Question: How many member states adopted the Social Charter in 1989?

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

Answer: 11 of the then 12 member states

<hl> The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states . <hl> The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by <hl> 11 of the then 12 member states <hl>. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by <hl> 11 of the then 12 member states <hl> .


Question: Which member state declined to sign the Social Charter?

Answer: The UK

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. <hl> The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. <hl> The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. <hl> The UK <hl> refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:


Question: What title was the Social Charter set to be included into the Maastricht treaty under?

Answer: the "Social Chapter"

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. <hl> The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. <hl> Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as <hl> the "Social Chapter" <hl> of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:


Question: What year was the Maastricht treaty signed?

Answer: 1992

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. <hl> The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. <hl> Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:

The Social Charter was subsequently adopted in 1989 by 11 of the then 12 member states. The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be bound by the legislation. The UK subsequently was the only member state to veto the Social Charter being included as the "Social Chapter" of the <hl> 1992 <hl> Maastricht Treaty - instead, an Agreement on Social Policy was added as a protocol. Again, the UK was exempt from legislation arising from the protocol, unless it agreed to be bound by it. The protocol was to become known as "Social Chapter", despite not actually being a chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. To achieve aims of the Agreement on Social Policy the European Union was to "support and complement" the policies of member states. The aims of the Agreement on Social Policy are:


Question: What lead to the UK to subscribe to the agreement on Social Policy?

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Answer: the election of the UK Labour Party to government

<hl> Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. <hl> The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following <hl> the election of the UK Labour Party to government <hl> in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.


Question: When did the UK formally subscribe to the Agreement on Social Policy?

Answer: 1997

<hl> Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997 , the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. <hl> The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in <hl> 1997 <hl>, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in <hl> 1997 <hl> , the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.


Question: Which directive mentioned was created in 1994?

Answer: Works Council Directive

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. <hl> The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive , which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. <hl> In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 <hl> Works Council Directive <hl>, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 <hl> Works Council Directive <hl> , which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive.


Question: When was the Parental Leave directive created?

Answer: 1996

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. <hl> The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. <hl> In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses, and the <hl> 1996 <hl> Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.


Question: What did the Works Council Directive require?

Answer: workforce consultation in businesses

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. <hl> The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required workforce consultation in businesses , and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. <hl> In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

Following the election of the UK Labour Party to government in 1997, the UK formally subscribed to the Agreement on Social Policy, which allowed it to be included with minor amendments as the Social Chapter of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required <hl> workforce consultation in businesses <hl>, and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive. In the 10 years following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and adoption of the Social Chapter the European Union has undertaken policy initiatives in various social policy areas, including labour and industry relations, equal opportunity, health and safety, public health, protection of children, the disabled and elderly, poverty, migrant workers, education, training and youth.

The UK subsequently adopted the main legislation previously agreed under the Agreement on Social Policy, the 1994 Works Council Directive, which required <hl> workforce consultation in businesses <hl> , and the 1996 Parental Leave Directive.


Question: Which countries were the European Coal and Steel Community agreement between?

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

Answer: France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany

<hl> EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. <hl> The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between <hl> France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany <hl> in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.


Question: What year was the ECSC agreement established?

Answer: 1951

<hl> EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. <hl> The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in <hl> 1951 <hl> following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.


Question: What did article 65 of the ECSC ban?

Answer: cartels

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. <hl> Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. <hl> This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned <hl> cartels <hl> and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.


Question: Which article made provisions for concentrations or mergers and the abuse of a dominant position by companies?

Answer: article 66

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. <hl> Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. <hl> This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and <hl> article 66 <hl> made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.


Question: When were competition rules included in the Treaty of Rome?

Answer: 1957

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. <hl> In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). <hl> The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.

EU Competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as members felt that its dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies. This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In <hl> 1957 <hl> competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.


Question: In which article does the Treaty of Lisbon prohibit anti-competitive agreements?

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Answer: Article 101(1)

<hl> Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) , including price fixing. <hl> According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in <hl> Article 101(1) <hl>, including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in <hl> Article 101(1) <hl> , including price fixing.


Question: What does Article 102 of the Treaty of Lisbon prohibit?

Answer: the abuse of dominant position

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). <hl> Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position , such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. <hl> Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits <hl> the abuse of dominant position <hl>, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Article 102 prohibits <hl> the abuse of dominant position <hl> , such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing.


Question: Which articles state that the member states' rights to deliver public services may not be obstructed?

Answer: Articles 106 and 107

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. <hl> Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. <hl> Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. <hl> Articles 106 and 107 <hl> provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.


Question: Which article allows the European Council to govern mergers between firms?

Answer: Article 102

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). <hl> Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. <hl> Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.

Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). <hl> Article 102 <hl> prohibits the abuse of dominant position, such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council to regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC). The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.


Question: When was the concept of a social market economy introduced into EU law?

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

Answer: 2007

<hl> While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007 , free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. <hl> According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in <hl> 2007 <hl>, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in <hl> 2007 <hl> , free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957.


Question: How long has free movement and trade been central to European development?

Answer: 1957

<hl> While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957 . <hl> According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome <hl> 1957 <hl>. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome <hl> 1957 <hl> .


Question: Breaking down barriers to trade and enhancing the free movement of goods is meant to reduce what?

Answer: consumer prices

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. <hl> Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices . <hl> It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce <hl> consumer prices <hl>. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce <hl> consumer prices <hl> .


Question: What do the Treaties generally limit?

Answer: free trade

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. <hl> It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. <hl> In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a <hl> free trade <hl> area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.


Question: What entity has taken the view that the goals of free trade are underpinned by the aims to improve people's well being?

Answer: the Court of Justice

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. <hl> Increasingly the Court of Justice has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being. <hl>

While the concept of a "social market economy" was only introduced into EU law in 2007, free movement and trade were central to European development since the Treaty of Rome 1957. According to the standard theory of comparative advantage, two countries can both benefit from trade even if one of them has a less productive economy in all respects. Like in other regional organisations such as the North American Free Trade Association, or the World Trade Organisation, breaking down barriers to trade, and enhancing free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, is meant to reduce consumer prices. It was originally theorised that a free trade area had a tendency to give way to a customs union, which led to a common market, then monetary union, then union of monetary and fiscal policy, political and eventually a full union characteristic of a federal state. In Europe, however, those stages were considerably mixed, and it remains unclear whether the "endgame" should be the same as a state, traditionally understood. In practice free trade, without standards to ensure fair trade, can benefit some people and groups within countries (particularly big business) much more than others, but will burden people who lack bargaining power in an expanding market, particularly workers, consumers, small business, developing industries, and communities. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union articles 28 to 37 establish the principle of free movement of goods in the EU, while articles 45 to 66 require free movement of persons, services and capital. These so-called "four freedoms" were thought to be inhibited by physical barriers (e.g. customs), technical barriers (e.g. differing laws on safety, consumer or environmental standards) and fiscal barriers (e.g. different Value Added Tax rates). The tension in the law is that the free movement and trade is not supposed to spill over into a licence for unrestricted commercial profit. The Treaties limit free trade, to prioritise other values such as public health, consumer protection, labour rights, fair competition, and environmental improvement. Increasingly <hl> the Court of Justice <hl> has taken the view that the specific goals of free trade are underpinned by the general aims of the treaty for improvement of people's well being.


Question: What helps the process of free movement of goods?

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

Answer: a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination

<hl> Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination . <hl> The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by <hl> a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination <hl>. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by <hl> a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination <hl> .


Question: What did did article 34 discriminate against in Procureur du Roi v Dassonville?

Answer: parallel importers like Mr Dassonville

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. <hl> It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville , who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. <hl> This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against <hl> parallel importers like Mr Dassonville <hl>, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

It discriminated against <hl> parallel importers like Mr Dassonville <hl> , who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch.


Question: Article 34 meant states could be responsible for what?

Answer: private actors

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. <hl> It also means states can be responsible for private actors . <hl> For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union, and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. In Procureur du Roi v Dassonville the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for <hl> private actors <hl>. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities ‘manifestly and persistently abstained' from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property." In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an overriding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austria the Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the ‘fundamental pillars of a democratic society’, against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

It also means states can be responsible for <hl> private actors <hl> .