CHAPTER IV: QUESTION 2 —THE MODE OF THE UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (cont)
Criterion To Be Followed In The Examination Of These Opinions
All these theologians wish to retain the ontological validity of the common notion of person, namely, an intelligent and free subject, and they wish to pass methodically, although they do not all do so, by the light of revelation, from this common notion of person to the more philosophical notion of person, which is like the guiding star.
We said, however, that according to natural reason, a person is an intelligent subject by itself separately existing, and this absolutely must be maintained.
Moreover, it must be observed that there are assertions of natural reason confirmed by revelation, and these must likewise be preserved intact. First of all, there are affirmative judgments, in which those things that pertain to a person are predicated of the person as a real subject of predication, such as: Peter is a man, Peter is existing, Peter is acting. In these affirmative propositions, however, the verb "is" affirms real identity between subject and predicate, and postulates the same real subject underlying nature, existence, and operation.
Lastly, the following truth must be retained. God alone is His existence, He alone can say: "I am who am." Peter is not his existence. This statement means that the act of existence even when in act is included only in God's essence, which is related to existence as A is to A, for God's essence is the self-subsisting Being. On the other hand, no created essence is its existence, no created essence contains existence as an essential predicate, for in such a case it would be self-existent and would not be created; but existence befits it as a contingent predicate, inasmuch as it is possible for this essence not to exist. Hence it is said of Michael the archangel, that he is not his existence, just as a grain of sand is not its existence. These propositions are commonly admitted by theologians as true, which means that they correspond to a reality, and hence we must say, as the Thomists assert, that before the consideration of our mind, Michael's essence or man's essence is not his existence, which means that it is really distinct from its existence.
Nevertheless we say that Michael is existing, Peter is existing. Thus the verb "is" signifies real identity between subject and predicate notwithstanding the real distinction between created essence and existence.
This principle is the criterion in the judgment of the above-mentioned opinions, and it is manifest that it makes a considerable difference in the notion of person, to whom essence and existence are attributed, according as a real distinction between essence and existence is or is not admitted. The true teaching about person has its foundation in this, that it is a requisite for the verification of the following judgments: Peter is existing, but is not his existence, whereas Christ is existing, and is His existence, just as "He is truth and life."
1) Opinion of Scotus. Scotus holds that a twofold negation is added to the notion of person as applied to a singular human nature, namely, actual dependence on the divine person, and aptitudinal dependence on this same divine person. Thus this humanity of ours is a person, because it is neither naturally apt to be terminated, nor actually terminated by the divine personality.
Scotus gives the following reasons for this conclusion:
(1) Because then there would be some positive entity in the human nature that would be incapable of assumption by the Word. (2) Because it would follow that the human nature assumed by the Word would be wanting in some positive entity... and thus Christ would not be universally a man.
Criticism. Cajetan reproduces exactly these arguments of Scotus, and examines them. Capreolus had already examined them. Later on John of St. Thomas, Zigliara, and Billot had discussed these arguments. The Thomists show that this opinion of Scotus is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, and that it does not preserve the common notion of person.
Fundamental argument. The constitutive element of that which is not perfect in nature cannot be assigned to something negative. But as St. Thomas says, "Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature, that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature." Therefore its constitutive element or its personality cannot be assigned to something negative. John of St. Thomas explains this point well.
1) "Subsistence," he says, "is not the negation of dependence. It is impossible for the independent not to be more perfect than the dependent. But dependence is something positive. Therefore, a fortiori, independence in that genus, cannot be a pure negation, although it is explained negatively, just as simplicity is explained by indivision."
Thus infinity in substance; although it is explained negatively, yet it is something positive. Hence God's independence in being constitutes His greatest perfection. Therefore that by which anything is a subject by itself, separately existing, cannot be a mere negation, for it is that which constitutes a subject as the first subject of attribution. Likewise every negation has its foundation in something positive, as Father Billot says against Scotus.
2) "Moreover," adds John of St. Thomas, "natural and proper subsistence is not only opposed to the hypostatic union, but it is also opposed to the existential mode of accident, or even of a part. And if the inherence of accident is something positive and not a negative notion, a fortiori the subsistence of first substance, to which second substance is attributed, must be something positive."
3) Then again, proper subsistence is something primo and per se natural, because it constitutes something of the natural order. Therefore it cannot primo and per se consist in the negation of the hypostatic union, which is supernatural, although the negation may also include this latter, just as in anything of the natural order we have the negation of the supernatural, although things of the natural order are not primo and per se constituted as such by this negation. Thus, according to the opinion of Scotus, either Heraclitus or Thales would have been persons, because their nature was not hypostatically united to any divine person.
4) Finally, in the case of the divine persons, there are in the strictest sense of the terms, three subsistences and three personalities, which, inasmuch as they are subsistences, denote positive realities, and not three negations. And the subsistence of the Word substituting Its subsistence for that of the human nature; but this union did not consist in anything negative, but in something positive.
But there must be analogy between the divine personality and created personality. "Nor is there something unbefitting resulting from this, as Scotus would have, for the Word assumed whatever pertains to the human nature, as a nature, although not whatever pertains to man as a suppositum." As St. Thomas says, "It is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself."
5) Furthermore, it must be said against Scotus that this theory does not make it clear how the following affirmative judgments can be true: Peter is a man, Peter is existing; for the verb "is" expresses real identity between subject and predicate. But this real identity cannot be established by something negative. In other words: that by which anything is a who or a what, or a first subject of attribution, cannot be something negative.
Some Scotists say that a subject is a singular nature.
Reply. The nature itself is not this subject, for as St. Thomas often says: "nature, i. e., humanity, is that by which anything is such, i. e., a man; it is not that which is." Individuation alone is not that by which anything is a who or a what, for matter constitutes this individuation in Christ, namely, this humanity; yet it does not constitute a subject distinct from the Word. Individuation is also found in the parts of a nature, for example, in this flesh, these bones, but these parts do not have the incommunicability that belongs properly to the suppositum.
Moreover, as we said, individuation derived from matter is something very low in dignity, but subsistence and especially personality is something far nobler, for it is that by which anything is a subject by itself separately existing and operating. On the contrary, matter is not that which is, but that by which anything is material.
6) Finally, Scotus denies a real distinction between created essence and existence, and so we should have to say: Peter is his existence, just as we say: God is His existence. But before the consideration of our mind it is true to say: God is His existence, and there is no real distinction between the Deity and His existence. Whereas, on the contrary, before any consideration of the mind, it is true that Peter is not his existence, but has existence, just as Peter cannot say: "I am the truth and the life," but only "I have truth and life." Hence, before any consideration of the mind, there is a certain distinction, not indeed spatial, but real or ontological between Peter's essence and his existence. More briefly, that which truly is not its existence, before any consideration of the mind is distinct from its existence, in some way just as matter is not form, but is related to it as potency is to act, as potency limiting to act determining. Act of itself is not limited, but is limited by the potency in which it is received; so also existence is in various ways limited in the essence of stones, plants, animals, and other things in which it is received.
Wherefore we said that the true doctrine of person has its foundation in this, that it postulates the truth of the following judgments: Peter is existing, but is not existence; whereas Christ is existing and is His existence.
7) It follows from the thesis of Scotus that there are two existences in Christ, which is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, and then this means that the humanity of Christ has its own ultimate actuality, namely, its own existence. Thus, before its union with the Word, it is absolutely complete, both substantially and subsistentially. Hence there is danger of Nestorianism in this opinion, since the human nature in Christ appears to be a suppositum distinct from the Word, with whom it can be united only accidentally. Scotus does not wish to affirm this, but his principles ought to lead him to this conclusion. There would be two supposita whose union would not have its foundation in anything positive.
2) Opinion of Suarez. This opinion of Suarez is examined after that of Scotus, since the two views are much alike, although Suarez departs from Scotus inasmuch as he holds personality to consist in something positive, namely, in a substantial mode, which in his opinion presupposes existence for the essence. How does Suarez reach this conclusion?
Often in his eclecticism, Suarez searches for a via media between St. Thomas and Scotus. In the present question, he sees, as the Thomists say, that personality must consist in something positive, and then he says: this positive element cannot be an accident, since person is a first substance. Therefore it must be a substantial mode by which a singular nature is rendered incommunicable, which is what Cajetan said. In Christ, he says, the human nature is not a person, because the mode of personality is wanting to it, the mode of the union taking its place.
But, on the other hand, Suarez holds, as Scotus does, that there is no real distinction between created essence and existence. Hence, in his opinion, the substantial mode which constitutes ontological personality, presupposes not only essence or nature, but also existence.
Thus Suarez frequently in accordance with his eclecticism, as in this question, refutes Scotus by St. Thomas, and St. Thomas by Scotus. But this via media is most difficult to follow, since it is very difficult to maintain the proper equilibrium or stability by this method, so that Suarez in the development of his theses not infrequently fluctuates or oscillates between St. Thomas and Scotus, not taking a firm stand for either view.
Criticism. The Thomists reply:
1) This opinion does not preserve what is fundamental in the truth of the following proposition: Peter is not his own existence, for only God is His existence. He alone can say: "I am who am," "I am the truth and the life," and not merely "I have being, truth, and life." But these judgments, acknowledged to be true by all theologians, demand a real distinction between created essence and existence; for, that these propositions be true even before any consideration of our mind, there must be a real distinction between Peter and his existence, whereas, on the contrary, God is really His existence, without even the least of real distinctions.
Hence the Sacred Congregation of Studies (1916), among the twenty-four propositions of St. Thomas that it declared to be the greater, posited a real distinction between created essence and existence. It is the third proposition which reads: "All other beings (except God) which participate in being, have a nature which is limited by existence, and consist of essence and existence, as really distinct principles."
Furthermore, the Thomists with John of St. Thomas say that the substantial mode, which is subsistence, does not presuppose existence, for it is by subsistence that the suppositum is formally constituted as either a suppositum or a person. But, as St. Thomas says: "Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but upon that whereby a thing is such; whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of the hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature." Peter is that which is, and first comes the concept of person and personality before existence that is attributed to the person when we say: Peter is existing, but is not his existence.
Hence personality terminates the nature and ultimately comes existence as primarily befitting the suppositum, and through the intermediary of the suppositum the nature. This is the constant teaching of St. Thomas. There is no existing subject unless the whole being is terminated and incommunicable (e. g., Peter), to whom existence is applicable as a contingent predicate. Being and becoming befit the suppositum, as St. Thomas shows, for the terminus of creation, or even of generation, is that which is, not that by which anything is such as it is.
Therefore very many Thomists say with Cajetan that the substantial mode is the terminus that causes the singular nature to be incommunicable and terminated, just as the point terminates the line and does not continue it, nor is subsistence an unexplainable entity. But it must be something real that constitutes this mode, not nature alone, however, nor existence. Therefore it must be by what terminates the mode. Thus John of St. Thomas, following Cajetan.
3) The Thomists and Father Billot also say against Suarez:
Since the existence of substance is its ultimate actuality, as St. Thomas often says, whatever accrues to substance already complete in its existence accrues to it accidentally. But this mode consisting in personality or subsistence, according to Suarez, accrues to substance after existence. Therefore the mode is not substantial as he would have it, but accidental.
Hence, as already stated against the opinion of Scotus, the union of the Word incarnate would thus be merely accidental, since each nature would have its own existence, or its ultimate actuality.
3) Opinion of Father Billot. Father Billot, S. J., insists especially on this, that St. Thomas maintains there is only one existence in Christ. Father Billot vigorously asserts this against Scotus and Suarez, because he firmly defends against them the opinion of a real distinction between essence and existence. On this point he is truly in agreement with St. Thomas and the Thomists.
But on the other hand, Father Billot, always attacking Suarez, will not admit a substantial mode even in Cajetan's sense, for-he says: "There is nothing positive about the terminus itself except what it terminates, for all that the point does which terminates a line is to deny its further extension, adding absolutely nothing to it."
Cajetan would reply by saying that the terminus itself is not indeed a new thing or reality, but is a real mode, really and modally distinct from the thing itself. Thus a line is made up of divisible parts and of indivisible points; a point that terminates a line, or two lines that converge in it, is neither a nonentity nor a part; So the roundness of a metallic sphere is not nothing; it is something really and modally distinct from substance, even from the metallic quantity that it terminates; the quantity of this metal is not its roundness, and it could have another shape.
But since Father Billot refuses to admit this substantial mode as terminating the nature, so that it is immediately capable of existing, he says that person is a singular nature under its own existence, and he identifies subsistence or personality with the existence of the substance.
He quotes for his opinion especially the passage in which St. Thomas asserts, and in similar passages, that there is one being in Christ. This assertion is indeed valid against Scotus and Suarez, but not against Cajetan, for he also maintains that there is one being in Christ.
Father Billot, who quotes Capreolus for his view, interprets him as saying that person is a singular nature with its existence. Cajetan's answer would be: Yes, it is a singular nature (terminated) with its existence, but it must be declared terminated, for nature in itself is only that by which anything is such as it is, it is not that which is.
The exact words of Capreolus on this point are: "1. The name suppositum is affirmed of that individual which subsists by itself. 2. Understood formally, as a mode, and then by suppositum is meant the composite that consists of the individual with its suchness and its own subsistence." It cannot be inferred from this text that a person and the singular nature are identical, for a person is what is, and the nature that by which something is; nor can it be said that personality is existence, for personality is attributed to a person already formally constituted as a person.
Criticism of Father Billot's opinion. It may be reduced to the following arguments.
1) This opinion is not in harmony with the teaching of St. Thomas, who says: "Being is consequent upon nature not as that which has being, but upon that whereby a thing is; whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis as upon that which has being." Hence being or existence does not formally constitute personality, because it is consequent upon a person already formally constituted as such by personality. St. Thomas speaks similarly in the body of the article just quoted.
2) Moreover, St. Thomas takes up this disputed point in discussing Christ's unity of being, by considering, as he himself says in the prologue to the previous question, the consequences of the union. Therefore he first established his teaching on the hypostatic union, and from this that there is only one person in Christ. Then he goes on to deduce that there is one being in Christ, inasmuch as being is immediately consequent not upon nature, but upon person, which alone is what is.
Hence if Father Billot's opinion were the true teaching of St. Thomas, the holy Doctor ought to have shown at the beginning of this treatise that there is one being in Christ, so as to make it clear that there is only one person and only one personality in Christ. But he considers this point only farther on, which presupposes the solution of the problem concerning what constitutes the hypostatic union.
3) The Complutenses Abbreviati note that St. Thomas teaches that "the angel is composed of existence and what is." Thus Michael is existing but is not his existence. Hence the holy Doctor teaches that existence enters into composition not only with essence, but also with the suppositum. It would not be so, however, if existence were the same as subsistence or personality. Likewise, the principium quod of the theandric operations in Christ is not common to the three divine persons. But existence is common to the three divine persons. Therefore the principium quod in Christ is not formally constituted by existence.
4) St. Thomas says: "Existence does not pertain to the notion of a created suppositum," which means that Peter is not his existence. But subsistence pertains to the notion of suppositum, and personality to the notion of person. Therefore they are not really the same as being or existence, at least for St. Thomas.
Finally, St. Thomas treats as distinct the following two questions, namely, whether essence and existence are the same, and whether essence and suppositum are the same. This would be superfluous if there were no real distinction between existence and subsistence. Such is the excellent observation of the Complutenses Abbreviati.
Moreover, it must be observed so as to avoid ambiguity, that subsistence does not mean existence of substance, but subsistence is the abstract name that is the correlative of the concrete name suppositum. Hence subsistence is to suppositum as personality is to person, as existence is to exist, and as running is to run.
Hence subsistence is not an abstract name that would correspond to the concrete to subsist, but to the concrete that is called suppositum. But to avoid this ambiguity, it is better to use the word personality than subsistence, because it is evident that personality corresponds in the concrete to person, and not as such to the word "subsist." Hence subsistence is to suppositum as personality is to person, and as existence is to exist or to being.
5) Father Billot's opinion leads to the denial of a real distinction between essence and existence, a distinction that he firmly maintains nevertheless against Scotus and Suarez. For it must be said that being which is not its existence, is, before the consideration of the mind, really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, even his personality, is not his existence. Therefore Peter's person, even his personality, is really distinct from his existence.
The major of this argument is the principle from which we deduce that there is a real distinction between essence and existence, and this Father Billot accepts. But the minor is most certain, namely, that Peter's person is not his existence, and therefore it differs from the person of the Word; moreover Peter's personality is not his existence, because it formally constitutes Peter's person, which is not his existence.
In other words, the denial of a real distinction between a created person, constituted as such by his own personality and existence, means that a real distinction between created essence and existence is without any foundation; for a being that is not its own existence is, before the consideration of the mind, really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, formally constituted as such by his personality, just as his essence, is really distinct from his existence. Only God is His existence, and the truth of this assertion will be most clearly seen in the beatific vision.
This point was more fully explained by quoting several texts of St. Thomas, and in the examination of the recent work of Father Charles Giacon, S. J.
Certain disciples of Father Billot advance the following objection. Peter is not his nature. Yet there is no real distinction between him and his nature. Therefore between him and his existence there is no real distinction.
Reply. I concede the major. I deny the minor and parity of agreement. For Peter is not his nature, because his nature is an essential part of himself, and even an essential part is not identified with the whole.
Thus I concede the major: Peter is not his nature. I deny the minor, for there is a real distinction between Peter and his nature, just as there is a real distinction between the real whole and its real part, and I deny also the parity of argument, because Peter's nature is an essential part of himself, but his existence is not. Thus when we say, "Peter is a man," man is an essential predicate; on the contrary, when we say, "Peter is existing," existing is a contingent predicate.
Father G. Mattiussi replies to this as follows: "St. Thomas says that existence is not included in the notion of suppositum, inasmuch as existence is not essential to any finite thing; but the suppositum can be considered in the order of possible things, without its actually existing"
To this it must be said: When I say that Peter is not his existence, I am not concerned with Peter's possible existence, but with his actual existence; just as when we say that the essence of a created thing really differs from its existence, it is not a question of a possible essence, but of a real essence that underlies the existence which it limits. For as Father Mattiussi himself admits, the act of existing is multiplied and limited only by the real essence and not the possible, in which it is received. Similarly, existence is a contingent predicate of existing Peter, and not of possible Peter. Of existing Peter we say that Peter is existing, but is not his existence; whereas of God, we say that God exists and is His existence.
That being which is not its existence is really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, even his personality, is not his existence, which is a contingent predicate. Therefore Peter's person, even his personality, is really distinct from his existence, which is really distinct from his personality.
Father Mattiussi quotes three texts of St. Thomas in proof that he, too, was of the same opinion, namely, that subsistence is the existence of substance. On the contrary, in these texts we read: "Subsistence is said of that whose act is to subsist, just as essence is said of that whose act is to exist." On the contrary, these texts do not in any way contradict Cajetan's opinion. Father Mattiussi does not search for that by which anything is a what, or for that in which the concrete, this man differs from this humanity. This man is what is, humanity that by which he is. They differ however by that which constitutes man the first subject of attribution, for it is the concrete that is constituted, whereas the form is in the subject. The Complutenses Abbreviati present this argument in various forms and excellently, showing that otherwise the proposition, man is existing, would be an eternally true proposition, just as this proposition, man is a substance of a rational nature. They insist on this, that subsistence or personality is intrinsic to the notion of a created person, whereas existence accrues to it and is completely outside the notion of person. Hence Father Billot's opinion denies the truth of the following proposition: Peter is not his existence.
6) Moreover, Father Billot's opinion denies the truth of another proposition, -namely, that Peter is existing. For in every affirmative proposition, the word "is" expresses real identity between subject and predicate. This real identity, however, must have its foundation in some real positive thing, in that by which anything is a what. But that by which anything is a what, is neither even a singular nature nor existence. For nature is that by which anything is such, for example, a man; existence is that by which anything is established beyond nothing and its causes. And two elements related to each other as by which, do not constitute a one that is a what, that is, a subject of itself separately existing.
7) Moreover, Father Billot overlooks the fact that in God there are three personalities and one existence, not three relative existences but one esse in that is substantial. St. Thomas says: "There is only one being in God and three subsistencies." Therefore personality is not being.
8) Capreolus does not say that personality is formally constituted by existence, but he says, supported by Cajetan on this point: "The being of actual existence is called the act of the essence as whereby of the suppositum, and the act of the suppositum as what exists....Existence thus pertains to the notion of suppositum, not forming a part of the suppositum, nor is it included in the essence of this latter, but is related to it by way of connotation and is implied indirectly, which is about the equivalent of saying that the suppositum is identical with the individual substance having existence. Such was the opinion of St. Thomas, so I think." Cajetan admits this. There is, indeed, a more recent opinion that maintains person is the singular nature itself underlying its existence.
Criticism. This does not explain whereby anything is properly what is, or the first subject of attribution subsisting of itself, first substance. For the singular nature, for example, this humanity, is not what is, but whereby anyone, namely, Peter or Paul, is a man. Hence we say: Peter is not his humanity, because the whole is not its part, it is not identical with its part, but includes other things besides; thus Peter includes his nature, existence, and accidents. Hence we seek that whereby a person is formally constituted the first subject of attribution, not attributable to another subject; whereas, on the contrary, this humanity is attributed to each human being.
Moreover, this humanity immediately is not capable of the act of existing, for it is not what exists. We are seeking the subject of this singular nature, of its existence and accidents.


Pitching for green power, the Railways have set up 1 megawatt solar power plant at Katra station, a move that can save up to Rs 1 crore annually on energy bills and also significant reduction of carbon dioxide at rail premises.
In keeping with the motto of ‘reduce, reuse and recycle’ for sustainable development and as a significant way to thwart climate change impact, we have been undertaking several green initiatives including the installation of the 1 megawatt solar power plant at Katra station, said a senior Northern Railway official.
The solar project was commissioned in March this year and presently, out of 5,000 units produced daily by the plant, only 1,700 to 1,800 units are utilized by Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Katra Railway Station, whereas 3,200 to 3,300 units are exported to Power Development Department of Jammu and Kashmir government, he said.
The 1 MW solar power plant consists of 300 KW installed on platform 2/3, 550 KW on platform 1, 100 KW on rooftop of the station building and 50 KW on pathway shelter. The accrued benefit envisaged was reduction of 10,000 tons of carbon dioxide per annum and a saving of Rs 1 crore per annum on energy bills to the Railways, the official said.
In keeping with its objective to resort to more eco-friendly measures, Northern Railway has also installed a 25 kb power Solar Energy Panel at Gurgaon station as well as installation of solar power panels at Bahadurgarh railway station, Diwana (near Panipat) and at Divisional Control Building in DRM office at New Delhi.
“As the use of solar power is a reliable source of energy, it has been decided to undertake a steady pursuit meeting energy needs through a planned green agenda. Now solar panels will be installed at more stations,” said the official.
While inaugurating the Udhampur-Katra railway line of Kashmir rail link project on July 4, 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had directed to provide solar power plant at Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Katra Railway Station as a green energy initiative to be a part of national solar mission.
The use of solar power is also envisaged to cut diesel and electricity consumption on trains while reducing load requirements at station premises and railway buildings.


Panthera’s Puma Program seeks to protect pumas across their expansive range by conducting critical ecological research, communicating the puma’s role in ecosystems, and addressing the wide-ranging persecution facing the species.
Despite their broad range, pumas are elusive and therefore often mischaracterized as vicious, solitary predators, leading to persecution and fueling human-puma conflict. Panthera is conducting novel research into the behavior and ecology of the species in order to determine how to effectively and sustainably manage pumas in landscapes that are increasingly dominated by humans.
Panthera is focusing on key areas where in which pumas face imminent threats, including the southern Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, the central coast of California and the area surrounding Torres del Paine National Park in Chile. Program activities include conflict mitigation, education, studying puma prey selection, addressing livestock predation, and studying the impact of reintroduced wolves in different parts of the puma’s range.
Pumas exist in 28 countries across the Americas. Panthera’s Puma Program operates in 2 puma range states.
The puma has the largest geographic range of any native terrestrial mammal in the Western Hemisphere, from southern Alaska down to the southern tip of Chile.
See puma range map
The State of the Puma
Pumas were eliminated from the entire eastern half of North America, except for a tiny population in Florida, within 200 years of European colonization. Today, the remnant puma population in Florida is endangered but recovering.
The status of puma populations in Central and South America is largely unknown, but many are suspected to be in decline.
The species is threatened by legal and illegal killing, including bounty hunting and poaching; human-puma conflict, which is exacerbated by old mythology perpetuating fear of pumas; loss of prey due to overhunting by people and agricultural land developments; and habitat loss and fragmentation.
The puma is listed as a species of “Least Concern” by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species.


Six years of research by well-known and respected birders Don and Lillian Stokes culminates with the publishing of the Stokes Field Guide To Birds Of North Americas. The result is the most comprehensive photographic field guide on the market. Over 3,400 beautiful color photos from top bird photographers, including co-author Lillian Stokes, present all significant plumages of birds as well as birds in flight. A bonus downloadable CD offers excellent help for beginning birders to expand identification skills through bird sounds. Scientifically precise and well organized, this guide caters to all ages.
- Includes 854 North American bird species from common backyard visitors to the latest rarities.
- Over 3400 color photos cover all significant plumages including male, female, summer, winter, immature, and morphs as well as important subspecies and birds in flight.
- A new cutting-edge method of bird identification called quantitative shape describes anatomical features in proportion to other parts of the bird and provides an accurate and understandable way to use shape for bird identification.
- Newest range maps detail species winter, summer, and year-around ranges as well as migration routes and extra-limital vagrancies.
- Offers detailed descriptions of songs, calls, behavorial info, and key habitat preferences of each species with special help for identifying birds in flight.
- 16 chapters focus on getting started as a birder with an emphasis on understanding identification, classification, behavior, and habitat. The final chapter addresses ethics and conservation.
- 125 full-color illustrations are included in this portable, pocket-sized guide.
- Multiple plumage illustrations clearly show variations in regards to season, age, wear and molt.


American School Counselor Association
five-year-old on track? Below are some general development milestones
to help you understand your child's progress over the school year.
Keep in mind that every child is different and may not fit perfectly
into this framework.
The average five-year-old is good, helpful, and conforming. He:
only things he knows he can do.
attention, affection, and praise.
energetic and fidgety.
short attention span.
opposite extremes of behavior.
become less well-behaved as the school year progresses.
School isn't just academics: Your child's teachers are also helping
her grow socially.
At five-years-old, your child is learning to
understand herself. You can help by encouraging her as she:
a positive, realistic self-image.
understand her own uniqueness.
awareness of her feelings.
how to participate in groups.
Begins to learn from her mistakes.


It’s funny that this pandemic can prove all anti-evolutionists wrong.
Nothing like seeing Charles Darwin natural selection right in front of your eyes at the speed of light. Just look at the SARS-CoV-2 viral evolution…
In his book “On the origin of species” written in 1859, Charles Darwin defined natural selection as the “principle by which each slight variation of a trait, if useful, is preserved”. What does this mean (?), it means the individuals best adapted to their environments are more likely to survive and reproduce.
What we are seeing now, is that the mutations of SARS-CoV-2 that better promote spreading, are the ones that are becoming more common among the population, even when derived in different locations. The virus is changing and evolving to spread more rapidly, because natural selection will optimize the level of virulence that maximizes pathogen fitness – expressed as the basic reproductive number (R0)1,2.
On average, comparative data from previous studies tell us that, low-virulence infections have a greater chance of successfully establishing transmission cycles in humans than virus with higher mortality3. As such, as before, the virus actually just wants to spread and not kill.
But, since the environment also affects transmissibility, there are more factors on the equation “when will this madness end” than we would have wished for.
For example, in the evolutionary trade-off between virulence and transmissibility, because intra-host virus replication is needed to allow inter-host transmission, it is almost impossible for natural selection to optimize all traits simultaneously1 and give us some peace.
For example, in the case of the Myxoma virus (MYXV) in rabbits, this evolutionary trade-off leads to an ‘intermediate’ virulence being more advantageous to the virus than a higher virulence1,4. This happens because the rabbit host dies before inter-host transmission, in the case of higher virulence; and, with lower virulence the virus goes absolutely nowhere, because it does not increase virus transmission rates. A similar trade-off model has been proposed to explain the evolution of HIV virulence1,5.
Unfortunately, experimental studies in some viruses have shown that high virulence can promote certain advantages, as in the case of malaria, where a higher virulence was shown to provide the Plasmodium parasites with a competitive advantage within hosts1,6. Or, in the case of the rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus (RHDV), where there is evidence that virulence has increased through time, probably because virus transmission often occurs through flies that feed on animal carcasses, making host death selectively favourable1,7.
Let’s thank the Gods that SARS-CoV-2 is NOT transmissible through flies.
So, current evolutionary theory tells us that it is possible to anticipate the direction of virulence evolution, if the key relationship between virulence and transmissibility, and hence viral fitness, is understood1. Crucial to this is the analysis of the intersection between genomics and evolutionary studies, what is called phylogenomics.
This field of science provides a way to understand virulence evolution, and creates a number of hypotheses that can be tested using appropriate experimental cell assays and bioinformatic tools8,9.
The collaboration of public health and research teams worldwide has now allowed the publication of 620,338 SARS-CoV-2 genomes in GISAID (http://www.gisaid.org/) (as of February 25, 2020)9. At the same time, a dynamic nomenclature system for SARS-CoV-2 has been described to facilitate real-time epidemiology revealing links between global outbreaks that share similar viral genomes10. At the root of the phylogeny are two lineages, A and B; where, A is likely ancestral, as it shares two distinguishing variants with the closest known bat viruses. Further linage designations link new variants to geographically distinct populations, B.1 in the Italian outbreak, then other parts of Europe and the world; and, B.1.1 being the major European lineage which was spread throughout the world. However, many of the major lineages are now present in most countries, and recapitulate the global diversity of SARS-CoV-2, indicating that most local epidemics were seeded by a large number of independent introductions of the virus.
The current evolutionary tree of SARS-CoV-2 shows multiple introductions of different variants across the globe, with introductions from distant locations seeding local epidemics, where infections sometimes went unrecognized for several weeks and allowed wider spread11. The tree topology actually indicates that SARS-CoV-2 viruses have not diverged significantly since the beginning of the pandemic11. These results show that, so far, SARS-CoV-2 has evolved through a non-deterministic, noisy process; and, that random genetic drift has played the dominant role in disseminating unique mutations throughout the world11.
There remains an urgent need for a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine as a primary countermeasure to contain and mitigate the spread; and, the virus’s surface S (Spike) protein continues to be an attractive vaccine target,because it plays a key role in mediating virus entry into the cells, and is known to be immunogenic.
Of course, the virus was only recently identified in the human population with a short time frame relative to the adaptive processes that can take years to occur.
But, the most recent findings show us that the SARS-CoV-2 viruses that are currently circulating, constitute a homogeneous viral population, to which the current vaccines available will be sufficient to mitigate the spread.
Soon, SARS-CoV-2 will become just another viral acquaintance during the winter, like a common cold
1 Geoghegan, J. L. & Holmes, E. C. The phylogenomics of evolving virus virulence. Nature Reviews Genetics 19, 756-769, doi:10.1038/s41576-018-0055-5 (2018).
2 Bull, J. J. & Lauring, A. S. Theory and empiricism in virulence evolution. PLoS Pathog 10, e1004387, doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1004387 (2014).
3 Geoghegan, J. L., Senior, A. M., Di Giallonardo, F. & Holmes, E. C. Virological factors that increase the transmissibility of emerging human viruses. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 113, 4170-4175, doi:10.1073/pnas.1521582113 (2016).
4 Kerr, P. J. et al. Next step in the ongoing arms race between myxoma virus and wild rabbits in Australia is a novel disease phenotype. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, 9397-9402, doi:10.1073/pnas.1710336114 (2017).
5 Fraser, C., Hollingsworth, T. D., Chapman, R., de Wolf, F. & Hanage, W. P. Variation in HIV-1 set-point viral load: epidemiological analysis and an evolutionary hypothesis. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104, 17441-17446, doi:10.1073/pnas.0708559104 (2007).
6 de Roode, J. C. et al. Virulence and competitive ability in genetically diverse malaria infections. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102, 7624-7628, doi:10.1073/pnas.0500078102 (2005).
7 Di Giallonardo, F. & Holmes, E. C. Viral biocontrol: grand experiments in disease emergence and evolution. Trends Microbiol 23, 83-90, doi:10.1016/j.tim.2014.10.004 (2015).
8 Stern, A. et al. The Evolutionary Pathway to Virulence of an RNA Virus. Cell 169, 35-46.e19, doi:10.1016/j.cell.2017.03.013 (2017).
9 Sjaarda, C. P. et al. Phylogenomics reveals viral sources, transmission, and potential superinfection in early-stage COVID-19 patients in Ontario, Canada. Scientific Reports 11, 3697, doi:10.1038/s41598-021-83355-1 (2021).
10 da Silva Filipe, A. et al. Genomic epidemiology reveals multiple introductions of SARS-CoV-2 from mainland Europe into Scotland. Nat Microbiol 6, 112-122, doi:10.1038/s41564-020-00838-z (2021).
11 Dearlove, B. et al. A SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidate would likely match all currently circulating strains. bioRxiv, 2020.2004.2027.064774, doi:10.1101/2020.04.27.064774 (2020).


At its core is the injunction found in the Acts of the Apostles (4:32) that the community must live in harmony, "being of one mind and heart on the way to God."
From this precept, the Rule goes on to specify the ways in which this ideal of mutual live is to be fostered and expressed. Above all, this unity of heart and mind entails a truly common ownership of all one's possessions. Just as the early Christians practised this commonality of goods, so the followers of Augustine must do likewise. At the same time, individuals do not receive equality of treatment in Augustine's Rule, since the needs of each person are different.
It is clear that the Rule was written for vastly diverse groups of people - rich, poor, healthy, sick, those from "high" and "low" society, educated and uneducated. But Augustine gives no group priority. Each member is to care for and mutually respect the others of the community.
They are to flee sinful temptations of all kinds, especially those of pride; they are to correct each other openly according to the injunctions of the gospel (Mt 18:15-17) as an expression of their mutual love; they are to respect and obey the legitimate authority, from love, not fear; they are to serve and forgive one another. Those who do not forgive other community members with all their hearts have no place in the monastery even if they are not expelled. Even cleanliness of body and one's clothes are expressions of mutual love in the community.
The community must pray together, since it is through prayer, as well as through its life of mutual love, that the community expresses its adoration and praise, as well as its thanks to God. The precise nature and times of this prayer Augustine leave to the custom of the local Church, although it is clear from his other writings that the community celebrates daily Eucharist with the local Church.
The Rule concludes with the exhortation that it be read once a week. As Augustine says, it should be used as a mirror in which community members may perceive in what ways they have neglected their calling to seek God together in mutual love.
The full text of the Rule of St Augustine. http://midwestaugustinians.org/roots-of-augustinian-spirituality


By Conor Mihell
To say Concord, Mass., resident P.G. Downes (1909-1959) was ahead of his time is an understatement. Between 1936 and 1947, the Harvard-educated schoolteacher spent his summers exploring the then-unmapped reaches of the Canadian subarctic, sensitively documenting the plight of fading aboriginal cultures and creating detailed maps of the waterways he followed by wood and canvas canoe. Downes made a habit of traveling north and spending his summers in exotically named locales like Ungava, Great Slave Lake, and Reindeer Lake. Once he arrived in the north, Downes would secure an outfit—a canoe, grubstake and camping gear—rustle up a companion or travel solo into the unknown.
In Sleeping Island, Downes documents his 1939 journey from the tiny northern Manitoba village of Brochet to a remote fur trading post on Windy Lake in the northern territory of Nunavut with an ace woodsman, canoeist and trapper simply known as John. The pair set off in a big cedar-canvas canoe, provisioned lightly with tea, flour and a too small supply of tobacco, expecting to live off the land. Even today, with the aid of modern GPS technology, accurate maps, lightweight gear and resilient canoes, the route they followed remains amongst the toughest in Canada. Yet despite the challenges of route-finding and navigating unknown sets of rapids, Downes still managed to keep a detailed journal, which evolved into his 1943 travelogue—a cult classic amongst canoe trippers.
Ottawa-area canoeists and history enthusiasts Patrick McGahern and Hugh Stewart started a publishing label to reproduce classic outdoors literature like Downes’. The first title in their Forgotten Northern Classics series is a “new and improved edition” of Sleeping Island, edited by retired University of New Brunswick professor R.H. Cockburn, who has spent over 30 years researching Downes’ travels.
“Here are vivid descriptions of trial and error on rivers and lakes,” writes Cockburn in the introduction, “of poling and paddling, of sweat-drenched portaging; columns of smoke rise from bush fires on the horizon, across miles of water; deserted trading posts decay along abandoned trade routes; canoeloads of Chipewyans appear suddenly, down from the Barrens; foul weather and windbound camps are followed by days of surpassing beauty; depression and exhilaration, companionship and separation, are tellingly conveyed.”
Besides engaging readers with the hardships of the trail, Downes recorded the stories of the landscape and its people. Cockburn ranks Sleeping Island’s digressions into ethnography, cartography and geology amongst Downes’ greatest strengths. Indeed, Downes was ahead of his time in his insightful and literary depiction of the fading traditions of aboriginal life. Among his other accomplishments was an unpublished dictionary of the native Cree and Chipewyan languages and extensive research into the aboriginal dreamscape that garnered him the Cree moniker, “The-man-who-talkes-about-dreams”.
McGahern Stewart Publishing’s 2011 edition of Sleeping Island includes a new epilogue and new photographs. Though the price of $34.95 (Canadian) is steep for a soft cover, the book should be considered essential reading for anyone who has ever dreamed about experiencing the freedom and tribulations of canoe travel in the Canadian North. What’s more, it’s good to support an upstart publishing house whose next title, Distant Summers, will compile more of Downes’ journals from his travels from 1936 to 1947.
Just before his death in 1959, Downes summed up his travels in the Canadian north: “I liked that life and I liked the people there. I saw a lot of it just as the old north was vanishing… I remember one time after a dreadful trip, camping on the edge of the tree line, again it was one of those indescribable smoky, bright-hazy days one sometimes gets in the high latitudes. I had hit the caribou migration and there was lots of meat; it was a curious spot, for all the horizon seemed to fall away from where I squatted, and I said to myself: Well, I suppose I shall never be so happy again.”


In Ireland, at least as early as the 17th century – 19th century, a unit of length usually taken to = 2 feet, but also reported at 27, 21 and 14 inches, the last probably wrong. It belongs to the cubit class of units. Bandle is an anglicized form of the Irish bannlám (from bann, measure + lám, arm). Also spelled bannlámh, banlámh. The Irish unit is older than the anglicized form.
In the phrase “bandle linen”, the qualifier “bandle” does indicate the cloth was narrow, but the cloth was not necessarily a bandle wide.
Diarmuid Ó Muirithe.
Dictionary of Anglo-Irish.
Portland (OR): Four Courts Press, 1996(?).
Glossographia, or, A dictionary interpreting the hard words of whatsoever language...
London : Printed by Tho. Newcomb and are to be sold by Tho. Flesher, 1681.
The Cloathing is a narrow sort of Frieze, of about twenty Inches broad, whereof two foot, call'd a Bandle is worth from 3d. halfpeny to 18d. Of this seventeen Bandles make a Mans Suit, and twelve make a Cloak. According to which numbers and proportions and the number of people who wear this Stuff, it seems that near thrice as much Wooll is spent in Ireland as exported; whereas others have thought quite contrary, that is that the exported Wooll is triple in quantity to what is spent at home.
Sir William Petty.
The Political Anatomy of Ireland, with the establishment for that kingdom when the late...
London: D. Brown and W. Rogers, 1691. (written in 1672)
Bannla'mh, a cubit, a bandle. bannlamh èàduigh, a bandle of cloth.
Focaloir Gaoidhilge-sax-Bhèarla, or, An Irish-English Dictionary.
Paris: Printed by Nicolas-Fráncis Valleyre, for the Author, 1768.
The yard and the bandle differ in many places, according as the rule, by which they measure, varies; the yard ought to be thirty-six inches, and the bandle twenty-seven inches long. In the county of Galway the bandle is thirty inches, and in Limerick only twenty-one inches, in some parts of Kilkenny twenty-four inches.
Statistical Survey of the County of Clare, with observations on the means of improvement etc..
27 inches = a Bandle.
An Account of Ireland, statistical and political.
London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1812.
Volume 2, page 202. Wakefield appears to indicate that the information came from Hely Dutton.
Some 300 looms were engaged in broadloom manufacture, and a further 500 in the production of bandle linen of twelve to thirteen inches wide.²¹
21. Sir T. Radcliff, A Report on the Agriculture and Livestock of Co. Kerry (Dublin, 1814), 169.
S. H. Cousens.
The regional variation in emigration from Ireland between 1821 and 1841.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, No. 37 (Dec. 1965).
Another kind of linen is also made here, called Bandle linen, from being of the width of fourteen inches, which makes the measure called a bandle: both sorts were in much demand, as well for domestic consumption as for the army and navy.
A Topographical Dictionary of Ireland, comprising the several counties, cities, boroughs, corporate, market, and...
London: Samuel Lewis, 1837.
Volume 2, page 46, under the entry “Kerry”.
Sorry. No information on contributors is available for this page.
Copyright © 2000 Sizes, Inc. All rights reserved.
Last revised: 20 April 2010.


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(MLCTS: ta.nangsayi. tuing:)
|Ethnicities||Bamar, Rakhine, Mon, Shan,Burmese-Thai, Kayin, Salone, Malay|
Tanintharyi Division (Burmese: တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း; (Thai:ตะนาวศรี); formerly, Tenasserim Division), is an administrative division of Myanmar, covering the long narrow southern part of the country on the Kra Isthmus. It borders the Andaman Sea to the west and Thailand to the east. To the north is the Mon State. The capital of the division is Dawei (Tavoy). Other important cities are Myeik (Mergui) and Kawthaung. The division covers an area of 43,328 km², and had an estimated population of 1.36 million in 2000. The ISO 3166-2 code for the division is MM-05.
Tanintharyi Division historically included the entire Tanintharyi peninsula--today's Tanintharyi Division, Mon State and southern Kayin State. The peninsula region was part of Thaton-based Mon kingdoms before 1057 and part of King Anawrahta's Pagan Empire after 1057. Soon after the fall of Pagan in 1287, the area fell to the ascendant Thai kingdom of Sukhothai, and later its successor Ayutthaya kingdom. The region's northernmost border was around the Thanlwin (Salween) river near today's Mawlamyaing (Moulmein).
The region reverted back to Burmese fold in 1564 when King Bayinnaung of Taungoo Dynasty conquered all of Siam. A resurgent Ayutthaya kingdom reclaimed the southern half of Tanintharyi in 1593 and the entire peninsula in 1599. In 1614, King Anaukpetlun recovered the upper half of the coast to Dawei but failed to capture the rest. King Alaungpaya of Konbaung Dynasty recovered the entire region for the Burmese in 1758. The Burmese used Tanintharyi as a forward base to launch several invasions of Siam in the next three decades. The Siamese tried to retake Tanintharyi in 1792 but the Burmese repelled the attacks.
The British gained the region after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826). Soon after the war ended, the British and the Siamese signed a boundary demarcation treaty on 20 June 1826, and another one in 1868. Mawlamyaing (Moulmein) became the first capital of British Burma. The British seized all of Lower Burma after the Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852, and moved the capital to Yangon (Rangoon). After 1852, Tanintharyi Division consisted the entire southeastern Myanmar, including today's Mon State, Kayin State, and Taungoo District, in Bago Division. Mawlamyaing was the capital of Tanintharyi.
Upon independence from Britain in 1948, the northeastern districts of Tanintharyi were placed into the newly created Karen State. In 1974, the northern part of remaining Tanintharyi was carved out to create Mon State. With Mawlamyaing now inside Mon State, the capital of Tanintharyi Division was moved to Dawei. In 1989 the division's English spelling was officially changed to Tanintharyi.
Educational opportunities in Myanmar are extremely limited outside the main cities of Yangon and Mandalay. According to official statistics, less than 10% of primary school students in the division reach high school.
All universities and colleges are located in Dawei and Myeik. Until recently, Dawei University was the only four-year university in the state.
The general state of health care in Myanmar is poor. The military government spends anywhere from 0.5% to 3% of the country's GDP on health care, consistently ranking among the lowest in the world. Although health care is nominally free, in reality, patients have to pay for medicine and treatment, even in public clinics and hospitals. Public hospitals lack many of the basic facilities and equipment. Moreover, the health care infrastructure outside of Yangon and Mandalay is extremely poor. In 2003, the entire Tanintharyi Division had less fewer hospital beds than the Yangon General Hospital. The following is a summary of the public health care system.
|2002-2003||# Hospitals||# Beds|
|General hospitals with specialist services||2||400|
- ^ "Union of Myanmar". City Population. http://www.citypopulation.de/Myanmar.html. Retrieved 2008-12-25.
- ^ a b International Boundary Study: Burma-Thailand Boundary. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State. 1966-02-01. http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS063.pdf.
- ^ Helen James (2004). Keat Gin Ooi. ed. Southeast Asia: a historical encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor. ABC-CLIO. p. 302.
- ^ Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur P. Phayre (1967). History of Burma (2 ed.). London: Sunil Gupta. p. 219–220.
- ^ a b "Myanmar Divisions". Statoids. http://www.statoids.com/umm.html. Retrieved 2009-04-10.
- ^ "Education statistics by level and by State and Division". Myanmar Central Statistical Organization. http://www.etrademyanmar.com/STATS/s1701.htm. Retrieved 2009-04-09.
- ^ "PPI: Almost Half of All World Health Spending is in the United States". 2007-01-17. http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=900003&contentID=254167.
- ^ Yasmin Anwar (2007-06-28). 06.28.2007 "Burma junta faulted for rampant diseases". UC Berkeley News. http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2007/06/28_Burma.shtml 06.28.2007.
- ^ "Hospitals and Dispensaries by State and Division". Myanmar Central Statistical Organization. http://www.etrademyanmar.com/STATS/s0413.htm. Retrieved 2009-04-11.


PERRYVILLE, Alaska — A powerful earthquake that struck just off Alaska's southern coast caused prolonged shaking and prompted tsunami warnings that sent people scrambling for shelters.
Residents reported only minor damage, but officials said that could change after sunrise and people get a better look.
The National Tsunami Warning Center canceled the warnings early Thursday when the biggest wave, of just over a half foot, was recorded in Old Harbor. A tsunami warning that had also been issued for Hawaii was also canceled, and officials said there was no threat to Guam, American Samoa or the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
The warning for Alaska covered nearly a 1,000-mile stretch from Prince William Sound to Samalga Island, Alaska, near the end of the Aleutian Islands.
The U.S. Geological Survey said the quake was magnitude 8.2 and hit 56 miles east southeast of Perryville, Alaska, at about 8:15 p.m. Wednesday. The quake was about 29 miles below the surface of the ocean, according to USGS.
Patrick Mayer, the superintendent of schools for the Aleutians East Borough, was sitting in his kitchen in the community of Sand Point when shaking from the quake started.
"It started to go and just didn't stop," Mayer told the Anchorage Daily News. "It went on for a long time and there were several aftershocks, too. The pantry is empty all over the floor, the fridge is empty all over the floor."
It started to go and just didn't stop.
On the Kenai Peninsula, a steady stream of cars was seen evacuating the Homer Spit, a jut of land extending nearly 5 miles into Kachemak Bay, a draw for tourists and fishermen.
In King Cove, up to 400 people took shelter in the school gym.
"We're used to this. This is pretty normal for this area to get these kind of quakes, and when the tsunami sirens go off, it's just something we do," school principal Paul Barker told the Anchorage newspaper. "It's not something you ever get used to, but it's part of the job living here and being part of the community."
Large earthquakes in Alaska are common. Last night's quake was on the same subduction zone that hosted the 2nd largest eq (M9.2) recorded on modern instrumentation in March 1964. If you haven't seen it yet, check out the story about the 1964 earthquake. https://t.co/CESiBrtFC0— USGS Earthquakes (@USGS_Quakes) July 29, 2021
Several other earthquakes, some with preliminary magnitudes of 6.2 and 5.6, occurred in the same area within hours of the first one, the U.S. Geological Survey reported.


“The use of religious imagery in The House of Bernarda Alba and Chronicle of a Death Foretold”
Both The House of
Bernarda Alba and Chronicle of a Death Foretold, set in rural
The circumstances of Adela’s life and death in The House of Bernarda Alba hold many Christ-like connotations and hence many criticisms of her bigoted society. Adela merely wished to be able to live freely; to not “waste away and grow old in [her] rooms,” yet in the end, she found that “the whole town [had turned]” against her: she was “persecuted by people who claim[ed] to be decent,” much like how Christ was driven away from his hometown for standing by his identity. The phrase “claim[ed] to be decent” is laden with irony, as the persecution of a Christ-like innocent like Adela is certainly no “decent” thing to do, therefore highlighting the defects in the system. Adela’s resemblance to Christ is further accentuated when she claims that she will “put on a crown of thorns,” a potent symbol of his last sufferings which brings with it a strong sense of martyrdom. Through this, Lorca portrays Adela as the ultimate ‘hero’ that remains steadfast to her true self, even unto her tragically fatal end. The religious imagery surrounding her death reveals how Adela, and hence anyone possessing the same noble, vibrant spirit that Lorca believed she had, could find no place in the oppressive society of that time.
This pre-Spanish Civil War society is further criticised by subtle predictions of Adela’s death, which may have been used to convey the unrest brewing prior to the Civil War that broke out soon after the play’s publication. Poncia, the supposedly loyal maid who in actuality wishes to “spit [on Bernarda] for a whole year” astutely sees that “there’s a storm…in every room” and predicts that “the day it bursts, [they’ll] all be swept away!” This could tentatively be seen as a reference to the Biblical Flood, which swept away all the World’s evil, and could be a foreshadowing of the flood of the Civil War, which aimed, like Poncia’s ‘prophesy,’ to sweep away the conservative oppression that Bernarda represented – something that Lorca, being a Liberal Activist, would have seen as the true evil in the World.
Similarly, Marquez uses
the Christ-like death of Santiago Nasar in Chronicle of a Death Foretold to
express like criticisms of his own society, though with a different focus in
mind. While Lorca condemned his society’s constraints, Marquez’s imagery
instead censures the dogmatic sense of honour that perpetrated
Marquez clearly uses
this portrayal of
Much of the other
‘religious’ imagery in The House of Bernarda Alba surrounds the women in it and
helps to convey their hidden, more vicious natures. One can primarily see this
in Bernarda Alba’s hypocritical self-righteousness: upon hearing of her
daughter, Adela’s, wanton behaviour, she cries out, “how poor I am, with no
bolt of lightning between my fingers!” Bolts of lightning have symbolised
punishments of not only the Christian God, but numerous pagan gods and
goddesses as well, and in this metaphor, Bernarda grieves the loss of her once
god-like power. The image deifies her, yet the people she wants to strike are
her own daughters, who only wish to be free of her oppressive restraint. Lorca
has specifically chosen to use the hypocrisy of religious imagery throughout
the play because religion was the foundation of the peoples’ way of life in
Correspondingly, much of the religious imagery in Chronicle of a Death Foretold also revolves around its women: there are many hypocritical allusions to saint-like, Biblical characters, which serve to reveal the co-existence of opposites in their society. Perhaps the best illustration of this is in the descriptions of Maria Alejandrina Cervantes, famed brothel owner of the town. In Chronicle, we are first introduced to her when the author relates his recovery “from the wedding revels in [her] apostolic lap” after having spent a night of debauchery in her “house of mercies.” The reverential use of “apostolic,” a description often found in relation to either the Pope or Christ’s own 12 apostles, gives Maria the image of a deified saint. In her “house of mercies,” a depiction of her brothel that brings to mind a convent dedicated to helping the poor and unfortunate, she helps the author “recover,” much akin to redemption in the lap of God.
Yet the irony of this portrayal is clear when we realise that the ‘help’ she offers is in fact her sexual services, an act that would have been forbidden by the Catholic Church, which dominated Colombian society in the 1950s. Marquez contrasts this with how Luisa Santiaga condones two girls who have “been raised to suffer” as “any man will be happy with them” when they were joined in holy matrimony. Conversely, however, Marquez uses this comparison more as a celebration of the divergent sides of his culture than to attack his society’s system. It accentuates the Magic Realism of his novel as these irreconcilable opposites co-exist peacefully. This also highlights the impossibility of truth: just as the author could not “put the broken mirror of memory back from so many scattered shards,” Marquez uses the hypocrisy of his religious references to show that it is impossible to determine the true nature of society in general.
Although both Lorca and Marquez adeptly integrate religious imagery in their works to convey their varying views on society, the strength of their views deviate. Lorca provides us with a definite criticism of his society’s machinery, but Marquez, although at times critical, offers us more a reflection of his society’s state than a condemnation of everything in it. Nevertheless, the one thing both authors seem to agree on is that being true to one’s own ideals is what life should be about.
Lorca, Federico Garcia., The House of
Bernarda Alba and Other Plays. translated by Michael Dewell and Carmen
Marquez, Gabriel Garcia., Chronicle of a
Death Foretold. translated by Gregory Rabassa.