. Further, no attacks against any other member of the Hare Krishna community in Jagodina had ever been reported, and any police interest in this community would have been perfectly reasonable given the alleged motivation of the applicant's assailants.


19.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service or alternative civilian service, while assuming a function within the Federation of Evangelical Communities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from such service, constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion, as prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


68.  The Government acknowledged that in Koua Poirrez v. France (no. 40892/98, ECHR 2003‑X) the Court had refused to make a distinction between contributory and non-contributory welfare benefits, finding that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also applicable to the latter category and, subsequently, that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in the Government’s submission, there were significant differences between the present case and Koua Poirrez. Firstly, the State pension claimed by the applicant in the instant case did not amount to “emergency assistance” in that it was not her sole source of income. Secondly, Mr Koua Poirrez had quite simply been refused the allowance he had sought, whereas Ms Andrejeva did receive a certain amount of retirement pension.


21.  The Government further contended that the restrictions on the applicant’s employment prospects could not be deemed discriminatory in nature just because the applicant belonged to a certain group of persons, namely that of “former secret collaborators”, since the mere fact of belonging to such a group did not automatically entail negative effects if the person had confessed. Therefore the Law did not impose collective responsibility on all “former secret collaborators” without exception. Given that only those “former secret collaborators” who had not confessed were affected by restrictions on their employment prospects, there had been no discriminatory treatment within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 14.


32.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State's national security. The Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the adoption of “the list” of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under Article 2 of the Act. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in Article 3 of the Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the Act, Article <mask> of the Convention was not therefore applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


61.  The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length and the outcome of the civil proceedings, and under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that he had been dismissed from his job because of his Serbian origin as well as on account of his political opinions and philosophical convictions.


38.  The Government argued that Article 14 was inapplicable as the facts of the case did not disclose any appreciable impact on either her relationship with her children, or her relationship with her partner. In order for Article 14 to apply, it must be shown that the specific factual context in which the allegation of discrimination arises was within the ambit of one of the substantive rights of the Convention. The intended limited scope of Article <mask> of the Convention stood in contrast to that of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, which the United Kingdom had not ratified. If the criteria for the applicability of Article 14 were to be loosened and widened, it would occupy more and more of the area intended to be covered by the other provision. Instead, Article 14 should be kept within boundaries of application closely associated with and bearing directly upon the operation of other Convention rights. The Government contended that the approach taken by Lords Walker, Bingham and Nicholls to the applicability of Article 14 was consistent with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and was now accepted by the domestic courts as providing a practical framework for determining when a given situation came within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. While the applicant had likened her situation to that at issue in the case of Petrovic v. Austria (27 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑II), hers was quite different. In Petrovic, the Court had found that the parental leave allowance necessarily affected the way in which family life was organised, as it allowed one parent to stay at home to look after the children (§ 27). In contrast, the application of the formula in the MASC regulations was not intended to deter the applicant from pursuing her relationship, nor did it have that effect. The mere fact that liability to contribute towards the cost of her children's upbringing might have some effect on the financial situation of her new household was insufficient. Otherwise any financial liability, or benefit, would be deemed as coming within the ambit of the family life aspect of Article 8. Since the Convention did not confer a right to full protection of private or family life against all interference, but a right to respect for private or family life, it followed that a significant threshold of intrusion had to be crossed before there could be an interference that called for justification under Article 8 § 2. The Government drew a comparison with a number of cases in which applicants who had lost their employment had complained of interferences with their right to respect for private life: Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, ECHR 1999‑VI; Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, ECHR 2004‑VIII; Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania, nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01, 7 April 2005. In each of these cases, the applicants had been able to point to additional restrictions or intrusions. This strongly suggested that the merely incidental effect of the MASC regulations on the finances of the applicant's household was not sufficient to bring the situation within the scope or ambit of Article 8. The facts of this case were very remote from any identifiable impact on the applicant's family life.


91.  The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in that they had been discriminated against in comparison with other political parties. They also alleged that the lack of a refund of the electoral deposit constituted a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.


31.  The Government, referring to Röösli v. Germany (no. 28318/95, Commission decision of 15 May 1996, Decisions and Reports 85-A, p. 149), submitted that the subject matter of the present case did not come within the ambit of Article 8 § 1 as regards the elements of “private and family life”. The issue whether it came within the ambit of the “home” element could be left open because, in any event, there had been no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.


42.  The applicant complained under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that there had been a number of irregularities during the election process in his constituency and that the authorities had failed to duly examine his complaints concerning those irregularities. In conjunction with this complaint, he also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that independent candidates were at a disadvantage in comparison to candidates representing major political parties because, by law, the latter could conduct their campaign under more privileged terms, such as receiving free air time on State television and other forms of free campaigning.


36.  The applicants alleged that the fact that the civil unions introduced by Law no. 3719/2008 were designed only for couples composed of different-sex adults infringed their right to respect for their private and family life and amounted to unjustified discrimination between different-sex and same-sex couples, to the detriment of the latter. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. Those provisions read as follows:


40.  The applicants in applications nos. 25330/11, 25340/11, 25345/11 and 25645/11 also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, in conjunction with the above complaint, that their electoral rights had been breached as part of a series of deliberate and unlawful practical measures implemented by the Government, and which were aimed at restricting the participation of the political opposition in the elections and denying its candidates equal status to pro-Government candidates. Article 14 provides as follows:


83.  The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the relevant domestic remedies for their complaints concerning their inability to proceed with their peaceful demonstration. Thus, if they considered that the police forces had not provided adequate protection from the counter-demonstrators, they should have sought civil redress from the Ministry of the Interior pursuant to Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code. Since the applicants had not resorted to that civil remedy, their complaints under Articles 10 and 11 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention were inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.


67.  The applicants complained that the fishing restrictions imposed by the State had violated their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, which allegedly included a right to fish certain coastal waters of the Gulf of Bothnia. The applicants further alleged that they had been discriminated against in comparison with fishermen operating in the open sea of the gulf. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken both alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


49.  The applicant alleged that he had been discriminated against on grounds of sex because he had been refused the possibility of obtaining a stay of execution of his prison sentence, as under Article 453 § 1 b) of the CCP only convicted mothers of children under the age of one could seek a stay of execution. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.


58.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 that they were being discriminated against in the enjoyment of their family life on account of the first and third applicants’ sexual orientation. They submitted that there was no reasonable and objective justification for allowing the adoption of one partner’s child by the other partner where heterosexual couples, whether married or unmarried, were concerned, while prohibiting the adoption of one partner’s child by the other partner in the case of same-sex couples.


42.  The applicants complained that the premature termination of their religious meeting on account of the arrival of the police amounted to a violation of Articles 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that, where the nature of a meeting is primarily religious, as it was in the present case, where the applicants had gathered for a service of worship, a complaint about the disruption of the meeting is to be examined from the standpoint of Article 9 alone (see Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, no. 184/02, § 53, 11 January 2007), which reads as follows:


90.  The Government took the view that the reckoning of periods of employment was essentially a matter to be addressed through bilateral inter-State agreements on social security. The Court, for its part, is fully aware of the importance of such agreements in the effective solution of problems such as those arising in the instant case. However, it reiterates that by ratifying the Convention, the respondent State undertook to secure “to everyone within [its] jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein. Accordingly, in the present case the Latvian State cannot be absolved of its responsibility under Article <mask> of the Convention on the ground that it is not or was not bound by inter-State agreements on social security with Ukraine and Russia (see Gaygusuz, cited above, § 51, and Koua Poirrez, cited above, § 46).


76.  The Government further submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply in the case. This provision, as confirmed by the Court on many occasions, did not have an independent existence and could only be invoked in relation to a breach of other rights. The applicant relied on Article 14 read together with Article 8. However, the subject-matter of his case, which concerned the right to succeed to a tenancy, did not come within the ambit of Article 8 § 1 which referred to four elements: “private life”, “family life”, “home” and “correspondence”.


48.  The applicant also alleged that she had been discriminated against as evidenced by the racist remarks made by the police officers, namely, “get out of here you black whore”. She submitted that other women in the same area carrying on the same activity but with a “European phenotype” had not been stopped by the police. Article <mask> of the Convention provides:


73.  The applicants pointed out, lastly, that the aim of their application was not to obtain a right to marry or access to a form of registered partnership. They explained that they were merely asking the Court to develop its decision in Karner v. Austria (no. 40016/98, ECHR 2003‑IX) and state that excluding same-sex couples from the right to a residence permit for family reasons was discriminatory. They submitted that, with regard to other rights recognised as belonging to married couples, the Court could decide on a case-by-case basis, distinguishing, for example, the right to obtain a residence permit from the right to adopt. Accordingly, in their view, concluding that there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case was not incompatible with the conclusions reached by the Court in its judgment in Gas and Dubois (cited above).


29.  The applicants complained of an infringement of the first applicant's inheritance rights and of their capacity to receive inter vivos or testamentary gifts from the first applicant's father. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken together with Article <mask> of the Convention, they submitted that they had been discriminated against because the first applicant had been born of an “adulterous” relationship. Those provisions read as follows:


58.  The applicant complained that the application in her case of paragraph 1 of the transitional provisions of the State Pensions Act, which made a distinction on the basis of nationality between those in receipt of retirement pensions, constituted discrimination prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention in the exercise of her right of property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of those provisions read as follows:


46.  The Government maintained that the situations referred to by the applicant in his assertion that he had been in a worse position compared with convicted persons had not been relevantly similar. The aim of detention on remand during judicial proceedings and that of a prison sentence were different. The former was aimed at ensuring the availability of an accused person for the purpose of criminal proceedings and their smooth conduct. The latter represented the most severe form of punishment within the system of criminal law. Any difference in the two regimes, which in any event had not been substantial, resulted from the difference in the relevant law. The applicant had not been discriminated against contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


55.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 3 and 5 that he had been subjected to discrimination because of his ethnic origin. In particular, he alleged that that the police’s decision to arrest and detain him and his ill-treatment in police custody had been due to his ethnicity. Article 14 reads as follows:


66.  The applicants also complained that, in breach of Article 13, they were denied an effective remedy in respect of their complaint under Article 2 about Mr Mihaylov’s killing. The investigation was deeply flawed and no civil remedy could have compensated for that. Finally, they complained of racial discrimination in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2, alleging that Chief Sergeant S had had less hesitation about using excessive force because of Mr Mihaylov’s Roma ethnic origin and low social status and that these factors had also contributed to the authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation into his death. In contrast with Nachova and Others, cited above, there was no complaint about any alleged failure on the part of the authorities to investigate possible racist motives in their killing.


52.  The applicants disagreed that a constitutional appeal had been available for their complaints under Articles 9 and 11. The outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court in which they had challenged the domestic authorities’ refusal to register the applicant association as a religious community under the 2007 Act (paragraphs 31-33 above) clearly demonstrated that that remedy, although available, would not have been effective for their grievances under Article <mask> of the Convention.


92.  The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that he had been discriminated against as a father by the Bologna Youth Court, as his statements, arguments and evidence had not been given the same weight as his wife’s. He submitted that his submissions and supporting evidence had been totally disregarded by the courts, as opposed to M.’s unsubstantiated statements.


17.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she was discriminated. She also complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention about the outcome of the compensation proceedings. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


16.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion, prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


48.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to private life, alleging that the Court of Cassation had ruled that his dismissal on the ground of his HIV status had been lawful. He also submitted that his dismissal had been discriminatory and that the Court of Cassation’s reasoning, according to which his dismissal had been justified by the need to preserve a good working environment in the company, was not a valid basis for differential treatment compatible with Article 14. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. Those provisions are worded as follows:


12.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


34.  The applicant further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention (the prohibition on discrimination) without any further reasoning. The Court finds no indication whatsoever in the case-file which might disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision. The Court, therefore, rejects this part of the application, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as being manifestly ill-founded.


76.  The applicant complained that the deprivation of his retirement benefits, on the ground that his wife and dependents would still benefit from it, had been discriminatory on the basis of his marital status, and therefore contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 as well as Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No.1. Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 read as follows:


35.   The applicants complained also under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the denial of access to court regarding their claims for compensation violated their right to property. Further relying on Article <mask> of the Convention they complained that other minority shareholders in similar situations had access to court. They referred to cases of wound up companies where no arbitration clause was concluded and of a squeeze-out without winding up the company under Article 183i of the Commercial Code.


106.  The Government agreed that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable here as the case fell within the scope of Article 8, but argued that there was no separate issue under Article 14. Were the Court to have a different opinion, the Government pointed out that cissexuals were not in a similar situation to the applicant because they were not applying for a change of their gender. In any event, there had been an objective and reasonable justification. The Finnish legal system prohibited discrimination based on transsexualism.


40.  The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the courts in the rei vindicatio proceedings had disregarded the binding force of the Balchik District Court’s final judgment of 7 December 1995. Lastly, they complained under Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they had been discriminated against in that the former king of Bulgaria and his sister had been able to obtain the restitution of their family’s former property under more lenient procedures than the ones applicable to their case. The Court has examined these complaints. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.


68.  The applicant further complained that the act of denying him the right to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections, for the sole reason that he had allegedly failed to provide accurate information about his place of residence for the previous five years, had caused him to suffer discrimination prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention in the exercise of his right under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. He compared his situation to that of another candidate who had not resided in Ukraine for a continuous period of five years but had nevertheless been registered as a candidate in the elections. Article 14 of the Convention reads:


24.  The applicant argued that the refusal to give him a retirement pension violated the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention combined with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He considered that the domestic legislation discriminated against Evangelical ministers compared with Catholic priests, who had been admitted to the general Social Security scheme much earlier. Also, when Evangelical ministers were eventually admitted to the general Social Security scheme, unlike Catholic priests they were not given the possibility of using their previous years of service as ministers to make up the minimum period of contribution required to qualify for a retirement pension.


34.  The applicants reiterated that they did not complain about a violation of the Estonian-Russian Agreement but about a violation by the Estonian authorities of their rights guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, their complaints did not relate to the size of the Russian pension but rather to the payment of the Estonian pension.


54.  The applicant complained that he had been discriminated against in that, having been prosecuted for a serious offence relating to organised crime, he had not been afforded the safeguard provided for in Article 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely a video recording of interviews at the investigating judge’s office of anyone placed under formal investigation, given that in accordance with the seventh paragraph of the Article in question, such a safeguard did not apply where the investigation concerned organised crime, serious offences undermining the fundamental interests of the nation or terrorist offences. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1. The Articles in question provide respectively:


74.  The applicants submitted that their inability to withdraw their “old” foreign-currency savings from their accounts at branches located in Bosnia and Herzegovina of a Slovenian bank, in the case of the first two applicants, and of a Serbian bank, in the case of the third applicant, amounted to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention by all of the respondent States. They also alleged a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.


78.  The Government stressed the importance of equal treatment and equality before the law, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Finland and Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant was not entitled to preferential or different treatment in comparison to other members of the crowd present at the demonstration. The police orders had been given without discrimination as to status or profession and had not been aimed at preventing the applicant’s professional activity. The aim of the police had been to calm the situation and to restore public order. Moreover, the District Court had established that the applicant had not shown his press badge to the apprehending officer or the receiving police officer at the police station. He had only shown his badge on the bus taking him to the police station. The applicant himself had written in the article about the event that he had started to wear his badge visibly only after he had been detained. Therefore, the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in assessing the proportionality of measures allegedly infringing the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had not been affected as the applicant had failed to make clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist.


154.  The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention that his detention had not been lawful and that the courts which reviewed his detention had not taken into consideration some of his arguments. He further invoked Article <mask> of the Convention without any substantiation. Lastly, he complained that the respondent Government failed to comply with the Court’s decision of 30 October 2009 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 55 above).


34.  The Government submitted that Article 8 was not applicable in the present case as that provision did not guarantee a right to retain employment or to choose a profession. They further stated that, in any event, the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of protecting national security and was necessary in a democratic society. According to the Government, the KGB Act constituted no more than a justified security screening measure intended to prevent former employees of a foreign secret service from working not only in State institutions but also in other spheres of activity which were important to the State’s national security. The KGB Act itself did not impose collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. It provided for individualised restrictions on employment prospects by way of the list of positions in the former KGB which warranted application of the restrictions under section 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 27 above). The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there existed a well-founded suspicion that the applicants lacked loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Given that not all former employees of the KGB were affected by the KGB Act, Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 8 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.


19.  The Government contended that the difference in the treatment of the brothers’ claims by the Bucharest Court of Appeal did not amount to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention since the applicants and their older brothers were not in similar situations. The domestic court had arrived at its conclusion by assessing the evidence in the file, and it had based its decision on the statement of one witness, not on the assumption that only a certain emotional development of the children (depending on their age) would entail mental suffering (see paragraph 13 above).


226.  The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that its ability to conduct business had been greatly inhibited as it had often been subjected to excessive fines. The applicant further invoked Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It complained of discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis the CyBC which was not required to pay an annual licence fee or fines. In application no. 35122/05 the applicant also relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 in respect of the last complaint.


133.  The applicants further complained that they were arrested, detained and expelled not based on infringements of the relevant immigration provisions but owing to their Georgian nationality. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 § 1 and 6 of the Convention, Articles 2 and 4 of Protocol No. 4 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:


90.  The Government left it to the Court's discretion to decide whether the applicants had substantiated their claim adequately. At any rate, part of the lawyer's fees concerned the applicants' complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which had been declared inadmissible. Moreover, assuming that a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were to result from the inheritance tax levied, the fees and expenses incurred in the expropriation proceedings (that is a total of FIM 29,800 without chargeable value-added tax) should not be reimbursed. The fees and costs incurred by the applicant Barbro Jokela should likewise be deducted from such an award. The number of hours claimed to have been spent by the lawyer on the case also appeared somewhat excessive.


184.  The applicant argued that the circumstances of this case disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 13. He submitted that there was sufficient evidence to establish that his brother’s abduction and murder had been carried out as a direct result of his lawful political views and his activities on behalf of HADEP and, more widely, the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Article 14 of the Convention provides as follows:


18.  The applicants submitted that while their older siblings’ claims for compensation in connection with their sister’s death had been allowed, their similar claims had been dismissed by the court of last resort on the ground of their young age at the time of the accident (see paragraph 13 above). They claimed that the distinction made by the court of last resort between their claims and those of their older siblings had amounted to discrimination prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention and caused them substantial loss.


28.  The Government argued that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the case. They contended that the difference in treatment complained of was justified by the provisional nature of a discontinuation decision given that, unlike an acquittal, a discontinuation decision based on the ground that there was no case to answer did not bar the reopening of the case if new evidence came to light.


51.  The applicant also complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the widow's payment and widowed mother's allowance to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position constituted discrimination on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a widow's pension.


39.  The applicant complained under Articles 8, 13, 14 and 15 of the Convention that the decision to refuse him authorisation to reside in Russia had been disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of public health and had disrupted his right to live with his family. The Court notes that the focal point of the present application is the difference of treatment to which the applicant was subjected on account of his health status when applying for a residence permit. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and bearing in mind that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I), the Court considers it appropriate to examine the applicant’s grievances from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8 (compare Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 70, Series A no. 94). Those provisions read as follows:


102.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they were victims of a two‑fold discrimination: firstly, in relation to those pensioners whose pensions fell below the cap and who thus remained unaffected by it, and secondly, in relation to the high-ranking officials whose pensions were exempted from the cap by virtue of paragraph 6(3) of the transitional and concluding provisions of the Social Security Code 1999 (see paragraph 40 above).


118.  The applicant further complained that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his origins because the Constitutional Court had dismissed his constitutional appeal without considering its merits with a simple reference to its Opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 21/05. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


12.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Wpt, WMA, WBA and WP constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


29.  The applicant claimed to have been a victim of discrimination on the ground of his sexual orientation in that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 5 December 1996, had denied him the status of “life companion” of the late Mr W. within the meaning of section 14 of the Rent Act, thereby preventing him from succeeding to Mr W.'s tenancy. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, which provide as follows:


68.  The Government submitted, inter alia, that the applicant could not claim compensation for the refusal to grant him French nationality, that he had ceased to be a victim since the 1998 Act was passed and that, in any event, a finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 would not give rise to a right to any compensation.


43.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion, prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 4.


67.  The Government asserted that it is not for the Court to determine the domestic legislation that should be applied to a particular case. Thus, the legal issue in the present case is to assess whether the Madrid High Court of Justice’s ruling, declaring that additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was not applicable to the case at hand due to the express lack of retroactive recognition of the right to a survivor’s pension in Law no. 13/2005, amounted to discrimination under Article <mask> of the Convention.


161.  The applicant submitted that her husband was killed because he was a Kurd and, although not politically involved, he was sympathetic to the democratic demands of the Kurds. He was thus, contrary to the prohibition contained in Article <mask> of the Convention, a victim of discrimination on grounds of national origin in relation to the exercise of his right to life as protected by Article 2. The applicant also maintained that she too had been discriminated against in violation of Article 14, which reads:


24.  The applicant complained that contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention read together with Article 1 of Protocol No.1 persons unable to report facts because they were unaware of them were treated differently under section 71 of the 1992 Act from those who were unable to report facts for some other reason. In the alternative, she complained that the law treated identically persons who were capable and persons who were incapable of understanding that there was something which they were required to report.


45.  The applicant submitted that the Government did not deny that the pension rules in force at the relevant time discriminated against married women and considered that there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised, namely to avoid the undesirable accumulation of pension rights. In the applicant's opinion other legislation could have been brought in. As to the point in time when social attitudes had changed, the applicant argued that even in 1957 the principle of equality and the resulting prohibition on discrimination were a general principle of both national and international law. In that connection, she referred to Article 1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. She further referred, inter alia, to Article <mask> of the Convention (1950), the Netherlands Act of 14 June 1956 abolishing the legal incapacity of married women, and Article 12 § 4 of the European Social Charter (1961), by which the Contracting States undertook to ensure equal treatment of their own nationals with nationals of other Contracting Parties in respect of social-security rights. The applicant was of the opinion that there were no weighty reasons to confront a small group of women, who did not fall within the scope of Directive 79/7/EEC, for the rest of their lives with the consequences of a discriminatory provision from the past that had been abolished in the meantime.


211.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 10, as the CyBC had not been subjected to the same restrictions. In particular, in view of the legal provisions applicable at the material time, the CybC was not monitored by the CRTA and subjected to fines. Furthermore, the CyBC did not have to obtain an annual licence.


13.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


83.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, read together with Article 8, that he had been treated differently, without justification, from both a foreign criminal sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment, who could benefit from the exceptions in paragraphs 399 and 399A of the Immigration Rules, and a British national sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment, who could not be deported.


154.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied access to court, as his contact rights had been determined by social work centres and not by the courts. Further, he alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been discriminated against on the grounds that he and his former wife had lived separately, a fact which had resulted in the case being dealt with by social work centres and not by the courts.


64.  The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 6 that they had been subjected to discrimination on the ground that the domestic law exempted State authorities from the obligation to observe time-limits for bringing actions in the interest of the State, while at the same time imposing such an obligation on private individuals’ actions against the State. They relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:


32.  The applicant contested the Government’s view, stating that it was sufficient to raise the alleged violations in substance, which she had done in the domestic proceedings. In contrast, it was not necessary to refer explicitly to the relevant Convention Articles before the domestic authorities. The applicant asserted that the principle of equality under Article 7 § 1 of the Federal Constitution corresponded to Article <mask> of the Convention but was wider in scope as it was not accessory in nature.


57.  The applicant further complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that he had been discriminated against based on his profession, in so far as the only reason why the Romanian courts denied him the return of his child was the fact that he belonged to the military forces. Lastly, invoking Article 17 of the Convention, he complained that the Romanian courts had made an erroneous interpretation of the rights guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention and of the notion of “the child’s best interest”.


88.  The Government argued that in the instant case no provisions, acts or omissions of the public authorities had exposed the applicants to treatment less favourable than that to which other persons in an analogous situation would have been subjected. There was no indication that their treatment had been based on any prohibited grounds. Consequently, the applicants had not suffered discrimination in the enjoyment of their freedom of assembly contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention.


78.  The applicant also complained: (a) under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that his right to peacefully enjoy his property had been violated in that he had been forced to change the place of residence to search for another job and thus had to leave his property in Montenegro; and (b) under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 thereto, about having been discriminated against.


14.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. and / or Article 8.


36.  The applicant complained that his continued imprisonment following the recommendation of the Parole Board on 25 March 2002 that he be released on licence violated his rights under Article 5 taken together with Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the requirement that prisoners serving determinate sentences of fifteen years or more secure the approval of the Secretary of State in addition to the recommendation of the Parole Board, when prisoners serving determinate sentences of less than fifteen years and prisoners serving indeterminate sentences were required only to obtain the positive recommendation of the Parole Board, amounted to an unjustified difference in treatment.


48.  The applicants indicate that these acts are not in themselves discriminatory. Rather, the situation at issue is a continued one, since, according to the applicants, the authorities could have taken measures at any time, and particularly at the beginning of each school year, to provide them with adequate education in accordance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.


97.  The applicant complained that the State failed to protect her from sexual abuse by a teacher in her national school and that she did not have an effective remedy against the State in that regard. She relied on Article 3 (alone and in conjunction with Article 13), Article 8, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as well as these latter Articles taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


89.  The Government submitted that, as there was no “right” within the meaning of Article 6, there was equally no possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Consequently, neither Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 nor Article <mask> of the Convention had any application to the case. Were the Court to hold otherwise, the Government submitted the following.


45.  The applicants complained that the enactment of Law no. 296/2006 and its application to their cases constituted an unjustified interference with their possessions. Moreover, it was arbitrary since it created a disparity in treatment between people who had chosen to work in Switzerland and those who had remained in Italy. They relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. The relevant provisions read as follows:


37.  The applicant complained under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention about the Bolu public prosecutor’s assessment that there had existed a factual basis for the content of the article. In this connection, the applicant contended that the domestic authorities had refrained from providing judicial protection on account of his political opinions. He further alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his political opinions on account of the domestic authorities’ decisions.


30.  The applicant further complained, for the first time in his written observations dated 19 May 2005, that his right of access to a court had been infringed because he had been unable to lodge an appeal on points of law (revizija) owing to the change in legislation governing civil procedure which had raised the statutory threshold for admissibility of such an appeal. He also submitted that limiting ratione valoris the right to lodge an appeal on points of law created inequality before the law and was therefore contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention which reads as follows:


56.  The applicant complained that he had been discriminated against by the Ukrainian authorities, who did not take into account his state of health because he was a Belarusian national and his extradition was conducted under the Minsk Convention. He considered that had he been a national of a country which is party to the European Convention on Extradition, the Ukrainian authorities would have been obliged to take his state of health into account. He referred to Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention. Article 14 provides as follows:


109.  The applicant submitted that his son had worked as a plumber and, as the eldest of ten children, had contributed significantly to his family’s upkeep. He claimed 12,300 euros (EUR) on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate of Mehmet Şah Şeker, and on behalf of himself, for loss of earnings over five years and five months. He further claimed EUR 12,300 on account of the failure of the authorities to conduct an effective investigation. The applicant also requested that, in the case of a finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, these figures be increased by 50%.


38.  The applicants claimed that they had been discriminated against as a different-sex couple, as they had no possibility of entering into a registered partnership, an institution they preferred to marriage. The Court therefore has to examine first whether, for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicants were in a comparable situation to same-sex couples who have access to registered partnerships and, if so, whether any difference in treatment was justified.


77.  The Government argued that the situation of the applicants, whose rights stemmed from an expropriation enforced in the former GDR, could not be compared to that of the Government, which had succeeded to rights based on a policy of providing redress for injustice committed under the National Socialist regime. Accordingly, Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable. In the alternative, the difference in treatment was based on objective and reasonable justification having regard to the legislature’s wish to clarify an unclear situation by means of the 1998 Act.


40.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his ethnic origin. He further alleged under Article 18 of the Convention that the respondent State had applied restrictions on the exercise of his rights in violation of the Convention.


16.  The applicants complain under Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of the exceptional situation which was favourable to the State as a result of the difference between the rate of interest payable on debts owed to the State (around 84% per annum) and the rate of interest on overdue State debts (30% per annum) at the material time.


59.  The applicant complained that the stopping of the payment of his YPA military pension for a period of thirteen months, after he had changed his place of residence to Serbia, had been arbitrary and discriminatory. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, which read as follows:


27.  The applicant stressed that, in so far as it had been called upon to rule as the court of last instance, the Court of Cassation had been required to request a preliminary ruling where there was doubt as to the interpretation of Community law. The applicant submitted that he had cited the case-law in which the CJEU had recognised the direct applicability of the principle of non-discrimination in the field of social security, contained in the agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (and in other agreements between the European Union and the Maghreb countries – Kziber, Case C-18/90, judgment of 31 January 1991). In the applicant’s view, that line of case-law, initially developed in the context of the cooperation agreements, was “fully transposable” to the relevant provisions of the association agreements. The CJEU had also added that its interpretation was compatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Furthermore, the interpretation of the concept of “social security” by the CJEU was sufficiently broad to encompass social-assistance benefits. In these circumstances, the applicant argued, it had not been open to the Court of Cassation to ignore the request to refer the question for a preliminary ruling.


108.  The Government submitted, relying on the Court’s case-law in Raviv v. Austria, no. 26266/05, 13 March 2012, that the applicant had never paid any contributions to a pension fund in Croatia and therefore he was not in the same position as other pension beneficiaries who had been paying contributions in Croatia. Therefore, in the Government’s view, there had been no issue under Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1. Furthermore, the Government pointed out that the domestic legislation concerning the payment of pensions abroad did not distinguish between pension beneficiaries on any ground, including their nationality, ethnicity or the nature of the pension entitlement. All of them, including YPA military pensioners, had had equal opportunities to obtain payment of their pension abroad if there was a bilateral treaty or reciprocal agreement between Croatia and their country of residence. The stopping of pension payments in a country with which there was no treaty or reciprocal agreement had been a consequence of an objective nature and not discrimination on any ground. In this respect, Croatia had made no distinction between YPA military pensioners and persons who had been paying contributions to pension funds in Croatia. Therefore, the fact that the applicant had not been receiving his pension in Serbia was a consequence of the fact that no reciprocal agreement or treaty on payment of YPA military pensions existed between Croatia and Serbia at the time.


151.  The applicants complained that the temporary suspension of and amendments to the Denationalisation Act and the Act on Implementation of Penal Sanctions, the State Bonds Act and the Constitutional Court's decisions of 16 July 1998 and 22 February 2001 violated their right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, since they constituted an unfair interference by the State in the pending proceedings to which the State was a party. They also invoked Article 6 § 1 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that the challenged Acts discriminated against those claimants for the restitution of forfeited property, whose restitution proceedings were still pending before the courts when the challenged legislation entered into force and introduced a less favourable restitution regime. The applicants further complained that the challenged Acts and the unreasonably long restitution proceedings breached their right to property as guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, arguing that from the moment the criminal judgments were quashed, they had a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining the full restitution of property forfeited by the judgments, which, until the present day, had not occurred. In addition, they claimed that the challenged Acts violated their right to full compensation for wrongful conviction as guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7. Finally, the applicants invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, alleging that the challenged Acts deprived them of their property on a discriminatory basis, since before the challenged legislation entered into force, the successful claimants were entitled to full restitution.


17.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges. He further argued under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that the prohibition of his access to the army’s social facilities, while other retired officers could benefit from this right, had amounted to discrimination. Lastly, he contended under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that there was no appeal against the decisions of the Supreme Military Administrative Court.


31.  The Government asserted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the Government’s view, the applicant had only claimed a violation of the principle of equality (Gleichheitsgrundsatz) under Article 7 § 1 of the Federal Constitution, but had neither explicitly nor in substance relied on her right of property in her complaints lodged with the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. Noting that the applicant had been represented by counsel throughout the domestic proceedings, the Government argued that she could have been expected to raise her complaint concerning her right of property with the domestic authorities, in addition to her allegation of discrimination. In conclusion, the Government claimed that the applicant had not duly exhausted domestic remedies in respect of her complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


11.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security benefit to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Wpt and WMA constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8 of the Convention.


81.  The applicant complained that, by imposing on him the maximum prison sentence applicable under domestic law and calculating his prison sentence on the basis of a new law (Law no. 5275), his rights under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention had been breached. The applicant further complained that Law no. 5816 was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention because it gives the judge too wide a discretion to choose a prison sentence of between one year and five years. As a result, different courts handed down different sentences for the same offence. Finally, relying on Article 11 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the ban which was imposed on him by the domestic courts and which prevented him not only from voting and taking part in elections, but also from running associations, parties, trade unions and cooperatives.


35.  The applicant’s primary complaint is that, in the exercise of a right granted by domestic law, he was discriminated against on the grounds, inter alia, of his illegitimate status. The latter is a concept covered by Article <mask> of the Convention (see Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and Inze v. Austria, 28 October 1987, § 41, Series A no. 126).


122.  The applicant complained, citing Articles 5 § 4 and 13 of the Convention, that there had been no effective remedy available for his complaints. He also cited Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, reiterating his arguments cited above, and Article <mask> of the Convention, arguing that he had been discriminated against, but without further relevant substantiation.


43.  The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 that he had been discriminated against in that, for the purposes of an access arrangement, his biological tie with A. had not been accepted as constituting “family life”, whereas the existence of “family life” was automatically assumed by the Netherlands judicial authorities in the case of an unmarried biological father who had recognised the child.


21.  The applicants claimed to be victims of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in that the Administrative Court in its decision of 4 October 2001 upheld that the insurance cover of the second applicant only extended to heterosexual partners within the meaning of section 56(6) CSSAIA. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8.


168.  The applicants complained that they had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of their Convention rights, because the violations of which they complained had taken place because of their being resident in Chechnya and their ethnic background as Chechens, which was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. They also complained that the abduction of their relative had breached Article 8 of the Convention, the text of which has been cited above.


52.  The Government submitted that the applicant could not be considered to be in an analogous situation for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention to the persons with whom he sought comparison. In their view, the crucial factor was not the legal ground on which the declaration of his paternity was based, but rather the fact that his paternity had been declared by means of a final and binding judicial decision. The other situations relied on by the applicant were different in that the paternity of the husband of the mother, or that of the man who declared jointly with the mother that he was the father, was presumed and could be challenged in a court.


21.  The applicant complained that the decision of the District Court not to appoint, of its own motion, defence counsel for him for the first-instance proceedings before it, breached his right to a fair trial, in particular the principle of equality of arms and the right to free legal assistance. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) and (c) of the Convention alone and taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Wetjen and Others v. Germany, nos. 68125/14 and 72204/14, § 44, 22 March 2018, with further references), finds it appropriate to examine this complaint solely under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:


85.  The applicant complained that the ill-treatment he suffered and the refusal of the military prosecutor to indict the police officers responsible for the ill-treatment was in substantial part due to his Roma ethnicity, and therefore inconsistent with the requirement of non-discrimination laid down by Article 14 taken together with Articles 3 and 13. Article <mask> of the Convention provides:


46.  The Government contested that argument. Firstly, they pointed out that a difference in treatment did exist between persons in pre-trial detention and convicted prisoners with respect to their right to conjugal visits, but that such a difference was “prescribed by law” (see paragraphs 24-26 above). They further considered that distinguishing between the two above-mentioned categories of persons deprived of their liberty had a legitimate aim. The restriction in question was required as a security measure to prevent further crimes from being committed or to ensure that criminal proceedings were not impeded. The grounds for imposing pre-trial detention were also to ensure that the suspect would not obstruct the investigation by tampering with evidence or intimidating witnesses. The Government concluded that the difference of treatment was objectively and reasonably justified within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Lastly, the Government considered it worth noting that the applicant’s requests for ordinary visits had never been refused by the prison administration, and as a result he had benefited from a large number of visits from his family during his detention.


218.  The Government submitted that no issues arose under Article <mask> of the Convention as there were no violations of the other Articles relied on by the applicants. In any event, the applicants had not been subjected to discriminatory treatment, because the military actions in Lachin had been aimed merely at opening a “humanitarian corridor” between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and had not been directed against the residents of the district, whatever their ethnic or religious affiliation. Moreover, Kurds had never been subjected to discrimination in the Republic of Armenia or the “NKR” and the population of approximately 1,500 Kurds living in Armenia at present actively participated in social and political life and enjoyed all rights.


50.  The applicant contended that the different treatment of different categories of prisoners depending on the sentences imposed was based on “other status” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He contested the Government's submission that only a status which met the requirement of being obviously analogous to one of the specific examples listed in Article 14 could constitute “other status” within the meaning of that Article. He argued that account should be taken of the purpose of the Convention, namely that it was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society (citing Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, cited above, § 53). Accordingly, the words “other status” should not be so strictly construed as to undermine the purposes of the Convention, as set out in its preamble where it states its aim of “securing the universal and effective recognition of rights” and reflected in Article 1 of the Convention. Relying on Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290/96, § 28, ECHR 1999‑IX and Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 72, Series A no. 22, the applicant argued that there was a need for a wide construction of Article 14, and that the categories expressly set out in that provision were illustrative and not exhaustive. He further referred to the French text, which does not mention “status” but “situation” (“toute autre situation”) and argued that this supported his argument for a wider construction.


50.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of an unfair hearing and the outcome of the proceedings in her cases. The applicant further complained that the failure of the courts to consider her complaints within a reasonable time and to award her appropriate compensation violated her rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.  The applicant finally complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that she had been discriminated on the ground of her social and property status.


49.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that he was unable to obtain a favourable judgment in his case and that other clean-up workers of the Chernobyl nuclear accident site were paid disability pensions. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


16.  The applicant complained that the national authorities’ refusal to allow her to bear only her maiden name after her marriage, despite the fact that she had submitted the Court’s judgment on the same topic (Ünal Tekeli, cited above) to the domestic courts in support of her request, had amounted to a breach of Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. She further claimed that the fact that Turkish law allowed married men but not married women to bear their own surname after marriage constituted sex discrimination and was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


40.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion, prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention taken together with Article 9.


66.  The applicant further complained that he had been a victim of discriminatory treatment in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. He submitted in particular that the German courts, in requiring a common proposal of the parents to be granted the joint exercise of parental authority, discriminate against one of the divorced spouses.  Article 14 provides:


36.  The applicant argued that the nationalisation and destruction of her late mother's property were flagrant and continuous breaches of her property rights. She also claimed that the decision of 25 September 1992 and the judgment of 3 April 1996 restored her property rights and entitled her to the return of the plot or proper compensation. However, the plot was not returned to her, and no compensation was afforded in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. According to the applicant, the violation of her property rights occurred only because her late mother's land was on a valuable location in the centre of the resort. Accordingly, the State allegedly discriminated against her in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention.


50.  The applicants submitted that the present case should also be considered from the point of view of the equal treatment, enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention, between married and unmarried couples. They pointed out, in support of that submission, that the draft revision of the European Convention on the Adoption of Children opened up adoption to registered partners (see “Relevant domestic and international law”, paragraphs 23-25 above). The survey produced by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law and adduced by the Government showed that a number of European States had already provided in their legislation for the principle of equal treatment in adoption matters between registered partners and married couples, and in some cases even same-sex partners.


132.  The Government argued that having regard to the content of Ms M.’s letter of 1 March 2006 addressed to the Court in which she had stated that she complained only on her son’s behalf, she was no longer an applicant and therefore could no longer claim to be a victim of the violation of her Convention rights guaranteed by Article 6 taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention.


39.  The Government submitted that the proceedings in issue did not concern a right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, consequently, fell outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. Relying, inter alia, on Gaygusuz v. Austria (judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1129), the Government argued that benefits under social-insurance schemes characterised by the principle of social solidarity could not be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that, unlike systems under which the level of benefit was linked to contributions paid, a system based on social solidarity distributed the available resources equally among all claimants.


22.  The applicant complains that the national authorities’ refusal to allow her to bear only her maiden name after her marriage amounted to a breach of Articles 6, 8 and 46 of the Convention. She also contends that the fact that Turkish law allows married men to bear their own surname after marriage and not married women constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex and is incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant further refers to the Court’s Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey judgment (cited above) and submits that the Turkish domestic authorities should have complied with this judgment.


87.  The applicants complained that the Law of 4 March 2002, by setting up a specific liability system, had created an unjustified inequality of treatment between the parents of children whose disabilities were not detected before birth on account of negligence and the parents of children disabled on account of some other form of negligence, to whom the principles of ordinary law would continue to apply. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


195.  The applicant alleged discrimination, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention combined with Article 2, due to her husband’s origins, as only Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin regularly suffered unlawful killings. She averred that there was an administrative, discriminatory practice on grounds of race in the failure to investigate fully or prosecute the unlawful acts of the security forces, contrary to Article 14.


31.  The applicant complained that he had been denied an old-age pension between November 1998 and April 2003 on the grounds that he had not had Slovenian citizenship, one of the requirements under section 2(1)(4) of the 1998 Act. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read as follows:


80.  The applicant further argued that the ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public, which undoubtedly targeted the burqa, generated discrimination in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention on grounds of sex, religion and ethnic origin, to the detriment of Muslim women who, like her, wore the full-face veil. In her view this was indirect discrimination between Muslim women whose beliefs required them to wear the full-face veil and other Muslim women, and also between them and Muslim men. The exception provided for by the Law of 11 October 2010, according to which the ban did not apply if the clothing was worn in the context of “festivities or artistic or traditional events” was also, in her view, discriminatory, in that it created an advantage for the Christian majority: it allowed Christians to wear in public clothing that concealed their face in the context of Christian festivities or celebrations (Catholic religious processions, carnivals or rituals, such as dressing up as Santa Claus) whereas Muslim women who wished to wear the full-face veil in public remained bound by the ban even during the month of Ramadan.


35.  The applicant complained that the refusal to grant her a survivor’s pension, on the ground that her marriage solemnised according to the rites of the Roma minority to which she belonged had no civil effects, infringed the principle of non-discrimination recognised by Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The provisions in question read as follows:


22.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention that the proceedings giving rise to the final decision of 28 January 2003 were unfair, in particular in so far as the same Court of Appeal adopted conflicting decisions in identical cases brought against other buyers of apartments situated in the same building.


38.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function within a religious community which was comparable to that of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention, taken together with Article 4.


95.  The applicant submitted that the Federal Hunting Act discriminated against him in two ways. Firstly, he was discriminated against vis-à-vis owners of real property which did not belong to a hunting district, such as enclaves, which were not subject to hunting rights. Secondly, the relevant provisions discriminated against the owners of smaller landholdings. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


30.  The Government referred to paragraph 53 of the Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment ([GC], no. 65731/01, ECHR 2006‑VI) and did not dispute the fact that if a State decided to set up a benefits or pension scheme it must do so in a manner compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted, however, that the ministers of the various churches had been brought into the Social Security scheme at different moments in time for practical reasons and not through discrimination, and they pointed out, citing the Stec judgment (cited above, § 49), that the State enjoyed a broad margin of appreciation in such matters. The Government further noted that the inclusion of the ministers of the different faiths in the Social Security scheme was possible only if there existed a prior agreement with the State, under which the faith concerned took on certain obligations vis-à-vis the State; they referred to Royal Decree 369/1999 (see paragraph 23 above).


96.  The applicants in application no. 29381/09 claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) jointly in respect of the non-pecuniary damage they had allegedly sustained on account of the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 and the lack of an effective remedy in that regard. They also requested the Court to make specific recommendations to the Government with a view to amending Law no. 3719/2008 and extending the application of civil unions to same-sex couples.


58.  The applicant complained that the fact that he was not exempt from military service while assuming a function with the Jehovah’s Witnesses which was comparable to those of members of recognised religious societies who were exempt from military service constituted discrimination on the ground of his religion prohibited by Article <mask> of the Convention, taken together with Article 4.


44.  The applicant complained about the refusal to grant him a retirement pension because, in spite of the integration of protestant ministers in the general Social Security scheme, he had been unable to use his years of service as a minister to make up the minimum period of contributions required in order to qualify for a pension, whereas Catholic priests did have that option. He considered that this amounted to discrimination on grounds of religion, which was contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


54.  The applicant churches contested in particular the Government’s contention that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable because the right to provide religious education in public schools and nurseries and the right to the official recognition of religious marriages were outside the scope of Article 9 of the Convention. They averred that in a situation in which certain religious communities had been granted such rights, there was clearly a positive obligation to grant the same rights to other religious communities in a comparable situation.


41.   The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, claiming that they had been initially unlawfully deprived of their pension and that this deprivation had occurred for political reasons because they had left the USSR for a “capitalist country”, whereas citizens who had left for a “socialist country” had retained their pensions.


40.  The Government submitted that since citizenship was not a right covered by the Convention differential treatment based on illegitimate status could not violate Article <mask> of the Convention. As to any distinction based on sex, according to the Government this protection only applied to persons claiming discrimination when compared with other persons of a different sex. In the present case, the applicant was not ineligible for Maltese nationality on the ground of his sex, and the legal distinction based on the sex of his parent was a condition applicable irrespective of his sex. They further submitted that there was no distinction between voluntary acknowledgment of a child and judicial acknowledgment, as even if a father was recognised on the birth certificate, the child would not be eligible for citizenship on the grounds that he or she was illegitimate.


27.  The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that certain other litigants obtained higher awards in similar cases and under Article 6 § 1 that the conduct of the judicial authorities handling his requests for re-opening of the proceedings was unlawful. Finally, the applicant invoked Article 3 of the Convention to the facts of the present case.


104.  The applicant claimed, firstly, 1,423 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary damage caused by the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She submitted that that sum corresponded to 1,000 Latvian lati (LVL), the difference between the retirement pension she had actually received since her retirement in August 1997 up to October 2006 and the pension she should have received had the discrimination complained of not taken place. The applicant explained that in calculating that amount, she had taken into account the eighteen amendments of the basic pension rate that had occurred in the meantime and the increase of her pension following the entry into force of the agreement with Ukraine (see paragraphs 21-22 above).


35.  The applicant did not claim a right to adopt, which – irrespective of the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive parent – did not exist. Nevertheless, she submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, was applicable to the present case. Firstly, the opportunity or chance of applying for authorisation to adopt fell within the scope of Article 8 both with regard to “private life”, since it concerned the creation of a new relationship with another individual, and “family life”, since it was an attempt to create a family life with the child being adopted. Secondly, a person's sexual orientation, which was an aspect of their private life, accordingly fell within the scope of Article 8.


75.  The applicant further relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and complained that she had been discriminated against, as an individual farmer, in that the agricultural property to which she was entitled had not been returned to her, that it had been used by a cooperative, and that she had been obliged to seek the return of the property or compensation in the context of insolvency proceedings brought against the cooperative.


95.  The applicants complained that the Law of 4 March 2002, by setting up a specific liability system, had created an unjustified inequality of treatment between the parents of children whose disabilities were not detected before birth on account of negligence and the parents of children disabled on account of some other form of negligence, to whom the principles of ordinary law would continue to apply. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides:


41.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not been duly reminded of his rights under Article 135 (3) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure to request a lawyer during police custody and that he had not been provided with the assistance of a lawyer during his questioning at the Istanbul police headquarters, by the public prosecutor or before the criminal court. He further alleged under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention that the public prosecutor and the first‑instance court had failed to conduct an additional investigation (tevsi-i tahkikat) in the case or to collect evidence or summon witnesses in his favour. Lastly, the applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that his conviction constituted discrimination on the ground of his Kurdish ethnic origin.


16.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, of discrimination due to differing visiting rights set out in the Code until 2014 in respect of male and female life prisoners. The first applicant also referred to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. The Court considers that the above complaint should be examined solely under Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, which read as follows:


83.  The applicant also claimed to be the victim of discrimination in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because, unlike many of his co‑workers, he had been unable to purchase the flat he was leasing and his case had not been examined on the merits. Article 14 provides:


46.  The applicants complain of discrimination of the facts of the conditions of their schooling during the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years: they had been schooled in a school situated in a prefabricated building, attended only by children of their community and offering an inferior level of study to that of other students. They enounce a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention. These provisions are as follows:


55.  The applicants maintained that the Roma communities faced an institutional racist bias, manifested throughout police policies and procedures aimed at their communities. They argued that the police intervention plan of 15 December 2011 had clearly shown that the raid had been intended against the Roma community, which had been portrayed as a criminal community. The very essence of the police intervention had been, in their view, racist. Moreover, they averred that the statistical data provided in the intervention plan did not coincide with the figures available from the official census. In their view, this proved that the police had conducted their own census of the Vâlcele population and collected data on criminality based on the ethnic appurtenance of the suspects. Therefore the police portrayed the whole Roma community as being a criminal community and made generalisations which were incompatible with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention.


35.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention of the unfairness and outcome of the proceedings. In his initial submissions he also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the violation of his property rights since he had not been provided with the apartment. He also invoked Articles 8 and 17 of the Convention in that respect. Finally, he complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about discrimination.


49.  The applicant complained that the extensive restrictions imposed on her property were tantamount to unlawful de facto expropriation of her property and/or disproportionate control of its use without compensation, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She further complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since the restrictions imposed on her property were not imposed on neighbouring properties which, in contrast to her property, had a building density coefficient of 30 per cent and could be used for residential purposes. Finally, she claimed that there was no effective remedy as required by Article 13 of the Convention in respect of her aforementioned complaints.


47.  The applicants complained of their conditions of detention at the Aghios Savvas Hospital in Korydallos Prison, their “ghettoisation” in a separate wing of that hospital, and the failure of the authorities to consider whether those conditions were compatible with their state of health. They alleged a violation of Article 3 taken alone and in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. Those provides read as follows:


19.  The applicant complained that, by refusing her compensation for non-pecuniary damage in connection with the death of her partner, the domestic authorities showed lack of respect for her private and family life. The Court decided also to examine that complaint from the standpoint of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, read alone or in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. The above provisions read as follows:


54.  The applicant submitted that the domestic authorities had established his liability to pay the tax on the basis of an imprecise and unforeseeable provision and without a proper assessment of the particular circumstances of his case. Moreover, they had failed to make any assessment of proportionality of the interference with his property rights. The applicant therefore considered that the refusal to grant him the tax exemption imposed an excessive individual burden on him, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Whereas the applicant accepted that the domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in matters of taxation, he pointed out that according to the Court’s well-established case-law their discretion could not be exercised in a manner incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention.


107.  The applicant lastly complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that during his detention the police officers had made disparaging statements about his Tatar ethnic origin and that the prosecutor had neglected to investigate this matter. The Court reiterates that discrimination on account of one's ethnic origin or religion is a form of racial discrimination, which is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction (see Igor Artyomov v. Russia (dec.), no. 17582/05, 7 December 2006, and Timishev v. Russia, nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, § 56, ECHR 2005-XII). However, Article 14 has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by those provisions (see Inze v. Austria, judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, § 36). It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.


13.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities’ refusal to pay him the social security and tax benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”), Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), Widow’s Bereavement Allowance (“WBA”) and Widow’s Pension (“WP”) constituted discrimination against him on grounds of sex contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and/or Article 8.


26.  The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of the exceptional situation which was favourable to the State as a result of the difference between the rate of interest payable on debts owed to the State and the rate of interest on overdue State debts at the material time and of the fact that State debts were not subjected to enforcement procedures like ordinary debts.


285.  The Government first maintained that, as the applicants’ claims were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 119-128 above), Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable. This concerned, in particular, the right to purchase a dwelling, as the right to acquire property was not guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.


105.  The applicant submitted that, because of her and her family's Kurdish origins, the various alleged violations of their Convention rights also gave rise to a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. She maintained that the case-law of the Commission and the Court clearly showed the inadequacy of investigations into allegations of security force wrongdoing in the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern region of Turkey. The matters complained of had a disproportionate impact on individuals of Kurdish origin.