Federalism in Nepal: A country in transition
Nepal transitioned to federalism with the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, bringing a shared sense of hope and optimism to many after more than a decade of political instability, a devastating earthquake and the border blockade between India and Nepal.
The transition was built on the campaigning of activists calling for proportional and meaningful participation for marginalised communities in a diverse country that had very limited representation of that diversity within government and the institutions that plan inclusive development and access to basic services.
Many argued that this change in government was unnecessary for a small country like Nepal, but the decentralisation of power brought about by the federal state system has reduced the gap between the people and their representatives. However, the question still remains – have the marginalised truly felt the dividends of federalism?
How have marginalised communities experienced federalism?
Hear the experiences of women who have government positions within federal Nepal in our short documentary.
Supporting a collaborative transition to federalism
International Alert’s Sundar Shanta Nepal project, funded by the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, aimed to support the implementation of federalism and inclusive peace processes in Nepal by working with marginalised communities, provincial and local government representatives, civil society and the media, to better understand the evolving forms of marginalisation in the context of federalism. By bringing these groups together to collaborate, we learned how federalism could be delivered more inclusively and also helped to achieve several policy reforms, including improving the education of marginalised children (such as Muslims).
Our in-depth research suggests that federalism has opened up new political spaces and opportunities for minority groups like the Madhesi Dalits, Muslims and Tharu people of southern Nepal, but these groups share a sense of both optimism and scepticism regarding how meaningful their participation is.
Tokenism or inclusion?
We learned that while women from Madhesi Dalits, Muslim and Tharus communities were now being included in decision-making mechanisms, including in provincial and local government bodies, some women representatives and their communities felt the positions were tokenistic with some seats being designated to women from certain communities only. This risks further marginalising women’s voices and concerns in these spheres of governance.
Our documentary shares experiences of elected representatives being dismissed by their peers. Even women who have been elected to senior positions like Deputy Mayor, have their decisions constantly challenged and questioned. Maya Devi Yadav and Urmila Kori, Ward Members from Kapilvastu Ward 8 told us:
The Ward chairperson himself doesn’t give us rights to practice our duties, neither does he give us the information he is supposed to. Now, what can we do? If anything has come to the Ward office, we are not told and come to know from outside sources.
“They question us and ask why you are so interested, sign the papers, take your allowance, and go home. And, when we don’t sign, we don’t get our allowance.”
“We at lower-level positions don’t have the power to enforce change. We don’t have the capacity to reach a higher position like Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Parliamentarians. There is no value for those who are at lower levels of governance. My heart is breaking since I can’t do much, I feel like I shouldn’t have done this. At least I wouldn’t have to face torture or be talked down to,” says Rubina Musalman, Women Committee Member, Lumbini.
Despite this, many also see the evolving federal system of governance as a genuine opportunity to address the long-standing grievances and marginalisation of various groups, regions and genders, and to strengthen good governance and state–citizen relations.
I am a member of the Provincial Assembly and I am gradually learning my roles and responsibilities as a member. I have learnt a lot but still I need to learn more. When a citizen comes to me with their problems, I usually go with them and solve it.
“Before, the citizens couldn’t speak with their “mananiya” (elected house members). They would come and go in their vehicles and the citizens didn’t have access to them. Now they can come to my house sit with me and talk about their problems.” Hon. Sunita Kumari Thater, Provincial Assembly Member, Province 5.
Post-election the peace and conflict context has shifted
During and following the 2017 elections, power has shifted in Nepal from a central government dominated by men and those in the “upper caste” to become decentralised and more inclusive, affecting the nature of decision-making in politics and society. Peace and conflict dynamics in the country have also changed, in relation to the recent elections and the post-election context, which reflects the need for building the capacity and constituency of the elected representatives from marginalised communities.
There is fear among these newly elected officials that their inability to perform while in government, or the perception of it, will reinforce the dissenting voices of those not in favour of federalism, which could lead to insecurity and instability within government structures and the country. A dominant conflict issue raised throughout our research has been disputes over jurisdiction and resources between the federal, provincial, and local governments. Interventions are needed to create an environment for sensible cooperation and collaboration in consolidating democracy and peace, and institutionalising federalism.
The demand and expectation of the people is high. For 20 years they have felt left behind and now finally, with the elections, with a changing context, it is likely to happen. We have had limited budget and resources, but have tried to fulfil the wishes and needs of the people.
“We have also been working on forming laws and regulations and there are many more to be made but we have to follow the due process according to the constitution which states that the law is made by the federal level, then at the provincial level, after which we can do so at local level. Therefore, we are waiting for the federal and provincial government to implement the laws. Another challenge is that the administrative staff and elected representatives, are not all well trained regarding this new structure. It has been nearly two years and we ourselves are trying to learn and have had the opportunity to coordinate with municipality and different civic organisations to enhance our skills and participated in trainings.” Prakash Yonjan, Ward Chairperson, Dhangandhimai.
How can federalism be supported?
Donors and development agencies should support local governments and community organisations to promote and institutionalise inclusive and locally responsive legislation-making processes to ensure that elected officials from marginalised communities can meaningfully undertake their legislative roles and functions.
They can achieve this by working alongside civil society organisations to build the capacity of elected representatives on public speaking, inclusive policy making, conflict sensitivity training and good governance; by working with the media, activists, women’s club, youth groups, in some cases religious leaders to organise dialogues between service seekers and service providers; and by working with local media and youth groups to amplify voices from the communities.
The 2015 Constitution of Nepal has ensured participation from all marginalised communities, be it gender, caste or ethnicity, but the idea of federalism is still new for Nepal. There is still a long road ahead to understand what federalism means for Nepal, its implications and how it can be truly inclusive of all voices, but people are still hopeful as federalism has opened the gate to build a better and more peaceful future for all.


Campus CommunityHonor and Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' DayNo Author ProvidedOctober 12, 2020Invalid ImageNo Image Credit ProvidedNo Caption ProvidedToday, Seattle University marks the significance of Indigenous Peoples’ Day, a day to honor and celebrate Indigenous peoples and to acknowledge the toil of colonization as reflected by the land we occupy as a university. Dear Seattle University Community, Today, Seattle University marks the significance of Indigenous Peoples’ Day, a day to honor and celebrate Indigenous peoples and to acknowledge the toil of colonization as reflected by the land we occupy as a university. We recognize that we reside on occupied Coast Salish lands and Seattle University is on the homelands of the Duwamish people. We pay respect to Coast Salish Elders past and present and extend that respect to their descendants and to all Indigenous people. The origin of Indigenous Peoples’ Day reaches back to 1977 and the first International NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, and beginning in 1991, many cities began a movement to recognize and celebrate Indigenous Peoples’ Day in place of Columbus Day and as a step toward recognizing the harmful legacies of the doctrine of discovery and North American colonization. In 2014 and as a direct result of community activism, the City of Seattle declared the second Monday in October Indigenous Peoples’ Day, and Seattle University officially adopted Indigenous Peoples’ Day in 2016. We celebrate and recognize that a changing the name of one day cannot fully address historical wrongs or adequately honor the gifts and contributions of Indigenous peoples. Yet, it remains an important step in changing our orientation to our shared history. As an educational institution with a Jesuit Catholic ethos, we are on a journey to understand and reconcile a range of atrocities of colonization and their lasting impacts. Thus, we must embrace a fuller narrative of the history and cultural features that continue to thwart full actualization of Indigenous people and deprive all of us of the rich heritage and gifts that come through full inclusion of students, faculty, and staff of Indigenous descent. We recognize the leadership of Dr. Christina Roberts (Aaniiih and Nakoda), Director of the Indigenous Peoples Institute, and the many ways in which she has elevated the experiences of our Indigenous communities and built avenues for belonging and thriving for our students. Over the years, we have worked to deepen our relationship to Indigenous Peoples by learning about and celebrating the many contributions of Coast Salish peoples. For example, in 2018, we deepened understanding by offering as the university’s common text, Harriette Shelton Dover’s Tulalip, from My Heart, and celebrating Vi Hilbert taqwšǝblu, a revered Upper Skagit woman and the namesake for our shared ethnobotanical garden and the newest residence hall on campus. Each year, the Office of Diversity and Inclusion includes in its inclusive excellence summer reading list texts by talented Indigenous writers as a small way to expose our community to the tapestry of talent and creative works. This year’s offerings included An American Sunrise: Poems by Joy Harjo (the first Native American Poet Laureate, 2019). Significantly, our students recently had an opportunity to attend the first annual IPI-sponsored event, “Honoring Indigenous Voices.” This year’s theme – “Navigating intergenerational trauma on the way home” – and the event was designed and led by a current Indigenous student in the College of Nursing, Misty Louie (Apsaalooke/Ktunaxa, class of 2021). Learn more here. In 2017, Seattle University’s Indigenous Peoples Institute, under the guidance of Dr. Roberts and Fr. Patrick Twohy, S.J., collaborated with Campus Ministry to co-create language that can be used to recognize the history and people, lands and waters of this Duwamish dxʷdəwʔabš aboriginal territory. This statement is often used in our community to open campus events, meetings, classes, and other gatherings. Dr. Roberts recently updated the statement which was shared to open the university’s Celebration of Spirit last month. In the words of Dr. Roberts, the statement offers a way for “our community to recognize this land and our histories; to honor the Indigenous people past and present who belong to these places; and to have common and consistent language for our events and ceremonies that is crafted with care and wisdom.” As we begin [name of event/gathering], I (we) invite us all to respectfully acknowledge that our campus is on occupied Coast Salish land, specifically the homelands of the Duwamish people. To acknowledge this land is to recognize the history and legacy of settler colonialism; it is to recognize these lands, waters, and their significance for the peoples who have thrived in this region despite the consequences of displacement and broken treaties. Let us take a moment to pause and pay our respects to Coast Salish Elders past and present and extend that respect to their descendants and to all Indigenous people. We invite you to continue incorporating this updated acknowledgment throughout the academic year as a beginning practice of paying attention to our shared stories. These efforts cannot change history but offer a small step toward building an honest relationship with our history and lands. We also encourage faculty, staff and students to identify additional ways we can honor, listen, celebrate, receive, share and complicate the stories of this region. Please see the additional information listed below. Sincerely, Natasha Martin, JDVice President for Diversity and InclusionAssociate Professor of Law Christina Roberts, PhDNakoda and Aaniiih NationsDirector, Indigenous Peoples InstituteAssociate Director, Matteo Ricci InstituteAssociate Professor, English and Women and Gender Studies Here are a few opportunities to join the Indigenous Peoples Institute in learning and celebration this academic year: Lushootseed Language Conference: Oct. 17, 2020 IPI Book Club – Tommy Orange’s There There: November 2020 Indigenous Peoples Institute Open House in Xavier: TBD Spring 2020 Indigenous Students Day: Virtual event in Winter Since Time Immemorial Tribal Sovereignty Curriculum in Washington State: http://www.k12.wa.us/IndianEd/TribalSovereignty/ Land-grab universities: Expropriated Indigenous land is the foundation of the land-grant university system.


There are four major differences PONY offers:
1. Pitching machine for younger ages
2. Leadoffs and steals for older ages
3. Increasingly larger field sizes as players move up in age
4. Division age grouping of 2 years
The first key difference is at ages 7-8 (Pinto) -- which is one of the most popular participating ages in all of youth baseball. NCYB (and PONY in general) features a pitching machine for the full season – as opposed to player-pitch as is often the practice in Little League.
Any player/parent who has seen a Little League game at this age level no doubt has suffered through the walk-filled boredom that results from kids who don’t have the physical ability to either consistently throw or hit live pitching.
Pitchers too often hurt their arms and shatter confidence by pitching at such an early age. Hitters don’t develop because they rarely see hittable balls and are rightly worried about being hit themselves. Base-running skills don’t develop because there are so few base-runners who advance off a hit. And defensive skills don’t improve because the ball is so seldom put into play.
All this too often results in a complete lack of on-field action – which ultimately concludes with players and families dropping out of baseball because they consider it too boring.
By contrast, Pinto is regarded by many as the most exciting division of PONY because of the fast-paced action, and the dramatic improvement of all players over the course of the season in all phases of the game. This is all due to a consistent ball being pitched by the machine. Many families move from Little League to PONY just for this reason.
The second major distinction comes at the next level up with ages 9-10 (Mustang). By this point, players are physically and emotionally mature enough to be introduced to live pitching. Unlike Little League though, PONY allows leadoffs and steals. This introduces additional nuances to the game just as you see in the big leagues.
For example, pitchers learn how to pitch from the wind-up and stretch, holding runners on bases. Catchers learn how to throw out potential base stealers. Base-runners learn proper lead-offs and other base running techniques.
The third significant difference is that as players move up from one division to the next, the base path distances increase. Little League maintains the same distances not increasing the size of the infield as the players get older and stronger. Therefore the infield never grows larger than 60’ between the bases. For comparison, freshman high school baseball up through the major leagues features 90’ base paths.
PONY believes in graduating up in field size as players get older.
The fourth difference is division age. Little League often has divisions with an age span of 3 years. Pony divisions are comprised of players with a 2 year age difference. With the tighter age grouping in the division, we believe that it is a safer environment for all the players. It also adds more parity to the teams and idividual players. The result is a more consistent competitive environment and this translates to more fun, confidence and enjoyment for the players.


Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855), Italian priest, philosopher, theologian and patriot, and founder of a religious congregation, aimed principally in his philosophical work at re-addressing the balance between reason and religion which had largely been lost as a result of the Enlightenment. To this purpose, he absorbed the tradition of philosophia perennis, read extensively the works of post-Renaissance philosophers, and developed his own views on philosophical fundamentals and many of their applications. Best known in Italy, but a controversial figure there during his life and for a century or more after his death, his philosophical work, centred upon the notion of being and the dignity of the human person, can be summarised under the headings: aims and method, the objectivity of thought and the concept of certainty; the dignity of the human person; morality; human rights; the nature of human society; natural theology; and being. The following article will examine Rosmini’s work under these titles, which are of perennial relevance and broad enough to embrace more particular themes, such as art, politics, education and marriage, which form a constant preoccupation of many of his lesser works, but can only be mentioned in passing here. His theological principles, other than those pertaining to natural theology, are considered only in so far as they throw light on the origin and development of his philosophical tenets.
- 1. Life and Works
- 2. Aim and Method
- 3. The Objectivity of Thought and the Concept of Certainty
- 4. The Dignity of the Human Person
- 5. Morality
- 6. Human Rights
- 7. The Nature and Purpose of Society
- 8. Natural theology
- 9. Being
- Academic Tools
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries
Rosmini was born in 1797 at Rovereto, Italy, a staunchly Italian-speaking town, but at the time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and ruled from Vienna. The Rosmini family, citizens of Rovereto for several centuries, had become rich through the manufacture of silk, and enjoyed the way of life proper to the lesser aristocracy. Antonio’s primary and secondary education was, however, catered for at the public school, and through his own intensive reading. Tertiary education was completed at the University of Padua. After ordination to the priesthood in 1821, Rosmini studied and wrote at Rovereto until 1826, and from 1826–28 at Milan. Despite his instinctive distaste for the excesses of the French Revolution, which inevitably played a large part in the cultural formation of persons growing to maturity in the first quarter of the 19th century, Rosmini was not afraid to take a stand against State interference in religious affairs. His Panegyric for Pius VII (1823) was considerably censored by the Austrian-Hungarian government and published only in 1831. By this time, Rosmini had founded his religious order (1828), and published at Rome his fundamental philosophical work, A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas (1830). As the title suggests, this was intended to supersede Locke’s famous Essay concerning Human Understanding. From then on, a torrent of philosophical and theological works poured out until his death at Stresa. From 1836 until 1855, Rosmini was involved in constant controversy. The approbation of his religious order (1836–38), his work on conscience (1840), theological disputes (1843–48) and his participation in the political events of 1848, occasioned strong debate which led in 1849 to the inclusion of two of his works, The Five Wounds of Holy Church and the Civil Constitution according to Social Justice, in the Index of Prohibited Books. Strengthened by this, Rosmini’s theological and political opponents pressed for an examination of all his works which led, however, to his exoneration (1854), a year before his death at Stresa in northern Italy (1855). Condemnation came posthumously (1888–9) when forty propositions, taken mostly from books published after his death, were included in the decree Post Obitum of Leo XIII. A remarkable swing in ecclesiastical opinion took place in 2001 when a Vatican Note stated: ‘The motives for preoccupation and for doctrinal and prudential difficulties which determined the promulgation of the decree Post Obitum condemning the “Forty Propositions” drawn from the works of Antonio Rosmini can now be considered as surmounted’ (CDF, Osservatore Romano, 1 July 2001).
Rosmini describes his aim and method at some length in his On the Studies of the Author. He sets out to combat error, to systematise the truth, to present a philosophy that can serve as a basis for the various branches of knowledge, and to offer philosophy as an aid to theology. To achieve this, he upholds freedom to philosophise, and sets out to reconcile, whenever possible, apparently contrasting views. His intention throughout is to present an image of knowledge as one, simple and indivisible.
2.1 Combating error
No one, he maintains, would err for the sake of erring. Philosophical tradition in particular provides an object lesson in the movement towards truth, and the elimination of error. Nevertheless, the path forward is not pursued without error because the movement towards higher levels of reflection takes place unevenly. Responses to questions at level A are no longer adequate in form to resolve questions at level B, which inevitably take on new aspects through their application to new circumstances. The role of the philosopher is to distinguish the form of difficulties, which may vary from age to age or generation to generation, and to formulate questions in such a way that it is possible to see both their historical antecedents and the underlying principles to be employed in solving them. The process, however, will never be complete. The same principles will always cry out for application to new cases, and the same struggle to avoid error will ensue.
2.2 Systematising the truth
The negative task of combating error is not, however, sufficient. What is needed in addition, says Rosmini, is a ‘system of truth’, that is, a system which shows clearly how the passage is made from the most general, self-evident principles to more particular levels of knowledge. Knowledge-wise, we move instinctively from the more general to the particular. A mother does not begin by naming roses, carnation and other species for her children; she first indicates them all as ‘flowers’ before calling them by their particular names. So ‘being’, which is the most general of all notions, is the fundamental principle of human knowledge which draws together every aspect of being. When ‘being’ is seen as the supreme principle of unity on which all knowledge depends, truth—‘being as known’—has been systematised and is seen in all its beauty. Since, however, the full application of being is never seen once and for all, it is better to ensure adherence to principle than to grasp at unconnected facts which serve at best as a ragbag of erudition—better to grasp the principle of the wheel, for example, than to know only a number of its applications.
2.3 Philosophy as a basis for the various branches of knowledge
Philosophy as ‘the study of the final reasons’ is thus central to Rosmini’s understanding. For him, the Enlightenment, with its sensistic, subjectivist attitude and devotion to the act of reasoning, rather than to the light of reason, degenerates inevitably into a hotchpotch of negation and ignorance, leading to radical corruption in ethics, and every other branch of philosophical endeavour.
2.4 Philosophy as an aid to theology
The fragmentation of philosophy and its consequent separation from theology is, according to Rosmini, a necessary consequence of sensationalist thinking. There can be no place for revealed doctrine to be expounded as true science unless certain truths are already demonstrated, in the logical order at least, by philosophical reason. On the other hand, theology itself often cannot make progress unless it is prepared to turn to philosophy for assistance. The notions of body, of person and of many other matters essential to theology, cannot be adequately expressed in isolation from philosophical teaching. In its turn, according to Rosmini, divine revelation does not cancel, but completes and ennobles reason, especially by drawing its attention to problems such as the relationship between person and nature which would otherwise escape its attention.
2.5 Freedom to Philosophise
Error, the antithesis of knowledge, is the only intellectual impediment to free, philosophical thought. From this principle, Rosmini concludes that assent to erroneous prejudices, not assent to prejudice as such, is the principal obstacle to be overcome by philosophers. Their work consists in examining preconceptions and determining their truth in order to provide grounds for rational persuasion about what they know. To maintain, as many do, that the possession of some unproven truth is inimical to philosophical thought is tantamount to requiring nil knowledge in the prospective philosopher. Rather, a person who knows something, but has not yet come to grips with the reasons leading to it, is like a person who knows the answer to a problem, but still has to consider the reason for the answer. In this case, freedom is not constrained. The point at issue, therefore, in the case of religion, is not that Christians, or Buddhists, or Muslims, or any other religious persons, are necessarily hampered by their beliefs, but whether these beliefs are true, and to what extent they are true. It is not sufficient to state simply that only persons who are devoid of any belief are capable of philosophising freely. Rather
total freedom is a necessary condition of the truth of faith. If faith were considered divine although in conflict with reason, it would impose an impossible obligation and totally inhibit our reasoning activity. We would be unable to give our assent to either reason or faith, and would thus remain deprived of truth (IP 39 [All numbers in references to Rosmini’s works are to paragraphs, not to pages]).
It is not the case, Rosmini would affirm, that only non-believers have the capacity to enter the world of philosophical enquiry.
2.6 Reconciliation of Conclusions
According to Rosmini, eclecticism, especially that upheld by Victor Cousin, is not the way to promote reconciliation between conclusions. Philosophical systems are not brought together as a result of arbitrary choice between what they offer. Each system, if it is truly such, will have a principle from which deductions are made, and will be able to be reconciled, despite accidental differences, with every other system sharing the same principle. On the other hand, systems will not be reconcilable, despite their accidental agreement, if their basic principles differ. In the former case, agreement will be possible by working back to the principle, and setting out once more from there; in the second case, apparent agreement will only be skin-deep. Only shared principles allow for effective reconciliation between systems.
Rosmini sets out to establish the nature of thought and certainty in his A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas. Faced by the critical philosophy of Kant on the one hand, and by British empiricism on the other, Rosmini reaches back to the pre-Socratics, to Plato and Aristotle, to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, in an endeavour to establish the nature of thought and the basis of certainty in human existence. As his guiding principles he takes the following rules:
In explaining facts connected with the human spirit, we must not make fewer assumptions than are required to explain them... [nor must we] make more assumptions than are needed to explain the facts (NE, vol. 1, 26–7).
With this as his methodological foundation, he places Locke, Condillac, Reid and Dugald Stewart among those whose explanation of the fact of thought is deficient; Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant are listed amongst those whose explanation is in many ways excessive. In other words, he distinguishes between sensationalists who, according to him, cannot explain the origin of ideas, and idealists who posit in their explanation more ideas or forms than are necessary. For him, however, human thought must depend upon the innate idea of being, without which nothing is intelligible. We cannot think of what is not. At the same time, nothing more is needed than the single idea of being, and its possible determinations, brought about through sensation, to explain all intellectual principles and the ramifications of thought.
After observing the fact of thought, Rosmini concludes that its absolute basis, without which nothing is thought and thought is nothing, must be the knowledge of being. Reflection can remove everything from thought, and still leave it embryonically sound provided the mind is granted the idea of being as its governing light. This idea, which possesses the divine attributes of universality, infinity, necessity and possibility, is not God himself but merely the possibility of things. Moreover, it acts in the mind, but without becoming a subjective part of the mind. As intellectual light, it illuminates, but from outside the mind. And it illuminates without revealing its source, as natural light can be seen without our looking at the sun. It is, as Dante would say, ‘the light connecting intellect and truth’ (Purgatorio 6: 45) and, as such, is the quasi-form of the intellect and the image of truth. Determinations of this idea, all of which possess in some way the characteristics of being, especially its objectivity, are provided through sensations experienced in the animal part of human existence and illuminated, being-wise, through the innate idea in which they are seen. Of themselves, sensations do not constitute knowledge but, when felt in the human subject, provide the matter of knowledge which determines the idea of being, that is, the form of knowledge. Knowledge consists first in the intuition of being, the universal, and then in a subsequent series of judgments, or direct perceptions, through which knowing subjects affirm the actual existence of what they have experienced sensationally. These direct perceptions cannot err, although reflection upon them, and a subsequent series of judgments, may be the source of error. In a word, Rosmini holds that basic knowledge, consisting of the idea of being and its immediate determinations, provides all that is needed for objective thought. Against idealists, he reduces the formal requirements of thought to the intuition of being; against sensationalists, he maintains the per se inadequacy of the senses to provide more than the matter of thought.
Objectivity, therefore, is essentially a characteristic of what is known. Certainty, in Rosmini’s view, is a characteristic of the person who knows, and can be defined as ‘a firm and reasonable persuasion that conforms to the truth’ (NE, vol. 3, 1044). In other words, we can be certain only of knowledge, not of error, and this because, according to Rosmini, to know and to know the truth is the same thing. The person who does not know the truth, does not know. There is no doubt, of course, that it is possible to be persuaded, and firmly persuaded, of error. But rational persuasion of error arrived at through one’s own reasoning is not possible. In this case, either the premiss is wrong, or the argument is erroneous. On the other hand, the persuasion must be firm. Certainty is not achieved without energy directed into persuasion. Certainty requires that we know something to be true, to be what it is, that we are persuaded that it is what we know it to be, and that we have an adequate reason for our persuasion. And precisely because error attempts to alter the being of things, formal error will not be found rooted in the intellect nor in the senses nor in involuntary reflection. It begins with the will, the only human faculty capable of drawing the reason to invent what it does not see, or to deny what it sees. Under pressure from the will, reason will falsely affirm that being is not, or deny that being is.
It is already clear from what has been said that Rosmini, in his solution to the basic problem of knowledge, has offered a perspective which places human dignity on a transcendent level. Human beings are made such, he would maintain, by the intuition of being which accompanies them from the first moment of their existence. Through this intuition, they share in the finality of being itself and in some finite way participate in its infinite characteristics. Nevertheless, the subjective element proper to the human being neither can nor should be denied. Indeed, it has to be examined thoroughly if a rational account is to be rendered of the essential unitary make-up of human nature. This examination was carried out initially in Rosmini’s A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas as part of his explanation of what he called ‘impure’ ideas, that is, ideas which, as perceptive (not simply intellective), require for their origin some sense experience. He pursued the investigation in his Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science and in Psychology where in four volumes entitled The Essence of the Human Soul, The Development of the Human Soul, Laws of Animality and Opinions about the Human Soul, he observed and discussed at length the animal, as well as the intellectual side of human nature.
The first fact presented by observation on ourselves is the essential distinction in human beings between that which feels and that which is felt. According to Rosmini, these are quite different and unconfusible elements with opposite characteristics. That which feels is an immaterial principle (soul); that which is felt is the term (body) of this principle. Together feeler and felt constitute feeling, the underlying subject of reflection when attention is concentrated on ‘myself’ and those elements which constitute ‘myself’. The chief action of body is to produce an undetermined, shapeless extension which enables that which feels to experience determined sensations of various kinds. This ‘fundamental feeling’, with its permanent perception of unlimited space, is that in which all other feelings are perceived, and runs parallel, as it were, with the idea of being in which all other ideas are intuited. Reaction to perceived feelings constitutes vital instinct (relative to the fundamental feeling) and sensuous instinct (relative to the adventitious sensations). All feeling and instinct is per se unknown in Rosmini’s view, and comes to be known through the formation in the knowing subject of ideas and perceptions which depend upon the illumination provided by the idea of being. Thus, for Rosmini, the human being is a knowing and feeling subject, having within itself a principle which, formed by the light of being, knows and reacts to what it knows through the faculties of intellect and will, and feels and reacts to what it feels through the faculties of sense and instinct. Within the human subject, the will - which reacts to what is known—is the supreme active principle and as such constitutes ‘person’ in the individual. The dignity of the human being lies within the will as such, in the first place, and then within the will’s choice to second whatever the intellect knows. This is also the foundation of genuine freedom within the human subject. Free to adhere to or reject what is known, human beings cannot be coerced by attempted external pressure or used as a means by others without prejudice to the inviolable truth in which they share innately through their participation in the light of being and which they attain adventitiously through the direct perception that unfolds determined truths to their intellectual gaze.
Rosmini’s ethical philosophy springs directly from the analysis summarised in the previous section. For him, ‘the human being is a knowing and feeling subject whose will, as supreme principle of activity, provides the basis of the incommunicable individuality that constitutes each real human nature as a person’ (Life, p. 26). ‘Person’, as supreme principle, is also the subject of moral activity, and is to be distinguished from all those habits and acts within human beings which take place without the necessary intervention of the person or, at most, effect the person indirectly. For example, a good pianist is not necessarily a good person. Morality deals necessarily with what people do as persons, with what affects themselves as subjects who cannot step aside from the truth they know without violating their adherence to truth. Rosmini deals with ethics, the science of morality, in his Principles of Ethics and in Comparative and Critical History of Systems dealing with the Principle of Morality. The History first offers an overview of systems which throughout history deny morality, or make it impossible, or provide it with a subjective foundation. It then moves on to summarise the objective view expressed by philosophers and developed by Rosmini in Principles of Ethics .
5.1 Moral Obligation
This view, as stated by Rosmini, depends upon what he sees as a self-evident principle that cannot be denied by any sane person. We are bound, he says, to acknowledge (recognise) what we know for what we know it to be. Granted that knowledge, according to Rosmini, is co-terminus with truth, never with error, it is clear that Rosmini’s affirmation depends upon the self-evident need to affirm what one knows. This, in turn, is an act by which the human subject is elevated, at a reflective level, to the level of the truth which, already known in the essential idea of being, is as sublime as being itself. On the other hand, to deny what one knows is equivalent to stepping into non-being, the antithesis of dignity. In more philosophical terms, Rosmini maintains that the principle he enunciates, in which every other moral dictate is implicitly included, may be characterised as follows: it expresses moral essence because it calls for agreement between the intellective act of the will and the ideal and real entities of things known; it is simple and as such able to be participated by every moral activity; it is evident because it is nothing more than an expression of the principle of contradiction; it is universal because all moral effects, denoted through external actions, depend upon it; it is supreme because it offers no possibility of further investigation; it provides the foundation for the recognition of the human subject as an essentially moral being, that is, one who, through the innate presence of the idea of being and the principle of will, is furnished with the object of morality and essential adherence to it. Finally, Rosmini’s distinction between the subject and object of morality opens a way, according to him, between the extremes of ethical theory. On the one hand, the limitation of the human subject provides for the possibility of moral error; on the other, the necessity and immutability of the object, the idea of being, furnish morality with its undeniable sense of obligation. It is a fatal but all too frequent mistake, Rosmini contends, to attribute characteristics proper to the subject (fallibility, error, and so on) to the object, and characteristics of the object (necessity, immutability and so on) to the subject.
5.2 Moral Good
A way is now present to describe adequately the nature of moral good as opposed to eudemonological good. That which is good is desirable, but what is desirable may either be desirable in itself, that is, as it stands in the order of being, or simply desirable in so far it is good, or imagined as good, for the individual. Moral good, says Rosmini, is found when the will adheres to what is good according to the order of being; eudemonological or utilitarian good is what is desired as good for the individual, without reference to what is good in itself. Human dignity is preserved only when, through an act of will, individuals adhering in practice to beings as they are in their order, implicitly adhere to the whole of being and to their presence in that order. Immorality, by which entities are appreciated or desired but not in their known order and thus not as they are, implies an essential rebellion against the order of being and thus against being itself. Self-imposed human indignity can go no lower than this.
Having dealt with the nature of morality and moral obligation, Rosmini turns his attention to conscience. He himself admits that such a treatise is almost universally neglected by philosophers, and feels himself constrained to justify such a study, which he undertakes with an almost inevitable admixture of religious and theological elements. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to filter the philosophical principles in his work from characteristics proper to the faith he professes. This is especially apparent in his approach to the nature of conscience, an area in which his views first prompted the dissension’s between him and some of his co-religionists that would go on until the end of his life. Rosmini defines conscience as a ‘speculative judgement that a person makes about the morality of his practical judgement’ (C19), that is, a judgement by which individuals come to know the moral value of their actions without necessarily acting upon it.
Several consequences can be drawn from this. First, morality in the individual is prior to conscience, and can be present without conscience; second, conscience can be mistaken (it is possible to form a incorrect notion of the moral value of one’s own action); third, it does not follow that conscience, once formed, will give rise to action in the person who forms it; fourth, conscience, if incorrect in its judgement, must as far as possible be reformed. Conscience, therefore, is only an adequate guide to morality when it provides accurate information of the moral state of a subject’s past, present or future action. In the light of these affirmations, it is possible to see how Rosmini lays the groundwork for overcoming the dilemma posed by the question: must conscience always be followed? While it is certain that the dictates of conscience can never be morally disregarded, it is equally certain that a deliberately misleading act of conscience cannot morally be followed. Sometimes, therefore, it will be morally imperative to correct conscience, which is always possible through proper reflection on the moral value of the human act posited or about to be posited by the individual. Rosmini goes on to distinguish between problems about conscience and problems connected with the formation of conscience. In fact, conscience, according to him, is not present as long as judgement is suspended about the moral value of an individual’s own action. Difficulties at this point are connected with the formation of the judgement, not with the judgement itself.
Rosmini’s view of ‘person’, seen as an inviolable end which can never be reduced to the status of ‘means’, leads spontaneously to what today is seen as paramount in human existence, that is, the question of human rights. These rights are studied at length in The Philosophy of Right, a six-volume treatise in the only extant English translation. The general title of the work shows immediately that for Rosmini all rights are founded in a single element called ‘right’ from which all ‘rights’ emanate, some innate in human beings, others springing from the determined circumstances of individuals or societies. The treatise can be summed up under three heads: the essence of right, individual rights, social rights.
6.1 The Essence of Right
The basis of Rosmini’s teaching on human rights is a consequence of his moral theory, of which he gives a careful synthesis in a preface to The Philosophy of Right. If each person is morally obliged to recognise in practice what is known for what it is known to be, every other human being will be recognised as essentially on a par with the knowing person, and will have to be acknowledged as such. But because each person is obliged to act in accordance with moral propriety, every person is obliged to respect this obligation in the other on pain of violating the moral law itself. Granted this principle as foundation, and ‘right’ as a relationship between one person and others by which a person has a claim to what is his own, Rosmini maintains that ‘person’ is subsistent right. In other words, all rights are founded on that to which persons have a claim in so far as they are acting morally or are at least not acting immorally. Such activity cannot be the object of attack on the part of others without violation of persons as ends. ‘Right’, as he says, ‘is a moral governance or authority to act, or: right is a faculty to do what we please, protected by the moral law which obliges others to respect that faculty’ (ER, vol. 1, 237).
The essence of right is, therefore, the activity of a person or persons relative to other persons. This activity, however, can be exercised either by individuals or by persons acting as members of a society.
6.2 Rights of individuals
When a person’s activity is actuated in a moral way, the object of that activity becomes the person’s own, that is, becomes proper to the person in such a way that it cannot be violated without damage to the person in whose ownership it is. Practical experience of this is found in what Rosmini calls ‘jural resentment’, the injured feeling that occurs on the occasion of violation of some right and gives rise to an instinct for repossession or restitution. Such an experience is obviously not a fact related solely to matter; it is fundamentally a fact of the spirit where alone it can be felt. It is also an indication of the sphere of jural freedom within which a person is and must be left free. More importantly, ‘person’ does not possess right, but—because formed by the light of being—is right itself; does not possess freedom, but is freedom. The divisions of activity give rise to two major kinds of rights in people. If what is possessed is such from the very beginning of existence in a human being (life, for example), the individual possesses innate right(s) which may be called ‘natural’ (pertaining essentially to human nature) or ‘rational’ (the rights are what they are and cannot be otherwise). But rights may also be acquired by human beings during the course of life through adventitious activity. When rights have been established in this way, they too are inviolable although there are circumstances, such as lack of use, which dissolve the relationship of ownership and thus leave the field open to others who may wish to extend their activity to the matter in question. Leaving these circumstances aside, however, individual rights cannot be absorbed by others. The State, for example, cannot absorb the inalienable rights proper to persons, nor can it be considered as more than its individual members in such a way that persons can be sacrificed for the sake of society.
6.3 Social right
Nevertheless, societies exist within which rights arise from the bonds between intellectual beings. According to Rosmini, these societies fall under three headings: theocratic society, that is, society between God and his creatures; domestic society, which is divided into conjugal and parental society; and civil society, that is, the communion desired by several families who wish to entrust the preservation and the regulation of their rights to a single or collective mind called ‘government’. Rosmini considers at some length the rights arising in these societies. In particular, he ponders the title of rights possessed by the Creator over human beings, the rights proper to husband and wife, and to parents. Of special interest is his description of the State as a society which, while it has the duty to influence for the common good only the modality and exercise of rights in its citizens, has no power to create or destroy human rights. In fact, the general purpose of the State is to arrange the exercise of individual rights in such a way that individuals are better able to enjoy the use of their innate and acquired rights. Thus, although in time of war the exercise of certain rights may be curtailed or even suspended, the rights remain invested in individuals to whose exercise they must be restored in normal circumstances. It is clear that Rosmini’s view of civil society is completely anti-totalitarian. He does not, however, espouse the cause of modern democracy According to him, the principle of democracy is not ‘one person, one vote’, but would depend rather upon the contribution made by citizens to the well-being of the State. Difficult to arrange in practice, the principle is nevertheless important, and can be considered the obverse of ‘No taxation without representation’.
It is clear that Rosmini’s view of rights in human society depends to a great extent on his views about the nature of society as such. In fact, his earliest work as a philosopher (1818–1826) was almost totally taken up with a study of society, and was only abandoned when he saw that his ideas would lack a solid foundation unless the problem of knowledge had first been confronted. Eventually (1837), he published his ideas on society in The Philosophy of Politics in which he deals with the principle according to which societies stand or fall, and the end to which societies are directed. . However, despite the universality of the principles examined in this work, their application is restricted to civil society. According to Rosmini, the first rule and criterion for governing any society whatsoever is this: That which constitutes the existence or substance of a society is to be preserved and strengthened even at the cost of neglect to accidental refinement. This is also the first rule of politics. It follows that the greatest errors of government are those by which the government of a society, because of its excessive concern for the society’s accidental progress, loses sight of that which constitutes the substance of the society. The steps taken towards decline, that is, towards the substitution of essential matters by accidental, can be considered on four levels: the periods of founders of societies and basic legislation; of genuine development; of external splendour; of frivolity. Beginning from the first stage, when attention is inevitably fixed on the nature itself of a society, there is a gradual diminution of interest in underlying societal values until weakness, manifested in attention to frivolities and inability to concentrate on weightier matters, undermines the society’s inner cohesion and its ability to withstand external inimical pressures. This would explain the profound truth lying behind Machiavelli’s observation: ‘If a sect or republic is to survive for any length of time, it must return frequently to its beginning’ (quoted in PP, vol. 1, 41)
For Rosmini, every society is simply the union of two or more people undertaken with the intention of obtaining a common advantage. ‘All the persons in this union [forming a society] together have the role of end, and the advantage expected from the association is applied equally to all (PP, vol. 2, 39). In other words, there must be in every society a moral element, an element of justice, which affects the behaviour of the members towards one another, even if collectively (as in Plato’s case of a band of robbers) they are unjust towards non-members. Hence the excellence of what Rosmini calls ‘the social bond’; where it is present and actuated, there is no injustice; injustice begins in its absence. In other words, the nature of society requires that those who form it, enjoy within it the personal dignity of end. There is, therefore, a moral element inherent in every society. Using some persons, some members, as means, even for the apparent good of the whole, is repugnant to the very nature of society. In a coherent universal society, such as that described by Cicero—‘This entire world is to be considered simply as a city common to both gods and human beings’ (quoted in PP, vol. 2, 49)—there will inevitably be a tendency to maximum justice. This means, however, that no one in any society can make one person subservient to another. All that is pertinent only to nature can be used as means; all that which is proper to person, or to which persons have extended themselves so that some thing or things have become proper to them, must be respected as end. Here again, though, a distinction must be made between that is proper to a member of a society as a person, and the modality of that which is proper. In certain cases, the government of a society may change the modality of what is proper if this is for the common good. A piece of land required for a road may, for instance, be substituted with an adequate sum of money. But those things which have no modality, such as innocent life, cannot be violated under the pretext of common good. It is clear that these principles must direct the government of every society.
Rosmini also deals with the nature of the good which is the aim or end of society. For him, this good is human good which ‘resides in virtue and the eudemonological appurtenances of virtue, and in general in every good in so far as it is connected with virtue.’ He concludes, therefore, that every society, in so far as it is contrary to virtue, is illegitimate because its aim is contrary to the essence of society. At the same time, every law of society is invalid if, or in so far as, it prevents members from achieving virtue. ‘Without virtue there is no human good, the end for which society is established’ (PP, vol. 2, 189). But while anti-virtue is essentially detrimental to the good of any society, virtue of itself is not the only element forming the good in question. Contentment of spirit, that is, of the whole person, as distinct from passing pleasure confined to parts of human nature, is also included in every society’s essential aim. Anything, therefore, opposed to contentment is inevitably detrimental to society, whatever favour it may have found in public opinion. Rosmini finds support for this affirmation in Hamilton, whom he quotes approvingly (PP, vol. 2, 195).
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.
Public opinion, it would seem, is not an infallible criterion of public good.
Rosmini’s natural theology, in the conventional philosophical sense of natural theology, can be summarised under two headings: proofs for the existence of God, found scattered throughout his philosophical writings, and theodicy, developed at length in a work of that name. But it will also be considered, under the heading ‘Being’ according to the meaning given it by Rosmini.
8.1 The existence of God
In his natural theology, Rosmini offers considerations which are consistent with the basic principles of his philosophical teaching. Although he does not deny the validity of a posteriori proofs of the existence of God, he affirms that an a priori method is more satisfactory because it sets off from the idea of being, the foundation of his philosophy, and argues to the necessity of God’s existence. First, however, he posits a fundamental barrier to the perception of God at a purely natural level of human nature. For Rosmini, what is real can only be perceived through feeling, which indeed is part of human existence but only at a finite level where it cannot be the vehicle of the perception of God’s infinite reality. Ideal being, however, while expressing only the possibility, not the reality of things, is shown on analysis to be characterised by necessity, eternity and immateriality, factors which are intrinsic marks of possibility. The idea of being, therefore, with its divine characteristics serves as a bridge between God and human beings, enabling us to posit proofs of God’s existence without our knowing him through perception, or real contact. One example of the a priori proofs may be given here. If infinite, intelligible being is present to the human mind—and Rosmini would maintain that it is—an infinite mind capable of giving this idea to humans must exist. But such a mind cannot not be God. In this and all similar proofs, there is a common mode of procedure. The existence of God is necessary for the existence of intelligible being; but intelligible being certainly exists; the existence of God is therefore necessary. Having determined the existence of God, Rosmini then makes use of divinely revealed truth as a basis on which to offer some reflections about the nature of what he has proved to exist. These reflections, he would maintain, lie within the scope of philosophy because they depend methodologically solely on reason, and conclude with rational, not authoritative affirmations. Their basis in revelation, however, precludes any examination of them here.
Rosmini provides an exact description of his aim in his work on theodicy. ‘Theodicy (theou dike) means “justice of God”. The intent of this work, therefore, is simply this: to justify God’s equity and goodness in the distribution of good and evil in the world.’ (Theodicy preface).
He also provides a clear indication of the method he will follow in the three books composing his Theodicy. The first prescribes the norms to be followed in judging about the disposition of divine providence if error is to be avoided; the second considers the laws of nature, the necessary limitations of what is created and the chain of causes operating in the universe; the third is devoted to the laws according to which God’s action takes place in the world he has created. These laws all spring from a single norm, the law of the least means, which Rosmini, following Aquinas, posits as follows: ‘The wise worker carries out his work in the briefest way possible’ (Sapiens operator perficit opus suum breviori via qua potest. ST, III, q. 4, art. 5, ad 3um). From this law, another ten are deduced whose titles provide a useful indication of their possible application. They are the laws of: excluded superfluity, the permission of evil, excluded equality, unity in the divine work, heroism, antagonism, rapidity in work, accumulation of good, and germ. These laws, according to Rosmini, are concerned with God’s providence relative to universal good. At the same time, but relative to particular good, the law followed is that of: supreme justice, equity, fittingness and conformity to God’s divine attributes. Divine governance consists in acting in such a way that the aspects of universal and particular good are harmonised.
The last nine years of Rosmini’s life, with the exception of 1848–9 when he was actively engaged in political affairs, were spent in great part working on his Theosophy (Teosofia). Despite its size (five volumes), this monumental work remained unfinished at Rosmini’s death and was published posthumously. The title itself, despite its obvious etymological implications, is today unhelpful. It would seem to indicate a philosophy ‘professing to achieve a knowledge of God by spiritual ecstasy, direct intuition or special individual relations’ (COD). Rosmini, however, is concerned here only with reasoning about God, and takes the word ‘theosophy’ in its fundamental meaning of ‘wisdom about God’ in so far as God is the supreme Being and the apex of philosophical speculation. Such speculation must sooner or later deal with the problem of the One Being and many beings, with unity and plurality in all their manifestations. In many ways, the book is a direct challenge to Hegel and Schelling with whose philosophy Rosmini had become thoroughly familiar as a result of the great editions of their works published in the 1830s and early 1840s. Kant’s teaching, already challenged in Rosmini’s A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas, was now to be opposed in what Rosmini perceived as the delirium and exaggerations of Kant’s Idealist successors.
Whenever we try to reduce the whole human being to speculation, and substitute the part for the whole, we presume that all human good must lie solely in speculation. As result, we make every effort to turn what is real into an idea; we try to derive from the idea the matter which constitutes the sensible world, together with the Spirit and finally God himself… But although Schelling and Hegel claimed that they had reached such total science, they still needed to teach it publicly not only for the sake of attaining the practice of virtue (which would make it worthwhile), but even to draw a salary. This proves without doubt that their absolute idea did not contain everything. If the world were present in it, as they said it was, wheat, bread and wine would have been there also. My theosophy certainly cannot give the public such magnificent and wonderful promises, but it will explain how the speculative human mind is inclined to find everything in itself. In other words, it will demonstrate that there must be an object which contains effectively within itself the universality of things, and that this object is not the idea in our mind. Nevertheless, the idea which shines in the human mind draws its form as object from that object. Hence, because the idea also is per se object, we easily confuse it, in our speculation, with the complete, subsistent object. A strong desire then arises in us of attributing to the idea which we intuit the attributes of the subsistent object which we know must exist, although we do not intuit it. The tendency to unity, an essential element of every intellect, causes this error and forces us towards an abyss of unseen absurdities in the hope that these will satisfy our desperate purpose. We should acknowledge (and this theosophy will demonstrate) that if being itself has an objective existence, it is per se intelligible, and that if it contains everything (that which is not being is nothing), everything must also be contained in that which is intelligible. Theosophy will also clearly show that, although being must actually have this primal form, human nature cannot intuit the intelligible which contains all. Human nature arrives at this solely by reasoning, which can provide only a formal, negative concept of it. We cannot therefore have either the absolute knowledge which Schelling attributes to us through direct intuition, or the absolute idea which his disciple, George Hegel (who was opposed to all immediacy), promised us by mediate reasoning… (TH, vol. 1, Preface, 9–10)
But the main thrust of the work is positive, rather than critical.
Theosophy will not be wasting time by demonstrating that behind this well-conceived and ingenious error [of Hegel] lies a great truth which those courageous speculative minds [Schelling and Hegel] tried in vain to grasp but could not. This truth is precisely the necessity I spoke of: there must be ‘something intelligible and eternal which contains everything’... Nevertheless, although absolute knowledge is proper to God but not to us, we do have an absolute knowledge relative to form, but not to matter (cf. NE, vol. 1, 325, 474–476). This kind of absoluteness of human knowledge caused errors in the German school, which I have already discussed. Theosophy must speak at length about absolute human knowledge, indeed it must use it and more importantly be it. Theosophy is simply the Theory of Ens (this definition is not to be despised, despite its being only two words). Because ens is first of all infinite and absolute, and only later enclosed and existing within limits as finite, no thought could attain it unless thought itself somehow became absolute. A thought informed by an object which is in some way absolute, is itself in some way made absolute. Plato therefore rightly called the treatise on what is greatest, the treatise about ens. There is nothing in the universe or in our mind antecedent to ens or being. When, in the order of things, we remove being, nothing remains except darkness in the order of cognition. For this reason the doctrine of ens, which I call ‘theosophy’, corresponds to the concept of philosophy in the ancients. According to them, philosophy differs from other sciences in that all other sciences suppose undemonstrated principles. Philosophy, however, which borrows nothing from anywhere, uses its own materials to construct itself. It starts from no gratuitous hypothesis or supposition—on the contrary, it seeks and establishes what is undemonstrable, which gives it an unshakeable basis, and admits only what is necessary (Ibid., 10–12).
For Rosmini, the problem of being is finally considered under the three divisions of the science of theosophy: ontology, rational theology and cosmology, each of which must enter into the other if the science is to be complete. In fact, he maintains, it is impossible to speak of being in all its universal essence (ontology), without regard to the infinity and absoluteness of Being (rational theology), just as it is impossible to consider the world philosophically (cosmology) without taking its cause into consideration. Each of the three divisions of theosophy is as essential to the whole as, according to his example, the various vital organs are necessary to the existence of an animal. But the centre and substance of the whole treatise is teaching about God, without which there is no final explanation of the being or the world. Theosophy, therefore, is a single science which, through its division into three parts, is both one and three. Such an affirmation is paradigmatic of the thrust of Rosmini’s theosophy which eventually enables him to confront this rational science with the doctrine of the Trinity.
Ontology, according to Rosmini’s description of it, considers being in all its universality, but only as the object of human thought which puts limited, intellectual beings in contact with the possibility of all that is, not with actuality (it is impossible, for instance, to assuage hunger by thinking about a meal). Thought must, therefore, reach out to absolute reality not through direct perception of God, but by means of concepts. Ontology, dealing with these concepts analytically and synthetically is, as it were, an immense preface to rational theology. Ontology as the theory of being in all its possibility is the necessary propedeutic to theology as the theory of absolute being without which ontology itself is inevitably incomplete, and cannot progress beyond a treatise on categories and on dialectic.
9.2 Rational theology
If, as Rosmini suggests, ontology is the ‘theory of abstract being’, rational theology is the ‘theory of subsistent Being’. These two parts of theosophy cannot, however, can be distinguished only if the same universal concepts, of which both are formed, can in some way be differentiated. This is done by considering that ontology serves to find, review, and describe the nature and relationship of these concepts; theology, in Rosmini’s understanding, synthesises them to form a single concept of the infinite Being. It is true that such a concept remains abstract (the essence contained in the concept is not beheld by the knowing subject), but the ‘theologian’ passes from the concept to affirm subsistent Being, which is therefore no longer a mere concept, but something which must exist in itself. An effort is then made in rational theology to see how the ontological concepts have their truth and their foundation in first subsistent Being. While this takes place, the concepts themselves are identified and become one. Their separation, now considered anew, is seen to be relative not to first subsistent Being, but to the beholding, finite mind. The problem of the One and the many is rooted not in the nature of absolute, subsistent Being, but in being by participation.
Ontology, while a preface to rational theology, is also necessary for knowledge of the intimate nature of finite being and the world. Rosmini posits three reasons for this. First, although finite being is perceived, perception is limited to very few beings. If the essential conditions of this being are to be known, it is necessary to know the common conditions of all finite beings. This cannot be done without recourse to universal principles which enable us to deduce what is lacking to limited experience. Second, the same principles are needed to provide a notion of finite beings in themselves, divested of the sensory phenomena that accompany their perception. Third, subsistent Being, if known, would be intelligible per se. This is not the case with finite beings, which are known through their participation in intellectual light, and consequently remain unknown without some relationship to concepts.
References in this article to Rosmini’s works use the following abbreviations:
- NE A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas
- IP Introduction to Philosophy
- PR The Philosophy of Right
- PP The Philosophy of Politics
- TH Theosophy
- Life Antonio Rosmini: Introduction to his Life and Teaching
- CFD Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
- COD Concise Oxford Dictionary
- Opere edite e inedite di Antonio Rosmini. Rome-Stresa. 1966–. Città Nuova Editrice (80 projected volumes —including 19 of correspondence — of which approximately 40 have been published )
- For a complete list of editions of all Rosmini’s published works in Italian or in translations, cf. Bergamaschi, Cirillo. Bibliografia degli scritti editi di Antonio Rosmini Serbati, 1815–1998, 4 vols., Milan-Stresa, 1970–98.
- Cleary, D., Watson, T., and Murphy, R. (trans.), 2001, A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas. 3 vols. Durham: Rosmini House.
- Cleary, D., and Watson, T. (trans.), Durham: Rosmini House.
- Principles of Ethics. 1988.
- Conscience. 1989.
- Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science. 1991.
- The Philosophy of Politics.
- vol. 1 The Summary Cause for the Stability or Downfall of Human Societies;
- vol. 2 Society and Its Purpose. 1994.
- The Philosophy of Right.
- vol. 1 The Essence of Right. 1993.
- vol. 2 Rights of the Individual. 1993.
- vol. 3 Universal Social Right. 1995.
- vol. 4 Rights in God’s Church. 1995.
- vol. 5 Rights in the Family. 1995.
- vol. 6 Rights in Civil Society. 1996.
- Psychology. 1999.
- vol. 1 Essence of the Human Soul.
- vol. 2 Development of the Human Soul.
- vol. 3 Laws of Animality.
- vol. 4 Opinions about the Human Soul.
- Theosophy. 2007.
- vol. 1 The Problem of Ontology Being-as-one
- vol. 2 Trine Being
- vol. 3 Trine Being Continued
- Grey, M. (trans.), 1887, The ruling Principle of Method applied to Education. Boston.
- Murphy, R. (trans.), 2004, Introduction to Philosophy, Durham, UK: Rosmini House.
- Signini, F. (trans.), 1912, Theodicy. 3 vols. London
- Bergamaschi, Cirillo, 2001, Grande dizionario antologico del pensiero di Antonio Rosmini, (4 vols of explanations of words and phrases from Rosmini’s works in Rosmini’s own words), Rome: Città Nuova Editrice. [CD version available.]
- Bergamaschi, Cirillo, 1967–96, Bibliografia Rosminiana, 8 vols, Milan-Stresa, (covers Rosminian bibliography in all languages from 1814–1995).
- Cleary, Denis, 1992, Antonio Rosmini: Introduction to his Life and Teaching. Durham: Rosmini House.
- Davidson, Thomas, 1882, The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, London.
- Pozzo, Riccardo, 1999, The Philosophical Works of Antonio Rosmini in Translation in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, LXXIII no. 4.
How to cite this entry. Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society. Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links to its database.
The SEP editors updated this entry in 2015.


South Cliff Street
When the village of Ansonia was founded in 1844, among its first residential neighborhoods was South Cliff street, located atop a stone-faced cliff extending 60 feet from the street below. The identity of the street seems to have been framed by the impressive houses and mansions that reflected the social standing and prosperity of the affluent families residing on the street.
The neighborhood served as the residence for Ansonia's industrialists, business, political and professional citizens, among whom were Arthur H. Bartholmew, first mayor; Charles Durand, Speaker of the CT House of Representatives; John Dearborn, manufacturer of screws and machine parts; George Schneller, President of S.O. & C. Company manufacturers of hoop skirts and shoe and corset laces; William Wallace, head of the Electrical & Supply Company; and Ralph Emerson, publisher of the Evening Sentinel.
The Library was opened in 1896.† The structure was designed by George Keller of Hartford, and was built with walls of Longmeadow Freestone.† The original roof of unglazed Red Spanish tiles has undergone a change.†The old clock tower that worked by pulleys and weights now operates electrically.†
In line with the clock tower is the crest of the sculpture of Minerva, the Roman Goddess of Wisdom, nestled in the gable above the heavy old oak doors that open to an entrance hall.† On the west wall in the entrance hall is a plaque with a bas relief of Caroline Phelps Stokesí grandfather.†
From the west wall, stone steps lead up to the Ansonia Room.† This room is unique in its wealth of significant history and cultural information. Here, housed in a wooden and glass display case is the transit surveying instrument used in the development of Ansonia.†The water trough and hitching posts which were on the street curb for use of horses drawing carriages of patrons to see the new library, now is an outdoor sculpture scene on the left grounds of the library building. In August of 1985, the library became eligible to be placed on the National Register of Historic places as a site of significance in American history and architecture.


I bear the name of ibn-Khaldun, whose biography appears
below. ``Haldun'' has no recognized meaning in modern Turkish.
Khaldun comes from the Arabic root ``khalada'' (kh-l-d), meaning to remain
or last forever, be everlasting; to be immortal, deathless, undying;
to abide forever; to remain, stay. The noun "khald" means infinite duration,
endless time, perpetuity, eternity (dar el-khald: paradise). Khaldi makes this
noun an adjective. Khaldun makes the adjective khaldi plural. Ibn Khaldun
is a last name which means son of immortals. This is a typical way of
forming a last name where the adjective refers to a place, an origin
or an attribute; in this case, immortality. The given male name
derived from this root is Khalid, which also means everlasting.
It is also interesting to note that form IV of the Arabic verb also
means ``to dwell on an idea, an image''. Halit and Haldun are both
used as male names and Halide is used as a female name in Turkish.
So essentially ``Haldun'' means ``of permanence'' or ``eternal,''
not a modest pseudonym!
My middle name ``Memduh'' was the name of my grandfather; this way of assigning middle names being of common practice. As for its meaning, I am informed that Memduh comes from the Arabic root ``medh'' or the verb ``medeha'' which essentially means to praise someone (``methetmek'' is recognized in Turkish as to mean the same), and memduh is the person being praised.
I used to think (now I believe wrongly), that ``Memduh'' was a
variety of Mehmet, Mehmed, Mahmut, and so on, all based on the Islamic
prophet Mohammed's name. These are common names in countries with an
Islamic heritage, just as varieties of Christ's and other prophets
names are common in countries with other monotheistic
heritages. (Incidentally, almost all such names, including Jesus,
Joseph, Joshua, Solomon, Mary and what not are also common names in
I was also told that in deriving words from Arabic roots, the order of the
letters are never interchanged: Memduh which comes from the root m-d-h and
Mehmed which comes from the root h-m-d are not derivatives of each other.
[I am grateful to Tijani Chahed (Tunisia)
for informing me of the Arabic meanings of Halid, Memduh, and Mohammed
and to Hatice Orun Ozturk for correcting several mistakes in an earlier
version and making many suggestions which greatly improved this note.]
My last name is a compound. ``Tas'' means ``stone.'' ``Ak''
means ``white.'' There are many people named ``Aktas,'' meaning
``Whitestone.'' My name has the additional ``Oz'' in front which has
no direct correspondence in English, neither as a word nor as a
concept. As an adjective it may mean ``pure,'' ``real,'' or ``essence
of.'' As a noun it refers to the inner essence of something, that
which gives it meaning or life or animation. If you pick up a phone
book anywhere in the world and look at the names starting with ``Oz,''
most will likely be of Turkish origin.
[Abdurrahman Aktas has pointed out that his last name has a different
meaning than ``Whitestone.'' ``Ak'' also means ``flow'' and ``tas''
also means ``overflow,'' so ``Aktas'' also means ``Flow-and-overflow,''
in the sense of a restless and energetic spirit. With this interpretation,
Ozaktas might be taken to refer to the flowing and overflowing of the
inner essence or spirit.]
Ibn-Khaldun (1332-1406), Arabian historian and sociologist,
whose full name was Abu Zayd `Abd-al-Rahman ibn-Muhammad, was born
in Tunis. Scion of a family of high officials at the courts of the
sultans of North Africa, he served under the sovereigns of his
country who ruled during his lifetime, as well as under the kings
of Granada in Spain, as an adviser, a minister, and an ambassador,
shifting from one master to the other with great ease, in spite of
their rivalry or enmity. He finally retired in 1374, and in 1382
moved to Egypt, where until his death he occupied, with
interruptions, the position of a supreme judge of the Malikite
School, one of the four systems of law officially admitted in
From his long experience in political affairs ibn-Khaldun
conceived the plan of writing a universal history arranged
according to the different dynasties of sovereigns in Muslim and
foreign countries. His work, The Book of Examples (Kitab al-`Ibar),
which bears the full title Book of Good Advice Concerning the
Epochs of the Arabs, the Persians and the Berbers, and the
Sovereigns Who Were Their Contemporaries, and occupies seven thick
volumes, is a remarkable achievement in itself, although its author
does not always succeed in sifting his sources critically. Ibn-
Khaldun was, however, the only Arabian historian aware of the
existence of the Roman Republic (all other Arabian historians,
depending upon Byzantine sources, began the history of Rome with
Caesar) and one of the few who ever made use of Latin and Hebrew
authors, as they appeared in Arabic translations.
Ibn-Khaldun's amazing penetration and originality appear,
however, in the Introduction, or prolegomena (The Muqaddimah), to
his history, which is both a summary of Islamic sciences and a
theoretical approach to history. Antedating the European
philosophers of history by several centuries, ibn-Khaldun
considered the succession of human events from a purely
sociological viewpoint, emphasizing the contrast between nomadic
and sedentary life; tracing the origin and development of social
and political organization to the need for food, shelter, and
security; analyzing the racial and national motives that underlie
the birth and growth of states; carefully defining the various
kinds of political establishments; and elucidating the reasons for
their success, decline, and fall. Although attempts to study the
principles of politics had been made in Islam before him, ibn-
Khaldun's approach was entirely new: without denying God's
intervention in the deeds and acts of mankind, he ignored it while
dealing with his subject and proceeded on purely rational
The greatness of ibn-Khaldun's thought was recognized in
Europe only at the beginning of the 19th century; since then much
has been written about his philosophy of history, but the subject
is far from exhausted. His historical work has been translated, the
history of the Berbers being available in French, and in 1958 an
English translation of the Muqaddimah was published in three
volumes in the Bollingen Series.
G. L. Della Vida
Copyright 1996 by P.F. Collier, a division of Newfield Publications Inc.
Source: Collier's Encyclopedia, Item Number: IB01087400


Common names: woolly mullein; common mullein; lungwort; feltwort; torches; Jacob's staff; velvetplant; old man's flannel; miner's candle
Verbascum thapsus (common mullein, woolly mullein) is a biennial or annual forb (family Scrophulariaceae) that occurs throughout California, but is particularly abundant in dry valleys on the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada. High population densities have been observed in moist meadows and creek drainages near Mono Lake and Owens Valley. Common mullein is a host for insects that are themselves economic pests. Common mullein seeds can survive for 35 years or more in the soil.Cal-IPC Rating: Limited
Plant Assessment Form - Information gathered by Cal-IPC on the impacts, rate of spread, and distribution of invasive plants in California. Does not include management information.
Weed RIC Management Notes
- Management Notes - Information on management techniques and effectiveness from the University of California Cooperative Extension’s Weed Research & Information Center.
Cal-IPC Newsletter Articles
- Wildland Weed News. Cal-IPC. Vol 23, Issue 2
Cal-IPC Symposium Presentations
Presentations are linked where available. Where a presentation is not available, find more information by reading the abstract in the Cal-IPC Symposia Archive.
There are no Symposium presentations associated with this species yet.
Other Verbascum thapsus Information
- CalPhotos - Images of plants taken mostly in California.
- Calflora - See the distribution of this species on Calflora's map of California.
- CalWeedMapper - Distribution information with ability to determine regional priorities.
- Jepson Online Interchange for California Flora - Information on taxonomy, biology, and distribution from UC Berkeley's Jepson Herbarium.
- USDA PLANTS Database - Federal database with information on identification and distribution, and links to websites in individual states.
- Bugwood - National database from the Center for Invasive Species and Ecosystem Health at the University of Georgia.


Nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) are critical components of a well-fertilized crop. But to achieve yields and more nutritious foods, crops need sulphur (S). This website is an introduction to sulphur and its important role in agriculture.
Sulphur is one of the 17 essential plant nutrients. It is essential for the growth and development of all crops, without exception. Like any essential nutrient, sulphur also has some key functions in plants:
The Sulphur Institute has recently increased programming promoting the use and importance of sulphur fertilizers. TSI staff has conducted interviews and developed print materials supporting this message. Click here to read more.
Sulphur deficiency symptoms resemble nitrogen deficiency: the leaves become pale-yellow or light green. Unlike nitrogen, sulphur-deficiency symptoms appear first on the younger leaves, and persist even after nitrogen application. Click here to read more.
While soil tests for sulphur deficiency indicate the likelihood that a crop grown on that soil will benefit from or respond to sulphur application, the real proof is when on such soils, sulphur application actually increases crop yield. Click here to read more.
Most sulphur-containing fertilizer materials generally can be divided into four groups: 1) fertilizers containing sulphate, 2) fertilizers containing elemental sulphur, 3) fertilizers containing a combination of sulphate and elemental sulphur, and 4) liquid sulphur fertilizers. Click here to read more.


What is a black widow?
Black widow spiders, also known by the latin name Latrodectus spp, are eight legged arthropods. They’re characterized by their shiny black color and the distinct red hourglass marking found on their bellies. Black widow spiders’ vary in size between the genders, with males measuring between 3 and 10 mm and females tending toward larger sizes up to 13 mm in length.
There are a few other black widow identification characteristics. They tend to be shy in nature and only socialize for the purpose of mating, which makes them particularly susceptible to being startled. They spin large webs with suspended cocoons during the night, as they are nocturnal, and if you see one it’s more likely than not going to be hanging upside down and showing off that tell-tale red hourglass shaped warning sign.
Are black widows dangerous?
Yes! If provoked, female black widow spiders have been known to attack and possess the most toxic bite of any known spider in the United States. Within the first hour of a bite from a black widow spider, you’ll begin to feel dull muscle pain, swelling of the bitten area, and general discomfort, nausea, and perspiration – if you’ve been bitten and feel these things, go to a doctor to be treated immediately. While their bites are unlikely to be fatal, that does not mean that, if left untreated, they cannot become a serious problem.
Why do I have black widows?
This variety of spider likes to hide in dark, secluded areas of your home. Crevices, garages, basement corners, cluttered attics, woodpiles, and anywhere they can find that has the right dimness and protection they prefer. If you have piles of leaves, wood, or old boxes in areas of your home that are also dim and dark, then you have the perfect breeding ground for a potential black widow spider infestation.
How can I prevent black widow infestations?
Don’t give them the environments they like to thrive in, including cluttered indoor and outdoor spaces. Keep seals on doors, windows, and all variety of entrance or exit in proper condition. Most importantly, if you ever see any webs or egg sacs in your home, immediately use a vacuum cleaner to remove them before eggs have a chance to hatch and spread infestations further.
How can Gregory Pest stop my pest problem?
An expert exterminator from Gregory Pest Solutions will be your full-service pest solutions provider. They specialize in the effective removal and prevention of black widows and their webs. All you have to do is give us a call.
When you hire us to evaluate how extensive your home’s pest problem is, one of our pros will be sent to assess the spider situation and then formulate an environmentally friendly plan on how to get rid of the black widow spiders. Once we implement our plan, our experts can make recommendations for sealing any openings that are prime for black widows as well as any other variety of spider so that you and your family can enjoy a lasting pest-free environment.
Where can I get help with black widows?
Sometimes black widows find their way into your home or business. If you need help getting them out, Gregory Pest Solutions has you covered. Our pest prevention services are comprehensive and offered in each and every state listed below. Whatever you need, commercial or residential, we’ve got you covered.
You can use the form below to get in touch with our team of expert pest removal technicians. Schedule an appointment, give us a call, or request a quote today.


As millions of young Americans return to school, parents may overlook a seemingly simple part of their children’s days. Minors with prescriptions, even for controlled substances (CS) like medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and prescription painkillers are often given unrestricted access to their medications. This unsupervised access may be tempting for some children, who may be coerced to give pills to friends, or to sell them for money. They may also be tempted to abuse the medication themselves, or be in danger of taking an incorrect dose.
While one survey showed that few parents are concerned about the misuse of prescription pain medication prescribed to their children rates of medication abuse among youth have been cited as a serious concern. For example, a 2011 study showed that nearly 15% of high school students have misused prescription CS drugs.
Parents are encouraged to consult with their family health care providers about the proper storage and use of their children’s medications. AWARXE®, , the National State Boards of Pharmacy, provides information on storage and safe drug disposal on the AWARXE Web site, as well as information on safely administering medications to children on the “Safety Tips for Children” page. These tips can be helpful in ensuring that your children’s medications are stored and administered properly.
This also brings to mind another concern. Your medications. Often times children are home earlier than mom or dad and although we don’t like to think this would happen, some children’s drug habits start with their parents or grandparents medication while someone is not looking. Please keep all medications, especially controlled substances, in a secure location so as to discourage easy access. Far too often the worst of drug habits start with a simple curious sample of medication. By following proper tips on medications, proper storage and proper disposal, we can play a greater role in our children’s health, both today and for the future.


Serbia is located in the South-East Europe, on the Balkan Peninsula. Serbia is a landlocked country and therefore surrounded by: Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia in the South, Romania and Bulgaria in the East, Hungary and Croatia in the North and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the West.
Serbia is the country of one of the most turbulent histories. In the 14th century, Serbian Empire fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and remained a part of it for almost 5 centuries. In the 19th century, Serbia regained its independence, but was soon afterwards occupied by the Central Forces (Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire) during the First World War. After the First World War, Serbia entered an alliance on the Balkan Peninsula, and thereforeYugoslavia was born. During the Second World War, Serbia lost its independence again, which it regained after the end of the war. After the break off of Yugoslavia, all until 2006, Serbia remained together with Montenegro under the name of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG).
Capital city: Belgrade (1.2 million inhabitants, wider city area is inhabited by 1.6 million people).
Surface area: 88,300 km2.
Population: 7.1 million inhabitants.
Currency: dinar (RSD).


The government’s plans to have an additional three million apprentices in place by 2020 are falling further behind, with the number of people starting their career as an apprentice dropping in England. Let’s look at the top facts about apprenticeships.
An apprenticeship combines classroom study with on-the-job practical training in business. Apprentices are employees. Most are aged under 25, and many work in construction and service industries.
The apprenticeship levy
A radical shake-up to the way apprenticeships are funded was launched in April 2017, with critics saying it discourages some businesses from recruiting apprentices. The levy is a tax on larger employers, measured by payroll bills, with bigger businesses paying more. Payroll bills of £3m+ are charged 0.5 per cent, which goes into a central apprenticeship pot. The estimated £2.8bn the levy could raise in 2018 looks increasingly unrealistic now, as the numbers are down.
In the three months between August and October 2017, there were 114.4k apprenticeship starts in England. This was a drop of 30 per cent from the same period the previous year.
Confusion for employers
It was thought that around two per cent of employers would be eligible for the levy, although many employers are not sure whether they have to pay. In reality, a survey by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) puts the number currently paying the levy much higher at nearly one in three.
Health, care and other public services are the most popular programmes, closely followed by business and law. Many young people are tempted into industry by a route that does not have the academic focus of going to university but will eventually get them to the same place, giving them work experience at the same time.
Engineering and manufacturing continue to be popular choices, with a similar number of starts in retail and commercial positions.
Women are embracing the practical route, with more female than male apprentices starting a new programme every year since 2010. In 2016-7, women accounted for 54 per cent of all new apprentices; however, the gender divide is reversed when it comes to wages, with men earning an average of £7.10 per hour and women just £6.85.
In many cases, this is largely industry-related, with fewer women taking on STEM (science, technology, engineering and maths) apprenticeships; STEM industries often have a higher average salary. Groups such as the Young Women’s Trust are calling for more to be done to encourage women into these male-dominated industries and to make them more accessible.
More apprentices are completing their programmes than ever before. Despite an overall drop in the number of apprenticeship starts, the number starting a higher-level apprenticeship is growing. ‘Advanced’ apprenticeships are equivalent to two A levels on completion, while ‘higher’ apprenticeships work at foundation degree level – and even bachelor’s – without having to pay the tuition fees that a university route would command.
Other parts of the UK operate their apprenticeships slightly differently to England, with both Wales and Scotland offering foundation level apprenticeships. In Northern Ireland, anyone with A levels is eligible to start a higher-level apprenticeship, which enables people to work while gaining a degree-equivalent qualification.
Recruiters love this COMPLETE set of Accredited Recruitment & HR Training – View Training Brochure